index,statute,fact_pattern,original_task_answer,original_task_gold_rationales,original_task_silver_rationales,ambiguity_exists,level_of_ambiguity,reason_for_ambiguity,additional_notes 0,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","4. The applicant was born in 1983 and at the time of lodging his application he was serving his prison sentence in Bolu F-type prison. 5. On 10 December 2007 the applicant wrote a letter to a member of parliament, in which he had praised the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan by using ""Kürt Halk Önderi"", meaning the leader of Kurdish people. 6. Pursuant to the Regulations on the administration of penitentiary institutions and the execution of sentences, the applicant was found guilty of breaching prison order by the Kocaeli F- type Prison Disciplinary Board (referred hereafter as ""the Board"") and on 24 December 2007 the applicant was sentenced to 13 days' solitary confinement, on account of his statements in the above mentioned letter. 7. On 17 January 2008 the Kocaeli Enforcement Judge rejected the applicant's objection. 8. On 14 February 2008 the Kocaeli Assize Court upheld the judgment of 17 January 2008.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"The applicant has a right to free expression as displayed in the letter. However, one could argue that the letter threatens interests of a democratic society through interfering with the reputation of others, as the applicant refers to an imprisoned leader as the leader.", 1,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","4. The applicant was born in 1974 and at the time of lodging his application he was serving his prison sentence in the Bolu F-type prison. 5. On 25 January 2008 the applicant wrote a letter to the Ministry of Justice, in which he had praised the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan by using the honorific ""sayın"", meaning esteemed. 6. Pursuant to the Regulations on the administration of penitentiary institutions and the execution of sentences, the applicant was found guilty of breaching a prison order by the Bolu F-type Prison Disciplinary Board (referred hereafter as ""the board""). 7. On 1 February 2008 the applicant was sentenced to 11 days' solitary confinement on the orders of the Board, on account of his statements in the above-mentioned letter. 8. On 26 February 2008 the Bolu Enforcement Judge rejected the applicant's objection. 9. On 11 March 2008 the Bolu Assize Court upheld the judgment of 26 February 2008.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While some may argue the honorific ""esteemed"" rises to the level of threatening democratic interests, it seems clear that this is the applicant's personal opinion.", 2,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","4. The applicant was born in 1960 and at the time of lodging his application he was serving his prison sentence in the Bolu F-type prison. 5. On 3 December 2007 the applicant wrote a letter to the Ministry of Justice, in which he had praised the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan by using the honorific ""sayın"", meaning esteemed. 6. Pursuant to the Regulations on the administration of penitentiary institutions and the execution of sentences, the applicant was found guilty of breaching prison order by the Bolu F- type Prison Disciplinary Board (referred hereafter as ""the Board""). 7. On 12 December 2007 the applicant was sentenced to 11 days' solitary confinement on the orders of the Board, on account of his statements in the above mentioned letter. 8. On 25 December 2007 the Bolu Enforcement Judge rejected the applicant`s objection. 9. On 15 January 2008 the Bolu Assize Court upheld the judgment of 25 December 2007.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While some may argue the honorific ""esteemed"" rises to the level of threatening democratic interests, it seems clear that this is the applicant's personal opinion. The protest of visits and telephone calls does not seem to rise to the level of threatening democratic interests either.", 3,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","4. The applicant was born in 1963 and at the time of lodging his application he was serving his prison sentence in the Bolu F-type prison. 5. On 3 December 2007 the applicant wrote a letter to the Ministry of Justice, in which he had praised the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan by using the honorific ""sayın"", meaning esteemed. 6. Pursuant to the Regulations on the administration of penitentiary institutions and the execution of sentences, the applicant was found guilty of breaching prison order by the Bolu F- type Prison Disciplinary Board (referred hereafter as ""the Board""). 7. On 12 December 2007 the applicant was sentenced to 11 days' solitary confinement on the orders of the Board, on account of his statements in the above mentioned letter. 8. On 25 December 2007 the Bolu Enforcement Judge rejected the applicant's objection. 9. On 15 January 2008 the Bolu Assize Court upheld the judgment of 25 December 2007.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While some may argue the honorific ""esteemed"" rises to the level of threatening democratic interests, it seems clear that this is the applicant's personal opinion.", 4,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","4. The applicants were born in 1967, 1965 and 1972 respectively and at the time of lodging their applications they were serving their prison sentences in the Muş E-type prison. 5. On 6 and 7 March 2006 each applicant sent a letter to the Ministry of Justice, referring to the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, by using the honorific ""sayın"", meaning esteemed. 6. Pursuant to the Regulations on the administration of penitentiary institutions and the execution of sentences, the applicants were found guilty of breaching prison order by the Erzurum H- type Prison Disciplinary Board (referred hereafter as ""the Board""). 7. On 5 April 2006 the applicants were each sentenced to 12 days' solitary confinement on the orders of the Board, on account of the statements in the above mentioned letters. 8. On 17 April 2006 the Erzurum Enforcement Judge rejected the applicants' objections. 9. On 30 June 2006 the Erzurum Assize Court upheld the judgment of 17 April 2006. 10. Furthermore, on 4 July 2005 a disciplinary sanction was imposed on the first applicant, as he avoided visits and telephone calls to protest against the detention conditions of Öcalan. He was accordingly banned from receiving visitors for 2 months. On 21 October 2005 and 14 November 2005, respectively, the Erzurum Enforcement Court and the Erzurum Assize Court rejected the first applicant's appeal requests.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While some may argue the honorific ""esteemed"" rises to the level of threatening democratic interests, it seems clear that this is the applicants' personal opinion.", 5,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","5. The applicants, whose names are listed in the appendix, are Turkish nationals. 6. On 17 and 18 July 2008, each of the applicants sent a letter to the Halfeti (Şanlıurfa) public prosecutor`s office which contained the following passage: ""If using the word of ""sayın"" (esteemed) is an offense, then I also say ""Sayın Abdullah Öcalan"", I commit this offense and denounce myself."" 7. On 19 September 2008, the public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Halfeti Magistrates' Court in Criminal Matters against the applicants. They were charged with praising an offence and offender, prescribed by Article 215 of the Criminal Code (Law no. 5237), on account of their statements in the above mentioned letters. 8. On 9 March 2009 the Halfeti Magistrates' Court in Criminal Matters found the applicants guilty of praising the imprisoned leader of the PKK, an illegal armed organisation, on account of their statements in the aforementioned letters and accordingly, sentenced them each to two months and fifteen days' imprisonment. In accordance with Article 50 of the Criminal Code, this prison sentence was commuted to a fine of 1,500 Turkish Liras (TRY). 9. The applicants appealed against this judgment. On 20 June 2012 the Court of Cassation, holding that the amount of the fine that had been imposed on the applicants did not attain the minimum requisite level, dismissed the appeal request.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"The applicant has a right to free expression as displayed in the letter. However, one could argue that the letter threatens interests of a democratic society through welcoming and explicitly declaring themselves as committing a crime. ", 6,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","4. The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Adıyaman. 5. On 21 March 2007 the applicant participated in the Newroz (Kurdish New Year) celebrations held in Malatya. 6. On an unspecified date the Malatya public prosecutor filed an indictment charging the applicant and twenty other people with disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). The public prosecutor claimed that the applicant had waved a green, yellow and red flag symbolising the PKK. 7. On 6 March 2008 the Malatya Assize Court convicted all of the accused as charged, including the applicant. On the basis of evidence in the case file, the court found it established that one of the accused, Ms N.K., had made a press statement, and the other accused, including the applicant, had chanted slogans in favour of the PKK and its leader. The court also noted that the accused had waved the so-called flag of the PKK. The applicant was sentenced to ten months' imprisonment. 8. On 31 May 2011 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 6 March 2008. 9. On 21 December 2011 the applicant started serving his prison sentence. 10. On 12 July 2012 the Malatya Assize Court ordered the applicant's release from prison in accordance with Law no. 6352, which had entered into force on 5 July 2012 and had amended certain provisions of Law no. 3713. 11. On 12 December 2012 the Malatya Assize Court decided to suspend the execution of the applicant's prison sentence in accordance with provisional section 1 of Law no. 6352. The suspension was for a period of three years, on the condition that he did not commit a terrorism-related offence during that period.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While some may argue the flag-waving and slogan-chanting rises to the level of threatening democratic interests through interfering with the reputation of others, it seems clear that this is the applicant's personal opinion.", 7,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","5. The applicants were born in 1957 and 1981 and live in Diyarbakır and Adana respectively. 6. On 17 August 2006 the Adana public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with Adana Magistrate's Court charging the applicants and five other persons with praising an offence and an offender under Article 215 of the Criminal Code. The public prosecutor alleged that the applicants had signed a petition in September 2005 which had been drafted in order to be sent to several institutions. The petition read as follows: ""As a person from Kurdistan, I consider and accept Mr/Esteemed Abdullah Öcalan of Kurdistan as a political actor.""[1] 7. On 19 January 2007 the Adana Magistrate's Court decided that it lacked jurisdiction in the case due to the possibility of application of section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) proscribing disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation. The court then sent the file to Adana Assize Court. 8. On 24 March 2008 the Adana Assize Court convicted the applicants of disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation under section 7(2) of Law No. 3713 and sentenced them each to two years' imprisonment. In its judgment, the first-instance court found it established that the above-mentioned petition had been prepared for the purpose of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK and its leader and that by signing that petition the applicants had committed the offence proscribed in section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. 9. On 13 July 2011 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 24 March 2008. On 24 August 2011 the Court of Cassation's judgment was deposited with the first instance court's registry. 10. On an unspecified date the second applicant started serving his prison sentence. 11. On 19 October 2012 the Adana Assize Court decided to suspend the execution of the applicants' prison sentence in accordance with Law no. 6352 which had entered into force on 5 July 2012 and which had amended certain provisions of Law no. 3713. The suspension was for a period of three years, on condition that they did not commit an offence through the press, media or other methods of expressing ideas and opinions.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"The applicant has a right to free expression as displayed in the petition. However, one could argue that the letter threatens interests of a democratic society through interfering with the reputation of others, as the applicant accepts the leader of a terrorist organization as their political actor. ", 8,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","5. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Diyarbakır. 6. On 30 September 2007 a reading out of a press statement and a march were held in Diyarbakır in order to protest about the conditions of detention and alleged poisoning of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), an illegal armed organisation. The protesters gathered in front of the building of the Diyarbakır branch of the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi) (DTP) where a press statement was read out. They then marched. The applicant, as a member of the DTP, participated in the gathering and the ensuing march. According to a police report dated 9 October 2007, the applicant was seen while carrying a banner which read ""İnsanlık zehirleniyor"" (""The humanity is being poisoned"") and applauding together with other demonstrators in the police video footage. 7. On 9 October 2007 the applicant was taken into police custody. On the same day she was detained on remand. 8. On 17 October 2007 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor charged the applicant with disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) on account of the content of the banner she had carried during the demonstration of 30 September 2007. 9. On 4 December 2007 the applicant was released pending trial. 10. On 18 March 2008 the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged. The court found it established, on the basis of an expert report on the police video footage, that the applicant had been together with other persons who had chanted the slogan ""Be Serok Jiyan Nabe"" (""There is no life without the leader"") and that she had carried a banner which read ""The humanity is being poisoned"". The applicant was sentenced to ten months' imprisonment. 11. On 9 January 2012 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 18 March 2008. 12. On an unspecified date the applicant started serving her prison sentence. On 17 July 2012, upon the applicant's request, the Diyarbakır Assize Court ordered her release from prison, in accordance with Law no. 6352 which had entered into force on 5 July 2012 and which had amended certain provisions of Law no. 3713.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. On 30 September 2007 a reading out of a press statement and a march were held in Diyarbakır in order to protest about the conditions of detention and alleged poisoning of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), an illegal armed organisation. The protesters gathered in front of the building of the Diyarbakır branch of the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi) (DTP) where a press statement was read out. They then marched. The applicant, as a member of the DTP, participated in the gathering and the ensuing march. According to a police report dated 9 October 2007, the applicant was seen while carrying a banner which read ""İnsanlık zehirleniyor"" (""The humanity is being poisoned"") and applauding together with other demonstrators in the police video footage. 10. On 18 March 2008 the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged. The court found it established, on the basis of an expert report on the police video footage, that the applicant had been together with other persons who had chanted the slogan ""Be Serok Jiyan Nabe"" (""There is no life without the leader"") and that she had carried a banner which read ""The humanity is being poisoned"". The applicant was sentenced to ten months' imprisonment.",TRUE,1,"While some may argue the protesting rises to the level of threatening democratic interests through interfering with the reputation of others, the context of this being a protest and the applicant's membership with the protesting party makes it seem clear that this is the applicant's personal opinion.", 9,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","5. The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Tunceli. 6. On 5 April 2007 the applicant attended a concert performed by a band called ""Grup Yorum"" in the Hozat district of Tunceli. 7. On 17 October 2007 the Malatya public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Malatya Assize Court, charging the applicant with disseminating propaganda in favour of the DHKP/C (Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front), an illegal armed organisation, under section 7 (2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). The public prosecutor noted that the applicant had chanted the following slogans during the concert: ""Mahir, Hüseyin, Ulaş; Fight until emancipation""[1] (""Mahir, Hüseyin, Ulaş; Kurtuluşa kadar savaş""); ""Martyrs of the revolution are immortal"" (""Devrim şehitleri ölümsüzdür""); ""Revolutionary prisoners are our honour"" (""Devrimci tutsaklar onurumuzdur""); and ""Victory on mountains, emancipation at the front; long live victory, long live resistance"" (""Dağlarda zafer, cephede kurtuluş; yaşasın zafer, yaşasın direniş""). 8. During the investigation and the proceedings against him, the applicant stated that he had attended the concert in question and chanted the slogans ""Music shall not stop, dance shall continue"" (""Türküler susmaz , halaylar sürer"") and ""We will not be defeated by oppression"" (""Baskılar bizi yıldıramaz""). He also noted that he had been on the concert's organising committee. 9. On 6 March 2008 the Malatya Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to ten months' imprisonment. In its judgment, on the basis of a police report on a police video recording of the concert of 5 April 2007, the indictment, the applicant's defence submissions, and the public prosecutor's observations on the merits of the case, the court considered it established that the applicant had chanted the slogans noted in the indictment. The court considered that the concert, for which legal and administrative authorisation had been obtained, had become a propaganda activity in favour of the DHKP/C, and that the applicant had chanted slogans used by that organisation. The Malatya Assize Court concluded that the applicant had committed the offence of disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation. 10. The applicant appealed. 11. On 4 July 2011 the Court of Cassation upheld the first-instance court's judgment. 12. Between 6 October 2011 and 1 August 2012 the applicant duly served his prison sentence.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. On 17 October 2007 the Malatya public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Malatya Assize Court, charging the applicant with disseminating propaganda in favour of the DHKP/C (Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front), an illegal armed organisation, under section 7 (2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). The public prosecutor noted that the applicant had chanted the following slogans during the concert: ""Mahir, Hüseyin, Ulaş; Fight until emancipation""[1] (""Mahir, Hüseyin, Ulaş; Kurtuluşa kadar savaş""); ""Martyrs of the revolution are immortal"" (""Devrim şehitleri ölümsüzdür""); ""Revolutionary prisoners are our honour"" (""Devrimci tutsaklar onurumuzdur""); and ""Victory on mountains, emancipation at the front; long live victory, long live resistance"" (""Dağlarda zafer, cephede kurtuluş; yaşasın zafer, yaşasın direniş""). 8. During the investigation and the proceedings against him, the applicant stated that he had attended the concert in question and chanted the slogans ""Music shall not stop, dance shall continue"" (""Türküler susmaz , halaylar sürer"") and ""We will not be defeated by oppression"" (""Baskılar bizi yıldıramaz""). He also noted that he had been on the concert's organising committee.",TRUE,2,"The applicant has a right to free expression as displayed during the concert. However, one could argue that this behavior threatens interests of a democratic society through interfering with the rights of other concertgoers who did not expect to attend a protest event.", 10,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","4. The applicants were born in 1987 and 1986 and live in Gümüşhane and Erzincan respectively. 5. On 18 May 2007 the applicants participated in reading out a press statement in commemoration of İbrahim Kaypakkaya, the leader of the TKP/ML[1] (Turkish Communist Party – Marxist/Leninist), who had died in 1973, allegedly under torture in police custody. 6. On 7 January 2008 the Erzurum public prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings against fifteen people, including the applicants, charging them with disseminating propaganda in favour of the TKP/ML, under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). According to the indictment, during the gathering, the second applicant had read out a press declaration containing statements praising the TKP/ML and İbrahim Kaypakkaya, and the following slogans had been chanted by the demonstrators: ""İbrahim is our leader"", ""Our struggle continues and shall continue"", ""İbrahim Kaypakkaya is immortal"", ""Down with the USA"" and ""We will drown fascism in the blood it has shed"". The group had also carried a banner which read ""İbrahim Kaypakkaya is immortal – Partizan""[2]. 7. On 31 March 2009 the Erzurum Assize Court found the applicants guilty as charged and sentenced each of them to ten months' imprisonment pursuant to section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. In its judgment, the assize court held that the applicants had disseminated propaganda in favour of the TKP/ML, given that the second applicant had read out the press statement and the first applicant had chanted slogans. The court based its judgment on a report prepared by an expert regarding a police video-recording of the public gathering in question. 8. Taking into account the applicants' good behaviour during the trial and the fact that they had no previous criminal convictions, the court suspended pronouncement of the applicants' conviction on the condition that they did not commit another intentional offence for a period of five years, under Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hükmün açıklanmasının geri bırakılması). 9. The applicants filed an objection against the decision of 31 March 2009. In their petition, they stated that the first-instance court had erred in interpreting the facts and the law, and they asked to be acquitted of the charges against them. They further stated that their prosecution had constituted a breach of Article 10 of the Convention. 10. On 20 July 2009 the Diyarbakır Assize Court held that the application of Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the case was in line with the domestic law, and rejected the applicants' objection without examining the merits of the case. That decision was served on the applicants on 5 August 2009.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. On 7 January 2008 the Erzurum public prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings against fifteen people, including the applicants, charging them with disseminating propaganda in favour of the TKP/ML, under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). According to the indictment, during the gathering, the second applicant had read out a press declaration containing statements praising the TKP/ML and İbrahim Kaypakkaya, and the following slogans had been chanted by the demonstrators: ""İbrahim is our leader"", ""Our struggle continues and shall continue"", ""İbrahim Kaypakkaya is immortal"", ""Down with the USA"" and ""We will drown fascism in the blood it has shed"". The group had also carried a banner which read ""İbrahim Kaypakkaya is immortal – Partizan""[2].",TRUE,1,"While some may argue the statements rise to the level of threatening democratic interests through interfering with the reputation of others, the context of this being a press reading makes it seem clear that this is the applicant's personal opinion.", 11,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","5. The applicant, who was born in 1948, lives in Corjova, a village under the formal control of Moldovan authorities, but where agents of the self‑proclaimed ""Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic"" (""MRT"", see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, § 90, ECHR 2004‑VII for further details) frequently intervened during the events in question, notably by blocking the participation of the local population in elections held in Moldova. 6. On 3 June 2007 local elections were to be held in Moldova, including in Corjova. The applicant, who is an ambulance driver, submitted his candidature for the position of Mayor of Corjova. 7. On 1 June 2007, at 11 p.m., the applicant's ambulance was stopped by the ""MRT"" road militia and his documents (Moldovan national identity card and driving licence) were taken away from him without any explanation. 8. On 2 June 2007 the applicant went to the ""MRT"" militia station located in Dubăsari and asked for the return of his documents. He was then arrested and placed in a detention cell. A few hours later a person came to his cell and, without presenting himself, asked him about his work and his electoral propaganda. The applicant later found out that the visitor had been a judge and that, following that discussion in the cell, the judge adopted a decision, finding him guilty of the administrative offence of unlawful electoral propaganda and sentencing him to 15 days' administrative detention. 9. The applicant submits that he was not allowed to contact his relatives or to find a lawyer, and was not issued with a copy of the court's decision, which prevented any possibility of lodging an effective appeal against the decision of 2 June 2007. 10. During his detention the applicant was placed in a cell which, according to him was damp and cold. Food was given once a day. When the applicant's relatives, alerted by his absence, contacted the local authorities in order to find out about his fate, they were informed of the applicant's detention. However, their requests to transmit food to him were allegedly rejected. 11. On 17 June 2007 the applicant was released from detention and he was issued with a copy of the decision of 2 June 2007. The time-limit for lodging an appeal had already expired by that time. Upon release, he was allegedly coughing and was diagnosed with chronic acute bronchitis. He also claims that his eyesight worsened considerably. 12. In the meantime, on 6 June 2007, the applicant complained to the Moldovan prosecutor's office of his unlawful detention. Based on this complaint, a criminal investigation was initiated on 12 June 2007, the applicant and witnesses were subsequently heard. Three high-ranking ""MRT"" officers were charged and were declared wanted persons. However, on 4 August 2010 the investigation was suspended due to the fact that the three accused were hiding from it in the ""MRT"".",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,The MRT has clearly acted against the interests of a democratic society in blocking election participation and infringing on the rights of the applicant., 12,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","7. The applicants were born in 1987 and 1985, respectively, and live in the Hozat district of Tunceli. 8. On 5 April 2007 the applicants attended a concert performed by a band called ""Grup Yorum"" in Hozat. During the concert they chanted certain slogans, such as ""Revolutionary prisoners are immortal"" (""Devrimci tutsaklar ölümsüzdür""), ""Revolutionary prisoners are our honour"" (""Devrimci tutsaklar onurumuzdur""). 9. On 17 October 2007 the Malatya public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Malatya Assize Court charging the applicants with disseminating propaganda in favour of the ""DHKP/C"" (Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front), an illegal armed organisation, under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). The public prosecutor noted that the first applicant had chanted the slogan ""Revolutionary prisoners are our honour"" (""Devrimci tutsaklar onurumuzdur"") during the concert. As regards the second applicant, the public prosecutor alleged that he had chanted the following slogans during the same concert: ""Mahir, Hüseyin, Ulaş; Fight until emancipation""[1] (""Mahir, Hüseyin, Ulaş; Kurtuluşa kadar savaş""); ""Martyrs of the revolution are immortal"" (""Devrim şehitleri ölümsüzdür""); ""Revolutionary prisoners are our honour"", ""Victory on mountains, emancipation at the front; long live victory, long live resistance"" (""Dağlarda zafer, cephede kurtuluş; yaşasın zafer, yaşasın direniş""). 11. On 6 March 2008 the Malatya Assize Court convicted the applicants as charged and sentenced them to ten months' imprisonment each. In its judgment, the assize court considered it established, on the basis of a police video recording of the concert of 5 April 2007, a report on the video recording, the indictment, the applicants' defence submissions and the public prosecutor's observations on the merits of the case, that the applicants had chanted the slogans noted in the indictment. The court considered that the concert in question had become a propaganda activity in favour of the DHKP/C and that the applicants had chanted slogans that were used by that organisation. The Malatya Assize Court concluded that the applicants had committed the offence of dissemination of propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation. 12. The applicants appealed. 13. On 4 July 2011 the Court of Cassation upheld the first-instance court's judgment. 14. On 13 and 14 September 2011 the applicants were informed that they had to start serving their prison sentences within ten days. According to the applicants' submissions, which were not contested by the Government, upon receipt of the summons to serve the prison sentences, both applicants duly served them.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"The applicant has a right to free expression as displayed during the concert. However, one could argue that this behavior threatens interests of a democratic society through interfering with the rights of other concertgoers who did not expect to attend a protest event.",edited by me to remove ambiguity in fact pattern 13,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","4. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Adana. 5. At the time of the events giving rise to the application, the applicant was a member of the Socialist Democracy Party (Sosyalist Demokrasi Partisi). 6. On 21 March 2007 the applicant attended the Newroz (Kurdish New Year) celebrations in Adana, where he made a speech on behalf of his political party. According to a report prepared on the same day by the police, in his speech the applicant stated that the military forces should comply with the ceasefire declared by the PKK and that a general amnesty should be declared. He contended that people were being detained for referring to Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, as ""Sayın (Esteemed) Öcalan"" whereas the Prime Minister also referred to him as ""Sayın Öcalan"". The applicant further stated that Abdullah Öcalan should not be kept in isolation in prison and that independent doctors should visit him. He lastly made the following statement: ""Do not fire but talk for resolving the Kurdish issue"". 7. The police report of 21 March 2007 further stated that subsequent to the applicant's speech, songs with Kurdish lyrics were played and some demonstrators waved PKK flags. 8. On 6 April 2007 the Adana public prosecutor asked two experts to prepare a report on the police video recordings of the celebrations of 21 March 2007. According to the report dated 16 April 2007 prepared by two persons, the demonstrators chanted certain slogans and waved flags and posters of Abdullah Öcalan from time to time during the celebrations. 9. On 18 April 2007 the Adana public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Adana Assize Court charging the applicant with membership of the PKK[1] under Articles 220 § 7 and 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code on account of his participation in the demonstration of 21 March 2007 and of the content of his speech. He relied on the police report of 21 March 2007, the police video recordings of the Newroz celebrations and the expert report dated 16 April 2007. 10. On an unspecified date the Adana public prosecutor amended the charges against the applicant and asked the Adana Assize Court to convict him of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). 11. On 24 March 2008 the Adana Assize Court convicted the applicant under the aforementioned provision and sentenced him to ten months' imprisonment. The court considered, on the basis of the police report of 21 March 2007 and the expert report of 16 April 2007, that the applicant's statements had constituted propaganda in favour of the PKK and that the crowd had chanted slogans in favour of the PKK after having listened the applicant's speech. 12. On 19 July 2011 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 24 March 2008. 13. On 11 January 2012 the applicant started serving his prison sentence. On 29 May 2012 the Adana Assize Court granted the applicant early conditional release starting from 3 June 2012.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. The police report of 21 March 2007 further stated that subsequent to the applicant's speech, songs with Kurdish lyrics were played and some demonstrators waved PKK flags. 8. On 6 April 2007 the Adana public prosecutor asked two experts to prepare a report on the police video recordings of the celebrations of 21 March 2007. According to the report dated 16 April 2007 prepared by two persons, the demonstrators chanted certain slogans and waved flags and posters of Abdullah Öcalan from time to time during the celebrations. 11. On 24 March 2008 the Adana Assize Court convicted the applicant under the aforementioned provision and sentenced him to ten months' imprisonment. The court considered, on the basis of the police report of 21 March 2007 and the expert report of 16 April 2007, that the applicant's statements had constituted propaganda in favour of the PKK and that the crowd had chanted slogans in favour of the PKK after having listened the applicant's speech.",TRUE,1,"While some may argue the protesting rises to the level of threatening democratic interests through interfering with the rights of other celebration-goers who did not expect to attend a protest event, the context of this being on behalf of the protesting party, which the applicant is a member of, makes it seem clear that this is the applicant's personal opinion.", 14,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","5. The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in the Kızıltepe district of Mardin. 6. On 30 March 2006 the applicant participated in a march and the reading out of a press statement held by the Party for a Democratic Society (Demokratik Toplum Partisi –""the DTP"") in Kızıltepe. The protesters gathered in front of the building of the Kızıltepe branch of the DTP and walked to the building of the district branch of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), where a press statement was read out. The press statement concerned the clashes that had occurred between demonstrators and the police in Diyarbakır on 29 and 30 March 2006. The protestors then returned to the DTP building. During the march the protesters chanted slogans. The applicant participated in the march and the reading out of the press statement as a member of the DTP. 7. On 8 March 2007 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor filed an indictment charging the applicant and eleven other individuals with disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). The public prosecutor claimed that the applicant had attended the demonstration of 30 March 2006 and chanted the slogan ""Tooth for tooth, blood for blood, we are with you Öcalan"" (""Dişe diş, kana kan, seninleyiz Öcalan""). 8. Within the context of the criminal proceedings initiated following the indictment dated 8 March 2007, an expert who had examined the police video recordings of the public gathering of 30 March 2006 observed that the applicant had acted together with the crowd, but that it could not be established whether he had chanted the above-mentioned slogan since he had covered his mouth and nose. 9. On 22 April 2008 the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted the applicant under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. In its judgment, the court noted that the applicant had accepted that he had participated in the march and the reading out of the press statement, but denied the veracity of the allegation that he had chanted any slogan. The Assize Court found it established that the march and the gathering at which a press statement had been read out on 30 March 2006 had turned into a propaganda event in favour of the PKK and an illegal demonstration, and that the accused, including the applicant, had actively participated in that event. The Assize Court further observed that although, according to the expert report, it could not be established that the applicant had chanted the slogan, on the basis of the photographs in the case file, it was established that he had acted together with the demonstrators. Noting that there were other demonstrators who had covered their mouths and that the police documents showed that the applicant had actively taken part in the demonstration and instructed others to chant slogans, the Assize Court concluded that the applicant had committed the offence of dissemination of propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation. The applicant was sentenced to ten months' imprisonment. 10. On 2 July 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 22 April 2008. 11. On 4 February 2011 the applicant started serving his prison sentence. On 21 June 2011 he was conditionally released.",Ruled as violated by court,,"9. On 22 April 2008 the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted the applicant under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. In its judgment, the court noted that the applicant had accepted that he had participated in the march and the reading out of the press statement, but denied the veracity of the allegation that he had chanted any slogan. The Assize Court found it established that the march and the gathering at which a press statement had been read out on 30 March 2006 had turned into a propaganda event in favour of the PKK and an illegal demonstration, and that the accused, including the applicant, had actively participated in that event. The Assize Court further observed that although, according to the expert report, it could not be established that the applicant had chanted the slogan, on the basis of the photographs in the case file, it was established that he had acted together with the demonstrators. Noting that there were other demonstrators who had covered their mouths and that the police documents showed that the applicant had actively taken part in the demonstration and instructed others to chant slogans, the Assize Court concluded that the applicant had committed the offence of dissemination of propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation. The applicant was sentenced to ten months' imprisonment.",TRUE,1,"While some may argue the protesting rises to the level of threatening democratic interests through interfering with the reputation of others, the context of this being a protest and the applicant's membership with the protesting party makes it seem clear that this is the applicant's personal opinion.", 15,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","6. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in İzmir. 7. On 21 March 2007 the applicant attended celebrations for the festival of Newroz in Buca, a district of the city of İzmir, as one of the moderators. While she was hosting the event, the applicant addressed the crowd in Kurdish and invited them to observe a minute's silence in memory of ""Newroz martyrs"" and martyrs for freedom and democracy. 8. On 10 April 2007 the İzmir Assize Court issued a warrant for the applicant's arrest and a search of her residence. 9. On 11 April 2007 she was arrested at her house. 10. On 12 April 2007 the applicant was brought before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge. In her statements to the public prosecutor and the judge, she maintained that she had attended the Newroz celebrations as a moderator and that she had not shouted any illegal slogans. She stated that she had called for a minute's silence in memory of revolutionary martyrs. The investigating judge remanded the applicant in custody following her questioning. 11. On 24 April 2007 the public prosecutor instituted criminal proceedings before the İzmir Assize Court against the applicant and seven other individuals, charging them under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) with disseminating propaganda in favour of an illegal organisation and, under Article 215 of the Criminal Code, praising a crime or a criminal. Subsequently the criminal proceedings commenced before the İzmir Assize Court. 12. On 13 August 2007, at the end of the first hearing in the trial, the first‑instance court ordered the applicant's release. 13. On 10 September 2008 the İzmir Assize Court convicted the applicant under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 of disseminating propaganda in favour of an illegal organisation and sentenced her to one year's imprisonment. The court observed that the applicant had made a speech in Kurdish, that a man had translated her words into Turkish at the end of her speech, and that according to the translation she had uttered the following sentences: ""Welcome. I wish you a happy Newroz. We thank those who enabled us to be where we are today. I invite you to stand to observe a moment of silence in memory of Newroz martyrs, martyrs for freedom and democracy, and those who enabled us to be where we are today."" 14. The Assize Court further noted that following the applicant's speech the crowd had made a ""V"" sign and that during the speeches made by the other speakers, the crowd had chanted slogans in favour of the PKK and its leader. According to the court, the Newroz celebrations had turned into a propaganda event in favour of the PKK and the speakers had chanted slogans and had incited the crowd to chant slogans. The court also observed that during the celebrations, symbols and banners of the PKK had been carried by the crowd. The court found that the speakers had provoked the crowd and had as a result committed the offence of disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation. The court considered that in view of the applicant's conviction under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 it was unnecessary to deliver a decision in respect of the charges under Article 215 of the Criminal Code. 15. On 21 September 2010 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the İzmir Assize Court. 16. Between 13 January and 22 June 2012 the applicant served her prison sentence. On 22 June 2012 the Diyarbakır Assize Court ordered her conditional release.",Ruled as violated by court,,"13. On 10 September 2008 the İzmir Assize Court convicted the applicant under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 of disseminating propaganda in favour of an illegal organisation and sentenced her to one year's imprisonment. The court observed that the applicant had made a speech in Kurdish, that a man had translated her words into Turkish at the end of her speech, and that according to the translation she had uttered the following sentences: ""Welcome. I wish you a happy Newroz. We thank those who enabled us to be where we are today. I invite you to stand to observe a moment of silence in memory of Newroz martyrs, martyrs for freedom and democracy, and those who enabled us to be where we are today."" 14. The Assize Court further noted that following the applicant's speech the crowd had made a ""V"" sign and that during the speeches made by the other speakers, the crowd had chanted slogans in favour of the PKK and its leader. According to the court, the Newroz celebrations had turned into a propaganda event in favour of the PKK and the speakers had chanted slogans and had incited the crowd to chant slogans. The court also observed that during the celebrations, symbols and banners of the PKK had been carried by the crowd. The court found that the speakers had provoked the crowd and had as a result committed the offence of disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation. The court considered that in view of the applicant's conviction under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 it was unnecessary to deliver a decision in respect of the charges under Article 215 of the Criminal Code.",TRUE,1,"While some, like the court, may argue that this threatens democratic interests through encouraging terrorism against national security, the context of this being a protest and the applicant's membership with the protesting party makes it seem clear that this is the applicant's personal opinion.", 16,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","4. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Istanbul. He was the owner and the editor-in-chief of a publishing house, Aram Basım ve Yayıncılık, which published a periodical, Vesta. 5. In 2004 an article written by Mr M.Ş. entitled ""On the Kurdish Intellectual"" was published in Vesta. 6. On 29 December 2004 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court, charging the applicant with disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). According to the indictment, certain passages of the article depicted the PKK[1] as part of the Kurdish intellectual movement and hence constituted propaganda of the organisation, known for employing violence and terror. 7. On 23 September 2008 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 as he had published the article in question in Vesta. 8. In its judgment, the Istanbul Assize Court cited the following passages from the article: ""In Kurdish history, there have been moments, in certain periods, during which Kurdish literature and culture developed and shone. In those moments, sparks of thought appeared. However, objectively and without renouncing the past, the conditions of the birth of Kurdish intellectualism are based on the 1970s. In earlier periods, there had only been individual and temporary developments not creating traditions. The political nature of the 20th century, the existence and rise of national liberation movements, the emergence of modern currents in Kurdish politics and, most importantly, the creation of a mass movement, served as the basis for the birth of the Kurdish intellectual. This process was manifested in the figure of the PKK. All political movements before the PKK were rebellious, devoid of political depth, tactical unity, stable path and permanence. The ideological and intellectual superficiality of these revolts and their fierce repression led to the loss of existing knowledge and to falling behind. From this point of view, through political and thoughtful analysis, while being free from the system and alienation, and bearing within it its own cultural identity based on the impoverished Kurdish rustics, [the PKK] allowed the beginning of a permanent and stable political enlightenment process. ... Another characteristic of the PKK movement at the beginning was that it realised that [the previous] abstract and theoretical movements had not led to a solution but deepened the problem. ... The fact that the PKK movement was based on the impoverished Kurdish rustics who were intact and preserved their national identity paved the way for a start favourable for a confident, militant and revolutionary tradition. Yet, the progress of the movement was accompanied by the downfall of the level of quality."" 9. The court considered that the aforementioned passages and the article in its entirety constituted propaganda in favour of the PKK. It hence sentenced the applicant to ten months' imprisonment and ordered him to pay a fine of 375 Turkish liras (TRY). Taking into account his good behaviour during the trial and his character, the court suspended the pronouncement of his conviction on condition that he did not commit another intentional offence for a period of five years, under Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hükmün açıklanmasının geri bırakılması). 10. On 22 October 2008 the court dismissed an objection lodged by the applicant against the above-mentioned decision.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While some, like the court, may argue that this rises to the level of threatening democratic interests through encouraging terrorism against national security, the publication of an article in a periodical is clearly a matter of personal opinion.", 17,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","5. The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Bern, Switzerland. At the time of the events giving rise to the present application, he was the editor‑in-chief of Ülkede Özgür Gündem, a daily newspaper published in Turkey. 6. On 6 July 2004 an article written by Mr B.G. entitled ""Analysing the Kurdish dynamic correctly"" was published in Ülkede Özgür Gündem. In his article, Mr B.G. stated his views on the role of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK (an illegal armed organisation), a number of organisations associated with the PKK in regional and international politics and political developments in Turkey. Next to the article a photograph of Abdullah Öcalan shaking hands with a group of armed men was published. 7. On 8 July 2004 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul Assize Court filed a bill of indictment, charging the applicant with disseminating propaganda in favour of the KONGRA-GEL[1] under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) on account of the article published on 6 July 2004. In the indictment, the public prosecutor quoted the following passage from the article: ""... Abdullah Öcalan, who has contributed to the essential dynamic of the Kurdish movement and the HPG[2], the PJA[3] and the KONGRA-GEL, organisations which have acted as military, political and ideological leaders and which have represented his leadership,... [must be well understood]"". The public prosecutor stated that a photograph of Abdullah Öcalan in which he was standing in a rural area holding a weapon had been published in the newspaper, next to the article. The public prosecutor considered as a result that the applicant had disseminated propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation inciting others to violence or other methods of terrorism. Subsequently, criminal proceedings were launched against the applicant before the Istanbul Assize Court. 8. During the proceedings the applicant maintained that the article in question had been a news article and had not contained propaganda inciting to violence. 9. On 24 May 2005 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and a fine. In its judgment, the Istanbul Assize Court held that the content of the article and the publication of Abdullah Öcalan's photograph amounted to dissemination of propaganda in favour of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL. 10. The applicant appealed. In his appeal petition, referring to a number of the Court's judgments, the applicant claimed that he had not had the intention of disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation and that his criminal conviction had been in breach of Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention as he had been exercising his right to impart information. He also noted that the first-instance court had failed to examine the article in its entirety. 11. On 16 May 2006 the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation returned the case file to the first-instance court and requested that the latter revise its judgment in the light of the recent legislative amendments. 12. On 28 September 2006 the Istanbul Assize Court once again convicted the applicant under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, with the same reasoning that it had adopted on 24 May 2005. The court sentenced the applicant to a fine of 1,802 Turkish liras (TRY). 13. The applicant appealed. 14. On 18 November 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 28 September 2006. 15. According to a document dated 15 January 2010, signed by the President of the Istanbul Assize Court and the Istanbul public prosecutor, the applicant was required to pay the fine of TRY 1,802.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"There is a view, as the public prosecutor argued, that this article threatens the interests of democratic society by inciting violence. But most would agree that the publication of an article in a periodical is clearly a matter of personal opinion.", 18,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","5. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Weinheim. He is a campaigner against abortion and operates an anti-abortion website. 6. On 12 and 13 April 2005 the applicant distributed leaflets in the vicinity of the medical practice of Dr St., who performed abortions there. The leaflets stated, inter alia, that the abortions performed by Dr St. in his practice, for which he gave the address, were unlawful according to the case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court. In addition the leaflet contained the following statements: ""According to international criminal law: Aggravated murder is the intentional ‘bringing-to-death' of an innocent human being!"" (Sinngemӓβ aus den internationalen Strafgesetzen: Mord ist das vorsӓtzliche ""Zu-Tode-Bringen"" eines unschuldigen Menschen!) ""The murder of human beings in Auschwitz was unlawful, but the morally degraded NS State allowed the murder of innocent people and did not make it subject to criminal liability."" (Die Ermordung der Menschen in Auschwitz war rechtswidrig, aber der moralisch verkommene NS-Staat hatte den Mord an den unschuldigen Menschen erlaubt und nicht unter Strafe gestellt.) 7. The applicant also addressed passers-by and the physician's presumed patients and attempted to engage with them in conversations about abortion. 8. Dr St. lodged an application for a civil injunction against the applicant and on 25 October 2005 the Mannheim Regional Court granted the requested injunction. The court ordered the applicant to desist from speaking to passers-by in the immediate vicinity of the medical practice and labelling the abortions performed by the plaintiff unlawful with the objective of irritating female patients and preventing them from visiting Dr St.'s practice. 9. On 24 February 2007 the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal upheld the decision and slightly modified the wording specifying the geographical area concerned by the injunction. It also refused to grant leave to appeal on points of law. 10. The Regional Court as well as the Court of Appeal both referred to a previous decision of the Federal Court of Justice in which it had confirmed a civil injunction against similar conduct by the applicant (see paragraph 13 below). The courts held that in the case at issue there were no factual or legal differences justifying deviating from the case-law of the Federal Court of Justice. In so far that the doctor in the present case was slightly more well-known than the doctor in the original case, the Court of Appeal held that this was of minor relevance. The fact that Dr St. had appeared as an expert before the German Parliament many years previously did not have any substantial effects on Dr St's public profile at that time. Moreover, the involvement of Dr St. in different legal disputes was irrelevant, as trying to enforce his rights in the appropriate legal procedure could not redound to Dr St.'s disadvantage. In sum, the applicant had vilified the non‑criminal professional activities of Dr St. by implying that he committed criminal acts and interfered with the relationship of trust between doctor and patient, which deserved special protection against the interventions of others. The applicant had therefore severely interfered with Dr St.'s personality rights. This interference was not justified by the applicant's freedom of expression in view of the massive ""pillory effect"" the applicant had created by singling out the plaintiff and criticising him in a harsh way in the immediate vicinity of his practice. 11. On 29 May 2007 the Federal Court of Justice refused a request by the applicant for legal aid on the grounds that the applicant's intended appeal on points of law lacked sufficient prospect of success. On 20 July 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit the applicant's complaint for adjudication for being inadmissible, without providing reasons (no. 1 BvR 1670/07).",NOT ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"The applicant is clearly expressing their personal opinion. At the same time, there are meaningful interests for democratic society in not infringing upon the rights of others to receive abortions.", 19,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","6. The applicants were born in 1973 and 1976 respectively and live in Switzerland. At the relevant time, they were members of a research cooperative called the East Scientific Research Cooperative (Doğu Bilimsel Araştırmalar Kooperatifi – ""the Cooperative""). 7. Between 30 May and 1 June 2005 the Cooperative organised an exhibition in Diyarbakır as part of the fifth Diyarbakır Culture and Art Festival, entitled ""Witnesses of War Talk"". Within the context of the exhibition, photographs of deceased members of the PKK (an illegal armed organisation), deceased members of the security forces who had been killed in security operations, persons who had lost their lives in prison, victims of enforced disappearances and victims of assassinations by unknown assailants in south-east Turkey were publicly displayed. The exhibition also included statements from family members of deceased and disappeared individuals, presenting their relatives and containing their personal views on the disturbances going on in south-east Turkey, and their wish for an enduring peace. 8. On an unspecified date a criminal investigation was launched against the applicants and five other people in relation to a charge of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK. On 31 May 2005 the applicants gave a statement to the investigating judge. Both of the applicants maintained that the exhibition in question had been organised for purely sociological reasons, and that they had conducted interviews with the families of the deceased which had also been included in the exhibition. They asserted that there had been no intention to disseminate propaganda in favour of the PKK. The investigating judge dismissed an application by the public prosecutor to remand the accused in custody. 9. On 6 October 2005 the public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Diyarbakır Assize Court, charging the applicants and five other suspects with disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. 10. Throughout the proceedings before the Diyarbakır Assize Court the applicants repeated their previous statements and contended that photographs of deceased members of the security forces had also been displayed in the exhibition alongside those of members of the PKK. 11. On 18 May 2006 the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted both applicants of disseminating propaganda in favour of an illegal organisation under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. The applicants were sentenced to two years and a year and eight months' imprisonment, respectively. In its judgment, the court observed that the invitations to the exhibition had referred to the armed conflict between the security forces and the PKK as a ""war"", and the PKK members as ""guerrillas"", thus glorifying the deceased terrorists and inciting young people to become members of the PKK. The court also noted that a ""war"" was an armed conflict between two States and a ""guerrilla"" was an armed person who fought against unjust occupation. The court further observed that a couple of photographs of deceased soldiers had also been displayed in order to conceal the accused's intention to incite young people to join the PKK. 12. On 9 June 2009 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment in respect of the second applicant, holding that the case should be reviewed in the light of Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no. 5271), which regulates the suspension of a judgment's pronouncement. However, the trial court's judgment of 18 May 2006 became final in respect of the first applicant. On 3 August 2009 the decision of the Court of Cassation was filed with the registry of the first-instance court. 13. On 22 October 2009, in accordance with Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Diyarbakır Assize Court decided to suspend the pronouncement of its judgment in respect of the second applicant on the condition that he did not commit another intentional offence for a period of five years. 14. The first applicant served the sentence arising from the judgment of 18 May 2006.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While some, like the court, may argue that this rises to the level of threatening democratic interests through encouraging terrorism against national security, an exhibition is clearly framed as an expression of personal opinions. ", 20,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","5. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Weinheim. He is a campaigner against abortion and operates an anti-abortion website (babycaust.de). At the time of the proceedings outlined below, the website included, among other things, the following content. 6. On the starting page a picture of graves was shown and the text underneath read ""then: Holocaust"". Upon clicking on the picture, the user was directed to a page titled: ""Abortion – the new Holocaust?"" on which the Holocaust was compared to abortions. On the left margin of the starting page, there were several links, of which one was called ""Life or death?"". Upon clicking on it, the user was directed to a page with the headline ""Prayer requests for Germany"". From that page, the reader was directed to a location-based alphabetical list mentioning the names and practice addresses of doctors who performed abortions in Germany, and to a request for prayers for those doctors. At the very bottom of the same page, under the highlighted text ""German contemporary history in brief"", a sentence read: ""Perverted doctors murder unborn children at the request of the mothers"" (Pervertierte Ärzte ermorden im Auftrag der Mütter die ungeborenen Kinder) On the same page, clicking on the button ""close page"" forwarded the user to a page where it was stated: ""Pray, if possible regularly, for the doctors ... who personally undertake the AGGRAVATED MURDER of abortion killing"" (Beten Sie – wenn möglich regelmäßig – für die Mediziner ..., welche den MORD der Abtreibungstötung selbst vornehmen ...) (Emphasis in original). Somewhat farther down on the same page, it was stated that counselling centres that issued certifications: ""... are enabling and facilitating the unpunished aggravated murder of children in their mother's womb."" (... ermöglichen und begünstigen einen straffreien Kindermord im Mutterschoβ.) 7. One of the doctors listed on the applicant's website, Dr Q., sought a civil injunction ordering the applicant to remove his name and address from the website. 8. On 23 May 2006 the Mannheim Regional Court rejected Dr Q.'s application on the grounds that it was a fact that Dr Q. performed abortions and that the remainder of the website's content was covered by the applicant's freedom of expression. It observed, in particular, that the present case was not comparable to similar cases which had concerned an interference with personality rights by the distribution of personalised leaflets. The publishing of a doctor's name on a list of abortion performing doctors had no comparable ""pillory effect"". 9. Subsequently Dr Q. appealed and – during the appeal proceedings – modified his application, seeking a civil injunction ordering the applicant to desist from labelling abortions, such as those performed by Dr Q., ""aggravated murder"". 10. On 28 February 2007 the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal granted the sought injunction. The court held that the applicant's website led it to be understood that abortions performed by Dr Q. constituted ""aggravated murder"". While the term ""aggravated murder"" did not have to be understood in a merely legal sense but could also be understood as a moral judgment, the overall presentation of the website at the very least did not exclude a reading that Dr Q. had perpetrated the criminal offence of aggravated murder. Even though the applicant had pointed out that abortions were exempt from punishment, he had not referred to section 218a of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 14 below), which exempted abortions as performed by Dr Q., from criminal liability. In addition, the applicant had emphasised the term ""aggravated murder"" in the relevant parts of the website and had compared abortions with the Holocaust. In sum, the statements of the website could be understood as a personalised accusation against Dr Q. of perpetrating aggravated murder. 11. On 29 May 2007 the Federal Court of Justice refused a request by the applicant for legal aid on the grounds that the applicant's intended appeal on points of law lacked sufficient prospect of success. 12. On 2 July 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit a complaint by the applicant for adjudication for being inadmissible, without providing reasons (no. 1 BvR 1663/07).",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"8. On 23 May 2006 the Mannheim Regional Court rejected Dr Q.'s application on the grounds that it was a fact that Dr Q. performed abortions and that the remainder of the website's content was covered by the applicant's freedom of expression. It observed, in particular, that the present case was not comparable to similar cases which had concerned an interference with personality rights by the distribution of personalised leaflets. The publishing of a doctor's name on a list of abortion performing doctors had no comparable ""pillory effect"". 12. On 2 July 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit a complaint by the applicant for adjudication for being inadmissible, without providing reasons (no. 1 BvR 1663/07).",TRUE,2,"The applicant has a right to free expression as displayed on the website. However, it's arguable the applicant endangered the rights and reputation of the doctor through the reading of ""aggravated murder.""", 21,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","6. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Diyarbakır. 7. At the time of the events giving rise to the application, the applicant was the head of the district branch of the Democratic People's Party (Demokratik Halklar Partisi – DEHAP) in the Ergani district of Diyarbakır. 8. On 15 February 2005, on the anniversary of the arrest and transfer of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK[1], to Turkey, the Ergani district branch of DEHAP organised a gathering in front of the district branch office in order to read out a press statement. The applicant read the statement in question. 9. On 31 May 2005 the Ergani public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Ergani Criminal Court against twenty-six persons, including the applicant, charging them with breach of the Marches and Demonstrations Act (Law no. 2911) on account of their participation in the above-mentioned event. They were accused of participating in the gathering and carrying banners with slogans such as ""The solution is in İmralı[2]"" (""Çözüm İmralı'da""), ""Solitary confinement is a crime against humanity"" (""Tecrit insanlık suçudur""), ""Not EU, not US, Öcalan has the solution"" (""Ne AB ne ABD, Çözüm Öcalan'da"") , ""The youth is Öcalan's fedai""[3] (""Gençlik Apo'nun Fedaisidir""), and ""Freedom to Öcalan"" (""Öcalan'a özgürlük""), as well as posters of Abdullah Öcalan. They were also accused of chanting slogans such as ""To the sun, to freedom"" (Güneşe güneşe, özgürleşmeye""), ""Long live the brotherhood of peoples"" (""Yaşasın halkların kardeşliği""), ""May those hands which aim to damage peace be broken"" (""Barışa uzanan eller kırılsın""), ""A tooth for a tooth, blood for blood, we are with you"" (""Dişe diş kana kan, seninleyiz"") and ""AKP, be careful, do not abuse our patience"" (""AKP şaşırma, sabrımızı taşırma""). 10. On 5 October 2006 the Ergani Criminal Court decided that it lacked jurisdiction to examine the case. It held that the impugned acts constituted the offence proscribed by section 7 (2) of Law no. 3713 and that the accused should therefore be tried by the Diyarbakır Assize Court. 11. On an unspecified date the Diyarbakır Assize Court remitted the case file to the Ergani Criminal Court. 12. On 19 March 2007 the Ergani Criminal Court once again decided that the Diyarbakır Assize Court had jurisdiction over the case. 13. On 10 August 2007 the Sixth Chamber of the Diyarbakır Assize Court began the trial in the case. 14. On 15 April 2010 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor submitted to the first-instance court his observations on the merits of the case. According to those submissions, the public prosecutor considered that the applicant should be convicted under section 7 (2) of Law no. 3713, as the press statement read out by him had referred to Abdullah Öcalan as the ""honourable Kurdish people's leader"". 15. On the same day the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted the applicant of disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation under section 7 (2) of Law no. 3713. The court based its judgment, among others, on a police report regarding the reading out of the press statement dated 15 February 2005 and a police report dated 23 February 2005 on the examination of a police video recording of the event of 15 February 2005. The court judgment read as follows: ""... it has been decided that Ahmet Kınık and R.A. committed the offence proscribed by section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, as they participated in the reading out of a press statement organised by the DEHAP in Ergani on 15 February 2005 on the anniversary of the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan, and chanted slogans such as ‘The solution is in İmralı', ‘Solitary confinement is a crime against humanity', ‘Not EU, not US, Öcalan has the solution', and ‘The youth is Öcalan's fedai'. They marched and chanted these slogans without obtaining prior permission."" 16. The Sixth Chamber of the Diyarbakır Assize Court sentenced the applicant to ten months' imprisonment but decided to suspend the pronouncement of the judgment (hükmün açıklanmasının geri bırakılması) for a period of five years, under Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 17. On 5 July 2010 the applicant objected to the decision of the Assize Court to suspend the pronouncement of the judgment. 18. On 22 November 2010 the Fourth Chamber of the Diyarbakır Assize Court dismissed the applicant's objection.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While some, like the court, may argue that this threatens democratic interests through encouraging terrorism against national security, the context of this being a protest and the applicant's membership with the protesting party makes it seem clear that this is the applicant's personal opinion.", 22,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","4. The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Orhei. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. On 16 January 1997 the Orhei mayor's office attested the property right of a number of private individuals over plots of land in the town. Based on that decision, on 3 April 1997 the same office issued the applicant's brother (C.) title to 0.0569 hectares of land. 7. On 13 July 1998 C. died. After his death the applicant took possession of the land and used continuously for her own needs. 8. On 10 September 1999 the territorial cadastre office registered the plot of land as belonging to C. 9. On 31 January 2000 the Orhei mayor's office amended the annex to its decision of 16 January 1997. C. continued to be mentioned as the owner of the relevant plot of land. 10. On 15 July 2005 the Orhei mayor's office lodged a civil court action aimed at annulling the property right of C. and the applicant to the relevant land. It claimed that the title had been issued in error since C. had moved to an apartment provided by the town and was no longer eligible to obtain such land. Following this relocation, the cadastre office was supposed to remove C.'s title from the list, which it had failed to do. In the meantime, on an unspecified date the applicant initiated a court action aimed at extending the time-limit for accepting her brother's inheritance. The two court actions were joined by the court on 6 November 2006. 11. On 15 February 2017 the Orhei district court rejected the court action lodged by the mayor's office and accepted that of the applicant. It noted, inter alia, that the applicant had raised the issue of expiry of the three-year limitation period and added that under Article 78 of the old Civil Code (see paragraph 15 below), the court had to apply the rules concerning the limitation period regardless of the parties' arguments. It found that the mayor's office had missed the three-year limitation period. However, in the operative part the court omitted to refer to the expiry of the limitation period and found that the court action had been groundless. The court also accepted the applicant's action, extending the time-limit for accepting her brother's inheritance since she had taken possession of the relevant land immediately after his death. 12. On 4 October 2007 the Chișinău Court of Appeal overturned that judgment, accepting the appeal lodged by the mayor's office. It annulled C.'s title to the relevant land, finding that he had obtained it in error and that under the applicable law he could not be the owner of that land. Moreover, the court rejected the applicant's claim for extending the time-limit for accepting her brother's inheritance, finding that she had missed it without a valid reason. 13. On 12 March 2008 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the judgment of the Chișinău Court of Appeal. 14. The applicant submitted documents showing that she had paid various taxes for the land in question over the years. 15. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code (1964, in force before 12 June 2003) reads as follows: ""Article 74. General limitation periods. The general limitation period for defending, by a court action, against the breach of a person's rights (prescripția) is of three years ..."" ""Article 78. Mandatory application of the limitation period. The competent court ... shall apply the limitation period regardless of the parties' request."" ""Article 581. Acceptance of inheritance. In order to inherit, the heir must accept the inheritance. ... It shall be considered that the heir has accepted the inheritance if he/she took actual possession or administration of inheritance assets ..."" 16. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code (in force from 12 June 2003) read as follows: ""Article 7. Application of the civil law in time. (1) The civil law has no retroactive effect. It does not modify and does not annul the conditions of creation of a legal situation which previously appeared, nor the conditions of ending of a legal situation which previously ended. ... (6) The provisions of the new law concerning limitation periods ... shall apply to limitation periods which started before the date of entry into force of the new law, but did not end before that date. ... The start, the suspension and the interruption of the limitation period shall be determined under the old law for the period before the entry into force of the new law. ...""",NOT ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,There is no relevance between free expression and private property ownership., 23,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","5. The applicants were born in 1971 and 1976 and are detained in Lipcani. 6. In July 1999 the German police found the corpse of a Moldovan national in a river near Hamburg. The investigation led to a Moldovan national, A.B., who had shared a house with the victim. During questioning by the German police, A.B., who was a suspect, declared that the murder had been committed by the applicants who had beaten up the victim and strangled him. A.B. stated that he had only helped them to carry the victim's dead body and that he had not seen the body being thrown into the river. He knew, however, that a concrete pole had been attached to the victim's body before it immersion. The goal of the murder was allegedly to obtain the victim's five thousand German marks, which he had deposited with a German family. According to A.B., after the murder, the applicants manipulated the German family into believing that the victim had been arrested by police in another part of Germany and that he needed the money. After obtaining the money, one of the applicants wired it to his family in Moldova. 7. During the court proceedings in Moldova, the competent court resorted to international legal assistance by summoning at least seven witnesses who lived in Germany, including A.B. All witnesses were summoned once through the intermediary of the Moldovan Ministry of Justice and the German authorities. However, none of them appeared before the Moldovan court and no reasons for failure to appear were given. The attempts to summon the witness were not repeated. 8. On 29 December 2008 the Botanica District Court acquitted the applicants of murder charges that had been brought against them. The court found that the only piece of evidence presented by the prosecutor in support of the accusation against the applicants was the statements made by A.B. to the German police. Since A.B. himself had been accused by the German police of the victim's murder at the time of his questioning, he had a personal interest in accusing other persons. Moreover, his statements were not totally coherent and consistent. In particular, he had stated to the German police that he had not been present when the victim's body had been thrown into the river. However, somehow he knew that a concrete pole had been attached to the corpse. Lastly, the Moldovan authorities had been unable to bring A.B. to Moldova, and the applicants had not been present during the interview with the German police and had therefore been unable to put questions to A.B. For all the above reasons the evidence was excluded from the file. However, the applicants were found guilty of fraud as a result of the fact that they had manipulated the German family with whom the victim's money had been deposited, and had appropriated the money. 9. On 25 February 2010 the Chişinău Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by the prosecutor and reversed the judgment of the lower court in so far as it concerned the murder charges. The court admitted A.B.'s statements given before the German police in evidence and found the applicants guilty of murder. The court found A.B.'s statements to be reliable because they had been made before an investigating judge. The applicants were sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. At the same time, the applicants were cleared of the charge of fraud on account of the Statute of Limitations. 10. The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law before the Supreme Court of Justice in which they argued, inter alia, that the statements made by A.B. before the German authorities and read out during the hearing before the Court of Appeal could not be admitted in evidence unless they had had the opportunity to confront A.B. in a court hearing and address questions to him. Moreover, the applicants submitted that A.B. had a personal interest in accusing them because he was a suspect himself. 11. On 18 January 2011 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicants' appeal and upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court held that the fact that the applicants had not been present during A.B.'s questioning by the German authorities had been as a result of their own actions, because they had left Germany by that time. Two of the sitting judges (S.M. and V.T.) wrote a dissenting opinion in which they expressed the view that the applicants' rights as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention had been breached by the fact that they had been unable to examine the only prosecution witness, A.B., on whose evidence their convictions had been based.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,"There is little relevance between free expression and this criminal trial. The statements given by a witness are meaningfully subject to restrictions, given their democratic interest in maintaining the authority of the judiciary.", 24,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","4. The first applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Moscow. The second applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Irkutsk. 5. On 20 February 2009, the first applicant, a lawyer at the time, was elected to be a member of the council of the Irkutsk Regional Bar (""the Bar""). 6. On 24 October 2010 the members of the council conducted elections for the presidency of the Bar. Five members of the Council voted for S. and the other five voted for the second applicant. 7. On 25 November 2010 the second applicant issued an order appointing herself acting President of the Bar. 8. On an unspecified date a group of lawyers applied to the Commercial Court of the Irkutsk Region challenging the second applicant's appointment. The court granted their request to enjoin the second applicant from fulfilling the functions of acting president pending the outcome of the proceedings. 9. On 19 January 2012 the Commercial Court discontinued the proceedings. The final decision on the matter was taken by the Supreme Commercial Court on 26 September 2012. 10. On 11 February, 2 March and 5 April 2011 several members of the Bar, including the applicants, lodged complaints with the President of the Commercial Court of the Irkutsk Region, to the Supreme Commercial Court of the Russian Federation and to the Supreme Judicial Qualifications Board, alleging that Judge R. had acted in contravention of the applicable laws on jurisdiction when she had accepted the claims concerning the second applicant's appointment to the office of President of the Bar for consideration. They further claimed that (1) S. had announced in public that his opponents in the council of the Bar would be disbarred and that he would organise a ""red terror"" in response to the ""orange revolution""; (2) S.'s ultimate goal had been to get rid of his opponents in the Council of the Bar through rotation and disbarment; (3) S. had had an extra‑professional relationship with the Deputy President of the Regional Commercial Court, who had been instrumental in ensuring a favourable outcome in the proceedings against the second applicant's appointment; (4) through his personal connections with the Deputy President of the Regional Commercial Court, S. had obtained an injunction against the second applicant and ensured that a group of bailiffs had been present at the Bar's conference in order to put pressure on the participants and his opponents. 11. On an unspecified date in July 2011 the lawyers posted their complaints on the website of the President of the Russian Federation. They sent a copy of their complaint to the President of the Supreme Commercial Court and to the Public Anticorruption Committee. 12. On 18 July 2011 the First Deputy of the President of the Regional Commercial Court informed the plaintiffs that their allegations were proven false by the conducted investigation. 13. On 27 July 2011 the President of the Regional Commercial Court forwarded a copy of the lawyers' complaint to the Bar and the First Vice‑President of the Bar instituted disciplinary proceedings against the applicants. 14. On 31 October 2011 the council of the Bar disbarred the first applicant. The council considered that (1) the letters sent by the group of the lawyers to the Judicial Qualifications Board and the President of the Commercial Court had not been a correct or permissible conduct in response to the actions of the judges of the Commercial Court; (2) the complaints had contained untrue allegations damaging to the reputation and goodwill of Judges B. and R., and S., a lawyer; (3) the first applicant had been disrespectful towards them. The Council concluded that (1) the first applicant had violated the relevant legislation and the Code of Professional Conduct for Lawyers (Кодекс профессиональной этики адвоката); (2) the dissemination of information damaging the reputation and goodwill of judges and lawyers was incompatible with membership of the Bar; (3) the first applicant's conduct had disparaged the Bar and its members. 15. On 8 December 2011 the Kirovskiy District Court of Irkutsk dismissed a complaint lodged by the first applicant against the decision of 31 October 2011. 16. On 11 March 2012 the Irkutsk Regional Court upheld the judgment of 8 December 2011 on appeal. 17. On 16 December 2011 the council of the Bar disbarred the second applicant. The reasons underlying the council's decision were identical to the one used in the first applicant's case. 18. On 27 December 2011 the Kirovskiy District Court of Irkutsk dismissed a complaint lodged by the second applicant against the decision of 16 December 2011. 19. On 19 April 2012 the Irkutsk Regional Court upheld the judgment of 27 December 2011 on appeal.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"The lawyers who filed the complaint are allowed their personal opinions on the election, but it could also be argued that they interfered with democratic interests through damaging the reputations of others.",edited by me to remove ambiguity in fact pattern 25,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","5. The first applicant (Mr Grigoryev) was born in 1984 and lives in Svetlogorsk. The second applicant (Ms Igamberdiyeva) was born in 1989 and lives in Kaliningrad. 6. On an unknown date the second applicant notified the Kaliningrad authorities of her intention to hold a group public event on 12 December 2010 in Pobeda Square. The authorities replied that preparations for the New Year celebrations were planned on that day; they did not suggest an alternative venue. The second applicant did not challenge the authority's reply before the domestic courts. Both applicants decided to stage solo demonstrations near the monument to ""Mother Russia"" instead; this did not require prior notification. 7. According to the applicants, on 12 December 2010 the first applicant staged a solo demonstration holding a banner saying ""Freedom for Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev! We plead for a lawful judgment"". After he had completed his demonstration and placed himself at a distance of some twenty metres, the second applicant held her own solo demonstration. She was wearing a T-shirt saying ""Freedom for Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev!"" She completed her demonstration in five minutes. Then the first applicant returned to the venue with his banner and remained there for about two minutes, until police officers took him to a police van. He was then taken to a police station and held there for over three hours. 8. According to the Government, at 4 p.m. on 12 December 2010 the applicants participated in a group public event in the form of a ""picket"" (пикетирование) using visual props, namely a banner and a T-shirt. At 4 p.m. the first applicant was taken to the Leninskiy district police station. Between 5.15 p.m. and 6.30 p.m. a duty officer drew up an administrative offence record in respect of the first applicant. He was accused of taking part in a group public event held without authorisation, an offence under Article 20.2 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter ""the CAO""). On 14 December 2012 the second applicant was called to the Leninskiy district police station, where she was accused of a similar offence, although it was classified under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO. 9. The cases against the applicants were submitted to a justice of the peace of court circuit no. 2 of the Leninskiy District of Kaliningrad. The court ordered the police to submit a video recording showing the events of 12 December 2010. By two judgments of 3 March 2011 the justice of the peace found that the applicants had held solo demonstrations and had not breached the Public Events Act (hereinafter ""the PEA""), including its prior notification requirement applicable to group events. The court relied, inter alia, on the video recording submitted by the police. The administrative cases against the applicants were discontinued for lack of the elements of the offences under Article 20.2 §§ 1 and 2 of the CAO. 10. The police lodged an appeal. On 16 May 2011 the Leninskiy District Court of Kaliningrad upheld the judgments. The appellate court also considered that it had not been confirmed that the applicants had in fact taken part in a group ""picket"". 11. The applicants sought compensation of 100,000 roubles (RUB)[1] each for unlawful deprivation of liberty and violation of their right to freedom of expression by way of solo demonstration. By a judgment of 15 July 2011 the Tsentralniy District Court of Kaliningrad found that taking the first applicant to the police station had been unlawful, and awarded him RUB 10,000 (equivalent to 250 euros (EUR) at the time) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. On 25 July 2011 the same court also granted the claims by the second applicant, having found that preventing her from staging a solo demonstration and consequently prosecuting her had been unlawful. The court also awarded the second applicant RUB 10,000 for non-pecuniary damage. 12. The first applicant appealed against the judgment of 15 July 2011, complaining, inter alia, about the amount of the compensation and the first‑instance court's failure to make specific findings in relation to the violation of his freedom of expression on account of the police intervention in his solo demonstration. On 7 September 2011 the Kaliningrad Regional Court upheld the judgment. Relying on Article 27.1 § 2 of the CAO and Article 1070 § 2 of the Civil Code, it ruled that it followed from the discontinuation of the CAO case that placing the first applicant under administrative escort and arrest had been unlawful under Russian law as well as ""unjustified"" (необоснованные). The appellate court also considered that the interference with freedom of expression had been acknowledged by the declaration that taking the first applicant to the police station had been unlawful. 13. The second applicant also appealed. On 21 September 2011 the Kaliningrad Regional Court upheld the judgment of 25 July 2011.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While one could argue that the applicants interfered with the rights of others to enjoy the celebration, their following of protocols makes this a straightforward case of free expression.", 26,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","6. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Istanbul. He was the owner and the editor-in-chief of a publishing house, namely Aram Basım ve Yayıncılık, at the time of the events giving rise to the present application. 7. In June 2001 and March 2003 the applicant's company published two books entitled Dağlarda Yaşamın Dili (""The Language of Life in the Mountains"") and Tufanda 33 Gün (""33 Days in the Deluge""), respectively. 8. On 29 August 2001 the public prosecutor attached to the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment with the Istanbul State Security Court charging the applicant with aiding and abetting the PKK, an illegal armed organisation, under Article 169 of the former Criminal Code, on account of the publication of the book entitled The Language of Life in the Mountains. 9. On 24 July 2002 the Istanbul State Security Court convicted the applicant as charged. 10. On 1 May 2003 the Court of Cassation, on appeal, upheld the judgment of 24 July 2002. 11. On 23 September 2003 the public prosecutor attached to the Istanbul State Security Court requested that the court revise its judgment of 24 July 2002 since Article 169 of the former Criminal Code had been amended on 7 August 2003. The Istanbul State Security Court accepted that request. 12. By Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, state security courts were abolished. The case against the applicant concerning the book entitled The Language of Life in the Mountains was transferred to the Istanbul Assize Court. 13. On 16 August 2003 the public prosecutor attached to the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment with the Istanbul State Security Court charging the applicant with aiding and abetting the PKK under Article 169 of the former Criminal Code on account of the publication of the book entitled 33 Days in the Deluge. According to the indictment, on pages 129, 130 and 135 the struggle of the PKK and its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, was praised and the applicant had therefore aided the PKK through the medium of the press. 14. On 30 April 2007 the Istanbul Assize Court decided to join the proceedings concerning The Language of Life in the Mountains and 33 Days in the Deluge. 15. On 7 December 2007 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) for disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK twice, because he had published two books, and sentenced him to a total of twenty months' imprisonment. With regard to the publication of 33 Days in the Deluge, the assize court considered that on pages 129, 130 and 135 the PKK and its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, were praised and the offence of dissemination of propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation had therefore been committed. The assize court furthermore found that the book allowed for the transmission of the opinions of the PKK to the public and was aimed at bringing more sympathisers into that organisation. 16. On 25 June 2009 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 7 December 2007, holding that the first-instance court should not have joined the two cases, since the case concerning The Language of Life in the Mountains was a re-qualification of the applicant's previous final conviction (uyarlama yargılaması). 17. On 7 December 2009 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant once again under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 on account of the publication of The Language of Life in the Mountains and sentenced him to a fine. 18. On 3 June 2013 the Court of Cassation quashed the first-instance judgment. 19. On 13 November 2013 the Istanbul Assize Court decided to suspend the execution of the sentence pronounced in its judgment of 7 December 2009. 20. In the meantime, the Istanbul Assize Court resumed the trial concerning the publication of 33 Days in the Deluge following the Court of Cassation's decision of 25 June 2009. 21. On 21 October 2009 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 for disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK on account of the publication of 33 Days in the Deluge and sentenced him to ten months' imprisonment. In its judgment, the assize court reiterated that on pages 129, 130 and 135 the PKK and its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, were praised and the offence of dissemination of propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation had therefore been committed. The court held that the turns of phrase used on those pages were not protected by Article 10 of the Convention and constituted an abuse of the right to freedom of expression. The assize court further found that the book permitted the opinions of the PKK to be transmitted to the public and was aimed at bringing more sympathisers into that organisation and thus at destroying the unitary nature of the State of the Republic of Turkey. 22. The applicant appealed. 23. On 15 February 2012 the Court of Cassation decided to discontinue the proceedings concerning the publication of 33 Days in the Deluge, holding that the prosecution was time-barred.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While one, like the public prosecutor, could argue that the applicants encouraged terrorism against democratic interests in national security, the publication of a book is clearly a matter of personal opinion.", 27,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","6. The applicants were born in 1983, 1973, 1983, 1986, 1984 and 1984. Mr Yaşar Çalışkan lives in Ankara. The other applicants live in Samsun. According to the applicants' submissions, which were not contested by the Government, at the time of the lodging of the application, they were serving the prison sentences arising out of their criminal convictions which gave rise to the present application. 7. On 17 and 18 June 2005 seventeen members of the Maoist Communist Party (hereinafter ""the MKP""), an illegal organisation, were killed in a rural area within the administrative jurisdiction of the town of Ovacık, near the city of Tunceli, by members of the security forces. 8. On 21 June 2005 a gathering was held in protest at the alleged unlawful killings of 17 and 18 June 2005 in Samsun. University students from the Samsun Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi, including the applicants, gathered in front of the building of the Black Sea Fundamental Rights and Freedoms Association (Karadeniz Temel Haklar ve Özgürlükler Derneği) where a press statement was read out. 9. On 8 July 2005 one of the applicants, Mr Ahmet Doğan, attended another reading out of a press statement in Samsun. The press statement concerned the killings of 17 and 18 June 2005, the arrest of a number of persons subsequent to the reading out of the press statement on 21 June 2005 and the alleged unlawful killing of a detainee by the police. 10. On 21 February 2007 the Ankara public prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings against twenty-three people, including the applicants, charging them with disseminating propaganda in favour of the MKP, under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). According to the indictment, during the gathering of 21 June 2005, slogans such as ""Long live revolutionary solidarity"" (""Yaşasın devrimci dayanışma""), ""We have paid a price. We will make them pay a price."" (""Bedel ödedik, bedel ödeteceğiz.""), ""Murderer State"" (""Katil devlet""), ""Revolutionary martyrs are immortal"" (""Devrim şehitleri ölümsüzdür.""), ""Martyrs are immortal"" (""Şehit namırın""), were chanted and the applicants participated in the gathering. The public prosecutor further noted that Mr Ahmet Doğan had participated in the gathering of 8 June 2005, during which the following slogans had been chanted: ""No emancipation alone, either all of us or none of us."" (""Kurtuluş yok tek başına, ya hep beraber ya hiçbirimiz.)"", ""Arrests, provocations and coercion cannot discourage us."" (""Tutuklamalar, provakasyonlar, baskılar bizi yıldıramaz.""), ""We will resist and succeed"" (""Direne direne kazanacağız.""), ""We have paid a price; we will make them pay a price."" ""Bedel ödedik, bedel ödeteceğiz""). 11. On 31 March 2009 the Ankara Assize Court found the applicants guilty as charged and sentenced each of them to ten months' imprisonment pursuant to section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, except for Mr Ahmet Doğan, who was sentenced to twenty months' imprisonment. As regards the gathering of 21 June 2005, the assize court found it established that the slogan ""Martyrs are immortal"" had been chanted by Mr Kürşad Arslan, Ms Dilek Kömpe, Mr Olcay Bayraktar and Mr Ahmet Doğan and that the slogans ""The murderer state will pay the price"", ""Revolutionary martyrs are immortal"" and ""Long live revolutionary solidarity"" had been chanted by Mr Yaşar Çalışkan, Mr Kürşad Arslan and Ms Dilek Kömpe. The court also found it established that all the applicants except for Mr Olcay Bayraktar had chanted the slogan ""We have paid a price; we will make them pay a price"" and that Mr Ahmet Doğan had carried a banner bearing the slogan ""Ovacık Martyrs are immortal"". As regards the gathering of 8 July 2005, the court noted that Mr Ahmet Doğan had chanted the slogans ""Arrests, provocations and coercion cannot discourage us."", ""We will resist and succeed"" and ""We have paid a price; we will make them pay a price."" during that public gathering. 12. In its judgment, the Ankara Assize Court referred to Article 10 of the Convention as well as to the Court's judgment in the case of Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) ([GC], no. 26682/95, ECHR 1999‑IV) and the report of the European Commission of Human Rights in the case of Karataş v. Turkey (no. 23168/94, Commission's report of 11 December 1997). The court held that by chanting the above-mentioned slogans the applicants had not exercised their democratic rights but had glorified terror by adopting the style of discourse of terror organisations and that they had not distanced themselves from violence. In the court's view, by chanting those slogans the applicants had not intended to find a solution to a problem but had praised and glorified the source of the problem, that is to say, the terrorist organisations concerned. Hence, the applicants had incited terror. The Ankara Assize Court concluded that chanting the slogans in question could not be considered as falling within the scope of the right to freedom of expression. 13. On 8 July 2010 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 31 March 2009 in so far as it concerned the applicants' conviction. 14. On unspecified dates the applicants served their prison sentences.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While one, like the court, could argue that the applicants encouraged terrorism against democratic interests in national security, the context of protest and party membership makes it clear that this is personal opinion.", 28,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","5. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Chișinău. 6. The applicant has been involved in numerous protests against alleged acts of corruption and abuse committed by police officers, prosecutors and judges. He was himself the victim of police abuse, ill-treatment and prosecutorial inaction (see Mătăsaru and Saviţchi v. Moldova, no. 38281/08, 2 November 2010). Each year during the professional holiday of the prosecutors or the police he stages protests involving live animals, toilets, caricatures and masks. 7. On 29 January 2013, the professional holiday of prosecutors in Moldova, the applicant conducted a one person demonstration in front of the Prosecutor General's Office. According to him, the aim of the protest was to draw public attention to the corruption and the control exercised by politicians over the Prosecutor General's Office. At 10 a.m. he started his protest by installing two large wooden sculptures on the stairs of the Prosecutor General's Office. The first sculpture represented an erect penis with a picture of the face of a high-ranking politician attached to its head. The sculpture had a white collar and a tie and measured two metres. The second sculpture represented a large vulva with pictures of several high‑ranking prosecutors between the labia. The applicant also inflated balloons in the form of male genitals and attached them to the nearby trees. 8. The demonstration was observed from the beginning by several police officers and numerous journalists approached to interview the applicant. At 11 a.m. a police van approached, the sculptures were removed by police officers and the applicant was taken to a police station. 9. Later the applicant was charged with the criminal offence of hooliganism. The criminal investigation was conducted by a department of the Prosecutor General's Office whose head's picture had been attached to the sculpture of the vulva. 10. On 2 March 2015 the Râșcani District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to two years' imprisonment. The sentence was suspended for a period of three years. In deciding on the sanction to be applied, the court took into consideration the fact that the applicant had previously been sanctioned with fines for similar deeds and that those sanctions had proved to be inefficient. The court considered that the applicant's deeds had been immoral because he had exposed obscene sculptures in a public place where they could be seen by anyone, including by children. The court based its findings on the statements of several prosecution witnesses who had stated that they had disliked the sculptures exposed by the applicant and had considered them to be indecent and obscene. The court also stated that assimilating public officials with genitals went beyond the acceptable limits of criticism in a democratic society and was therefore not an act protected under Article 10 of the Convention. Moreover, the accusations meant to be made by the applicant by means of his protest against the officials concerned lacked a factual basis and had been contrary to the principle of presumption of innocence. 11. The applicant appealed against the above decision arguing, inter alia, that it ran contrary to his rights guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. 12. On 2 November 2015 the Chișinău Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal. 13. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court of Justice in which he reiterated his position that his conviction had been contrary to the provisions of the Convention and stated that the sculptures had represented a form of artistic expression which was to be protected under Article 10 of the Convention. He reiterated that his protest had been against the corruption within the Prosecutor General's Office and among high-ranking politicians, a phenomenon which was universally known and did not need to be proved. He also argued that the sculptures exposed by him could not be considered obscene. In any event, at the time of his protest, children were normally at schools and kindergartens. The fact that some of the prosecution witnesses disliked what they saw was not sufficient to hold him responsible for a criminal offence. The applicant admitted that the form of the protest chosen by him had been striking, however he considered this manner of protesting as the only way possible to make himself heard in a society which was oversaturated with subjects of discussion. The applicant finally submitted that the sanction applied to him had been disproportionately harsh and that it had had a chilling effect on him. He pointed to the fact that the first-instance court had admitted to having pursued the goal of discouraging his future involvement in protests. By the application of a suspended sentence, he had in fact been forced to abstain from organising further protests for a period of three years or risk being imprisoned. 14. On 20 April 2016 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant's appeal on points of law and upheld the judgments of the lower courts. The decision was notified to the applicant on 19 May 2016.",Ruled as violated by court,,"10. On 2 March 2015 the Râșcani District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to two years' imprisonment. The sentence was suspended for a period of three years. In deciding on the sanction to be applied, the court took into consideration the fact that the applicant had previously been sanctioned with fines for similar deeds and that those sanctions had proved to be inefficient. The court considered that the applicant's deeds had been immoral because he had exposed obscene sculptures in a public place where they could be seen by anyone, including by children. The court based its findings on the statements of several prosecution witnesses who had stated that they had disliked the sculptures exposed by the applicant and had considered them to be indecent and obscene. The court also stated that assimilating public officials with genitals went beyond the acceptable limits of criticism in a democratic society and was therefore not an act protected under Article 10 of the Convention. Moreover, the accusations meant to be made by the applicant by means of his protest against the officials concerned lacked a factual basis and had been contrary to the principle of presumption of innocence.",TRUE,2,The applicant has a right to free expression as displayed in the protest. One could also argue that the protest threatens democratic interests through infringing on the reputations of others and protected morals. , 29,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","5. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Slavonski Brod. 6. The applicant is a local political figure in Slavonski Brod. She was the head of administration for all kindergartens in Slavonski Brod, and during several local elections ran for mayor of that town. While the applicant held the position of head of administration for all kindergartens in Slavonski Brod, Z.B. sought and obtained employment in one of the kindergartens in Slavonski Brod as a teacher. One of the conditions for obtaining such employment was holding Croatian citizenship, and Z.B. presented a certificate confirming such citizenship. At a certain point in time Z.B., as an employee of a kindergarten in Slavonski Brod, was a subordinate of the applicant. In February 2008 Z.B. was appointed head of administration for all kindergartens in Slavonski Brod. 7. On 23 October 2008 the applicant held a press conference entitled ""All victims of the human resources policy of the mayor of Slavonski Brod, M.D."", where she alleged that the mayor of Slavonski Brod was involved in various irregularities in the employment of civil servants in local public institutions. The applicant thereby also alleged that the mayor had appointed Z.B. as the manager of a kindergarten run by the municipality even though she had used invalid documents and held only citizenship of the former Yugoslavia, and that together the mayor and Z.B. had denied a Croatian war veteran's daughter employment (see paragraph 11 below). 8. On 24 November 2008 Z.B. instituted a private prosecution against the applicant in the Slavonski Brod Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Slavonskom Bordu) on charges of defamation related to the above-mentioned statement. 9. During the proceedings the applicant contended that she had wanted to show all irregularities concerning the mayor's employment of local civil servants, and that she had learnt that Z.B. had requested Croatian citizenship only after she had been employed as manager of the kindergarten. The applicant also submitted that a councillor in the local assembly had provided her with certain documents concerning Z.B., including an annulled citizenship certificate. 10. On 21 May 2010 the Slavonski Brod Municipal Court acquitted the applicant on the grounds that the material obtained during the proceedings showed that Z.B. had been registered in 1985 in the register of births of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which at the time had been one of the former Yugoslav republics. She had been registered as a Croatian citizen on 13 October 2008, whereas she had lodged her application for employment at the kindergarten on 12 February 2008. In the circumstances, the Slavonski Brod Municipal Court considered that the applicant demonstrated the veracity of her statements. 11. On 23 May 2011, upon an appeal by Z.B., the Slavonski Brod County Court (Županijski sud u Slavonskom Brodu) quashed the first-instance judgment and ordered a retrial, on the grounds that not all of the relevant facts had been properly established. 12. After a retrial, on 26 January 2012 the Slavonski Brod Municipal Court found the applicant guilty of defamation for having said ""[the mayor] appointed people who are using invalid documents to crucial positions, for example Z.B., who unfortunately still has citizenship of the former Yugoslavia"" and ""[the mayor], together with his manager [Z.B.], fired a girl on the pretence that, as the child of a [Croatian] war veteran, she had no right to preferential treatment with regard to employment"". The applicant was given a suspended sentence of sixty days' imprisonment with a probation period of one year. The Slavonski Brod Municipal Court held that it was a well-known fact that Yugoslavia no longer existed, and that therefore Z.B. could not have Yugoslav citizenship. Moreover, Z.B. had acquired Croatian citizenship in 1992, but her citizenship certificate had later been annulled in 2008 due to some administrative irregularities, and later she had been issued with a new certificate. The Slavonski Brod Municipal Court therefore held that the applicant had uttered untrue information concerning Z.B. in public, amounting to defamation. The applicant was also ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings in the amount of 8,250 Croatian kunas (HRK). 13. The applicant appealed, and on 30 May 2012 the Slavonski Brod County Court dismissed her appeal, upholding the first-instance judgment. 14. The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), complaining, inter alia, that her freedom of expression had been violated by the judgments of the lower courts. 15. On 26 September 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant's constitutional complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. 16. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant's representative on 11 October 2012. 17. On 4 October 2007 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted Resolution 1577 (2007), ""Towards decriminalisation of defamation"", in which it urged those member States which still allowed prison sentences for defamation, even if those sentences were not actually imposed, to abolish them without delay.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. The applicant is a local political figure in Slavonski Brod. She was the head of administration for all kindergartens in Slavonski Brod, and during several local elections ran for mayor of that town. While the applicant held the position of head of administration for all kindergartens in Slavonski Brod, Z.B. sought and obtained employment in one of the kindergartens in Slavonski Brod as a teacher. One of the conditions for obtaining such employment was holding Croatian citizenship, and Z.B. presented a certificate confirming such citizenship. At a certain point in time Z.B., as an employee of a kindergarten in Slavonski Brod, was a subordinate of the applicant. In February 2008 Z.B. was appointed head of administration for all kindergartens in Slavonski Brod. 17. On 4 October 2007 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted Resolution 1577 (2007), ""Towards decriminalisation of defamation"", in which it urged those member States which still allowed prison sentences for defamation, even if those sentences were not actually imposed, to abolish them without delay.",TRUE,1,"While the applicant has a right to free expression about the mayor, it seems clear that they infringed upon the reputation of another.", 30,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","4. The applicant was born in 1977 and lived in Naberezhniye Chelny, Tatarstan Republic, before his conviction of an unrelated criminal offence. 5. On 7 April 2008 the applicant notified the executive committee of Naberezhniye Chelny of his intention to hold a public event in the form of a hunger strike in front of the local prosecutor's office beginning from 21 April 2008. On the same day the applicant was informed that his notice did not comply with the requirements of the law. 6. On 16 April 2008 the applicant lodged an addendum to his notice in which he indicated the place, the timing and the goal of the planned event as well as the information about its organiser. He also asked to ensure the protection of a tent (to be positioned near the prosecutor's office) from 9 p.m. to 9 a.m. daily and the twenty-four-hour presence of an ambulance at the venue of the event. 7. On 17 April 2008 the head of the public relations department of the local executive committee informed the applicant that his planned public event amounted to a ""picket"" within the meaning of the Public Events Act (hereinafter ""PEA""). In breach of the PEA the notice about the event did not contain information about the number of participants or arrangements to be made for preventing disorder and providing medical aid during the event. The applicant was required to align his notice with the PEA in that connection but, according to the Government, he failed to do so. 8. According to the applicant, on 22 April 2008 he started to hold a solo demonstration at noon and continued it until 4 p.m., when he was arrested by the police. 9. According to the Government, on 22 April 2008 at 3.15 p.m. the applicant set up on the lawn in front of the prosecutor's office a tent and a poster reading ""Hunger strike. Call for signatures"". He gathered passers-by and voiced his claims to them. At 3.40 p.m. a police officer drew up a record of an administrative offence allegedly committed by the applicant. He was accused of the breach of the procedure for the organisation of public events, an offence under Article 20.2 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter ""CAO""). The case file was then submitted to a justice of the peace, who adjourned the hearing so that the applicant could retain a counsel. It is unclear whether the applicant was arrested by the police or otherwise deprived of his liberty at any moment prior to appearing before the justice of the peace. 10. At 8 p.m. on the same day the applicant returned to the site near the prosecutor's office and resumed his demonstration. The police ordered him to terminate this allegedly unlawful public event, but he refused. They compiled an administrative offence record, stating that the applicant had committed an offence under Article 19.3 § 1 of the CAO; they also compiled an administrative arrest record (протокол административного задержания). The applicant was then taken to the central police station of Naberezhniye Chelny where he was detained until 24 April 2008 in the afternoon. 11. On 24 April 2008 the justice of the peace of the 8th Court Circuit of Naberezhniye Chelny found the applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 1 of the CAO and imposed a fine of 1,000 Russian roubles ((RUB), equivalent to 27 euros (EUR) at the time). The court noted that the applicant had intended to hold a non-stop hunger-strike making use of posters for an indefinite period of time; on 22 April 2008 he had held an unlawful picket by way of setting up a tent and a poster reading ""Hunger strike. Call for signatures"" as well as by gathering passers-by and ""campaigning"" among them. In breach of the PEA he had failed to specify his arrangements for preventing disorder or providing medical aid during the event. Moreover, the applicant had intended to hold a twenty-four-hour picket in breach of the PEA's ban on public events between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. The court concluded that the applicant breached the procedure for the organisation of his public event. 12. The applicant appealed to the Naberezhniye Chelny Town Court. By a decision of 7 May 2008 the Town Court upheld the judgment of the justice of the peace. 13. In separate proceedings, on 7 May 2008 the justice of the peace of the 1st Court Circuit of Naberezhniye Chelny found the applicant guilty under Article 19.3 § 1 of the CAO. The justice of the peace found it established, on the basis of testimony of two eyewitnesses and police officers, that at 8 p.m. on 22 April 2008 the applicant being aware of the administrative offence proceedings pending against him under Article 20.2 of the CAO, had nevertheless disobeyed the lawful police order to stop the picket being held in breach of the PEA. The court sentenced him to seven days of administrative detention. The applicant's detention from 9 p.m. on 22 April to 3.35 p.m. on 24 April 2008 counted towards his sentence of administrative detention. 14. The applicant appealed against the judgment to the Naberezhniye Chelny Town Court. On 8 May 2008 the Town Court upheld the judgment in a summary manner. 15. On 3 June 2008 the applicant lodged a supervisory-review appeal against the judgment of 7 May 2008. On 8 July 2008 the Deputy President of the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic dismissed it, fully endorsing the findings of the lower courts.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While public organization protocols serve meaningful democratic interests, the applicant's early compliance and lack of engagement with the public make it seem clear this was a personal expression.", 31,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","5. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Katowice. 6. The applicant is a former activist of an anti-communist opposition group, who was interned in 1982. 7. He observed the trial against three high-ranking members of the communist-era Military Council of National Salvation who had ordered the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981. 8. The trial in question, which lasted from 2007 until 2015, attracted a lot of public attention in Poland. 9. On 12 January 2012 the main defendant, General C.K. was convicted and sentenced to four years' imprisonment. This penalty was reduced by half under the Amnesty Act and its execution was suspended for five years in view of the defendant's old age and poor health. Another defendant was acquitted and another had her case discontinued. On 15 June 2015 the appellate court upheld the first-instance judgment. 10. The applicant was in the courtroom when on 12 January 2012 the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) was to deliver its judgment in the case described above. 11. At 1.30 p.m., after the judges had arrived in the courtroom, the applicant jumped behind the judge's table and shouted: ""This is a mockery of justice!"" (Tutaj trwa kpina z wymiaru sprawiedliwości). 12. The judges left the courtroom. 13. Some other members of the audience shouted ""Disgrace!"" and ""Court before the court!"" (Hańba and Sąd pod sąd). They were all holding up photos of victims of the communist regime. 14. The applicant was forcibly removed from the courtroom. 15. Shortly afterwards, he returned and continued shouting out similar statements joint by other members of the audience. In view of the audience's refusal to leave the courtroom, the judge who was presiding over the trial decided to announce the judgment from a different room. 16. At 3 p.m. the trial was resumed in a new room, with the public comprising only journalists. Here, in the applicant's absence, the Warsaw Regional Court imposed on him a disciplinary custodial penalty of fourteen days for contempt of court (""for the breach of the solemn nature, serenity and the course of court proceedings, to the degree making the announcement of the judgment impossible""). 17. On 12 January 2012 a written decision, in the form of an extract from the court minutes as described in the preceding paragraph, was issued to that effect. 18. The applicant submitted that he had not been served with that decision or informed of it. 19. On the day of the trial in question, that is 12 January 2012, a warrant was issued ordering the applicant's placement in a penal facility with a view to his serving the penalty. On 13 January 2012 a warrant to this effect was sent to Katowice police station together with a copy of the court's decision imposing the disciplinary punishment. 20. On 19 January 2012 the applicant was served with a warrant and then arrested so that he could be committed to Warsaw Remand Centre to serve the penalty in a closed regime. 21. On 22 January 2012 the applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal against the decision imposing the custodial penalty. He argued that his one-minute statement had not disturbed the court to such an extent as to make it impossible to announce the judgment. He also submitted that if the presiding judge had told him to return to his seat, he would have complied. Since only a copy of the first page of the applicant's appeal has been submitted to the Court, it is unclear whether the applicant had also raised the argument of the lack of impartiality of the judges who had punished him for contempt of court. 22. On 30 January 2012 this appeal was registered with the Registry of the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny). 23. On 31 January 2012 the applicant's appeal was transferred to the Warsaw Regional Court for comment. 24. On 1 February 2012 the appeal together with the Regional Court's comments was received by the Warsaw Court of Appeal. The appellate hearing was scheduled for 23 February 2012. 25. On 2 February 2012 – the fourteenth day of the applicant's detention – the Prison Board of the Warsaw Remand Centre decided that the applicant should be detained under a semi-open regime (with the possibility to leave his cell during the day). 26. Following that decision, the applicant was transferred for several hours to a remand centre with a semi-open regime. 27. He was released later that day. 28. On an unspecified date, the appellate hearing was rescheduled because of the judge's illness for 22 March 2012. 29. On 22 March 2012 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's interlocutory appeal, finding that the applicant's disrespectful behaviour had interfered with the solemn nature of court proceedings and with the court's dignity, and had disrupted the proceedings. His action had provoked the audience to shout similar slogans. It had been premeditated as the applicant had known that the announcement of the judgment had been scheduled for live media broadcast. The court also considered that the applicant's behaviour could not be explained by an emotional disagreement with the court's ruling because at the time of the incident the applicant had been unaware of the outcome of the trial. The applicant had wished to disturb the order of the proceedings irrespective of their result. In the domestic court's view, imposing a more lenient penalty would have sanctioned unaccountability and would have lacked a deterrent effect.",Ruled as violated by court,,"11. At 1.30 p.m., after the judges had arrived in the courtroom, the applicant jumped behind the judge's table and shouted: ""This is a mockery of justice!"" (Tutaj trwa kpina z wymiaru sprawiedliwości). 17. On 12 January 2012 a written decision, in the form of an extract from the court minutes as described in the preceding paragraph, was issued to that effect.",TRUE,2,"The applicant has a right to free expression as displayed in their reaction to the court case. However, there is also a meaningful democratic interest in maintaining the judiciary.", 32,"Article 10 Freedom of expression 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.","5. The first applicant (Mr Ryklin) was born in 1958. The second applicant (Mr Sharov) was born in 1956. Both applicants are human rights activists and pro-democracy campaigners. They both live in Moscow. 6. On 21 April 2015 the applicants, with three others, sent written notification to the Moscow Mayor's office of their intention to hold a demonstration with some 15,000 participants from 7 p.m. to 10 p.m. on 6 May 2015 in Bolotnaya Square. After the expiry of the statutory period for the authority's reply, on 28 April 2015 the applicants wrote a letter to the Mayor's office stating that they considered the event of 6 May 2015 to have been approved by the Mayor. 7. On 27 April 2015 the Regional Security and Anti-Corruption Department of Moscow telephoned the applicants and suggested that the event be held on Marshal Vasilevskiy Street. On 30 April 2015 the Department repeated this proposal in a letter. The event organisers were also warned that if they rejected this proposal they would not be allowed to hold a public event at all. 8. According to the applicants, they informed all possible participants in the demonstration about its cancellation by way of posting information on the internet and via various mass-media outlets. 9. At around 7.05 p.m. both the applicants arrived in Bolotnaya Square, where they saw a gathering of some fifty people standing quietly, without any banners. According to the applicants, each positioned himself at a distance from other people with a political banner. The applicants considered that each of them was staging a solo demonstration which did not require prior notification of the authorities. A few minutes later the applicants were arrested and taken to a police van. 10. According to the Government, on 6 May 2015 the applicants, acting in a group of fifty people, organised and held a public assembly without prior notification being given to the authorities. The applicants called upon others to shout the slogans ""Freedom to political prisoners"", ""Death to fascists"" and others; the second applicant held a banner stating that all ""Bolotnaya participants"" were innocent. The applicants did not respond to the multiple demands by the police that they cease their actions, and at 7.35 p.m. they were taken to the Yakimanka district police station. 11. According to the records of transfer to the police station (протоколы доставления) and the administrative arrest records, the first applicant was brought to the police station at 7.40 p.m. on 6 May 2015 and placed under administrative arrest at the same time. The second applicant was brought to the police station at 7.25 p.m. and placed under administrative arrest at 7.40 p.m. The records of the transfer contained an indication that both applicants were taken to the police station for an administrative offence record to be drawn up. 12. According to the Government, the term of the applicants' retention in the police station was extended to forty-eight hours. On 6 May 2015 at 10.15 p.m. the first applicant was transported to the police station in Zamoskvorechye District of Moscow. On 7 May 2015 at 4 p.m. he was taken to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow. The second applicant was taken to that same court on 7 May 2015 at 4.10 p.m. 13. At the police stations both applicants were accused of organising and holding a group public event without notifying the authorities in advance, in breach of Article 20.2 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter ""the CAO""). In particular, they called upon others to shout political slogans; the second applicant had a banner. 14. On 7 May 2015 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court convicted the first applicant under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to ten days' detention. The court found that the first applicant, with the second applicant, had organised and held a group public event in the form of a ""meeting"" with about fifty participants, without notifying the authorities in advance. It dismissed the applicant's argument that he had staged a solo demonstration, after considering it as a line of defence. The court also refused to admit in evidence a video recording of the events in Bolotnaya Square, because it was ""undated and did not contain the entire chronology of events preceding [the applicant's] arrest"". 15. On the same day the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court heard the case against the second applicant. The court reiterated the description of the administrative offence imputed to the first applicant, found the second applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO, and sentenced him to ten days' detention. The court dismissed the evidence of two eyewitnesses who stated that the second applicant had been standing alone on the bridge with a banner. It also refused to admit in evidence video recordings and photographs showing the second applicant, because neither of them contained ""information about the address"". 16. Both the applicants appealed, insisting that they had staged solo demonstrations. On 13 May 2015 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgments. Referring to the statutory definition of a ""meeting"" (the presence of people in a specific place in order to publicly express their opinions, essentially on social and political issues), the appellate court considered that some fifty people had been present in Bolotnaya Square, including the applicants, who had called on others to shout political slogans.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"The applicants have rights to free expression. Still, public organization protocols serve meaningful democratic interests, which the applicants appear to have flouted by demonstrating despite the notice of cancellation.", 33,"Article 11 Freedom of assembly and association 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.","4. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Mersin. 5. The applicant is a teacher in primary school and at the material time she was a member and secretary of the local branch of the trade union of Education and Science Workers (Eğitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası). 6. On 28 November 2008 the applicant participated in a demonstration organised by the above mentioned trade union on the theme ""No to violence against women"". 7. On 29 June 2009 the District Directorate of National Education imposed a disciplinary sanction in the form of a reprimand on the applicant for her participation in the aforementioned demonstration under Article 125 of the Law no. 657 on Civil Servants. 8. On 10 July 2009 the applicant objected to this decision and requested its annulment. 9. On 29 July 2009 the Disciplinary Board of the Yenişehir district governor dismissed the applicant's objection considering that the contested decision was in accordance with law and there were no grounds for its annulment.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,The applicant has a clear right to assemble with a union., 34,"Article 11 Freedom of assembly and association 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.","4. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Antalya. 5. The applicant is a teacher in a high school. At the material time he was a member of the local branch of the trade union of Education and Science Workers (Eğitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası). 6. In May 2009, disciplinary proceedings were instituted against the applicant for putting up a notice encouraging the participation in a press statement published by his Union on the notice board that was set aside for that particular purpose in their office, and for distributing it in one of the common areas at school. 7. On 30 September 2009 the District Directorate of National Education imposed a disciplinary sanction in the form of a reprimand on him, for putting up and distributing notices produced by the trade union, of which he was a member, under Article 125 of the Law no. 657 on Civil Servants. 8. On 6 October 2009 the applicant objected to this decision and requested its annulment. 9. On 15 October 2009 the Disciplinary Board of the Kepez district governor dismissed the applicant's objection considering that the contested decision was in accordance with law and there were no grounds for its annulment.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,The applicant has a clear right to assemble with a union., 35,"Article 11 Freedom of assembly and association 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.","4. The applicants were born in 1961 and 1967 respectively and live in Mersin and Diyarbakır. 5. The applicants were civil servants for tax offices attached to the Ministry of Finance in Mersin and Diyarbakır. At the material time they were members of the local branch of the trade union Büro Emekçileri, which is affiliated to Trades Union Confederation of Public Employees (Kamu Emekçileri Sendikaları Konfederasyonu-""KESK""). 6. In March and April 2009, the applicants were informed of the disciplinary investigations that were initiated against them for having participated in a statement to the press organised by the trade union of which they were members and were invited to send their defence submissions. 7. Subsequently, the disciplinary sanctions of warning and reprimand were imposed on the applicants for their participation in the aforementioned trade union activities under Section 125 of the Law no. 657 on Civil Servants. 8. The applicants objected to these decisions and requested their annulment. 9. In May 2009 the Disciplinary Board of the tax offices dismissed the applicants' objections considering that the contested decisions were in accordance with law and there were no grounds for annulment.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,The applicants have a clear right to assemble with a union., 36,"Article 11 Freedom of assembly and association 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.","4. The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Erzincan. 5. The applicant was a civil servant in the Erzincan Provincial Directorate of Environment and Forestry, and at the time of the events he was a member of the local branch of a trade union affiliated to KESK (Kamu Emekçileri Sendikaları Konfederasyonu – Confederation of Public Employees' Trade Unions). 6. On 27 November 2004 and 12 December 2004 respectively, the applicant participated in a press statement and a demonstration organised by his trade union. 7. Subsequently, a disciplinary investigation was initiated against the applicant for his participation in the above mentioned trade union activities. 8. On 31 August 2005 a disciplinary sanction in the form of a reduction in salary was imposed on the applicant for having participated in trade union activities. 9. On 27 October 2005 the applicant filed a petition with the Sivas Administrative Court and requested the annulment of the disciplinary sanction that had been imposed on him. 10. On 18 May 2006 the Sivas Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's request, considering that the administrative decision was in accordance with law and there were no grounds for its annulment. 11. On 20 October 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of the Sivas Administrative Court.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,The applicant has a clear right to assemble with a union., 37,"Article 11 Freedom of assembly and association 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.","5. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Istanbul. 6. At the material time, the applicant was a civil servant in the Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul and a member of the local branch of the Tümbel-Sen trade union, which is affiliated to the KESK (Kamu Emekçileri Sendikaları Konfederasyonu – the Confederation of Public Employees' Trade Unions). 7. In April 2008 two of the largest trade unions, namely the DİSK (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu – Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Trade Unions) and the KESK (Kamu Emekçileri Sendikaları Konfederasyonu – Confederation of Public Employees' Trade Unions) announced that they were planning a large scale demonstration in Istanbul for 1 May 2008 and that their members would be gathering to celebrate the Labour Day and to commemorate their friends who had lost their lives during the demonstrations of 1 May 1977. 8. In May 2008 the applicant was informed that a disciplinary investigation had been initiated against him for being absent without leave on 1 May 2008 and he was asked to submit his defence submissions. The applicant explained that he had participated in a demonstration organised by his trade union on that day to celebrate International Labour Day. 9. Subsequently, the applicant was given a warning as a disciplinary sanction owing to his being absent without leave on 1 May 2008 pursuant to section 125 of the Civil Servants Act (Law no. 657). 10. On 13 May 2008 the applicant objected to the decision and requested its annulment. 11. On 16 May 2008 the Disciplinary Board of the Istanbul Municipality dismissed the applicant's objection, finding that the contested decision was in accordance with the law and that there were no grounds to annul it.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,The applicant has a clear right to assemble with a union. Being absent without leave does not rise to the level necessary for democratic interest intervention., 38,"Article 11 Freedom of assembly and association 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.","5. The applicants, who are husband and wife, were born in 1970 and live in Chișinău. 6. On 29 January 2008 the applicants were involved in a peaceful street protest as a result of which they were arrested and detained for six hours and forty‑five minutes. On 18 December 2008 the first applicant was again involved in a peaceful street protest, as a result of which he was arrested and detained for approximately four hours and a half. Later both applicants were acquitted and the actions of the police were found to be unlawful. The facts concerning those protests were described in detail in Mătăsaru and Saviţchi v. Moldova, no. 38281/08, §§ 6-58, 2 November 2010. 7. On 29 January 2009 the first applicant organised again a street protest and was arrested again and detained for some six hours. Later the applicant was acquitted and the actions of the police were found to be unlawful. 8. On 2 November 2010 the Court adopted a judgment in the case of Mătăsaru and Saviţchi (cited above), in which it declared inadmissible the applicants' complaints concerning the alleged breaches of their rights guaranteed by Articles 5 and 11 of the Convention on the ground of their failure to exhaust domestic remedies (see Mătăsaru and Saviţchi (cited above, § 75). 9. After that, the applicants brought a civil action under Law 1545 (on compensation for damage caused by illegal acts of the criminal investigation bodies, the prosecution authorities or the courts) seeking compensation in respect of the breach of their rights guaranteed by Articles 5 and 11 of the Convention in regard to all three street protests of 2008 and 2009. 10. By a final judgment of 6 February 2013 the Supreme Court of Justice acknowledged the breach of the applicnts' rights guaranteed by Articles 5 and 11 of the Convention and awarded them the equivalent of 900 and 270 euros (EUR), respectively.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,"The applicants have a clear right to assemble with a union. Both protests were peaceful, not rising to the level of threatening democratic interests.",edited by me to remove ambiguity in fact pattern 39,"Article 11 Freedom of assembly and association 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.","5. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Adana. 6. On 16 February 2006 a gathering was held in Adana on the anniversary of the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), an illegal armed organisation. The protesters gathered in front of the building of the Adana branch of the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi) (DTP), where a press statement was read out. Being a member of the DTP, the applicant participated in the gathering. 7. Subsequently, clashes occurred between police officers and some demonstrators who were attempting to block the traffic. According to police reports, two police officers were injured as a result of objects thrown from the DTP building. The police then entered the DTP building and arrested 223 people, including the applicant. The next day, the applicant was detained on remand. 8. On 10 March 2006 the Adana public prosecutor charged the applicant and sixteen other people with membership of the PKK under Articles 220 § 6 and 314 of the Criminal Code. The prosecutor alleged that the accused had participated in the public gathering in question in response to calls made by the PKK and had resisted the police officers, and that they had therefore acted on behalf of the PKK. 9. On 5 May 2006 the applicant was released pending trial. 10. On 10 September 2008 the Adana Assize Court convicted the applicant under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). The assize court did not find it established that the applicant had attended the reading out of the press statement in response to calls made by the PKK or that she had injured any police officers. It therefore concluded that the applicant could not be convicted of membership of the PKK or resistance to the police. The court nonetheless considered that on 16 February 2006 the applicant had gone to the DTP building with a view to disseminating propaganda in support of the PKK and that she should therefore be convicted under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. The applicant was sentenced to ten months' imprisonment. 11. Taking into account the applicant's good behaviour during the trial and the absence of any previous criminal record, the court suspended the pronouncement of her conviction on condition that she did not commit another intentional offence for a period of five years, under Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hükmün açıklanmasının geri bırakılması). 12. On 20 November 2008 the court dismissed an objection lodged by the applicant against the above-mentioned decision. The final decision was served on the applicant on 9 January 2009.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"The applicant has a right to assemble with the party, but one could argue, as the prosecutor does, that this protest interferes with democratic interests in national security and preventing disorder.", 40,"Article 11 Freedom of assembly and association 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.","5. The United Civil Aviation Trade Union (""the first applicant"") is a trade union registered in Budapest. Mr A. Csorba (""the second applicant"") is a Hungarian national who was born in 1970 and lives in Vecsés. He is the President of the United Civil Aviation Trade Union. 6. On 12 October 2012 the second applicant applied to the Budapest police department for authorisation to hold a demonstration on the road leading to Budapest Ferenc Liszt International Airport. He stated that the demonstration would be held on the hard shoulder of the road, which was not ordinarily used for traffic. The declared objectives of the demonstration were, inter alia, to draw the public's attention to the precarious financial situation in which the employees of the airport would find themselves if salary cuts envisaged by the company managing the airport were carried out. The event was scheduled to be held between 3 p.m. and 5 p.m. on 17 October 2012. The second applicant also specified that it was expected that about fifty to 100 persons would participate in the event and that it was intended that speeches would be given and that an open letter would be read out. 7. On 14 October 2012 the Budapest police department registered the application and informed the second applicant that, in order to clarify details regarding the programme of the demonstration and the number of police officers that would be required to secure the event, it was necessary to schedule a meeting with the organisers. 8. The second applicant and the Vice-President of the United Civil Aviation Trade Union met with the representatives of the Monor police department on the same day. The representative of the police department suggested that the demonstration be held at another location, since the planned venue would endanger traffic. The second applicant assured the police that the demonstrators would respect traffic rules, would only occupy the part of the road not used for traffic and would distribute flyers to car passengers, and that the organisers would call off or halt the demonstration if it was not in compliance with the relevant legal provisions. 9. On 14 October 2012 the Monor police department forbade the demonstration. It was of the view that the planned demonstration would endanger traffic and would render the airport inaccessible, infringing passengers' right to leave the country. In any event, the demonstration would breach the traffic code, since those parts of the road not used for traffic were not supposed to be accessed by pedestrians or be used for parking. 10. On 17 October 2012 the applicants requested judicial review of the decision, relying on their right to freedom of expression and to freedom of assembly. They argued that a demonstration could only be forbidden on the grounds of a need to ensure traffic safety if there were no alternative means of access to the airport. In their view the demonstration would not constitute any greater hindrance to traffic than would roadworks. 11. By a decision of 19 October 2012 the Budapest Surroundings High Court (Budapest Környéki Törvényszék) dismissed their complaint, endorsing in essence the police department's reasoning (see paragraph 9 above).",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. On 12 October 2012 the second applicant applied to the Budapest police department for authorisation to hold a demonstration on the road leading to Budapest Ferenc Liszt International Airport. He stated that the demonstration would be held on the hard shoulder of the road, which was not ordinarily used for traffic. The declared objectives of the demonstration were, inter alia, to draw the public's attention to the precarious financial situation in which the employees of the airport would find themselves if salary cuts envisaged by the company managing the airport were carried out. The event was scheduled to be held between 3 p.m. and 5 p.m. on 17 October 2012. The second applicant also specified that it was expected that about fifty to 100 persons would participate in the event and that it was intended that speeches would be given and that an open letter would be read out. 8. The second applicant and the Vice-President of the United Civil Aviation Trade Union met with the representatives of the Monor police department on the same day. The representative of the police department suggested that the demonstration be held at another location, since the planned venue would endanger traffic. The second applicant assured the police that the demonstrators would respect traffic rules, would only occupy the part of the road not used for traffic and would distribute flyers to car passengers, and that the organisers would call off or halt the demonstration if it was not in compliance with the relevant legal provisions. 9. On 14 October 2012 the Monor police department forbade the demonstration. It was of the view that the planned demonstration would endanger traffic and would render the airport inaccessible, infringing passengers' right to leave the country. In any event, the demonstration would breach the traffic code, since those parts of the road not used for traffic were not supposed to be accessed by pedestrians or be used for parking. 11. By a decision of 19 October 2012 the Budapest Surroundings High Court (Budapest Környéki Törvényszék) dismissed their complaint, endorsing in essence the police department's reasoning (see paragraph 9 above).",TRUE,1,"While one, like the police department, could argue that the applicant interfered with democratic interests of public order and safety through impeding traffic, the applicants' arguments make it seem clear this would be possible as a peaceful, non-interfering protest.", 41,"Article 11 Freedom of assembly and association 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.","5. The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Zheleznodorozhnyy, Moscow Region. 6. The applicant was a locomotive driver with Russian Railways in the Moscow Region. He was a member of one of the railway workers' trade unions, Rosprofzhel (""the trade union""). 7. On 7 April 2008 the trade union entered into negotiations with Russian Railways, seeking a general pay raise and the introduction of long‑service bonuses for the relevant staff. As the negotiations failed, the trade union decided to organise a strike. On 25 April 2008 the trade union committee decided that the staff of Russian Railways in two suburban Moscow sectors should participate in the strike as from 4 a.m. on 28 April 2008. The trade union committee's decision referred to minimum services which would be provided during the strike, although the parties have not made any submissions in this regard. 8. Russian Railways did not apply to the courts for the strike to be declared unlawful. On 28 April 2008 the applicant took part in the strike. He came to work but refused to take up his duties. The strike caused delays in circulation of the trains in the sector where the applicant worked. 9. On 9 July 2008 the applicant was dismissed for two breaches of disciplinary rules. The first breach ascribed to him had had no relation to his trade union activities. (A year previously, on 8 June 2007, the applicant had been officially reprimanded for having stopped the train 50 metres after the platform). The second breach was the applicant's refusal to take up his duties during the strike on 28 April 2008. 10. The applicant complained to a court that he should not have been dismissed for having participated in the strike organised by his trade union. 11. On 19 August 2008 the case was heard by the Meschanskiy District Court of Moscow (""the District Court""). The court confirmed the lawfulness of the applicant's dismissal for a repeated failure to properly perform his professional duties. Regarding the applicant's participation in the strike, the court relied on the Railway Acts of 1995 and 2003 (Articles 17 and 26 (2) respectively – see paragraphs 15 and 17 below). The Acts prohibited strikes of railway workers responsible, inter alia, for the circulation of trains, shunting, and services to passengers. The court stressed that those limitations were aimed at securing safety on the railway and that railway workers were subjected to stricter disciplinary rules than workers in other sectors of industry. The applicant was a locomotive driver; therefore, his work was directly linked to the circulation of trains, shunting, and the provision of services to passengers. The District Court concluded that the applicant had been precluded from participating in the strike. Relying on a report dated 29 April 2008 issued by the Moscow Interregional Transport Prosecutor's Office, the District Court furthermore noted that the strike had caused a number of cancelled and delayed trains which had resulted in ""massive violations of the rights and lawful interests of citizens, leading to their belated arrival at their workplaces and educational institutions, at medical facilities providing health care, [and] for long-distance trains, bus runs and flights"". The strike had also ""contributed to the mass gathering of people on railway platforms, which [had] directly threatened their safety"". Given the above and the applicant's earlier transgression, his dismissal had been justified. The District Court did not discuss the question of whether advance notice of the strike had been given or other issues related to the lawfulness of the strike of 28 April 2008. 12. On 29 January 2009, following an appeal by the applicant, the Moscow City Court confirmed the judgment of 19 August 2008.",Ruled as violated by court,,"11. On 19 August 2008 the case was heard by the Meschanskiy District Court of Moscow (""the District Court""). The court confirmed the lawfulness of the applicant's dismissal for a repeated failure to properly perform his professional duties. Regarding the applicant's participation in the strike, the court relied on the Railway Acts of 1995 and 2003 (Articles 17 and 26 (2) respectively – see paragraphs 15 and 17 below). The Acts prohibited strikes of railway workers responsible, inter alia, for the circulation of trains, shunting, and services to passengers. The court stressed that those limitations were aimed at securing safety on the railway and that railway workers were subjected to stricter disciplinary rules than workers in other sectors of industry. The applicant was a locomotive driver; therefore, his work was directly linked to the circulation of trains, shunting, and the provision of services to passengers. The District Court concluded that the applicant had been precluded from participating in the strike. Relying on a report dated 29 April 2008 issued by the Moscow Interregional Transport Prosecutor's Office, the District Court furthermore noted that the strike had caused a number of cancelled and delayed trains which had resulted in ""massive violations of the rights and lawful interests of citizens, leading to their belated arrival at their workplaces and educational institutions, at medical facilities providing health care, [and] for long-distance trains, bus runs and flights"". The strike had also ""contributed to the mass gathering of people on railway platforms, which [had] directly threatened their safety"". Given the above and the applicant's earlier transgression, his dismissal had been justified. The District Court did not discuss the question of whether advance notice of the strike had been given or other issues related to the lawfulness of the strike of 28 April 2008. 12. On 29 January 2009, following an appeal by the applicant, the Moscow City Court confirmed the judgment of 19 August 2008.",TRUE,2,"The applicant has a clear right to assemble with a union. At the same time, one, like the district court, could argue that the lack of work as a locomotive driver endangered public safety. ", 42,"Article 11 Freedom of assembly and association 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.","4. The applicants were born in 1984 and 1979 respectively and live in Moscow. 5. On 14 December 2012 the State Duma adopted at first reading a draft law which, in particular, prohibited adoption of children of Russian nationality by US citizens. 6. On 17 December 2012 the official daily newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta announced that the second reading was scheduled for 19 December 2012. 7. According to the applicants, they read on various online social networks that many people intended to stage solo ""pickets"" (одиночные пикеты) on 19 December 2012 in front of the State Duma to express their opposition to the draft law. The format of solo ""pickets"" was chosen because there was no longer time to observe the minimum statutory three‑day notification period for other types of (group) events. 8. The applicants decided to hold their own solo ""pickets"" and at around 9 a.m. positioned themselves, holding banners, in the vicinity of the State Duma at some distance from other protesters (see also Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, nos. 57818/09 and 14 others, §§ 206-15, 7 February 2017). 9. According to the applicants, they were arrested by the police several minutes later and brought to a police station. At 10.30 a.m. the police drew up a record of the administrative escorting (протокол административного доставления) in respect of each applicant. A record of administrative arrest (протокол административного задержания), drawn up at the same time, stated that the applicants had arrived at the police station at 10.30 a.m. The first applicant, Mr Tsukanov, made a handwritten note on his arrest record that he had been actually apprehended at 9.20 a.m. The second applicant, Mr Torchinskiy, made a handwritten note on his escorting record that he had been actually apprehended at 9.30 a.m. 10. At the police station both applicants were accused of organising and holding a group public event without prior notification, in breach of Article 20.2 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter, ""CAO""). The administrative offence records indicate that the offences were committed at 10 a.m. The first applicant made a handwritten note that he came to the event venue at 9 a.m. and was arrested at 9.20 a.m. 11. The first applicant was released at 1.20 p.m. The second applicant was released at 1.10 p.m. 12. On 15 January 2013 the justice of the peace of the 369th Court Circuit of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the second applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB), (about 495 euros (EUR) at the time). The justice of the peace found it established, on the basis of the records and testimony of police officers, that the applicant had taken part in a ""picket"" involving fifty people. That ""picket"" was unlawful because no notification had been submitted by the organisers as required by the Public Events Act (hereinafter ""PEA""). The applicant had waved a banner, thereby attracting the attention of passers-by and journalists assembled for the occasion. He had not complied with the police order to stop picketing. 13. On 6 February 2013 the justice of the peace of the 369th Court Circuit of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the first applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of RUB 20,000 (about EUR 495 at the time), with the reasoning identical to that in the judgment of 15 January 2013. The justice of the peace also relied on police reports and testimony of a police officer who had apprehended the first applicant at the venue of the public event. 14. Both applicants appealed, insisting that each of them had held a solo demonstration which did not require prior notification of the authorities. The first applicant also pointed out that he had been arrested earlier than indicated in the arrest record. 15. On 13 February and 11 March 2013 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow upheld the judgments concerning the second and the first applicant respectively. 16. The second applicant applied for review of the court decisions under Article 30.12 of the CAO. On 28 June 2013 the Deputy President of the Moscow City Court partly allowed his complaint and changed the classification of the administrative charge against him. The second applicant was found guilty of the breach of the established procedure for the conduct of public events committed by a participant, an offence punishable under Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO. His fine was reduced to RUB 10,000 (about EUR 233 at the time).",Ruled as violated by court,,"5. On 14 December 2012 the State Duma adopted at first reading a draft law which, in particular, prohibited adoption of children of Russian nationality by US citizens. 6. On 17 December 2012 the official daily newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta announced that the second reading was scheduled for 19 December 2012. 7. According to the applicants, they read on various online social networks that many people intended to stage solo ""pickets"" (одиночные пикеты) on 19 December 2012 in front of the State Duma to express their opposition to the draft law. The format of solo ""pickets"" was chosen because there was no longer time to observe the minimum statutory three‑day notification period for other types of (group) events. 9. According to the applicants, they were arrested by the police several minutes later and brought to a police station. At 10.30 a.m. the police drew up a record of the administrative escorting (протокол административного доставления) in respect of each applicant. A record of administrative arrest (протокол административного задержания), drawn up at the same time, stated that the applicants had arrived at the police station at 10.30 a.m. The first applicant, Mr Tsukanov, made a handwritten note on his arrest record that he had been actually apprehended at 9.20 a.m. The second applicant, Mr Torchinskiy, made a handwritten note on his escorting record that he had been actually apprehended at 9.30 a.m. 10. At the police station both applicants were accused of organising and holding a group public event without prior notification, in breach of Article 20.2 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter, ""CAO""). The administrative offence records indicate that the offences were committed at 10 a.m. The first applicant made a handwritten note that he came to the event venue at 9 a.m. and was arrested at 9.20 a.m. 12. On 15 January 2013 the justice of the peace of the 369th Court Circuit of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the second applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB), (about 495 euros (EUR) at the time). The justice of the peace found it established, on the basis of the records and testimony of police officers, that the applicant had taken part in a ""picket"" involving fifty people. That ""picket"" was unlawful because no notification had been submitted by the organisers as required by the Public Events Act (hereinafter ""PEA""). The applicant had waved a banner, thereby attracting the attention of passers-by and journalists assembled for the occasion. He had not complied with the police order to stop picketing. 13. On 6 February 2013 the justice of the peace of the 369th Court Circuit of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the first applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of RUB 20,000 (about EUR 495 at the time), with the reasoning identical to that in the judgment of 15 January 2013. The justice of the peace also relied on police reports and testimony of a police officer who had apprehended the first applicant at the venue of the public event. 16. The second applicant applied for review of the court decisions under Article 30.12 of the CAO. On 28 June 2013 the Deputy President of the Moscow City Court partly allowed his complaint and changed the classification of the administrative charge against him. The second applicant was found guilty of the breach of the established procedure for the conduct of public events committed by a participant, an offence punishable under Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO. His fine was reduced to RUB 10,000 (about EUR 233 at the time).",TRUE,1,"While public organization protocols serve meaningful democratic interests, the applicants have a clear right to assemble peacefully.", 43,"Article 11 Freedom of assembly and association 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.","5. The first applicant (Mr Ryklin) was born in 1958. The second applicant (Mr Sharov) was born in 1956. Both applicants are human rights activists and pro-democracy campaigners. They both live in Moscow. 6. On 21 April 2015 the applicants, with three others, sent written notification to the Moscow Mayor's office of their intention to hold a demonstration with some 15,000 participants from 7 p.m. to 10 p.m. on 6 May 2015 in Bolotnaya Square. After the expiry of the statutory period for the authority's reply, on 28 April 2015 the applicants wrote a letter to the Mayor's office stating that they considered the event of 6 May 2015 to have been approved by the Mayor. 7. On 27 April 2015 the Regional Security and Anti-Corruption Department of Moscow telephoned the applicants and suggested that the event be held on Marshal Vasilevskiy Street. On 30 April 2015 the Department repeated this proposal in a letter. The event organisers were also warned that if they rejected this proposal they would not be allowed to hold a public event at all. 8. According to the applicants, they informed all possible participants in the demonstration about its cancellation by way of posting information on the internet and via various mass-media outlets. 9. At around 7.05 p.m. both the applicants arrived in Bolotnaya Square, where they saw a gathering of some fifty people standing quietly, without any banners. According to the applicants, each positioned himself at a distance from other people with a political banner. The applicants considered that each of them was staging a solo demonstration which did not require prior notification of the authorities. A few minutes later the applicants were arrested and taken to a police van. 10. According to the Government, on 6 May 2015 the applicants, acting in a group of fifty people, organised and held a public assembly without prior notification being given to the authorities. The applicants called upon others to shout the slogans ""Freedom to political prisoners"", ""Death to fascists"" and others; the second applicant held a banner stating that all ""Bolotnaya participants"" were innocent. The applicants did not respond to the multiple demands by the police that they cease their actions, and at 7.35 p.m. they were taken to the Yakimanka district police station. 11. According to the records of transfer to the police station (протоколы доставления) and the administrative arrest records, the first applicant was brought to the police station at 7.40 p.m. on 6 May 2015 and placed under administrative arrest at the same time. The second applicant was brought to the police station at 7.25 p.m. and placed under administrative arrest at 7.40 p.m. The records of the transfer contained an indication that both applicants were taken to the police station for an administrative offence record to be drawn up. 12. According to the Government, the term of the applicants' retention in the police station was extended to forty-eight hours. On 6 May 2015 at 10.15 p.m. the first applicant was transported to the police station in Zamoskvorechye District of Moscow. On 7 May 2015 at 4 p.m. he was taken to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow. The second applicant was taken to that same court on 7 May 2015 at 4.10 p.m. 13. At the police stations both applicants were accused of organising and holding a group public event without notifying the authorities in advance, in breach of Article 20.2 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter ""the CAO""). In particular, they called upon others to shout political slogans; the second applicant had a banner. 14. On 7 May 2015 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court convicted the first applicant under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to ten days' detention. The court found that the first applicant, with the second applicant, had organised and held a group public event in the form of a ""meeting"" with about fifty participants, without notifying the authorities in advance. It dismissed the applicant's argument that he had staged a solo demonstration, after considering it as a line of defence. The court also refused to admit in evidence a video recording of the events in Bolotnaya Square, because it was ""undated and did not contain the entire chronology of events preceding [the applicant's] arrest"". 15. On the same day the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court heard the case against the second applicant. The court reiterated the description of the administrative offence imputed to the first applicant, found the second applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO, and sentenced him to ten days' detention. The court dismissed the evidence of two eyewitnesses who stated that the second applicant had been standing alone on the bridge with a banner. It also refused to admit in evidence video recordings and photographs showing the second applicant, because neither of them contained ""information about the address"". 16. Both the applicants appealed, insisting that they had staged solo demonstrations. On 13 May 2015 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgments. Referring to the statutory definition of a ""meeting"" (the presence of people in a specific place in order to publicly express their opinions, essentially on social and political issues), the appellate court considered that some fifty people had been present in Bolotnaya Square, including the applicants, who had called on others to shout political slogans.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"The applicants have rights to assemble peacefully. Still, public organization protocols serve meaningful democratic interests, which the applicants appear to have flouted by demonstrating despite the notice of cancellation.", 44,"Article 11 Freedom of assembly and association 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.","5. The first applicant (Ms Makarova) was born in 1989 and lived in Moscow. The second applicant (Ms Astakhova) was born in 1985 and lives in Mytishchi, Moscow Region. The third applicant (Ms Fokht‑Babushkina) was born in 1994 and lives in Moscow. 6. On 14 December 2012 the State Duma, the lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia, adopted at first reading a draft law which, in particular, prohibited the adoption of children of Russian nationality by citizens of the United States of America. 7. On 17 December 2012 the official daily newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta announced that the second reading of the draft law was scheduled for 19 December 2012. 8. According to the first applicant, she had read on various online social networks that many people intended to stage solo demonstrations (одиночные пикеты) on 19 December 2012 in front of the State Duma to express their opposition to the draft law. The format of solo demonstrations was chosen because there was no longer time to observe the minimum statutory three‑day notification period for other types of (group) events. 9. All of the applicants decided to hold solo demonstrations on 19 December 2012. According to them, at around 9 a.m. they positioned themselves, holding banners, in the vicinity of the State Duma at some distance from other protesters (see also Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, nos. 57818/09 and 14 others, §§ 206-15, 7 February 2017). 10. According to the first applicant, she was arrested by the police several minutes later and taken to a police van. There were no orders from police officers to stop the demonstration and leave the area. According to the second and third applicants, after their solo demonstrations they left the area, showing their posters to journalists at their request. At that point, they were arrested by the police and taken to the Tverskoy district police station. 11. According to the Government, at 10 a.m. on 19 December 2012 all of the applicants took part in a group ""picket"" (пикет) held without prior notification of the authorities. The first applicant had a poster reading ""I am looking for an American who will adopt me"", the second and the third applicants had posters reading ""Orphans are guilty for the death of Mr Magnitskiy? Do not disgrace yourself"". The applicants did not react to the lawful demands of the police to stop participating in the event and continued ""picketing"", attracting the attention of passers-by. At 10.30 a.m. they were arrested and taken to the Tverskoy district police station for the purpose of compiling an administrative-offence record. At 1.20 p.m. on that day the applicants were released. 12. At the police station the applicants were charged with participating in a group public event held without prior notification, in breach of Article 20.2 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter, ""the CAO""). The administrative-offence record in respect of the first applicant and the police officers' reports in respect of all the applicants indicated that the offence had been committed at 10 a.m. It was also stated that they had taken part in a non-notified group public event and had refused to end it when requested to do so by the police. 13. On 15 January 2013 the justice of the peace of circuit no. 369 of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the first applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced her to a fine of 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB; about 495 euros (EUR) at the time). The court found it established, on the basis of the administrative-offence record, the police officers' reports and oral testimony by a police officer who had arrested the applicant that the latter had taken part in a public event (""picket"") which had involved fifty people and had been held without prior notification of the authorities. On 14 February 2013 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow upheld the judgment on appeal. The applicant did not attend the appeal hearing, even though she had been duly summoned to it. 14. On 31 January 2013 in two separate proceedings the same justice of the peace convicted the second and the third applicants under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced each of them to fines of RUB 20,000. The court relied on the administrative offence records, the police officers' reports and oral testimony by a police officer who had arrested the applicants. On 21 February and 21 March 2013 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow upheld the judgments in respect of the third and second applicants respectively. Both applicants were absent from the appeal hearings, though the third applicant's lawyer did participate. In the third applicant's case the appellate court examined some documents and interviewed a police officer in a detailed manner before affording the defence counsel an opportunity to cross-examine him; the appeal judge then asked a number of follow-up questions. In its appeal decision the appellate court considered that the third applicant's guilt had been proved by the adverse evidence, such as the administrative-offence record, the escort procedure record and testimonies. 15. On 1 and 5 July 2013 the Moscow City Court examined supervisory review complaints lodged by the second and third applicants. The court reclassified the charges against the applicants as falling under Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO, namely breach of the established procedure for the conduct of public events committed by a participant. Their fines were reduced to RUB 10,000 (about EUR 232 at the time) each.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. On 14 December 2012 the State Duma, the lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia, adopted at first reading a draft law which, in particular, prohibited the adoption of children of Russian nationality by citizens of the United States of America. 7. On 17 December 2012 the official daily newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta announced that the second reading of the draft law was scheduled for 19 December 2012. 8. According to the first applicant, she had read on various online social networks that many people intended to stage solo demonstrations (одиночные пикеты) on 19 December 2012 in front of the State Duma to express their opposition to the draft law. The format of solo demonstrations was chosen because there was no longer time to observe the minimum statutory three‑day notification period for other types of (group) events. 12. At the police station the applicants were charged with participating in a group public event held without prior notification, in breach of Article 20.2 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter, ""the CAO""). The administrative-offence record in respect of the first applicant and the police officers' reports in respect of all the applicants indicated that the offence had been committed at 10 a.m. It was also stated that they had taken part in a non-notified group public event and had refused to end it when requested to do so by the police. 13. On 15 January 2013 the justice of the peace of circuit no. 369 of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the first applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced her to a fine of 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB; about 495 euros (EUR) at the time). The court found it established, on the basis of the administrative-offence record, the police officers' reports and oral testimony by a police officer who had arrested the applicant that the latter had taken part in a public event (""picket"") which had involved fifty people and had been held without prior notification of the authorities. On 14 February 2013 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow upheld the judgment on appeal. The applicant did not attend the appeal hearing, even though she had been duly summoned to it. 14. On 31 January 2013 in two separate proceedings the same justice of the peace convicted the second and the third applicants under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced each of them to fines of RUB 20,000. The court relied on the administrative offence records, the police officers' reports and oral testimony by a police officer who had arrested the applicants. On 21 February and 21 March 2013 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow upheld the judgments in respect of the third and second applicants respectively. Both applicants were absent from the appeal hearings, though the third applicant's lawyer did participate. In the third applicant's case the appellate court examined some documents and interviewed a police officer in a detailed manner before affording the defence counsel an opportunity to cross-examine him; the appeal judge then asked a number of follow-up questions. In its appeal decision the appellate court considered that the third applicant's guilt had been proved by the adverse evidence, such as the administrative-offence record, the escort procedure record and testimonies. 15. On 1 and 5 July 2013 the Moscow City Court examined supervisory review complaints lodged by the second and third applicants. The court reclassified the charges against the applicants as falling under Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO, namely breach of the established procedure for the conduct of public events committed by a participant. Their fines were reduced to RUB 10,000 (about EUR 232 at the time) each.",TRUE,1,"While public organization protocols serve meaningful democratic interests, the applicants have a clear right to assemble peacefully.", 45,"Article 12 Right to marry Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.","5. The applicants were born in 1979 and 1983 respectively. The first applicant is serving a life sentence in Dnipropetrovsk Prison no. 89. The second applicant lives in Obukhiv. 6. On 24 March 2000 the applicants got married. 7. On 16 February 2001 the first applicant was found guilty of a number of criminal offences and was sentenced to life imprisonment. 8. The applicants requested that the prison administration allow them a long-term family visit on many occasions, in particular, in 2006. Their requests were rejected on the grounds that Article 151 of the Code of Execution of Sentences did not provide for long-term visits to life prisoners. 9. In April 2007 the applicants lodged an administrative claim against the State Department for Enforcement of Sentences seeking an entitlement to a long-term conjugal visit every three months. They submitted that they were willing to have a common child and that a denial of that right to them was unlawful and arbitrary. The courts, on three levels of jurisdiction, rejected that claim as not based on law. The final decision of the Higher Administrative Court was delivered on 8 December 2009. 10. According to the information provided by the Government, the first applicant was disciplined on three occasions during the period of his detention from 2001 to 2016: once in 2001 following the discovery of an unreported written message on him; once in 2003 on account of his attempt to get in touch with an inmate in an adjacent cell; and once in 2013 on account of unauthorised possession of a mobile telephone. 11. The applicants got divorced on an unspecified date. According to the Government, it happened ""shortly after the introduction of the application"". According to the applicants, the divorce took place on an unspecified date in 2014. 12. As indicated in the information note issued on 24 June 2016 by the administration of Dnipropetrovsk Prison no. 89, during his detention in that prison starting from 2003, the first applicant had had forty short-term visits and nine long-term family visits. More specifically, on 10 December 2003 and 10 June 2004 he had short-term visits from the second applicant, as well as his mother and sister. The second applicant did not pay him visits thereafter. During the period from 2004 to 2012 the first applicant had regular short-term visits from his mother, sister and some other persons. On 13 September 2012 he had a visit from his sister and a certain Ms L. who was registered in the prison's logbook as his fiancée. Since then he had regular short-term visits from Ms L. On 11 July 2014 the first applicant was allowed for the first time a long-term family visit, which was from his sister. On 5 December 2014 the first applicant got married with Ms L. and they were allowed a long-term family visit on that occasion. Subsequently, they enjoyed long-term conjugal visits about every three months.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"9. In April 2007 the applicants lodged an administrative claim against the State Department for Enforcement of Sentences seeking an entitlement to a long-term conjugal visit every three months. They submitted that they were willing to have a common child and that a denial of that right to them was unlawful and arbitrary. The courts, on three levels of jurisdiction, rejected that claim as not based on law. The final decision of the Higher Administrative Court was delivered on 8 December 2009. 10. According to the information provided by the Government, the first applicant was disciplined on three occasions during the period of his detention from 2001 to 2016: once in 2001 following the discovery of an unreported written message on him; once in 2003 on account of his attempt to get in touch with an inmate in an adjacent cell; and once in 2013 on account of unauthorised possession of a mobile telephone. 11. The applicants got divorced on an unspecified date. According to the Government, it happened ""shortly after the introduction of the application"". According to the applicants, the divorce took place on an unspecified date in 2014. 12. As indicated in the information note issued on 24 June 2016 by the administration of Dnipropetrovsk Prison no. 89, during his detention in that prison starting from 2003, the first applicant had had forty short-term visits and nine long-term family visits. More specifically, on 10 December 2003 and 10 June 2004 he had short-term visits from the second applicant, as well as his mother and sister. The second applicant did not pay him visits thereafter. During the period from 2004 to 2012 the first applicant had regular short-term visits from his mother, sister and some other persons. On 13 September 2012 he had a visit from his sister and a certain Ms L. who was registered in the prison's logbook as his fiancée. Since then he had regular short-term visits from Ms L. On 11 July 2014 the first applicant was allowed for the first time a long-term family visit, which was from his sister. On 5 December 2014 the first applicant got married with Ms L. and they were allowed a long-term family visit on that occasion. Subsequently, they enjoyed long-term conjugal visits about every three months.",FALSE,0,The right to get married is not relevant to prison visitation rights., 46,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","3. The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table. 4. The applicants sued different State and municipal unitary companies (the debtor companies) in several unrelated sets of court proceedings. 5. On the dates set out in the appended table domestic courts by separate judgments made pecuniary awards in favour of the applicants to be paid by the debtor companies. In application no. 34145/11 the courts also ordered the debtor company to take certain action in favour of the applicant, as specified in the appended table. 6. The companies were incorporated as State or municipal unitary enterprises. They provided services specified in the appended table. 7. On various dates insolvency proceedings were opened in respect of some of the debtor companies. The companies were subsequently liquidated. The dates on which the insolvency proceedings started and ended are tabulated below. The applicants' rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated. ",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,"With the liquidation of debtor companies, applicants were denied effective remedy.",edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 47,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","4. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Mersin. 5. The applicant is a teacher in primary school and at the material time she was a member and secretary of the local branch of the trade union of Education and Science Workers (Eğitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası). 6. On 28 November 2008 the applicant participated in a demonstration organised by the above mentioned trade union on the theme ""No to violence against women"". 7. On 29 June 2009 the District Directorate of National Education imposed a disciplinary sanction in the form of a reprimand on the applicant for her participation in the aforementioned demonstration under Article 125 of the Law no. 657 on Civil Servants. 8. On 10 July 2009 the applicant objected to this decision and requested its annulment. 9. On 29 July 2009 the Disciplinary Board of the Yenişehir district governor dismissed the applicant's objection considering that the contested decision was in accordance with law and there were no grounds for its annulment. The applicant's rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,"With the dismissal of the objection, the applicant was denied effective remedy.",edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 48,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","4. The applicants were born in 1961 and 1967 respectively and live in Mersin and Diyarbakır. 5. The applicants were civil servants for tax offices attached to the Ministry of Finance in Mersin and Diyarbakır. At the material time they were members of the local branch of the trade union Büro Emekçileri, which is affiliated to Trades Union Confederation of Public Employees (Kamu Emekçileri Sendikaları Konfederasyonu-""KESK""). 6. In March and April 2009, the applicants were informed of the disciplinary investigations that were initiated against them for having participated in a statement to the press organised by the trade union of which they were members and were invited to send their defence submissions. 7. Subsequently, the disciplinary sanctions of warning and reprimand were imposed on the applicants for their participation in the aforementioned trade union activities under Section 125 of the Law no. 657 on Civil Servants. 8. The applicants objected to these decisions and requested their annulment. 9. In May 2009 the Disciplinary Board of the tax offices dismissed the applicants' objections considering that the contested decisions were in accordance with law and there were no grounds for annulment. The applicants' rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,"With the dismissal of the objection, applicants were denied effective remedy.",edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 49,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","6. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Corjova. 7. He had his car registered with the authorities of the Republic of Moldova and had Moldovan registration plates installed on it. 8. On 16 December 2006 a customs officer of the self-proclaimed ""Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria"" (""MRT"") stopped the applicant at a check‑point and seized his car on the ground that upon entry on the territory of Transdniestria he had failed to stop at the border. He was later obliged to pay a fine of 58 United States dollars in order to recover the car. 9. On 19 December 2006 the applicant's driving licence was seized on the ground that he had failed to comply with traffic rules. His car was also seized, on the ground of his failure to comply with customs regulations, but the seizure report was destroyed and he was able to recover his car five hours later after the intervention of a group of Russian peacekeepers. His driving licence was not returned and he was issued a temporary driving licence. 10. According to the applicant, he complained to the authorities of Moldova, but they informed him that there was nothing they could help him with. The Moldovan Government disputed the fact that the applicant had informed them about the circumstances of the present case. 11. Reports by inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations, the relevant domestic law and practice of the Republic of Moldova, and other pertinent documents were summarised in Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia ([GC], no. 11138/10, §§ 61-77, 23 February 2016). The applicant's rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,"With the authorities informing him there was nothing they could do, the applicant was denied effective remedy.",edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 50,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","5. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Istanbul. 6. At the material time, the applicant was a civil servant in the Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul and a member of the local branch of the Tümbel-Sen trade union, which is affiliated to the KESK (Kamu Emekçileri Sendikaları Konfederasyonu – the Confederation of Public Employees' Trade Unions). 7. In April 2008 two of the largest trade unions, namely the DİSK (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu – Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Trade Unions) and the KESK (Kamu Emekçileri Sendikaları Konfederasyonu – Confederation of Public Employees' Trade Unions) announced that they were planning a large scale demonstration in Istanbul for 1 May 2008 and that their members would be gathering to celebrate the Labour Day and to commemorate their friends who had lost their lives during the demonstrations of 1 May 1977. 8. In May 2008 the applicant was informed that a disciplinary investigation had been initiated against him for being absent without leave on 1 May 2008 and he was asked to submit his defence submissions. The applicant explained that he had participated in a demonstration organised by his trade union on that day to celebrate International Labour Day. 9. Subsequently, the applicant was given a warning as a disciplinary sanction owing to his being absent without leave on 1 May 2008 pursuant to section 125 of the Civil Servants Act (Law no. 657). 10. On 13 May 2008 the applicant objected to the decision and requested its annulment. 11. On 16 May 2008 the Disciplinary Board of the Istanbul Municipality dismissed the applicant's objection, finding that the contested decision was in accordance with the law and that there were no grounds to annul it. The applicant's rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,"With the dismissal of the objection, the applicant was denied effective remedy.",edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 51,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","5. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Varna. 6. The applicant and his wife divorced on 21 August 2006 pursuant to a court-approved agreement between the two of them. Under the terms of this agreement, the applicant undertook to pay child support to the two children born during the marriage and agreed to his wife's keeping his family name after the divorce. 7. Subsequently, the applicant learned that his former wife had conceived their second child, born in 2003, as a result of a relationship with another man during her marriage to the applicant. The applicant underwent a DNA test to determine whether he was the father of the younger child. The DNA test ‒ the result of which the applicant received on 15 January 2007 ‒ established that he was not the biological father of the second child. The results of this DNA test were never considered by a court. 8. Shortly thereafter, in February 2007, the applicant brought a civil claim in court, seeking to contest his paternity of the child in question. On 1 March 2007 the Varna Regional Court dismissed his request, finding that it was time-barred due to the expiry – in 2004 – of the year-long limitation period counting from the child's birth or from learning thereof (see the section ""Relevant domestic law and practice"" below""). This finding was confirmed by two higher judicial instances, the final decision being pronounced by the Supreme Court of Cassation on 19 September 2007. 9. The applicant brought subsequent proceedings in which he sought to stop paying child support to the second child. On 20 May 2008 his claim was rejected by the Varna District Court, which found that it had not been proven that the applicant was not the child's father, given that he had not rebutted the legal presumption under Article 32 (1) of the Family Code 1985 (""the 1985 Code""). The applicant's rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"8. Shortly thereafter, in February 2007, the applicant brought a civil claim in court, seeking to contest his paternity of the child in question. On 1 March 2007 the Varna Regional Court dismissed his request, finding that it was time-barred due to the expiry – in 2004 – of the year-long limitation period counting from the child's birth or from learning thereof (see the section ""Relevant domestic law and practice"" below""). This finding was confirmed by two higher judicial instances, the final decision being pronounced by the Supreme Court of Cassation on 19 September 2007.",TRUE,2,"While the applicant has a right to effective remedy, the courts provided reasonable explanations for the lack of remedy such as time barring. It depends on what the statute means by ""effective"" remedy.",edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 52,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","5. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Moscow. 6. On 24 January 2011 a bomb attack at the Domodedovo airport killed 37 people and injured more than 160. It was later established that the explosion was caused by a suicide bomber and organised by a militant group operating in the North Caucasus. The applicant, who was present at the airport at the time of explosion, sustained multiple injuries to her body (wounds, contusions and fractures) which provoked further complications (cerebral oedema, coma, respiratory and cardiac insufficiency and a traumatic shock). The applicant's injuries were life-threatening and caused serious harm to her health. 7. Within the framework of the criminal investigation into the bombing, the investigative authorities arrested four persons. On 11 November 2013 the Moscow Regional Court found them guilty of multiple charges, including commission of an act of terror, organisation of a criminal gang and illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. Three defendants received life sentence and the fourth one was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. 8. On 25 November 2014 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the judgment of 11 November 2013 in substance on appeal. 9. According to the Government, the applicant was granted a victim status. She did not bring a civil action for damages against the convicted persons. 10. On 25 January 2011 the Russian authorities opened criminal investigation on the charges of negligence against the airport managers and employees and the policemen deployed at the airport. On 22 March 2011 the applicant was granted a victim status in the proceedings. On 5 March 2012 the investigator decided to recall it. On 26 March 2012 the investigator discontinued the proceedings. 11. On 22 May 2012 the Deputy President of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation quashed the decision of 26 March 2012 and re-opened the case. The proceedings are pending to date. 12. On 3 June 2013 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow dismissed the applicant's complaint against the decision of 5 March 2012. 13. On an unspecified date the applicant brought a civil claim against the airport seeking damages resulting from the failure of the airport security to prevent the bombing. 14. On 27 August 2013 the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed the applicant's claims for damages. On 16 December 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 27 August 2013 on appeal. The City Court dismissed, inter alia, as unsubstantiated the applicant's allegation that the suicide bomber had been able to enter the airport owing to the lack of a metal detector at one of the airport entrances noting that such fact should have been established in the course of the relevant criminal investigation. The applicant's rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While the applicant is pursuing more investigation, they did receive one completed criminal investigation, which seems to serve as effective remedy. ",edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 53,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","4. The applicants are a family. They were born in 1971, 1968, 1992, 1995, and live in Samara. 5. On 26 April 2004 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Samara (""the Oktyabrskiy District Court"") ordered, inter alia, the management of the State unitary enterprise ""16th Military Plant"" (""the company"") to provide the applicants with a suitable dwelling, while keeping their names on the list of persons awaiting housing. 6. On 11 May 2004 the judgment came into force. 7. On 28 May 2004 the Department of the Bailiffs' Service for Oktyabrskiy District of Samara opened the enforcement proceedings. 8. On 22 December 2004 the enforcement proceedings were terminated as the company had no available residential accommodation. 9. On 1 October 2007, due to the reorganisation of the company (see paragraph 16 below), the enforcement file was sent to the Department of the Bailiffs' Service for the Engelsskiy District of Saratov Region. 10. On 21 April 2008 the bailiffs ruled that it was impossible to enforce the judgment in the part relating to the housing, as the new debtor, FGUP 9 TSARZ (see paragraph 16 below), had no available accommodation. The enforcement proceedings were terminated. 11. On 26 August 2009 the Engelsskiy District Court of Saratov Region, following the bailiffs' application, replaced the debtor in the enforcement proceedings from FGUP 9 TSARZ to OAO 9 TSARZ (see paragraph 17 below). 12. On 14 October 2009 the Oktyabrskiy District Court clarified the judgment of 26 April 2004 stating that the applicants should be provided with an apartment in Samara. 13. Several times in 2004-2011 the parties applied to the Oktyabrskiy District Court for changing the mode of enforcement of the judgment. Each time the courts rejected the applications finding that a payment of the amount representing the cost of an apartment would be equal to modifying the original judgment. 14. The judgment of 26 April 2004 remained unenforced. 15. The company was incorporated as a municipal unitary enterprise. According to its articles of association, the company's aim was to produce goods and render services for the Ministry of Defense of Russia, as well as for meeting other public needs and making a profit. 16. Under the Order of the Federal Agency for State Property Management dated 22 September 2005 the company was joined to FGUP 9 TSARZ (FGUP 9 Tsentralnyy Avtomobilnyy Remontnyy Zavod – ФГУП 9 ЦАРЗ or ФГУП 9 Центральный Автомобильный Ремонтный Завод). The reorganisation was completed on 13 February 2007, and the latter company became the universal successor of the company. 17. In accordance with the Decree of the President of Russia of 15 September 2008 and the Decree of the Russian Government of 22 November 2008, FGUP 9 TSARZ was further reorganized into OAO 9 TSARZ, a publicly-traded private open joint-stock company incorporated under the laws of Russia. The applicants' rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,"The applicants have a right to effective remedy in the form of the housing originally promised, which was never delivered to them through multiple legal struggles.",edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 54,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","5. The applicant, who was born in 1948, lives in Corjova, a village under the formal control of Moldovan authorities, but where agents of the self‑proclaimed ""Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic"" (""MRT"", see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, § 90, ECHR 2004‑VII for further details) frequently intervened during the events in question, notably by blocking the participation of the local population in elections held in Moldova. 6. On 3 June 2007 local elections were to be held in Moldova, including in Corjova. The applicant, who is an ambulance driver, submitted his candidature for the position of Mayor of Corjova. 7. On 1 June 2007, at 11 p.m., the applicant's ambulance was stopped by the ""MRT"" road militia and his documents (Moldovan national identity card and driving licence) were taken away from him without any explanation. 8. On 2 June 2007 the applicant went to the ""MRT"" militia station located in Dubăsari and asked for the return of his documents. He was then arrested and placed in a detention cell. A few hours later a person came to his cell and, without presenting himself, asked him about his work and his electoral propaganda. The applicant later found out that the visitor had been a judge and that, following that discussion in the cell, the judge adopted a decision, finding him guilty of the administrative offence of unlawful electoral propaganda and sentencing him to 15 days' administrative detention. 9. The applicant submits that he was not allowed to contact his relatives or to find a lawyer, and was not issued with a copy of the court's decision, which prevented any possibility of lodging an effective appeal against the decision of 2 June 2007. 10. During his detention the applicant was placed in a cell which, according to him was damp and cold. Food was given once a day. When the applicant's relatives, alerted by his absence, contacted the local authorities in order to find out about his fate, they were informed of the applicant's detention. However, their requests to transmit food to him were allegedly rejected. 11. On 17 June 2007 the applicant was released from detention and he was issued with a copy of the decision of 2 June 2007. The time-limit for lodging an appeal had already expired by that time. Upon release, he was allegedly coughing and was diagnosed with chronic acute bronchitis. He also claims that his eyesight worsened considerably. 12. In the meantime, on 6 June 2007, the applicant complained to the Moldovan prosecutor's office of his unlawful detention. Based on this complaint, a criminal investigation was initiated on 12 June 2007, the applicant and witnesses were subsequently heard. Three high-ranking ""MRT"" officers were charged and were declared wanted persons. However, on 4 August 2010 the investigation was suspended due to the fact that the three accused were hiding from it in the ""MRT"". The applicant's rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"It could be argued that the launch of the investigation serves as effective remedy, but with the suspension of the investigation after years, it seems the applicant was denied effective remedy.",edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 55,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","5. The applicants were born in 1979 and 1983 respectively. The first applicant is serving a life sentence in Dnipropetrovsk Prison no. 89. The second applicant lives in Obukhiv. 6. On 24 March 2000 the applicants got married. 7. On 16 February 2001 the first applicant was found guilty of a number of criminal offences and was sentenced to life imprisonment. 8. The applicants requested that the prison administration allow them a long-term family visit on many occasions, in particular, in 2006. Their requests were rejected on the grounds that Article 151 of the Code of Execution of Sentences did not provide for long-term visits to life prisoners. 9. In April 2007 the applicants lodged an administrative claim against the State Department for Enforcement of Sentences seeking an entitlement to a long-term conjugal visit every three months. They submitted that they were willing to have a common child and that a denial of that right to them was unlawful and arbitrary. The courts, on three levels of jurisdiction, rejected that claim as not based on law. The final decision of the Higher Administrative Court was delivered on 8 December 2009. 10. According to the information provided by the Government, the first applicant was disciplined on three occasions during the period of his detention from 2001 to 2016: once in 2001 following the discovery of an unreported written message on him; once in 2003 on account of his attempt to get in touch with an inmate in an adjacent cell; and once in 2013 on account of unauthorised possession of a mobile telephone. 11. The applicants got divorced on an unspecified date. According to the Government, it happened ""shortly after the introduction of the application"". According to the applicants, the divorce took place on an unspecified date in 2014. 12. As indicated in the information note issued on 24 June 2016 by the administration of Dnipropetrovsk Prison no. 89, during his detention in that prison starting from 2003, the first applicant had had forty short-term visits and nine long-term family visits. More specifically, on 10 December 2003 and 10 June 2004 he had short-term visits from the second applicant, as well as his mother and sister. The second applicant did not pay him visits thereafter. During the period from 2004 to 2012 the first applicant had regular short-term visits from his mother, sister and some other persons. On 13 September 2012 he had a visit from his sister and a certain Ms L. who was registered in the prison's logbook as his fiancée. Since then he had regular short-term visits from Ms L. On 11 July 2014 the first applicant was allowed for the first time a long-term family visit, which was from his sister. On 5 December 2014 the first applicant got married with Ms L. and they were allowed a long-term family visit on that occasion. Subsequently, they enjoyed long-term conjugal visits about every three months. The applicants' rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"9. In April 2007 the applicants lodged an administrative claim against the State Department for Enforcement of Sentences seeking an entitlement to a long-term conjugal visit every three months. They submitted that they were willing to have a common child and that a denial of that right to them was unlawful and arbitrary. The courts, on three levels of jurisdiction, rejected that claim as not based on law. The final decision of the Higher Administrative Court was delivered on 8 December 2009. 10. According to the information provided by the Government, the first applicant was disciplined on three occasions during the period of his detention from 2001 to 2016: once in 2001 following the discovery of an unreported written message on him; once in 2003 on account of his attempt to get in touch with an inmate in an adjacent cell; and once in 2013 on account of unauthorised possession of a mobile telephone. 11. The applicants got divorced on an unspecified date. According to the Government, it happened ""shortly after the introduction of the application"". According to the applicants, the divorce took place on an unspecified date in 2014. 12. As indicated in the information note issued on 24 June 2016 by the administration of Dnipropetrovsk Prison no. 89, during his detention in that prison starting from 2003, the first applicant had had forty short-term visits and nine long-term family visits. More specifically, on 10 December 2003 and 10 June 2004 he had short-term visits from the second applicant, as well as his mother and sister. The second applicant did not pay him visits thereafter. During the period from 2004 to 2012 the first applicant had regular short-term visits from his mother, sister and some other persons. On 13 September 2012 he had a visit from his sister and a certain Ms L. who was registered in the prison's logbook as his fiancée. Since then he had regular short-term visits from Ms L. On 11 July 2014 the first applicant was allowed for the first time a long-term family visit, which was from his sister. On 5 December 2014 the first applicant got married with Ms L. and they were allowed a long-term family visit on that occasion. Subsequently, they enjoyed long-term conjugal visits about every three months.",FALSE,0,The applicant was subsequently allowed effective remedy of visits.,edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 56,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","4. The applicant was born in 1975 and is detained in Chișinău. 5. On 24 August 2011 the applicant was taken into police custody on charges of murder and unauthorized possession of a firearm. He was remanded in custody by the Centru District Court on 28 August 2011 and his detention was subsequently extended every thirty days until 21 January 2012 on the grounds that given the seriousness of the charges against him, he might abscond, re-offend and interfere with the investigation. The applicant did not appeal against those decisions. 6. On 17 January 2012 the applicant's case was committed for trial and his detention was extended by the court every three months, finding that the grounds which justified his initial detention had remained valid. 7. In his appeals against the decisions of 12 April, 10 June and 10 July 2013 the applicant complained, inter alia, about the length of his detention which, in his view, was no longer justified. He argued that his detention pending trial had already exceeded the twelve-month time-limit set under Article 186 (8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the courts had not put forward any exceptional circumstance justifying such a long detention period, while the seriousness of charges could not by themselves constitute sufficient ground for his extended deprivation of liberty. 8. By decisions of 23 April, 20 June and 25 July 2013 the Chișinău Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals. 9. By a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of 17 September 2014 the applicant was found guilty on all charges and sentenced to twenty‑three years of imprisonment. 10. On 28 September 2011 the applicant was transferred to prison no. 13 in Chișinău where he was detained until 4 December 2014. 11. According to the applicant, he was detained in cells with poor lighting, damp walls, and accommodating six inmates in an area of 6 square metres. Due to overcrowding, the applicant had to share a bed with another inmate with whom he took turns to sleep. During his detention the applicant did not receive any bedding or clothing. Certain inmates were diagnosed with tuberculosis or HIV and had bleeding wounds. He was allowed to walk outside the cell only one hour per day. Without a functional ventilation system, in summer the air indoors was hot, humid and smelly which made it difficult to breathe. In cold weather the heating was not turned on and the temperature in the cells was extremely low. The squat toilet was not separated from the rest of the cell. The prison laundry was not operational and the applicant was unable to wash his clothes. 12. On 18 April 2014 the applicant's lawyer complained to the Prosecutor General's Office about the applicant's detention conditions in prison no. 13. By a letter of 15 May 2014 the Department of Penitentiary Institutions denied the complaints on overcrowding, TB infected inmates, insufficient food and medical assistance. The applicant's rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",Ruled as violated by court,,"11. According to the applicant, he was detained in cells with poor lighting, damp walls, and accommodating six inmates in an area of 6 square metres. Due to overcrowding, the applicant had to share a bed with another inmate with whom he took turns to sleep. During his detention the applicant did not receive any bedding or clothing. Certain inmates were diagnosed with tuberculosis or HIV and had bleeding wounds. He was allowed to walk outside the cell only one hour per day. Without a functional ventilation system, in summer the air indoors was hot, humid and smelly which made it difficult to breathe. In cold weather the heating was not turned on and the temperature in the cells was extremely low. The squat toilet was not separated from the rest of the cell. The prison laundry was not operational and the applicant was unable to wash his clothes.",FALSE,0,The applicant received no remedy at all; all appeals were denied.,edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 57,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","4. The applicant was born in 1968 and has been serving a prison sentence in Lukiškės Remand Prison since 16 January 2002. 5. On 16 May 2014 the applicant lodged a civil claim against the State, alleging that he was being detained in overcrowded and unsanitary cells. He also complained that toilets were not properly partitioned from the rest of the cells and thus the prison staff could see him use the toilet. He submitted that his health had deteriorated as a result of the inappropriate conditions of his detention and claimed 450,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 130,300 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 6. On 19 January 2015 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant's claim in part. It firstly held that the time-limit for claiming damages was three years after the damage arose, and accordingly dismissed the part of the applicant's claim concerning the period before 16 May 2011 as time-barred. On the basis of documents provided by the prison administration, the court found that from 16 May 2011 to 15 May 2014 the applicant had spent 1,082 days in Lukiškės Remand Prison. During that period, for thirteen days and one afternoon he had had 3.24 sq. m of personal space and on one afternoon he had had 2.65 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.6 sq. m. For the remaining time the personal space available to him was found to be in compliance with the requirement of 3.6 sq. m. 7. The court also quoted the report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (""the CPT"") on its visit to Lithuania in 2012. According to that report, nearly all the inmates in Lukiškės Remand Prison were confined to their cells for twenty-three hours per day, with no out-of-cell activities other than outdoor exercise lasting one hour in small and dilapidated yards (see paragraph 13 below). The court noted that the prison administration had not provided any evidence that the situation in the prison had changed. 8. Furthermore, the court ruled that toilets had not been partitioned from the rest of the cells in the manner required by relevant domestic regulations. It stated that, in accordance with accepted social norms, inability to use the toilet in private was degrading and humiliating to the individual. 9. The court considered that the applicant had not proved that his health had deteriorated as a result of the conditions of his detention. It awarded the applicant EUR 80 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, taking into account the ""scope, intensity and duration"" of the violation of his rights and the economic conditions in the country. 10. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision, arguing that the first-instance court had erred by dismissing part of his claim as time-barred, that the conditions in Lukiškės Remand Prison had not improved and that his health had deteriorated because of them. On 10 November 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's appeal and upheld the first-instance court's decision in its entirety. The applicant's rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. On 19 January 2015 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant's claim in part. It firstly held that the time-limit for claiming damages was three years after the damage arose, and accordingly dismissed the part of the applicant's claim concerning the period before 16 May 2011 as time-barred. On the basis of documents provided by the prison administration, the court found that from 16 May 2011 to 15 May 2014 the applicant had spent 1,082 days in Lukiškės Remand Prison. During that period, for thirteen days and one afternoon he had had 3.24 sq. m of personal space and on one afternoon he had had 2.65 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.6 sq. m. For the remaining time the personal space available to him was found to be in compliance with the requirement of 3.6 sq. m. 8. Furthermore, the court ruled that toilets had not been partitioned from the rest of the cells in the manner required by relevant domestic regulations. It stated that, in accordance with accepted social norms, inability to use the toilet in private was degrading and humiliating to the individual. 9. The court considered that the applicant had not proved that his health had deteriorated as a result of the conditions of his detention. It awarded the applicant EUR 80 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, taking into account the ""scope, intensity and duration"" of the violation of his rights and the economic conditions in the country. 10. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision, arguing that the first-instance court had erred by dismissing part of his claim as time-barred, that the conditions in Lukiškės Remand Prison had not improved and that his health had deteriorated because of them. On 10 November 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's appeal and upheld the first-instance court's decision in its entirety.",TRUE,2,"While the applicant has a right to effective remedy, the court awarded some remedies and provided reasonable explanations for other lack of remedy such as time barring. It depends on what the statute means by ""effective"" remedy.",edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 58,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","4. The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Chisinau. 5. At the material time, the applicant was a student and was undertaking an unpaid internship at a law firm. 6. On 23 October 2008 criminal proceedings were initiated against T., a lawyer with whom the applicant worked, on charges of trading in influence. In particular, T. was accused of receiving 10,500 euros (EUR) from D. to pass on to the judges examining a criminal case against a relative of D.'s in order to obtain his acquittal or a more lenient sentence. The applicant had no procedural standing in those proceedings. 7. On 30 October 2008 the police lodged with an investigating judge a request for a warrant to search the applicant's apartment. The request was granted; the decision to issue the warrant read as follows: ""The criminal investigation against T. was initiated on 23 October 2008 ... In the course of the investigation it has been established that from March until September 2008, T. extorted and received from D. in several instalments the amount of EUR 10,500, [to be given to] the judges who examined D.'s relative's case, in order to obtain his acquittal or a more lenient sentence. On 24 October 2008 T. was caught in flagrante receiving 3,800 US dollars (USD) from D., allegedly for influencing the prosecutor not to appeal against the [subsequent] judgment [acquitting the accused]. The evidence in the file and the material obtained through the operational investigation allow the well-founded assumption that at [the applicant's] home, situated at [address], can be found EUR 10,500 received from D. and relevant documents, Decides To order a search of [the applicant's] residence, situated at [address], with the aim of finding and seizing EUR 10,500 received from D. and documents concerning the criminal case."" 8. On the same day, a prosecutor lodged a request with the Buiucani District Court for a warrant to be issued for the search of the applicant's apartment. His request took the form of a verbatim copy of the police decision. Also on the same day the Buiucani district investigating judge issued a decision authorising the search. The decision read as follows: ""The present criminal proceedings were initiated on 23 October 2008 ... against T. After hearing the prosecutor and examining the material, and taking in consideration the fact that that material had been obtained in [a manner] in compliance with the law, the court finds that the request for the authorisation of the search is well founded and should be upheld. On the basis of Articles 41, 125, 301, 305 and 306 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court: ... 9. On 10 December 2008 the police searched the applicant's apartment in the presence of her elderly mother [but not the applicant]. They did not find anything. 10. On 21 August 2009 the applicant lodged a request for access to the evidence which had been presented to the judge to justify the search. On 3 September 2009 the Buiucani district investigating judge replied that the case file was held at the [premises of] the investigating authority and that access could only be granted pursuant to the law. 11. It appears from the material in the case file that the criminal proceedings against T. ended with the latter's acquittal. The applicant's rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,"With the acquittal of T., the applicant was denied effective remedy.",edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 59,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","5. The applicants' dates of birth and places of residence are listed in the Appendix. 6. On different dates between 2012 and 2016 (see Appendix) the applicants learned that their right to leave the country had been restricted and that they were no longer allowed to leave Azerbaijan. 7. It appears from the documents in the case files that in all the cases the restriction in question was imposed by the investigating authorities, in the absence of any judicial decision, within the framework of various criminal proceedings in which the applicants were not convicted, accused or suspected persons, but were only questioned as witnesses. 8. The travel bans imposed in respect of the applicants in applications nos. 62775/16 and 43327/16 were lifted by the investigating authorities on 29 January and 21 April 2016 respectively. 9. On various dates the applicants brought an action claiming that the restriction imposed on them was unlawful, either by lodging a complaint with the administrative courts or applying to the ordinary courts for a review of the lawfulness of procedural actions or decisions by the prosecuting authorities under the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter ""judicial review""). Some of the applicants used both of the above-mentioned remedies. 10. The applicants claimed, in particular, that the domestic law did not provide for the imposition of travel bans on witnesses in criminal proceedings and that the restriction on their right to leave the country was not justified. 11. In the domestic proceedings relating to all the applications, except application no. 66650/13, the domestic courts refused to examine the applicants' complaint on the merits. Final decisions were adopted on various dates, by the Supreme Court in the administrative proceedings and the Baku Court of Appeal in the proceedings for judicial review (see Appendix). In their decisions, both the administrative and ordinary courts declared that they did not have competence to examine a complaint relating to the lawfulness of travel bans imposed by the investigating authorities. 12. As regards the applicant in application no. 66650/13, by a decision dated 1 April 2013, a judge at the Sabail District Court dismissed his complaint after examining it on the merits. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: ""Having assessed all the examined evidence, I conclude that the actions of the Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Azerbaijan restricting the right of Mursaliyev Azad Oktay oglu to leave the country are lawful, that the procedure for judicial review as defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Azerbaijan does not provide for a [decision] on the payment of pecuniary or non-pecuniary damages, [and] that, for these reasons, the complaint should not be allowed."" 13. On 5 April 2013 the applicant in application no. 66650/13 appealed against that decision, reiterating that there was no legal basis for restricting his right to leave the country under domestic law. 14. On 12 April 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the first-instance court's decision justified. The appellate court repeated the reasoning provided by the first-instance court and made no mention of the complaint concerning the legal basis for the imposition of the travel ban. The applicants' rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",Ruled as violated by court,,"11. In the domestic proceedings relating to all the applications, except application no. 66650/13, the domestic courts refused to examine the applicants' complaint on the merits. Final decisions were adopted on various dates, by the Supreme Court in the administrative proceedings and the Baku Court of Appeal in the proceedings for judicial review (see Appendix). In their decisions, both the administrative and ordinary courts declared that they did not have competence to examine a complaint relating to the lawfulness of travel bans imposed by the investigating authorities. 12. As regards the applicant in application no. 66650/13, by a decision dated 1 April 2013, a judge at the Sabail District Court dismissed his complaint after examining it on the merits. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: ""Having assessed all the examined evidence, I conclude that the actions of the Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Azerbaijan restricting the right of Mursaliyev Azad Oktay oglu to leave the country are lawful, that the procedure for judicial review as defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Azerbaijan does not provide for a [decision] on the payment of pecuniary or non-pecuniary damages, [and] that, for these reasons, the complaint should not be allowed."" 14. On 12 April 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the first-instance court's decision justified. The appellate court repeated the reasoning provided by the first-instance court and made no mention of the complaint concerning the legal basis for the imposition of the travel ban.",FALSE,0,"With the repeated refusal and dismissal of complaints, the applicants were denied effective remedy.",edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 60,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 5. The applicant was born in 1986 in the Georgian SSR of the USSR. In 1996, when he was ten years old, his parents divorced and he moved with his mother to Kaluga in Russia. In 2003, the applicant graduated from high school in Kaluga and began studies at the Finance and Economics Institute. 6. On 4 May and 17 October 2005 the applicant was convicted of various offences and given a custodial sentence. Upon his release on 29 February 2008, he returned to Kaluga. 7. On 12 January 2012 the police stopped the applicant in the courtyard of his house and charged him with illegal residence in Russia. 8. On the following day the Kaluzhskiy District Court in the Kaluga Region found the applicant guilty of the administrative offence under Article 18.8 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (failure to leave Russia upon the expiry of the authorised period of stay and illegal residence) and sentenced him to a fine of 2,500 Russian roubles (62 euros) and administrative removal from the Russian Federation. Pending removal, the District Court held that the applicant should be held in the detention centre. On 24 January 2012 the Kaluga Regional Court upheld the District Court's decision on appeal. 9. The applicant asked the District Court to postpone the enforcement of the removal order, emphasising that it was currently unenforceable because he had no identity documents and because he was not a Georgian national and could not be sent to Georgia. On 12 April 2012 the District Court refused the applicant's request in a summary fashion. 10. The applicant was held in the administrative detention centre operated by the Kaluga regional police. He shared Cell 13 measuring 8.7 square metres with five Uzbek nationals awaiting deportation. The cell had only one window, 90 centimetres by 120 centimetres, protected with three layers of thick netting and fitted with a matte glass. Two light bulbs, 40 Watts each, lit the cell. The cell was not ventilated. 11. The toilet bowl sunk into the floor was located 40 centimetres from the nearest bed. It was cleaned with cold water without detergent. Prisoners were given three litres of water per day, it was not allowed to boil it. Once a week prisoners were taken to the shower room. There was not enough hot water for all of them and they took turns skipping the shower. 12. There was no calendar or clock in the cell. Nor was there a radio, television, books or newspapers. Board games were forbidden. The applicant did not speak the Uzbek language and could not communicate with his cellmates. 13. Prisoners were taken outdoors in groups of thirty. The yard was small, six by four metres, so they huddled together. It had no sports equipment or awning for bad weather. 14. The applicant's complaints to a prosecutor were rejected as unfounded. In January and March 2012 two members of the Kaluga public monitoring commission visited the facility. Their report corroborated the applicant's description of his conditions of detention. 15. In May 2012 the applicant developed pulmonary tuberculosis. He was transferred for treatment to a civilian hospital in Kaluga. Upon his discharge, he took advantage of the absence of police escort and absconded. A search operation was launched; the applicant was located on 30 January 2013 and returned to the detention centre. 16. On 31 January 2013 the applicant was placed on board of a Tbilisi-bound flight and left Russia. The applicant's rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",Ruled as violated by court,,"10. The applicant was held in the administrative detention centre operated by the Kaluga regional police. He shared Cell 13 measuring 8.7 square metres with five Uzbek nationals awaiting deportation. The cell had only one window, 90 centimetres by 120 centimetres, protected with three layers of thick netting and fitted with a matte glass. Two light bulbs, 40 Watts each, lit the cell. The cell was not ventilated.",FALSE,0,The applicant never received any remedy.,edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 61,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","4. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Simferopol. She is a single mother and has a son who at the time of the accident in question was eight years old. 5. On 24 July 1995 the applicant was knocked down by a trolley bus. She suffered an open craniocerebral injury and contusion of the brain. As a result, the applicant received the status of a disabled person with the lowest degree of disability (третя група інвалідності). 6. In January 1996 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Tsentralnyy District Court against the Simferopol Trolley Bus Company, claiming compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage to her health caused by the accident. In particular, as pecuniary damage the applicant claimed compensation for medicines, additional nutrition, treatment in a sanatorium, transport expenses, and compensation for loss of earnings. 7. On 25 February 2003 the applicant lodged an application with the Court (Litvinyuk v. Ukraine, no. 9724/03) complaining, inter alia, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the lengthy examination of her case by the domestic courts. 8. On 1 February 2007, while the proceedings were still pending before the national courts, the Court delivered a judgment on the applicant's first application (no. 9724/03), finding that the length of the proceedings in her case had been excessive. The Court took into consideration the period after 11 September 1997, when the Convention had come into force in respect of Ukraine. The length of the proceedings within the Court's competence was nine years and twenty two days. 9. The Court, in particular, noted the following: ""47. As for the issues that were at stake for the applicant, the Court notes that following the traffic accident the applicant was seriously injured and received a disability degree. Given that the applicant was a single mother and had a child to raise, the compensations for loss of earnings and for expenses sustained as a result of a poor state of her health were of undeniable importance for the applicant. The Court therefore considers that what was at stake for the applicant called for an expeditious decision on her claims."" 10. On 27 March 2007 the Simferopolskiy District Court found against the applicant. On 24 December 2007 the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea quashed this decision and remitted the case to a first-instance court for fresh examination. On 23 April 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the decision of the court of appeal. 11. On 13 May 2009 the Simferopolskiy District Court partly found for the applicant. On 29 July 2009 the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea quashed this decision and remitted the case to a first-instance court for fresh examination. On 15 October 2009 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the decision of the court of appeal. 12. On 10 November 2009 the Simferopolskiy District Court left the applicant's case without consideration because she had failed to appear in court without giving plausible reasons on 28 October 2009 and 10 November 2009. The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision stating that she had not been aware about the above-mentioned hearings. On 27 January 2010 the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea rejected the applicant's appeal. The court noted that the applicant had been duly notified about the date of the hearings. On 5 October 2011 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the decisions of the lower courts. A further attempt by the applicant to have the above decisions reviewed in the light of newly discovered circumstances was to no avail. The applicant's rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",Ruled as violated by court,,10. On 27 March 2007 the Simferopolskiy District Court found against the applicant. On 24 December 2007 the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea quashed this decision and remitted the case to a first-instance court for fresh examination. On 23 April 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the decision of the court of appeal.,FALSE,0,"With the dismissal of complaints through multiple courts over such an extended period of time, the applicant was denied effective remedy.",edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 62,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","5. The applicants, who are police officers, were born in 1967, 1978, 1976, 1979 and 1964 respectively. The first and second applicants live in Chișinău and Caușeni and the remaining applicants live in Bender. 6. On 14 June 2006 officers Mangîr, Vasiliev and Condrea, who were conducting a criminal investigation in Tiraspol, were arrested by the secret service of the self-proclaimed ""Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria"" (""MRT"")[1]. During their arrest they managed to call the Bender police station. 7. The other two applicants (officers Daţco and Pohila) went to Tiraspol to clarify the reasons for the arrest of their colleagues, but were also arrested upon their arrival. 8. The applicants were placed in the Tiraspol Remand Centre (IVS Tiraspol). 9. On 17 June 2006 officers Pohila, Daţco and Vasiliev were released without charge and without any explanation for their arrest. 10. On 18 June 2006 officer Mangîr was allegedly beaten up and injected with an unknown substance, which rendered him unconscious for four days. After his release he was admitted for in-patient treatment in the hospital of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, where he was diagnosedwith, inter alia, concussion. 11. On 20 June 2006 the Tiraspol City Court issued a warrant for officer Mangîr to be detained for thirty days. On 23 June 2006 the ""MRT"" authorities released officers Mangîr and Condrea. The head of the ""MRT"" secret service declared in an interview that the officers had been released after Russian authorities had ""given assurances"" that Moldovan authorities would not ""kidnap people"" in the ""MRT"". 12. The applicants were accused in the ""MRT"" media of being members of ""black squadrons"" created for the purpose of kidnapping politicians and other persons causing nuisance to the Moldovan authorities. According to the applicants, during their detention they were questioned by the ""MRT"" secret service and forced to declare that in Tiraspol they had been trying to kidnap ""MRT"" politicians. Officers Pohila, Daţco and Vasiliev were allegedly beaten on the soles of their feet and threatened with the killing of members of their families, as well as with being transferred to cells occupied by common criminals, where they would be ill-treated or even killed. 13. Officer Condrea was allegedly subjected to so-called ""Palestinian hanging"" for up to seven hours and was taken to his cell unconscious thereafter. 14. The applicants described as follows their conditions of detention at the Tiraspol Remand Centre. The cells in which they had been held had been in the basement and had not had access to natural light. In the absence of ventilation and because of overcrowding it had been difficult to breathe. Officer Condrea submits that he was detained in the same cell as that in which Mr Ilie Ilaşcu had been detained (for more details see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, ECHR 2004‑VII). 15. During their detention the applicants did not have any daily exercise and were not given access to a shower; they could not receive parcels containing food from their relatives, they did not have bed linen and they were not allowed to be seen by doctors. 16. After the applicants' release the Moldovan authorities initiated two sets of criminal proceedings concerning their unlawful detention and their alleged ill-treatment while in detention. However, several years later the investigation was discontinued. 17. The applicants were also subjected to medical check-ups, which found no traces of violence on their bodies. Only one applicant, Stefan Mangîr, was found to be suffering from the consequences of concussion. The applicants' rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",Ruled as violated by court,,"16. After the applicants' release the Moldovan authorities initiated two sets of criminal proceedings concerning their unlawful detention and their alleged ill-treatment while in detention. However, several years later the investigation was discontinued.",FALSE,0,"With the discontinuation of the investigation, the applicants were denied effective remedy.",edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 63,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","5. On 23 December 2004 the applicants and 126 others lodged a claim with the Komárno Land Office, an authority that is now part of the Komárno District Office (""the Land Office""), for restitution of land under the Restoration of Land Ownership Act (Law no. 503/2003 Coll., as amended). 6. On 27 May 2010 the Land Office dismissed the claim on the grounds that all the claimants lacked standing to bring it. 7. On 21 November 2011 the Nitra Regional Court upheld that decision following an administrative-law appeal by the claimants, lodged on their behalf by four individuals. 8. However, following an appeal lodged by the claimants with the Supreme Court, on 29 January 2014 that court quashed the Regional Court's judgment and remitted the case to it on the grounds that the latter had failed to establish the representatives' authority to act on behalf of all the claimants. The proceedings before the Regional Court had been conducted merely in the presence of the designated representatives and the court had failed to summon the claimants in person and to have its judgment served on them. It had thereby breached the claimants' right of access to a court. 9. Accordingly, it became incumbent on the Regional Court to determine anew the claimants' administrative-law appeal against the decision of the Land Office of 27 May 2010. In those proceedings, the court invited the claimants to clarify issues concerning their legal representation with a view to ensuring that they would be represented by a common representative. 10. In a decision of 4 December 2014 the Regional Court issued several rulings. In so far as relevant for the present application, it ruled that the claimants would all be jointly represented by a lawyer who had up until then represented only some of them. 11. On 25 May 2016 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 4 December 2014 following an appeal lodged by the claimants. 12. The proceedings are still pending before the Regional Court. 13. Meanwhile, on 21 January 2015 the Constitutional Court had rejected a complaint lodged by the applicants about the length of the proceedings in their claim, in so far as they had taken place before the Land Office and the Regional Court. The Constitutional Court held that the length of the administrative proceedings before the Land Office and of the judicial‑review proceedings held before the Regional Court could not be considered together. Having split the complaint into those two segments, the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint concerning the administrative proceedings on the grounds of non-exhaustion of ordinary remedies. In particular, it noted that the applicants had failed to challenge the alleged inactivity of the Land Office under Article 250t § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) (see paragraphs 19 et seq. in ""Relevant domestic law and practice"" below). As regards the judicial-review proceedings, the Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint as manifestly ill-founded. It noted that those proceedings as a whole had lasted some four and a half years. However, the case had been pending on appeal before the Supreme Court for about two years of that period. Although the length of the appellate proceedings had been unsatisfactory, as such it had not been complained of by the applicants, who had limited their compliant to the proceedings before the Regional Court. In addition, the Constitutional Court observed that the proceedings had been procedurally complex on account of the number of claimants. In sum, despite the fact that its judgment had been quashed as flawed, the length of the proceedings before the Regional Court had not been excessive. The applicants' rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",Ruled as violated by court,,"13. Meanwhile, on 21 January 2015 the Constitutional Court had rejected a complaint lodged by the applicants about the length of the proceedings in their claim, in so far as they had taken place before the Land Office and the Regional Court. The Constitutional Court held that the length of the administrative proceedings before the Land Office and of the judicial‑review proceedings held before the Regional Court could not be considered together. Having split the complaint into those two segments, the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint concerning the administrative proceedings on the grounds of non-exhaustion of ordinary remedies. In particular, it noted that the applicants had failed to challenge the alleged inactivity of the Land Office under Article 250t § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) (see paragraphs 19 et seq. in ""Relevant domestic law and practice"" below). As regards the judicial-review proceedings, the Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint as manifestly ill-founded. It noted that those proceedings as a whole had lasted some four and a half years. However, the case had been pending on appeal before the Supreme Court for about two years of that period. Although the length of the appellate proceedings had been unsatisfactory, as such it had not been complained of by the applicants, who had limited their compliant to the proceedings before the Regional Court. In addition, the Constitutional Court observed that the proceedings had been procedurally complex on account of the number of claimants. In sum, despite the fact that its judgment had been quashed as flawed, the length of the proceedings before the Regional Court had not been excessive.",FALSE,0,"With the dismissal of the objection, the applicants were denied effective remedy.",edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 64,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","5. The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Bern, Switzerland. At the time of the events giving rise to the present application, he was the editor‑in-chief of Ülkede Özgür Gündem, a daily newspaper published in Turkey. 6. On 6 July 2004 an article written by Mr B.G. entitled ""Analysing the Kurdish dynamic correctly"" was published in Ülkede Özgür Gündem. In his article, Mr B.G. stated his views on the role of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK (an illegal armed organisation), a number of organisations associated with the PKK in regional and international politics and political developments in Turkey. Next to the article a photograph of Abdullah Öcalan shaking hands with a group of armed men was published. 7. On 8 July 2004 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul Assize Court filed a bill of indictment, charging the applicant with disseminating propaganda in favour of the KONGRA-GEL[1] under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) on account of the article published on 6 July 2004. In the indictment, the public prosecutor quoted the following passage from the article: ""... Abdullah Öcalan, who has contributed to the essential dynamic of the Kurdish movement and the HPG[2], the PJA[3] and the KONGRA-GEL, organisations which have acted as military, political and ideological leaders and which have represented his leadership,... [must be well understood]"". The public prosecutor stated that a photograph of Abdullah Öcalan in which he was standing in a rural area holding a weapon had been published in the newspaper, next to the article. The public prosecutor considered as a result that the applicant had disseminated propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation inciting others to violence or other methods of terrorism. Subsequently, criminal proceedings were launched against the applicant before the Istanbul Assize Court. 8. During the proceedings the applicant maintained that the article in question had been a news article and had not contained propaganda inciting to violence. 9. On 24 May 2005 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and a fine. In its judgment, the Istanbul Assize Court held that the content of the article and the publication of Abdullah Öcalan's photograph amounted to dissemination of propaganda in favour of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL. 10. The applicant appealed. In his appeal petition, referring to a number of the Court's judgments, the applicant claimed that he had not had the intention of disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation and that his criminal conviction had been in breach of Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention as he had been exercising his right to impart information. He also noted that the first-instance court had failed to examine the article in its entirety. 11. On 16 May 2006 the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation returned the case file to the first-instance court and requested that the latter revise its judgment in the light of the recent legislative amendments. 12. On 28 September 2006 the Istanbul Assize Court once again convicted the applicant under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, with the same reasoning that it had adopted on 24 May 2005. The court sentenced the applicant to a fine of 1,802 Turkish liras (TRY). 13. The applicant appealed. 14. On 18 November 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 28 September 2006. 15. According to a document dated 15 January 2010, signed by the President of the Istanbul Assize Court and the Istanbul public prosecutor, the applicant was required to pay the fine of TRY 1,802. The applicant's rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,The applicant never received any remedy.,edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 65,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","5. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Weinheim. He is a campaigner against abortion and operates an anti-abortion website. 6. On 12 and 13 April 2005 the applicant distributed leaflets in the vicinity of the medical practice of Dr St., who performed abortions there. The leaflets stated, inter alia, that the abortions performed by Dr St. in his practice, for which he gave the address, were unlawful according to the case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court. In addition the leaflet contained the following statements: ""According to international criminal law: Aggravated murder is the intentional ‘bringing-to-death' of an innocent human being!"" (Sinngemӓβ aus den internationalen Strafgesetzen: Mord ist das vorsӓtzliche ""Zu-Tode-Bringen"" eines unschuldigen Menschen!) ""The murder of human beings in Auschwitz was unlawful, but the morally degraded NS State allowed the murder of innocent people and did not make it subject to criminal liability."" (Die Ermordung der Menschen in Auschwitz war rechtswidrig, aber der moralisch verkommene NS-Staat hatte den Mord an den unschuldigen Menschen erlaubt und nicht unter Strafe gestellt.) 7. The applicant also addressed passers-by and the physician's presumed patients and attempted to engage with them in conversations about abortion. 8. Dr St. lodged an application for a civil injunction against the applicant and on 25 October 2005 the Mannheim Regional Court granted the requested injunction. The court ordered the applicant to desist from speaking to passers-by in the immediate vicinity of the medical practice and labelling the abortions performed by the plaintiff unlawful with the objective of irritating female patients and preventing them from visiting Dr St.'s practice. 9. On 24 February 2007 the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal upheld the decision and slightly modified the wording specifying the geographical area concerned by the injunction. It also refused to grant leave to appeal on points of law. 10. The Regional Court as well as the Court of Appeal both referred to a previous decision of the Federal Court of Justice in which it had confirmed a civil injunction against similar conduct by the applicant (see paragraph 13 below). The courts held that in the case at issue there were no factual or legal differences justifying deviating from the case-law of the Federal Court of Justice. In so far that the doctor in the present case was slightly more well-known than the doctor in the original case, the Court of Appeal held that this was of minor relevance. The fact that Dr St. had appeared as an expert before the German Parliament many years previously did not have any substantial effects on Dr St's public profile at that time. Moreover, the involvement of Dr St. in different legal disputes was irrelevant, as trying to enforce his rights in the appropriate legal procedure could not redound to Dr St.'s disadvantage. In sum, the applicant had vilified the non‑criminal professional activities of Dr St. by implying that he committed criminal acts and interfered with the relationship of trust between doctor and patient, which deserved special protection against the interventions of others. The applicant had therefore severely interfered with Dr St.'s personality rights. This interference was not justified by the applicant's freedom of expression in view of the massive ""pillory effect"" the applicant had created by singling out the plaintiff and criticising him in a harsh way in the immediate vicinity of his practice. 11. On 29 May 2007 the Federal Court of Justice refused a request by the applicant for legal aid on the grounds that the applicant's intended appeal on points of law lacked sufficient prospect of success. On 20 July 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit the applicant's complaint for adjudication for being inadmissible, without providing reasons (no. 1 BvR 1670/07). The applicant's rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,"With the repeated refusal of complaints, the applicant was denied effective remedy.",edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 66,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","4. The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Cork. 5. He suffers from severe brain damage. It was asserted on his behalf that his condition was caused by the measles vaccination administered to him in 1988 when he was 15 months old. 6. In November 2002, 14 years after receiving the vaccine, the applicant's mother instituted proceedings on his behalf against four defendants; the local health authority, the State, the Attorney General (collectively described in the domestic proceedings as the State defendants) and the doctor who had administered the vaccination, H. 7. On 5 August 2003, the High Court issued a limited order of discovery addressed to the local health authority seeking all relevant records about the applicant in its possession, as well as information about the vaccine used, about any adverse effects noted at the time with this vaccine, about the manner in which the mother's consent was obtained, and about the health of the other members of the applicant's family. Although the High Court set a time-limit of 8 weeks for discovery, the local health authority only complied with the order in June 2008, that is to say with a delay of over four and a half years. 8. The applicant appealed the scope of the order of discovery of 5 August 2003, leading to the grant of a further limited order of discovery by the High Court on 30 January 2004, addressed to all four defendants. The applicant brought another appeal against the order of discovery of 30 January 2004, but in July 2006 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, making only a minor amendment to the order granted by the High Court. 9. The applicant's mother died in December 2007. 10. In June 2008 the applicant's lawyer wrote to the local health authority to complain that the long delays in litigating the case had caused grave prejudice to the case. The applicant's mother had been a vital witness, and with her death essential evidence had been lost. Settlement of the substantive dispute was proposed but not agreed. 11. In May 2008 the applicant's lawyer sought to have the defence of the State defendants set aside. The High Court refused this application on 12 March 2010. 12. The trial involved ten days of hearings. No factual evidence was called on behalf of the applicant, but independent medical witnesses gave evidence, having read the applicant's medical records, and documentary evidence provided by way of discovery was before the court. On the eleventh day of the trial, 19 July 2011, the judge accepted an application by the defendants to strike the case out for failure to establish a prima facie case against them. 13. Regarding the doctor, he noted that the applicant accepted there was insufficient evidence to establish any negligence in the administration of the vaccine. The claim against the doctor H was dismissed. In relation to the State defendants, the judge held that no evidence had been produced that could support the various grounds relied on by the applicant. 14. The proceedings in the High Court terminated on 19 December 2011. The applicant filed a notice of appeal presenting 30 grounds of appeal. Following the establishment of the Court of Appeal in October 2014, the applicant's case was transferred to it. Outline written submissions were submitted by H in February 2015 and by the State defendants in September 2015. 15. The Court of Appeal gave its judgment on 10 February 2016, dismissing the appeal. In its conclusions, the Court of Appeal stated that, by taking the case at its highest, the trial judge had adopted the correct approach on the question of striking the case out. The Court of Appeal concluded by remarking on the many legal hurdles the applicant would have had to overcome in order to succeed. It found no basis for overturning the decision of the High Court. 16. The proceedings ended on 10 May 2016 when the Supreme Court declined the applicant's request for leave to appeal. The applicant's rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,"With the repeated dismissal of appeals, the applicant was denied effective remedy.",edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 67,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","5. The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Oryol. He is currently serving his sentence in IK-7 in the village of Areyskoye, Krasnoyarsk Region. 6. The applicant, his partner and his mother were living in Oryol when the applicant was charged with drug-related crimes. 7. On 2 December 2009 the Federal Penal Authority (""Федеральная служба исполнения наказаний"", ""the FSIN"") of Russia sent a telegram to the FSIN department for the Oryol Region (""the Oryol FSIN"") instructing the latter to send each month up to forty people detained in remand prisons and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in a strict-regime facility to the Krasnoyarsk Region. The instruction was valid as of 1 December 2009 until further notice. 8. On 7 December 2009 the Sovetskiy District Court of Oryol convicted the applicant of drug-related crimes and sentenced him to twelve years' imprisonment in a strict-regime post-conviction detention facility. On 2 February 2010 the Oryol Regional Court upheld the conviction on appeal. 9. Acting on the basis of the FSIN of Russia's instruction of 2 December 2009, on an unspecified date the Oryol FSIN decided, in view of the overcrowding in the post‑conviction detention facilities in the Oryol Region, that the issue of which particular facility the applicant would be transferred to should be resolved by the FSIN department for the Krasnoyarsk Region (""the Krasnoyarsk FSIN""). The latter allocated the applicant to IK-7, a strict-regime post-conviction detention facility in the village of Areyskoye, Krasnoyarsk Region (about 4,200 km from Oryol), to serve his sentence. The applicant has been detained there since 20 April 2010. 10. The applicant has repeatedly asked the penal authorities at different levels to transfer him to a detention facility located closer to Oryol so that he could effectively maintain family ties while serving his sentence. 11. On 12 November 2010 the FSIN of Russia rejected the applicant's request, informing him that, under Article 81 of the Code on the Execution of Sentences (""the CES""), in the absence of exceptional circumstances convicts were to serve their prison term in its entirety in the same detention facility, and that there were no such exceptional circumstances in the applicant's case. They noted as follows: ""[a]s regards maintaining the convict's social ties, the right to receive visits and parcels as well as the right to correspondence and phone calls should be realised in accordance with the laws on execution of sentences in force and does not depend on the place in which he is serving the sentence."" 12. The applicant brought civil proceedings against the Oryol FSIN, claiming compensation for pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damage caused by their decision to transfer him to a penal facility in the Krasnoyarsk Region in breach of his right, under Article 73 § 1 of the CES, to serve his prison sentence in his home region, which had adversely affected his capacity to maintain his family and social ties. 13. On 3 August 2012 the Zavodskoy District Court of Oryol dismissed the claims for damages with reference to Article 73 § 2 of the CES and Ruling No. 1700-O-O of the Constitutional Court of Russia. The court held that the Oryol FSIN's decision had been lawful because between December 2009 and February 2010 the penal facilities in the Oryol Region had been overcrowded. It also noted that the defendant had acted in accordance with the FSIN of Russia's instructions. The court did not address the applicant's argument regarding his difficulties in maintaining family ties because of the distance between his family home and the detention facility. It appears that the applicant did not appeal against the judgment. 14. Between July 2011 and October 2013 the applicant's partner made long-term family visits to IK-7 on six occasions. In 2014 she gave birth to the couple's daughter. While in IK-7, the applicant received a number of parcels and phone calls from his mother and partner. The applicant's rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"The applicant never received any remedy. However, the applicant also appears not to have moved to, as they did not appeal and continued to receive visits.",edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 68,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","5. The first applicant was born in 1972 and is detained in Vilnius. The second applicant was born in 1982 and is detained in Pravieniškės. 6. The first applicant has been detained in Lukiškės Remand Prison since 17 March 2008. 7. On 27 July 2012 he lodged a civil claim against the State, alleging that he was being detained in overcrowded and unsanitary cells. He claimed 74,690 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 21,630 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 8. On 8 November 2012 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court allowed in part the applicant's claim. It firstly held that the time‑limit for claiming damages was three years after the damage arose, and accordingly dismissed the part of the applicant's claim concerning the period before 27 July 2009 as time‑barred. The court then examined various documents provided by the prison authorities and found that, during the remaining period, for about one year and seven months the size of the personal space afforded to the applicant had not complied with the domestic requirements (until 11 May 2010 the minimum personal space in prison cells stipulated by domestic law was 5 sq. m, and from 11 May 2010 it was 3.6 sq. m). 9. The court also found, on the basis of reports submitted by domestic public healthcare authorities, that the temperature and the amount of natural light in some of the cells in which the applicant had been detained had not complied with domestic hygiene norms. However, it dismissed as unproved the applicant's allegations that the cells had been dilapidated and that there had been parasites and rodents. Furthermore, the court considered that the applicant had not proved that his health had deteriorated as a result of the conditions of his detention. 10. The applicant was awarded LTL 1,500 (approximately EUR 434) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 11. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision, but on 20 May 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed his appeal and upheld the lower court's decision in its entirety. 12. The second applicant was detained in Vilnius Correctional Facility from 8 June 2012 to 5 February 2016. 13. On 4 October 2013 he lodged a civil claim against the State, alleging that he was being detained in overcrowded dormitory‑type rooms. He claimed LTL 11,000 (approximately EUR 3,200) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 14. On 12 March 2014 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court allowed in part the applicant's claim. The court found that for seventy‑nine days the applicant had had 2.9 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic requirement of 3.1 sq. m applicable to dormitory‑type rooms. It also found that for eighteen days, when the applicant had been kept under stricter disciplinary regime, he had had 3.34 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic requirement of 3.6 sq. m applicable to such cells. 15. However, the court noted that the applicant had been allowed to move freely around the correctional facility during the day, except when he had been serving disciplinary penalties, and that the material conditions of his detention had been appropriate. It also considered that the applicant had not proved that his health had deteriorated as a result of the conditions of his detention. The court therefore dismissed the applicant's claim for non‑pecuniary damages. 16. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision and on 15 May 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld in part his appeal. It found that, according to the applicant's submissions which the administration of the correctional facility had failed to refute, for 274 days he had had between 2.33 and 3.04 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the relevant domestic requirements. The court considered that, despite the fact that the applicant had been allowed to move freely during the day and that the material conditions of detention had been appropriate, there were grounds to award him non-pecuniary damages. The applicant was awarded EUR 130. The applicant's rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"6. The first applicant has been detained in Lukiškės Remand Prison since 17 March 2008. 8. On 8 November 2012 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court allowed in part the applicant's claim. It firstly held that the time‑limit for claiming damages was three years after the damage arose, and accordingly dismissed the part of the applicant's claim concerning the period before 27 July 2009 as time‑barred. The court then examined various documents provided by the prison authorities and found that, during the remaining period, for about one year and seven months the size of the personal space afforded to the applicant had not complied with the domestic requirements (until 11 May 2010 the minimum personal space in prison cells stipulated by domestic law was 5 sq. m, and from 11 May 2010 it was 3.6 sq. m). 9. The court also found, on the basis of reports submitted by domestic public healthcare authorities, that the temperature and the amount of natural light in some of the cells in which the applicant had been detained had not complied with domestic hygiene norms. However, it dismissed as unproved the applicant's allegations that the cells had been dilapidated and that there had been parasites and rodents. Furthermore, the court considered that the applicant had not proved that his health had deteriorated as a result of the conditions of his detention. 10. The applicant was awarded LTL 1,500 (approximately EUR 434) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 12. The second applicant was detained in Vilnius Correctional Facility from 8 June 2012 to 5 February 2016. 15. However, the court noted that the applicant had been allowed to move freely around the correctional facility during the day, except when he had been serving disciplinary penalties, and that the material conditions of his detention had been appropriate. It also considered that the applicant had not proved that his health had deteriorated as a result of the conditions of his detention. The court therefore dismissed the applicant's claim for non‑pecuniary damages. 16. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision and on 15 May 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld in part his appeal. It found that, according to the applicant's submissions which the administration of the correctional facility had failed to refute, for 274 days he had had between 2.33 and 3.04 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the relevant domestic requirements. The court considered that, despite the fact that the applicant had been allowed to move freely during the day and that the material conditions of detention had been appropriate, there were grounds to award him non-pecuniary damages. The applicant was awarded EUR 130.",FALSE,0,The applicant was awarded effective remedy and did not appeal further.,edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 69,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","6. The applicants, Mr Ömer Yaman (first applicant), Mr Mustafa Ürek (second applicant), and Mr Kerem Bilen (third applicant) were born in 1956, 1967 and 1977 respectively. 7. On 20 June 1999 the applicants were arrested in the course of a military operation in Şırnak. They were subsequently interrogated by the gendarmes in the absence of a lawyer. In their statements, the applicants accepted the charges against them and gave a detailed account of their involvement in the PKK (the Workers' Party of Kurdistan, an illegal organisation). 8. On 23 June 1999 the applicants were brought before the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor and subsequently before the investigating judge. The first and second applicants were provided with an interpreter during their interrogation. Before the public prosecutor and the judge, the applicants denied the charges against them. They further stated that they had signed their gendarmerie statements without reading them. Following the questioning, the investigating judge remanded the applicants in custody. 9. On 2 July 1999 the Public Prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed an indictment with that court and accused the applicants of carrying out activities for the purpose of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory, under Article 125 of the Criminal Code. 10. The proceedings resumed before the Diyarbakır State Security Court and the first and second applicants were authorised to have the assistance of an interpreter. In their defence submissions before the trial court, the applicants retracted the statements they had allegedly made during the preliminary investigation stage. They submitted that the gendarmes had made them sign their statements without reading them. 11. On 7 May 2002 the Diyarbakır State Security Court found the applicants guilty as charged and convicted them under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code with carrying out activities with the aim of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory. It further sentenced the applicants to life imprisonment. In convicting them, the court had regard to the applicants' statements taken by the gendarmes. 12. On 25 March 2003 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court on the ground that during the trial certain witness statements, which had been taken on commission before other courts, had not been read out to the applicants for comment during the trial. The case was accordingly remitted to the Diyarbakır State Security Court. 13. In the meantime, State Security Courts were abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, and therefore, the case against the applicants was transferred to the Diyarbakır Assize Court. 14. On 7 March 2005 the Diyarbakır Assize Court complied with the decision of the Court of Cassation and witness statements that had been taken on commission were read out to the applicants for their comments. At the end of the trial, the Diyarbakır Assize Court found the applicants guilty as charged and sentenced them to life imprisonment. 15. On 17 June 2005 the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation decided that the case file should be remitted to the Diyarbakır Assize Court for examination of whether the new Criminal Code which had entered into force on 1 June 2005 (Law no. 5297) provided more favourable provisions for the applicants. The case was thus once again examined by the Diyarbakır Assize Court in view of the recent legislative changes. 16. On 25 October 2005 the Diyarbakır Assize Court once again convicted the applicants under Article 125 of the former Criminal Court, finding that this provision was more favourable to them than the corresponding provision of the new criminal code. 17. On 30 May 2006 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment on procedural grounds, holding in particular that certain documents which had been relied on by the first-instance court in its judgment were not of an official nature. 18. On 24 April 2007 the Diyarbakır Assize Court, after obtaining official copies of all the documents in the case file, convicted the applicants under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code and sentenced them to life imprisonment. 19. On 11 December 2007 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. The applicants' rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,The applicants never received any remedy.,edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 70,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","6. The applicant was born in 1991 and lives in Skopje. 7. In 1999 the applicant (eight years old at the time) and her family (parents and three siblings) fled Kosovo[1] and settled in the respondent State, where she has been living ever since. In 2005 she was granted asylum and a residence permit. She entered into a common-law partnership with a Macedonian national, with whom she has three minor children (the children also have Macedonian nationality). Her residence permit was extended each year until 3 February 2014, when the Ministry of the Interior terminated her asylum, holding that she was ""a risk to [national] security."" The decision was preceded by an interview at which the applicant, who had been legally represented, had confirmed her family situation and her intention to marry her partner. That the applicant represented a security risk was not discussed at the interview. The decision further stated: ""[the applicant] is obliged to leave the respondent State within twenty days of receipt of the final decision."" 8. The applicant, through her lawyer, challenged the decision as arbitrary. She argued that there was no evidence that her presence in the respondent State represented a threat to national security. Furthermore, she had not been given an opportunity to challenge any such evidence. 9. On 3 July 2014 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's appeal and upheld the decision of the Ministry, noting that the latter had obtained a classified written note (службена белешка со назнака за доверлив документ) from the Security and Counter Intelligence Agency (""the Intelligence Agency"") indicating that she represented a threat to national security. The court did not provide any further details regarding that document. It ruled accordingly that the impugned proceedings had been lawful. 10. The applicant's representative appealed against that decision before the Higher Administrative Court, reiterating the arguments raised previously. She further alleged that the wording used by the Administrative Court implied that there were some documents on which the impugned decision had been based. However, she had not been given an opportunity to have knowledge of or to comment on that evidence. 11. By a decision of 1 July 2015, served on the applicant on 6 October 2015, the Higher Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's appeal and upheld the Ministry's decision. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: ""... [The Ministry] decided on the basis of ... classified information obtained from a relevant body (which) proves indisputably that her presence in (the respondent State) represents a threat to its security. The Higher Administrative Court has examined the (applicant's) allegations ... that information provided by the relevant body within the Ministry of the Interior was not forwarded to her and her representative, but it considers them irrelevant ..."" 12. In the proceedings before the Court, the Government submitted a redacted version of the classified note that the Intelligence Agency had sent on 19 September 2013 to the Ministry of the Interior. The relevant parts of the note read as follows: ""... following security checks of [the applicant], it has been established that recognition of her asylum status would be a threat to the (national) security of the [respondent State]. It has been established that her (hidden text) ... are perpetrators of tens of crimes (serious thefts, thefts and acts of concealment). The applicant was aware of and supported all crimes committed by her (hidden text) ... She has also been living in a common-law partnership with M.M. in order to obtain the monetary allowance to which she was entitled having been granted asylum. In such circumstances, we are of the opinion that she should not be granted asylum in [the respondent State]."" 13. On 11 November 2015 the Ministry granted a request by the applicant to leave the respondent State in order to obtain, as she had stated, documents from the Serbian authorities for marrying her common-law partner in the respondent State. She was allowed re-entry to the respondent State in January 2016, which was one month after the expiry of the time‑limit for returning to the respondent State. In February 2016 she contacted the Ministry with a view to submitting the relevant documents. The applicant's rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"7. In 1999 the applicant (eight years old at the time) and her family (parents and three siblings) fled Kosovo[1] and settled in the respondent State, where she has been living ever since. In 2005 she was granted asylum and a residence permit. She entered into a common-law partnership with a Macedonian national, with whom she has three minor children (the children also have Macedonian nationality). Her residence permit was extended each year until 3 February 2014, when the Ministry of the Interior terminated her asylum, holding that she was ""a risk to [national] security."" The decision was preceded by an interview at which the applicant, who had been legally represented, had confirmed her family situation and her intention to marry her partner. That the applicant represented a security risk was not discussed at the interview. The decision further stated: ""[the applicant] is obliged to leave the respondent State within twenty days of receipt of the final decision."" 12. In the proceedings before the Court, the Government submitted a redacted version of the classified note that the Intelligence Agency had sent on 19 September 2013 to the Ministry of the Interior. The relevant parts of the note read as follows: ""... following security checks of [the applicant], it has been established that recognition of her asylum status would be a threat to the (national) security of the [respondent State]. It has been established that her (hidden text) ... are perpetrators of tens of crimes (serious thefts, thefts and acts of concealment). The applicant was aware of and supported all crimes committed by her (hidden text) ... She has also been living in a common-law partnership with M.M. in order to obtain the monetary allowance to which she was entitled having been granted asylum. In such circumstances, we are of the opinion that she should not be granted asylum in [the respondent State]."" 13. On 11 November 2015 the Ministry granted a request by the applicant to leave the respondent State in order to obtain, as she had stated, documents from the Serbian authorities for marrying her common-law partner in the respondent State. She was allowed re-entry to the respondent State in January 2016, which was one month after the expiry of the time‑limit for returning to the respondent State. In February 2016 she contacted the Ministry with a view to submitting the relevant documents.",TRUE,1,"While the applicant was originally denied remedy by the state, it appears this was for legitimate legal reasons, and she was ultimately able to reenter the state. ",edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 71,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","5. The applicant was born in 1975 and is detained in the Corradino Correctional Facility, Paola, Malta. 6. The applicant is currently serving a term of imprisonment for drug-related offences. On 3 December 2009 he was sentenced to sixteen years' imprisonment and fined 40,000 euros (EUR) by the Criminal Court. The punishment was confirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeal on 19 September 2013. 7. The applicant started to serve his prison sentence and on 10 December 2009 he had been placed in Division 2 (cell no. 88) of the Corradino Correctional Facility. He remained in various cells in Division 2 to date, except for two brief periods in 2011 where he had been placed in Division 6 (a high security unit) for nine and eleven days respectively, the latter ending on 4 December 2011. In particular after 4 December 2011 the applicant had been staying in cell no. 45 until 26 December 2014 and thereafter had been hosted in cell no. 70, both in Division 2. 8. The applicant alleged that a huge amount of maintenance was needed to the area due to its old age (around 200 years old) and that it lacked both light and air. Windows were behind two iron grids and a third layer of exterior iron bars (hereinafter referred to as ‘triple‑barred windows'). Division 2 also had three skylights, which were kept closed even during the summer months, leading to a great amount of heat. The ""environment"" was squalid and had a bad smell. 9. In the period during which he had been placed in cell no. 45, the applicant had had to suffer the fumes and excessive heat from the bakery close to his cell, which fumes and heat poured into his poorly ventilated cell. The applicant also described the cell as being nearly underground and as structurally condemned. Due the triple-barred windows he could barely see outside. In winter the cell was very humid and cold. 10. When, on 26 December 2014, he moved to cell no. 70 (see paragraph 7 above), which was very small and had very little ventilation; the applicant felt claustrophobic. Furthermore, he claimed to hardly ever having had access to running water. 11. According to the applicant, in Division 2 the food was of a very poor quality, non-nutritious, and portions were too small. Additionally, the food quality was so terrible that between 1 and 4 September 2015 prisoners had to be taken to hospital as a result of food poisoning. The applicant claimed that the kitchen was so dirty that mice were found dead in it. 12. The applicant complained that there was no combined automated toilet‑flushing system installed. Therefore, inmates had to flush their own personal toilet by means of a water bucket which was provided to them. Moreover, at times there was no access to running water in the cell. Access to water was limited in general, and water available was not potable. While inmates were permitted to buy bottled water, they were forced to reduce their daily intake when they were short on cash. 13. As to the showers, hot water was often not available and the water was dirty. The applicant submitted that there were not enough showers, with one of the showers having a broken and cracked tray that could cause injury if one were not careful. He alleged that, for all the inmates in Division 2, only one shower was available most of the time, with two showers being available during the summer months. 14. The applicant claimed that the cost to make telephone calls was very high and had been increased on 3 December 2014. He had complained to the prison authorities to no avail. 15. He complained that the prison allowance given to detainees was too little. This made everything available at the tuck shop excessively expensive. It inevitably also impacted the inmates' ability to buy bottled water and make telephone calls. 16. The applicant claimed to have suffered health issues and had even been confined to his bed because of illness for some time. The emergency buzzer in the cell never worked and when he had been confined to his bed because of illness and tried to ring it, no one came, since the buzzer did not work. It took thirty minutes for someone from the staff to show up, at which point he was told off by the staff member. 17. Petitions were filed in regard to these conditions. Furthermore, some of his fellow inmates had lodged constitutional cases concerning the situation. However, none led to any change. The applicant's rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. The applicant started to serve his prison sentence and on 10 December 2009 he had been placed in Division 2 (cell no. 88) of the Corradino Correctional Facility. He remained in various cells in Division 2 to date, except for two brief periods in 2011 where he had been placed in Division 6 (a high security unit) for nine and eleven days respectively, the latter ending on 4 December 2011. In particular after 4 December 2011 the applicant had been staying in cell no. 45 until 26 December 2014 and thereafter had been hosted in cell no. 70, both in Division 2. 8. The applicant alleged that a huge amount of maintenance was needed to the area due to its old age (around 200 years old) and that it lacked both light and air. Windows were behind two iron grids and a third layer of exterior iron bars (hereinafter referred to as ‘triple‑barred windows'). Division 2 also had three skylights, which were kept closed even during the summer months, leading to a great amount of heat. The ""environment"" was squalid and had a bad smell. 16. The applicant claimed to have suffered health issues and had even been confined to his bed because of illness for some time. The emergency buzzer in the cell never worked and when he had been confined to his bed because of illness and tried to ring it, no one came, since the buzzer did not work. It took thirty minutes for someone from the staff to show up, at which point he was told off by the staff member.",FALSE,0,"With the lack of change or response to petitions, the applicant was denied effective remedy.",edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 72,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","5. The applicant was born in 1971 and at the time of introduction of the application to the Court he was detained in Diavata Prison. 6. The applicant is serving a life sentence for drug dealing. He was initially placed in Diavata Prison from 1 October 2014 until 24 November 2015. On that date he was transferred to Malandrino Prison, from where he was transferred back to Diavata Prison on 9 May 2016. Lastly, on 20 December 2016 he was transferred back to Malandrino Prison. 7. The applicant alleged that he had been detained initially in cell no. B 14, which had measured 9 sq. m and had held four detainees in total. On 7 August 2016 he had been placed in cell no. GR 2 on the ground floor, which had measured 24 sq. m and had held ten detainees. In both cases, therefore, the living space afforded to him had been less than 3 sq. m. Overcrowding had exposed him to infectious diseases and he had suffered from passive smoking. In addition, detainees had had barely any space to move within their cell and their bunk beds had been low, not allowing them to sit up comfortably. 8. Apart from the overcrowding, the applicant submitted that the conditions of his detention had been very poor. Access to natural light and ventilation had been inadequate. Sanitary facilities and supplies had been old, broken and insufficient to ensure the detainees' well‑being and personal hygiene. Heating had been provided only for one hour per day from 9 p.m. to 10 p.m., while hot water during winter had been provided for two hours per day and had not sufficed for all detainees. They had been forced to wash themselves using buckets of water, as the water pressure in showers had been insufficient. In each ten-person cell there had been five bunk beds, five stools, a small table and five side tables but no lockable space for personal belongings. In the four-person cell there had been two bunk beds and two stools. The mattresses had been old, mouldy and smelly, and sheets and towels had not been provided. 9. In general, detainees had lacked access to cultural, recreational and sports activities. They had had to rely on visits from friends and family in order to obtain any newspapers or magazines, which had intensified their feeling of isolation. The hours that they had been allowed to spend in the corridors had been insufficient, taking into account that they had coincided with the meal times as well as with the times they had been allowed to receive visits or make phone calls. The yard had included a football field but no balls had been provided to the detainees and the yard had not offered any opportunities for spending time creatively. The applicant further complained of the quantity and the quality of the food, claiming that it had been repetitive and lacking any nutritional value. 10. Lastly, the applicant submitted that the conditions of his detention had led him having several cardiac arrests. 11. The Government, referring to a document provided by the prison authorities, submitted that Diavata Prison had a capacity of 358 detainees on the basis of allocation of 4 sq. m per detainee according to the minimum standards set by the CPT. At the time the applicant had been detained, the prison facility had exceeded its capacity by accommodating 460 to 500 detainees. The applicant had been detained in cell no. 11 on the first floor, which had measured 24 sq. m, including a toilet measuring 2 sq. m. The cell had had a capacity of ten detainees; however, following a new law in April 2015 aimed at relieving overcrowding in prisons, many detainees had been released and that had resulted in the applicant sharing the cell with four to six detainees. Therefore, the living space afforded to the applicant had ranged from 3.14 to 4.4 sq. m. 12. As regards the rest of the applicant's complaints, the Government argued that the prison had had a central heating system, in addition to the electric heating devices that had been provided to each cell. The cell in which the applicant had been detained had had large windows. Detainees had had access to hot water and had been provided regularly with personal hygiene products. The cells had been regularly disinfected. As regards prisoners' meals, the Government submitted the menu of various random weeks to demonstrate that they had been comprised of a variety of food. 13. The Government submitted the applicant's medical file in order to prove that the applicant had already suffered from cardiac conditions when his incarceration had started. The applicant's medical needs had been fully fulfilled during the time he had spent in Diavata Prison either by visits to the prison doctor or by his transfer to nearby hospitals. Lastly, the applicant had been granted fifteen days of leave in order to take matriculation exams. The applicant's rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. The applicant alleged that he had been detained initially in cell no. B 14, which had measured 9 sq. m and had held four detainees in total. On 7 August 2016 he had been placed in cell no. GR 2 on the ground floor, which had measured 24 sq. m and had held ten detainees. In both cases, therefore, the living space afforded to him had been less than 3 sq. m. Overcrowding had exposed him to infectious diseases and he had suffered from passive smoking. In addition, detainees had had barely any space to move within their cell and their bunk beds had been low, not allowing them to sit up comfortably. 11. The Government, referring to a document provided by the prison authorities, submitted that Diavata Prison had a capacity of 358 detainees on the basis of allocation of 4 sq. m per detainee according to the minimum standards set by the CPT. At the time the applicant had been detained, the prison facility had exceeded its capacity by accommodating 460 to 500 detainees. The applicant had been detained in cell no. 11 on the first floor, which had measured 24 sq. m, including a toilet measuring 2 sq. m. The cell had had a capacity of ten detainees; however, following a new law in April 2015 aimed at relieving overcrowding in prisons, many detainees had been released and that had resulted in the applicant sharing the cell with four to six detainees. Therefore, the living space afforded to the applicant had ranged from 3.14 to 4.4 sq. m.",FALSE,0,The applicant never received any remedy.,edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 73,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","5. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Novocheboksarsk. 6. The facts of the applicant's ill-treatment in police custody were established in a judgment of the Novocheboksarsk Town Court of the Chuvash Republic (""the Town Court"") of 22 August 2008 and upheld on 11 November 2008 by the Supreme Court of the Chuvash Republic. The facts are as follows. 7. On 10 April 2007 the applicant was stopped by police officers on a street near his home and taken to district police station no. 1 of Novocheboksarsk to have his identity checked. At the police station a district police officer (участковый уполномоченный милиции), Officer M. from the Novocheboksarsk town police station, who wore a police uniform, threatened the applicant by saying that a criminal case against him would be opened, grabbed him by his clothing, violently pushed him backwards against a wall several times and punched his left ear. 8. According to a forensic medical expert's report, the applicant had a traumatic rupture of the left eardrum with a haemorrhage, which caused a short-term – lasting between six and twenty-one days – health disorder. Accordingly, this qualified as ""insignificant"" health damage. 9. Officer M. was convicted under Article 286 § 3 (a) of the Criminal Code (abuse of power with the use of violence) and sentenced to three years' imprisonment and a two‑year ban on exercising official power. 10. In January 2009 the applicant brought a civil claim in the amount of 312,487 Russian roubles (RUB) against the Ministry of Finance of the Chuvash Republic in respect of non-pecuniary damage. He argued, inter alia, that his ill‑treatment by the police had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment proscribed by Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (""the Convention""), and that, in accordance with the Plenary Supreme Court Resolution no. 5 of 10 October 2003, the domestic courts were to apply the Convention in accordance with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (""the Court""). He also argued that, in calculating the amount of compensation due in respect of non‑pecuniary damage for a violation of the Convention, the domestic courts therefore had to take into account the sums awarded by the Court under Article 41 of the Convention in similar cases. He stated that his claim had been calculated based on the sum awarded by the Court in the case of Ribitsch, in which a violation of Article 3 of the Convention had been found on account of inhuman and degrading treatment in police custody (see Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, Series A no. 336). 11. On 6 April 2009 the Town Court allowed the applicant's civil claim in part. It noted that, under Article 61 § 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a judgment in a criminal case which had become enforceable was binding on a court examining the civil-law consequences of the acts of a person against whom the judgment had been delivered, in so far as it established whether those acts had taken place and whether they had been committed by that person. Article 53 of the Constitution and Articles 151 and 1069 of the Civil Code provided for State liability for harm caused to individuals by State agents. Relying on Articles 1099-1101 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation and section 8 of the Plenary Supreme Court Resolution no. 10 of 20 December 1994, the Town Court held that RUB 20,000 would be just and reasonable satisfaction for the applicant's mental suffering as a result of his ill-treatment by the police officer, treatment which had undermined his honour and dignity and caused him insignificant health damage. 12. The applicant appealed against the judgment. On 6 May 2009 the Supreme Court of the Chuvash Republic upheld the judgment on appeal, fully endorsing the Town Court's calculation of the amount of compensation in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. It disagreed with the applicant that, in determining the amount of compensation for non‑pecuniary damage, the domestic courts had to be guided by the amounts of such compensation awarded by the Court in similar cases, stating as follows: ""Indeed, in accordance with Article 15 § 4 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, commonly recognised principles and norms of international law and international agreements of the Russian Federation are an integral part of [the Russian Federation's] legal system. However, this does not mean that the amount of compensation for non-pecuniary damage determined by the European Court of Human Rights in a specific case has a binding effect on national courts examining other cases where a violation of similar norms and principles can be found. The determination of the amount of compensation for non-pecuniary damage in specific cases is the prerogative of national courts examining such cases."" The applicant's rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While the applicant continued to appeal, the government provided remedy and reasons for its effectiveness.",edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 74,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","5. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Bílovice nad Svitavou (the Czech Republic). 6. On 30 December 1992 the applicant's legal predecessor and two others applied to the Bratislava Land Office for the restitution of some plots of land under the Land Ownership Act of 1991. The date on which the applicant subsequently became a party to the proceedings is not specified. 7. On 23 June 1997 the Land Office issued a decision approving an agreement whereby the proceedings would end in relation to part of the property but continue in relation to the remainder. 8. By a decision of the Land Office of 17 May 1999, the proceedings in respect of another part of the property ended. However, on 23 May 2003 the relevant part of the proceedings was reopened. 9. On 12 July 2013 the Land Office stayed the restitution proceedings on the grounds that the parties had failed to furnish it with their consent to process, in the course of the proceedings, their personal data. 10. On 11 September 2015 the Land Office dismissed part of what was left of the applicant's claim. 11. On 19 October 2015 the Land Office stayed the examination of the remainder of the claim, inviting a number of institutions to submit relevant documentation, which they did by the end of 2015. 12. The remainder of the applicant's claim is still pending. 13. Following repeated requests for acceleration of the proceedings and complaints, on 18 June 2011 the Bratislava Regional Land Office acknowledged that there had been unjustified delays in the proceedings before the District Land Office. 14. On 20 December 2011 the applicant brought an action in the Bratislava Regional Court for acceleration of the proceedings under Article 250t § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (""the CCP""). 15. On 19 April 2012 the Regional Court dismissed the action on the grounds that the Land Office was short of staff and overburdened with complex and time-consuming restitution claims. It also noted that the Land Office had maintained active correspondence with the applicant and had therefore not caused any undue delays. 16. The decision of 19 April 2012 was quashed by the Constitutional Court following the applicant's constitutional complaint (see paragraph 22 below). This led to re-examination of the case by the Regional Court, which decided on 11 April 2013 to allow the action and to order the Land Office to decide on the applicant's claim within sixty days. 17. On 12 November 2013, in response to a complaint lodged by the applicant, the Bratislava II District Office of the Public Prosecution Service (""the PPS"") informed him that the PPS had reprimanded the Land Office for unjustified delays in the restitution proceedings. 18. On 21 August 2014 the applicant lodged a fresh action with the Regional Court under Article 250t § 1 of the CCP, arguing that the Land Office had failed to abide by the order of 11 April 2013. 19. On 27 May 2015 the Regional Court allowed the action, issuing a fresh order to the Land Office to decide on the matter within three months. At the same time, it fined it 1,000 euros (EUR) payable to the account of the Regional Court. 20. On 4 July 2012 the applicant lodged two constitutional complaints. 21. The first complaint was directed against the Land Office, in particular at the length of the proceedings on his restitution claim before it. On 23 August 2012 the Constitutional Court rejected that complaint for lack of jurisdiction to examine it. The Constitutional Court noted that under Article 250t § 1 of the CCP examination of delays in proceedings before administrative authorities fell within the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals, which excluded the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. Accordingly, as the administrative proceedings were still pending, the applicant should have lodged a fresh complaint about the alleged inactivity of the Land Office with the Regional Court. Even though the applicant had already been unsuccessful in using such a remedy, the Regional Court continued to have jurisdiction over actions of that type. 22. The second complaint was directed against the Regional Court. The applicant contested, inter alia, the fairness of the proceedings leading to its decision of 19 April 2012 (see paragraph 15 above). In a constitutional judgment of 16 January 2013, the Constitutional Court allowed the relevant part of the applicant's complaint and found a violation of his right to a fair hearing. It held, in particular, that the Regional Court had failed to take account of relevant aspects of the case and to give adequate reasoning in respect of them. Accordingly, it quashed the Regional Court's decision of 19 April 2012 and remitted the applicant's action of 20 December 2011 to the Regional Court for fresh examination. Moreover, it awarded the applicant EUR 2,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The applicant's rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",Ruled as violated by court,,"13. Following repeated requests for acceleration of the proceedings and complaints, on 18 June 2011 the Bratislava Regional Land Office acknowledged that there had been unjustified delays in the proceedings before the District Land Office. 16. The decision of 19 April 2012 was quashed by the Constitutional Court following the applicant's constitutional complaint (see paragraph 22 below). This led to re-examination of the case by the Regional Court, which decided on 11 April 2013 to allow the action and to order the Land Office to decide on the applicant's claim within sixty days. 17. On 12 November 2013, in response to a complaint lodged by the applicant, the Bratislava II District Office of the Public Prosecution Service (""the PPS"") informed him that the PPS had reprimanded the Land Office for unjustified delays in the restitution proceedings. 19. On 27 May 2015 the Regional Court allowed the action, issuing a fresh order to the Land Office to decide on the matter within three months. At the same time, it fined it 1,000 euros (EUR) payable to the account of the Regional Court. 21. The first complaint was directed against the Land Office, in particular at the length of the proceedings on his restitution claim before it. On 23 August 2012 the Constitutional Court rejected that complaint for lack of jurisdiction to examine it. The Constitutional Court noted that under Article 250t § 1 of the CCP examination of delays in proceedings before administrative authorities fell within the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals, which excluded the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. Accordingly, as the administrative proceedings were still pending, the applicant should have lodged a fresh complaint about the alleged inactivity of the Land Office with the Regional Court. Even though the applicant had already been unsuccessful in using such a remedy, the Regional Court continued to have jurisdiction over actions of that type. 22. The second complaint was directed against the Regional Court. The applicant contested, inter alia, the fairness of the proceedings leading to its decision of 19 April 2012 (see paragraph 15 above). In a constitutional judgment of 16 January 2013, the Constitutional Court allowed the relevant part of the applicant's complaint and found a violation of his right to a fair hearing. It held, in particular, that the Regional Court had failed to take account of relevant aspects of the case and to give adequate reasoning in respect of them. Accordingly, it quashed the Regional Court's decision of 19 April 2012 and remitted the applicant's action of 20 December 2011 to the Regional Court for fresh examination. Moreover, it awarded the applicant EUR 2,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.",TRUE,2,"While there were some early dismissals, the process ultimately ended in some remedy. It depends on what the statute means by ""effective"" remedy.",edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 75,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","4. The applicant was born in 1991 and lives in Orenburg. 5. The facts of the applicant's ill-treatment were established in a judgment of the Promyshlenniy District Court of Orenburg of 15 December 2011, as upheld on 14 February 2012 by the Orenburg Regional Court, and are as follows. 6. At around 7 p.m. on 30 August 2009 the applicant was arrested at a bus stop by police officers of the criminal investigation unit and taken to a police station in Orenburg (УВД по г. Оренбургу). From 8 p.m. to midnight on 30 August 2009, and from 12 noon to 6 p.m. on 31 August 2009, police officers K. and M. subjected the applicant to physical and psychological violence in order to obtain a confession from him about a drug-related crime which they suspected him of having committed. 7. The facts of the ill-treatment on 30 August 2009 were established as follows. Officers K. and M. pushed the applicant to the floor and punched and kicked him numerous times in the head, face, chest, arms and legs. K. placed a plastic bag over his head, closing off his access to air, while M. held him down. As regards the ill-treatment on 31 August 2009, officers K. and M. punched the applicant numerous times in the head and threatened to detain him. 8. At 8 p.m. on 31 August 2009 the applicant was formally arrested on suspicion of possession of drugs and placed in a temporary detention facility. 9. On 2 September 2009 the applicant was released after giving an undertaking not to leave his place of residence. On the same day he sought medical help at a traumatology centre (TP no. 2). According to his medical records, he had abrasions on his forearms, a bruise under his right eye, a bruise in the left lumbar region and abrasions on his legs. 10. On 3 September 2009 the applicant made a complaint to the Orenburg regional investigative committee regarding his ill‑treatment. 11. On 4 September 2009 he underwent a forensic medical examination ordered by the investigation authority. According to report no. 6368, he had the following injuries: (i) a haematoma (swelling) of the soft tissues in the parietal region of the head, measuring 4 by 3 cm; (ii) four bruises of indefinite form on the right infraorbital region of the face, on his neck, on the left side of his chest and around the right iliac (hip) bone, measuring up to 4 by 3 cm each; and (iii) seventeen abrasions, some linear and some of indefinite form, on both forearms, his right hip and left lower leg, measuring from 0.8 by 0.5 cm to 2.5 by 1 cm each. The expert concluded that the applicant's injuries had resulted from being struck repeatedly with a hard, blunt object with a limited surface area on the day of the alleged incident, and had not caused any ""health damage"". Subsequent forensic medical expert reports of 4 December 2009 and 21 October 2010 came to similar conclusions. It was stated in the first of those reports that the applicant's injuries had been caused by at least twenty traumatic blows to his body. 12. Officers K. and M. were convicted under Article 286 § 3 (a) of the Criminal Code and banned from exercising official duties for three years. They were also given a three-year suspended sentence with a three-year probation period, which required them to appear monthly before the Service for the Execution of Sentences and disclose any change of place of work or residence. 13. The following circumstances were taken into account in sentencing the police officers. The fact that officer K. had a child under 14 years old was considered a mitigating circumstance, while the fact that he and M. had committed the crime with a group of other officers was considered an aggravating circumstance. It was further taken into account that K. and M. had positive references from their places of work and residence, had no previous convictions, and had led a law-abiding way of life without committing any administrative offences for more than two years since the crime had been committed. 14. On 31 November 2009 criminal proceedings against the applicant under Article 228 § 2 of the Criminal Code (possession of large quantities of drugs) were terminated for absence of a crime, pursuant to Article 24 § 1(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 15. In 2012 the applicant brought a civil claim against the Russian Ministry of Finance, seeking 2,655,936 Russian roubles (RUB) in compensation for his unlawful detention and ill‑treatment in police custody by K. and M. 16. On 28 June 2012 the Leninskiy District Court of Orenburg allowed the applicant's claim in part and awarded him RUB 20,000. In determining the amount of compensation, the court found that the applicant had sustained injuries as a result of the police officers' actions and had experienced physical and mental suffering, but that this had not caused him any ""health damage"". 17. The applicant appealed against that judgment to the Orenburg Regional Court, which on 19 September 2012 increased the amount of compensation to RUB 80,000. The applicant's rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"12. Officers K. and M. were convicted under Article 286 § 3 (a) of the Criminal Code and banned from exercising official duties for three years. They were also given a three-year suspended sentence with a three-year probation period, which required them to appear monthly before the Service for the Execution of Sentences and disclose any change of place of work or residence. 13. The following circumstances were taken into account in sentencing the police officers. The fact that officer K. had a child under 14 years old was considered a mitigating circumstance, while the fact that he and M. had committed the crime with a group of other officers was considered an aggravating circumstance. It was further taken into account that K. and M. had positive references from their places of work and residence, had no previous convictions, and had led a law-abiding way of life without committing any administrative offences for more than two years since the crime had been committed.",FALSE,0,The applicant received all effective remedy pursued.,edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 76,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","4. The applicant was born in 1990 and lives in Galashki, Ingushetia Republic. 5. On 11 December 2009 the applicant was abducted by S. with intent to marry her. The applicant's mother opposed the marriage and on the same day S.'s relatives took the applicant back to her mother's house. 6. On 12 December 2009 the relatives of the applicant's deceased father made the applicant go back to S.'s, because of the presumed consummation of the marriage. They also threatened to kill S., should the applicant decide to leave him. 7. The applicant had to live with S.'s family as his wife. The marriage was not officially registered. She was kept locked in a room without being able to communicate with people outside S.'s family. S. moved to a different town. On rare occasions S.'s sister let the applicant use her mobile phone so that she could call her mother. She complained that S.'s family, especially her mother-in-law, treated her poorly. She did not feel well and complained about dizziness, numbing of the lower jaw and difficulty to breathe. According to the applicant's mother, the applicant told her once that her mother-in-law did not let her see S. and claimed that the applicant would not last living with them longer than two months. On several occasions the applicant lost consciousness and foamed at the mouth. 8. On 28 December 2009 the applicant was taken to a municipal hospital. The doctor diagnosed her with renal colic. 9. On 29 December 2009 during another visit to hospital the applicant was diagnosed with poisoning by unknown substance. 10. On 1 February 2010 the applicant foamed at the mouth again and was taken to hospital. She was released on the same day. 11. On 2 February 2010 the applicant lost consciousness and was taken to hospital. A general practitioner and a neuropathologist examined her. She was diagnosed with stress and overdose of sedatives and placed in an intensive care unit. Subsequently she was diagnosed with post-hypoxic encephalopathy and vegetative state. She has not regained consciousness since then. 12. In April 2010 the applicant was released to her mother's care. 13. On 23 September 2010 the applicant's mother complained to the local police department and prosecutor's office that the applicant had been forcefully held by S.'s family in inhuman conditions which led to deterioration of her health and coma. 14. On 10 October 2010 the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings against S.'s family on the charges of incitement of suicide and causing damage to health. 15. On 24 October 2011 the applicant's mother lodged another complaint with the local police department alleging that the applicant had been poisoned while staying at S.'s house. She also stated that the applicant had been repeatedly beaten up and deprived of her liberty. 16. According to the forensic medical report completed on 8 November 2011, a vegetative state, similar to the applicant's, could be caused primarily by intoxication. The expert, however, was unable to determine the cause of the applicant's condition. 17. On 24 November 2011 the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings against S.'s family. The applicant appealed. 18. On 29 July 2012 the supervising prosecutor quashed the decision of 24 November 2011 and ordered further inquiry into the matter. 19. On 3 August 2012 the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings on the charges of attempted murder. 20. On 1 October 2012 the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings on the charges of causing serious damage to health. The applicant appealed. 21. On 26 July 2013 the Sunzhenskiy District Court of the Ingushetiya Republic quashed the decision of 1 October 2012. The court noted that the inquiry had been incomplete. The investigator had failed (1) to question a number of important witnesses and (2) to determine the cause of the applicant's condition. 22. On 26 September 2013 the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings reiterating verbatim his reasoning set out in the decision of 1 October 2013. 23. On 15 January, 14 March and 21 May 2014 the deputy head of the district police department ordered a new inquiry noting that the previous inquiry had been incomplete. 24. On 18 January and 18 March 2014 the investigator refused to open a criminal investigation reproducing verbatim the earlier decisions of 1 October 2012 and 26 September 2013. 25. On 21 May 2014 the investigator again refused to open a criminal investigation. In addition to his earlier findings, he studied the applicant's medical case-file and concluded that it did not contain information accounting for the cause of her medical condition. 26. On 28 February 2015 the district deputy prosecutor quashed the decision of 21 May 2014 and ordered a further inquiry. 27. The case-file materials submitted by the Government contain two decisions dated 6 March 2015. The first decision was taken by the investigator who refused to institute a criminal investigation in the applicant's case. The second decision was taken by the district deputy prosecutor who ordered a new inquiry, which nothing came out of. The applicant's rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,"With the refusal to investigate and lack of remedy, the applicant was denied effective remedy.",edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated; edited by me to remove ambiguity in fact pattern 77,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","5. The applicant was born in 1963. 6. From 22 July 2016 the applicant was held in the Chernigiv pre-trial detention centre (""the SIZO"") as a suspect in respect of a crime. 7. On 8 September 2016, while being held at the SIZO, the applicant suffered acute myocardial infarction. He was treated at Kozeletsk Town Hospital from 8 until 19 September 2016. 8. On 27 September and 6 October 2016 the applicant underwent examinations at the Chernigiv Regional Cardiological Centre. He was diagnosed with ischemic heart disease; acute myocardial infarction; third‑stage hypertonic disease; a hypertensive heart; and second-degree heart failure. The applicant was prescribed outpatient medical treatment and a further heart examination. On the last mentioned date he was recommended to undergo a cardiac ventriculography test. 9. On 7 February 2017, in response to a request for information lodged by the Chernigiv regional prosecutor's office, Chernihiv City Hospital (""the Hospital"") noted that the applicant's state of health posed a high risk to his life. 10. On 15 March 2017, the Hospital informed the SIZO authorities that the cost of a cardiac ventriculography test was 4,000 hryvnias (UAH – approximately 140 euros (EUR)). 11. Following a deterioration in the applicant's health, on 23 May 2017 the Court indicated to the Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that they should immediately ensure that the recommended treatment was available and provided to the applicant and that the applicant was placed in a specialised medical institution for medical treatment – including surgery, if appropriate. 12. On 23 May 2017 the applicant was transported to the Hospital, where the previous diagnosis was confirmed (see paragraph 8 above). On the same day he was returned to the SIZO and provided with outpatient treatment. 13. On 25 May 2017 the Hospital informed the SIZO that in order for the applicant to be provided with qualified medical advice, he needed a cardiac ventriculography test. In view of the complexity of the applicant's state of health, before the cardiac ventriculography test the Hospital requested that the applicant have an additional consultation at the Amosov Cardiology Institute. 14. According to the Government, the SIZO administration offered the applicant transportation to the Kyiv SIZO in a prison van with a view to his undergoing a further medical examination at the Amosov Cardiology Institute. On 16 June 2017 the applicant refused that offer, arguing that he could not be transported in a prison van owing to his state of health. The case file contains a statement by the applicant dated 16 June 2017 addressed to the head of the SIZO, according to which he did not refuse transportation but insisted on it being in a form that was compatible with his state of health. 15. Following a further deterioration in the applicant's health, on 22 June 2017 the ambulance took him to the Hospital, where the previous diagnosis (see paragraph 8 above) was confirmed, electrocardiography and cardiac ventriculography tests were recommended, and he was prescribed some medication. 16. The case file contains an extract from the applicant's medical file bearing no date and signed by the head of the SIZO medical unit; according to the extract, the SIZO had no cardiologist on its staff and high-quality medical treatment was not possible at the SIZO. The applicant did not receive the prescribed medication in full owing to a lack of funds. The extract furthermore stated that he remained under the supervision of the SIZO medical staff and did not require inpatient medical treatment. 17. On 10 July 2017 the Court reiterated its previous decision (see paragraph 11 above) indicating that the authorities were to ensure that the applicant was transported promptly, and in conditions commensurate with his state of health, to a specialised medical institution to undergo the necessary medical examinations, such as a cardiac ventriculography test, in order that a correct diagnosis could be made and the applicant could receive medical treatment, if necessary. On 8 August 2017 the Government submitted that the applicant had not been transported to a specialised medical institution, as had been indicated by the Court, owing to his refusal of 16 June 2017 (see paragraph 14 above). 18. According to the available information, from August 2016 until September 2017 the applicant underwent more than fifteen examinations, both within the SIZO and at civilian hospitals, and an ambulance was called twelve times to provide him with urgent treatment. 19. On an unspecified date the applicant was released from custody. On 7 November 2017 he underwent an examination at the Amosov Cardiology Institute. According to the results of the examination, he was diagnosed with ischemic heart disease, exertional angina (class III), postinfarction cardiosclerosis, and atherosclerosis of the aorta and of the coronary arteries. It was recommended that he undergo surgery for his ischemic heart disease, together with further inpatient treatment. The applicant's rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",Ruled as violated by court,,"11. Following a deterioration in the applicant's health, on 23 May 2017 the Court indicated to the Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that they should immediately ensure that the recommended treatment was available and provided to the applicant and that the applicant was placed in a specialised medical institution for medical treatment – including surgery, if appropriate. 14. According to the Government, the SIZO administration offered the applicant transportation to the Kyiv SIZO in a prison van with a view to his undergoing a further medical examination at the Amosov Cardiology Institute. On 16 June 2017 the applicant refused that offer, arguing that he could not be transported in a prison van owing to his state of health. The case file contains a statement by the applicant dated 16 June 2017 addressed to the head of the SIZO, according to which he did not refuse transportation but insisted on it being in a form that was compatible with his state of health. 17. On 10 July 2017 the Court reiterated its previous decision (see paragraph 11 above) indicating that the authorities were to ensure that the applicant was transported promptly, and in conditions commensurate with his state of health, to a specialised medical institution to undergo the necessary medical examinations, such as a cardiac ventriculography test, in order that a correct diagnosis could be made and the applicant could receive medical treatment, if necessary. On 8 August 2017 the Government submitted that the applicant had not been transported to a specialised medical institution, as had been indicated by the Court, owing to his refusal of 16 June 2017 (see paragraph 14 above).",TRUE,2,"While there were some early refusals of treatment, the process ultimately ended in some remedy. It depends on what the statute means by ""effective"" remedy.",edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated; edited by me to remove ambiguity in fact pattern 78,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","4. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Klaipėda. 5. On 2 July 2013 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of possession of drugs with intention to distribute. On 9 July 2013 the applicant was brought to Šiauliai Remand Prison and was held there until 31 May 2016. In judgment of 23 December 2015 the applicant was sentenced to four years imprisonment by the Klaipėda District Court. Following an appeal by the applicant, the judgment became final on 25 May 2016. The applicant was then transferred to Alytus Correctional Facility and after serving his sentence was released on 30 June 2017. 6. In April 2014 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Šiauliai Regional Administrative Court about his conditions of detention in Šiauliai Remand Prison. He complained of: overcrowding; of there being no partition wall between toilets and cells; of insufficient ventilation; of insufficient time in the open air; of insufficient time for showering; of the presence of cockroaches; of inmates smoking in the cells; of no long-stay or short visits; of the fact that he had not been allowed to go home; of the low energy value of the food provided; of the prohibition on receiving food from relatives and friends; and of the prohibition on having his own blanket and a music player. 7. On 27 June 2014 the Šiauliai Regional Administrative Court held that for 135 days the applicant had been housed in cell no. 53, and the personal space available to him had varied between 1.87 and 3.12 sq. m. This had been a clear violation of domestic norms. For eighty-seven days the applicant had been held in cell no. 50, where the personal space available to him had varied between 1.86 and 4.65 sq. m, and it had come close to a violation of domestic norms. The court further held that the presence of toilets in the applicant's cell had not corresponded to the requirements of domestic law, that the lighting had been insufficient and the temperature had been too low, and that the food provided had had insufficient energy value. The court noted that inmates could buy food and other necessities in the shops of the facility. The applicant's other complaints were dismissed as unsubstantiated. As regards the prohibition on having his own blanket and a music player, the court held that the use of personal blankets was not allowed in accordance with domestic norms. As for music players, inmates could use television sets, computers, computer-game devices, discs that could not be rewritten, other memory cards of up to 4GB and bedding (except for a pillow, a mattress and a blanket) that could be given to them by their spouses, partners or close relatives. As regards long-stay and short visits, the court held that remand prisoners did not have a right to long-stay visits but he had a right to short visits of up to two hours. The applicant asked for a long-stay visit but on 20 January 2014 the prosecutor decided not to allow him such a visit. The court also held that inmates could be allowed to go home for up to five days in the event of the death or serious illness of a spouse, partner or close relative, or in the event of a natural disaster that had caused serious pecuniary damage to the inmate, his or her spouse, partner or close relatives. However, in his request of 31 January 2014 the applicant did not indicate any of those circumstances. As a result, the applicant was awarded 1,200 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 348 euros (EUR)) in compensation for inadequate material conditions of detention for 222 days during the period between 9 July 2013 and 3 April 2014. 8. The applicant appealed, and on 11 February 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court held that it was impossible to calculate for how many days the applicant had had sufficient personal space at his disposal, and decided to hold that for 245 days the applicant had not had sufficient personal space, and that this had been a breach of Article 3 of the Convention. The court thus decided to increase the compensation to EUR 1,500. 9. In October 2014 the applicant lodged a new complaint concerning his material conditions in Šiauliai Remand Prison. He complained of overcrowding, low temperature, dampness, insufficient lighting, prisoners smoking in the cells, that his partner had not been able to pay him a long‑stay visit and that he had not been allowed to ""take holidays"". It appears that the applicant had asked the prison management to allow him to receive a long-stay visit from his spouse and his sister on 28 April 2014. 10. On 5 December 2014 the Šiauliai Regional Administrative Court held that during the period between 4 April and 5 October 2014 – for 176 days – the applicant had had insufficient cell space. As regards long-stay visits, the court agreed with Šiauliai Remand Prison and stated that the applicant had not been entitled to them under domestic law; he could have had short visits but, however, he had never asked for them. The court accepted the argument of the Šiauliai Remand Prison that remand detainees had been held in prisons or correctional facilities for short periods of time and they were not in a similar situation to convicted inmates. The court awarded the applicant EUR 869 in compensation for the material conditions of his detention. 11. The applicant appealed, and on 21 September 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision in its entirety. The applicant's rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"5. On 2 July 2013 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of possession of drugs with intention to distribute. On 9 July 2013 the applicant was brought to Šiauliai Remand Prison and was held there until 31 May 2016. In judgment of 23 December 2015 the applicant was sentenced to four years imprisonment by the Klaipėda District Court. Following an appeal by the applicant, the judgment became final on 25 May 2016. The applicant was then transferred to Alytus Correctional Facility and after serving his sentence was released on 30 June 2017. 7. On 27 June 2014 the Šiauliai Regional Administrative Court held that for 135 days the applicant had been housed in cell no. 53, and the personal space available to him had varied between 1.87 and 3.12 sq. m. This had been a clear violation of domestic norms. For eighty-seven days the applicant had been held in cell no. 50, where the personal space available to him had varied between 1.86 and 4.65 sq. m, and it had come close to a violation of domestic norms. The court further held that the presence of toilets in the applicant's cell had not corresponded to the requirements of domestic law, that the lighting had been insufficient and the temperature had been too low, and that the food provided had had insufficient energy value. The court noted that inmates could buy food and other necessities in the shops of the facility. The applicant's other complaints were dismissed as unsubstantiated. As regards the prohibition on having his own blanket and a music player, the court held that the use of personal blankets was not allowed in accordance with domestic norms. As for music players, inmates could use television sets, computers, computer-game devices, discs that could not be rewritten, other memory cards of up to 4GB and bedding (except for a pillow, a mattress and a blanket) that could be given to them by their spouses, partners or close relatives. As regards long-stay and short visits, the court held that remand prisoners did not have a right to long-stay visits but he had a right to short visits of up to two hours. The applicant asked for a long-stay visit but on 20 January 2014 the prosecutor decided not to allow him such a visit. The court also held that inmates could be allowed to go home for up to five days in the event of the death or serious illness of a spouse, partner or close relative, or in the event of a natural disaster that had caused serious pecuniary damage to the inmate, his or her spouse, partner or close relatives. However, in his request of 31 January 2014 the applicant did not indicate any of those circumstances. As a result, the applicant was awarded 1,200 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 348 euros (EUR)) in compensation for inadequate material conditions of detention for 222 days during the period between 9 July 2013 and 3 April 2014. 8. The applicant appealed, and on 11 February 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court held that it was impossible to calculate for how many days the applicant had had sufficient personal space at his disposal, and decided to hold that for 245 days the applicant had not had sufficient personal space, and that this had been a breach of Article 3 of the Convention. The court thus decided to increase the compensation to EUR 1,500. 9. In October 2014 the applicant lodged a new complaint concerning his material conditions in Šiauliai Remand Prison. He complained of overcrowding, low temperature, dampness, insufficient lighting, prisoners smoking in the cells, that his partner had not been able to pay him a long‑stay visit and that he had not been allowed to ""take holidays"". It appears that the applicant had asked the prison management to allow him to receive a long-stay visit from his spouse and his sister on 28 April 2014. 10. On 5 December 2014 the Šiauliai Regional Administrative Court held that during the period between 4 April and 5 October 2014 – for 176 days – the applicant had had insufficient cell space. As regards long-stay visits, the court agreed with Šiauliai Remand Prison and stated that the applicant had not been entitled to them under domestic law; he could have had short visits but, however, he had never asked for them. The court accepted the argument of the Šiauliai Remand Prison that remand detainees had been held in prisons or correctional facilities for short periods of time and they were not in a similar situation to convicted inmates. The court awarded the applicant EUR 869 in compensation for the material conditions of his detention. 11. The applicant appealed, and on 21 September 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision in its entirety.",TRUE,1,"While the applicant continued to appeal, the government provided remedy and reasons for its effectiveness.",edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 79,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","4. The applicants, Ms Bozhana Boyanova Uzunova and Mr Ferad Ismail Seid, were born in 1978 and 1955 respectively, and live in Kardzhali. 5. The applicants co-owned a plot of land of 15,276 square metres near the town of Kapitan Andreevo. 6. On 30 November 2007 the Council of Ministers decided to expropriate 6,218 square metres of the applicants' plot with a view to building a motorway. The decision allowed preliminary enforcement of the expropriation and stated that the owners were to be given BGN 13,023 (the equivalent of approximately EUR 6,657) in compensation. The decision recorded as owner of the expropriated plot the person from whom the applicants had bought the property. 7. The applicants brought judicial review proceedings in respect of the expropriation decision before the Supreme Administrative Court. In a final judgment of 3 April 2009 that court declared the decision null and void as it had failed to specify the actual owners of the plot to whom compensation was due, and referred the case back to the administrative authorities. The Road Infrastructure Agency requested re-opening of the judicial review proceedings on the ground that it had not been able to take part in them as an interested third party even though its participation was mandatory under the State Property Act 1996 as investor in the construction of the motorway. In a judgment of 12 October 2009 a five-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court allowed the request, quashed the judgment of 3 April 2009 and remitted the case to be re-examined by a three-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court. 8. In a final judgment of 28 December 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court found that compensation was due to the applicants as owners of the plot at issue and that it had to be increased to BGN 59,817 (the equivalent of EUR 30,577), in accordance with the conclusions of an expert report obtained in the course of the proceedings. The court also awarded the applicants BGN 600 in costs, to be paid by the Council of Ministers. 9. On 13 January 2011 the applicants invited the Road Infrastructure Agency to pay the compensation due to them. In its response of 21 February 2011, the Agency informed the applicants that due to some changes in the layout of the motorway, a new decision for expropriation of the affected property was being prepared. 10. On 5 July 2011 the Council of Ministers issued a new decision for expropriation, in accordance with which 5,215 square metres of the applicants' plot were to be expropriated against compensation in the amount of BGN 1,794 (the equivalent of EUR 917). The applicants brought judicial review proceedings in respect of this decision. In a judgment of 26 June 2012, the Supreme Administrative Court declared the decision of 5 July 2011 null and void as it had failed to take account of the binding character of the judgment of 28 December 2010, the latter having determined the dispute between the parties with final effect. In March 2012 the Ministry of Finance unsuccessfully sought reopening of the proceedings ending with the judgment of 28 December 2010 before the Supreme Administrative Court. 11. On 4 July 2012 the applicants once again invited the Road Infrastructure Agency to pay the compensation due to them. They subsequently wrote to the agency again on 15 October 2012, to the Council of Ministers on 14 October 2013 submitting also a writ of enforcement in respect of the sum due, and to the regional governor on 21 February 2014. 12. On 26 February 2015, at the time of submitting their observations on the admissibility and merits in this case, the Government informed the Court that on 15 May 2014 the Road Infrastructure Agency had paid to each applicant BGN 29,908.50, or altogether BGN 59,817 pursuant to the final judgment in their favour of 28 December 2010. 13. On 10 December 2014, 20 January 2015 and 23 March 2015 respectively, the applicants wrote to various authorities, without success, seeking the payment of interest on the above amount for the period of over three years when it had remained unenforced. 14. In the meantime, on 22 November 2013 the applicants brought proceedings before the Sofia Administrative Court in relation to the lack of enforcement of the final judicial decision of 28 December 2010. In particular, they claimed they had incurred pecuniary damage as a result of the lack of enforcement; they also claimed interest on the amount determined in the said judgment for the period of its non-enforcement. On 18 December 2013 the court dismissed their claim as inadmissible. It found, on the one hand, that the applicants had not indicated an individual administrative act as the subject of their judicial review proceedings. If, on the other hand, the applicants' claim was about the lack of enforcement of a final judicial decision, the court held that the competent body in that connection was the bailiff and the relevant procedure was under chapter XVII of the Code of Administrative Procedure 2006 (""the 2006 Code""). 15. The applicants appealed before the Supreme Administrative Court, alleging a breach of Article 203 of the 2006 Code and a breach of section 1(1) of the State and Municipalities Responsibility for Damage Act (the ""SMRDA""), and challenging the lower court's decision as being unreasoned. In a final decision of 13 February 2014, the Supreme Administrative Court confirmed the lower court's decision. The applicants' rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",Ruled as violated by court,,"12. On 26 February 2015, at the time of submitting their observations on the admissibility and merits in this case, the Government informed the Court that on 15 May 2014 the Road Infrastructure Agency had paid to each applicant BGN 29,908.50, or altogether BGN 59,817 pursuant to the final judgment in their favour of 28 December 2010.",TRUE,1,"While the government gave reasonable explanation for the effectivness of its remedy, the applicants have a right to effective remedy in the form of the full monetary sum originally promised.",edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated 80,"Article 13 Right to an effective remedy Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.","4. The applicant was born in 1978. According to the most recently available information, at the time of the events in June 2016 the applicant was detained in Kirovograd pre-trial detention facility no. 14 (""the SIZO""). 5. In January 2013 the applicant started serving a sentence of ten years' imprisonment for murder. In February 2013 he was placed in Kirovograd prison no. 6 (""the Prison""). 6. In April 2014 the applicant's health deteriorated. He complained of fever, abdominal pain and vomiting. Following his examination in Kirovograd Regional Hospital, the applicant was diagnosed with chronic calculous cholecystitis (calculi within the gallbladder) and acute chronic gastroduodenitis. 7. On 11 April 2014 the applicant complained of feeling unwell to the Prison medical unit. He was examined immediately and diagnosed with acute gastroduodenitis and chronic calculous cholecystitis. According to the case-file material, he was not prescribed medical treatment. 8. On 22 August 2014 the applicant further complained to the Prison medical unit of feeling unwell. He was diagnosed with acute chronic gastroduodenitis and was prescribed dietary treatment for three days. 9. On 6, 8 and 13 October and 5 November 2014, and 6 March 2015, in response to further complaints by the applicant, he was prescribed outpatient treatment. According to the Government, the outpatient treatment consisted of medicine, which was administered to the applicant in various combinations, notably, papaverine, co-trimixazole, azithromycin, and bromhexin. 10. Following another such complaint, on 16 April 2015 the Prison doctor diagnosed the applicant with acute chronic gastroduodenitis and recommended that he be further examined at a specialist institution with a view to deciding whether he required surgery. 11. From 2 to 29 May and from 3 to 11 June 2015 the applicant underwent inpatient treatment for acute chronic gastroduodenitis in the Prison medical unit. According to the Government, he was administered the prescribed medication and his state of health improved. 12. On 10 July 2015 he was examined by a general practitioner of Kirovograd City Hospital, who confirmed the earlier diagnoses and recommended inpatient treatment and dietary treatment. 13. From 28 July to 10 September 2015 the applicant underwent inpatient treatment for calculus cholecystitis in unstable remission at the hospital in Bucha prison no. 85. The applicant alleged that the treatment which he had received there had been inadequate and had led to an aggravation of his condition. He also alleged that surgery for his calculus cholecystitis had been scheduled but had not been performed owing to lack of funds. 14. On 21 September 2015 he was transferred back to the Prison. In the meantime he had been detained in the Kyiv SIZO and the Odessa SIZO. During his detention from 14 to 21 September 2015, he complained to the SIZOs' administration of abdominal pain and vomiting, but allegedly to no avail. 15. On 8 October 2015 the applicant was placed in a disciplinary cell in the Prison for three months as a penalty for consumption of alcohol. According to the applicant, the conditions of his detention there were very poor: he suffered from lack of fresh air, low temperatures, unsanitary conditions and high humidity. Furthermore, he allegedly had no mattress to sleep on. 16. According to the Government, on 8 October 2015 the Prison governor issued a decision on the applicant' placement in a disciplinary cell for consumption of alcohol. On 30 December 2015 he was early released from the disciplinary cell. 17. On 12 October 2015 the applicant's lawyer complained to the Kirovograd regional prosecutor's office that the applicant was not receiving the requisite medical care in detention. He submitted, in particular, that the surgery which the applicant required had been postponed owing to the lack of funds. 18. On 23 October 2015 the Prison doctor examined the applicant once again and diagnosed him with chronic calculous cholecystitis in unstable remission. He prescribed the applicant medication and recommended elective surgery. 19. On 9 November 2015 the prison service of Kirovograd Region sent a request for the applicant's placement in the hospital in Bucha prison no. 85. On 9 December 2015 this request was refused owing to the lack of available places in the hospital. 20. On 11 December 2015 and 16 January 2016 the prison service again requested the applicant's placement in the hospital at correctional colony no. 4 of Dnipropetrovsk Region. On 27 January 2016 the prison service took a decision on the applicant's transfer to the hospital for the required surgery. 21. On 12 February 2016 the applicant informed the Prison governor that he had refused the treatment offered to him in the hospitals within the Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv SIZOs because of lack of trust in the doctors of those facilities. On the same day the applicant gave his consent to receive treatment at any other medical institution. 22. On 22 April 2016 following deterioration of his health, the applicant was transferred by ambulance to Kirovograd Regional Hospital, where he was examined by a surgeon and diagnosed with calculous cholecystitis, chronic pancreatitis and ""diffusive changes"" of the liver (дифузні зміни печінки). 23. According to the Government, as of November 2016 the applicant's state of health was satisfactory. The Government did not provide documentary evidence in respect of that statement. The applicant's rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention were violated.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. In April 2014 the applicant's health deteriorated. He complained of fever, abdominal pain and vomiting. Following his examination in Kirovograd Regional Hospital, the applicant was diagnosed with chronic calculous cholecystitis (calculi within the gallbladder) and acute chronic gastroduodenitis. 8. On 22 August 2014 the applicant further complained to the Prison medical unit of feeling unwell. He was diagnosed with acute chronic gastroduodenitis and was prescribed dietary treatment for three days. 9. On 6, 8 and 13 October and 5 November 2014, and 6 March 2015, in response to further complaints by the applicant, he was prescribed outpatient treatment. According to the Government, the outpatient treatment consisted of medicine, which was administered to the applicant in various combinations, notably, papaverine, co-trimixazole, azithromycin, and bromhexin. 10. Following another such complaint, on 16 April 2015 the Prison doctor diagnosed the applicant with acute chronic gastroduodenitis and recommended that he be further examined at a specialist institution with a view to deciding whether he required surgery. The parties did not inform the Court whether the applicant had undergone the recommended examination. 17. On 12 October 2015 the applicant's lawyer complained to the Kirovograd regional prosecutor's office that the applicant was not receiving the requisite medical care in detention. He submitted, in particular, that the surgery which the applicant required had been postponed owing to the lack of funds. 18. On 23 October 2015 the Prison doctor examined the applicant once again and diagnosed him with chronic calculous cholecystitis in unstable remission. He prescribed the applicant medication and recommended elective surgery. 19. On 9 November 2015 the prison service of Kirovograd Region sent a request for the applicant's placement in the hospital in Bucha prison no. 85. On 9 December 2015 this request was refused owing to the lack of available places in the hospital. 21. On 12 February 2016 the applicant informed the Prison governor that he had refused the treatment offered to him in the hospitals within the Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv SIZOs because of lack of trust in the doctors of those facilities. On the same day the applicant gave his consent to receive treatment at any other medical institution. 22. On 22 April 2016 following deterioration of his health, the applicant was transferred by ambulance to Kirovograd Regional Hospital, where he was examined by a surgeon and diagnosed with calculous cholecystitis, chronic pancreatitis and ""diffusive changes"" of the liver (дифузні зміни печінки).",TRUE,2,"The government denied the applicant's requests for effective remedy in terms of treatment multiple times. However, the patient ended up healthy. ",edited by me to add that applicant rights were violated; edited by me to remove ambiguity in fact pattern 81,"Article 14 Prohibition of discrimination The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.","4. The applicant was born in 1992 and lives in Bukhara, Uzbekistan. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. The applicant was born in Uzbekistan. In 2003 his father, mother, brother and sister moved to Vladivostok in Russia and subsequently acquired Russian nationality, while he continued to live with his grandfather in Bukhara, visiting them in the summer months. After his grandfather had died and the applicant had finished the secondary school, in June 2011 he joined his family in Russia. 7. The applicant took a mandatory blood test with a view to obtaining a health certificate to support his application for a temporary residence permit. He was found to be HIV-positive. 8. On 23 September 2011 the Consumer Protection Authority declared the applicant's presence in Russian undesirable (the ""exclusion order"") on the ground that he was HIV-positive. 9. By judgment of 19 December 2011, the Sovetskiy District Court in Vladivostok rejected the applicant's challenge to the exclusion order, finding that it was issued in full compliance with Russian law. 10. On 13 February 2012 the Primorskiy Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 11. On 22 February 2012 the applicant left Russia to comply with the exclusion order.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,The applicant was discriminated on by basis of HIV status., 82,"Article 14 Prohibition of discrimination The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.","4. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Adıyaman. 5. On 17 October 1999 the applicant sat an examination in order to become a public servant. She was successful in the examination and on 27 June 2000 she was notified by the State Personnel Department attached to the Prime Minister's office that she had been appointed to the post of security officer in the Kilis branch of TEDAŞ, the state-run Electricity Company. 6. On 4 September 2000 the Kilis branch of TEDAŞ informed the applicant that she would not be appointed to a post in that office as she did not fulfil the requirements of ""being a man"" and ""having completed military service"". 7. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an action against TEDAŞ with the Ankara Administrative Court requesting the annulment of the decision of the Kilis branch of TEDAŞ. In her deposition, the applicant noted that being a man was not a requirement for appointment to the post in question and that she fulfilled all the requirements for that post. 8. On an unspecified date the general directorate of TEDAŞ submitted to the administrative court that one of the requirements for the post in question had been declared by the State Personnel Department as ""having completed military service"" and that therefore only men could be appointed to the post. The applicant, being a woman, could therefore not be recruited as a security officer. 9. On 28 November 2001 the Ankara Administrative Court annulled the decision of the Kilis branch of TEDAŞ. The court held that the requirement of ""having completed military service"" should be considered to apply only to male candidates and that there had been no restriction on women working as security officers in TEDAŞ. 10. On 30 January 2002 TEDAŞ lodged an appeal against the judgment of 28 November 2001. 11. On 1 April 2003 the applicant was recruited by TEDAŞ. 12. On 21 October 2003 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the judgment of the Ankara Administrative Court, holding that the requirement regarding military service demonstrated that the post in question was reserved for male candidates. The high court therefore found that the administration's decision had been in accordance with the law. 13. On 19 March 2004 the applicant was dismissed from her post. 14. On 30 December 2004 the Ankara Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's case, taking into consideration the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court. 15. On 7 May 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's appeal and upheld the judgment of 30 December 2004. 16. On 12 July 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court's judgment was notified to the applicant.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,The applicant was discriminated on by basis of gender., 83,"Article 14 Prohibition of discrimination The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.","5. The applicant was born in 1974 in Khabarovsk and is serving a life sentence in the Sverdlovsk Region. 6. From 25 May 2012 to 10 April 2014 the applicant was held in penal colony IK-56 in the Sverdlovsk Region. He was able to have five short visits in 2013 and one short visit in 2014. 7. On 15 July 2013 the applicant asked the governor to allow him a short meeting with four adult relatives, his mother, sister and two cousins. He also asked for the meeting to be held without a glass partition between him and his visitors or the presence of a prison officer. The governor signed his decision on the petition: ""Rejected. Not allowed under the Code of Execution of Sentences"". 8. From 15 May to 16 July 2014 the applicant was transferred to remand prison SIZO-1 in Khabarovsk – where his family still lived – to take part in another investigation. 9. On the day after his arrival at the prison, he asked the prison governor to authorise a short meeting with four family members – his sister, two cousins and aunt – without a physical partition between him and the visitors or the presence of prison officers. By a letter of 21 May 2014, the governor rejected his request. He pointed out that, pursuant to section 18 of the Pre‑trial Detention Act, visits are subject to written authorisation from the official or authority in charge of the criminal case. Furthermore, the Rules of Internal Order in Remand Prisons required that visiting rooms be equipped with a physical partition and that visits be supervised by a prison officer. 10. On 3 June 2014 the applicant asked the governor to authorise a long meeting with his mother and sister. He relied on Article 89 of the Code of Execution of Sentences (CES) and emphasised that the remand prison was equipped with rooms for long-stay visits which could be used by convicted prisoners serving their sentence in that prison. Three days later the governor replied that the applicable law did not make a provision for long-stay visits in respect of remand prisoners. He referred the applicant to Article 77.1 of the CES. 11. The applicant subsequently asked the authorities in charge of the criminal case to authorise short visits from his family members. On 11 June and 1 August 2014 the investigator and the deputy head of the investigations department, respectively, rejected his request. They informed the applicant that ""the authorities in charge of the investigation were not preventing [him] from having short visits from his family members as long as it did not contradict Russian law, including the Code of Execution of Sentences"". 12. The applicant challenged the restrictions on family visits before a court of general jurisdiction. According to the information from the Government, all of his challenges were dismissed as unfounded. 13. According to a certificate issued by the governor on 27 April 2017, the applicant did not have any short or long-stay visits during his time in the Khabarovsk remand prison.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"9. On the day after his arrival at the prison, he asked the prison governor to authorise a short meeting with four family members – his sister, two cousins and aunt – without a physical partition between him and the visitors or the presence of prison officers. By a letter of 21 May 2014, the governor rejected his request. He pointed out that, pursuant to section 18 of the Pre‑trial Detention Act, visits are subject to written authorisation from the official or authority in charge of the criminal case. Furthermore, the Rules of Internal Order in Remand Prisons required that visiting rooms be equipped with a physical partition and that visits be supervised by a prison officer. 10. On 3 June 2014 the applicant asked the governor to authorise a long meeting with his mother and sister. He relied on Article 89 of the Code of Execution of Sentences (CES) and emphasised that the remand prison was equipped with rooms for long-stay visits which could be used by convicted prisoners serving their sentence in that prison. Three days later the governor replied that the applicable law did not make a provision for long-stay visits in respect of remand prisoners. He referred the applicant to Article 77.1 of the CES. 11. The applicant subsequently asked the authorities in charge of the criminal case to authorise short visits from his family members. On 11 June and 1 August 2014 the investigator and the deputy head of the investigations department, respectively, rejected his request. They informed the applicant that ""the authorities in charge of the investigation were not preventing [him] from having short visits from his family members as long as it did not contradict Russian law, including the Code of Execution of Sentences"". 13. According to a certificate issued by the governor on 27 April 2017, the applicant did not have any short or long-stay visits during his time in the Khabarovsk remand prison.",FALSE,0,There is no relevance between discrimination and prison visitation., 84,"Article 14 Prohibition of discrimination The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.","5. The applicants were born in 1954, 1952, 1964, 1926, 1952, 1960 and 1956 respectively and live in Donetsk. 6. From the beginning of April 2014 armed groups started to seize official buildings in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and announced the creation of self-proclaimed entities known as the ""Donetsk People's Republic"" and ""Luhansk People's Republic"" (the ""DPR"" and ""LPR""). 7. In response, on 14 April 2014 the Government, who consider the armed groups to be terrorist organisations, authorised the use of force against them in the legal form of an ""anti-terrorist operation"". 8. In June 2014 the armed groups started to seize offices of the National Bank of Ukraine and other regional financial institutions in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. 9. On 24 July 2014 the Ukrainian postal service Ukrposhta suspended its operations on the territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions that were outside the control of the Government, because of frequent attacks on its vehicles and employees by armed groups. 10. On 6 August 2014 the National Bank of Ukraine suspended all financial transactions on the territories outside the control of the Government (see paragraph 20 below). 11. Government forces recaptured some territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but certain parts of the regions have remained outside the Government's control since that time. One part of the Donetsk region not under the Government's control is the city of Donetsk. 12. On 2 September 2014, following changes in the law, jurisdiction of the courts in the non-controlled areas was transferred to the relevant courts in the neighbouring regions on the territory controlled by the Government (see paragraphs 34 to 36 below). 13. On 11 November 2014 all social benefit payments in the settlements of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions that were outside the control of the Government were suspended (see paragraph 26 below) 14. In December 2014 the Donetsk Regional Administrative Court and the Donetsk Regional Administrative Court of Appeal were relocated to the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, territory controlled by the Government (see paragraphs 37 and 38 below). 15. The applicants were registered as recipients of social benefits with different departments of the Pension Fund of Ukraine in Donetsk. Some applicants had been receiving their social benefits until 30 June 2014, others until 31 August 2014. 16. On 16 June 2015 the first and second applicants registered themselves with the Labour and Social Security Department of the Krasnoarmiysk District of the Donetsk region (currently the city of Pokrovsk), controlled by the Government. On the same day their social benefits was reinstated, including social benefits due to them for the period 1 July 2014 to 16 June 2015. 17. The sixth applicant was registered with the Labour and Social Security Department of the Obolonskiy District in Kyiv on 9 September 2015. However, she did not apply for reinstatement of her social benefits. 18. The other applicants did not apply to the relevant social authorities on the territory controlled by the Government for reinstatement of their social benefits. 19. According to the Government, the sixth and seventh applicants travelled from Donetsk to the territory controlled by the Government after their social benefits had been suspended. The Government provided a certificate from the State Customs Office stating that the sixth and seventh applicants had entered the territory controlled by the Government on 31 October 2015, through an authorised checkpoint near the frontline between Ukrainian forces and ""DPR"" armed groups in the town of Zaitseve.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"16. On 16 June 2015 the first and second applicants registered themselves with the Labour and Social Security Department of the Krasnoarmiysk District of the Donetsk region (currently the city of Pokrovsk), controlled by the Government. On the same day their social benefits was reinstated, including social benefits due to them for the period 1 July 2014 to 16 June 2015. 17. The sixth applicant was registered with the Labour and Social Security Department of the Obolonskiy District in Kyiv on 9 September 2015. However, she did not apply for reinstatement of her social benefits. 19. According to the Government, the sixth and seventh applicants travelled from Donetsk to the territory controlled by the Government after their social benefits had been suspended. The Government provided a certificate from the State Customs Office stating that the sixth and seventh applicants had entered the territory controlled by the Government on 31 October 2015, through an authorised checkpoint near the frontline between Ukrainian forces and ""DPR"" armed groups in the town of Zaitseve.",FALSE,0,There is no relevance between discrimination and the timeline of social benefits., 85,"Article 14 Prohibition of discrimination The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.","4. The applicants were born in 1997 and 1999 respectively and live in Bucharest. 5. On 20 July 2010 X, the applicants' sister, nine-year-old at the time, was grievously injured in a car accident. She was immediately admitted to hospital where, after four days of intense suffering, she died. 6. A criminal investigation for involuntary manslaughter was initiated against the driver of the car. It was established that while driving at about ninety‑two kilometres per hour (when the speed limit was fifty kilometres per hour) she lost control of her car and mounted the pavement where the applicants' sister was situated. 7. On 26 September 2010, during the pre-trial investigation stage, the applicants, their mother and their older brothers brought a claim for damages in the criminal proceedings. 8. On 24 October 2011 the Bucharest District Court severed the civil claims from the criminal proceedings. 9. On 6 December 2011 the Bucharest District court awarded each civil party (including the applicants) 100,000 euros (EUR) in compensation for non‑pecuniary damage. It ordered the driver's insurance company to pay the damages. 10. The court held that between the civil parties and the nine‑year‑old girl there had been a strong emotional relationship and the girl's violent death had caused intense pain to her family. The wording of the court judgment read as follows: ""...the brothers of the deceased suffered non-pecuniary damage, consisting of the pain caused by the loss of their nine-year-old sister in violent circumstances and by their sister's suffering in the hospital until her death; from the evidence adduced before the court (the statements of the civil parties were corroborated by the statements of three witnesses) it can be determined that between the civil parties and the nine-year-old girl there was a strong emotional relationship. Therefore, having regard to the negative consequences, the importance of the infringed moral values, the way in which they were perceived by the civil parties, and the impact of their loss on the stability of their family, the court will grant to each civil party the equivalent of 100,000 euros"". 11. All the parties appealed against the judgment. 12. No new pieces of evidence were adduced before the Bucharest Court of Appeal. 13. On 9 April 2012 the Bucharest Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on points of law lodged by the insurance company. It ordered the driver of the car to pay the damages, holding that the insurance company's liability was only contractual and therefore subsidiary. The court further dismissed the applicants' claim for non-pecuniary damages on the ground that at the time of their sister's accident they had been younger than fourteen and had therefore been unaware of the negative consequences of her death. In relation to the claims lodged by their older siblings, the court decreased the awards to EUR 25,000 each. The wording of the court judgment read as follows: ""The court will dismiss the civil claims lodged by Cosmin Mihai Deaconu and Alexandru Bogdan Deaconu on grounds other than those invoked by the insurance company. In the present case, the applicants' situation should be assessed in a different way, having regard to the fact that at the time of their minor sister's accident they were younger than fourteen and therefore they were not aware of the negative consequences of her death. This aspect was apparent to persons who had a close relationship with the deceased's family; thus, witness N.G.G. contended in her statement before the court that the younger brothers were less aware than their older brothers, who suffered..."" 14. The court also decreased the award for their mother in respect of non‑pecuniary damage to EUR 50,000.",Ruled as violated by court,,"10. The court held that between the civil parties and the nine‑year‑old girl there had been a strong emotional relationship and the girl's violent death had caused intense pain to her family. The wording of the court judgment read as follows: ""...the brothers of the deceased suffered non-pecuniary damage, consisting of the pain caused by the loss of their nine-year-old sister in violent circumstances and by their sister's suffering in the hospital until her death; from the evidence adduced before the court (the statements of the civil parties were corroborated by the statements of three witnesses) it can be determined that between the civil parties and the nine-year-old girl there was a strong emotional relationship. Therefore, having regard to the negative consequences, the importance of the infringed moral values, the way in which they were perceived by the civil parties, and the impact of their loss on the stability of their family, the court will grant to each civil party the equivalent of 100,000 euros"". 12. No new pieces of evidence were adduced before the Bucharest Court of Appeal. 13. On 9 April 2012 the Bucharest Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on points of law lodged by the insurance company. It ordered the driver of the car to pay the damages, holding that the insurance company's liability was only contractual and therefore subsidiary. The court further dismissed the applicants' claim for non-pecuniary damages on the ground that at the time of their sister's accident they had been younger than fourteen and had therefore been unaware of the negative consequences of her death. In relation to the claims lodged by their older siblings, the court decreased the awards to EUR 25,000 each. The wording of the court judgment read as follows: ""The court will dismiss the civil claims lodged by Cosmin Mihai Deaconu and Alexandru Bogdan Deaconu on grounds other than those invoked by the insurance company. In the present case, the applicants' situation should be assessed in a different way, having regard to the fact that at the time of their minor sister's accident they were younger than fourteen and therefore they were not aware of the negative consequences of her death. This aspect was apparent to persons who had a close relationship with the deceased's family; thus, witness N.G.G. contended in her statement before the court that the younger brothers were less aware than their older brothers, who suffered...""",FALSE,0,The applicants were discriminated on by basis of age., 86,"Article 14 Prohibition of discrimination The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.","5. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Ostia Lido. 6. At birth, the applicant was entered in the civil-status registers as male and was given the forename L. However, the applicant stated that she had always identified as female and lived in society as a woman under the forename S. For instance, her work colleagues (the applicant has worked as a civil servant since 1999) had always called her S., and in the photograph on her identity card issued in August 2000 her appearance was that of a woman. 7. In 1999 S.V. began treatment with feminising hormones as part of the gender transition process. 8. On 9 November 2000 she applied to the Rome District Court on the basis of section 3 of Law no. 164 of 1982, stating that she wished to complete the transition process by permanently changing her primary sexual characteristics, and sought authorisation to undergo gender reassignment surgery. 9. In a judgment of 10 May 2001 the District Court found that the applicant had embarked on the gender transition process after careful consideration. Having taken note of her determination the court authorised her to undergo surgery in order to adapt her primary sexual characteristics to match her female gender identity. 10. On 30 May 2001 the applicant, while awaiting the surgery authorised by the District Court, applied to the prefect of Rome for a change of forename under Article 89 of Presidential Decree no. 396 of 2000. She argued that, given that she had been undergoing a gender transition process for several years, and in view of her physical appearance, the fact that her identity papers indicated a male forename was a constant source of humiliation and embarrassment. She also asserted that the waiting period for surgery was approximately four years. 11. In a decision of 4 July 2001 the prefect refused the applicant's request on the grounds that, under Presidential Decree no. 396 of 2000, a person's forename had to correspond to his or her gender. In the prefect's view, in the absence of a final court ruling ordering the change to her legal gender status for the purposes of Law no. 164 of 1982, the applicant's forename could not be changed. 12. The applicant appealed against that decision to the Lazio Regional Administrative Court and also requested a stay of execution of the prefect's decision. 13. On 23 July 2001 the applicant underwent mammoplasty. On 6 September 2001 she was placed on a waiting list at Trieste University Hospital for surgery to alter her primary sexual characteristics. 14. On 21 February 2002 the Regional Administrative Court refused to grant a stay of execution of the prefect's decision. 15. On 3 February 2003, while the proceedings before the Regional Administrative Court were still pending on the merits, the applicant underwent an operation to change her sexual characteristics from male to female. She subsequently applied to the Rome District Court, on an unspecified date, for legal recognition of her gender reassignment under section 3 of Law no. 164 of 1982. 16. In a judgment of 10 October 2003 the Rome District Court granted the applicant's request and ordered the Savona municipal authorities to alter the indication of the applicant's gender from male to female and to change the forename L. to S. 17. By a judgment of 6 March 2008, deposited with the registry on 17 May 2008, the Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's appeal against the prefect's decision of 4 July 2001. The court held that Article 89 of Presidential Decree no. 396 of 2000 concerning changes of forename was not applicable in the present case, which actually came within the scope of Law no. 164 of 1982 concerning changes to legal gender status. The court stressed in that regard that, under the terms of the latter, the amendment of the civil-status records of a transgender person had to be ordered by the court ruling on his or her gender reassignment. It therefore considered that the prefect had correctly refused the applicant's request. The applicant did not appeal against that judgment.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"The applicant was discriminated on by basis of gender, but arguably not the by-birth gender. It depends on the interpretation of the grounds listed in the statute.", 87,"Article 14 Prohibition of discrimination The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.","6. The first, second and third applicants were born in 1981, 1973 and 1984 respectively. Since 2004 they have been serving life sentences in correctional colonies in Ukraine. 7. On 11 July 2003 the Ukrainian Parliament adopted the Code on the Execution of Sentences of Ukraine (""the Code""). Article 150 of the Code (""Place of serving life imprisonment"") provided that life prisoners were to serve their sentences in maximum-security correctional colonies. Article 151 (""Procedure for, and conditions of, the execution and serving of life sentences"") further provided, inter alia, that life prisoners were entitled to one short visit every six months. No reference to prisoners' gender was made in those Articles. At the same time, Article 18 (""Correctional colonies"") provided that female life prisoners were to serve their sentences in medium-security colonies. In turn, Article 139 (""Medium-security correctional colonies"") provided that prisoners serving their sentences in such colonies were entitled, inter alia, to have one short visit every month and one long visit every three months. Article 110 specified that a short visit from relatives or other persons could last for up to four hours and a long visit from close relatives could last for up to three days. 8. By a letter of 27 June 2007 the State Department of Ukraine for the Execution of Sentences informed the second applicant, in reply to a letter sent by him on an earlier date, that female life prisoners were entitled to have one long visit every three months, as provided by Article 139 of the Code, given that they served their sentences in medium-security colonies, as provided by Article 18 of the Code. Referring, in particular, to Article 151 of the Code, the Department further stated that male life prisoners were entitled to have one short visit every six months and that they were not entitled to have long visits. 9. On 21 January 2010 the Code was amended (""the 2010 amendments""). Article 150, as amended, stated that persons sentenced to life imprisonment were to serve their sentences as follows: male prisoners ‑ either in maximum-security sectors of medium-security correctional colonies or in maximum-security correctional colonies; and female prisoners – either in medium-security sectors of minimum-security correctional colonies with general conditions of detention or in medium-security correctional colonies. Article 151, as amended, stated that life prisoners were entitled to one short visit every three months. A newly introduced Article 151² (""Specifics regarding the serving of sentences by female life prisoners"") provided that female life prisoners were to be placed, as a rule, in medium-security sectors of minimum-security colonies with general conditions of detention. It also provided that female life prisoners were to be subject to the regime laid down for prisoners held in medium‑security colonies (that is, the regime provided for in Article 139 of the Code). 10. By the Law of 8 April 2014 on the introduction of amendments to the Code relating to the adaptation of status of convicted persons to European standards the Code was amended again (""the 2014 amendments""). Article 151 was amended to entitle all life prisoners to one short visit every month and one long visit every three months regardless of the type of correctional colony in which they were detained or the security regime to which they were subject. 11. Further amendments to Article 151 of the Code, which were passed by Parliament on 7 September 2016, entitled all life prisoners to one long visit every two months. 12. The first applicant stated that he and his family had wished to maintain their relationships, but as the result of the absence of the right to long visits until 2014 he had had to divorce his wife. His father, grandfather and grandmother had died in 2008, 2009 and 2014 respectively and he had not been able to see them while serving his sentence. The Government submitted that while serving his sentence the first applicant had received twenty-eight short visits on unspecified dates and fifteen long visits (between 17 March 2015 and 6 July 2018) from his new wife, mother and his other grandmother. 13. The second applicant stated that, because of the lack of the opportunity to have long visits until 2014, he had lost contact with his family. His relatives had died – in particular he referred to his father having died in 2012 – and when the 2014 amendments entitled him to long visits, there had no longer been anyone to visit him. The Government submitted that while serving his sentence the second applicant had had one short visit in 2005 (from his sister) and had not requested any long visits. 14. The third applicant stated that, in the absence of the right to long visits until 2014, his right to found a family had been more declaratory than effective as, in particular, he had not been able to have any physical contact in order to conceive children. The Government submitted that while serving his sentence the third applicant had had twelve short visits (between 25 July 2012 and 26 December 2017) and fourteen long visits (between 5 August 2014 and 6 February 2018) from his wife, mother, father and friends.",Ruled as violated by court,,"8. By a letter of 27 June 2007 the State Department of Ukraine for the Execution of Sentences informed the second applicant, in reply to a letter sent by him on an earlier date, that female life prisoners were entitled to have one long visit every three months, as provided by Article 139 of the Code, given that they served their sentences in medium-security colonies, as provided by Article 18 of the Code. Referring, in particular, to Article 151 of the Code, the Department further stated that male life prisoners were entitled to have one short visit every six months and that they were not entitled to have long visits.",FALSE,0,The applicants were discriminated on by basis of gender., 88,"Article 2 Right to life 1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.","4. The facts, as submitted by the parties, are similar to those in Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, §§ 12-41, 24 May 2011). 5. The applicants or their close relatives participated in demonstrations and were injured or killed by gunfire during the events of December 1989 in Bucharest, Slobozia, Târgoviște and Reșița, which led to the fall of the communist regime. 6. In 1990 the military prosecutor's offices from several cities opened on their own motion criminal investigations into the use of violence against the demonstrators, which was found excessive. The applicants' injury and their close relatives' deaths were investigated along with most of the cases in a main criminal investigation recorded in file no. 97/P/1990 (current no. 11/P/2014). 7. The most important procedural steps were mentioned in Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others (cited above, §§ 12-41) and in Sidea and Others v. Romania ([Committee] no. 889/15, §§ 8-11, 5 June 2018). Subsequent relevant developments of the criminal investigation are as follows. 8. On 1 November 2016 the military prosecutor ordered the initiation in rem of a criminal investigation for the offence of crimes against humanity in respect of the same circumstances of fact. Up to February 2017 further steps were taken in gathering information from domestic authorities, the prosecutor's office contacting 211 civil parties, questioning members of the political party which took over the presidency at the time of events, planning the taking of evidence from military officers and other participants in the events, verifying the activity of the relevant military units and the audio/video recordings broadcast by radio and television. 9. From March 2017 the military prosecutor examined military and civilian archives, including the vast archives of the Romanian Senate. They also viewed and transcribed more than 400 hours of audio/video recordings. They proceeded with the re-examination of several witnesses. They questioned military personnel involved in the December 1989 military operations and fifty-one members of the political party which ruled at the time and of other authorities. They verified the documents indicating the military units' actions from that period. 10. At the date of the latest information communicated by the parties to the Court (29 March 2018), the criminal investigation was still ongoing.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. In 1990 the military prosecutor's offices from several cities opened on their own motion criminal investigations into the use of violence against the demonstrators. The applicants' injury and their close relatives' deaths were investigated along with most of the cases in a main criminal investigation recorded in file no. 97/P/1990 (current no. 11/P/2014). 10. At the date of the latest information communicated by the parties to the Court (29 March 2018), the criminal investigation was still ongoing.",FALSE,0,The protestors were deprived of their lives as a result of more force than absolutely necessary.,edited by me to remove ambiguity in fact pattern 89,"Article 2 Right to life 1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.","5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, are similar to those in Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, §§ 12-41, 24 May 2011). 6. Between 21 and 27 December 1989 many people including the applicants and/or their close relatives involved in this case took part in the anti-communist demonstrations in Bucharest, Timișoara, Brașov, Reșița and Craiova which led to the fall of the communist regime. They were injured or killed by gunfire during the demonstrations. 7. In 1990 following the overthrow of the communist regime, the military prosecutor's office opened investigations into the armed crackdown on the demonstrations. The main criminal investigation into the use of violence, particularly against civilian demonstrators, which was found excessive, during the events of December 1989 in Bucharest and other cities has been contained in file no. 97/P/1990 (current number 11/P/2014). 8. In a number of cases concerning events in Bucharest and Craiova, the prosecutor decided not to initiate a criminal investigation or to discontinue the proceedings. Those decisions were taken between 1990 and 2007. It results from the documents submitted by the parties that, after the adoption of those decisions, the prosecutor continued to examine the circumstances of these cases in the main criminal investigation – object of file no. 97/P/1990 (current number 11/P/2014). 9. To date, the main criminal investigation appears to be still ongoing. The most important procedural steps were summarised in Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others (cited above, §§ 12-41) and Alecu and Others v. Romania, nos. 56838/08 and 80 others, §§ 7-13, 27 January 2015. Subsequent developments are as follows. 10. Following the entry into force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure in February 2014, jurisdiction over the case was relinquished in favour of the military prosecutor's office. 11. On 14 October 2015 the prosecutor's office closed the investigation, finding that the applicants' complaints were partly statute-barred, partly subject to an amnesty and partly ill-founded. It also found that some of the facts which had been investigated could not be classified as criminal offences and that some of them were res judicata. The parties have not submitted any information on whether there was an appeal against that decision (see Ecaterina Mirea and Others v. Romania, nos. 43626/13 and 69 others, § 15, 12 April 2016). However, from the information available on the prosecutor's office website, the investigation is still ongoing and must have therefore been reopened.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. In 1990 following the overthrow of the communist regime, the military prosecutor's office opened investigations into the armed crackdown on the demonstrations. The main criminal investigation into the use of violence, particularly against civilian demonstrators, during the events of December 1989 in Bucharest and other cities has been contained in file no. 97/P/1990 (current number 11/P/2014). 8. In a number of cases concerning events in Bucharest and Craiova, the prosecutor decided not to initiate a criminal investigation or to discontinue the proceedings. Those decisions were taken between 1990 and 2007. It results from the documents submitted by the parties that, after the adoption of those decisions, the prosecutor continued to examine the circumstances of these cases in the main criminal investigation – object of file no. 97/P/1990 (current number 11/P/2014). 11. On 14 October 2015 the prosecutor's office closed the investigation, finding that the applicants' complaints were partly statute-barred, partly subject to an amnesty and partly ill-founded. It also found that some of the facts which had been investigated could not be classified as criminal offences and that some of them were res judicata. The parties have not submitted any information on whether there was an appeal against that decision (see Ecaterina Mirea and Others v. Romania, nos. 43626/13 and 69 others, § 15, 12 April 2016). However, from the information available on the prosecutor's office website, the investigation is still ongoing and must have therefore been reopened.",FALSE,0,The protestors were deprived of their lives as a result of more force than absolutely necessary.,edited by me to remove ambiguity in fact pattern 90,"Article 2 Right to life 1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.","4. The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Bucharest. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, refer to the same context and domestic criminal proceedings as those described in the case Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, §§ 12-41, 24 May 2011). 6. During the events which led to the fall of the communist regime, on the night of 21/22 December 1989 the applicant's son was killed by gunfire in Bucharest. 7. In 1990 the military prosecutor's office opened several investigations into the December 1989 armed crackdown on the anti-communism demonstrations. A main criminal investigation concerning the use of violence against civilians in Bucharest and other cities was registered with the highest prosecutor's office – the military prosecutors section − under no. 97/P/1990 (current number 11/P/2014). In the main criminal investigation the applicant raised civil claims and asked that the perpetrators of the offence of homicide committed against her son be identified and punished. 8. At the same time, another investigation concerning the offences of complicity in seriously aggravated homicide and complicity in attempted seriously aggravated homicide, committed against a large number of persons, including the applicant's son, culminated in the committal for trial of public officials, members of the ruling political party, and their subsequent conviction by a final decision of the Supreme Court of Justice of 20 April 1992. 9. The relevant procedural steps taken in the main criminal investigation were described in the cases Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others (cited above, §§ 12-41) and Sidea and Others v. Romania ([Committee] no. 889/15, §§ 8-11, 5 June 2018). 10. On 14 October 2015 the military prosecutor's office closed the main criminal investigation, finding that the applicant's complaint regarding the offence of homicide committed against her son was statute-barred and that a complaint concerning instigation of homicide was a matter of res judicata following the Supreme Court of Justice's decision of 20 April 1992 (see paragraph 8 above). 11. The decision of 14 October 2015 was subsequently annulled by a Prosecutor General's decision of 5 April 2016, confirmed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 13 June 2016. On 1 November 2016 the military prosecutor ordered the opening of a criminal investigation in rem for the offence of crimes against humanity in respect of the same factual circumstances. 12. According to the information submitted by the parties, the main criminal investigation is still ongoing (see Bănuțoiu and Ștefoglu v. Romania [Committee], nos. 64752/13 and 54607/14, § 12, 3 July 2018).",Ruled as violated by court,,"12. According to the information submitted by the parties, the main criminal investigation is still ongoing (see Bănuțoiu and Ștefoglu v. Romania [Committee], nos. 64752/13 and 54607/14, § 12, 3 July 2018).",FALSE,0,"The applicant's son was deprived of his life as a result of more force than absolutely necessary, according to the aggravated homicide case.", 91,"Article 2 Right to life 1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.","5. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Moscow. 6. On 24 January 2011 a bomb attack at the Domodedovo airport killed 37 people and injured more than 160. It was later established that the explosion was caused by a suicide bomber and organised by a militant group operating in the North Caucasus. The applicant, who was present at the airport at the time of explosion, sustained multiple injuries to her body (wounds, contusions and fractures) which provoked further complications (cerebral oedema, coma, respiratory and cardiac insufficiency and a traumatic shock). The applicant's injuries were life-threatening and caused serious harm to her health. 7. Within the framework of the criminal investigation into the bombing, the investigative authorities arrested four persons. On 11 November 2013 the Moscow Regional Court found them guilty of multiple charges, including commission of an act of terror, organisation of a criminal gang and illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. Three defendants received life sentence and the fourth one was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. 8. On 25 November 2014 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the judgment of 11 November 2013 in substance on appeal. 9. According to the Government, the applicant was granted a victim status. She did not bring a civil action for damages against the convicted persons. 10. On 25 January 2011 the Russian authorities opened criminal investigation on the charges of negligence against the airport managers and employees and the policemen deployed at the airport. On 22 March 2011 the applicant was granted a victim status in the proceedings. On 5 March 2012 the investigator decided to recall it. On 26 March 2012 the investigator discontinued the proceedings. 11. On 22 May 2012 the Deputy President of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation quashed the decision of 26 March 2012 and re-opened the case. The proceedings are pending to date. 12. On 3 June 2013 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow dismissed the applicant's complaint against the decision of 5 March 2012. 13. On an unspecified date the applicant brought a civil claim against the airport seeking damages resulting from the failure of the airport security to prevent the bombing. 14. On 27 August 2013 the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed the applicant's claims for damages. On 16 December 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 27 August 2013 on appeal. The City Court dismissed, inter alia, as unsubstantiated the applicant's allegation that the suicide bomber had been able to enter the airport owing to the lack of a metal detector at one of the airport entrances noting that such fact should have been established in the course of the relevant criminal investigation.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"The applicant did not die. However, one could argue the applicant's right to life was not protected, as the suicide bomber was able to inflict life-threatening injuries upon her. ", 92,"Article 2 Right to life 1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.","4. The facts, as submitted by the parties, are similar to those in Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, § 12-41, 24 May 2011). 5. The applicants or their close relatives participated in demonstrations and were injured or killed by gunfire during the events of December 1989 in Bucharest, Brașov and Vișina which led to the fall of the communist regime. 6. In 1990 the military prosecutor's offices from several cities opened criminal investigations into the use of violence against the demonstrators, which was found excessive, including the applicants' injury or their close relatives' death during these events. The main criminal investigation was recorded in file no. 97/P/1990 (current no. 11/P/2014). In a number of cases the prosecutor decided between 1991 and 1996 not to open an investigation or to discontinue the proceedings. These cases were further examined in the main criminal investigation file irrespective of a formal decision ordering re-opening, applicants being questioned by the prosecutor and raising civil claims, according to the circumstances of each case. 7. The most important procedural steps were described in Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others (cited above, §§ 12-41), and also in Ecaterina Mirea and Others v. Romania (nos. 43626/13 and 69 others, §§ 6-15, 12 April 2016). Subsequent relevant domestic decisions are shown below. 8. On 14 October 2015 the military prosecutor's office closed the main investigation, finding that the complaints were partly statute-barred, partly subject to an amnesty, and partly ill-founded. It also found that some of the occurrences could not be classified as offences and some were res judicatae (see Anamaria-Loredana Orășanu and Others v. Romania [Committee], no. 43629/13, § 11, 7 November 2017). 9. The decision of 14 October 2015 was annulled by a Prosecutor General's decision of 5 April 2016, confirmed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 13 June 2016. It was noted that the investigation in file no. 11/P/2014 was incomplete and that the facts could not be established based on the evidence gathered up to that date. 10. On 1 November 2016 the military prosecutor ordered the initiation in rem of a criminal investigation for the offence of crimes against humanity in respect of the same circumstances of fact. Up to February 2017 further steps were taken in gathering information from domestic authorities, the prosecutor's office contacting 211 civil parties, questioning members of the political party which took over the presidency at the time of events, planning the hearing of military officers and other participants in the events, verifying the activity of the relevant military units and the audio/video recordings broadcast by radio and television. 11. At the date of the latest information available to the Court (submitted by the parties on 13 April 2017 and 19 May 2017), the criminal investigation was still ongoing.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. In 1990 the military prosecutor's offices from several cities opened criminal investigations into the use of violence against the demonstrators, including the applicants' injury or their close relatives' death during these events. The main criminal investigation was recorded in file no. 97/P/1990 (current no. 11/P/2014). In a number of cases the prosecutor decided between 1991 and 1996 not to open an investigation or to discontinue the proceedings. These cases were further examined in the main criminal investigation file irrespective of a formal decision ordering re-opening, applicants being questioned by the prosecutor and raising civil claims, according to the circumstances of each case.",FALSE,0,The protestors were deprived of their lives as a result of more force than absolutely necessary.,edited by me to remove ambiguity in fact pattern 93,"Article 2 Right to life 1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.","5. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in St Petersburg. She is the mother of the late Mr Denis Aleksandrovich Vyrzhikovskiy. 6. On 1 October 2010 police officers apprehended the applicant's son and his friend, Ms Z. and took them to the Moskovskiy District Department of the Interior of St Petersburg (УВД по Московскому району г. Санкт‑Петербурга). No record of their arrest was drawn up. 7. For approximately six hours the applicant's son was ill-treated by police officers He was repeatedly punched in the stomach and hit to the head, right palm and both calves. He was also subjected to the so-called ""swallow"" method of torture (""ласточка""), with his head, hands and legs being pulled together towards the spine. 8. Two police officers then took the applicant's son and Ms Z. to another police station. Ms Z. later testified to having seen a bruise on Mr Vyrzhikovskiy's forehead and to his having been in pain and having had difficulties getting into a police car. 9. Early in the morning on 2 October 2010 Mr Vyrzhikovskiy was taken from the station to a hospital. He died there eight days later. An autopsy report stated that the cause of death was ""a severe fat pulmonary embolism aggravated by bronchopneumonia with cerebral edema resulted from a comminuted humeral head fracture with a tear of joint capsules and massive bruises, suffusion and strain of soft tissue and the subcutaneous fat layer."" A pathologist also found the following ante mortem injuries on Mr Vyrzhikovskiy's body, all directly linked to his death: massive bruises covering hands, chest, upper back, neck, armpits and most of his face and ears; bruises on the left hip, right palm, right part of the stomach, right thigh, left knee, both calves; abrasions and bruises on the buttocks. All injuries had been inflicted by hard blunt objects. 10. On 12 October 2010 criminal investigation was initiated. The applicant was granted victim status in the proceedings. Several police officers were charged with manslaughter and abuse of powers entailing a substantial violation of individual rights, committed using violence. 11. On 26 March 2014 the Moskovskiy District Court of St Petersburg found the officers guilty as charged and sentenced them to various terms of imprisonment. On 1 October 2014 the St Petersburg City Court partially quashed the judgment and acquitted officers of manslaughter for lack of evidence. While having found it established that the injuries had been inflicted on the applicant's son intentionally in the police custody, the City Court remitted the case for an additional investigation in order to identify those responsible for his death. 12. On 2 March 2015 the investigation was suspended because the time‑limit for the investigation had expired and it was impossible to identify the perpetrators and to carry out any investigative measures in the absence of an accused. On 12 November 2015 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of St Petersburg upheld that decision as lawful. The decision became final on 27 January 2016.",Ruled as violated by court,,"11. On 26 March 2014 the Moskovskiy District Court of St Petersburg found the officers guilty as charged and sentenced them to various terms of imprisonment. On 1 October 2014 the St Petersburg City Court partially quashed the judgment and acquitted officers of manslaughter for lack of evidence. While having found it established that the injuries had been inflicted on the applicant's son intentionally in the police custody, the City Court remitted the case for an additional investigation in order to identify those responsible for his death.",FALSE,0,"The applicant's son was deprived of his life as a result of more force than absolutely necessary, such as the torture interrogation method.", 94,"Article 2 Right to life 1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.","4. The applicants were born in 1939 and 1944 respectively and live in Dumbrăvița, Timiș County. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, refer to the same context and domestic criminal proceedings as those described in Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, §§ 12-41, 24 May 2011) and Şandru and Others v. Romania (no. 22465/03, §§ 7-47, 8 December 2009). 6. Between 17 and 28 December 1989 many people, including the applicants' son, participated in anti-communism demonstrations in Timișoara, Bucharest and other cities in Romania. 7. The applicants' son was killed by gunfire on 23 December 1989 in Timișoara. 8. In 1990 the military prosecutor's office opened several investigations into the December 1989 armed crackdown on the anti-communism demonstrations. A main criminal investigation concerning the use of violence against civilians in Bucharest and other cities, which was found excessive, was also registered with the highest prosecutor's office – the military prosecutors section − under no. 97/P/1990 (current number 11/P/2014). 9. In cases concerning the events in Timișoara, a separate investigation was carried out under file no. 11/P/1996, culminating in the referral to court and subsequent conviction of senior military officers by a decision of the High Court of Cassation and Justice of 3 April 2007, which became final on 15 October 2008. As is apparent from the documents submitted by the parties, the death of the applicants' son did not form part of this investigation, but in the court proceedings the first applicant nonetheless lodged a civil claim regarding his son's death during the December 1989 events. The court dismissed it on the grounds that he had failed to submit documents substantiating this claim. 10. As acknowledged by the Government, both applicants are parties in the main criminal investigation file. On 26 June 2013 they brought civil claims before the prosecutor requesting the right to participate, being civil parties in this file. The applicants had first made statements and raised civil claims in criminal investigation files other than file no. 97/P/1990 (current number 11/P/2014) on 11 January 1990 and 1 March 2000. The parties did not inform the Court whether these files had been joined to the main criminal investigation (see paragraph 8 above). 11. The most important steps taken by the prosecutors in the main criminal investigation are summarised in Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others (cited above, §§ 12-41) and Anamaria‑Loredana Orășanu and Others v. Romania ([Committee] nos. 43629/13 and 74 others, §§ 10‑11, 7 November 2017). Further developments are as follows. 12. On 14 October 2015 the prosecutor's office closed the main investigation, finding that the offences of homicide and instigation to homicide of which the applicants' son had been a victim had become statute‑barred. 13. Although the parties have not communicated any information regarding the lodging of an appeal against this decision, it is apparent from the prosecutor's office website that it was subsequently quashed and to date the main criminal investigation is still ongoing (see Anamaria‑Loredana Orășanu and Others, cited above, § 11).",Ruled as violated by court,,"11. The most important steps taken by the prosecutors in the main criminal investigation are summarised in Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others (cited above, §§ 12-41) and Anamaria‑Loredana Orășanu and Others v. Romania ([Committee] nos. 43629/13 and 74 others, §§ 10‑11, 7 November 2017). Further developments are as follows.",FALSE,0,The protestors were deprived of their lives as a result of more force than absolutely necessary.,edited by me to remove ambiguity in fact pattern 95,"Article 2 Right to life 1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.","4. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Nizhniy Novgorod. 5. On 25 July 2002 the applicant's 51-year-old brother Aleksandr Alekseyvich Anoshin was murdered by a policeman in the alcohol recovery centre of the Sovietsky District Police Department of Nizhniy Novgorod (медицинский вытрезвитель при Советском РУВД г. Нижнего Новгорода). 6. Earlier that day, at about 7 p.m., he was stopped in the street by a police patrol as he was staggering home after having drinks with workmates. He was driven to the centre and left alone on a bed in a recovery room, as centre staff sat down to a game of cards nearby. One hour later Mr Anoshin started banging on the door and asking to be let out. Officer M., who together with his partner K. had just returned from patrol duty, got annoyed at the disruption, pushed Mr Anoshin away from the door and demanded that he calm down. Mr Anoshin fell on the bed and his head slammed against the wall. He then got to his feet and stepped towards the officer. Officer M. punched the applicant's brother in the head and chest five times, and strangled him until he was unconscious using a squared piece of a broken wooden chair. M. laid Mr Anoshin down on the bed, and walked out. Officer An. watched this scene from the doorway. 7. At 10 p.m. the applicant's brother died of asphyxia. 8. On 3 August 2002 the Prosecutor's Office of the Sovietsky District opened a criminal investigation into the death. The investigation lasted four years and was handled in turn by at least six different investigators. They inspected the scene, conducted witness interviews, commissioned forensic reports, and staged reconstructions. 9. The centre staff initially testified that they had found the applicant's brother unwell in his bed, but then changed their story, saying that they had seen him hang himself using a bed sheet tied to the bars of his cell window. The forensic reports (on the cause of death, the nature of the injuries, the origin of blood on the wall and the presence of metallic traces on the sheet) refuted the hanging hypothesis, pointed to a violent death and incriminated the centre staff. However, the investigation was put on hold thirteen times because no credible suspect had been identified. 10. In March 2006 M. was interviewed for the first time. 11. By August 2006 the case against him had gone to trial. 12. On 1 August 2008 the Sovietsky District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod convicted M. of murder and violent abuse of official power and sentenced him to fourteen years' imprisonment and a three-year ban from police service. Neglect-of-duty charges brought against his two co‑defendants (Officers An. and Ag.) were dropped as time-barred. 13. At the trial, M. was directly incriminated by An., Ag., and K. Officers An. and Ag. confessed that the suicide story had been a cover-up condoned by commanders of Sovietsky Police Department. 14. On 14 November 2008 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court upheld the sentence. 15. The applicant and three of her brother's four children each claimed from the State 3,000,000 Russian roubles (RUB – approximately 69,000 euros (EUR)) for emotional distress caused by the crime. On 25 May 2009 the Sovietsky District Court awarded RUB 150,000 (approximately EUR 3,400) to each claimant. 16. On 14 August 2009 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court upheld that decision.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,The applicant's brother was deprived of his life as a result of more force than absolutely necessary., 96,"Article 2 Right to life 1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.","7. The applicant was born in 1987 and lived in Syria before he came to Russia in 2015. 8. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 9. On 23 March 2016 the applicant was arrested for violation of migration rules. On the same day the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Izhevsk (""the district court"") imposed an administrative fine on the applicant and ordered his administrative removal and detention until his removal. 10. On 5 April 2016 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya excluded the removal order from the administrative penalty imposed on him by the district court. 11. On 2 June 2016 the applicant was released. 12. On 3 June 2016 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya re‑opened the applicant's case at the request of the migration official and sent it for re-examination to the district court. 13. On 16 June 2016 the district court reviewed the administrative removal order of 23 March 2016 and confirmed its validity. The applicant was detained on the same day. On 12 September 2016 the judgment of 16 June 2016 was upheld by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya. On 7 February 2017 the applicant filed a cassation appeal against these three decisions at the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. 14. On 15 July, 7 November and 19 December 2016 and 27 January, 2 March and 10 April 2017 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Izhevsk allowed an application lodged by the bailiff for the postponement of the enforcement of the order of administrative removal by one month owing to the application of an interim measure by the Court on 17 June 2016. The district court granted the bailiff's request having relied on Article 31.5 of the Code of Administrative Offences ((""the CAO""), see paragraph 21 below). In these proceedings the applicant's lawyer also argued that there was a lack of grounds for the applicant's detention and requested that the enforcement proceedings be terminated and that the applicant be released. However, the district court dismissed her arguments, having concluded that, ""the grounds for the applicant's detention had already been established by the court in the removal proceedings and the discontinuation of the enforcement proceedings in the circumstances of [the applicant's] case is not provided for by Article 31.7 of the CAO"" (see paragraph 22 below). All these decisions, except the one of 15 July 2016 (no appeal was brought), were upheld by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya. 15. On 17 May 2017 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (""the Supreme Court"") examined the cassation appeal complaint of the applicant and reviewed the judgments issued in respect of his removal (see paragraph 13 above). The Supreme Court confirmed the judgments but discontinued the enforcement of administrative penalty in the form of the removal imposed on the applicant on 23 March 2016. The Supreme Court found that the applicant might be exposed to a risk of torture or ill-treatment in Syria in the event of his return there. On 2 June 2017 the applicant was released (after the decision entered into force). 16. On 11 May 2016 the applicant's request for refugee status was dismissed. According to the applicant, he did not appeal against this decision because the migration authorities had convinced the applicant that ""his application for temporary asylum would be granted"". 17. On 4 July 2016 the applicant's request for temporary asylum was dismissed. 18. On 25 November 2016 a second request lodged by the applicant for temporary asylum was denied by the migration authorities and the applicant did not lodge a complaint against this refusal. 19. According to the information provided by the applicant's lawyer on 9 November 2017, while the proceedings before the Court were ongoing, the applicant left Russia of his own volition on 2 August 2017 and had settled in Sweden.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"11. On 2 June 2016 the applicant was released. 13. On 16 June 2016 the district court reviewed the administrative removal order of 23 March 2016 and confirmed its validity. The applicant was detained on the same day. On 12 September 2016 the judgment of 16 June 2016 was upheld by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya. On 7 February 2017 the applicant filed a cassation appeal against these three decisions at the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. 14. On 15 July, 7 November and 19 December 2016 and 27 January, 2 March and 10 April 2017 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Izhevsk allowed an application lodged by the bailiff for the postponement of the enforcement of the order of administrative removal by one month owing to the application of an interim measure by the Court on 17 June 2016. The district court granted the bailiff's request having relied on Article 31.5 of the Code of Administrative Offences ((""the CAO""), see paragraph 21 below). In these proceedings the applicant's lawyer also argued that there was a lack of grounds for the applicant's detention and requested that the enforcement proceedings be terminated and that the applicant be released. However, the district court dismissed her arguments, having concluded that, ""the grounds for the applicant's detention had already been established by the court in the removal proceedings and the discontinuation of the enforcement proceedings in the circumstances of [the applicant's] case is not provided for by Article 31.7 of the CAO"" (see paragraph 22 below). All these decisions, except the one of 15 July 2016 (no appeal was brought), were upheld by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya. 19. According to the information provided by the applicant's lawyer on 9 November 2017, while the proceedings before the Court were ongoing, the applicant left Russia of his own volition on 2 August 2017 and had settled in Sweden.",FALSE,0,There is no relevance between being deprived of life and detention., 97,"Article 2 Right to life 1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.","4. The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in the town of Snizhne, Donetsk region. 5. On 14 January 2004 the applicant's son, born in 1967, was found dead in the applicant's barn. On the same day police officers inspected the scene and reported that the man had committed suicide by hanging. 6. On 24 January 2004 the investigator of the Snizhne Prosecutor's Office, following the pre-investigation inquiries, refused to initiate criminal proceedings on the grounds that no elements of a crime had been established in relation to the death of the applicant's son. 7. On 11 February 2004, following a forensic medical examination, an expert concluded that the applicant's son's death had been caused by strangulation by a loop of rope, possibly as a result of the applicant's son's body weight pulling against the rope. The body displayed no other injuries. 8. On 5 April 2005 the Donetsk Regional Prosecutor's Office quashed the decision of 24 January 2004 (see paragraph 6 above) as premature and unfounded, finding that further pre-investigation inquiries were necessary given that the possible reasons for suicide had not been examined, and other relatives as well as acquaintances of the deceased had not been questioned either. Numerous investigating instructions were given. 9. In the course of further pre-investigation inquiries, between 2005 and 2012, the investigators took measures to establish the circumstances of the applicant's son's death. They questioned various persons, and ordered numerous additional medical examinations of the corpse of the deceased. At a certain point medical experts noted that the applicant's son's body had numerous fractures. The experts opined that all those fractures had been inflicted after the applicant's son's death, possibly during the exhumation of the body. The applicant's husband informed the authorities that when he had seen his dead son in the barn, the corpse of his son had been in a sitting position and the rope loop had not been tightened. The applicant argued that it had not been suicide but a violent murder. She advanced different theories, suspecting notably: police security guards who had allegedly taken the applicant's son from a local bar, following which he had been found dead; a local police officer who had engaged in a dispute with the applicant's son; a woman who had been employed by the applicant's son in his textile business and her husband; the applicant's son's brothers-in-law; a business partner of the applicant's son; and people from a local gambling club (the applicant's son had been engaged in transporting money from the club to another town). 10. On 25 April 2005, 26 March 2006, 20 August 2008, 17 February and 12 December 2011, 15 February 2012 and 17 September 2012, following the pre-investigation inquiries, the investigators refused to initiate criminal proceedings on the grounds that no elements of a crime had been established. Those decisions were quashed as unsubstantiated by the supervising authorities, which found that further investigative measures were necessary. Numerous investigating instructions were given. 11. On 7 December 2012 the applicant, relying on the new Code of Criminal Procedure of 2012, requested that an investigation be opened in respect of the alleged murder of her son. On the same day criminal proceedings were instituted. 12. On 24 December 2012, 22 July and 30 September 2013 the criminal proceedings were terminated because no elements of a crime could be established. Those decisions were quashed by the supervising authorities as unsubstantiated and further investigations were ordered. In particular, on 5 December 2013 the Snizhne Town Court quashed the decision of 30 September 2013 after finding that the investigation had not been thorough and comprehensive. The court noted the theory of the possible involvement of the local police had not been properly examined, the role of the applicant's son's brother-in-law had not been clarified even though he might have been the first to find the dead body, the applicant had not been questioned on all the issues which were relevant to the case, and the evidence relating to the applicant's son's suicidal tendencies had not been assessed. 13. On 1 April 2014 the criminal proceedings were closed one more time on the ground that no elements of a crime could be established.",Ruled as violated by court,,"5. On 14 January 2004 the applicant's son, born in 1967, was found dead in the applicant's barn. On the same day police officers inspected the scene and reported that the man had committed suicide by hanging. 6. On 24 January 2004 the investigator of the Snizhne Prosecutor's Office, following the pre-investigation inquiries, refused to initiate criminal proceedings on the grounds that no elements of a crime had been established in relation to the death of the applicant's son. 7. On 11 February 2004, following a forensic medical examination, an expert concluded that the applicant's son's death had been caused by strangulation by a loop of rope, possibly as a result of the applicant's son's body weight pulling against the rope. The body displayed no other injuries. 8. On 5 April 2005 the Donetsk Regional Prosecutor's Office quashed the decision of 24 January 2004 (see paragraph 6 above) as premature and unfounded, finding that further pre-investigation inquiries were necessary given that the possible reasons for suicide had not been examined, and other relatives as well as acquaintances of the deceased had not been questioned either. Numerous investigating instructions were given. 9. In the course of further pre-investigation inquiries, between 2005 and 2012, the investigators took measures to establish the circumstances of the applicant's son's death. They questioned various persons, and ordered numerous additional medical examinations of the corpse of the deceased. At a certain point medical experts noted that the applicant's son's body had numerous fractures. The experts opined that all those fractures had been inflicted after the applicant's son's death, possibly during the exhumation of the body. The applicant's husband informed the authorities that when he had seen his dead son in the barn, the corpse of his son had been in a sitting position and the rope loop had not been tightened. The applicant argued that it had not been suicide but a violent murder. She advanced different theories, suspecting notably: police security guards who had allegedly taken the applicant's son from a local bar, following which he had been found dead; a local police officer who had engaged in a dispute with the applicant's son; a woman who had been employed by the applicant's son in his textile business and her husband; the applicant's son's brothers-in-law; a business partner of the applicant's son; and people from a local gambling club (the applicant's son had been engaged in transporting money from the club to another town). 10. On 25 April 2005, 26 March 2006, 20 August 2008, 17 February and 12 December 2011, 15 February 2012 and 17 September 2012, following the pre-investigation inquiries, the investigators refused to initiate criminal proceedings on the grounds that no elements of a crime had been established. Those decisions were quashed as unsubstantiated by the supervising authorities, which found that further investigative measures were necessary. Numerous investigating instructions were given. 11. On 7 December 2012 the applicant, relying on the new Code of Criminal Procedure of 2012, requested that an investigation be opened in respect of the alleged murder of her son. On the same day criminal proceedings were instituted. 12. On 24 December 2012, 22 July and 30 September 2013 the criminal proceedings were terminated because no elements of a crime could be established. Those decisions were quashed by the supervising authorities as unsubstantiated and further investigations were ordered. In particular, on 5 December 2013 the Snizhne Town Court quashed the decision of 30 September 2013 after finding that the investigation had not been thorough and comprehensive. The court noted the theory of the possible involvement of the local police had not been properly examined, the role of the applicant's son's brother-in-law had not been clarified even though he might have been the first to find the dead body, the applicant had not been questioned on all the issues which were relevant to the case, and the evidence relating to the applicant's son's suicidal tendencies had not been assessed.",TRUE,2,"The applicant's son was deprived of his life, but ostensibly through his own doing. It depends on the intent of the statute as to whether it covers suicide.", 98,"Article 2 Right to life 1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.","5. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Istanbul. 6. On 2 October 2004 the Büyükçekmece Magistrates' Court issued a search warrant allowing the gendarmerie to conduct searches of public places and suspected persons in a designated area. 7. Late at night on the same day, the gendarmerie carried out a search at the Sancak Hotel, which is owned by the applicant. The records drawn up afterwards noted that during the course of the search, a certain M.Ş. had approached the plain-clothes officers outside the hotel and told them that he had a girl inside. It was then established that M.Ş. trafficked women. He and a woman in the hotel were both taken to the gendarmerie headquarters. 8. The search records, which were prepared a few hours after the search and signed by the hotel's manager, showed that five women of foreign nationalities had been staying at the hotel with some men and that they had all been taken to the gendarmerie headquarters. 9. On 3 October 2004 the gendarmerie questioned several men as suspects and five women as victims. They all confirmed that they had been staying at the hotel for prostitution purposes. Some of the women were asked whether they knew of any complicity between the traffickers and the management of Sancak Hotel, to which they responded in the negative. 10. On the same day the applicant was arrested and taken into the custody of the gendarmerie on suspicion of facilitating prostitution. 11. On 4 October 2004 the applicant gave statements to the gendarmerie. He denied having provided premises for prostitution. He argued that he did not allow procurers into his hotel and had never seen M.Ş. before. 12. On the same day, the gendarmerie also questioned the hotel's manager, who stated that both he and the applicant were very strict about keeping procurers out of their hotel. 13. On 30 May 2005 the Büyükçekmece Public Prosecutor issued an indictment against the applicant and three other persons. He accused them of failure to obey an order from an official authority under Article 526 § 1 of the Criminal Code (Law no. 765) in force at the time, on the ground that they had provided premises for prostitution in their hotels. 14. On 1 June 2005 the Misdemeanours Act (Law no. 5326) and the new Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no. 5271) entered into force. 15. On 10 June 2005 the Büyükçekmece Magistrates' Court assessed the case without holding a hearing. Establishing that the accused had provided premises for prostitution in their hotels, it held that the applicant had failed to obey the orders of an official authority as charged and should be punished accordingly. It then sentenced him to an administrative fine of 100 Turkish liras (TRY)[1] pursuant to Section 32 of the Misdemeanours Act (Law no. 5326). 16. The applicant objected to that decision, arguing that his defence rights had been restricted in that the court had sentenced him to the fine solely on the basis of the statements taken previously by the police, and without hearing him in person. He maintained that he accepted clients into his hotel in compliance with the relevant regulation and that he could not be expected to refuse to offer accommodation to foreign nationals or to question their motives for staying there. 17. On 3 February 2006 after examining the case on the basis of the case file, the Bakırköy Assize Court upheld the decision of the Magistrates' Court. That decision was final. 18. On 24 May 2006 an official letter was sent to the applicant. It was indicated on the envelope that the applicant was invited to a hearing concerning his case, which would be held on 10 July 2006. The envelope did not show any confirmation that the letter had been served on him. 19. The applicant's lawyer stated that he had received a copy of the final decision at the registry of the Büyükçekmece Magistrates' Court on 11 July 2006. In support of his claim, he submitted a copy of the Assize Court's decision, on which a lawyer working at his office had noted that he had been served with the copy in person on that date. That document was later stamped and certified as an authentic copy by the registry of the domestic court. 20. Following communication of the present application, on 21 December 2009 a public prosecutor prepared an assessment report, summarising the events in the case. He concluded that the final decision had been served on the applicant on 26 May 2006. 21. On 2 January 2014 both the applicant and the Government were asked under Rule 54 § 2 (c) of the Rules of Court to provide the Court with a document indicating the notification date of the final decision by 16 January 2014 at the latest. The parties did not respond to that request. 22. On 3 November 2017 the Government were once again asked to provide documents regarding the commencement of the six-month time‑limit, in particular the content of the envelope from the Büyükçekmece Magistrates' Court dated 24 May 2006 and the document in support of the public prosecutor's claim that the final decision had been served on the applicant on 26 May 2006. On 30 November 2017 the Government informed the Court that they could not find the requested documents.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"11. On 4 October 2004 the applicant gave statements to the gendarmerie. He denied having provided premises for prostitution. He argued that he did not allow procurers into his hotel and had never seen M.Ş. before. 12. On the same day, the gendarmerie also questioned the hotel's manager, who stated that both he and the applicant were very strict about keeping procurers out of their hotel. 13. On 30 May 2005 the Büyükçekmece Public Prosecutor issued an indictment against the applicant and three other persons. He accused them of failure to obey an order from an official authority under Article 526 § 1 of the Criminal Code (Law no. 765) in force at the time, on the ground that they had provided premises for prostitution in their hotels. 14. On 1 June 2005 the Misdemeanours Act (Law no. 5326) and the new Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no. 5271) entered into force. 15. On 10 June 2005 the Büyükçekmece Magistrates' Court assessed the case without holding a hearing. Establishing that the accused had provided premises for prostitution in their hotels, it held that the applicant had failed to obey the orders of an official authority as charged and should be punished accordingly. It then sentenced him to an administrative fine of 100 Turkish liras (TRY)[1] pursuant to Section 32 of the Misdemeanours Act (Law no. 5326). 16. The applicant objected to that decision, arguing that his defence rights had been restricted in that the court had sentenced him to the fine solely on the basis of the statements taken previously by the police, and without hearing him in person. He maintained that he accepted clients into his hotel in compliance with the relevant regulation and that he could not be expected to refuse to offer accommodation to foreign nationals or to question their motives for staying there. 17. On 3 February 2006 after examining the case on the basis of the case file, the Bakırköy Assize Court upheld the decision of the Magistrates' Court. That decision was final. 20. Following communication of the present application, on 21 December 2009 a public prosecutor prepared an assessment report, summarising the events in the case. He concluded that the final decision had been served on the applicant on 26 May 2006. 21. On 2 January 2014 both the applicant and the Government were asked under Rule 54 § 2 (c) of the Rules of Court to provide the Court with a document indicating the notification date of the final decision by 16 January 2014 at the latest. The parties did not respond to that request. 22. On 3 November 2017 the Government were once again asked to provide documents regarding the commencement of the six-month time‑limit, in particular the content of the envelope from the Büyükçekmece Magistrates' Court dated 24 May 2006 and the document in support of the public prosecutor's claim that the final decision had been served on the applicant on 26 May 2006. On 30 November 2017 the Government informed the Court that they could not find the requested documents.",FALSE,0,The fact pattern makes no mention of being deprived of life., 99,"Article 2 Right to life 1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.","4. The applicant was born in 1990 and lives in Galashki, Ingushetia Republic. 5. On 11 December 2009 the applicant was abducted by S. with intent to marry her. The applicant's mother opposed the marriage and on the same day S.'s relatives took the applicant back to her mother's house. 6. On 12 December 2009 the relatives of the applicant's deceased father made the applicant go back to S.'s, because of the presumed consummation of the marriage. They also threatened to kill S., should the applicant decide to leave him. 7. The applicant had to live with S.'s family as his wife. The marriage was not officially registered. She was kept locked in a room without being able to communicate with people outside S.'s family. S. moved to a different town. On rare occasions S.'s sister let the applicant use her mobile phone so that she could call her mother. She complained that S.'s family, especially her mother-in-law, treated her poorly. She did not feel well and complained about dizziness, numbing of the lower jaw and difficulty to breathe. According to the applicant's mother, the applicant told her once that her mother-in-law did not let her see S. and claimed that the applicant would not last living with them longer than two months. On several occasions the applicant lost consciousness and foamed at the mouth. 8. On 28 December 2009 the applicant was taken to a municipal hospital. The doctor diagnosed her with renal colic. 9. On 29 December 2009 during another visit to hospital the applicant was diagnosed with poisoning by unknown substance. 10. On 1 February 2010 the applicant foamed at the mouth again and was taken to hospital. She was released on the same day. 11. On 2 February 2010 the applicant lost consciousness and was taken to hospital. A general practitioner and a neuropathologist examined her. She was diagnosed with stress and overdose of sedatives and placed in an intensive care unit. Subsequently she was diagnosed with post-hypoxic encephalopathy and vegetative state. She has not regained consciousness since then. 12. In April 2010 the applicant was released to her mother's care. 13. On 23 September 2010 the applicant's mother complained to the local police department and prosecutor's office that the applicant had been forcefully held by S.'s family in inhuman conditions which led to deterioration of her health and coma. 14. On 10 October 2010 the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings against S.'s family on the charges of incitement of suicide and causing damage to health. 15. On 24 October 2011 the applicant's mother lodged another complaint with the local police department alleging that the applicant had been poisoned while staying at S.'s house. She also stated that the applicant had been repeatedly beaten up and deprived of her liberty. 16. According to the forensic medical report completed on 8 November 2011, a vegetative state, similar to the applicant's, could be caused primarily by intoxication. The expert, however, was unable to determine the cause of the applicant's condition. 17. On 24 November 2011 the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings against S.'s family. The applicant appealed. 18. On 29 July 2012 the supervising prosecutor quashed the decision of 24 November 2011 and ordered further inquiry into the matter. 19. On 3 August 2012 the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings on the charges of attempted murder. 20. On 1 October 2012 the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings on the charges of causing serious damage to health. The applicant appealed. 21. On 26 July 2013 the Sunzhenskiy District Court of the Ingushetiya Republic quashed the decision of 1 October 2012. The court noted that the inquiry had been incomplete. The investigator had failed (1) to question a number of important witnesses and (2) to determine the cause of the applicant's condition. 22. On 26 September 2013 the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings reiterating verbatim his reasoning set out in the decision of 1 October 2013. 23. On 15 January, 14 March and 21 May 2014 the deputy head of the district police department ordered a new inquiry noting that the previous inquiry had been incomplete. 24. On 18 January and 18 March 2014 the investigator refused to open a criminal investigation reproducing verbatim the earlier decisions of 1 October 2012 and 26 September 2013. 25. On 21 May 2014 the investigator again refused to open a criminal investigation. In addition to his earlier findings, he studied the applicant's medical case-file and concluded that it did not contain information accounting for the cause of her medical condition. 26. On 28 February 2015 the district deputy prosecutor quashed the decision of 21 May 2014 and ordered a further inquiry. 27. The case-file materials submitted by the Government contain two decisions dated 6 March 2015. The first decision was taken by the investigator who refused to institute a criminal investigation in the applicant's case. The second decision was taken by the district deputy prosecutor who ordered a new inquiry. The Government did not inform of the outcome of the proceedings.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"The applicant did not die. However, one could argue the applicant's right to life was not protected, as S.'s family was able to poison her, resulting in a coma.", 100,"Article 2 Right to life 1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.","5. The first applicant, Habibe İncin, is the wife of Kerim İncin; the second to seventh applicants are his children; the eighth applicant is his mother and the remaining seven applicants are the siblings of Kerim İncin. 6. On 22 March 2005 the applicants Halima İncin and Hazım İncin, with the assistance of their lawyer, submitted a petition to the Hakkari prosecutor. In their petition the two applicants alleged that after severe military clashes had taken place in the vicinity of their village, in 1994 they and their family members had left Turkey and moved to live with their relatives in Iraq. In June 1995 Kerim İncin had gone back to their village in Turkey to collect a sum of money he was owed. While he was having dinner in the village headman's house, village guards had arrived and taken him to the nearby Geçimli military station. While at the military station Kerim İncin had been questioned and subjected to ill-treatment. After having detained him at the station for a week, the soldiers had taken him back to the village, where they had shot him and buried him. 7. In the petition the lawyer representing the applicants stated that the applicant Hazım İncin had recently returned to Turkey from Iraq and wanted to lodge an official complaint concerning the killing of his father. In their petition the two applicants also gave the prosecutor the names of a number of people who they alleged had witnessed the incident in question. They asked the prosecutor to carry out an investigation, to identify and question all the eyewitnesses, to exhume the body of Kerim İncin and to find and punish those responsible for the killing. 8. The prosecutor started an investigation into the applicants' allegations immediately. In the course of the investigation, between 2005 and 2006 the prosecutor questioned the applicants and other members of their family. During the same period the prosecutor also identified, summoned and questioned a large number of witnesses and members of the military who had lived or worked in the region at the time of the events but who, in the years that had elapsed since the killing, had moved to different parts of the country. A number of witnesses told the prosecutor that they had seen Kerim İncin being taken away from the village by the soldiers and added that shortly afterwards a large-scale military operation had been conducted in the area and they had heard that Kerim İncin had been killed in the course of that operation. 9. Some members of the military forces told the prosecutor during their questioning that they had no recollection of the events while others stated that no such incident had taken place. 10. As a result of the questioning the prosecutor found it established that Kerim İncin had indeed been killed and that his body had been buried in Taşbaşı village cemetery. 11. On 26 May 2006 the prosecutor asked the Hakkari Gendarmerie Command whether there would be any security concerns if he were to visit that cemetery with a view to exhuming a body. The prosecutor was informed in reply that it was not a good idea to do so because the security forces conducted spontaneous operations in the area during the summer months. 12. The prosecutor continued to request security updates from the military until 2009 and sent approximately twenty letters requesting that the military inform him as soon as it was possible to visit the village. In respect of the requests made during winter months the military informed the prosecutor that it would not be safe to go to the area because of adverse weather conditions. In their replies during spring, summer and autumn months, the soldiers informed the prosecutor that it was not a good idea to go to the area in question because a military operation could be conducted there at any time. 13. Finally, on 11 June 2009 the prosecutor informed the military of his intention to go to the cemetery on 18 June 2009 and instructed the military to take the necessary security measures for his planned visit. 14. On 18 June 2009 the prosecutor went to the cemetery in question and a body was exhumed from a grave in his presence. It was subsequently established by DNA analysis that it was the body of Kerim İncin. Forensic examinations showed that there were ten holes in the clothes in which Kerim İncin had been buried and that the cause of death had been numerous firearms injuries inflicted on his body and skull. 15. On 25 March 2010 the prosecutor took a decision not to prosecute ten of the suspects who had been working as members of the military at the time of the events, for lack of evidence. The following day the prosecutor prepared an indictment and charged Y.K. − who had been the commander of the Geçimli military station where Kerim İncin had allegedly been taken at the time of the events − with the offence of murder. 16. The trial before the Hakkari Assize Court started on 12 April 2010. The two applicants who had introduced the complaint with the prosecutor on 22 March 2005 (see paragraph 6 above), namely Halima İncin and Hazım İncin, joined the criminal proceedings as interveners. In the course of the trial a total of twenty hearings were held. On 27 November 2014 the Hakkari Assize Court acquitted Y.K. for lack of evidence. The same day the applicants appealed against the judgment acquitting Y.K. and the proceedings before the Court of Cassation are still pending. 17. At the request of the Court, the Government stated that, in accordance with the applicable statute of limitations, the criminal proceedings against Y.K. would not become time-barred until 2025.",Ruled as violated by court,,"8. The prosecutor started an investigation into the applicants' allegations immediately. In the course of the investigation, between 2005 and 2006 the prosecutor questioned the applicants and other members of their family. During the same period the prosecutor also identified, summoned and questioned a large number of witnesses and members of the military who had lived or worked in the region at the time of the events but who, in the years that had elapsed since the killing, had moved to different parts of the country. A number of witnesses told the prosecutor that they had seen Kerim İncin being taken away from the village by the soldiers and added that shortly afterwards a large-scale military operation had been conducted in the area and they had heard that Kerim İncin had been killed in the course of that operation. 9. Some members of the military forces told the prosecutor during their questioning that they had no recollection of the events while others stated that no such incident had taken place. 11. On 26 May 2006 the prosecutor asked the Hakkari Gendarmerie Command whether there would be any security concerns if he were to visit that cemetery with a view to exhuming a body. The prosecutor was informed in reply that it was not a good idea to do so because the security forces conducted spontaneous operations in the area during the summer months. 12. The prosecutor continued to request security updates from the military until 2009 and sent approximately twenty letters requesting that the military inform him as soon as it was possible to visit the village. In respect of the requests made during winter months the military informed the prosecutor that it would not be safe to go to the area because of adverse weather conditions. In their replies during spring, summer and autumn months, the soldiers informed the prosecutor that it was not a good idea to go to the area in question because a military operation could be conducted there at any time. 13. Finally, on 11 June 2009 the prosecutor informed the military of his intention to go to the cemetery on 18 June 2009 and instructed the military to take the necessary security measures for his planned visit. 15. On 25 March 2010 the prosecutor took a decision not to prosecute ten of the suspects who had been working as members of the military at the time of the events, for lack of evidence. The following day the prosecutor prepared an indictment and charged Y.K. − who had been the commander of the Geçimli military station where Kerim İncin had allegedly been taken at the time of the events − with the offence of murder. 16. The trial before the Hakkari Assize Court started on 12 April 2010. The two applicants who had introduced the complaint with the prosecutor on 22 March 2005 (see paragraph 6 above), namely Halima İncin and Hazım İncin, joined the criminal proceedings as interveners. In the course of the trial a total of twenty hearings were held. On 27 November 2014 the Hakkari Assize Court acquitted Y.K. for lack of evidence. The same day the applicants appealed against the judgment acquitting Y.K. and the proceedings before the Court of Cassation are still pending.",FALSE,0,Kerim İncin was intentionally deprived of his life., 101,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","5. The applicant was born in 1985 and is currently detained in St Petersburg. 6. He was suspected of involvement in large-scale drug dealing. 7. On 2 February 2011 he was arrested. He remained in custody pending the investigation and trial. 8. On 6 October 2011 the Sovetskiy District Court of Kazan (""the District Court"") received the case file and set the trial date for 19 October 2011. 9. On 19 March 2012 the District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to nine and a half years' imprisonment. 10. During the trial, which consisted of sixteen hearings, the applicant was confined in a metal cage in the courtroom. There was no desk inside the cage, only a wooden bench, which made it impossible for him to take notes during the hearings. Armed security guards remained beside the cage dock. The applicant's lawyer could only approach him with the court's permission. Any conversations between them had to take place in the presence of the guards. 11. On 10 August 2012 the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic upheld the applicant's conviction on appeal. The applicant participated in the hearing by videoconference. He was placed behind a floor-to-ceiling metal partition on the premises of the remand prison SIZO-3 of the Tatarstan Republic where he was detained and communicated with the judges via a video link.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"This is degrading treatment, but the applicant is not tangibly harmed. It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 102,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","4. The applicant was born in 1972 and is detained in Belovo, Kemerovo Region. 5. Following the applicant's arrest on suspicion of drug trafficking, on 14 November 2008 he was placed in temporary detention facility no. 70/1 in Tomsk. He remained in that facility until 20 April 2010. He was detained in cells nos. 91, 1, 7, 55, 4, 56, 51. Each cell measured approximately twenty metres and housed, for the major part of his stay, between 10 and 14 inmates. In the majority of the cells the toilet was merely a hole in the floor. A lavatory pan was installed in three cells, in the corner, and was separated from the living area by a 1.5-metre fence. The applicant was afforded an hour-long walk daily in the recreation yard. 6. According to the Government the applicant was provided with an individual sleeping place, except for the detention period between 18 November and 2 December 2008. There was artificial lighting, natural and artificial ventilation in the cells; the cells were heated. 7. On 30 December 2009 the Leninskiy District Court of Tomsk found the applicant guilty of attempted drug trafficking and sentenced him to nine years and six months' imprisonment. 8. The applicant's lawyer lodged an appeal and asked to ensure the applicant's presence at the appeal hearing. 9. On 17 May 2010 the Tomsk Regional Court upheld the conviction, having heard a prosecutor and the applicant's lawyer. The applicant was not transported to the hearing. 10. On 13 February 2013 the Presidium of the Tomsk Regional Court quashed the decision of 17 May 2010 and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 11. On 25 March 2013 the Tomsk Regional Court upheld the applicant's conviction on appeal. The applicant and his lawyer were present at the hearing.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"This is degrading treatment, but the applicant is not tangibly harmed. It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 103,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","4. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Bielsk Podlaski. 5. The facts of the case were not in dispute and may be summarised as follows. 6. The applicant was detained in Siedlce Prison from 26 January to 19 April 2007 and from 15 July to 15 October 2009. 7. The applicant submitted that, during his detention in Siedlce Prison, he had been held in cells where the amount of space per person had been below the Polish statutory minimum standard of 3 m². He also submitted that he had been held in cells with smokers. Moreover, he raised the problems of humidity, lack of hygiene and warm water and limited access to make telephone calls. 8. The domestic courts found that the applicant had been detained in an overcrowded cell during his detention in Siedlce Prison from 15 July to 15 October 2009 (91 days), when he had been assigned to cell no. 616 (15.94 m²) with 5 other prisoners (2.65 m² per person). 9. The courts further found that the toilet areas had been separated from the rest of the living space in the cells in compliance with the relevant law. The toilet annex had only cold running water. It was further noted that the cells were adequately equipped. The applicant was held in cells in accordance with his declaration about his tobacco habits. 10. On 13 July 2013 the applicant brought a civil action against the State Treasury for infringement of his personal rights and for compensation on account of his detention in an overcrowded cell in Siedlce Prison. He claimed 43,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (10,750 euros (EUR)) in compensation. 11. On 30 May 2014 the Siedlce District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) dismissed the applicant's action. It confirmed, however, that the applicant had been detained temporarily in an overcrowded cell, from 15 July to 15 October 2009. 12. On 17 February 2015 the Siedlce Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) dismissed the applicant's appeal.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"This is degrading treatment, but the applicant is not tangibly harmed. It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 104,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","5. The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Łatanice. 6. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 7. The applicant was detained in Kielce Remand Centre from 6 September to 4 October 2012 (28 days). 8. The applicant submitted that throughout his detention in Kielce Remand Centre, he had been held in overcrowded cells in which the space per person had been below the Polish statutory minimum standard of 3 m². 9. In their observations, the Government admitted that the applicant had been detained in an overcrowded cell. However, they emphasised that the space in each cell had exceeded 2 m² per person and that the hardship caused by staying in an overcrowded cell had been compensated by adding 30 minutes to his daily walk as well as additional cultural and educational classes or sports activities. 10. In the course of civil proceedings instituted by the applicant, the domestic courts established that for twenty-eight days the applicant had been detained in an overcrowded cell (see also paragraph 13 below). 11. Regarding the conditions of detention, the domestic courts established that the overall conditions in cells were adequate. Cells were equipped in compliance with the relevant law; they were properly ventilated and the toilet area had been separated from the rest of the living space in the cells. 12. On 12 August 2013 the applicant brought a civil action against the State Treasury for infringement of his personal rights and for compensation on account of his detention in overcrowded cells in various penitentiary facilities. He claimed 35,000 Polish zlotys (approximately 8,750 euros) in just satisfaction. 13. On 28 May 2014 the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) dismissed the applicant's action. It confirmed, however, that temporarily (from 6 September to 4 October 2012) the applicant had been detained in cells in which the space per person had been below the Polish statutory minimum standard of 3 m², but not below 2 m². 14. On 1 April 2015 the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) dismissed the applicant's appeal.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"This is degrading treatment, but the applicant is not tangibly harmed. It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 105,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","4. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Sovetskaya Gavan, Khabarovsk Region. 5. On 22 October 2009 the applicant was arrested and brought to the Khabarovsk Administrative Detention Centre where he stayed until 27 November 2009. 6. Since 22 October 2009 he had been detained with more than 12 inmates in the cell no. 9 designed for 12 persons and had to take turns to sleep. A month after he had been transferred to another cell with the area of 6 square meters which he had shared with another inmate. 7. The detention centre had no shower facilities or a place for outdoor walks. The applicant's cell was cold and damp, iron banks were not covered by mattresses. Toilets were not separated from the living area, and the persons using them were in full view of others. Food supply was inadequate, the applicant was served meals only once a day and had no drinking water from within the cell. 8. The Government submitted that the Khabarovsk Administrative Detention Centre comprised two cells: no. 5 with the area of 14.6 square meters for 3 inmates and no. 6 with the area of 18 square meters for 4 inmates. There was no overcrowding; the toilet had been separate by a shoulder length fence. The detainees may take a shower once a week. The temperature was 23oC, there were kettles with boiled water in the cells. 9. On 26 October 2009 the applicant's wife, Mrs Liu, sought to visit the applicant but was refused. 10. On 6 and 10 November 2009 the applicant's wife filed complaints with the Khabarovsk Prosecutor's Office stating that she had not been allowed to see the applicant. 11. In August 2010 the applicant brought a civil claim for compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage, stating that the conditions of his detention had been inhuman and degrading, and that the prohibition on family visits was unlawful. 12. On 9 February 2011 the Industrialnyy District Court of Khabarovsk dismissed his claim. Relying on the statements of a representative of the detention centre, the court held that the Internal Rules of the Administrative Detention Centres approved by the Decree of the Ministry of Defence of Russia of 6 June 2000 no. 605 dsp (""the Rules"") did not make provision for family visits, and that the applicant's right to family life had not been breached as he had met his wife during court hearings. 13. On 18 May 2011 the Khabarovsk Regional Court upheld the above decision on appeal.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"This is degrading treatment, but the applicant is not tangibly harmed. It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 106,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","4. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Bucharest. 5. During the events which led to the fall of the communist regime in Bucharest, on 21 December 1989, the applicant suffered injuries caused by impingement and compression, as a result of which she needed 50 days of medical care, her life not being imperilled. 6. In 1990 the military prosecutor's office opened, of its own motion, several investigations into the ill-treatment and injuries suffered by those participating in the events of December 1989. The main criminal investigation was recorded in file no. 97/P/1990 (currently no. 11/P/2014). As regards the applicant, an investigation was opened under a separate file and she gave a statement as a witness on 23 June 1994. Her case has been further examined at a later date in the main criminal investigation. 7. The most important procedural steps were described in the case Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, §§ 12-41, 24 May 2011), and also in Sidea and Others v. Romania ([Committee] no. 889/15 and 38 others, §§ 8-11, 5 June 2018). Subsequent relevant domestic decisions are referred to below. 8. On 14 October 2015 the military prosecutor's office closed the main investigation, finding that the complaint regarding the offence of attempted homicide committed against the applicant was statute-barred. This decision was annulled by a Prosecutor General's decision of 5 April 2016, confirmed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 13 June 2016. It was noted that the investigation under file no. 11/P/2014 was incomplete and that the facts could not be established based on the evidence gathered up to that date. 9. On 1 November 2016 the military prosecutor ordered the opening of a criminal investigation in rem for the offence of crimes against humanity in respect of the same factual circumstances. Up to February 2017 further steps were taken to gather information from domestic authorities: the prosecutor's office contacted 211 civil parties, questioning members of the political party which took over the presidency at the time of the events, planning the hearing of military officers and other participants in the events, and verifying the activity of the relevant military units and the audio/video recordings broadcast by radio and television. 10. At the date of the latest information available to the Court (see Sidea and Others, cited above, § 11), the criminal investigation was still ongoing.",Ruled as violated by court,,"5. During the events which led to the fall of the communist regime in Bucharest, on 21 December 1989, the applicant suffered injuries caused by impingement and compression, as a result of which she needed 50 days of medical care, her life not being imperilled. 6. In 1990 the military prosecutor's office opened, of its own motion, several investigations into the ill-treatment and injuries suffered by those participating in the events of December 1989. The main criminal investigation was recorded in file no. 97/P/1990 (currently no. 11/P/2014). As regards the applicant, an investigation was opened under a separate file and she gave a statement as a witness on 23 June 1994. Her case has been further examined at a later date in the main criminal investigation.",TRUE,2,"The applicant suffered injuries during the event, but it's arguable whether this carries the requisite intent to count as ""torture"" or ""punishment."" It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 107,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","4. The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Forráskút. At the time of lodging the application, he was detained at Márianosztra Prison. 5. On 29 January 2014 the applicant was convicted of possession of narcotics and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. On appeal, on 14 October 2014 the Budapest Court of Appeal upheld the judgment. 6. The applicant began serving his sentence at Szeged Prison on 15 January 2015 and was transferred to Márianosztra Prison on 26 January 2015. He was released on parole on 8 September 2015. 7. While the applicant was held at Szeged Prison, the per capita space available to him was about 3.2 sq. m; the gross ground surface of the cell was 16 sq. m for five occupants but included the in-cell sanitary facility. He was allowed to spend one hour per day in the open air and could take part in various sports and other activities, thus reducing the time spent in the cell. He was provided with basic standard meals and was able to take a shower twice a week. 8. At Márianosztra Prison, the per capita cell space available to the applicant was about 2.67 sq. m; the gross ground surface of the cell was 8 sq. m for three occupants but included the in-cell sanitary facility. Only between 26 and 29 January and 11 and 15 May 2015 he was held in a cell where a wall separated the toilet from the rest of the space. He could take a shower twice a week and pursue certain free-time activities. At his request, he was provided with vegetarian meals but very often consisting only of soya beans. 9. The applicant submitted that he suffered from epilepsy and a personality disorder. In his own submissions he stated that prior to his conviction he had cultivated and consumed cannabis partly because it alleviated his symptoms. 10. As regards the medical care in prison, the Government submitted that, during the first examination at Szeged Prison, the applicant had stated that he suffered from epilepsy without presenting any relevant documentation. The doctor referred him for a psychiatric examination, which took place on 22 January 2015; but the applicant refused the treatment prescribed by the specialist. 11. During his first medical examination at Márianosztra Prison, the doctor noted that the applicant's aptitude for work could be assessed only after external medical records concerning his illness had been obtained. 12. The applicant suffered an epileptic seizure on 24 April 2015, whilst in his cell. Following medication, his condition improved but he refused the neurological examination recommended by the doctor and any further treatment. He suffered further fits on 4 May and 8 July 2015, following which a neurologist prescribed him anti-epileptic drugs, but he agreed to take them only after suffering yet another seizure.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. The applicant began serving his sentence at Szeged Prison on 15 January 2015 and was transferred to Márianosztra Prison on 26 January 2015. He was released on parole on 8 September 2015. 7. While the applicant was held at Szeged Prison, the per capita space available to him was about 3.2 sq. m; the gross ground surface of the cell was 16 sq. m for five occupants but included the in-cell sanitary facility. He was allowed to spend one hour per day in the open air and could take part in various sports and other activities, thus reducing the time spent in the cell. He was provided with basic standard meals and was able to take a shower twice a week.",TRUE,1,"While it somewhat depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment,"" this is degrading treatment leading to tangible harm to the applicant.", 108,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. The applicant was born in 1967 in the Tajikistan Soviet Socialist Republic of the Soviet Union and came to Russia in 1993. He is an apatride. 7. On 31 July 2014 the applicant was arrested for vagrancy. On 2 August 2014 the Kalininskiy District Court in St Petersburg sentenced him to a fine and administrative removal from Russia. The court also directed that he should be detained until expulsion in the special facility for the detention of aliens in the Leningrad Region (СУВСИГ по СПб и ЛО) in Krasnoye Selo. The decision described the applicant as being ""a native (уроженец) of the Tajikistan Republic"". 8. By letters dated 11 August and 18 November 2014, the Federal Migration Service asked the Embassy of Tajikistan in Moscow to issue a laissez-passer document enabling the applicant's return to Tajikistan. No reply was received. 9. On an unspecified date the applicant was fingerprinted. It was discovered that he had been registered in the police database under a different name. On 11 February 2015 the Federal Migration Service used that name to request a laissez-passer from the Embassy of Tajikistan. It did not receive a response. 10. On 10 September 2015 the Federal Migration Service again attempted to obtain a travel document for the applicant using his original name. The Embassy did not reply. 11. On 28 July 2016 the governor of the detention centre asked the Kalininskiy District Court to discontinue the enforcement of the judgment on the ground that the two-year limitation period in respect of the applicant's offence had expired. On 29 July 2016 the District Court granted the application. The applicant was released on 13 August 2016. 12. While in detention, the applicant was held in standard six-person cells (Cells 509, 402, 516 and 615) measuring 27.4 square metres which were furnished with three two-tier bunk beds, six bed stands, six chairs and a table. Between October 2014 and February 2015 he was also held in a smaller cell (Cell 514, 13 sq. m, two beds) and a larger cell (Cell 315, 40.2 sq. m, four two-tier bunk beds). 13. Cell 402, in which he stayed from February to September 2015, was a so-called ""closed cell"". The steel door with a peephole and a hatch for serving food remained under lock at all times and he was not allowed to leave the cell, except for short and infrequent outdoor exercise. For the first two months, he had been alone in that cell. 14. The applicant complained about dim lighting, poor quality of food, insufficient outdoor exercise in cramped conditions, a lack of medical assistance and a shortage of meaningful activities. The Government disputed the applicant's allegations and submitted copies of contracts with the catering, cleaning and laundering companies and a copy of visitors' register from the medical unit.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"13. Cell 402, in which he stayed from February to September 2015, was a so-called ""closed cell"". The steel door with a peephole and a hatch for serving food remained under lock at all times and he was not allowed to leave the cell, except for short and infrequent outdoor exercise. For the first two months, he had been alone in that cell.",TRUE,1,"While the applicant complained of degrading conditions, the government's rebuttal and the lack of tangible harm suffered suggest it was not so.", 109,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","5. The applicant, who was born in 1948, lives in Corjova, a village under the formal control of Moldovan authorities, but where agents of the self‑proclaimed ""Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic"" (""MRT"", see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, § 90, ECHR 2004‑VII for further details) frequently intervened during the events in question, notably by blocking the participation of the local population in elections held in Moldova. 6. On 3 June 2007 local elections were to be held in Moldova, including in Corjova. The applicant, who is an ambulance driver, submitted his candidature for the position of Mayor of Corjova. 7. On 1 June 2007, at 11 p.m., the applicant's ambulance was stopped by the ""MRT"" road militia and his documents (Moldovan national identity card and driving licence) were taken away from him without any explanation. 8. On 2 June 2007 the applicant went to the ""MRT"" militia station located in Dubăsari and asked for the return of his documents. He was then arrested and placed in a detention cell. A few hours later a person came to his cell and, without presenting himself, asked him about his work and his electoral propaganda. The applicant later found out that the visitor had been a judge and that, following that discussion in the cell, the judge adopted a decision, finding him guilty of the administrative offence of unlawful electoral propaganda and sentencing him to 15 days' administrative detention. 9. The applicant submits that he was not allowed to contact his relatives or to find a lawyer, and was not issued with a copy of the court's decision, which prevented any possibility of lodging an effective appeal against the decision of 2 June 2007. 10. During his detention the applicant was placed in a cell which, according to him was damp and cold. Food was given once a day. When the applicant's relatives, alerted by his absence, contacted the local authorities in order to find out about his fate, they were informed of the applicant's detention. However, their requests to transmit food to him were allegedly rejected. 11. On 17 June 2007 the applicant was released from detention and he was issued with a copy of the decision of 2 June 2007. The time-limit for lodging an appeal had already expired by that time. Upon release, he was allegedly coughing and was diagnosed with chronic acute bronchitis. He also claims that his eyesight worsened considerably. 12. In the meantime, on 6 June 2007, the applicant complained to the Moldovan prosecutor's office of his unlawful detention. Based on this complaint, a criminal investigation was initiated on 12 June 2007, the applicant and witnesses were subsequently heard. Three high-ranking ""MRT"" officers were charged and were declared wanted persons. However, on 4 August 2010 the investigation was suspended due to the fact that the three accused were hiding from it in the ""MRT"".",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it somewhat depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment,"" this is degrading treatment leading to tangible harm to the applicant.", 110,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","4. The applicant was born in 1975 and is detained in Chișinău. 5. On 24 August 2011 the applicant was taken into police custody on charges of murder and unauthorized possession of a firearm. He was remanded in custody by the Centru District Court on 28 August 2011 and his detention was subsequently extended every thirty days until 21 January 2012 on the grounds that given the seriousness of the charges against him, he might abscond, re-offend and interfere with the investigation. The applicant did not appeal against those decisions. 6. On 17 January 2012 the applicant's case was committed for trial and his detention was extended by the court every three months, finding that the grounds which justified his initial detention had remained valid. 7. In his appeals against the decisions of 12 April, 10 June and 10 July 2013 the applicant complained, inter alia, about the length of his detention which, in his view, was no longer justified. He argued that his detention pending trial had already exceeded the twelve-month time-limit set under Article 186 (8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the courts had not put forward any exceptional circumstance justifying such a long detention period, while the seriousness of charges could not by themselves constitute sufficient ground for his extended deprivation of liberty. 8. By decisions of 23 April, 20 June and 25 July 2013 the Chișinău Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals. 9. By a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of 17 September 2014 the applicant was found guilty on all charges and sentenced to twenty‑three years of imprisonment. 10. On 28 September 2011 the applicant was transferred to prison no. 13 in Chișinău where he was detained until 4 December 2014. 11. According to the applicant, he was detained in cells with poor lighting, damp walls, and accommodating six inmates in an area of 6 square metres. Due to overcrowding, the applicant had to share a bed with another inmate with whom he took turns to sleep. During his detention the applicant did not receive any bedding or clothing. Certain inmates were diagnosed with tuberculosis or HIV and had bleeding wounds. He was allowed to walk outside the cell only one hour per day. Without a functional ventilation system, in summer the air indoors was hot, humid and smelly which made it difficult to breathe. In cold weather the heating was not turned on and the temperature in the cells was extremely low. The squat toilet was not separated from the rest of the cell. The prison laundry was not operational and the applicant was unable to wash his clothes. 12. On 18 April 2014 the applicant's lawyer complained to the Prosecutor General's Office about the applicant's detention conditions in prison no. 13. By a letter of 15 May 2014 the Department of Penitentiary Institutions denied the complaints on overcrowding, TB infected inmates, insufficient food and medical assistance.",Ruled as violated by court,,"11. According to the applicant, he was detained in cells with poor lighting, damp walls, and accommodating six inmates in an area of 6 square metres. Due to overcrowding, the applicant had to share a bed with another inmate with whom he took turns to sleep. During his detention the applicant did not receive any bedding or clothing. Certain inmates were diagnosed with tuberculosis or HIV and had bleeding wounds. He was allowed to walk outside the cell only one hour per day. Without a functional ventilation system, in summer the air indoors was hot, humid and smelly which made it difficult to breathe. In cold weather the heating was not turned on and the temperature in the cells was extremely low. The squat toilet was not separated from the rest of the cell. The prison laundry was not operational and the applicant was unable to wash his clothes.",TRUE,2,"This is degrading treatment and other prisoners suffered tangible harms, but this applicant is not tangibly harmed. It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 111,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","5. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in St Petersburg. She is the mother of the late Mr Denis Aleksandrovich Vyrzhikovskiy. 6. On 1 October 2010 police officers apprehended the applicant's son and his friend, Ms Z. and took them to the Moskovskiy District Department of the Interior of St Petersburg (УВД по Московскому району г. Санкт‑Петербурга). No record of their arrest was drawn up. 7. For approximately six hours the applicant's son was ill-treated by police officers He was repeatedly punched in the stomach and hit to the head, right palm and both calves. He was also subjected to the so-called ""swallow"" method of torture (""ласточка""), with his head, hands and legs being pulled together towards the spine. 8. Two police officers then took the applicant's son and Ms Z. to another police station. Ms Z. later testified to having seen a bruise on Mr Vyrzhikovskiy's forehead and to his having been in pain and having had difficulties getting into a police car. 9. Early in the morning on 2 October 2010 Mr Vyrzhikovskiy was taken from the station to a hospital. He died there eight days later. An autopsy report stated that the cause of death was ""a severe fat pulmonary embolism aggravated by bronchopneumonia with cerebral edema resulted from a comminuted humeral head fracture with a tear of joint capsules and massive bruises, suffusion and strain of soft tissue and the subcutaneous fat layer."" A pathologist also found the following ante mortem injuries on Mr Vyrzhikovskiy's body, all directly linked to his death: massive bruises covering hands, chest, upper back, neck, armpits and most of his face and ears; bruises on the left hip, right palm, right part of the stomach, right thigh, left knee, both calves; abrasions and bruises on the buttocks. All injuries had been inflicted by hard blunt objects. 10. On 12 October 2010 criminal investigation was initiated. The applicant was granted victim status in the proceedings. Several police officers were charged with manslaughter and abuse of powers entailing a substantial violation of individual rights, committed using violence. 11. On 26 March 2014 the Moskovskiy District Court of St Petersburg found the officers guilty as charged and sentenced them to various terms of imprisonment. On 1 October 2014 the St Petersburg City Court partially quashed the judgment and acquitted officers of manslaughter for lack of evidence. While having found it established that the injuries had been inflicted on the applicant's son intentionally in the police custody, the City Court remitted the case for an additional investigation in order to identify those responsible for his death. 12. On 2 March 2015 the investigation was suspended because the time‑limit for the investigation had expired and it was impossible to identify the perpetrators and to carry out any investigative measures in the absence of an accused. On 12 November 2015 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of St Petersburg upheld that decision as lawful. The decision became final on 27 January 2016.",Ruled as violated by court,,"11. On 26 March 2014 the Moskovskiy District Court of St Petersburg found the officers guilty as charged and sentenced them to various terms of imprisonment. On 1 October 2014 the St Petersburg City Court partially quashed the judgment and acquitted officers of manslaughter for lack of evidence. While having found it established that the injuries had been inflicted on the applicant's son intentionally in the police custody, the City Court remitted the case for an additional investigation in order to identify those responsible for his death.",FALSE,0,The applicant's son was subject to a torture method., 112,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","5. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Opaci. 6. On 29 July 2009, the applicant was celebrating his birthday with a group of friends by a lake when they were attacked by S. who was intoxicated and carrying a hunting rifle. S. was angry because the applicant and his friends had allegedly ill-treated his uncle earlier. During the conflict, S. hit one of the applicant's friends with the barrel of his gun and fired four gunshots at the group's cars parked nearby. The applicant attempted to prevent S. from continuing shooting but was shot from a distance of some five metres into his right calf. The applicant's repeated attempts to disarm S. resulted in his receiving two more gunshots from a very short distance into his already wounded leg. 7. As a result of the attack the applicant sustained serious injuries to his right leg which led to amputation of his leg above the knee. 8. On 31 July 2009 criminal proceedings were instituted against S. on charges of hooliganism with the use of a firearm resulting in the causing of severe harm to the applicant's health. 9. Between 1 and 10 August 2009 twenty-five witnesses were questioned and by 12 September 2009 most of the investigative measures were completed. 10. On 12 August 2009 S. was declared a suspect in the criminal proceedings and on 29 December 2009 he was indicted. 11. On 12 January 2010 S. was heard as an accused. He acknowledged his guilt, but refused to make any declarations. 12. On 23 February 2010 the criminal case-file was remitted for examination from the Căușeni Police Station to the Anenii Noi Police Station. 13. Between March and December 2010 the Anenii Noi police conducted a new investigation into the circumstances of the case and carried out again all the investigative measures. 14. On 14 December 2010 the case-file was transmitted to the Anenii Noi prosecutor's office with the proposal to be remitted to a court for consideration. 15. On 20 December 2010 both the applicant and his representative were notified of the completion of the criminal investigation. 16. On 30 December 2010 the prosecutor's office decided to discontinue the criminal proceedings against S. The prosecutor's office found that according to Article 63(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a person's status as suspect cannot be maintained longer than three months. Since S. was indicted on 29 December 2009, that is four months and seventeen days later, the indictment was unlawful. Therefore, all charges against S. were dropped and the proceedings discontinued. 17. On 18 February 2011 at the request of the applicant's representative, the prosecutor general's office decided to annul its previous decision of 30 December 2010, and to resume the criminal investigation on the ground that new facts had been discovered. 18. On 31 March 2011 the Rascani District Court upheld S.'s objection against the prosecutor's decision of 18 February 2011, ordering its annulment. The applicant and his representative were not summoned or informed about the proceedings.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"The applicant suffered serious injuries during the shooting, arguably as a form of ""punishment"" for earlier alleged actions, but it's arguable whether this carries the requisite intent to count as ""torture."" It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 113,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","4. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Yekaterinburg. 5. On 13 May 2009 he was arrested on suspicion of armed robbery. On the following day the Verkh-Isetskiy District Court in Yekaterinburg remanded him in custody and set the time-limit until 12 July 2009. 6. On 13 July 2009 the District Court granted a two-month extension of the detention period. However, on 31 July 2009 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court quashed the extension order as it had been issued outside the authorised detention period, and ordered the applicant's release. 7. The applicant was not released. He was not allowed to leave the police ward and was re-arrested on the charge of theft. The arrest record mentioned the charge, without specifying when or where the theft had been committed or why the applicant was suspected of it. 8. On 2 August 2009 the District Court adjourned the detention hearing for seventy-two hours, at the request from the applicant's counsel. On 4 August 2009 the District Court issued a detention order which did not set a time-limit for the applicant's detention or give any assessment to the existence of a ""reasonable suspicion"" against the applicant. On 2 September 2009 the Regional Court upheld the detention order on appeal. 9. Further extensions of the applicant's detention were granted by the Leninskiy District Court on 29 September, 20 October and 2 November 2009. The last extension order was issued in the absence of the parties. On 25 November 2009 the Regional Court found that extension order unlawful and set it aside, but extended the applicant's detention for a future period. 10. On 23 December 2009 the Bogdanovichi Town Court in the Sverdlovsk Region opened the trial and extended the applicant's detention. The applicant's appeal against the extension order was rejected by the Regional Court on 11 June 2010. 11. On 2 March and 22 April 2010 the Town Court extended the applicant's detention. Each time the court referred to the gravity of the charges and the applicant's criminal record. The appeals against the orders were rejected on 30 June and 11 June, respectively. 12. Throughout the trial the applicant was held in a metal cage. 13. On 13 May 2010 the applicant was found guilty of theft and armed robbery and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. On 18 August 2010 the Regional Court upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence to three years' imprisonment. 14. On 24 June 2010 the applicant's mother died. His request to be allowed to attend the funeral was rejected by the governor of the IZ-66/1 remand prison and upheld by the courts on the ground that remand prisoners did not have the benefit of a leave of absence under Russian law. When his father died on 5 November 2010, the director of the correctional colony in Sosnovoborsk in the Krasnoyarsk Region also refused his request for a short-term absence, on account of the funeral being held outside of the region where the colony was located. 15. The Sosnovoborsk colony was located some 2,400 kilometres away from Yekaterinburg where the applicant's family lived.",Ruled as violated by court,,"9. Further extensions of the applicant's detention were granted by the Leninskiy District Court on 29 September, 20 October and 2 November 2009. The last extension order was issued in the absence of the parties. On 25 November 2009 the Regional Court found that extension order unlawful and set it aside, but extended the applicant's detention for a future period. 10. On 23 December 2009 the Bogdanovichi Town Court in the Sverdlovsk Region opened the trial and extended the applicant's detention. The applicant's appeal against the extension order was rejected by the Regional Court on 11 June 2010. 11. On 2 March and 22 April 2010 the Town Court extended the applicant's detention. Each time the court referred to the gravity of the charges and the applicant's criminal record. The appeals against the orders were rejected on 30 June and 11 June, respectively. 15. The Sosnovoborsk colony was located some 2,400 kilometres away from Yekaterinburg where the applicant's family lived.",TRUE,2,"This is degrading treatment, but the applicant is not tangibly harmed. It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 114,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","4. The applicant was born in 1968 and has been serving a prison sentence in Lukiškės Remand Prison since 16 January 2002. 5. On 16 May 2014 the applicant lodged a civil claim against the State, alleging that he was being detained in overcrowded and unsanitary cells. He also complained that toilets were not properly partitioned from the rest of the cells and thus the prison staff could see him use the toilet. He submitted that his health had deteriorated as a result of the inappropriate conditions of his detention and claimed 450,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 130,300 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 6. On 19 January 2015 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant's claim in part. It firstly held that the time-limit for claiming damages was three years after the damage arose, and accordingly dismissed the part of the applicant's claim concerning the period before 16 May 2011 as time-barred. On the basis of documents provided by the prison administration, the court found that from 16 May 2011 to 15 May 2014 the applicant had spent 1,082 days in Lukiškės Remand Prison. During that period, for thirteen days and one afternoon he had had 3.24 sq. m of personal space and on one afternoon he had had 2.65 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.6 sq. m. For the remaining time the personal space available to him was found to be in compliance with the requirement of 3.6 sq. m. 7. The court also quoted the report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (""the CPT"") on its visit to Lithuania in 2012. According to that report, nearly all the inmates in Lukiškės Remand Prison were confined to their cells for twenty-three hours per day, with no out-of-cell activities other than outdoor exercise lasting one hour in small and dilapidated yards (see paragraph 13 below). The court noted that the prison administration had not provided any evidence that the situation in the prison had changed. 8. Furthermore, the court ruled that toilets had not been partitioned from the rest of the cells in the manner required by relevant domestic regulations. It stated that, in accordance with accepted social norms, inability to use the toilet in private was degrading and humiliating to the individual. 9. The court considered that the applicant had not proved that his health had deteriorated as a result of the conditions of his detention. It awarded the applicant EUR 80 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, taking into account the ""scope, intensity and duration"" of the violation of his rights and the economic conditions in the country. 10. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision, arguing that the first-instance court had erred by dismissing part of his claim as time-barred, that the conditions in Lukiškės Remand Prison had not improved and that his health had deteriorated because of them. On 10 November 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's appeal and upheld the first-instance court's decision in its entirety.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. On 19 January 2015 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant's claim in part. It firstly held that the time-limit for claiming damages was three years after the damage arose, and accordingly dismissed the part of the applicant's claim concerning the period before 16 May 2011 as time-barred. On the basis of documents provided by the prison administration, the court found that from 16 May 2011 to 15 May 2014 the applicant had spent 1,082 days in Lukiškės Remand Prison. During that period, for thirteen days and one afternoon he had had 3.24 sq. m of personal space and on one afternoon he had had 2.65 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.6 sq. m. For the remaining time the personal space available to him was found to be in compliance with the requirement of 3.6 sq. m. 8. Furthermore, the court ruled that toilets had not been partitioned from the rest of the cells in the manner required by relevant domestic regulations. It stated that, in accordance with accepted social norms, inability to use the toilet in private was degrading and humiliating to the individual. 9. The court considered that the applicant had not proved that his health had deteriorated as a result of the conditions of his detention. It awarded the applicant EUR 80 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, taking into account the ""scope, intensity and duration"" of the violation of his rights and the economic conditions in the country. 10. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision, arguing that the first-instance court had erred by dismissing part of his claim as time-barred, that the conditions in Lukiškės Remand Prison had not improved and that his health had deteriorated because of them. On 10 November 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's appeal and upheld the first-instance court's decision in its entirety.",TRUE,2,"This is degrading treatment, but the applicant is not tangibly harmed, as the court concludes. It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 115,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","5. The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Nicoreni. 6. In January 2012 the applicant had an agreement with a person (""X"") according to which he promised to help him apply for a Spanish visa at the Spanish consulate in Moscow. They were to travel to Moscow by train, however, X did not show up at the train station at the time of leaving and the applicant left for Moscow alone with the money he had previously obtained from X in the amount of 520 euros. He did not return to Moldova until October 2015. 7. In the meantime X lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant accusing him of fraud. Criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant in March 2012 on the basis of that complaint. 8. Since the prosecutor in charge of the case could not locate the applicant, he applied to an investigating judge for a detention warrant in respect of the applicant for a period of thirty days. The prosecutor argued in support of the remand that the applicant had been hiding from the investigating authorities. 9. On 8 February 2013 the Râșcani District Court ordered the applicant's remand in custody for a period of thirty days. In support of its decision, the court argued that the applicant had been absconding from the investigating authorities and that he could hinder the investigation and influence witnesses. 10. On 9 October 2015 the applicant returned to Moldova from the Russian Federation. At the border he was informed that he was being wanted by the police and that he had to present himself at the Râșcani Police Station. The applicant telephoned the police station and agreed to come on 13 October 2015. 11. On 13 October 2015 the applicant went to the Râșcani Police Station where he was immediately arrested and placed in detention. 12. On 15 October 2015 the applicant appealed against the order of 8 February 2013. He argued, inter alia, that he had not been aware of the criminal investigation against himself and that he had learned about it upon his return to Moldova. Moreover, after learning about the investigation he had immediately contacted the Police Station and presented himself there. He also submitted that there were no reasons to believe that he would abscond or interfere with the investigation. 13. On 2 November 2015 the Chișinău Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal. It did not give an answer to the applicant's argument that he had not been aware of the criminal investigation against him. 14. The applicant's detention was prolonged on several other occasions until 16 March 2016 on identical grounds and all his appeals were dismissed. 15. In the meantime the applicant was detained in Prison no. 13. According to him, he was detained in an overcrowded cell; the cell was equipped with a squat toilet which was not properly separated; the food was insufficient and of poor quality; he could have only one hour of outside exercise per day and only one shower per week. 16. By a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of 12 July 2017 the applicant was convicted of fraud and given a suspended sentence of four years imprisonment.",Ruled as violated by court,,"15. In the meantime the applicant was detained in Prison no. 13. According to him, he was detained in an overcrowded cell; the cell was equipped with a squat toilet which was not properly separated; the food was insufficient and of poor quality; he could have only one hour of outside exercise per day and only one shower per week.",TRUE,2,"This is degrading treatment, but the applicant is not tangibly harmed. It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 116,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","7. The applicant was born in 1980. He arrived in Russia in 2003. He travelled to Tajikistan on a number of occasions to visit his parents for short periods of time. 8. On 3 May 2011 the applicant was charged in absentia in Tajikistan with participating in an extremist religious movement, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and an international search and arrest warrant was issued in his name. On 6 May 2011 the Tajik authorities ordered his pre-trial detention. 9. On 3 November 2013 the applicant was arrested in Moscow and detained. On 4 November 2013 the Meshchanskiy District Court of Moscow (""the District Court"") ordered his detention pending extradition. 10. On 4 December 2013 the Tajik prosecution authorities requested the applicant's extradition on the basis of the above charges. The request included assurances regarding his proper treatment, which were formulated in standard terms. 11. On 12 December 2013 the District Court extended the applicant's detention until 3 May 2014. 12. An appeal by the applicant of 16 December 2013 was dismissed by the Moscow City Court (""the City Court"") on 3 February 2014. 13. On 29 April 2014 the District Court again extended the applicant's detention until 3 August 2014. 14. An appeal by the applicant of 5 May 2014 was dismissed by the City Court on 23 July 2014. 15. On 9 October 2014 the applicant's extradition was refused by the Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, owing to the absence of culpable actions under Russian criminal law. 16. On 13 October 2014 the applicant was released from detention. 17. On 13 October 2014, immediately after his release, the applicant was rearrested for violating migration regulations. 18. On 14 October 2014 the District Court found the applicant guilty of violating migration regulations, fined him and ordered his administrative removal. Allegations by the applicant regarding a real risk of ill-treatment were dismissed, and he was detained pending expulsion. The District Court assessing the risks stated that ""[t]he claims of the representative ... are of a speculative nature and not confirmed by the case materials"" 19. The above judgment was upheld on appeal by the City Court on 24 October 2014. Claims by the applicant under Article 3 of the Convention were dismissed with reference to the District Court's assessment of the case, which took into consideration ""...the nature of the administrative offence, the character of the accused [who was criminally convicted in Russia]... the length of his stay in Russia and other circumstances of the case"". 20. According to the latest submissions of his representative in 2015, the applicant was still in detention. 21. On 18 December 2013 the applicant lodged a request for refugee status, referring to persecution in Tajikistan and a real risk of ill-treatment. 22. On 15 September 2014 his request was refused by a final administrative decision of the migration authorities. The applicant challenged that decision in the courts, referring, inter alia, to the risk of ill‑treatment. 23. On 12 November 2015 his appeals were dismissed by a final decision of the City Court.",Ruled as violated by court,"9. On 3 November 2013 the applicant was arrested in Moscow and detained. On 4 November 2013 the Meshchanskiy District Court of Moscow (""the District Court"") ordered his detention pending extradition. 11. On 12 December 2013 the District Court extended the applicant's detention until 3 May 2014. 13. On 29 April 2014 the District Court again extended the applicant's detention until 3 August 2014. 17. On 13 October 2014, immediately after his release, the applicant was rearrested for violating migration regulations. 18. On 14 October 2014 the District Court found the applicant guilty of violating migration regulations, fined him and ordered his administrative removal. Allegations by the applicant regarding a real risk of ill-treatment were dismissed, and he was detained pending expulsion. The District Court assessing the risks stated that ""[t]he claims of the representative ... are of a speculative nature and not confirmed by the case materials"" 19. The above judgment was upheld on appeal by the City Court on 24 October 2014. Claims by the applicant under Article 3 of the Convention were dismissed with reference to the District Court's assessment of the case, which took into consideration ""...the nature of the administrative offence, the character of the accused [who was criminally convicted in Russia]... the length of his stay in Russia and other circumstances of the case"". 20. According to the latest submissions of his representative in 2015, the applicant was still in detention.",,TRUE,2,"This is degrading treatment, but the applicant is not tangibly harmed. It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 117,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","5. The applicant was born in 1979 and is detained in Strzelce Opolskie Prison. 6. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 7. The applicant was detained in Mysłowice Remand Centre from 20 April 2010 to 12 January 2011 and in Wojkowice Prison from 12 January 2011 to 9 March 2012 (1 year, 10 months and 20 days). 8. The parties' statements relating to the conditions of the applicant's detention from 20 April 2010 to 9 March 2012 are to a large extent contradictory. 9. The applicant submitted that throughout his detention in Mysłowice Remand Centre and Wojkowice Prison, he had been held in overcrowded cells in which the space per person had been below the Polish statutory minimum standard of 3 m². 10. In their observations, the Government submitted that the applicant had been detained in overcrowded cells only on 20 April, 18 and 19 May 2009. 11. In the course of civil proceedings instituted by the applicant (see paragraphs 14-16 below), the domestic courts established, without giving any further details, that the applicant had been detained in overcrowded cells from 20 April 2010 to 9 March 2012 (1 year, 10 months and 20 days). 12. Regarding the conditions of detention in Mysłowice Remand Centre, the domestic court established that the overall conditions in cells were adequate. The applicant had one hot shower per week and one hour of outdoor exercise per day. 13. Regarding the conditions of detention in Wojkowice Prison, as established by the domestic courts, the toilets were separated from the cell's living area, every prisoner had his own bed, a stool and access to cold running water. The prisoners had basic hygiene products at their disposal. The ceiling was infested with humidity. The applicant had one hot shower per week and one hour of outdoor exercise per day. 14. On 24 February 2012 the applicant brought a civil action for the infringement of his personal rights on account of inadequate living conditions in Wojkowice Prison from November 2005 to July 2006 and from January to March 2007, in Mysłowice Remand Centre from 20 April 2010 to 12 January 2011 and, subsequently, again in Wojkowice Prison from 12 January 2011 to 9 March 2012. The applicant argued that he had been detained in overcrowded cells, where the space per person had been below the statutory minimum of 3 m². He claimed 80,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approximately 20,000 euros (EUR)) in compensation. 15. On 18 December 2012 the Katowice Regional Court dismissed the applicant's action, finding that from 20 April 2010 to 9 March 2012 the applicant had been detained in cells above the minimum statutory standard. As regards the remainder of the period, the claim was time-barred as lodged outside the three-year period of statutory limitation. 16. On 27 June 2013 the Katowice Court of Appeal overruled the lower court's judgment and allowed the applicant's action, finding that from 20 April 2010 to 9 March 2012 he had been detained in overcrowded cells. The court relied in this respect on the applicant's submissions, holding that the State Treasury had in fact acknowledged these by its multiple refusals to provide the first and the second instance courts with an official register of cells in which the applicant had been detained. It also granted the applicant PLN 1,000 (EUR 250) in compensation, holding that the breach of the statutory minimum standard had not been significant.",Ruled as violated by court,,"16. On 27 June 2013 the Katowice Court of Appeal overruled the lower court's judgment and allowed the applicant's action, finding that from 20 April 2010 to 9 March 2012 he had been detained in overcrowded cells. The court relied in this respect on the applicant's submissions, holding that the State Treasury had in fact acknowledged these by its multiple refusals to provide the first and the second instance courts with an official register of cells in which the applicant had been detained. It also granted the applicant PLN 1,000 (EUR 250) in compensation, holding that the breach of the statutory minimum standard had not been significant.",TRUE,2,"This is degrading treatment, but the applicant is not tangibly harmed. It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 118,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","4. The applicant was born in 1978 and is serving a prison sentence in Khabarovsk. 5. On 30 July 2004 the Samara Regional Court sentenced the applicant to life imprisonment. On 20 July 2007 the applicant was placed in Correctional Colony No. IK-56. 6. The Government submitted the following information as regards the personal space afforded to the applicant during his detention in the colony: Cell No. Period of detention Cell measurements (sq. m) Number of inmates 7 From 20 July to 2 August 2007 18 2 No information available. The relevant documents have been destroyed. 10 From 29 October to 26 November 2014 18 2 6 From 26 November 2014 to 2 April 2015 18 2 010 From 2 April 13 December 2015 4 1 6 From 13 to 23 December 2015 18 2 010 From 23 December 2015 to 9 August 2016 4 1 10 From 9 August to 7 September 2016 18 2 010 From 7 September to 26 December 2016 4 1 7 From 26 to 27 December 2016 18 2 10 From 27 December 2016 to 21 July 2017 18 2 3 From 21 July to 3 March 2017 18 2 6 From 3 March 2017 to date 18 2 7. The Government further submitted that from 21 October to 11 November 2009, from 14 to 18 December 2013, and from 5 October to 26 December 2016 the applicant had been detained in Correctional Colony No. IK-55. 8. According to the applicant, the inmates are housed in double or single cells. The double cells measure approximately 18 m² and the single ones approximately 4 m². Since 2007 the applicant has been assigned to different cells, his conditions of detention remaining unchanged. 9. There is no water supply or sewage system on the colony premises. The inmates are given buckets, to compensate for the lack of a toilet, which they have to empty every morning in a cesspool located some two metres away from the recreation area. Each day the inmates receive 10 litres of river water for their personal needs. They are allowed to take a shower once a week. 10. The windows in the cells are covered with three layers of metal bars or screens. The cells are not ventilated. The lighting is dim and inadequate. 11. The food is not fresh, lacks variety and is of poor quality. The milk is often sour, and the fruit juices are diluted with water. 12. The applicant has been housed in single cell no. 10 since 2010. The temperature in the cell does not exceed +120C during the winter. It is damp and stuffy during the summer. He is confined to his cell 22 hours a day and is entitled to one and a half hours' outdoor exercise per day. 13. The recreation area is divided into exercise yards measuring 7 m². The yards are covered with metal bars and screens. There is no exercise equipment. 14. From July 2007 to December 2016 the applicant was not allowed to grow a beard or to have his hair longer than 0.5 cm. His hair was completely shaved off 2 to 4 times a month, and he had to shave his face 2 to 3 times a week. 15. On an unspecified date the applicant complained to the prosecutor about the compulsory shaving. 16. On 13 December 2013 the prosecutor replied that the compulsory shaving of the head and beard to which the applicant had been subjected had been unlawful, and that the prosecutor's office had informed the administration of the correctional colony where the applicant was serving his prison sentence. The prosecutor also informed the applicant of his right to appeal either to a higher-ranking prosecutor or a court. It appears that the applicant took no further action.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"This is degrading treatment, but the applicant is not tangibly harmed. It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 119,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 5. The applicant was born in 1986 in the Georgian SSR of the USSR. In 1996, when he was ten years old, his parents divorced and he moved with his mother to Kaluga in Russia. In 2003, the applicant graduated from high school in Kaluga and began studies at the Finance and Economics Institute. 6. On 4 May and 17 October 2005 the applicant was convicted of various offences and given a custodial sentence. Upon his release on 29 February 2008, he returned to Kaluga. 7. On 12 January 2012 the police stopped the applicant in the courtyard of his house and charged him with illegal residence in Russia. 8. On the following day the Kaluzhskiy District Court in the Kaluga Region found the applicant guilty of the administrative offence under Article 18.8 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (failure to leave Russia upon the expiry of the authorised period of stay and illegal residence) and sentenced him to a fine of 2,500 Russian roubles (62 euros) and administrative removal from the Russian Federation. Pending removal, the District Court held that the applicant should be held in the detention centre. On 24 January 2012 the Kaluga Regional Court upheld the District Court's decision on appeal. 9. The applicant asked the District Court to postpone the enforcement of the removal order, emphasising that it was currently unenforceable because he had no identity documents and because he was not a Georgian national and could not be sent to Georgia. On 12 April 2012 the District Court refused the applicant's request in a summary fashion. 10. The applicant was held in the administrative detention centre operated by the Kaluga regional police. He shared Cell 13 measuring 8.7 square metres with five Uzbek nationals awaiting deportation. The cell had only one window, 90 centimetres by 120 centimetres, protected with three layers of thick netting and fitted with a matte glass. Two light bulbs, 40 Watts each, lit the cell. The cell was not ventilated. 11. The toilet bowl sunk into the floor was located 40 centimetres from the nearest bed. It was cleaned with cold water without detergent. Prisoners were given three litres of water per day, it was not allowed to boil it. Once a week prisoners were taken to the shower room. There was not enough hot water for all of them and they took turns skipping the shower. 12. There was no calendar or clock in the cell. Nor was there a radio, television, books or newspapers. Board games were forbidden. The applicant did not speak the Uzbek language and could not communicate with his cellmates. 13. Prisoners were taken outdoors in groups of thirty. The yard was small, six by four metres, so they huddled together. It had no sports equipment or awning for bad weather. 14. The applicant's complaints to a prosecutor were rejected as unfounded. In January and March 2012 two members of the Kaluga public monitoring commission visited the facility. Their report corroborated the applicant's description of his conditions of detention. 15. In May 2012 the applicant developed pulmonary tuberculosis. He was transferred for treatment to a civilian hospital in Kaluga. Upon his discharge, he took advantage of the absence of police escort and absconded. A search operation was launched; the applicant was located on 30 January 2013 and returned to the detention centre. 16. On 31 January 2013 the applicant was placed on board of a Tbilisi-bound flight and left Russia.",Ruled as violated by court,,"10. The applicant was held in the administrative detention centre operated by the Kaluga regional police. He shared Cell 13 measuring 8.7 square metres with five Uzbek nationals awaiting deportation. The cell had only one window, 90 centimetres by 120 centimetres, protected with three layers of thick netting and fitted with a matte glass. Two light bulbs, 40 Watts each, lit the cell. The cell was not ventilated.",TRUE,1,"While it somewhat depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment,"" this is degrading treatment leading to tangible harm to the applicant.", 120,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 5. The applicant was born in Baku, Azerbaijan, in 1992 and came to Russia in 2003, together with his mother and grandmother. He graduated from a secondary school and a vocational training college in St Petersburg. He has no identity documents. 6. On 7 February 2014 the Kirovskiy District Court in St Petersburg found the applicant guilty of illegally residing in Russia, which was an offence Article 18.8 § 3 of the Code of Administrative Offences, imposed a fine on him and ordered his administrative removal from Russia. The judgment described him as a ""native"" (уроженец) and a national of Azerbaijan. Pending his removal, the applicant was to be detained in the special facility for the detention of aliens (СУВСИГ УФМС по СПб и ЛО) located in Krasnoye Selo in the Leningrad Region. 7. On 12 February 2014 the Federal Migration Service requested the Consulate General of Azerbaijan in St Petersburg to submit information about the applicant's nationality. Replying to that inquiry, on 14 April 2014 the Consulate confirmed that the applicant was not a national of that State. 8. On 19 May 2014 a bailiff asked the District Court in St Petersburg to discontinue the enforcement proceedings because the applicant could not be issued with travel documents or removed from Russia. 9. By a judgment of 17 July 2014, as upheld on appeal on 30 October 2014, the St Petersburg courts refused to discontinue the proceedings, finding that the bailiff had not shown that she had taken sufficient measures to secure the applicant's removal. 10. On 7 August 2014 counsel for the applicant asked the St Petersburg City Court to review the Kirovskiy District Court's judgment by way of supervisory review, to annul the sanction of administrative removal and to release the applicant. Counsel pleaded in particular that the applicant's removal was not a realistic prospect and that his continued detention could only be justified if deportation proceedings were genuinely in progress. On 25 November 2014 a deputy president of the City Court acceded to her request. Noting that the applicant was not an Azerbaijani national, the judge found that his removal was not feasible and that his detention was likely to become indefinite. He amended the judgment, replacing the removal with the requirement to leave Russia voluntarily under control. 11. On 27 November 2014 the applicant was released. 12. The applicant described his conditions of detention as follows. From 7 to 20 February 2014 he shared Cell 307 measuring 17 square metres with ten other detainees. It was not furnished, inmates unrolled mattresses for the night. From 20 February to 5 May 2014 he was held in a smaller, seven‑square-metre cell (Cell 310), together with five or six persons. Two-tier bunk beds were brought in only in late April 2014. From 5 May to 27 November 2014 he was in Cell 309 measuring seventeen square metres. Initially it had accommodated twelve persons but their number rose to seventeen in November when they started renovating the cells on the seventh and eighth floors of the facility. Detainees had to remain within the floor on which their cell was located; they could not go outside or to other floors. Outdoor exercise was limited to a fifteen-minute walk once a week because there was not enough staff to supervise the detainees. The facility did not have a library, board games, radio or workshop, or offer any other meaningful activities.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. On 7 February 2014 the Kirovskiy District Court in St Petersburg found the applicant guilty of illegally residing in Russia, which was an offence Article 18.8 § 3 of the Code of Administrative Offences, imposed a fine on him and ordered his administrative removal from Russia. The judgment described him as a ""native"" (уроженец) and a national of Azerbaijan. Pending his removal, the applicant was to be detained in the special facility for the detention of aliens (СУВСИГ УФМС по СПб и ЛО) located in Krasnoye Selo in the Leningrad Region. 7. On 12 February 2014 the Federal Migration Service requested the Consulate General of Azerbaijan in St Petersburg to submit information about the applicant's nationality. Replying to that inquiry, on 14 April 2014 the Consulate confirmed that the applicant was not a national of that State.",TRUE,2,"This is degrading treatment, but the applicant is not tangibly harmed. It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 121,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","4. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Orsk. 5. On 28 May 2005 the applicant, who was walking home after an evening drinking, was stopped on the street by police officers from the patrol and inspection service and driven to the Sovetskiy district police station of Orsk (Советское РОВД г. Орска). He attempted to run away, but was stopped and assaulted by the police officers, who kicked him in the stomach. He felt unwell and lost consciousness. The police officers placed him in a cell and did not react when he demanded that they call an ambulance. 6. The applicant was released the next morning. On the evening of 29 May 2005 he was admitted to hospital with internal bleeding. He spent six weeks in hospital. 7. According to forensic medical expert report no. 3634 of 25 July 2005, the applicant had blunt abdominal trauma with a ruptured intestine, which had provoked the development of serofibrinous peritonitis. This injury had been caused by impact with a hard, blunt object, possibly one to two days before the applicant's hospitalisation, and had caused him ""serious health damage"". The applicant also had abrasions on his back and forearms, and circular abrasions on his wrist joints, which had originated from impact with hard, blunt objects during the same period, and had not caused him any ""health damage"". 8. Forensic medical expert report no. 5684 of 14 December 2011 contained similar information concerning the applicant's injuries. The expert considered that the injuries had been caused several hours to several days before the applicant's hospitalisation. The expert excluded the possibility that they had been caused as a result of him falling over. 9. On 29 May 2005 the Orsk police received information about the applicant's hospitalisation in Town Hospital no. 2 with blunt abdominal trauma and abrasions on his body. 10. On 14 June 2005 an investigator from the Orsk Sovetskiy district prosecutor's office opened a criminal case under Article 111 § 3 of the Criminal Code (physical assault causing ""serious health damage""). 11. On 11 July 2005 the applicant was granted victim status and questioned. 12. On 14 October 2005 the preliminary investigation into the criminal case was suspended under Article 208 § 1 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, owing to the inability to identify the individuals to be charged. 13. On 31 January and 25 April 2012 the preliminary investigation into the criminal case was restarted, in view of the need to take additional investigative measures. 14. On 1 March and 18 July 2012 the preliminary investigation into the criminal case was suspended again, on the same grounds as before. 15. In 2012 the applicant brought a civil claim against various State authorities, including the Russian Ministry of Finance, seeking 6,000,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in compensation for his ill‑treatment at the police station and the lack of an effective investigation into his complaint. 16. On 24 July 2012 the Leninskiy District Court of Orsk allowed the applicant's claim in part and awarded him RUB 150,000 (the equivalent of about 3,800 euros) in compensation. It established that the applicant had been taken into police custody in good health and that his injuries had been caused at the police station, since the State authorities had failed to provide a plausible explanation for the injuries or any evidence showing that he could have sustained them elsewhere. 17. On 9 October 2012 the Orenburg Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"The applicant suffered serious injuries at the hands of the police, but it's arguable whether this carries the requisite intent to count as ""torture."" It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 122,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","5. The applicants, who are police officers, were born in 1967, 1978, 1976, 1979 and 1964 respectively. The first and second applicants live in Chișinău and Caușeni and the remaining applicants live in Bender. 6. On 14 June 2006 officers Mangîr, Vasiliev and Condrea, who were conducting a criminal investigation in Tiraspol, were arrested by the secret service of the self-proclaimed ""Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria"" (""MRT"")[1]. During their arrest they managed to call the Bender police station. 7. The other two applicants (officers Daţco and Pohila) went to Tiraspol to clarify the reasons for the arrest of their colleagues, but were also arrested upon their arrival. 8. The applicants were placed in the Tiraspol Remand Centre (IVS Tiraspol). 9. On 17 June 2006 officers Pohila, Daţco and Vasiliev were released without charge and without any explanation for their arrest. 10. On 18 June 2006 officer Mangîr was allegedly beaten up and injected with an unknown substance, which rendered him unconscious for four days. After his release he was admitted for in-patient treatment in the hospital of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, where he was diagnosedwith, inter alia, concussion. 11. On 20 June 2006 the Tiraspol City Court issued a warrant for officer Mangîr to be detained for thirty days. On 23 June 2006 the ""MRT"" authorities released officers Mangîr and Condrea. The head of the ""MRT"" secret service declared in an interview that the officers had been released after Russian authorities had ""given assurances"" that Moldovan authorities would not ""kidnap people"" in the ""MRT"". 12. The applicants were accused in the ""MRT"" media of being members of ""black squadrons"" created for the purpose of kidnapping politicians and other persons causing nuisance to the Moldovan authorities. According to the applicants, during their detention they were questioned by the ""MRT"" secret service and forced to declare that in Tiraspol they had been trying to kidnap ""MRT"" politicians. Officers Pohila, Daţco and Vasiliev were allegedly beaten on the soles of their feet and threatened with the killing of members of their families, as well as with being transferred to cells occupied by common criminals, where they would be ill-treated or even killed. 13. Officer Condrea was allegedly subjected to so-called ""Palestinian hanging"" for up to seven hours and was taken to his cell unconscious thereafter. 14. The applicants described as follows their conditions of detention at the Tiraspol Remand Centre. The cells in which they had been held had been in the basement and had not had access to natural light. In the absence of ventilation and because of overcrowding it had been difficult to breathe. Officer Condrea submits that he was detained in the same cell as that in which Mr Ilie Ilaşcu had been detained (for more details see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, ECHR 2004‑VII). 15. During their detention the applicants did not have any daily exercise and were not given access to a shower; they could not receive parcels containing food from their relatives, they did not have bed linen and they were not allowed to be seen by doctors. 16. After the applicants' release the Moldovan authorities initiated two sets of criminal proceedings concerning their unlawful detention and their alleged ill-treatment while in detention. However, several years later the investigation was discontinued. 17. The applicants were also subjected to medical check-ups, which found no traces of violence on their bodies. Only one applicant, Stefan Mangîr, was found to be suffering from the consequences of concussion.",Ruled as violated by court,,"16. After the applicants' release the Moldovan authorities initiated two sets of criminal proceedings concerning their unlawful detention and their alleged ill-treatment while in detention. However, several years later the investigation was discontinued.",FALSE,0,"The applicants were tangibly harmed in service of political aims, which is definitionally torture.", 123,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","5. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Râbniţa. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 28 July 1999, the applicant was arrested in Râbniţa by virtue of a decision of a prosecutor from the self-proclaimed ""Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria"" (the ""MRT""; for further details about the ""MRT"", see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, §§ 28-185, ECHR 2004‑VII, and Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], nos. 43370/04 and 2 others, §§ 8-42, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). He was charged with fraud and incitement to bribery. 8. On 17 May 2000, the Camenca District Court, which was under the jurisdiction of the ""MRT"", convicted the applicant and sentenced him to five years' imprisonment. According to the applicant, he appealed, but his appeal was rejected by the ""MRT"" Supreme Court on an unspecified date. 9. The applicant initially served his sentence in Tiraspol Prison no. 2. On 25 October 2001, he was transferred to Pruncul Prison Hospital, which was under the control of the Moldovan authorities. On 30 October 2001, he signed a form of authority authorising the Chişinău-based non-governmental organisation Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) to represent him before this Court. That form of authority, together with the application form, reached the Court on 19 November 2001. 10. On 20 November 2001, a lawyer from LHR informed the Moldovan Prosecutor General's Office that the applicant and seven other people were being held in Pruncul Prison Hospital on the basis that they had been convicted by ""MRT"" courts. He asked for their immediate release, in view of the fact that they had been convicted by unlawful courts. He also submitted that some of those eight detainees had already lodged applications with the Court, and that a failure to immediately release them or any attempt to transfer them back to the ""MRT"" authorities would result in the Republic of Moldova incurring responsibility. A similar letter was sent on the same day to the Minister of Justice. 11. On 21 November 2001, members of LHR organised a press conference, during which they informed the media of the circumstances of the case and of the letter sent to the Prosecutor General's Office on the previous day. 12. Also on 21 November 2001, all eight detainees, including the applicant, were allegedly transferred back to ""MRT"" prisons. 13. On 23 November 2001, LHR informed the media of the detainees' transfer back to the ""MRT"" authorities on 21 November 2001. 14. On 26 November 2001, the Head of the Penal Institutions Department of the Ministry of Justice informed LHR that the detainees mentioned in their request of 20 November 2001 were not being held at Pruncul Prison Hospital. 15. On 7 December 2001, the lawyer from LHR wrote to the ""MRT"" Ministry of Justice, asking for permission to see the applicant and stating that he was planning to lodge in the applicant's name an application before the Court. He never received a reply to that letter. 16. On 22 January 2002, the applicant was released from prison on the basis of an amnesty act. 17. The applicant described the conditions of his detention in the ""MRT"" in the following manner. He was allegedly detained in a cell with several people suffering from tuberculosis, and risked contracting that disease himself. During his detention in Tiraspol Prison no. 2, approximately 100 detainees there died of tuberculosis. He was also affected by parasitic insects. The applicant is a person with a category 3 disability, but he was not given any medication during his detention. Food was served only once a day and was of very poor quality.",Ruled as violated by court,,"9. The applicant initially served his sentence in Tiraspol Prison no. 2. On 25 October 2001, he was transferred to Pruncul Prison Hospital, which was under the control of the Moldovan authorities. On 30 October 2001, he signed a form of authority authorising the Chişinău-based non-governmental organisation Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) to represent him before this Court. That form of authority, together with the application form, reached the Court on 19 November 2001. 10. On 20 November 2001, a lawyer from LHR informed the Moldovan Prosecutor General's Office that the applicant and seven other people were being held in Pruncul Prison Hospital on the basis that they had been convicted by ""MRT"" courts. He asked for their immediate release, in view of the fact that they had been convicted by unlawful courts. He also submitted that some of those eight detainees had already lodged applications with the Court, and that a failure to immediately release them or any attempt to transfer them back to the ""MRT"" authorities would result in the Republic of Moldova incurring responsibility. A similar letter was sent on the same day to the Minister of Justice. 12. Also on 21 November 2001, all eight detainees, including the applicant, were allegedly transferred back to ""MRT"" prisons. 14. On 26 November 2001, the Head of the Penal Institutions Department of the Ministry of Justice informed LHR that the detainees mentioned in their request of 20 November 2001 were not being held at Pruncul Prison Hospital. 15. On 7 December 2001, the lawyer from LHR wrote to the ""MRT"" Ministry of Justice, asking for permission to see the applicant and stating that he was planning to lodge in the applicant's name an application before the Court. He never received a reply to that letter. 16. On 22 January 2002, the applicant was released from prison on the basis of an amnesty act. 17. The applicant described the conditions of his detention in the ""MRT"" in the following manner. He was allegedly detained in a cell with several people suffering from tuberculosis, and risked contracting that disease himself. During his detention in Tiraspol Prison no. 2, approximately 100 detainees there died of tuberculosis. He was also affected by parasitic insects. The applicant is a person with a category 3 disability, but he was not given any medication during his detention. Food was served only once a day and was of very poor quality.",TRUE,1,"While it somewhat depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment,"" this is degrading treatment leading to tangible harm to the applicant.", 124,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","4. The applicants were born in 1965 and 1954 respectively and live in Bucharest. 5. Both applicants were ill-treated and injured on 21 December 1989 during the events which led to the fall of the communist regime in Bucharest. The first applicant suffered injuries that needed eight days of medical care and the second applicant was beaten by militia forces on the same occasion. 6. In 1990 the military prosecutor's office opened ex officio investigations into the illegal detention, ill-treatment and injury suffered by the applicants and other participants in the events of December 1989 in respect of several offences as mentioned below. The main criminal investigation was recorded in file no. 97/P/1990 (current no. 11/P/2014). 7. In the meantime, an ex officio investigation concerning the offences of illegal deprivation of liberty, illegal arrest and abusive investigation of a large number of persons, including the applicants, culminated in the referral to court and subsequent conviction of senior military and public officials by a decision of the Supreme Court of Justice of 10 May 1991, which became final on 14 November 1991. The injured parties, including the applicants, did not participate in that procedure, as the Government acknowledged. 8. As regards the offence of abusive conduct, the military prosecutor's office decided on 9 March 1994 (in respect of the first applicant) and 28 October 1994 (in respect of the second applicant) not to open a separate ex officio investigation on the grounds that the offence of abusive conduct fell under a subsequently enacted amnesty law; that decision was communicated only to the second applicant on 4 October 2001. No decision was adopted in respect of the applicants' injury. 9. Further, without a formal decision to overturn the decisions issued by the military prosecutor's office (see paragraph 8 above) and to reopen the applicants' respective cases, in the main criminal investigation, the prosecutor heard the applicants who reiterated their complaints regarding the offences of illegal deprivation of liberty and homicide as an attempt raised on account of their ill-treatment and injury during the events of December 1989. Thus, the first applicant requested on 5 January 2005 and on 4 August 2008 to participate in these proceedings as a civil party and for the investigation of his case to be pursued by the military prosecutor's office. In the main criminal investigation, the second applicant gave a statement on 4 October 2001 and lodged a civil claim on 17 May 2005, asking for the punishment of those responsible. 10. The relevant procedural steps taken in the main criminal investigation were described in Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, §§ 12-41, 24 May 2011) and Anamaria‑Loredana Orășanu and Others v. Romania ([Committee] (nos. 43629/13 and 74 others, §§ 10‑11, 7 November 2017). 11. On 14 October 2015, as regards the second applicant, the military prosecutor's office issued a decision only in respect of the offence of instigation to illegal deprivation of liberty by closing the main criminal investigation on the grounds of res judicata in relation to the Supreme Court of Justice's decision of 10 May 1991, failing to decide the offence of homicide as an attempt or her injury, as complained of (see paragraph 7 above). No decision was taken in respect of the first applicant. 12. Although the parties have not communicated any information regarding the lodging of an appeal against this decision, it can be seen from the military prosecutor's office website that it was subsequently quashed. Thus, on 1 November 2016 the military prosecutor's office ordered the initiation in rem of a criminal investigation regarding the offence of crimes against humanity in respect of the same circumstances of fact. To date, the main criminal investigation is still ongoing.",Ruled as violated by court,,"5. Both applicants were ill-treated and injured on 21 December 1989 during the events which led to the fall of the communist regime in Bucharest. The first applicant suffered injuries that needed eight days of medical care and the second applicant was beaten by militia forces on the same occasion. 7. In the meantime, an ex officio investigation concerning the offences of illegal deprivation of liberty, illegal arrest and abusive investigation of a large number of persons, including the applicants, culminated in the referral to court and subsequent conviction of senior military and public officials by a decision of the Supreme Court of Justice of 10 May 1991, which became final on 14 November 1991. The injured parties, including the applicants, did not participate in that procedure, as the Government acknowledged. 8. As regards the offence of abusive conduct, the military prosecutor's office decided on 9 March 1994 (in respect of the first applicant) and 28 October 1994 (in respect of the second applicant) not to open a separate ex officio investigation on the grounds that the offence of abusive conduct fell under a subsequently enacted amnesty law; that decision was communicated only to the second applicant on 4 October 2001. No decision was adopted in respect of the applicants' injury. 9. Further, without a formal decision to overturn the decisions issued by the military prosecutor's office (see paragraph 8 above) and to reopen the applicants' respective cases, in the main criminal investigation, the prosecutor heard the applicants who reiterated their complaints regarding the offences of illegal deprivation of liberty and homicide as an attempt raised on account of their ill-treatment and injury during the events of December 1989. Thus, the first applicant requested on 5 January 2005 and on 4 August 2008 to participate in these proceedings as a civil party and for the investigation of his case to be pursued by the military prosecutor's office. In the main criminal investigation, the second applicant gave a statement on 4 October 2001 and lodged a civil claim on 17 May 2005, asking for the punishment of those responsible. 12. Although the parties have not communicated any information regarding the lodging of an appeal against this decision, it can be seen from the military prosecutor's office website that it was subsequently quashed. Thus, on 1 November 2016 the military prosecutor's office ordered the initiation in rem of a criminal investigation regarding the offence of crimes against humanity in respect of the same circumstances of fact. To date, the main criminal investigation is still ongoing.",TRUE,2,"The applicants suffered injuries during the event, but it's arguable whether this carries the requisite intent to count as ""torture"" or ""punishment."" It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 125,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","5. The first applicant was born in 1972 and is detained in Vilnius. The second applicant was born in 1982 and is detained in Pravieniškės. 6. The first applicant has been detained in Lukiškės Remand Prison since 17 March 2008. 7. On 27 July 2012 he lodged a civil claim against the State, alleging that he was being detained in overcrowded and unsanitary cells. He claimed 74,690 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 21,630 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 8. On 8 November 2012 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court allowed in part the applicant's claim. It firstly held that the time‑limit for claiming damages was three years after the damage arose, and accordingly dismissed the part of the applicant's claim concerning the period before 27 July 2009 as time‑barred. The court then examined various documents provided by the prison authorities and found that, during the remaining period, for about one year and seven months the size of the personal space afforded to the applicant had not complied with the domestic requirements (until 11 May 2010 the minimum personal space in prison cells stipulated by domestic law was 5 sq. m, and from 11 May 2010 it was 3.6 sq. m). 9. The court also found, on the basis of reports submitted by domestic public healthcare authorities, that the temperature and the amount of natural light in some of the cells in which the applicant had been detained had not complied with domestic hygiene norms. However, it dismissed as unproved the applicant's allegations that the cells had been dilapidated and that there had been parasites and rodents. Furthermore, the court considered that the applicant had not proved that his health had deteriorated as a result of the conditions of his detention. 10. The applicant was awarded LTL 1,500 (approximately EUR 434) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 11. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision, but on 20 May 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed his appeal and upheld the lower court's decision in its entirety. 12. The second applicant was detained in Vilnius Correctional Facility from 8 June 2012 to 5 February 2016. 13. On 4 October 2013 he lodged a civil claim against the State, alleging that he was being detained in overcrowded dormitory‑type rooms. He claimed LTL 11,000 (approximately EUR 3,200) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 14. On 12 March 2014 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court allowed in part the applicant's claim. The court found that for seventy‑nine days the applicant had had 2.9 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic requirement of 3.1 sq. m applicable to dormitory‑type rooms. It also found that for eighteen days, when the applicant had been kept under stricter disciplinary regime, he had had 3.34 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic requirement of 3.6 sq. m applicable to such cells. 15. However, the court noted that the applicant had been allowed to move freely around the correctional facility during the day, except when he had been serving disciplinary penalties, and that the material conditions of his detention had been appropriate. It also considered that the applicant had not proved that his health had deteriorated as a result of the conditions of his detention. The court therefore dismissed the applicant's claim for non‑pecuniary damages. 16. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision and on 15 May 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld in part his appeal. It found that, according to the applicant's submissions which the administration of the correctional facility had failed to refute, for 274 days he had had between 2.33 and 3.04 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the relevant domestic requirements. The court considered that, despite the fact that the applicant had been allowed to move freely during the day and that the material conditions of detention had been appropriate, there were grounds to award him non-pecuniary damages. The applicant was awarded EUR 130.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. The first applicant has been detained in Lukiškės Remand Prison since 17 March 2008. 8. On 8 November 2012 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court allowed in part the applicant's claim. It firstly held that the time‑limit for claiming damages was three years after the damage arose, and accordingly dismissed the part of the applicant's claim concerning the period before 27 July 2009 as time‑barred. The court then examined various documents provided by the prison authorities and found that, during the remaining period, for about one year and seven months the size of the personal space afforded to the applicant had not complied with the domestic requirements (until 11 May 2010 the minimum personal space in prison cells stipulated by domestic law was 5 sq. m, and from 11 May 2010 it was 3.6 sq. m). 9. The court also found, on the basis of reports submitted by domestic public healthcare authorities, that the temperature and the amount of natural light in some of the cells in which the applicant had been detained had not complied with domestic hygiene norms. However, it dismissed as unproved the applicant's allegations that the cells had been dilapidated and that there had been parasites and rodents. Furthermore, the court considered that the applicant had not proved that his health had deteriorated as a result of the conditions of his detention. 10. The applicant was awarded LTL 1,500 (approximately EUR 434) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 12. The second applicant was detained in Vilnius Correctional Facility from 8 June 2012 to 5 February 2016. 15. However, the court noted that the applicant had been allowed to move freely around the correctional facility during the day, except when he had been serving disciplinary penalties, and that the material conditions of his detention had been appropriate. It also considered that the applicant had not proved that his health had deteriorated as a result of the conditions of his detention. The court therefore dismissed the applicant's claim for non‑pecuniary damages. 16. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision and on 15 May 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld in part his appeal. It found that, according to the applicant's submissions which the administration of the correctional facility had failed to refute, for 274 days he had had between 2.33 and 3.04 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the relevant domestic requirements. The court considered that, despite the fact that the applicant had been allowed to move freely during the day and that the material conditions of detention had been appropriate, there were grounds to award him non-pecuniary damages. The applicant was awarded EUR 130.",TRUE,2,"For the first applicant, this is degrading treatment, but the applicant is not tangibly harmed. It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 126,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","4. The first applicant, Mr Tamašauskas, was born in 1971. The second applicant, Mr Radzevičius, was born in 1977. They are both detained in Vilnius. 5. The first applicant was detained in Šiauliai Remand Prison from 28 September 2012 until 4 September 2014. 6. On an unspecified date he lodged a civil claim against the State, alleging that he had been detained in overcrowded and unsanitary cells. He claimed 48,493 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 7. On 9 January 2015 the Šiauliai Regional Administrative Court allowed in part the applicant's claim. It found that during the period under consideration the applicant had spent 629 days in Šiauliai Remand Prison and that during the remaining periods he had been transported outside of that prison. During those 629 days, he had between 1.72 and 16.96 sq. m of personal space. The court noted that the documents provided to it by the administration of the prison did not indicate the exact amount of personal space available to the applicant in each cell. It therefore gave the applicant the benefit of the doubt and held that during the entire period of 629 days his right to adequate personal space (3.6 sq. m, under the domestic law applicable to prison cells) might have been breached. The court also noted that parts of the cells had been occupied by furniture and that the space in which the applicant had been able to move had thus been even smaller. 8. However, the court dismissed the applicant's allegations that the conditions in the cells had been unsanitary on the basis of reports submitted by domestic public healthcare authorities. It also held that the applicant had not proved that his health had deteriorated as a result of the conditions in which he had been detained. 9. The applicant was awarded EUR 3,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 10. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision, but on 6 October 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed his appeal and upheld the lower court's decision in its entirety. 11. The second applicant was detained in Alytus Correctional Facility from 22 November 2012 until 17 September 2014. 12. On an unspecified date he lodged a civil claim against the State, alleging that he had been detained in overcrowded and unsanitary dormitory-type rooms. He claimed EUR 16,611 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 13. On 12 October 2015 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed in part the applicant's claim. It found that from 22 November 2012 until 11 April 2013 the applicant had had 2.96 sq. m of personal space, and that from 11 April 2013 to 13 August 2014 he had had 3.03 sq. m of personal space, in violation of the domestic requirement of 3.1 sq. m, applicable to dormitory-type rooms. During the remainder of his detention the personal space available to the applicant had complied with the domestic requirements. 14. On the basis of reports submitted by the domestic public healthcare authorities, the court held that the temperature, ventilation and humidity in the rooms had complied with the relevant domestic requirements, and dismissed the applicant's complaints in that regard. However, it observed that the administration of the correctional facility had not submitted any documents refuting the applicant's allegation that the natural light in the rooms had been insufficient, and found in the applicant's favour. The court also noted that during the relevant period the applicant had sought medical help for back pain, headaches, mood swings and insomnia; the court considered that those ailments might have been related to the unsuitable conditions of his detention. 15. However, the court considered that the reduction in the minimum personal space available to the applicant had been minor and that it had been compensated for by his ability to move freely around the correctional facility and by the various leisure activities available there. It therefore held that the finding of a violation was sufficient, and dismissed the applicant's claim for non-pecuniary damages. 16. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision, but on 14 October 2016 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed his appeal and upheld the lower court's decision in its entirety.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. On 9 January 2015 the Šiauliai Regional Administrative Court allowed in part the applicant's claim. It found that during the period under consideration the applicant had spent 629 days in Šiauliai Remand Prison and that during the remaining periods he had been transported outside of that prison. During those 629 days, he had between 1.72 and 16.96 sq. m of personal space. The court noted that the documents provided to it by the administration of the prison did not indicate the exact amount of personal space available to the applicant in each cell. It therefore gave the applicant the benefit of the doubt and held that during the entire period of 629 days his right to adequate personal space (3.6 sq. m, under the domestic law applicable to prison cells) might have been breached. The court also noted that parts of the cells had been occupied by furniture and that the space in which the applicant had been able to move had thus been even smaller. 9. The applicant was awarded EUR 3,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 13. On 12 October 2015 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed in part the applicant's claim. It found that from 22 November 2012 until 11 April 2013 the applicant had had 2.96 sq. m of personal space, and that from 11 April 2013 to 13 August 2014 he had had 3.03 sq. m of personal space, in violation of the domestic requirement of 3.1 sq. m, applicable to dormitory-type rooms. During the remainder of his detention the personal space available to the applicant had complied with the domestic requirements.",TRUE,2,"This is degrading treatment, but the applicants were not severely tangibly harmed, as the court concluded. It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 127,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","5. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Weinheim. He is a campaigner against abortion and operates an anti-abortion website (babycaust.de). At the time of the proceedings outlined below, the website included, among other things, the following content. 6. On the starting page a picture of graves was shown and the text underneath read ""then: Holocaust"". Upon clicking on the picture, the user was directed to a page titled: ""Abortion – the new Holocaust?"" on which the Holocaust was compared to abortions. On the left margin of the starting page, there were several links, of which one was called ""Life or death?"". Upon clicking on it, the user was directed to a page with the headline ""Prayer requests for Germany"". From that page, the reader was directed to a location-based alphabetical list mentioning the names and practice addresses of doctors who performed abortions in Germany, and to a request for prayers for those doctors. At the very bottom of the same page, under the highlighted text ""German contemporary history in brief"", a sentence read: ""Perverted doctors murder unborn children at the request of the mothers"" (Pervertierte Ärzte ermorden im Auftrag der Mütter die ungeborenen Kinder) On the same page, clicking on the button ""close page"" forwarded the user to a page where it was stated: ""Pray, if possible regularly, for the doctors ... who personally undertake the AGGRAVATED MURDER of abortion killing"" (Beten Sie – wenn möglich regelmäßig – für die Mediziner ..., welche den MORD der Abtreibungstötung selbst vornehmen ...) (Emphasis in original). Somewhat farther down on the same page, it was stated that counselling centres that issued certifications: ""... are enabling and facilitating the unpunished aggravated murder of children in their mother's womb."" (... ermöglichen und begünstigen einen straffreien Kindermord im Mutterschoβ.) 7. One of the doctors listed on the applicant's website, Dr Q., sought a civil injunction ordering the applicant to remove his name and address from the website. 8. On 23 May 2006 the Mannheim Regional Court rejected Dr Q.'s application on the grounds that it was a fact that Dr Q. performed abortions and that the remainder of the website's content was covered by the applicant's freedom of expression. It observed, in particular, that the present case was not comparable to similar cases which had concerned an interference with personality rights by the distribution of personalised leaflets. The publishing of a doctor's name on a list of abortion performing doctors had no comparable ""pillory effect"". 9. Subsequently Dr Q. appealed and – during the appeal proceedings – modified his application, seeking a civil injunction ordering the applicant to desist from labelling abortions, such as those performed by Dr Q., ""aggravated murder"". 10. On 28 February 2007 the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal granted the sought injunction. The court held that the applicant's website led it to be understood that abortions performed by Dr Q. constituted ""aggravated murder"". While the term ""aggravated murder"" did not have to be understood in a merely legal sense but could also be understood as a moral judgment, the overall presentation of the website at the very least did not exclude a reading that Dr Q. had perpetrated the criminal offence of aggravated murder. Even though the applicant had pointed out that abortions were exempt from punishment, he had not referred to section 218a of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 14 below), which exempted abortions as performed by Dr Q., from criminal liability. In addition, the applicant had emphasised the term ""aggravated murder"" in the relevant parts of the website and had compared abortions with the Holocaust. In sum, the statements of the website could be understood as a personalised accusation against Dr Q. of perpetrating aggravated murder. 11. On 29 May 2007 the Federal Court of Justice refused a request by the applicant for legal aid on the grounds that the applicant's intended appeal on points of law lacked sufficient prospect of success. 12. On 2 July 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit a complaint by the applicant for adjudication for being inadmissible, without providing reasons (no. 1 BvR 1663/07).",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"8. On 23 May 2006 the Mannheim Regional Court rejected Dr Q.'s application on the grounds that it was a fact that Dr Q. performed abortions and that the remainder of the website's content was covered by the applicant's freedom of expression. It observed, in particular, that the present case was not comparable to similar cases which had concerned an interference with personality rights by the distribution of personalised leaflets. The publishing of a doctor's name on a list of abortion performing doctors had no comparable ""pillory effect"". 12. On 2 July 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit a complaint by the applicant for adjudication for being inadmissible, without providing reasons (no. 1 BvR 1663/07).",TRUE,2,It depends on whether the statute applies to the unborn children., 128,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","4. The applicant was born in 1961 and is currently detained in Kremikovtsi Prison Hostel near Sofia. 5. In a final judgment of 23 February 2009, the applicant was convicted of murder and sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment. On 6 April 2009 he entered Sofia Prison to serve his sentence. He did not say anything about the conditions of his detention there. 6. On 21 August 2009 he was transferred to Kremikovtsi Prison Hostel, a closed-type prison hostel. 7. On 26 August 2009 the serving of his sentence of imprisonment was interrupted in order for him to take care of his elderly mother, who had undergone hip-replacement surgery in July 2009. The interruption came to an end on 26 October 2009, and the applicant was again placed in Kremikovtsi Prison Hostel. 8. From 26 October 2009 until 28 October 2010 the applicant was placed in group no. 72. According to him, the group was housed in several cabins with cement floors. The cells were heated with wooden and coal stoves. They were damp and had many of their windows broken and doors shattered. Each cell had between thirty and thirty-five square metres of floor space and housed between sixteen and twenty-two inmates – that is, provided less than two square metres per inmate –, and had one sink and one toilet with a shower. According to the Government, the cell measured between thirty-five and forty square metres and housed around twelve inmates. 9. The applicant further said that cold water was only available between 6 and 8 a.m. and 6 and 8 p.m., and hot water was only available between 8 and 9 a.m. and 7 and 8 p.m. Hygienic and sanitary materials were not regularly provided. There was no canteen or dedicated eating space, and no cutlery. As a result of those conditions – mainly the cold and the humidity –he had developed arthritis of both knees. 10. On 28 October 2010 the applicant was transferred to group no. 6. He was placed in a cell which he shared with three to four other inmates. He also started working in the hostel's canteen and had his meals there. According to the Government, the applicant had to share a cell with two to three inmates. The cell was heated with electricity and there were no water supply restrictions. The door and the windows were in good condition. 11. After the applicant's prison regime was changed to a more lenient one, on 19 November 2014 he was placed in a cell outside the guarded area of the hostel. The Government submitted that his cell had its own sanitary facilities and that no water supply restrictions existed. 12. According to the applicant, material conditions in the cells in which he was placed after 28 October 2010 were significantly better in terms of heating, lighting and hygiene, and were satisfactory. Food was also of good quality. Taking a shower, however, was only possible after 10 p.m. due to low water pressure. 13. Lastly, the applicant alleged that health care in custody was inadequate, with no qualified doctors but only a dentist working on site, and no provision of medicines at reduced prices, as available to people out of prison. 14. Kremikovtsi Prison is a closed-type prison hostel attached to Sofia Prison. 15. According to the 2010 report of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (""the CPT"") on the visit to Bulgaria from 15 to 19 December 2008, in 2008 the number of the inmates detained in that facility was 622. 16. In its 2008 report The Prisons in Bulgaria the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee noted poor material conditions, overcrowding and problems with health care in closed-types prison hostels. According to the same report in 2007 the health-care staff in Kremikovtsi Prison Hostel consisted only of a dentist and a feldsher. 17. According to information provided by the Government to the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers, in December 2013 the official capacity of the prison hostel was 426, whereas the actual number of inmates housed there was 493 (see Neshkov and Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 36925/10 and 5 others, § 143, 27 January 2015). 18. In the 2012 report and 2016 report adopted under the national preventive mechanism, the Ombudsman of Bulgaria recommended that Kremikovtsi Prison Hostel be closed due to severe overcrowding, poor hygiene and unsanitary living conditions.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"This is degrading treatment and the prison was recommended to close, but the applicant was not severely tangibly harmed. It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 129,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","6. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Toronto, Canada. 7. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 8. The applicant was the director of a company (D.) registered in Ukraine. In 1996, in the name of D., he concluded a contract with a collective farm (N.), situated in the self-proclaimed ""Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria"" (the ""MRT"" – for further details about the ""MRT"", see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, §§ 28-185, ECHR 2004‑VII, and Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], nos. 43370/04 and 2 others, §§ 8-42, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). Under the contract, N. undertook to send D. 15 tonnes of paprika and 5 tonnes of butter, while D. undertook to send N. 275 tonnes of diesel fuel as payment. 9. Subsequently, N. sent the paprika, but according to the applicant some of it was of poor quality and D. suffered financial losses as a result. Consequently, D. refused to send the diesel fuel. 10. On 22 December 1996 the applicant was summoned to the Department for the Fight against Organised Crime in Crivoi Rog, Ukraine, and asked to give an explanation for his refusal to send the diesel fuel. On 24 January 1997 he was summoned again. After the second interview he was taken, allegedly against his will and without his passport, to the ""MRT"". 11. The applicant was accused of fraud by the ""MRT"" authorities. On 30 December 1999 he was convicted and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment by the Ribnita People's Court, which was under the jurisdiction of the ""MRT"". He did not appeal against that judgment, which then became final. 12. On 2 March 2002 the applicant was released from prison on the basis of an amnesty act. 13. While in detention pending trial and after his conviction, the applicant was initially held in solitary confinement for more than two years. The cell was a concrete box with no windows or ventilation, and no natural light, toilet or tap water. 14. According to the applicant, after his transfer to an ordinary cell and until his release, he was detained in cells with persons who were ill with tuberculosis. During his detention several detainees died from tuberculosis. He was given food once a day – some 250 grams of soup (containing no protein or vitamins), 100 grams of porridge of the same quality, and 250 grams of bread. As a result of the lack of food the applicant developed constant hunger pains, which he viewed as tantamount to torture. The cell was infested with blood-sucking parasites. Their bites caused him discomfort and itching, which in turn created wounds that bled after being scratched. As a result, he caught the skin disease streptodermia. The lack of medical treatment left him suffering and he was only able to cure himself by taking medication borrowed from another detainee. The lack of medication caused him to constantly fear that he might fall ill with no possibility of being treated. 15. On an unknown date in 1997 the applicant's lawyer complained to the Moldovan Prosecutor General's Office of the unlawful detention of his client ordered by the ""MRT"" authorities. In a letter dated 21 January 1998 the Office replied that the complaint had been accepted and that an action had been brought in the Supreme Court of Justice for the annulment of any ""MRT"" court sentence that might be imposed in respect of the applicant. 16. On 14 November 2000, in reply to a complaint by the applicant's lawyer, the Moldovan Prosecutor General's Office informed him that it had initiated a criminal investigation into his client's abduction. It noted that the investigation was aimed at establishing whether the applicant had indeed been abducted, and if so by whom and precisely from where. 17. On 19 February 2001, the Moldovan Prosecutor General's Office informed the applicant's lawyer that on 17 January 2001 a previously adopted decision to discontinue the investigation had been annulled; the documents relevant to the investigation of the complaint of kidnapping from Ukrainian territory had been sent to Ukrainian prosecutors. 18. In reply to a complaint concerning his client lodged on an unknown date with the Russian President, on 25 September 2002 the applicant's lawyer was informed that the complaint had been forwarded to the Moldovan Supreme Court of Justice.",Ruled as violated by court,,"13. While in detention pending trial and after his conviction, the applicant was initially held in solitary confinement for more than two years. The cell was a concrete box with no windows or ventilation, and no natural light, toilet or tap water. 14. According to the applicant, after his transfer to an ordinary cell and until his release, he was detained in cells with persons who were ill with tuberculosis. During his detention several detainees died from tuberculosis. He was given food once a day – some 250 grams of soup (containing no protein or vitamins), 100 grams of porridge of the same quality, and 250 grams of bread. As a result of the lack of food the applicant developed constant hunger pains, which he viewed as tantamount to torture. The cell was infested with blood-sucking parasites. Their bites caused him discomfort and itching, which in turn created wounds that bled after being scratched. As a result, he caught the skin disease streptodermia. The lack of medical treatment left him suffering and he was only able to cure himself by taking medication borrowed from another detainee. The lack of medication caused him to constantly fear that he might fall ill with no possibility of being treated. 15. On an unknown date in 1997 the applicant's lawyer complained to the Moldovan Prosecutor General's Office of the unlawful detention of his client ordered by the ""MRT"" authorities. In a letter dated 21 January 1998 the Office replied that the complaint had been accepted and that an action had been brought in the Supreme Court of Justice for the annulment of any ""MRT"" court sentence that might be imposed in respect of the applicant. 16. On 14 November 2000, in reply to a complaint by the applicant's lawyer, the Moldovan Prosecutor General's Office informed him that it had initiated a criminal investigation into his client's abduction. It noted that the investigation was aimed at establishing whether the applicant had indeed been abducted, and if so by whom and precisely from where. 17. On 19 February 2001, the Moldovan Prosecutor General's Office informed the applicant's lawyer that on 17 January 2001 a previously adopted decision to discontinue the investigation had been annulled; the documents relevant to the investigation of the complaint of kidnapping from Ukrainian territory had been sent to Ukrainian prosecutors.",FALSE,0,"This is degrading treatment leading to tangible harm to the applicant and self-described ""torture"" in a constant state of hunger.", 130,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","5. The applicant was born in 1975 and is detained in the Corradino Correctional Facility, Paola, Malta. 6. The applicant is currently serving a term of imprisonment for drug-related offences. On 3 December 2009 he was sentenced to sixteen years' imprisonment and fined 40,000 euros (EUR) by the Criminal Court. The punishment was confirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeal on 19 September 2013. 7. The applicant started to serve his prison sentence and on 10 December 2009 he had been placed in Division 2 (cell no. 88) of the Corradino Correctional Facility. He remained in various cells in Division 2 to date, except for two brief periods in 2011 where he had been placed in Division 6 (a high security unit) for nine and eleven days respectively, the latter ending on 4 December 2011. In particular after 4 December 2011 the applicant had been staying in cell no. 45 until 26 December 2014 and thereafter had been hosted in cell no. 70, both in Division 2. 8. The applicant alleged that a huge amount of maintenance was needed to the area due to its old age (around 200 years old) and that it lacked both light and air. Windows were behind two iron grids and a third layer of exterior iron bars (hereinafter referred to as ‘triple‑barred windows'). Division 2 also had three skylights, which were kept closed even during the summer months, leading to a great amount of heat. The ""environment"" was squalid and had a bad smell. 9. In the period during which he had been placed in cell no. 45, the applicant had had to suffer the fumes and excessive heat from the bakery close to his cell, which fumes and heat poured into his poorly ventilated cell. The applicant also described the cell as being nearly underground and as structurally condemned. Due the triple-barred windows he could barely see outside. In winter the cell was very humid and cold. 10. When, on 26 December 2014, he moved to cell no. 70 (see paragraph 7 above), which was very small and had very little ventilation; the applicant felt claustrophobic. Furthermore, he claimed to hardly ever having had access to running water. 11. According to the applicant, in Division 2 the food was of a very poor quality, non-nutritious, and portions were too small. Additionally, the food quality was so terrible that between 1 and 4 September 2015 prisoners had to be taken to hospital as a result of food poisoning. The applicant claimed that the kitchen was so dirty that mice were found dead in it. 12. The applicant complained that there was no combined automated toilet‑flushing system installed. Therefore, inmates had to flush their own personal toilet by means of a water bucket which was provided to them. Moreover, at times there was no access to running water in the cell. Access to water was limited in general, and water available was not potable. While inmates were permitted to buy bottled water, they were forced to reduce their daily intake when they were short on cash. 13. As to the showers, hot water was often not available and the water was dirty. The applicant submitted that there were not enough showers, with one of the showers having a broken and cracked tray that could cause injury if one were not careful. He alleged that, for all the inmates in Division 2, only one shower was available most of the time, with two showers being available during the summer months. 14. The applicant claimed that the cost to make telephone calls was very high and had been increased on 3 December 2014. He had complained to the prison authorities to no avail. 15. He complained that the prison allowance given to detainees was too little. This made everything available at the tuck shop excessively expensive. It inevitably also impacted the inmates' ability to buy bottled water and make telephone calls. 16. The applicant claimed to have suffered health issues and had even been confined to his bed because of illness for some time. The emergency buzzer in the cell never worked and when he had been confined to his bed because of illness and tried to ring it, no one came, since the buzzer did not work. It took thirty minutes for someone from the staff to show up, at which point he was told off by the staff member. 17. Petitions were filed in regard to these conditions. Furthermore, some of his fellow inmates had lodged constitutional cases concerning the situation. However, none led to any change.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. The applicant started to serve his prison sentence and on 10 December 2009 he had been placed in Division 2 (cell no. 88) of the Corradino Correctional Facility. He remained in various cells in Division 2 to date, except for two brief periods in 2011 where he had been placed in Division 6 (a high security unit) for nine and eleven days respectively, the latter ending on 4 December 2011. In particular after 4 December 2011 the applicant had been staying in cell no. 45 until 26 December 2014 and thereafter had been hosted in cell no. 70, both in Division 2. 8. The applicant alleged that a huge amount of maintenance was needed to the area due to its old age (around 200 years old) and that it lacked both light and air. Windows were behind two iron grids and a third layer of exterior iron bars (hereinafter referred to as ‘triple‑barred windows'). Division 2 also had three skylights, which were kept closed even during the summer months, leading to a great amount of heat. The ""environment"" was squalid and had a bad smell. 16. The applicant claimed to have suffered health issues and had even been confined to his bed because of illness for some time. The emergency buzzer in the cell never worked and when he had been confined to his bed because of illness and tried to ring it, no one came, since the buzzer did not work. It took thirty minutes for someone from the staff to show up, at which point he was told off by the staff member.",TRUE,2,"This is degrading treatment, but the applicant was not severely tangibly harmed. It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 131,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","5. The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Łomża. 6. On 7 August 2010 the applicant had a motorcycle accident in which he broke his right arm and right thigh. Between 13 and 22 December 2010 the applicant underwent an arthroscopy on his right knee. Between 25 January and 15 February 2011 the applicant underwent rehabilitation treatment in Łomża Regional Hospital and during this stay no dysfunction was diagnosed in his right foot. 7. Subsequently, between 28 March and 26 July 2011, he was detained in Białystok Remand Centre. While in prison, he was examined three times (on 1 and 18 April and on 13 May 2011) by an orthopaedist, who observed that the applicant required physical therapy in the light of a limitation of his knee-joint movement, the atrophy of a thigh muscle, and an injury to a peroneal nerve. On 11 April 2011 the applicant was examined by a neurologist who likewise found atrophy of the thigh muscle and impaired bending of the right foot, which he attributed to an injury to the peroneal nerve. The applicant never received any physical therapy during his imprisonment, instead being offered only nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory medicines. 8. On an unspecified date, but not later than 27 March 2012, the applicant brought a civil action against the State Treasury/Białystok Remand Centre for infringement of his personal rights, claiming that the prison healthcare system had failed to provide him with appropriate medical care during his detention and, moreover, that the cells had not met the minimum spatial requirement of 3 square metres per person and had been mouldy and infested with insects. He requested 200,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) in compensation, the equivalent of approximately 48,300 euros (EUR). 9. On 27 March 2012 the Białystok Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) exempted the applicant from the court fees. 10. On 20 January 2014 the Białystok Regional Court granted the applicant PLN 23,000 (approximately EUR 5,550) and dismissed the remainder of his action. The court held, particularly on the basis of the medical expert opinion, that the applicant had had a motorcycle accident and had required physical therapy as recommended by the prison orthopaedist. However, he had not been given any, either in prison or outside, which had resulted in a deterioration of his health. The court established that, due to the lack of physical therapy, the applicant had suffered atrophy of the thigh muscle and foot drop affecting his right foot. The court compared this finding with the fact that upon his arrival the applicant had not been suffering from foot drop, the pain in his knee had not been severe, and his right leg muscles had been working more effectively. The court emphasised that the applicant had not been offered proper treatment despite a worsening of his symptoms. These changes in his physical condition would not have been irreversible, but the break in the therapy had entailed a prolonged rehabilitation process. The court stated that the rehabilitation process for the applicant would be long and arduous, a situation which could have been avoided had the defendant acted appropriately. The court held that the applicant had suffered physical pain of significant seriousness, which, in turn, had had negative psychological consequences. The court therefore found the applicant's claim for compensation for lack of adequate medical care partly justified. The claim concerning the alleged overcrowding and inadequate sanitary conditions was dismissed in full. The court also ordered the applicant to reimburse PLN 3,186 (EUR 766) for the costs of the defendant's legal representation and PLN 10,932 (EUR 2,628) in court fees (in total: PLN 14,118 (EUR 3,394)). 11. The applicant did not lodge an appeal against the first-instance judgment. 12. Following the defendant's appeal against the judgment, on 12 September 2014 the Białystok Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) amended the judgment, reduced the compensation granted to the applicant to PLN 13,000 (EUR 3,095), and upheld the first-instance court's findings of fact and law. The applicant was not ordered to pay the court fees for the proceedings before that court. This court pointed out that in the experts' opinions it was not specified, even approximately, what the effects of the negligence might be, how much longer the rehabilitation process would take, or how much stronger the pain had become in comparison to pain experienced previously by the applicant.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. Subsequently, between 28 March and 26 July 2011, he was detained in Białystok Remand Centre. While in prison, he was examined three times (on 1 and 18 April and on 13 May 2011) by an orthopaedist, who observed that the applicant required physical therapy in the light of a limitation of his knee-joint movement, the atrophy of a thigh muscle, and an injury to a peroneal nerve. On 11 April 2011 the applicant was examined by a neurologist who likewise found atrophy of the thigh muscle and impaired bending of the right foot, which he attributed to an injury to the peroneal nerve. The applicant never received any physical therapy during his imprisonment, instead being offered only nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory medicines. 10. On 20 January 2014 the Białystok Regional Court granted the applicant PLN 23,000 (approximately EUR 5,550) and dismissed the remainder of his action. The court held, particularly on the basis of the medical expert opinion, that the applicant had had a motorcycle accident and had required physical therapy as recommended by the prison orthopaedist. However, he had not been given any, either in prison or outside, which had resulted in a deterioration of his health. The court established that, due to the lack of physical therapy, the applicant had suffered atrophy of the thigh muscle and foot drop affecting his right foot. The court compared this finding with the fact that upon his arrival the applicant had not been suffering from foot drop, the pain in his knee had not been severe, and his right leg muscles had been working more effectively. The court emphasised that the applicant had not been offered proper treatment despite a worsening of his symptoms. These changes in his physical condition would not have been irreversible, but the break in the therapy had entailed a prolonged rehabilitation process. The court stated that the rehabilitation process for the applicant would be long and arduous, a situation which could have been avoided had the defendant acted appropriately. The court held that the applicant had suffered physical pain of significant seriousness, which, in turn, had had negative psychological consequences. The court therefore found the applicant's claim for compensation for lack of adequate medical care partly justified. The claim concerning the alleged overcrowding and inadequate sanitary conditions was dismissed in full. The court also ordered the applicant to reimburse PLN 3,186 (EUR 766) for the costs of the defendant's legal representation and PLN 10,932 (EUR 2,628) in court fees (in total: PLN 14,118 (EUR 3,394)). 12. Following the defendant's appeal against the judgment, on 12 September 2014 the Białystok Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) amended the judgment, reduced the compensation granted to the applicant to PLN 13,000 (EUR 3,095), and upheld the first-instance court's findings of fact and law. The applicant was not ordered to pay the court fees for the proceedings before that court. This court pointed out that in the experts' opinions it was not specified, even approximately, what the effects of the negligence might be, how much longer the rehabilitation process would take, or how much stronger the pain had become in comparison to pain experienced previously by the applicant.",TRUE,2,"The applicant suffered severe tangible harms, but it's arguable that these would've occurred regardless.", 132,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","4. The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in the Altay region. 5. At the material time the applicant was serving a sentence for robbery in correctional colony no. LIU-8 in the Altay region. 6. On 22 June, 12 July and 20 December 2004 he attempted suicide by opening his veins. 7. On 12 July 2004 a prison psychiatrist diagnosed the applicant as suffering from a slight mental retardation, psychopathy and claustrophobia with elements of self-aggression. An entry was made in his medical records that solitary confinement was contraindicated for mental health reasons. The correctional colony authorities were informed accordingly. The applicant was prescribed treatment. Since that time he had been examined by the prison psychiatrist at regular intervals. The prison psychiatrist's diagnosis and recommendations were confirmed by the psychiatric unit of prison hospital no. 12 where the applicant was treated from 2 to 26 April 2005. 8. On 3 May 2005 the governor of the correctional colony ordered the applicant's placement in a punishment cell for thirteen days as a punishment for the disorderly state of his bed and bedside table. 9. On 5 May 2005 the applicant was examined by the prison doctor on duty who found that his state of health permitted his placement in a punishment cell, provided that he was not held in solitary confinement. 10. The applicant was then placed in punishment cell no. 32 designed to accommodate two inmates. He was left alone in the cell, but the door was kept open. 11. On the same day the applicant went on a hunger strike in protest against his placement in solitary confinement. 12. At 8 p.m. on 8 May 2005 the applicant was visited by the prison doctor on duty who examined him and found that his health was satisfactory. He reiterated the recommendation that given the applicant's mental condition solitary confinement was contraindicated. 13. After the doctor left, the door of the applicant's cell was shut. About an hour later the applicant had a panic attack and attempted to open his veins with his teeth. The doctor was called back. He noted numerous lacerated wounds on the applicant's forearms and made bandages. 14. By letters of 15 June, 8 August and 1 November 2005 the applicant asked the prosecutor's office of the Altay Region to initiate criminal proceedings against the warders on duty. 15. On 15 December 2005 a deputy prosecutor of Barnaul refused to open criminal proceedings. He referred to statements by a warder, Mr Sh., that the applicant had himself asked him to shut the door. Moreover, the applicant's health had not been seriously damaged as a result of the incident. 16. It follows from the letter of 16 December 2005 from the prosecutor of Barnaul that the prosecutor's office had found that the applicant had been lawfully placed in a punishment cell. At the same time, the warders had disrespected the doctor's recommendation by leaving the applicant alone in a closed cell. The governor of correctional colony no. LIU-8 had been warned against ""permitting similar incidents to occur in future"". 17. Following to further complaints by the applicant, in which he stated in particular that he had never asked the warders to close the door, the prosecutor of Barnaul conducted an additional inquiry. He questioned the applicant and Mr Sh. He also questioned warders Mr K. and Mr S. who testified that the door to the applicant's cell had been temporarily closed to prevent his communication with other inmates who were at that time receiving clean bedding in the storage room opposite to the applicant's cell. 18. On 27 January 2006 the prosecutor of Baranaul refused to open criminal proceedings against the warders. He found that the warders had acted in compliance with the internal regulations and had had no intention of provoking the applicant to self-injury. 19. The applicant challenged the prosecutor's decisions of 15 December 2005 and 27 January 2006 before the Tsentralniy District Court of Barnaul. 20. On 27 September 2006 the Tsentralniy District Court upheld the prosecutor's decisions, finding that the inquiry had been thorough and the refusals to open criminal proceedings had been lawful and justified. 21. The applicant appealed. He submitted, in particular, that the warders had known that he suffered from claustrophobia and had closed the door to take vengeance on him for going on a hunger strike. 22. On 2 November 2006 the Altay Regional Court upheld the decision of 27 September 2006 on appeal. II.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"The applicant suffered severe tangible harms, but it's arguable that these would've occurred regardless.", 133,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","4. The applicant was born in 1970 and is currently detained in Alytus Correctional Facility. 5. The applicant was arrested on 3 June 2012 and transferred to Kaunas Remand Prison on 4 June 2012. On 5 June 2012 he was examined by a doctor (see paragraph 15 below). During that examination, the applicant did not indicate that he needed any special devices. 6. On 26 November 2012 the applicant consulted a doctor and indicated that he had sleep apnoea and he wished to acquire a continuous positive airway pressure (hereinafter ""CPAP"") device for its treatment. 7. On 15 March 2013 a report was issued by a medical expert, indicating that the use of a CPAP device was the most effective way to treat sleep apnoea and that the applicant's condition was deteriorating because he had not been using a CPAP device. It also indicated that there was a risk of complications if the sleep apnoea was not treated properly. 8. Between 12 and 17 September 2013 the applicant was hospitalised in the Prison Hospital. A doctor recommended that he continue using a CPAP device following his discharge from the hospital. 9. On 19 September the applicant asked the prison administration to allow him to use a CPAP device. On 3 October 2013 the administration of Kaunas Remand Prison responded that under domestic law such a device was not among the items that could be given to detainees by their spouses or close relatives (see paragraph 14 below), but indicated that such an item could be purchased from the prison shop. The applicant then asked the Kaunas Remand Prison Administration to allow his relatives to give him the device. On 29 October 2013, this request was also refused, on the grounds that there were no indications in the applicant's medical history or in the document issued by the Prison Hospital that the applicant needed the device (see paragraph 16 below). 10. On 20 October 2014 the applicant lodged a complaint before the domestic courts, which he specified on 19 February 2015. He asked the court to award him 86,800 euros (EUR) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage suffered in the period between 4 June 2012 and 20 October 2014. The applicant stated that while he had been detained in Kaunas Remand Prison, he had asked the prison administration to allow him to have a CPAP device to treat his sleep apnoea, as recommended to him by a doctor in the Prison Hospital (see paragraph 8 above). The applicant stated that the prison administration had refused to allow him to have such a device, and he had been experiencing serious health issues. 11. On 12 October 2015 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant's complaint in part and awarded him EUR 1,100 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The court stated that the prison administration had failed to provide the applicant with the same level of healthcare available to persons who were not detained. It was clear from the case file that the applicant had twice asked the prison administration to allow him to purchase and use a CPAP device. The refusal of permission by the Kaunas Remand Prison Administration had been unfounded because there had been a recommendation issued by a doctor. The court held that the applicant had a right to compensation in respect of non‑pecuniary damage suffered from 3 October 2013 (when his request was refused by the prison administration – see paragraph 9 below) until 20 October 2014 and thus decided to award the applicant EUR 1,100 in this regard. The court also noted that there was no information in the case file to indicate that the applicant had not received appropriate healthcare in Kaunas Remand Prison. It stated that although the recommendation issued by the specialist contained a reference to possible complications, there was no information in the applicant's case file to show that the inability to use a CPAP device had had any negative consequences for his health. 12. The applicant appealed against the decision of the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court. On 4 October 2016 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision in its entirety. 13. On 12 July 2017 the applicant asked the Prison Department for a transfer to Alytus Correctional Facility from Vilnius Correctional Facility, where he had been transferred on 20 March 2015. The applicant submitted that he had been serving his sentence in premises for disabled persons but that he could be transferred to the standard dormitory-type premises. On 2 August 2017 the applicant's request was allowed and he was transferred to Alytus Correctional Facility on 21 August 2017 where he was able to continue using his CPAP device.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. On 15 March 2013 a report was issued by a medical expert, indicating that the use of a CPAP device was the most effective way to treat sleep apnoea and that the applicant's condition was deteriorating because he had not been using a CPAP device. It also indicated that there was a risk of complications if the sleep apnoea was not treated properly. 8. Between 12 and 17 September 2013 the applicant was hospitalised in the Prison Hospital. A doctor recommended that he continue using a CPAP device following his discharge from the hospital. 10. On 20 October 2014 the applicant lodged a complaint before the domestic courts, which he specified on 19 February 2015. He asked the court to award him 86,800 euros (EUR) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage suffered in the period between 4 June 2012 and 20 October 2014. The applicant stated that while he had been detained in Kaunas Remand Prison, he had asked the prison administration to allow him to have a CPAP device to treat his sleep apnoea, as recommended to him by a doctor in the Prison Hospital (see paragraph 8 above). The applicant stated that the prison administration had refused to allow him to have such a device, and he had been experiencing serious health issues. 11. On 12 October 2015 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant's complaint in part and awarded him EUR 1,100 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The court stated that the prison administration had failed to provide the applicant with the same level of healthcare available to persons who were not detained. It was clear from the case file that the applicant had twice asked the prison administration to allow him to purchase and use a CPAP device. The refusal of permission by the Kaunas Remand Prison Administration had been unfounded because there had been a recommendation issued by a doctor. The court held that the applicant had a right to compensation in respect of non‑pecuniary damage suffered from 3 October 2013 (when his request was refused by the prison administration – see paragraph 9 below) until 20 October 2014 and thus decided to award the applicant EUR 1,100 in this regard. The court also noted that there was no information in the case file to indicate that the applicant had not received appropriate healthcare in Kaunas Remand Prison. It stated that although the recommendation issued by the specialist contained a reference to possible complications, there was no information in the applicant's case file to show that the inability to use a CPAP device had had any negative consequences for his health. 12. The applicant appealed against the decision of the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court. On 4 October 2016 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision in its entirety. 13. On 12 July 2017 the applicant asked the Prison Department for a transfer to Alytus Correctional Facility from Vilnius Correctional Facility, where he had been transferred on 20 March 2015. The applicant submitted that he had been serving his sentence in premises for disabled persons but that he could be transferred to the standard dormitory-type premises. On 2 August 2017 the applicant's request was allowed and he was transferred to Alytus Correctional Facility on 21 August 2017 where he was able to continue using his CPAP device.",TRUE,2,"This is degrading treatment leading to tangible harm to the applicant, but it's arguable whether this carries the requisite intent to count as ""torture"" or ""punishment."" It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 134,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","4. The facts, as submitted by the parties, are similar to those in the case of Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, §§ 12-41, 24 May 2011). 5. All applicants were ill-treated and injured on the night of 21⁄22 December 1989 during the events which led to the fall of the communist regime in Bucharest. The applicant in application no. 30392/15 (Vasu v. Romania) suffered injuries that needed twenty-two days of medical care and the other two applicants were beaten by militia forces on the same occasion. 6. In 1990 the military prosecutor's office opened, of its own motion, investigations into the illegal detention, ill-treatment and injury suffered by the applicants and other participants in the events of December 1989 in respect of several offences as mentioned below. The main criminal investigation was recorded in file no. 97/P/1990 (currently no. 11/P/2014). 7. At the same time, another investigation concerning the offences of illegal deprivation of liberty, illegal arrest and abusive investigation against a large number of persons, including the applicants, culminated in the committal for trial of senior military and public officials and their subsequent conviction by a decision of the Supreme Court of Justice of 10 May 1991, which became final on 14 November 1991. It cannot be seen from the court's decision whether the injured persons, including the applicants, participated in those proceedings (see, mutatis mutandis, Bănuțoiu and Ștefoglu v. Romania [Committee], nos. 64752/13 and 54607/14, § 7, 3 July 2018). 8. As regards the offence of improper conduct, the military prosecutor's office decided on 27 October 1993 (Ms Nicoleta-Lorena Giurcanu ‑ applicant in application no. 30365/15, hereinafter ""the first applicant""), 9 March 1994 (Mr Traian Vasu – applicant in application no. 30392/15, hereinafter ""the second applicant"") and 27 August 1993 (Ms Luminița Zeleniuc – applicant in application no. 30410/15, hereinafter ""the third applicant"") not to open a separate investigation of its own motion on the grounds that the offence of improper conduct fell under a subsequently enacted amnesty law; that decision was communicated only to the third applicant on 25 September 2008. No decision was adopted in respect of the applicants' injury. 9. Further, without a formal decision to overturn the decisions issued by the military prosecutor's office (see paragraph 8 above) and to reopen the applicants' respective cases, in the main criminal investigation, the prosecutor heard evidence from the applicants, who reiterated their complaints regarding the offences of illegal deprivation of liberty and assault and battery, based on their ill-treatment and injuries during the events of December 1989. Thus, the first applicant asked on 29 April 2005 to be joined to these proceedings as a civil party and for the investigation of the case to be pursued by the military prosecutor's office. The second applicant gave statements as an injured party on 7 January 2000 and 23 November 2004. The third applicant raised civil claims on 25 September 2008 and requested that the persons responsible be identified and committed to stand trial. 10. The relevant procedural steps taken in the main criminal investigation were described in Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others v. Romania (cited above, §§ 12-41), and Sidea and Others v. Romania ([Committee] no. 889/15, §§ 8-11, 5 June 2018). 11. On 14 October 2015 the military prosecutor's office issued a decision in respect of the offence of instigating illegal deprivation of liberty, concerning all the applicants, by closing the main criminal investigation on the grounds of res judicata in relation to the Supreme Court of Justice's decision of 10 May 1991 (see paragraph 7 above). In addition, the military prosecutor's office closed the main investigation in respect of the offence of instigating improper conduct regarding the second applicant, as it fell under an amnesty law (see paragraph 8 above). No decision was adopted with respect to the injury and assault and battery complained of by the applicants. 12. The decision of 14 October 2015 (see paragraph 11 above) was subsequently annulled by a Prosecutor General's decision of 5 April 2016, confirmed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 13 June 2016. On 1 November 2016 the military prosecutor ordered the opening of a criminal investigation in rem for the offence of crimes against humanity in respect of the same factual circumstances. 13. According to the information submitted by the parties, the main criminal investigation is still ongoing (see Bănuțoiu and Ștefoglu, cited above, § 12).",Ruled as violated by court,,"5. All applicants were ill-treated and injured on the night of 21⁄22 December 1989 during the events which led to the fall of the communist regime in Bucharest. The applicant in application no. 30392/15 (Vasu v. Romania) suffered injuries that needed twenty-two days of medical care and the other two applicants were beaten by militia forces on the same occasion. 9. Further, without a formal decision to overturn the decisions issued by the military prosecutor's office (see paragraph 8 above) and to reopen the applicants' respective cases, in the main criminal investigation, the prosecutor heard evidence from the applicants, who reiterated their complaints regarding the offences of illegal deprivation of liberty and assault and battery, based on their ill-treatment and injuries during the events of December 1989. Thus, the first applicant asked on 29 April 2005 to be joined to these proceedings as a civil party and for the investigation of the case to be pursued by the military prosecutor's office. The second applicant gave statements as an injured party on 7 January 2000 and 23 November 2004. The third applicant raised civil claims on 25 September 2008 and requested that the persons responsible be identified and committed to stand trial.",TRUE,2,"The applicants suffered injuries during the event, but it's arguable whether this carries the requisite intent to count as ""torture"" or ""punishment."" It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 135,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","5. The applicant was born in 1971 and at the time of introduction of the application to the Court he was detained in Diavata Prison. 6. The applicant is serving a life sentence for drug dealing. He was initially placed in Diavata Prison from 1 October 2014 until 24 November 2015. On that date he was transferred to Malandrino Prison, from where he was transferred back to Diavata Prison on 9 May 2016. Lastly, on 20 December 2016 he was transferred back to Malandrino Prison. 7. The applicant alleged that he had been detained initially in cell no. B 14, which had measured 9 sq. m and had held four detainees in total. On 7 August 2016 he had been placed in cell no. GR 2 on the ground floor, which had measured 24 sq. m and had held ten detainees. In both cases, therefore, the living space afforded to him had been less than 3 sq. m. Overcrowding had exposed him to infectious diseases and he had suffered from passive smoking. In addition, detainees had had barely any space to move within their cell and their bunk beds had been low, not allowing them to sit up comfortably. 8. Apart from the overcrowding, the applicant submitted that the conditions of his detention had been very poor. Access to natural light and ventilation had been inadequate. Sanitary facilities and supplies had been old, broken and insufficient to ensure the detainees' well‑being and personal hygiene. Heating had been provided only for one hour per day from 9 p.m. to 10 p.m., while hot water during winter had been provided for two hours per day and had not sufficed for all detainees. They had been forced to wash themselves using buckets of water, as the water pressure in showers had been insufficient. In each ten-person cell there had been five bunk beds, five stools, a small table and five side tables but no lockable space for personal belongings. In the four-person cell there had been two bunk beds and two stools. The mattresses had been old, mouldy and smelly, and sheets and towels had not been provided. 9. In general, detainees had lacked access to cultural, recreational and sports activities. They had had to rely on visits from friends and family in order to obtain any newspapers or magazines, which had intensified their feeling of isolation. The hours that they had been allowed to spend in the corridors had been insufficient, taking into account that they had coincided with the meal times as well as with the times they had been allowed to receive visits or make phone calls. The yard had included a football field but no balls had been provided to the detainees and the yard had not offered any opportunities for spending time creatively. The applicant further complained of the quantity and the quality of the food, claiming that it had been repetitive and lacking any nutritional value. 10. Lastly, the applicant submitted that the conditions of his detention had led him having several cardiac arrests. 11. The Government, referring to a document provided by the prison authorities, submitted that Diavata Prison had a capacity of 358 detainees on the basis of allocation of 4 sq. m per detainee according to the minimum standards set by the CPT. At the time the applicant had been detained, the prison facility had exceeded its capacity by accommodating 460 to 500 detainees. The applicant had been detained in cell no. 11 on the first floor, which had measured 24 sq. m, including a toilet measuring 2 sq. m. The cell had had a capacity of ten detainees; however, following a new law in April 2015 aimed at relieving overcrowding in prisons, many detainees had been released and that had resulted in the applicant sharing the cell with four to six detainees. Therefore, the living space afforded to the applicant had ranged from 3.14 to 4.4 sq. m. 12. As regards the rest of the applicant's complaints, the Government argued that the prison had had a central heating system, in addition to the electric heating devices that had been provided to each cell. The cell in which the applicant had been detained had had large windows. Detainees had had access to hot water and had been provided regularly with personal hygiene products. The cells had been regularly disinfected. As regards prisoners' meals, the Government submitted the menu of various random weeks to demonstrate that they had been comprised of a variety of food. 13. The Government submitted the applicant's medical file in order to prove that the applicant had already suffered from cardiac conditions when his incarceration had started. The applicant's medical needs had been fully fulfilled during the time he had spent in Diavata Prison either by visits to the prison doctor or by his transfer to nearby hospitals. Lastly, the applicant had been granted fifteen days of leave in order to take matriculation exams.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. The applicant alleged that he had been detained initially in cell no. B 14, which had measured 9 sq. m and had held four detainees in total. On 7 August 2016 he had been placed in cell no. GR 2 on the ground floor, which had measured 24 sq. m and had held ten detainees. In both cases, therefore, the living space afforded to him had been less than 3 sq. m. Overcrowding had exposed him to infectious diseases and he had suffered from passive smoking. In addition, detainees had had barely any space to move within their cell and their bunk beds had been low, not allowing them to sit up comfortably. 11. The Government, referring to a document provided by the prison authorities, submitted that Diavata Prison had a capacity of 358 detainees on the basis of allocation of 4 sq. m per detainee according to the minimum standards set by the CPT. At the time the applicant had been detained, the prison facility had exceeded its capacity by accommodating 460 to 500 detainees. The applicant had been detained in cell no. 11 on the first floor, which had measured 24 sq. m, including a toilet measuring 2 sq. m. The cell had had a capacity of ten detainees; however, following a new law in April 2015 aimed at relieving overcrowding in prisons, many detainees had been released and that had resulted in the applicant sharing the cell with four to six detainees. Therefore, the living space afforded to the applicant had ranged from 3.14 to 4.4 sq. m.",TRUE,2,"This is degrading treatment and the applicant suffered severe tangible harms, but it's arguable that these would've occurred regardless. It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 136,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","5. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Novocheboksarsk. 6. The facts of the applicant's ill-treatment in police custody were established in a judgment of the Novocheboksarsk Town Court of the Chuvash Republic (""the Town Court"") of 22 August 2008 and upheld on 11 November 2008 by the Supreme Court of the Chuvash Republic. The facts are as follows. 7. On 10 April 2007 the applicant was stopped by police officers on a street near his home and taken to district police station no. 1 of Novocheboksarsk to have his identity checked. At the police station a district police officer (участковый уполномоченный милиции), Officer M. from the Novocheboksarsk town police station, who wore a police uniform, threatened the applicant by saying that a criminal case against him would be opened, grabbed him by his clothing, violently pushed him backwards against a wall several times and punched his left ear. 8. According to a forensic medical expert's report, the applicant had a traumatic rupture of the left eardrum with a haemorrhage, which caused a short-term – lasting between six and twenty-one days – health disorder. Accordingly, this qualified as ""insignificant"" health damage. 9. Officer M. was convicted under Article 286 § 3 (a) of the Criminal Code (abuse of power with the use of violence) and sentenced to three years' imprisonment and a two‑year ban on exercising official power. 10. In January 2009 the applicant brought a civil claim in the amount of 312,487 Russian roubles (RUB) against the Ministry of Finance of the Chuvash Republic in respect of non-pecuniary damage. He argued, inter alia, that his ill‑treatment by the police had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment proscribed by Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (""the Convention""), and that, in accordance with the Plenary Supreme Court Resolution no. 5 of 10 October 2003, the domestic courts were to apply the Convention in accordance with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (""the Court""). He also argued that, in calculating the amount of compensation due in respect of non‑pecuniary damage for a violation of the Convention, the domestic courts therefore had to take into account the sums awarded by the Court under Article 41 of the Convention in similar cases. He stated that his claim had been calculated based on the sum awarded by the Court in the case of Ribitsch, in which a violation of Article 3 of the Convention had been found on account of inhuman and degrading treatment in police custody (see Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, Series A no. 336). 11. On 6 April 2009 the Town Court allowed the applicant's civil claim in part. It noted that, under Article 61 § 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a judgment in a criminal case which had become enforceable was binding on a court examining the civil-law consequences of the acts of a person against whom the judgment had been delivered, in so far as it established whether those acts had taken place and whether they had been committed by that person. Article 53 of the Constitution and Articles 151 and 1069 of the Civil Code provided for State liability for harm caused to individuals by State agents. Relying on Articles 1099-1101 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation and section 8 of the Plenary Supreme Court Resolution no. 10 of 20 December 1994, the Town Court held that RUB 20,000 would be just and reasonable satisfaction for the applicant's mental suffering as a result of his ill-treatment by the police officer, treatment which had undermined his honour and dignity and caused him insignificant health damage. 12. The applicant appealed against the judgment. On 6 May 2009 the Supreme Court of the Chuvash Republic upheld the judgment on appeal, fully endorsing the Town Court's calculation of the amount of compensation in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. It disagreed with the applicant that, in determining the amount of compensation for non‑pecuniary damage, the domestic courts had to be guided by the amounts of such compensation awarded by the Court in similar cases, stating as follows: ""Indeed, in accordance with Article 15 § 4 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, commonly recognised principles and norms of international law and international agreements of the Russian Federation are an integral part of [the Russian Federation's] legal system. However, this does not mean that the amount of compensation for non-pecuniary damage determined by the European Court of Human Rights in a specific case has a binding effect on national courts examining other cases where a violation of similar norms and principles can be found. The determination of the amount of compensation for non-pecuniary damage in specific cases is the prerogative of national courts examining such cases.""",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"The applicant suffered serious injuries at the hands of the police, but it's arguable whether this carries the requisite intent to count as ""torture."" It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 137,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","5. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Dubno. 6. The applicant was the principal of a private school in the town of Dubno, in the Rivne Region. 7. On 30 March 2000 criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant for failure to comply with a court decision ordering the reinstatement of a teacher at the private school. 8. According to the applicant, at about 9.00 a.m. on 29 May 2000 officers from Dubno police broke down the front door of the applicant's house. Inside the house, an investigator from the Dubno inter-district prosecutor's office ordered the applicant to go to his office for questioning. When the applicant refused, the investigator asked the police officers to ensure her compulsory appearance for questioning. The police officers allegedly beat the applicant, twisted her arms behind her back and forced her out of the house barefoot. They placed her in a police car and took her to the office of the investigator. At about 1 p.m. on 29 May 2000 the applicant was released. 9. On the next day, 30 May 2000, the applicant was examined by a doctor, who noted that there were injuries on her shoulders. 10. On 9 April 2001 the Dubno inter-district prosecutor's office discontinued the investigation into the applicant's criminal case, having regard to the insignificance of her offence. 11. On 2 August 2001 the Dubno Town Court quashed the decision of 9 April 2001 as unfounded and ordered that there be further investigation. 12. On 14 August 2001 the investigation was completed and the case file was referred to the Dubno Town Court for trial. 13. On 30 January 2004 and 13 March 2006 the Dubno Town Court issued judgments in the applicant's case, which were quashed as unfounded by the Rivne Regional Court of Appeal. 14. On 30 January 2007 the Dubno Town Court convicted the applicant of failure to comply with a court decision, and decided that it was appropriate to punish her with a fine. However, ultimately it released the applicant from the punishment, as the statute of limitation had expired. 15. On 17 April 2007 the Rivne Regional Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the judgment of 30 January 2007. 16. On 13 November 2007 the Supreme Court refused to examine an appeal by the applicant on points of law, on the grounds that she had failed to comply with procedural rules when submitting it. 17. On 2 June 2000 the applicant complained to the Rivne regional prosecutor's office regarding the events of 29 May 2000 (see paragraph 8 above). She was examined by a medical expert, who found that she had sustained five bruises to her shoulders and had injured her left shoulder ligaments. The expert stated that the injuries had been caused by blunt solid objects; they could have been sustained in the circumstances described by the applicant. 18. On 30 June 2000 the Rivne regional prosecutor's office, having conducted a pre-investigation inquiry, refused to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers because of the absence of the constituent elements of a criminal offence. 19. On 20 March 2001, following a complaint by the applicant, the Prosecutor General's Office reversed the decision of 30 June 2000 as unsubstantiated, and ordered an additional inquiry. The applicant was not informed of the decision taken within the additional inquiry. In 2016 the Office of the Government Agent was informed that the file on those inquiries had been destroyed, along with other files relating to the same period, after the expiry of the statutory period for keeping such records. 20. On 29 May 2003 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Dubno Town Court, seeking damages for the violation of the inviolability of her home and her unlawful arrest and ill-treatment on 29 May 2000. 21. On 9 July 2007 the Dubno Town Court found that on 29 May 2000 the applicant had been ill-treated and unlawfully taken from her home to the investigator's office. The court found that the authorities had acted unlawfully and that they had violated her right to the inviolability of her home, right to liberty and right to respect for human dignity. The court awarded the applicant 500 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH – approximately 73 euros (EUR) at the relevant time) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 22. On 26 May 2008 the Lviv Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 9 July 2007. 23. The applicant appealed on points of law, contesting the amount of the award. 24. On 8 May 2009 the Higher Administrative Court found that the appeal had not been prepared in a proper way. That court set a time-limit within which the applicant could rectify shortcomings in her appeal on points of law. 25. On 13 July 2009 the Higher Administrative Court returned the applicant's appeal without examining it on the merits, after finding that she had failed to comply with the procedural requirements for submitting appeals.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. On 30 March 2000 criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant for failure to comply with a court decision ordering the reinstatement of a teacher at the private school. 16. On 13 November 2007 the Supreme Court refused to examine an appeal by the applicant on points of law, on the grounds that she had failed to comply with procedural rules when submitting it. 18. On 30 June 2000 the Rivne regional prosecutor's office, having conducted a pre-investigation inquiry, refused to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers because of the absence of the constituent elements of a criminal offence. 19. On 20 March 2001, following a complaint by the applicant, the Prosecutor General's Office reversed the decision of 30 June 2000 as unsubstantiated, and ordered an additional inquiry. The applicant was not informed of the decision taken within the additional inquiry. In 2016 the Office of the Government Agent was informed that the file on those inquiries had been destroyed, along with other files relating to the same period, after the expiry of the statutory period for keeping such records. 20. On 29 May 2003 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Dubno Town Court, seeking damages for the violation of the inviolability of her home and her unlawful arrest and ill-treatment on 29 May 2000. 21. On 9 July 2007 the Dubno Town Court found that on 29 May 2000 the applicant had been ill-treated and unlawfully taken from her home to the investigator's office. The court found that the authorities had acted unlawfully and that they had violated her right to the inviolability of her home, right to liberty and right to respect for human dignity. The court awarded the applicant 500 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH – approximately 73 euros (EUR) at the relevant time) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 22. On 26 May 2008 the Lviv Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 9 July 2007. 23. The applicant appealed on points of law, contesting the amount of the award. 24. On 8 May 2009 the Higher Administrative Court found that the appeal had not been prepared in a proper way. That court set a time-limit within which the applicant could rectify shortcomings in her appeal on points of law. 25. On 13 July 2009 the Higher Administrative Court returned the applicant's appeal without examining it on the merits, after finding that she had failed to comply with the procedural requirements for submitting appeals.",TRUE,2,"The applicant suffered serious injuries at the hands of the police, but it's arguable whether this carries the requisite intent to count as ""torture."" It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 138,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","5. The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Kostino, Kirov Region. 6. The background facts relating to the planning, conduct and dispersal of the public event at Bolotnaya Square are set out in more detail in Frumkin v. Russia (no. 74568/12, §§ 7-65, 5 January 2016) and Yaroslav Belousov v. Russia (nos. 2653/13 and 60980/14, §§ 7-33, 4 October 2016). The parties' submissions on the circumstances directly relevant to the present case are set out below. 7. On 6 May 2012 a public demonstration entitled the ""March of Millions"" was held in central Moscow to protest against allegedly rigged presidential elections. The event had been approved by the city authorities in the form of a march followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square, which was supposed to end at 7.30 p.m. The march was peaceful and held without any disruptions, but when the marchers arrived at Bolotnaya Square it turned out that barriers installed by the police had narrowed the entrance to the meeting venue, allegedly restricting the space allocated for the meeting. To control the crowd the police cordon forced the protestors to remain within the barriers. There were numerous clashes between the police and protesters. At 5.30 p.m. the police ordered that the meeting finish early and began to disperse the participants. It took them about two hours to clear the protestors from the square. 8. On the same day the Moscow city department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation opened criminal proceedings to investigate suspected acts of mass disorder and violence against the police (Articles 212 § 2 and 318 § 1 of the Criminal Code). On 18 May 2012 the file was transferred to the headquarters of the Investigative Committee for further investigation. On 28 May 2012 an investigation was also launched into the criminal offence of organising acts of mass disorder (Article 212 § 1 of the Criminal Code). The two criminal cases were joined on the same day. 9. The applicant took part in the demonstration of 6 May 2012 at Bolotnaya Square. He was arrested on the date indicated below and charged with participation in mass disorder. The applicant was detained and tried on those charges but subsequently exempted from liability under the Amnesty Act. The applicant's complaints concerning the grounds and the length of his detention on remand, the poor conditions of detention and the lack of medical assistance in the remand prison were examined in the case Kovyazin and Others v. Russia (nos. 13008/13 and 2 others, 17 September 2015). 10. At the time of his arrest the applicant was working part-time as a videotape operator for a local newspaper Vyatskiy Nablyudatel. On 4 May 2012 he received an assignment from the newspaper chief editor to attend the ""March of Millions"" on 6 May 2012 at Bolotnaya Square and to take a video footage of the event. 11. According to the applicant, on 6 May 2012 he arrived at Bolotnaya Square, filmed the event and did not take part in any disorder or clashes with the police. After the events in question the applicant continued to live at his usual address and to work for the newspaper. 12. On 5 September 2012 the applicant was arrested and charged under Article 212 § 2 of the Criminal Code (participation in mass disorder accompanied by violence). He was accused of having breached public order during the demonstration on 6 May 2012, in particular, of having turned over portable toilet cabins and having piled them on the road to build a barrier obstructing the riot police. 13. On 7 September 2012 the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention where he remained one year and three months. It was found to be unjustified by the Court in the case of Kovyazin and Others (cited above, §§ 79-93). 14. On 24 May 2013 the applicant's criminal case was transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow for the determination of criminal charges. 15. On 6 June 2013 court proceedings began in hearing room no. 338 at the Moscow City Court, moving at the end of July to hearing room no. 635. The defendants, including the applicant, were held in glass cabins in both hearing rooms. From mid-September 2013 to the end of 2013 the hearings continued at the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow in hearing room no. 303. It was equipped with metal cages, in which nine defendants, including the applicant, sat during the hearings. For a detailed description of the conditions in those hearing rooms see Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, §§ 74-77). 16. On 18 December 2013 the State Duma passed the Amnesty Act, which exempted persons suspected and accused of criminal offences under Article 212 §§ 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code from criminal liability. 17. On 19 December 2013 the applicant requested the termination of the criminal proceedings against him by operation of the Amnesty Act. On the same day the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court granted the request and released him from detention.",Ruled as violated by court,,"15. On 6 June 2013 court proceedings began in hearing room no. 338 at the Moscow City Court, moving at the end of July to hearing room no. 635. The defendants, including the applicant, were held in glass cabins in both hearing rooms. From mid-September 2013 to the end of 2013 the hearings continued at the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow in hearing room no. 303. It was equipped with metal cages, in which nine defendants, including the applicant, sat during the hearings. For a detailed description of the conditions in those hearing rooms see Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, §§ 74-77). 17. On 19 December 2013 the applicant requested the termination of the criminal proceedings against him by operation of the Amnesty Act. On the same day the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court granted the request and released him from detention.",TRUE,2,"The applicant engaged in degrading treatment, but did not severely tangibly harm the police. It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 139,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","4. The applicant was born in 1991 and lives in Orenburg. 5. The facts of the applicant's ill-treatment were established in a judgment of the Promyshlenniy District Court of Orenburg of 15 December 2011, as upheld on 14 February 2012 by the Orenburg Regional Court, and are as follows. 6. At around 7 p.m. on 30 August 2009 the applicant was arrested at a bus stop by police officers of the criminal investigation unit and taken to a police station in Orenburg (УВД по г. Оренбургу). From 8 p.m. to midnight on 30 August 2009, and from 12 noon to 6 p.m. on 31 August 2009, police officers K. and M. subjected the applicant to physical and psychological violence in order to obtain a confession from him about a drug-related crime which they suspected him of having committed. 7. The facts of the ill-treatment on 30 August 2009 were established as follows. Officers K. and M. pushed the applicant to the floor and punched and kicked him numerous times in the head, face, chest, arms and legs. K. placed a plastic bag over his head, closing off his access to air, while M. held him down. As regards the ill-treatment on 31 August 2009, officers K. and M. punched the applicant numerous times in the head and threatened to detain him. 8. At 8 p.m. on 31 August 2009 the applicant was formally arrested on suspicion of possession of drugs and placed in a temporary detention facility. 9. On 2 September 2009 the applicant was released after giving an undertaking not to leave his place of residence. On the same day he sought medical help at a traumatology centre (TP no. 2). According to his medical records, he had abrasions on his forearms, a bruise under his right eye, a bruise in the left lumbar region and abrasions on his legs. 10. On 3 September 2009 the applicant made a complaint to the Orenburg regional investigative committee regarding his ill‑treatment. 11. On 4 September 2009 he underwent a forensic medical examination ordered by the investigation authority. According to report no. 6368, he had the following injuries: (i) a haematoma (swelling) of the soft tissues in the parietal region of the head, measuring 4 by 3 cm; (ii) four bruises of indefinite form on the right infraorbital region of the face, on his neck, on the left side of his chest and around the right iliac (hip) bone, measuring up to 4 by 3 cm each; and (iii) seventeen abrasions, some linear and some of indefinite form, on both forearms, his right hip and left lower leg, measuring from 0.8 by 0.5 cm to 2.5 by 1 cm each. The expert concluded that the applicant's injuries had resulted from being struck repeatedly with a hard, blunt object with a limited surface area on the day of the alleged incident, and had not caused any ""health damage"". Subsequent forensic medical expert reports of 4 December 2009 and 21 October 2010 came to similar conclusions. It was stated in the first of those reports that the applicant's injuries had been caused by at least twenty traumatic blows to his body. 12. Officers K. and M. were convicted under Article 286 § 3 (a) of the Criminal Code and banned from exercising official duties for three years. They were also given a three-year suspended sentence with a three-year probation period, which required them to appear monthly before the Service for the Execution of Sentences and disclose any change of place of work or residence. 13. The following circumstances were taken into account in sentencing the police officers. The fact that officer K. had a child under 14 years old was considered a mitigating circumstance, while the fact that he and M. had committed the crime with a group of other officers was considered an aggravating circumstance. It was further taken into account that K. and M. had positive references from their places of work and residence, had no previous convictions, and had led a law-abiding way of life without committing any administrative offences for more than two years since the crime had been committed. 14. On 31 November 2009 criminal proceedings against the applicant under Article 228 § 2 of the Criminal Code (possession of large quantities of drugs) were terminated for absence of a crime, pursuant to Article 24 § 1(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 15. In 2012 the applicant brought a civil claim against the Russian Ministry of Finance, seeking 2,655,936 Russian roubles (RUB) in compensation for his unlawful detention and ill‑treatment in police custody by K. and M. 16. On 28 June 2012 the Leninskiy District Court of Orenburg allowed the applicant's claim in part and awarded him RUB 20,000. In determining the amount of compensation, the court found that the applicant had sustained injuries as a result of the police officers' actions and had experienced physical and mental suffering, but that this had not caused him any ""health damage"". 17. The applicant appealed against that judgment to the Orenburg Regional Court, which on 19 September 2012 increased the amount of compensation to RUB 80,000.",Ruled as violated by court,,"12. Officers K. and M. were convicted under Article 286 § 3 (a) of the Criminal Code and banned from exercising official duties for three years. They were also given a three-year suspended sentence with a three-year probation period, which required them to appear monthly before the Service for the Execution of Sentences and disclose any change of place of work or residence. 13. The following circumstances were taken into account in sentencing the police officers. The fact that officer K. had a child under 14 years old was considered a mitigating circumstance, while the fact that he and M. had committed the crime with a group of other officers was considered an aggravating circumstance. It was further taken into account that K. and M. had positive references from their places of work and residence, had no previous convictions, and had led a law-abiding way of life without committing any administrative offences for more than two years since the crime had been committed.",FALSE,0,"The applicant was subjected to extended physical and psychological violence in order to obtain a confession, which is definitionally torture.", 140,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","5. The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Perm. 6. On 9 April 2007 at about 11 p.m. the applicant was stopped by the police and taken to the Dzerzhinskiy District Department of the Interior of the town of Perm (Дзержинский РОВД г. Перми – ""the police station"") for an identity check. 7. After the applicant's identity was established the applicant was informed that he was wanted on suspicion of having committed a crime. 8. On 10 April 2007 at 1 a.m. the applicant was placed in the cell for administrative detainees at the police station. At 9 a.m. he was handed over to a police officer, P. According to the applicant, P. subjected him to ill‑treatment by administering several blows to his chest, abdomen and face. 9. Subsequently the applicant was interrogated by an investigator, B., in the presence of N. (the head of the police station), P., and Zh. (another police officer), as a witness in criminal case no. 1470 instituted on 8 March 2007 under Article 161 § 2 of the Criminal Code (robbery). After his questioning the applicant was released. 10. Immediately after his release on 10 April 2007 the applicant complained at the police station of having been beaten by P. 11. On the same day the applicant went to a traumatology centre, where he was diagnosed with bruising on the left side of his forehead. 12. On 11 April 2007 the applicant complained of the beatings to the prosecutor's office. He was made to undergo an expert examination, which revealed the following injuries: bruises on the left side of his forehead, at the outer corner of his left eye and on the left side of his neck, and an abrasion behind his left ear. The expert concluded that the above-mentioned injuries could have been caused by his being hit by a hard blunt object(s) or by that object being drawn across the applicant's skin, possibly at the time and under the circumstances indicated by the applicant. 13. On 9 June 2007 the investigator of the Dzerzhinskiy district prosecutor's office of the town of Perm decided not to institute criminal proceedings against P., in the absence of any indication that a criminal act had been committed. Having questioned the applicant and others involved in the incident and having examined the medical evidence, the investigator found that there were no objective data confirming that the injuries had been inflicted by the police officer. The investigator noted, in particular, the discrepancies between the applicant's description of the alleged beatings and the injuries that he had actually sustained. 14. On 27 June 2007 the applicant challenged the above-mentioned decision before the court. 15. On 2 July 2007 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of Perm (""the District Court"") declined to examine the applicant's challenge. 16. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 24 July 2007 the Perm Regional Court (""the Regional Court"") quashed the decision of 2 July 2007. 17. On 24 August 2007 the District Court held that the decision of 9 June 2007 not to institute criminal proceedings against P. had been unlawful and unjustified. The court held that the applicant's allegations of ill-treatment had been substantiated by medical evidence. 18. On 20 September 2007 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 24 August 2007 (since it had been delivered in the absence of P.), and remitted the matter for fresh examination by a different bench. 19. On 9 October 2007 the District Court held that the decision of 9 June 2007 not to institute criminal proceedings against P. had been unlawful and unjustified. The court pointed out that the decision in question had been based on the submissions of the police officers, without due assessment of the fact that the applicant, who had had no bodily injuries prior to his arrest by the police (as confirmed by I., A. and Pan.), had been diagnosed as having such injuries immediately after his release from the police station. 20. On 13 November 2007 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 9 October 2007 on appeal and remitted the matter for fresh examination by a different bench. 21. On 29 November 2007 the District Court again held that the decision of 9 June 2007 not to institute criminal proceedings against P. had been unlawful and unjustified. The court's reasoning was similar to that in respect of the judgment of 9 October 2007. 22. Following an appeal by the district prosecutor on 20 December 2007 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 29 November 2007 on appeal and referred the matter again for fresh examination by a different bench. 23. On 30 January 2008 the District Court dismissed the applicant's claim. The court found that the investigator had rightly come to the conclusion that there had been no objective information confirming the applicant's allegation of ill-treatment by the police officer, P., and that the above-mentioned conclusion had been reached on the basis of comprehensive evidence. 24. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 19 February 2008 the Regional Court upheld the above-mentioned judgment on appeal.",Ruled as violated by court,,"13. On 9 June 2007 the investigator of the Dzerzhinskiy district prosecutor's office of the town of Perm decided not to institute criminal proceedings against P., in the absence of any indication that a criminal act had been committed. Having questioned the applicant and others involved in the incident and having examined the medical evidence, the investigator found that there were no objective data confirming that the injuries had been inflicted by the police officer. The investigator noted, in particular, the discrepancies between the applicant's description of the alleged beatings and the injuries that he had actually sustained.",TRUE,2,"The applicant suffered serious injuries at the hands of the police, but it's arguable whether this carries the requisite intent to count as ""torture."" It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 141,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","4. The applicant was born in 1977. He is currently serving a life sentence in Dnipro. 5. By the final domestic judgment of 16 July 2002, the applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and other crimes. 6. Until September 2004 the applicant was detained in the Cherkassy pre-trial detention centre (""the Cherkassy SIZO"") in which, he stated, cells had been overcrowded and had lacked basic amenities. 7. In October 2004 the applicant was transferred to Sokalska Correctional Colony no. 47 in Zhvyrka (""the Sokalska Colony""), where he remained until 15 November 2007. 8. The applicant stated that during his detention in the above Colony, one of his cellmates had been Mr V.M. Guk, a former applicant to the Court, with whom he had shared the cell for three years. Mr Guk's application has already been examined by the Court, which found, in particular, a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of his detention in the above Colony (see Guk v. Ukraine [Committee], no. 16995/05, §§ 83-86, 8 December 2016). 9. According to the applicant, during his stay in the Colony he was held in a cell, in which the living space was ""extremely insufficient"". As confirmation thereof, he referred to a written statement signed by Mr Guk, which he had submitted to the Court. According to that statement, the cell measured 3.7 by 3.4 metres (12.58 square metres) including a sanitary facility measuring 1.35 by 1.3 metres (1.76 square metres). 10. The cell lacked basic amenities: no furniture for storage of personal belongings and food; a very small table; no rubbish container; and no toilet cleaners. The tap water was of a poor quality and water filters were not provided. Heating in the cell was inadequate; the air was damp and cold; the walls were covered with mould. (b) Submissions by the Government 11. According to the Government, the equipment in the applicant's cell corresponded to the domestic standards. Prisoners were provided with all necessary amenities. The quality of the tap water corresponded to the standards. The temperature in the cell was not less than 18 degrees Celsius and the air in the cell was neither damp nor cold. 12. According to the applicant, the washing unit in the Colony had no changing facilities, so the prisoners had first to undress in their cells. A guard watched them wash and hurried them up. The prisoners had to shave with poor-quality razors. Prisoners with tuberculosis washed in the same unit as healthy prisoners; no disinfection measures were taken. Sick and healthy prisoners took their daily walks in the same courtyards, which were also small, damp and dark. 13. Whenever the guards opened the cell, the prisoners had to retreat to its far corner, squat and put their arms behind their heads. When taken out of the cell, the applicant was handcuffed; he was required to walk in a squat or some other unnatural position; his head was covered with a black bag; handcuffs were not disinfected. 14. Until April 2005 the prisoners had been required to roll up their mattresses in the morning. During the daytime they had been prohibited from lying down on the beds. 15. In support of the above submissions, the applicant referred to the written statement of Mr Guk, which confirmed the procedure the prisoners had had to follow when the guards had opened the cell. It also stated that, when taken out of the cell, the prisoners had been handcuffed and escorted in a crouched position; a bag had often been put over a prisoner's head. Sick and healthy prisoners washed in the same unit and walked in the same courtyard. Mattresses on the beds had to be rolled up during the daytime. 16. The applicant also stated that the administration had carried out searches of personal belongings, leaving them in disorder and often damaged; his watch had been stolen by an unidentified guard. Prisoners had not been provided with adequate medical assistance; they had been constantly ill-treated by the administration. In 2004-2005 the applicant had been regularly beaten by the guards. In 2004-2006 family visits had not been adequately organised. The applicant's correspondence with relatives had been reviewed and a number of his letters had disappeared. (b) Submissions by the Government 17. The Government stated that the washing unit had a changing room. Disinfection measures in the Colony had fully complied with the domestic standards. Prisoners with tuberculosis were detained in a separate cell; they washed after others, and the washing unit was disinfected afterwards. 18. Whenever the cell was opened, the prisoners were required to retreat to its far end, but not to squat. When escorted out of the cell, they were handcuffed, but not required to walk in a squat or with the head covered with a bag; handcuffs were in a proper condition and their disinfection was not required. 19. Searches were conducted pursuant to the relevant regulations, and there were no situations alleged by the applicant. Prisoners were not prohibited to use mattresses during the daytime.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"This is degrading treatment, but the applicant was not severely tangibly harmed. It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 142,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","5. The applicant was born in 1969 and is now serving his sentence in a detention facility at Nizhniy Tagil. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 7 November 2013 a group of nine detainees, including the applicant, was scheduled for a transfer from a police station to a remand prison. A Gazel prison van was available for transfer. It was designed to transport a maximum of seven prisoners, but Police Major V., who was in charge of the transfer, took the decision to take all nine prisoners at once to save fuel. 8. The prison van was manned by four officers. Driver G. and Major V. were seated in the front, and Officers K. and D. were riding in the rear part of the cabin next to the prisoner cells. 9. Five prisoners were placed in the large cell in the van, and three prisoners in individual cells. As the applicant was a former law-enforcement officer, the transfer regulations required that he should be separated from the other detainees. However, no other individual cells were available, so he was allowed to ride in the rear together with Officers K. and D. 10. Approximately half way to the destination, prisoners Sa., Ma. and Mu. kicked out the door of the large cell and attacked the convoy officers. Prisoner Mu. overpowered Officer D. and seized his holster containing a handgun. A struggle for the gun ensued and Mu. fired a shot at the floor. Prisoner Sa. grabbed Officer D. from behind, and a second shot was fired. 11. Meanwhile, Officer K. pushed prisoner Ma. aside, drew his gun and told everyone to freeze or he would shoot. Prisoners Sa. and Mu. were still struggling with Officer D. for the gun. Officer K. shot at Sa. and hit him. 12. Major V. came running to the back of the van and opened the door. More shots followed. Eventually, prisoner Mu. released the gun and threw it out of the van. At some point, a bullet ricocheted, wounding the applicant in his left shin. 13. The applicant was taken to a local military hospital where his wounded leg was put in a cast. On the following day he was discharged and transferred to a prison hospital. 14. In December 2013 the applicant complained to a prosecutor that he had been injured as a consequence of the grossly negligent actions of convoy officers who had breached the transfer regulations. 15. On 9 January 2014 an investigator with the Bashkortostan Regional Division of the Investigations Committee refused to open a criminal case. He found no indications of gross negligence arising from the decision to transport two prisoners in excess of the van's design capacity and that not putting the applicant in a cell had been motivated by ""considerations of budgetary austerity and saving money allocated for the purchase of fuel"". 16. On 4 December 2014 a deputy prosecutor of the Kirovskiy District in Ufa rejected the applicant's complaint against the investigator's decision. 17. On 30 April 2015 the Kirovskiy District Court in Ufa upheld the investigator's decision as lawful, noting that it had been within his competence to issue such a decision, and that the decision contained no defects of form. On 20 July 2015 the Supreme Court of the Bashkortostan Republic rejected an appeal against the District Court's judgment. 18. On 14 September 2015 the acting head of the regional division of the Investigations Committee ordered an additional ""pre‑investigation inquiry"" into whether an offence of negligence causing grievous bodily harm had been committed. Ten days later the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings: ""... it does not appear possible to establish with certainty that the bullet which hit [the applicant] was shot from the handgun of Officer V., rather than from [the handgun of] Officer D., while it was in the possession of prisoner Mu. Besides, under Article [41] of the Criminal Code, causing damage to interests protected by criminal law is not a criminal offence if the act causing such damage was based on a reasonable risk assessment and sought to achieve a socially useful objective, such as preventing an attempted escape in the instant case."" 19. On 8 February 2016 the deputy head of the regional division upheld the investigator's decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings. 20. On 5 May 2016 the supervising deputy prosecutor of the Bashkortostan Republic set the decision aside and ordered a forensic assessment of the applicant's injury. On 6 June 2016 the investigator with the Central Investigations Department in Ufa again refused to institute criminal proceedings, noting that the applicant's medical record could not be located. It had been sent to the facility where he was serving his sentence and that facility had not responded to the investigator's request for a copy. 21. In parallel criminal proceedings, on 22 December 2014 the Ordjonikidzevskiy District Court in Ufa convicted prisoners Mu. and Sa. of attempted escape from prison and sentenced them to five years' imprisonment each. Convoy Officers K., D. and V. had been given the status of injured parties in those proceedings. The applicant testified as a witness.",Ruled as violated by court,,"14. In December 2013 the applicant complained to a prosecutor that he had been injured as a consequence of the grossly negligent actions of convoy officers who had breached the transfer regulations. 15. On 9 January 2014 an investigator with the Bashkortostan Regional Division of the Investigations Committee refused to open a criminal case. He found no indications of gross negligence arising from the decision to transport two prisoners in excess of the van's design capacity and that not putting the applicant in a cell had been motivated by ""considerations of budgetary austerity and saving money allocated for the purchase of fuel"". 18. On 14 September 2015 the acting head of the regional division of the Investigations Committee ordered an additional ""pre‑investigation inquiry"" into whether an offence of negligence causing grievous bodily harm had been committed. Ten days later the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings: ""... it does not appear possible to establish with certainty that the bullet which hit [the applicant] was shot from the handgun of Officer V., rather than from [the handgun of] Officer D., while it was in the possession of prisoner Mu. Besides, under Article [41] of the Criminal Code, causing damage to interests protected by criminal law is not a criminal offence if the act causing such damage was based on a reasonable risk assessment and sought to achieve a socially useful objective, such as preventing an attempted escape in the instant case."" 20. On 5 May 2016 the supervising deputy prosecutor of the Bashkortostan Republic set the decision aside and ordered a forensic assessment of the applicant's injury. On 6 June 2016 the investigator with the Central Investigations Department in Ufa again refused to institute criminal proceedings, noting that the applicant's medical record could not be located. It had been sent to the facility where he was serving his sentence and that facility had not responded to the investigator's request for a copy.",FALSE,0,The fact pattern makes no mention of anything readable as torture., 143,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","5. The applicant was born in 1963. 6. From 22 July 2016 the applicant was held in the Chernigiv pre-trial detention centre (""the SIZO"") as a suspect in respect of a crime. 7. On 8 September 2016, while being held at the SIZO, the applicant suffered acute myocardial infarction. He was treated at Kozeletsk Town Hospital from 8 until 19 September 2016. 8. On 27 September and 6 October 2016 the applicant underwent examinations at the Chernigiv Regional Cardiological Centre. He was diagnosed with ischemic heart disease; acute myocardial infarction; third‑stage hypertonic disease; a hypertensive heart; and second-degree heart failure. The applicant was prescribed outpatient medical treatment and a further heart examination. On the last mentioned date he was recommended to undergo a cardiac ventriculography test. 9. On 7 February 2017, in response to a request for information lodged by the Chernigiv regional prosecutor's office, Chernihiv City Hospital (""the Hospital"") noted that the applicant's state of health posed a high risk to his life. 10. On 15 March 2017, the Hospital informed the SIZO authorities that the cost of a cardiac ventriculography test was 4,000 hryvnias (UAH – approximately 140 euros (EUR)). There is no information regarding whether that test was undertaken. 11. Following a deterioration in the applicant's health, on 23 May 2017 the Court indicated to the Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that they should immediately ensure that the recommended treatment was available and provided to the applicant and that the applicant was placed in a specialised medical institution for medical treatment – including surgery, if appropriate. 12. On 23 May 2017 the applicant was transported to the Hospital, where the previous diagnosis was confirmed (see paragraph 8 above). On the same day he was returned to the SIZO and provided with outpatient treatment. 13. On 25 May 2017 the Hospital informed the SIZO that in order for the applicant to be provided with qualified medical advice, he needed a cardiac ventriculography test. In view of the complexity of the applicant's state of health, before the cardiac ventriculography test the Hospital requested that the applicant have an additional consultation at the Amosov Cardiology Institute. 14. According to the Government, the SIZO administration offered the applicant transportation to the Kyiv SIZO in a prison van with a view to his undergoing a further medical examination at the Amosov Cardiology Institute. On 16 June 2017 the applicant refused that offer, arguing that he could not be transported in a prison van owing to his state of health. The case file contains a statement by the applicant dated 16 June 2017 addressed to the head of the SIZO, according to which he did not refuse transportation but insisted on it being in a form that was compatible with his state of health. 15. Following a further deterioration in the applicant's health, on 22 June 2017 the ambulance took him to the Hospital, where the previous diagnosis (see paragraph 8 above) was confirmed, electrocardiography and cardiac ventriculography tests were recommended, and he was prescribed some medication. 16. The case file contains an extract from the applicant's medical file bearing no date and signed by the head of the SIZO medical unit; according to the extract, the SIZO had no cardiologist on its staff and high-quality medical treatment was not possible at the SIZO. The applicant did not receive the prescribed medication in full owing to a lack of funds. The extract furthermore stated that he remained under the supervision of the SIZO medical staff and did not require inpatient medical treatment. 17. On 10 July 2017 the Court reiterated its previous decision (see paragraph 11 above) indicating that the authorities were to ensure that the applicant was transported promptly, and in conditions commensurate with his state of health, to a specialised medical institution to undergo the necessary medical examinations, such as a cardiac ventriculography test, in order that a correct diagnosis could be made and the applicant could receive medical treatment, if necessary. On 8 August 2017 the Government submitted that the applicant had not been transported to a specialised medical institution, as had been indicated by the Court, owing to his refusal of 16 June 2017 (see paragraph 14 above). 18. According to the available information, from August 2016 until September 2017 the applicant underwent more than fifteen examinations, both within the SIZO and at civilian hospitals, and an ambulance was called twelve times to provide him with urgent treatment. 19. On an unspecified date the applicant was released from custody. On 7 November 2017 he underwent an examination at the Amosov Cardiology Institute. According to the results of the examination, he was diagnosed with ischemic heart disease, exertional angina (class III), postinfarction cardiosclerosis, and atherosclerosis of the aorta and of the coronary arteries. It was recommended that he undergo surgery for his ischemic heart disease, together with further inpatient treatment. There is no information regarding whether the applicant has undergone the recommended surgery and treatment.",Ruled as violated by court,,"11. Following a deterioration in the applicant's health, on 23 May 2017 the Court indicated to the Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that they should immediately ensure that the recommended treatment was available and provided to the applicant and that the applicant was placed in a specialised medical institution for medical treatment – including surgery, if appropriate. 14. According to the Government, the SIZO administration offered the applicant transportation to the Kyiv SIZO in a prison van with a view to his undergoing a further medical examination at the Amosov Cardiology Institute. On 16 June 2017 the applicant refused that offer, arguing that he could not be transported in a prison van owing to his state of health. The case file contains a statement by the applicant dated 16 June 2017 addressed to the head of the SIZO, according to which he did not refuse transportation but insisted on it being in a form that was compatible with his state of health. 17. On 10 July 2017 the Court reiterated its previous decision (see paragraph 11 above) indicating that the authorities were to ensure that the applicant was transported promptly, and in conditions commensurate with his state of health, to a specialised medical institution to undergo the necessary medical examinations, such as a cardiac ventriculography test, in order that a correct diagnosis could be made and the applicant could receive medical treatment, if necessary. On 8 August 2017 the Government submitted that the applicant had not been transported to a specialised medical institution, as had been indicated by the Court, owing to his refusal of 16 June 2017 (see paragraph 14 above).",TRUE,2,"The applicant suffered severe tangible harms, but it's arguable that these would've occurred regardless.", 144,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","5. The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Viljandi. 6. At the time of the events at issue, the applicant was serving a prison sentence for robbery and violence against a prison official. According to the risk assessment contained in his individual management plan drawn up by Tartu Prison on 16 January 2013 (kinnipeetava individuaalne täitmiskava), the applicant had been punished five times for criminal acts and was assessed to be a danger to the public, prone to risks and impulsive. 7. On 13 May 2013 the applicant requested prison leave to attend his grandmother's funeral in Tarvastu, Viljandi County, which is located approximately 80 km from Tartu Prison. The applicant stated in his request that he was aware that the leave would entail him wearing handcuffs and that he would be accompanied by guards. 8. Permission for prison leave under supervision (lühiajaline väljaviimine) was granted on 14 May 2013. The decision (käskkiri) made reference to the fact that the applicant was considered highly dangerous and had received several disciplinary punishments which were still in effect. The decision was accompanied by an order (korraldus) of the same date which detailed how the prison leave would be organised, specifying that the applicant had to be escorted by at least three prison officers and that, as a preventive measure, he had to wear both hand and ankle cuffs. 9. On 15 May 2013 the applicant and his brother (also a prisoner in the same prison), were to be transported to the funeral service in the same prison van. The applicant signed a document about the prison escort regime (kinnipeetavale isikule lühiajalise väljaviimise raames kohaldatav saatmisrežiim) which explained the rules about being escorted, including the obligation to wear hand and ankle cuffs. At 9.30 a.m. he was placed in a single occupancy compartment of a prisoner transport van. It was a Volkswagen Crafter van used by the prison since October 2010, which had one four-person compartment and four single occupancy compartments. Each single occupancy compartment was at least 60 cm wide, 149 cm high and 85 cm long, with a floor area of 0.51 square metres. The compartment in which the applicant was placed was furnished with a plastic seat attached to the floor. There were no handles or seat belt. 10. The prison van reached the vehicle access gate of the prison premises. The applicant then decided not to go to the funeral and was taken back to the prison approximately twenty minutes later. His brother was thereafter transported to the funeral at 10.02 a.m. and reached the cemetery at 10.57 a.m. 11. On 9 September 2013 the applicant lodged a request with Tartu Prison, asking for compensation in the sum of 7,500 euros (EUR), claiming that the use of hand and ankle cuffs had been unjustified and that the prison authorities had wished to expose him to the public and to his family in such degrading circumstances. He added that the van compartment had been too small and without safety equipment, making him fear for his life. The applicant also alleged he had suffered psychological trauma because he had been forced to forego attending his grandmother's funeral owing to the above-mentioned conditions. The prison dismissed his complaint. 12. On 4 December 2013, repeating the same complaints as those detailed above, the applicant lodged a complaint against Tartu Prison with the Tartu Administrative Court. 13. On 11 March 2014 the Tartu Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's complaint. The court referred to the legal basis for using hand and ankle cuffs and considered it justified. With regard to the conditions in the transport van, the court noted that the applicant had refused to be transferred and therefore had never been subjected to the conditions described. As the applicant had refused to go on prison leave of his own free will, no unlawful action could be attributed to Tartu Prison. The court considered it plausible that the applicant had decided not to attend the funeral because he had not wanted his relatives to have a bad impression of him. However, there was no sign that the prison authorities had particularly wanted to degrade him in front of his family by resorting to the use of hand and ankle cuffs. 14. On 9 September 2014 the applicant lodged an appeal against the first-instance judgment with the Tartu Court of Appeal. He claimed, inter alia, that there had been no reason to conclude that he would have been embarrassed to be in shackles in front of his family, and that the main reason he had decided not to go to the funeral had been the transport conditions. 15. On 7 October 2014 the Tartu Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal and upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. Since the applicant had foregone being transferred to his grandmother's funeral, there had been no unlawful act on the part of the prison authorities. As the transfer van had never left the precincts of the prison, he could not claim compensation for something that might have happened or for any trauma that might have occurred had he taken the prison leave. 16. On 10 November 2014 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, stating that he stood by the same submissions he had made to the lower courts. On 11 February 2015 the Supreme Court refused him leave to appeal on points of law.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While the applicant complained of degrading conditions, the government's rebuttal and the lack of tangible harm suffered suggest it was not so.", 145,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","5. The applicants were born in 1964 and 1973 respectively and are detained in Corradino Correctional facility, Paola, Malta. 6. The first applicant is a Venezuelan national who has been detained in Corradino Correctional Facility, Paola, since September 2009. He is serving a ten‑year prison sentence following a judgment of 21 March 2012. Since 10 January 2013 he has been detained in Division 3, cell no. 148. The first applicant has never asked for a transfer because, although there were prospects that he would be transferred to a division with an automated flushing system, this would also have meant that he would lose his individual cell and be placed in a dormitory, to the detriment of his privacy. 7. The first applicant submitted that his cell has one window and one air vent. The latter is clogged with dirt and debris and his cell window is positioned too high up, meaning that he therefore has to climb onto the sink to open or close it. He stated that the cell does not have adequate ventilation and it is subject to high temperatures in the summer and low temperatures in the winter. He alleged that he had not been provided with a heater during the winter and that his requests to this effect had been turned down. The prison authorities had provided him only with one blanket, other blankets and clothes having been received from NGOs. In the summer, when the temperature ranges between 35 and 40 degrees Celsius, the two fans purchased by the first applicant do not suffice as they merely circulate hot air, which is made worse in the absence of proper ventilation. 8. He also claimed that he has to use a bucket to flush his toilet. Given the low water pressure, it takes time to fill a bucket and sometimes more than one bucket is necessary to flush the toilet, making the situation deplorable, especially in the summer. 9. As the building housing the Division is more than 150 years old, the ceiling releases dust, which is allegedly harmful to the first applicant's lungs. 10. The first applicant submitted that he does not have access to drinking water, since the tap water is rusty and filthy, and he therefore has to purchase drinking water. However, his job in prison pays only 0.60 euro (EUR) cents per day and in the summer he drinks three six packs of water a week, at considerable cost. The Government submitted that the first applicant received EUR 34.77 every four weeks in so‑called ""gratuity"" remuneration and from the ""Work and Pay"" scheme, with which he had been involved since 2015. They stated that at the tuck shop a six‑pack of water cost EUR 2.24 and an individual bottle EUR 0.38. 11. The second applicant, who is a national of the Dominican Republic, has been detained in Corradino Correctional Facility since 24 November 2009. He is serving a nine-year prison sentence following a judgment of 15 October 2012. Since 27 January 2012 he has been detained in Division 3, cell no. 155 (with the exception of one day ‑ 3 October 2015 ‑ spent in Division 6). 12. According to the Government, following communication of the complaint, the second applicant was asked whether he wanted to be transferred to another division and replied in the negative. 13. The second applicant submitted that his cell window is at a height of more than two metres and it is very difficult to open without endangering one's life. Its metal protective bars make it difficult for the cell to admit any natural light. Although there are two openings for the purposes of ventilation, one of them is blocked and there is therefore not sufficient ventilation. 14. The second applicant alleged that the water is not drinkable; he therefore has to purchase it. The Government submitted that the second applicant received EUR 41.58 every four weeks in so-called ""gratuity remuneration"" and from the ""Work and Pay"" scheme, with which he had become involved prior to 2015. 15. The dust which falls from the cell's ceiling allegedly affects the second applicant, who suffers from asthma. The Government submitted that the amount of dust falling from the ceiling of his cell was not abnormal, but was what emanates naturally from Maltese stone. They noted that the second applicant had never asked for materials to paint his cell. 16. The second applicant also submitted that because of the humidity in his cell and the fact that he does not have a heater, he frequently catches the flu during the winter months. The Government submitted that the cell was humid because the second applicant had blocked his vent with a towel and did not undertake any maintenance of his cell. 17. The second applicant noted that the light both inside and outside the cell is very poor, making it difficult for him to read. The Government noted that the second applicant had a ceiling light and another wall‑mounted light, as well a portable lamp which he had acquired. Natural light came in through three skylights and artificial light was provided through bell lamps of 400W each. The second applicant also claimed that the spiral staircase is not appropriate in the case of an emergency, since a stretcher could not be carried down it and it would not be possible to evacuate people two at a time. In this connection the Government submitted that other options were available should an emergency arise, such as the use of the walkway between the divisions.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"7. The first applicant submitted that his cell has one window and one air vent. The latter is clogged with dirt and debris and his cell window is positioned too high up, meaning that he therefore has to climb onto the sink to open or close it. He stated that the cell does not have adequate ventilation and it is subject to high temperatures in the summer and low temperatures in the winter. He alleged that he had not been provided with a heater during the winter and that his requests to this effect had been turned down. The prison authorities had provided him only with one blanket, other blankets and clothes having been received from NGOs. In the summer, when the temperature ranges between 35 and 40 degrees Celsius, the two fans purchased by the first applicant do not suffice as they merely circulate hot air, which is made worse in the absence of proper ventilation. 8. He also claimed that he has to use a bucket to flush his toilet. Given the low water pressure, it takes time to fill a bucket and sometimes more than one bucket is necessary to flush the toilet, making the situation deplorable, especially in the summer. 9. As the building housing the Division is more than 150 years old, the ceiling releases dust, which is allegedly harmful to the first applicant's lungs. 10. The first applicant submitted that he does not have access to drinking water, since the tap water is rusty and filthy, and he therefore has to purchase drinking water. However, his job in prison pays only 0.60 euro (EUR) cents per day and in the summer he drinks three six packs of water a week, at considerable cost. The Government submitted that the first applicant received EUR 34.77 every four weeks in so‑called ""gratuity"" remuneration and from the ""Work and Pay"" scheme, with which he had been involved since 2015. They stated that at the tuck shop a six‑pack of water cost EUR 2.24 and an individual bottle EUR 0.38. 13. The second applicant submitted that his cell window is at a height of more than two metres and it is very difficult to open without endangering one's life. Its metal protective bars make it difficult for the cell to admit any natural light. Although there are two openings for the purposes of ventilation, one of them is blocked and there is therefore not sufficient ventilation. 14. The second applicant alleged that the water is not drinkable; he therefore has to purchase it. The Government submitted that the second applicant received EUR 41.58 every four weeks in so-called ""gratuity remuneration"" and from the ""Work and Pay"" scheme, with which he had become involved prior to 2015. 15. The dust which falls from the cell's ceiling allegedly affects the second applicant, who suffers from asthma. The Government submitted that the amount of dust falling from the ceiling of his cell was not abnormal, but was what emanates naturally from Maltese stone. They noted that the second applicant had never asked for materials to paint his cell. 16. The second applicant also submitted that because of the humidity in his cell and the fact that he does not have a heater, he frequently catches the flu during the winter months. The Government submitted that the cell was humid because the second applicant had blocked his vent with a towel and did not undertake any maintenance of his cell. 17. The second applicant noted that the light both inside and outside the cell is very poor, making it difficult for him to read. The Government noted that the second applicant had a ceiling light and another wall‑mounted light, as well a portable lamp which he had acquired. Natural light came in through three skylights and artificial light was provided through bell lamps of 400W each. The second applicant also claimed that the spiral staircase is not appropriate in the case of an emergency, since a stretcher could not be carried down it and it would not be possible to evacuate people two at a time. In this connection the Government submitted that other options were available should an emergency arise, such as the use of the walkway between the divisions.",TRUE,1,"While the applicants complained of degrading conditions, the government's rebuttal and the lack of tangible harm suffered suggest it was not so.", 146,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","4. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Klaipėda. 5. On 2 July 2013 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of possession of drugs with intention to distribute. On 9 July 2013 the applicant was brought to Šiauliai Remand Prison and was held there until 31 May 2016. In judgment of 23 December 2015 the applicant was sentenced to four years imprisonment by the Klaipėda District Court. Following an appeal by the applicant, the judgment became final on 25 May 2016. The applicant was then transferred to Alytus Correctional Facility and after serving his sentence was released on 30 June 2017. 6. In April 2014 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Šiauliai Regional Administrative Court about his conditions of detention in Šiauliai Remand Prison. He complained of: overcrowding; of there being no partition wall between toilets and cells; of insufficient ventilation; of insufficient time in the open air; of insufficient time for showering; of the presence of cockroaches; of inmates smoking in the cells; of no long-stay or short visits; of the fact that he had not been allowed to go home; of the low energy value of the food provided; of the prohibition on receiving food from relatives and friends; and of the prohibition on having his own blanket and a music player. 7. On 27 June 2014 the Šiauliai Regional Administrative Court held that for 135 days the applicant had been housed in cell no. 53, and the personal space available to him had varied between 1.87 and 3.12 sq. m. This had been a clear violation of domestic norms. For eighty-seven days the applicant had been held in cell no. 50, where the personal space available to him had varied between 1.86 and 4.65 sq. m, and it had come close to a violation of domestic norms. The court further held that the presence of toilets in the applicant's cell had not corresponded to the requirements of domestic law, that the lighting had been insufficient and the temperature had been too low, and that the food provided had had insufficient energy value. The court noted that inmates could buy food and other necessities in the shops of the facility. The applicant's other complaints were dismissed as unsubstantiated. As regards the prohibition on having his own blanket and a music player, the court held that the use of personal blankets was not allowed in accordance with domestic norms. As for music players, inmates could use television sets, computers, computer-game devices, discs that could not be rewritten, other memory cards of up to 4GB and bedding (except for a pillow, a mattress and a blanket) that could be given to them by their spouses, partners or close relatives. As regards long-stay and short visits, the court held that remand prisoners did not have a right to long-stay visits but he had a right to short visits of up to two hours. The applicant asked for a long-stay visit but on 20 January 2014 the prosecutor decided not to allow him such a visit. The court also held that inmates could be allowed to go home for up to five days in the event of the death or serious illness of a spouse, partner or close relative, or in the event of a natural disaster that had caused serious pecuniary damage to the inmate, his or her spouse, partner or close relatives. However, in his request of 31 January 2014 the applicant did not indicate any of those circumstances. As a result, the applicant was awarded 1,200 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 348 euros (EUR)) in compensation for inadequate material conditions of detention for 222 days during the period between 9 July 2013 and 3 April 2014. 8. The applicant appealed, and on 11 February 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court held that it was impossible to calculate for how many days the applicant had had sufficient personal space at his disposal, and decided to hold that for 245 days the applicant had not had sufficient personal space, and that this had been a breach of Article 3 of the Convention. The court thus decided to increase the compensation to EUR 1,500. 9. In October 2014 the applicant lodged a new complaint concerning his material conditions in Šiauliai Remand Prison. He complained of overcrowding, low temperature, dampness, insufficient lighting, prisoners smoking in the cells, that his partner had not been able to pay him a long‑stay visit and that he had not been allowed to ""take holidays"". It appears that the applicant had asked the prison management to allow him to receive a long-stay visit from his spouse and his sister on 28 April 2014. 10. On 5 December 2014 the Šiauliai Regional Administrative Court held that during the period between 4 April and 5 October 2014 – for 176 days – the applicant had had insufficient cell space. As regards long-stay visits, the court agreed with Šiauliai Remand Prison and stated that the applicant had not been entitled to them under domestic law; he could have had short visits but, however, he had never asked for them. The court accepted the argument of the Šiauliai Remand Prison that remand detainees had been held in prisons or correctional facilities for short periods of time and they were not in a similar situation to convicted inmates. The court awarded the applicant EUR 869 in compensation for the material conditions of his detention. 11. The applicant appealed, and on 21 September 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision in its entirety.",Ruled as violated by court,,"5. On 2 July 2013 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of possession of drugs with intention to distribute. On 9 July 2013 the applicant was brought to Šiauliai Remand Prison and was held there until 31 May 2016. In judgment of 23 December 2015 the applicant was sentenced to four years imprisonment by the Klaipėda District Court. Following an appeal by the applicant, the judgment became final on 25 May 2016. The applicant was then transferred to Alytus Correctional Facility and after serving his sentence was released on 30 June 2017. 7. On 27 June 2014 the Šiauliai Regional Administrative Court held that for 135 days the applicant had been housed in cell no. 53, and the personal space available to him had varied between 1.87 and 3.12 sq. m. This had been a clear violation of domestic norms. For eighty-seven days the applicant had been held in cell no. 50, where the personal space available to him had varied between 1.86 and 4.65 sq. m, and it had come close to a violation of domestic norms. The court further held that the presence of toilets in the applicant's cell had not corresponded to the requirements of domestic law, that the lighting had been insufficient and the temperature had been too low, and that the food provided had had insufficient energy value. The court noted that inmates could buy food and other necessities in the shops of the facility. The applicant's other complaints were dismissed as unsubstantiated. As regards the prohibition on having his own blanket and a music player, the court held that the use of personal blankets was not allowed in accordance with domestic norms. As for music players, inmates could use television sets, computers, computer-game devices, discs that could not be rewritten, other memory cards of up to 4GB and bedding (except for a pillow, a mattress and a blanket) that could be given to them by their spouses, partners or close relatives. As regards long-stay and short visits, the court held that remand prisoners did not have a right to long-stay visits but he had a right to short visits of up to two hours. The applicant asked for a long-stay visit but on 20 January 2014 the prosecutor decided not to allow him such a visit. The court also held that inmates could be allowed to go home for up to five days in the event of the death or serious illness of a spouse, partner or close relative, or in the event of a natural disaster that had caused serious pecuniary damage to the inmate, his or her spouse, partner or close relatives. However, in his request of 31 January 2014 the applicant did not indicate any of those circumstances. As a result, the applicant was awarded 1,200 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 348 euros (EUR)) in compensation for inadequate material conditions of detention for 222 days during the period between 9 July 2013 and 3 April 2014. 8. The applicant appealed, and on 11 February 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court held that it was impossible to calculate for how many days the applicant had had sufficient personal space at his disposal, and decided to hold that for 245 days the applicant had not had sufficient personal space, and that this had been a breach of Article 3 of the Convention. The court thus decided to increase the compensation to EUR 1,500. 9. In October 2014 the applicant lodged a new complaint concerning his material conditions in Šiauliai Remand Prison. He complained of overcrowding, low temperature, dampness, insufficient lighting, prisoners smoking in the cells, that his partner had not been able to pay him a long‑stay visit and that he had not been allowed to ""take holidays"". It appears that the applicant had asked the prison management to allow him to receive a long-stay visit from his spouse and his sister on 28 April 2014. 10. On 5 December 2014 the Šiauliai Regional Administrative Court held that during the period between 4 April and 5 October 2014 – for 176 days – the applicant had had insufficient cell space. As regards long-stay visits, the court agreed with Šiauliai Remand Prison and stated that the applicant had not been entitled to them under domestic law; he could have had short visits but, however, he had never asked for them. The court accepted the argument of the Šiauliai Remand Prison that remand detainees had been held in prisons or correctional facilities for short periods of time and they were not in a similar situation to convicted inmates. The court awarded the applicant EUR 869 in compensation for the material conditions of his detention. 11. The applicant appealed, and on 21 September 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision in its entirety.",TRUE,2,"This is degrading treatment, according to the court's decisions, but the applicant was not severely tangibly harmed. It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 147,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","4. The first applicant, Mr Stemplys, was born in 1963 and lives in Marijampolė. The second applicant, Mr Debesys, was born in 1954 and lives in Vilnius. 5. The first applicant was detained in the Pravieniškės Correctional Facility from 6 April 2005 to 28 August 2015. 6. On 19 December 2012 he submitted a civil claim against the State, alleging that he was being detained in overcrowded and unsanitary cells and that his health had deteriorated as a result. He claimed 250,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 72,400 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 7. On 26 February 2013 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant's claim in part. It firstly held that the time-limit for claiming damages was three years from the damage being caused, and thus dismissed the part of the applicant's claim concerning the period before 19 December 2009 as time‑barred. The court then found that from 19 December 2009 to 19 December 2012 (the day when the applicant had submitted his complaint) he had had between 1.98 and 2.74 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.1 sq. m. However, the court found that the sanitary conditions in the cells complied with relevant domestic hygiene norms. It also dismissed as unproven the applicant's claim that his health had deteriorated. The court further underlined that the applicant was detained in a dormitory-type facility, he was able to move around freely during the day, and various leisure and educational activities were available. He was awarded LTL 1,000 (approximately EUR 290) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 8. On 7 October 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance court's judgment in its entirety. 9. On an unspecified date the applicant submitted a new civil claim against the State concerning the conditions of his detention after 19 December 2012, claiming LTL 63,750 (approximately EUR 18,500) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 10. On 21 October 2013 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant's claim in part. It found that from 19 December 2012 to 21 October 2013 (the day the court issued its decision) the applicant had had 1.98 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.1 sq. m, and that during that period for fourteen days he had been placed in solitary confinement as a disciplinary measure, where he had had 3.47 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.6 sq. m. Again, the court found that the sanitary conditions in the cells complied with relevant domestic hygiene norms, and dismissed as unproven the applicant's claims that his health had deteriorated. He was awarded LTL 400 (approximately EUR 116) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 11. On 25 August 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance court's judgment in its entirety. 12. The second applicant was detained in the Pravieniškės Correctional Facility from 19 May 2001 to 20 December 2013. 13. On 28 June 2012 he submitted a civil claim against the State, alleging that he was being detained in overcrowded and unsanitary cells and that his health had deteriorated as a result. He claimed LTL 125,000 (approximately EUR 36,200) in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. 14. On 26 February 2013 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant's claim in part. It firstly held that the time-limit for claiming damages was three years from the damage being caused, and thus dismissed the part of the applicant's claim concerning the period before 28 June 2009 as time‑barred. The court then found that from 28 June 2009 to 28 June 2012 (the day when the applicant had submitted his complaint) he had had around 2.55 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.1 sq. m. However, the court found that the sanitary conditions in the cells complied with relevant domestic hygiene norms. It also held that the deterioration in the applicant's state of health was not related to the conditions of his detention. The court further underlined that the applicant was detained in a dormitory-type facility, he was able to move around freely during the day, and various leisure and educational activities were available. He was awarded LTL 1,000 (approximately EUR 290) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 15. On 15 October 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance court's judgment in its entirety. 16. On 15 May 2013 the applicant submitted a new civil claim against the State concerning the conditions of his detention after 28 June 2012, claiming LTL 33,875 (approximately EUR 9,800) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 17. On 16 September 2013 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant's claim in part. It found that from 28 June 2012 to 15 May 2013 (the day when the applicant had submitted his complaint) the applicant had had between 1.59 and 2.77 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.1 sq. m. Again, the court found that the sanitary conditions in the cells complied with relevant domestic hygiene norms and found no causal link between the deterioration in the applicant's state of health and the conditions of his detention. The applicant was awarded LTL 500 (approximately EUR 145) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 18. On 18 September 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance court's judgment in its entirety.",Ruled as violated by court,"6. On 19 December 2012 he submitted a civil claim against the State, alleging that he was being detained in overcrowded and unsanitary cells and that his health had deteriorated as a result. He claimed 250,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 72,400 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.","7. On 26 February 2013 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant's claim in part. It firstly held that the time-limit for claiming damages was three years from the damage being caused, and thus dismissed the part of the applicant's claim concerning the period before 19 December 2009 as time‑barred. The court then found that from 19 December 2009 to 19 December 2012 (the day when the applicant had submitted his complaint) he had had between 1.98 and 2.74 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.1 sq. m. However, the court found that the sanitary conditions in the cells complied with relevant domestic hygiene norms. It also dismissed as unproven the applicant's claim that his health had deteriorated. The court further underlined that the applicant was detained in a dormitory-type facility, he was able to move around freely during the day, and various leisure and educational activities were available. He was awarded LTL 1,000 (approximately EUR 290) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 10. On 21 October 2013 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant's claim in part. It found that from 19 December 2012 to 21 October 2013 (the day the court issued its decision) the applicant had had 1.98 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.1 sq. m, and that during that period for fourteen days he had been placed in solitary confinement as a disciplinary measure, where he had had 3.47 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.6 sq. m. Again, the court found that the sanitary conditions in the cells complied with relevant domestic hygiene norms, and dismissed as unproven the applicant's claims that his health had deteriorated. He was awarded LTL 400 (approximately EUR 116) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 14. On 26 February 2013 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant's claim in part. It firstly held that the time-limit for claiming damages was three years from the damage being caused, and thus dismissed the part of the applicant's claim concerning the period before 28 June 2009 as time‑barred. The court then found that from 28 June 2009 to 28 June 2012 (the day when the applicant had submitted his complaint) he had had around 2.55 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.1 sq. m. However, the court found that the sanitary conditions in the cells complied with relevant domestic hygiene norms. It also held that the deterioration in the applicant's state of health was not related to the conditions of his detention. The court further underlined that the applicant was detained in a dormitory-type facility, he was able to move around freely during the day, and various leisure and educational activities were available. He was awarded LTL 1,000 (approximately EUR 290) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 17. On 16 September 2013 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant's claim in part. It found that from 28 June 2012 to 15 May 2013 (the day when the applicant had submitted his complaint) the applicant had had between 1.59 and 2.77 sq. m of personal space, in breach of the domestic standard of 3.1 sq. m. Again, the court found that the sanitary conditions in the cells complied with relevant domestic hygiene norms and found no causal link between the deterioration in the applicant's state of health and the conditions of his detention. The applicant was awarded LTL 500 (approximately EUR 145) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.",TRUE,2,"This is degrading treatment, according to the court's decisions, but the applicant was not severely tangibly harmed, nor were the conditions all degrading. It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 148,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","5. The applicant was born in 1972 and is currently serving a life sentence in Ladyzhynska colony no. 39 (""the colony""). 6. On 25 November 2004 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal convicted the applicant of several crimes and sentenced him to life imprisonment and ordered confiscation of all his property. On 23 February 2006 the Supreme Court upheld that judgment with certain changes. 7. Since 26 August 2003 the applicant has been detained in various detention facilities, initially pending the criminal investigation against him and his trial, and subsequently after sentencing. 8. On 26 August 2003 the applicant was placed in a temporary detention facility in Donetsk (SIZO No. 5) for the duration of the criminal proceedings against him. On 25 January 2007, as a result of conditions in the detention facility, he was diagnosed with tuberculosis. The case file contains other evidence to indicate that 1 February 2007 was the date of the tuberculosis diagnosis. 9. Upon completion of the criminal proceedings, on 16 March 2007 the applicant was transferred to the Ladyzhynska colony. 10. On 20 March 2007 a preliminary examination of the applicant was conducted, together with laboratory tests and an X-ray. He was put under medical supervision owing to the residual effects of his tuberculosis. 11. According to the Government, the applicant was under medical supervision and received the appropriate medical care for his tuberculosis. In particular, he had been examined on a regular basis by the colony doctors between 20 March 2007 and 26 February 2018 and prescribed treatment. As a result of each course of treatment his health had improved. The Government did not specify the frequency of the applicant's regular examination and treatment during that time. 12. In December 2011 a blood test revealed that the applicant had contracted hepatitis C. According to the applicant, he was denied access to copies of the test results. 13. According to the Government, on 28 February 2012 the applicant was examined by a colony doctor who diagnosed him with chronic persistent hepatitis in remission. The applicant was prescribed treatment. 14. On 16 May 2012 doctors from the Vinnytsya Regional Centre of Control and Prevention of HIV-Aids diagnosed the applicant with hepatitis C in remission without hepatic impairment. According to the Government, the applicant was prescribed with symptomatic treatment and as a result of the treatment his health improved. The Government did not specify the nature of that treatment. 15. According to the Government, the applicant was supervised by the colony doctors and was prescribed with all necessary medicine and a special diet. The Government did not specify the frequency of the treatment or the nature of the diet provided to the applicant. 16. The Government further submitted that from 23 February to 20 March 2015 the applicant had been under medical treatment in a multi-disciplinary hospital in Stryzhavska correctional colony no. 81. As a result of the treatment his health had improved. The nature of that treatment was not specified. 17. They also added that as of 26 February 2018 the applicant remained under the ongoing supervision of the colony doctors, and his state of health was satisfactory. 18. According to the applicant, during his detention he submitted numerous applications to the domestic authorities, including the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal (""the Court of Appeal""), seeking to obtain copies of various documents to be submitted to the Court in substantiation of his application. 19. He added that between August and November 2006 he requested that the Court of Appeal provide him with a copy of his indictment. His requests were refused on 8 August and 6 September 2006 on the grounds that he had already been provided with a copy of that document in the course of the criminal proceedings against him and that there was no legal requirement to meet his requests. Eventually, on 21 July 2008 a copy of that document was sent to the applicant. 20. Between April and August 2009 the applicant requested that the Court of Appeal send him copies of several court records from his criminal case file as well as from that of his accomplice. Those requests were initially refused as not having a basis in law. According to the Government, on 10 September 2009 the applicant lodged another application with the Court of Appeal in which he requested copies of court hearing records, the cassation appeal and other documents from his criminal proceedings case file. On 2 October 2009 the Court of Appeal sent the requested copies to the applicant, but excluded copies of the court hearing records, on the ground that their transmission was not covered by the legislation that was applicable at that time. On 21 April 2011 the Office of the Government Agent before the European Court of Human Rights sent copies of the court hearing records to the applicant. 21. By letters dated 12 and 17 January 2017, the Court of Appeal refused the applicant's applications for a copy of his request for an extension of the time-limit for lodging a cassation appeal against his conviction of 25 November 2004 and a copy of a court ruling of 26 October 2016 dismissing that request. The Court of Appeal specified that the applicant's criminal case file had been sent to the Higher Specialised Court of Ukraine for Civil and Criminal Matters upon the latter court's request. The applicant has not been provided with a copy of the requested documents.",Ruled as violated by court,,"8. On 26 August 2003 the applicant was placed in a temporary detention facility in Donetsk (SIZO No. 5) for the duration of the criminal proceedings against him. On 25 January 2007 he was diagnosed with tuberculosis. The case file contains other evidence to indicate that 1 February 2007 was the date of the tuberculosis diagnosis. 11. According to the Government, the applicant was under medical supervision and received the appropriate medical care for his tuberculosis. In particular, he had been examined on a regular basis by the colony doctors between 20 March 2007 and 26 February 2018 and prescribed treatment. As a result of each course of treatment his health had improved. The Government did not specify the frequency of the applicant's regular examination and treatment during that time. 13. According to the Government, on 28 February 2012 the applicant was examined by a colony doctor who diagnosed him with chronic persistent hepatitis in remission. The applicant was prescribed treatment. 16. The Government further submitted that from 23 February to 20 March 2015 the applicant had been under medical treatment in a multi-disciplinary hospital in Stryzhavska correctional colony no. 81. As a result of the treatment his health had improved. The nature of that treatment was not specified. 17. They also added that as of 26 February 2018 the applicant remained under the ongoing supervision of the colony doctors, and his state of health was satisfactory.",TRUE,2,"This is degrading treatment leading to tangible harm to the applicant, but it's arguable whether this carries the requisite intent to count as ""torture"" or ""punishment,"" especially as the applicant received swift treatment each time. It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""",edited by me to remove ambiguity in fact pattern 149,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","5. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Wrocław. 6. The applicant was detained in Wrocław Remand Centre during various periods between 1991 and 2014, including from 24 June 2009 to 2 October 2010. He was released from detention on 8 July 2017. 7. The applicant submitted that during his detention in Wrocław Remand Centre he had been held in overcrowded cells in which the space per person had been below the Polish statutory minimum standard of 3 sq. m 8. According to documents from the domestic proceedings and the Government's submissions, the applicant was held in overcrowded cells between 29 July and 26 August 2009 (a period of approximately one month). 9. On 5 April 2011 the applicant brought a civil claim before the Wrocław Regional Court against the State Treasury for infringement of his personal rights and for compensation on account of his detention in overcrowded cells in Wrocław Remand Centre. He claimed 20,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) in compensation. His case was transferred to the Wrocław‑Śródmieście District Court in Wrocław (hereinafter ""the court"") and registered under the reference number IX C 295/11. 10. On 6 May 2011 the court exempted the applicant from the court fees and dismissed his application for legal aid. The court held that the applicant was able to formulate his claims in a clear and understandable manner. Hence, the legal aid was not necessary. The applicant did not challenge that decision. 11. In the course of the judicial proceedings the applicant lodged several applications and requests with the court, including a letter of 8 August 2012. The court, by an order of 28 August 2012, instructed the applicant that to comply with formal requirements he should submit an additional copy of that letter. The order further stated: ""At the same time the court informs [you] that all pleadings (pisma) should be submitted in two copies."" 12. On 5 October 2012 the Wrocław‑Śródmieście District Court dismissed the applicant's civil claim. The court found that the applicant's cells had indeed been overcrowded for approximately one month, but that he had failed to demonstrate that the actions of the defendant had been unlawful. 13. On 10 October 2012 the applicant lodged with the court a letter entitled ""application: refers to an appeal against the judgment of the Wrocław‑Śródmieście District Court of 5 October 2012"" which the court treated as an appeal. That pleading was submitted in one copy. 14. On an unspecified date the applicant applied for legal aid. On 26 October 2012 the Wrocław‑Śródmieście District Court rejected the applicant's request on the same grounds as previously (see paragraph 10 above). 15. On 29 October 2012 the applicant was served with the judgment and information about the time and manner of the right to appeal, in the following terms: ""A party who disagrees with the judgment has a right to request the written reasoning of the judgment within seven days of the service of that judgment and later to appeal to the second-instance court via the court that issued the judgment, within two weeks, calculated from the service of the reasoned judgment. If the party does not ask for the reasoned judgment, the appeal is to be submitted directly within 21 days of the service of the judgment. Article 369 § 1: The appeal shall be submitted to the court that issued the judgment within two weeks, calculated from the service of the reasoned judgment."" 16. On 12 November 2012 the applicant received the reasoning of the court's judgment of 5 October 2012. 17. On 21 December 2012 the applicant lodged with the court a request for leave to appeal out of time against the judgment of 5 October 2012, as well as two copies of a letter entitled ""appeal"". On 1 February 2013 the court dismissed the applicant's request for leave to appeal, and explained that he had already lodged his appeal on 10 October 2012, which was within the relevant time-limit. The court underlined that the applicant's appeal of 10 October 2012 did not comply with the formal requirements. 18. Therefore, on 6 February 2013 the court issued an order and instructed the applicant to comply with the formal requirements of his appeal by submitting a copy thereof within seven days of the service of the court order. The order was served on 14 February 2013. 19. On 15 February 2013 the applicant submitted a letter in which he informed the court that he was unable to comply with the order because he did not have the text of his appeal that he could copy or rewrite and he did not remember the exact wording of his pleadings. He added that he had not been aware that he should have submitted his appeal in two copies. 20. On 19 March 2013 the court rejected the applicant's appeal for failure to submit an exact copy thereof. 21. On 30 March 2013 the applicant appealed against that decision. When ordered, he rectified the formal requirements of his interlocutory appeal by submitting a copy of it and stating the amount of his claim. On 21 June 2013 the Wrocław Regional Court dismissed the applicant's interlocutory appeal, holding that the applicant, who had started a civil action and knew that he was deprived of his liberty, could justifiably be expected to keep copies of all letters he sent to the court, especially since he had been informed on 28 August 2012 that all letters to the court should be submitted in two copies. Additionally, after the judgment had been issued the applicant was informed about the means and procedure of submitting appeals.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"10. On 6 May 2011 the court exempted the applicant from the court fees and dismissed his application for legal aid. The court held that the applicant was able to formulate his claims in a clear and understandable manner. Hence, the legal aid was not necessary. The applicant did not challenge that decision. 11. In the course of the judicial proceedings the applicant lodged several applications and requests with the court, including a letter of 8 August 2012. The court, by an order of 28 August 2012, instructed the applicant that to comply with formal requirements he should submit an additional copy of that letter. The order further stated: ""At the same time the court informs [you] that all pleadings (pisma) should be submitted in two copies."" 13. On 10 October 2012 the applicant lodged with the court a letter entitled ""application: refers to an appeal against the judgment of the Wrocław‑Śródmieście District Court of 5 October 2012"" which the court treated as an appeal. That pleading was submitted in one copy. 14. On an unspecified date the applicant applied for legal aid. On 26 October 2012 the Wrocław‑Śródmieście District Court rejected the applicant's request on the same grounds as previously (see paragraph 10 above). 15. On 29 October 2012 the applicant was served with the judgment and information about the time and manner of the right to appeal, in the following terms: ""A party who disagrees with the judgment has a right to request the written reasoning of the judgment within seven days of the service of that judgment and later to appeal to the second-instance court via the court that issued the judgment, within two weeks, calculated from the service of the reasoned judgment. If the party does not ask for the reasoned judgment, the appeal is to be submitted directly within 21 days of the service of the judgment. Article 369 § 1: The appeal shall be submitted to the court that issued the judgment within two weeks, calculated from the service of the reasoned judgment."" 19. On 15 February 2013 the applicant submitted a letter in which he informed the court that he was unable to comply with the order because he did not have the text of his appeal that he could copy or rewrite and he did not remember the exact wording of his pleadings. He added that he had not been aware that he should have submitted his appeal in two copies. 20. On 19 March 2013 the court rejected the applicant's appeal for failure to submit an exact copy thereof.",TRUE,2,"This is degrading treatment, but the applicant was not severely tangibly harmed. It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 150,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","4. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Batumi. 5. On 2 September 2008 at 10.05 a.m. the applicant was arrested (together with his friend Z.B.) in Batumi on suspicion of possession of illegal drugs, by members of the Special Operations Unit (სოდის სამმართველო) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (""the MIA""). According to the report of his detention and personal search, he physically resisted the arrest. As a result he sustained injuries to his face and both legs when being forced out of his car and on to the ground. The applicant signed this report without making any written comments. 6. At 5:35 p.m. on the same day the applicant underwent an external visual examination at the Batumi no. 1 temporary detention centre. A report drawn up thereafter recorded multiple injuries on the applicant's body, including bruises and abrasions on his face and head, both legs, and the waist area, and black and swollen eyes. A note was made to the effect that the applicant could not remember in what circumstances he had sustained those injuries and that he had no complaints about the arresting officers. 7. Soon afterwards an ambulance was called for the applicant. He was pre-diagnosed as suffering from possible concussion and was recommended for a transfer to a medical establishment. An hour later an ambulance was called again. After the applicant had been examined, he was diagnosed with a closed head injury and concussion; bruises were noted on his chest and waist area and it was recommended that he undergo inpatient treatment in a hospital neurosurgery department. 8. At 10.10 p.m. the applicant was taken to Batumi hospital. After a brain tomography examination and other medical check-ups the diagnosis of a head injury was not confirmed. He was diagnosed instead with a fracture of the maxillary sinus on the right side, multiple bruises, and excoriations on his face and body. He was then taken back to the temporary detention centre. 9. On the same night the applicant's lawyer called the hotline of the office of the Prosecutor General of Georgia, complaining that the applicant had been ill-treated. On 4 September 2008 criminal proceedings were initiated under Article 118 § 2 of the Criminal Code of Georgia (causing less serious bodily injury). On the same date the investigator dealing with the case ordered a forensic examination of the applicant. Having visually examined the applicant, the medical expert concluded on 10 September 2008 that the applicant had multiple scratches and bruises all over his body and face, as well as black eyes and a fracture of the right maxillary sinus. He noted that the injuries could have been sustained on 2 September 2008 by the impact of a hard blunt object, and cumulatively belonged to the category of less serious bodily injuries causing long-lasting damage to health. 10. On 4 September 2008 the applicant was questioned in connection with the circumstances of his arrest. He maintained his allegations of ill treatment, claiming that he had been beaten during the arrest as well as after he was transferred to the Special Operations Unit at the MIA. He further dismissed the accusation that he had resisted arrest as untrue. On 6 September 2008 the investigator questioned two employees of the Batumi no. 1 temporary detention centre. They both confirmed that the applicant had had multiple injuries when he had arrived at the detention centre, and that in reply to their question he had claimed that he had sustained those injuries during the arrest. He had not provided any additional details, and had not made any complaints against the arresting police officers. 11. On 17 November 2008 the investigator decided to continue the investigation under Article 333 § 1 of the Criminal Code of Georgia (abuse of power). In the meantime, on 15 November 2008, the applicant's lawyer lodged a complaint with the General Prosecutor's Office denouncing the investigation as ineffective. He complained about the fact that no identification parade had been carried out: this would have allowed the applicant to identify the police officers who had ill-treated him during the arrest. Nor was this done in respect of the time after he was transferred to the Special Operations Unit, where he had stayed for about seven hours. He also noted that he had requested footage from the video surveillance cameras in the street where the arrest operation had taken place, but that his request had received no response. By a letter of 15 January 2009 the prosecutor dealing with the case informed the applicant's lawyer that the investigation was still pending, and that in view of the conflicting evidence it was impossible to establish whether the force used against the applicant during the arrest had been proportionate or not. The applicant's lawyer was also informed that the surveillance cameras in question had not been working on the day of the applicant's arrest, so no video recording could have been obtained. 12. According to the Government, at the time they submitted their observations the investigation of the applicant's allegations of ill-treatment was still pending. 13. According to the bill of indictment, the applicant was charged with various drug offences under Article 260 § 3 (a) and Article 273 of the Criminal Code. On 18 March 2009 the Batumi City Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to fourteen years and three months' imprisonment and a fine. His conviction was confirmed by the Kutaisi Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Georgia on 23 September and 18 November 2009 respectively.",Ruled as violated by court,,"9. On the same night the applicant's lawyer called the hotline of the office of the Prosecutor General of Georgia, complaining that the applicant had been ill-treated. On 4 September 2008 criminal proceedings were initiated under Article 118 § 2 of the Criminal Code of Georgia (causing less serious bodily injury). On the same date the investigator dealing with the case ordered a forensic examination of the applicant. Having visually examined the applicant, the medical expert concluded on 10 September 2008 that the applicant had multiple scratches and bruises all over his body and face, as well as black eyes and a fracture of the right maxillary sinus. He noted that the injuries could have been sustained on 2 September 2008 by the impact of a hard blunt object, and cumulatively belonged to the category of less serious bodily injuries causing long-lasting damage to health. 10. On 4 September 2008 the applicant was questioned in connection with the circumstances of his arrest. He maintained his allegations of ill treatment, claiming that he had been beaten during the arrest as well as after he was transferred to the Special Operations Unit at the MIA. He further dismissed the accusation that he had resisted arrest as untrue. On 6 September 2008 the investigator questioned two employees of the Batumi no. 1 temporary detention centre. They both confirmed that the applicant had had multiple injuries when he had arrived at the detention centre, and that in reply to their question he had claimed that he had sustained those injuries during the arrest. He had not provided any additional details, and had not made any complaints against the arresting police officers. 12. According to the Government, at the time they submitted their observations the investigation of the applicant's allegations of ill-treatment was still pending. 13. According to the bill of indictment, the applicant was charged with various drug offences under Article 260 § 3 (a) and Article 273 of the Criminal Code. On 18 March 2009 the Batumi City Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to fourteen years and three months' imprisonment and a fine. His conviction was confirmed by the Kutaisi Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Georgia on 23 September and 18 November 2009 respectively.",TRUE,2,"The applicant suffered serious injuries at the hands of the police, but it's arguable whether this carries the requisite intent to count as ""torture."" It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 151,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","7. The applicants are Syrian nationals. Their initials, dates of birth, application numbers and the other details of their cases are set out in the Appendix. At the time of lodging their applications the applicants were detained at detention centres for foreign nationals run by the Federal Migration Service (hereinafter ""the FMS"") in different towns in Russia. 8. The facts of the cases, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows. 9. On various dates between 2012 and 2016 the applicants came to Russia on various visas and did not leave when the period of their stay had expired. They were apprehended by the police and/or officers of the FMS in various regions in Russia for breaching the applicable immigration regulations, and placed in detention centres for foreigners (see the Appendix for the applicants' dates of detention and details of the relevant proceedings). The domestic courts in the respective regions examined their cases and found the applicants guilty of breaching various immigration regulations. Some of the applicants lodged appeals, but they were rejected by the domestic courts, whereas other applicants eventually had their expulsion orders quashed by the appeal courts. One of the applicants did not appeal against his expulsion order (see the Appendix for the details of individual cases) 10. All the applicants sought to obtain refugee status and/or temporary asylum in Russia. Some of the applicants voluntarily withdrew their requests and others' requests were rejected, first by the FMS and then by the domestic courts which examined the appeals against the FMS's refusals. Only Y.A.'s request for temporary asylum was granted (see the Appendix for details). 11. According to the information provided by their lawyers, while the proceedings before the Court were ongoing, six of the applicants (M.S.A., R.K., H.R., B.Z., S.W. and A.A.) left Russia of their own volition on various dates to go to third countries, where they settled (see the Appendix for details). 12. Between 24 January 2014 and 10 June 2014 M.S.A. and R.K. were detained in a detention centre for foreign nationals run by the FMS in Krasnoye Selo, in the Leningrad Region. 13. According to their submissions, the centre was based in an eight-storey building with windows covered with grills; five of the storeys were designed to accommodate 176 people in total. Each storey comprised around ten to eleven cells. The centre was severely overcrowded during the whole period of the applicants' detention. In particular, according to a report of the Human Rights Ombudsman in Saint Petersburg, on 26 February 2014 the centre accommodated 400 foreign nationals. 14. Both applicants were detained in cell no. 511, located on the fifth storey, which measured around 9 square metres and was designed to accommodate six people. All places in the cell were occupied during the whole period of their detention. Thus, each detainee had no more than 1.5 square metres of personal space, despite the statutory requirement that each detainee in a detention centre for foreign nationals have at least 4.5 square metres of personal space. The cell was furnished with three bunk beds and two bedside tables. There was no dining table in the cell. 15. The food was of poor quality, with no fruit or vegetables, and included pork, which the applicants could not eat for religious reasons. No alternative food was offered instead of pork, so they were deprived of any meal when pork was served. There were no kitchen and dining facilities in the centre. Food was delivered to the centre in containers and served cold in the cells. Detainees were forced to eat on their beds because there were no tables in the cells. This shortage in food was exacerbated by arbitrary restrictions on the contents of food parcels delivered from outside. Detainees were not allowed to receive fermented milk products, home‑cooked food, fruit or vegetables. 16. Detainees had no free access to drinking water or devices to boil tap water. The cell where M.S.A. and R.K. were detained was only lit by one light bulb, and the detainees were not allowed to switch on the light after 10 p.m. 17. The applicants and other inmates could move around on that storey to get to sanitary facilities, but they were not allowed to leave the storey or enter other detainees' cells. At the two ends of the common corridor there were bathrooms, each equipped with three lavatories, two washbasins and two showers. The storey was under the control of a dozen ""chosen"" inmates who, with the tacit consent of the centre's administration, dictated their rules to others and created an atmosphere of fear, violence and extortion. One of the bathrooms was for their exclusive use. The other seventy to eighty inmates had to use the other bathroom. 18. Outdoor exercise was sporadic and lasted around 15-20 minutes. In winter, the applicants did not go outside, as they did not possess winter clothes. In the period April-May 2014 they were able to enjoy outdoor exercise only four times. Outdoor exercise took place in a closed yard measuring around 50 metres in length and 10 metres in width. There was gravel on the ground, and there were no benches, plants or sports equipment. 19. The facility did not offer any activities, and no library was available. 20. During the administrative hearing concerning his removal from Russia on 26 February 2016, H.R. was not represented by a lawyer. 21. According to the lawyer representing B.Z., H.D. and S.W., on 25 March 2015 he was not allowed to meet with them in the detention centre.",Ruled as violated by court,,"21. According to the lawyer representing B.Z., H.D. and S.W., on 25 March 2015 he was not allowed to meet with them in the detention centre.",TRUE,2,"This is degrading treatment, but the applicants were not severely tangibly harmed. It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 152,"Article 3 Prohibition of torture No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.","4. The applicant was born in 1978. According to the most recently available information, at the time of the events in June 2016 the applicant was detained in Kirovograd pre-trial detention facility no. 14 (""the SIZO""). 5. In January 2013 the applicant started serving a sentence of ten years' imprisonment for murder. In February 2013 he was placed in Kirovograd prison no. 6 (""the Prison""). 6. In April 2014 the applicant's health deteriorated. He complained of fever, abdominal pain and vomiting. Following his examination in Kirovograd Regional Hospital, the applicant was diagnosed with chronic calculous cholecystitis (calculi within the gallbladder) and acute chronic gastroduodenitis. 7. On 11 April 2014 the applicant complained of feeling unwell to the Prison medical unit. He was examined immediately and diagnosed with acute gastroduodenitis and chronic calculous cholecystitis. According to the case-file material, he was not prescribed medical treatment. 8. On 22 August 2014 the applicant further complained to the Prison medical unit of feeling unwell. He was diagnosed with acute chronic gastroduodenitis and was prescribed dietary treatment for three days. 9. On 6, 8 and 13 October and 5 November 2014, and 6 March 2015, in response to further complaints by the applicant, he was prescribed outpatient treatment. According to the Government, the outpatient treatment consisted of medicine, which was administered to the applicant in various combinations, notably, papaverine, co-trimixazole, azithromycin, and bromhexin. 10. Following another such complaint, on 16 April 2015 the Prison doctor diagnosed the applicant with acute chronic gastroduodenitis and recommended that he be further examined at a specialist institution with a view to deciding whether he required surgery. The parties did not inform the Court whether the applicant had undergone the recommended examination. 11. From 2 to 29 May and from 3 to 11 June 2015 the applicant underwent inpatient treatment for acute chronic gastroduodenitis in the Prison medical unit. According to the Government, he was administered the prescribed medication and his state of health improved. 12. On 10 July 2015 he was examined by a general practitioner of Kirovograd City Hospital, who confirmed the earlier diagnoses and recommended inpatient treatment and dietary treatment. 13. From 28 July to 10 September 2015 the applicant underwent inpatient treatment for calculus cholecystitis in unstable remission at the hospital in Bucha prison no. 85. The applicant alleged that the treatment which he had received there had been inadequate and had led to an aggravation of his condition. He also alleged that surgery for his calculus cholecystitis had been scheduled but had not been performed owing to lack of funds. 14. On 21 September 2015 he was transferred back to the Prison. In the meantime he had been detained in the Kyiv SIZO and the Odessa SIZO. During his detention from 14 to 21 September 2015, he complained to the SIZOs' administration of abdominal pain and vomiting, but allegedly to no avail. 15. On 8 October 2015 the applicant was placed in a disciplinary cell in the Prison for three months as a penalty for consumption of alcohol. According to the applicant, the conditions of his detention there were very poor: he suffered from lack of fresh air, low temperatures, unsanitary conditions and high humidity. Furthermore, he allegedly had no mattress to sleep on. 16. According to the Government, on 8 October 2015 the Prison governor issued a decision on the applicant' placement in a disciplinary cell for consumption of alcohol. On 30 December 2015 he was early released from the disciplinary cell. 17. On 12 October 2015 the applicant's lawyer complained to the Kirovograd regional prosecutor's office that the applicant was not receiving the requisite medical care in detention. He submitted, in particular, that the surgery which the applicant required had been postponed owing to the lack of funds. 18. On 23 October 2015 the Prison doctor examined the applicant once again and diagnosed him with chronic calculous cholecystitis in unstable remission. He prescribed the applicant medication and recommended elective surgery. 19. On 9 November 2015 the prison service of Kirovograd Region sent a request for the applicant's placement in the hospital in Bucha prison no. 85. On 9 December 2015 this request was refused owing to the lack of available places in the hospital. 20. On 11 December 2015 and 16 January 2016 the prison service again requested the applicant's placement in the hospital at correctional colony no. 4 of Dnipropetrovsk Region. On 27 January 2016 the prison service took a decision on the applicant's transfer to the hospital for the required surgery. 21. On 12 February 2016 the applicant informed the Prison governor that he had refused the treatment offered to him in the hospitals within the Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv SIZOs because of lack of trust in the doctors of those facilities. On the same day the applicant gave his consent to receive treatment at any other medical institution. 22. On 22 April 2016 following deterioration of his health, the applicant was transferred by ambulance to Kirovograd Regional Hospital, where he was examined by a surgeon and diagnosed with calculous cholecystitis, chronic pancreatitis and ""diffusive changes"" of the liver (дифузні зміни печінки). 23. According to the Government, as of November 2016 the applicant's state of health was satisfactory. The Government did not provide documentary evidence in respect of that statement.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. In April 2014 the applicant's health deteriorated. He complained of fever, abdominal pain and vomiting. Following his examination in Kirovograd Regional Hospital, the applicant was diagnosed with chronic calculous cholecystitis (calculi within the gallbladder) and acute chronic gastroduodenitis. 8. On 22 August 2014 the applicant further complained to the Prison medical unit of feeling unwell. He was diagnosed with acute chronic gastroduodenitis and was prescribed dietary treatment for three days. 9. On 6, 8 and 13 October and 5 November 2014, and 6 March 2015, in response to further complaints by the applicant, he was prescribed outpatient treatment. According to the Government, the outpatient treatment consisted of medicine, which was administered to the applicant in various combinations, notably, papaverine, co-trimixazole, azithromycin, and bromhexin. 10. Following another such complaint, on 16 April 2015 the Prison doctor diagnosed the applicant with acute chronic gastroduodenitis and recommended that he be further examined at a specialist institution with a view to deciding whether he required surgery. The parties did not inform the Court whether the applicant had undergone the recommended examination. 17. On 12 October 2015 the applicant's lawyer complained to the Kirovograd regional prosecutor's office that the applicant was not receiving the requisite medical care in detention. He submitted, in particular, that the surgery which the applicant required had been postponed owing to the lack of funds. 18. On 23 October 2015 the Prison doctor examined the applicant once again and diagnosed him with chronic calculous cholecystitis in unstable remission. He prescribed the applicant medication and recommended elective surgery. 19. On 9 November 2015 the prison service of Kirovograd Region sent a request for the applicant's placement in the hospital in Bucha prison no. 85. On 9 December 2015 this request was refused owing to the lack of available places in the hospital. 21. On 12 February 2016 the applicant informed the Prison governor that he had refused the treatment offered to him in the hospitals within the Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv SIZOs because of lack of trust in the doctors of those facilities. On the same day the applicant gave his consent to receive treatment at any other medical institution. 22. On 22 April 2016 following deterioration of his health, the applicant was transferred by ambulance to Kirovograd Regional Hospital, where he was examined by a surgeon and diagnosed with calculous cholecystitis, chronic pancreatitis and ""diffusive changes"" of the liver (дифузні зміни печінки).",TRUE,2,"This is degrading treatment leading to tangible harm to the applicant, but it's arguable whether this carries the requisite intent to count as ""torture"" or ""punishment,"" especially as the applicant received multiple treatments and ended up healthy. It depends on what the statute intends by ""torture"" and ""punishment.""", 153,"Article 34 Individual applications The Court may receive applications from any person, nongovernmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.","4. The applicants, Mr Makhlyagin and Mr Belyayev, were born in 1983 and 1979 respectively and were held in different detention facilities. The facilities' officials opened and/or inspected letters that the applicants exchanged with the Court. 5. From September 2008 until October 2009 the applicant, detained in a correctional colony, lodged several letters with the Court. All of them were accompanied by cover letters from a chief officer of the colony summarising the content of the applicant's letters. Some letters also bore the colony's registration stamps. 6. The applicant lodged a claim, alleging that the colony's staff had impeded his correspondence with the Court. On 22 January 2009 the Tagilstroyevskiy District Court of Nizhniy Tagil dismissed his claim 7. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Sverdlovskiy Regional Court. On 4 March 2009 the Sverdlovskiy Regional Court rejected his appeal, stating that it should be lodged through the first-instance court. The regional court also noted that the applicant could request that the time-limit in respect of the appeal be re-set. 8. On 30 March 2009 the applicant lodged his appeal with the first‑instance court. Instead of requesting that the time-limit in respect of his appeal be re-set the applicant asked the court to restore his case to the list of pending cases. On 9 April 2009 the District Court refused to examine the appeal as belated. 9. The applicant appealed against this decision. However, he once again lodged his appeal with the Regional Court instead of the first-instance court. His appeal statement did not contain a request for the missed time‑limit to be re-set. The Sverdlovskiy Regional Court dismissed the applicant's appeal. 10. On 2 November 2010 the applicant received a letter from the Court; the letter was opened by a member of the remand prison staff. 11. The applicant lodged a claim for compensation. By a final decision of 7 June 2011 the Tver Regional Court dismissed his claim. The court stated that Russian law did not prohibit the opening of incoming correspondence from the Court.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"The applicant was able to submit applications to the Court, but arguably, the Court hindered the effective exercise of this right through intercourt shuffling and repeated dismissals.", 154,"Article 34 Individual applications The Court may receive applications from any person, nongovernmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.","5. The applicants' dates of birth and places of residence are listed in the Appendix. 6. On different dates between 2012 and 2016 (see Appendix) the applicants learned that their right to leave the country had been restricted and that they were no longer allowed to leave Azerbaijan. 7. It appears from the documents in the case files that in all the cases the restriction in question was imposed by the investigating authorities, in the absence of any judicial decision, within the framework of various criminal proceedings in which the applicants were not convicted, accused or suspected persons, but were only questioned as witnesses. 8. The travel bans imposed in respect of the applicants in applications nos. 62775/16 and 43327/16 were lifted by the investigating authorities on 29 January and 21 April 2016 respectively. 9. On various dates the applicants brought an action claiming that the restriction imposed on them was unlawful, either by lodging a complaint with the administrative courts or applying to the ordinary courts for a review of the lawfulness of procedural actions or decisions by the prosecuting authorities under the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter ""judicial review""). Some of the applicants used both of the above-mentioned remedies. 10. The applicants claimed, in particular, that the domestic law did not provide for the imposition of travel bans on witnesses in criminal proceedings and that the restriction on their right to leave the country was not justified. 11. In the domestic proceedings relating to all the applications, except application no. 66650/13, the domestic courts refused to examine the applicants' complaint on the merits. Final decisions were adopted on various dates, by the Supreme Court in the administrative proceedings and the Baku Court of Appeal in the proceedings for judicial review (see Appendix). In their decisions, both the administrative and ordinary courts declared that they did not have competence to examine a complaint relating to the lawfulness of travel bans imposed by the investigating authorities. 12. As regards the applicant in application no. 66650/13, by a decision dated 1 April 2013, a judge at the Sabail District Court dismissed his complaint after examining it on the merits. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: ""Having assessed all the examined evidence, I conclude that the actions of the Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Azerbaijan restricting the right of Mursaliyev Azad Oktay oglu to leave the country are lawful, that the procedure for judicial review as defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Azerbaijan does not provide for a [decision] on the payment of pecuniary or non-pecuniary damages, [and] that, for these reasons, the complaint should not be allowed."" 13. On 5 April 2013 the applicant in application no. 66650/13 appealed against that decision, reiterating that there was no legal basis for restricting his right to leave the country under domestic law. 14. On 12 April 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the first-instance court's decision justified. The appellate court repeated the reasoning provided by the first-instance court and made no mention of the complaint concerning the legal basis for the imposition of the travel ban.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"11. In the domestic proceedings relating to all the applications, except application no. 66650/13, the domestic courts refused to examine the applicants' complaint on the merits. Final decisions were adopted on various dates, by the Supreme Court in the administrative proceedings and the Baku Court of Appeal in the proceedings for judicial review (see Appendix). In their decisions, both the administrative and ordinary courts declared that they did not have competence to examine a complaint relating to the lawfulness of travel bans imposed by the investigating authorities. 12. As regards the applicant in application no. 66650/13, by a decision dated 1 April 2013, a judge at the Sabail District Court dismissed his complaint after examining it on the merits. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: ""Having assessed all the examined evidence, I conclude that the actions of the Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Azerbaijan restricting the right of Mursaliyev Azad Oktay oglu to leave the country are lawful, that the procedure for judicial review as defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Azerbaijan does not provide for a [decision] on the payment of pecuniary or non-pecuniary damages, [and] that, for these reasons, the complaint should not be allowed."" 14. On 12 April 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the first-instance court's decision justified. The appellate court repeated the reasoning provided by the first-instance court and made no mention of the complaint concerning the legal basis for the imposition of the travel ban.",FALSE,0,"The applicant was able to submit applications to the Court, which were then ruled upon without hindrance.", 155,"Article 34 Individual applications The Court may receive applications from any person, nongovernmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.","5. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Râbniţa. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 28 July 1999, the applicant was arrested in Râbniţa by virtue of a decision of a prosecutor from the self-proclaimed ""Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria"" (the ""MRT""; for further details about the ""MRT"", see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, §§ 28-185, ECHR 2004‑VII, and Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], nos. 43370/04 and 2 others, §§ 8-42, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). He was charged with fraud and incitement to bribery. 8. On 17 May 2000, the Camenca District Court, which was under the jurisdiction of the ""MRT"", convicted the applicant and sentenced him to five years' imprisonment. According to the applicant, he appealed, but his appeal was rejected by the ""MRT"" Supreme Court on an unspecified date. 9. The applicant initially served his sentence in Tiraspol Prison no. 2. On 25 October 2001, he was transferred to Pruncul Prison Hospital, which was under the control of the Moldovan authorities. On 30 October 2001, he signed a form of authority authorising the Chişinău-based non-governmental organisation Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) to represent him before this Court. That form of authority, together with the application form, reached the Court on 19 November 2001. 10. On 20 November 2001, a lawyer from LHR informed the Moldovan Prosecutor General's Office that the applicant and seven other people were being held in Pruncul Prison Hospital on the basis that they had been convicted by ""MRT"" courts. He asked for their immediate release, in view of the fact that they had been convicted by unlawful courts. He also submitted that some of those eight detainees had already lodged applications with the Court, and that a failure to immediately release them or any attempt to transfer them back to the ""MRT"" authorities would result in the Republic of Moldova incurring responsibility. A similar letter was sent on the same day to the Minister of Justice. 11. On 21 November 2001, members of LHR organised a press conference, during which they informed the media of the circumstances of the case and of the letter sent to the Prosecutor General's Office on the previous day. 12. Also on 21 November 2001, all eight detainees, including the applicant, were allegedly transferred back to ""MRT"" prisons. 13. On 23 November 2001, LHR informed the media of the detainees' transfer back to the ""MRT"" authorities on 21 November 2001. 14. On 26 November 2001, the Head of the Penal Institutions Department of the Ministry of Justice informed LHR that the detainees mentioned in their request of 20 November 2001 were not being held at Pruncul Prison Hospital. 15. On 7 December 2001, the lawyer from LHR wrote to the ""MRT"" Ministry of Justice, asking for permission to see the applicant and stating that he was planning to lodge in the applicant's name an application before the Court. He never received a reply to that letter. 16. On 22 January 2002, the applicant was released from prison on the basis of an amnesty act. 17. The applicant described the conditions of his detention in the ""MRT"" in the following manner. He was allegedly detained in a cell with several people suffering from tuberculosis, and risked contracting that disease himself. During his detention in Tiraspol Prison no. 2, approximately 100 detainees there died of tuberculosis. He was also affected by parasitic insects. The applicant is a person with a category 3 disability, but he was not given any medication during his detention. Food was served only once a day and was of very poor quality.",Ruled as violated by court,,"9. The applicant initially served his sentence in Tiraspol Prison no. 2. On 25 October 2001, he was transferred to Pruncul Prison Hospital, which was under the control of the Moldovan authorities. On 30 October 2001, he signed a form of authority authorising the Chişinău-based non-governmental organisation Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) to represent him before this Court. That form of authority, together with the application form, reached the Court on 19 November 2001. 10. On 20 November 2001, a lawyer from LHR informed the Moldovan Prosecutor General's Office that the applicant and seven other people were being held in Pruncul Prison Hospital on the basis that they had been convicted by ""MRT"" courts. He asked for their immediate release, in view of the fact that they had been convicted by unlawful courts. He also submitted that some of those eight detainees had already lodged applications with the Court, and that a failure to immediately release them or any attempt to transfer them back to the ""MRT"" authorities would result in the Republic of Moldova incurring responsibility. A similar letter was sent on the same day to the Minister of Justice. 12. Also on 21 November 2001, all eight detainees, including the applicant, were allegedly transferred back to ""MRT"" prisons. 14. On 26 November 2001, the Head of the Penal Institutions Department of the Ministry of Justice informed LHR that the detainees mentioned in their request of 20 November 2001 were not being held at Pruncul Prison Hospital. 15. On 7 December 2001, the lawyer from LHR wrote to the ""MRT"" Ministry of Justice, asking for permission to see the applicant and stating that he was planning to lodge in the applicant's name an application before the Court. He never received a reply to that letter. 16. On 22 January 2002, the applicant was released from prison on the basis of an amnesty act. 17. The applicant described the conditions of his detention in the ""MRT"" in the following manner. He was allegedly detained in a cell with several people suffering from tuberculosis, and risked contracting that disease himself. During his detention in Tiraspol Prison no. 2, approximately 100 detainees there died of tuberculosis. He was also affected by parasitic insects. The applicant is a person with a category 3 disability, but he was not given any medication during his detention. Food was served only once a day and was of very poor quality.",FALSE,0,The applicant was hindered by the prison system from submitting an application to the Court., 156,"Article 34 Individual applications The Court may receive applications from any person, nongovernmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.","5. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Sofia. 6. The applicant is a former police officer. Criminal proceedings were brought against him in 1996. 7. By a decision of the competent prosecutor of 6 March 1996, as provided under domestic law at the time, the applicant was placed under house arrest. The period of arrest continued until 3 April 1996, when the applicant was remanded in custody. He was once again placed under house arrest on 1 July 1996 and was released on 30 September 1997. 8. The applicant therefore was deprived of his liberty for one year, six months and twenty-five days. 9. In a final judgment of 27 January 1998 the Sofia Military Court found the applicant guilty of failing to perform his duties and he was given a one‑year suspended prison sentence. 10. In another set of proceedings, in a final judgment of 26 March 2003 the Supreme Court of Cassation convicted the applicant of fraud and sentenced him to one year of imprisonment. 11. The court also held in the second set of proceedings that the applicant should serve a single sentence for all his offences, which was set at one year in prison. 12. On 1 July 2003 the applicant was once again detained and placed in prison to serve his sentence. He was released on 18 September 2003 by a decision of the competent prosecutor. The prosecutor noted that the period of pre-trial detention should have been deducted from the applicant's sentence, which meant he had already served it. 13. As he had worked in prison the applicant was also entitled to a reduction of his sentence by seventeen days. 14. In 2004 the applicant brought a tort action against the prosecution authorities under section 2(6) of the State and Municipalities' Responsibility for Damage Act (see paragraph 21 below). He claimed 20,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) for non-pecuniary damage for his detention in 1996-97 to the extent it had exceeded the set term of imprisonment and BGN 40,000 for his imprisonment between 1 July and 18 September 2003. 15. The domestic courts examined witnesses and a court-appointed psychologist who said that the applicant had been traumatised by the experience and suffered from anxiety, that his personality had been ""permanently altered"", that he had difficulties communicating with others, and that his family ties had been ""irreparably damaged"". 16. In a judgment of 2 May 2006 the Sofia City Court (hereinafter ""the City Court"") allowed the claim in part, finding that the applicant had been detained for nine months and twenty-nine days in excess of his sentence and awarding him BGN 10,000 for non-pecuniary damage. It stated that his detention in 1996-97 had been ""unjustified"" and that his imprisonment in 2003 had amounted to ""unlawful detention without any valid grounds"". 17. In accordance with the applicable provisions of domestic law, the City Court ordered the applicant to pay BGN 2,040 (the equivalent of 1,040 euros – EUR) in court fees, calculated as a pro rata percentage of the part of his claim that had been dismissed. 18. The judgment was upheld on 18 June 2007 by the Sofia Court of Appeal (hereinafter ""the Court of Appeal""), which specified that the prosecution authorities were also liable to pay default interest on the above amount, calculated from 18 September 2003. 19. In a final judgment of 24 April 2009 the Supreme Court of Cassation reduced the award to BGN 3,000 (approximately EUR 1,530), plus default interest. It justified the reduction by referring to the ""nature of the offences"" the applicant had been convicted for, the ""regime under which the sentence had been served"" and the ""socially acceptable criteria for justice"". It did not deal with the matter of court fees and took no separate decision in that regard. 20. The Court has not been informed whether and when the amount above was paid to the applicant. Calculations made with a calculator available on the Internet show that the default interest on BGN 3,000 for the period from 18 September 2003 to 24 April 2009 would be BGN 2,265 (the equivalent of EUR 1,155).",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"14. In 2004 the applicant brought a tort action against the prosecution authorities under section 2(6) of the State and Municipalities' Responsibility for Damage Act (see paragraph 21 below). He claimed 20,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) for non-pecuniary damage for his detention in 1996-97 to the extent it had exceeded the set term of imprisonment and BGN 40,000 for his imprisonment between 1 July and 18 September 2003. 15. The domestic courts examined witnesses and a court-appointed psychologist who said that the applicant had been traumatised by the experience and suffered from anxiety, that his personality had been ""permanently altered"", that he had difficulties communicating with others, and that his family ties had been ""irreparably damaged"". 16. In a judgment of 2 May 2006 the Sofia City Court (hereinafter ""the City Court"") allowed the claim in part, finding that the applicant had been detained for nine months and twenty-nine days in excess of his sentence and awarding him BGN 10,000 for non-pecuniary damage. It stated that his detention in 1996-97 had been ""unjustified"" and that his imprisonment in 2003 had amounted to ""unlawful detention without any valid grounds"". 17. In accordance with the applicable provisions of domestic law, the City Court ordered the applicant to pay BGN 2,040 (the equivalent of 1,040 euros – EUR) in court fees, calculated as a pro rata percentage of the part of his claim that had been dismissed. 18. The judgment was upheld on 18 June 2007 by the Sofia Court of Appeal (hereinafter ""the Court of Appeal""), which specified that the prosecution authorities were also liable to pay default interest on the above amount, calculated from 18 September 2003. 19. In a final judgment of 24 April 2009 the Supreme Court of Cassation reduced the award to BGN 3,000 (approximately EUR 1,530), plus default interest. It justified the reduction by referring to the ""nature of the offences"" the applicant had been convicted for, the ""regime under which the sentence had been served"" and the ""socially acceptable criteria for justice"". It did not deal with the matter of court fees and took no separate decision in that regard. 20. The Court has not been informed whether and when the amount above was paid to the applicant. Calculations made with a calculator available on the Internet show that the default interest on BGN 3,000 for the period from 18 September 2003 to 24 April 2009 would be BGN 2,265 (the equivalent of EUR 1,155).",FALSE,0,"The applicant was able to submit applications to the Court, which were then ruled upon without hindrance.", 157,"Article 34 Individual applications The Court may receive applications from any person, nongovernmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.","5. The applicant was born in 1950 and, at the time of the last communication from him to the Court, was detained in Torez Correctional Colony. 6. The applicant, represented by a lawyer, stood trial before the Kerch Court on charges of engaging in sexual intercourse with his stepdaughter, A. (born in 1999), over the period between March 2006 and April 2007. The applicant denied the charges, asserting that he may have broken A.'s hymen by accident while bathing her. 7. On 27 July 2007 the trial court found the applicant guilty of rape and sentenced him to eleven years' imprisonment. 8. The judgment was based, in particular, on (i) the victim's statements made at the pre-trial stage; (ii) the statements of a number of witnesses (comprising nannies, a classmate and a psychologist) made during the court hearings, who had reported incriminating statements that A. had made to them. Witness K. had testified that, in the relevant period, she had had sexual relations with the applicant; (iii) the conclusions of experts who had examined the applicant and the victim. The experts had concluded that the victim's hymen had been broken and it was unlikely that that had been caused by unintentional actions; the victim and the applicant both had a fungal infection on their genitalia; the examination of the applicant's genitalia had not revealed any obstacle to his having sexual relations; the victim suffered from a light mental retardation and the applicant did not suffer from any psychiatric illness. According to the applicant, the trial court had refused to order an additional expert examination to determine whether, because of any disease of his ""internal sexual organs"", he had been unable to engage in normal sexual intercourse at the relevant time. 9. On 11 September 2007 the Crimea Court of Appeal upheld the applicant's conviction. 10. The applicant lodged an appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court. He argued that there had been insufficient evidence of his guilt. The appeal contained the following statement: ""The court's conclusion as to my guilt is based only on indirect evidence and on the statement of a minor [A.], made in the course of the pre-trial investigation and who, according to a psychiatric expert's analysis, was suffering from mental retardation"" (Вывод суда о моей виновности сделан судом только на основании косвенных доказательств, а так же [sic] на показаниях малолетней [A.], которые она дала на досудебном следствии, и которая, согласно заключению судебно-психиатрической экспертизы, страдает умственной отсталостью). 11. The applicant submitted that the breaking of A.'s hymen was explained by the fact that he had accidentally penetrated her with his finger while bathing her. However, even if such a penetration had been intentional, it would not have constituted the offence of rape. 12. The applicant further complained of the trial court's refusal to order an additional expert examination to determine whether he had any diseases of his ""internal sexual organs"" which would have prevented him from sustaining an erection and engaging in sexual intercourse. 13. The applicant asked the Supreme Court to reclassify his actions as ""abuse of a minor"" (розбещення неповнолітніх), a lesser offence than rape, and to impose a non-custodial sentence. 14. On 9 June 2008 the Supreme Court refused to consider the case in cassation and upheld the lower courts' findings. 15. On 27 November 2008 the Court's Registry asked the applicant to provide copies of his appeal, his appeal in cassation and the decision of the Supreme Court in his case, to supplement his application. 16. He accordingly requested those documents from the trial court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. 17. On 19 January 2009 the Court of Appeal advised the applicant that he needed to address his request for the copies to the trial court. 18. On 26 January 2009 the trial court informed the applicant that it was not empowered to send him the requested copies. 19. On 28 January 2009 the Supreme Court informed the applicant that it was not the court's practice to issue copies of appeals in cassation or of its decisions.",Ruled as violated by court,,"8. The judgment was based, in particular, on (i) the victim's statements made at the pre-trial stage; (ii) the statements of a number of witnesses (comprising nannies, a classmate and a psychologist) made during the court hearings, who had reported incriminating statements that A. had made to them. Witness K. had testified that, in the relevant period, she had had sexual relations with the applicant; (iii) the conclusions of experts who had examined the applicant and the victim. The experts had concluded that the victim's hymen had been broken and it was unlikely that that had been caused by unintentional actions; the victim and the applicant both had a fungal infection on their genitalia; the examination of the applicant's genitalia had not revealed any obstacle to his having sexual relations; the victim suffered from a light mental retardation and the applicant did not suffer from any psychiatric illness. According to the applicant, the trial court had refused to order an additional expert examination to determine whether, because of any disease of his ""internal sexual organs"", he had been unable to engage in normal sexual intercourse at the relevant time.",TRUE,2,"The applicant was able to submit applications to the Court, but arguably, the Court hindered the effective exercise of this right through its refusal.", 158,"Article 34 Individual applications The Court may receive applications from any person, nongovernmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.","5. The applicant was born in 1963. 6. From 22 July 2016 the applicant was held in the Chernigiv pre-trial detention centre (""the SIZO"") as a suspect in respect of a crime. 7. On 8 September 2016, while being held at the SIZO, the applicant suffered acute myocardial infarction. He was treated at Kozeletsk Town Hospital from 8 until 19 September 2016. 8. On 27 September and 6 October 2016 the applicant underwent examinations at the Chernigiv Regional Cardiological Centre. He was diagnosed with ischemic heart disease; acute myocardial infarction; third‑stage hypertonic disease; a hypertensive heart; and second-degree heart failure. The applicant was prescribed outpatient medical treatment and a further heart examination. On the last mentioned date he was recommended to undergo a cardiac ventriculography test. 9. On 7 February 2017, in response to a request for information lodged by the Chernigiv regional prosecutor's office, Chernihiv City Hospital (""the Hospital"") noted that the applicant's state of health posed a high risk to his life. 10. On 15 March 2017, the Hospital informed the SIZO authorities that the cost of a cardiac ventriculography test was 4,000 hryvnias (UAH – approximately 140 euros (EUR)). There is no information regarding whether that test was undertaken. 11. Following a deterioration in the applicant's health, on 23 May 2017 the Court indicated to the Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that they should immediately ensure that the recommended treatment was available and provided to the applicant and that the applicant was placed in a specialised medical institution for medical treatment – including surgery, if appropriate. 12. On 23 May 2017 the applicant was transported to the Hospital, where the previous diagnosis was confirmed (see paragraph 8 above). On the same day he was returned to the SIZO and provided with outpatient treatment. 13. On 25 May 2017 the Hospital informed the SIZO that in order for the applicant to be provided with qualified medical advice, he needed a cardiac ventriculography test. In view of the complexity of the applicant's state of health, before the cardiac ventriculography test the Hospital requested that the applicant have an additional consultation at the Amosov Cardiology Institute. 14. According to the Government, the SIZO administration offered the applicant transportation to the Kyiv SIZO in a prison van with a view to his undergoing a further medical examination at the Amosov Cardiology Institute. On 16 June 2017 the applicant refused that offer, arguing that he could not be transported in a prison van owing to his state of health. The case file contains a statement by the applicant dated 16 June 2017 addressed to the head of the SIZO, according to which he did not refuse transportation but insisted on it being in a form that was compatible with his state of health. 15. Following a further deterioration in the applicant's health, on 22 June 2017 the ambulance took him to the Hospital, where the previous diagnosis (see paragraph 8 above) was confirmed, electrocardiography and cardiac ventriculography tests were recommended, and he was prescribed some medication. 16. The case file contains an extract from the applicant's medical file bearing no date and signed by the head of the SIZO medical unit; according to the extract, the SIZO had no cardiologist on its staff and high-quality medical treatment was not possible at the SIZO. The applicant did not receive the prescribed medication in full owing to a lack of funds. The extract furthermore stated that he remained under the supervision of the SIZO medical staff and did not require inpatient medical treatment. 17. On 10 July 2017 the Court reiterated its previous decision (see paragraph 11 above) indicating that the authorities were to ensure that the applicant was transported promptly, and in conditions commensurate with his state of health, to a specialised medical institution to undergo the necessary medical examinations, such as a cardiac ventriculography test, in order that a correct diagnosis could be made and the applicant could receive medical treatment, if necessary. On 8 August 2017 the Government submitted that the applicant had not been transported to a specialised medical institution, as had been indicated by the Court, owing to his refusal of 16 June 2017 (see paragraph 14 above). 18. According to the available information, from August 2016 until September 2017 the applicant underwent more than fifteen examinations, both within the SIZO and at civilian hospitals, and an ambulance was called twelve times to provide him with urgent treatment. 19. On an unspecified date the applicant was released from custody. On 7 November 2017 he underwent an examination at the Amosov Cardiology Institute. According to the results of the examination, he was diagnosed with ischemic heart disease, exertional angina (class III), postinfarction cardiosclerosis, and atherosclerosis of the aorta and of the coronary arteries. It was recommended that he undergo surgery for his ischemic heart disease, together with further inpatient treatment. There is no information regarding whether the applicant has undergone the recommended surgery and treatment.",Ruled as violated by court,,"11. Following a deterioration in the applicant's health, on 23 May 2017 the Court indicated to the Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that they should immediately ensure that the recommended treatment was available and provided to the applicant and that the applicant was placed in a specialised medical institution for medical treatment – including surgery, if appropriate. 14. According to the Government, the SIZO administration offered the applicant transportation to the Kyiv SIZO in a prison van with a view to his undergoing a further medical examination at the Amosov Cardiology Institute. On 16 June 2017 the applicant refused that offer, arguing that he could not be transported in a prison van owing to his state of health. The case file contains a statement by the applicant dated 16 June 2017 addressed to the head of the SIZO, according to which he did not refuse transportation but insisted on it being in a form that was compatible with his state of health. 17. On 10 July 2017 the Court reiterated its previous decision (see paragraph 11 above) indicating that the authorities were to ensure that the applicant was transported promptly, and in conditions commensurate with his state of health, to a specialised medical institution to undergo the necessary medical examinations, such as a cardiac ventriculography test, in order that a correct diagnosis could be made and the applicant could receive medical treatment, if necessary. On 8 August 2017 the Government submitted that the applicant had not been transported to a specialised medical institution, as had been indicated by the Court, owing to his refusal of 16 June 2017 (see paragraph 14 above).",FALSE,0,The applicant never submitted an application to the Court., 159,"Article 34 Individual applications The Court may receive applications from any person, nongovernmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.","5. The applicant was born in 1972 and is currently serving a life sentence in Ladyzhynska colony no. 39 (""the colony""). 6. On 25 November 2004 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal convicted the applicant of several crimes and sentenced him to life imprisonment and ordered confiscation of all his property. On 23 February 2006 the Supreme Court upheld that judgment with certain changes. 7. Since 26 August 2003 the applicant has been detained in various detention facilities, initially pending the criminal investigation against him and his trial, and subsequently after sentencing. 8. On 26 August 2003 the applicant was placed in a temporary detention facility in Donetsk (SIZO No. 5) for the duration of the criminal proceedings against him. On 25 January 2007 he was diagnosed with tuberculosis. The case file contains other evidence to indicate that 1 February 2007 was the date of the tuberculosis diagnosis. 9. Upon completion of the criminal proceedings, on 16 March 2007 the applicant was transferred to the Ladyzhynska colony. 10. On 20 March 2007 a preliminary examination of the applicant was conducted, together with laboratory tests and an X-ray. He was put under medical supervision owing to the residual effects of his tuberculosis. 11. According to the Government, the applicant was under medical supervision and received the appropriate medical care for his tuberculosis. In particular, he had been examined on a regular basis by the colony doctors between 20 March 2007 and 26 February 2018 and prescribed treatment. As a result of each course of treatment his health had improved. The Government did not specify the frequency of the applicant's regular examination and treatment during that time. 12. In December 2011 a blood test revealed that the applicant had contracted hepatitis C. According to the applicant, he was denied access to copies of the test results. 13. According to the Government, on 28 February 2012 the applicant was examined by a colony doctor who diagnosed him with chronic persistent hepatitis in remission. The applicant was prescribed treatment. 14. On 16 May 2012 doctors from the Vinnytsya Regional Centre of Control and Prevention of HIV-Aids diagnosed the applicant with hepatitis C in remission without hepatic impairment. According to the Government, the applicant was prescribed with symptomatic treatment and as a result of the treatment his health improved. The Government did not specify the nature of that treatment. 15. According to the Government, the applicant was supervised by the colony doctors and was prescribed with all necessary medicine and a special diet. The Government did not specify the frequency of the treatment or the nature of the diet provided to the applicant. 16. The Government further submitted that from 23 February to 20 March 2015 the applicant had been under medical treatment in a multi-disciplinary hospital in Stryzhavska correctional colony no. 81. As a result of the treatment his health had improved. The nature of that treatment was not specified. 17. They also added that as of 26 February 2018 the applicant remained under the ongoing supervision of the colony doctors, and his state of health was satisfactory. 18. According to the applicant, during his detention he submitted numerous applications to the domestic authorities, including the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal (""the Court of Appeal""), seeking to obtain copies of various documents to be submitted to the Court in substantiation of his application. 19. He added that between August and November 2006 he requested that the Court of Appeal provide him with a copy of his indictment. His requests were refused on 8 August and 6 September 2006 on the grounds that he had already been provided with a copy of that document in the course of the criminal proceedings against him and that there was no legal requirement to meet his requests. Eventually, on 21 July 2008 a copy of that document was sent to the applicant. 20. Between April and August 2009 the applicant requested that the Court of Appeal send him copies of several court records from his criminal case file as well as from that of his accomplice. Those requests were initially refused as not having a basis in law. According to the Government, on 10 September 2009 the applicant lodged another application with the Court of Appeal in which he requested copies of court hearing records, the cassation appeal and other documents from his criminal proceedings case file. On 2 October 2009 the Court of Appeal sent the requested copies to the applicant, but excluded copies of the court hearing records, on the ground that their transmission was not covered by the legislation that was applicable at that time. On 21 April 2011 the Office of the Government Agent before the European Court of Human Rights sent copies of the court hearing records to the applicant. 21. By letters dated 12 and 17 January 2017, the Court of Appeal refused the applicant's applications for a copy of his request for an extension of the time-limit for lodging a cassation appeal against his conviction of 25 November 2004 and a copy of a court ruling of 26 October 2016 dismissing that request. The Court of Appeal specified that the applicant's criminal case file had been sent to the Higher Specialised Court of Ukraine for Civil and Criminal Matters upon the latter court's request. The applicant has not been provided with a copy of the requested documents.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"8. On 26 August 2003 the applicant was placed in a temporary detention facility in Donetsk (SIZO No. 5) for the duration of the criminal proceedings against him. On 25 January 2007 he was diagnosed with tuberculosis. The case file contains other evidence to indicate that 1 February 2007 was the date of the tuberculosis diagnosis. 11. According to the Government, the applicant was under medical supervision and received the appropriate medical care for his tuberculosis. In particular, he had been examined on a regular basis by the colony doctors between 20 March 2007 and 26 February 2018 and prescribed treatment. As a result of each course of treatment his health had improved. The Government did not specify the frequency of the applicant's regular examination and treatment during that time. 13. According to the Government, on 28 February 2012 the applicant was examined by a colony doctor who diagnosed him with chronic persistent hepatitis in remission. The applicant was prescribed treatment. 16. The Government further submitted that from 23 February to 20 March 2015 the applicant had been under medical treatment in a multi-disciplinary hospital in Stryzhavska correctional colony no. 81. As a result of the treatment his health had improved. The nature of that treatment was not specified. 17. They also added that as of 26 February 2018 the applicant remained under the ongoing supervision of the colony doctors, and his state of health was satisfactory.",TRUE,2,"The applicant was able to submit applications to the Court, but arguably, the Court hindered the effective exercise of this right through its range of decisions.", 160,"Article 34 Individual applications The Court may receive applications from any person, nongovernmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.","5. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Moscow. 6. The facts of the cases, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 24 November 2006 the applicant, the owner and CEO of a large dairy producer, was charged with large-scale fraud and money laundering and summoned for questioning. He did not show up for a few initial interviews and the investigator put his name on the list of fugitives from justice. 8. On 26 January 2007 the investigator, acting on the information that the applicant had fled abroad, asked the Ostankinskiy District Court in Moscow for a detention order. 9. The detention hearing was fixed for 1 February 2007. The applicant's lawyers had been notified of the date and time of the hearing on the previous day but did not show up and asked the investigator to postpone the examination of his application because they were busy in other proceedings. The District Court appointed legal-aid counsel to represent the absent applicant, proceeded with the hearing and issued the detention order, referring to the fact of the applicant's absconding to Ukraine and from there to Hungary, the gravity of the charges against him and the risk of interference with the investigation. On 9 February 2007 the applicant's lawyers appealed. 10. On 15 February 2007 the applicant was arrested in Moscow. 11. On 19 March 2007 the Moscow City Court heard an appeal against the detention order. The applicant and his lawyers were present at the hearing. Considering that the risks of flight and obstruction of the investigation were sufficiently established, the City Court upheld the detention order. 12. The applicant's detention was later extended on nine occasions. The applicant appealed against each of the detention orders, lodging statements of appeal within two to ten days of the hearing date. It took the appeal courts between twenty-six and sixty days to examine the complaints. 13. The most recent detention order of 25 July 2008 was quashed on appeal by the Supreme Court on 2 October 2008. The Supreme Court considered that there was no evidence substantiating the risk of absconding or interfering with justice. The investigation had been pending for over two years of which the applicant had spent more than a year and a half in custody. The Supreme Court concluded that that the proceedings had been unreasonably long and ordered the applicant's release on bail. 14. While in custody, the applicant asked the investigator to be allowed to receive visits from his mother, wife and children and also pastoral visits from two Orthodox priests, A. and S. 15. With the investigator's consent, the applicant's mother and daughters visited him on two occasions in April and May 2007. In August and September 2007 the investigator interviewed his wife and mother as potential witnesses but they refused to testify, invoking the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. The investigator refused the applicant's subsequent applications to see his family, stating that such visits could ""have a negative influence on the conduct of the investigation"". As to the Orthodox priests, on 29 March 2007 the investigator invoked the same ground to refuse a visit from S. On 30 August 2007 the investigator once again refused a pastoral visit, stating that the applicant should see the prison chaplain instead. 16. Counsel for the applicant applied for a judicial review of visiting restrictions. 17. On 24 October 2007 and 6 February 2008 the Tverskoy District Court pronounced the refusal of pastoral visits to be lawful and justified, holding that the investigator had full discretion to determine whether or not such visits ran counter to the interests of the investigation. On 18 June 2008 the City Court upheld the latter decision on appeal, holding that a restriction on religious rights was an inherent consequence of the pre-trial detention. 18. As regards family visits, on 30 October 2007 the Tverskoy District Court granted the applicant's complaint in part, finding as follows: (a) restrictions on visits from the applicant's wife and mother in the period after the investigator had interviewed them as witnesses in the criminal proceedings had been lawful and within the discretion of the investigator; (b) restrictions on visits from the wife and mother in the preceding period had not been justified but no relief could be afforded to the applicant because they had already been granted the status of witnesses and the investigator might wish to interview them again at some point in time; (c) restrictions on visits from the applicant's children were not justified and the investigator had an obligation to remedy a breach of the applicant's rights. 19. On 10 December 2007 the applicant's representative before the Court, Ms Kostromina, asked the director of the remand prison to allow her to see the applicant and provided credentials confirming her status. Her application was referred to the investigator. 20. On 24 January 2008 Ms Kostromina lodged a complaint with the Preobrazhenskiy District Court claiming that the prison director should have authorised her visit without any restrictions, on the basis of Article 34 of the Convention guaranteeing unhindered access of an applicant to his representative. 21. On 15 February 2008 the District Court dismissed the complaint, finding that Ms Kostromina was not the applicant's counsel in the domestic criminal proceedings and could not therefore visit him. On 6 May 2008 the Moscow City Court upheld that decision on appeal.",Ruled as violated by court,,"13. The most recent detention order of 25 July 2008 was quashed on appeal by the Supreme Court on 2 October 2008. The Supreme Court considered that there was no evidence substantiating the risk of absconding or interfering with justice. The investigation had been pending for over two years of which the applicant had spent more than a year and a half in custody. The Supreme Court concluded that that the proceedings had been unreasonably long and ordered the applicant's release on bail. 18. As regards family visits, on 30 October 2007 the Tverskoy District Court granted the applicant's complaint in part, finding as follows: (a) restrictions on visits from the applicant's wife and mother in the period after the investigator had interviewed them as witnesses in the criminal proceedings had been lawful and within the discretion of the investigator; (b) restrictions on visits from the wife and mother in the preceding period had not been justified but no relief could be afforded to the applicant because they had already been granted the status of witnesses and the investigator might wish to interview them again at some point in time; (c) restrictions on visits from the applicant's children were not justified and the investigator had an obligation to remedy a breach of the applicant's rights.",TRUE,2,"The applicant was able to submit applications to the Court, but arguably, the Court hindered the effective exercise of this right through its range of decisions and the length of the process.", 161,"Article 34 Individual applications The Court may receive applications from any person, nongovernmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.","7. The applicants are Syrian nationals. Their initials, dates of birth, application numbers and the other details of their cases are set out in the Appendix. At the time of lodging their applications the applicants were detained at detention centres for foreign nationals run by the Federal Migration Service (hereinafter ""the FMS"") in different towns in Russia. 8. The facts of the cases, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows. 9. On various dates between 2012 and 2016 the applicants came to Russia on various visas and did not leave when the period of their stay had expired. They were apprehended by the police and/or officers of the FMS in various regions in Russia for breaching the applicable immigration regulations, and placed in detention centres for foreigners (see the Appendix for the applicants' dates of detention and details of the relevant proceedings). The domestic courts in the respective regions examined their cases and found the applicants guilty of breaching various immigration regulations. Some of the applicants lodged appeals, but they were rejected by the domestic courts, whereas other applicants eventually had their expulsion orders quashed by the appeal courts. One of the applicants did not appeal against his expulsion order (see the Appendix for the details of individual cases) 10. All the applicants sought to obtain refugee status and/or temporary asylum in Russia. Some of the applicants voluntarily withdrew their requests and others' requests were rejected, first by the FMS and then by the domestic courts which examined the appeals against the FMS's refusals. Only Y.A.'s request for temporary asylum was granted (see the Appendix for details). 11. According to the information provided by their lawyers, while the proceedings before the Court were ongoing, six of the applicants (M.S.A., R.K., H.R., B.Z., S.W. and A.A.) left Russia of their own volition on various dates to go to third countries, where they settled (see the Appendix for details). 12. Between 24 January 2014 and 10 June 2014 M.S.A. and R.K. were detained in a detention centre for foreign nationals run by the FMS in Krasnoye Selo, in the Leningrad Region. 13. According to their submissions, the centre was based in an eight-storey building with windows covered with grills; five of the storeys were designed to accommodate 176 people in total. Each storey comprised around ten to eleven cells. The centre was severely overcrowded during the whole period of the applicants' detention. In particular, according to a report of the Human Rights Ombudsman in Saint Petersburg, on 26 February 2014 the centre accommodated 400 foreign nationals. 14. Both applicants were detained in cell no. 511, located on the fifth storey, which measured around 9 square metres and was designed to accommodate six people. All places in the cell were occupied during the whole period of their detention. Thus, each detainee had no more than 1.5 square metres of personal space, despite the statutory requirement that each detainee in a detention centre for foreign nationals have at least 4.5 square metres of personal space. The cell was furnished with three bunk beds and two bedside tables. There was no dining table in the cell. 15. The food was of poor quality, with no fruit or vegetables, and included pork, which the applicants could not eat for religious reasons. No alternative food was offered instead of pork, so they were deprived of any meal when pork was served. There were no kitchen and dining facilities in the centre. Food was delivered to the centre in containers and served cold in the cells. Detainees were forced to eat on their beds because there were no tables in the cells. This shortage in food was exacerbated by arbitrary restrictions on the contents of food parcels delivered from outside. Detainees were not allowed to receive fermented milk products, home‑cooked food, fruit or vegetables. 16. Detainees had no free access to drinking water or devices to boil tap water. The cell where M.S.A. and R.K. were detained was only lit by one light bulb, and the detainees were not allowed to switch on the light after 10 p.m. 17. The applicants and other inmates could move around on that storey to get to sanitary facilities, but they were not allowed to leave the storey or enter other detainees' cells. At the two ends of the common corridor there were bathrooms, each equipped with three lavatories, two washbasins and two showers. The storey was under the control of a dozen ""chosen"" inmates who, with the tacit consent of the centre's administration, dictated their rules to others and created an atmosphere of fear, violence and extortion. One of the bathrooms was for their exclusive use. The other seventy to eighty inmates had to use the other bathroom. 18. Outdoor exercise was sporadic and lasted around 15-20 minutes. In winter, the applicants did not go outside, as they did not possess winter clothes. In the period April-May 2014 they were able to enjoy outdoor exercise only four times. Outdoor exercise took place in a closed yard measuring around 50 metres in length and 10 metres in width. There was gravel on the ground, and there were no benches, plants or sports equipment. 19. The facility did not offer any activities, and no library was available. 20. During the administrative hearing concerning his removal from Russia on 26 February 2016, H.R. was not represented by a lawyer. 21. According to the lawyer representing B.Z., H.D. and S.W., on 25 March 2015 he was not allowed to meet with them in the detention centre.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"21. According to the lawyer representing B.Z., H.D. and S.W., on 25 March 2015 he was not allowed to meet with them in the detention centre.",FALSE,0,"The applicants were able to submit applications to the Court, which were then ruled upon without hindrance.", 162,"Article 46 Binding force and execution of judgments 1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties. 2. The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution. 3. If the Committee of Ministers considers that the supervision of the execution of a final judgment is hindered by a problem of interpretation of the judgment, it may refer the matter to the Court for a ruling on the question of interpretation. A referral decision shall require a majority vote of two-thirds of the representatives entitled to sit on the committee. 4. If the Committee of Ministers considers that a High Contracting Party refuses to abide by a final judgment in a case to which it is a party, it may, after serving formal notice on that Party and by decision adopted by a majority vote of two-thirds of the representatives entitled to sit on the committee, refer to the Court the question whether that Party has failed to fulfil its obligation under paragraph1. 5. If the Court finds a violation of paragraph 1, it shall refer the case to the Committee of Ministers for consideration of the measures to be taken. If the Court finds no violation of paragraph1, it shall refer the case to the Committee of Ministers, which shall close its examination of the case.","5. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Weinheim. He is a campaigner against abortion and operates an anti-abortion website (babycaust.de). At the time of the proceedings outlined below, the website included, among other things, the following content. 6. On the starting page a picture of graves was shown and the text underneath read ""then: Holocaust"". Upon clicking on the picture, the user was directed to a page titled: ""Abortion – the new Holocaust?"" on which the Holocaust was compared to abortions. On the left margin of the starting page, there were several links, of which one was called ""Life or death?"". Upon clicking on it, the user was directed to a page with the headline ""Prayer requests for Germany"". From that page, the reader was directed to a location-based alphabetical list mentioning the names and practice addresses of doctors who performed abortions in Germany, and to a request for prayers for those doctors. At the very bottom of the same page, under the highlighted text ""German contemporary history in brief"", a sentence read: ""Perverted doctors murder unborn children at the request of the mothers"" (Pervertierte Ärzte ermorden im Auftrag der Mütter die ungeborenen Kinder) On the same page, clicking on the button ""close page"" forwarded the user to a page where it was stated: ""Pray, if possible regularly, for the doctors ... who personally undertake the AGGRAVATED MURDER of abortion killing"" (Beten Sie – wenn möglich regelmäßig – für die Mediziner ..., welche den MORD der Abtreibungstötung selbst vornehmen ...) (Emphasis in original). Somewhat farther down on the same page, it was stated that counselling centres that issued certifications: ""... are enabling and facilitating the unpunished aggravated murder of children in their mother's womb."" (... ermöglichen und begünstigen einen straffreien Kindermord im Mutterschoβ.) 7. One of the doctors listed on the applicant's website, Dr Q., sought a civil injunction ordering the applicant to remove his name and address from the website. 8. On 23 May 2006 the Mannheim Regional Court rejected Dr Q.'s application on the grounds that it was a fact that Dr Q. performed abortions and that the remainder of the website's content was covered by the applicant's freedom of expression. It observed, in particular, that the present case was not comparable to similar cases which had concerned an interference with personality rights by the distribution of personalised leaflets. The publishing of a doctor's name on a list of abortion performing doctors had no comparable ""pillory effect"". 9. Subsequently Dr Q. appealed and – during the appeal proceedings – modified his application, seeking a civil injunction ordering the applicant to desist from labelling abortions, such as those performed by Dr Q., ""aggravated murder"". 10. On 28 February 2007 the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal granted the sought injunction. The court held that the applicant's website led it to be understood that abortions performed by Dr Q. constituted ""aggravated murder"". While the term ""aggravated murder"" did not have to be understood in a merely legal sense but could also be understood as a moral judgment, the overall presentation of the website at the very least did not exclude a reading that Dr Q. had perpetrated the criminal offence of aggravated murder. Even though the applicant had pointed out that abortions were exempt from punishment, he had not referred to section 218a of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 14 below), which exempted abortions as performed by Dr Q., from criminal liability. In addition, the applicant had emphasised the term ""aggravated murder"" in the relevant parts of the website and had compared abortions with the Holocaust. In sum, the statements of the website could be understood as a personalised accusation against Dr Q. of perpetrating aggravated murder. 11. On 29 May 2007 the Federal Court of Justice refused a request by the applicant for legal aid on the grounds that the applicant's intended appeal on points of law lacked sufficient prospect of success. 12. On 2 July 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit a complaint by the applicant for adjudication for being inadmissible, without providing reasons (no. 1 BvR 1663/07).",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"8. On 23 May 2006 the Mannheim Regional Court rejected Dr Q.'s application on the grounds that it was a fact that Dr Q. performed abortions and that the remainder of the website's content was covered by the applicant's freedom of expression. It observed, in particular, that the present case was not comparable to similar cases which had concerned an interference with personality rights by the distribution of personalised leaflets. The publishing of a doctor's name on a list of abortion performing doctors had no comparable ""pillory effect"". 12. On 2 July 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit a complaint by the applicant for adjudication for being inadmissible, without providing reasons (no. 1 BvR 1663/07).",FALSE,0,The fact pattern follows the procedure laid out in the statute., 163,"Article 46 Binding force and execution of judgments 1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties. 2. The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution. 3. If the Committee of Ministers considers that the supervision of the execution of a final judgment is hindered by a problem of interpretation of the judgment, it may refer the matter to the Court for a ruling on the question of interpretation. A referral decision shall require a majority vote of two-thirds of the representatives entitled to sit on the committee. 4. If the Committee of Ministers considers that a High Contracting Party refuses to abide by a final judgment in a case to which it is a party, it may, after serving formal notice on that Party and by decision adopted by a majority vote of two-thirds of the representatives entitled to sit on the committee, refer to the Court the question whether that Party has failed to fulfil its obligation under paragraph1. 5. If the Court finds a violation of paragraph 1, it shall refer the case to the Committee of Ministers for consideration of the measures to be taken. If the Court finds no violation of paragraph1, it shall refer the case to the Committee of Ministers, which shall close its examination of the case.","6. The cases concern the 1982 State internal premium loan bonds (облигации государственного внутреннего выигрышного займа 1982 года - ""1982 premium bonds"") which are in the applicants' possession. The applicants submitted lists of serials numbers or photocopies of their bonds. 7. On 30 December 1980 the USSR Cabinet of Ministers decided to issue bonds of an internal premium loan to finance certain State programmes. The bonds had nominal values of 25, 50 and 100 Soviet roubles (SUR). Their period of circulation was set at twenty years, from 1 January 1982 to 1 January 2002, and they were redeemable at any time during the term of the loan with interest at 3% per annum. Soviet citizens could either buy the 1982 premium bonds with their own money or obtain them in exchange for bonds from an earlier 1966 State internal premium loan. The average monthly wage in 1982 was SUR 177.30 across all branches of the economy plus SUR 68.70 in various social benefits (People's Economy of the USSR 1982, a statistical yearbook by the USSR Central Statistics Directorate, Moscow, 1983). 8. By the late 1980s the Soviet economy was suffering from a structural imbalance due a rapidly increasing money supply and decreasing availability of consumer goods sold at State-controlled prices. In January 1991 the USSR Government freed 40% of prices and carried out a monetary reform eliminating the largest banknotes in circulation and restricting the withdrawal of money from bank deposit accounts to SUR 500 a month. This led to a two to threefold increase in prices. On 22 March 1991 the USSR President issued Decree no. UP-1708, ordering a one-time increase to savings instruments, including the 1982 premium bonds, of 40% to offset the price rise. 9. On 26 December 1991 the USSR was dissolved by Declaration no. 142-N of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The declaration invited the heads of newly independent States to reflect on the issues of succession. 10. On 19 February 1992 the Russian Government issued Resolution no. 97, recognising its succession in respect of the obligations of the former USSR under the 1982 loan: ""1. To confirm succession of the [Russian] Government in respect of the obligations of the former USSR vis-à-vis Russian Federation citizens arising out of the bonds of the 1982 State internal premium loan. ... 6. To give Russian Federation citizens who are holders of bonds of the 1982 State internal premium loan the right to voluntarily exchange their bonds against State securities, including 1992 Russian internal premium loan bonds, shares in the Savings Bank ... and also to credit the proceeds of sale of the bonds into deposit accounts open in the Savings Bank ... from 1 October 1992 ..."" 11. Between 1995 and 2000 a series of Russian laws and regulations were passed which provided for the conversion of Soviet securities, including the 1982 premium bonds, into special Russian promissory notes nominated in ""promissory roubles"" (DOR) (for details, see Yuriy Lobanov v. Russia, no. 15578/03, §§ 16-21, 2 December 2010). 12. From 2003 to the present day, the application and implementation of those laws and regulations have been continuously suspended, most recently for the period 1 January 2017 to 1 January 2020, by Law no. 429‑FZ of 19 December 2016 and Resolution no. 1437 dated 22 December 2016. 13. The applicants applied to the Russian financial authorities and the courts, seeking the redemption of their bonds. Their claims were rejected on procedural and substantive grounds. Mr Ruzanov's claim was allowed at first instance but the judgment was later overturned on appeal. On 5 May 2014 Mr Israfilov obtained a decision from the Leninskiy District Court in Makhachkala, requiring the Russian Government to convert his bonds into special promissory notes. 14. Mr Losyakov and Ms Losyakova's claim was referred by the Supreme Court to the Constitutional Court. By decision no. 632-O of 3 April 2012, the Constitutional Court declared it inadmissible, finding that it was not competent to rule on the issue of an alleged failure of federal lawmakers to enact laws guaranteeing the protection of savings which had been recognised as Russia's internal debt. In its view, the federal lawmakers had adequate discretion to legislate on those issues in the interests of everyone, taking into account the specific social and economic conditions prevailing in Russia and the balance between the rights and lawful interests of various categories of citizens, including those who acted as creditors of the State and others in respect of whom the State had public policy obligations. The legislature was entitled to restrict the rights, including property rights, of some people for the protection of rights and lawful interests of others.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"12. From 2003 to the present day, the application and implementation of those laws and regulations have been continuously suspended, most recently for the period 1 January 2017 to 1 January 2020, by Law no. 429‑FZ of 19 December 2016 and Resolution no. 1437 dated 22 December 2016. 14. Mr Losyakov and Ms Losyakova's claim was referred by the Supreme Court to the Constitutional Court. By decision no. 632-O of 3 April 2012, the Constitutional Court declared it inadmissible, finding that it was not competent to rule on the issue of an alleged failure of federal lawmakers to enact laws guaranteeing the protection of savings which had been recognised as Russia's internal debt. In its view, the federal lawmakers had adequate discretion to legislate on those issues in the interests of everyone, taking into account the specific social and economic conditions prevailing in Russia and the balance between the rights and lawful interests of various categories of citizens, including those who acted as creditors of the State and others in respect of whom the State had public policy obligations. The legislature was entitled to restrict the rights, including property rights, of some people for the protection of rights and lawful interests of others.",FALSE,0,The fact pattern follows the procedure laid out in the statute., 164,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1989. 5. On 27 December 2010 the applicant was arrested on drug-related charges and placed in custody. 6. On 14 December 2012 the case was submitted for trial to the Voronezh Regional Court. 7. On 11 July 2013 the court returned the case to the deputy Prosecutor General for remedying certain procedural defects. 8. On 20 September 2013 the Investigations Department of the Federal Drug Control Service received the case file and forwarded it to its regional branch in St Petersburg. 9. On 1 November 2013 an investigator asked the St Petersburg City Court to extend the applicant's detention for a further four months, until 31 March 2014. On 8 November 2013 the City Court granted the application. The applicant filed an appeal. He pointed out that the maximum statutory time period for keeping him in pre-trial detention had expired a long time ago and that any further extensions had been unlawful. 10. On 27 November 2013 the St Petersburg City Court rejected his appeal in a summary fashion, without examining his arguments in detail.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""prompt,"" it appears that after being held on reasonable suspicion, the applicant was not brought promptly to trial, as it took more than the maximum statutory period.", 165,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Groznyy in the Chechen Republic. 5. On 23 June 2012 the applicant was arrested in connection with a drug-related offence and placed in custody. 6. On 14 August 2012 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Groznyy found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to one year's imprisonment. 7. On 14 November 2012 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic quashed the conviction and ordered a retrial. 8. On 30 May 2013 the Oktyabrskiy District Court again convicted the applicant and sentenced him to one year's imprisonment. The court stated that the ""preventive measure [should] remain unchanged until the conviction [had become] final"". 9. On 24 June 2013 counsel for the applicant asked the director of the remand prison to release the applicant since he had already served the one-year sentence. On the same day a judge of the District Court faxed a letter to the director, informing him that the applicant should not be released until the Supreme Court had examined the matter on appeal since the District Court ordered the preventive measure to remain unchanged. 10. On 3 July 2013 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction and the applicant was released.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""prompt,"" it appears that after being held on reasonable suspicion, the applicant was not brought promptly to trial, as it took more than 3 months.", 166,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Yerevan. 5. On 16 August 2004 he was charged with fraud in Armenia and the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court in Yerevan issued an arrest warrant. 6. On 8 November 2006 the applicant was arrested in Ufa, Russia. On an unspecified date the Russian Prosecutor General received an extradition request from his Armenian counterpart. 7. On an application a district prosecutor in Ufa, on 27 December 2006 the Kirovskiy District Court in Ufa remanded the applicant in custody, without setting a time-limit for his detention. On 13 February 2007 the Supreme Court of Bashkortostan upheld the detention order on appeal. 8. On 23 March 2007 a deputy Prosecutor General granted the extradition request; on 17 July 2007 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld that decision in final instance. 9. On 24 August 2007 the applicant was extradited to Armenia where he was acquitted of all charges and released. 10. On 16 February 2008, when attempting to return to Russia, the applicant was detained by the Russian border control and held in custody until 22 February 2008. The parties did not produce a record of the applicant's arrest or any judicial decision authorising his detention.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""prompt,"" it appears that after being held on reasonable suspicion, the applicant was not brought promptly to trial, as it took more than 3 months.", 167,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","5. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Costesti. 6. On 16 July 2008 the Ialoveni District Court found the applicant guilty of disrespectful conduct towards a police officer and sentenced him to five days' administrative arrest. The applicant appealed. 7. On 12 August 2008 the Chișinău Court of Appeal quashed the above‑mentioned judgment and returned the case for a re‑examination on the merits. 8. On 11 February 2009 the Ialoveni District Court discontinued the proceedings against the applicant as a result of the expiry of the time-limit for applying an administrative sanction. Meanwhile, the applicant had already served his sentence. The applicant appealed. 9. On 13 March 2009 the Chișinău Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of the district court and discontinued the administrative proceedings in respect of the applicant for lack of corpus delicti. 10. The applicant brought an action under Law no. 1545 seeking 300,000 Moldovan lei (MDL) (the equivalent of 18,750 euros (EUR)) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. On 11 May 2011 the Supreme Court of Justice concluded that the applicant's administrative arrest had been unlawful and thus awarded him MDL 8,000 (equivalent to EUR 500) as compensation for the damage caused.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,The applicant was a victim of unlawful arrest and able to seek recourse and compensation appropriately., 168,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant, who was born in 1989, lives in Istanbul. 5. On 14 January 2009 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation. 6. On 17 January 2009 the investigating judge at the Istanbul Assize Court, after questioning the applicant, ordered his pre-trial detention. 7. On 24 June 2009 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court. 8. The trial commenced before the Istanbul Assize Court and the first preparatory hearing was held on 4 November 2009. 9. In the subsequent hearings held between 17 February 2010 and 3 November 2010, the applicant appeared before the court and the judges ordered his continued detention. 10. The applicant filed an objection against the decision of 3 November 2010. On 29 November 2010 the 12th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court dismissed this objection without holding an oral hearing, and based on the public prosecutor's written opinion, which had not been communicated to the applicant or his representative. 11. On 13 February 2013 the applicant was released from detention on remand. 12. According to the latest information in the case-file, the proceedings against the applicant are still pending before the first-instance court.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 169,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","5. The applicant was born in 1992 and lives in Istanbul. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 7 December 2009 the applicant was arrested. 8. On 9 December 2009 the applicant was placed in detention on remand by the judge at the Istanbul Assize Court on suspicion of committing crimes on behalf of an illegal terrorist organisation, disseminating propaganda for the same organisation, storage of hazardous materials, and damage to public property. 9. On 30 December 2009 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed his indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court. 10. On 6 May 2010 the first hearing was held before the Istanbul Assize Court. At the end of the hearing the court ordered the continuation of his detention in the presence of the applicant. 11. The applicant filed an objection against this decision. On 20 May 2010 the 10th Chamber of Istanbul Assize Court dismissed this objection without holding an oral hearing. In delivering its decision, the court took into consideration the written opinion of the public prosecutor, which had not been communicated to the applicant or his representative. 12. On 10 December 2010 the applicant was released from detention on remand. 13. At the time when the application was lodged, the proceedings against the applicant were still pending before the first-instance court.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 170,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Siirt. 5. On 9 January 2009 the applicant was taken into custody on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation and disseminating its propaganda. 6. On 13 January 2009 the applicant was brought before the Siirt Magistrates' Court, who ordered his detention on remand taking into account the strong suspicion that he had committed the alleged offences. 7. On 3 August 2009 the applicant's lawyer filed an objection against the above decision on the applicant's detention and requested his release. 8. On 6 August 2009 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment, charging the applicant with disseminating terrorist propaganda, and aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation. 9. On 10 August 2009, at the end of the preparatory hearing, the Diyarbakır Assize Court decided to prolong the applicant's detention on the basis of the case-file. 10. On 8 September 2009 the Diyarbakır Assize Court ex officio examined the applicant's detention on remand on the basis of the case-file and decided to extend it. 11. On 1 October 2009, at the end of the first hearing before the Diyarbakır Assize Court, the applicant was released pending trial. 12. On 31 December 2009 the Diyarbakır Assize Court acquitted the applicant of the charges against him. No appeal was filed and the judgment became final on 8 January 2010.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,The applicant was brought to trial promptly and the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was decided speedily., 171,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1991 and lives in Mersin. 5. On 30 December 2011 the applicant was taken into custody on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation and of making propaganda for that organisation. 6. On the same day, the applicant was brought before the investigating judge who ordered his detention on remand taking into account the nature of the offences, and the strong suspicion that he had committed the alleged offences, and the risk of absconding. 7. On 28 March 2012 the applicant's lawyer lodged an objection against the decision dated 30 December 2011 ordering the applicant's detention and requested his release. On 29 March 2012 the Mersin Magistrates' Court dismissed the objection on the basis of the case file, without holding a hearing. On 16 April 2012 the applicant's lawyer filed a further objection against that decision. On 17 April 2012 the Mersin Criminal Court with General Jurisdiction dismissed the objection on the basis of the case file, without holding a hearing. 8. On 5 September 2012 the applicant was released from detention on remand. 9. On 10 September 2012 the Adana Public Prosecutor filed a bill of indictment against the applicant, accusing him of being a member of a terrorist organisation and of making propaganda in its favour. 10. According to the latest information in the case file, the proceedings against the applicant are still pending before an assize court.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""prompt,"" it appears that after being held on reasonable suspicion, the applicant was not brought promptly to trial, as it took more than 3 months.", 172,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1967 and was detained at the Tekirdağ F‑type prison when the application was lodged. 5. On 9 April 2003 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of being a member of a terrorist organisation. 6. On 13 April 2003 the applicant was brought before the judge at the Istanbul State Security Court who placed him in detention on remand taking into consideration the nature of the offence, and the state of evidence. 7. On 23 July 2003 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul State Security Court, charging the applicant with membership of a terrorist organisation, and attempting to undermine the constitutional order of the Republic of Turkey by force. The criminal proceedings against the applicant commenced. 8. On 10 November 2008 the court held a further hearing, in which both the applicant and his lawyer were present. At the end of that hearing, the court ordered the continuation of the applicant's detention. 9. On 10 November 2008 the applicant's lawyer filed an objection against this decision. On 27 November 2008 the 13th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court dismissed the objection without holding a hearing. In delivering its decision, the court took into consideration the written opinion of the public prosecutor, which had not been communicated to the applicant or his representative. 10. On 4 May 2011 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 11. On 25 September 2012 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 173,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1980 in Abakan, the Khakassiya Republic. 5. The applicant stood accused of theft and murder. On 22 November 2004 the Sayanogorsk Town Court in Khakassiya fixed, in the hearing held without the applicant's attendance, the opening date for the trial and ordered an extension of his pre-trial detention. On 2 December 2004 the applicant was convicted and given a custodial sentence. 6. On 22 March 2005 the Constitutional Court held, in unrelated proceedings, that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure ought to be interpreted as guaranteeing the right of the defendant to take part in the hearing where the matter of detention was decided, to make submissions to the court and to produce evidence (Judgment no. 4-P, point 4 of the operative part). 7. On 8 August 2013 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Khakassiya Republic quashed the Town Court's decision of 22 November 2004 in the part relating to the detention matter. Referring to the case-law of the Constitutional Court, it found that the District Court had unlawfully extended the applicant's detention without giving him an opportunity to take part in the hearing or to make submissions to the court. 8. The applicant sued the Ministry of Finance, seeking compensation for the unlawful detention from 22 November to 2 December 2004. By judgment of 16 September 2013, as upheld on appeal on 27 November 2013, the Abakan Town Court rejected his claim, holding that he was not eligible for compensation in respect of pre-trial detention because he had been found guilty and given a custodial sentence.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 174,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Sochi. 5. On 27 November 2010 the applicant, a police captain, was arrested for soliciting a bribe. He was taken into custody and his detention was extended on several occasions. On 4 July 2011 the case was submitted for trial in the Tsentralnyy District Court of Sochi. 6. On 8 July 2011 the District Court determined that the case was not ready for trial and returned the file to the prosecutor. By the same decision, it extended the applicant's detention until 10 August 2011. 7. On 9 August 2011 the director of the IZ-23/2 remand prison where the applicant was held reported to the Sochi prosecutor and to the president of the Tsentralnyy District Court that, in the absence of an order extending the applicant's detention beyond 10 August, he would need to be released on that date. On the same date the Sochi prosecutor replied to him that there were no grounds for releasing the applicant because the date for hearing the prosecutor's appeal against the District Court's order of 8 July had been fixed for 17 August. The applicant was not released on 10 August. He complained about his unlawful detention to the head of the Investigations Committee and the regional head of the Ministry of the Interior but did not receive any reply. 8. On 17 August 2011 the Krasnodar Regional Court quashed the District Court's order on appeal. As regards the custodial measure, it held that no extension had been necessary because by virtue of Article 255 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the applicant could be held in custody for an initial six-month period starting from the date on which the case had been submitted for trial.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. On 9 August 2011 the director of the IZ-23/2 remand prison where the applicant was held reported to the Sochi prosecutor and to the president of the Tsentralnyy District Court that, in the absence of an order extending the applicant's detention beyond 10 August, he would need to be released on that date. On the same date the Sochi prosecutor replied to him that there were no grounds for releasing the applicant because the date for hearing the prosecutor's appeal against the District Court's order of 8 July had been fixed for 17 August. The applicant was not released on 10 August. He complained about his unlawful detention to the head of the Investigations Committee and the regional head of the Ministry of the Interior but did not receive any reply.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""prompt,"" it appears that after being held on reasonable suspicion, the applicant was not brought promptly to trial, as it took more than 3 months.", 175,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant, a Syrian national, was born in 1993 and currently resides in Khartoum, Sudan. 5. On 24 April 2015 the applicant arrived in Russia, being in possession of a study visa. He enrolled in the Izhevsk State Technical University and had his registered residence in the town of Izhevsk. His visa expired on 26 April 2016. 6. On 4 May 2016 the applicant applied for refugee status alleging the risks to his life and safety in the light of the on-going conflict in Syria. The request and the subsequent appeals were dismissed by the Russian migration authorities and the courts. 7. On 8 June 2016 the applicant was arrested and put in detention by the migration authorities. 8. By a judgment of 9 June 2016 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Izhevsk found the applicant in breach of migration rules, an offence under Article 18.8 § 1.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences, and ordered his expulsion. In order to facilitate enforcement, the court ordered that the applicant be placed in detention. 9. On 10 June 2016 the Supreme Court of the Udmurtiya Republic upheld the lower court's judgment. 10. On 22 June 2016 the Court indicated to the respondent Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that the applicant should not be extradited, expelled or otherwise involuntarily removed from Russia to Syria for the duration of the proceedings before the Court. Since that date the enforcement of the applicant's expulsion was monthly postponed by the domestic courts. 11. On 13 January 2017 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on appeal amended the lower courts' judgments and excluded administrative removal from the sanction, since it would have exposed the applicant's life to risk in Syria. 12. On 20 January 2017 the applicant left Russia for Lebanon.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 176,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant, who was born in 1972, lives in İzmir. 5. On 29 November 2004 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation. 6. On 3 December 2004 the applicant was brought before the judge at the Istanbul Assize Court who placed him in detention on remand taking into consideration the nature of the offence, the state of evidence and the risk of absconding. 7. On 7 December 2004 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court, charging the applicant with membership of a terrorist organisation. 8. On 14 March 2006 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to six years and three months' imprisonment. The court ordered the continuation of his detention. 9. On 24 January 2007 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment on procedural grounds. The case was accordingly remitted to the Istanbul Assize Court. 10. On 19 July 2007 the 10th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court held a further hearing, in which both the applicant and his lawyer were present. At the end of that hearing, the court ordered the continuation of the applicant's detention. 11. On 25 July 2007 the applicant's lawyer filed an objection against the decision of 19 July 2007. On 7 August 2007 the 11th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court dismissed this objection without holding a hearing. In delivering its decision, the court took into consideration the written opinion of the public prosecutor, which had not been communicated to the applicant or his representative. 12. On 6 November 2007 the Istanbul Assize Court once more convicted the applicant and sentenced him to six years and three months' imprisonment and ordered his release. 13. On 30 January 2012 the Court of Cassation upheld this decision.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""prompt,"" it appears that after being held on reasonable suspicion, the applicant was not brought promptly to trial, as it took more than 3 months.", 177,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1977 and was detained at the Kırıkkale F‑type prison when the application was lodged. 5. On 1 October 2004 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of being member of a terrorist organisation. 6. On 5 October 2004 the applicant was brought before the judge at the Ankara Assize Court who placed him in detention on remand taking into consideration the nature of the offence, the state of evidence and the severity of the envisaged penalty. 7. On 15 March 2005 the Ankara public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Ankara Assize Court, charging the applicant with membership of a terrorist organisation. 8. On 31 January 2008 the Ankara Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to 15 years' imprisonment. The court ordered the continuation of his detention. 9. On 6 May 2009 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment. The case was accordingly remitted to the Ankara Assize Court for further examination. 10. On 10 November 2009 the 11th Chamber of the Ankara Assize Court held a further hearing, in which both the applicant and his lawyer were present. At the end of that hearing, the court ordered the continuation of the applicant's detention. 11. On 10 December 2009 the applicant's lawyer filed an objection against the decision of 10 November 2009. On 21 December 2009 the 12th Chamber of the Ankara Assize Court dismissed this objection without holding a hearing. In delivering its decision, the court took into consideration the written opinion of the public prosecutor, which had not been communicated to the applicant or his representative. 12. On 28 August 2012 the Ankara Assize Court once more convicted the applicant and sentenced him to fifteen years' imprisonment. 13. On 8 July 2013 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first instance court.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""prompt,"" it appears that after being held on reasonable suspicion, the applicant was not brought promptly to trial, as it took more than 3 months.", 178,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Belebey, Republic of Bashkortostan. 5. In October 2007 the applicant and his family moved from Uzbekistan to Russia, apparently for the purpose of obtaining Russian nationality as well as seeking medical treatment for the applicant's drug addiction. 6. In December 2007 the Uzbek authorities charged the applicant with large-scale drug-trafficking committed in October 2007 and issued a detention order and an international search warrant. 7. On 12 July 2008 the applicant was arrested in Moscow and on 14 July 2008 the Dragomilovskiy District Court of Moscow ordered the applicant's detention pending extradition, without setting any time-limit. 8. On 9 December 2008 the Russian Prosecutor General's Office ordered the applicant's extradition. 9. On 28 January 2009 the Moscow City Court confirmed the lawfulness of the applicant's arrest and detention, and upheld the extradition. 10. In the meantime, on 4 March 2009 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the judgment of 28 January 2009. 11. On 10 August 2009 the applicant issued an authority form to lawyers to lodge an application with the Court on his behalf. 12. On 21 August 2009 the extradition order was enforced and the applicant was transferred to Uzbekistan. 13. On 28 August 2009 the applicant's lawyers – who were apparently unaware of the extradition − requested an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in order to stay the removal. On 1 September 2009 the Court indicated the relevant measure to the Russian Government. 14. However, after the Russian Government had informed the Court about the extradition on 21 August 2009, the interim measure was lifted on 7 October 2009. 15. The parties submitted no information on related events in Uzbekistan. 16. On an unspecified date the applicant joined his family in Russia.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""prompt,"" it appears that after being held on reasonable suspicion, the applicant was not brought promptly to trial, as it took more than 3 months.", 179,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","5. The applicants, who are husband and wife, were born in 1970 and live in Chișinău. 6. On 29 January 2008 the applicants were involved in a street protest as a result of which they were arrested and detained for six hours and forty‑five minutes. On 18 December 2008 the first applicant was again involved in a street protest, as a result of which he was arrested and detained for approximately four hours and a half. Later both applicants were acquitted and the actions of the police were found to be unlawful. The facts concerning those protests were described in detail in Mătăsaru and Saviţchi v. Moldova, no. 38281/08, §§ 6-58, 2 November 2010. 7. On 29 January 2009 the first applicant organised again a street protest and was arrested again and detained for some six hours. Later the applicant was acquitted and the actions of the police were found to be unlawful. 8. On 2 November 2010 the Court adopted a judgment in the case of Mătăsaru and Saviţchi (cited above), in which it declared inadmissible the applicants' complaints concerning the alleged breaches of their rights guaranteed by Articles 5 and 11 of the Convention on the ground of their failure to exhaust domestic remedies (see Mătăsaru and Saviţchi (cited above, § 75). 9. After that, the applicants brought a civil action under Law 1545 (on compensation for damage caused by illegal acts of the criminal investigation bodies, the prosecution authorities or the courts) seeking compensation in respect of the breach of their rights guaranteed by Articles 5 and 11 of the Convention in regard to all three street protests of 2008 and 2009. 10. By a final judgment of 6 February 2013 the Supreme Court of Justice acknowledged the breach of the applicnts' rights guaranteed by Articles 5 and 11 of the Convention and awarded them the equivalent of 900 and 270 euros (EUR), respectively.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,It is arguable whether or not this detention counts as in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law., 180,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicants were born in 1990, 1988 and 1957, respectively and live in Chișinău. 5. The first and the second applicants were arrested on 8 and 9 April 2009, as a result of the mass protest which took place in Chișinău after the elections of 5 April 2009. They were placed in detention for ten and seven days respectively. Later the charges against them were dropped. 6. The third applicant was accused of fraud and placed in detention pending trial between 15 and 18 April 2004 and between 28 July and 3 August 2005, i.e. for nine days. Later the charges against him were dropped. The Government disputed the fact that the third applicant was detained between 28 July and 3 August 2005. 7. On different dates the applicants brought civil actions under Law No. 1545 (on compensation for damage caused by illegal acts of the criminal investigation bodies, the prosecution authorities or the courts) seeking 115,000 Moldovan lei (MDL) (the equivalent of 6,765 euros (EUR)), MDL 600,000 (the equivalent of EUR 36,700) and MDL 80,000 (the equivalent of EUR 4800), respectively, in compensation for non‑pecuniary damage. On 11 December 2013, 3 July 2013 and 28 May 2014 respectively, the Supreme Court of Justice concluded that the applicants' detentions had been unlawful and in breach of Article 5 of the Convention and awarded them MDL 15,000 (the equivalent of EUR 835), MDL 7,000 (the equivalent to EUR 428) and MDL 6,000 (the equivalent of EUR 317) respectively as compensation for the damage caused. The domestic courts found inter alia that the third applicant had been detained between 15 and 18 April 2004 and between 28 July and 3 August 2005. 8. In addition, the first and the second applicants were part of a group of persons considered to be victims of the events of April 2009 and were awarded by two Government decisions MDL 10,000 (the equivalent of EUR 625) and MDL 7000 (the equivalent of EUR 444), respectively.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,It is arguable whether or not these detentions count as in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law., 181,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","5. The applicants were born in 1980 and 1986, respectively, and were detained at the Tekirdağ F-Type prison when the application was lodged. 6. On 28 and 29 October 2005 the applicants were arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation. 7. On 31 October 2005 the applicants were brought before a judge at the Istanbul Assize Court which ordered their detention on remand. 8. On 23 December 2005 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment against the applicants, accusing them, inter alia, of membership of a terrorist organisation and illegal possession of explosives. 9. On 26 December 2005 the Istanbul Assize Court held a preparatory hearing and ordered the continuation of the applicants' detention. 10. Throughout the proceedings the trial court ordered the continuation of the applicants' detention on remand. Between the hearings, with regular intervals of one month, the court ex officio examined the applicants' detentions on the basis of the case-file and decided to extend. 11. At the end of the hearing held on 13 October 2008, the trial court decided once again to prolong the applicants' detention. Although the applicants' lawyer was present at this hearing, the applicants were not brought from prison to the court. Subsequently, their lawyer filed an objection against the decision of 13 October 2008. On 11 November 2008 the 13th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court dismissed the objection, without holding an oral hearing and based on the written opinions of the public prosecutor, which had not been communicated to the applicants or to their representative. 12. On 23 December 2009 the court convicted the applicants and sentenced them to imprisonment. The court also ordered the continuation of the first applicant's detention and the release of the second applicant. 13. On 24 March 2011 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first instance court.",Ruled as violated by court,,"11. At the end of the hearing held on 13 October 2008, the trial court decided once again to prolong the applicants' detention. Although the applicants' lawyer was present at this hearing, the applicants were not brought from prison to the court. Subsequently, their lawyer filed an objection against the decision of 13 October 2008. On 11 November 2008 the 13th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court dismissed the objection, without holding an oral hearing and based on the written opinions of the public prosecutor, which had not been communicated to the applicants or to their representative.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicants' detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 182,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicants were born in 1982 and 1981 respectively. 5. On 22 April 2006 upon receipt of intelligence reports that the youth branch of the PKK would be holding a meeting in the premises of a cooperative, the police officers, under the orders of the magistrates' court, conducted a search in the premises of the co-operative of which the applicants were members. The police seized several documents and CDs that contained propaganda materials related to the youth branch of the PKK. 6. On the same day the applicants were taken into custody on suspicion of being members of a terrorist organisation. 7. On 24 April 2006 the Urfa Magistrates' Court ordered the applicants' detention on remand. 8. On 27 April 2006 and 28 April 2006, respectively, the applicants filed objections against their pre-trial detention. The courts rejected their request on the basis of the case-file, without holding a hearing. 9. During the pre-trial stage, the magistrates' court continued to examine, by virtue of Article 108 of Law no. 5271, the necessity of applicants' continued detention every thirty days on the basis of the case file, without holding an oral hearing. The applicants also filed objections against their continued pre-trial detention, namely on 15 June, 12 July, 17 July, 1 August and 17 October 2006. All these objections were examined on the basis of the case file and were rejected by the domestic courts. 10. On 10 October 2006 the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor filed an indictment with the Diyarbakır Assize Court charging the applicants, along with twenty three other persons, with aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation under Article 314 of the Criminal Code (Law no. 5237). 11. On 30 November 2006 the Diyarbakır Assize Court held its first hearing and the applicants appeared before the court. On the same day, the applicants were released pending trial. 12. On 4 November 2008 the Diyarbakır Assize Court acquitted the applicants of the charges against them. In the absence of an appeal, this judgment became final on 12 November 2008.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,"According to the Court acquittal, the applicants were victims of unlawful detention and should've received compensation.", 183,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1960 and is detained in Nizhniy Tagil. 5. On 20 January 2009 the Verkh-Isetskiy District Court in Yekaterinburg remanded the applicant in custody on suspicion of fraud. The authorised detention period was subsequently extended on several occasions. 6. On 16 February 2010 the District Court determined that the case was not ready for trial. It directed the prosecution to remedy certain defects and extended the authorised period of the applicant's detention until 22 April 2010. 7. On 21 April 2010 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court heard an appeal against that detention order and decided that the applicant could be released on bail. By a supplementary decision taken on the following day in the absence of the applicant and his representatives, the Regional Court fixed the time-limit for posting bail until 11 May 2010. On 29 April 2010 that decision was sent by fax to the remand prison where the applicant was held. He was however unable to post the bail because the District Court did not have a deposit account. The applicant remained in custody. 8. On 12 May 2010 the District Court held that the applicant must be re-detained for his failure to comply with the bail conditions. It did not set any time-limit for the application of the custodial measure. 9. On 2 June 2010 the Regional Court quashed the detention order, finding that the detention order had lacked a basis in fact. It annulled the custodial measure and ordered the applicant's release. 10. The applicant was released on 4 June 2010. 11. The conditions of the applicant's detention in remand prison IZ-66/1 can be summarised as follows: (a) Cell 622, from January to June 2009, measured 30 square metres and accommodated 20 to 25 persons who took turns to sleep; windows were not glazed; the toilet was not separated from the living area; (b) Cell 129, June and July 2009, 9 square metres and 6 inmates; (c) Cell 407, July 2009, 12 square metres and 12 to 14 inmates; (d) Cell 408, August 2009 to April 2010, same as above; (e) Cell 155, April 2010, 15 square metres; (f) Cell 134, May 2010, 14 square metres for 8 inmates.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""prompt,"" it appears that after being held on reasonable suspicion, the applicant was not brought promptly to trial, as it took more than 3 months.", 184,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Istanbul. 5. On 20 January 2009 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody. 6. On 22 January 2009 the Edirne Magistrates' Court placed the applicant in detention on remand on suspicion of forming an organised criminal organisation to commit offences and illegal possession of firearms contrary to Article 13 § 1 of Law no. 6136. 7. On 3 July 2009 the Edirne public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Edirne Assize Court charging the applicant with membership of an organised criminal organisation as well as fraud and robbery. 8. On 8 July 2009 the Edirne Assize Court held that it had no jurisdiction and referred the case file to the Istanbul Assize Court. The court also ordered the continuation of the applicant's detention. 9. On 12 August 2009 the 9th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court held a preparatory hearing and ordered the continuation of the applicant's detention. 10. On 29 December 2009 the first hearing was held before the 9th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court. 11. On 4 May 2010 the Istanbul Assize Court held another hearing and decided to prolong the applicant's detention on remand. The applicant was present at this hearing. 12. The applicant filed an objection against this decision. On 25 May 2010 his objection was dismissed by the 10th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court without holding an oral hearing. 13. By decisions dated 30 June 2010 and 8 July 2010 the 9th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court rejected the applicant's requests for release without holding an oral hearing. 14. On 30 September 2010 the 9th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court held the third hearing in the proceedings and again prolonged the applicant's detention. The applicant was present at this hearing. 15. On 11 October 2011 the 9th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize held the seventh hearing in the proceedings and released the applicant from detention on remand. 16. At the time when he present application was lodged with the Court, the proceedings against the applicant were still pending before the first‑instance court. The parties did not submit any further information concerning the outcome of the proceedings.",Ruled as violated by court,,13. By decisions dated 30 June 2010 and 8 July 2010 the 9th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court rejected the applicant's requests for release without holding an oral hearing.,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 185,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Jrvezh. 5. On 19 February 2008 a presidential election was held in Armenia, which was followed by daily protest rallies held at Yerevan's Freedom Square from 20 February onwards by the supporters of the main opposition candidate. On 1 March 2008 the assembly at Freedom Square was dispersed by the police. The applicant, who was present at Freedom Square at that time, was arrested and later charged under Article 316 § 1 of the Criminal Code (CC) with assaulting police officers. 6. On 4 March 2008 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan ordered the applicant's pre-trial detention for a period of two months, namely until 1 May 2008, on the ground that the applicant, if at large, might abscond and obstruct the investigation by exerting unlawful influence on the persons involved in the criminal proceedings. 7. On 10 March 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal, arguing that there was no evidence to substantiate the need for his detention. He was a former high-ranking police officer and a law-abiding citizen who enjoyed trust and respect in society. 8. On 21 March 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fact that the applicant was accused of a grave offence punishable by up to ten years' imprisonment increased the probability of his evading criminal liability and punishment and was sufficient to conclude that the applicant, if at large, might commit a new offence. As to the applicant's good character, mentioned by him in his appeal, this was not sufficient for lifting the detention order. 9. On 29 April 2008 the indictment was finalised and the applicant's case was sent to court for trial. The applicant remained in detention by virtue of Article 138 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP). 10. On 13 May 2008 the District Court decided to set the case down for trial, ruling in the same decision that the applicant's detention was to remain unchanged. That decision was not subject to appeal. 11. On 11 June 2008 the District Court found the applicant guilty under Article 316 § 1 of the CC of assaulting police officers and sentenced him to a suspended term of one and a half years' imprisonment.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""prompt,"" it appears that after being held on reasonable suspicion, the applicant was not brought promptly to trial, as it took more than 3 months.", 186,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1951 and lived in Sarajevo. 5. By its decision of 3 August 2004, and at the recommendation of the Sarajevo Psychiatric Clinic (the ""Psychiatric Clinic""), the Sarajevo Municipal Court instituted proceedings for the applicant's placement in a psychiatric facility. 6. On 18 August 2004, the Sarajevo Municipal Court decided to keep the applicant in the Psychiatric Clinic for a maximum of 45 days (counting from the date of his placement, that is 1 August 2004). 7. On 22 September 2004 the Sarajevo Canton Social Care Centre (the ""Social Care Centre"") placed the applicant in the Drin Social Care Home (the ""Drin Home""). 8. On 7 January 2005, the Sarajevo Municipal Court deprived the applicant of his legal capacity. 9. On 10 March 2005 the Social Care Centre placed the applicant under the guardianship of D.M., one of its employees. Several other employees were subsequently appointed as the applicant's successive guardians. 10. By its decisions of 25 February 2010 and 25 December 2014, the Social Care Centre decided that the applicant should remain in the Drin Home. 11. On 16 September 2015 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (""the Constitutional Court"") held that the applicant's deprivation of liberty had not been ""in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law"" within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention as he had been held in psychiatric detention without a decision of a competent civil court. It also found that Article 5 § 4 of the Convention had been breached because of the lack of judicial review of the lawfulness of the applicant's detention. The Constitutional Court ordered the Social Care Centre to take measures to ensure respect for the applicant's rights under Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention. 12. On 7 December 2015, the Sarajevo Municipal Court restored the applicant's legal capacity. 13. The applicant was released from the Drin Home on 14 December 2015. 14. At the applicant's request, the Social Care Centre again admitted him to the Drin Home, between 1 January 2016 and 31 March 2016. 15. The applicant requested an extension of his stay in social care, which request was granted on 1 April 2016. The applicant was thus placed in the Social and Health Care Home for Persons with Disabilities and Other Persons (the ""Social and Health Care Home""). 16. The applicant died on 26 September 2016, while in the Social and Health Care Home.",Ruled as violated by court,,"11. On 16 September 2015 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (""the Constitutional Court"") held that the applicant's deprivation of liberty had not been ""in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law"" within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention as he had been held in psychiatric detention without a decision of a competent civil court. It also found that Article 5 § 4 of the Convention had been breached because of the lack of judicial review of the lawfulness of the applicant's detention. The Constitutional Court ordered the Social Care Centre to take measures to ensure respect for the applicant's rights under Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 187,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","5. The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Bălți. 6. On 5 February 2011 at 1.30 p.m. the applicant was arrested on suspicion of trafficking in human beings and placed in detention for a period of seventy-two hours, which is the maximum duration of detention under the Moldovan law before a detainee is brought before a judge. 7. On 8 February 2011 at 10.20 a.m. the prosecutor applied to a judge for the applicant's remand in custody and at 2 p.m. the applicant was brought before a judge, who ordered his remand in custody for thirty days. It is not clear at what time the decision was adopted, but there is a handwritten note on it which states it had been presented to the applicant at 3.50 p.m., followed by the applicant's signature. 8. The applicant appealed against the above decision and argued, inter alia, that the detention which had taken place before the court's decision of 8 February 2011 had been longer than seventy-two hours, which was the maximum duration provided for by law. He also submitted that he had not been given access to the materials in the case-file relied upon by the prosecutor when requesting his remand in custody. 9. On 17 February 2011 the Bălți Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal. The court did not pay attention to the applicant's allegation that he had no access to the materials in the case-file. 10. On 5 March 2011 the prosecutor in charge of the case applied to a judge for a prolongation of the applicant's detention for another thirty days. A judge examined and upheld it on the same date. He ordered the applicant's detention until 6 March 2011. 11. On an unspecified date, the same judge issued a new decision rectifying the date of the validity of the applicant's order for remand in custody from 6 March to 6 April 2011. The applicant appealed. 12. On 16 March 2011 the Bălți Court of Appeal upheld the applicant's appeal and quashed the decision of the lower court, after having found that the second decision modifying the date from 6 March to 6 April 2011 had not been taken in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court found therefore that the applicant's detention had been unlawful since 6 March and ordered his immediate release. 13. It appears from the materials contained in the case file that the applicant has been convicted at first instance and that the proceedings are still pending before the Bălți Court of Appeal. According to the information provided by the parties, the applicant is currently wanted by the authorities.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,"According to the court's finding, the applicant was a victim of unlawful detention and should've received compensation.", 188,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","5. Mr Vasilevskiy was born in 1973 and lives in Blagoveshchensk. 6. Mr Vasilevskiy stayed in detention for longer that he should have because the sentencing courts did not count the time he had spent in pre-trial detention towards the overall duration of his sentence, in breach of the applicable domestic provisions. In response to Mr Vasilevskiy's repeated complaints, on 7 May 2007 the Belogorskiy District Court in the Amur Region corrected the error and acknowledged that his sentence had expired on 26 February 2006. Mr Vasilevskiy was released on 13 June 2007. He sought compensation for 472 days during which he had been wrongfully detained. 7. On 13 December 2013 the Blagoveshchensk Town Court in the Amur Region awarded him 150,000 Russian roubles (RUB – 3,320 euros (EUR) at the then-applicable exchange rate) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. Mr Vasilevskiy lodged an appeal, submitting in particular that that sum was substantially lower than that which the Court would have awarded in a similar case. 8. On 28 February 2014 the Amur Regional Court dismissed his appeal. As regards the level of compensation, it held that the Town Court had ""had regard to the case-law of the European Court but had correctly determined the amount of compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage in the light of the requirements of Russian law"". 9. Mr Bogdanov was born in 1981 and lives in the Novgorod Region. 10. On 30 March 2007 Mr Bogdanov was convicted of supplying drugs on four separate occasions in 2006 and sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment. On 20 March 2013 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation acknowledged, referring to the Court's case-law under Article 6 of the Convention, that the police had incited Mr Bogdanov to commit the last three of the four offences. It declared that part of evidence inadmissible, voided his conviction in that part, reduced his sentence to six years' imprisonment and ordered his immediate release. 11. By that time, Mr Bogdanov had spent 119 days in custody over and above the adjusted six-year sentence. He sought to recover damages in respect of his wrongful imprisonment. 12. On 13 March 2014 the Valdayskiy District Court in the Novgorod Region awarded him RUB 80,000 (EUR 1,576). However, on 9 July 2014 the Novgorod Regional Court reduced the award to RUB 15,000 (EUR 324), referring to the ""circumstances in which the criminal proceedings had been instituted"" and the ""category of offence that Mr Bogdanov had been charged with"". On 30 September 2014 the Regional Court rejected a cassation appeal lodged by Mr Bogdanov.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"The applicant was a victim of unlawful detention and received compensation, although he claims not enough. It is unclear from the statute text whether compensation amount is within the purview of the statute.", 189,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The first applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Horná Kráľová. The second applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Nitra. 5. On 14 March 2014 a judge of the Nitra District Court remanded the applicants in detention pending trial on the charge of continuous criminal offence of insurance fraud. This followed their arrest on 11 March 2014. 6. With respect to the first applicant, the District Court decided that there were reasons to suspect that he would influence witnesses, reoffend and continue to make illegal financial gains. With respect to the second applicant, the District Court concluded that there was a reason to suspect that he would interfere with witnesses and his co-accused to influence the evidence they would give. 7. On 21 March 2014 both applicants lodged an interlocutory appeal, arguing that no specific factual elements had been relied on in the District Court's decision to justify their pre-trial detention. 8. On 1 April 2014 the Nitra Regional Court dismissed the applicants' interlocutory appeals, referring to the findings of the District Court. 9. On 24 April 2014 the applicants lodged a constitutional complaint alleging that the decisions on their detention lacked specific reasons justifying their pre-trial detention. They each requested just satisfaction of 5,000 euros (EUR). 10. The Constitutional Court joined their complaints and on 24 September 2014 found a violation of their rights under Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention. It quashed the relevant part of the decision of the Regional Court and awarded each of the applicants EUR 1,000 as just satisfaction in addition to their legal costs and expenses in the amount of EUR 284. The Constitutional Court noted that where the ordinary courts used only formal and standard phrases in their decisions on detention (as was the case with the applicants), suspicion arose as to whether they had looked properly at the specific circumstances at hand. It concluded that even though the ordinary courts had referred to some specific facts, which allegedly justified the applicants' detention, they had failed to explain them in their decisions. Furthermore, the Regional Court had not dealt with some of the applicants' core arguments and thus had not remedied the shortcomings of the District Court's decision. In view of the above, the Constitutional Court concluded that the applicants' pre-trial detention had been based on an arbitrary decision lacking proper and sufficient reasoning. 11. In the meantime, on 30 May 2014 the applicants had been released and placed under supervised probation.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,"According to the court decision, the applicants were victims of unlawful detention and so received compensation.", 190,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1988 and lives in Istanbul. 5. On 12 May 2009 the judge at the Istanbul Assize Court decided to restrict access to the investigation file relating to an investigation against the applicant and others pursuant to Section 10 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713), which was in force at the material time. 6. On 31 October 2009 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation. 7. On 1 November 2009 the applicant's police statement was taken at the Anti-Terror Branch of the Istanbul Security Directorate, in the presence of his lawyer. He was questioned at length about his telephone conversations that had been intercepted. The police read out the transcripts of the said telephone conversations and asked the applicant to comment on them. He was further questioned in relation to allegations about aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation as well as his participation in several illegal demonstrations on behalf of this terrorist organisation and several incidents of assault and battery. He was further asked questions about a co‑accused's incriminating statements. 8. On 2 November 2009 the public prosecutor questioned the applicant in the presence of his lawyer. The prosecutor read out the transcripts of the intercepted conversations to the applicant. The applicant did not deny that he had had these conversations but claimed that they were not made with the intention to plan a terrorist action. 9. On the same day the judge at the Istanbul Assize Court ordered his pre-trial detention. 10. On 2 November 2009 the applicant's lawyer asked the court to lift the restriction of access to the investigation file. On 10 November 2009 the Istanbul Assize Court rejected this objection. 11. On 4 November 2009 the applicant's lawyer filed an objection against the decision on the applicant's detention, and requested his release. On 12 November 2009 the Istanbul Assize Court, relying on the public prosecutor's written opinion, which had not been communicated to the applicant or his representative, dismissed the objection without holding a hearing. 12. On 25 November 2009 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court, charging the applicant with aiding and abetting of a terrorist organisation, and looting. 13. On 4 December 2009 the Istanbul Assize Court accepted the indictment. On the same date the restriction on the file was lifted. 14. On 26 February 2010 the applicant was released. 15. According to the latest information in the case file, the criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 191,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Kharkiv, Ukraine. 5. In 1999 he obtained a Russian passport. 6. On 29 December 2006 the Leninskiy District Court of Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine, ordered to arrest and bring the applicant to the court in order to determine the preventive measure during the investigation of his alleged robbery. The applicant's name was put on the international list of wanted persons. 7. On 26 September 2007 the applicant was arrested in Moscow. As the applicant was a Russian national, he was released. 8. On 14 October 2007 the Ukrainian authorities sought the applicant's extradition from Russia in relation to the criminal proceedings against him. 9. On 21 December 2007 the Russian Federal Migration Authority concluded that the applicant had fraudulently obtained his Russian passport by falsifying a number of documents. They ordered to seize his passport and put his name on the federal wanted list. The applicant's subsequent attempts to challenge the Federal Migration Authority's decision on his Russian passport were unsuccessful. 10. On 13 May 2008 the applicant was arrested. On 15 May 2008 a prosecutor authorised his detention considering that the decision of 29 December 2006 of the Leninskiy District Court of Dnepropetrovsk had authorised the applicant's ""placement into custody"", as mentioned in Article 61 § 1 of the Minsk Convention. 11. On 24 June 2008 a district prosecutor decided that the applicant should be ""placed in custody"" considering that the decision of the Leninskiy District Court of Dnepropetrovsk of 29 December 2006 authorised ""placement into custody"", as required under Article 466 § 2 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure (""the CCrP""). 12. On several occasions the applicant unsuccessfully complained about his detention to the prosecuting authorities. On 4 September 2008 the Perovskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed the applicant's complaint considering that his arrest and detention in relation to the Ukrainian extradition request had been and remained lawful. On 24 November 2008 the Moscow City Court upheld this decision of 4 September 2008 concluding that ""matters relating to lawfulness and reasons for detention should be raised under another procedure prescribed by law"". 13. On 3 October 2008 the Russian Prosecutor General's Office granted the extradition request. On 18 November 2008 the Moscow City Court confirmed the decision of 3 October 2008. On 29 January 2009 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the judgment of 18 November 2008 on appeal. 14. On 20 May 2009 the applicant was transferred to the Ukrainian authorities in the town of Kharkov. On 26 May 2009 he was transferred to the town of Dnepropetrovsk. On 6 June 2009 a Ukrainian court refused to order the applicant's detention pending the investigation. The applicant was released.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 192,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. The applicant was born in 1967 in the Tajikistan Soviet Socialist Republic of the Soviet Union and came to Russia in 1993. He is an apatride. 7. On 31 July 2014 the applicant was arrested for vagrancy. On 2 August 2014 the Kalininskiy District Court in St Petersburg sentenced him to a fine and administrative removal from Russia. The court also directed that he should be detained until expulsion in the special facility for the detention of aliens in the Leningrad Region (СУВСИГ по СПб и ЛО) in Krasnoye Selo. The decision described the applicant as being ""a native (уроженец) of the Tajikistan Republic"". 8. By letters dated 11 August and 18 November 2014, the Federal Migration Service asked the Embassy of Tajikistan in Moscow to issue a laissez-passer document enabling the applicant's return to Tajikistan. No reply was received. 9. On an unspecified date the applicant was fingerprinted. It was discovered that he had been registered in the police database under a different name. On 11 February 2015 the Federal Migration Service used that name to request a laissez-passer from the Embassy of Tajikistan. It did not receive a response. 10. On 10 September 2015 the Federal Migration Service again attempted to obtain a travel document for the applicant using his original name. The Embassy did not reply. 11. On 28 July 2016 the governor of the detention centre asked the Kalininskiy District Court to discontinue the enforcement of the judgment on the ground that the two-year limitation period in respect of the applicant's offence had expired. On 29 July 2016 the District Court granted the application. The applicant was released on 13 August 2016. 12. While in detention, the applicant was held in standard six-person cells (Cells 509, 402, 516 and 615) measuring 27.4 square metres which were furnished with three two-tier bunk beds, six bed stands, six chairs and a table. Between October 2014 and February 2015 he was also held in a smaller cell (Cell 514, 13 sq. m, two beds) and a larger cell (Cell 315, 40.2 sq. m, four two-tier bunk beds). 13. Cell 402, in which he stayed from February to September 2015, was a so-called ""closed cell"". The steel door with a peephole and a hatch for serving food remained under lock at all times and he was not allowed to leave the cell, except for short and infrequent outdoor exercise. For the first two months, he had been alone in that cell. 14. The applicant complained about dim lighting, poor quality of food, insufficient outdoor exercise in cramped conditions, a lack of medical assistance and a shortage of meaningful activities. The Government disputed the applicant's allegations and submitted copies of contracts with the catering, cleaning and laundering companies and a copy of visitors' register from the medical unit.",Ruled as violated by court,,"13. Cell 402, in which he stayed from February to September 2015, was a so-called ""closed cell"". The steel door with a peephole and a hatch for serving food remained under lock at all times and he was not allowed to leave the cell, except for short and infrequent outdoor exercise. For the first two months, he had been alone in that cell.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 193,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","5. The applicant, who was born in 1948, lives in Corjova, a village under the formal control of Moldovan authorities, but where agents of the self‑proclaimed ""Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic"" (""MRT"", see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, § 90, ECHR 2004‑VII for further details) frequently intervened during the events in question, notably by blocking the participation of the local population in elections held in Moldova. 6. On 3 June 2007 local elections were to be held in Moldova, including in Corjova. The applicant, who is an ambulance driver, submitted his candidature for the position of Mayor of Corjova. 7. On 1 June 2007, at 11 p.m., the applicant's ambulance was stopped by the ""MRT"" road militia and his documents (Moldovan national identity card and driving licence) were taken away from him without any explanation. 8. On 2 June 2007 the applicant went to the ""MRT"" militia station located in Dubăsari and asked for the return of his documents. He was then arrested and placed in a detention cell. A few hours later a person came to his cell and, without presenting himself, asked him about his work and his electoral propaganda. The applicant later found out that the visitor had been a judge and that, following that discussion in the cell, the judge adopted a decision, finding him guilty of the administrative offence of unlawful electoral propaganda and sentencing him to 15 days' administrative detention. 9. The applicant submits that he was not allowed to contact his relatives or to find a lawyer, and was not issued with a copy of the court's decision, which prevented any possibility of lodging an effective appeal against the decision of 2 June 2007. 10. During his detention the applicant was placed in a cell which, according to him was damp and cold. Food was given once a day. When the applicant's relatives, alerted by his absence, contacted the local authorities in order to find out about his fate, they were informed of the applicant's detention. However, their requests to transmit food to him were allegedly rejected. 11. On 17 June 2007 the applicant was released from detention and he was issued with a copy of the decision of 2 June 2007. The time-limit for lodging an appeal had already expired by that time. Upon release, he was allegedly coughing and was diagnosed with chronic acute bronchitis. He also claims that his eyesight worsened considerably. 12. In the meantime, on 6 June 2007, the applicant complained to the Moldovan prosecutor's office of his unlawful detention. Based on this complaint, a criminal investigation was initiated on 12 June 2007, the applicant and witnesses were subsequently heard. Three high-ranking ""MRT"" officers were charged and were declared wanted persons. However, on 4 August 2010 the investigation was suspended due to the fact that the three accused were hiding from it in the ""MRT"".",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,"Upon arrest, the applicant was not informed clearly of the charge against him and the judge's presence.", 194,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1975 and is detained in Chișinău. 5. On 24 August 2011 the applicant was taken into police custody on charges of murder and unauthorized possession of a firearm. He was remanded in custody by the Centru District Court on 28 August 2011 and his detention was subsequently extended every thirty days until 21 January 2012 on the grounds that given the seriousness of the charges against him, he might abscond, re-offend and interfere with the investigation. The applicant did not appeal against those decisions. 6. On 17 January 2012 the applicant's case was committed for trial and his detention was extended by the court every three months, finding that the grounds which justified his initial detention had remained valid. 7. In his appeals against the decisions of 12 April, 10 June and 10 July 2013 the applicant complained, inter alia, about the length of his detention which, in his view, was no longer justified. He argued that his detention pending trial had already exceeded the twelve-month time-limit set under Article 186 (8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the courts had not put forward any exceptional circumstance justifying such a long detention period, while the seriousness of charges could not by themselves constitute sufficient ground for his extended deprivation of liberty. 8. By decisions of 23 April, 20 June and 25 July 2013 the Chișinău Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals. 9. By a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of 17 September 2014 the applicant was found guilty on all charges and sentenced to twenty‑three years of imprisonment. 10. On 28 September 2011 the applicant was transferred to prison no. 13 in Chișinău where he was detained until 4 December 2014. 11. According to the applicant, he was detained in cells with poor lighting, damp walls, and accommodating six inmates in an area of 6 square metres. Due to overcrowding, the applicant had to share a bed with another inmate with whom he took turns to sleep. During his detention the applicant did not receive any bedding or clothing. Certain inmates were diagnosed with tuberculosis or HIV and had bleeding wounds. He was allowed to walk outside the cell only one hour per day. Without a functional ventilation system, in summer the air indoors was hot, humid and smelly which made it difficult to breathe. In cold weather the heating was not turned on and the temperature in the cells was extremely low. The squat toilet was not separated from the rest of the cell. The prison laundry was not operational and the applicant was unable to wash his clothes. 12. On 18 April 2014 the applicant's lawyer complained to the Prosecutor General's Office about the applicant's detention conditions in prison no. 13. By a letter of 15 May 2014 the Department of Penitentiary Institutions denied the complaints on overcrowding, TB infected inmates, insufficient food and medical assistance.",Ruled as violated by court,,"11. According to the applicant, he was detained in cells with poor lighting, damp walls, and accommodating six inmates in an area of 6 square metres. Due to overcrowding, the applicant had to share a bed with another inmate with whom he took turns to sleep. During his detention the applicant did not receive any bedding or clothing. Certain inmates were diagnosed with tuberculosis or HIV and had bleeding wounds. He was allowed to walk outside the cell only one hour per day. Without a functional ventilation system, in summer the air indoors was hot, humid and smelly which made it difficult to breathe. In cold weather the heating was not turned on and the temperature in the cells was extremely low. The squat toilet was not separated from the rest of the cell. The prison laundry was not operational and the applicant was unable to wash his clothes.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 195,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Yerevan. 5. On 19 February 2008 a presidential election was held in Armenia, which was followed by daily protest rallies held at Yerevan's Freedom Square from 20 February onwards by the supporters of the main opposition candidate, Mr Ter-Petrosyan. The applicant was the head of Mr Ter‑Petrosyan's election headquarters in the town of Abovyan and regularly attended the rallies. On 1 March 2008 the assembly at Freedom Square was dispersed by the police, causing mass protests throughout Yerevan. 6. On 8 March 2008 the applicant was summoned to a local police station in Abovyan where he was questioned about the leaflets that he had prepared and distributed among the demonstrators during the rallies. 7. On 11 March 2008 the applicant was charged with organising mass disorder and an attempt to usurp State power. 8. On the same date the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan (the District Court) ordered the applicant's pre-trial detention for a period of two months, namely until 8 May 2008, taking into account the nature and the gravity of the imputed offence and the severity of the punishment prescribed for it. By the same decision the District Court refused the applicant's request to be released on bail. 9. On 14 March 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal, arguing that the investigating authority had not presented any evidence to substantiate the need for his detention. 10. On 21 March 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal decided to dismiss the applicant's appeal, holding that the fact that the applicant had been accused of a grave offence punishable by up to ten years' imprisonment increased the probability of his evading criminal punishment. Furthermore, it was unacceptable to release the applicant on bail in view of the fact that, if at large, the applicant could abscond, obstruct the proceedings, commit another offence, evade responsibility and punishment, and continue to breach public order. As to the applicant's good character, mentioned by him in his appeal, this was not sufficient to justify lifting the detention order. 11. On 4 May, 2 July, 3 September and 30 October 2008 the District Court extended the applicant's detention on the same grounds, on each occasion by two months. 12. On 19 May, 18 July, 19 September and 16 November 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeals against those decisions. 13. On 10 December 2008 the trial court decided to set the case down for trial, ruling in the same decision that the applicant's detention was to remain unchanged. 14. On 22 June 2009 the District Court found the applicant guilty of making public calls inciting a violent overthrow of the government, and imposed a two-year sentence. It further decided to absolve the applicant from serving his sentence under a general amnesty declared by the Armenian parliament on 19 June 2009. The applicant was immediately released from detention.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""prompt,"" it appears that after being held on reasonable suspicion, the applicant was not brought promptly to trial, as it took more than 3 months.", 196,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","5. The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Bratislava. 6. On 20 December 2014 the Bratislava IV District Court ordered the applicant's pre-trial detention in the context of criminal proceedings in which he was prosecuted for committing the criminal offence of manslaughter. The reason for his detention was the risk of reoffending. 7. On 3 March 2015 the applicant submitted a request to the District Prosecution Office for release from pre-trial detention. In it, he asked for his detention to be replaced with supervision by a probation officer. The request was received by the latter on 4 March 2015 and dismissed on 5 March 2015, following which it was transferred to the District Court for a judicial determination. 8. On 26 March 2015 the District Court held a hearing and dismissed the applicant's request for release. The written version of that decision was served on the applicant on 14 April 2015 and, after several unsuccessful attempts at delivery, was served on the applicant's lawyer on 21 April 2015. 9. The applicant's lawyer lodged a written interlocutory appeal with the District Court within the statutory three-day period, namely on 24 April 2015. The case file was transferred to the Bratislava Regional Court on 29 April 2015 and the applicant's appeal was dismissed in chambers on 7 May 2015. The written version of that decision was served on the applicant's lawyer on 18 May 2015. 10. On 1 June 2015 the applicant filed a constitutional complaint, relying inter alia on Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. He alleged that the authorities had not proceeded speedily with his request for release. He formally challenged the proceedings held before the District Curt, the decision of the Regional Court of 7 May 2015 and the proceedings preceding this decision. He also requested compensation of 2,000 euros (EUR) in addition to his legal costs and expenses. 11. On 30 March 2016 the Constitutional Court declared the part of his complaint in respect of the proceedings held before the District Court admissible and the remainder inadmissible. The Constitutional Court held that it had found no irregularities in the Regional Court's decision of 7 May 2015. 12. On 21 June 2016 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant's right guaranteed under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. It did not award him any compensation or legal costs and expenses. The Constitutional Court scrutinised only the District Court's proceedings and concluded that they had lasted 44 days. The District Court had therefore failed to deal with the applicant's request speedily and to serve the written decision on him promptly. With respect to the financial compensation, the Constitutional Court referred to ""the principle of fairness"", ""the particular circumstances of the case"", the duration of the delays and the intensity of the interference, and concluded that the finding of a violation of the applicant's right constituted a sufficient redress.",Ruled as violated by court,,"12. On 21 June 2016 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant's right guaranteed under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. It did not award him any compensation or legal costs and expenses. The Constitutional Court scrutinised only the District Court's proceedings and concluded that they had lasted 44 days. The District Court had therefore failed to deal with the applicant's request speedily and to serve the written decision on him promptly. With respect to the financial compensation, the Constitutional Court referred to ""the principle of fairness"", ""the particular circumstances of the case"", the duration of the delays and the intensity of the interference, and concluded that the finding of a violation of the applicant's right constituted a sufficient redress.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 197,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1990 and lives in Istanbul. 5. On 28 August 2007 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of child molestation and on the same day he was brought before a judge at the Gaziosmanpaşa Juvenile Court, who placed him in detention on remand. 6. On 3 September 2007 the applicant filed an objection against the decision on his detention. On 18 September 2007 the Beyoğlu Juvenile Assize Court dismissed his objection on the basis of the case file, without holding a hearing. 7. On 23 October 2007 and 19 November 2007 the Gaziosmanpaşa Magistrates' Court prolonged the applicant's detention ex officio. 8. On 16 December 2007 the Bakırköy public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Bakırköy Juvenile Assize Court, charging the applicant with child molestation. 9. On 31 December 2007 the Bakırköy Juvenile Assize Court ordered the continuation of the applicant's pre-trial detention on the basis of the case file, and decided that it had no jurisdiction ratione loci and that the case should be heard by the Beyoğlu Juvenile Assize Court and referred the case file to the latter. 10. On 24 January 2008 the Beyoğlu Juvenile Assize Court declared itself incompetent ratione loci as well and sent the case file to the Court of Cassation to render its decision on the conflict of jurisdiction ratione loci. On the same date the court also ordered the continuation of the applicant's pre-trial detention on the basis of the case file. 11. On 30 January 2008 the applicant filed an objection against the decision on the continuation of his pre-trial detention. On 14 February 2008 the Bakırköy Juvenile Assize Court dismissed his objection on the basis of the case file, without holding a hearing. 12. On 23 June 2008 the Court of Cassation gave its decision authorising Bakırköy Juvenile Assize Court over the case. 13. On 13 August 2008 the trial court held a preparatory hearing and ordered the continuation of the applicant's detention on the basis of the case file. On 12 September 2008 and 9 October 2008, respectively, the court ex officio examined the applicant's detention on remand on the basis of the case-file and decided to extend it. 14. On 30 October 2008 the court held its first hearing, in which both the applicant and his lawyer were present. At the end of that hearing, the court ordered the continuation of the applicant's detention. 15. During the hearings held on 21 January 2009, 14 April 2009 and 21 July 2009, at which the applicant was present, the trial court ordered the continuation of the applicant's detention on remand. Between the hearings, which were held with regular intervals of one month, the court ex officio examined the applicant's detention on remand on the basis of the case‑file and decided to extend it 16. On 3 November 2009, at the end of the fifth hearing before the court, the applicant was released pending trial. 17. According to the latest information in the case file, the criminal proceedings against the applicant were still pending.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 198,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Yekaterinburg. 5. On 13 May 2009 he was arrested on suspicion of armed robbery. On the following day the Verkh-Isetskiy District Court in Yekaterinburg remanded him in custody and set the time-limit until 12 July 2009. 6. On 13 July 2009 the District Court granted a two-month extension of the detention period. However, on 31 July 2009 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court quashed the extension order as it had been issued outside the authorised detention period, and ordered the applicant's release. 7. The applicant was not released. He was not allowed to leave the police ward and was re-arrested on the charge of theft. The arrest record mentioned the charge, without specifying when or where the theft had been committed or why the applicant was suspected of it. 8. On 2 August 2009 the District Court adjourned the detention hearing for seventy-two hours, at the request from the applicant's counsel. On 4 August 2009 the District Court issued a detention order which did not set a time-limit for the applicant's detention or give any assessment to the existence of a ""reasonable suspicion"" against the applicant. On 2 September 2009 the Regional Court upheld the detention order on appeal. 9. Further extensions of the applicant's detention were granted by the Leninskiy District Court on 29 September, 20 October and 2 November 2009. The last extension order was issued in the absence of the parties. On 25 November 2009 the Regional Court found that extension order unlawful and set it aside, but extended the applicant's detention for a future period. 10. On 23 December 2009 the Bogdanovichi Town Court in the Sverdlovsk Region opened the trial and extended the applicant's detention. The applicant's appeal against the extension order was rejected by the Regional Court on 11 June 2010. 11. On 2 March and 22 April 2010 the Town Court extended the applicant's detention. Each time the court referred to the gravity of the charges and the applicant's criminal record. The appeals against the orders were rejected on 30 June and 11 June, respectively. 12. Throughout the trial the applicant was held in a metal cage. 13. On 13 May 2010 the applicant was found guilty of theft and armed robbery and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. On 18 August 2010 the Regional Court upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence to three years' imprisonment. 14. On 24 June 2010 the applicant's mother died. His request to be allowed to attend the funeral was rejected by the governor of the IZ-66/1 remand prison and upheld by the courts on the ground that remand prisoners did not have the benefit of a leave of absence under Russian law. When his father died on 5 November 2010, the director of the correctional colony in Sosnovoborsk in the Krasnoyarsk Region also refused his request for a short-term absence, on account of the funeral being held outside of the region where the colony was located. 15. The Sosnovoborsk colony was located some 2,400 kilometres away from Yekaterinburg where the applicant's family lived.",Ruled as violated by court,,"9. Further extensions of the applicant's detention were granted by the Leninskiy District Court on 29 September, 20 October and 2 November 2009. The last extension order was issued in the absence of the parties. On 25 November 2009 the Regional Court found that extension order unlawful and set it aside, but extended the applicant's detention for a future period. 10. On 23 December 2009 the Bogdanovichi Town Court in the Sverdlovsk Region opened the trial and extended the applicant's detention. The applicant's appeal against the extension order was rejected by the Regional Court on 11 June 2010. 11. On 2 March and 22 April 2010 the Town Court extended the applicant's detention. Each time the court referred to the gravity of the charges and the applicant's criminal record. The appeals against the orders were rejected on 30 June and 11 June, respectively. 15. The Sosnovoborsk colony was located some 2,400 kilometres away from Yekaterinburg where the applicant's family lived.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 199,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","5. The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Nicoreni. 6. In January 2012 the applicant had an agreement with a person (""X"") according to which he promised to help him apply for a Spanish visa at the Spanish consulate in Moscow. They were to travel to Moscow by train, however, X did not show up at the train station at the time of leaving and the applicant left for Moscow alone with the money he had previously obtained from X in the amount of 520 euros. He did not return to Moldova until October 2015. 7. In the meantime X lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant accusing him of fraud. Criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant in March 2012 on the basis of that complaint. 8. Since the prosecutor in charge of the case could not locate the applicant, he applied to an investigating judge for a detention warrant in respect of the applicant for a period of thirty days. The prosecutor argued in support of the remand that the applicant had been hiding from the investigating authorities. 9. On 8 February 2013 the Râșcani District Court ordered the applicant's remand in custody for a period of thirty days. In support of its decision, the court argued that the applicant had been absconding from the investigating authorities and that he could hinder the investigation and influence witnesses. 10. On 9 October 2015 the applicant returned to Moldova from the Russian Federation. At the border he was informed that he was being wanted by the police and that he had to present himself at the Râșcani Police Station. The applicant telephoned the police station and agreed to come on 13 October 2015. 11. On 13 October 2015 the applicant went to the Râșcani Police Station where he was immediately arrested and placed in detention. 12. On 15 October 2015 the applicant appealed against the order of 8 February 2013. He argued, inter alia, that he had not been aware of the criminal investigation against himself and that he had learned about it upon his return to Moldova. Moreover, after learning about the investigation he had immediately contacted the Police Station and presented himself there. He also submitted that there were no reasons to believe that he would abscond or interfere with the investigation. 13. On 2 November 2015 the Chișinău Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal. It did not give an answer to the applicant's argument that he had not been aware of the criminal investigation against him. 14. The applicant's detention was prolonged on several other occasions until 16 March 2016 on identical grounds and all his appeals were dismissed. 15. In the meantime the applicant was detained in Prison no. 13. According to him, he was detained in an overcrowded cell; the cell was equipped with a squat toilet which was not properly separated; the food was insufficient and of poor quality; he could have only one hour of outside exercise per day and only one shower per week. 16. By a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of 12 July 2017 the applicant was convicted of fraud and given a suspended sentence of four years imprisonment.",Ruled as violated by court,,"15. In the meantime the applicant was detained in Prison no. 13. According to him, he was detained in an overcrowded cell; the cell was equipped with a squat toilet which was not properly separated; the food was insufficient and of poor quality; he could have only one hour of outside exercise per day and only one shower per week.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 200,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","7. The applicant was born in 1980. He arrived in Russia in 2003. He travelled to Tajikistan on a number of occasions to visit his parents for short periods of time. 8. On 3 May 2011 the applicant was charged in absentia in Tajikistan with participating in an extremist religious movement, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and an international search and arrest warrant was issued in his name. On 6 May 2011 the Tajik authorities ordered his pre-trial detention. 9. On 3 November 2013 the applicant was arrested in Moscow and detained. On 4 November 2013 the Meshchanskiy District Court of Moscow (""the District Court"") ordered his detention pending extradition. 10. On 4 December 2013 the Tajik prosecution authorities requested the applicant's extradition on the basis of the above charges. The request included assurances regarding his proper treatment, which were formulated in standard terms. 11. On 12 December 2013 the District Court extended the applicant's detention until 3 May 2014. 12. An appeal by the applicant of 16 December 2013 was dismissed by the Moscow City Court (""the City Court"") on 3 February 2014. 13. On 29 April 2014 the District Court again extended the applicant's detention until 3 August 2014. 14. An appeal by the applicant of 5 May 2014 was dismissed by the City Court on 23 July 2014. 15. On 9 October 2014 the applicant's extradition was refused by the Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, owing to the absence of culpable actions under Russian criminal law. 16. On 13 October 2014 the applicant was released from detention. 17. On 13 October 2014, immediately after his release, the applicant was rearrested for violating migration regulations. 18. On 14 October 2014 the District Court found the applicant guilty of violating migration regulations, fined him and ordered his administrative removal. Allegations by the applicant regarding a real risk of ill-treatment were dismissed, and he was detained pending expulsion. The District Court assessing the risks stated that ""[t]he claims of the representative ... are of a speculative nature and not confirmed by the case materials"" 19. The above judgment was upheld on appeal by the City Court on 24 October 2014. Claims by the applicant under Article 3 of the Convention were dismissed with reference to the District Court's assessment of the case, which took into consideration ""...the nature of the administrative offence, the character of the accused [who was criminally convicted in Russia]... the length of his stay in Russia and other circumstances of the case"". 20. According to the latest submissions of his representative in 2015, the applicant was still in detention. 21. On 18 December 2013 the applicant lodged a request for refugee status, referring to persecution in Tajikistan and a real risk of ill-treatment. 22. On 15 September 2014 his request was refused by a final administrative decision of the migration authorities. The applicant challenged that decision in the courts, referring, inter alia, to the risk of ill‑treatment. 23. On 12 November 2015 his appeals were dismissed by a final decision of the City Court.",Ruled as violated by court,"9. On 3 November 2013 the applicant was arrested in Moscow and detained. On 4 November 2013 the Meshchanskiy District Court of Moscow (""the District Court"") ordered his detention pending extradition. 11. On 12 December 2013 the District Court extended the applicant's detention until 3 May 2014. 13. On 29 April 2014 the District Court again extended the applicant's detention until 3 August 2014. 17. On 13 October 2014, immediately after his release, the applicant was rearrested for violating migration regulations. 18. On 14 October 2014 the District Court found the applicant guilty of violating migration regulations, fined him and ordered his administrative removal. Allegations by the applicant regarding a real risk of ill-treatment were dismissed, and he was detained pending expulsion. The District Court assessing the risks stated that ""[t]he claims of the representative ... are of a speculative nature and not confirmed by the case materials"" 19. The above judgment was upheld on appeal by the City Court on 24 October 2014. Claims by the applicant under Article 3 of the Convention were dismissed with reference to the District Court's assessment of the case, which took into consideration ""...the nature of the administrative offence, the character of the accused [who was criminally convicted in Russia]... the length of his stay in Russia and other circumstances of the case"". 20. According to the latest submissions of his representative in 2015, the applicant was still in detention.",,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 201,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","6. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Makhachkala, Republic of Dagestan. 7. In 1990 the applicant started living with Ms T.K. 8. In 1991 and 1992 they had two daughters, Kr. (born on 1 July 1991) and K. (born on 13 July 1992). The applicant did not register his paternity. 9. In 2002 the applicant and T.K. separated. Both girls continued living with the applicant. 10. In 2004 T.K. married Yu.K. 11. In May 2004 Yu.K. registered his paternity in respect of Kr. and K. However, the girls still remained living with the applicant. 12. In July 2007 K. stopped attending school, frequently ran away from home and exhibited delinquent behaviour. She allegedly stole her mother's jewellery. 13. In December 2007, following an application by T.K., K. was placed in a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders. 14. On 18 February 2008 the Kirovskiy District Court of Makhachkala (""the District Court""), sitting in a single-judge formation composed of Judge I., granted an application lodged by the administration of the Kirovskiy District of Makhachkala to place K. in a closed educational institution for minors for two years and five months. In taking this decision the District Court relied on the following circumstances: K.'s not attending school, running away from home, vagabonding and leading an anti-social and immoral lifestyle, as well as unsuccessful attempts to discipline K. and her being detained in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders. 15. On an unspecified date shortly afterwards K. was placed in a closed educational institution for minors in the town of Pokrov, Vladimir Region, some 2,500 km from her home town of Makhachkala. According to the applicant, his daughter's correspondence with him was subjected to censorship by the facility's administration. 16. In the meantime, the applicant brought proceedings seeking the establishment of his paternity vis-à-vis Kr. and K. 17. On 9 April 2008 the District Court established the applicant's paternity in respect of Kr. and K. and annuled the registration of Yu.K. as the girls' father. 18. At the applicant's request, the Prosecutor of the Republic of Dagestan applied to the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Dagestan for a supervisory review of the decision of 18 February 2008. 19. The present application was already pending before the European Court of Human Rights when, on 7 August 2008, the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Dagestan, by way of a supervisory review, quashed the decision of 18 February 2008 as unlawful and unjustified, and discontinued the proceedings. The court held, in particular, that in violation of the procedure established by the Federal Law on Basic Measures for Preventing Child Neglect and Delinquency of Minors, no. 120-FZ of 24 June 1999 (""the Minors Act""), the District Court had decided to place K. in a closed educational institution for minors in the absence of a decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings or a decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings against the latter, and without her having undergone a prior medical examination. 20. On 30 September 2008 K. was released from the closed educational institution for minors and returned home.",Ruled as violated by court,,"18. At the applicant's request, the Prosecutor of the Republic of Dagestan applied to the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Dagestan for a supervisory review of the decision of 18 February 2008.",TRUE,2,It is arguable whether or not this detention of a minor counts as by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision., 202,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 5. The applicant was born in 1986 in the Georgian SSR of the USSR. In 1996, when he was ten years old, his parents divorced and he moved with his mother to Kaluga in Russia. In 2003, the applicant graduated from high school in Kaluga and began studies at the Finance and Economics Institute. 6. On 4 May and 17 October 2005 the applicant was convicted of various offences and given a custodial sentence. Upon his release on 29 February 2008, he returned to Kaluga. 7. On 12 January 2012 the police stopped the applicant in the courtyard of his house and charged him with illegal residence in Russia. 8. On the following day the Kaluzhskiy District Court in the Kaluga Region found the applicant guilty of the administrative offence under Article 18.8 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (failure to leave Russia upon the expiry of the authorised period of stay and illegal residence) and sentenced him to a fine of 2,500 Russian roubles (62 euros) and administrative removal from the Russian Federation. Pending removal, the District Court held that the applicant should be held in the detention centre. On 24 January 2012 the Kaluga Regional Court upheld the District Court's decision on appeal. 9. The applicant asked the District Court to postpone the enforcement of the removal order, emphasising that it was currently unenforceable because he had no identity documents and because he was not a Georgian national and could not be sent to Georgia. On 12 April 2012 the District Court refused the applicant's request in a summary fashion. 10. The applicant was held in the administrative detention centre operated by the Kaluga regional police. He shared Cell 13 measuring 8.7 square metres with five Uzbek nationals awaiting deportation. The cell had only one window, 90 centimetres by 120 centimetres, protected with three layers of thick netting and fitted with a matte glass. Two light bulbs, 40 Watts each, lit the cell. The cell was not ventilated. 11. The toilet bowl sunk into the floor was located 40 centimetres from the nearest bed. It was cleaned with cold water without detergent. Prisoners were given three litres of water per day, it was not allowed to boil it. Once a week prisoners were taken to the shower room. There was not enough hot water for all of them and they took turns skipping the shower. 12. There was no calendar or clock in the cell. Nor was there a radio, television, books or newspapers. Board games were forbidden. The applicant did not speak the Uzbek language and could not communicate with his cellmates. 13. Prisoners were taken outdoors in groups of thirty. The yard was small, six by four metres, so they huddled together. It had no sports equipment or awning for bad weather. 14. The applicant's complaints to a prosecutor were rejected as unfounded. In January and March 2012 two members of the Kaluga public monitoring commission visited the facility. Their report corroborated the applicant's description of his conditions of detention. 15. In May 2012 the applicant developed pulmonary tuberculosis. He was transferred for treatment to a civilian hospital in Kaluga. Upon his discharge, he took advantage of the absence of police escort and absconded. A search operation was launched; the applicant was located on 30 January 2013 and returned to the detention centre. 16. On 31 January 2013 the applicant was placed on board of a Tbilisi-bound flight and left Russia.",Ruled as violated by court,,"10. The applicant was held in the administrative detention centre operated by the Kaluga regional police. He shared Cell 13 measuring 8.7 square metres with five Uzbek nationals awaiting deportation. The cell had only one window, 90 centimetres by 120 centimetres, protected with three layers of thick netting and fitted with a matte glass. Two light bulbs, 40 Watts each, lit the cell. The cell was not ventilated.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 203,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 5. The applicant was born in Baku, Azerbaijan, in 1992 and came to Russia in 2003, together with his mother and grandmother. He graduated from a secondary school and a vocational training college in St Petersburg. He has no identity documents. 6. On 7 February 2014 the Kirovskiy District Court in St Petersburg found the applicant guilty of illegally residing in Russia, which was an offence Article 18.8 § 3 of the Code of Administrative Offences, imposed a fine on him and ordered his administrative removal from Russia. The judgment described him as a ""native"" (уроженец) and a national of Azerbaijan. Pending his removal, the applicant was to be detained in the special facility for the detention of aliens (СУВСИГ УФМС по СПб и ЛО) located in Krasnoye Selo in the Leningrad Region. 7. On 12 February 2014 the Federal Migration Service requested the Consulate General of Azerbaijan in St Petersburg to submit information about the applicant's nationality. Replying to that inquiry, on 14 April 2014 the Consulate confirmed that the applicant was not a national of that State. 8. On 19 May 2014 a bailiff asked the District Court in St Petersburg to discontinue the enforcement proceedings because the applicant could not be issued with travel documents or removed from Russia. 9. By a judgment of 17 July 2014, as upheld on appeal on 30 October 2014, the St Petersburg courts refused to discontinue the proceedings, finding that the bailiff had not shown that she had taken sufficient measures to secure the applicant's removal. 10. On 7 August 2014 counsel for the applicant asked the St Petersburg City Court to review the Kirovskiy District Court's judgment by way of supervisory review, to annul the sanction of administrative removal and to release the applicant. Counsel pleaded in particular that the applicant's removal was not a realistic prospect and that his continued detention could only be justified if deportation proceedings were genuinely in progress. On 25 November 2014 a deputy president of the City Court acceded to her request. Noting that the applicant was not an Azerbaijani national, the judge found that his removal was not feasible and that his detention was likely to become indefinite. He amended the judgment, replacing the removal with the requirement to leave Russia voluntarily under control. 11. On 27 November 2014 the applicant was released. 12. The applicant described his conditions of detention as follows. From 7 to 20 February 2014 he shared Cell 307 measuring 17 square metres with ten other detainees. It was not furnished, inmates unrolled mattresses for the night. From 20 February to 5 May 2014 he was held in a smaller, seven‑square-metre cell (Cell 310), together with five or six persons. Two-tier bunk beds were brought in only in late April 2014. From 5 May to 27 November 2014 he was in Cell 309 measuring seventeen square metres. Initially it had accommodated twelve persons but their number rose to seventeen in November when they started renovating the cells on the seventh and eighth floors of the facility. Detainees had to remain within the floor on which their cell was located; they could not go outside or to other floors. Outdoor exercise was limited to a fifteen-minute walk once a week because there was not enough staff to supervise the detainees. The facility did not have a library, board games, radio or workshop, or offer any other meaningful activities.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. On 7 February 2014 the Kirovskiy District Court in St Petersburg found the applicant guilty of illegally residing in Russia, which was an offence Article 18.8 § 3 of the Code of Administrative Offences, imposed a fine on him and ordered his administrative removal from Russia. The judgment described him as a ""native"" (уроженец) and a national of Azerbaijan. Pending his removal, the applicant was to be detained in the special facility for the detention of aliens (СУВСИГ УФМС по СПб и ЛО) located in Krasnoye Selo in the Leningrad Region. 7. On 12 February 2014 the Federal Migration Service requested the Consulate General of Azerbaijan in St Petersburg to submit information about the applicant's nationality. Replying to that inquiry, on 14 April 2014 the Consulate confirmed that the applicant was not a national of that State.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 204,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Baku. 5. He was the chairman of the Azerbaijani National Statehood Party. 6. In December 2010 the applicant sold his car to a certain E.R., who encountered a number of technical problems with it. 7. On 7 January 2011 E.R. contacted the applicant and they agreed to meet on the same day. During the meeting E.R. expressed his dissatisfaction with the car and requested that the applicant return his money and take the car back. The applicant got angry, started to insult E.R. and then assaulted him together with a certain C. 8. A passer-by intervened and stopped the altercation. E.R. reported the incident to the police on the same day. 9. On 8 January 2011 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant by the Nasimi District Police Office under Article 221.3 (hooliganism) of the Criminal Code. The investigator's decision stated that at around 8.30 p.m. on 7 January 2011 the applicant and a certain C. had insulted and assaulted E.R. on the street in Baku. 10. On 8 January 2011 the police compiled a record of the applicant's arrest as a suspect. 11. On 10 January 2011 the applicant was charged under Articles 127.2.3 (deliberate infliction of less serious injury to health) and 221.3 (hooliganism) of the Criminal Code. 12. On the same day the Nasimi District Court, relying on the charges brought against the applicant and an application from the prosecutor to apply the preventive measure of remanding the applicant in custody, ordered his detention pending trial for a period of two months. The court justified the application of the preventive custodial measure by the gravity of the offences imputed to him, the risk of his reoffending and the likelihood that he might abscond if released. 13. On 12 January 2011 the applicant appealed against that decision, stating that there was no justification for the application of the preventive measure of remand in custody and that the court had failed to substantiate the necessity for his detention pending trial. He also submitted that the court had failed to take account of his personal situation and to consider the possibility of another preventive measure, such as house arrest or release on bail. 14. On 17 January 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that there were no grounds to quash the first-instance decision. 15. On 2 March 2011 the prosecutor in charge of the criminal case applied to the court for an extension of the applicant's pre-trial detention for a period of one month. He submitted that more time was needed to complete the investigation. 16. On 3 March 2011 the Nasimi District Court extended the applicant's detention pending trial by one month, until 8 April 2011. The court justified its decision by the need for more time to carry out further investigative actions, the complexity of the criminal case and the likelihood that the applicant might abscond and obstruct the investigation if released. 17. On 4 March 2011 the applicant appealed against that decision, arguing that the first-instance court had failed to substantiate its decision on his continued detention. 18. On 9 March 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the Nasimi District Court's decision of 3 March 2011. 19. No further extension decisions are available in the case file. 20. On 17 June 2011 the Nasimi District Court found the applicant guilty on all counts and sentenced him to six years' imprisonment. 21. The applicant was released from serving the remainder of his sentence by a presidential pardon issued on 17 March 2016.",Ruled as violated by court,"12. On the same day the Nasimi District Court, relying on the charges brought against the applicant and an application from the prosecutor to apply the preventive measure of remanding the applicant in custody, ordered his detention pending trial for a period of two months. The court justified the application of the preventive custodial measure by the gravity of the offences imputed to him, the risk of his reoffending and the likelihood that he might abscond if released. 13. On 12 January 2011 the applicant appealed against that decision, stating that there was no justification for the application of the preventive measure of remand in custody and that the court had failed to substantiate the necessity for his detention pending trial. He also submitted that the court had failed to take account of his personal situation and to consider the possibility of another preventive measure, such as house arrest or release on bail. 14. On 17 January 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that there were no grounds to quash the first-instance decision. 15. On 2 March 2011 the prosecutor in charge of the criminal case applied to the court for an extension of the applicant's pre-trial detention for a period of one month. He submitted that more time was needed to complete the investigation. 16. On 3 March 2011 the Nasimi District Court extended the applicant's detention pending trial by one month, until 8 April 2011. The court justified its decision by the need for more time to carry out further investigative actions, the complexity of the criminal case and the likelihood that the applicant might abscond and obstruct the investigation if released. 17. On 4 March 2011 the applicant appealed against that decision, arguing that the first-instance court had failed to substantiate its decision on his continued detention.","12. On the same day the Nasimi District Court, relying on the charges brought against the applicant and an application from the prosecutor to apply the preventive measure of remanding the applicant in custody, ordered his detention pending trial for a period of two months. The court justified the application of the preventive custodial measure by the gravity of the offences imputed to him, the risk of his reoffending and the likelihood that he might abscond if released. 13. On 12 January 2011 the applicant appealed against that decision, stating that there was no justification for the application of the preventive measure of remand in custody and that the court had failed to substantiate the necessity for his detention pending trial. He also submitted that the court had failed to take account of his personal situation and to consider the possibility of another preventive measure, such as house arrest or release on bail. 14. On 17 January 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that there were no grounds to quash the first-instance decision. 15. On 2 March 2011 the prosecutor in charge of the criminal case applied to the court for an extension of the applicant's pre-trial detention for a period of one month. He submitted that more time was needed to complete the investigation. 16. On 3 March 2011 the Nasimi District Court extended the applicant's detention pending trial by one month, until 8 April 2011. The court justified its decision by the need for more time to carry out further investigative actions, the complexity of the criminal case and the likelihood that the applicant might abscond and obstruct the investigation if released. 17. On 4 March 2011 the applicant appealed against that decision, arguing that the first-instance court had failed to substantiate its decision on his continued detention. 18. On 9 March 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the Nasimi District Court's decision of 3 March 2011.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 205,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Glodeni. 5. At the time of the events giving rise to the present application he was a pensioner who received an amount equivalent to some fifty-eight euros (EUR) per month. On 5 May 2014 the Minister of Social Protection organised a meeting with the inhabitants of the applicant's town. The applicant was also present and after the meeting he asked the Minister a question about the method of calculation of his pension. He contended that the coefficient employed for the calculation had been wrong and that his pension was too small. The Minister replied that his pension was high enough and questioned in an ironic manner whether the applicant even understood the meaning of the words used in his question. The answer infuriated the applicant and he cursed and slapped the Minister in the face. 6. On the same day, following the Minister's complaint, criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant on charges of hooliganism. 7. On 12 May 2014 the prosecutor in charge of the case ordered the applicant's psychiatric examination in order to determine whether he was fit to plead in the criminal proceedings. 8. On 29 May 2014 a commission of psychiatrists speculated that the applicant might suffer from either dementia or amnesia. However, they did not reach a final conclusion and recommended the conduct of an in-patient psychiatric examination. 9. On 2 July 2014, at the prosecutor's request, the Glodeni District Court ordered an in-patient psychiatric forensic examination of the applicant. The applicant challenged the above decision but without success. His appeal and appeal on points of law were rejected by the Bălți Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Justice on 28 August and 15 October 2014, respectively. 10. On 18 September 2014 the applicant was arrested by a group of five police officers and taken to the Chișinău Psychiatric Hospital. Upon arrival, the applicant was asked to sign several pre-printed documents, the meaning of which was that he was giving his formal consent to hospitalisation and treatment. He signed them, but wrote on one of them that he did not consent to being subjected to a psychiatric examination (nu sunt de acord cu expertiza). 11. On 20 September 2014 the applicant was visited by his son in hospital. After the visit the son employed a lawyer who started to take measures in order to have the applicant released. 12. On 24 September 2014, at the lawyer's advice, the applicant wrote to the hospital administration a letter stating that he had been hospitalised against his will on 18 September 2014 and that if he had signed anything, he wished to withdraw his signature. 13. On 25 September 2014 the applicant was released from hospital. It appears from a video submitted by the applicant's representative, that the door of the hospital ward where the applicant was detained was locked and that one could enter or exit only with the approval of the medical staff. 14. On 30 September 2014 the prosecutor in charge of the case applied to the Glodeni District Court to have the applicant remanded in custody pending trial for a period of thirty days. 15. On 4 November 2014 the Glodeni District Court rejected the prosecutor's request and found that the applicant had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment as a result of his forceful hospitalisation. 16. By a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of 26 December 2017 the applicant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to a criminal fine of 4,000 Moldovan lei (MDL), the equivalent of some EUR 180.",Ruled as violated by court,,"10. On 18 September 2014 the applicant was arrested by a group of five police officers and taken to the Chișinău Psychiatric Hospital. Upon arrival, the applicant was asked to sign several pre-printed documents, the meaning of which was that he was giving his formal consent to hospitalisation and treatment. He signed them, but wrote on one of them that he did not consent to being subjected to a psychiatric examination (nu sunt de acord cu expertiza).",TRUE,1,"While it could be argued that this was a lawful detention of a person with unsound mind, the consensus according to the court decision is that it was forceful hospitalisation.", 206,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","5. The applicants, who are police officers, were born in 1967, 1978, 1976, 1979 and 1964 respectively. The first and second applicants live in Chișinău and Caușeni and the remaining applicants live in Bender. 6. On 14 June 2006 officers Mangîr, Vasiliev and Condrea, who were conducting a criminal investigation in Tiraspol, were arrested by the secret service of the self-proclaimed ""Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria"" (""MRT"")[1]. During their arrest they managed to call the Bender police station. 7. The other two applicants (officers Daţco and Pohila) went to Tiraspol to clarify the reasons for the arrest of their colleagues, but were also arrested upon their arrival. 8. The applicants were placed in the Tiraspol Remand Centre (IVS Tiraspol). 9. On 17 June 2006 officers Pohila, Daţco and Vasiliev were released without charge and without any explanation for their arrest. 10. On 18 June 2006 officer Mangîr was allegedly beaten up and injected with an unknown substance, which rendered him unconscious for four days. After his release he was admitted for in-patient treatment in the hospital of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, where he was diagnosedwith, inter alia, concussion. 11. On 20 June 2006 the Tiraspol City Court issued a warrant for officer Mangîr to be detained for thirty days. On 23 June 2006 the ""MRT"" authorities released officers Mangîr and Condrea. The head of the ""MRT"" secret service declared in an interview that the officers had been released after Russian authorities had ""given assurances"" that Moldovan authorities would not ""kidnap people"" in the ""MRT"". 12. The applicants were accused in the ""MRT"" media of being members of ""black squadrons"" created for the purpose of kidnapping politicians and other persons causing nuisance to the Moldovan authorities. According to the applicants, during their detention they were questioned by the ""MRT"" secret service and forced to declare that in Tiraspol they had been trying to kidnap ""MRT"" politicians. Officers Pohila, Daţco and Vasiliev were allegedly beaten on the soles of their feet and threatened with the killing of members of their families, as well as with being transferred to cells occupied by common criminals, where they would be ill-treated or even killed. 13. Officer Condrea was allegedly subjected to so-called ""Palestinian hanging"" for up to seven hours and was taken to his cell unconscious thereafter. 14. The applicants described as follows their conditions of detention at the Tiraspol Remand Centre. The cells in which they had been held had been in the basement and had not had access to natural light. In the absence of ventilation and because of overcrowding it had been difficult to breathe. Officer Condrea submits that he was detained in the same cell as that in which Mr Ilie Ilaşcu had been detained (for more details see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, ECHR 2004‑VII). 15. During their detention the applicants did not have any daily exercise and were not given access to a shower; they could not receive parcels containing food from their relatives, they did not have bed linen and they were not allowed to be seen by doctors. 16. After the applicants' release the Moldovan authorities initiated two sets of criminal proceedings concerning their unlawful detention and their alleged ill-treatment while in detention. However, several years later the investigation was discontinued. 17. The applicants were also subjected to medical check-ups, which found no traces of violence on their bodies. Only one applicant, Stefan Mangîr, was found to be suffering from the consequences of concussion.",Ruled as violated by court,,"16. After the applicants' release the Moldovan authorities initiated two sets of criminal proceedings concerning their unlawful detention and their alleged ill-treatment while in detention. However, several years later the investigation was discontinued.",FALSE,0,"The applicants were detained unlawfully, but did not receive compensation.", 207,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","5. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Râbniţa. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 28 July 1999, the applicant was arrested in Râbniţa by virtue of a decision of a prosecutor from the self-proclaimed ""Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria"" (the ""MRT""; for further details about the ""MRT"", see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, §§ 28-185, ECHR 2004‑VII, and Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], nos. 43370/04 and 2 others, §§ 8-42, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). He was charged with fraud and incitement to bribery. 8. On 17 May 2000, the Camenca District Court, which was under the jurisdiction of the ""MRT"", convicted the applicant and sentenced him to five years' imprisonment. According to the applicant, he appealed, but his appeal was rejected by the ""MRT"" Supreme Court on an unspecified date. 9. The applicant initially served his sentence in Tiraspol Prison no. 2. On 25 October 2001, he was transferred to Pruncul Prison Hospital, which was under the control of the Moldovan authorities. On 30 October 2001, he signed a form of authority authorising the Chişinău-based non-governmental organisation Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) to represent him before this Court. That form of authority, together with the application form, reached the Court on 19 November 2001. 10. On 20 November 2001, a lawyer from LHR informed the Moldovan Prosecutor General's Office that the applicant and seven other people were being held in Pruncul Prison Hospital on the basis that they had been convicted by ""MRT"" courts. He asked for their immediate release, in view of the fact that they had been convicted by unlawful courts. He also submitted that some of those eight detainees had already lodged applications with the Court, and that a failure to immediately release them or any attempt to transfer them back to the ""MRT"" authorities would result in the Republic of Moldova incurring responsibility. A similar letter was sent on the same day to the Minister of Justice. 11. On 21 November 2001, members of LHR organised a press conference, during which they informed the media of the circumstances of the case and of the letter sent to the Prosecutor General's Office on the previous day. 12. Also on 21 November 2001, all eight detainees, including the applicant, were allegedly transferred back to ""MRT"" prisons. 13. On 23 November 2001, LHR informed the media of the detainees' transfer back to the ""MRT"" authorities on 21 November 2001. 14. On 26 November 2001, the Head of the Penal Institutions Department of the Ministry of Justice informed LHR that the detainees mentioned in their request of 20 November 2001 were not being held at Pruncul Prison Hospital. 15. On 7 December 2001, the lawyer from LHR wrote to the ""MRT"" Ministry of Justice, asking for permission to see the applicant and stating that he was planning to lodge in the applicant's name an application before the Court. He never received a reply to that letter. 16. On 22 January 2002, the applicant was released from prison on the basis of an amnesty act. 17. The applicant described the conditions of his detention in the ""MRT"" in the following manner. He was allegedly detained in a cell with several people suffering from tuberculosis, and risked contracting that disease himself. During his detention in Tiraspol Prison no. 2, approximately 100 detainees there died of tuberculosis. He was also affected by parasitic insects. The applicant is a person with a category 3 disability, but he was not given any medication during his detention. Food was served only once a day and was of very poor quality.",Ruled as violated by court,,"9. The applicant initially served his sentence in Tiraspol Prison no. 2. On 25 October 2001, he was transferred to Pruncul Prison Hospital, which was under the control of the Moldovan authorities. On 30 October 2001, he signed a form of authority authorising the Chişinău-based non-governmental organisation Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) to represent him before this Court. That form of authority, together with the application form, reached the Court on 19 November 2001. 10. On 20 November 2001, a lawyer from LHR informed the Moldovan Prosecutor General's Office that the applicant and seven other people were being held in Pruncul Prison Hospital on the basis that they had been convicted by ""MRT"" courts. He asked for their immediate release, in view of the fact that they had been convicted by unlawful courts. He also submitted that some of those eight detainees had already lodged applications with the Court, and that a failure to immediately release them or any attempt to transfer them back to the ""MRT"" authorities would result in the Republic of Moldova incurring responsibility. A similar letter was sent on the same day to the Minister of Justice. 12. Also on 21 November 2001, all eight detainees, including the applicant, were allegedly transferred back to ""MRT"" prisons. 14. On 26 November 2001, the Head of the Penal Institutions Department of the Ministry of Justice informed LHR that the detainees mentioned in their request of 20 November 2001 were not being held at Pruncul Prison Hospital. 15. On 7 December 2001, the lawyer from LHR wrote to the ""MRT"" Ministry of Justice, asking for permission to see the applicant and stating that he was planning to lodge in the applicant's name an application before the Court. He never received a reply to that letter. 16. On 22 January 2002, the applicant was released from prison on the basis of an amnesty act. 17. The applicant described the conditions of his detention in the ""MRT"" in the following manner. He was allegedly detained in a cell with several people suffering from tuberculosis, and risked contracting that disease himself. During his detention in Tiraspol Prison no. 2, approximately 100 detainees there died of tuberculosis. He was also affected by parasitic insects. The applicant is a person with a category 3 disability, but he was not given any medication during his detention. Food was served only once a day and was of very poor quality.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 208,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","5. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Chișinău. 6. At the time of the events the applicant was the owner of a company, incorporated in Moldova, which ran an erotic video-chat business in Chișinău. It employed young female models who provided erotic shows via webcam to customers outside Moldova in exchange for payment. 7. On 3 March 2015 the applicant was arrested and accused of pimping (proxenetism). 8. On 7 March 2015, at the request of a public prosecutor, the Centru District Court ordered that the applicant be remanded in custody for a period of thirty days. The applicant appealed against the order and argued that his detention had not been based on a reasonable suspicion that he had committed an offence. He submitted that he could not be accused of pimping, in that the female models employed by him had not been engaged in prostitution. He argued that the prosecutor and the court which had ordered his detention had applied an extensive interpretation of the provisions of the Criminal Code concerning the offence of pimping. He also argued that the existing case-law of the domestic courts did not contain anything which would enable erotic video-chat activity to be assimilated with prostitution and pimping. The applicant also contended that there were no relevant and sufficient reasons for remanding him in custody. 9. On 16 March 2015 the Chișinău Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal and held that there had been grounds to believe that he might abscond or interfere with the investigation. The court did not respond to the applicant's argument about a lack of reasonable suspicion and the allegation of extensive interpretation of the criminal law. 10. On 31 March 2015 the Centru District Court upheld a request by the Public Prosecutor and prolonged the applicant's detention for another thirty days. The applicant appealed on the same grounds as on the first occasion. However, his appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 7 April 2015. 11. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a habeas corpus request, which was upheld by the Centru District Court on 27 April 2015; the applicant was released from detention. 12. During the proceedings the applicant explained that, prior to starting the video-chat business, he had consulted a lawyer to make sure that the activity was legal in Moldova, and he had been assured that it was not illegal. He also submitted that he had seen numerous similar businesses in Chișinău, which had strengthened his belief that the activity was not unlawful. 13. On 30 December 2016 the Centru District Court found the applicant guilty as charged but ordered that the criminal proceedings against him be terminated on the basis of an amnesty law. One of the conditions for applying the amnesty law was for the applicant to admit his guilt and express remorse. The applicant did not appeal against this decision. 14. In deciding the case, the court sought an opinion from the State Agency for the Protection of Morality as to whether the acts committed by the female models employed by the applicant could be qualified as prostitution and, thus, whether the applicant's activity could be qualified as pimping. The opinion of 21 October 2015, which was the key element in convicting the applicant and was subsequently used in other similar cases, stated that the actions of the female models employed by the applicant could be considered acts of prostitution, in that their clients could obtain sexual gratification as a result of the models' performance and because the models were paid for those acts. Thus, the fact that the applicant obtained revenue from the above activity could be considered pimping.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""prompt,"" it appears that after being held on reasonable suspicion, the applicant was not brought promptly to trial, as it took more than 3 months.", 209,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","5. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Yerevan. He is a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and at the material time he headed a political movement called ""Civil Disobedience"". 6. On 5 May 2007 criminal proceedings were instituted under Article 190 § 3 (1) of the Criminal Code (money laundering) in respect of the applicant. 7. On 7 May 2007 the applicant was arrested and on 10 May 2007 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan ordered the applicant's detention for a period of two months, upon an application by the investigator, taking into account the nature and the dangerousness of the imputed offence and the fact that the applicant, if remaining at large, could abscond and obstruct the investigation by exerting unlawful influence on the persons involved in the proceedings. The applicant objected to that application, arguing that the investigator had failed to submit any well‑founded arguments in support of the allegation that he would abscond or obstruct justice, whereas he had no previous convictions, was known to be of good character, had a permanent place of residence and stable social life, and was a well-known public figure. The District Court's decision stated that it could be contested before the Criminal Court of Appeal within fifteen days. 8. On 11 May 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal, raising similar arguments. 9. On 24 May 2007 the Criminal Court of Appeal decided to uphold the decision of the District Court, finding that the nature and the dangerousness of the imputed offence, the particular circumstances of the case and the possible investigative measures to be carried out gave sufficient reasons to believe that the applicant could obstruct the investigation. 10. On 2 July 2007 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan extended the applicant's detention by two months, upon an application by the investigator, finding that the applicant, if remaining at large, could obstruct the investigation, abscond, exert unlawful influence on the persons involved in the proceedings and commit another offence. The District Court's decision stated that it could be contested before the Criminal Court of Appeal. 11. On 3 July and 3 September 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal, raising arguments similar to those previously raised. 12. On 24 July 2007 the Criminal Court of Appeal decided to uphold the decision of the District Court, finding that the nature and the dangerousness of the imputed offence, the particular circumstances and complexity of the case; the investigative measures to be carried out and the applicant's behaviour, namely his refusal to give any testimony, which was a factor slowing down the investigation, gave sufficient reasons to believe that the applicant could obstruct the investigation by exerting unlawful influence on the persons involved in the proceedings and also abscond. 13. On 31 August 2007 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan extended the applicant's detention by two months, upon an application of the investigator, on the same grounds as before. The District Court's decision stated that it could be contested before the Criminal Court of Appeal. 14. On 3 September 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal, raising arguments similar to those previously raised 15. On 6 September 2007 the investigator decided to replace the applicant's detention with a written undertaking not to leave his residence and to release him in view of the fact that the investigative measures would take some time and it was no longer necessary to keep the applicant in detention. 16. On 17 September 2007 the Criminal Court of Appeal decided to leave the applicant's appeal of 3 September 2007 unexamined in view of the fact that he had been released.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. On 7 May 2007 the applicant was arrested and on 10 May 2007 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan ordered the applicant's detention for a period of two months, upon an application by the investigator, taking into account the nature and the dangerousness of the imputed offence and the fact that the applicant, if remaining at large, could abscond and obstruct the investigation by exerting unlawful influence on the persons involved in the proceedings. The applicant objected to that application, arguing that the investigator had failed to submit any well‑founded arguments in support of the allegation that he would abscond or obstruct justice, whereas he had no previous convictions, was known to be of good character, had a permanent place of residence and stable social life, and was a well-known public figure. The District Court's decision stated that it could be contested before the Criminal Court of Appeal within fifteen days. 9. On 24 May 2007 the Criminal Court of Appeal decided to uphold the decision of the District Court, finding that the nature and the dangerousness of the imputed offence, the particular circumstances of the case and the possible investigative measures to be carried out gave sufficient reasons to believe that the applicant could obstruct the investigation. 10. On 2 July 2007 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan extended the applicant's detention by two months, upon an application by the investigator, finding that the applicant, if remaining at large, could obstruct the investigation, abscond, exert unlawful influence on the persons involved in the proceedings and commit another offence. The District Court's decision stated that it could be contested before the Criminal Court of Appeal. 12. On 24 July 2007 the Criminal Court of Appeal decided to uphold the decision of the District Court, finding that the nature and the dangerousness of the imputed offence, the particular circumstances and complexity of the case; the investigative measures to be carried out and the applicant's behaviour, namely his refusal to give any testimony, which was a factor slowing down the investigation, gave sufficient reasons to believe that the applicant could obstruct the investigation by exerting unlawful influence on the persons involved in the proceedings and also abscond. 13. On 31 August 2007 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan extended the applicant's detention by two months, upon an application of the investigator, on the same grounds as before. The District Court's decision stated that it could be contested before the Criminal Court of Appeal.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""prompt,"" it appears that after being held on reasonable suspicion, the applicant was not brought promptly to trial, as it took more than 3 months.", 210,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Százhalombatta. 5. On 11 April 2009, quoting the relevant sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Pest Central District Court ordered the applicant's pre-trial detention on charges of terrorist acts and other related offences involving abuse of firearms and explosives on the grounds that he might abscond for fear of a severe punishment, might frustrate the on-going investigation by colluding with accomplices still at large, or might execute the planned offences or re-offend. 6. The detention measure was extended on 8 May and again on 7 August 2009. The court reiterated its earlier reasons, adding that the risk of collusion was serious, since certain other suspects had not yet been apprehended. 7. A further extension was ordered on 9 November 2009. The court stated that the applicant was being prosecuted for terrorist acts committed as an associate of an organised criminal group whose plans entailed a real risk of loss of life. It was of note that the group had existed for quite some time and had been committed to carrying out terrorist acts. Moreover, the volume of evidence supporting a reasonable suspicion, as weighed individually against the applicant, was increasing. 8. On 9 February 2010 the applicant's detention was again extended, the court noting that, in view of the grounds for his detention, not even his clean criminal record, family ties and settled background could provide adequate justification for a less strict measure. 9. On 7 April 2010 the measure was renewed, with special reference to the fact that the case was concerned with a series of crimes committed over a long period of time by a criminal organisation. 10. On 9 June 2010 the Budapest Regional Court ordered that the applicant be held under house arrest, holding that the danger of his re-offending was not of a degree that justified his continued detention, noting also that the investigation was about to be wrapped up and that, in any case, some accomplices in the case had already been released pending trial. The applicant was released from detention the next day. During the ensuing period he complied with the rules of house arrest. 11. On 7 July 2010 the Budapest Court of Appeal again ordered the applicant's detention. It held that the charges of several very serious offences committed over a long time in an organised group were of such gravity that they could not be addressed merely by house arrest. 12. The measure was extended on 4 August 2010. In addition to the previously cited reasons, the court considered that there was no reason to assume that the applicant's political motivation behind the incriminated acts had subsided, which meant that the risk of re-offending was real. 13. On 24 November 2010 the Budapest Court of Appeal ordered the applicant's house arrest, observing that the applicant had abided by the previous house arrest (see paragraph 10 above) and holding that the risk of re-offending was slight. 14. On 20 September 2012 the applicant's house arrest was replaced by a restraining order, which was eventually lifted on 6 July 2014. 15. On 22 April 2015 the applicant was again detained on remand for the purposes of prosecution for a new offence allegedly committed during the on-going proceedings. He was accused of having threatened and harassed a relative of one of the witnesses in the main case. For want of evidence, this new investigation was discontinued on 30 October 2015. 16. On 18 December 2015 the applicant was released from detention and put under house arrest, which lasted until 27 July 2016. 17. On 30 August 2016 the applicant and his accomplices were convicted. He was sentenced to 12 years in a strict-regime prison. 18. Both the defendants and the prosecution appealed. The outcome of the ensuing proceedings is unknown.",Ruled as violated by court,"5. On 11 April 2009, quoting the relevant sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Pest Central District Court ordered the applicant's pre-trial detention on charges of terrorist acts and other related offences involving abuse of firearms and explosives on the grounds that he might abscond for fear of a severe punishment, might frustrate the on-going investigation by colluding with accomplices still at large, or might execute the planned offences or re-offend. 6. The detention measure was extended on 8 May and again on 7 August 2009. The court reiterated its earlier reasons, adding that the risk of collusion was serious, since certain other suspects had not yet been apprehended. 7. A further extension was ordered on 9 November 2009. The court stated that the applicant was being prosecuted for terrorist acts committed as an associate of an organised criminal group whose plans entailed a real risk of loss of life. It was of note that the group had existed for quite some time and had been committed to carrying out terrorist acts. Moreover, the volume of evidence supporting a reasonable suspicion, as weighed individually against the applicant, was increasing. 8. On 9 February 2010 the applicant's detention was again extended, the court noting that, in view of the grounds for his detention, not even his clean criminal record, family ties and settled background could provide adequate justification for a less strict measure. 9. On 7 April 2010 the measure was renewed, with special reference to the fact that the case was concerned with a series of crimes committed over a long period of time by a criminal organisation. 11. On 7 July 2010 the Budapest Court of Appeal again ordered the applicant's detention. It held that the charges of several very serious offences committed over a long time in an organised group were of such gravity that they could not be addressed merely by house arrest. 12. The measure was extended on 4 August 2010. In addition to the previously cited reasons, the court considered that there was no reason to assume that the applicant's political motivation behind the incriminated acts had subsided, which meant that the risk of re-offending was real. 15. On 22 April 2015 the applicant was again detained on remand for the purposes of prosecution for a new offence allegedly committed during the on-going proceedings. He was accused of having threatened and harassed a relative of one of the witnesses in the main case. For want of evidence, this new investigation was discontinued on 30 October 2015.","5. On 11 April 2009, quoting the relevant sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Pest Central District Court ordered the applicant's pre-trial detention on charges of terrorist acts and other related offences involving abuse of firearms and explosives on the grounds that he might abscond for fear of a severe punishment, might frustrate the on-going investigation by colluding with accomplices still at large, or might execute the planned offences or re-offend. 10. On 9 June 2010 the Budapest Regional Court ordered that the applicant be held under house arrest, holding that the danger of his re-offending was not of a degree that justified his continued detention, noting also that the investigation was about to be wrapped up and that, in any case, some accomplices in the case had already been released pending trial. The applicant was released from detention the next day. During the ensuing period he complied with the rules of house arrest. 11. On 7 July 2010 the Budapest Court of Appeal again ordered the applicant's detention. It held that the charges of several very serious offences committed over a long time in an organised group were of such gravity that they could not be addressed merely by house arrest. 13. On 24 November 2010 the Budapest Court of Appeal ordered the applicant's house arrest, observing that the applicant had abided by the previous house arrest (see paragraph 10 above) and holding that the risk of re-offending was slight. 14. On 20 September 2012 the applicant's house arrest was replaced by a restraining order, which was eventually lifted on 6 July 2014. 15. On 22 April 2015 the applicant was again detained on remand for the purposes of prosecution for a new offence allegedly committed during the on-going proceedings. He was accused of having threatened and harassed a relative of one of the witnesses in the main case. For want of evidence, this new investigation was discontinued on 30 October 2015. 16. On 18 December 2015 the applicant was released from detention and put under house arrest, which lasted until 27 July 2016.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 211,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","7. The applicant was born in 1987 and lived in Syria before he came to Russia in 2015. 8. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 9. On 23 March 2016 the applicant was arrested for violation of migration rules. On the same day the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Izhevsk (""the district court"") imposed an administrative fine on the applicant and ordered his administrative removal and detention until his removal. 10. On 5 April 2016 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya excluded the removal order from the administrative penalty imposed on him by the district court. 11. On 2 June 2016 the applicant was released. 12. On 3 June 2016 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya re‑opened the applicant's case at the request of the migration official and sent it for re-examination to the district court. 13. On 16 June 2016 the district court reviewed the administrative removal order of 23 March 2016 and confirmed its validity. The applicant was detained on the same day. On 12 September 2016 the judgment of 16 June 2016 was upheld by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya. On 7 February 2017 the applicant filed a cassation appeal against these three decisions at the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. 14. On 15 July, 7 November and 19 December 2016 and 27 January, 2 March and 10 April 2017 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Izhevsk allowed an application lodged by the bailiff for the postponement of the enforcement of the order of administrative removal by one month owing to the application of an interim measure by the Court on 17 June 2016. The district court granted the bailiff's request having relied on Article 31.5 of the Code of Administrative Offences ((""the CAO""), see paragraph 21 below). In these proceedings the applicant's lawyer also argued that there was a lack of grounds for the applicant's detention and requested that the enforcement proceedings be terminated and that the applicant be released. However, the district court dismissed her arguments, having concluded that, ""the grounds for the applicant's detention had already been established by the court in the removal proceedings and the discontinuation of the enforcement proceedings in the circumstances of [the applicant's] case is not provided for by Article 31.7 of the CAO"" (see paragraph 22 below). All these decisions, except the one of 15 July 2016 (no appeal was brought), were upheld by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya. 15. On 17 May 2017 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (""the Supreme Court"") examined the cassation appeal complaint of the applicant and reviewed the judgments issued in respect of his removal (see paragraph 13 above). The Supreme Court confirmed the judgments but discontinued the enforcement of administrative penalty in the form of the removal imposed on the applicant on 23 March 2016. The Supreme Court found that the applicant might be exposed to a risk of torture or ill-treatment in Syria in the event of his return there. On 2 June 2017 the applicant was released (after the decision entered into force). 16. On 11 May 2016 the applicant's request for refugee status was dismissed. According to the applicant, he did not appeal against this decision because the migration authorities had convinced the applicant that ""his application for temporary asylum would be granted"". 17. On 4 July 2016 the applicant's request for temporary asylum was dismissed. 18. On 25 November 2016 a second request lodged by the applicant for temporary asylum was denied by the migration authorities and the applicant did not lodge a complaint against this refusal. 19. According to the information provided by the applicant's lawyer on 9 November 2017, while the proceedings before the Court were ongoing, the applicant left Russia of his own volition on 2 August 2017 and had settled in Sweden.",Ruled as violated by court,,"11. On 2 June 2016 the applicant was released. 13. On 16 June 2016 the district court reviewed the administrative removal order of 23 March 2016 and confirmed its validity. The applicant was detained on the same day. On 12 September 2016 the judgment of 16 June 2016 was upheld by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya. On 7 February 2017 the applicant filed a cassation appeal against these three decisions at the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. 14. On 15 July, 7 November and 19 December 2016 and 27 January, 2 March and 10 April 2017 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Izhevsk allowed an application lodged by the bailiff for the postponement of the enforcement of the order of administrative removal by one month owing to the application of an interim measure by the Court on 17 June 2016. The district court granted the bailiff's request having relied on Article 31.5 of the Code of Administrative Offences ((""the CAO""), see paragraph 21 below). In these proceedings the applicant's lawyer also argued that there was a lack of grounds for the applicant's detention and requested that the enforcement proceedings be terminated and that the applicant be released. However, the district court dismissed her arguments, having concluded that, ""the grounds for the applicant's detention had already been established by the court in the removal proceedings and the discontinuation of the enforcement proceedings in the circumstances of [the applicant's] case is not provided for by Article 31.7 of the CAO"" (see paragraph 22 below). All these decisions, except the one of 15 July 2016 (no appeal was brought), were upheld by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya. 19. According to the information provided by the applicant's lawyer on 9 November 2017, while the proceedings before the Court were ongoing, the applicant left Russia of his own volition on 2 August 2017 and had settled in Sweden.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 212,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Romny. 5. In September 2009 criminal proceedings in respect of fraud and bribery were instituted against the applicant. 6. On 12 January 2010 the Romny Court convicted the applicant of both charges and sentenced him to two years' imprisonment. By the same decision the court remanded him in custody pending the execution of its judgment. 7. On 23 March 2010, upon an appeal by the applicant, the Sumy Regional Court of Appeal (""the Regional Court"") quashed the judgment of 12 January 2010 and remitted the case for retrial. By the same decision it also ordered his continued pre-trial detention, without providing any reasons or indicating a time-limit for it. 8. On 27 April 2010 the applicant asked the Romny Court to order his release from custody, subject to an undertaking not to abscond. He noted, in particular, that his conviction having been quashed, an undertaking not to abscond would constitute a sufficient measure for ensuring the proper conduct of proceedings. In that regard he submitted that he had no prior criminal record and that the crimes imputed to him were not serious. In addition, he had a permanent residence and had obtained positive character references. He also needed to support a family, including a child, and was suffering from several chronic illnesses which required regular medical supervision and which might deteriorate if he remained in detention. The applicant also submitted that, having been bound by an undertaking not to abscond throughout the first round of the proceedings, he had never attempted to abscond or to obstruct the investigation and had dutifully complied with all his procedural obligations. 9. On an unknown date in May 2010 the Romny Court refused the applicant's request for release, having found that the crimes imputed to him were sufficiently serious as to potentially warrant a prison sentence of three years or more. It also ruled, without providing any details, that there was sufficient evidence that the applicant might obstruct the proceedings if he were to be released. 10. On several further occasions (in particular, on 13 July, 29 September and 7 December 2010) the applicant lodged similar requests for release; the court rejected each such application on the date on which it was lodged, referring to the seriousness of the offences imputed to the applicant and to the lack of any valid reasons justifying his release. 11. On 10 February 2011 the applicant again asked to be released from custody pending the proceedings against him, reiterating his previous arguments and emphasising that it was very difficult while in detention to keep to his special diet and secure the necessary medical supervision for his chronic medical conditions. 12. On 23 February 2011 the Romny Court allowed that request and released the applicant, subject to an undertaking not to abscond. Referring to Article 5 of the Convention, the court noted that, regard being had to the applicant's character (in particular, his age, health, family and social status, the absence of a prior criminal record and his positive character references), there was no reason to consider that he would abscond, obstruct the investigation or engage in criminal activity if released pending trial. 13. Subsequently, the case was remitted to the prosecutor's office for further investigation. The charge of bribery was dropped by the prosecutor's office, and the applicant was committed to stand trial on the charge of fraud alone. 14. On 23 November 2012 the Romny Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to a fine. However, it released him from any liability to pay the fine levied for the crime for which he had been tried as the time-limit for implementing that sanction had expired. Accordingly, the court also terminated the proceedings as time-barred. The applicant did not appeal against this ruling and it became final.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. On 23 March 2010, upon an appeal by the applicant, the Sumy Regional Court of Appeal (""the Regional Court"") quashed the judgment of 12 January 2010 and remitted the case for retrial. By the same decision it also ordered his continued pre-trial detention, without providing any reasons or indicating a time-limit for it. 8. On 27 April 2010 the applicant asked the Romny Court to order his release from custody, subject to an undertaking not to abscond. He noted, in particular, that his conviction having been quashed, an undertaking not to abscond would constitute a sufficient measure for ensuring the proper conduct of proceedings. In that regard he submitted that he had no prior criminal record and that the crimes imputed to him were not serious. In addition, he had a permanent residence and had obtained positive character references. He also needed to support a family, including a child, and was suffering from several chronic illnesses which required regular medical supervision and which might deteriorate if he remained in detention. The applicant also submitted that, having been bound by an undertaking not to abscond throughout the first round of the proceedings, he had never attempted to abscond or to obstruct the investigation and had dutifully complied with all his procedural obligations. 9. On an unknown date in May 2010 the Romny Court refused the applicant's request for release, having found that the crimes imputed to him were sufficiently serious as to potentially warrant a prison sentence of three years or more. It also ruled, without providing any details, that there was sufficient evidence that the applicant might obstruct the proceedings if he were to be released. 10. On several further occasions (in particular, on 13 July, 29 September and 7 December 2010) the applicant lodged similar requests for release; the court rejected each such application on the date on which it was lodged, referring to the seriousness of the offences imputed to the applicant and to the lack of any valid reasons justifying his release.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 213,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 5. The applicant was born in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, in 1971 and came to Russia in 1993. He graduated from a vocational training college in the Arkhangelsk Region. He has no identity documents. 6. On 14 August 2014 the Directorate of the Federal Migration Service for the Arkhangelsk Region declared applicant's stay in the Russia undesirable (""the exclusion order""). This order was based on his multiple convictions in the administrative and criminal proceedings. The applicant was required to leave Russia voluntarily by 14 September 2014. He was informed of this decision on 27 August 2014. 7. Since the applicant failed to depart voluntarily, on 2 October 2014 the Plesetskiy District Court in the Arkhangelsk Region found him guilty of failing to leave Russia within the specified time-limit, which was an offence Article 18.8 § 1.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences, imposed a fine on him and ordered his administrative removal from Russia. Pending his removal, the applicant was to be detained in a special facility for the detention of aliens. The removal and detention order indicated that the applicant was an apatride. 8. The applicant was initially placed in one such facility in Arkhangelsk. A few days later the building was damaged by fire. On 7 October the applicant was transferred to the Krasnoye Selo facility in the Leningrad Region (СУВСИГ УФМС по СПб и ЛО). 9. Replying to an inquiry from the Federal Migration Service, on 12 November 2014 the Embassy of Tajikistan confirmed that the applicant was not a national of that State. Subsequently, a bailiff asked the District Court in St Petersburg to discontinue the enforcement proceedings because the applicant could not be issued with travel documents or removed from Russia. On 4 December 2014 the Oktyabrskiy District Court refused her application, finding that it had not been shown that the bailiff had taken sufficient measures to secure the applicant's removal. 10. On 8 May 2015 counsel for the applicant asked the Plesetskiy District Court to discontinue the enforcement of the removal and detention order. He submitted that the applicant was an apatride, that no State was willing to accept him, and that he had already spent seven months in custody in poor conditions. 11. On 4 June 2015 the District Court rejected the application. It considered that even an apatride could be removed from Russia and that the length of the applicant's detention had not been unreasonable. 12. On appeal from counsel, the Arkhangelsk Regional Court set aside the District Court's decision. Referring to the case-law of the Russian Constitutional Court prohibiting indefinite detention of individuals (judgment no. 6-P of 17 February 1998), it held that the removal and detention order should have set the maximum period of the applicant's detention. 13. On 31 July 2015 the District Court carried out a fresh determination of the application. It found that enforcement was no longer feasible because the applicant was not a national of Tajikistan and that he had already spent a long time in the detention centre. The District Court discontinued the execution of the removal and detention order and ordered the applicant's release. He was released on the same day. 14. In so far as the parties' descriptions of the conditions of the applicant's detention coincided or were undisputed, they may be summarised as follows. The applicant shared the cell with three other detainees. Its floor surface was given as fifteen square metres by the applicant and as twenty-seven square metres by the Government. Each detainee had his own bed and bed linen. A squat toilet and a sink were placed inside the cell and separated with a one-metre-high wall. Detainees were allowed to spend up to fifteen minutes outside per week, in the courtyard of the facility. Food was brought in pre-cooked, the ration did not include fish, dairy products or fresh fruit.",Ruled as violated by court,,"9. Replying to an inquiry from the Federal Migration Service, on 12 November 2014 the Embassy of Tajikistan confirmed that the applicant was not a national of that State. Subsequently, a bailiff asked the District Court in St Petersburg to discontinue the enforcement proceedings because the applicant could not be issued with travel documents or removed from Russia. On 4 December 2014 the Oktyabrskiy District Court refused her application, finding that it had not been shown that the bailiff had taken sufficient measures to secure the applicant's removal. 10. On 8 May 2015 counsel for the applicant asked the Plesetskiy District Court to discontinue the enforcement of the removal and detention order. He submitted that the applicant was an apatride, that no State was willing to accept him, and that he had already spent seven months in custody in poor conditions. 11. On 4 June 2015 the District Court rejected the application. It considered that even an apatride could be removed from Russia and that the length of the applicant's detention had not been unreasonable. 12. On appeal from counsel, the Arkhangelsk Regional Court set aside the District Court's decision. Referring to the case-law of the Russian Constitutional Court prohibiting indefinite detention of individuals (judgment no. 6-P of 17 February 1998), it held that the removal and detention order should have set the maximum period of the applicant's detention. 13. On 31 July 2015 the District Court carried out a fresh determination of the application. It found that enforcement was no longer feasible because the applicant was not a national of Tajikistan and that he had already spent a long time in the detention centre. The District Court discontinued the execution of the removal and detention order and ordered the applicant's release. He was released on the same day.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 214,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","5. The applicant was born in 1992 and lives in Tver. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 7 May 2009 the applicant and his classmate A. were arrested on suspicion of causing grievous bodily injuries to a boy from their school. They confessed to their deeds. The applicant was initially released under parental supervision, whilst A. was remanded in custody. The following day they retracted their confessions. 8. On 16 November 2009, after the investigator had reclassified their actions as a more serious offence, the Zavolzhskiy District Court in Tver ordered the applicant's placement in custody, citing the gravity of the charges and the fact that he had recanted. The District Court interpreted the latter element as amounting to the risk of an obstruction of justice. On 11 December 2009 the Tver Regional Court upheld the detention order on appeal, finding as follows: ""[The fact that the defendant] has a permanent place of residence, lives with his family, is studying in high school and does not have a criminal record does not provide a basis for rejecting unconditionally the investigator's application [for a detention order] in the light of the extreme gravity of the charges."" 9. On 12 January 2010 the District Court extended the authorised detention period, pointing out that the applicant ""had changed his attitude to the committed offence from an outright acknowledgement to a downright denial"". In the court's opinion, that implied that the applicant might interfere with justice if released. The District Court also added that the custodial measure was necessary ""to secure the enforcement of the conviction"". On 3 February 2010 the Regional Court upheld the District Court's assessment on appeal, in particular its finding that a non-custodial measure would not be sufficient to secure the enforcement of the conviction. 10. On 20 January 2010 the investigator in charge of the applicant's case refused the parents' request for leave to visit their son, reasoning as follows: ""The investigation appointed Mr V. Smirnov, the father of Mr A. Smirnov, as the legal representative of the underage defendant. However, the investigation considers that Mr V. Smirnov is using all means to interfere with the criminal proceedings because of his vested interests; he has not responded when summonsed by the investigator or court, and is causing all kinds of delays in the proceedings. The investigation considers that this kind of conduct on the part of Mr V. Smirnov may have a negative influence of the defendant Mr A. Smirnov, as well as interfering with the establishment of the truth in the criminal case."" 11. On 25 January 2010 the supervising prosecutor rejected a complaint from the applicant's father about the investigator's decision, recalling that the granting of leave to visit a detainee was at the investigator's discretion rather than being a legal obligation and that the arguments for refusing leave were ""persuasive and well-justified"". 12. On 3 February 2010 the District Court issued a further extension order, holding that the applicant had been charged with a particularly serious offence and that the circumstances warranting the application of a custodial measure still obtained. On 19 February 2010 the Regional Court upheld the order on appeal. 13. The final extension order of 11 March 2010 referred to the gravity of the charges against both co-defendants, without distinguishing between their individual situations. 14. By a judgment of 25 March 2010, the Regional Court found the applicant and his co-defendant guilty of attempted murder and sentenced each of them to five years' imprisonment. On 9 June 2010 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the conviction. 15. Between November 2009 and July 2010 the applicant's parents visited him in prison a total of sixteen times. All visits were carried out under the supervision of a warden while the applicant was separated from his parents by a glass partition.",Ruled as violated by court,,"8. On 16 November 2009, after the investigator had reclassified their actions as a more serious offence, the Zavolzhskiy District Court in Tver ordered the applicant's placement in custody, citing the gravity of the charges and the fact that he had recanted. The District Court interpreted the latter element as amounting to the risk of an obstruction of justice. On 11 December 2009 the Tver Regional Court upheld the detention order on appeal, finding as follows: ""[The fact that the defendant] has a permanent place of residence, lives with his family, is studying in high school and does not have a criminal record does not provide a basis for rejecting unconditionally the investigator's application [for a detention order] in the light of the extreme gravity of the charges."" 9. On 12 January 2010 the District Court extended the authorised detention period, pointing out that the applicant ""had changed his attitude to the committed offence from an outright acknowledgement to a downright denial"". In the court's opinion, that implied that the applicant might interfere with justice if released. The District Court also added that the custodial measure was necessary ""to secure the enforcement of the conviction"". On 3 February 2010 the Regional Court upheld the District Court's assessment on appeal, in particular its finding that a non-custodial measure would not be sufficient to secure the enforcement of the conviction. 10. On 20 January 2010 the investigator in charge of the applicant's case refused the parents' request for leave to visit their son, reasoning as follows: ""The investigation appointed Mr V. Smirnov, the father of Mr A. Smirnov, as the legal representative of the underage defendant. However, the investigation considers that Mr V. Smirnov is using all means to interfere with the criminal proceedings because of his vested interests; he has not responded when summonsed by the investigator or court, and is causing all kinds of delays in the proceedings. The investigation considers that this kind of conduct on the part of Mr V. Smirnov may have a negative influence of the defendant Mr A. Smirnov, as well as interfering with the establishment of the truth in the criminal case."" 11. On 25 January 2010 the supervising prosecutor rejected a complaint from the applicant's father about the investigator's decision, recalling that the granting of leave to visit a detainee was at the investigator's discretion rather than being a legal obligation and that the arguments for refusing leave were ""persuasive and well-justified"". 12. On 3 February 2010 the District Court issued a further extension order, holding that the applicant had been charged with a particularly serious offence and that the circumstances warranting the application of a custodial measure still obtained. On 19 February 2010 the Regional Court upheld the order on appeal. 13. The final extension order of 11 March 2010 referred to the gravity of the charges against both co-defendants, without distinguishing between their individual situations.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 215,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","5. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Sofia. 6. The applicant is a former police officer. Criminal proceedings were brought against him in 1996. 7. By a decision of the competent prosecutor of 6 March 1996, as provided under domestic law at the time, the applicant was placed under house arrest. The period of arrest continued until 3 April 1996, when the applicant was remanded in custody. He was once again placed under house arrest on 1 July 1996 and was released on 30 September 1997. 8. The applicant therefore was deprived of his liberty for one year, six months and twenty-five days. 9. In a final judgment of 27 January 1998 the Sofia Military Court found the applicant guilty of failing to perform his duties and he was given a one‑year suspended prison sentence. 10. In another set of proceedings, in a final judgment of 26 March 2003 the Supreme Court of Cassation convicted the applicant of fraud and sentenced him to one year of imprisonment. 11. The court also held in the second set of proceedings that the applicant should serve a single sentence for all his offences, which was set at one year in prison. 12. On 1 July 2003 the applicant was once again detained and placed in prison to serve his sentence. He was released on 18 September 2003 by a decision of the competent prosecutor. The prosecutor noted that the period of pre-trial detention should have been deducted from the applicant's sentence, which meant he had already served it. 13. As he had worked in prison the applicant was also entitled to a reduction of his sentence by seventeen days. 14. In 2004 the applicant brought a tort action against the prosecution authorities under section 2(6) of the State and Municipalities' Responsibility for Damage Act (see paragraph 21 below). He claimed 20,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) for non-pecuniary damage for his detention in 1996-97 to the extent it had exceeded the set term of imprisonment and BGN 40,000 for his imprisonment between 1 July and 18 September 2003. 15. The domestic courts examined witnesses and a court-appointed psychologist who said that the applicant had been traumatised by the experience and suffered from anxiety, that his personality had been ""permanently altered"", that he had difficulties communicating with others, and that his family ties had been ""irreparably damaged"". 16. In a judgment of 2 May 2006 the Sofia City Court (hereinafter ""the City Court"") allowed the claim in part, finding that the applicant had been detained for nine months and twenty-nine days in excess of his sentence and awarding him BGN 10,000 for non-pecuniary damage. It stated that his detention in 1996-97 had been ""unjustified"" and that his imprisonment in 2003 had amounted to ""unlawful detention without any valid grounds"". 17. In accordance with the applicable provisions of domestic law, the City Court ordered the applicant to pay BGN 2,040 (the equivalent of 1,040 euros – EUR) in court fees, calculated as a pro rata percentage of the part of his claim that had been dismissed. 18. The judgment was upheld on 18 June 2007 by the Sofia Court of Appeal (hereinafter ""the Court of Appeal""), which specified that the prosecution authorities were also liable to pay default interest on the above amount, calculated from 18 September 2003. 19. In a final judgment of 24 April 2009 the Supreme Court of Cassation reduced the award to BGN 3,000 (approximately EUR 1,530), plus default interest. It justified the reduction by referring to the ""nature of the offences"" the applicant had been convicted for, the ""regime under which the sentence had been served"" and the ""socially acceptable criteria for justice"". It did not deal with the matter of court fees and took no separate decision in that regard. 20. The Court has not been informed whether and when the amount above was paid to the applicant. Calculations made with a calculator available on the Internet show that the default interest on BGN 3,000 for the period from 18 September 2003 to 24 April 2009 would be BGN 2,265 (the equivalent of EUR 1,155).",Ruled as violated by court,,"14. In 2004 the applicant brought a tort action against the prosecution authorities under section 2(6) of the State and Municipalities' Responsibility for Damage Act (see paragraph 21 below). He claimed 20,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) for non-pecuniary damage for his detention in 1996-97 to the extent it had exceeded the set term of imprisonment and BGN 40,000 for his imprisonment between 1 July and 18 September 2003. 15. The domestic courts examined witnesses and a court-appointed psychologist who said that the applicant had been traumatised by the experience and suffered from anxiety, that his personality had been ""permanently altered"", that he had difficulties communicating with others, and that his family ties had been ""irreparably damaged"". 16. In a judgment of 2 May 2006 the Sofia City Court (hereinafter ""the City Court"") allowed the claim in part, finding that the applicant had been detained for nine months and twenty-nine days in excess of his sentence and awarding him BGN 10,000 for non-pecuniary damage. It stated that his detention in 1996-97 had been ""unjustified"" and that his imprisonment in 2003 had amounted to ""unlawful detention without any valid grounds"". 17. In accordance with the applicable provisions of domestic law, the City Court ordered the applicant to pay BGN 2,040 (the equivalent of 1,040 euros – EUR) in court fees, calculated as a pro rata percentage of the part of his claim that had been dismissed. 18. The judgment was upheld on 18 June 2007 by the Sofia Court of Appeal (hereinafter ""the Court of Appeal""), which specified that the prosecution authorities were also liable to pay default interest on the above amount, calculated from 18 September 2003. 19. In a final judgment of 24 April 2009 the Supreme Court of Cassation reduced the award to BGN 3,000 (approximately EUR 1,530), plus default interest. It justified the reduction by referring to the ""nature of the offences"" the applicant had been convicted for, the ""regime under which the sentence had been served"" and the ""socially acceptable criteria for justice"". It did not deal with the matter of court fees and took no separate decision in that regard. 20. The Court has not been informed whether and when the amount above was paid to the applicant. Calculations made with a calculator available on the Internet show that the default interest on BGN 3,000 for the period from 18 September 2003 to 24 April 2009 would be BGN 2,265 (the equivalent of EUR 1,155).",TRUE,2,"The applicant was a victim of earlier unlawful detention and received compensation, although he claims not enough. It is unclear from the statute text whether compensation amount is within the purview of the statute.", 216,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","5. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Weinheim. He is a campaigner against abortion and operates an anti-abortion website (babycaust.de). At the time of the proceedings outlined below, the website included, among other things, the following content. 6. On the starting page a picture of graves was shown and the text underneath read ""then: Holocaust"". Upon clicking on the picture, the user was directed to a page titled: ""Abortion – the new Holocaust?"" on which the Holocaust was compared to abortions. On the left margin of the starting page, there were several links, of which one was called ""Life or death?"". Upon clicking on it, the user was directed to a page with the headline ""Prayer requests for Germany"". From that page, the reader was directed to a location-based alphabetical list mentioning the names and practice addresses of doctors who performed abortions in Germany, and to a request for prayers for those doctors. At the very bottom of the same page, under the highlighted text ""German contemporary history in brief"", a sentence read: ""Perverted doctors murder unborn children at the request of the mothers"" (Pervertierte Ärzte ermorden im Auftrag der Mütter die ungeborenen Kinder) On the same page, clicking on the button ""close page"" forwarded the user to a page where it was stated: ""Pray, if possible regularly, for the doctors ... who personally undertake the AGGRAVATED MURDER of abortion killing"" (Beten Sie – wenn möglich regelmäßig – für die Mediziner ..., welche den MORD der Abtreibungstötung selbst vornehmen ...) (Emphasis in original). Somewhat farther down on the same page, it was stated that counselling centres that issued certifications: ""... are enabling and facilitating the unpunished aggravated murder of children in their mother's womb."" (... ermöglichen und begünstigen einen straffreien Kindermord im Mutterschoβ.) 7. One of the doctors listed on the applicant's website, Dr Q., sought a civil injunction ordering the applicant to remove his name and address from the website. 8. On 23 May 2006 the Mannheim Regional Court rejected Dr Q.'s application on the grounds that it was a fact that Dr Q. performed abortions and that the remainder of the website's content was covered by the applicant's freedom of expression. It observed, in particular, that the present case was not comparable to similar cases which had concerned an interference with personality rights by the distribution of personalised leaflets. The publishing of a doctor's name on a list of abortion performing doctors had no comparable ""pillory effect"". 9. Subsequently Dr Q. appealed and – during the appeal proceedings – modified his application, seeking a civil injunction ordering the applicant to desist from labelling abortions, such as those performed by Dr Q., ""aggravated murder"". 10. On 28 February 2007 the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal granted the sought injunction. The court held that the applicant's website led it to be understood that abortions performed by Dr Q. constituted ""aggravated murder"". While the term ""aggravated murder"" did not have to be understood in a merely legal sense but could also be understood as a moral judgment, the overall presentation of the website at the very least did not exclude a reading that Dr Q. had perpetrated the criminal offence of aggravated murder. Even though the applicant had pointed out that abortions were exempt from punishment, he had not referred to section 218a of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 14 below), which exempted abortions as performed by Dr Q., from criminal liability. In addition, the applicant had emphasised the term ""aggravated murder"" in the relevant parts of the website and had compared abortions with the Holocaust. In sum, the statements of the website could be understood as a personalised accusation against Dr Q. of perpetrating aggravated murder. 11. On 29 May 2007 the Federal Court of Justice refused a request by the applicant for legal aid on the grounds that the applicant's intended appeal on points of law lacked sufficient prospect of success. 12. On 2 July 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit a complaint by the applicant for adjudication for being inadmissible, without providing reasons (no. 1 BvR 1663/07).",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"8. On 23 May 2006 the Mannheim Regional Court rejected Dr Q.'s application on the grounds that it was a fact that Dr Q. performed abortions and that the remainder of the website's content was covered by the applicant's freedom of expression. It observed, in particular, that the present case was not comparable to similar cases which had concerned an interference with personality rights by the distribution of personalised leaflets. The publishing of a doctor's name on a list of abortion performing doctors had no comparable ""pillory effect"". 12. On 2 July 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit a complaint by the applicant for adjudication for being inadmissible, without providing reasons (no. 1 BvR 1663/07).",FALSE,0,The fact pattern contains no mention of arrest or detention., 217,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","6. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Toronto, Canada. 7. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 8. The applicant was the director of a company (D.) registered in Ukraine. In 1996, in the name of D., he concluded a contract with a collective farm (N.), situated in the self-proclaimed ""Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria"" (the ""MRT"" – for further details about the ""MRT"", see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, §§ 28-185, ECHR 2004‑VII, and Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], nos. 43370/04 and 2 others, §§ 8-42, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). Under the contract, N. undertook to send D. 15 tonnes of paprika and 5 tonnes of butter, while D. undertook to send N. 275 tonnes of diesel fuel as payment. 9. Subsequently, N. sent the paprika, but according to the applicant some of it was of poor quality and D. suffered financial losses as a result. Consequently, D. refused to send the diesel fuel. 10. On 22 December 1996 the applicant was summoned to the Department for the Fight against Organised Crime in Crivoi Rog, Ukraine, and asked to give an explanation for his refusal to send the diesel fuel. On 24 January 1997 he was summoned again. After the second interview he was taken, allegedly against his will and without his passport, to the ""MRT"". 11. The applicant was accused of fraud by the ""MRT"" authorities. On 30 December 1999 he was convicted and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment by the Ribnita People's Court, which was under the jurisdiction of the ""MRT"". He did not appeal against that judgment, which then became final. 12. On 2 March 2002 the applicant was released from prison on the basis of an amnesty act. 13. While in detention pending trial and after his conviction, the applicant was initially held in solitary confinement for more than two years. The cell was a concrete box with no windows or ventilation, and no natural light, toilet or tap water. 14. According to the applicant, after his transfer to an ordinary cell and until his release, he was detained in cells with persons who were ill with tuberculosis. During his detention several detainees died from tuberculosis. He was given food once a day – some 250 grams of soup (containing no protein or vitamins), 100 grams of porridge of the same quality, and 250 grams of bread. As a result of the lack of food the applicant developed constant hunger pains, which he viewed as tantamount to torture. The cell was infested with blood-sucking parasites. Their bites caused him discomfort and itching, which in turn created wounds that bled after being scratched. As a result, he caught the skin disease streptodermia. The lack of medical treatment left him suffering and he was only able to cure himself by taking medication borrowed from another detainee. The lack of medication caused him to constantly fear that he might fall ill with no possibility of being treated. 15. On an unknown date in 1997 the applicant's lawyer complained to the Moldovan Prosecutor General's Office of the unlawful detention of his client ordered by the ""MRT"" authorities. In a letter dated 21 January 1998 the Office replied that the complaint had been accepted and that an action had been brought in the Supreme Court of Justice for the annulment of any ""MRT"" court sentence that might be imposed in respect of the applicant. 16. On 14 November 2000, in reply to a complaint by the applicant's lawyer, the Moldovan Prosecutor General's Office informed him that it had initiated a criminal investigation into his client's abduction. It noted that the investigation was aimed at establishing whether the applicant had indeed been abducted, and if so by whom and precisely from where. 17. On 19 February 2001, the Moldovan Prosecutor General's Office informed the applicant's lawyer that on 17 January 2001 a previously adopted decision to discontinue the investigation had been annulled; the documents relevant to the investigation of the complaint of kidnapping from Ukrainian territory had been sent to Ukrainian prosecutors. 18. In reply to a complaint concerning his client lodged on an unknown date with the Russian President, on 25 September 2002 the applicant's lawyer was informed that the complaint had been forwarded to the Moldovan Supreme Court of Justice.",Ruled as violated by court,,"13. While in detention pending trial and after his conviction, the applicant was initially held in solitary confinement for more than two years. The cell was a concrete box with no windows or ventilation, and no natural light, toilet or tap water. 14. According to the applicant, after his transfer to an ordinary cell and until his release, he was detained in cells with persons who were ill with tuberculosis. During his detention several detainees died from tuberculosis. He was given food once a day – some 250 grams of soup (containing no protein or vitamins), 100 grams of porridge of the same quality, and 250 grams of bread. As a result of the lack of food the applicant developed constant hunger pains, which he viewed as tantamount to torture. The cell was infested with blood-sucking parasites. Their bites caused him discomfort and itching, which in turn created wounds that bled after being scratched. As a result, he caught the skin disease streptodermia. The lack of medical treatment left him suffering and he was only able to cure himself by taking medication borrowed from another detainee. The lack of medication caused him to constantly fear that he might fall ill with no possibility of being treated. 15. On an unknown date in 1997 the applicant's lawyer complained to the Moldovan Prosecutor General's Office of the unlawful detention of his client ordered by the ""MRT"" authorities. In a letter dated 21 January 1998 the Office replied that the complaint had been accepted and that an action had been brought in the Supreme Court of Justice for the annulment of any ""MRT"" court sentence that might be imposed in respect of the applicant. 16. On 14 November 2000, in reply to a complaint by the applicant's lawyer, the Moldovan Prosecutor General's Office informed him that it had initiated a criminal investigation into his client's abduction. It noted that the investigation was aimed at establishing whether the applicant had indeed been abducted, and if so by whom and precisely from where. 17. On 19 February 2001, the Moldovan Prosecutor General's Office informed the applicant's lawyer that on 17 January 2001 a previously adopted decision to discontinue the investigation had been annulled; the documents relevant to the investigation of the complaint of kidnapping from Ukrainian territory had been sent to Ukrainian prosecutors.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""prompt,"" it appears that after being held on reasonable suspicion, the applicant was not brought promptly to trial, as it took more than 3 months.", 218,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicants, who were born in 1984, 1987 and 1988 respectively, live in İstanbul. 5. On 23 August 2007 the applicants were arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation. 6. On the same day, the judge at the İstanbul Assize Court decided to restrict access to the investigation file, under Article 153 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the ""CCP""), Law no. 5271. The judge also decided to delay the second and third applicants' right of access to their lawyer for twenty-four hours pursuant to section 10 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713), which was in force at the material time. 7. On 26 August 2007 the applicants were questioned by police officers from the Anti-Terror Branch of the İstanbul Security Directorate, in the presence of their lawyer. They used their right to remain silent. 8. On the same day, the applicants were also interrogated by the public prosecutor, in the presence of their lawyer. They were mainly questioned about certain records of telephone conversations and the incident of the arson of vehicles during an illegal demonstration. The prosecutor read out the transcripts of the intercepted conversations to the applicants. The applicants did not remember that they had had these conversations but claimed that these conversations did not prove that they had committed the offences with which they were charged with, or that they attended the illegal demonstration on behalf of a terrorist organisation. 9. On 26 August 2007, after having taken the applicants' statements, the judge at the 10th Chamber of the İstanbul Assize Court ordered their pre‑trial detention. 10. On 31 August 2008 the applicants' lawyer filed an objection against the decision of 26 August 2007 ordering the applicants' detention, and requested their release. On the same day, the 10th Chamber of the İstanbul Assize Court, relying on the public prosecutor's written opinion, which had not been communicated to the applicants or their representative, dismissed the objection without holding a hearing. 11. On 3 December 2007 the İstanbul public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment against the applicants, accusing them, inter alia, of membership of a terrorist organisation, illegal possession of explosives and causing damage to public property. 12. On 17 December 2007 the İstanbul Assize Court accepted the indictment. 13. On 27 December 2007 the İstanbul Assize Court held a preparatory hearing and dismissed the applicants' requests for release. 14. On 18 April 2008 and 22 July 2008 the court held further hearings, in which the applicants and their lawyer were present. At the end of those hearings, the court ordered the continuation of the applicants' detention. 15. At the end of the third hearing, held on 20 November 2008, the court prolonged the applicants' detentions. The applicants were present at this hearing. Subsequently, they filed an objection against this decision. On 28 November 2008 the 11th Chamber of the İstanbul Assize Court dismissed the objection, without holding an oral hearing and based on the written opinions of the public prosecutor, which had not been communicated to the applicants or their representative. 16. On 19 December 2008 the court ex officio examined the applicants' detention on remand on the basis of the case-file and decided to extend it. 17. At the hearings held on 19 March 2009 and 16 July 2009, in which the applicants were present, the trial court ordered the continuation of the applicants' detention on remand. 18. On 24 November 2009, 30 March 2010 and 24 May 2012, respectively, the applicants were released from detention on remand. 19. On 1 October 2013 the İstanbul Assize Court acquitted the second applicant of the charges against him. The court convicted the first and the third applicants and sentenced them to imprisonment. The judgment in concerning the acquittal of the second applicant became final, as there was no appeal against it. 20. On 1 July 2016 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first instance court in so far as it concerned the convictions of the first and third applicants. Accordingly, the case file was remitted to the first instance court. 21. According to the latest information in the case file, the criminal proceedings against the first and third applicants are still pending before the İstanbul Assize Court.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 219,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicants were born in 1984 and 1979 respectively and live in Moscow. 5. On 14 December 2012 the State Duma adopted at first reading a draft law which, in particular, prohibited adoption of children of Russian nationality by US citizens. 6. On 17 December 2012 the official daily newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta announced that the second reading was scheduled for 19 December 2012. 7. According to the applicants, they read on various online social networks that many people intended to stage solo ""pickets"" (одиночные пикеты) on 19 December 2012 in front of the State Duma to express their opposition to the draft law. The format of solo ""pickets"" was chosen because there was no longer time to observe the minimum statutory three‑day notification period for other types of (group) events. 8. The applicants decided to hold their own solo ""pickets"" and at around 9 a.m. positioned themselves, holding banners, in the vicinity of the State Duma at some distance from other protesters (see also Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, nos. 57818/09 and 14 others, §§ 206-15, 7 February 2017). 9. According to the applicants, they were arrested by the police several minutes later and brought to a police station. At 10.30 a.m. the police drew up a record of the administrative escorting (протокол административного доставления) in respect of each applicant. A record of administrative arrest (протокол административного задержания), drawn up at the same time, stated that the applicants had arrived at the police station at 10.30 a.m. The first applicant, Mr Tsukanov, made a handwritten note on his arrest record that he had been actually apprehended at 9.20 a.m. The second applicant, Mr Torchinskiy, made a handwritten note on his escorting record that he had been actually apprehended at 9.30 a.m. 10. At the police station both applicants were accused of organising and holding a group public event without prior notification, in breach of Article 20.2 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter, ""CAO""). The administrative offence records indicate that the offences were committed at 10 a.m. The first applicant made a handwritten note that he came to the event venue at 9 a.m. and was arrested at 9.20 a.m. 11. The first applicant was released at 1.20 p.m. The second applicant was released at 1.10 p.m. 12. On 15 January 2013 the justice of the peace of the 369th Court Circuit of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the second applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB), (about 495 euros (EUR) at the time). The justice of the peace found it established, on the basis of the records and testimony of police officers, that the applicant had taken part in a ""picket"" involving fifty people. That ""picket"" was unlawful because no notification had been submitted by the organisers as required by the Public Events Act (hereinafter ""PEA""). The applicant had waved a banner, thereby attracting the attention of passers-by and journalists assembled for the occasion. He had not complied with the police order to stop picketing. 13. On 6 February 2013 the justice of the peace of the 369th Court Circuit of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the first applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of RUB 20,000 (about EUR 495 at the time), with the reasoning identical to that in the judgment of 15 January 2013. The justice of the peace also relied on police reports and testimony of a police officer who had apprehended the first applicant at the venue of the public event. 14. Both applicants appealed, insisting that each of them had held a solo demonstration which did not require prior notification of the authorities. The first applicant also pointed out that he had been arrested earlier than indicated in the arrest record. 15. On 13 February and 11 March 2013 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow upheld the judgments concerning the second and the first applicant respectively. 16. The second applicant applied for review of the court decisions under Article 30.12 of the CAO. On 28 June 2013 the Deputy President of the Moscow City Court partly allowed his complaint and changed the classification of the administrative charge against him. The second applicant was found guilty of the breach of the established procedure for the conduct of public events committed by a participant, an offence punishable under Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO. His fine was reduced to RUB 10,000 (about EUR 233 at the time).",Ruled as violated by court,,"5. On 14 December 2012 the State Duma adopted at first reading a draft law which, in particular, prohibited adoption of children of Russian nationality by US citizens. 6. On 17 December 2012 the official daily newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta announced that the second reading was scheduled for 19 December 2012. 7. According to the applicants, they read on various online social networks that many people intended to stage solo ""pickets"" (одиночные пикеты) on 19 December 2012 in front of the State Duma to express their opposition to the draft law. The format of solo ""pickets"" was chosen because there was no longer time to observe the minimum statutory three‑day notification period for other types of (group) events. 9. According to the applicants, they were arrested by the police several minutes later and brought to a police station. At 10.30 a.m. the police drew up a record of the administrative escorting (протокол административного доставления) in respect of each applicant. A record of administrative arrest (протокол административного задержания), drawn up at the same time, stated that the applicants had arrived at the police station at 10.30 a.m. The first applicant, Mr Tsukanov, made a handwritten note on his arrest record that he had been actually apprehended at 9.20 a.m. The second applicant, Mr Torchinskiy, made a handwritten note on his escorting record that he had been actually apprehended at 9.30 a.m. 10. At the police station both applicants were accused of organising and holding a group public event without prior notification, in breach of Article 20.2 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter, ""CAO""). The administrative offence records indicate that the offences were committed at 10 a.m. The first applicant made a handwritten note that he came to the event venue at 9 a.m. and was arrested at 9.20 a.m. 12. On 15 January 2013 the justice of the peace of the 369th Court Circuit of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the second applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB), (about 495 euros (EUR) at the time). The justice of the peace found it established, on the basis of the records and testimony of police officers, that the applicant had taken part in a ""picket"" involving fifty people. That ""picket"" was unlawful because no notification had been submitted by the organisers as required by the Public Events Act (hereinafter ""PEA""). The applicant had waved a banner, thereby attracting the attention of passers-by and journalists assembled for the occasion. He had not complied with the police order to stop picketing. 13. On 6 February 2013 the justice of the peace of the 369th Court Circuit of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the first applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of RUB 20,000 (about EUR 495 at the time), with the reasoning identical to that in the judgment of 15 January 2013. The justice of the peace also relied on police reports and testimony of a police officer who had apprehended the first applicant at the venue of the public event. 16. The second applicant applied for review of the court decisions under Article 30.12 of the CAO. On 28 June 2013 the Deputy President of the Moscow City Court partly allowed his complaint and changed the classification of the administrative charge against him. The second applicant was found guilty of the breach of the established procedure for the conduct of public events committed by a participant, an offence punishable under Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO. His fine was reduced to RUB 10,000 (about EUR 233 at the time).",TRUE,2,It is arguable whether or not these detentions count as in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law., 220,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","5. The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Toksovo. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 2 October 2009 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of raping K., who was employed at the Vasileostrovskiy District Court in St Petersburg as an assistant to Judge N., and who also was the daughter of that court's former president, Judge K., who carried on working as a judge at that time. 8. On 4 October 2009 Judge R. of the Vasileostrovskiy District Court remanded the applicant in custody. He rejected a challenge for bias which the applicant's lawyer raised in respect of the entire composition of the District Court because of a link between the alleged victim and the judges of that court. On 26 October 2009 the St Petersburg City Court upheld the detention order on appeal, rejecting a challenge by the applicant as unsubstantiated. 9. On 30 November 2009 a deputy president of the City Court referred an application by an investigator for an extension order to the Oktyabrskiy District Court for consideration. The District Court granted the application on the following day. On 11 December 2009 the City Court upheld that decision on appeal. However, on 31 March 2010 the Supreme Court of Russia determined that the decision to refer the application to another district court had been invalid, because the City Court's deputy president had decided on the change of venue of his own initiative without hearing what the defendant's opinion on that issue was. 10. On 30 December 2009 a further extension was granted by the President of the Vasileostrovskiy District Court, Judge Sh., who again rejected a challenge for bias by the applicant. On 26 January 2010 the City Court upheld the extension order on appeal. By a separate decision of the same date, it upheld the rejection of the challenge in respect of Judge Sh.: ""The available material indicates that the court considered the challenge for bias in accordance with the established procedure, and upon review of the parties' arguments found no grounds for the challenge; the stated grounds fall outside of the scope of Article 61 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as they do not indicate the presiding judge's interest in any predetermined outcome of the case ... In addition, when considering the challenge in respect of the presiding judge, the court had regard to the opinion of the prosecutor, who declared at the hearing on 30 December 2009 that there were no legal grounds for allowing the challenge ... in particular because the hearing did not touch upon the defendant's guilt; it was not an examination of the merits of the case, but a hearing [on the remand matter]."" 11. On 27 January and 27 February 2010 extension orders were issued by judges of the Kalininskiy District Court, which had territorial jurisdiction over the area where the applicant was detained. Those orders were upheld on appeal on 25 March and 8 April 2010. 12. On 11 March 2010 the case against the applicant was referred to the Vasileostrovskiy District Court for trial and allocated to its President, Judge Sh. On 23 March 2010 Judge Sh. allowed the applicant's challenge for bias in respect of the entire composition of that court, holding as follows: ""It has been established that the injured party in the criminal proceedings [K.] works as an assistant to the Vasileostrovskiy District Court's Judge [N.], and that her father [Judge K.] is a judge of the Vasileostrovskiy District Court. It follows that circumstances exist leading the defendant and his counsel to believe that [Judge Sh.] and all the judges of the Vasileostrovskiy District Court are, either directly or indirectly, interested in the outcome of the criminal case. In order to ensure an impartial examination of the criminal case, the challenge ... must be allowed and the case referred to the President of the St Petersburg City Court for determination of the territorial jurisdiction."" 13. Continuing the same decision, Judge Sh. extended the applicant's detention until 12 May 2010. On the last day of the extended period the Presidium of the City Court, by way of supervisory review, quashed the decision of 23 March in part in relation to the detention matter, on the grounds that an extension could not have been granted by a judge who had recused himself. The Presidium extended the applicant's detention until 12 August 2010. 14. On 15 April 2010 a deputy president of the City Court determined that the trial would be held in the Petrogradskiy District Court. On 31 March 2011 the Petrogradskiy District Court found the applicant guilty of rape and sentenced him to five years and six months' imprisonment.",Ruled as violated by court,,"8. On 4 October 2009 Judge R. of the Vasileostrovskiy District Court remanded the applicant in custody. He rejected a challenge for bias which the applicant's lawyer raised in respect of the entire composition of the District Court because of a link between the alleged victim and the judges of that court. On 26 October 2009 the St Petersburg City Court upheld the detention order on appeal, rejecting a challenge by the applicant as unsubstantiated. 10. On 30 December 2009 a further extension was granted by the President of the Vasileostrovskiy District Court, Judge Sh., who again rejected a challenge for bias by the applicant. On 26 January 2010 the City Court upheld the extension order on appeal. By a separate decision of the same date, it upheld the rejection of the challenge in respect of Judge Sh.: ""The available material indicates that the court considered the challenge for bias in accordance with the established procedure, and upon review of the parties' arguments found no grounds for the challenge; the stated grounds fall outside of the scope of Article 61 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as they do not indicate the presiding judge's interest in any predetermined outcome of the case ... In addition, when considering the challenge in respect of the presiding judge, the court had regard to the opinion of the prosecutor, who declared at the hearing on 30 December 2009 that there were no legal grounds for allowing the challenge ... in particular because the hearing did not touch upon the defendant's guilt; it was not an examination of the merits of the case, but a hearing [on the remand matter]."" 12. On 11 March 2010 the case against the applicant was referred to the Vasileostrovskiy District Court for trial and allocated to its President, Judge Sh. On 23 March 2010 Judge Sh. allowed the applicant's challenge for bias in respect of the entire composition of that court, holding as follows: ""It has been established that the injured party in the criminal proceedings [K.] works as an assistant to the Vasileostrovskiy District Court's Judge [N.], and that her father [Judge K.] is a judge of the Vasileostrovskiy District Court. It follows that circumstances exist leading the defendant and his counsel to believe that [Judge Sh.] and all the judges of the Vasileostrovskiy District Court are, either directly or indirectly, interested in the outcome of the criminal case. In order to ensure an impartial examination of the criminal case, the challenge ... must be allowed and the case referred to the President of the St Petersburg City Court for determination of the territorial jurisdiction.""",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 221,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","5. The applicants were born in 1965 and 1966 respectively and live in Moscow. 6. The applicant, who was one of the indirect beneficial owners of a company, arranged for it to be sold to another company. On 1 October 2013 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of fraud through the execution of a sham sales contract. It was alleged, in particular, that the company purchasing the applicant's company also belonged to the applicant and the price it paid had been unrealistically low. On 3 October 2013 the Taganskiy District Court of Moscow (""the Taganskiy District Court"") held a hearing to determine a preventive measure in respect of the applicant. The latter argued that he should not be detained by reliance on Article 108 § 1.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (""the CCrP""), which prohibits the remanding in custody of people suspected or accused of offences committed within the sphere of their business activities. The Taganskiy District Court dismissed that argument in the following terms: ""... [the applicant] is suspected of having committed a serious offence aimed at making a profit which was unconnected to any business activity and had been organised by a group of people; [the offence being] punishable with up to ten years' imprisonment, some of the accomplices have not yet been identified and arrested."" 7. On 21 October 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order. 8. On 28 November 2013 and 27 January 2014 the Taganskiy District Court extended the applicant's detention, repeating its previous findings. On 27 December 2013 and 18 April 2014 respectively the Moscow City Court upheld the above detention extensions on appeal. 9. On 28 March 2014 the Ostankinskiy District Court of Moscow (""the Ostankinskiy District Court"") further extended the applicant's detention. As regards Article 108 § 1.1 of the CCrP, the District Court stated as follows: ""The court dismisses the arguments of the defence and of [the applicant] himself that the offence of which he is accused was committed within the sphere of his business activity because, according to the current bill of indictment, he is accused of having committed an offence motivated by profit with the aim of misappropriating another's property by way of deception or abuse of trust, using an organised group, and on a particularly large scale. The court therefore concludes that the offence imputed to [the applicant] was not connected to the carrying out of a business activity, which is an independent activity undertaken at one's own risk with the aim of obtaining regular revenues from the use of possessions, the sale of goods, or the performance of works or services by people registered in such a capacity in accordance with the law."" 10. On 14 May 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld on appeal the detention extension order of 28 March 2014. It held that the first-instance court had examined and dismissed with proper substantiation the applicant's argument that his alleged offence had been committed within the sphere of his business activity. 11. On 10 April 2015 the Moscow City Court granted bail to the applicant. Upon deposit of the bail sum on 17 April 2015 the applicant was released. 12. On 15 September 2014 a criminal investigation was opened into the misappropriation of the funds of an insolvent bank. On 23 September 2014 the applicant, who owned the bank, was arrested on suspicion of having transferred money out of the bank's account by acquiring unsecured promissory notes. 13. On 25 September 2014 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow (""the Tverskoy District Court"") authorised the applicant's detention. The applicant argued that he should not be detained, inter alia, because he was suspected of an offence committed within the sphere of his business activity. The Tverskoy District Court rejected the argument as follows: ""... the court takes the view that, as can be seen from the evidence in the case, the method and circumstances described in the decision to initiate the criminal investigation, and the actions of [the applicant] in misappropriating the funds in this case are not related to [a business] activity as defined in Article 2 § 1 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation"". 14. On 10 November 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order on appeal. The Moscow City Court dismissed the applicant's argument that his alleged offences had been committed within the sphere of his business activity. In particular, the Moscow City Court held as follows: ""... the action of committing an offence by using another's funds and taking on obligations to the Bank's clients without any intention to comply with them, cannot be considered to be a business activity.""",Ruled as violated by court,,"13. On 25 September 2014 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow (""the Tverskoy District Court"") authorised the applicant's detention. The applicant argued that he should not be detained, inter alia, because he was suspected of an offence committed within the sphere of his business activity. The Tverskoy District Court rejected the argument as follows: ""... the court takes the view that, as can be seen from the evidence in the case, the method and circumstances described in the decision to initiate the criminal investigation, and the actions of [the applicant] in misappropriating the funds in this case are not related to [a business] activity as defined in Article 2 § 1 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation"". 14. On 10 November 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order on appeal. The Moscow City Court dismissed the applicant's argument that his alleged offences had been committed within the sphere of his business activity. In particular, the Moscow City Court held as follows: ""... the action of committing an offence by using another's funds and taking on obligations to the Bank's clients without any intention to comply with them, cannot be considered to be a business activity.""",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 222,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant, Mr Sergey Marksovich Dudin, is a Russian national, who was born in 1962 and lives in Parfino, Novgorod Region. He is represented before the Court by Mr K. V. Pakin, a lawyer practising in Velikiy Novgorod. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. 6. On 23 July 2007 the applicant was apprehended by police at the cargo terminal ""Shushary"" in Saint Petersburg under suspicion of robbery. Later that day he was transferred to Krestsy, Novgorod Region. 7. On 25 July 2007 the Krestetskiy District Court of Novgorod Region (the District Court) ordered pre-trial detention of the applicant. Subsequently the period of the applicant's detention was extended on 20 September and 2 November 2007. 8. In the order of 2 November 2007 the District Court authorised extension of the applicant's detention ""until and including 24 December 2007"". 9. On 11 December 2007 the District Court scheduled a preliminary hearing for the applicant's trial in order to decide on his further detention. The relevant section of the operative part of the decision read as follows: ""[The court] ORDERED To schedule a preliminary hearing in the criminal case of Mr Dudin ... on 25 December 2007 at 10.00 a.m. ... To transfer [from the detention facility] the accused Mr Dudin for the hearing at the set date and time. To keep the measure of Mr Dudin's restraint – pre-trial detention – unchanged."" 10. On 25 December 2007 between 10.00 a.m. and 11.00 a.m. the District Court held a preliminary hearing ordering the criminal case to be send to trial and the applicant's further detention. During the hearing the applicant and his representative raised the objection regarding unlawfulness of the applicant's detention between 24 December 2007 and the time of the hearing, but the District Court dismissed it without advancing any specific reasons in this regard. The applicant appealed. 11. On 21 February 2008 the Novgorod Regional Court upheld the lower court's decision. In the relevant part the Regional Court's decision read as follows: ""Mr Dudin's and his representative's arguments regarding unlawfulness of the detention ... at the moment of the adoption of the decision [are unfounded] ... [T]he present criminal case was transferred to court on 11 December 2007, i.e. within the period of [the accused's detention ordered during investigation] and according to section 2, Article 255 of the Criminal Procedure Code the period of the defendant's detention is calculated from the date when the case was transferred to court and until the judgment is pronounced and may not exceed six months."" 12. On 27 May 2008 the District Court convicted the applicant of aggravated robbery and sentenced to six years' imprisonment. On 10 July 2008 the conviction was upheld on appeal by the Novgorod Regional Court and the period of the applicant's pre-trial detention between 23 June 2007 and the day of conviction was fully counted towards execution of his sentence. 13. On 2 March 2011 the applicant was released before serving his full sentence on probation. 14. The applicant lodged a civil action against the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation seeking non-pecuniary damages for his allegedly unlawful detention without a court order between 24 and 25 December 2007. 15. On 24 April 2008 the Novgorodskiy Town Court of Novgorod Region found that between midnight 24 December 2007 and 11.00 a.m. on 25 December 2007 the applicant's detention was unlawful and violated his rights under Article 22 of the Russian Constitution and Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. The applicant was awarded non-pecuniary damages of 2000 Russian roubles (50 euros). During the hearings the representative of the Ministry of Finance acknowledged that the applicant's detention during the abovementioned period was not secured by a court order. The representative of the Ministry of the Interior (intervening in the proceedings) admitted that the authorisation for the detention expired on 24 December 2007. The representative of the regional Prosecutor's Office (also intervening in the proceedings) maintained that the applicant's detention was lawful, but stated that any detention without a court order would be unlawful. 16. On 11 June 2008 the Novgorod Regional Court annulled the lower court's judgment on appeal and adopted a new judgment dismissing the applicant's claims. The Regional Court argued that while the order of 2 November 2007 set the period of detention ""until and including 24 December 2007"", the decision of 11 December 2007 to schedule a preliminary hearing to 25 December 2007 essentially ordered the detention until that date, because it left it ""unchanged"" (see paragraph 6 above).",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 223,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","5. The applicant was born in 1979 and is detained in Diyarbakır. 6. On 23 December 2001 the applicant was arrested and taken into police custody on suspicion of being a member of Hizbullah, an illegal organisation. During his detention in police custody, the applicant was allegedly subjected to ill-treatment by police officers. In particular, electric shocks were administered to his testicles. 7. On 25 December 2001 the applicant was interrogated by the police in the absence of a lawyer. During his interrogation, he confessed in detail to his involvement in the activities of the illegal organisation and gave detailed information about the organisation and its members. 8. On 26 December 2001 the applicant gave a statement to the public prosecutor in the absence of a lawyer in which he denied the statements he had given to the police. 9. On the same day the applicant was brought before the investigating judge at the Diyarbakır State Security Court, who questioned him in the absence of a lawyer. The applicant again denied his statements to the police. During his questioning, the applicant alleged to the investigating judge that he had been subjected to ill-treatment while in police custody and that his statements had been taken under duress. However, a medical report issued by Bağlar Health Clinic dated the same day stated that there was no sign that he had been subjected to violence. At the end of the hearing, the court ordered that the applicant be placed in pre-trial detention. 10. On 9 January 2002 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment, charging the applicant under Article 146 of the former Turkish Criminal Code with attempting to undermine the constitutional order of the State. 11. On 19 March 2002 the Diyarbakır State Security Court held the first hearing on the merits of the case. During the hearing, the applicant repeated his allegations of having been subjected to ill-treatment in police custody and denied his statements to the police. 12. On 27 January 2004 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Diyarbakır public prosecutor's office against the police officers who had allegedly ill-treated him. He stated that electric shocks had been administered to his body through his testicles and that his testicles had been squeezed, which had caused serious harm. He attached a medical report dated 20 September 2002 from Fırat University on the state of his testicles. The report stated that the applicant had a dilation of the veins in his left testicle of up to 2.6 mm, which had resulted in a varicocele. 13. State Security Courts were abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004. The case against the applicant was transferred to the Diyarbakır Assize Court. 14. On 25 June 2004 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor issued a decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings against the police officers on account of a lack of evidence. 15. During the criminal proceedings against the applicant, the first-instance courts examined the applicant's continued detention at the end of the hearings, either on their own motion or at the applicant's request. The courts ordered that he be kept in detention owing to the nature of the offence, the state of the evidence and the contents of the file. 16. On 12 June 2008 the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The sentence, however, was reduced to twenty years of imprisonment as the applicant was a minor at the time of the offence. 17. On 18 January 2010 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision for procedural reasons. 18. On 2 April 2010 the applicant asked the Diyarbakır Assize Court for his release pending trial. On 9 April 2010 the court dismissed his application for release on the grounds of the nature of the offence. 19. On 30 September 2010 the Diyarbakır Assize Court issued a decision of lack of jurisdiction (görevsizlik kararı), pursuant to section 8 of Law no. 6008, which provided that juveniles could not be tried before assize courts, which had special jurisdiction to try a number of aggravated crimes enumerated under Article 250 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at the material time. The case was thus referred to the Diyarbakır Juvenile Court. 20. On 2 November 2010 the applicant was released pending trial. 21. On 5 June 2012 the Diyarbakır Juvenile Court found that, inter alia, on the basis of the applicant's statements to the police, the applicant had committed the offence under Article 146 of the former Turkish Criminal Code and sentenced him to sixteen years and eight months' imprisonment. 22. On 17 June 2014 the Court of Cassation upheld the Diyarbakır Juvenile Court's judgment.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"For the first detention, while it depends on the definition of ""prompt,"" it appears that after being held on reasonable suspicion, the applicant was not brought promptly to trial, as it took more than 3 months.", 224,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Warsaw. 5. On 29 November 2012 the Warsaw-Wola District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) ordered the applicant's detention on remand on suspicion of drug dealing, as well as facilitating and benefiting from prostitution, committed in an organised criminal group. The domestic court relied on a strong likelihood that the applicant had committed the offences in question, on the fact that he faced a severe penalty and that he was suspected of acting with accomplices. The likelihood that the applicant had committed the offences in question was established, in particular, on the basis of the testimony of a key prosecution witness (the so-called ""crown witness""). 6. On 8 January 2013 the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) dismissed the applicant's appeal against this decision. It stressed that the sole fact that the applicant faced a severe penalty and had been suspected of committing offences in an organised criminal group justified a suspicion that, if released, the applicant would try to obstruct the proceedings by influencing witnesses or his accomplices. 7. The applicant's detention on remand was extended by the Warsaw Regional Court on 21 February, 27 May and 8 August 2013. In these decisions, the court repeated the reasons originally relied on. In its decision of 21 February 2013, the Warsaw Regional Court further noted that the case against the applicant was complex, and indicated a number of steps that still had to be taken in order to terminate the investigation. The court noted that not all of those steps required the applicant's detention and urged the prosecutor to accelerate the proceedings. 8. The applicant appealed against all these decisions, without success. 9. On 21 November 2013 the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) ordered a further extension of the applicant's detention on remand. It relied on the same grounds as previously given for his detention. The applicant appealed. The decision was upheld on appeal on 12 December 2013. 10. The bill of indictment against the applicant was lodged with the Warsaw Regional Court on 30 December 2013. The applicant was charged with ten offences committed in an organised criminal group and – in the case of some of the offences – as a re-offender. The charges included facilitating prostitution by renting an apartment to prostitutes and collecting money from them, and a number of counts of drug possession and distribution. The bill of indictment concerned altogether seventeen accused, charged with 150 offences. Later, the number of accused in the proceedings dropped to fourteen. The prosecutor requested that the court hear over 90 witnesses, including five ""crown witnesses"". 11. Subsequently, the applicant's detention pending trial was extended by the Warsaw Regional Court's decisions of 10 January and 7 May 2014 and by the Warsaw Court of Appeal's decisions of 30 December 2014, 28 April, 27 August and 26 November 2015, and of 25 February and 25 May 2016. The domestic courts continued to rely on the same grounds for detention as in their previous decisions. They also stressed the complexity of the case and the links between the co-accused within an organised criminal group which, according to the domestic courts, justified a suspicion that, if released, they would attempt to obstruct the proper course of the proceedings. 12. The appeals by the applicant against decisions extending his detention and all his applications for release were unsuccessful. 13. On 9 May 2016 the trial court ordered the applicant's release on bail for 80,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approximately 20,000 euros (EUR)). The applicant appealed against this decision, contesting the amount of bail as excessive. On 25 May 2016 the Warsaw Court of Appeal upheld the decision. It underlined that the amount of bail had to take into consideration not only the financial situation of the applicant, but also the gravity of the charges against him. The court also stated that it had taken into consideration the fact that the applicant had abused his procedural rights in order to obstruct and delay the proceedings. It indicated that the amount in question had to be such that the prospect of its loss would constitute a genuine deterrent against any illegal activities which, until that moment, had been prevented by the applicant's detention. 14. On 30 May 2016 the Warsaw Regional Court again ordered the applicant's release on bail of PLN 80,000. It also imposed a prohibition on leaving the country. The applicant paid the security required by the court and was released on 31 May 2016. 15. The case against the applicant and his co-accused appears to be pending before the Warsaw Regional Court (no. XII K 1/14). The material includes 188 volumes.",Ruled as violated by court,,"5. On 29 November 2012 the Warsaw-Wola District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) ordered the applicant's detention on remand on suspicion of drug dealing, as well as facilitating and benefiting from prostitution, committed in an organised criminal group. The domestic court relied on a strong likelihood that the applicant had committed the offences in question, on the fact that he faced a severe penalty and that he was suspected of acting with accomplices. The likelihood that the applicant had committed the offences in question was established, in particular, on the basis of the testimony of a key prosecution witness (the so-called ""crown witness""). 6. On 8 January 2013 the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) dismissed the applicant's appeal against this decision. It stressed that the sole fact that the applicant faced a severe penalty and had been suspected of committing offences in an organised criminal group justified a suspicion that, if released, the applicant would try to obstruct the proceedings by influencing witnesses or his accomplices. 7. The applicant's detention on remand was extended by the Warsaw Regional Court on 21 February, 27 May and 8 August 2013. In these decisions, the court repeated the reasons originally relied on. In its decision of 21 February 2013, the Warsaw Regional Court further noted that the case against the applicant was complex, and indicated a number of steps that still had to be taken in order to terminate the investigation. The court noted that not all of those steps required the applicant's detention and urged the prosecutor to accelerate the proceedings. 8. The applicant appealed against all these decisions, without success. 9. On 21 November 2013 the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) ordered a further extension of the applicant's detention on remand. It relied on the same grounds as previously given for his detention. The applicant appealed. The decision was upheld on appeal on 12 December 2013. 10. The bill of indictment against the applicant was lodged with the Warsaw Regional Court on 30 December 2013. The applicant was charged with ten offences committed in an organised criminal group and – in the case of some of the offences – as a re-offender. The charges included facilitating prostitution by renting an apartment to prostitutes and collecting money from them, and a number of counts of drug possession and distribution. The bill of indictment concerned altogether seventeen accused, charged with 150 offences. Later, the number of accused in the proceedings dropped to fourteen. The prosecutor requested that the court hear over 90 witnesses, including five ""crown witnesses"". 11. Subsequently, the applicant's detention pending trial was extended by the Warsaw Regional Court's decisions of 10 January and 7 May 2014 and by the Warsaw Court of Appeal's decisions of 30 December 2014, 28 April, 27 August and 26 November 2015, and of 25 February and 25 May 2016. The domestic courts continued to rely on the same grounds for detention as in their previous decisions. They also stressed the complexity of the case and the links between the co-accused within an organised criminal group which, according to the domestic courts, justified a suspicion that, if released, they would attempt to obstruct the proper course of the proceedings.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 225,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","6. The applicant was born in 1988 and is currently detained in Warsaw Służewiec Remand Centre. 7. On 26 November 2010 the applicant was arrested by the police. 8. On 27 November 2010 the Warsaw Wola District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) charged the applicant with possession of a significant amount of drugs and requested that the Warsaw Wola District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) detain him on remand. 9. On 28 November 2010 the court decided to detain the applicant on remand for a period of three months, in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had been in possession of a significant amount of drugs (III Kp 2159/10). The court applied this measure due to the high probability that the applicant had committed the offence with which he was charged, the severity of the maximum sentence provided by law for such offence (up to at least eight years' imprisonment) and the fact that the likelihood of such a penalty might induce the applicant to obstruct the proceedings, as well as the fear that the applicant might influence other persons to present a version of events favourable to him. 10. On 21 February 2011 the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) extended the applicant's pre-trial detention. The court noted that the applicant had also been charged with being a member of an organised, armed criminal gang and pointed out the actions that needed to be taken to conclude the investigation. 11. Between 18 March and 12 April 2011 the applicant partially served a prison sentence ordered in another set of criminal proceedings against him (III K 203/09). 12. On 23 May the Warsaw Regional Court extended the applicant's detention on remand. The court again relied on the severity of the anticipated sentence and possibly adverse consequences that the applicant's release could have for the ongoing investigation. 13. On 22 August 2011 the Warsaw Regional Court again extended the applicant's detention on remand. It listed the charges against the applicant, which included, apart from those mentioned above, battery, making a profit from prostitution of others and destroying property. The court expressly stated that it was not obliged to specify actions aiming to obstruct the investigation, because the sole gravity of charges allowed for the presumption that such actions might be undertaken. It also pointed out that, while at large, the applicant might hinder the investigation concerning other members of the same gang. 14. On 16 September 2011 a bill of indictment against the applicant and fourteen other persons was lodged with the Warsaw Regional Court (XVIII K 297/11). 15. The applicant's detention on remand was extended by the Warsaw Regional Court on 26 September 2011 until 30 March 2012. 16. Between 24 October 2011 and 24 October 2012 the applicant served the remaining part of the prison sentence ordered in case III K 203/09, and from 24 October 2012 to 23 October 2013 he served a prison sentence ordered in another set of criminal proceedings against him (III K 1027/07). 17. In the meantime, the Warsaw Regional Court extended the applicant's detention on remand on 13 March, 4 July and 20 September 2012. The two latter decisions were upheld by the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) on 31 July and 4 October 2012 respectively. 18. The Warsaw Court of Appeal extended the applicant's detention on 4 October 2012, 15 January, 13 June and 28 October 2013, 13 March, 29 July and 30 December 2014, 25 June and 22 October 2015 and on 26 January 2016. The court relied on a high probability that the applicant and other accused had committed the offences with which they had been charged and on the complexity of the case. The court also considered that the persons accused might take actions aiming at obstructing the proper course of the proceedings, because they had known other accused, and the charges against them included being members of an armed and organised criminal gang. The Court of Appeal also considered that there was a high likelihood of a severe sentence being imposed. The relevant decisions were often phrased in general terms and no particular instances of the applicant's conduct during the investigation or at the judicial stage was provided to substantiate the extension of detention on remand. 19. The applicant's appeals against those decisions were unsuccessful. His numerous requests for release, including on bail, were dismissed. 20. On 4 March 2016 the Warsaw Regional Court gave judgment. The applicant was convicted of multiple offences and sentenced to six years' imprisonment and to a fine of 8,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approximately 1,850 euros (EUR)). On the same date the applicant's detention on remand was lifted. 21. On 12 May 2017 the Warsaw Court of Appeal upheld that judgment in respect of the applicant.",Ruled as violated by court,,"18. The Warsaw Court of Appeal extended the applicant's detention on 4 October 2012, 15 January, 13 June and 28 October 2013, 13 March, 29 July and 30 December 2014, 25 June and 22 October 2015 and on 26 January 2016. The court relied on a high probability that the applicant and other accused had committed the offences with which they had been charged and on the complexity of the case. The court also considered that the persons accused might take actions aiming at obstructing the proper course of the proceedings, because they had known other accused, and the charges against them included being members of an armed and organised criminal gang. The Court of Appeal also considered that there was a high likelihood of a severe sentence being imposed. The relevant decisions were often phrased in general terms and no particular instances of the applicant's conduct during the investigation or at the judicial stage was provided to substantiate the extension of detention on remand.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""prompt,"" it appears that after being held on reasonable suspicion, the applicant was not brought promptly to trial, as it took more than 3 months.", 226,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","5. The first applicant (Mr Grigoryev) was born in 1984 and lives in Svetlogorsk. The second applicant (Ms Igamberdiyeva) was born in 1989 and lives in Kaliningrad. 6. On an unknown date the second applicant notified the Kaliningrad authorities of her intention to hold a group public event on 12 December 2010 in Pobeda Square. The authorities replied that preparations for the New Year celebrations were planned on that day; they did not suggest an alternative venue. The second applicant did not challenge the authority's reply before the domestic courts. Both applicants decided to stage solo demonstrations near the monument to ""Mother Russia"" instead; this did not require prior notification. 7. According to the applicants, on 12 December 2010 the first applicant staged a solo demonstration holding a banner saying ""Freedom for Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev! We plead for a lawful judgment"". After he had completed his demonstration and placed himself at a distance of some twenty metres, the second applicant held her own solo demonstration. She was wearing a T-shirt saying ""Freedom for Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev!"" She completed her demonstration in five minutes. Then the first applicant returned to the venue with his banner and remained there for about two minutes, until police officers took him to a police van. He was then taken to a police station and held there for over three hours. 8. According to the Government, at 4 p.m. on 12 December 2010 the applicants participated in a group public event in the form of a ""picket"" (пикетирование) using visual props, namely a banner and a T-shirt. At 4 p.m. the first applicant was taken to the Leninskiy district police station. Between 5.15 p.m. and 6.30 p.m. a duty officer drew up an administrative offence record in respect of the first applicant. He was accused of taking part in a group public event held without authorisation, an offence under Article 20.2 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter ""the CAO""). On 14 December 2012 the second applicant was called to the Leninskiy district police station, where she was accused of a similar offence, although it was classified under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO. 9. The cases against the applicants were submitted to a justice of the peace of court circuit no. 2 of the Leninskiy District of Kaliningrad. The court ordered the police to submit a video recording showing the events of 12 December 2010. By two judgments of 3 March 2011 the justice of the peace found that the applicants had held solo demonstrations and had not breached the Public Events Act (hereinafter ""the PEA""), including its prior notification requirement applicable to group events. The court relied, inter alia, on the video recording submitted by the police. The administrative cases against the applicants were discontinued for lack of the elements of the offences under Article 20.2 §§ 1 and 2 of the CAO. 10. The police lodged an appeal. On 16 May 2011 the Leninskiy District Court of Kaliningrad upheld the judgments. The appellate court also considered that it had not been confirmed that the applicants had in fact taken part in a group ""picket"". 11. The applicants sought compensation of 100,000 roubles (RUB)[1] each for unlawful deprivation of liberty and violation of their right to freedom of expression by way of solo demonstration. By a judgment of 15 July 2011 the Tsentralniy District Court of Kaliningrad found that taking the first applicant to the police station had been unlawful, and awarded him RUB 10,000 (equivalent to 250 euros (EUR) at the time) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. On 25 July 2011 the same court also granted the claims by the second applicant, having found that preventing her from staging a solo demonstration and consequently prosecuting her had been unlawful. The court also awarded the second applicant RUB 10,000 for non-pecuniary damage. 12. The first applicant appealed against the judgment of 15 July 2011, complaining, inter alia, about the amount of the compensation and the first‑instance court's failure to make specific findings in relation to the violation of his freedom of expression on account of the police intervention in his solo demonstration. On 7 September 2011 the Kaliningrad Regional Court upheld the judgment. Relying on Article 27.1 § 2 of the CAO and Article 1070 § 2 of the Civil Code, it ruled that it followed from the discontinuation of the CAO case that placing the first applicant under administrative escort and arrest had been unlawful under Russian law as well as ""unjustified"" (необоснованные). The appellate court also considered that the interference with freedom of expression had been acknowledged by the declaration that taking the first applicant to the police station had been unlawful. 13. The second applicant also appealed. On 21 September 2011 the Kaliningrad Regional Court upheld the judgment of 25 July 2011.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,It is arguable whether or not these detentions count as in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law., 227,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","5. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Dubno. 6. The applicant was the principal of a private school in the town of Dubno, in the Rivne Region. 7. On 30 March 2000 criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant for failure to comply with a court decision ordering the reinstatement of a teacher at the private school. 8. According to the applicant, at about 9.00 a.m. on 29 May 2000 officers from Dubno police broke down the front door of the applicant's house. Inside the house, an investigator from the Dubno inter-district prosecutor's office ordered the applicant to go to his office for questioning. When the applicant refused, the investigator asked the police officers to ensure her compulsory appearance for questioning. The police officers allegedly beat the applicant, twisted her arms behind her back and forced her out of the house barefoot. They placed her in a police car and took her to the office of the investigator. At about 1 p.m. on 29 May 2000 the applicant was released. 9. On the next day, 30 May 2000, the applicant was examined by a doctor, who noted that there were injuries on her shoulders. 10. On 9 April 2001 the Dubno inter-district prosecutor's office discontinued the investigation into the applicant's criminal case, having regard to the insignificance of her offence. 11. On 2 August 2001 the Dubno Town Court quashed the decision of 9 April 2001 as unfounded and ordered that there be further investigation. 12. On 14 August 2001 the investigation was completed and the case file was referred to the Dubno Town Court for trial. 13. On 30 January 2004 and 13 March 2006 the Dubno Town Court issued judgments in the applicant's case, which were quashed as unfounded by the Rivne Regional Court of Appeal. 14. On 30 January 2007 the Dubno Town Court convicted the applicant of failure to comply with a court decision, and decided that it was appropriate to punish her with a fine. However, ultimately it released the applicant from the punishment, as the statute of limitation had expired. 15. On 17 April 2007 the Rivne Regional Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the judgment of 30 January 2007. 16. On 13 November 2007 the Supreme Court refused to examine an appeal by the applicant on points of law, on the grounds that she had failed to comply with procedural rules when submitting it. 17. On 2 June 2000 the applicant complained to the Rivne regional prosecutor's office regarding the events of 29 May 2000 (see paragraph 8 above). She was examined by a medical expert, who found that she had sustained five bruises to her shoulders and had injured her left shoulder ligaments. The expert stated that the injuries had been caused by blunt solid objects; they could have been sustained in the circumstances described by the applicant. 18. On 30 June 2000 the Rivne regional prosecutor's office, having conducted a pre-investigation inquiry, refused to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers because of the absence of the constituent elements of a criminal offence. 19. On 20 March 2001, following a complaint by the applicant, the Prosecutor General's Office reversed the decision of 30 June 2000 as unsubstantiated, and ordered an additional inquiry. The applicant was not informed of the decision taken within the additional inquiry. In 2016 the Office of the Government Agent was informed that the file on those inquiries had been destroyed, along with other files relating to the same period, after the expiry of the statutory period for keeping such records. 20. On 29 May 2003 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Dubno Town Court, seeking damages for the violation of the inviolability of her home and her unlawful arrest and ill-treatment on 29 May 2000. 21. On 9 July 2007 the Dubno Town Court found that on 29 May 2000 the applicant had been ill-treated and unlawfully taken from her home to the investigator's office. The court found that the authorities had acted unlawfully and that they had violated her right to the inviolability of her home, right to liberty and right to respect for human dignity. The court awarded the applicant 500 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH – approximately 73 euros (EUR) at the relevant time) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 22. On 26 May 2008 the Lviv Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 9 July 2007. 23. The applicant appealed on points of law, contesting the amount of the award. 24. On 8 May 2009 the Higher Administrative Court found that the appeal had not been prepared in a proper way. That court set a time-limit within which the applicant could rectify shortcomings in her appeal on points of law. 25. On 13 July 2009 the Higher Administrative Court returned the applicant's appeal without examining it on the merits, after finding that she had failed to comply with the procedural requirements for submitting appeals.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. On 30 March 2000 criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant for failure to comply with a court decision ordering the reinstatement of a teacher at the private school. 16. On 13 November 2007 the Supreme Court refused to examine an appeal by the applicant on points of law, on the grounds that she had failed to comply with procedural rules when submitting it. 18. On 30 June 2000 the Rivne regional prosecutor's office, having conducted a pre-investigation inquiry, refused to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers because of the absence of the constituent elements of a criminal offence. 19. On 20 March 2001, following a complaint by the applicant, the Prosecutor General's Office reversed the decision of 30 June 2000 as unsubstantiated, and ordered an additional inquiry. The applicant was not informed of the decision taken within the additional inquiry. In 2016 the Office of the Government Agent was informed that the file on those inquiries had been destroyed, along with other files relating to the same period, after the expiry of the statutory period for keeping such records. 20. On 29 May 2003 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Dubno Town Court, seeking damages for the violation of the inviolability of her home and her unlawful arrest and ill-treatment on 29 May 2000. 21. On 9 July 2007 the Dubno Town Court found that on 29 May 2000 the applicant had been ill-treated and unlawfully taken from her home to the investigator's office. The court found that the authorities had acted unlawfully and that they had violated her right to the inviolability of her home, right to liberty and right to respect for human dignity. The court awarded the applicant 500 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH – approximately 73 euros (EUR) at the relevant time) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 22. On 26 May 2008 the Lviv Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 9 July 2007. 23. The applicant appealed on points of law, contesting the amount of the award. 24. On 8 May 2009 the Higher Administrative Court found that the appeal had not been prepared in a proper way. That court set a time-limit within which the applicant could rectify shortcomings in her appeal on points of law. 25. On 13 July 2009 the Higher Administrative Court returned the applicant's appeal without examining it on the merits, after finding that she had failed to comply with the procedural requirements for submitting appeals.",TRUE,2,"The applicant was a victim of unlawful detention and received compensation, although she claims not enough. It is unclear from the statute text whether compensation amount is within the purview of the statute.", 228,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Chișinău. 5. At the time of the events giving rise to the present application, the applicant worked as a cashier in the main office of a bank. Her duty was to count cash money brought in bags from the bank's branches. 6. On 18 September 2015 the applicant came to work at around 7.40 a.m. and started counting money in bags of cash. After having counted the money from four bags she went to the toilet and, upon her return, she heard one of her colleagues saying that one of the uncounted bags lacked its seal. She did not pay much attention to that, since that was not the first time when a seal was missing. The colleague who found the bag without a seal was instructed by her superior to count the money in the bag. It appeared that forty-seven thousand euros (EUR) was missing from that bag. 7. Another superior was called in and a search of the premises was carried out. The branch from which the bag of money came was contacted; however, its employees stressed that the bag had been sealed upon its dispatch. Later, the applicant went again to the toilet and then left for lunch. 8. On 2 October 2015 a search was carried out at the applicant's home but nothing of interest for the investigation was found. 9. On the same day, the applicant was arrested and placed in detention. 10. On 5 October 2015 the applicant was charged with the offence of theft in the amount of EUR 47,000. It was alleged that, together with other employees of the bank, she had stolen the aforementioned amount of money from the bag in question. The indictment order did not point to any evidence capable of proving the applicant's involvement in the offence. It appears that one of the applicant's colleagues was also accused of the same offence. 11. On the same date, namely on 5 October 2015, the prosecutor in charge of the case applied to the Buiucani District Court for the applicant's remand in custody for a period of thirty days. The prosecutor alleged that there was a risk that the applicant could tamper with evidence, influence witnesses and reoffend, which therefore warrant her detention on remand. 12. On 5 October 2015 the Buiucani District Court found that the prosecutor in charge of the case did not specify in his application the reasons giving rise to the suspicion that the applicant might have committed an offence. Nevertheless, the court noted that during the hearing the prosecutor had indicated that the other co-accused had stated that the money could have been stolen by the applicant because she had taken bags from the stack of bags in which the unsealed bag had been found and she had had a suspicious behaviour. Moreover, the security camera in the room was turned away from the place where the applicant was sit. The court concluded that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed an offence. The court noted that some thirteen days had elapsed since the day of the theft. The applicant had a permanent abode, a job, family and no criminal record. There were no reasons to believe that she would hinder the investigation in circumstances in which her involvement in the offence was unclear. The court considered that the risk of reoffending had also not been proven by the prosecutor which would warrant placing the applicant in detention. Therefore, the court ordered the applicant's house arrest for a period of twenty days. 13. The applicant appealed against the above decision and argued that the measure of house arrest was unnecessary because even the court of first instance had found that the reasons adduced by the prosecutor had not been convincing. The prosecutor also appealed. 14. On 15 October 2015 the Chișinău Court of Appeal upheld the appeal lodged by the prosecutor. It quashed the decision of 5 October 2018 and ordered the applicant's remand in custody for a period of thirty days. The court considered that there was a risk of absconding, interference with the investigation and collusion with the other co-accused persons. The court observed that unjustified manifestations of clemency would encourage anti‑social behaviour of the sort and would affect the peoples' trust in the law enforcement organs and that the measure of pre-trial detention was called to punish and discourage anti-social behaviour. As to the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence imputed to her, the court noted that the applicant had not contested its presence. 15. The next day the applicant was arrested and placed in detention. 16. On 26 October 2015 the Chișinău Court of Appeal examined the appeal lodged by the applicant, upheld it and ordered her release under judicial control. The court found that there were no reasons to believe that the applicant would abscond, hinder the investigation or reoffend. 17. It appears that the criminal investigation into the circumstances of the alleged theft of 18 September 2015 is pending to date.",Ruled as violated by court,,"14. On 15 October 2015 the Chișinău Court of Appeal upheld the appeal lodged by the prosecutor. It quashed the decision of 5 October 2018 and ordered the applicant's remand in custody for a period of thirty days. The court considered that there was a risk of absconding, interference with the investigation and collusion with the other co-accused persons. The court observed that unjustified manifestations of clemency would encourage anti‑social behaviour of the sort and would affect the peoples' trust in the law enforcement organs and that the measure of pre-trial detention was called to punish and discourage anti-social behaviour. As to the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence imputed to her, the court noted that the applicant had not contested its presence.",FALSE,0,The applicants was detained unlawfully; the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was decided speedily. , 229,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","5. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Split. 6. On 19 May 2011 the applicant and several other individuals (see, for further information, Šoš v. Croatia, no. 26211/13, § 17, 1 December 2015) were arrested on suspicion of drug trafficking and detained under Article 123 § 1(2), (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of collusion, risk of reoffending, and seriousness of charges). 7. During the investigation, an investigating judge of the Split County Court (Županijski sud u Splitu) several times extended the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other suspects under Article 123 § 1(2), (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of collusion, risk of reoffending, and seriousness of charges). The reasoning of the relevant decisions is outlined in the case of Šoš (cited above, §§ 20 and 23). 8. On 18 August 2011 the investigating judge extended the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other suspects under Article 123 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending and seriousness of charges). He found that all the relevant witnesses had been questioned and that there was no further possibility of remanding the suspects in detention on the grounds of the risk of collusion. As to the other grounds relied upon for the pre-trial detention, the investigating judge reiterated his previous findings. 9. The investigating judge relied on the same reasons extending the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other suspects in the further course of the investigation. The reasoning of the relevant decisions is outlined in the Šoš case (cited above, §§ 28, 31, 36 and 41). 10. On 16 May 2012 the applicant and nine other individuals were indicted on charges of drug trafficking in the Split County Court. 11. Following the submission of the indictment, on 18 May 2012 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other accused relying on Article 123 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending and seriousness of charges). His pre-trial detention was extended several times on the same grounds. The reasoning of the relevant decisions is outlined in the Šoš case (cited above, §§ 44, 47 and 52). 12. On 20 February 2013 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), acting as a court of appeal, found that the applicant's detention should be extended only under Article 123 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending). It explained that the 2013 amendments to the Criminal Code provided that the offence at issue was punishable by a prison sentence of between three and fifteen years and no longer by long-term imprisonment. It was therefore not possible to remand the applicant on the grounds of the seriousness of the charges since the possibility of imposing a sentence of long-term imprisonment was one of the conditions for extending pre-trial detention under Article 123 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (seriousness of charges). 13. On 20 April 2013 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other accused under Article 123 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending), without changing its previous reasoning. 14. On 17 May 2013 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the maximum two-year statutory time-limit for the applicant's pre-trial detention under Article 133 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for a further six months (until 19 November 2013) relying on section 35(2) of the Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime Act (hereinafter ""the OSCOCA""). 15. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that section 35(2) of the OSCOCA was inapplicable to his case since he was not detained during the investigation. 16. On 7 June 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal on the grounds that the said provision of the OSCOCA made a mistaken reference to Article 130 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It also considered that the cited provision was incomprehensible since, if understood as provided in that Act, it merely repeated paragraph 1 of section 35 of the OSCOCA, which would be obsolete. Instead it should be interpreted in line with the previous abrogated version of the OSCOCA, which in its section 28(3) had provided for a possibility of extension of the overall maximum period of detention for a further six months, which was in the applicant's case until 19 November 2013. 17. On 18 June 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) reiterating his previous arguments. 18. On 11 July 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's constitutional complaint as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the Supreme Court. 19. The applicant's pre-trial detention was extended, under Article 123 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending), until the maximum period expired on 19 November 2013, when he was released.",Ruled as violated by court,"6. On 19 May 2011 the applicant and several other individuals (see, for further information, Šoš v. Croatia, no. 26211/13, § 17, 1 December 2015) were arrested on suspicion of drug trafficking and detained under Article 123 § 1(2), (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of collusion, risk of reoffending, and seriousness of charges). 7. During the investigation, an investigating judge of the Split County Court (Županijski sud u Splitu) several times extended the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other suspects under Article 123 § 1(2), (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of collusion, risk of reoffending, and seriousness of charges). The reasoning of the relevant decisions is outlined in the case of Šoš (cited above, §§ 20 and 23). 8. On 18 August 2011 the investigating judge extended the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other suspects under Article 123 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending and seriousness of charges). He found that all the relevant witnesses had been questioned and that there was no further possibility of remanding the suspects in detention on the grounds of the risk of collusion. As to the other grounds relied upon for the pre-trial detention, the investigating judge reiterated his previous findings. 9. The investigating judge relied on the same reasons extending the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other suspects in the further course of the investigation. The reasoning of the relevant decisions is outlined in the Šoš case (cited above, §§ 28, 31, 36 and 41). 11. Following the submission of the indictment, on 18 May 2012 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other accused relying on Article 123 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending and seriousness of charges). His pre-trial detention was extended several times on the same grounds. The reasoning of the relevant decisions is outlined in the Šoš case (cited above, §§ 44, 47 and 52). 12. On 20 February 2013 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), acting as a court of appeal, found that the applicant's detention should be extended only under Article 123 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending). It explained that the 2013 amendments to the Criminal Code provided that the offence at issue was punishable by a prison sentence of between three and fifteen years and no longer by long-term imprisonment. It was therefore not possible to remand the applicant on the grounds of the seriousness of the charges since the possibility of imposing a sentence of long-term imprisonment was one of the conditions for extending pre-trial detention under Article 123 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (seriousness of charges). 13. On 20 April 2013 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other accused under Article 123 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending), without changing its previous reasoning. 14. On 17 May 2013 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the maximum two-year statutory time-limit for the applicant's pre-trial detention under Article 133 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for a further six months (until 19 November 2013) relying on section 35(2) of the Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime Act (hereinafter ""the OSCOCA""). 16. On 7 June 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal on the grounds that the said provision of the OSCOCA made a mistaken reference to Article 130 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It also considered that the cited provision was incomprehensible since, if understood as provided in that Act, it merely repeated paragraph 1 of section 35 of the OSCOCA, which would be obsolete. Instead it should be interpreted in line with the previous abrogated version of the OSCOCA, which in its section 28(3) had provided for a possibility of extension of the overall maximum period of detention for a further six months, which was in the applicant's case until 19 November 2013. 19. The applicant's pre-trial detention was extended, under Article 123 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending), until the maximum period expired on 19 November 2013, when he was released.","6. On 19 May 2011 the applicant and several other individuals (see, for further information, Šoš v. Croatia, no. 26211/13, § 17, 1 December 2015) were arrested on suspicion of drug trafficking and detained under Article 123 § 1(2), (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of collusion, risk of reoffending, and seriousness of charges). 7. During the investigation, an investigating judge of the Split County Court (Županijski sud u Splitu) several times extended the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other suspects under Article 123 § 1(2), (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of collusion, risk of reoffending, and seriousness of charges). The reasoning of the relevant decisions is outlined in the case of Šoš (cited above, §§ 20 and 23). 8. On 18 August 2011 the investigating judge extended the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other suspects under Article 123 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending and seriousness of charges). He found that all the relevant witnesses had been questioned and that there was no further possibility of remanding the suspects in detention on the grounds of the risk of collusion. As to the other grounds relied upon for the pre-trial detention, the investigating judge reiterated his previous findings. 9. The investigating judge relied on the same reasons extending the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other suspects in the further course of the investigation. The reasoning of the relevant decisions is outlined in the Šoš case (cited above, §§ 28, 31, 36 and 41). 10. On 16 May 2012 the applicant and nine other individuals were indicted on charges of drug trafficking in the Split County Court. 11. Following the submission of the indictment, on 18 May 2012 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other accused relying on Article 123 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending and seriousness of charges). His pre-trial detention was extended several times on the same grounds. The reasoning of the relevant decisions is outlined in the Šoš case (cited above, §§ 44, 47 and 52). 12. On 20 February 2013 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), acting as a court of appeal, found that the applicant's detention should be extended only under Article 123 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending). It explained that the 2013 amendments to the Criminal Code provided that the offence at issue was punishable by a prison sentence of between three and fifteen years and no longer by long-term imprisonment. It was therefore not possible to remand the applicant on the grounds of the seriousness of the charges since the possibility of imposing a sentence of long-term imprisonment was one of the conditions for extending pre-trial detention under Article 123 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (seriousness of charges). 13. On 20 April 2013 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the pre-trial detention in respect of the applicant and the other accused under Article 123 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending), without changing its previous reasoning.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""prompt,"" it appears that after being held on reasonable suspicion, the applicant was not brought promptly to trial, as it took more than 3 months.", 230,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Nalchik, the Ingushetiya Republic. He is a practising lawyer. 5. On 10 October 2006 the applicant was travelling by a collective taxi from Nalchik to Grozny in Chechnya. At about 1 p.m. a police officer stopped the vehicle at the Ingush-Chechen administrative border and proceeded to check the passengers' identity documents. He discovered that the applicant's signature in his passport had been made in red ink and told him that he would be charged with an administrative offence under Article 19.15 of the Code of Administrative Offences for using an invalid identity document. The applicant raised his objections, claiming that the wrong kind of ink did not render his passport invalid. 6. The police first took the applicant by car to the Goragorsk police station (ТОМ пос. Горагорск) where an inspector told him that he was ""temporarily detained for the purpose of drawing up a report"". Once the report had been completed at 3.15 p.m., another police officer took the applicant, again by police car, from Goragorsk the Nadterechnyi district police station (ОДЧ Надтереченского района). An operative established his identity, verified his documents and let him go at 5.10 p.m. The station chief later stated that the applicant had ""thanked him for a prompt release"". 7. The applicant asked the supervising prosecutor to investigate whether the police had abused their powers by detaining him. The Nadterechnyi district prosecutor's office issued several decisions refusing institution of criminal proceedings. One of them was set aside by the Nadterechnyi District Court on 13 July 2007 for the following reasons: ""The issue whether the administrative detention of Mr Timishev was necessary has not been clarified. Pursuant to Article 27.3(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences, administrative detention may be applied in exceptional circumstances if this is necessary for the prompt and proper examination of the alleged administrative offence. The decision ... refusing institution of criminal proceedings indicates that a report on the administrative offence ... was compiled and forwarded to [Mr Timishev's] place of residence. In these circumstances, the court sees no grounds for the administrative detention of Mr Timishev."" 8. Subsequent decisions refusing institution of criminal proceedings stated alternatively that it was impossible to establish the time of the applicant's detention because it had not been recorded in any documents, that the applicant had been detained for disobeying police orders, that he had been actually free to go after 3.15 p.m. but had asked to be taken to the Nadterechnyi office to file a complaint there and the police had ensured his safe passage. Each time the prosecutor concluded that the police had not committed any prosecutable offence. 9. On 27 January 2009 the Nadterechnyi District Court identified a number of serious shortcomings in the investigation. The court pointed out that it had not been established why the report on the administrative office could not have been drafted at the checkpoint and why it was considered necessary to escort the applicant to Goragorsk. It remained unclear what had happened to the report: the investigator had not obtained the forwarding letter or any information about the outcome of the proceedings. The investigator had not inquired why an escorting report required under Article 27.2(3) of the Code or the detention report required under Article 27.4 of the Code had not been prepared. Nor had he determined what ""exceptional circumstances"" within the meaning of Article 27.3(1) had called for the applicant's detention and at what time the applicant had actually left the Nadterechnyi police station. 10. The court was not convinced that the applicant had asked the police to take him to the Nadterechnyi office to file a complaint. It considered implausible that the police had provided a car and an escort to help him complain about their conduct. Even assuming that he had indeed wished to make a complaint, the investigator did not establish what had happened to it or, alternatively, why he had not written it, or why he had gone there in person instead of sending it by post from Goragorsk. Statements by the police officers who stated that the applicant had been ""released"" were also indicative of the fact that he had been taken to the Nadterechnyi office against his will. 11. Finally, the court criticised the investigator's assumption that the applicant had committed an administrative offence. It noted that, according to the Guidance on Issuing Passports (order no. 605 of 15 September 1997), the head of the passports department should have asked the passport holder to sign the passport with special ink. Responsibility for the wrong kind of ink should lie with the official who departed from the Guidance rather than with the applicant. 12. On 9 April 2009 the investigator issued a further decision refusing institution of criminal proceedings. It was similar in its wording to the previous ones and did not touch upon the areas of concern identified in the District Court's judgment.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. The police first took the applicant by car to the Goragorsk police station (ТОМ пос. Горагорск) where an inspector told him that he was ""temporarily detained for the purpose of drawing up a report"". Once the report had been completed at 3.15 p.m., another police officer took the applicant, again by police car, from Goragorsk the Nadterechnyi district police station (ОДЧ Надтереченского района). An operative established his identity, verified his documents and let him go at 5.10 p.m. The station chief later stated that the applicant had ""thanked him for a prompt release"". 7. The applicant asked the supervising prosecutor to investigate whether the police had abused their powers by detaining him. The Nadterechnyi district prosecutor's office issued several decisions refusing institution of criminal proceedings. One of them was set aside by the Nadterechnyi District Court on 13 July 2007 for the following reasons: ""The issue whether the administrative detention of Mr Timishev was necessary has not been clarified. Pursuant to Article 27.3(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences, administrative detention may be applied in exceptional circumstances if this is necessary for the prompt and proper examination of the alleged administrative offence. The decision ... refusing institution of criminal proceedings indicates that a report on the administrative offence ... was compiled and forwarded to [Mr Timishev's] place of residence. In these circumstances, the court sees no grounds for the administrative detention of Mr Timishev."" 9. On 27 January 2009 the Nadterechnyi District Court identified a number of serious shortcomings in the investigation. The court pointed out that it had not been established why the report on the administrative office could not have been drafted at the checkpoint and why it was considered necessary to escort the applicant to Goragorsk. It remained unclear what had happened to the report: the investigator had not obtained the forwarding letter or any information about the outcome of the proceedings. The investigator had not inquired why an escorting report required under Article 27.2(3) of the Code or the detention report required under Article 27.4 of the Code had not been prepared. Nor had he determined what ""exceptional circumstances"" within the meaning of Article 27.3(1) had called for the applicant's detention and at what time the applicant had actually left the Nadterechnyi police station. 10. The court was not convinced that the applicant had asked the police to take him to the Nadterechnyi office to file a complaint. It considered implausible that the police had provided a car and an escort to help him complain about their conduct. Even assuming that he had indeed wished to make a complaint, the investigator did not establish what had happened to it or, alternatively, why he had not written it, or why he had gone there in person instead of sending it by post from Goragorsk. Statements by the police officers who stated that the applicant had been ""released"" were also indicative of the fact that he had been taken to the Nadterechnyi office against his will. 11. Finally, the court criticised the investigator's assumption that the applicant had committed an administrative offence. It noted that, according to the Guidance on Issuing Passports (order no. 605 of 15 September 1997), the head of the passports department should have asked the passport holder to sign the passport with special ink. Responsibility for the wrong kind of ink should lie with the official who departed from the Guidance rather than with the applicant.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""prompt,"" it appears that after being held on reasonable suspicion, the applicant was not brought promptly to trial, as it took more than 3 months.", 231,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1961 and lived until his arrest in the town of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, the Sakhalin Region. 5. On 3 April 2003 the applicant was apprehended in a flat with unregistered firearms in his possession. Four tied persons with traces of beatings, including Mr P., were discovered in a cloakroom of the flat. An investigator of the Sakhalin Regional police department drew up an arrest record. 6. On the following day the applicant's detention on remand was authorised. A week later the applicant was charged with a number of crimes, including organisation and leadership of an armed gang, several counts of aggravated kidnapping, extortion, robbery and fraud, as well as illegal possession of firearms. 7. The applicant's detention was further extended by the Yuzhno‑Sakhalinsk Town Court and the Sakhalin Regional Court on thirteen occasions up until his conviction. When extending the applicant's detention, the domestic courts referred to the particular gravity and quantity of the charges against him; complexity of the criminal investigation and difficulties of jury trial; the applicant's liability to abscond, re-offend and interfere with the course of justice, given his personality and criminal record; significant volume of evidence presented by the defence during the trial. The courts also kept track of the course of the investigation and assessed investigative and operative measures planned by the prosecution, including arrests of the applicant's accomplices (which were still at liberty or had absconded in breach of the measure of restraint imposed on them and had been put on the wanted persons' list), complex expert examinations requiring participation of the applicant and the victims and examination of the case-file by the applicant and his accomplices. The applicant's requests for release on bail, as well as his appeal complaints against the detention orders, were to no avail. 8. On 21 April 2004 the applicant and his lawyers started studying the case file materials comprising nineteen volumes, 200-300 pages long each. On 7 September 2004 the Town Court set a time-limit for studying, affording the applicant additional twenty working days to complete it. On 29 December 2004 the case was referred to the Regional Court for trial. 9. On 6 April 2006 the Regional Court, by a jury verdict, found the applicant and six of his accomplices guilty as charged. On 12 May 2006 the Regional Court, relying on the jury verdict, sentenced the applicant to twenty-one years' imprisonment. 10. The applicant was found guilty, in particular, of an aggravated fraud, robbery, kidnapping and extortion in respect of Mr L., a businessman from the Moscow Region. The jury found that in May 2001 the applicant had approached Mr L. under the pretence of being a car salesman. The applicant had promised Mr L. to sell him a car for approximately 600,000 Russian roubles (RUB). However, after Mr L. had transferred the money to an account indicated by the applicant, the latter had disappeared. In October 2002 the applicant contacted Mr L., told him that he had just returned from Japan with his car and invited him to come to Sakhalin for it. On his arrival at the airport of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk on 13 October 2002 Mr L. was met by Mr K., one of the applicant's accomplices, and taken to the applicant's country house where he was held until 6 November 2002, being subjected to beatings and extortion by the applicant and his gang. 11. Neither Mr K., nor Mr L. were heard in open court. Mr K. had been found dead in a remand prison cell before the trial commenced. As for Mr L., residing in the Moscow Region, the trial court attempted to secure his presence on several occasions by summoning him and ordering his escort to the court. In reply he informed the trial court about being unable to travel to Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk in view of his spinal disease and a medical contraindication to air travel. He submitted a number of documents in support, as well as a written notice in which he confirmed his pre-trial statements. Having regard to these circumstances, the trial court allowed the prosecution's request to read out Mr L. and Mr K.'s statements incriminating the applicant, despite the latter's objections. 12. The jury further established that in September and December 2002 and in March 2003 the applicant had organised an armed robbery and kidnapping of eight other victims, including Mr P. and had extorted a large sum of money in exchange for their freedom. Mr P. also was not heard in court as he was allegedly on vacation in Ukraine. Disregarding the applicant's objections, the Regional Court read out Mr P.'s pre-trial statements against the applicant. 13. The applicant's lawyer appealed against the judgment of the Regional Court, complaining, among other matters, about the decision to read out pre-trial statements by Mr L., Mr P. and Mr K. On 14 November 2007 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the judgment of the Regional Court, noting that it had correctly considered that reasons for the witnesses' absence had been extraordinary and that it had lawfully read out their pre-trial statements.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"7. The applicant's detention was further extended by the Yuzhno‑Sakhalinsk Town Court and the Sakhalin Regional Court on thirteen occasions up until his conviction. When extending the applicant's detention, the domestic courts referred to the particular gravity and quantity of the charges against him; complexity of the criminal investigation and difficulties of jury trial; the applicant's liability to abscond, re-offend and interfere with the course of justice, given his personality and criminal record; significant volume of evidence presented by the defence during the trial. The courts also kept track of the course of the investigation and assessed investigative and operative measures planned by the prosecution, including arrests of the applicant's accomplices (which were still at liberty or had absconded in breach of the measure of restraint imposed on them and had been put on the wanted persons' list), complex expert examinations requiring participation of the applicant and the victims and examination of the case-file by the applicant and his accomplices. The applicant's requests for release on bail, as well as his appeal complaints against the detention orders, were to no avail. 10. The applicant was found guilty, in particular, of an aggravated fraud, robbery, kidnapping and extortion in respect of Mr L., a businessman from the Moscow Region. The jury found that in May 2001 the applicant had approached Mr L. under the pretence of being a car salesman. The applicant had promised Mr L. to sell him a car for approximately 600,000 Russian roubles (RUB). However, after Mr L. had transferred the money to an account indicated by the applicant, the latter had disappeared. In October 2002 the applicant contacted Mr L., told him that he had just returned from Japan with his car and invited him to come to Sakhalin for it. On his arrival at the airport of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk on 13 October 2002 Mr L. was met by Mr K., one of the applicant's accomplices, and taken to the applicant's country house where he was held until 6 November 2002, being subjected to beatings and extortion by the applicant and his gang. 11. Neither Mr K., nor Mr L. were heard in open court. Mr K. had been found dead in a remand prison cell before the trial commenced. As for Mr L., residing in the Moscow Region, the trial court attempted to secure his presence on several occasions by summoning him and ordering his escort to the court. In reply he informed the trial court about being unable to travel to Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk in view of his spinal disease and a medical contraindication to air travel. He submitted a number of documents in support, as well as a written notice in which he confirmed his pre-trial statements. Having regard to these circumstances, the trial court allowed the prosecution's request to read out Mr L. and Mr K.'s statements incriminating the applicant, despite the latter's objections. 12. The jury further established that in September and December 2002 and in March 2003 the applicant had organised an armed robbery and kidnapping of eight other victims, including Mr P. and had extorted a large sum of money in exchange for their freedom. Mr P. also was not heard in court as he was allegedly on vacation in Ukraine. Disregarding the applicant's objections, the Regional Court read out Mr P.'s pre-trial statements against the applicant.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""prompt,"" it appears that after being held on reasonable suspicion, the applicant was not brought promptly to trial, as it took more than 3 months.", 232,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","4. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Gdynia. 5. On 2 January 2007 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having committed homicide together with other persons. 6. On 5 January 2007 the Gdynia District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) remanded him in custody. The court stressed the need to ensure the proper conduct of the proceedings, given that extensive evidence had still to be obtained in the case. It also referred to the fact that the proceedings in question concerned several alleged accomplices. The court further relied on the likelihood that a severe penalty would be imposed on the applicant. 7. On 12 February 2007 the applicant applied for the preventive measure to be lifted or varied. On 15 February the District Prosecutor refused the request, finding that the grounds for the imposition of this measure remained valid. 8. The applicant's detention was further extended by decisions of the Gdańsk Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) of 20 March, 19 June and 21 August 2007. The applicant appealed against all of those decisions. His appeals were dismissed by the Gdańsk Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) on 4 May, 1 August and 19 September 2007 respectively. The courts repeatedly relied in their decisions on the strong suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence in question, the likelihood of a severe prison sentence being imposed on him and the need to secure the proper conduct of the investigation, especially the need to obtain further expert evidence. 9. On 17 September 2007 the applicant again applied for release. His application was refused on 21 September 2007 by the Gdynia District Prosecutor. 10. On 27 November 2007 the Gdańsk Regional Court further extended the applicant's detention until 31 March 2008. The applicant appealed, unsuccessfully. 11. On an unspecified date in late 2007 a bill of indictment was lodged with the Gdańsk Regional Court. The applicant was charged with homicide committed together with two other co-accused. 12. The applicant's detention was continually extended during the course of the trial. 13. On 4 August 2008 the applicant requested the court to release him on health grounds. On 19 August 2008 the trial court refused his request. It relied on the medical certificate issued by a prison doctor, stating that the applicant could be adequately treated in detention. 14. On 25 September 2008 the Gdańsk Regional Court gave judgment (case no. IV 457/07). The applicant was convicted as charged and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. He lodged an appeal. 15. On 13 May 2009 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal quashed the impugned judgment and remitted the case for retrial (case no. II AKa 45/09). 16. The applicant's detention was continually extended by the domestic courts, pending his appeal and in the course of the retrial. In particular, on 24 August 2009 the Gdańsk Regional Court extended his detention until 31 December 2009. The applicant appealed against this decision. On 23 September 2009 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal upheld the impugned decision, finding that the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence in question persisted, despite the fact that the judgment convicting the applicant had been quashed. The Court of Appeal further considered that the Regional Court had correctly relied on the severity of the anticipated penalty as the principal ground for the applicant's continuing detention and on the risk of the obstruction of the proceedings. 17. On 16 March 2010 the Gdańsk Regional Court gave judgment (case no. XIV K 48/09). The applicant was again convicted as charged and sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment. The applicant lodged an appeal. 18. On 10 November 2010 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal quashed the judgment and remitted the case for retrial (case no. II AKa 277/10). 19. On 23 March 2012 the Gdańsk Regional Court further extended the applicant's detention, reiterating the grounds given in its initial decisions. The applicant appealed unsuccessfully. 20. During the retrial proceedings the Gdańsk Regional Court held fifteen hearings in total. 21. On 12 July 2012 the court gave judgment (case no. XIV K 210/10). The applicant was again convicted and sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment. He lodged an appeal against that judgment. 22. On 26 October 2012 the Gdańsk Regional Court extended the applicant's detention until 30 December 2012. On 13 November 2012 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal upheld the impugned decision. It considered that the applicant's involvement in the offences with which he had been charged had been supported by the non-final judgment of 12 July 2012, in which he had been convicted and had received a severe sentence. The court also held that further detention on remand was the only preventive measure capable of securing the proper course of the proceedings until the delivery of a final judgment. 23. On 6 June 2013 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal partly allowed the applicant's appeal (case no. II AKa 84/13). The appellate court upheld the conviction but reclassified the offence as involuntary manslaughter (nieumyślne spowodowanie śmierci). The applicant's sentence was reduced to four years' imprisonment. The applicant was released on the same day.",Ruled as violated by court,,"16. The applicant's detention was continually extended by the domestic courts, pending his appeal and in the course of the retrial. In particular, on 24 August 2009 the Gdańsk Regional Court extended his detention until 31 December 2009. The applicant appealed against this decision. On 23 September 2009 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal upheld the impugned decision, finding that the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence in question persisted, despite the fact that the judgment convicting the applicant had been quashed. The Court of Appeal further considered that the Regional Court had correctly relied on the severity of the anticipated penalty as the principal ground for the applicant's continuing detention and on the risk of the obstruction of the proceedings. 19. On 23 March 2012 the Gdańsk Regional Court further extended the applicant's detention, reiterating the grounds given in its initial decisions. The applicant appealed unsuccessfully. 22. On 26 October 2012 the Gdańsk Regional Court extended the applicant's detention until 30 December 2012. On 13 November 2012 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal upheld the impugned decision. It considered that the applicant's involvement in the offences with which he had been charged had been supported by the non-final judgment of 12 July 2012, in which he had been convicted and had received a severe sentence. The court also held that further detention on remand was the only preventive measure capable of securing the proper course of the proceedings until the delivery of a final judgment. 23. On 6 June 2013 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal partly allowed the applicant's appeal (case no. II AKa 84/13). The appellate court upheld the conviction but reclassified the offence as involuntary manslaughter (nieumyślne spowodowanie śmierci). The applicant's sentence was reduced to four years' imprisonment. The applicant was released on the same day.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""prompt,"" it appears that after being held on reasonable suspicion, the applicant was not brought promptly to trial, as it took more than 3 months.", 233,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","5. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Moscow. 6. The facts of the cases, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 24 November 2006 the applicant, the owner and CEO of a large dairy producer, was charged with large-scale fraud and money laundering and summoned for questioning. He did not show up for a few initial interviews and the investigator put his name on the list of fugitives from justice. 8. On 26 January 2007 the investigator, acting on the information that the applicant had fled abroad, asked the Ostankinskiy District Court in Moscow for a detention order. 9. The detention hearing was fixed for 1 February 2007. The applicant's lawyers had been notified of the date and time of the hearing on the previous day but did not show up and asked the investigator to postpone the examination of his application because they were busy in other proceedings. The District Court appointed legal-aid counsel to represent the absent applicant, proceeded with the hearing and issued the detention order, referring to the fact of the applicant's absconding to Ukraine and from there to Hungary, the gravity of the charges against him and the risk of interference with the investigation. On 9 February 2007 the applicant's lawyers appealed. 10. On 15 February 2007 the applicant was arrested in Moscow. 11. On 19 March 2007 the Moscow City Court heard an appeal against the detention order. The applicant and his lawyers were present at the hearing. Considering that the risks of flight and obstruction of the investigation were sufficiently established, the City Court upheld the detention order. 12. The applicant's detention was later extended on nine occasions. The applicant appealed against each of the detention orders, lodging statements of appeal within two to ten days of the hearing date. It took the appeal courts between twenty-six and sixty days to examine the complaints. 13. The most recent detention order of 25 July 2008 was quashed on appeal by the Supreme Court on 2 October 2008. The Supreme Court considered that there was no evidence substantiating the risk of absconding or interfering with justice. The investigation had been pending for over two years of which the applicant had spent more than a year and a half in custody. The Supreme Court concluded that that the proceedings had been unreasonably long and ordered the applicant's release on bail. 14. While in custody, the applicant asked the investigator to be allowed to receive visits from his mother, wife and children and also pastoral visits from two Orthodox priests, A. and S. 15. With the investigator's consent, the applicant's mother and daughters visited him on two occasions in April and May 2007. In August and September 2007 the investigator interviewed his wife and mother as potential witnesses but they refused to testify, invoking the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. The investigator refused the applicant's subsequent applications to see his family, stating that such visits could ""have a negative influence on the conduct of the investigation"". As to the Orthodox priests, on 29 March 2007 the investigator invoked the same ground to refuse a visit from S. On 30 August 2007 the investigator once again refused a pastoral visit, stating that the applicant should see the prison chaplain instead. 16. Counsel for the applicant applied for a judicial review of visiting restrictions. 17. On 24 October 2007 and 6 February 2008 the Tverskoy District Court pronounced the refusal of pastoral visits to be lawful and justified, holding that the investigator had full discretion to determine whether or not such visits ran counter to the interests of the investigation. On 18 June 2008 the City Court upheld the latter decision on appeal, holding that a restriction on religious rights was an inherent consequence of the pre-trial detention. 18. As regards family visits, on 30 October 2007 the Tverskoy District Court granted the applicant's complaint in part, finding as follows: (a) restrictions on visits from the applicant's wife and mother in the period after the investigator had interviewed them as witnesses in the criminal proceedings had been lawful and within the discretion of the investigator; (b) restrictions on visits from the wife and mother in the preceding period had not been justified but no relief could be afforded to the applicant because they had already been granted the status of witnesses and the investigator might wish to interview them again at some point in time; (c) restrictions on visits from the applicant's children were not justified and the investigator had an obligation to remedy a breach of the applicant's rights. 19. On 10 December 2007 the applicant's representative before the Court, Ms Kostromina, asked the director of the remand prison to allow her to see the applicant and provided credentials confirming her status. Her application was referred to the investigator. 20. On 24 January 2008 Ms Kostromina lodged a complaint with the Preobrazhenskiy District Court claiming that the prison director should have authorised her visit without any restrictions, on the basis of Article 34 of the Convention guaranteeing unhindered access of an applicant to his representative. 21. On 15 February 2008 the District Court dismissed the complaint, finding that Ms Kostromina was not the applicant's counsel in the domestic criminal proceedings and could not therefore visit him. On 6 May 2008 the Moscow City Court upheld that decision on appeal.",Ruled as violated by court,,"13. The most recent detention order of 25 July 2008 was quashed on appeal by the Supreme Court on 2 October 2008. The Supreme Court considered that there was no evidence substantiating the risk of absconding or interfering with justice. The investigation had been pending for over two years of which the applicant had spent more than a year and a half in custody. The Supreme Court concluded that that the proceedings had been unreasonably long and ordered the applicant's release on bail. 18. As regards family visits, on 30 October 2007 the Tverskoy District Court granted the applicant's complaint in part, finding as follows: (a) restrictions on visits from the applicant's wife and mother in the period after the investigator had interviewed them as witnesses in the criminal proceedings had been lawful and within the discretion of the investigator; (b) restrictions on visits from the wife and mother in the preceding period had not been justified but no relief could be afforded to the applicant because they had already been granted the status of witnesses and the investigator might wish to interview them again at some point in time; (c) restrictions on visits from the applicant's children were not justified and the investigator had an obligation to remedy a breach of the applicant's rights.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 234,"Article 5 Right to liberty and security 1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.","7. The applicants are Syrian nationals. Their initials, dates of birth, application numbers and the other details of their cases are set out in the Appendix. At the time of lodging their applications the applicants were detained at detention centres for foreign nationals run by the Federal Migration Service (hereinafter ""the FMS"") in different towns in Russia. 8. The facts of the cases, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows. 9. On various dates between 2012 and 2016 the applicants came to Russia on various visas and did not leave when the period of their stay had expired. They were apprehended by the police and/or officers of the FMS in various regions in Russia for breaching the applicable immigration regulations, and placed in detention centres for foreigners (see the Appendix for the applicants' dates of detention and details of the relevant proceedings). The domestic courts in the respective regions examined their cases and found the applicants guilty of breaching various immigration regulations. Some of the applicants lodged appeals, but they were rejected by the domestic courts, whereas other applicants eventually had their expulsion orders quashed by the appeal courts. One of the applicants did not appeal against his expulsion order (see the Appendix for the details of individual cases) 10. All the applicants sought to obtain refugee status and/or temporary asylum in Russia. Some of the applicants voluntarily withdrew their requests and others' requests were rejected, first by the FMS and then by the domestic courts which examined the appeals against the FMS's refusals. Only Y.A.'s request for temporary asylum was granted (see the Appendix for details). 11. According to the information provided by their lawyers, while the proceedings before the Court were ongoing, six of the applicants (M.S.A., R.K., H.R., B.Z., S.W. and A.A.) left Russia of their own volition on various dates to go to third countries, where they settled (see the Appendix for details). 12. Between 24 January 2014 and 10 June 2014 M.S.A. and R.K. were detained in a detention centre for foreign nationals run by the FMS in Krasnoye Selo, in the Leningrad Region. 13. According to their submissions, the centre was based in an eight-storey building with windows covered with grills; five of the storeys were designed to accommodate 176 people in total. Each storey comprised around ten to eleven cells. The centre was severely overcrowded during the whole period of the applicants' detention. In particular, according to a report of the Human Rights Ombudsman in Saint Petersburg, on 26 February 2014 the centre accommodated 400 foreign nationals. 14. Both applicants were detained in cell no. 511, located on the fifth storey, which measured around 9 square metres and was designed to accommodate six people. All places in the cell were occupied during the whole period of their detention. Thus, each detainee had no more than 1.5 square metres of personal space, despite the statutory requirement that each detainee in a detention centre for foreign nationals have at least 4.5 square metres of personal space. The cell was furnished with three bunk beds and two bedside tables. There was no dining table in the cell. 15. The food was of poor quality, with no fruit or vegetables, and included pork, which the applicants could not eat for religious reasons. No alternative food was offered instead of pork, so they were deprived of any meal when pork was served. There were no kitchen and dining facilities in the centre. Food was delivered to the centre in containers and served cold in the cells. Detainees were forced to eat on their beds because there were no tables in the cells. This shortage in food was exacerbated by arbitrary restrictions on the contents of food parcels delivered from outside. Detainees were not allowed to receive fermented milk products, home‑cooked food, fruit or vegetables. 16. Detainees had no free access to drinking water or devices to boil tap water. The cell where M.S.A. and R.K. were detained was only lit by one light bulb, and the detainees were not allowed to switch on the light after 10 p.m. 17. The applicants and other inmates could move around on that storey to get to sanitary facilities, but they were not allowed to leave the storey or enter other detainees' cells. At the two ends of the common corridor there were bathrooms, each equipped with three lavatories, two washbasins and two showers. The storey was under the control of a dozen ""chosen"" inmates who, with the tacit consent of the centre's administration, dictated their rules to others and created an atmosphere of fear, violence and extortion. One of the bathrooms was for their exclusive use. The other seventy to eighty inmates had to use the other bathroom. 18. Outdoor exercise was sporadic and lasted around 15-20 minutes. In winter, the applicants did not go outside, as they did not possess winter clothes. In the period April-May 2014 they were able to enjoy outdoor exercise only four times. Outdoor exercise took place in a closed yard measuring around 50 metres in length and 10 metres in width. There was gravel on the ground, and there were no benches, plants or sports equipment. 19. The facility did not offer any activities, and no library was available. 20. During the administrative hearing concerning his removal from Russia on 26 February 2016, H.R. was not represented by a lawyer. 21. According to the lawyer representing B.Z., H.D. and S.W., on 25 March 2015 he was not allowed to meet with them in the detention centre.",Ruled as violated by court,,"21. According to the lawyer representing B.Z., H.D. and S.W., on 25 March 2015 he was not allowed to meet with them in the detention centre.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""speedy,"" it appears that the lawfulness of the applicant's detention was not decided speedily, as it took more than 3 months.", 235,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Smederevo. 6. On 26 March 2007 the applicant lodged a claim with the Žabari Municipal Court against his employer, the Ministry of Interior, seeking payment of certain benefits. 7. On 23 April 2012 the Požarevac First Instance Court the Žabari Court Unit ruled in favour of the applicant. 8. On 4 October 2012 the Belgrade Appellate Court revised the First Instance Court's judgment and rejected the applicant's claim. The applicant received the said judgment on 5 November 2012. 9. On 12 November 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant's constitutional appeal.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 236,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1989 and lives in Manisa. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 7 July 2009 the applicant was dismissed from the Expert Gendarmerie School due to non-compliance with disciplinary rules. 8. On 28 July 2009 the applicant brought an action before the Supreme Military Administrative Court and requested the annulment of the decision to dismiss him. 9. On 6 January 2010 the Supreme Military Administrative Court rejected the applicant's case, taking into account the ""secret documents"" submitted by the Ministry of Defence. These documents were not disclosed to the applicant. 10. On 5 May 2010 the applicant's request for rectification was rejected by the same court.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""fair and public,"" secret documents appear to threaten this definition.", 237,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","3. The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table. 4. The applicants sued different State and municipal unitary companies (the debtor companies) in several unrelated sets of court proceedings. 5. On the dates set out in the appended table domestic courts by separate judgments made pecuniary awards in favour of the applicants to be paid by the debtor companies. In application no. 34145/11 the courts also ordered the debtor company to take certain action in favour of the applicant, as specified in the appended table. 6. The companies were incorporated as State or municipal unitary enterprises. They provided services specified in the appended table. 7. On various dates insolvency proceedings were opened in respect of some of the debtor companies. The companies were subsequently liquidated. The dates on which the insolvency proceedings started and ended are tabulated below.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,There is no relevance between fair trial and debt recovery., 238,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Sarajevo. 5. In 1999 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against his employer, the local police, seeking his reinstatement and damages. His claim was eventually rejected. 6. The first-instance judgment was rendered by the Sarajevo Municipal Court on 17 April 2006. 7. The second-instance judgment was rendered by the Sarajevo Cantonal Court on 27 March 2008. 8. The third-instance judgment was rendered by the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 26 January 2010. 9. On 19 April 2010 the applicant filed a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina complaining under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the outcome and length of his labour dispute. 10. On 10 April 2013 the Constitutional Court found a breach of the applicant's right to a trial within a reasonable time and rejected the remainder of the case. It did not award any damages.",Ruled as violated by court,,8. The third-instance judgment was rendered by the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 26 January 2010.,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears, according to the Constitutional Court, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time.", 239,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.",4. The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Čačak. 5. On 7 September 2005 the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Kotor seeking redress regarding various contractual issues. 6. On 4 December 2008 the Court of First Instance in Kotor ruled in favour of the applicant. 7. On 17 November 2009 the High Court (Viši sud) in Podgorica upheld this judgment on appeal. 8. On 20 May 2010 the Supreme Court quashed the previous judgments and ordered a re-trial. 9. On 12 August 2011 the Court of First Instance in Kotor ruled against the applicant. This judgment was upheld by the High Court in Podgorica and the Supreme Court on 6 April 2012 and 12 September 2012 respectively. 10. The Supreme Court's judgment was served on the applicant on 20 October 2012. 11. The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal on 28 November 2012. 12. On 30 June 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant's appeal. This decision was served on the applicant on 25 September 2015.,Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 240,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Kayseri. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. The applicant, who was a sergeant in the Army had a traffic accident in 2007 and was declared ""disabled"" (Adi malül""). 7. On unspecified date, the applicant requested the General Directorate of Pension Fund (the Fund) (""Emekli-Sandığı"") to modify his retirement statute as service-disabled (""vazife malülü""), but the fund rejected that request. 8. On 9 August 2007 the applicant brought an action before the Supreme Military Administrative Court seeking the annulment of the Fund's decision. 9. On 22 May 2008 the Supreme Military Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's request. 10. On 11 September 2008 the applicant's rectification request was rejected. 11. During the proceedings, namely on 12 May 2008 and 29 July 2008 the Public Prosecutor at the Supreme Military Administrative Court filed lengthy written opinions on the case. However these opinions were not communicated to the applicant.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""judgment pronounced publicly,"" written opinions not communicated to the applicant appear to threaten this definition.", 241,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Novi Sad. 5. On 1 June 2004 the applicant instituted civil proceedings seeking reimbursement for income she had lost because of a car accident. 6. On 25 February 2008 the Novi Sad Court of First Instance delivered a judgment partly in favour of the applicant and ordered the defendant to pay her a certain amount in that respect. 7. On 30 October 2008 the Novi Sad District Court partly quashed the judgment of 25 February 2008 and remitted the case, upholding the remainder of the judgment. 8. On 2 July 2010 the Novi Sad Court of First Instance rejected the applicant's claim in the remitted part. 9. On 30 January 2012 the Novi Sad Court of Appeal partly upheld the judgment of 2 July 2010 and partly reversed it granting certain applicant's claims. 10. On 5 February 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant's complaint about the length of those proceedings, taking into consideration that the civil courts had rendered four judgments at two instances and that the proceedings had been complex.",Ruled as violated by court,,"10. On 5 February 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant's complaint about the length of those proceedings, taking into consideration that the civil courts had rendered four judgments at two instances and that the proceedings had been complex.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 242,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The first applicant lives in Sarajevo. He is the grandfather of the second applicant. The second applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Sarajevo. 5. On 10 November 2005 the second applicant initiated administrative proceedings in order to obtain recognition of the veteran status of his late father. His request was rejected on 12 December 2005. The second applicant appealed on an unknown date in December 2005 or January 2006. 6. On 26 January 2006 the competent Ministry upheld the first-instance decision. 7. On 21 January 2008 the Sarajevo Cantonal Court quashed the decisions of 12 December 2005 and 26 January 2006, and remitted the case to the first-instance body. In the new proceedings, the second applicant's request was again rejected. The last decision was given by the Sarajevo Cantonal Court on 25 September 2012. It was served on the second applicant on 23 October 2012. 8. In the meantime, on 10 October 2012, the Constitutional Court found a breach of the second applicant's right to a trial within a reasonable time. It did not award any damages.",Ruled as violated by court,,"5. On 10 November 2005 the second applicant initiated administrative proceedings in order to obtain recognition of the veteran status of his late father. His request was rejected on 12 December 2005. The second applicant appealed on an unknown date in December 2005 or January 2006. 7. On 21 January 2008 the Sarajevo Cantonal Court quashed the decisions of 12 December 2005 and 26 January 2006, and remitted the case to the first-instance body. In the new proceedings, the second applicant's request was again rejected. The last decision was given by the Sarajevo Cantonal Court on 25 September 2012. It was served on the second applicant on 23 October 2012.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears, according to the Constitutional Court, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time.", 243,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicants were born in 1949 and 1950, respectively, and lived in Podgorica, where the second applicant still lives. 6. On 25 July 2000 the applicants' mother instituted civil proceedings against Podgorička banka Societe Generale Group ad Podgorica (hereinafter ""respondent"") seeking the payment of her savings, which she had deposited with the respondent's legal predecessor Titogradska osnovna banka Titograd. 7. On an unspecified date the applicants continued the above-mentioned proceedings in their mother's stead as she had passed away in the meantime. 8. On 25 July 2008 the First Instance Court in Podgorica ruled partly in favour of the applicants. 9. On 19 January 2010 the High Court in Podgorica reversed the first‑instance judgment by dismissing the applicants' claims in their entirety. This judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court on 19 October 2010. 10. On 5 December 2010 the Supreme Court's judgment was served on the applicants. 11. On 3 February 2011 the applicants lodged a constitutional appeal. 12. On 12 April 2012 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicants' appeal, which decision was served on the applicants on 29 May 2012.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. On 25 July 2000 the applicants' mother instituted civil proceedings against Podgorička banka Societe Generale Group ad Podgorica (hereinafter ""respondent"") seeking the payment of her savings, which she had deposited with the respondent's legal predecessor Titogradska osnovna banka Titograd. 10. On 5 December 2010 the Supreme Court's judgment was served on the applicants.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 244,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Belgrade. 5. On 9 May 2005 the applicant lodged a claim seeking ownership of 265 shares of the company Tri Grozda a.d. Beograd 6. On 14 September 2007 the Belgrade Court of First Instance delivered a judgment in favour of the applicant. 7. On 13 December 2011 the Belgrade Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of 14 September 2007, and rejected the applicant's claim. 8. On 3 April 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal, complaining of a violation of his right to a trial within a reasonable time and requesting compensation in that regard. 9. On 23 September 2014 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant's right to a trial within a reasonable time. It held that the finding of a violation had constituted sufficient just satisfaction in the particular circumstances of the present case for the following reasons. First, the nominal value of the impugned shares was only slightly higher than 200 euros. The case was thus of minor importance for the applicant. Secondly, it considered that the applicant had contributed to the length of the civil proceedings by failing to lodge a constitutional appeal earlier.",Ruled as violated by court,,"9. On 23 September 2014 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant's right to a trial within a reasonable time. It held that the finding of a violation had constituted sufficient just satisfaction in the particular circumstances of the present case for the following reasons. First, the nominal value of the impugned shares was only slightly higher than 200 euros. The case was thus of minor importance for the applicant. Secondly, it considered that the applicant had contributed to the length of the civil proceedings by failing to lodge a constitutional appeal earlier.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears, according to the Constitutional Court, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time.", 245,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The list of applicants is set out in the appended tables. 5. On the dates indicated in the appended tables the applicants obtained monetary court awards against the Municipal Unitary Enterprise Passenger Transport Company of Kotlas (MUP Kotlas Passazhirskoye avtotransportnoye predpriyatiye – муниципальное предприятие муниципального образования Котлас «Пассажирское автотранспортное предприятие»). 6. Some of the judgments in the applicants' favour have been partly enforced during the insolvency proceedings in respect of the company (see paragraphs 7-10 below), while others remained unenforced to date. 7. The company was incorporated as a municipal unitary enterprise. It was set up by the municipality of Kotlas. The company provided transport services in the town. It had ""the right of economic control"" (право хозяйственного ведения) over the assets allocated to it. 8. As submitted by the applicants, the prices for the transport services in the town of Kotlas were regulated by the Administration of Arkhangelsk region. 9. On 28 September 2007 insolvency proceedings started in respect of the company. 10. On 18 September 2012 the company was declared insolvent and subsequently liquidated.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,There is no relevance between fair trial and debt recovery., 246,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Podgorica. 5. Between 3 December 2002 and 15 September 2003 the daily newspaper Dan published several articles about a human trafficking case in Montenegro, in which the applicant's name was mentioned in various contexts. 6. On 22 October 2004 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the publisher of the said newspaper, seeking compensation for non‑pecuniary damage due to violation of his honour and reputation caused by the publishing of untrue information about him. 7. On 4 June 2010, following a remittal, the Podgorica First Instance Court ruled partly in favour of the applicant, ordering the publisher to pay the applicant 8,000 euros (EUR) in non-pecuniary damages and to publish the judgment in Dan, the daily newspaper in question. 8. On 22 October 2010 the Podgorica High Court amended this judgment by awarding the applicant EUR 4,000 as compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered, which judgment was served on the applicant on 29 November 2010. 9. The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal on 14 January 2011. 10. On 7 April 2011 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's appeal. This decision was served on the applicant on 19 May 2011.",Ruled as violated by court,,"8. On 22 October 2010 the Podgorica High Court amended this judgment by awarding the applicant EUR 4,000 as compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered, which judgment was served on the applicant on 29 November 2010.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 247,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Bor. 6. The proceedings began on 30 March 1992 when the applicant brought a lawsuit against third persons concerning the execution of a contract. 7. On 19 June 1997 the first-instance court accepted the applicant's claim. 8. On 30 October 1997 the appeal court quashed the decision on legal costs, remitted that issue to the first-instance court for a retrial and upheld the remainder of the first-instance judgment. 9. The first-instance court subsequently rendered three decisions on the costs of the proceedings on 23 July 1998, 19 February 1999 and 3 March 2000. All of these decisions were quashed on appeal. 10. On 5 February 2013 the first-instance court rendered a fourth decision on the issue of legal costs awarding the applicant approximately 2,000 euros (EUR). 11. According to the information on the file, the proceedings are currently pending before the second-instance court. 12. On 13 March 2013 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant's right to a hearing within a reasonable time and awarded him EUR 300 for the non-pecuniary damage suffered in this regard. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court ordered the applicant's proceedings to be expedited.",Ruled as violated by court,,"11. According to the information on the file, the proceedings are currently pending before the second-instance court. 12. On 13 March 2013 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant's right to a hearing within a reasonable time and awarded him EUR 300 for the non-pecuniary damage suffered in this regard. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court ordered the applicant's proceedings to be expedited.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears, according to the Constitutional Court, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time.", 248,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table. 6. On 25 September 2000 the Neamț County Court ordered a state‑owned company to pay the applicant due salary rights. 7. On 9 October 2001 the Roman District Court ordered a private person to reimburse a loan to the applicant. 8. On 14 November 2008 the Brașov County Court ordered the municipality of Brașov to leave a plot of land in the applicant's full property and possession. 9. On 3 April 2009 the applicant signed a report, drafted on the occasion of the compulsory enforcement of the above judgment, which attested to the restoration of his possession over the land in dispute by placement of metal bars on the free area and by tracing a line with white paint over the area occupied by roads and bridge pillars belonging to the municipality. 10. On 18 July 2008 the applicant contracted a loan of 250,000 euros (EUR) from a bank, with the plot of land used as guarantee. 11. On 22 August 2011 the bank sold the land at a public auction for EUR 325,000, since the applicant had failed to repay the loan within the set deadline. In accordance with domestic law, the remaining amount after the recovery of the debt must be returned to the debtor.",Ruled as violated by court,,"10. On 18 July 2008 the applicant contracted a loan of 250,000 euros (EUR) from a bank, with the plot of land used as guarantee. 11. On 22 August 2011 the bank sold the land at a public auction for EUR 325,000, since the applicant had failed to repay the loan within the set deadline. In accordance with domestic law, the remaining amount after the recovery of the debt must be returned to the debtor.",FALSE,0,There is no relevance between fair trial and debt recovery., 249,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Županja. 6. On 5 July 2011 the applicant was indicted before the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court (Općinski kazneni sud u Zagrebu) on charges of causing a road accident under Article 272 of the Criminal Code. 7. The applicant was tried in summary proceedings (skraćeni postupak). On 4 May 2012 the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court convicted the applicant as charged and gave him a suspended sentence of four months' imprisonment with two years' probation. 8. On 23 May 2012 the applicant appealed against his conviction and asked to be allowed to appear at the session of the appeal panel. 9. On 15 January 2013 the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu), without informing the applicant or his lawyer, examined the case without holding a hearing. It dismissed the appeal and upheld the applicant's conviction and sentence. 10. The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), complaining, inter alia, that he had not been allowed to appear at the session of the appeal panel. 11. On 18 September 2013 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant's constitutional complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. That decision was served on the applicant's representative on 4 October 2013.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""defending oneself,"" it appears that the applicant was denied this right, as he asked to appear at the appeal session but was denied.", 250,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Čurug. 5. On 2 August 2002 the applicant and one of his colleagues (hereinafter ""the plaintiffs"") instituted civil proceedings against their employer seeking payment of salary arrears and other employment-related benefits. 6. On 8 February 2013, after two remittals the First Instance Court in Novi Sad, specifically its Detached Section in Bečej, ruled partly in favour of the plaintiffs, ordering their employer to pay each of them specified sums in respect of salary arrears. The remainder of their claims was rejected. 7. On 15 April 2013 the Court of Appeal in Novi Sad reversed a part of the above judgment, while upholding the remainder. This judgment was served on the plaintiffs on 6 June 2013. 8. On 29 January 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal on points of law as the value of their respective claims was below the statutory threshold allowing for this remedy. 9. On 9 April 2013 the plaintiffs lodged the constitutional appeal, complaining of a violation of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time in the impugned proceedings. By its decision of 9 December 2015, the Constitutional Court found a violation of their right to a hearing within a reasonable time and awarded each of them EUR 800 in respect of the non‑pecuniary damage suffered.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. On 15 April 2013 the Court of Appeal in Novi Sad reversed a part of the above judgment, while upholding the remainder. This judgment was served on the plaintiffs on 6 June 2013. 9. On 9 April 2013 the plaintiffs lodged the constitutional appeal, complaining of a violation of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time in the impugned proceedings. By its decision of 9 December 2015, the Constitutional Court found a violation of their right to a hearing within a reasonable time and awarded each of them EUR 800 in respect of the non‑pecuniary damage suffered.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears, according to the Constitutional Court, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time.", 251,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. Between 1986 and 1987 the applicants took part in the clean-up operation at the Chernobyl nuclear disaster site. They were subsequently registered disabled and became entitled to various social benefits and compensation paid on a regular basis. 5. Considering these benefits insufficient, the applicants together with other 482 people, sued the Russian Ministry of Finance for additional compensation corresponding to non-pecuniary damage suffered as a result of their participation in the operation. 6. On different dates in January and April 2011 the Nalchik Town Court of Kabardino-Balkaria (""the Town Court"") allowed their claims in part and awarded each claimant, including the applicants, compensation ranging between 1,200,000 Russian roubles (RUB) and RUB 1,600,000 for non‑pecuniary damage. 7. No appeals were lodged against these judgments within the statutory ten-day time-limit. The judgments became final but have never been executed. 8. On different dates the Town Court granted the defendant authority's request to extend the time-limit for appeal on the grounds that the authorities had not received a copy of the judgment in due course. Subsequently the regional Supreme Court quashed the judgments delivered in the applicants' favour on the grounds that they had been based on retrospective application of the law.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 252,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","6. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Istanbul. 7. On 11 December 1995 the applicant, a traffic control officer, was hit by a car while on duty. He suffered bodily injuries as a result of the accident. An official disability report indicated that he had a reduced working capacity of 60%. 8. On the basis of this report the applicant, while reserving the right to increase his claims in due course, made an initial request for compensation to the Ministry of Interior, claiming 20,000 Turkish liras (TRY) in pecuniary damages and TRY 5,000 in non-pecuniary damages. 9. Following tacit dismissal of the claim by the Ministry, the applicant brought a case for compensation before the Istanbul Administrative Court for the amounts he had specified in his request to the Ministry. 10. During the course of the proceedings, the court decided of its own motion to order an expert report to determine the exact amount of pecuniary damage suffered by the applicant. The report, which was submitted to the court on 26 September 2005, indicated the applicant's pecuniary damages as 157,077 TRY. The applicant did not submit a request to the court to increase his initial claims in the light of that report. The Istanbul Administrative Court in its decision delivered on 15 February 2006 only awarded him the amounts initially requested by him.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 253,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1985 and is currently detained in St Petersburg. 6. He was suspected of involvement in large-scale drug dealing. 7. On 2 February 2011 he was arrested. He remained in custody pending the investigation and trial. 8. On 6 October 2011 the Sovetskiy District Court of Kazan (""the District Court"") received the case file and set the trial date for 19 October 2011. 9. On 19 March 2012 the District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to nine and a half years' imprisonment. 10. During the trial, which consisted of sixteen hearings, the applicant was confined in a metal cage in the courtroom. There was no desk inside the cage, only a wooden bench, which made it impossible for him to take notes during the hearings. Armed security guards remained beside the cage dock. The applicant's lawyer could only approach him with the court's permission. Any conversations between them had to take place in the presence of the guards. 11. On 10 August 2012 the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic upheld the applicant's conviction on appeal. The applicant participated in the hearing by videoconference. He was placed behind a floor-to-ceiling metal partition on the premises of the remand prison SIZO-3 of the Tatarstan Republic where he was detained and communicated with the judges via a video link.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"It depends on whether the applicant's state during the trials counts as an infringement upon ""adequate facilities"" with which to prepare his defense.", 254,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicants are Turkish nationals, whose dates of birth and places of residence are shown in the appendix. They all own plots of land located in different cities of Turkey. 5. Following local land development plans, the applicants' plots of land were designated for public use. Subsequently, complaining about the decrease in the market value of the land and the long-term uncertainty about the fate of their plots of land, the applicants initiated compensation proceedings before the civil courts. 6. During the proceedings relating to their land, the applicants submitted the decision given by the Plenary Chamber of the Court of Cassation (civil divisions, numbered E.2004/5-555 K.2005/17) to the domestic courts and asserted that according to this decision their compensation claims had to be accepted. 7. On various dates between 2007 and 2010, the applicants' respective claims for compensation were dismissed by the domestic courts on the ground that their plots of land were not actually seized by the authorities. In their decisions, neither the courts of first instance nor Fifth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation, which examined the applicants' claims on cassation, expressed any reason as to why they had reached a different conclusion from the plenary Court of Cassation. 8. The details of the proceedings may be found in the appended table.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that some applicants did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 255,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix. 6. On 21 November 1994 the applicants were taken into police custody. Their statements were taken by the police in the absence of a lawyer. All the applicants confessed to having committed the crimes with which they had been charged. On 28 December 1994 they were remanded in custody. 7. On 24 January 1995 the Public Prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed a bill of indictment against the applicants (except for Eyyup Yaşar), charging them under Section 125 of the former Criminal Code with carrying out activities with the aim of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory. 8. On 18 June 1999 the Constitution was amended and the military judges sitting on the bench of the State Security Courts were replaced by civilian judges. 9. On 4 December 2001 the Diyarbakır State Security Court convicted the applicants as charged. 10. On 20 November 2002 the Court of Cassation quashed the convictions. 11. State Security Courts were abolished on 16 June 2004 pursuant to Law no. 5190. The case was accordingly transferred to the Diyarbakır Assize Court. 12. On 22 February 2007 the Diyarbakır Assize Court again convicted the applicants under Section 125 of the Criminal Code and sentenced them to life imprisonment. 13. On 6 February 2008 the Court of Cassation upheld the convictions.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,The applicants were denied their right to defend themselves., 256,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicants, whose names are listed in the appendix, are Turkish nationals. 6. On 17 and 18 July 2008, each of the applicants sent a letter to the Halfeti (Şanlıurfa) public prosecutor`s office which contained the following passage: ""If using the word of ""sayın"" (esteemed) is an offense, then I also say ""Sayın Abdullah Öcalan"", I commit this offense and denounce myself."" 7. On 19 September 2008, the public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Halfeti Magistrates' Court in Criminal Matters against the applicants. They were charged with praising an offence and offender, prescribed by Article 215 of the Criminal Code (Law no. 5237), on account of their statements in the above mentioned letters. 8. On 9 March 2009 the Halfeti Magistrates' Court in Criminal Matters found the applicants guilty of praising the imprisoned leader of the PKK, an illegal armed organisation, on account of their statements in the aforementioned letters and accordingly, sentenced them each to two months and fifteen days' imprisonment. In accordance with Article 50 of the Criminal Code, this prison sentence was commuted to a fine of 1,500 Turkish Liras (TRY). 9. The applicants appealed against this judgment. On 20 June 2012 the Court of Cassation, holding that the amount of the fine that had been imposed on the applicants did not attain the minimum requisite level, dismissed the appeal request.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 257,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Ercsi. 6. On 28 February 2007 the applicant filed an action with the Székesfehérvár Labour Court against his former employer, claiming unlawful dismissal. On 6 June 2008 the court found in his favour and obliged the respondent to the action to pay him a severance payment, outstanding wages, a lump sum in compensation, and default interest. 7. On appeal, on 25 February 2009 the Fejér County Regional Court changed the judgment in part. In June 2009 the respondent filed a petition for review. 8. In an order of 2 June 2010 the Supreme Court forwarded the respondent's petition to the applicant and informed him that, within eight days of receiving the order, he could file comments on the respondent's petition and/or request an oral hearing. 9. On 7 June 2010 the applicant received the order, and on 14 June 2010 he dispatched his comments on the petition for review. The document was received by the Supreme Court on 17 June 2010. 10. Meanwhile, on 16 June 2010 the Supreme Court, sitting as a review court, had given a judgment in which it had reversed the previous decisions and dismissed the applicant's action. The court stated that the applicant had not filed any comments on the petition for review. 11. The applicant complained and addressed his complaint of 6 December 2010 to the President of the Supreme Court. The Head of the Civil Division informed him that his comments on the petition for review had been belated.",Ruled as violated by court,,"8. In an order of 2 June 2010 the Supreme Court forwarded the respondent's petition to the applicant and informed him that, within eight days of receiving the order, he could file comments on the respondent's petition and/or request an oral hearing. 9. On 7 June 2010 the applicant received the order, and on 14 June 2010 he dispatched his comments on the petition for review. The document was received by the Supreme Court on 17 June 2010. 10. Meanwhile, on 16 June 2010 the Supreme Court, sitting as a review court, had given a judgment in which it had reversed the previous decisions and dismissed the applicant's action. The court stated that the applicant had not filed any comments on the petition for review. 11. The applicant complained and addressed his complaint of 6 December 2010 to the President of the Supreme Court. The Head of the Civil Division informed him that his comments on the petition for review had been belated.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 258,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. On 28 February 1996 the applicants and the debtor (JSP ""Tara"" Cetinje) reached a court approved settlement before the Cetinje Municipal Court, whereby the debtor undertook to pay the applicants specified amounts in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. 5. The settlement became final on the same date. 6. The debtor ultimately paid part of the amounts determined in the settlement. 7. On 26 May 1997 the Podgorica Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings against the debtor. 8. On 19 August 1997 the applicants submitted their respective claims based on the settlement. 9. In the course of the insolvency proceedings the Podgorica Commercial Court acknowledged the applicants' claims. 10. On 23 December 2009 the Podgorica Commercial Court terminated (zaključio) the insolvency proceedings against the debtor, but continued the proceedings against the debtor's estate. This decision was upheld by the Appellate Court on 9 April 2010. 11. The proceedings are still pending. 12. On 14 October 2010 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants' constitutional appeal on procedural grounds. 13. The court settlement in question remains partly unenforced to the present day. 14. It transpires from the case file that at the time the court settlement was concluded and became final (see paragraphs 4 and 5 above) the debtor was a company predominantly comprised of State‑controlled capital. The Government neither contested this nor provided any evidence to the contrary.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicants did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 259,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Novi Sad. 5. The proceedings began on 19 November 1999 when a third private party brought a lawsuit concerning his tenancy rights in respect of a flat owned by a respondent. The applicant acted as an intervener in these proceedings on the side of the respondent since she had previously signed a tenancy agreement with him. 6. On 8 April 2003 the first instance court suspended the proceedings (mirovanje postupka). 7. On 20 August 2003, 20 October 2005 and 13 May 2009 the first instance court terminated the proceedings having deemed the lawsuit as withdrawn due to the fact that the parties had failed to appear at the scheduled hearings. All three of these decisions were subsequently quashed on appeal. 8. On 29 March 2012 the first instance court rendered a judgment in favour of the respondent and the applicant. 9. On 22 August 2012 this judgment was upheld on appeal. 10. On 28 September 2012 the applicant lodged a further appeal with the Constitutional Court alleging a violation of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time. 11. On 10 February 2015 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant's right to a hearing within a reasonable time, but rejected her claim for non-pecuniary damages stating that the finding of a violation alone constituted sufficient redress for the said breach. In so doing it noted, inter alia, that the applicant had significantly contributed to the length of proceedings in question.",Ruled as violated by court,,9. On 22 August 2012 this judgment was upheld on appeal.,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears, according to the Constitutional Court, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time.", 260,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant company is a privately owned company registered in Danilovgrad, Montenegro. 5. In July 2004 a call for tender for hotel ""Otrant"" in Montenegro was issued. The deadline for submitting bids was October 2004. Together with three other companies, the applicant company took part in the tendering process. On 30 November 2004, however, it was informed that the tender was awarded to another bidder. 6. On an unspecified date in December 2004, the applicant company objected to this decision. On 29 December 2004 the Commercial Court in Podgorica (Privredni sud u Podgorici) rejected the applicant company's objection. 7. On 28 January 2006 the Court of Appeal quashed this decision and remitted the case to the first instance. 8. On 15 June 2006 the Commercial Court ruled against the applicant company. This decision was served on the applicant company on 8 September 2009. 9. On 26 March 2010 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Commercial Court. The decision of the Court of Appeal was served on the applicant company's lawyer on 27 April 2010. 10. On 15 July 2010 the applicant company lodged an initiative urging the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office (Vrhovno državno tužilaštvo) to file a request for the protection of legality (zahtjev za zaštitu zakonitosti), but this motion was rejected on 21 July 2010. 11. On 30 July 2010 the applicant company lodged a constitutional appeal. On 14 October 2010 the Constitutional Court rejected this appeal as having been lodged out of time.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. On an unspecified date in December 2004, the applicant company objected to this decision. On 29 December 2004 the Commercial Court in Podgorica (Privredni sud u Podgorici) rejected the applicant company's objection. 8. On 15 June 2006 the Commercial Court ruled against the applicant company. This decision was served on the applicant company on 8 September 2009.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 261,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","6. The applicants, who were born in 1980 and 1977, respectively, live in Slobozia and Parcani, in the self-proclaimed ""Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria"" (""MRT""). In view of the fact that, in the applicants' submission, it was impossible for them to apply to the Court directly, the application was lodged by their mothers. 7. On 2 March 2005 the applicants were arrested by the ""MRT"" authorities and placed in detention on remand on suspicion of murder. On 1 June 2009 they were convicted by an ""MRT"" court and sentenced to terms of fourteen years and a half, and fourteen years' imprisonment, respectively. On 4 August 2009 the Supreme Court of the ""MRT"" upheld the above judgment, but reduced the sentence of the first applicant to fourteen years' imprisonment. 8. It does not appear from the material in the case file and from the parties' submissions that the applicants informed the authorities of the Republic of Moldova about the proceedings against them and the conviction and detention in the ""MRT"". 9. In December 2014 the applicants challenged their conviction by way of an extraordinary appeal before the Supreme Court of the Republic of Moldova which, on 14 February 2015, upheld their appeal and quashed the judgments of the ""MRT"" courts on the ground that they had been issued by unconstitutional tribunals. 10. The applicants were released from detention on 20 July and 20 August 2015, respectively, for reasons which were not related to the Supreme Court of Moldova's decision of 14 February 2015.",Ruled as violated by court,,"8. It does not appear from the material in the case file and from the parties' submissions that the applicants informed the authorities of the Republic of Moldova about the proceedings against them and the conviction and detention in the ""MRT"".",TRUE,2,"It is arguable whether or not the MRT courts count as ""independent and impartial tribunals.""", 262,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","6. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Larnaca. 7. Following his dismissal from Cyprus Airways Ltd as a trainee pilot, the applicant on 26 June 1998 brought a civil action before the District Court of Nicosia for wrongful dismissal and defamation (civil action no. 7562/98). The defendant company was represented by a law firm. 8. On 29 December 2006 the court dismissed the action. 9. On 9 February 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court (appeal no. 43/07). The appeal was tried by a bench of three judges. 10. The hearing of the appeal was held on 11 March 2007. On that date the managing partner of the above-mentioned law firm, Mr P.G.P., appeared for the defendant company and addressed the Supreme Court. Up until that date, other lawyers from the firm had appeared before the appeal bench on behalf of the defendant company. 11. On 21 April 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal unanimously. 12. The applicant submitted that after the judgment of the Supreme Court was given, he discovered that the son of one of the judges sitting on the bench, Judge A.K., and the daughter of Mr P.G.P., were married and that both worked at the latter's law firm. The lawyer representing him in the domestic proceedings had not requested the exemption of the judge in question because he had not had sufficient knowledge of the relevant facts at the time. The applicant had also not instructed his lawyer to do so as he had found out about this fact only after the appeal proceedings had ended.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 263,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicants were born in 1961 and 1996 respectively and live in Muğla. 5. The first applicant was the husband and the second applicant was the son of Mrs Özlem Gürakın, who died on 3 September 2001. 6. On an unspecified date, the applicants brought compensation proceedings against the Dokuz Eylül University Hospital, alleging that Mrs Özlem Gürakın had been a victim of medical negligence. The applicants further requested legal aid for the court fees. In respect of their legal aid claim, they submitted documents attesting to their poor financial situation. 7. On 13 December 2006 the Izmir Administrative Court rejected the applicants' legal aid claim, without indicating any specific reasons. They were notified that they had to pay 1,683 Turkish liras (TRY) (approximately 870 Euros (EUR)) in court fees within one month to continue the proceedings and that failure to do so would result in the discontinuation of the proceedings. 8. As the applicants failed to pay the court fees within the time-limit, the İzmir Administrative Court sent a further warning letter to the applicants and ordered them to pay the court fees. 9. On 6 April 2007 the applicants made a second request for legal aid and asked the court to reconsider its former decision. 10. On 20 April 2007 the Izmir Administrative Court once again rejected the applicants' request and granted them one month to pay the court fees. 11. On 12 July 2007 the court decided to discontinue the proceedings, because the applicants had not paid the necessary court fees.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicants did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 264,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Kyustendil. 5. In a judgment of 15 August 2004 the Sofia District Court awarded the applicant BGN 2,120.28 (about 1,100 euros (EUR)) in damages, plus the legal interest for the period starting on 11 February 2003 until full payment, and BGN 200 in costs and expenses, against the National Centre for Recreation, Rehabilitation and Sport (""the Centre""). The Centre was a State body subsidised by the Ministry of Education. It exercised certain functions entrusted by the Ministry. The damages were awarded for loss of salary following the applicant's unlawful dismissal from work. The judgment became final on 11 February 2008. 6. In the meantime, on 25 May 2005 the Minister of Education ordered that the Centre be closed down and its remaining property be managed by the Ministry of Education. The Ministry then established a State-owned joint-stock company with part of the Centre's property. 7. On 26 November 2008 the applicant was issued with a writ of enforcement for the amount awarded against the Centre in the final judgment of 11 February 2008 (see paragraph 5 above). On 18 March 2009 he filed a request with the Minister for Education for payment of that amount. 8. The Ministry of Education replied in May 2009 that neither the Ministry, nor the State-owned joint-stock company, was the successor of the Centre and that the amount claimed was not due by them. 9. As of 23 March 2015, the date of the applicant's last communication to the Court, no change in the above circumstances had been recorded.",Ruled as violated by court,,"8. The Ministry of Education replied in May 2009 that neither the Ministry, nor the State-owned joint-stock company, was the successor of the Centre and that the amount claimed was not due by them.",FALSE,0,There is no relevance between fair trial and debt recovery., 265,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","6. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Adana. 7. On 11 July 2000 the Adana Magistrate's Court ordered the detention of the applicant in absentia. 8. On 20 July 2000 the applicant was questioned by the gendarmerie in the absence of his lawyer. In his statement, the applicant gave a detailed description about his involvement in an illegal organisation and the activities in which he had taken part. Subsequently, he was brought before the public prosecutor at the Adana State Security Court. During the interview, the applicant stated, again in the absence of a lawyer, that his statements made to the gendarmerie had been correct. 9. On 15 September 2000 the investigating judge at the Mardin Magistrate's Court ordered the applicant's pre-trial detention, again in the absence of a lawyer. 10. On 24 October 2000 the public prosecutor lodged an indictment before the Adana State Security Court, charging the applicant under Section 125 of the former Criminal Code with carrying out activities with the aim of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory. 11. On 25 October 2005 the Adana Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged. 12. On 26 April 2006 the Court of Cassation quashed the conviction. 13. On 6 November 2007 the Adana Assize Court found that, inter alia, on the basis of the applicant's statements to the gendarmerie and the public prosecutor, the applicant had committed the offence under Section 125 of the former Criminal Code and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 14. On 12 November 2008 the Court of Cassation upheld the conviction.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,The applicant was denied his right to defend himself., 266,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicants were born in 1977 and 1964, respectively, and live in Voronezh. 5. The applicants are lawyers practicing in Russia. 6. Between 2008 and 2010 the applicants, within the group of lawyers, consulted several municipal organisations about various legal issues and provided other legal service. However municipal organisations did not pay for the service and the applicants instituted proceedings seeking to recover the debt. 7. On 22 June 2010 the Sovetskiy District Court of Voronezh granted the applicants claim against the municipal transport company and awarded them 40,020,000 Russian roubles. The judgment was not appealed against and became final. It appears that the judgment was executed at the expense of the municipal budget. 8. On 9 January 2013 the prosecutor of the Voronezh Region applied to the district court for the extension of the time-limits for an ordinary appeal against the judgment of 22 June 2010. 9. On 13 June 2013 the district court refused to extend the time-limits. The prosecutor appealed. 10. On 8 August 2013 the Voronezh Regional Court quashed the decision of the district court and extended the time limit for an ordinary appeal. The court found that the public interest had been concerned as far as the judgment had been executed by means of the municipal budget. Thus the prosecutor had the right to lodge an appeal. 11. On 12 November 2013 the Voronezh Regional Court granted the appeal lodged by the prosecutor and quashed the judgment of 22 June 2010 and ordered the reversal of execution. The judgment became final and was partially executed.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 267,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Sofia. 6. The Sofia Municipal Council approved the exchange of a municipal flat for a smaller flat owned and occupied by the applicant in December 2005. However, the mayor of Sofia did not issue the necessary order and did not sign a contract for the exchange, as provided in the applicable rules. The applicant brought judicial review proceedings challenging the mayor's tacit refusal to act. The Sofia Administrative Court quashed the mayor's tacit refusal in a judgment of 1 April 2010 and instructed the mayor to issue an order for the exchange of the flats. That part of the judgment became final and enforceable on 19 May 2010. 7. By a decision of 25 March 2010 the Sofia Municipal Council revoked its December 2005 decision approving the exchange of the two properties. The applicant lodged a challenge against that 25 March 2010 decision. In a final judgment of 7 March 2011 the Supreme Administrative Court declared the Council's decision of 25 March 2010 null and void. 8. On 18 April 2011 the mayor issued a decision explicitly refusing to issue an order for the exchange of the two flats. Following an application by the applicant for judicial review, on 30 March 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court declared that decision null and void as having been issued in breach of the judgment of the Sofia Administrative Court of 1 April 2010. The court also instructed the mayor to issue an order for the conclusion of the exchange agreement. 9. The mayor ordered the flat exchange on 6 March 2013 and the applicant signed a contract for the exchange on 25 June 2013.",Ruled as violated by court,,"8. On 18 April 2011 the mayor issued a decision explicitly refusing to issue an order for the exchange of the two flats. Following an application by the applicant for judicial review, on 30 March 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court declared that decision null and void as having been issued in breach of the judgment of the Sofia Administrative Court of 1 April 2010. The court also instructed the mayor to issue an order for the conclusion of the exchange agreement.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 268,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","6. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Muş. 7. On 30 October 2001 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, namely the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers' Party). 8. On 1 November 2001 the applicant's statement was taken by the police in the absence of a lawyer. During his interrogation, he confessed being a member of the PKK and gave a detailed account of his acts within the illegal organisation. 9. On 3 November 2001 the applicant was heard by the public prosecutor and the investigating judge at the Istanbul State Security Court, again in the absence of a lawyer. In his statements before both the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant denied the accusations. On the same day, upon the order of the investigating judge, the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention. 10. On 6 November 2001 the Public Prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment with that court, charging the applicant under Article 168 of the former Criminal Code, with membership of an illegal armed organisation. 11. The state security courts were later abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, and the case was transferred to the Istanbul Assize Court. 12. On 6 October 2006 the Istanbul Assize Court, relying on, inter alia, the applicant's statements to the police, convicted him of membership of an illegal organisation under Article 314 § 2 of the new Criminal Code and sentenced him to seven years and six months' imprisonment. 13. On 15 December 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first‑instance court.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,The applicant was denied his right to defend himself., 269,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Oslo, Norway. 5. On 26 April 2000 criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant and one other person in connection with a traffic accident which had resulted in death of a child. 6. On 25 February 2003 the Court of First Instance in Podgorica convicted the applicant for endangering public traffic and sentenced him and his co-accused to one year and six months' imprisonment. 7. On an unspecified date in 2006 the High Court in Podgorica quashed this judgment and remitted case back to the Court of First Instance. 8. On 18 April 2007 the Court of First Instance adopted a new judgment and again convicted the applicant and his co-accused. But the court reduced the sentence to one year and four months' imprisonment. 9. On 13 November 2009 the High Court further reduced the sentence of the applicant's co-accused, but upheld the judgment of the Court of First Instance in respect of the applicant. 10. The applicant's subsequent appeal against the judgment of the High Court was rejected on 14 June 2010. 11. Following that rejection, on an unspecified date in 2010, the applicant lodged a further appeal on points of law (zahtjev za ispitivanje zakonitosti pravosnažne presude) with the Supreme Court. 12. On 26 October 2010 the Supreme Court rejected this appeal. 13. On 11 December 2010 the applicant lodged an action for fair redress (tužba za pravično zadovoljenje) with the Supreme Court, complaining about the overall length of criminal proceedings. It was rejected on 31 December 2010. 14. On 19 April 2013 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant's ultimate appeal.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"10. The applicant's subsequent appeal against the judgment of the High Court was rejected on 14 June 2010. 11. Following that rejection, on an unspecified date in 2010, the applicant lodged a further appeal on points of law (zahtjev za ispitivanje zakonitosti pravosnažne presude) with the Supreme Court. 12. On 26 October 2010 the Supreme Court rejected this appeal.",TRUE,2,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year. However, the Constitutional Court rejected this.", 270,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","6. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Sofia. 7. The applicant's grandfather owned part of a real estate. He donated his part to the applicant's cousins in 1997. The applicant's grandfather died on 16 January 2003. 8. On 13 February 2004 the applicant brought proceedings under section 30 of the Inheritance Act 1949 before the Sofia District Court. She claimed that, by donating his part in the immovable property in 1997, her grandfather had infringed her right to a ""reserved share"" in his inheritance, given that the immovable property in question represented his entire estate. In a decision of 2 March 2005 the court upheld her claim by diminishing the part of the estate donated to the applicant's cousins and restoring the applicant's ""reserved share"" in her grandfather's inheritance. 9. Following an appeal by the other party, on 20 September 2007 the Sofia City Court quashed the first instance court's judgment and rejected the applicant's claim for restoration of her ""reserved share"" in her grandfather's estate. In particular, referring to Interpretative Decision No. 1 of 4 February 2005 by the Supreme Court of Cassation (""SCC""), the court found that the applicant had not complied with the statutory requirements for claiming her reserved share. The court held that, given that her cousins to whom the real estate had been donated could not be considered ""heirs-at-law"", the applicant should have claimed the reserved share of the inheritance by means of an ""inventory"". 10. Following a cassation appeal brought by the applicant, on 24 March 2009 the SCC upheld the Sofia City Court's findings in full in a final decision.",Ruled as violated by court,,"9. Following an appeal by the other party, on 20 September 2007 the Sofia City Court quashed the first instance court's judgment and rejected the applicant's claim for restoration of her ""reserved share"" in her grandfather's estate. In particular, referring to Interpretative Decision No. 1 of 4 February 2005 by the Supreme Court of Cassation (""SCC""), the court found that the applicant had not complied with the statutory requirements for claiming her reserved share. The court held that, given that her cousins to whom the real estate had been donated could not be considered ""heirs-at-law"", the applicant should have claimed the reserved share of the inheritance by means of an ""inventory"". 10. Following a cassation appeal brought by the applicant, on 24 March 2009 the SCC upheld the Sofia City Court's findings in full in a final decision.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 271,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Smědčice. 6. On 9 November 2006 the applicant requested a building permit for temporary stables for horses. On 6 January 2011 the Rokycany Planning Office (stavební úřad) dismissed his request and on 26 May 2011 the Plzeň Regional Office (krajský úřad) upheld that decision. 7. On 29 March 2013 the Plzeň Regional Court (krajský soud) dismissed a complaint lodged by the applicant against the decision of the Plzeň Regional Office. 8. On 31 July 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court (Nejvyšší správní soud) dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant. The decision was served on the applicant on 28 August 2013. 9. On 29 October 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint (ústavní stížnost). 10. On 31 March 2014 the Constitutional Court (Ústavní soud) rejected the applicant's appeal as being lodged out of time. It held that as the Supreme Administrative Court's decision had been served on him on 28 August 2013, the last day of the two-month time-limit for lodging a constitutional appeal was 28 October 2013. 11. On 8 April 2014 the applicant wrote to the Constitutional Court urging it to set aside its decision. He argued that as 28 October 2013 had been a national holiday, domestic procedural rules provided that the last day for lodging his appeal had been the following day, namely 29 October 2013. 12. By a letter of 11 April 2014 the Registrar (generální sekretář) of the Constitutional Court acknowledged that the judge-rapporteur had undoubtedly overlooked the fact that the time-limit had been complied with. However, as the Constitutional Court did not have the power to set aside its own decision, he advised the applicant to lodge an application with the European Court of Human Rights.",Ruled as violated by court,,"12. By a letter of 11 April 2014 the Registrar (generální sekretář) of the Constitutional Court acknowledged that the judge-rapporteur had undoubtedly overlooked the fact that the time-limit had been complied with. However, as the Constitutional Court did not have the power to set aside its own decision, he advised the applicant to lodge an application with the European Court of Human Rights.",FALSE,0,"With the multiple dismissals of appeals, the applicant was denied his right to fair trial to determine civil rights.", 272,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Naberezhnyye Chelny. 5. The applicant was a police officer. On 1 November 2004 he was arrested on suspicion of having extracted a bribe. 6. On 10 November 2005 the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic convicted the applicant and sentenced him to imprisonment. He stayed under the obligation not to leave his place of residence in Naberezhnyye Chelny until the conviction became final. He could leave his place of residence only upon the summons from the investigator or the court. 7. Several parties to the criminal proceedings, including the applicant, appealed against the conviction. The case was forwarded to the Russian Supreme Court in Moscow, 1,000 km away from Naberezhnyye Chelny. The applicant never received any summons to the appeal hearing due to the Supreme Court's mistake in the postal code. Neither did he receive copies of the statements of appeal filed by the prosecutor, by the co-accused, G., and the latter's lawyer. 8. On 28 February 2006 the conviction was upheld by the Russian Supreme Court. The prosecutor and G.'s lawyer attended the appeal hearing. Neither the applicant nor his lawyer was present. 9. In 2011 the applicant lodged a compensation claim for non-pecuniary damages caused by poor conditions of detention. In the text of his claim the applicant explicitly asked the court to consider the claim in his absence. On 14 April 2011 the Bugulminskiy Town Court of the Tatarstan Republic dismissed his claim. The applicant received the notification of the time and date of the hearing after the hearing had actually taken place. 10. The first-instance judgment was upheld on 4 July 2011 by the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic. The applicant had been notified of that hearing on 29 June 2011.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""fair and public,"" the applicant's lack of summons appear to threaten this definition.", 273,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. Following judicial proceedings which ended with a final judgment of the Bălţi Court of Appeal of 8 December 2009, the applicant company obtained a final ruling obliging the Cadastral Authority to register immovable property privatised by it in 1999 and in 2004 in its name. 6. On an unspecified date the defendant in the proceedings lodged a request for a review of the judgment of 8 December 2009, seeking its annulment on the grounds that in a technical report dated 25 May 2009 it had been stated that the immovable property in question did not qualify as immovable property (""the review request""). 7. On 24 August 2010 the Bălţi Court of Appeal dismissed the review request on the grounds that the information contained in the technical report of 25 May 2009 did not qualify as new and relevant information which could not have been obtained before the delivery of the final judgment in the case. 8. On 22 December 2010 the Supreme Court quashed the above judgment and ordered a re-examination of the review request. 9. On 16 November 2011 the Chişinău Court of Appeal re-examined the review request and allowed it. The court relied on grounds other than those relied upon by the defendant in framing the request. In particular, the court relied on a Government decision from 2005, in accordance with which the disputed goods had been transferred to the defendant's control. The court quashed the final judgment of 8 December 2009 and ordered a fresh examination of the case. 10. On 16 August 2012, after examining the merits of the case, the Edineţ District Court again found in favour of the applicant company and required the Cadastral Authority to register some of the immovable property privatised by the applicant company in 1999 and in 2004 in its name. The Cadastral Authority challenged that judgment by lodging an appeal and the proceedings are still pending.",Ruled as violated by court,,"9. On 16 November 2011 the Chişinău Court of Appeal re-examined the review request and allowed it. The court relied on grounds other than those relied upon by the defendant in framing the request. In particular, the court relied on a Government decision from 2005, in accordance with which the disputed goods had been transferred to the defendant's control. The court quashed the final judgment of 8 December 2009 and ordered a fresh examination of the case.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 274,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","8. The applicants were born in 1949 and 1923 respectively and lived in Bucharest, where the first applicant still lives. 9. The applicants were co-owners of two adjacent plots of land in Montenegro. 10. On 13 June 2009, during a visit to the plots, the first applicant noticed a metal fence built partly on their property. The fence divided the two plots of land and made it impossible for them to access one plot from the other. It appears that the fence had been erected some time in February 2009. 11. On 15 July 2009 the applicants, who had legal representation, instituted civil proceedings for trespass (radi smetanja posjeda) against B.Ć., their neighbour. 12. On 27 June 2011 the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Kotor ruled in favour of the applicants and ordered B.Ć. to remove the fence and pay the applicants 1,435 euros (EUR) in respect of legal costs. The court was satisfied that the applicants had lodged their claim in time, given that the deadline for initiating proceedings was 30 days from the day on which they had noticed the trespass, taking into account that 13 and 14 July were national holidays. In doing so the court relied on section 77 of Property Act (see paragraph 14 below). 13. On 20 December 2011 the High Court (Viši sud) in Podgorica, ruling on an appeal lodged by B.Ć., quashed the previous judgment and rejected the applicants' claim (tužba se odbacuje) as submitted out of time. The court held that 13 and 14 July were indeed national holidays when the courts did not sit. It considered, however, that the 30-day period within which the applicants could institute proceedings was mandatory ""[in which case] there could be no shifting of the time-limit when its last day fell on a day when the courts [did] not sit"". The time-limit had therefore expired on 13 July 2009, and the applicants had not filed their claim until 15 July 2009.",Ruled as violated by court,,"13. On 20 December 2011 the High Court (Viši sud) in Podgorica, ruling on an appeal lodged by B.Ć., quashed the previous judgment and rejected the applicants' claim (tužba se odbacuje) as submitted out of time. The court held that 13 and 14 July were indeed national holidays when the courts did not sit. It considered, however, that the 30-day period within which the applicants could institute proceedings was mandatory ""[in which case] there could be no shifting of the time-limit when its last day fell on a day when the courts [did] not sit"". The time-limit had therefore expired on 13 July 2009, and the applicants had not filed their claim until 15 July 2009.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicants did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 275,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Kraljevo. 6. Between June 2003 and December 2004 the applicant, as an entrepreneur, was providing heating installation services to AD Fabrika za proizvodnju konfekcije i trikotaže Raška, a socially-owned company based in Novi Pazar (hereinafter ""the debtor company""). 7. On 2 December 2010 the Kraljevo Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor company (St. 31/2010). 8. The applicant duly submitted his claim. 9. On 15 March 2011 the Commercial Court rejected his claim and instructed him to initiate a regular civil suit and request determination of his claim. The applicant lodged a separate civil claim. 10. On 1 December 2011 the Commercial Court ruled in favour of the applicant by recognizing his claim and ordered the debtor company to pay the applicant the costs of the civil proceedings. 11. On an unspecified date thereafter, the said judgment having become final, was acknowledged within the insolvency proceedings. 12. On 22 July 2013 the Commercial Court issued a decision ordering payment of approximately 10 % of the total debt to the applicant. The applicant received this payment on an unspecified date. 13. The debtor company was ultimately struck from the relevant public register on 9 July 2014. 14. On 16 December 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal complaining against the Commercial Court's decision of 22 July 2013 and that his right to work and right to compensation for work and providing services were infringed, because he received only 10 % of the total debt. He asked further the Constitutional Court to order the payment of the rest of the debt. 15. On 2 March 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's appeal finding that it is not vested with the power to order such a payment. That decision was delivered to the applicant after 24 April 2015.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took less than a year.", 276,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","6. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Muş. 7. On 19 April 2003 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation. 8. On 20 April 2003 the applicant's statements were taken by the police in the absence of a lawyer. During the interrogation, the applicant gave a detailed account of his acts within the illegal organisation PKK (the Kurdistan Workers' Party). 9. On 22 April 2003 the applicant was heard by the public prosecutor and the investigating judge at the Istanbul State Security Court, again in the absence of a lawyer. In his statements before both the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant denied the accusations and maintained that his statements to the police had been given under duress. On the same day, upon the order of the investigating judge, the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention. 10. On 6 May 2003 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment accusing the applicant of membership of an illegal terrorist organisation under Article 168 of the former Criminal Code, Law no. 765. 11. The State Security Courts were later abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, and the case was transferred to the Istanbul Assize Court. 12. On 19 September 2006, relying on, inter alia, the applicant's statements to the police, the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant under Article 314 § 2 of the new Turkish Criminal Code and sentenced him to six years and three months' imprisonment. 13. On 19 November 2007 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment on procedural grounds. 14. On 30 December 2008 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant again under Article 314 § 2 of the new Turkish Criminal Code and sentenced him to six years and three months' imprisonment. 15. On 20 March 2012 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Istanbul Assize Court.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,The applicant was denied his right to defend himself., 277,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was employed by HK Komgrap and Komgrap-Makiš doo, a company based in Belgrade (hereinafter ""the debtor""). At the relevant time, the company was predominantly socially-owned (see Stoković and Others v. Serbia, nos. 75879/14 and seq. §§ 10-14, 8 March 2016) 6. Since the debtor had failed to fulfil its obligations towards its employees, the applicant brought a civil claim seeking payment of salary arrears and various social security contributions. 7. On 23 June 2003 the Belgrade Second Municipal Court (Drugi opštinski sud u Beogradu) ordered the debtor to pay to the applicant certain sums in respect of salary arrears and the various social security contributions. This judgment became final and enforceable on 25 July 2005. 8. On 26 September 2005 the applicant applied to the Belgrade Fourth Municipal Court (Četvrti opštinski sud u Beogradu) for enforcement of the judgment of 23 June 2003. 9. On 18 January 2006 the said court ordered the enforcement of the judgment and awarded the applicant the costs incurred in the enforcement proceedings. 10. On 27 October 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal, seeking redress for the non-enforcement of the judgment in question. 11. On 27 November 2013 the Constitutional Court held that the applicant had suffered a breach of the ""right to a trial within a reasonable time"" with regard to the enforcement proceedings. The court ordered the acceleration of these proceedings and declared that the applicant was entitled to compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered in the amount of 800 euros (EUR) converted into the national currency at the rate applicable at the date of settlement. 12. The Constitutional Court held that since the enforcement proceedings in question had not yet been completed, the constitutional appeals were premature in so far as they concerned the pecuniary damage, and dismissed the appeal in that regard.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears, according to the Constitutional Court, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time.", 278,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. Between 1986 and 1987 the applicants took part in the clean-up operation at the Chernobyl nuclear disaster site. They were subsequently registered disabled and became entitled to various social benefits and compensation paid on a regular basis. 5. Considering these benefits insufficient, the applicants together with other 482 people, sued the Russian Ministry of Finance for additional compensation corresponding to non-pecuniary damage suffered as a result of their participation in the operation. 6. On different dates in January and April 2011 the Nalchik Town Court of Kabardino-Balkaria (""the Town Court"") allowed their claims in part and awarded each claimant, including the applicants, compensation ranging between 1,100,000 Russian roubles (RUB) and RUB 1,800,000 for non‑pecuniary damage. 7. No appeals were lodged against these judgments within the statutory ten-day time-limit. The judgments became final. Some judgments in respect of several applicants remained unenforced (see ""Enforcement status"" in the Appendix). 8. On different dates in 2012 and 2013 the domestic courts granted the defendant authority's request to extend the time-limit for appeal essentially on the ground that the defendant authority had not been served with the impugned judgments. Subsequently the regional Supreme Court quashed the judgments delivered in the applicants' favour on the grounds that they had been based on retrospective application of the law. The applicants were ordered to repay the sums received under the judgments. 9. The applicants lodged a supervisory review application. There is no indication that they requested the enforcement proceedings to be suspended pending the examination of their supervisory review application. 10. Between June and August 2013 the Presidium of the regional Supreme Court partially quashed the appeal judgments as regards the applicants' obligation to reimburse the sums paid.",Ruled as violated by court,,9. The applicants lodged a supervisory review application. There is no indication that they requested the enforcement proceedings to be suspended pending the examination of their supervisory review application. 10. Between June and August 2013 the Presidium of the regional Supreme Court partially quashed the appeal judgments as regards the applicants' obligation to reimburse the sums paid.,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicants did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 279,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Vilnius. 5. On 17 April 2009 the applicant was officially notified that she was suspected of having organised the embezzlement of property of high value. On 7 May 2009 the applicant was charged with the relevant offences. She denied her guilt. 6. On 22 July 2011 the Vilnius Regional Court held that the legal classification of the charges against the applicant was incorrect, because the total value of the allegedly embezzled property was not high. The court reclassified the charges on the basis of a less serious offence, held that the prosecution had become time-barred and discontinued the proceedings. 7. The prosecutor appealed. On 27 October 2011 the Court of Appeal quashed the decision and remitted the case to the Vilnius Regional Court. 8. After re-examining the case, on 10 June 2013 the Vilnius Regional Court found the applicant guilty of the charges against her. She was given a fine of 12,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL) (approximately 3,475 euros (EUR)). She was also ordered to pay some of the damages claimed by a company, amounting to LTL 2,800 (approximately EUR 810). 9. The applicant lodged an appeal, but on 18 October 2013 the Court of Appeal dismissed it and upheld the lower court's judgment in its entirety. 10. On 7 January 2014 the applicant submitted an appeal on points of law to the Supreme Court. On 17 February 2014 a selection panel of three judges refused to examine the appeal, on the basis that it did not comply with Article 368 § 2 and Article 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter ""the CCP"") (see paragraphs 15 and 16 below). The chair of the selection panel, Judge V.G., was the father of M.G., who had been the prosecutor in the case against the applicant before the first-instance and the appellate courts. 11. The Supreme Court consists of two divisions: Civil and Criminal. The Criminal Division has sixteen judges in it.",Ruled as violated by court,,11. The Supreme Court consists of two divisions: Civil and Criminal. The Criminal Division has sixteen judges in it.,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicants did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 280,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","6. The applicant was born in Qesarat, Tepelenë, in 1977. He is currently serving a prison sentence. 7. On 14 January and 10 November 2005, following proceedings in absentia, the Gjirokastër District Court and the Court of Appeal, respectively, convicted the applicant of attempted theft resulting in death in collusion with others and sentenced him to seventeen years' imprisonment. That decision became final on 9 February 2007 after the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant's lawyer. It appears that the applicant was represented by a lawyer appointed by his family throughout the court proceedings. 8. It appears that on 30 March 2007 the applicant was extradited from Greece to Albania. 9. On 3 May 2007 the Gjirokastër District Court allowed a request by the applicant to appeal out of time and he lodged an appeal against his conviction in absentia. 10. On 12 November 2007 the Gjirokaster Court of Appeal while requalifying the charges against the applicant on the basis of the evidence obtained during the proceedings in absentia, upheld the applicant's conviction, ruling that it had become res judicata. 11. By a final decision of 7 October 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the applicant's conviction as decided in the Gjirokastër District Court's decision of 2005, ruling that it had become res judicata and that the facts and law in the case had been examined previously. It further noted that leave to appeal out of time should not have been granted as the case had become res judicata. 12. On 21 February 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court against the Supreme Court's decision, complaining, inter alia, about the fact that the domestic courts had not given him the possibility of a fresh factual and legal determination of the criminal charge. 13. On 9 May 2011 the applicant's lawyer was notified of the Constitutional Court's decision to dismiss his appeal.",Ruled as violated by court,,8. It appears that on 30 March 2007 the applicant was extradited from Greece to Albania.,FALSE,0,"With the dismissal of the appeal, the applicant was denied the right to fair trial.", 281,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The list of applicants is set out in the appended tables. 6. The applicants were employees of a municipal education institution. 7. On 13 June 2001 they brought proceedings before the Kolomna Town Court of the Moscow Region (""the Town Court"") against their employer and the town administration seeking recovery of unpaid wages and taxes to various social funds. 8. On 13 July 2004 the Kolomna Town Court issued a first-instance judgment on the merits of the case. On 22 September 2004 the Moscow Regional Court quashed the judgment on appeal and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 9. On 7 July 2005 the Town Court granted the applicants' claims awarding each of them a certain amount against their employer (see Appendix I). The judgment was upheld on appeal by the Moscow Regional Court on 28 September 2005. 10. Between 26 June 2001 and 7 July 2005 the court hearings were adjourned twenty-five times due to the respondents' or one of the respondents' failure to appear, eighteen times on the claimants' request and eleven times pursuant the requests by the defendants; four times the first‑instance court adjourned the case as the respondent authorities had been requested to submit additional documents. Moreover, on 11 June 2002 the proceedings were suspended pursuant to a decision by the domestic court on account of the claimants' alleged failure to appear; on 4 February 2003 that decision was quashed by the appeal court, due to the first-instance court's failure to notify the applicants of the hearing date. Thus, the period attributable to the authorities amounts to over one year. 11. On an unspecified date in 2005 the employer institution was liquidated. On 18 October 2005 the relevant record was made into the State Register of Legal Entities. 12. According to the Government's submissions of 19 July 2011, on 30 June 2006 the judgment of 7 July 2005 was partially enforced in respect of certain applicants, as specified in Appendix I.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicants did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 282,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Štitare. 5. On 30 May 2000 the Belgrade Third Municipal Court ordered a socially-owned company KMG Trudbenik (hereinafter ""the debtor company""), based in Belgrade, to pay to the applicant a specified amount on account of salary arrears, plus the costs of the civil proceedings (judgment no. P1 863/99). This judgment became enforceable on 19 June 2000. 6. On 13 March 2002, upon the applicant's request to that effect, the Fourth Belgrade Municipal Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgment and further ordered the debtor company to pay the applicant's enforcement costs (enforcement order no. I-VIII 101/2002). 7. On 7 October 2003 the enforcement proceedings were suspended due to the institution of compulsory settlement proceedings before the Belgrade Commercial Court (""the Commercial Court""). 8. On 9 December 2011 the Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor company. 9. On 6 March 2012 the applicant submitted his request for enforcement of the 30 May 2000 judgment (""enforcement request"") to the insolvency manager. The insolvency manager neither rejected the applicant's claim nor forwarded it to the Commercial Court. 10. On 24 February 2014 the applicant thus submitted his enforcement request with the Commercial Court, and on 1 October 2014 he supplemented it. 11. On 6 August and 27 October 2014 the applicant complained about the inactivity of the acting judge in the insolvency proceedings. 12. On 13 October 2014 the Commercial Court rejected the applicant's enforcement request as having been lodged out of time. 13. On 28 January 2015 the Commercial Appellate Court rejected the applicant's appeal, and upheld the Commercial Court's decision of 13 October 2014. 14. On 24 March 2015 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal, complaining of the decision of 28 January 2015. 15. However, on 19 May 2016 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant's appeal as unfounded.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,There is no relevance between fair trial and debt recovery., 283,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","6. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Istanbul. 7. On 16 June 1999 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of belonging to an illegal organisation, namely Hizbullah. 8. On 21 June 1999 the applicant's statements were taken by the police in the absence of a lawyer. During his interrogation, he confessed being a member of the Hizbullah and gave a detailed account of his acts within the illegal organisation. 9. On 22 June 1999 the applicant was heard by the Diyarbakır public prosecutor and the investigating judge at the Diyarbakır State Security Court, again in the absence of a lawyer. In his statements before both the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant denied the accusations and maintained that his statements to the police had been given under duress. On the same date, upon the order of the investigating judge, the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention. 10. On 30 June 1999 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed an indictment with that court, charging the applicant under Article 168 § 2 of the former Turkish Criminal Code, namely for membership of an illegal armed organisation. 11. On 9 November 1999 the applicant was released pending trial. 12. The State Security Courts were later abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, and the case was transferred to the Diyarbakır Assize Court. 13. On 12 June 2008, relying on, inter alia, the applicant's statements to the police, the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted the applicant under Article 314 § 2 of the new Turkish Criminal Code and sentenced him to six years and three months' imprisonment. In convicting the applicant, the Assize Court further took into consideration information on computer hard disks and print-outs, which had been seized in a house belonging to the illegal organisation, as well as the statements of several witnesses who had testified against the applicant. 14. On 4 June 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,The applicant was denied his right to defend himself., 284,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The first applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Cetinje. The second applicant was founded in Cetinje in 1990. The first applicant is the founder, the sole owner, and the executive director of the second applicant. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. On 1 July 2013 an insolvency creditor X (stečajni povjerilac) requested the Commercial Court (Privredni sud) in Podgorica to open insolvency proceedings (stečajni postupak) in respect of the second applicant. In the proceedings before the Commercial Court the second applicant was represented by the first applicant and a lawyer duly authorised by the latter. On 27 December 2013 the Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the second applicant and, inter alia, appointed an insolvency administrator (stečajni upravnik). 7. On 23 January 2014 the second applicant, through the lawyer, lodged an appeal against the Commercial Court decision. 8. On 18 March 2014 the Court of Appeals (Apelacioni sud) in Podgorica rejected the appeal (žalba se odbacuje) as having been submitted by an unauthorised person, given that the lawyer had not been appointed by the insolvency administrator. The court relied on sections 75 and 76 of the Insolvency Act (see paragraphs 17-18 below). This decision was served on the applicants on 17 April 2014. 9. On 12 May 2014 the applicants lodged a constitutional appeal. 10. On 13 May 2014 the applicants' representative filed an initiative with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud) seeking the assessment of the constitutionality of section 76 of the Insolvency Act in force at the time. There is nothing in the case-file as to the outcome of that initiative. 11. On 23 July 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicants' constitutional appeal for ""not having been lodged by a party to the domestic proceedings or by a person authorised to appeal on behalf of the person whose rights and freedoms were violated"". This decision was served on the applicants on 15 October 2014.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"It depends on the meaning of ""fair and public trial"" whether the 2nd applicant being represented by the 1st applicant and their appointed lawyer is allowed.", 285,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1971 and serves his life sentence in a correctional colony in the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region of Russia. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. On 27 March 2003 the applicant was arrested on charges of illegal possession of firearms, two armed robberies of local post offices, murder of three Russian Post Service cash messengers and attempted murder of the fourth one. On 14 October 2003 the case was sent to the Supreme Court of the Buryatia Republic (""the Regional Court"") for trial. 7. Twice, on 20 April 2004 and 22 May 2007, the applicant was convicted as charged. Both convictions were set aside by the Supreme Court of Russia. On 12 September 2008, in the course of the third round of jury trial, the Regional Court decided, upon a request by a representative of the Russian Post, to close proceedings to the public. It dismissed the applicant's objections made with reference to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In doing so the Presiding judge referred to the case-file documents containing information about security measures and equipment in post offices, weaponry, schedules and routes of cash messengers, etc. Under the relevant Russian Post regulations that information was classified as ""for internal use only"". The Regional Court found that that information was a trade secret protected by the Commercial Secrets Act (Federal Law no. 98-FZ of 29 July 2004) and that its disclosure could have harmed public interests. Every hearing after 12 September 2008 was held in camera. 8. On 14 December 2008 the jury convicted the applicant as charged. In the last days of December the trial judge sentenced him to life imprisonment. On 4 June 2009 the Supreme Court quashed the conviction on one count and upheld the remainder of the verdict and sentence. The hearing was public. The court of appeal held, in particular, that the decision to dispense with a public hearing had been lawful and rejected, in a summary fashion, the relevant arguments by the applicant.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"The applicant has a right to a public trial. But according to the appeal court, there were legitimate democratic interests for limiting public access to the trial.", 286,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Lisichansk-18, the Lugansk region of Ukraine. 5. In 1972 the applicant suffered 100 per cent disability as a result of a traffic accident. In 1994 the Lisichansk Town Court of the Lugansk Region of Ukraine found the State Health Care Institution of the Sanitary and Epidemiology Monitoring of the Ministry of Railways of the Russian Federation (""the institution"") responsible for the accident and ordered it to pay to the applicant compensation and to reimburse his medical expenses. Since that time, the applicant has been involved in several sets of proceedings concerning various types of allowances and compensation due to him. 6. On 17 July 1995 by the Lisichansk Town Court ordered the increase of the monthly payments due to the applicant in respect of compensation, allowances and medical expenses. It appears that the debtor institution complied with the judgment in part and in May 2000 discontinued payments due under the judgment. 7. On 31 March 2006 the Perm Regional Court of Russia allowed the applicant's request for compulsory execution of the above judgment in Russia as from May 2000. It was enforced on 30 March 2007. 8. The applicant sued the defendant institution for medical expenses, various types of allowances and compensation, as well as index-linking and arrears in the respective payments, and acquired several judgments by Russian courts in his favour listed in Appendixes I and II. 9. In course of the proceedings the defendant institution was replaced by the Federal Health Care Institution ""Hygiene and Epidemiology Center of the Perm Region and the Komi-Perm Autonomous Region"" and subsequently by Federal Health Care Institution ""Hygiene and Epidemiology Center of the Perm Region"", its legal successors. 10. He complained about non-enforcement to the Ministry of Finance, the prosecutor's office and various other authorities, but to no avail. 11. The judgments were enforced fully or in part on dates listed in Appendixes I and II. Some of them have not been enforced, as shown in the tables below.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,The applicant was able to engage in multiple trials., 287,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Kocaeli. 6. Following a dispute with a private third party, the applicant initiated compensation proceedings. 7. On 12 March 2009 the Tuzla Civil Court of General Jurisdiction granted the applicant compensation, amounting to 386,464.75 Turkish liras (TRY) (approximately 174,000 euros (EUR)). In the operative part of the judgment, the court indicated that the defendant party had to pay TRY 16,000 (approximately EUR 7,400) for court fees pursuant to the Law on Charges. The court registry accordingly sent a payment order to the defendant party. However, no payment was made. 8. On 18 May 2009 the applicant submitted a petition to the registry of the first instance court, requesting that the judgment be served on her in order to commence enforcement proceedings. On the same day, the court rejected the request on the ground that it was impossible under Section 28(1) (a) of the Law on Charges (Law no. 492) to serve a copy of the judgment unless the court costs that should have been born by the defendant party had been discharged. 9. At the time when the application was introduced, the applicant had therefore been unable to bring enforcement proceedings in order to have the above-mentioned judgment executed unless she herself was willing to pay the court fees that the defendant party had failed to pay. 10. Following the introduction of the present application with the Court, the domestic legislation was amended (see paragraphs 11-13 below), and subsequently the judgment in question was served on the applicant. In the absence of an appeal, the judgment became final on 17 October 2012. On 5 March 2013 the applicant initiated enforcement proceedings against her debtor. On 10 April 2013 the applicant further requested the enforcement office to place a lien on the debtor's property. According to the documents in the file, as of 14 April 2017 the debt, which is still not enforced, amounts to TRY 812,648.94 (approximately EUR 193,500) including the initial amount of compensation awarded by the domestic court plus interest running at statutory rate.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""entitled to a hearing,"" it appears that the applicant's right was threatened by her inability to bring enforcement proceedings without paying for defendant costs. ", 288,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Smolyan. 5. In two final judgments of 28 February 2005 and 8 May 2006 the Supreme Court of Cassation awarded the applicant pecuniary damages in respect of breach of contract for construction works which she had carried out. The awarded damages comprised BGN 52,784 for the principal amount, plus BGN 17,685 in default interest and BGN 5,433 in costs and expenses, or a total amount of BGN 75,902.93, the equivalent to 38,000 euros (EUR). The damages were awarded to the applicant against the National Centre for Recreation, Rehabilitation and Sport – Ministry of Education and Science (""the Centre"", a State body subsidised by the Ministry of Education and Science and exercising certain functions delegated by the Ministry). 6. By an order of 25 May 2005 the Minister of Education closed down the Centre and ordered that its remaining property be managed by the Ministry of Education. The Ministry then established a State-owned joint‑stock company with part of the Centre's property, including the real estate in which the applicant had carried out the construction works. 7. On 13 May 2005 and 15 March 2007 the applicant was issued with two writs of enforcement for the amounts awarded in the final judgments of 2005 and 2006 (see paragraph 5 above) and on 6 February 2008 she presented the writs to the Ministry of Education asking it to pay. 8. The Ministry replied in writing that it was not the successor to the Centre and did not owe payment to the applicant. In October 2009 the applicant reiterated her request but received a similar reply by the Ministry. The Ministry also pointed out that payment could not be sought from the State-owned joint-stock company either as it had a legal personality separate from that of the Ministry. By a letter of 23 September 2010, the Minister provided a similar explanation to the applicant. 9. The applicant brought judicial review proceedings challenging the Minister's refusal. In a final decision of 8 April 2011 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the appeal as inadmissible. 10. As of 19 March 2015, the date of the applicant's last communication to the Court, no change in the above circumstances had been reported.",Ruled as violated by court,,"8. The Ministry replied in writing that it was not the successor to the Centre and did not owe payment to the applicant. In October 2009 the applicant reiterated her request but received a similar reply by the Ministry. The Ministry also pointed out that payment could not be sought from the State-owned joint-stock company either as it had a legal personality separate from that of the Ministry. By a letter of 23 September 2010, the Minister provided a similar explanation to the applicant. 10. As of 19 March 2015, the date of the applicant's last communication to the Court, no change in the above circumstances had been reported.",FALSE,0,The applicant was able to bring proceedings., 289,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in İzmir. 5. In March 2002, the applicant, who was a working as a civil servant, was dismissed due gross misconduct. He applied to the administrative courts to have the annulment of that decision. In the course of the proceedings, on 4 July 2006 Law no. 5525, granting amnesty to civil servants who had been subjected to disciplinary proceedings, entered into force. Accordingly, in the light of this new amnesty law, on 10 April 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court decided that there was no need to examine the merits of the case. 6. In the meantime, on 30 September 2005 the criminal proceedings initiated against the applicant had ended with the decision of the criminal court, convicting him of abuse of office. 7. Following the entry into force of the amnesty law, the applicant applied to the administration and asked to be reinstated. His request was refused on 19 December 2006. The applicant initiated proceedings to have the annulment of that decision. 8. By a decision dated 8 January 2008, the Ankara Administrative Court found in line with the applicant's claims and decided to annul the decision of the authorities by which they had refused to reinstate the applicant. 9. Following appeal, the case was transferred before the Supreme Administrative Court. In the course of the proceedings, the Chief Public Prosecutor at the Supreme Administrative Court filed his written opinion. This opinion included substantial grounds on the merits of the case with a proposal to quash the decision of the first instance court. On 25 May 2009, relying also on the opinion of the Chief Public Prosecutor, the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the decision of 8 January 2008. In particular, the appeal court referred to its previous leading case which had been delivered on 17 October 2008 on a similar case and held that the amnesty law did not put an obligation on the administration to reinstate the applicant. 10. The case was accordingly remitted before the Ankara Administrative Court. On 9 October 2009 the first instance court adhered to the judgment of the appeal court and dismissed the applicant's case. This decision was served on the applicant on 13 November 2009.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears, with the multiple closings and reopenings, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 290,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Riga. 6. On 17 October 2000 the Medical Commission for the Assessment of Health and Fitness for Work (Veselības un darbspēju ekspertīzes ārstu komisija) granted the applicant a disability status of category 3 (the least severe level of disability) on the grounds of a visual impairment. 7. On 16 October 2001 following an examination the Medical Commission for the Assessment of Health and Fitness for Work declined the applicant's request to prolong her disability status. 8. On 9 November 2001 this decision was upheld by the State Medical Commission for the Assessment of Health and Fitness for Work (Veselības un darbspēju ekspertīzes ārstu valsts komisija, hereinafter ‑ the Commission) and on 5 December 2001 by an extended composition of that Commission. 9. The applicant challenged the decision of the Commission before a court. On 22 April 2002 the Riga City Zemgale District Court declined the claim. The applicant appealed. 10. On 30 July 2004 the Regional Administrative Court annulled the decision of 5 December 2001 due to lack of reasoning and ordered the Commission to carry out a new examination. On 30 November 2004 this judgment was upheld by the Administrative Cases Division of the Supreme Court. 11. On 11 January 2005, following a new examination by an extended composition, the Commission again refused to grant the applicant the status of a disabled person. 12. On 9 January 2006 the applicant brought a claim to the Administrative District Court challenging the Commission's decision and requesting to be granted the status of a disabled person from 16 October 2001. 13. On 29 September 2006 the Administrative District Court declined the applicant's claim. This judgment was upheld by the Regional Administrative Court. 14. The Administrative Cases Division of the Supreme Court two times quashed the judgments of the Regional Administrative Court for its failure to follow the interpretation of the domestic law given by the Supreme Court. 15. On 24 November 2010 the Regional Administrative Court declined the applicant's claim, and on 14 March 2011 the Administrative Cases Division of the Supreme Court refused to institute cassation proceedings.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears, with the multiple closings and reopenings, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 291,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1976 and is serving a sentence of life imprisonment. 5. In December 2005 violent robberies were committed at two scrap metal collection points in Odesa. One employee was shot dead. In the course of the investigation, the police organised an ambush, which led to the applicant and his acquaintance, Mr D., being arrested. As established by the domestic courts, before his arrest the applicant had pointed a gun at a police officer, who had knocked it out of his hands using a martial arts technique. The gun had been loaded and had had its safety catch released. 6. On an unspecified date the applicant had free legal counsel appointed for him for the pre-trial investigation and the proceedings before the first‑instance court. 7. On 4 September 2006 the Odesa Regional Court of Appeal, sitting as a court of first instance, found the applicant guilty of the illegal handling of arms, robbery with violence, intentional murder for profit and an attempt on the life of a law-enforcement officer. It relied, inter alia, on the statements of several eyewitnesses who had recognised the applicant. Having regard to the fact that the applicant had previously been convicted of the intentional infliction of fatal injuries and that he had committed the crimes at issue while on probation following release in October 2005, the court sentenced him to life imprisonment. 8. The applicant, who was no longer legally represented, appealed in cassation. He complained, in particular, about the absence of free legal assistance at that stage of the proceedings. The applicant contended that the first-instance court had erred in its assessment of the facts of the case and their legal classification. 9. On 30 January 2007, following a hearing with the participation of Mr D. (the other defendant) and his lawyer, as well as the prosecutor, but without the applicant or any representative from his side, the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 4 September 2006. 10. On 11 June 2007 the applicant, who was not aware of the above ruling, requested that the Supreme Court ensure his presence at its hearing. 11. On 17 August 2007 a copy of the Supreme Court's ruling of 30 January 2007 was sent to the applicant.",Ruled as violated by court,,"10. On 11 June 2007 the applicant, who was not aware of the above ruling, requested that the Supreme Court ensure his presence at its hearing.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""defending oneself,"" it appears that the applicant was denied this right, as he wanted to appear at the hearing but was not allowed prior.", 292,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1984 and is currently being detained in a correctional colony in the village of Torbeyevo, Mordovia Republic, Russia. 6. On 21 April 2005 the applicant was convicted during a public hearing of murder and was sentenced to imprisonment. He and his lawyer had had thirty-five minutes to study the case file, which consisted of five volumes. The conviction was upheld on appeal in a public hearing on 18 August 2005 (""the 2005 proceedings""). 7. On 30 July 2010 the appeal judgment was quashed by way of a supervisory review (on grounds not related to the applicant's Article 6 complaints in respect of the 2005 proceedings) as the applicant's right to defence had been breached during the appeal hearing. The case was sent for fresh examination on appeal. 8. The applicant was allowed to re-read the case file within the new appeal proceedings. He and his lawyer had five days, from 4 to 8 October 2010, to study the now six-volume case file (about 1,500 pages) in remand prison no. IZ-24/1 in Krasnoyarsk, where the applicant was being detained. The applicant was allegedly held in a metal cage while studying the case, without a table or any other facilities to take notes. After studying the case file both the applicant and the lawyer filed appeals. In his appeal statements the applicant analysed the case materials in detail, referred extensively to all the main items of evidence, including expert opinions and witness testimony, and referred to exact pages in the case file. 9. The applicant's case was examined by the Supreme Court of Russia (""the Supreme Court"") over four hearings, three of which (21 October, 30 November and 16 December 2010), according to the trial record and the court's procedural decisions, were held in camera. The case file did not contain any formal decision by the Supreme Court to close the hearings to the public. The applicant was represented by two lawyers who confirmed to the court that they had had enough time to study the case file. 10. On 16 December 2010 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 21 April 2005. The Supreme Court's judgment was delivered to the remand prison, where the applicant was still being detained, on 11 January 2011 (""the 2010 proceedings"").",Ruled as violated by court,,"9. The applicant's case was examined by the Supreme Court of Russia (""the Supreme Court"") over four hearings, three of which (21 October, 30 November and 16 December 2010), according to the trial record and the court's procedural decisions, were held in camera. The case file did not contain any formal decision by the Supreme Court to close the hearings to the public. The applicant was represented by two lawyers who confirmed to the court that they had had enough time to study the case file.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""adequate time and facilities,"" it does not appear the applicant and their lawyer received adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence.", 293,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Chişinău. 6. The applicant had a dispute with H. over ownership of a house. He brought a claim against H. seeking acknowledgement of his property rights, as his father's heir, and H.'s eviction from the house. H. lodged a counterclaim, seeking acknowledgement of her property rights to the house as she had built it. 7. On 20 December 2007 the Buiucani District Court dismissed H.'s counterclaim and allowed the applicant's claim in full. H. lodged an appeal. On 20 May 2008 the Chișinău Court of Appeal upheld the earlier judgment and dismissed H.'s appeal. H. did not attend the appellate hearing, even though the summons had been repeatedly sent to the address she had provided in her appeal. A registered letter was returned with a note stating that H. did not live at the address indicated by her. The judgment became final after the expiry of the two-month time-limit for lodging an appeal on points of law. 8. On 11 May 2009 H. lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court of Justice, stating that she had only learned of the judgment of 20 May 2008 on 23 April 2009. In her application, she indicated the same address as in the proceedings before the Court of Appeal. The applicant asked the Supreme Court of Justice to dismiss the appeal as being lodged outside the legal time-limit. He submitted that since it had been H. who had lodged the appeal with the Chişinău Court of Appeal, it had been her duty to enquire about the progress of the proceedings and not to wait for a year before doing so. 9. On 16 October 2009 the Supreme Court of Justice allowed H.'s appeal on points of law, quashed the previous judgments and delivered a new judgment on the merits of the case dividing the disputed house into equal shares between the applicant and H. The court argued that the appeal had not been lodged outside the time-limit because H. had not attended the hearing before the Court of Appeal and there was nothing in the file to suggest that that court had informed her of the availability of the full judgment. The court concluded that without any evidence of the date when H. had learned of the judgment, her appeal was considered to have been submitted on time. The judgment was final.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""public judgment,"" it appears that H. was not sufficiently notified of the judgment, as the final court argued.", 294,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Ankara. 5. The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Ankara. On an unspecified date, the applicant brought a case before the Ankara Administrative Court against the Çankaya Municipality and the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality for the annulment of the construction permit pertaining to a neighboring building which was being built opposite his apartment. 6. On 14 December 1999 the Ankara Administrative Court accepted the applicant's request and revoked the construction permit based on a breach of height restrictions. According to this judgment, the building in question was constructed 1.48 meters higher than the norm that was laid down in the zoning plan in force. 7. On 17 February 2000 the Çankaya municipal executive committee (belediye encümeni) ordered the demolition of the illegally constructed part of the building in order to comply with the administrative court's judgment. However, it did not implement the said decision. 8. On 19 November 2001 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the administrative court's judgment. 9. In the meantime, on 3 August 2001 the Çankaya municipal council (belediye meclisi) amended the zoning plan and sent its decision to the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality for approval. 10. On 26 October 2001 the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality withheld its approval, holding that the zoning plan had been amended with the aim of legalizing the previously revoked building permit and thereby avoiding the demolition of the illegal construction. 11. On 5 December 2001 the Çankaya municipal council insisted in its previous decision and the amended zoning plan thus came into force. 12. Subsequently on 31 December 2001 the applicant brought a case before the Ankara Administrative Court for the annulment of the Çankaya municipal council's decision of 5 December 2001. 13. On 31 March 2003 the Ankara Administrative Court annulled the said decision for, inter alia, encouraging unlicensed construction practices. 14. On 21 February 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the administrative court's decision and on 18 October 2005 it rejected the Çankaya Municipality's rectification request. This decision was served on the applicant on 13 December 2005.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,There is no relevance between fair trial and resulting construction decisions., 295,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Belgrade. 6. On 15 June 2004 the applicant was injured in a traffic accident. He suffered severe serious injuries. An investigation into this incident was initiated in November 2004 and terminated in May 2005, with no criminal charges being brought. 7. On 10 June 2005 the applicant lodged a civil claim for non-pecuniary damages with the Second Municipal Court in Belgrade against the Belgrade City's Transportation Company (Gradsko saobraċajno preduzeċe Beograd). 8. On 27 December 2007 the Second Municipal Court ruled in the applicant's favour. On 3 July 2008 the District Court quashed the decision and remitted the case to the first instance. 9. On 23 October 2009 the Second Municipal Court adopted a partial decision (delimičnu presudu) against which the applicant and the defendant appealed on 7 December 2009 and 10 December 2009, respectively. 10. On 30 September 2010 the Court of Appeals in Belgrade quashed the decision and remitted the case to the Court of First Instance for a re-trial. 11. In the meantime, on 22 December 2009, the applicant lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court complaining under Article 32 of the Constitution (a provision which corresponds to Article 6 of the Convention) about the overall fairness of domestic proceedings and their length. The Constitutional Court's decision was rendered on 4 November 2010. No violation in respect of the applicant's complaints was found. 12. Due to applicant's change to the value of the dispute (vrednost spora), on 31 October 2010 the Court of First Instance ruled that it had no further jurisdiction to examine the applicant's complaint. The case was then sent to the High Court in Belgrade. 13. On 20 June 2013 the High Court adopted a partial judgment against which the applicant and the defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals in Belgrade. 14. On 6 June 2014 the Court of Appeals partly quashed the impugned judgment. 15. It would appear that the case is still pending before the High Court. 16. Additionally, on 28 October 2014 the applicant lodged a new submission with the Constitutionals Court concerning, inter alia, the length of the impugned proceedings. It would appear from the facts of the case that the Constitutional Court has not yet responded.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 296,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Nizhniy Novgorod. 6. On 25 October 2002 the Military Court of the Vladikavkaz Garrison (""the Military Court"") ordered, inter alia, the head of the respondent military institute to re-calculate the period of the applicant's service, applying the favourable terms of such calculation for a specified period of service. The applicant was also awarded some additional allowances and payments for certain periods. 7. The judgment came into force on 5 November 2002. 8. On 3 March 2003 the Military Court issued a writ of execution. On 4 August 2003 the bailiffs' service instituted the enforcement proceedings. 9. On 19 September 2003 the enforcement proceedings were terminated and the writ of execution was returned to the applicant, as the debt could not be recovered. 10. On 13 November 2003 the head of the respondent military institute issued Order No. 463 requiring to make payments in accordance with the judgment of 25 October 2002. However, no calculations or payments were made at that time. 11. On 4 February 2005 the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the Federal Treasury. 12. On 18 May 2005 the writ was returned to the applicant on the ground that the judgment obliged an official of an organisation to take certain actions rather than ordered to recover payments from a budgetary organisation. Thus, the writ of execution was to be submitted to the bailiffs' service. 13. On an unspecified date in 2005 the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the bailiffs' service. 14. On 14 April 2006 the writ of execution was returned to the applicant from the bailiffs' service without enforcement. The bailiffs explained that for the applicant to be able to receive the payments under the judgment, he should obtain a writ of execution stating the sum of the debt to be recovered. After that, the writ could be submitted to the Federal Treasury for enforcement. 15. In 2005 in accordance with Order No. 463, the defendant military institute calculated the amounts due to the applicant as follows: the compensation for the supplementary ration for the period from October 1998 until March 2000 –11,341.85 Russian roubles (RUB); allowance for special regime of the service in 1998-2002 – RUB 2,720.1; and special allowance – RUB 327,000. In total: RUB 341,061.95.",Ruled as violated by court,,"8. On 3 March 2003 the Military Court issued a writ of execution. On 4 August 2003 the bailiffs' service instituted the enforcement proceedings. 9. On 19 September 2003 the enforcement proceedings were terminated and the writ of execution was returned to the applicant, as the debt could not be recovered. 10. On 13 November 2003 the head of the respondent military institute issued Order No. 463 requiring to make payments in accordance with the judgment of 25 October 2002. However, no calculations or payments were made at that time. 11. On 4 February 2005 the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the Federal Treasury. 12. On 18 May 2005 the writ was returned to the applicant on the ground that the judgment obliged an official of an organisation to take certain actions rather than ordered to recover payments from a budgetary organisation. Thus, the writ of execution was to be submitted to the bailiffs' service. 13. On an unspecified date in 2005 the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the bailiffs' service. 14. On 14 April 2006 the writ of execution was returned to the applicant from the bailiffs' service without enforcement. The bailiffs explained that for the applicant to be able to receive the payments under the judgment, he should obtain a writ of execution stating the sum of the debt to be recovered. After that, the writ could be submitted to the Federal Treasury for enforcement. 15. In 2005 in accordance with Order No. 463, the defendant military institute calculated the amounts due to the applicant as follows: the compensation for the supplementary ration for the period from October 1998 until March 2000 –11,341.85 Russian roubles (RUB); allowance for special regime of the service in 1998-2002 – RUB 2,720.1; and special allowance – RUB 327,000. In total: RUB 341,061.95.",FALSE,0,There is no relevance between fair trial and debt recovery., 297,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Tuzla. 6. By judgment of the Mostar Municipal Court of 18 June 2009, which became final on 16 December 2010, company R. was ordered to reinstate the applicant in his previous employment, as well as to pay him a total amount of 16,314 convertible marks (BAM)[1], together with default interest calculated from 20 March 2007 until final payment. The respondent company was further ordered to pay the applicant BAM 2,641 in respect of legal costs, together with default interest calculated from 18 June 2009 until final payment. Lastly, the respondent company was ordered to cover all pension-related contributions in respect of the applicant between 1 January 2003 and 17 January 2007. 7. On 17 October 2011 the Municipal Court issued a writ of execution (rješenje o izvršenju) in this regard. 8. On 23 February 2012, upon the applicant's request, the Municipal Court amended its decision of 17 October 2011 by changing the object of enforcement. 9. On 16 January 2012 the Municipal Court requested the respondent to indicate why it had not reinstated the applicant. On 23 January 2012 it fined the respondent in this connection. 10. On 1 February 2013 the Municipal Court joined the enforcement proceedings in the applicant's case with an earlier enforcement procedure against the respondent. 11. On 25 June 2014 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina found a violation of the applicant's right to enforcement within a reasonable time, and ordered the Municipal Court to urgently finalise the enforcement proceedings. The Constitutional Court considered this to be sufficient just satisfaction and rejected the applicant's claim for non-pecuniary damage. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant on 15 August 2014. 12. On 18 March 2015 the Municipal Court ordered the sale of the respondent's property. On 27 April 2015 it transferred the respondent's real estate to company H., the highest ranked judgment creditor. The applicant did not lodge an appeal against this decision. 13. On 29 March 2016 the Mostar Cantonal Court quashed the decision of the Municipal Court of 27 April 2015 and remitted the case for reconsideration. 14. According to the latest information provided by the parties on 28 July 2017, on that date the enforcement proceedings in the applicant's case were still pending.",Ruled as violated by court,,"11. On 25 June 2014 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina found a violation of the applicant's right to enforcement within a reasonable time, and ordered the Municipal Court to urgently finalise the enforcement proceedings. The Constitutional Court considered this to be sufficient just satisfaction and rejected the applicant's claim for non-pecuniary damage. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant on 15 August 2014. 12. On 18 March 2015 the Municipal Court ordered the sale of the respondent's property. On 27 April 2015 it transferred the respondent's real estate to company H., the highest ranked judgment creditor. The applicant did not lodge an appeal against this decision. 13. On 29 March 2016 the Mostar Cantonal Court quashed the decision of the Municipal Court of 27 April 2015 and remitted the case for reconsideration. 14. According to the latest information provided by the parties on 28 July 2017, on that date the enforcement proceedings in the applicant's case were still pending.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears, according to the Constitutional Court, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time.", 298,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The facts, as submitted by the parties, are similar to those in Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, §§ 12-41, 24 May 2011). 5. The applicants or their close relatives participated in demonstrations and were injured or killed by gunfire during the events of December 1989 in Bucharest, Slobozia, Târgoviște and Reșița, which led to the fall of the communist regime. 6. In 1990 the military prosecutor's offices from several cities opened on their own motion criminal investigations into the use of violence against the demonstrators. The applicants' injury and their close relatives' deaths were investigated along with most of the cases in a main criminal investigation recorded in file no. 97/P/1990 (current no. 11/P/2014). 7. The most important procedural steps were mentioned in Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others (cited above, §§ 12-41) and in Sidea and Others v. Romania ([Committee] no. 889/15, §§ 8-11, 5 June 2018). Subsequent relevant developments of the criminal investigation are as follows. 8. On 1 November 2016 the military prosecutor ordered the initiation in rem of a criminal investigation for the offence of crimes against humanity in respect of the same circumstances of fact. Up to February 2017 further steps were taken in gathering information from domestic authorities, the prosecutor's office contacting 211 civil parties, questioning members of the political party which took over the presidency at the time of events, planning the taking of evidence from military officers and other participants in the events, verifying the activity of the relevant military units and the audio/video recordings broadcast by radio and television. 9. From March 2017 the military prosecutor examined military and civilian archives, including the vast archives of the Romanian Senate. They also viewed and transcribed more than 400 hours of audio/video recordings. They proceeded with the re-examination of several witnesses. They questioned military personnel involved in the December 1989 military operations and fifty-one members of the political party which ruled at the time and of other authorities. They verified the documents indicating the military units' actions from that period. 10. At the date of the latest information communicated by the parties to the Court (29 March 2018), the criminal investigation was still ongoing.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"6. In 1990 the military prosecutor's offices from several cities opened on their own motion criminal investigations into the use of violence against the demonstrators. The applicants' injury and their close relatives' deaths were investigated along with most of the cases in a main criminal investigation recorded in file no. 97/P/1990 (current no. 11/P/2014). 10. At the date of the latest information communicated by the parties to the Court (29 March 2018), the criminal investigation was still ongoing.",FALSE,0,There is no relevance between fair trial and ongoing criminal investigation., 299,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1982 and is detained in Labytnangi, Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region. 5. On 22 May 2008 the applicant arrived at the IK-8 correctional colony, Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region. 6. On 31 March 2008 the applicant's wife instituted divorce proceedings. 7. On 9 April 2008 the Justice of the Peace of Circuit no. 2 of the Krasnosulinskiy District of the Rostov Region (""Justice of the Peace"") sent a letter rogatory to the courts of Tyumen Region, asking them to interview the applicant and to establish whether he wished to attend the hearing in person. 8. On 22 April 2008 the Tyumen Regional Division of the Judicial Department received the letter. 9. On 4 July 2008 a Justice of the Peace in Labytnangi fixed an interview with the applicant for 18 July 2008 and sent two summonses to his home address, which his wife had listed in her statement of claim. Both summonses were returned undelivered. 10. On 10 September 2009 the Tyumen courts informed the Justice of the Peace that it had been impossible to reach the applicant. On the same day the Justice of the Peace decided to hold a hearing in the applicant's absence, noting that although the applicant had his registered residence at the address mentioned by the plaintiff, he had not appeared for an interview before the Justice of the Peace. 11. On 18 September 2008 the Justice of the Peace granted the divorce. On the same day a copy of the decision was sent to the applicant's home address. 12. On 20 November 2013, the applicant learnt of the judgment of 18 September 2008. He asked for an extension of the time-limit for lodging an appeal against it. He argued that he had never received the judgment of 18 September 2008 and that he had been previously unaware of the divorce proceedings. 13. On 26 December 2013 the Justice of the Peace heard evidence from the applicant's former wife who claimed that the applicant should have been aware of the divorce proceedings in 2008 because his mother had received the final judgment of 18 September 2008. The Justice of the Peace held that an excerpt of the judgment had been served on the applicant in person on 31 October 2008 and refused the applicant's application to extend the time limit for lodging an appeal. The hearing was held in the applicant's absence. The applicant lodged an appeal against the decision. 14. On 15 May 2014 the Krasnosulinskiy District Court of Rostov Region upheld the decision of 26 December 2013, again in his absence.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""public judgment,"" it appears that the applicant was not sufficiently notified of the judgment.", 300,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Bijela, Montenegro. 5. On 1 March 2012 the Herceg Novi First Instance Court rendered a judgment in favour of the applicant and ordered the applicant's employer ""Vektra Boka"" AD Herceg Novi (hereinafter ""the debtor"") to carry out a re‑allocation of plots for the construction of apartments. This judgment became final on 21 December 2012. 6. On 15 January 2013 the applicant requested enforcement of the above judgment and the Herceg Novi First Instance Court issued an enforcement order on 31 January 2013. 7. On 12 June 2015 the Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor. 8. On 28 January 2016 the Herceg Novi First Instance Court transferred the case to the Commercial Court for further action. 9. On 22 March 2016 the Commercial Court suspended (obustavio) the enforcement due to the opening of the insolvency proceedings, which decision became final on 11 May 2016. 10. The judgement in question remains unenforced to the present day. 11. On 8 February 2013 the applicant instituted administrative proceedings seeking, on the basis of the above judgment, the removal of competing titles from the Land Register. 12. On 29 July 2015 the Real Estate Directorate terminated (prekinuo) the administrative proceedings because the Commercial Court had commenced insolvency proceeding in respect of the debtor. 13. On 7 September 2015 the applicant submitted an objection against the above decision. This objection was rejected as being out of time by the Real Estate Directorate on 5 October 2015. 14. The administrative proceedings are still pending. 15. On an unspecified day in 2003, the applicant instituted separate civil proceedings against the debtor, as his former employer, seeking reinstatement and damages. Following three remittals, on 3 March 2014 the Herceg Novi First Instance Court rendered a judgment in the applicant's favour. 16. On 22 September 2015 the High Court upheld this judgment on the merits, but quashed it as regards the costs. 17. On 31 October 2016 the Herceg Novi First Instance Court transferred the case to the Commercial Court for further action due to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor. 18. On 22 February 2017 the Commercial Court ruled partly in favour of the applicant regarding the costs. 19. The parties did not inform the Court about when the Commercial Court's decision became final and was served on the applicant.",Ruled as violated by court,"5. On 1 March 2012 the Herceg Novi First Instance Court rendered a judgment in favour of the applicant and ordered the applicant's employer ""Vektra Boka"" AD Herceg Novi (hereinafter ""the debtor"") to carry out a re‑allocation of plots for the construction of apartments. This judgment became final on 21 December 2012. 18. On 22 February 2017 the Commercial Court ruled partly in favour of the applicant regarding the costs. 19. The parties did not inform the Court about when the Commercial Court's decision became final and was served on the applicant.","15. On an unspecified day in 2003, the applicant instituted separate civil proceedings against the debtor, as his former employer, seeking reinstatement and damages. Following three remittals, on 3 March 2014 the Herceg Novi First Instance Court rendered a judgment in the applicant's favour. 18. On 22 February 2017 the Commercial Court ruled partly in favour of the applicant regarding the costs. 19. The parties did not inform the Court about when the Commercial Court's decision became final and was served on the applicant.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 301,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Bucharest. 5. During the events which led to the fall of the communist regime in Bucharest, on 21 December 1989, the applicant suffered injuries caused by impingement and compression, as a result of which she needed 50 days of medical care, her life not being imperilled. 6. In 1990 the military prosecutor's office opened, of its own motion, several investigations into the ill-treatment and injuries suffered by those participating in the events of December 1989. The main criminal investigation was recorded in file no. 97/P/1990 (currently no. 11/P/2014). As regards the applicant, an investigation was opened under a separate file and she gave a statement as a witness on 23 June 1994. Her case has been further examined at a later date in the main criminal investigation. 7. The most important procedural steps were described in the case Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, §§ 12-41, 24 May 2011), and also in Sidea and Others v. Romania ([Committee] no. 889/15 and 38 others, §§ 8-11, 5 June 2018). Subsequent relevant domestic decisions are referred to below. 8. On 14 October 2015 the military prosecutor's office closed the main investigation, finding that the complaint regarding the offence of attempted homicide committed against the applicant was statute-barred. This decision was annulled by a Prosecutor General's decision of 5 April 2016, confirmed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 13 June 2016. It was noted that the investigation under file no. 11/P/2014 was incomplete and that the facts could not be established based on the evidence gathered up to that date. 9. On 1 November 2016 the military prosecutor ordered the opening of a criminal investigation in rem for the offence of crimes against humanity in respect of the same factual circumstances. Up to February 2017 further steps were taken to gather information from domestic authorities: the prosecutor's office contacted 211 civil parties, questioning members of the political party which took over the presidency at the time of the events, planning the hearing of military officers and other participants in the events, and verifying the activity of the relevant military units and the audio/video recordings broadcast by radio and television. 10. At the date of the latest information available to the Court (see Sidea and Others, cited above, § 11), the criminal investigation was still ongoing.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"5. During the events which led to the fall of the communist regime in Bucharest, on 21 December 1989, the applicant suffered injuries caused by impingement and compression, as a result of which she needed 50 days of medical care, her life not being imperilled. 6. In 1990 the military prosecutor's office opened, of its own motion, several investigations into the ill-treatment and injuries suffered by those participating in the events of December 1989. The main criminal investigation was recorded in file no. 97/P/1990 (currently no. 11/P/2014). As regards the applicant, an investigation was opened under a separate file and she gave a statement as a witness on 23 June 1994. Her case has been further examined at a later date in the main criminal investigation.",FALSE,0,There is no relevance between fair trial and ongoing criminal investigation., 302,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Orhei. 5. In September 2009 the applicant initiated civil proceedings against a company which was in process of insolvency. 6. On 18 December 2009 the Drochia District Court found in favour of the applicant and ordered the defendant company to pay him 24,957 Moldovan Lei (MDL) (the equivalent of 1,413 euros (EUR)) for pecuniary damage and MDL 749 (the equivalent of EUR 42) for costs and expenses. The representative of the defendant company was not present at the hearing. 7. On 28 December 2009 the secretariat of the Drochia District Court sent a copy of the reasoned judgment to the defendant company by ordinary mail. 8. On 11 January 2010 an enforcement writ was issued to the applicant by the same court in respect of the judgment of 18 December 2009. 9. On 10 February 2010, in a different set of proceedings concerning the insolvency of the defendant company, the company's insolvency administrator updated the list of creditors by making express reference to the judgment of 18 December 2009 and to the exact amounts awarded in that judgment. The court which treated the insolvency issued a decision concerning the updated list of creditors on the same date. 10. On 26 April 2010 the insolvency administrator of the defendant company lodged an appeal against the judgment of 18 December 2009. The applicant objected to the appeal by arguing that it had been time-barred. He indicated that the time-limit for lodging the appeal had expired twenty days after the serving of the impugned judgment and that the insolvency administrator of the defendant company had been aware of the judgment of 18 December 2009 since in February 2010 he had informed the court dealing with the insolvency proceedings about the judgment in question. 11. On 28 September 2010 the Bălţi Court of Appeal admitted the appeal lodged by the insolvency administrator of the defendant company and quashed the judgment of 18 December 2009. The Court of Appeal did respond to the objection raised by the applicant and, after re-examining the merits of the case, dismissed the applicant's action against the defendant company. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law raising the same arguments as in his appeal. 12. On 26 January 2011 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant's appeal on points of law and upheld the judgment of the lower court. The Supreme Court did not make any comment about the applicant's objection concerning the late appeal.",Ruled as violated by court,,"9. On 10 February 2010, in a different set of proceedings concerning the insolvency of the defendant company, the company's insolvency administrator updated the list of creditors by making express reference to the judgment of 18 December 2009 and to the exact amounts awarded in that judgment. The court which treated the insolvency issued a decision concerning the updated list of creditors on the same date.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""fair and public trial,"" it appears that the defendant company not appearing at the hearing threatens this right.", 303,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Podgorica. 6. On 6 September 2003 the applicant lodged an application with the Commission for Restitution (Komisija za restituciju nepokretnosti) in Berane requesting restitution of the property expropriated from his father in 1969. 7. Following the adoption of a new Restitution Act (Zakon o povraćaju oduzetih imovinskih prava i obeštećenju), on 28 December 2005, the applicant submitted another application to the newly established Commission for Restitution and Compensation in Berane (Komisija za povraćaj oduzetih imovinskih prava i obeštećenja) requesting compensation. 8. In 2008 all the Commissions for Restitution and Compensation were consolidated into three regional Commissions in Bar, Bijelo Polje and Podgorica. Due to the location of the expropriated property, the applicant's request was assigned to the Commission with its seat in Bijelo Polje (hereinafter ""the Commission""). 9. On 19 February 2009 the applicant sought opinion from an independent expert regarding the expropriated property. 10. On 21 July 2009 the Commission also requested an assessment report on the expropriated property. The report was submitted to the Commission on 24 July 2009. 11. Due to Commission's inactivity, on 4 September 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal (žalba zbog ćutanja uprave) with the Appeals Commission (Komisija za žalbe u postupku za povraćaj imovinskog prava ili obeštećenja). 12. On 23 October 2009 and 5 December 2013 the applicant filed complaints with the Ministry of Finance and the Administrative Court, respectively, about the Appeals Commission's inactivity. 13. On 24 December 2013 the Appeals Commission ordered the Commission to decide on the applicant's request within a period of 30 days. 14. On 13 October 2014 the Commission ruled against the applicant. 15. On 23 December 2014 the Appeals Commission upheld that decision on appeal. 16. The applicant filed and action with the Administrative Court seeking redress. 17. On 17 April 2015 the Administrative Court rejected the applicant's claim as unfounded. This decision was served on the applicant on 23 April 2015. 18. On 23 June 2015 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. On 24 July 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected his appeal for failure to make proper use of other available domestic remedies. According to the Constitutional Court, the applicant should first have made use of an additional request for the judicial review of his case (zahtjev za vanredno preispitivanje sudske odluke).",Ruled as violated by court,,"11. Due to Commission's inactivity, on 4 September 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal (žalba zbog ćutanja uprave) with the Appeals Commission (Komisija za žalbe u postupku za povraćaj imovinskog prava ili obeštećenja). 17. On 17 April 2015 the Administrative Court rejected the applicant's claim as unfounded. This decision was served on the applicant on 23 April 2015. 18. On 23 June 2015 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. On 24 July 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected his appeal for failure to make proper use of other available domestic remedies. According to the Constitutional Court, the applicant should first have made use of an additional request for the judicial review of his case (zahtjev za vanredno preispitivanje sudske odluke).",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 304,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicants are a family comprising the husband and wife (the first and second applicants) and their child (the third applicant). They were born in 1976, 1978 and 2001 respectively and live in Kayseri. 5. On 9 August 2001, the second applicant was admitted to a State Hospital in Niğde. She gave birth to the third applicant who has irreversible injuries caused by an intervention performed by that hospital's medical staff during labor. 6. In their report of 12 May 2004, the Forensic Medicine Institute concluded that the two members of the medical staff who tended to the labor were equally and solely at fault for the third applicant's injuries. 7. On 1 December 2004, the first and second applicants on their own and on behalf of the third applicant, submitted a claim to the Ministry of Health for compensation arising from the third applicant's injuries. 8. Following the tacit dismissal of the claim by the administrative authorities, the applicants brought an action for damages before the Konya Administrative Court on 2 February 2005. They claimed 30,000 Turkish liras (TRY) in respect of pecuniary damage and TRY 100,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 9. In the course of the proceedings, the domestic court decided proprio motu to seek an expert report to determine the amount of pecuniary damage suffered by the applicants. In his report submitted on 14 June 2006 to the court, the expert assessed the amount of pecuniary damage suffered by the applicants to have been TRY 194,916. 10. On 27 June 2006, the applicants requested to increase the amount of their claim for pecuniary damage in the light of the expert report. 11. On 6 July 2006 the court ruled in favour of the applicants and awarded them the full amount of their initial claims in respect of pecuniary damage, namely TRY 30,000 plus interest running from the date of lodging their claims with the Ministry of Health. It further awarded them a total of TRY 50,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and interest running from the date of the lawsuit. The applicants' request to increase their claim for pecuniary damage were dismissed by the court which considered itself bound by the initial claim indicated by the applicants when they lodged their case. 12. The applicants' ensuing appeals were dismissed by the Supreme Administrative Court on 16 June 2009 and 28 December 2010 respectively. 13. On 22 January 2010, the Ministry of Health paid the applicants a total of TRY 144,144. Approximately TRY 53,830 of that sum represented statutory interest accrued on the principal judgment award.",Ruled as violated by court,,"13. On 22 January 2010, the Ministry of Health paid the applicants a total of TRY 144,144. Approximately TRY 53,830 of that sum represented statutory interest accrued on the principal judgment award.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicants did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 305,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicants were born in 1976 and 1982 and live in Khust and Kharkiv respectively. 6. The first applicant lodged a claim against a social security authority, seeking an increase in the amount of child allowance she was receiving. A first-instance court allowed her claim in part. That judgment was upheld on appeal but the social security authority lodged a further appeal on points of law. 7. On 6 November 2012 the Higher Administrative Court (""the HAC""), having examined the appeal, quashed the lower courts' judgments and dismissed the applicant's claim. 8. The second applicant moved from the territory of the Republic of Moldova controlled by the so‑called ""Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria"" (""MRT"") (see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, ECHR 2004‑VII) to Ukraine to take up permanent residence. Under domestic law, repatriating Ukrainians were entitled to the tax-free and duty-free import of their foreign-registered vehicles. However, the customs office refused to apply this tax exemption in the applicant's case on the grounds that the car had not been registered by the appropriate authorities of the Republic of Moldova. She challenged this refusal before the administrative courts. A first-instance court allowed her claim and ordered the customs office to clear her car through customs. That judgment was upheld on appeal but the customs office lodged a further appeal on points of law. 9. On 4 April 2013 the HAC allowed the appeal, quashed the lower courts' decisions and dismissed the applicant's claim. 10. Both applicants alleged that the HAC, contrary to domestic law (see paragraph 11 below), had not sent them copies of the appeals lodged in their cases or informed them of the pending appeals by any other means, thus depriving them of an opportunity to respond. They alleged that they had only learned of the appeal proceedings when they had been served with the HAC's final decisions quashing the lower courts' decisions in their favour. 11. As worded at the relevant time, Articles 214 and 215 of the 2005 Code of Administrative Justice provided that a HAC judge-rapporteur would decide, having considered an appeal, whether to initiate proceedings to review the lower courts' decisions on points of law. If the judge decided to initiate such proceedings, he or she was required to inform the parties of that decision and serve a copy of the appeal on the opposing party with a time-limit for responding. 12. The relevant provisions of the Code concerning the procedure for serving court documents are summarised in Lazarenko and Others v. Ukraine (nos. 70329/12 and 5 others, § 15, 27 June 2017).",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""fair and public trial,"" it appears that HAC not informing the applicants of appeals threatens this right.", 306,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Melitopol. 6. Between 2004 and 2006 the applicant was head of Melitopol City Council's Disadvantaged Persons' Welfare Centre (Центр по обслуговуванню одиноких, непрацездатних та малозабезпечених громадян Управління праці, соціального захисту та житлових субсидій Мелітопольської міської Ради – ""the Centre""). On 21 April 2006 she was dismissed as part of a reorganisation of the Centre. Another person was subsequently appointed to a position similar to the one previously occupied by the applicant. 7. In May 2006 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in the Melitopolskyy Local Court (""the Melitopolskyy Court"") seeking reinstatement, salary arrears and compensation for non-pecuniary damage. On 24 October 2006 the court rejected the applicant's claim. It found that the Centre had offered the applicant another position but that she had rejected this proposal, and that a more experienced person had been appointed as the head of the Centre. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 7 December 2006 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 24 October 2006. The applicant lodged a further appeal, and on 22 August 2007 the Supreme Court of Ukraine quashed these decisions and remitted the case to the first-instance court for fresh consideration. It held that the case was to be considered under the administrative justice procedure since it concerned a public-service dispute. 8. Accordingly, the applicant instituted administrative proceedings before the Melitopolskyy Court, which, on 21 February 2008, again found against her for reasons similar to those listed in its decision of 24 October 2006. The applicant appealed, and on 16 July 2008 the Dnipropetrovsk Administrative Court of Appeal quashed this decision and terminated the proceedings on the grounds that it fell to be examined under the civil justice procedure as the applicant was not a public servant. On 2 March 2011 the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine upheld this decision. On 14 April 2011 the same court rejected the applicant's request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Ukraine against the decision of 2 March 2011. 9. On 28 March 2011 the applicant again lodged a civil claim seeking reinstatement, salary arrears and compensation for non-pecuniary damage. On 4 August 2011 the Melitopolskyy Court refused to examine the merits of the applicant's civil claim as the applicant had sought to have adjourned previous court hearings in respect of her case on numerous occasions without good reason. On 5 October 2011 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the first-instance court.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears, with the multiple closings and reopenings, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 307,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","6. The applicant was born in 1975 and is detained in Tekirdağ. 7. On 9 September 1995 the applicant was arrested and taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation. 8. On the same day the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court prolonged the applicant's detention in police custody for a period of up to 15 days. 9. On 13 September 1995 the applicant's statements were taken by the police in the absence of a lawyer. The applicant confessed to being a member of an illegal organisation and having been involved in a murder. 10. On 14 September 1995 the applicant participated in a reconstruction of the events (yer gösterme) with another suspect K.A., organised by the police in the absence of a lawyer. According to a report, drafted by police officers and signed by the applicant and K.A., both of the accused gave the details of the murder which they had committed. 11. On 22 September 1995 the applicant was examined by a doctor from the Istanbul Forensic Institute. A collective medical report was drawn up in respect of the applicant and five other suspects. According to the report, there were no traces of ill-treatment on the applicant's body. 12. On 22 September 1995 the applicant was heard by a public prosecutor and an investigating judge respectively. In his statements to the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant denied his police statements alleging that they had been taken under duress. Following his questioning, the investigating judge ordered the applicant's detention on remand. 13. On 9 October 1995 a public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment with that court, charging the applicant with attempting to undermine the constitutional order, an offence prescribed by Article 146 § 1 of the former Criminal Code. 14. On 7 December 1995 the applicant was heard by the trial court during the first hearing in the presence of his lawyer. The applicant denied all the charges against him and stated that his statements at the police had been taken under duress. 15. In the meantime, State Security Courts were abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004. Accordingly, the case was transferred to Istanbul Assize Court. 16. On 13 September 2007, relying on, inter alia, the applicant's and his co-accused K. A.'s statements to the police, the Istanbul Assize Court held that the applicant had committed the offence under Article 146 § 1 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to life-imprisonment. 17. On an unknown date the applicant's lawyer appealed against the judgment of 13 September 2007. 18. On 1 December 2008 the Court of Cassation upheld the above judgment.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"It's unclear whether the applicant was able to exercise his right to defend himself. He did not have access to legal assistance while in custody, but did at the trial.", 308,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant company is a limited liability company incorporated under Moldovan Law. 6. On 24 December 2012 and 21 June 2013 respectively the applicant company initiated two sets of civil proceedings challenging two decisions issued by the State Tax Inspectorate of Străşeni (Inspectoratul Fiscal de Stat Străşeni – ""the Inspectorate"") under which it had been fined for non‑compliance with the VAT reporting regulations. On 5 September 2013 these two sets of proceedings were joined. 7. On 26 December 2013 the Străşeni District Court upheld the applicant company's claims and overturned the impugned decisions. The representative of the Inspectorate was not present when the judgment was delivered, despite having been duly informed of the date and the time of the hearing. 8. On 5 February 2014 the Inspectorate lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Străşeni District Court. No request for an extension of the legal time-limit for lodging an appeal was made. The applicant company objected to the appeal and argued that it had been lodged outside the thirty‑day time-limit and that the Inspectorate had not requested an extension of the legal time-limit for lodging it. 9. In a decision of 3 September 2014 the Chişinău Court of Appeal calculated the applicable time-limit and found that it had expired on 27 January 2014 and, accordingly, that the Inspectorate had been late in lodging its appeal. It therefore decided to strike the appeal out of its list of cases as time-barred. The Inspectorate lodged an appeal on points of law against that decision. It argued that the Chişinău Court of Appeal could not strike out the appeal after having commenced its examination of the merits of the case. 10. On 8 October 2014 the Supreme Court of Justice quashed the Chişinău Court of Appeal's strike-out decision of 3 September 2014. Without contesting the Court of Appeal's calculation of the time-limit for lodging the appeal, the Supreme Court of Justice accepted the argument put forward by the Inspectorate and found that the Court of Appeal had breached the rules of procedure by adopting a strike-out decision after having started an examination of the merits of the case. Ultimately, the case was referred back to the Chişinău Court of Appeal for re-examination. 11. On 28 January 2015, after rehearing the case, the Chişinău Court of Appeal upheld the Inspectorate's appeal, quashed the judgment of the Străşeni District Court of 26 December 2013 and rendered a new judgment whereby the applicant company's action was rejected as ill-founded. 12. On 10 June 2015 the Supreme Court of Justice declared an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant company inadmissible.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 309,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Budenovsk, the Stavropol Region of the Russian Federation. He is a former military officer. 6. On an unspecified date the applicant sued his former employer military unit. 7. On 3 May 2001 the Military Court of the Pyatigorsk Garrison (""the military court"") ordered, inter alia, the head of the respondent military unit to re-calculate the period of the applicant's service, applying the favourable terms of such calculation for the time when the applicant had participated in a military operation. The military court obliged the head of the military unit to issue the relevant orders, to calculate and to pay the applicant some additional payments and field allowance for the periods specified in the judgment. The judgment contained information on the indexes and other parameters that should be applied for the awarded amounts to be calculated. 8. On 14 May 2001 the judgment came into force. 9. In March 2002 the applicant obtained the writ of execution and submitted it to the Department of the Federal Treasury in Budenovsk. 10. On 19 March 2002 the Department of the Federal Treasury returned the writ of execution to the applicant on the ground that the military unit did not have an account there, and the judgment contained no specific amounts awarded to the applicant. 11. On 21 March 2002 the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the bailiffs' service. On the same day the enforcement proceedings were initiated. 12. On 19 February 2003 the enforcement proceedings were terminated and the writ was returned to the applicant without enforcement following his request to withdraw the writ. 13. In 2004-2005 the applicant applied to the domestic courts for clarification of the initial judgment with the view to establish the specific amounts due to him. The applicant's requests were dismissed as being lodged out of time. The courts noted that, in any case, the matter concerning the awarded amounts should have been resolved by way of an additional decision rather than clarification of a final judgment, and informed that an application for an additional decision should have been lodged before the entry into force of the main judgment. 14. It is not disputed between the parties that the judgment of 3 May 2001 remained unenforced in the part concerning the payment to the applicant of the second salary and the field allowances for the periods specified in the judgment. 15. On 24 March 2016, after communication of the present case, the Ministry of Finance of Russia calculated the amount due to the applicant under the judgment of 3 May 2001. According to this calculation, the main debt amounted to 80,220.74 Russian roubles.",Ruled as violated by court,,"10. On 19 March 2002 the Department of the Federal Treasury returned the writ of execution to the applicant on the ground that the military unit did not have an account there, and the judgment contained no specific amounts awarded to the applicant. 11. On 21 March 2002 the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the bailiffs' service. On the same day the enforcement proceedings were initiated. 12. On 19 February 2003 the enforcement proceedings were terminated and the writ was returned to the applicant without enforcement following his request to withdraw the writ. 13. In 2004-2005 the applicant applied to the domestic courts for clarification of the initial judgment with the view to establish the specific amounts due to him. The applicant's requests were dismissed as being lodged out of time. The courts noted that, in any case, the matter concerning the awarded amounts should have been resolved by way of an additional decision rather than clarification of a final judgment, and informed that an application for an additional decision should have been lodged before the entry into force of the main judgment. 14. It is not disputed between the parties that the judgment of 3 May 2001 remained unenforced in the part concerning the payment to the applicant of the second salary and the field allowances for the periods specified in the judgment. 15. On 24 March 2016, after communication of the present case, the Ministry of Finance of Russia calculated the amount due to the applicant under the judgment of 3 May 2001. According to this calculation, the main debt amounted to 80,220.74 Russian roubles.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears, with the multiple closings and reopenings, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 310,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Bucharest. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, refer to the same context and domestic criminal proceedings as those described in the case Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, §§ 12-41, 24 May 2011). 6. During the events which led to the fall of the communist regime, on the night of 21/22 December 1989 the applicant's son was killed by gunfire in Bucharest. 7. In 1990 the military prosecutor's office opened several investigations into the December 1989 armed crackdown on the anti-communism demonstrations. A main criminal investigation concerning the use of violence against civilians in Bucharest and other cities was registered with the highest prosecutor's office – the military prosecutors section − under no. 97/P/1990 (current number 11/P/2014). In the main criminal investigation the applicant raised civil claims and asked that the perpetrators of the offence of homicide committed against her son be identified and punished. 8. At the same time, another investigation concerning the offences of complicity in seriously aggravated homicide and complicity in attempted seriously aggravated homicide, committed against a large number of persons, including the applicant's son, culminated in the committal for trial of public officials, members of the ruling political party, and their subsequent conviction by a final decision of the Supreme Court of Justice of 20 April 1992. 9. The relevant procedural steps taken in the main criminal investigation were described in the cases Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others (cited above, §§ 12-41) and Sidea and Others v. Romania ([Committee] no. 889/15, §§ 8-11, 5 June 2018). 10. On 14 October 2015 the military prosecutor's office closed the main criminal investigation, finding that the applicant's complaint regarding the offence of homicide committed against her son was statute-barred and that a complaint concerning instigation of homicide was a matter of res judicata following the Supreme Court of Justice's decision of 20 April 1992 (see paragraph 8 above). 11. The decision of 14 October 2015 was subsequently annulled by a Prosecutor General's decision of 5 April 2016, confirmed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 13 June 2016. On 1 November 2016 the military prosecutor ordered the opening of a criminal investigation in rem for the offence of crimes against humanity in respect of the same factual circumstances. 12. According to the information submitted by the parties, the main criminal investigation is still ongoing (see Bănuțoiu and Ștefoglu v. Romania [Committee], nos. 64752/13 and 54607/14, § 12, 3 July 2018).",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"12. According to the information submitted by the parties, the main criminal investigation is still ongoing (see Bănuțoiu and Ștefoglu v. Romania [Committee], nos. 64752/13 and 54607/14, § 12, 3 July 2018).",FALSE,0,The applicant received a trial. There is no relevance between fair trial and the ongoing criminal investigation., 311,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. On 30 November 2004 the applicant company signed a contract (""the contract"") with the Ministry of Finance (""the Ministry"") for an investment loan, expressed in the equivalent of the national currency, with the repayments calculated in euros (во денарска противвредност пресметана во евра). Clause 11 of the contract stipulated that a statutory default interest rate (затезна камата по стапка yтврдена со закон) was to be paid on all overdue repayments, which, according to an annex forming part of the contract, were expressed in euros. 5. On 4 September 2012 a bailiff issued an enforcement order under the terms of the contract. The applicant company's protest and appeal against the enforcement order were dismissed by both the President of the Ohrid Court of First Instance (Основен суд Охрид) and by the Bitola Court of Appeal (Апелационен суд Битола), with the final decision being dated 3 April 2013. 6. On 17 May 2013 the applicant company lodged a civil claim against the Ministry seeking an annulment of clause 11 of the contract, claiming that, in accordance with domestic law, interest on the repayment of loans in foreign currencies should be calculated on the basis of that foreign currency's domestic rate (домицилна камата) instead of the statutory default interest rate. In that respect it relied on a judgment by the Supreme Court in which the same provision, contained in an identical contract regarding a State-granted loan to another person, had been annulled (Рев1. бр. 74/2012). 7. The applicant company's claim was dismissed by the Ohrid Court of First Instance and the Bitola Court of Appeal on 7 October and 13 January 2014 respectively, each holding that the loan had been approved in the national currency and therefore the statutory default interest rate applied. Neither court commented as to the Supreme Court's case-law. The final judgment was served on the applicant company's representative on 31 March 2014. 8. On 27 May 2015 insolvency proceedings were opened in respect of the applicant company. 9. In judgments Рев.1 бр. 168/2011 of 8 February 2012, Рев.1 бр.74/2012 of 6 December 2012 and Рев. бр. 202/2012 of 24 October 2013, the Supreme Court held that interest on State-granted loans which were to be repaid in amounts expressed in a foreign currency should be calculated on the basis of that currency's domestic interest rate. The Supreme Court took the stance that the loan repayment instalments were the determinative factor in the cases, and since, in those cases, the instalments had been expressed in a foreign currency, the statutory default interest rate was not applicable. The same stance was taken in two appeal court judgments (ТСЖ бр. 828/08 of 21 May 2008 and ТСЖ 1527/09 of 11 November 2009).",Ruled as violated by court,,"4. On 30 November 2004 the applicant company signed a contract (""the contract"") with the Ministry of Finance (""the Ministry"") for an investment loan, expressed in the equivalent of the national currency, with the repayments calculated in euros (во денарска противвредност пресметана во евра). Clause 11 of the contract stipulated that a statutory default interest rate (затезна камата по стапка yтврдена со закон) was to be paid on all overdue repayments, which, according to an annex forming part of the contract, were expressed in euros. 5. On 4 September 2012 a bailiff issued an enforcement order under the terms of the contract. The applicant company's protest and appeal against the enforcement order were dismissed by both the President of the Ohrid Court of First Instance (Основен суд Охрид) and by the Bitola Court of Appeal (Апелационен суд Битола), with the final decision being dated 3 April 2013. 6. On 17 May 2013 the applicant company lodged a civil claim against the Ministry seeking an annulment of clause 11 of the contract, claiming that, in accordance with domestic law, interest on the repayment of loans in foreign currencies should be calculated on the basis of that foreign currency's domestic rate (домицилна камата) instead of the statutory default interest rate. In that respect it relied on a judgment by the Supreme Court in which the same provision, contained in an identical contract regarding a State-granted loan to another person, had been annulled (Рев1. бр. 74/2012). 7. The applicant company's claim was dismissed by the Ohrid Court of First Instance and the Bitola Court of Appeal on 7 October and 13 January 2014 respectively, each holding that the loan had been approved in the national currency and therefore the statutory default interest rate applied. Neither court commented as to the Supreme Court's case-law. The final judgment was served on the applicant company's representative on 31 March 2014. 8. On 27 May 2015 insolvency proceedings were opened in respect of the applicant company. 9. In judgments Рев.1 бр. 168/2011 of 8 February 2012, Рев.1 бр.74/2012 of 6 December 2012 and Рев. бр. 202/2012 of 24 October 2013, the Supreme Court held that interest on State-granted loans which were to be repaid in amounts expressed in a foreign currency should be calculated on the basis of that currency's domestic interest rate. The Supreme Court took the stance that the loan repayment instalments were the determinative factor in the cases, and since, in those cases, the instalments had been expressed in a foreign currency, the statutory default interest rate was not applicable. The same stance was taken in two appeal court judgments (ТСЖ бр. 828/08 of 21 May 2008 and ТСЖ 1527/09 of 11 November 2009).",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 312,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","6. The applicants are five Russian nationals. Their personal details are set out in the Appendix. They are members of one family. 7. Since 1981 the applicants have lived in a flat in an apartment block provided to them under a social tenancy agreement by the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. The landlord was under obligation to perform a major overhaul of the apartment block, and the applicants had to make regular payments for the major overhaul. They paid the amounts due. The overhaul had never been performed, allegedly since 1935. 8. On the dates listed in the Appendix the Orenburgskiy District Court of the Orenburg Region granted their claims, having noted from expert reports that the apartment block was ""64%‒dilapidated"" and its state was ""unsatisfactory"", and that the flat was 64%‒dilapidated. The court found that the applicants' living premises, as well as the common property of the apartment block required a major overhaul. The court ordered the Federal State Institution of the Privolzhsko-Uralskiy Military Circuit to perform the major overhaul of the applicants' flat, as well as of the common property of the apartment block and of the ""devices situated in the living premises and serving for provision of communal services"" in the apartment block, and to pay each applicant 3,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 9. According to the applicants' observations, on 9 November 2011 the Orenburgskiy District Court awarded the claimants RUB 490,155.43 (approximately 11.681 euros) of compensation of losses. They did not enclose a copy of the judgment or further details as to either the defendant, or the exact list of claimants, the scope of the judgment or its subsequent challenge on appeal by any of the parties. 10. In 2012 Federal State Treasury Department (Управление) of the Privolzhsko-Uralskiy Military Circuit became a legal successor of the debtor institution. 11. In 2012 the applicants sued various authorities for penalties for several years of the non-enforcement. By the final judgment of 5 February 2013 the Orenburg Regional Court rejected their claims in full, having found that they were based on an incorrect interpretation of the domestic law and that the applicants had failed to submit a calculation of the penalty. 12. According to the Government, in December 2013 the applicant's house was included in a regional housing overhaul assistance program. The authorities prepared a project and the budget documentation, which were approved by the experts. 13. On 13 April 2015 Ms Konstantinova privatized the flat and acquired a title to it. 14. According to the Government's latest observations of 31 May 2017, the judgments had remained unenforced at the material time.",Ruled as violated by court,,"8. On the dates listed in the Appendix the Orenburgskiy District Court of the Orenburg Region granted their claims, having noted from expert reports that the apartment block was ""64%‒dilapidated"" and its state was ""unsatisfactory"", and that the flat was 64%‒dilapidated. The court found that the applicants' living premises, as well as the common property of the apartment block required a major overhaul. The court ordered the Federal State Institution of the Privolzhsko-Uralskiy Military Circuit to perform the major overhaul of the applicants' flat, as well as of the common property of the apartment block and of the ""devices situated in the living premises and serving for provision of communal services"" in the apartment block, and to pay each applicant 3,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 12. According to the Government, in December 2013 the applicant's house was included in a regional housing overhaul assistance program. The authorities prepared a project and the budget documentation, which were approved by the experts. 14. According to the Government's latest observations of 31 May 2017, the judgments had remained unenforced at the material time.",FALSE,0,There is no relevance between fair trial and enforcement of property overhaul., 313,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant is a professor of law at a private university in Skopje. She holds a doctoral degree in the field of criminal law. 5. On 14 January 2010 the applicant lodged a request with the Ministry of Justice (""the Ministry"") in order to be recognised as having the same status as a person who had passed the BAR examination (изедначување со правата на лицата кои положиле правосуден испит). As she did not obtain a decision, she lodged two further requests, on 24 November 2011 and 6 February 2012. 6. On 11 April 2012 the Ministry rejected her request, holding that she did not meet the relevant criteria to obtain such recognition. In particular, the Ministry found that although she was a professor of law at a university, she did not hold a bachelor's degree in law (дипломиран правник на правен факултет). The Ministry further found that the bachelor's degree which she had obtained had been awarded by the Faculty of Security and Social Defence (Факултет за безбедност и општествена самозаштита), and not by a faculty of law, as required. 7. On 10 May 2012 the applicant brought an action with the Administrative Court (Управен суд), challenging the refusal. She argued that as a university professor at a faculty of law she met the relevant criteria. 8. On 30 May 2013 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's action. It held that regardless of her current status, she did not meet the criteria to obtain the desired recognition under domestic law. In particular, it established that the applicant did not hold a bachelor's degree in law, which was a condition for the recognition she sought. 9. On 23 September 2013 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Higher Administrative Court (Виш управен суд). She argued that she met the relevant criteria and that the lower court had failed to properly interpret the procedural and substantive law in the case. 10. On an unspecified date, the Ministry submitted observations to the Higher Administrative Court concerning the applicant's case. The Ministry stated in the observations that the right to obtain recognition as having the same status as a person who had passed the BAR examination was dependent on having a bachelor's degree issued by a faculty of law. The applicant did not possess such a degree and had therefore failed to meet the criteria under domestic law. Those observations were not communicated to the applicant. 11. On 30 January 2014 the Higher Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's appeal, reiterating in full the reasons provided by the Administrative Court. It restated that the recognition sought by the applicant was dependent on her having a bachelor's degree issued by a faculty of law, a condition which she had failed to meet. 12. The decision was served on the applicant on 19 May 2014.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 314,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Blagoevgrad. 5. He had been employed by the National Security Service, at the Regional Office of Blagoevgrad, as an agent since 1998. On account of the nature of his duties, he had held a security clearance permitting him access to classified information constituting State secrets. According to the applicant's job description, being in a possession of such a security clearance had been a prerequisite to him holding his post. 6. On 20 November 2013, the Director of the National Security Service issued a decision to revoke the applicant's security clearance allowing access to classified information. The decision did not contain any reasoning in respect of that revocation, apart from a reference to section 59, in relation with section 40 § 1 f) and h); section 41 c) and d), and section 42 a) and b) of the Classified Information Protection Act (see paragraphs 12 and 13 below). 7. The applicant lodged an appeal against the revocation with the State Commission for Information Security. The latter, by a decision of 9 January 2014, upheld the revocation. That decision was final and not amenable to judicial review. 8. On 6 March 2014, the Director of the National Security Service ordered that the applicant be dismissed. The reason given for the termination of his employment was the revocation of his security clearance, possession of which was an indispensable precondition for him to be able to perform his duties. 9. The applicant challenged his dismissal at two levels of jurisdiction. He contested the lawfulness of the dismissal procedure, arguing that he was not able to challenge, in the course of the procedure before the State Commission for Information Security, the facts on which the revocation of the security clearance permit was based. The Director of the National Security Service abused his powers in dismissing the applicant, who was not allowed an opportunity to defend himself. 10. By its judgment of 19 March 2015, the Blagoevgrad Administrative Court rejected the applicant's claims, reasoning that the decision of the Director of the National Security Service to revoke the applicant's security clearance was a final and valid administrative act, and it rendered the applicant's dismissal inevitable because he was no longer able to perform his duties. The court added that the applicant had exhausted the remedy provided by law by challenging the revocation decision, and that the latter had become final; in addition, the court was not competent to examine, within the framework of the dismissal proceedings, any questions related to its lawfulness. 11. On 11 July 2016, the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld that judgment, confirming that the decision to revoke the applicant's security clearance was not amenable to judicial review.",Ruled as violated by court,,"11. On 11 July 2016, the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld that judgment, confirming that the decision to revoke the applicant's security clearance was not amenable to judicial review.",FALSE,0,The applicant was denied his right to a hearing., 315,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Adana. 6. On 8 March 2002 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation. 7. On 9 March 2002 the applicant's statements were taken by the police in the absence of a lawyer. During the interrogation, the applicant gave a detailed account of her acts within the illegal organisation PKK (the Kurdistan Workers' Party). 8. On 11 March 2002 the applicant was heard by the public prosecutor and the investigating judge at the Istanbul State Security Court, again in the absence of a lawyer. Before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant partially retracted her previous statements maintaining that she had given statements to the police under duress. On the same day, upon the order of the investigating judge, the applicant was placed in pre‑trial detention. 9. On 18 March 2002 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment accusing the applicant of membership of an illegal terrorist organisation under Article 168 of the former Criminal Code. 10. At a hearing held on 31 May 2002, the applicant gave evidence in person in the presence of her lawyer. She stated that she had left Turkey through her own means and that she went to Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and Iran with the help of the people whose names she could not remember anymore. She further stated that she had stayed in camps in Greece and Iran. While she was at the camp in Iran she was not involved in many activities owing to her young age. She further maintained that she had wanted to return to Turkey due to her health condition and for family reasons. She further stated that she had turned back to Turkey through the mountains with the help of people who knew the area well. While the applicant was staying at her elder sister's house, she was arrested by the police. The applicant also claimed that she did not know any of the other accused in the case and that she had not received any training in the camps. Lastly, she stated that she had been called the code name ""Ariel"" at the camp in Iran. When asked about her statements to the police, the applicant denied them, claiming that they had been taken under duress. When asked about her statements to the public prosecutor, she denied them except for the parts concerning her travel. When asked about her statements to the investigating judge, she denied them claiming once again that the police had put pressure on her. 11. On 16 April 2008, relying on, inter alia, the applicant's statements to the police, the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant under Article 314 § 2 of the new Turkish Criminal Code and sentenced her to six years and three months' imprisonment. 12. On 23 December 2010 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Istanbul Assize Court.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"It's unclear whether the applicant was able to exercise her right to defend herself. She did not have access to legal assistance while in custody, but did at the trial.", 316,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Sanski Most. 6. By a judgment of the Banja Luka Court of First Instance of 23 May 2005, which became final on 11 September 2007, the Republika Srpska (an entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina) was ordered to pay the applicant 42,767 convertible marks (BAM)[1] on account of pecuniary damage together with default interest calculated from 23 May 2005 until final payment. 7. On 1 February 2010 the applicant submitted a request for the issuance of the writ of execution in his case, which request he amended on 30 August 2010. 8. On 18 October 2010 the applicant submitted a request for the acceleration of the proceedings before the Banja Luka Court of First Instance. 9. On 15 November 2010 the Banja Luka Court of First Instance issued the writ of execution (rješenje o izvršenju). 10. On 18 March 2011 the Banja Luka Court of First Instance rejected the objections against its decision of 15 November 2010, as well as the applicant's request for the payment of the costs of the enforcement proceedings. 11. On 31 May 2011 the Banja Luka Court of First Instance made certain corrections to its decision of 18 March 2011. 12. On 15 December 2011 the Banja Luka Court of Second Instance quashed the decision of the Banja Luka Court of First Instance of 18 March 2011 and remitted the case for reconsideration. 13. On 26 March 2012 the applicant submitted a request for the acceleration of the proceedings before the Banja Luka Court of First Instance. 14. On 12 April 2012 the Banja Luka Court of First Instance partially granted the objection of the Republika Srpska against the writ of execution. 15. On 23 April 2012 the applicant appealed the decision of the Banja Luka Court of First Instance of 12 April 2012. On 11 June, 13 July, and 21 November 2012, and on 15 January 2013 the applicant submitted further requests for the acceleration of the proceedings before the Banja Luka Court of Second Instance. 16. On 21 January 2013 the Banja Luka Court of Second Instance rejected the applicant's appeal and upheld the decision of 12 April 2012. 17. On 7 October 2014 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina ruled in favour of the applicant that the enforcement proceedings before the Banja Luka Court of First Instance had not been finalised within a reasonable time. It further ordered the Banja Luka Court of First Instance to urgently expedite the enforcement proceedings in the applicant's case. The Constitutional Court considered this to be sufficient just satisfaction and rejected the applicant's claim for non-pecuniary damage. 18. On 8 November 2016 the final decision in question was enforced in cash, regarding the principal amount and the statutory default interests. On 5 July 2017 the costs of the enforcement proceedings and related statutory default interests were also fully paid to the applicant.",Ruled as violated by court,,"18. On 8 November 2016 the final decision in question was enforced in cash, regarding the principal amount and the statutory default interests. On 5 July 2017 the costs of the enforcement proceedings and related statutory default interests were also fully paid to the applicant.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears, according to the applicant's multiple requests for acceleration, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time.", 317,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicants are a family. They were born in 1971, 1968, 1992, 1995, and live in Samara. 5. On 26 April 2004 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Samara (""the Oktyabrskiy District Court"") ordered, inter alia, the management of the State unitary enterprise ""16th Military Plant"" (""the company"") to provide the applicants with a suitable dwelling, while keeping their names on the list of persons awaiting housing. 6. On 11 May 2004 the judgment came into force. 7. On 28 May 2004 the Department of the Bailiffs' Service for Oktyabrskiy District of Samara opened the enforcement proceedings. 8. On 22 December 2004 the enforcement proceedings were terminated as the company had no available residential accommodation. 9. On 1 October 2007, due to the reorganisation of the company (see paragraph 16 below), the enforcement file was sent to the Department of the Bailiffs' Service for the Engelsskiy District of Saratov Region. 10. On 21 April 2008 the bailiffs ruled that it was impossible to enforce the judgment in the part relating to the housing, as the new debtor, FGUP 9 TSARZ (see paragraph 16 below), had no available accommodation. The enforcement proceedings were terminated. 11. On 26 August 2009 the Engelsskiy District Court of Saratov Region, following the bailiffs' application, replaced the debtor in the enforcement proceedings from FGUP 9 TSARZ to OAO 9 TSARZ (see paragraph 17 below). 12. On 14 October 2009 the Oktyabrskiy District Court clarified the judgment of 26 April 2004 stating that the applicants should be provided with an apartment in Samara. 13. Several times in 2004-2011 the parties applied to the Oktyabrskiy District Court for changing the mode of enforcement of the judgment. Each time the courts rejected the applications finding that a payment of the amount representing the cost of an apartment would be equal to modifying the original judgment. 14. The judgment of 26 April 2004 remained unenforced. 15. The company was incorporated as a municipal unitary enterprise. According to its articles of association, the company's aim was to produce goods and render services for the Ministry of Defense of Russia, as well as for meeting other public needs and making a profit. 16. Under the Order of the Federal Agency for State Property Management dated 22 September 2005 the company was joined to FGUP 9 TSARZ (FGUP 9 Tsentralnyy Avtomobilnyy Remontnyy Zavod – ФГУП 9 ЦАРЗ or ФГУП 9 Центральный Автомобильный Ремонтный Завод). The reorganisation was completed on 13 February 2007, and the latter company became the universal successor of the company. 17. In accordance with the Decree of the President of Russia of 15 September 2008 and the Decree of the Russian Government of 22 November 2008, FGUP 9 TSARZ was further reorganized into OAO 9 TSARZ, a publicly-traded private open joint-stock company incorporated under the laws of Russia.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears, with the multiple closings and reopenings, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 318,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant, who was born in 1948, lives in Corjova, a village under the formal control of Moldovan authorities, but where agents of the self‑proclaimed ""Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic"" (""MRT"", see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, § 90, ECHR 2004‑VII for further details) frequently intervened during the events in question, notably by blocking the participation of the local population in elections held in Moldova. 6. On 3 June 2007 local elections were to be held in Moldova, including in Corjova. The applicant, who is an ambulance driver, submitted his candidature for the position of Mayor of Corjova. 7. On 1 June 2007, at 11 p.m., the applicant's ambulance was stopped by the ""MRT"" road militia and his documents (Moldovan national identity card and driving licence) were taken away from him without any explanation. 8. On 2 June 2007 the applicant went to the ""MRT"" militia station located in Dubăsari and asked for the return of his documents. He was then arrested and placed in a detention cell. A few hours later a person came to his cell and, without presenting himself, asked him about his work and his electoral propaganda. The applicant later found out that the visitor had been a judge and that, following that discussion in the cell, the judge adopted a decision, finding him guilty of the administrative offence of unlawful electoral propaganda and sentencing him to 15 days' administrative detention. 9. The applicant submits that he was not allowed to contact his relatives or to find a lawyer, and was not issued with a copy of the court's decision, which prevented any possibility of lodging an effective appeal against the decision of 2 June 2007. 10. During his detention the applicant was placed in a cell which, according to him was damp and cold. Food was given once a day. When the applicant's relatives, alerted by his absence, contacted the local authorities in order to find out about his fate, they were informed of the applicant's detention. However, their requests to transmit food to him were allegedly rejected. 11. On 17 June 2007 the applicant was released from detention and he was issued with a copy of the decision of 2 June 2007. The time-limit for lodging an appeal had already expired by that time. Upon release, he was allegedly coughing and was diagnosed with chronic acute bronchitis. He also claims that his eyesight worsened considerably. 12. In the meantime, on 6 June 2007, the applicant complained to the Moldovan prosecutor's office of his unlawful detention. Based on this complaint, a criminal investigation was initiated on 12 June 2007, the applicant and witnesses were subsequently heard. Three high-ranking ""MRT"" officers were charged and were declared wanted persons. However, on 4 August 2010 the investigation was suspended due to the fact that the three accused were hiding from it in the ""MRT"".",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,"The applicant was not informed of the charge against him, nor allowed to defend himself.", 319,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Muğla. 6. On an unspecified date the applicant brought an enforcement order through a bailiff's office against her former husband, G.F., to collect alimony in arrears and accrued interest. 7. On 9 March 2006 G.F. objected to that order by bringing a case against the applicant before the Datça Enforcement Court. He requested that the court declare the enforcement order null and void on the grounds that he had made the payments in question in full. 8. In the first hearing G.F.'s representative requested the court to take out an expert report to determine whether the payments he had made corresponded to the alleged debt. The court adjourned its examination on the question whether an expert report would be sought to a hearing to be held on 10 May 2006. 9. In that hearing, the applicant's representative left it to the court's discretion for an expert to be appointed concerning the determination of the amounts that were already paid. The court therefore ruled for an expert to be appointed and scheduled another hearing for 7 June 2006. 10. In the meantime, but before the hearing of 7 June 2006, the applicant's representative requested that he be excused from that hearing since he had another scheduled court hearing elsewhere. 11. The court held the hearing as scheduled but noted that the applicant's representative was excused. In that hearing, the court noted that the expert report had been submitted in the case-file and read its contents out in the presence of G.F.'s legal representative. The latter asked the court to rule in accordance with the findings in the expert report, which had concluded that all the relevant alimony payments had been made. The court scheduled a hearing for 21 June 2006 holding that the absent party be notified. 12. On 21 June 2006, in its final hearing, the court ruled against the applicant on the basis of the expert report in question. Neither the applicant nor her representative was present at that hearing. There is no indication in the transcript of the hearing that suggests that the court examined whether the applicant's representative had been notified in due time. 13. On 31 July 2006 the applicant's representative lodged an appeal before the Court of Cassation, arguing that the notice for the court hearing of 21 June 2006 had been served on him only on 26 June 2006, resulting in him and her client missing the opportunity to participate in the hearing and submit their observations on the findings of the expert report. He explained in that connection that the expert's calculations had been erroneous and did not correspond to the bank transfer receipts in the case-file. 14. On 5 December 2006 the Court of Cassation upheld the decision of 21 June 2006 without responding to the applicant's arguments. 15. The applicant's rectification request against that decision was rejected on 13 March 2007.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""fair and public trial,"" it appears that the applicant and their lawyer not appearing at the hearings threatens this right.", 320,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The first applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Belgrade, Serbia. The second applicant is a privately owned company, founded by the first applicant in 1990, with its registered seat in Ilijaš - Podlugovi, Bosnia and Herzegovina. 6. On 19 December 2001 the second applicant requested a licence to build a petrol station on the main highway in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 7. On 21 October 2002 the Federal Road Directorate of Bosnia and Herzegovina (""the Directorate"") rejected the request. The second applicant appealed on 31 October 2002. 8. On 28 February 2003 the Federal Ministry upheld that decision. 9. On 28 March 2003 the second applicant initiated proceedings for judicial review before the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (""the Supreme Court""). 10. On 25 August 2005 and 24 August 2006 the second applicant urged the Supreme Court to expedite the proceedings. 11. On 22 November 2006 the Supreme Court quashed the decisions of 21 October 2002 and 28 February 2003 (see paragraphs 7-8 above) on procedural grounds, and remitted the case to the Directorate. 12. On 9 May 2007 the second applicant informed the Supreme Court that the decision of 22 November 2006 had not been enforced yet. 13. On 16 August 2007 the Directorate rejected the second applicant's request. On 30 August 2007 the second applicant appealed. 14. On 8 November 2007 the second applicant complained to the Administrative Inspectorate of the Federal Ministry of Justice about the inaction of the administration. 15. On 12 November 2007 the Federal Ministry upheld the decision of 16 August 2007 (see paragraph 13 above). The decision was served on the second applicant on 18 April 2008. 16. On 30 May 2008 the second applicant initiated proceedings for judicial review with the Supreme Court seeking it to quash the decisions of 16 August 2007 and 12 November 2007 (see paragraphs 13 and 15 above). On 31 August 2009 the Supreme Court referred the claim to the Mostar Cantonal Court, as the competent court. 17. On 27 November 2009 the Mostar Cantonal Court rejected the application for judicial review. 18. On 6 January 2010 the applicant submitted a request for an extraordinary review of the decision of 27 November 2009 with the Supreme Court, which request was rejected as unfounded on 12 May 2010. That decision was served on the second applicant on 9 July 2010. 19. On 6 September 2010 the second applicant lodged a constitutional appeal before the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (""the Constitutional Court"") complaining, notably, about the length of the above administrative proceedings. 20. On 23 December 2013 the Constitutional Court rejected the appeal as unfounded. It noted that the relevant proceedings had lasted eight years and five months in total, that seven different decisions had been rendered by the competent authorities and that, therefore, the length of the proceedings had not been excessive.",Ruled as violated by court,"6. On 19 December 2001 the second applicant requested a licence to build a petrol station on the main highway in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 10. On 25 August 2005 and 24 August 2006 the second applicant urged the Supreme Court to expedite the proceedings. 14. On 8 November 2007 the second applicant complained to the Administrative Inspectorate of the Federal Ministry of Justice about the inaction of the administration. 19. On 6 September 2010 the second applicant lodged a constitutional appeal before the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (""the Constitutional Court"") complaining, notably, about the length of the above administrative proceedings. 20. On 23 December 2013 the Constitutional Court rejected the appeal as unfounded. It noted that the relevant proceedings had lasted eight years and five months in total, that seven different decisions had been rendered by the competent authorities and that, therefore, the length of the proceedings had not been excessive.","7. On 21 October 2002 the Federal Road Directorate of Bosnia and Herzegovina (""the Directorate"") rejected the request. The second applicant appealed on 31 October 2002. 18. On 6 January 2010 the applicant submitted a request for an extraordinary review of the decision of 27 November 2009 with the Supreme Court, which request was rejected as unfounded on 12 May 2010. That decision was served on the second applicant on 9 July 2010.",TRUE,2,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year. At the same time, the Constitutional Court ruled that the length of proceedings was not excessive.", 321,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant, S.S. Yeniköy Konut Yapı Kooperatifi, is a housing construction cooperative under Turkish law operating in İzmir. 5. In 1993, a third party cooperative bought a plot of land measuring 12,000 square metres and the title deed of the land was registered in its name. In 1995, construction works started on the land in question. 6. In 2000, the forest administration initiated proceedings before the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance for the annulment of the title deed to the land, alleging that it was part of the public forest area. In the meantime, the third party cooperative had merged with the applicant cooperative and the land had been registered in the Land Registry in the name of the latter. 7. On 26 December 2002 the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance ordered that 9,322 square metres of the land be registered in the name of the Treasury as it was part of the public forest area. It also ordered that the buildings constructed on this part of the land be demolished. 8. Subsequently, the applicant brought a case before the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance and sought pecuniary damages from the Treasury under Article 1007 of the Civil Code which provided for the State's responsibility for any damage resulting from the keeping of the land registry records. 9. On 4 February 2005 the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance awarded 138,917,600,000 Turkish Liras (TRL – approximately 81,716 euros (EUR) at the time) to the applicant. 10. On 7 February 2006 the Fourth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance on the ground that there was no illegal act or action on the part of the land registry officials that might have had a causal link with the applicant's loss. 11. On 6 July 2006 the applicant submitted a further petition to the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance and indicated that there was a decision of the First Civil Division of the Court of Cassation which was in contradiction with the decision of the Fourth Civil Division. In this context, the applicant alleged that its case should be accepted according to that decision of the First Civil Division issued on 7 May 2002 and numbered E.2002/3549 K.2002/5807. 12. On 20 October 2006 the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance followed the decision of the Fourth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation and dismissed the applicant's claim. 13. The applicant appealed. Reiterating its allegations and referring to the decision of the First Civil Division of the Court of Cassation of 7 May 2002, it repeated its compensation request. 14. On 1 May 2007 the applicant's appeal was rejected by the Fourth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation. This decision became final. 15. In their decisions, neither the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance nor the Fourth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation expressed any reason about why they had reached a different conclusion from the First Civil Division of the Court of Cassation.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 322,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Zagreb. 5. On 28 April 2008 the daily newspaper B. published an article under the headline ""Mob Lawyer joins the Supervisory Board"", describing the applicant as an extortionist. 6. On 27 May 2008 the applicant's representative asked the publisher to publish a correction of that information. The publisher neither replied nor published a correction of the disputed information. 7. On 9 July 2008, after the expiry of the deadline envisaged in the relevant provisions of the Media Act (Zakon o medijima) to publish a correction, the applicant brought a civil action against the publisher in the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court (Općinski građanski sud u Zagrebu), claiming non-pecuniary damage. 8. On 10 July 2009 the publisher replied stating in particular that the applicant had failed to submit a power of attorney with his request. 9. At a hearing held on 31 January 2012 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court heard evidence from the applicant who said that he had authorised his representative to act on his behalf vis-à-vis the publisher. 10. On 31 January 2012 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court, relying on sections 22(2) and 40(3) of the Media Act, declared the applicant's claim inadmissible. The first-instance court held that the request for the publication of a correction of the disputed information had not been signed by a duly authorised person because the applicant had not proved that his representative had actually submitted a power of attorney with the request. The relevant part of the decision reads: ""In his testimony, the [applicant] stated that he had given power of attorney to his counsel, [Lj.P], authorising her to institute both criminal and civil proceedings for defamation ... He was present during the preparation of a draft of the request for the correction of the disputed information ... ... This court does not accept the [applicant]'s evidence because the [applicant] has no direct knowledge of what was ultimately sent to the defendant ... On the other hand, the [applicant's] statement concerning the granting of a power of attorney is of no relevance for the solution to the specific legal issue ... ... Given that the request for the publication of a correction of the disputed information was not signed by the [applicant], but by his counsel, [Lj.P.], and that it was not accompanied with a power of attorney, the [applicant] has not proved that he had properly requested the publication of a correction of the disputed information ... an action which is, pursuant to section 22(2) of the Media Act, a procedural requirement for bringing a civil action for non-pecuniary damage against the publisher ..."" 11. On 19 November 2012 the Šibenik County Court (Županijski sud u Šibeniku) dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the first-instance decision. 12. On 14 March 2013 the Constitutional Court declared a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant inadmissible on the grounds that there was ""no constitutional issue"" to be examined.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. On 27 May 2008 the applicant's representative asked the publisher to publish a correction of that information. The publisher neither replied nor published a correction of the disputed information. 9. At a hearing held on 31 January 2012 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court heard evidence from the applicant who said that he had authorised his representative to act on his behalf vis-à-vis the publisher. 10. On 31 January 2012 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court, relying on sections 22(2) and 40(3) of the Media Act, declared the applicant's claim inadmissible. The first-instance court held that the request for the publication of a correction of the disputed information had not been signed by a duly authorised person because the applicant had not proved that his representative had actually submitted a power of attorney with the request. The relevant part of the decision reads: ""In his testimony, the [applicant] stated that he had given power of attorney to his counsel, [Lj.P], authorising her to institute both criminal and civil proceedings for defamation ... He was present during the preparation of a draft of the request for the correction of the disputed information ... ... This court does not accept the [applicant]'s evidence because the [applicant] has no direct knowledge of what was ultimately sent to the defendant ... On the other hand, the [applicant's] statement concerning the granting of a power of attorney is of no relevance for the solution to the specific legal issue ... ... Given that the request for the publication of a correction of the disputed information was not signed by the [applicant], but by his counsel, [Lj.P.], and that it was not accompanied with a power of attorney, the [applicant] has not proved that he had properly requested the publication of a correction of the disputed information ... an action which is, pursuant to section 22(2) of the Media Act, a procedural requirement for bringing a civil action for non-pecuniary damage against the publisher ...""",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 323,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicants were born in 1968, 1960, 1966, 1962, 1959, 1955 and 1954, respectively, and live in Novi Travnik and Bugojno, Bosnia and Herzegovina. 6. By seven judgments of the Travnik Municipal Court and the Bugojno Municipal Court, of 19 January 2007, 15 May 2008, 19 January 2006, 28 October 2011, 2 February 2009, 1 September 2009 and 9 April 2004, respectively, the applicants' employers, two companies manufacturing weapons and military technology, were ordered to pay them various sums in respect of unpaid work-related benefits together with default interest at the statutory rate and legal costs. The judgments became final on 24 August 2007, 15 May 2008, 19 January 2006, 26 November 2011, 20 August 2009, 13 October 2009 and 13 April 2005, respectively. 7. The applicants' winding-up petitions were rejected on 27 May 2010 and 14 February 2011, respectively, because the Federal Ministry of Energy had refused authorisation (see paragraph 14 below). Consequently, in accordance with the 2003 Insolvency Act, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina became liable for the debts of the applicants' employers (see paragraph 14 below). 8. The Sarajevo Municipal Court issued enforcement orders on 9 November 2011, 21 February 2012, 17 April 2012, 25 April 2012, 5 July 2012, 27 March 2012 and 9 August 2012, respectively, in which the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was designated as a debtor. They were transferred to the competent bank and were listed among the charges in the federal budget. 9. On several occasions thereafter the bank informed the competent courts that the enforcement was not possible because the budgetary funds intended for that purpose had already been spent. 10. The applicants complained of the non-enforcement to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (""the Constitutional Court""). 11. On 17 March 2015 (decision no. AP 2892/13) the Constitutional Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in the applicants' cases on account of the prolonged non-enforcement of the final judgments in their favour. It ordered the government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to take the necessary steps in order to secure the payment of its debt arising from the final judgments within a reasonable time. Although the applicants submitted a claim for non-pecuniary damages, the Constitutional Court did not award any compensation. 12. On the following dates in 2017 the final judgments in the applicants' favour were fully enforced: (i) on 10 January 2017 in respect of Mr Mujo Zahirović; (ii) on 9 January 2017 in respect of Ms Nedžvija Mandara; (iii) on 13 April 2017 in respect of Mr Miralem Mustajbegović; (iv) on 17 January 2017 in respect of Mr Nihad Hrnjica; (v) on 11 January 2017 in respect of Mr Zijad Džugum; (vi) on 17 January 2017 in respect of Ms Đevada Hodžić; and (vii) on 13 April 2017 in respect of Mr Fadil Pandžo. The payments made in the applicants' favour included the reimbursement of the costs sustained for the enforcement procedure.",Ruled as violated by court,,"11. On 17 March 2015 (decision no. AP 2892/13) the Constitutional Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in the applicants' cases on account of the prolonged non-enforcement of the final judgments in their favour. It ordered the government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to take the necessary steps in order to secure the payment of its debt arising from the final judgments within a reasonable time. Although the applicants submitted a claim for non-pecuniary damages, the Constitutional Court did not award any compensation.",FALSE,0,There is no relevance between fair trial and enforcement., 324,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant is a Roman Catholic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, based in Sarajevo. 5. By decision of 9 May 2003, which became final and binding on 4 September 2003, the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina (""the Chamber"") found that the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (an entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina) had discriminated against the applicant in its enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention. In order to remedy the situation it ordered the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure the relocation of public schools housed in the Archdiocese High School building in Travnik, and to reinstate the applicant in the premises within one year. The Chamber rejected a request by the applicant for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. 6. By an agreement of 21 May 2004, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina undertook to reinstate the applicant in the impugned premises by 1 July 2006. Shortly thereafter, the Travnik Municipal Council adopted the implementing decisions, and also one of the public schools was moved from the premises. 7. On 23 June 2010 the Travnik Municipal Council issued a writ of execution (rješenje o izvršenju). On 5 October 2011 the Travnik Cantonal Court quashed that decision and remitted the case for reconsideration. On 17 October 2011 the Travnik Municipal Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to deal with the case. On 16 May 2012 the Travnik Cantonal Court quashed that decision and remitted the case for reconsideration. On 3 July 2012 the Travnik Municipal Court held that the decisions of the Chamber were not subject to enforcement proceedings. On 12 July 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision. At the date of the latest information available to the Court (28 August 2017), the Travnik Cantonal Court had not yet ruled on the matter. 8. On 30 October 2012 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina determined that the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had not yet fully enforced the decision of 9 May 2003. 9. On 17 February 2017 the applicant initiated civil proceedings against the public school remaining in its premises, requesting its relocation, as well as damages for the use of the premises for the period between 1 February 2014 and 1 June 2017. 10. On 14 July 2017 the Municipal Court in Travnik rendered a judgment in the applicant's favour, rewarding in full its claims finally specified in the proceedings, namely 270,360 convertible marks (BAM)[1] for pecuniary damages and 6,713 BAM for costs and expenses. The Municipal Court also ordered the respondent to vacate the applicant's premises within 30 days from receiving the judgment. On 20 December 2017 the Cantonal Court in Novi Travnik upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. At the date of the latest information available to the Court (20 February 2018), the Central Bosnia Canton submitted a revision petition to the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina against the final judgment in these proceedings. It also appears that the public school has still not been relocated.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 325,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Kragujevac. 6. On 14 December 2006 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the Kragujevac Clinical Centre requesting damages. In the course of the proceedings eleven hearings were held, whereas five hearings were scheduled, but were not held. 7. On 20 May 2011 the applicant's claim was rejected as unfounded by the Kragujevac Court of First Instance. 8. On 26 December 2011 the Kragujevac Appellate Court (""the Appellate Court"") quashed the decision of 20 May 2011 and remitted the case to the first instance court. 9. In the resumed proceedings the applicant sought recusal of the acting judge twice, but both of his motions were rejected. 10. On 4 October 2012, after three held hearings and two hearings which were not held, expert examination and the increase of the applicants claim, the case was transferred to the Kragujevac High Court (""the High Court""). 11. On 20 March 2013, following the applicant's two other recusal requests, one of which was adopted, the High Court rejected the applicant's damages claim as unfounded. The applicant appealed. 12. On 21 August 2014 the Appellate Court rejected the applicant's appeal and upheld the decision of 20 March 2013. Thereafter, the applicant filed an appeal on points of law, which was rejected by the Supreme Court of Cassation only on 21 December 2016. 13. In the meantime, on 7 February 2013, the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court complaining about the length of the pending civil proceedings, seeking non-pecuniary damages in the amount of 3,000 euros and publication of the decision of the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court transferred the case-file to the Appellate Court, as a competent court to deal with the length complaints of the pending cases, pursuant to Article 8a of the Law on the Organization of the Courts. However, on 23 September 2014 the Appellate Court established that it no longer had jurisdiction to deal with the applicant's complaint since it found that the civil proceedings had been finished. The applicant's case-file was thus returned to the Constitutional Court. 14. On 6 November 2014 the Constitutional Court returned the case-file to the Appellate Court, which on 28 November 2014 again found that it had no jurisdiction to deal with the case. The Appellate Court then transferred the case-file further to the Supreme Court of Cassation, as the competent court. The applicant appealed. 15. On 22 January 2015 the Supreme Court of Cassation rejected the applicant's appeal and upheld the decision of 28 November 2014. It also partially adopted the applicant's complaint concerning the length of the proceedings and awarded him 200 euros for non-pecuniary damage, whereas the rest of claim rejected. 16. On 21 October 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant's appeal in regards to the length of the proceedings. The Constitutional Court established that even though the impugned proceedings had lasted seven years and eight months, they were very complex and the applicant largely contributed to its length, whereas the competent courts acted efficiently.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year. At the same time, the Constitutional Court ruled that the length of proceedings was not excessive.", 326,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1979. He is currently serving a prison sentence. 6. On 17 April 1999 the Fier District Court (""the District Court""), following proceedings in which the applicant did not take part, convicted the applicant and his two co-accused of a number of serious criminal offences. It sentenced the applicant to death in absentia. 7. On 1 June 1999 the Vlora Court of Appeal (""the Court of Appeal""), following appeals lodged by the two other co-accused, upheld the District Court's decision of 17 April 1999. 8. On 8 May 2001, following appeals lodged by the applicant's co‑accused, the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' decisions. However, it sentenced the applicant to life imprisonment. 9. On 1 December 2006 the applicant was extradited to Albania from Italy. He was officially informed of his conviction in absentia on the same day. 10. On 8 December 2006 the applicant lodged an application with the District Court for leave to appeal out of time. 11. On 25 January 2007 the District Court dismissed the application, finding that the Supreme Court's decision of 8 May 2001 had become res judicata and that, consequently, the applicant could not be tried a second time for the same offence. 12. On 8 June 2007 and 2 July 2010, following the applicant's appeals, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, respectively, upheld that decision. 13. On 8 June 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal against the Supreme Court's decision of 2 July 2010. He also complained about the unfairness of the proceedings in absentia. 14. On 21 September 2011, the Constitutional Court, sitting as a full bench, rejected the appeal by a majority. It found that the applicant's complaint against the Supreme Court's decision of 2 July 2010 was manifestly ill-founded. As regards his complaint about the unfairness of the proceedings in absentia, and the domestic courts' dismissal of his application for leave to appeal out of time, the Constitutional Court noted that the applicant had not complained about the domestic courts' decisions taken in absentia (see paragraphs 6-8 above). It further found that that complaint was in any event time-barred. It also reasoned that in the present case the Supreme Court's unifying decision no. 1 of 20 January 2011 was applicable (see Izet Haxhia v. Albania, no. 34783/06, §§ 28-31, 5 November 2013). In addition, it noted that although the appeals before the Supreme Court against the lower courts' decision were lodged by the co‑accused and not the applicant, the Supreme Court had examined and amended the lower courts' decisions of 17 April and 1 June 1999 also in respect of the applicant. 15. On an unspecified date in 2007 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal against the District Court's decision of 17 April 1999, the Court of Appeal's decision of 1 June 1999 and the Supreme Court's decision of 8 May 2001 complaining about his conviction in absentia. 16. On 21 September 2007 the Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal as having been lodged out of time, considering that the two-year time-limit had started to run as from 8 May 2001. The decision was communicated to the applicant's lawyer on 25 September 2007.",Ruled as violated by court,,"9. On 1 December 2006 the applicant was extradited to Albania from Italy. He was officially informed of his conviction in absentia on the same day. 10. On 8 December 2006 the applicant lodged an application with the District Court for leave to appeal out of time. 11. On 25 January 2007 the District Court dismissed the application, finding that the Supreme Court's decision of 8 May 2001 had become res judicata and that, consequently, the applicant could not be tried a second time for the same offence. 12. On 8 June 2007 and 2 July 2010, following the applicant's appeals, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, respectively, upheld that decision. 13. On 8 June 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal against the Supreme Court's decision of 2 July 2010. He also complained about the unfairness of the proceedings in absentia. 14. On 21 September 2011, the Constitutional Court, sitting as a full bench, rejected the appeal by a majority. It found that the applicant's complaint against the Supreme Court's decision of 2 July 2010 was manifestly ill-founded. As regards his complaint about the unfairness of the proceedings in absentia, and the domestic courts' dismissal of his application for leave to appeal out of time, the Constitutional Court noted that the applicant had not complained about the domestic courts' decisions taken in absentia (see paragraphs 6-8 above). It further found that that complaint was in any event time-barred. It also reasoned that in the present case the Supreme Court's unifying decision no. 1 of 20 January 2011 was applicable (see Izet Haxhia v. Albania, no. 34783/06, §§ 28-31, 5 November 2013). In addition, it noted that although the appeals before the Supreme Court against the lower courts' decision were lodged by the co‑accused and not the applicant, the Supreme Court had examined and amended the lower courts' decisions of 17 April and 1 June 1999 also in respect of the applicant. 16. On 21 September 2007 the Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal as having been lodged out of time, considering that the two-year time-limit had started to run as from 8 May 2001. The decision was communicated to the applicant's lawyer on 25 September 2007.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""fair and public trial,"" it appears that the applicant not appearing at the proceedings threatens this right.", 327,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Poltava. 6. On 18 April 2003 the applicant's employer, Grebinkivska District State Administration (""the Administration""), received a statement from the Grebinkivskyy District prosecutor's office dated 17 April 2003 (""the prosecutor's statement""). The document analysed the amount of preventive social work performed by the applicant in connection with minors in 2002 and concluded that the applicant, as the head of the juvenile service department of the Administration, had no knowledge of the relevant law and displayed an irresponsible attitude towards her professional duties. The document contained a demand that the applicant be disciplined. 7. On 21 April 2003 the Administration examined the prosecutor's statement and decided to give the applicant a warning against the use of excessive formalism in her work. On 14 May 2003 the Administration informed the prosecutor's office of the actions taken in consequence of their consideration of the prosecutor's statement. 8. On 10 April 2004 the applicant brought civil defamation proceedings against the Grebinkivskyy District prosecutor's office, Prosecutor Mr B., the Poltava Region prosecutor's office and the State Treasury of Ukraine, alleging that the prosecutor's statement contained untrue information relating to her professional activity and that this negative evaluation of her attitude to work had damaged her honour, dignity and professional reputation. She asked the court to order the Grebinkivskyy District prosecutor's office to retract the prosecutor's statement and to pay her compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 9. On 8 December 2005 the Pyryatynskyy District Court of Poltava Region applied defamation law as contained in the Civil Code of 2003, the Prosecutor's Office Act and the Information Act. It considered the case on its merits and allowed the applicant's claim in part. 10. On 17 July 2006 the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal did not challenge the approach of the first-instance court in considering the case under civil law defamation provisions. However, it disagreed with the application of the Civil Code of 2003 and applied the old Civil Code of 1963. It partly allowed the claim and increased the level of compensation awarded to the applicant for non-pecuniary damage. 11. On 20 September 2006 the State Treasury of Ukraine appealed against the decision to the Supreme Court. 12. On 6 February 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine quashed the above decision of 17 July 2006 and closed the proceedings, finding that the case should not have been examined in civil proceedings. The court indicated that the prosecutor's statement should have been contested either before a superior prosecutor (in accordance with section 22 of the Prosecutor's Act) or before ""a court"". The Supreme Court also ruled that, according to paragraph 4 of Resolution no. 7 of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of Ukraine dated 28 September 1990, entitled ""on the application of legislation by the courts regulating defence of honour, dignity and reputation of citizens and organisations"" (""the Resolution""), it was not possible to file a civil defamation claim in respect of statements contained in courts' decisions or decisions of various investigative bodies.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 328,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1984 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Rubtsovsk, Altai Region. 5. On 2 March 2011 the applicant was arrested. On an unspecified date he was charged with extortion and the murder of Vos. 6. On an unspecified date a trial by jury was opened in the applicant's case in the Altai Regional Court. 7. On an unspecified date the jury returned a guilty verdict against the applicant and three other defendants. By a judgment dated 17 May 2012 the Regional Court sentenced the applicant to nineteen years' imprisonment. 8. On 6 September 2012 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation quashed the verdict on appeal, in view of contradictory conclusions contained in the jury's verdict, and remitted the matter to the trial court for fresh consideration. 9. On 30 January 2013 the jury returned a guilty verdict in respect of the applicant and three other defendants. 10. On 19 February 2013 juror V. made a statement addressed to the trial judge. She alleged that Ch., Vos's mother, had repeatedly talked to the jurors during the adjournments. Ch. had informed the jurors that it was the second trial and that the applicant and other defendants had already been found guilty of her son's murder. Ch. had also advised the jurors to check out the information concerning her son's murder on the Internet. V. had done so and, as a result, had been influenced by this information when finding the defendants guilty. It appears that the trial judge ordered an inquiry in response to V.'s allegations. 11. On 25 February 2013 Ch. submitted a written statement denying V.'s allegations. 12. On 26 February 2013 jury foreperson G. signed a statement in which she indicated that she ""had not been aware"" of any instances of undue influence on the jury by Ch. 13. On 27 February 2013 the Regional Court sentenced the applicant to nineteen years' imprisonment. 14. On 28 February 2013 the trial judge asked the bailiffs' service to conduct an inquiry in response to the statement made by juror V. 15. On 18 March 2013 the deputy head of the bailiffs' service responded to the trial judge as follows: ""It follows from the reports submitted by the bailiffs ... and the bailiffs' group supervisor that on the relevant dates the jurors were supervised by the bailiff ... while they were in the courtroom or in the jurors' room. None of the jurors contacted [the bailiffs' service] as regards the [jurors'] security or interference with the fulfilment of the jury's duties."" 16. Following an appeal lodged by the applicant and two other defendants, on 8 August 2013 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the applicant's conviction. As regards the applicant's argument that Ch. had exerted undue influence on the jury, the court stated as follows: ""[The court] rejects as unsubstantiated the argument ... that the jury's verdict was ... a result of unlawful influence exerted by Ch. According to the trial record, the jury members were selected in compliance with the requirements set out in [the rules of criminal procedure]. The materials in the case file show that ... Ch. did not exert undue influence on the jurors. [The court] discerns no violations of the rules of criminal procedure, including those alleged by [the defendants], that would justify the quashing of the verdict.""",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears, with the multiple closings and reopenings, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 329,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1960. 6. At the time of the events the applicant was serving in the Turkish Army as a lieutenant-colonel. 7. On 8 May, 10 May and 11 May 2000, the applicant was interrogated by the military prosecutor within the context of a criminal investigation initiated against him for embezzlement. 8. On 16 June 2000 an arrest warrant was issued in respect of the applicant on suspicion of embezzlement. 9. 19 June 2000 the applicant applied to the Military Prosecutor's Office. He was placed in detention on remand on the same day by the General Staff Military Court. 10. On the same day, the applicant gave a power of attorney to a lawyer. 11. On 22 June 2000 the applicant's brother Şükrü Aymelek, who was a lawyer, was also placed in detention on remand. On 10 April 2012 the applicant's brother was released. 12. On 26 June 2000 the General Staff Military Prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the General Staff Military Court charging the applicant with embezzlement under Section 131 of Military Criminal Code, involving in trade activities as a soldier under Additional Section 1 of Military Criminal Code and breaching Article 13 of the Law No. 3628 (Law on Disclosure of Assets and Fight Against Bribery and Corruption). The siblings of the applicant, Şükrü Aymelek and Ulviye Toprakkıran were also charged with the same bill of indictment with embezzlement and breaching Article 13 of the Law No. 3628. 13. On 29 May 2001 the General Staff Military Prosecutor filed an additional bill of indictment and charged the accused with additional acts related to the crimes already stated in the first bill of indictment. 14. On 19 September 2001, the applicant submitted a petition with the prison authorities, complaining that he had not been able to see his brother Şükrü Aymelek, who was also detained in remand. The applicant stated that he regretted that his brother was also in prison because of him, and requested to see him. 15. On 19 September 2002 the applicant was found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment for embezzlement and being involved in trade activities as a soldier by the General Staff Military Court, composed of a military officer with no legal background and two military judges. 16. On 6 January 2003 the applicant appealed against the decision of the General Staff Military Court. 17. On 2 April 2003 the Military Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 19 September 2002 on procedural grounds and on the merits. 18. On 17 December 2003 the General Staff Military Court found the applicant guilty for embezzlement and being involved in trade activities as a soldier, but reduced his prison sentence. The applicant appealed. 19. On 2 June 2004 the Military Court of Cassation upheld the decision of 17 December 2003. 20. On 13 January 2014 the applicant requested from the Military Court of Cassation to reopen the criminal proceedings alleging that a witness who had not been heard, was ready to give statements before the court. The applicant submitted that witness' written statements to the Military Court of Cassation as well. 21. On 19 February 2014 rejected the applicant's request for reopening of the criminal proceedings, on the grounds that the witness' statements did not have any evidential value, which could warrant a lesser sentence or the acquittal of the applicant.",Ruled as violated by court,"9. 19 June 2000 the applicant applied to the Military Prosecutor's Office. He was placed in detention on remand on the same day by the General Staff Military Court. 11. On 22 June 2000 the applicant's brother Şükrü Aymelek, who was a lawyer, was also placed in detention on remand. On 10 April 2012 the applicant's brother was released. 14. On 19 September 2001, the applicant submitted a petition with the prison authorities, complaining that he had not been able to see his brother Şükrü Aymelek, who was also detained in remand. The applicant stated that he regretted that his brother was also in prison because of him, and requested to see him. 17. On 2 April 2003 the Military Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 19 September 2002 on procedural grounds and on the merits. 20. On 13 January 2014 the applicant requested from the Military Court of Cassation to reopen the criminal proceedings alleging that a witness who had not been heard, was ready to give statements before the court. The applicant submitted that witness' written statements to the Military Court of Cassation as well. 21. On 19 February 2014 rejected the applicant's request for reopening of the criminal proceedings, on the grounds that the witness' statements did not have any evidential value, which could warrant a lesser sentence or the acquittal of the applicant.",13. On 29 May 2001 the General Staff Military Prosecutor filed an additional bill of indictment and charged the accused with additional acts related to the crimes already stated in the first bill of indictment.,FALSE,0,The applicant was denied his right to have witnesses examined., 330,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. Ms Bazanova (""the first applicant"") was born on 4 December 1964 and lives in Serpukhov. 5. On 6 October 2009 the first applicant, deputy head of the municipal administration at the time, was arrested on the charges of abuse of power and bribery. Ts. and K. alleged that they had bribed the first applicant in order to facilitate the purchase of plots of land. 6. On 19 November 2010 the Moscow Regional Court opened the trial in the first applicant's case. 7. On 23 March 2011 K. complained to the court that certain publications about the trial had an adverse effect on his private life. The information disclosed had been damaging to his reputation. His statements had been taken out of context and misconstrued. He also alleged that unknown persons had followed and threatened him in the courthouse. 8. On the same date Ts. lodged a similar complaint with the court. He alleged that the publications in the local newspaper about the trial and his role in it had been damaging to his reputation. 9. On 24 March 2011 the prosecutor asked the court to hold the trial in camera. He relied on the complaints lodged by K. and Ts. The court granted the prosecutor's request and decided to hold the trial in camera in order to protect the interests of the witnesses. 10. On 11 August 2011 the Regional Court found the first applicant guilty on two counts of abuse of power and two counts of bribery and sentenced her to 7.5 years' imprisonment and a monetary fine. The first applicant appealed. 11. On 12 October 2011, having heard the judge rapporteur, the prosecutor, the first applicant and her counsel, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the first applicant's conviction in part (one count of abuse of power and one count of bribery in respect of Ts.'s attempt to purchase a plot of land) and quashed it in part (one count of abuse of power and one count of bribery in respect of K.'s attempt to purchase a plot of land) remitting the matter for fresh consideration. The court also reduced the first applicant's sentence and the amount of the fine. 12. On 8 October 2013 the Regional Court found the first applicant guilty as charged, as regards charges of abuse of power and bribery in respect of the bribe paid by K., and sentenced her cumulatively to 7 years and 3 months' imprisonment and a monetary fine. The court held a public hearing. It appears that the first applicant did not appeal against the judgment of 8 October 2013. 13. Mr Mukhachev (""the second applicant""), was born on 29 December 1976 and lived, prior to his conviction, in Zheleznodorozhniy, Moscow Region. 14. On 4 August 2009 the second applicant was arrested on the charges of extremism and fraud. He remained in custody pending investigation and trial. 15. On 31 March 2011 the Savelovskiy District Court of Moscow fixed the trial for 14 April 2011. The court decided to hold the trial in camera in order to ensure security for the parties to the proceedings and their family members. 16. On 30 September 2011 the District Court found the second applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to 9 years' imprisonment. The second applicant appealed. 17. On 14 December 2011, having heard the judge rapporteur, the prosecutor, the second applicant and his counsel and the counsel for the civil party, the Moscow City Court upheld, in substance, the second applicant's conviction on appeal.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the first applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 331,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in İzmir. 5. On 18 June 1998 the applicant started working for a company owned by İzmir City Council (""the City Council""). On 19 March 2007 he resigned from his job to perform his military service. 6. On 12 April 2007 the applicant was paid 16,985 Turkish liras (TRY ‑ approximately 9,200 euros (EUR)) in respect of severance pay and he signed a release (ibraname) discharging the City Council from all liability. 7. Following his discharge from the military on health grounds shortly after he was enlisted, on 20 April and 31 May 2007 the applicant requested his reinstatement in his previous job. However, his requests were rejected by the City Council. 8. On 28 June 2007 the applicant initiated proceedings before the İzmir Labour Court, seeking reinstatement. He relied on clause 19 of the collective bargaining agreement in force at the company (""the collective agreement""), which provided for the reinstatement of employees who had quit their jobs to perform their military service, provided that they applied within three months of their discharge from the armed forces. 9. On 12 September 2007, in a decision rendered orally in the presence of the parties, the İzmir Labour Court found in favour of the applicant. The Labour Court held that the applicant's discharge from the military shortly after he had been enlisted fell under the provision of the collective agreement, which called for the suspension of the employment contract when an employee was conscripted (silah altına alınma) for reasons other than compulsory military service, such as being recalled to the armed forces in times of war. Therefore it held that the applicant was entitled to be reinstated in accordance with the terms of the collective agreement. The court informed the parties that they could appeal against this decision within the time-limits set out in the applicable procedure. 10. On 18 September 2007 the City Council appealed against the decision and reserved its right to submit additional observations once the reasoned judgment of the first-instance court had been served on it. That appeal was not communicated to the applicant. 11. On 15 October 2007, the registry of the first-instance court forwarded the file to the Court of Cassation for appeal on points of law. 12. On 23 October 2007 the City Council submitted its additional observations. It argued, inter alia, that the first-instance court's interpretation of the collective agreement had been erroneous. These observations were also not communicated to the applicant. 13. On 21 July 2008, following an examination based on the case file and without holding a hearing, the Court of Cassation quashed the first‑instance court's judgment and found in favour of the City Council. The Court of Cassation found it established that the applicant had resigned from his job to perform his military service and that he had been paid severance pay. It held that a rejection of the applicant's request for reinstatement could not be regarded as the termination of the applicant's employment contract; therefore, the applicant could not technically ask to be reinstated. The Court of Cassation further held that clause 19 of the collective agreement was not directly applicable in the case before it. No appeal was possible against this decision. 14. This decision was served on the applicant on 22 September 2008.",Ruled as violated by court,,"10. On 18 September 2007 the City Council appealed against the decision and reserved its right to submit additional observations once the reasoned judgment of the first-instance court had been served on it. That appeal was not communicated to the applicant. 12. On 23 October 2007 the City Council submitted its additional observations. It argued, inter alia, that the first-instance court's interpretation of the collective agreement had been erroneous. These observations were also not communicated to the applicant.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""fair and public trial,"" it appears that the applicant not being informed of the appeal threatens this right.", 332,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","6. The applicant was born in 1934 and lived in Moscow. 7. In June 1998 he deposited 5,187.40 United States dollars in a three‑month account with Russian Credit, a private bank. 8. In August 1998 the country suffered a financial crisis, the rouble fell, and the bank defaulted. In December 1998 the applicant accepted the bank's offer to settle and close his account in return for the balance in depreciated roubles. By the time the money reached the applicant in March 1999, the rouble had depreciated further. 9. In October 1999 the bank went into external administration and its debt repayments were frozen pending a restructuring. 10. In May 2000 the bank and its creditors negotiated a group settlement of the pre-October 1999 debt and had it approved by the courts. The settlement discharged the bank from fines, penalties, default interest, and damages arising under legislation, contracts with clients, and court decisions. 11. In December 2001 the applicant sued the bank for the loss caused by the exchange-rate fluctuations between the day he had accepted the bank's offer and the day the money had arrived. The bank objected to that claim on the ground that it had extinguished its obligations by repaying the deposit to the applicant. On 17 April 2002 the Golovinskiy District Court of Moscow awarded the applicant 77,603.50 Russian roubles (RUB)[1]. 12. In May 2003 the applicant filed a writ of execution with a bailiff. 13. On 17 June 2003, on the application of the bank, the District Court terminated the enforcement of its judgment in view of the group settlement. The District Court said: Considering the nature of the legal relationship at issue, the court takes into account the fact that the enforcement proceedings have been instituted with the purpose of collecting from [Russian Credit] the liabilities that had come into existence before 18 October 1999 inclusive and, under the ... terms of the friendly settlement, are related to [the bank's] restructured liabilities subject to novation on the terms of the friendly settlement approved by a [court decision] that had defined the procedure and terms of the extinction of the liabilities. Pursuant to section 23 § 2 of the Federal Law on Enforcement Proceedings, the conclusion of a friendly settlement between a creditor and a debtor constitutes a ground for the termination of the enforcement proceedings, and therefore the [bank's] application shall be granted and the [enforcement proceedings] shall be terminated. 14. In July 2003, in reply to the applicant's query, the bank's external administrator informed the applicant that his deposit had not been on the books and that under the terms of the group settlement his judgment debt could not be paid. 15. On 14 August 2003 the Moscow City Court upheld the District Court's decision, finding that the applicant's individual claim was to be settled with the group claim. The City Court said: When terminating the [enforcement] proceedings the [District Court] has referred to the provisions of section 439 of the Code of Civil Procedure and reached the conclusion that the terms of the said friendly settlement regarding the restructuring of the credit obligations of [Russian Credit] extended also to [the applicant]. The [City Court] agrees with the said conclusion of the [District Court] as based on the provisions of the law and confirmed by the circumstances of the present case.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,The applicant was able to bring proceedings., 333,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Vodnjan. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. On 9 July 2010 the applicant was indicted before the Pula-Pola Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Puli-Pola) on charges of indecent behaviour. 7. He was tried in summary proceedings (skraćeni postupak). During the proceedings before the first- and the second-instance courts he was represented by a lawyer, M.K. 8. On 11 October 2011 the Pula-Pola Municipal Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to one year's imprisonment. 9. On 7 November 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Pula‑Pola County Court (Županijski sud u Puli-Pola), challenging the factual and legal grounds for his conviction and sentence. He did not ask that he or his lawyer be invited to the session of the appeal panel. 10. On an unspecified date in 2011, the Pula-Pola County Court, acting as the court of appeal, forwarded the applicant's appeal and the Pula-Pola Municipal Court's case file to the Pula‑Pola County State Attorney's Office (Županijsko državno odvjetništvo u Puli-Pola) for their examination and opinion. 11. On 7 December 2011 the Pula-Pola County State Attorney's Office returned the case file to Pula-Pola County Court accompanied by a submission which read as follows: ""In the criminal case against Slobodan Kliba, accused of the criminal offence referred to in Article 193 § 2 in conjunction with Article 192 § 1 of the Criminal Code, the defence lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Pula Municipal Court No. K-344/10 of 11 October 2011 complaining about errors of facts, alleging that the Criminal Code had been violated and challenging the sanction as well as the decision concerning costs and expenses. I consider the appeal unfounded, therefore I propose that it be dismissed as in my opinion the facts in the criminal proceedings in question were duly established. The Criminal Code was not violated and the sanction inflicted is appropriate, considering the type and seriousness of the criminal offence of which the accused was found guilty. The costs of proceedings were properly estimated and can be borne by the accused, regard being had to his financial status."" The submission in question was not forwarded to the defence. 12. On 20 January 2012 the Pula-Pola County Court held a session which the parties did not attend. On the same day it dismissed the appeal as unfounded and upheld the first-instance judgment. 13. On 13 March 2012 the applicant, represented by lawyer V.D.L., lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) complaining, inter alia, that his right to a fair trial had been violated because the submission of the Pula-Pola County State Attorney's Office had not been communicated to the defence. 14. On 14 January 2016 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's constitutional complaint as unfounded. It held that the fact that the Pula-Pola County State Attorney's Office submission of 12 July 2013 had not been forwarded to the applicant had not breached his constitutional rights, having regard to the content of the submission, the fact that he had been tried in summary proceedings and that he had not asked that he or his lawyer be invited to the session of the appeal panel. 15. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant's representative on 2 February 2016.",Ruled as violated by court,,"11. On 7 December 2011 the Pula-Pola County State Attorney's Office returned the case file to Pula-Pola County Court accompanied by a submission which read as follows: ""In the criminal case against Slobodan Kliba, accused of the criminal offence referred to in Article 193 § 2 in conjunction with Article 192 § 1 of the Criminal Code, the defence lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Pula Municipal Court No. K-344/10 of 11 October 2011 complaining about errors of facts, alleging that the Criminal Code had been violated and challenging the sanction as well as the decision concerning costs and expenses. I consider the appeal unfounded, therefore I propose that it be dismissed as in my opinion the facts in the criminal proceedings in question were duly established. The Criminal Code was not violated and the sanction inflicted is appropriate, considering the type and seriousness of the criminal offence of which the accused was found guilty. The costs of proceedings were properly estimated and can be borne by the accused, regard being had to his financial status."" The submission in question was not forwarded to the defence.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""fair and public trial,"" it appears that the defence not being informed of the appeal threatens this right.", 334,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","6. The applicant was born in 1977. 7. On 25 April 1999 the applicant was arrested and placed in police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation and the murder of thirteen persons. On the same day, she underwent a medical examination. The doctor who examined the applicant noted no sign of injury on her body. 8. On 26 April 1999 police officers at the Istanbul Security Directorate took statements from the applicant in the absence of a lawyer. The applicant confessed that she was a member of the illegal organisation and admitted having planned an attack on a shopping centre and having acted as a lookout while other co-accused started a fire by throwing Molotov cocktails at the shopping centre, killing thirteen persons in March 1999. 9. On 27 April 1999 the applicant was required to confront with two other co-accused before the police, in the absence of a lawyer. According to the record of the confrontation she admitted having carried out the attack on the shopping centre with those two and another co-accused. 10. On the same day an identification parade took place at the Istanbul Security Directorate, in the absence of a lawyer, where one of the eyewitnesses of the incident identified the applicant in front of police officers and the public prosecutor at the State Security Court. 11. On the same day the applicant was also required to participate in a reconstruction of the events (yer gösterme). According to the record drafted by police officers and signed by the applicant, the applicant described in detail what steps she had taken before the attack on the shopping centre and indicated how she had acted as a lookout while the other co-accused threw Molotov cocktails in the shopping centre. 12. On 30 April 1999 the applicant was seen by a doctor at the Forensic Medicine Institution who noted in his report that the applicant bore no traces of ill-treatment. 13. On the same day, the applicant was heard by the Istanbul Public Prosecutor and by the investigating judge, still in the absence of a lawyer. In her statements before both the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant denied the accusations and maintained that her statements to the police had been given under duress. Subsequently, the investigating judge ordered the applicant's detention on remand. 14. On 6 May 1999 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment with that court, and charged the applicant with carrying out activities for the purpose of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory, pursuant to Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. 15. The state security courts were later abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, and the case was transferred to the Istanbul Assize Court. 16. On 7 May 2007 relying on, inter alia, the applicant's statements to the police, the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced her to life imprisonment for membership of an illegal organisation and the murder of thirteen people. In delivering its judgment, the Assize Court further took into consideration several items of evidence, such as the applicant's statements to the police, public prosecutor and investigating judge, video recordings and written records of the crime scene visits, autopsy reports, eyewitness identifications, and the statements given by some of the accused persons. 17. On 7 May 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first instance court.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,The applicant was denied her right to defend herself., 335,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Yerevan. 5. The applicant was employed by the State Revenue Service (""the Service""), division no. 2. On 23 February 2009 the head of the Service decided to terminate the applicant's employment. 6. On 2 April 2009 the applicant initiated proceedings in the Administrative Court against the Service seeking to 1) have the decision of 23 February 2009 annulled; 2) be reinstated in her previous position; and 3) recover her average salary starting from the moment of her dismissal until her reinstatement to the previous position. 7. On 17 September 2009 the Administrative Court granted the applicant's three claims. In particular, it annulled the decision of 23 February 2009, ordered the Service to reinstate her to her previous position and to pay her her average monthly salary starting from 23 February 2009 until her reinstatement. It reasoned its decision, inter alia, by stating that while the Service had been under an obligation to offer the applicant another position within the Service before deciding to dismiss her, it had failed to do so, even though such a position had existed in the Service at the material time. 8. This judgment was upheld in the final instance by the Court of Cassation and it became final on 4 November 2009. 9. On 29 November 2009 the Service paid the applicant 1,197,748 Armenian drams (AMD) (approximately 2,131 euros (EUR) at the material time) as compensation for her unemployment during the period from 23 February to 29 November 2009. 10. On 11 December 2009 the Administrative Court issued a writ of execution. 11. On 25 February 2010 the Department for the Enforcement of Judicial Acts (""the DEJA"") initiated enforcement proceedings. On the same day the DEJA gave a decision obliging the Service to comply with the writ of execution of 11 December 2009 within two weeks. 12. It appears that no further actions were taken by the DEJA and the Service in relation to the enforcement of the judgment of 17 September 2009 between the period of 25 February 2010 and 18 July 2011. 13. On 18 July 2011 the bailiff decided to discontinue the enforcement proceedings on the basis of section 41(1)(8) of the Enforcement of Judicial Acts Act. The bailiff reasoned that the Service had already paid the applicant AMD 1,197,748 while the reinstatement of the applicant in her previous position in the Service was impossible because that position was no longer vacant. 14. On 29 May 2012 the applicant asked the DEJA to resume the enforcement proceedings. 15. On 1 June 2012 the bailiff granted the applicant's request and decided to resume the enforcement proceedings. On the same day the bailiff gave a decision on obliging the Service to take certain actions. In particular, the bailiff obliged the Service to 1) annul the decision of the head of the Service of 23 February 2009; 2) reinstate the applicant to her previous position; and 3) pay her her average monthly salary for the period between her dismissal and her reinstatement to the previous position. 16. On 2 July 2012 the bailiff decided once again to terminate the enforcement proceedings on the basis of section 41(1)(8) of the Enforcement of Judicial Acts Act. In particular, the bailiff reasoned that the Service had already paid the applicant AMD 1,197,748 as ordered by the judgment of 17 September 2009 while the reinstatement of the applicant in her previous position in the Service was impossible because Division no. 2, where the applicant had previously worked, no longer existed.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. On 17 September 2009 the Administrative Court granted the applicant's three claims. In particular, it annulled the decision of 23 February 2009, ordered the Service to reinstate her to her previous position and to pay her her average monthly salary starting from 23 February 2009 until her reinstatement. It reasoned its decision, inter alia, by stating that while the Service had been under an obligation to offer the applicant another position within the Service before deciding to dismiss her, it had failed to do so, even though such a position had existed in the Service at the material time. 8. This judgment was upheld in the final instance by the Court of Cassation and it became final on 4 November 2009. 9. On 29 November 2009 the Service paid the applicant 1,197,748 Armenian drams (AMD) (approximately 2,131 euros (EUR) at the material time) as compensation for her unemployment during the period from 23 February to 29 November 2009. 10. On 11 December 2009 the Administrative Court issued a writ of execution. 11. On 25 February 2010 the Department for the Enforcement of Judicial Acts (""the DEJA"") initiated enforcement proceedings. On the same day the DEJA gave a decision obliging the Service to comply with the writ of execution of 11 December 2009 within two weeks. 13. On 18 July 2011 the bailiff decided to discontinue the enforcement proceedings on the basis of section 41(1)(8) of the Enforcement of Judicial Acts Act. The bailiff reasoned that the Service had already paid the applicant AMD 1,197,748 while the reinstatement of the applicant in her previous position in the Service was impossible because that position was no longer vacant. 14. On 29 May 2012 the applicant asked the DEJA to resume the enforcement proceedings. 15. On 1 June 2012 the bailiff granted the applicant's request and decided to resume the enforcement proceedings. On the same day the bailiff gave a decision on obliging the Service to take certain actions. In particular, the bailiff obliged the Service to 1) annul the decision of the head of the Service of 23 February 2009; 2) reinstate the applicant to her previous position; and 3) pay her her average monthly salary for the period between her dismissal and her reinstatement to the previous position. 16. On 2 July 2012 the bailiff decided once again to terminate the enforcement proceedings on the basis of section 41(1)(8) of the Enforcement of Judicial Acts Act. In particular, the bailiff reasoned that the Service had already paid the applicant AMD 1,197,748 as ordered by the judgment of 17 September 2009 while the reinstatement of the applicant in her previous position in the Service was impossible because Division no. 2, where the applicant had previously worked, no longer existed.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears, with the multiple closings and reopenings, that the applicant did not receive an enforcement proceeding hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 336,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Toretsk. 5. In December 2007 the applicant lodged a claim with the Dzerzhynsk Court against the Social Insurance Fund (""the Fund""), seeking damages for injuries caused by a work-related accident. 6. By a judgment of 17 January 2008, the above court allowed the claim in part and awarded the applicant certain amounts in damages. The applicant and the Fund both sought to appeal against that judgment. 7. In particular, on 25 January 2008 the applicant lodged through the Dzerzhynsk Court a statement of intent to lodge an appeal (""the statement of intent""; заява про апеляційне оскарження). The copy of the statement of intent submitted to the Court bears the Dzerzhynsk Court's stamp with reference number 1561 showing 25 January 2008 as the date of receipt. On 13 February 2008 the applicant lodged the appeal itself, in which he requested that the appellate court quash the judgment of 17 January 2008 and award him the claimed damages in full. A copy of the appeal bears the Dzerzhynsk Court's stamp, with 13 February 2008 showing as the date of receipt. The applicant stated that no separate procedural decisions had been made about his appeal because it had been mislaid by the court. 8. In a ruling of 18 March 2008 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal (""the Court of Appeal"") examined the appeal lodged by the Fund, rejected it as unsubstantiated and upheld the judgment of 17 January 2008. The ruling did not mention the applicant's appeal, and only stated that at the hearing, which was held on the same day, the applicant and his representative had contested the Fund's appeal and had asked the court to reject it. 9. According to the transcript of the court hearing on 18 March 2008, the applicant's representative stated during the hearing that the applicant had lodged the statement of intent on 25 January 2008 and the appeal itself on 13 February 2008. She also stated that they were not challenging the judgment of 17 January 2008 as regards the application of the law but rather were merely seeking an award of the full amount of damages claimed by the applicant. The applicant's representative also asked the Court of Appeal to reject the Fund's appeal. The applicant submitted that at the hearing his representative had also produced a copy of his appeal and had asked the Court of Appeal to join it to the case file; however, the latter refused to do so. 10. The applicant appealed in cassation to the Supreme Court of Ukraine. A copy of the appeal in cassation submitted to the Court shows that the applicant had dated it 17 May 2008. In it the applicant stated that he had lodged an appeal against the judgment of 17 January 2008 but that when he had arrived at the appellate hearing on 18 March 2008, it transpired that his appeal had been mislaid and his submissions had therefore not been examined by the Court of Appeal. He thus asked the Supreme Court to quash the ruling of 18 March 2008 and to remit the case for fresh examination. 11. On 27 June 2008 the Supreme Court refused to grant leave for the applicant's appeal in cassation. It stated that the Court of Appeal had examined the appeal lodged by the Fund, but that the applicant had not personally appealed against the judgment of 17 January 2008 and for this reason the case could not be reviewed in cassation. It did not address the applicant's argument that he had indeed lodged an appeal, but that it had been mislaid. The decision of the Supreme Court indicated that the applicant's appeal in cassation had been lodged in ""April 2007"".",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. By a judgment of 17 January 2008, the above court allowed the claim in part and awarded the applicant certain amounts in damages. The applicant and the Fund both sought to appeal against that judgment. 7. In particular, on 25 January 2008 the applicant lodged through the Dzerzhynsk Court a statement of intent to lodge an appeal (""the statement of intent""; заява про апеляційне оскарження). The copy of the statement of intent submitted to the Court bears the Dzerzhynsk Court's stamp with reference number 1561 showing 25 January 2008 as the date of receipt. On 13 February 2008 the applicant lodged the appeal itself, in which he requested that the appellate court quash the judgment of 17 January 2008 and award him the claimed damages in full. A copy of the appeal bears the Dzerzhynsk Court's stamp, with 13 February 2008 showing as the date of receipt. The applicant stated that no separate procedural decisions had been made about his appeal because it had been mislaid by the court. 8. In a ruling of 18 March 2008 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal (""the Court of Appeal"") examined the appeal lodged by the Fund, rejected it as unsubstantiated and upheld the judgment of 17 January 2008. The ruling did not mention the applicant's appeal, and only stated that at the hearing, which was held on the same day, the applicant and his representative had contested the Fund's appeal and had asked the court to reject it. 10. The applicant appealed in cassation to the Supreme Court of Ukraine. A copy of the appeal in cassation submitted to the Court shows that the applicant had dated it 17 May 2008. In it the applicant stated that he had lodged an appeal against the judgment of 17 January 2008 but that when he had arrived at the appellate hearing on 18 March 2008, it transpired that his appeal had been mislaid and his submissions had therefore not been examined by the Court of Appeal. He thus asked the Supreme Court to quash the ruling of 18 March 2008 and to remit the case for fresh examination. 11. On 27 June 2008 the Supreme Court refused to grant leave for the applicant's appeal in cassation. It stated that the Court of Appeal had examined the appeal lodged by the Fund, but that the applicant had not personally appealed against the judgment of 17 January 2008 and for this reason the case could not be reviewed in cassation. It did not address the applicant's argument that he had indeed lodged an appeal, but that it had been mislaid. The decision of the Supreme Court indicated that the applicant's appeal in cassation had been lodged in ""April 2007"".",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""fair and public trial,"" it appears that the miscommunication of the applicant's appeal threatens this right.", 337,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","6. The applicant was born in Peqin in 1977. He is currently serving a prison sentence. 7. In 1998 the applicant was implicated in the commission of the criminal offence of setting up and being a member of an armed gang and of other criminal offences. 8. On 4 February 1999 the prosecutor charged him with the offences of membership of an armed gang, attempted intentional murder and other crimes. The notification of the prosecutor's charges was acknowledged by the applicant's officially appointed lawyer. 9. It appears that throughout the investigation proceedings the applicant was represented by an officially appointed lawyer. 10. On 12 February 1999 the Elbasan District Court ordered the applicant's arrest. However, the order could not be enforced as the applicant could not be traced. 11. On 19 February 1999 the Elbasan District Court declared the applicant a fugitive from justice after unsuccessful attempts to locate him. The decision stated that it was impossible to find him as it appeared that he had escaped to an unknown destination (këto kërkime nuk kanë bërë të mundur kapjen e të pandehurit pasi ai rezulton të ketë ikur në drejtim të paditur). 12. On an unspecified date the prosecutor decided to commit the applicant for trial. 13. On 28 May 1999 the Supreme Court transferred the case for examination to the Durrës District Court. 14. On 2 June 1999 the applicant's father appointed a lawyer to represent the applicant before the domestic courts. 15. The trial proceedings against the applicant were conducted in absentia and he was represented by a lawyer appointed by his family in accordance with Article 48 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (""CCP""). 16. On 15 February 2000 the Durrës District Court convicted the applicant in absentia of establishing and participating in an armed gang and attempted intentional murder. He was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. The decision was based on evidence from documents and witness testimony. 17. The applicant's family-appointed lawyer and the other co-accused appealed against the conviction to the Durrës Court of Appeal (""the Court of Appeal""). On 19 April 2000 the Court of Appeal declined to examine the applicant's appeal on the grounds that the applicant's family had not given any express authority to the lawyer for such a procedure. However, the Court of Appeal examined the applicant's case as part of its overall examination, having regard to the appeals of the other defendants. It convicted the applicant of the same offences as before and sentenced him to thirteen years' imprisonment. 18. On 7 December 2000 the Supreme Court dismissed appeals by the applicant and other co-accused against the Court of Appeal's decision of 19 April 2000. 19. On 16 September 2005 the applicant was arrested by the Czech authorities on the basis of an arrest warrant issued by Albania. 20. On 25 January 2006 the applicant was extradited to Albania. 21. On 1 March 2006 the applicant was officially informed of his conviction in absentia. 22. On 13 September 2007 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal against the conviction in absentia. 23. On 24 October 2007 the Constitutional Court, sitting in camera, declared the appeal time-barred as the two-year time-limit had started to run on 7 December 2000. The Constitutional Court's reasoning stated that throughout the proceedings the applicant had been represented by a court‑appointed lawyer or a family-appointed lawyer and that accordingly he had had the opportunity to become acquainted with the proceedings brought against him.",Ruled as violated by court,,21. On 1 March 2006 the applicant was officially informed of his conviction in absentia.,TRUE,2,"It's unclear whether the applicant was able to exercise his right ""to defend himself in person or through legal assistance,"" as he was not in attendance at the proceedings, but his father-appointed and court-appointed lawyers were.", 338,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1975. He is currently serving a prison sentence. 6. On 9 July 2002, following proceedings in absentia, the Gjirokastër District Court convicted the applicant of attempted armed robbery, negligent homicide and premeditated murder in relation to another criminal offence, and sentenced him to twenty-five years' imprisonment. Three other co‑defendants, whose requests for the use of the summary procedure had been granted, were also found guilty. The applicant was represented by a court-appointed lawyer. 7. On 7 October 2002, following an appeal by the three other defendants, the Gjirokastër Court of Appeal upheld the decision in the applicant's absence. 8. On 10 October 2007, upon the applicant's extradition to Albania, the District Court accepted his application for leave to appeal out of time. The District Court stated in its reasoning that the postal service had noted that the applicant was living in Italy and that as a consequence he had not been aware of his conviction. 9. On an unspecified date in October 2007 the applicant lodged his appeal. In the first place, he requested that his case be re-examined separately from that of his co-defendants on the grounds that he had not sought the use of the summary procedure. He relied on the Supreme Court's unifying decision no. 2 of 29 January 2003 (see paragraph 16 below). Secondly, he requested that a fresh examination of the evidence be conducted in his presence and that a number of witnesses be questioned. Thirdly, he maintained that the authorities had failed to inform him about the judicial proceedings before the first-instance court. 10. On 17 December 2007 the Gjirokastër Court of Appeal upheld the applicant's conviction in absentia. The court ruled that the applicant had not put forward new evidence to change the outcome of those proceedings. His request had been directed against the probative value of evidence which had already been examined and decided upon. In upholding the conviction, the court relied on forensic evidence produced in 1997 and 1999 and on witness statements made in 2001 and 2002. The court further stated that the applicant had been duly informed as the authorities had issued a public notice. It finally noted that the summary procedure had been applied equally to all the defendants in accordance with the Supreme Court's unifying decision of 29 January 2003 (see ""Relevant domestic case law below""). Separating the cases could not be considered as the district court had not decided on that issue. 11. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal against the Court of Appeal's decision. He complained of a breach of his right to have witnesses questioned and evidence re-examined. He stressed the fact that in his appeal to the Court of Appeal he had asked for evidence to be obtained, including an identification parade, the questioning of a fourth person who had been present at the events, a face-to face confrontation between himself and the other co-defendants and so on. It had not been possible for him to obtain that evidence himself, only the courts or the prosecutor could have done that. The applicant also maintained the other complaints he had raised in his Court of Appeal case. 12. On 5 March 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding that it lacked any grounds of appeal as prescribed by law. 13. On 21 February 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court. 14. On 9 May 2011 the applicant's lawyer was notified of the Constitutional Court's decision that his appeal was inadmissible.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. On 9 July 2002, following proceedings in absentia, the Gjirokastër District Court convicted the applicant of attempted armed robbery, negligent homicide and premeditated murder in relation to another criminal offence, and sentenced him to twenty-five years' imprisonment. Three other co‑defendants, whose requests for the use of the summary procedure had been granted, were also found guilty. The applicant was represented by a court-appointed lawyer. 7. On 7 October 2002, following an appeal by the three other defendants, the Gjirokastër Court of Appeal upheld the decision in the applicant's absence. 8. On 10 October 2007, upon the applicant's extradition to Albania, the District Court accepted his application for leave to appeal out of time. The District Court stated in its reasoning that the postal service had noted that the applicant was living in Italy and that as a consequence he had not been aware of his conviction.",TRUE,1,"While the applicant had a court-appointed lawyer, he appears denied of his rights to be informed of the charges and examine witnesses.", 339,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Simferopol. She is a single mother and has a son who at the time of the accident in question was eight years old. 5. On 24 July 1995 the applicant was knocked down by a trolley bus. She suffered an open craniocerebral injury and contusion of the brain. As a result, the applicant received the status of a disabled person with the lowest degree of disability (третя група інвалідності). 6. In January 1996 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Tsentralnyy District Court against the Simferopol Trolley Bus Company, claiming compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage to her health caused by the accident. In particular, as pecuniary damage the applicant claimed compensation for medicines, additional nutrition, treatment in a sanatorium, transport expenses, and compensation for loss of earnings. 7. On 25 February 2003 the applicant lodged an application with the Court (Litvinyuk v. Ukraine, no. 9724/03) complaining, inter alia, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the lengthy examination of her case by the domestic courts. 8. On 1 February 2007, while the proceedings were still pending before the national courts, the Court delivered a judgment on the applicant's first application (no. 9724/03), finding that the length of the proceedings in her case had been excessive. The Court took into consideration the period after 11 September 1997, when the Convention had come into force in respect of Ukraine. The length of the proceedings within the Court's competence was nine years and twenty two days. 9. The Court, in particular, noted the following: ""47. As for the issues that were at stake for the applicant, the Court notes that following the traffic accident the applicant was seriously injured and received a disability degree. Given that the applicant was a single mother and had a child to raise, the compensations for loss of earnings and for expenses sustained as a result of a poor state of her health were of undeniable importance for the applicant. The Court therefore considers that what was at stake for the applicant called for an expeditious decision on her claims."" 10. On 27 March 2007 the Simferopolskiy District Court found against the applicant. On 24 December 2007 the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea quashed this decision and remitted the case to a first-instance court for fresh examination. On 23 April 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the decision of the court of appeal. 11. On 13 May 2009 the Simferopolskiy District Court partly found for the applicant. On 29 July 2009 the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea quashed this decision and remitted the case to a first-instance court for fresh examination. On 15 October 2009 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the decision of the court of appeal. 12. On 10 November 2009 the Simferopolskiy District Court left the applicant's case without consideration because she had failed to appear in court without giving plausible reasons on 28 October 2009 and 10 November 2009. The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision stating that she had not been aware about the above-mentioned hearings. On 27 January 2010 the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea rejected the applicant's appeal. The court noted that the applicant had been duly notified about the date of the hearings. On 5 October 2011 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the decisions of the lower courts. A further attempt by the applicant to have the above decisions reviewed in the light of newly discovered circumstances was to no avail.",Ruled as violated by court,,10. On 27 March 2007 the Simferopolskiy District Court found against the applicant. On 24 December 2007 the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea quashed this decision and remitted the case to a first-instance court for fresh examination. On 23 April 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the decision of the court of appeal.,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 340,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicants were born in 1954, 1952, 1964, 1926, 1952, 1960 and 1956 respectively and live in Donetsk. 6. From the beginning of April 2014 armed groups started to seize official buildings in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and announced the creation of self-proclaimed entities known as the ""Donetsk People's Republic"" and ""Luhansk People's Republic"" (the ""DPR"" and ""LPR""). 7. In response, on 14 April 2014 the Government, who consider the armed groups to be terrorist organisations, authorised the use of force against them in the legal form of an ""anti-terrorist operation"". 8. In June 2014 the armed groups started to seize offices of the National Bank of Ukraine and other regional financial institutions in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. 9. On 24 July 2014 the Ukrainian postal service Ukrposhta suspended its operations on the territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions that were outside the control of the Government, because of frequent attacks on its vehicles and employees by armed groups. 10. On 6 August 2014 the National Bank of Ukraine suspended all financial transactions on the territories outside the control of the Government (see paragraph 20 below). 11. Government forces recaptured some territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but certain parts of the regions have remained outside the Government's control since that time. One part of the Donetsk region not under the Government's control is the city of Donetsk. 12. On 2 September 2014, following changes in the law, jurisdiction of the courts in the non-controlled areas was transferred to the relevant courts in the neighbouring regions on the territory controlled by the Government (see paragraphs 34 to 36 below). 13. On 11 November 2014 all social benefit payments in the settlements of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions that were outside the control of the Government were suspended (see paragraph 26 below) 14. In December 2014 the Donetsk Regional Administrative Court and the Donetsk Regional Administrative Court of Appeal were relocated to the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, territory controlled by the Government (see paragraphs 37 and 38 below). 15. The applicants were registered as recipients of social benefits with different departments of the Pension Fund of Ukraine in Donetsk. Some applicants had been receiving their social benefits until 30 June 2014, others until 31 August 2014. 16. On 16 June 2015 the first and second applicants registered themselves with the Labour and Social Security Department of the Krasnoarmiysk District of the Donetsk region (currently the city of Pokrovsk), controlled by the Government. On the same day their social benefits was reinstated, including social benefits due to them for the period 1 July 2014 to 16 June 2015. 17. The sixth applicant was registered with the Labour and Social Security Department of the Obolonskiy District in Kyiv on 9 September 2015. However, she did not apply for reinstatement of her social benefits. 18. The other applicants did not apply to the relevant social authorities on the territory controlled by the Government for reinstatement of their social benefits. 19. According to the Government, the sixth and seventh applicants travelled from Donetsk to the territory controlled by the Government after their social benefits had been suspended. The Government provided a certificate from the State Customs Office stating that the sixth and seventh applicants had entered the territory controlled by the Government on 31 October 2015, through an authorised checkpoint near the frontline between Ukrainian forces and ""DPR"" armed groups in the town of Zaitseve.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"16. On 16 June 2015 the first and second applicants registered themselves with the Labour and Social Security Department of the Krasnoarmiysk District of the Donetsk region (currently the city of Pokrovsk), controlled by the Government. On the same day their social benefits was reinstated, including social benefits due to them for the period 1 July 2014 to 16 June 2015. 17. The sixth applicant was registered with the Labour and Social Security Department of the Obolonskiy District in Kyiv on 9 September 2015. However, she did not apply for reinstatement of her social benefits. 19. According to the Government, the sixth and seventh applicants travelled from Donetsk to the territory controlled by the Government after their social benefits had been suspended. The Government provided a certificate from the State Customs Office stating that the sixth and seventh applicants had entered the territory controlled by the Government on 31 October 2015, through an authorised checkpoint near the frontline between Ukrainian forces and ""DPR"" armed groups in the town of Zaitseve.",FALSE,0,There is no relevance between fair trial and suspension of benefits as mentioned in the fact pattern., 341,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. On 23 December 2004 the applicants and 126 others lodged a claim with the Komárno Land Office, an authority that is now part of the Komárno District Office (""the Land Office""), for restitution of land under the Restoration of Land Ownership Act (Law no. 503/2003 Coll., as amended). 6. On 27 May 2010 the Land Office dismissed the claim on the grounds that all the claimants lacked standing to bring it. 7. On 21 November 2011 the Nitra Regional Court upheld that decision following an administrative-law appeal by the claimants, lodged on their behalf by four individuals. 8. However, following an appeal lodged by the claimants with the Supreme Court, on 29 January 2014 that court quashed the Regional Court's judgment and remitted the case to it on the grounds that the latter had failed to establish the representatives' authority to act on behalf of all the claimants. The proceedings before the Regional Court had been conducted merely in the presence of the designated representatives and the court had failed to summon the claimants in person and to have its judgment served on them. It had thereby breached the claimants' right of access to a court. 9. Accordingly, it became incumbent on the Regional Court to determine anew the claimants' administrative-law appeal against the decision of the Land Office of 27 May 2010. In those proceedings, the court invited the claimants to clarify issues concerning their legal representation with a view to ensuring that they would be represented by a common representative. 10. In a decision of 4 December 2014 the Regional Court issued several rulings. In so far as relevant for the present application, it ruled that the claimants would all be jointly represented by a lawyer who had up until then represented only some of them. 11. On 25 May 2016 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 4 December 2014 following an appeal lodged by the claimants. 12. The proceedings are still pending before the Regional Court. 13. Meanwhile, on 21 January 2015 the Constitutional Court had rejected a complaint lodged by the applicants about the length of the proceedings in their claim, in so far as they had taken place before the Land Office and the Regional Court. The Constitutional Court held that the length of the administrative proceedings before the Land Office and of the judicial‑review proceedings held before the Regional Court could not be considered together. Having split the complaint into those two segments, the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint concerning the administrative proceedings on the grounds of non-exhaustion of ordinary remedies. In particular, it noted that the applicants had failed to challenge the alleged inactivity of the Land Office under Article 250t § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) (see paragraphs 19 et seq. in ""Relevant domestic law and practice"" below). As regards the judicial-review proceedings, the Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint as manifestly ill-founded. It noted that those proceedings as a whole had lasted some four and a half years. However, the case had been pending on appeal before the Supreme Court for about two years of that period. Although the length of the appellate proceedings had been unsatisfactory, as such it had not been complained of by the applicants, who had limited their compliant to the proceedings before the Regional Court. In addition, the Constitutional Court observed that the proceedings had been procedurally complex on account of the number of claimants. In sum, despite the fact that its judgment had been quashed as flawed, the length of the proceedings before the Regional Court had not been excessive.",Ruled as violated by court,,"13. Meanwhile, on 21 January 2015 the Constitutional Court had rejected a complaint lodged by the applicants about the length of the proceedings in their claim, in so far as they had taken place before the Land Office and the Regional Court. The Constitutional Court held that the length of the administrative proceedings before the Land Office and of the judicial‑review proceedings held before the Regional Court could not be considered together. Having split the complaint into those two segments, the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint concerning the administrative proceedings on the grounds of non-exhaustion of ordinary remedies. In particular, it noted that the applicants had failed to challenge the alleged inactivity of the Land Office under Article 250t § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) (see paragraphs 19 et seq. in ""Relevant domestic law and practice"" below). As regards the judicial-review proceedings, the Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint as manifestly ill-founded. It noted that those proceedings as a whole had lasted some four and a half years. However, the case had been pending on appeal before the Supreme Court for about two years of that period. Although the length of the appellate proceedings had been unsatisfactory, as such it had not been complained of by the applicants, who had limited their compliant to the proceedings before the Regional Court. In addition, the Constitutional Court observed that the proceedings had been procedurally complex on account of the number of claimants. In sum, despite the fact that its judgment had been quashed as flawed, the length of the proceedings before the Regional Court had not been excessive.",TRUE,2,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears, with the multiple closings and reopenings, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year. At the same time, the Constitutional Court ruled that the length of proceedings was not excessive.", 342,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1974 and is detained in Diyarbakır. 6. On 8 March 1995 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of Hizbullah, an illegal organisation. The applicant's right of access to a lawyer was restricted during his police custody according to the now defunct Law no. 3842. On the same day he was examined by a doctor at his own request. The doctor noted, in a police document, that there was no sign of physical violence on the applicant's body. 7. On 16 March 1995 the applicant was taken part in ""an identification parade with statements (ifadeli yüzleştirme tutanağı)"" with other accused persons and identified, in the absence of a lawyer, certain persons as members of the said organisation and confessed to committing a murder. 8. On 26 March 1995 the applicant further participated in the reconstruction of the events (olay ve yer gösterme) in the course of which he had confessed, in the absence a lawyer, having carried out an arson attack. 9. On 29 March 1995 the applicant was questioned by the police officers in the absence of a lawyer. In his statement, the applicant gave a detailed description about his involvement in Hizbullah. 10. On 5 April 1995 the applicant was brought before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge respectively, again in the absence of a lawyer. Before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant denied his police statements claiming that he had been subjected to torture. The investigating judge ordered the applicant's detention on remand. On the same day and before his statements were taken, he had been examined by a doctor at the request of the police. The doctor noted, in a police document, that there was no sign of physical violence on the applicant's body. 11. On 12 April 1995 he was examined by a doctor at his own request claiming that he had been subjected to torture while in police custody. The doctor noted that there was no sign of physical violence on the applicant's body. 12. On 2 May 1995 the applicant gave evidence as complainant before the public prosecutor and stated that the had been subjected to various forms of torture, which included beatings, electric shock treatment, blindfolding, hosing with cold water, and being stripped naked. 13. On 23 May 1995 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed a bill of indictment against the applicant and several other persons. The applicant was accused of carrying out activities for the purpose of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory, proscribed by Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. 14. On 19 October 1995 the State Security Court held the first hearing in the case. 15. By Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004, State Security Courts were abolished. The case against the applicant was transferred to the Diyarbakır Assize Court. 16. On 31 March 2005 the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted the applicant of attempting to undermine the constitutional order, proscribed by Article 146 § 1 of the former Criminal Code, and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 17. On 11 December 2006 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 31 March 2005 in respect of some of the accused, including the applicant, and remitted the case to the Diyarbakır Assize Court. 18. On 9 November 2007, the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted the applicant of attempting to undermine the constitutional order, proscribed by Article 146 § 1 of the former Criminal Code, and sentenced him to life imprisonment again. 19. On 19 January 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the first-instance court's judgment.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,The applicant was denied his right to defend himself., 343,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Bern, Switzerland. At the time of the events giving rise to the present application, he was the editor‑in-chief of Ülkede Özgür Gündem, a daily newspaper published in Turkey. 6. On 6 July 2004 an article written by Mr B.G. entitled ""Analysing the Kurdish dynamic correctly"" was published in Ülkede Özgür Gündem. In his article, Mr B.G. stated his views on the role of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK (an illegal armed organisation), a number of organisations associated with the PKK in regional and international politics and political developments in Turkey. Next to the article a photograph of Abdullah Öcalan shaking hands with a group of armed men was published. 7. On 8 July 2004 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul Assize Court filed a bill of indictment, charging the applicant with disseminating propaganda in favour of the KONGRA-GEL[1] under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) on account of the article published on 6 July 2004. In the indictment, the public prosecutor quoted the following passage from the article: ""... Abdullah Öcalan, who has contributed to the essential dynamic of the Kurdish movement and the HPG[2], the PJA[3] and the KONGRA-GEL, organisations which have acted as military, political and ideological leaders and which have represented his leadership,... [must be well understood]"". The public prosecutor stated that a photograph of Abdullah Öcalan in which he was standing in a rural area holding a weapon had been published in the newspaper, next to the article. The public prosecutor considered as a result that the applicant had disseminated propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation inciting others to violence or other methods of terrorism. Subsequently, criminal proceedings were launched against the applicant before the Istanbul Assize Court. 8. During the proceedings the applicant maintained that the article in question had been a news article and had not contained propaganda inciting to violence. 9. On 24 May 2005 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and a fine. In its judgment, the Istanbul Assize Court held that the content of the article and the publication of Abdullah Öcalan's photograph amounted to dissemination of propaganda in favour of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL. 10. The applicant appealed. In his appeal petition, referring to a number of the Court's judgments, the applicant claimed that he had not had the intention of disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation and that his criminal conviction had been in breach of Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention as he had been exercising his right to impart information. He also noted that the first-instance court had failed to examine the article in its entirety. 11. On 16 May 2006 the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation returned the case file to the first-instance court and requested that the latter revise its judgment in the light of the recent legislative amendments. 12. On 28 September 2006 the Istanbul Assize Court once again convicted the applicant under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, with the same reasoning that it had adopted on 24 May 2005. The court sentenced the applicant to a fine of 1,802 Turkish liras (TRY). 13. The applicant appealed. 14. On 18 November 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 28 September 2006. 15. According to a document dated 15 January 2010, signed by the President of the Istanbul Assize Court and the Istanbul public prosecutor, the applicant was required to pay the fine of TRY 1,802.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 344,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicants were born in 1931, 1972, 1948, 1965, 1970, and 1964 respectively, and live in Golubovci. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. The applicants intervened, as injured party, in criminal proceedings against X, in the course of which they sought 2.705,70 euros (EUR) as compensation for legal costs. 8. On 14 October 2008 the High Court (Viši sud) in Podgorica found X guilty and, inter alia, ordered him to pay the applicants 505.70 euros (EUR) for the costs of legal representation, without specifying what exactly was covered by this amount. 9. On an unspecified date X and the High State Prosecutor appealed. 10. On 30 March 2009 the applicants appealed in respect of costs and expenses. On 6 May 2009 the High Court transmitted the applicants' appeal to the Court of Appeal (Apelacioni sud) in Podgorica. 11. On 22 September 2009 the Court of Appeal ruled on the appeals lodged by the High State Prosecutor and X. The applicants learned of this judgment on 27 May 2010 when checking the case-file at the High Court. It was served on them on 3 October 2013. 12. On 28 May 2010 the applicants complained to the President of the Supreme Court that the Court of Appeal had failed to rule on their appeal. 13. On 7 June 2010 the President of the Supreme Court notified them that she had been informed by the High Court President that the case file had been ""at the Court of Appeal in order for it to rule on [their] appeal in respect of costs of criminal proceedings given that it had not been ruled upon by [its] judgment of 22 September 2009"". 14. On 24 October 2011 the applicants requested the President of the High Court to transmit the case file to the Court of Appeal given that they had learnt that the file had been archived in the High Court, contrary to what that court had said to the President of the Supreme Court. 15. On 11 January 2012 the applicants again complained to the President of the Supreme Court. 16. It would appear that the Court of Appeal has not ruled on the applicants' appeal. 17. On 14 March 2011, in the absence of any ruling by the Court of Appeal, the applicants filed a compensation claim against the State. 18. On 17 June 2011 the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Podgorica rejected the claim (odbacuje se) finding that the High Court had awarded them the costs, which judgment had become final in the meantime, and that the issue was thus res iudicata. 19. On 7 July 2011 the High Court upheld this judgment. 20. On 12 July 2012 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud) dismissed the applicants' constitutional appeal, considering that there was no violation of Article 6 as res iudicata was indeed a procedural obstacle which prevented further proceedings. It further held that the applicants' dissatisfaction with the costs awarded in the criminal proceedings did not mean that they could claim them by a regular civil claim (putem redovne građanske tužbe). In any event, the civil proceedings could not serve to correct the final decisions issued in criminal proceedings. 21. On 8 December 2011 the High Court issued a decision ordering its finance department (računovodstvo) to pay the applicants' representative the amount awarded by the High Court on 14 October 2008. This decision became final on 5 January 2012, given that no appeal was lodged against it. 22. On 10 January 2017 the High Court informed the Agent's office that the Court of Appeal had not ruled on the applicants' appeal in respect of costs of criminal proceedings, but that the High Court, after its judgment of 14 October 2008 had become final, had issued a decision on 8 December 2011 ordering that the applicants' representative be paid the sum awarded thereby.",Ruled as violated by court,"8. On 14 October 2008 the High Court (Viši sud) in Podgorica found X guilty and, inter alia, ordered him to pay the applicants 505.70 euros (EUR) for the costs of legal representation, without specifying what exactly was covered by this amount. 20. On 12 July 2012 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud) dismissed the applicants' constitutional appeal, considering that there was no violation of Article 6 as res iudicata was indeed a procedural obstacle which prevented further proceedings. It further held that the applicants' dissatisfaction with the costs awarded in the criminal proceedings did not mean that they could claim them by a regular civil claim (putem redovne građanske tužbe). In any event, the civil proceedings could not serve to correct the final decisions issued in criminal proceedings. 22. On 10 January 2017 the High Court informed the Agent's office that the Court of Appeal had not ruled on the applicants' appeal in respect of costs of criminal proceedings, but that the High Court, after its judgment of 14 October 2008 had become final, had issued a decision on 8 December 2011 ordering that the applicants' representative be paid the sum awarded thereby.","13. On 7 June 2010 the President of the Supreme Court notified them that she had been informed by the High Court President that the case file had been ""at the Court of Appeal in order for it to rule on [their] appeal in respect of costs of criminal proceedings given that it had not been ruled upon by [its] judgment of 22 September 2009"". 20. On 12 July 2012 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud) dismissed the applicants' constitutional appeal, considering that there was no violation of Article 6 as res iudicata was indeed a procedural obstacle which prevented further proceedings. It further held that the applicants' dissatisfaction with the costs awarded in the criminal proceedings did not mean that they could claim them by a regular civil claim (putem redovne građanske tužbe). In any event, the civil proceedings could not serve to correct the final decisions issued in criminal proceedings. 21. On 8 December 2011 the High Court issued a decision ordering its finance department (računovodstvo) to pay the applicants' representative the amount awarded by the High Court on 14 October 2008. This decision became final on 5 January 2012, given that no appeal was lodged against it. 22. On 10 January 2017 the High Court informed the Agent's office that the Court of Appeal had not ruled on the applicants' appeal in respect of costs of criminal proceedings, but that the High Court, after its judgment of 14 October 2008 had become final, had issued a decision on 8 December 2011 ordering that the applicants' representative be paid the sum awarded thereby.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 345,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1966 and is detained in Włocławek. 5. Criminal proceedings against the applicant concerning charges of leading an organised criminal gang, assault and extortion have been pending since 29 September 2005 (case no. IV K 59/09, Łódź Regional Court). 6. On 1 October 2009 the applicant was arrested and detained on remand. 7. On 2 March 2010 the applicant was indicted before the Łódź Regional Court. The bill of indictment was directed against the applicant and twenty‑two co-accused charged with over 900 offences in total. The applicant was charged on thirty-eight counts with respect to various offences related to stealing cars, dealing in drugs, assaults and burglaries, in the context of an organised criminal gang. 8. At a session on 23 November 2010 the trial court decided to sever the remainder of the case from the proceedings against the applicant, which would be dealt with at a separate trial and joined with other charges brought against him. In consequence, the proceedings against the applicant were to be transferred to another division of the Łódź Regional Court. The decision pertaining to the competence of the court was quashed on 14 December 2010. On 28 December 2010 the trial court extended the applicant's detention on remand. On 4 February 2011 the proceedings were stayed pending the outcome of another trial, but that decision was quashed upon appeal on 16 March 2011. The case was transferred to the relevant division of the court in March 2011, and thereafter the presiding judge scheduled the beginning of the trial for 14 September 2011 and undertook other preparative actions (such as tracing the addresses of some twelve witnesses). During the proceedings the applicant lodged multiple procedural requests which were examined by the trial court. In particular, he asked for adjournments of hearings, asked for new evidence to be admitted, and challenged a judge and a prosecutor. 9. The Łódź Regional Court held about twenty-four hearings in total and on 13 May 2013 convicted the applicant and sentenced him to nine years' imprisonment. 10. The applicant appealed against the judgment. 11. A hearing of the appellate court scheduled for 15 April 2014 was cancelled due to the absence of the applicant's lawyer. 12. On 12 June 2014 the Łódź Court of Appeal allowed the applicant's appeal in part and reduced his sentence to eight years' imprisonment. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal. 13. On 17 December 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeal. 14. The applicant lodged two complaints under the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints of breaches of the right to have a case examined in an investigation conducted or supervised by a prosecutor, and in judicial proceedings, without undue delay (ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu przygotowawczym prowadzonym lub nadzorowanym przez prokuratora i postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki - ""the 2004 Act""). 15. On 7 September 2011 the Łódź Court of Appeal dismissed the first complaint. The court, relying on the Convention principles, ruled that, taking into account the complexity of the case, the length of the proceedings had not been excessive. During the period under consideration the trial court had prepared diligently for trial by, for instance, securing the presence of a large number of witnesses who had been summoned from various detention facilities. 16. On 28 November 2012 the Łódź Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's second complaint. The court examined the course of the proceedings and ruled that there had been no delays on the part of the courts. It noted that the trial court had taken many procedural decisions requested by the parties, including the applicant.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 346,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Assemini (Italy). 6. By a decision of 4 December 2006 of the Cantonal Prosecutor of the Hercegovina-Neretva Canton (Hercegovačko-neretvanski kanton; one of the ten cantons of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) the applicant was granted the reimbursement of costs which she had incurred as a witness in the amount of 519 convertible marks (BAM)[1]. 7. On 29 February 2008 the Mostar Municipal Court (""the Municipal Court"") rejected the applicant's request for the enforcement of this decision, deeming it unenforceable. 8. On 18 September 2008 the Mostar Cantonal Court (""the Cantonal Court"") quashed this decision and remitted the case for reconsideration. 9. On 19 November 2008 the Municipal Court issued a writ of execution (rješenje o izvršenju). 10. On 19 June 2009 the Municipal Court upheld the objection lodged against this decision. 11. On 1 April 2010 the Cantonal Court quashed this decision and again remitted the case to the Municipal Court. 12. On 18 February 2011 the Municipal Court partly accepted the objection against the writ of execution specifically as regards the interest on the main debt calculated from 4 January 2007, and the interest on the total costs of the enforcement proceedings. 13. On 2 December 2011 the Cantonal Court upheld this decision. 14. On 19 September 2013 the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina dismissed the applicant's request for revision as inadmissible. 15. On 23 December 2013 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina partially accepted the applicant's appeal and thereby found a violation of her right to a trial within a reasonable time, due to the non-enforcement of the decision of the Municipal Court of 18 February 2011 (see paragraph 12 above). It also ordered the Hercegovina-Neretva Canton to undertake measures in order to enforce the decision within a reasonable time. The Constitutional Court, however, did not award the non-pecuniary damage requested by the applicant. 16. On 21 October 2014 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina confirmed that the final decision in question had not yet been enforced. 17. On 18 December 2014 the said final decision was enforced and the applicant was paid in cash. 18. By a judgment of the Municipal Court of 3 April 2009, which became final on 16 December 2009, a certain P.M. was ordered to pay the applicant the costs of civil proceedings in the amount of BAM 1,959. 19. On 31 October 2010 the applicant submitted to the Municipal Court a request for the enforcement of this judgment. 20. On 14 September 2011, 4 November 2011 and 5 October 2012 the applicant submitted requests for the acceleration of the enforcement proceedings. 21. On 5 December 2012 the Municipal Court issued a writ of execution. 22. On 13 June 2013 the Municipal Court dismissed the objection lodged against its decision of 5 December 2012, and P.M. subsequently appealed this decision to the Cantonal Court. 23. On 17 September 2013 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina found a violation of the applicant's right to a trial within a reasonable time, due to the duration of the enforcement proceedings before the Municipal Court. It further ordered the Cantonal Court to urgently rule on the appeal lodged by P.M. The Constitutional Court, however, did not award the non-pecuniary damage requested by the applicant. 24. On 16 October 2013 the Cantonal Court dismissed the appeal lodged by P.M. 25. On 11 June 2015 the Municipal Court issued a writ of execution. 26. On 4 August 2016 the said final judgment was enforced and the applicant was paid in cash on her bank account in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It appears that the applicant was still living in Italy at that time.",Ruled as violated by court,,26. On 4 August 2016 the said final judgment was enforced and the applicant was paid in cash on her bank account in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It appears that the applicant was still living in Italy at that time.,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears, with the multiple closings and reopenings, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, according to the Constitutional Court.", 347,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Riga. 5. On 23 April 2003 criminal proceedings were instituted. 6. On 29 April 2003 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of attempted bribery. 7. On 2 May 2003 the applicant was detained on remand. On 25 July 2003 he was released and police supervision was imposed instead, under which he was obliged not to leave his home district without the authorisation of the investigation authorities, and to report to the local police department twice a week. 8. On 27 November 2003 a bill of indictment was served on the applicant and his two co-accused (D.E. and V.M.). On 2 December 2003 a judge of the Riga Regional Court (Rīgas apgabaltiesa) accepted the criminal case for trial. The first hearing was scheduled to take place from 1 to 4 August 2005. 9. On 1 August 2005 the hearing was adjourned for an indefinite period owing to D.E.'s poor state of health and the fact that the applicant's defence lawyer was on vacation. 10. On 1 October 2005 the new Criminal Procedure Law entered into force; it introduced new rules concerning, inter alia, conflicts of interest faced by judges. In the light of the new rules, on 22 February 2006 the hearing was adjourned because one of the judges of the Riga Regional Court had had to recuse herself from the trial. 11. On 31 July 2006 the hearing was adjourned because the prosecutor and the applicant's defence lawyer were due to go away on holiday. 12. On 13 November 2006 the hearing was adjourned once again owing to D.E.'s poor state of health. On 15 November 2006 a judge from the Riga Regional Court requested the hospital in which D.E. was being treated to provide information about her state of health. On 20 November 2006 the court was informed that D.E. had been discharged from the hospital and placed under the care of her family doctor. 13. On 27 February 2007 the hearing was adjourned for unspecified reasons. 14. On 26 June 2007 the hearing was adjourned again owing to D.E.'s poor state of health. On the same day the Riga Regional Court ordered that D.E. undergo a medical examination in order for her capacity to participate in the proceedings to be determined. The findings of that examination were delivered less than one month later and indicated that D.E. was able to participate in the proceedings. 15. On 27 September 2007 the Riga Regional Court scheduled the next hearing for 27 December 2007. On 18 October 2007 D.E.'s lawyer requested that that hearing be rescheduled in order to accommodate his taking planned holidays. The court dismissed that request, noting that six hearings had already been adjourned and that further delays in the proceedings could not be allowed. 16. On 27 December 2007 the hearing was adjourned, as the prosecution needed to replace the charge against the applicant with a more lenient one. 17. On 11 January 2008 the Riga Regional Court started to hear the parties' arguments regarding the merits of the case. On 15 January 2008 it convicted the applicant of attempted bribery and sentenced him to three years' imprisonment. 18. On 4 February 2008 the applicant submitted an appeal. On 1 December 2008 the appellate court upheld the lower court's judgment. 19. On 30 December 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, arguing, inter alia, that his right to a trial within a reasonable time had been breached. In this respect he referred to several provisions of national and international law, including Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 20. By a final decision of 26 January 2009 the Senate of the Supreme Court (Augstākās tiesas Senāts) refused the applicant leave to appeal on points of law, noting, inter alia, that the applicant's ""reference to violations of certain laws and international legal provisions was formalistic.""",Ruled as violated by court,"6. On 29 April 2003 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of attempted bribery. 7. On 2 May 2003 the applicant was detained on remand. On 25 July 2003 he was released and police supervision was imposed instead, under which he was obliged not to leave his home district without the authorisation of the investigation authorities, and to report to the local police department twice a week. 13. On 27 February 2007 the hearing was adjourned for unspecified reasons. 19. On 30 December 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, arguing, inter alia, that his right to a trial within a reasonable time had been breached. In this respect he referred to several provisions of national and international law, including Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.","8. On 27 November 2003 a bill of indictment was served on the applicant and his two co-accused (D.E. and V.M.). On 2 December 2003 a judge of the Riga Regional Court (Rīgas apgabaltiesa) accepted the criminal case for trial. The first hearing was scheduled to take place from 1 to 4 August 2005. 9. On 1 August 2005 the hearing was adjourned for an indefinite period owing to D.E.'s poor state of health and the fact that the applicant's defence lawyer was on vacation. 10. On 1 October 2005 the new Criminal Procedure Law entered into force; it introduced new rules concerning, inter alia, conflicts of interest faced by judges. In the light of the new rules, on 22 February 2006 the hearing was adjourned because one of the judges of the Riga Regional Court had had to recuse herself from the trial. 11. On 31 July 2006 the hearing was adjourned because the prosecutor and the applicant's defence lawyer were due to go away on holiday. 12. On 13 November 2006 the hearing was adjourned once again owing to D.E.'s poor state of health. On 15 November 2006 a judge from the Riga Regional Court requested the hospital in which D.E. was being treated to provide information about her state of health. On 20 November 2006 the court was informed that D.E. had been discharged from the hospital and placed under the care of her family doctor. 13. On 27 February 2007 the hearing was adjourned for unspecified reasons. 14. On 26 June 2007 the hearing was adjourned again owing to D.E.'s poor state of health. On the same day the Riga Regional Court ordered that D.E. undergo a medical examination in order for her capacity to participate in the proceedings to be determined. The findings of that examination were delivered less than one month later and indicated that D.E. was able to participate in the proceedings. 15. On 27 September 2007 the Riga Regional Court scheduled the next hearing for 27 December 2007. On 18 October 2007 D.E.'s lawyer requested that that hearing be rescheduled in order to accommodate his taking planned holidays. The court dismissed that request, noting that six hearings had already been adjourned and that further delays in the proceedings could not be allowed. 16. On 27 December 2007 the hearing was adjourned, as the prosecution needed to replace the charge against the applicant with a more lenient one. 18. On 4 February 2008 the applicant submitted an appeal. On 1 December 2008 the appellate court upheld the lower court's judgment. 20. By a final decision of 26 January 2009 the Senate of the Supreme Court (Augstākās tiesas Senāts) refused the applicant leave to appeal on points of law, noting, inter alia, that the applicant's ""reference to violations of certain laws and international legal provisions was formalistic.""",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 348,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant company, Virprod-Lux S.R.L., is a company incorporated in Moldova. 6. On 13 April 2000 the Tax Authority seized a building from a State‑owned company, company V., on account of taxes which were due. 7. On 1 October 2000, at the request of the Tax Authority, the building was valued by an estate agency at 352,000 Moldovan lei (MDL). 8. On 29 January 2001 the Department of Privatisation and Administration of State Property sold the building in question to company B. for MDL 360,500 (approximately 29,678 Euros (EUR), following a public auction. 9. On 25 April 2003 the applicant company bought the building from company B. for MDL 628,000 (approximately EUR 22,053). 10. On 29 March 2007 the Prosecutor General's Office initiated court proceedings in which it sought the annulment of both the sale of the building on 29 January 2001 and the subsequent transaction between company B. and the applicant company. It also sought the return of the building to its initial owner, company V. The reason relied upon by the Prosecutor's General's Office was that the valuation of the building conducted by the estate agency had not been carried out in accordance with the provisions of the law. The applicant company opposed the Prosecutor General's action and argued, among other things, that it was time-barred. 11. On 21 August 2007 the Economic Court of Appeal dismissed the Prosecutor General's action as time-barred. The court held, inter alia, that in accordance with the statute of limitations, the Prosecutor General's action could not be initiated more than three years after the events in dispute had taken place. 12. On 11 October 2007 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld an appeal by the Prosecutor General, reversed the judgment of the Economic Court of Appeal, and upheld the action in its entirety. The Supreme Court considered that the Prosecutor General's action concerned a declaration of the absolute nullity of the contracts in question and that therefore, in accordance with Article 217 of the Civil Code, enacted on 12 June 2003, it could not be limited in time. Following this judgment, the transactions of 29 January 2001 and 25 April 2003 were annulled and each party involved was ordered to return to the other parties whatever they received by virtue of those transactions. 13. On 7 December 2007 the applicant company lodged a revision request against the above judgment in which it indicated that it had carried out an expert evaluation of the disputed building by an independent expert who determined its value at MDL 8,550,000 (approximately EUR 511,440) after the improvements made by the applicant company to it. 14. In the meantime, the applicant company did not leave the disputed building because it had its production line there and it needed time and resources to find another suitable building and to move its production line. 15. Since company V. did not need the disputed building, the applicant company proposed to it and the latter accepted to conclude a friendly settlement agreement in accordance with which company V. agreed that the applicant company would retain ownership of the building in exchange for MDL 325,092 (approximately EUR 19,328). 16. On 20 March 2008, within the framework of the review proceedings, the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the parties' request to settle the case. It confirmed the friendly settlement agreement between the applicant company and company V., and on that basis it quashed its previous judgment and rejected the Prosecutor General's action. 17. It is unclear from the materials of the case and the parties' submissions whether after the adoption of the judgment of 11 October 2007 by the Supreme Court of Justice, company B. returned to the applicant company the amount received as a result of the transaction of 25 April 2003.",Ruled as violated by court,,"11. On 21 August 2007 the Economic Court of Appeal dismissed the Prosecutor General's action as time-barred. The court held, inter alia, that in accordance with the statute of limitations, the Prosecutor General's action could not be initiated more than three years after the events in dispute had taken place.",FALSE,0,There is no relevance between fair trial and agreed-upon private settlement., 349,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Kyiv. 6. At the time of the events he was the director of a private company. 7. In August 2002 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on suspicion of tax evasion and forgery in office. Subsequently, the tax-evasion charge was dropped. 8. On 7 December 2004 the Kyiv Dniprovskyy District Court (""the Dniprovskyy Court"") found the applicant guilty of forgery in office. It held that he had entered knowingly false data in the company's tax returns. More specifically, instead of applying a straight-line depreciation method in respect of the company's intangible assets, the applicant calculated their depreciation costs as the difference between the company's gross revenues and expenses. As a result, the documents showed the absence of any profit or loss in the company's activity, whereas in the reality it had had losses. The applicant was sentenced to one year's restriction of liberty (namely detention in a semi-open penal institution by the place of his residence) with a ban on holding administrative posts for one year. The sentence was suspended on probation for one year. The applicant was under an undertaking not to leave the town until the judgment became final. 9. The applicant appealed. He submitted that the activity of the company had been subject to numerous tax inspections, which had not found any violations of the tax legislation. He therefore contended that he had not done anything criminal and that that fact had not received due attention of the first-instance court. Furthermore, the applicant considered that the expert questioned in the trial did not have adequate qualification. Lastly, he argued that the tax police investigator, who had also been questioned, was not impartial and that his statements should not have been relied on. Accordingly, the applicant requested the appellate court to quash the first‑instance court's judgment and to pronounce a new one, acquitting him for the lack of the constituent elements of a crime in his actions. 10. On 10 February 2005 the Dniprovskyy Court sent a letter to the Kyiv City Court of Appeal (""the Court of Appeal"") stating as follows: ""The [Dniprovskyy Court] is sending you the criminal case regarding [the applicant] convicted under Article 366 § 1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine [forgery in office], for the appellate examination at 10.35 a.m. on 17 March 2005."" 11. In addition to the president of the Court of Appeal, the above letter was also addressed to the prosecutor, the applicant and his lawyer. There is no evidence in the case file as to whether the applicant and/or his lawyer received it. According to the applicant, they were unaware of its existence. 12. On 17 March 2005, following a hearing held with the prosecutor's participation, but in the absence of both the applicant and his lawyer, the appellate court rejected the applicant's appeal. It delivered its ruling ""having heard the report of the judge-rapporteur of the appellate court and the explanations of the prosecutor, the latter considering the judgment lawful and [the applicant's] appeal groundless, having checked the case-file materials and having discussed the arguments advanced in the appeal"". The issue of the applicant's and his lawyer's absence from the hearing was not mentioned in the appellate court's ruling. 13. The applicant appealed on points of law, challenging, among other things, the examination of his case on appeal in his and his lawyer's absence as being in breach of his defence rights. 14. On 23 January 2007 the Supreme Court, in written proceedings, upheld the decisions of the lower courts. Referring to the case-file materials, it noted that the first-instance court had informed the applicant and his lawyer about the scheduled appellate hearing, without further details.",Ruled as violated by court,,"9. The applicant appealed. He submitted that the activity of the company had been subject to numerous tax inspections, which had not found any violations of the tax legislation. He therefore contended that he had not done anything criminal and that that fact had not received due attention of the first-instance court. Furthermore, the applicant considered that the expert questioned in the trial did not have adequate qualification. Lastly, he argued that the tax police investigator, who had also been questioned, was not impartial and that his statements should not have been relied on. Accordingly, the applicant requested the appellate court to quash the first‑instance court's judgment and to pronounce a new one, acquitting him for the lack of the constituent elements of a crime in his actions. 10. On 10 February 2005 the Dniprovskyy Court sent a letter to the Kyiv City Court of Appeal (""the Court of Appeal"") stating as follows: ""The [Dniprovskyy Court] is sending you the criminal case regarding [the applicant] convicted under Article 366 § 1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine [forgery in office], for the appellate examination at 10.35 a.m. on 17 March 2005."" 11. In addition to the president of the Court of Appeal, the above letter was also addressed to the prosecutor, the applicant and his lawyer. There is no evidence in the case file as to whether the applicant and/or his lawyer received it. According to the applicant, they were unaware of its existence. 12. On 17 March 2005, following a hearing held with the prosecutor's participation, but in the absence of both the applicant and his lawyer, the appellate court rejected the applicant's appeal. It delivered its ruling ""having heard the report of the judge-rapporteur of the appellate court and the explanations of the prosecutor, the latter considering the judgment lawful and [the applicant's] appeal groundless, having checked the case-file materials and having discussed the arguments advanced in the appeal"". The issue of the applicant's and his lawyer's absence from the hearing was not mentioned in the appellate court's ruling.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""defending oneself,"" it appears that the applicant was denied this right, as he and his lawyer were not able to appear at the hearing.", 350,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Rotterdam. 6. The applicant was charged with having, with an accomplice called V., robbed three supermarkets and with having, with two accomplices, mugged someone in the street outside a discotheque. 7. V. made statements to the police admitting his own participation in the supermarket robberies and implicating the applicant in all four crimes. 8. The applicant was tried before the Rotterdam Regional Court (rechtbank). V. was summoned as a witness by the defence. 9. Not being suspected of having taken part in the street mugging, V. could not refuse to give evidence about it; he made a statement to the effect that he had not personally witnessed the robbery but had heard from bystanders that it had been committed by a group that did not include the applicant. 10. V.'s statement disculpating the applicant was not believed by the public prosecutor (officier van justitie) and the court. V. was subsequently charged with perjury (meineed). 11. On 30 August 2006 the Regional Court gave judgment convicting the applicant of all four crimes. It sentenced him to four years' imprisonment and ordered the execution of a suspended two-week sentence of juvenile detention (jeugddetentie) imposed on a previous occasion when the applicant was still a minor. 12. The applicant lodged an appeal (hoger beroep) with the Court of Appeal (gerechtshof) of The Hague. 13. V. was again summoned as a witness by the defence. As relevant to the case before the Court, he kept silence on all four charges, including the street mugging in relation to which he was by this time being prosecuted for perjury. 14. The Court of Appeal gave judgment on 4 March 2008 convicting the applicant of all four charges. It sentenced the applicant to six years' imprisonment and, as the Regional Court had done, ordered the execution of the two-week suspended sentence of juvenile detention. 15. The evidence on which the conviction of the fourth charge was based may be summarised as follows: (a) The supermarket manager's report to the police that his supermarket had been robbed; (b) A statement made to the police by a cashier who had been forced at gunpoint to open her cash register, from which one of the robbers had snatched money and other goods; (c) V.'s confession to the police, in which the applicant was named as co-perpetrator. 16. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (cassatie) with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). As relevant to the case before the Court, he complained under Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention of the use made by the Court of Appeal of V.'s statements to the police to ground his convictions even though V. had refused to answer the questions of the defence under cross-examination. 17. The Advocate General (advocaat-generaal) submitted an advisory opinion (conclusie) analysing the case-law of the Court, in particular the Chamber judgment Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom, nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06, 20 January 2009, and expressing the view that V.'s evidence was ""sole and decisive"" in respect of the fourth charge but not in respect of the first three charges, for which sufficient other evidence was available. 18. On 5 January 2010 the Supreme Court gave judgment dismissing the applicant's appeal on points of law. Referring to its own case-law (its judgment of 6 June 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AV1633, Netherlands Law Reports (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, ""NJ"") 2006, no. 332, its judgment in the Vidgen case; see Vidgen v. the Netherlands, no. 29353/06, § 23, 10 July 2012), it found that the applicant had had sufficient opportunity to cross-examine V. or have him cross-examined. The mere fact that V. had refused to give evidence under cross-examination did not mean that use in evidence of his statement to the police was excluded by Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. The applicant was charged with having, with an accomplice called V., robbed three supermarkets and with having, with two accomplices, mugged someone in the street outside a discotheque. 10. V.'s statement disculpating the applicant was not believed by the public prosecutor (officier van justitie) and the court. V. was subsequently charged with perjury (meineed). 15. The evidence on which the conviction of the fourth charge was based may be summarised as follows: (a) The supermarket manager's report to the police that his supermarket had been robbed; (b) A statement made to the police by a cashier who had been forced at gunpoint to open her cash register, from which one of the robbers had snatched money and other goods; (c) V.'s confession to the police, in which the applicant was named as co-perpetrator. 17. The Advocate General (advocaat-generaal) submitted an advisory opinion (conclusie) analysing the case-law of the Court, in particular the Chamber judgment Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom, nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06, 20 January 2009, and expressing the view that V.'s evidence was ""sole and decisive"" in respect of the fourth charge but not in respect of the first three charges, for which sufficient other evidence was available.",TRUE,2,"While it depends on the definition of ""defending oneself,"" it appears that V. was denied this right; however, V. is not the person being charged. It depends on whether this counts as ""examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him.""", 351,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Cork. 5. He suffers from severe brain damage. It was asserted on his behalf that his condition was caused by the measles vaccination administered to him in 1988 when he was 15 months old. 6. In November 2002, 14 years after receiving the vaccine, the applicant's mother instituted proceedings on his behalf against four defendants; the local health authority, the State, the Attorney General (collectively described in the domestic proceedings as the State defendants) and the doctor who had administered the vaccination, H. 7. On 5 August 2003, the High Court issued a limited order of discovery addressed to the local health authority seeking all relevant records about the applicant in its possession, as well as information about the vaccine used, about any adverse effects noted at the time with this vaccine, about the manner in which the mother's consent was obtained, and about the health of the other members of the applicant's family. Although the High Court set a time-limit of 8 weeks for discovery, the local health authority only complied with the order in June 2008, that is to say with a delay of over four and a half years. 8. The applicant appealed the scope of the order of discovery of 5 August 2003, leading to the grant of a further limited order of discovery by the High Court on 30 January 2004, addressed to all four defendants. The applicant brought another appeal against the order of discovery of 30 January 2004, but in July 2006 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, making only a minor amendment to the order granted by the High Court. 9. The applicant's mother died in December 2007. 10. In June 2008 the applicant's lawyer wrote to the local health authority to complain that the long delays in litigating the case had caused grave prejudice to the case. The applicant's mother had been a vital witness, and with her death essential evidence had been lost. Settlement of the substantive dispute was proposed but not agreed. 11. In May 2008 the applicant's lawyer sought to have the defence of the State defendants set aside. The High Court refused this application on 12 March 2010. 12. The trial involved ten days of hearings. No factual evidence was called on behalf of the applicant, but independent medical witnesses gave evidence, having read the applicant's medical records, and documentary evidence provided by way of discovery was before the court. On the eleventh day of the trial, 19 July 2011, the judge accepted an application by the defendants to strike the case out for failure to establish a prima facie case against them. 13. Regarding the doctor, he noted that the applicant accepted there was insufficient evidence to establish any negligence in the administration of the vaccine. The claim against the doctor H was dismissed. In relation to the State defendants, the judge held that no evidence had been produced that could support the various grounds relied on by the applicant. 14. The proceedings in the High Court terminated on 19 December 2011. The applicant filed a notice of appeal presenting 30 grounds of appeal. Following the establishment of the Court of Appeal in October 2014, the applicant's case was transferred to it. Outline written submissions were submitted by H in February 2015 and by the State defendants in September 2015. 15. The Court of Appeal gave its judgment on 10 February 2016, dismissing the appeal. In its conclusions, the Court of Appeal stated that, by taking the case at its highest, the trial judge had adopted the correct approach on the question of striking the case out. The Court of Appeal concluded by remarking on the many legal hurdles the applicant would have had to overcome in order to succeed. It found no basis for overturning the decision of the High Court. 16. The proceedings ended on 10 May 2016 when the Supreme Court declined the applicant's request for leave to appeal.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 352,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant is a construction company, which was established in 2003 and has its seat of business in Mersin. 6. In 2005, after having obtained a permit to operate a mine, the applicant opened a mine in a plot of land of 8,700 m² which it owned. 7. During the course of its mining activities, on 31 January 2006 an audit commission under the Mersin Provincial Administration conducted an inspection. Subsequently, the commission drew up a report, proposing that the applicant should be ordered to pay 131,250 Turkish liras (TRY)[1] for quarrying substantial amounts of sand in the neighbouring plots of 5,000 m², outside of its licensed area. 8. On 8 March 2006 the Tarsus Provincial Administration informed the applicant that it had decided to impose the proposed administrative fine pursuant to Article 19 of the Regulation Concerning Group A Mines (A Grubu Madenlerle İlgili Uygulama Yönetmeliği). 9. On 8 February 2006 the applicant company's president, Ü.T., filed a complaint with the Mersin Public Prosecutor's office, stating that one of the auditors in the commission, M.A.L., had told him that the fine had initially been calculated as TRY 500,000 and that he had reduced that amount. Ü.T. claimed that M.A.L. had asked him to pay TRY 10,000 in return and had threatened to have his mine closed if he refused to do so. He indicated that M.A.L. had acted together with a certain F.G., an official at the Provincial Administration. 10. In his police statements on 9 February 2006, Ü.T. described his conversations with M.A.L. in detail. He noted, inter alia, that after the inspection of the audit commission, he had conducted another inspection with an official from the Directorate of Land Registration, and had calculated that he had trespassed on the neighbouring plots by only 400 metres. He also explained that he had acted as an undercover agent in line with the directions of the Public Prosecutor to catch the perpetrators in flagrante delicto. Accordingly, the police gave him TRY 10,000 and noted down the serial numbers of the banknotes. He stated that in line with the instructions of M.A.L. and F.G., he had given the money to a third person, who had received it in the name of the other two. 11. Subsequently, on 16 February 2006 the Mersin Public Prosecutor issued an indictment against M.A.L. and F.G., accusing them of extortion. 12. On 13 May 2011 the Mersin Assize Court found the two officials guilty as charged. The appeal proceedings with regard to that judgment are still pending before the Court of Cassation as of September 2017. 13. In the meantime, on 17 April 2006 the applicant had filed an objection with the Tarsus Magistrates' Court and requested a stay of execution of the fine. It informed the court of the criminal proceedings pending against certain officials involved, in which they were being tried for extortion. By a subsequent petition dated 5 June 2006, the applicant also requested the court to hold an oral hearing, to carry out an on-site examination, and to hear its witnesses in order to better evaluate the credibility of the inspection report the fine was based on. 14. On 13 June 2006, the Tarsus Magistrates' Court rejected the applicant's requests for an oral hearing and on-site examination without indicating any reasons for its decision. Relying on the inspection report drawn up on 31 January 2006, the court rejected the applicant's objection. 15. The applicant objected to that decision, arguing that the fine had been unlawfully imposed on it and that the Magistrates' Court had failed to adequately assess the case as it had not held a hearing. It drew the court's attention once again to the criminal proceedings against the officials involved. 16. On 10 July 2006 the Tarsus Assize Court rejected the applicant's objection without holding a hearing. 17. On 7 March 2008 the administration seized the plot of land where the applicant conducted mining activities due to the latter's failure to pay the administrative fine.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. During the course of its mining activities, on 31 January 2006 an audit commission under the Mersin Provincial Administration conducted an inspection. Subsequently, the commission drew up a report, proposing that the applicant should be ordered to pay 131,250 Turkish liras (TRY)[1] for quarrying substantial amounts of sand in the neighbouring plots of 5,000 m², outside of its licensed area. 10. In his police statements on 9 February 2006, Ü.T. described his conversations with M.A.L. in detail. He noted, inter alia, that after the inspection of the audit commission, he had conducted another inspection with an official from the Directorate of Land Registration, and had calculated that he had trespassed on the neighbouring plots by only 400 metres. He also explained that he had acted as an undercover agent in line with the directions of the Public Prosecutor to catch the perpetrators in flagrante delicto. Accordingly, the police gave him TRY 10,000 and noted down the serial numbers of the banknotes. He stated that in line with the instructions of M.A.L. and F.G., he had given the money to a third person, who had received it in the name of the other two.",FALSE,0,"With the rejection, the applicant was denied their right to a hearing.", 353,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Sofia. 6. The applicant is a former police officer. Criminal proceedings were brought against him in 1996. 7. By a decision of the competent prosecutor of 6 March 1996, as provided under domestic law at the time, the applicant was placed under house arrest. The period of arrest continued until 3 April 1996, when the applicant was remanded in custody. He was once again placed under house arrest on 1 July 1996 and was released on 30 September 1997. 8. The applicant therefore was deprived of his liberty for one year, six months and twenty-five days. 9. In a final judgment of 27 January 1998 the Sofia Military Court found the applicant guilty of failing to perform his duties and he was given a one‑year suspended prison sentence. 10. In another set of proceedings, in a final judgment of 26 March 2003 the Supreme Court of Cassation convicted the applicant of fraud and sentenced him to one year of imprisonment. 11. The court also held in the second set of proceedings that the applicant should serve a single sentence for all his offences, which was set at one year in prison. 12. On 1 July 2003 the applicant was once again detained and placed in prison to serve his sentence. He was released on 18 September 2003 by a decision of the competent prosecutor. The prosecutor noted that the period of pre-trial detention should have been deducted from the applicant's sentence, which meant he had already served it. 13. As he had worked in prison the applicant was also entitled to a reduction of his sentence by seventeen days. 14. In 2004 the applicant brought a tort action against the prosecution authorities under section 2(6) of the State and Municipalities' Responsibility for Damage Act (see paragraph 21 below). He claimed 20,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) for non-pecuniary damage for his detention in 1996-97 to the extent it had exceeded the set term of imprisonment and BGN 40,000 for his imprisonment between 1 July and 18 September 2003. 15. The domestic courts examined witnesses and a court-appointed psychologist who said that the applicant had been traumatised by the experience and suffered from anxiety, that his personality had been ""permanently altered"", that he had difficulties communicating with others, and that his family ties had been ""irreparably damaged"". 16. In a judgment of 2 May 2006 the Sofia City Court (hereinafter ""the City Court"") allowed the claim in part, finding that the applicant had been detained for nine months and twenty-nine days in excess of his sentence and awarding him BGN 10,000 for non-pecuniary damage. It stated that his detention in 1996-97 had been ""unjustified"" and that his imprisonment in 2003 had amounted to ""unlawful detention without any valid grounds"". 17. In accordance with the applicable provisions of domestic law, the City Court ordered the applicant to pay BGN 2,040 (the equivalent of 1,040 euros – EUR) in court fees, calculated as a pro rata percentage of the part of his claim that had been dismissed. 18. The judgment was upheld on 18 June 2007 by the Sofia Court of Appeal (hereinafter ""the Court of Appeal""), which specified that the prosecution authorities were also liable to pay default interest on the above amount, calculated from 18 September 2003. 19. In a final judgment of 24 April 2009 the Supreme Court of Cassation reduced the award to BGN 3,000 (approximately EUR 1,530), plus default interest. It justified the reduction by referring to the ""nature of the offences"" the applicant had been convicted for, the ""regime under which the sentence had been served"" and the ""socially acceptable criteria for justice"". It did not deal with the matter of court fees and took no separate decision in that regard. 20. The Court has not been informed whether and when the amount above was paid to the applicant. Calculations made with a calculator available on the Internet show that the default interest on BGN 3,000 for the period from 18 September 2003 to 24 April 2009 would be BGN 2,265 (the equivalent of EUR 1,155).",Ruled as violated by court,,"14. In 2004 the applicant brought a tort action against the prosecution authorities under section 2(6) of the State and Municipalities' Responsibility for Damage Act (see paragraph 21 below). He claimed 20,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) for non-pecuniary damage for his detention in 1996-97 to the extent it had exceeded the set term of imprisonment and BGN 40,000 for his imprisonment between 1 July and 18 September 2003. 15. The domestic courts examined witnesses and a court-appointed psychologist who said that the applicant had been traumatised by the experience and suffered from anxiety, that his personality had been ""permanently altered"", that he had difficulties communicating with others, and that his family ties had been ""irreparably damaged"". 16. In a judgment of 2 May 2006 the Sofia City Court (hereinafter ""the City Court"") allowed the claim in part, finding that the applicant had been detained for nine months and twenty-nine days in excess of his sentence and awarding him BGN 10,000 for non-pecuniary damage. It stated that his detention in 1996-97 had been ""unjustified"" and that his imprisonment in 2003 had amounted to ""unlawful detention without any valid grounds"". 17. In accordance with the applicable provisions of domestic law, the City Court ordered the applicant to pay BGN 2,040 (the equivalent of 1,040 euros – EUR) in court fees, calculated as a pro rata percentage of the part of his claim that had been dismissed. 18. The judgment was upheld on 18 June 2007 by the Sofia Court of Appeal (hereinafter ""the Court of Appeal""), which specified that the prosecution authorities were also liable to pay default interest on the above amount, calculated from 18 September 2003. 19. In a final judgment of 24 April 2009 the Supreme Court of Cassation reduced the award to BGN 3,000 (approximately EUR 1,530), plus default interest. It justified the reduction by referring to the ""nature of the offences"" the applicant had been convicted for, the ""regime under which the sentence had been served"" and the ""socially acceptable criteria for justice"". It did not deal with the matter of court fees and took no separate decision in that regard. 20. The Court has not been informed whether and when the amount above was paid to the applicant. Calculations made with a calculator available on the Internet show that the default interest on BGN 3,000 for the period from 18 September 2003 to 24 April 2009 would be BGN 2,265 (the equivalent of EUR 1,155).",FALSE,0,The applicant was not treated as innocent until proven guilty., 354,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. In 1957 several plots of land (agricultural land at the time) were expropriated from the applicants' legal predecessors. The present cases concern restitution proceedings in which the applicants sought that the plots of land, which, at present, form part of a campsite on the shore of Lake Ohrid, be restored to their possession. 6. On 14 August 2001 the applicants instituted restitution proceedings. On 15 September 2003 the Ministry of Finance's Restitution Commission (""the Restitution Commission"") granted the applicants' claims and awarded them compensation, the form of which was to be determined by a separate decision. It established that according to an urban plan of 20 March 2002 the land was designated as a public green zone in a tourist area. Relying on an on-site inspection (увид) of 1 September 2002, it further held that the land was developed (уреден простор) with access paths and supporting infrastructure. 7. On 4 December 2003 the applicants appealed, arguing that, inter alia, the land was undeveloped and could be restored to their possession. Were the urban plan to be implemented in the future, the land could be expropriated anew. 8. On 31 May 2005 the the Second-Instance Administrative-Procedure Commission in the Area of Denationalisation (Комисија за решавање во управна постапка во втор степен од областа на денационализацијата – ""the second-instance commission"") dismissed the applicants' appeal finding no grounds to depart from the established facts and the reasons given by the Restitution Commission. Relying on section 10 of the Restitution Act (see paragraph 15 below), the second-instance commission held that the land in question was of public interest (јавен интерес) and could not be restored to the applicants' possession, but that compensation should be awarded instead. 9. On 21 September 2005 the applicants lodged an administrative-dispute claim with the Supreme Court reiterating that the land within the campsite was undeveloped and could therefore be restored to their possession. In submissions lodged subsequently, they further referred to decision no. 44-530/1 of 7 March 2006 in which the second-instance commission had accepted a similar claim and ordered that a neighbouring plot of land located within the same campsite had been restored to possession of the claimants. In that case, the second-instance commission had held, unlike in the applicants' case, that access paths and supporting infrastructure had not been sufficient for the land in question to be regarded as developed. 10. On 7 February 2008 the Administrative Court, which had in the meantime become competent to decide administrative-dispute claims, dismissed the applicants' claim and upheld the findings of the administrative authorities. 11. On 28 November 2003 the Restitution Commission upheld the applicants' restitution claim and awarded them compensation in State bonds. Relying on an on-site inspection of 13 May 2002 and a certificate of 15 September 2002 issued by the competent Ministry, it established that the plot in question was located within the boundaries of the campsite; that it had been designated as a public green zone and that pedestrian paths and other similar infrastructure were planned for construction. It concluded accordingly that the plot could not be restored to the applicants' possession. 12. An appeal by the applicants of 7 April 2004 was dismissed by the second-instance commission on 15 November 2005. The latter held that, inter alia, the findings of the Restitution Commission had been based on section 10 of the Restitution Act. 13. The applicants lodged an administrative-dispute claim in which, alike the applicants in application no. 38024/08, they referred to the second-instance commission's decision no. 44-530/1 and asked the Administrative Court to ensure consistent application of the law. 14. On 21 April 2008 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicants' claim, finding no grounds to depart from the established facts and the reasoning given by the administrative authorities.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. On 4 December 2003 the applicants appealed, arguing that, inter alia, the land was undeveloped and could be restored to their possession. Were the urban plan to be implemented in the future, the land could be expropriated anew. 9. On 21 September 2005 the applicants lodged an administrative-dispute claim with the Supreme Court reiterating that the land within the campsite was undeveloped and could therefore be restored to their possession. In submissions lodged subsequently, they further referred to decision no. 44-530/1 of 7 March 2006 in which the second-instance commission had accepted a similar claim and ordered that a neighbouring plot of land located within the same campsite had been restored to possession of the claimants. In that case, the second-instance commission had held, unlike in the applicants' case, that access paths and supporting infrastructure had not been sufficient for the land in question to be regarded as developed. 10. On 7 February 2008 the Administrative Court, which had in the meantime become competent to decide administrative-dispute claims, dismissed the applicants' claim and upheld the findings of the administrative authorities. 12. An appeal by the applicants of 7 April 2004 was dismissed by the second-instance commission on 15 November 2005. The latter held that, inter alia, the findings of the Restitution Commission had been based on section 10 of the Restitution Act. 13. The applicants lodged an administrative-dispute claim in which, alike the applicants in application no. 38024/08, they referred to the second-instance commission's decision no. 44-530/1 and asked the Administrative Court to ensure consistent application of the law. 14. On 21 April 2008 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicants' claim, finding no grounds to depart from the established facts and the reasoning given by the administrative authorities.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicants did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 355,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant, Mr Grigoriy Nikolayevich Pleshchinskiy, is a Russian national who was born in 1954 and lives in Solnechnogorsk, Moscow Region. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. 6. The applicant was kept in Solnechnogorsk Police's temporary detention centre in overcrowded cells from 2 to 10 October 2003; 20 to 24 October 2003; 17 to 21 November 2003; 21 to 28 November 2003; 22 to 29 December 2003; 26 to 30 January 2004; 2 and 3 February 2004; 31 March to 2 April 2004 and then on several occasions between April and 22 July 2004. He had to relieve himself in a bucket in the presence of other detainees and it was very difficult to breathe in the cells. There was no tap or other access to water, no proper light, no table on which to eat food and no area for outdoor activities. In the winter the walls and ceiling were covered with ice or damp. He had no access to a shower. 7. The applicant made numerous journeys in 2003-2004 between Volokolamsk remand centre and the temporary detention centre in Solnechnogorsk, which took three to four hours in an overcrowded van, which was cold in the winter and stuffy in the summer. 8. On 11 July 2005 the applicant sued the State for compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage caused by the allegedly appalling conditions of his detention in the temporary detention centre. 9. On 14 November 2005 the Solnechnogorsk Town Court rejected the applicant's claims. It established that the material conditions of his detention could be explained by insufficient funding. 10. On 22 November and 6 December 2005 the applicant lodged appeals against the decision of 14 November 2005. 11. On 19 December 2005 the applicant was informed that the text of the judgment had been available since 5 December 2005. 12. On an unspecified date the court sent a summons to an appeal hearing which had been scheduled for 30 January 2006. However, the applicant did not receive the summons as it contained an error in the address, which was written as ""2, Vishnevskaya Street"" instead of ""2, Vishnevaya Street"". 13. On 30 January 2006 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the decision of 14 November 2005 in the applicant's absence. 14. In reply to an enquiry from the applicant about the date of the appeal hearing, he was informed on 1 February 2006 that it had been held on 30 January 2006. 15. In December 1992 the municipality allowed the applicant and his son, a minor at the time, to obtain ownership of the flat in Solnechnogorsk in which they were living by way of privatisation. The applicant obtained a title certificate, which, however, named him as the sole owner. 16. After reaching the age of majority, the son sued the father, asserting his right to the flat and seeking an annulment of the above-mentioned certificate. 17. In support of his claim the plaintiff submitted a copy of the housing register, and certificates from his school and kindergarten. All the documents showed that the plaintiff had been permanently residing in Solnechnogorsk. 18. The applicant sought to prove that at the material time the plaintiff had lived in a flat in another town, Taganrog, and tried to obtain certificates of his moving in and out of the privatised flat. However, the competent authority would not issue them unless they were requested by a judge. However, the judge considered that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff sufficed. 19. On 4 May 2005 the Solnechnogorsk Town Court of the Moscow Region granted the plaintiff's claim. It held that the housing law provided that minors living with a tenant in a flat leased under a social lease agreement enjoyed the same rights as the tenant as of the privatisation date. Accordingly, where flats were privatised without payment, they could become owners of the flat together with the adults. Furthermore, under the privatisation law then in force, a privatisation agreement had to contain a reference to the minors who enjoyed the right to use the premises in question. 20. On 14 June 2005 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the decision of 4 May 2005 on appeal.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""defending oneself,"" it appears that the applicant was denied this right, as he was not able to appear at the hearing.", 356,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1950 and, at the time of the last communication from him to the Court, was detained in Torez Correctional Colony. 6. The applicant, represented by a lawyer, stood trial before the Kerch Court on charges of engaging in sexual intercourse with his stepdaughter, A. (born in 1999), over the period between March 2006 and April 2007. The applicant denied the charges, asserting that he may have broken A.'s hymen by accident while bathing her. 7. On 27 July 2007 the trial court found the applicant guilty of rape and sentenced him to eleven years' imprisonment. 8. The judgment was based, in particular, on (i) the victim's statements made at the pre-trial stage; (ii) the statements of a number of witnesses (comprising nannies, a classmate and a psychologist) made during the court hearings, who had reported incriminating statements that A. had made to them. Witness K. had testified that, in the relevant period, she had had sexual relations with the applicant; (iii) the conclusions of experts who had examined the applicant and the victim. The experts had concluded that the victim's hymen had been broken and it was unlikely that that had been caused by unintentional actions; the victim and the applicant both had a fungal infection on their genitalia; the examination of the applicant's genitalia had not revealed any obstacle to his having sexual relations; the victim suffered from a light mental retardation and the applicant did not suffer from any psychiatric illness. According to the applicant, the trial court had refused to order an additional expert examination to determine whether, because of any disease of his ""internal sexual organs"", he had been unable to engage in normal sexual intercourse at the relevant time. 9. On 11 September 2007 the Crimea Court of Appeal upheld the applicant's conviction. 10. The applicant lodged an appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court. He argued that there had been insufficient evidence of his guilt. The appeal contained the following statement: ""The court's conclusion as to my guilt is based only on indirect evidence and on the statement of a minor [A.], made in the course of the pre-trial investigation and who, according to a psychiatric expert's analysis, was suffering from mental retardation"" (Вывод суда о моей виновности сделан судом только на основании косвенных доказательств, а так же [sic] на показаниях малолетней [A.], которые она дала на досудебном следствии, и которая, согласно заключению судебно-психиатрической экспертизы, страдает умственной отсталостью). 11. The applicant submitted that the breaking of A.'s hymen was explained by the fact that he had accidentally penetrated her with his finger while bathing her. However, even if such a penetration had been intentional, it would not have constituted the offence of rape. 12. The applicant further complained of the trial court's refusal to order an additional expert examination to determine whether he had any diseases of his ""internal sexual organs"" which would have prevented him from sustaining an erection and engaging in sexual intercourse. 13. The applicant asked the Supreme Court to reclassify his actions as ""abuse of a minor"" (розбещення неповнолітніх), a lesser offence than rape, and to impose a non-custodial sentence. 14. On 9 June 2008 the Supreme Court refused to consider the case in cassation and upheld the lower courts' findings. 15. On 27 November 2008 the Court's Registry asked the applicant to provide copies of his appeal, his appeal in cassation and the decision of the Supreme Court in his case, to supplement his application. 16. He accordingly requested those documents from the trial court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. 17. On 19 January 2009 the Court of Appeal advised the applicant that he needed to address his request for the copies to the trial court. 18. On 26 January 2009 the trial court informed the applicant that it was not empowered to send him the requested copies. 19. On 28 January 2009 the Supreme Court informed the applicant that it was not the court's practice to issue copies of appeals in cassation or of its decisions.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"8. The judgment was based, in particular, on (i) the victim's statements made at the pre-trial stage; (ii) the statements of a number of witnesses (comprising nannies, a classmate and a psychologist) made during the court hearings, who had reported incriminating statements that A. had made to them. Witness K. had testified that, in the relevant period, she had had sexual relations with the applicant; (iii) the conclusions of experts who had examined the applicant and the victim. The experts had concluded that the victim's hymen had been broken and it was unlikely that that had been caused by unintentional actions; the victim and the applicant both had a fungal infection on their genitalia; the examination of the applicant's genitalia had not revealed any obstacle to his having sexual relations; the victim suffered from a light mental retardation and the applicant did not suffer from any psychiatric illness. According to the applicant, the trial court had refused to order an additional expert examination to determine whether, because of any disease of his ""internal sexual organs"", he had been unable to engage in normal sexual intercourse at the relevant time.",FALSE,0,The applicant was not allowed to obtain an expert witness for him analogous to that against him., 357,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant lives in Kutina. 5. From 1 January 2001 the applicant concluded several consecutive fixed-duration contracts of employment with the company C.N.S. Ltd. concerning the same post. The contracts were for a continuous period which in total amounted to over seven years and seven months. 6. On 5 June 2009 the applicant's employer returned the applicant's employment registration book to him, without any written or oral notification, showing that his employment had been terminated. 7. On 20 July 2009 the applicant brought a civil action before the Ivanić Grad Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Ivanić Gradu). He asked it to recognise that he had concluded an open-ended contract of employment, given that he had been in continuous employment with his employer for over three years, which was the time-limit for fixed-term employment contracts under the Labour Act. He also asked the Municipal Court to establish that his employment had not been terminated and to order his reinstatement. 8. On 22 January 2010 the Ivanić Grad Municipal Court dismissed the applicant's claim as time-barred. 9. Upon an appeal by the applicant, on 16 February 2011 the Velika Gorica County Court (Županijski sud u Velikoj Gorici) quashed the first‑instance decision and remitted the case for fresh consideration. It held that the first-instance court should have declared the applicant's claims inadmissible as time-barred, without examining it on the merits. 10. In the fresh proceedings, the Ivanić Grad Municipal Court on 6 May 2011 declared the applicant's action inadmissible as having been lodged outside the prescribed time-limit. The first-instance court, relying on section 133 of the Labour Act, held that the applicant and his employer had concluded a fixed-term contract lasting until 31 May 2009 and that the applicant must have known that his contract would end on that day. He had not concluded a new contract of employment with his employer and he had therefore been obliged to lodge an application for the protection of his rights with his employer within the fifteen-day time-limit, starting from 1 June 2009. However, he had failed to do so and consequently his claim had been lodged out of time. Rejecting the applicant's argument, the first‑instance court also held that the defendant company had not been obliged to adopt a formal decision on terminating his employment or to send him any other kind of notification, given that he must have known that his contract would come to an end on 31 May 2009. 11. On 12 May 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Velika Gorica County Court. 12. On 26 July 2011 the Velika Gorica County Court upheld the first‑instance decision. 13. On 14 November 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (revizija) with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), which was dismissed as ill-founded on 25 September 2012. The Supreme Court also held that the applicant had failed to seek the protection of his rights in respect of his employer within the deadlines prescribed by section 133 of the Labour Act. Accordingly, his claim had been lodged out of time. 14. On 14 March 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske). He complained that the courts had wrongly declared his claim inadmissible because it had been of a declaratory nature and as such had not been subject to deadlines. He relied on a decision by the Velika Gorica County Court of 16 January 2013 in the case of a colleague of his, who for the same reasons as the applicant had also sought to have the court recognise that he had concluded an open-ended contract of employment. In that decision the Velika Gorica County Court, in accordance with instructions given in the Supreme Court's decision no. Revr-1697/11 of 6 June 2012, had dismissed the defendant's (the employer's) objection that the claim was time-barred. Namely, the Supreme Court had held that the claim had been of a declaratory nature and as such was not subject to deadlines. 15. On 6 May 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's constitutional complaint as manifestly ill-founded.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. On 20 July 2009 the applicant brought a civil action before the Ivanić Grad Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Ivanić Gradu). He asked it to recognise that he had concluded an open-ended contract of employment, given that he had been in continuous employment with his employer for over three years, which was the time-limit for fixed-term employment contracts under the Labour Act. He also asked the Municipal Court to establish that his employment had not been terminated and to order his reinstatement. 8. On 22 January 2010 the Ivanić Grad Municipal Court dismissed the applicant's claim as time-barred. 9. Upon an appeal by the applicant, on 16 February 2011 the Velika Gorica County Court (Županijski sud u Velikoj Gorici) quashed the first‑instance decision and remitted the case for fresh consideration. It held that the first-instance court should have declared the applicant's claims inadmissible as time-barred, without examining it on the merits. 10. In the fresh proceedings, the Ivanić Grad Municipal Court on 6 May 2011 declared the applicant's action inadmissible as having been lodged outside the prescribed time-limit. The first-instance court, relying on section 133 of the Labour Act, held that the applicant and his employer had concluded a fixed-term contract lasting until 31 May 2009 and that the applicant must have known that his contract would end on that day. He had not concluded a new contract of employment with his employer and he had therefore been obliged to lodge an application for the protection of his rights with his employer within the fifteen-day time-limit, starting from 1 June 2009. However, he had failed to do so and consequently his claim had been lodged out of time. Rejecting the applicant's argument, the first‑instance court also held that the defendant company had not been obliged to adopt a formal decision on terminating his employment or to send him any other kind of notification, given that he must have known that his contract would come to an end on 31 May 2009. 11. On 12 May 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Velika Gorica County Court. 12. On 26 July 2011 the Velika Gorica County Court upheld the first‑instance decision. 13. On 14 November 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (revizija) with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), which was dismissed as ill-founded on 25 September 2012. The Supreme Court also held that the applicant had failed to seek the protection of his rights in respect of his employer within the deadlines prescribed by section 133 of the Labour Act. Accordingly, his claim had been lodged out of time.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears, with the multiple closings and reopenings, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 358,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1974 and lived, prior to his arrest and conviction, in Moscow. 5. On an unspecified date the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having murdered Ch. He was charged with unlawful purchase and possession of firearms and aggravated murder. 6. On 11 July 2006 the investigator questioned Sh., who had witnessed Ch.'s murder. Sh. identified the applicant as the perpetrator. On 27 July 2006 she confirmed her earlier statements in the applicant's presence. On an unspecified date Sh. was admitted to hospital and was unable to attend the trial. 7. On 28 March 2007 the trial by a jury opened in the Moscow City Court. 8. On 10 April 2007 the jury returned a guilty verdict. The twelve jurors held the applicant responsible for the murder by ten votes to two, and for unlawful possession of firearms by nine votes to three. 9. By a judgment of 13 April 2007, the Moscow City Court sentenced the applicant to eighteen years' imprisonment. 10. On 18 April 2007 the applicant lodged a statement of appeal in which he alleged, inter alia, that Sh.'s statement had been read out during the trial in contravention of the applicable rules of criminal procedure. On 28 April 2007 he lodged a supplementary statement of appeal ""in connection with newly discovered circumstances"". He wrote that he had found out that on several occasions the presiding judge had entered the room where the jurors had been deliberating and advised them to declare him guilty. The applicant asked the appellate court to take evidence from the jurors and to quash the conviction. 11. On 14 May 2007 Judge Sht., who had presided over the applicant's trial, refused to amend the minutes of the trial to take note of the applicant's statement that the judge had been present during the jury's deliberations, had advised them as to how to fill out the questionnaire and had made comments about the applicant's character and guilt. 12. On 21 May 2007 the applicant's representative obtained a statement, certified by a notary public from N., a juror. The juror stated that during the trial the presiding Judge Sht. had often visited the deliberations room, that he had spoken of the applicant's guilt as if it had been already established and that he had given them instructions on how to fill out the questionnaire. ",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,The judge's manipulation of the jury goes against the right to a fair trial.,edited by me to remove ambiguity in fact pattern 359,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Zagreb. He was formerly a lawyer practising in Zagreb. 6. In the context of the use of secret surveillance measures in respect of a vice-president of the Croatian Privatisation Fund (Hrvatski fond za privatizaciju, hereinafter ""the Fund""), a legal entity established by the State and tasked with carrying out the privatisation of publicly owned property, the authorities intercepted and recorded a number of the applicant's telephone conversations and messages. The secret surveillance was carried out on the basis of orders issued by an investigating judge of the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu). The reasoning of the relevant orders is outlined in the case of Matanović v. Croatia (no. 2742/12, §§ 11‑13, 4 April 2017). 7. On 16 June 2007 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of corruption involving a number of officials of the Fund and other individuals. 8. Following his arrest, an investigation was opened in the Zagreb County Court (see, for further details, Matanović, cited above, §§ 15-28). 9. On 12 February 2008, upon completion of the investigation, the State Attorney's Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime (Ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta – hereinafter: ""the State Attorney's Office"") indicted the applicant and nine other individuals in the Zagreb County Court on charges of bribe-taking, offering bribes, and abuse of power and authority. The applicant was indicted ‒ in his capacity as the lawyer acting for the Vice-President of the Fund ‒ for facilitating the receipt of a bribe of 150,000 euros (EUR) for his client and aiding and abetting the abuse of power and authority by him. 10. During the proceedings the applicant challenged the lawfulness of the secret surveillance orders, arguing that they lacked the requisite reasoning and had been issued contrary to the provisions of the relevant domestic law (see, for further details on the procedural actions taken, Matanović, cited above, §§ 29-63). 11. On 15 May 2009 the Zagreb County Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to three years' imprisonment. It examined in detail and dismissed the applicant's arguments regarding the unlawfulness of secret surveillance orders on the grounds that they had been issued by the relevant investigating judge in accordance with the law. The trial court also provided detailed reasoning why it considered that the available evidence provided a reliable basis for the applicant's conviction. When convicting the applicant, the trial court had relied on the secret surveillance recordings, the statement of an informant, who had been questioned at the trial, the statements of other witnesses, and the evidentiary material available in the file. 12. On 24 and 28 September 2009, the applicant both personally and through a lawyer lodged appeals against the first-instance judgment before the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske). In the appeals, the applicant argued that he had been unlawfully monitored and that his conviction had been based on evidence obtained unlawfully by the use of secret surveillance. He also extensively challenged the factual findings and conclusions of the first-instance court. 13. On 17 February 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the first-instance judgment. 14. On 22 April 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) alleging in particular that he had been placed under unlawful secret surveillance and that the evidence thereby obtained had been used in the criminal proceedings against him. He also extensively elaborated on the alleged deficiencies in the lower courts' factual conclusions. 15. On 21 February 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's complaints as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the lower courts. It also stressed that the applicant had actively participated in the proceedings and that there had been no arbitrariness in the findings and decisions of the relevant courts. 16. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant's representative on 23 February 2012.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"6. In the context of the use of secret surveillance measures in respect of a vice-president of the Croatian Privatisation Fund (Hrvatski fond za privatizaciju, hereinafter ""the Fund""), a legal entity established by the State and tasked with carrying out the privatisation of publicly owned property, the authorities intercepted and recorded a number of the applicant's telephone conversations and messages. The secret surveillance was carried out on the basis of orders issued by an investigating judge of the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu). The reasoning of the relevant orders is outlined in the case of Matanović v. Croatia (no. 2742/12, §§ 11‑13, 4 April 2017). 10. During the proceedings the applicant challenged the lawfulness of the secret surveillance orders, arguing that they lacked the requisite reasoning and had been issued contrary to the provisions of the relevant domestic law (see, for further details on the procedural actions taken, Matanović, cited above, §§ 29-63). 11. On 15 May 2009 the Zagreb County Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to three years' imprisonment. It examined in detail and dismissed the applicant's arguments regarding the unlawfulness of secret surveillance orders on the grounds that they had been issued by the relevant investigating judge in accordance with the law. The trial court also provided detailed reasoning why it considered that the available evidence provided a reliable basis for the applicant's conviction. When convicting the applicant, the trial court had relied on the secret surveillance recordings, the statement of an informant, who had been questioned at the trial, the statements of other witnesses, and the evidentiary material available in the file. 12. On 24 and 28 September 2009, the applicant both personally and through a lawyer lodged appeals against the first-instance judgment before the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske). In the appeals, the applicant argued that he had been unlawfully monitored and that his conviction had been based on evidence obtained unlawfully by the use of secret surveillance. He also extensively challenged the factual findings and conclusions of the first-instance court. 13. On 17 February 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the first-instance judgment. 14. On 22 April 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) alleging in particular that he had been placed under unlawful secret surveillance and that the evidence thereby obtained had been used in the criminal proceedings against him. He also extensively elaborated on the alleged deficiencies in the lower courts' factual conclusions. 15. On 21 February 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's complaints as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the lower courts. It also stressed that the applicant had actively participated in the proceedings and that there had been no arbitrariness in the findings and decisions of the relevant courts.",TRUE,2,"It depends on whether the definition of ""fair and public trial"" covers evidence gathered covertly.", 360,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","6. The applicants, Mr Ömer Yaman (first applicant), Mr Mustafa Ürek (second applicant), and Mr Kerem Bilen (third applicant) were born in 1956, 1967 and 1977 respectively. 7. On 20 June 1999 the applicants were arrested in the course of a military operation in Şırnak. They were subsequently interrogated by the gendarmes in the absence of a lawyer. In their statements, the applicants accepted the charges against them and gave a detailed account of their involvement in the PKK (the Workers' Party of Kurdistan, an illegal organisation). 8. On 23 June 1999 the applicants were brought before the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor and subsequently before the investigating judge. The first and second applicants were provided with an interpreter during their interrogation. Before the public prosecutor and the judge, the applicants denied the charges against them. They further stated that they had signed their gendarmerie statements without reading them. Following the questioning, the investigating judge remanded the applicants in custody. 9. On 2 July 1999 the Public Prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed an indictment with that court and accused the applicants of carrying out activities for the purpose of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory, under Article 125 of the Criminal Code. 10. The proceedings resumed before the Diyarbakır State Security Court and the first and second applicants were authorised to have the assistance of an interpreter. In their defence submissions before the trial court, the applicants retracted the statements they had allegedly made during the preliminary investigation stage. They submitted that the gendarmes had made them sign their statements without reading them. 11. On 7 May 2002 the Diyarbakır State Security Court found the applicants guilty as charged and convicted them under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code with carrying out activities with the aim of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory. It further sentenced the applicants to life imprisonment. In convicting them, the court had regard to the applicants' statements taken by the gendarmes. 12. On 25 March 2003 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court on the ground that during the trial certain witness statements, which had been taken on commission before other courts, had not been read out to the applicants for comment during the trial. The case was accordingly remitted to the Diyarbakır State Security Court. 13. In the meantime, State Security Courts were abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, and therefore, the case against the applicants was transferred to the Diyarbakır Assize Court. 14. On 7 March 2005 the Diyarbakır Assize Court complied with the decision of the Court of Cassation and witness statements that had been taken on commission were read out to the applicants for their comments. At the end of the trial, the Diyarbakır Assize Court found the applicants guilty as charged and sentenced them to life imprisonment. 15. On 17 June 2005 the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation decided that the case file should be remitted to the Diyarbakır Assize Court for examination of whether the new Criminal Code which had entered into force on 1 June 2005 (Law no. 5297) provided more favourable provisions for the applicants. The case was thus once again examined by the Diyarbakır Assize Court in view of the recent legislative changes. 16. On 25 October 2005 the Diyarbakır Assize Court once again convicted the applicants under Article 125 of the former Criminal Court, finding that this provision was more favourable to them than the corresponding provision of the new criminal code. 17. On 30 May 2006 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment on procedural grounds, holding in particular that certain documents which had been relied on by the first-instance court in its judgment were not of an official nature. 18. On 24 April 2007 the Diyarbakır Assize Court, after obtaining official copies of all the documents in the case file, convicted the applicants under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code and sentenced them to life imprisonment. 19. On 11 December 2007 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""defending oneself,"" it appears that the applicants were denied this right, as they did not have access to lawyers in custody and were not able to comment upon their statements in court.", 361,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Orhei. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. On 16 January 1997 the Orhei mayor's office attested the property right of a number of private individuals over plots of land in the town. Based on that decision, on 3 April 1997 the same office issued the applicant's brother (C.) title to 0.0569 hectares of land. 7. On 13 July 1998 C. died. After his death the applicant took possession of the land and used continuously for her own needs. 8. On 10 September 1999 the territorial cadastre office registered the plot of land as belonging to C. 9. On 31 January 2000 the Orhei mayor's office amended the annex to its decision of 16 January 1997. C. continued to be mentioned as the owner of the relevant plot of land. 10. On 15 July 2005 the Orhei mayor's office lodged a civil court action aimed at annulling the property right of C. and the applicant to the relevant land. It claimed that the title had been issued in error since C. had moved to an apartment provided by the town and was no longer eligible to obtain such land. Following this relocation, the cadastre office was supposed to remove C.'s title from the list, which it had failed to do. In the meantime, on an unspecified date the applicant initiated a court action aimed at extending the time-limit for accepting her brother's inheritance. The two court actions were joined by the court on 6 November 2006. 11. On 15 February 2017 the Orhei district court rejected the court action lodged by the mayor's office and accepted that of the applicant. It noted, inter alia, that the applicant had raised the issue of expiry of the three-year limitation period and added that under Article 78 of the old Civil Code (see paragraph 15 below), the court had to apply the rules concerning the limitation period regardless of the parties' arguments. It found that the mayor's office had missed the three-year limitation period. However, in the operative part the court omitted to refer to the expiry of the limitation period and found that the court action had been groundless. The court also accepted the applicant's action, extending the time-limit for accepting her brother's inheritance since she had taken possession of the relevant land immediately after his death. 12. On 4 October 2007 the Chișinău Court of Appeal overturned that judgment, accepting the appeal lodged by the mayor's office. It annulled C.'s title to the relevant land, finding that he had obtained it in error and that under the applicable law he could not be the owner of that land. Moreover, the court rejected the applicant's claim for extending the time-limit for accepting her brother's inheritance, finding that she had missed it without a valid reason. 13. On 12 March 2008 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the judgment of the Chișinău Court of Appeal. 14. The applicant submitted documents showing that she had paid various taxes for the land in question over the years. 15. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code (1964, in force before 12 June 2003) reads as follows: ""Article 74. General limitation periods. The general limitation period for defending, by a court action, against the breach of a person's rights (prescripția) is of three years ..."" ""Article 78. Mandatory application of the limitation period. The competent court ... shall apply the limitation period regardless of the parties' request."" ""Article 581. Acceptance of inheritance. In order to inherit, the heir must accept the inheritance. ... It shall be considered that the heir has accepted the inheritance if he/she took actual possession or administration of inheritance assets ..."" 16. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code (in force from 12 June 2003) read as follows: ""Article 7. Application of the civil law in time. (1) The civil law has no retroactive effect. It does not modify and does not annul the conditions of creation of a legal situation which previously appeared, nor the conditions of ending of a legal situation which previously ended. ... (6) The provisions of the new law concerning limitation periods ... shall apply to limitation periods which started before the date of entry into force of the new law, but did not end before that date. ... The start, the suspension and the interruption of the limitation period shall be determined under the old law for the period before the entry into force of the new law. ...""",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 362,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","6. The applicant was born in 1973 and is detained in Sivas. 7. According to a report drawn up by the police officers and signed by the applicant, on 19 November 2002 at 1.30 p.m., the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, namely the Hizbullah following an hour long armed conflict with the police officers during which he had resisted, had thrown a grenade and had fired back at the police officers. 8. On the same day at 1.50 p.m. the applicant was examined at the Silvan State Hospital, in Diyarbakır, by a doctor who observed the following on the applicant's body: 2 cm-long scrape on his lower left chest, handcuff marks on his wrists, a traumatic scrape on the front side of his right leg. The doctor observed no unfitness for work. Also on the same day at 5.45 p.m. the applicant was examined at the Diyarbakır State Hospital by another doctor who made similar findings as those mentioned in the first medical report. 9. On 22 November 2002 the applicant was interviewed by police in the absence of a lawyer in the course of which he had allegedly sustained both physical and psychological ill-treatment. According to the applicant's submissions, he was allegedly forced to sign some documents, as well as a declaration to waive his right to legal assistance. He further maintained that when he had wished to read the documents that he had been made to sign he had been threatened with further ill-treatment. 10. On 23 November 2002 at the end of his police custody, the applicant was examined at the Diyarbakır State Hospital by a doctor who noted that there were no new signs of ill-treatment on the applicant's body. According to the applicant, during the examination the police officers intervened and ordered the doctor to write that the applicant had some grazes on his wrists and ankles. 11. On 23 November 2002 the applicant gave a statement to the public prosecutor in the absence of a lawyer in which he accepted the accusations against him. On the same day the applicant was brought before the investigating judge at the Diyarbakır State Security Court, who took his statements in the absence of a lawyer in which he had accepted most of the statements he had given to the police. According to his submissions before the Court, the applicant claimed that he had admitted being a member of the Hizbullah before the public prosecutor and the judge on account of the duress and the intimidation exerted on him by the police. He further claimed that the police officers had threatened him with excessive length of proceedings and had told him that if he had accepted the charges they would help him and release him from detention. 12. On 27 November 2002 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment, charging the applicant under Article 146 of the former Turkish Criminal Code with attempting to undermine the constitutional order of the State. 13. On 19 March 2003 the Diyarbakır State Security Court held the first hearing on the merits of the case. During the hearing, the applicant gave evidence without a lawyer in which he denied his previous statements and the accusations. He further stated, without providing any details, that he had been subjected to pressure while in police custody and that he had pressurised to sign his police statements without reading them. When asked about his statements before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant stated that he had given self-incriminating statements as a result of the pressure from the police officers. 14. At a hearing held on 18 September 2003 the applicant submitted, without providing any details, that he had been tortured during the preliminary investigation. 15. By Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004, State Security Courts were abolished. Therefore, the Diyarbakır Assize Court acquired jurisdiction over the case. 16. On 22 June 2007 the Diyarbakır Assize Court found that, inter alia, on the basis of the applicant's statements to the police, the public prosecutor and the investigating judge that the applicant had committed the offence under Article 146 of the former Criminal Code and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Relying on the medical report dated 23 November 2002, it also rejected the applicant's contention that he had been tortured while in police custody. 17. On 10 April 2008 the Court of Cassation upheld the trial court's judgment.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,The applicant was denied his right to defend himself., 363,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicants were born in 1984 and 1979 respectively and live in Moscow. 5. On 14 December 2012 the State Duma adopted at first reading a draft law which, in particular, prohibited adoption of children of Russian nationality by US citizens. 6. On 17 December 2012 the official daily newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta announced that the second reading was scheduled for 19 December 2012. 7. According to the applicants, they read on various online social networks that many people intended to stage solo ""pickets"" (одиночные пикеты) on 19 December 2012 in front of the State Duma to express their opposition to the draft law. The format of solo ""pickets"" was chosen because there was no longer time to observe the minimum statutory three‑day notification period for other types of (group) events. 8. The applicants decided to hold their own solo ""pickets"" and at around 9 a.m. positioned themselves, holding banners, in the vicinity of the State Duma at some distance from other protesters (see also Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, nos. 57818/09 and 14 others, §§ 206-15, 7 February 2017). 9. According to the applicants, they were arrested by the police several minutes later and brought to a police station. At 10.30 a.m. the police drew up a record of the administrative escorting (протокол административного доставления) in respect of each applicant. A record of administrative arrest (протокол административного задержания), drawn up at the same time, stated that the applicants had arrived at the police station at 10.30 a.m. The first applicant, Mr Tsukanov, made a handwritten note on his arrest record that he had been actually apprehended at 9.20 a.m. The second applicant, Mr Torchinskiy, made a handwritten note on his escorting record that he had been actually apprehended at 9.30 a.m. 10. At the police station both applicants were accused of organising and holding a group public event without prior notification, in breach of Article 20.2 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter, ""CAO""). The administrative offence records indicate that the offences were committed at 10 a.m. The first applicant made a handwritten note that he came to the event venue at 9 a.m. and was arrested at 9.20 a.m. 11. The first applicant was released at 1.20 p.m. The second applicant was released at 1.10 p.m. 12. On 15 January 2013 the justice of the peace of the 369th Court Circuit of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the second applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB), (about 495 euros (EUR) at the time). The justice of the peace found it established, on the basis of the records and testimony of police officers, that the applicant had taken part in a ""picket"" involving fifty people. That ""picket"" was unlawful because no notification had been submitted by the organisers as required by the Public Events Act (hereinafter ""PEA""). The applicant had waved a banner, thereby attracting the attention of passers-by and journalists assembled for the occasion. He had not complied with the police order to stop picketing. 13. On 6 February 2013 the justice of the peace of the 369th Court Circuit of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the first applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of RUB 20,000 (about EUR 495 at the time), with the reasoning identical to that in the judgment of 15 January 2013. The justice of the peace also relied on police reports and testimony of a police officer who had apprehended the first applicant at the venue of the public event. 14. Both applicants appealed, insisting that each of them had held a solo demonstration which did not require prior notification of the authorities. The first applicant also pointed out that he had been arrested earlier than indicated in the arrest record. 15. On 13 February and 11 March 2013 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow upheld the judgments concerning the second and the first applicant respectively. 16. The second applicant applied for review of the court decisions under Article 30.12 of the CAO. On 28 June 2013 the Deputy President of the Moscow City Court partly allowed his complaint and changed the classification of the administrative charge against him. The second applicant was found guilty of the breach of the established procedure for the conduct of public events committed by a participant, an offence punishable under Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO. His fine was reduced to RUB 10,000 (about EUR 233 at the time).",Ruled as violated by court,,"5. On 14 December 2012 the State Duma adopted at first reading a draft law which, in particular, prohibited adoption of children of Russian nationality by US citizens. 6. On 17 December 2012 the official daily newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta announced that the second reading was scheduled for 19 December 2012. 7. According to the applicants, they read on various online social networks that many people intended to stage solo ""pickets"" (одиночные пикеты) on 19 December 2012 in front of the State Duma to express their opposition to the draft law. The format of solo ""pickets"" was chosen because there was no longer time to observe the minimum statutory three‑day notification period for other types of (group) events. 9. According to the applicants, they were arrested by the police several minutes later and brought to a police station. At 10.30 a.m. the police drew up a record of the administrative escorting (протокол административного доставления) in respect of each applicant. A record of administrative arrest (протокол административного задержания), drawn up at the same time, stated that the applicants had arrived at the police station at 10.30 a.m. The first applicant, Mr Tsukanov, made a handwritten note on his arrest record that he had been actually apprehended at 9.20 a.m. The second applicant, Mr Torchinskiy, made a handwritten note on his escorting record that he had been actually apprehended at 9.30 a.m. 10. At the police station both applicants were accused of organising and holding a group public event without prior notification, in breach of Article 20.2 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter, ""CAO""). The administrative offence records indicate that the offences were committed at 10 a.m. The first applicant made a handwritten note that he came to the event venue at 9 a.m. and was arrested at 9.20 a.m. 12. On 15 January 2013 the justice of the peace of the 369th Court Circuit of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the second applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB), (about 495 euros (EUR) at the time). The justice of the peace found it established, on the basis of the records and testimony of police officers, that the applicant had taken part in a ""picket"" involving fifty people. That ""picket"" was unlawful because no notification had been submitted by the organisers as required by the Public Events Act (hereinafter ""PEA""). The applicant had waved a banner, thereby attracting the attention of passers-by and journalists assembled for the occasion. He had not complied with the police order to stop picketing. 13. On 6 February 2013 the justice of the peace of the 369th Court Circuit of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the first applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of RUB 20,000 (about EUR 495 at the time), with the reasoning identical to that in the judgment of 15 January 2013. The justice of the peace also relied on police reports and testimony of a police officer who had apprehended the first applicant at the venue of the public event. 16. The second applicant applied for review of the court decisions under Article 30.12 of the CAO. On 28 June 2013 the Deputy President of the Moscow City Court partly allowed his complaint and changed the classification of the administrative charge against him. The second applicant was found guilty of the breach of the established procedure for the conduct of public events committed by a participant, an offence punishable under Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO. His fine was reduced to RUB 10,000 (about EUR 233 at the time).",FALSE,0,The applicants were denied their rights to defend themselves., 364,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicants were born in 1971 and 1976 and are detained in Lipcani. 6. In July 1999 the German police found the corpse of a Moldovan national in a river near Hamburg. The investigation led to a Moldovan national, A.B., who had shared a house with the victim. During questioning by the German police, A.B., who was a suspect, declared that the murder had been committed by the applicants who had beaten up the victim and strangled him. A.B. stated that he had only helped them to carry the victim's dead body and that he had not seen the body being thrown into the river. He knew, however, that a concrete pole had been attached to the victim's body before it immersion. The goal of the murder was allegedly to obtain the victim's five thousand German marks, which he had deposited with a German family. According to A.B., after the murder, the applicants manipulated the German family into believing that the victim had been arrested by police in another part of Germany and that he needed the money. After obtaining the money, one of the applicants wired it to his family in Moldova. 7. During the court proceedings in Moldova, the competent court resorted to international legal assistance by summoning at least seven witnesses who lived in Germany, including A.B. All witnesses were summoned once through the intermediary of the Moldovan Ministry of Justice and the German authorities. However, none of them appeared before the Moldovan court and no reasons for failure to appear were given. The attempts to summon the witness were not repeated. 8. On 29 December 2008 the Botanica District Court acquitted the applicants of murder charges that had been brought against them. The court found that the only piece of evidence presented by the prosecutor in support of the accusation against the applicants was the statements made by A.B. to the German police. Since A.B. himself had been accused by the German police of the victim's murder at the time of his questioning, he had a personal interest in accusing other persons. Moreover, his statements were not totally coherent and consistent. In particular, he had stated to the German police that he had not been present when the victim's body had been thrown into the river. However, somehow he knew that a concrete pole had been attached to the corpse. Lastly, the Moldovan authorities had been unable to bring A.B. to Moldova, and the applicants had not been present during the interview with the German police and had therefore been unable to put questions to A.B. For all the above reasons the evidence was excluded from the file. However, the applicants were found guilty of fraud as a result of the fact that they had manipulated the German family with whom the victim's money had been deposited, and had appropriated the money. 9. On 25 February 2010 the Chişinău Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by the prosecutor and reversed the judgment of the lower court in so far as it concerned the murder charges. The court admitted A.B.'s statements given before the German police in evidence and found the applicants guilty of murder. The court found A.B.'s statements to be reliable because they had been made before an investigating judge. The applicants were sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. At the same time, the applicants were cleared of the charge of fraud on account of the Statute of Limitations. 10. The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law before the Supreme Court of Justice in which they argued, inter alia, that the statements made by A.B. before the German authorities and read out during the hearing before the Court of Appeal could not be admitted in evidence unless they had had the opportunity to confront A.B. in a court hearing and address questions to him. Moreover, the applicants submitted that A.B. had a personal interest in accusing them because he was a suspect himself. 11. On 18 January 2011 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicants' appeal and upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court held that the fact that the applicants had not been present during A.B.'s questioning by the German authorities had been as a result of their own actions, because they had left Germany by that time. Two of the sitting judges (S.M. and V.T.) wrote a dissenting opinion in which they expressed the view that the applicants' rights as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention had been breached by the fact that they had been unable to examine the only prosecution witness, A.B., on whose evidence their convictions had been based.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""obtaining the attendance of witnesses on his behalf,"" it appears that applicant was not able to do so, as witnesses on his behalf ultimately did not show.", 365,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Kırıkkale. 6. On 25 September 1998 the applicant was arrested by police officers and taken into custody on suspicion of being a member of an illegal organisation. 7. On 30 September 1998 police officers at the Istanbul Security Headquarters took a statement from the applicant in the absence of a lawyer, as a result of the restriction stemming from Law no. 3842. He confessed that he was a member of the organisation in question and gave information about certain activities in which he had participated. 8. On 2 October 1998 a statement was taken from the applicant by the Istanbul public prosecutor. He confirmed the statement he had made to the police. 9. On the same day, the applicant was questioned by the investigating judge in the absence of a lawyer. He confirmed the statement he had made to the public prosecutor, but withdrew the one he had made to the police. The applicant alleged that he had given the statements under duress. The investigating judge ordered the applicant's pre-trial detention. 10. On 7 October 1998 the public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul State Security Court, charging the applicant under Article 125 of the former Turkish Criminal Code with being involved in separatist activities against the Republic of Turkey. The criminal proceedings commenced before the Istanbul State Security Court, the bench of which included a military judge. 11. On 12 October 1998 the Istanbul State Security Court held a preparatory hearing and decided that the first hearing would take place on 16 December 1998. 12. On 16 December 1998 the other co-accused, namely G.T., Z.A. and D.P.N.J., gave evidence in person. They did not give any statement in relation to the applicant. 13. On 8 March 1999 the trial court, noting the absence of the accused, decided to adjourn the hearing. 14. At the hearing held on 2 June 1999, the applicant gave evidence in person and stated that he had been forced to sign his previous statements. The applicant retracted those statements while maintaining that he had not been involved in any of the offences attributed to him. At the same hearing, the other co-accused, namely A.B. and B.G. also gave evidence in person. They did not make any statements in respect of the applicant. 15. While the criminal proceedings against the applicant were pending, on 18 June 1999 the Constitution was amended and the military judge sitting on the bench of the Istanbul State Security Court was replaced by a civilian judge. Between 18 June 1999 and 2 September 2002, the trial court consisting of three civilian judges held fourteen hearings on the merits. 16. On 4 August 1999, the State Security Court, composed of three civilian judges, heard evidence from A.S., Ş.K., H.K., S.K., N.Ç., T.G., Ö.Ö. as witnesses, from M.N. as accused and from K.Ö. as a complainant. Two of them made incriminatory statements in relation to the applicant. When asked his comments concerning those statements, the applicant rejected them, maintaining that he had had no connection with the accusations. 17. On 25 April 2001 the public prosecutor read out his observations on the merits (esas hakkında mütalaa) and requested that the applicant be convicted and sentenced under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. At the same hearing, the applicant's lawyer requested time to submit the applicant's defence submissions. 18. On 29 August 2001 the applicant's lawyer made his defence submissions in relation to the merits of the case. 19. On 27 March 2002 the applicant's lawyer reiterated his previous defence submissions. 20. On 19 June 2002 the applicant's lawyer, again reiterated his previous defence submissions. At the same hearing, the applicant stated that he had agreed to his lawyer's submissions. 21. On 2 September 2002 the applicant and his lawyer presented their closing arguments. On the same day the Istanbul State Security Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to thirty years' imprisonment, pursuant to Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. The first-instance court based its decision on several items of evidence, such as the applicant's statements to the police, the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, documents relating to the organisation which had been found and seized in the course of police operations, and the statements of some co-defendants. 22. On 7 April 2003 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment. On 29 May 2003 that decision was deposited with the registry of the Istanbul State Security Court.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"It's unclear whether the applicant was able to exercise his right to defend himself. He did not have access to legal assistance while in custody, but did at the trial.", 366,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicants were born in 1966, 1971, 1993 and 1996 respectively. The second applicant is the former spouse of the first applicant and the third and the fourth applicants are their children. The first, the third and the fourth applicants live in Lviv. The second applicant had his registered residence in Lviv as at the time when the application was lodged; his current whereabouts are not known. 5. In August 2001 the second applicant, a military officer at the material time, was provided with a two-room flat for himself and his family in an accommodation hall owned by the Lviv Military Academy. Subsequently all four applicants obtained residence registration with the local authority as tenants of that flat. Since 2001 (and as at the time of the observations exchanges between the parties), the household was paying the relevant maintenance charges and other tenancy-related fees, which were calculated on the premise that the flat was occupied by four persons. 6. On 28 November 2003 the second applicant was dismissed from military service on grounds of redundancy. The dismissal order stipulated that he was eligible for priority allocation of social housing from the waiting list managed by the Ministry of Defence. 7. In 2005 the first and the second applicant divorced and the first applicant and her children were placed on the waiting list for social housing managed by the municipal authority. 8. In August 2011 the Lviv garrison military prosecutor instituted eviction proceedings against the applicants. He referred, essentially, to the fact that the accommodation hall belonged to the Military Academy and was designed for the temporary housing of military personnel. Meanwhile, none of the applicants had any connection to the military or the Military Academy, which owned the building. 9. On 15 November 2012 the Frankivskyy District Court in Lviv dismissed the prosecutor's claim. It found that the applicants had lawfully obtained the tenancy in connection with the second applicant's previous military service. Regard being had to the applicable legal provisions concerning the social protection of former military officers and their families, they could not be evicted from the accommodation hall without first being provided with other housing. In addition to that, the fourth applicant had still been a minor at the material time, and further legislation applicable to the protection of minors warranted the protection of her housing rights. 10. Following an appeal by the prosecutor, on 17 September 2013 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal quashed this judgment and ordered the applicants' eviction. It found that they had settled in the disputed premises without the building owner having taken a formal decision authorising their occupancy and without an occupancy order (""ордер""), having been issued in their favour. Accordingly, the applicants' occupancy was unlawful ab initio. This fact extinguished the applicability of the legal provisions cited by the first-instance court concerning the social protection of retired military officers, their families and minors. 11. The applicants lodged a cassation appeal against this judgment. They noted, in particular, that the disputed housing had been their only home for more than ten years and that their eviction would render them homeless. They also submitted that their income level was not sufficient for them to acquire housing at their own expense and that they did not have any family members in Lviv who could offer shelter to them. Their residence was duly registered and they had been dutifully paying all the applicable fees connected with their occupancy of the flat. The fact that the building owner had failed to comply with certain formalities connected with regularising their occupancy was not their fault. In addition, evicting them on this basis should have become time-barred in 2004 (three years after they had moved into the flat). Lastly, the applicants referred to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Kryvitska and Kryvitskyy v. Ukraine (no. 30856/03, judgment of 2 December 2010), and alleged that their eviction would be in breach of the principles established in that judgment, according to which the courts had to assess whether the eviction was necessary in a democratic society. 12. On 20 November 2013 the Higher Specialised Court of Ukraine dismissed the applicants' cassation appeal. 13. Subsequently, enforcement proceedings were instituted with a view to evicting the applicants. The parties have not informed the Court whether the eviction order has been enforced.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"10. Following an appeal by the prosecutor, on 17 September 2013 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal quashed this judgment and ordered the applicants' eviction. It found that they had settled in the disputed premises without the building owner having taken a formal decision authorising their occupancy and without an occupancy order (""ордер""), having been issued in their favour. Accordingly, the applicants' occupancy was unlawful ab initio. This fact extinguished the applicability of the legal provisions cited by the first-instance court concerning the social protection of retired military officers, their families and minors. 11. The applicants lodged a cassation appeal against this judgment. They noted, in particular, that the disputed housing had been their only home for more than ten years and that their eviction would render them homeless. They also submitted that their income level was not sufficient for them to acquire housing at their own expense and that they did not have any family members in Lviv who could offer shelter to them. Their residence was duly registered and they had been dutifully paying all the applicable fees connected with their occupancy of the flat. The fact that the building owner had failed to comply with certain formalities connected with regularising their occupancy was not their fault. In addition, evicting them on this basis should have become time-barred in 2004 (three years after they had moved into the flat). Lastly, the applicants referred to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Kryvitska and Kryvitskyy v. Ukraine (no. 30856/03, judgment of 2 December 2010), and alleged that their eviction would be in breach of the principles established in that judgment, according to which the courts had to assess whether the eviction was necessary in a democratic society.",FALSE,0,There is no relevance between fair trial and housing principles., 367,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Batumi. 6. He was a judge at the Khulo District Court. On 12 November 2004 the Supreme Council of Justice initiated disciplinary proceedings against him on the grounds set out in section 2(2)-(a) Act of 22 February 2000 on Disciplinary Proceedings against Judges of Ordinary Courts (hereinafter, ""the Disciplinary Proceedings Act"" – see paragraphs 16 and 17 below). He was accused in particular of having kept a defendant in a criminal case under his consideration in unlawful detention for the period of fourteen days in September 2004, which fact was qualified as a ""manifest breach of the law"" within the meaning of the above-mentioned provision of the Disciplinary Proceedings Act. 7. On 18 November 2004 a Panel of the Disciplinary Council of Judges (hereinafter, ""the Panel""), composed of Mr K.K. (the President of the Panel and rapporteur), Mr G.Ch., Mr D.S. and Mr I.K., considered the case at an oral hearing. According to the transcript of the hearing, the applicant admitted to the act he had been accused of. After examining the circumstances of the case, the Panel found the applicant guilty of the misconduct in question. Describing the mistake at issue as unacceptable, the Panel decided, despite his lack of prior disciplinary sanctions and his good professional reputation, to remove the applicant from judicial office. 8. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Disciplinary Council of Judges (hereinafter, ""the Disciplinary Council"") on points of fact and law. He questioned the assessment of the circumstances of the case and the application of the legal provisions to the established facts in the decision of 18 November 2004. 9. By a decision of 27 January 2005, the Disciplinary Council unanimously upheld the Panel's decision of 18 November 2004 in its entirety. 10. The applicant appealed on points of law to the Supreme Court of Georgia. In a judgment of 11 July 2005, the Supreme Court quashed the Disciplinary Council's decision of 27 January 2005 for lack of reasoning and legal assessment of the facts, and remitted the case for re-examination. 11. On 4 August 2005 the Disciplinary Council, composed of six members, including three members, Mr K.K. (President and rapporteur), Mr G.Ch., Mr I.K, who had sat at the first hearing, re-considered the applicant's case; another member of the Disciplinary Council who participated in the examination of the applicant's case was Ms N.K. During the oral hearing, the applicant challenged the above-mentioned three members of the bench – Mr K.K., Mr G.Ch. and Mr I.K – on the ground that they had considered his case when it had come before the Panel on 18 November 2004. The request was dismissed. 12. After re-considering all the factual circumstances of the case, the Disciplinary Council found, in its decision of 4 August 2005, that the applicant had committed ""a manifest breach of the law"" and upheld the Panel's decision of 18 November 2004 in its entirety. 13. In his appeal on points of law, the applicant complained that Mr K.K. had presided over all of the benches of both the Disciplinary Council and the Panel, and three of the members sitting on the Disciplinary Council when it ruled on 4 August 2005 had already dealt with the case at first instance on 18 November 2004. He also complained about his request for their withdrawal being rejected. Finally, the applicant criticised the haste with which the case had been considered by the Disciplinary Council. 14. On 14 November 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal on points of law, finding that the case had been objectively and exhaustively examined by the disciplinary bodies and that the punishment imposed had been appropriate. As for the rest, noting that the Disciplinary Proceedings Act had instituted a system whereby members of the disciplinary panel could also sit on the Disciplinary Council, the Supreme Court concluded that the composition of the benches complained of by the applicant had been perfectly legal. Moreover, in the court's opinion, the fact that the persons concerned had previously participated in the examination of the case was not in itself sufficient to prove that the Disciplinary Council, in its ruling on 4 August 2005, had not been impartial. 15. According to the materials available in the case file, the applicant did not voice, even in remote terms, either before the Panel, the Disciplinary Council or the Supreme Court any complaint about the lack of professional qualifications by any of the individual members of the Disciplinary Council who had participated in the examination of his case.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""independent and impartial tribunal,"" the appeal courts sharing judges seems to threaten the idea of independence.", 368,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","6. The applicant was born in 1969 and is detained in Tekirdağ. 7. On 13 February 1999, the applicant was arrested during an operation carried out against an illegal organisation, namely the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers' Party), at which time he was found to be in possession of a fake identity card. 8. On 15 February 1999 the applicant was interrogated by police officers at the Istanbul Security Headquarters in the absence of a lawyer pursuant to Law No. 3842, which at the time of the applicant's arrest provided for a systemic restriction in respect of offences falling within the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts. 9. The applicant admitted in his statement that he was a member of the organisation in question and gave information about a number of activities in which he had participated, including armed activities. 10. On 18 February 1999 statements were taken from the applicant by the Istanbul public prosecutor in the absence of a lawyer. The applicant stated that he was a member of the illegal organisation in question, that he had joined them in a rural area, and that he had afterwards tried to collect money for the organisation in Istanbul. However, he withdrew the statements he had made to the police, maintaining that he had not participated in any other activity for the illegal organisation. He alleged that he had given those statements to the police under duress. 11. On the same day the applicant was questioned by the investigating judge, once again in the absence of a lawyer. He confirmed the statement he had made to the public prosecutor, but withdrew the one he had made to the police. The investigating judge ordered the applicant's pre-trial detention. 12. On 19 March 1999 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed an indictment with the Diyarbakır State Security Court, charging the applicant under Article 125 of the former Turkish Criminal Code with membership of an illegal organisation and involvement in separatist activities against the Republic of Turkey. 13. On 5 June 1999 Diyarbakır State Security Court declared that it had no jurisdiction to examine the case and transferred the file to the Istanbul State Security Court. 14. At a hearing held on 18 February 2000, the applicant stated that he had not been able to see his lawyer to prepare his defence and requested time to do so. The applicant was granted time to prepare his defence. 15. At a hearing held on 1 September 2000, the applicant gave evidence in person and denied all the charges. He stated that he had given his previous statements under duress. 16. At a hearing held on 14 November 2001 the applicant stated that he was a member of the illegal organisation, but had carried out only political activities for the organisation and not armed activities. 17. On 1 July 2003 another set of criminal proceedings brought against the applicant, which had been pending since 1994 and concerning charges related to membership of the PKK and taking part in activities for that illegal organisation, was merged with the one that had been initiated in 1999. 18. The State Security Courts were later abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004 and the case was transferred to the Istanbul Assize Court. 19. On 16 September 2004 Istanbul Assize Court held that the applicant had committed an offence under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The court based its decision, inter alia, on the applicant's statements to the police, the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, and other witness statements taken by the police and the public prosecutor. 20. On 3 May 2005 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision of 16 September 2004 on the grounds that the details of a number of PKK activities for which the applicant had been held responsible had not been discussed in the decision in depth and that the case file lacked the necessary official reports. 21. The applicant was tried afresh before the Istanbul Assize Court. A number of hearings took place during the trial. The applicant claimed during the trial that his statements during the preliminary investigation had been made under duress. 22. On 1 February 2007 Istanbul Assize Court found the applicant guilty of committing an offence under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code and again sentenced him to life imprisonment. 23. On 9 October 2007 the Court of Cassation upheld the decision of 1 February 2007.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"It's unclear whether the applicant was able to exercise his right to defend himself. He did not have access to legal assistance while in custody, but did at the trial.",edited by me to narrow down to one ambiguity 369,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Piaski. 5. On 2 May 2011 the Koszalin Regional Court issued a payment order (nakaz zapłaty) against the applicant. It stipulated that she was to pay to the claimant, a certain D.K., the sum of 156,000 Polish zlotys (PLN), equivalent to 36,000 euros (EUR). 6. The applicant lodged an appeal (zarzuty) within the time-limit. She complained that the payment order had been based on a lease contract which had turned out to be null and void but which she had secured by a blank bill of exchange signed by her. She challenged that basis for the payment order and considered it illegal and unfounded. She further applied for exemption from the court fees. 7. On 13 July 2011 a court officer from the Koszalin Regional Court (referendarz sądowy) decided to partly exempt her from the fees. The court examined in detail the financial situation of the applicant. In particular it noted that in 2010 her company had generated a gross income of PLN 213,000; however, the expenses exceeded this sum by approximately PLN 50,000. As regards the first four months of 2011 the applicant had declared a gross income of PLN 53,600 and expenses of PLN 48,500; therefore she had generated a net income of over PLN 5,000. Moreover the applicant had declared that she had other financial obligations, amounting to PLN 4,000 per month, which she had been paying on time. The court agreed that her financial situation had been difficult and that she had not initiated the current proceedings. However, the situation of a commercial activity which had been generating a very high income, and even higher costs, did not automatically justify a full exemption from court fees. Moreover, the applicant had declared a net income for the first four months of 2011. In an extensively reasoned decision the domestic court concluded that the applicant should be expected to pay one third of the fees due for lodging an appeal against the payment order. 8. The applicant appealed against the decision of the court officer. She reiterated that her business had generated losses and that she had been financially dependent on her family. The applicant stressed that she had not instituted the civil proceedings, so could not prepare for their costs or limit the sum claimed. 9. On 3 August 2011 the Koszalin Regional Court upheld the decision of the court officer. The applicant was ordered to pay PLN 1,928 (EUR 500) within seven days. 10. On 22 August 2011 the applicant's lawyer lodged a second request for exemption from the court fees. The applicant submitted that she had wound up her company's activity as it had been operating at a loss. 11. On 26 August 2011 the court officer of the Koszalin District Court partly allowed the applicant's request and exempted her from the court fees above PLN 1,000 (equivalent to EUR 250). The court took into account the applicant's difficult financial situation but noted that the court fee should not have been regarded as less important than the other financial obligations that the applicant had been able to honour, in the amount of PLN 4,000 monthly. Having examined all the arguments relied on by the applicant, the court considered that the situation did not justify a total exemption from the court fees. The applicant did not appeal against this decision. 12. On 16 September 2011 the applicant was ordered to pay PLN 1,000 within seven days. 13. On 29 September 2011 the applicant lodged a third request for exemption from the court fees. She submitted that her financial situation had not improved and that she had no income whatsoever. Moreover her car broke down which generated further costs. 14. On 26 October 2011 the Koszalin Regional Court rejected the applicant's appeal against the payment order of 2 May 2011 and rejected her third application for full exemption from the court fees as it had been substantially the same as the one lodged before and examined on 26 August 2011. 15. On 10 November 2011 the applicant appealed against the decision of 26 October 2011. She was ordered to pay a court fee of PLN 1,500 for pursuing her appeal. She requested the court to exempt her from that fee. 16. On 22 December 2011 the court partly granted her request. The applicant was ordered to pay a court fee in the amount of PLN 1,000. 17. On 30 March 2012 the Szczecin Court of Appeal rejected her appeal against the decision of 26 October 2011 for failure to pay the fee. The decision was delivered to the applicant on 10 April 2012. It appears that around that time the applicant took up employment. During that period the applicant unsuccessfully attempted to have the proceedings stayed.",Ruled as violated by court,,"5. On 2 May 2011 the Koszalin Regional Court issued a payment order (nakaz zapłaty) against the applicant. It stipulated that she was to pay to the claimant, a certain D.K., the sum of 156,000 Polish zlotys (PLN), equivalent to 36,000 euros (EUR). 10. On 22 August 2011 the applicant's lawyer lodged a second request for exemption from the court fees. The applicant submitted that she had wound up her company's activity as it had been operating at a loss. 14. On 26 October 2011 the Koszalin Regional Court rejected the applicant's appeal against the payment order of 2 May 2011 and rejected her third application for full exemption from the court fees as it had been substantially the same as the one lodged before and examined on 26 August 2011. 15. On 10 November 2011 the applicant appealed against the decision of 26 October 2011. She was ordered to pay a court fee of PLN 1,500 for pursuing her appeal. She requested the court to exempt her from that fee. 16. On 22 December 2011 the court partly granted her request. The applicant was ordered to pay a court fee in the amount of PLN 1,000. 17. On 30 March 2012 the Szczecin Court of Appeal rejected her appeal against the decision of 26 October 2011 for failure to pay the fee. The decision was delivered to the applicant on 10 April 2012. It appears that around that time the applicant took up employment. During that period the applicant unsuccessfully attempted to have the proceedings stayed.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""entitled to a hearing,"" it appears that the applicant's right was threatened by her financial inability to appeal.", 370,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The facts, as submitted by the parties, are similar to those in the case of Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, §§ 12-41, 24 May 2011). 5. All applicants were ill-treated and injured on the night of 21⁄22 December 1989 during the events which led to the fall of the communist regime in Bucharest. The applicant in application no. 30392/15 (Vasu v. Romania) suffered injuries that needed twenty-two days of medical care and the other two applicants were beaten by militia forces on the same occasion. 6. In 1990 the military prosecutor's office opened, of its own motion, investigations into the illegal detention, ill-treatment and injury suffered by the applicants and other participants in the events of December 1989 in respect of several offences as mentioned below. The main criminal investigation was recorded in file no. 97/P/1990 (currently no. 11/P/2014). 7. At the same time, another investigation concerning the offences of illegal deprivation of liberty, illegal arrest and abusive investigation against a large number of persons, including the applicants, culminated in the committal for trial of senior military and public officials and their subsequent conviction by a decision of the Supreme Court of Justice of 10 May 1991, which became final on 14 November 1991. It cannot be seen from the court's decision whether the injured persons, including the applicants, participated in those proceedings (see, mutatis mutandis, Bănuțoiu and Ștefoglu v. Romania [Committee], nos. 64752/13 and 54607/14, § 7, 3 July 2018). 8. As regards the offence of improper conduct, the military prosecutor's office decided on 27 October 1993 (Ms Nicoleta-Lorena Giurcanu ‑ applicant in application no. 30365/15, hereinafter ""the first applicant""), 9 March 1994 (Mr Traian Vasu – applicant in application no. 30392/15, hereinafter ""the second applicant"") and 27 August 1993 (Ms Luminița Zeleniuc – applicant in application no. 30410/15, hereinafter ""the third applicant"") not to open a separate investigation of its own motion on the grounds that the offence of improper conduct fell under a subsequently enacted amnesty law; that decision was communicated only to the third applicant on 25 September 2008. No decision was adopted in respect of the applicants' injury. 9. Further, without a formal decision to overturn the decisions issued by the military prosecutor's office (see paragraph 8 above) and to reopen the applicants' respective cases, in the main criminal investigation, the prosecutor heard evidence from the applicants, who reiterated their complaints regarding the offences of illegal deprivation of liberty and assault and battery, based on their ill-treatment and injuries during the events of December 1989. Thus, the first applicant asked on 29 April 2005 to be joined to these proceedings as a civil party and for the investigation of the case to be pursued by the military prosecutor's office. The second applicant gave statements as an injured party on 7 January 2000 and 23 November 2004. The third applicant raised civil claims on 25 September 2008 and requested that the persons responsible be identified and committed to stand trial. 10. The relevant procedural steps taken in the main criminal investigation were described in Association ""21 December 1989"" and Others v. Romania (cited above, §§ 12-41), and Sidea and Others v. Romania ([Committee] no. 889/15, §§ 8-11, 5 June 2018). 11. On 14 October 2015 the military prosecutor's office issued a decision in respect of the offence of instigating illegal deprivation of liberty, concerning all the applicants, by closing the main criminal investigation on the grounds of res judicata in relation to the Supreme Court of Justice's decision of 10 May 1991 (see paragraph 7 above). In addition, the military prosecutor's office closed the main investigation in respect of the offence of instigating improper conduct regarding the second applicant, as it fell under an amnesty law (see paragraph 8 above). No decision was adopted with respect to the injury and assault and battery complained of by the applicants. 12. The decision of 14 October 2015 (see paragraph 11 above) was subsequently annulled by a Prosecutor General's decision of 5 April 2016, confirmed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 13 June 2016. On 1 November 2016 the military prosecutor ordered the opening of a criminal investigation in rem for the offence of crimes against humanity in respect of the same factual circumstances. 13. According to the information submitted by the parties, the main criminal investigation is still ongoing (see Bănuțoiu and Ștefoglu, cited above, § 12).",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"5. All applicants were ill-treated and injured on the night of 21⁄22 December 1989 during the events which led to the fall of the communist regime in Bucharest. The applicant in application no. 30392/15 (Vasu v. Romania) suffered injuries that needed twenty-two days of medical care and the other two applicants were beaten by militia forces on the same occasion. 9. Further, without a formal decision to overturn the decisions issued by the military prosecutor's office (see paragraph 8 above) and to reopen the applicants' respective cases, in the main criminal investigation, the prosecutor heard evidence from the applicants, who reiterated their complaints regarding the offences of illegal deprivation of liberty and assault and battery, based on their ill-treatment and injuries during the events of December 1989. Thus, the first applicant asked on 29 April 2005 to be joined to these proceedings as a civil party and for the investigation of the case to be pursued by the military prosecutor's office. The second applicant gave statements as an injured party on 7 January 2000 and 23 November 2004. The third applicant raised civil claims on 25 September 2008 and requested that the persons responsible be identified and committed to stand trial.",TRUE,2,It depends on how the statute should apply to cases once combined., 371,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","6. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Tirana. 7. On an unspecified date criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant and two other co-accused on account of premeditated murder. The applicant was subsequently arrested by the authorities. 8. On 21 July 1998 the applicant addressed a letter (kërkesë) to the Kavaja District Court (""the District Court"") and the Kavaja district prosecutor (""the district prosecutor""), stating that he had engaged A., a lawyer, to represent him before the district prosecutor during the investigation and during the trial proceedings. It appears that the applicant wrote this letter while he was in detention. 9. On 1 November 1999 the District Court found the applicant not guilty and ordered his release. He had attended the trial and had been defended by A., his chosen lawyer. The two other co-accused were convicted and sentenced. 10. On an unspecified date the two other co-accused and the prosecutor appealed against the District Court's decision of 1 November 1999. 11. On an unspecified date the applicant left Albania. It appears that the applicant was not informed of the appeals of the two other co-accused and the prosecutor, but apparently A. was so informed. 12. On 28 February 2000 the Durrës Court of Appeal (""the Court of Appeal"") quashed the District Court's decision and remitted the case for re‑examination. The applicant was represented by A. in his absence. 13. On 21 April 2000 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant's appeal lodged by A. against the Durrës Court of Appeal decision of 28 February 2000. 14. On 26 December 2000, during the retrial proceedings, the District Court convicted the applicant in absentia of premeditated murder and sentenced him to twenty-three years' imprisonment. The applicant was represented by lawyer A. (see paragraph 9), the decision stating that A. had been appointed by the court. The two other co-accused appealed. 15. On 10 September 2001 and 14 December 2001 the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, respectively, upheld the decision of 26 December 2000. The applicant had been represented in those proceedings by a new, court-appointed lawyer. 16. On 14 April 2004 the applicant's mother hired another lawyer, K., to make an application for review. It appears from the Supreme Court's decision of 9 July 2010 (see paragraph 18 below) and the Constitutional Court's decision of 25 February 2011 (see paragraph 21 below) that an application for review was rejected by the Supreme Court. There is no copy of the said Supreme Court decision in the case file. 17. On 8 July 2005 the applicant was informed of his conviction in absentia by his family members. He lodged an application for leave to appeal out of time against the decision of 26 December 2000, arguing that he had never been informed of his conviction in absentia as he had been living abroad. The applicant was represented by K. as his counsel. 18. On 4 November 2005, 29 September 2006 and 9 July 2010 respectively, the District Court and the Court of Appeal dismissed, and the Supreme Court rejected, his application. The domestic courts held that the applicant should have known of the proceedings as he had been represented by a lawyer of his own choosing, A., who had been informed of the prosecutor's appeal, and as his mother had appointed a lawyer to make an application for review. They also held that the case had already been examined at all instances and that their decisions were still in effect. 19. Judge A.H., who had been a member of the District Court's bench that had delivered the judgment of 26 December 2000, also sat in the District Court's bench of 4 November 2005 that dismissed the applicant's application. Judges V.C. and Sh.M., who had been members of the Court of Appeal's bench that on 10 September 2001 had upheld the decision of 26 December 2000, also sat in the Court of Appeal's bench that dismissed his appeal on 29 September 2006. 20. On an unspecified date the applicant, represented by his lawyer, lodged a constitutional complaint in respect of the alleged unfairness of the proceedings in absentia and the lack of impartiality of the District Court and the Court of Appeal. 21. On 16 March 2011 the applicant's lawyer was informed of the Constitutional Court's decision of 25 February 2011 to dismiss the applicant's constitutional appeal. The Constitutional Court, noting that A. and the applicant's mother had had knowledge of the trial proceedings, stated that there had been no exceptional circumstances which had prevented the applicant from attending the proceedings in person. It did not examine the applicant's claim about the impartiality of the District Court and the Court of Appeal",Ruled as violated by court,,"16. On 14 April 2004 the applicant's mother hired another lawyer, K., to make an application for review. It appears from the Supreme Court's decision of 9 July 2010 (see paragraph 18 below) and the Constitutional Court's decision of 25 February 2011 (see paragraph 21 below) that an application for review was rejected by the Supreme Court. There is no copy of the said Supreme Court decision in the case file. 18. On 4 November 2005, 29 September 2006 and 9 July 2010 respectively, the District Court and the Court of Appeal dismissed, and the Supreme Court rejected, his application. The domestic courts held that the applicant should have known of the proceedings as he had been represented by a lawyer of his own choosing, A., who had been informed of the prosecutor's appeal, and as his mother had appointed a lawyer to make an application for review. They also held that the case had already been examined at all instances and that their decisions were still in effect. 21. On 16 March 2011 the applicant's lawyer was informed of the Constitutional Court's decision of 25 February 2011 to dismiss the applicant's constitutional appeal. The Constitutional Court, noting that A. and the applicant's mother had had knowledge of the trial proceedings, stated that there had been no exceptional circumstances which had prevented the applicant from attending the proceedings in person. It did not examine the applicant's claim about the impartiality of the District Court and the Court of Appeal",TRUE,2,"It's unclear whether the applicant was able to exercise his right ""to defend himself in person or through legal assistance,"" as he was not in attendance at the proceedings, but his appointed lawyer was.", 372,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Osijek. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 6 November 2000, in inheritance proceedings following the applicant's grandmother's death, the applicant's relative, M.J., and the applicant's father were declared the beneficiaries in respect of a house, which was not registered in the land register, by a decision of the Zabok Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zaboku). 8. On 18 October 2007 M.J. brought a civil action against the applicant in the Zabok Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zaboku) asking that court to recognise his ownership of a share of half of an inherited piece of property and to order the applicant to allow him to register his ownership in the land register. He set the value of the dispute (vrijednost predmeta spora) at 110,000 Croatian kunas (HRK). 9. In the proceedings before the first-instance court, on 5 November 2007 the applicant contested the value of the dispute and suggested that it be set at HRK 300,000. 10. At the hearing held on 23 January 2008 the applicant, inter alia, withdrew her objection to the value of the dispute as indicated by the claimant, and stated that she agreed with it. 11. In its judgment of 25 April 2008 the Zabok Municipal Court accepted M.J.'s claim. 12. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Zlatar County Court (Županijski sud u Zlataru) and on 16 September 2009 the second-instance court dismissed her appeal as ill-founded, upholding the first-instance judgment. 13. On 24 November 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), challenging the lower courts' judgments. 14. On 27 May 2010 the Supreme Court declared the applicant's appeal on points of law inadmissible ratione valoris. It interpreted M.J.'s civil action as being composed of two separate claims arising from different factual and legal bases - the first one for recognition of ownership, and the second for obtaining an order securing the registration of his ownership in the land register (hereinafter ""the issuance of a clausula intabulandi""). The Supreme Court thus halved the value of the dispute and held that the value of each claim did not reach the necessary ratione valoris threshold of HRK 100,001 (approximately 13,300 euros (EUR)) for an appeal on points of law to be admissible. The relevant part of this decision reads as follows: ""The claimant in his civil action indicated the value of the dispute as HRK 110,000. Pursuant to section 37(2) of the CPA [(Civil Procedure Act)], if the claims in the civil action arise from a variety of grounds, or different claimants put forward individual claims or individual claims are raised against several defendants, the value of the dispute must be established in accordance with the value of each individual claim. In the instant case the claimant made two non-monetary claims, one concerning property rights - for recognition of ownership -, and a claim under the law on obligations - for the issuance of a clausula intabulandi , namely for obtaining an order securing registration of his ownership in the land register. Therefore, the value of the dispute has to be established in relation to the value of the dispute of each claim. Consequently, the value of the dispute of each claim ... has to be established by dividing the indicated unique value of the dispute by [these] two [claims]. Given that the claimant indicated the [unique] value of the dispute as HRK 110,000, and that this amount should be divided by [the number of the claims], the value of the dispute of each claim does not exceed the amount of 100,000. It follows that an appeal on points of law by the defendant is inadmissible."" 15. The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), arguing that M.J.'s action had two aspects which could not be separated, and that the Supreme Court's decision finding that the case concerned two separate claims had therefore been arbitrary and had violated her right to a fair hearing, in particular her right of access to the Supreme Court, as guaranteed under Article 29 of the Constitution. 16. On 17 February 2011 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's constitutional complaint. It held that the applicant in her constitutional complaint ""did not demonstrate that the Supreme Court had failed to respect the provisions of the Constitution concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms, namely that it had applied relevant law in an arbitrary manner"" and that therefore ""the present case did not raise a constitutional issue."" Its decision was served on the applicant's representative on 3 March 2011.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"7. On 6 November 2000, in inheritance proceedings following the applicant's grandmother's death, the applicant's relative, M.J., and the applicant's father were declared the beneficiaries in respect of a house, which was not registered in the land register, by a decision of the Zabok Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zaboku). 8. On 18 October 2007 M.J. brought a civil action against the applicant in the Zabok Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zaboku) asking that court to recognise his ownership of a share of half of an inherited piece of property and to order the applicant to allow him to register his ownership in the land register. He set the value of the dispute (vrijednost predmeta spora) at 110,000 Croatian kunas (HRK). 13. On 24 November 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), challenging the lower courts' judgments. 14. On 27 May 2010 the Supreme Court declared the applicant's appeal on points of law inadmissible ratione valoris. It interpreted M.J.'s civil action as being composed of two separate claims arising from different factual and legal bases - the first one for recognition of ownership, and the second for obtaining an order securing the registration of his ownership in the land register (hereinafter ""the issuance of a clausula intabulandi""). The Supreme Court thus halved the value of the dispute and held that the value of each claim did not reach the necessary ratione valoris threshold of HRK 100,001 (approximately 13,300 euros (EUR)) for an appeal on points of law to be admissible. The relevant part of this decision reads as follows: ""The claimant in his civil action indicated the value of the dispute as HRK 110,000. Pursuant to section 37(2) of the CPA [(Civil Procedure Act)], if the claims in the civil action arise from a variety of grounds, or different claimants put forward individual claims or individual claims are raised against several defendants, the value of the dispute must be established in accordance with the value of each individual claim. In the instant case the claimant made two non-monetary claims, one concerning property rights - for recognition of ownership -, and a claim under the law on obligations - for the issuance of a clausula intabulandi , namely for obtaining an order securing registration of his ownership in the land register. Therefore, the value of the dispute has to be established in relation to the value of the dispute of each claim. Consequently, the value of the dispute of each claim ... has to be established by dividing the indicated unique value of the dispute by [these] two [claims]. Given that the claimant indicated the [unique] value of the dispute as HRK 110,000, and that this amount should be divided by [the number of the claims], the value of the dispute of each claim does not exceed the amount of 100,000. It follows that an appeal on points of law by the defendant is inadmissible.""",TRUE,1,"While it could be argued, as the applicant did, that she was denied fair trial, the Constitutional Court's rebuttal makes it appear it was not so.", 373,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1979 and is detained in Diyarbakır. 6. On 23 December 2001 the applicant was arrested and taken into police custody on suspicion of being a member of Hizbullah, an illegal organisation. During his detention in police custody, the applicant was allegedly subjected to ill-treatment by police officers. In particular, electric shocks were administered to his testicles. 7. On 25 December 2001 the applicant was interrogated by the police in the absence of a lawyer. During his interrogation, he confessed in detail to his involvement in the activities of the illegal organisation and gave detailed information about the organisation and its members. 8. On 26 December 2001 the applicant gave a statement to the public prosecutor in the absence of a lawyer in which he denied the statements he had given to the police. 9. On the same day the applicant was brought before the investigating judge at the Diyarbakır State Security Court, who questioned him in the absence of a lawyer. The applicant again denied his statements to the police. During his questioning, the applicant alleged to the investigating judge that he had been subjected to ill-treatment while in police custody and that his statements had been taken under duress. However, a medical report issued by Bağlar Health Clinic dated the same day stated that there was no sign that he had been subjected to violence. At the end of the hearing, the court ordered that the applicant be placed in pre-trial detention. 10. On 9 January 2002 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment, charging the applicant under Article 146 of the former Turkish Criminal Code with attempting to undermine the constitutional order of the State. 11. On 19 March 2002 the Diyarbakır State Security Court held the first hearing on the merits of the case. During the hearing, the applicant repeated his allegations of having been subjected to ill-treatment in police custody and denied his statements to the police. 12. On 27 January 2004 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Diyarbakır public prosecutor's office against the police officers who had allegedly ill-treated him. He stated that electric shocks had been administered to his body through his testicles and that his testicles had been squeezed, which had caused serious harm. He attached a medical report dated 20 September 2002 from Fırat University on the state of his testicles. The report stated that the applicant had a dilation of the veins in his left testicle of up to 2.6 mm, which had resulted in a varicocele. 13. State Security Courts were abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004. The case against the applicant was transferred to the Diyarbakır Assize Court. 14. On 25 June 2004 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor issued a decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings against the police officers on account of a lack of evidence. 15. During the criminal proceedings against the applicant, the first-instance courts examined the applicant's continued detention at the end of the hearings, either on their own motion or at the applicant's request. The courts ordered that he be kept in detention owing to the nature of the offence, the state of the evidence and the contents of the file. 16. On 12 June 2008 the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The sentence, however, was reduced to twenty years of imprisonment as the applicant was a minor at the time of the offence. 17. On 18 January 2010 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision for procedural reasons. 18. On 2 April 2010 the applicant asked the Diyarbakır Assize Court for his release pending trial. On 9 April 2010 the court dismissed his application for release on the grounds of the nature of the offence. 19. On 30 September 2010 the Diyarbakır Assize Court issued a decision of lack of jurisdiction (görevsizlik kararı), pursuant to section 8 of Law no. 6008, which provided that juveniles could not be tried before assize courts, which had special jurisdiction to try a number of aggravated crimes enumerated under Article 250 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at the material time. The case was thus referred to the Diyarbakır Juvenile Court. 20. On 2 November 2010 the applicant was released pending trial. 21. On 5 June 2012 the Diyarbakır Juvenile Court found that, inter alia, on the basis of the applicant's statements to the police, the applicant had committed the offence under Article 146 of the former Turkish Criminal Code and sentenced him to sixteen years and eight months' imprisonment. 22. On 17 June 2014 the Court of Cassation upheld the Diyarbakır Juvenile Court's judgment.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definitions of ""defending oneself"" and ""presumed innocent until proven guilty,"" it appears that the applicant was denied his right, as he did not have a lawyer and was kept in detention throughout most of the trial.", 374,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Bílovice nad Svitavou (the Czech Republic). 6. On 30 December 1992 the applicant's legal predecessor and two others applied to the Bratislava Land Office for the restitution of some plots of land under the Land Ownership Act of 1991. The date on which the applicant subsequently became a party to the proceedings is not specified. 7. On 23 June 1997 the Land Office issued a decision approving an agreement whereby the proceedings would end in relation to part of the property but continue in relation to the remainder. 8. By a decision of the Land Office of 17 May 1999, the proceedings in respect of another part of the property ended. However, on 23 May 2003 the relevant part of the proceedings was reopened. 9. On 12 July 2013 the Land Office stayed the restitution proceedings on the grounds that the parties had failed to furnish it with their consent to process, in the course of the proceedings, their personal data. 10. On 11 September 2015 the Land Office dismissed part of what was left of the applicant's claim. 11. On 19 October 2015 the Land Office stayed the examination of the remainder of the claim, inviting a number of institutions to submit relevant documentation, which they did by the end of 2015. 12. The remainder of the applicant's claim is still pending. 13. Following repeated requests for acceleration of the proceedings and complaints, on 18 June 2011 the Bratislava Regional Land Office acknowledged that there had been unjustified delays in the proceedings before the District Land Office. 14. On 20 December 2011 the applicant brought an action in the Bratislava Regional Court for acceleration of the proceedings under Article 250t § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (""the CCP""). 15. On 19 April 2012 the Regional Court dismissed the action on the grounds that the Land Office was short of staff and overburdened with complex and time-consuming restitution claims. It also noted that the Land Office had maintained active correspondence with the applicant and had therefore not caused any undue delays. 16. The decision of 19 April 2012 was quashed by the Constitutional Court following the applicant's constitutional complaint (see paragraph 22 below). This led to re-examination of the case by the Regional Court, which decided on 11 April 2013 to allow the action and to order the Land Office to decide on the applicant's claim within sixty days. 17. On 12 November 2013, in response to a complaint lodged by the applicant, the Bratislava II District Office of the Public Prosecution Service (""the PPS"") informed him that the PPS had reprimanded the Land Office for unjustified delays in the restitution proceedings. 18. On 21 August 2014 the applicant lodged a fresh action with the Regional Court under Article 250t § 1 of the CCP, arguing that the Land Office had failed to abide by the order of 11 April 2013. 19. On 27 May 2015 the Regional Court allowed the action, issuing a fresh order to the Land Office to decide on the matter within three months. At the same time, it fined it 1,000 euros (EUR) payable to the account of the Regional Court. 20. On 4 July 2012 the applicant lodged two constitutional complaints. 21. The first complaint was directed against the Land Office, in particular at the length of the proceedings on his restitution claim before it. On 23 August 2012 the Constitutional Court rejected that complaint for lack of jurisdiction to examine it. The Constitutional Court noted that under Article 250t § 1 of the CCP examination of delays in proceedings before administrative authorities fell within the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals, which excluded the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. Accordingly, as the administrative proceedings were still pending, the applicant should have lodged a fresh complaint about the alleged inactivity of the Land Office with the Regional Court. Even though the applicant had already been unsuccessful in using such a remedy, the Regional Court continued to have jurisdiction over actions of that type. 22. The second complaint was directed against the Regional Court. The applicant contested, inter alia, the fairness of the proceedings leading to its decision of 19 April 2012 (see paragraph 15 above). In a constitutional judgment of 16 January 2013, the Constitutional Court allowed the relevant part of the applicant's complaint and found a violation of his right to a fair hearing. It held, in particular, that the Regional Court had failed to take account of relevant aspects of the case and to give adequate reasoning in respect of them. Accordingly, it quashed the Regional Court's decision of 19 April 2012 and remitted the applicant's action of 20 December 2011 to the Regional Court for fresh examination. Moreover, it awarded the applicant EUR 2,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.",Ruled as violated by court,,"13. Following repeated requests for acceleration of the proceedings and complaints, on 18 June 2011 the Bratislava Regional Land Office acknowledged that there had been unjustified delays in the proceedings before the District Land Office. 16. The decision of 19 April 2012 was quashed by the Constitutional Court following the applicant's constitutional complaint (see paragraph 22 below). This led to re-examination of the case by the Regional Court, which decided on 11 April 2013 to allow the action and to order the Land Office to decide on the applicant's claim within sixty days. 17. On 12 November 2013, in response to a complaint lodged by the applicant, the Bratislava II District Office of the Public Prosecution Service (""the PPS"") informed him that the PPS had reprimanded the Land Office for unjustified delays in the restitution proceedings. 19. On 27 May 2015 the Regional Court allowed the action, issuing a fresh order to the Land Office to decide on the matter within three months. At the same time, it fined it 1,000 euros (EUR) payable to the account of the Regional Court. 21. The first complaint was directed against the Land Office, in particular at the length of the proceedings on his restitution claim before it. On 23 August 2012 the Constitutional Court rejected that complaint for lack of jurisdiction to examine it. The Constitutional Court noted that under Article 250t § 1 of the CCP examination of delays in proceedings before administrative authorities fell within the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals, which excluded the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. Accordingly, as the administrative proceedings were still pending, the applicant should have lodged a fresh complaint about the alleged inactivity of the Land Office with the Regional Court. Even though the applicant had already been unsuccessful in using such a remedy, the Regional Court continued to have jurisdiction over actions of that type. 22. The second complaint was directed against the Regional Court. The applicant contested, inter alia, the fairness of the proceedings leading to its decision of 19 April 2012 (see paragraph 15 above). In a constitutional judgment of 16 January 2013, the Constitutional Court allowed the relevant part of the applicant's complaint and found a violation of his right to a fair hearing. It held, in particular, that the Regional Court had failed to take account of relevant aspects of the case and to give adequate reasoning in respect of them. Accordingly, it quashed the Regional Court's decision of 19 April 2012 and remitted the applicant's action of 20 December 2011 to the Regional Court for fresh examination. Moreover, it awarded the applicant EUR 2,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""fair trial,"" it appears, according to the Constitutional Court, that the applicants were denied this.", 375,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Dubno. 6. The applicant was the principal of a private school in the town of Dubno, in the Rivne Region. 7. On 30 March 2000 criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant for failure to comply with a court decision ordering the reinstatement of a teacher at the private school. 8. According to the applicant, at about 9.00 a.m. on 29 May 2000 officers from Dubno police broke down the front door of the applicant's house. Inside the house, an investigator from the Dubno inter-district prosecutor's office ordered the applicant to go to his office for questioning. When the applicant refused, the investigator asked the police officers to ensure her compulsory appearance for questioning. The police officers allegedly beat the applicant, twisted her arms behind her back and forced her out of the house barefoot. They placed her in a police car and took her to the office of the investigator. At about 1 p.m. on 29 May 2000 the applicant was released. 9. On the next day, 30 May 2000, the applicant was examined by a doctor, who noted that there were injuries on her shoulders. 10. On 9 April 2001 the Dubno inter-district prosecutor's office discontinued the investigation into the applicant's criminal case, having regard to the insignificance of her offence. 11. On 2 August 2001 the Dubno Town Court quashed the decision of 9 April 2001 as unfounded and ordered that there be further investigation. 12. On 14 August 2001 the investigation was completed and the case file was referred to the Dubno Town Court for trial. 13. On 30 January 2004 and 13 March 2006 the Dubno Town Court issued judgments in the applicant's case, which were quashed as unfounded by the Rivne Regional Court of Appeal. 14. On 30 January 2007 the Dubno Town Court convicted the applicant of failure to comply with a court decision, and decided that it was appropriate to punish her with a fine. However, ultimately it released the applicant from the punishment, as the statute of limitation had expired. 15. On 17 April 2007 the Rivne Regional Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the judgment of 30 January 2007. 16. On 13 November 2007 the Supreme Court refused to examine an appeal by the applicant on points of law, on the grounds that she had failed to comply with procedural rules when submitting it. 17. On 2 June 2000 the applicant complained to the Rivne regional prosecutor's office regarding the events of 29 May 2000 (see paragraph 8 above). She was examined by a medical expert, who found that she had sustained five bruises to her shoulders and had injured her left shoulder ligaments. The expert stated that the injuries had been caused by blunt solid objects; they could have been sustained in the circumstances described by the applicant. 18. On 30 June 2000 the Rivne regional prosecutor's office, having conducted a pre-investigation inquiry, refused to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers because of the absence of the constituent elements of a criminal offence. 19. On 20 March 2001, following a complaint by the applicant, the Prosecutor General's Office reversed the decision of 30 June 2000 as unsubstantiated, and ordered an additional inquiry. The applicant was not informed of the decision taken within the additional inquiry. In 2016 the Office of the Government Agent was informed that the file on those inquiries had been destroyed, along with other files relating to the same period, after the expiry of the statutory period for keeping such records. 20. On 29 May 2003 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Dubno Town Court, seeking damages for the violation of the inviolability of her home and her unlawful arrest and ill-treatment on 29 May 2000. 21. On 9 July 2007 the Dubno Town Court found that on 29 May 2000 the applicant had been ill-treated and unlawfully taken from her home to the investigator's office. The court found that the authorities had acted unlawfully and that they had violated her right to the inviolability of her home, right to liberty and right to respect for human dignity. The court awarded the applicant 500 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH – approximately 73 euros (EUR) at the relevant time) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 22. On 26 May 2008 the Lviv Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 9 July 2007. 23. The applicant appealed on points of law, contesting the amount of the award. 24. On 8 May 2009 the Higher Administrative Court found that the appeal had not been prepared in a proper way. That court set a time-limit within which the applicant could rectify shortcomings in her appeal on points of law. 25. On 13 July 2009 the Higher Administrative Court returned the applicant's appeal without examining it on the merits, after finding that she had failed to comply with the procedural requirements for submitting appeals.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. On 30 March 2000 criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant for failure to comply with a court decision ordering the reinstatement of a teacher at the private school. 16. On 13 November 2007 the Supreme Court refused to examine an appeal by the applicant on points of law, on the grounds that she had failed to comply with procedural rules when submitting it. 18. On 30 June 2000 the Rivne regional prosecutor's office, having conducted a pre-investigation inquiry, refused to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers because of the absence of the constituent elements of a criminal offence. 19. On 20 March 2001, following a complaint by the applicant, the Prosecutor General's Office reversed the decision of 30 June 2000 as unsubstantiated, and ordered an additional inquiry. The applicant was not informed of the decision taken within the additional inquiry. In 2016 the Office of the Government Agent was informed that the file on those inquiries had been destroyed, along with other files relating to the same period, after the expiry of the statutory period for keeping such records. 20. On 29 May 2003 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Dubno Town Court, seeking damages for the violation of the inviolability of her home and her unlawful arrest and ill-treatment on 29 May 2000. 21. On 9 July 2007 the Dubno Town Court found that on 29 May 2000 the applicant had been ill-treated and unlawfully taken from her home to the investigator's office. The court found that the authorities had acted unlawfully and that they had violated her right to the inviolability of her home, right to liberty and right to respect for human dignity. The court awarded the applicant 500 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH – approximately 73 euros (EUR) at the relevant time) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 22. On 26 May 2008 the Lviv Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 9 July 2007. 23. The applicant appealed on points of law, contesting the amount of the award. 24. On 8 May 2009 the Higher Administrative Court found that the appeal had not been prepared in a proper way. That court set a time-limit within which the applicant could rectify shortcomings in her appeal on points of law. 25. On 13 July 2009 the Higher Administrative Court returned the applicant's appeal without examining it on the merits, after finding that she had failed to comply with the procedural requirements for submitting appeals.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""entitled to a hearing,"" it appears that the applicant's right was threatened by repeated procedural dismissals.", 376,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Bečej, where he was employed as a police officer. 6. On 24 January 2003 the Bečej Municipal Court (""the Municipal Court"") started judicial investigation proceedings against the applicant for the alleged commission of a number of criminal offences concerning the performance of his duties. 7. On 26 May 2003 the competent directorate of the Ministry of Interior dismissed the applicant from the police force (effective as of 30 May 2003). The decision noted that the criminal proceedings had been instituted against the applicant and that Article 45, in conjunction with Article 34 (1)(2), of the Ministry of Interior Act 1991, which was in force at the time of the dismissal, should be applied. According to this provision a police officer could be dismissed, at the discretion of the Ministry of Interior, if he no longer met the requirements for being a police officer, which included the requirement that criminal proceedings of a particular type should not be pending against him. The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision, but on 30 June 2003 his appeal was rejected and the dismissal thus confirmed. 8. On 23 July 2003 the applicant lodged a claim with the Municipal Court seeking his reinstatement. 9. On 31 October 2003 the Municipal Court partly discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant based on the applicable procedural prescription period. 10. On 12 November 2003 the remainder of the criminal proceedings were discontinued because the public prosecutor had withdrawn the charges. 11. On 30 December 2003 the Municipal Court annulled the decision on the applicant's dismissal of 26 May 2003 by partial judgment, establishing that everyone charged with a criminal offence should be presumed innocent until proven guilty by a court of law, and that a broad interpretation of Article 45 of the Ministry of Interior Act 1991 in regards to the persons who were not found guilty could be only to their detriment. 12. On 17 June 2004 the Novi Sad District Court (""the District Court"") upheld this judgment. The applicant's former employer thereafter submitted an appeal on points of law. 13. In the meantime, the applicant was reinstated to his previous post by decision of the Ministry of Interior of 13 January 2005. The decisions of 26 May and 30 June 2003 were also repealed. 14. On 9 March 2005, however, the Supreme Court upheld the appeal on points of law, reversed the judgments of 30 December 2003 and 17 June 2004 and rejected the applicant's claim for reinstatement. It found that the dismissal of 26 May 2006 had been in accordance with the Article 45, read in conjunction with Article 34 (1)(2) of the Ministry of Interior Act 1991, and that the mere fact that the criminal proceedings had been pending against the applicant was sufficient reason for the applicant's dismissal. 15. On 4 July 2005 the applicant was thus again dismissed from his job, which decision was upheld on 11 August 2005 by the Minister of Interior. 16. On 4 August 2005, the applicant brought another set of the proceedings for the annulment of his second dismissal. However, the Municipal Court, the District Court and the Supreme Court, by their judgments of 27 October 2005, 10 May 2007 and 18 December 2007, respectively, all ruled against him and upheld his dismissal on the basis of Article 45, read in conjunction with Article 34 (1)(2), of the Ministry of Interior Act 1991. 17. On 14 March 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court concerning the outcome, fairness and the length of the civil proceedings concerning his dismissal, the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and the ""right to work"". 18. On 17 February 2011 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant's appeal. In regards to the court judgments of 31 October 2003, 17 June 2004 and 9 March 2005 the Constitutional Court established that the his complaints were inadmissible ratione temporis given that the Serbian Constitution had come into force on 8 November 2006, i.e. after the first set of the proceedings concerning the applicant's dismissal. On the other hand, with respect to the judgments of 27 October 2005, 10 May and 18 December 2007, the Constitutional Court found that they were not arbitrary, and upheld the legality of the applicant's second dismissal on the basis of Article 45, read in conjunction with Article 34 (1)(2), of the Ministry of Interior Act 1991. In the Constitutional Court's view, the fact that the applicant was ultimately dismissed on 4 July 2005, instead of on 26 May 2003, was only in the applicant's favour, and that fact alone could not affect the legality of his ""dismissal as such"". 19. Before this on 19 January 2011, the Constitutional Court rendered a decision in the case of Stefanović v. Serbia (UŽ 753/2008), concerning the same legal issue in which it ruled in favour of the appelant in that case (see Milojević and Others v. Serbia, nos. 43519/07 and 2 others, §§ 36-37, 12 January 2016).",Ruled as violated by court,,"15. On 4 July 2005 the applicant was thus again dismissed from his job, which decision was upheld on 11 August 2005 by the Minister of Interior. 16. On 4 August 2005, the applicant brought another set of the proceedings for the annulment of his second dismissal. However, the Municipal Court, the District Court and the Supreme Court, by their judgments of 27 October 2005, 10 May 2007 and 18 December 2007, respectively, all ruled against him and upheld his dismissal on the basis of Article 45, read in conjunction with Article 34 (1)(2), of the Ministry of Interior Act 1991. 18. On 17 February 2011 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant's appeal. In regards to the court judgments of 31 October 2003, 17 June 2004 and 9 March 2005 the Constitutional Court established that the his complaints were inadmissible ratione temporis given that the Serbian Constitution had come into force on 8 November 2006, i.e. after the first set of the proceedings concerning the applicant's dismissal. On the other hand, with respect to the judgments of 27 October 2005, 10 May and 18 December 2007, the Constitutional Court found that they were not arbitrary, and upheld the legality of the applicant's second dismissal on the basis of Article 45, read in conjunction with Article 34 (1)(2), of the Ministry of Interior Act 1991. In the Constitutional Court's view, the fact that the applicant was ultimately dismissed on 4 July 2005, instead of on 26 May 2003, was only in the applicant's favour, and that fact alone could not affect the legality of his ""dismissal as such"".",TRUE,2,It depends on whether the applicant's dismissal from employment constitutes being treated as guilty before being proven., 377,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Charlotte, North Carolina (the United States of America). 6. The case concerns ""non-contentious"" proceedings for the return of the child instituted on 13 October 2011 in which the domestic courts refused to order the return of the applicant's son to the United States after the child's mother (a Croatian national and the applicant's former wife) had in August 2011 ""wrongfully retained"" him in Croatia within the meaning of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (""the Hague Convention""). 7. Specifically, on 15 March 2012 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court (Općinski građanski sud u Zagrebu), without holding a single hearing, dismissed the applicant's request for the return of the child. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 2 July 2012 the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu) quashed the Municipal Court's decision and remitted the case. In so deciding it, inter alia, instructed the Municipal Court to hold a hearing. The relevant part of the County Court's decision reads as follows: ""... the first-instance court based [its] decision in part on undisputed facts, and in the relevant part on the arguments and evidence submitted by the counterparty ... even though it failed to give an opportunity to the petitioner to comment on them ... [T]herefore, the petitioner's appeal has to be allowed, the first-instance decision quashed and the case remitted ... In the fresh proceedings, the first-instance court shall correct the above error by scheduling a hearing (section 309(5) of the Family Act) at which it shall, together with the parties (sections 297-298 of the Civil Procedure Act), examine the circumstances of the case."" 8. In the fresh proceedings the Municipal Court obtained an opinion from a forensic expert in psychiatry on whether returning the child to the United States would expose him to psychological harm – that is, to a risk envisaged in Article 13 paragraph 1 (b) of the Hague Convention (see paragraph 27 below with further references). On 21 May 2014 that court, without holding a hearing, again dismissed the applicant's request for his son to be returned to the United States. This decision was upheld on appeal by the Zagreb County Court on 22 October 2014. The Municipal Court justified its decision not to hold a hearing in the following way: ""... the court did not take evidence by hearing the parties because that would significantly protract the proceedings, bearing in mind that in their testimonies – precisely because they have a personal stake in the outcome of the proceedings and their objectivity is very questionable – the parties mostly want to praise and present themselves in the best light while discrediting the opposing party ... [S]uch testimonies are [therefore] generally not at all suitable [in terms of assisting a court in establishing the facts of a case] and reaching a decision."" 9. Those return proceedings (see paragraphs 6-8 above) were already subject to the examination by the Court. In the first Adžić case the Court in the judgment of 12 March 2015 held that the domestic authorities had failed to act expeditiously in the proceedings in question. The Court had accordingly found a violation of the State's positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention (see Adžić v. Croatia, no. 22643/14, §§ 96-99, 12 March 2015). At the time the Court adopted its judgment, i.e. 17 February 2015, the proceedings were still pending before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) upon a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant. 10. In his constitutional complaint the applicant complained of a violation of his right to fair procedure, in particular of a breach of his right to an oral hearing and a breach of the principle of equality of arms and the adversarial principle. More specifically, the applicant submitted that the ordinary courts had not held a single hearing in the case and that the first‑instance court had not informed him of its decision to obtain an opinion from a forensic expert in psychiatry, thus preventing him from objecting to the choice of expert. He further complained that he had not been involved in the expert's assessment, even though he had previously expressed his willingness to make himself available for such an assessment. The applicant also complained that the domestic court's refusal to order the return of his son constituted a violation of his right to respect for family life. 11. By a decision of 28 October 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's constitutional complaint. It served its decision on his representative on 4 December 2015. The Constitutional Court examined only the alleged violation of the applicant's right to fair procedure, because it considered that the alleged violation of his right to family life had been addressed by the Court in the first Adžić case (see paragraph 9 above). 12. The other relevant facts of the case are set out in detail in the Court's judgment in the first Adžić case (see Adžić, cited above, §§ 6-57).",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. The case concerns ""non-contentious"" proceedings for the return of the child instituted on 13 October 2011 in which the domestic courts refused to order the return of the applicant's son to the United States after the child's mother (a Croatian national and the applicant's former wife) had in August 2011 ""wrongfully retained"" him in Croatia within the meaning of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (""the Hague Convention""). 7. Specifically, on 15 March 2012 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court (Općinski građanski sud u Zagrebu), without holding a single hearing, dismissed the applicant's request for the return of the child. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 2 July 2012 the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu) quashed the Municipal Court's decision and remitted the case. In so deciding it, inter alia, instructed the Municipal Court to hold a hearing. The relevant part of the County Court's decision reads as follows: ""... the first-instance court based [its] decision in part on undisputed facts, and in the relevant part on the arguments and evidence submitted by the counterparty ... even though it failed to give an opportunity to the petitioner to comment on them ... [T]herefore, the petitioner's appeal has to be allowed, the first-instance decision quashed and the case remitted ... In the fresh proceedings, the first-instance court shall correct the above error by scheduling a hearing (section 309(5) of the Family Act) at which it shall, together with the parties (sections 297-298 of the Civil Procedure Act), examine the circumstances of the case."" 8. In the fresh proceedings the Municipal Court obtained an opinion from a forensic expert in psychiatry on whether returning the child to the United States would expose him to psychological harm – that is, to a risk envisaged in Article 13 paragraph 1 (b) of the Hague Convention (see paragraph 27 below with further references). On 21 May 2014 that court, without holding a hearing, again dismissed the applicant's request for his son to be returned to the United States. This decision was upheld on appeal by the Zagreb County Court on 22 October 2014. The Municipal Court justified its decision not to hold a hearing in the following way: ""... the court did not take evidence by hearing the parties because that would significantly protract the proceedings, bearing in mind that in their testimonies – precisely because they have a personal stake in the outcome of the proceedings and their objectivity is very questionable – the parties mostly want to praise and present themselves in the best light while discrediting the opposing party ... [S]uch testimonies are [therefore] generally not at all suitable [in terms of assisting a court in establishing the facts of a case] and reaching a decision."" 9. Those return proceedings (see paragraphs 6-8 above) were already subject to the examination by the Court. In the first Adžić case the Court in the judgment of 12 March 2015 held that the domestic authorities had failed to act expeditiously in the proceedings in question. The Court had accordingly found a violation of the State's positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention (see Adžić v. Croatia, no. 22643/14, §§ 96-99, 12 March 2015). At the time the Court adopted its judgment, i.e. 17 February 2015, the proceedings were still pending before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) upon a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant. 10. In his constitutional complaint the applicant complained of a violation of his right to fair procedure, in particular of a breach of his right to an oral hearing and a breach of the principle of equality of arms and the adversarial principle. More specifically, the applicant submitted that the ordinary courts had not held a single hearing in the case and that the first‑instance court had not informed him of its decision to obtain an opinion from a forensic expert in psychiatry, thus preventing him from objecting to the choice of expert. He further complained that he had not been involved in the expert's assessment, even though he had previously expressed his willingness to make himself available for such an assessment. The applicant also complained that the domestic court's refusal to order the return of his son constituted a violation of his right to respect for family life. 11. By a decision of 28 October 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's constitutional complaint. It served its decision on his representative on 4 December 2015. The Constitutional Court examined only the alleged violation of the applicant's right to fair procedure, because it considered that the alleged violation of his right to family life had been addressed by the Court in the first Adžić case (see paragraph 9 above).",FALSE,0,The applicant was denied his right to a hearing., 378,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant company, S.C. Textinc S.A., is a Romanian company whose registered office is in Timişoara. 5. On 12 December 2008 the Timişoara Finance Inspectorate (hereinafter, ""the T.F.I."") instituted enforcement proceedings against the applicant company on the grounds that it had an outstanding tax liability for the year 2008 amounting to 237,128 Romanian lei (RON). 6. The applicant company, represented by its appointed lawyer, Mr. P. Sălăjan, challenged before the Timişoara District Court the T.F.I.'s decision to open enforcement proceedings. It claimed that it had no outstanding fiscal debts and submitted documentary evidence in this respect. 7. At the first hearing in the proceedings the T.F.I. acknowledged that the applicant company had no outstanding tax liability and that the enforcement proceedings had been instituted in error. Invoking Article 275 of the Romanian Code of the Civil Procedure (hereinafter, ""the CCP"" – see paragraph 15 below), it also contended that as it had acknowledged its error at the first hearing in the proceedings it should not be ordered to pay the costs and expenses incurred by the applicant company. 8. By a judgment of 16 February 2009 the Timişoara District Court allowed the applicant company's challenge concerning the T.F.I.'s decision to open enforcement proceedings and ordered the T.F.I. to pay the applicant RON 9,893; this sum represented respectively the fees of the applicant company's lawyer (9,700 RON), stamp duty and trial tax (193 RON). The court held that although the T.F.I. had acknowledged its error at the first hearing it could not be exonerated from the payment of the costs and expenses incurred by the applicant company, as the challenge proceedings were the result of a mistake on its part. The court further noted that the T.F.I. had started enforcement proceedings against the applicant company for a non-existent debt and that the latter had accordingly had to hire a lawyer and pay the trial fees in order to defend itself. The court also noted that the applicant company had submitted evidence to support its request for the reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred. 9. The T.F.I. lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of 16 February 2009. It claimed that the first-instance court had not observed the principle of adversarial proceedings and of equality of arms, as it had not had the opportunity to challenge the amount paid by the applicant company in lawyer's fees, which in its opinion were too high. 10. By a final judgment of 12 August 2009 the Timiş County Court dismissed the appeal as unfounded. While holding that the lawyer's fees corresponded to his input in the case, the court reiterated that the judge was entitled to increase or to reduce a lawyer's fees, according the specific criteria set out by Article 274 of the CCP (see paragraph 15 below). The court thus concluded that the judgment given by the Timişoara District Court was lawful and well-founded; it further awarded the applicant company the amount of 7,596 RON in legal costs in respect of the appeal proceedings. 11. The T.F.I. lodged with the Timiş County Court an application for the judgment of 12 August 2009 to be set aside (contestaţie în anulare – see paragraph 14 below) on the grounds that the County Court had not examined all the arguments that it had raised in its appeal on points of law; the T.F.I. referred in particular to the fact that before the Timişoara District Court they were not given the possibility to bring their arguments concerning the amount requested by the applicant company and then awarded in legal costs and expenses by the first-instance court. 12. In a final judgment of 19 February 2010 the Timiş County Court, sitting in a different formation from that of 12 August 2009, allowed the request: it set aside the judgment of 12 August 2009 (see paragraph 10 above) and allowed the appeal lodged by the T.F.I. against the judgment of 16 February 2009 (see paragraph 8 above), which it partly amended. The County Court held that the appellate court had not examined the arguments raised by the defendant in their appeal on points of law in relation to the manner in which the first instance court applied Article 274 § 3 of the CCP (see paragraph 15 below); in particular, the first instance court had not allowed the parties to bring their arguments concerning the amount of the legal costs requested by the applicant company. Such an omission was sufficient, in the County Court's view, to justify the quashing of the previous judgments. 13. The County Court then re-examined the amount paid by the applicant company in lawyer's fees and considered that in relation to the lawyer's input in the case, it was justified to reduce that amount from RON 9700 to RON 700. It also considered that the stamp duty and trial tax in the amount of 193 RON were not to be granted to the applicant company, in so far as this amount could be requested separately from the fiscal authorities, based on the Law no. 146/1997 on stamp duty, as a consequence of the fact that the challenge to the enforcement had been allowed.",Ruled as violated by court,,"10. By a final judgment of 12 August 2009 the Timiş County Court dismissed the appeal as unfounded. While holding that the lawyer's fees corresponded to his input in the case, the court reiterated that the judge was entitled to increase or to reduce a lawyer's fees, according the specific criteria set out by Article 274 of the CCP (see paragraph 15 below). The court thus concluded that the judgment given by the Timişoara District Court was lawful and well-founded; it further awarded the applicant company the amount of 7,596 RON in legal costs in respect of the appeal proceedings. 12. In a final judgment of 19 February 2010 the Timiş County Court, sitting in a different formation from that of 12 August 2009, allowed the request: it set aside the judgment of 12 August 2009 (see paragraph 10 above) and allowed the appeal lodged by the T.F.I. against the judgment of 16 February 2009 (see paragraph 8 above), which it partly amended. The County Court held that the appellate court had not examined the arguments raised by the defendant in their appeal on points of law in relation to the manner in which the first instance court applied Article 274 § 3 of the CCP (see paragraph 15 below); in particular, the first instance court had not allowed the parties to bring their arguments concerning the amount of the legal costs requested by the applicant company. Such an omission was sufficient, in the County Court's view, to justify the quashing of the previous judgments.",TRUE,2,"It could be argued, depending on the definition of ""entitled to hearing,"" that the ability of judges to set lawyers' fees interferes with this entitlement.", 379,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Golasowice. 5. On 1 February 1999 the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Jastrzębie Zdrój District Court for the purposes of establishing an easement. In particular the applicant sought a decision allowing her to use a strip of land belonging to her neighbours as a roadway allowing her access to her property. The roadway in question, which has been used by her in the past, runs along a causeway (grobla) between fishponds. 6. By a decision of 11 July 2000 (file no. I Ns 57/99) the Jastrzębie Zdrój District Court allowed the applicant's claim. The other party appealed against this decision. 7. On 15 November 2000 the Katowice Regional Court quashed the first-instance decision and remitted the case (file no. III Ca 661/00). 8. At a hearing on 13 March 2001 the court ordered the preparation of an expert opinion. Two experts declined the invitation to prepare an opinion, and the third expert approached by the court eventually prepared it on 17 October 2001. 9. The defendants contested both the expert opinion itself and the fee for drafting it. In March 2002 they requested preparation of another expert opinion. 10. It appears that the next hearing was held on 23 April 2002. The court questioned the expert and appointed another one to assess the value of the plot of land. 11. On 12 November 2002 the court held a viewing of the property. 12. At a hearing on 13 January 2003 the court decided to appoint yet another expert to establish whether the easement would have any impact on the fishponds. The opinion was submitted to the court on 11 April 2003. The expert was questioned at a hearing on 3 July 2003. On 27 January 2004 another expert submitted a complementary opinion, at the request of the court. 13. The next hearing was held on 17 June 2004. The court subsequently dealt with an application lodged by the applicant to exempt her from payment of the fees for the expert opinion. 14. On 2 June 2005 the Jastrzębie Zdrój District Court allowed, in essence, the applicant's claim (file no. I Ns 57/99). The other party appealed against the decision. 15. On 26 January 2006 (file no. III Ca 1322/05) the Gliwice Regional Court quashed the first-instance decision and remitted the case for the second time. 16. At a hearing on 26 June 2006 the court requested preparation of an expert geological opinion. The opinion was submitted one year later, on 22 June 2007. 17. At a hearing on 18 October 2007 the court decided that further defendants should join the proceedings. 18. A viewing of the land took place on 6 November 2007. Afterwards anther expert opinion on road construction was ordered by the court. It was submitted to the court in January 2008 and the parties duly commented on it. 19. At a hearing on 23 July 2008 the court questioned the expert and requested the preparation of another expert opinion on the value of the plot of land. 20. The opinion was submitted to the court on 12 January 2009. 21. The court held a hearing on 25 November 2009 and decided to hold another viewing of the property. Two subsequent viewings scheduled for December 2009 and February 2010 were cancelled due to the weather conditions. 22. A hearing was held on 4 March 2010 and on 30 April 2010 the court held a viewing of the land. 23. Another expert opinion ordered by the court was prepared on 6 August 2010. 24. The court held hearings in March 2011. On 31 March 2011 it gave a decision granting the applicant the easement in question. 25. The defendants appealed. 26. On 22 February 2012 the Gliwice Regional Court finally dismissed the appeals. 27. On 9 December 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Gliwice Regional Court under the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaint about breach of the right to have a case examined in judicial proceedings without undue delay (ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki – ""the 2004 Act""). She stated that she had lodged her claim in 1999 and that her case had still not been examined. She also claimed PLN 10,000 in compensation. 28. By a decision of 21 December 2004 (file no. III S 36/04) the Gliwice Regional Court rejected the claim on formal grounds, having found that the applicant ""had not specified the circumstances on which her complaint had been based."" 29. Subsequently, the applicant lodged another complaint under the 2004 Act. She sought a finding that the length of the proceedings had been excessive and claimed PLN 10,000 in compensation. 30. By a decision of 5 April 2006 (file no. III S 7/06) the Gliwice Regional Court dismissed the claim. It analysed in detail the course of the proceedings after September 2004 and held that they had generally been conducted in a correct and timely manner. As regards the period prior to September 2004, the court relied on the Supreme Court's jurisprudence and held that the 2004 Act applied to delays caused by the court's inactivity occurring before that date but only if that delay still continued; what had not been the case in the case under the consideration.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. By a decision of 11 July 2000 (file no. I Ns 57/99) the Jastrzębie Zdrój District Court allowed the applicant's claim. The other party appealed against this decision. 13. The next hearing was held on 17 June 2004. The court subsequently dealt with an application lodged by the applicant to exempt her from payment of the fees for the expert opinion. 14. On 2 June 2005 the Jastrzębie Zdrój District Court allowed, in essence, the applicant's claim (file no. I Ns 57/99). The other party appealed against the decision. 24. The court held hearings in March 2011. On 31 March 2011 it gave a decision granting the applicant the easement in question. 28. By a decision of 21 December 2004 (file no. III S 36/04) the Gliwice Regional Court rejected the claim on formal grounds, having found that the applicant ""had not specified the circumstances on which her complaint had been based.""",TRUE,2,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year. At the same time, the Regional Court ruled that the length of proceedings was not excessive.", 380,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1961 and lived until his arrest in the town of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, the Sakhalin Region. 5. On 3 April 2003 the applicant was apprehended in a flat with unregistered firearms in his possession. Four tied persons with traces of beatings, including Mr P., were discovered in a cloakroom of the flat. An investigator of the Sakhalin Regional police department drew up an arrest record. 6. On the following day the applicant's detention on remand was authorised. A week later the applicant was charged with a number of crimes, including organisation and leadership of an armed gang, several counts of aggravated kidnapping, extortion, robbery and fraud, as well as illegal possession of firearms. 7. The applicant's detention was further extended by the Yuzhno‑Sakhalinsk Town Court and the Sakhalin Regional Court on thirteen occasions up until his conviction. When extending the applicant's detention, the domestic courts referred to the particular gravity and quantity of the charges against him; complexity of the criminal investigation and difficulties of jury trial; the applicant's liability to abscond, re-offend and interfere with the course of justice, given his personality and criminal record; significant volume of evidence presented by the defence during the trial. The courts also kept track of the course of the investigation and assessed investigative and operative measures planned by the prosecution, including arrests of the applicant's accomplices (which were still at liberty or had absconded in breach of the measure of restraint imposed on them and had been put on the wanted persons' list), complex expert examinations requiring participation of the applicant and the victims and examination of the case-file by the applicant and his accomplices. The applicant's requests for release on bail, as well as his appeal complaints against the detention orders, were to no avail. 8. On 21 April 2004 the applicant and his lawyers started studying the case file materials comprising nineteen volumes, 200-300 pages long each. On 7 September 2004 the Town Court set a time-limit for studying, affording the applicant additional twenty working days to complete it. On 29 December 2004 the case was referred to the Regional Court for trial. 9. On 6 April 2006 the Regional Court, by a jury verdict, found the applicant and six of his accomplices guilty as charged. On 12 May 2006 the Regional Court, relying on the jury verdict, sentenced the applicant to twenty-one years' imprisonment. 10. The applicant was found guilty, in particular, of an aggravated fraud, robbery, kidnapping and extortion in respect of Mr L., a businessman from the Moscow Region. The jury found that in May 2001 the applicant had approached Mr L. under the pretence of being a car salesman. The applicant had promised Mr L. to sell him a car for approximately 600,000 Russian roubles (RUB). However, after Mr L. had transferred the money to an account indicated by the applicant, the latter had disappeared. In October 2002 the applicant contacted Mr L., told him that he had just returned from Japan with his car and invited him to come to Sakhalin for it. On his arrival at the airport of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk on 13 October 2002 Mr L. was met by Mr K., one of the applicant's accomplices, and taken to the applicant's country house where he was held until 6 November 2002, being subjected to beatings and extortion by the applicant and his gang. 11. Neither Mr K., nor Mr L. were heard in open court. Mr K. had been found dead in a remand prison cell before the trial commenced. As for Mr L., residing in the Moscow Region, the trial court attempted to secure his presence on several occasions by summoning him and ordering his escort to the court. In reply he informed the trial court about being unable to travel to Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk in view of his spinal disease and a medical contraindication to air travel. He submitted a number of documents in support, as well as a written notice in which he confirmed his pre-trial statements. Having regard to these circumstances, the trial court allowed the prosecution's request to read out Mr L. and Mr K.'s statements incriminating the applicant, despite the latter's objections. 12. The jury further established that in September and December 2002 and in March 2003 the applicant had organised an armed robbery and kidnapping of eight other victims, including Mr P. and had extorted a large sum of money in exchange for their freedom. Mr P. also was not heard in court as he was allegedly on vacation in Ukraine. Disregarding the applicant's objections, the Regional Court read out Mr P.'s pre-trial statements against the applicant. 13. The applicant's lawyer appealed against the judgment of the Regional Court, complaining, among other matters, about the decision to read out pre-trial statements by Mr L., Mr P. and Mr K. On 14 November 2007 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the judgment of the Regional Court, noting that it had correctly considered that reasons for the witnesses' absence had been extraordinary and that it had lawfully read out their pre-trial statements.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. The applicant's detention was further extended by the Yuzhno‑Sakhalinsk Town Court and the Sakhalin Regional Court on thirteen occasions up until his conviction. When extending the applicant's detention, the domestic courts referred to the particular gravity and quantity of the charges against him; complexity of the criminal investigation and difficulties of jury trial; the applicant's liability to abscond, re-offend and interfere with the course of justice, given his personality and criminal record; significant volume of evidence presented by the defence during the trial. The courts also kept track of the course of the investigation and assessed investigative and operative measures planned by the prosecution, including arrests of the applicant's accomplices (which were still at liberty or had absconded in breach of the measure of restraint imposed on them and had been put on the wanted persons' list), complex expert examinations requiring participation of the applicant and the victims and examination of the case-file by the applicant and his accomplices. The applicant's requests for release on bail, as well as his appeal complaints against the detention orders, were to no avail. 10. The applicant was found guilty, in particular, of an aggravated fraud, robbery, kidnapping and extortion in respect of Mr L., a businessman from the Moscow Region. The jury found that in May 2001 the applicant had approached Mr L. under the pretence of being a car salesman. The applicant had promised Mr L. to sell him a car for approximately 600,000 Russian roubles (RUB). However, after Mr L. had transferred the money to an account indicated by the applicant, the latter had disappeared. In October 2002 the applicant contacted Mr L., told him that he had just returned from Japan with his car and invited him to come to Sakhalin for it. On his arrival at the airport of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk on 13 October 2002 Mr L. was met by Mr K., one of the applicant's accomplices, and taken to the applicant's country house where he was held until 6 November 2002, being subjected to beatings and extortion by the applicant and his gang. 11. Neither Mr K., nor Mr L. were heard in open court. Mr K. had been found dead in a remand prison cell before the trial commenced. As for Mr L., residing in the Moscow Region, the trial court attempted to secure his presence on several occasions by summoning him and ordering his escort to the court. In reply he informed the trial court about being unable to travel to Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk in view of his spinal disease and a medical contraindication to air travel. He submitted a number of documents in support, as well as a written notice in which he confirmed his pre-trial statements. Having regard to these circumstances, the trial court allowed the prosecution's request to read out Mr L. and Mr K.'s statements incriminating the applicant, despite the latter's objections. 12. The jury further established that in September and December 2002 and in March 2003 the applicant had organised an armed robbery and kidnapping of eight other victims, including Mr P. and had extorted a large sum of money in exchange for their freedom. Mr P. also was not heard in court as he was allegedly on vacation in Ukraine. Disregarding the applicant's objections, the Regional Court read out Mr P.'s pre-trial statements against the applicant.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definitions of ""adequate time and facilities"" and ""examining witnesses,"" it does not appear the applicant and their lawyer received adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence, nor that they were able to examine the witnesses whose statements were read out.", 381,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicants were born in 1935, 1945 and 1956 respectively and live in Ploieşti. 5. In 1975 a group of engineers patented an invention concerning a method for separating hydrocarbon. The first applicant is one of the inventors. The second and third applicants are heirs of the other members of the group. 6. On 26 January 1995 the applicants lodged an action for compensation against company R., a privately-owned former State company which had used the 1975 invention between 1985 and 1988 (for details about those proceedings, see Farcaş and Others v. Romania, no. 67020/01, §§ 7-22, 10 November 2005). 7. In a decision of 24 June 2002 the Braşov County Court allowed in part the action lodged by the applicants against company R., and ordered the latter to pay to the first applicant 2,284,679,617 Romanian lei (ROL), an amount representing compensation for the use, between 1985 and 1988, of the invention patented in 1975. The second and third applicants appealed, and in a decision of 8 November 2002 the Braşov Court of Appeal also awarded them compensation – ROL 2,230,620,676 to the second applicant and ROL 1,669,759,157 to the third applicant. 8. On 10 March 2004 the applicants and company R. signed an agreement for the payment of the compensation awarded by the court. Between 2 and 21 April 2004 the company paid about 20% of the amounts granted. 9. On 5 May 2005 the High Court of Cassation and Justice took note of the terms of the agreement of 10 March 2004 and concluded that company R. had withdrawn its appeal on points of law against the decision of 8 November 2002 (see paragraph 7 above), which thus became final. 10. Meanwhile, on 31 March 2004 company R. had sought its judicial reorganisation under a procedure provided for by Law no. 64/1995 on judicial reorganisation and bankruptcy. 11. On 28 April 2004 the Bacău County Court allowed the application, started the reorganisation proceedings and nominated a judicial administrator. The applicants' claims were accepted by the County Court and recorded in the register of claims compiled by the judicial administrator in conformity with the provisions of the applicable law (tabloul creditorilor, hereinafter ""the register of claims""). 12. The applicants lodged an objection to the register of claims, asking to be recognised as priority creditors (creditori privilegiaţi). Eleven other creditors also lodged objections against the records in the register of claims. 13. Meanwhile, on 24 November 2004 the judicial administrator had submitted a reorganisation plan to a vote by the creditors. It was proposed that the priority claims (creanţe privilegiate) be paid in full, and the remaining unsecured non-priority claims (creanţe chirografare) be paid at a rate of 20% of their value. In an interlocutory judgment of 8 December 2004 the Bacău County Court validated the plan after examining the objections raised by the unsecured creditors (creditori chirografari). In 2006 company R. paid its debts in accordance with the plan. 14. On 11 October 2007 the Braşov County Court held a hearing on the objections to the register of claims lodged by the applicants. The first applicant was present at the hearing to represent both himself and the other applicants. The County Court gave the parties until 18 October 2007 to submit written observations. On that date, in the applicants' absence, it adjourned delivery of the judgment to 1 November 2007. The County Court gave its judgment on 1 November 2007; it found against the applicants. 15. On 23 January 2008, in accordance with the rules on notification in relation to court documents in insolvency proceedings (see paragraph 20 below), the judgment of 1 November 2007 was published in the Bulletin of Insolvency Proceedings (Buletinul Procedurilor de Insolvenţă, ""the Bulletin""). 16. On an unspecified date the applicants enquired about the judgment's date of delivery and asked the County Court to provide them with a copy of the judgment, which was sent to them on 31 January 2008; they received it on 4 February 2008. On 13 February 2008 they lodged an appeal by post. 17. Before the Braşov Court of Appeal, the applicants argued that, as they had not had access to the Bulletin, they had not been able to know on which date the judgment had been published. 18. In a final decision of 17 April 2008 the Court of Appeal dismissed that argument and concluded that the appeal had been made out of time, as it had been lodged more than ten days after 23 January 2008, the date on which the Braşov County Court's judgment had been published (see paragraph 15 above). Relying on the Constitutional Court's decision no. 1137 of 4 December 2007 (see paragraph 21 below), the Court of Appeal considered that the notification procedure via the Bulletin had offered sufficient safeguards to the participants in the proceedings, and had been justified by the nature of the insolvency procedure. 19. On 21 June 2010 the County Court closed the insolvency proceedings and noted that company R. had complied with all the obligations set out in the reorganisation plan (see paragraph 13 above), and thus it no longer had any debts.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. In a decision of 24 June 2002 the Braşov County Court allowed in part the action lodged by the applicants against company R., and ordered the latter to pay to the first applicant 2,284,679,617 Romanian lei (ROL), an amount representing compensation for the use, between 1985 and 1988, of the invention patented in 1975. The second and third applicants appealed, and in a decision of 8 November 2002 the Braşov Court of Appeal also awarded them compensation – ROL 2,230,620,676 to the second applicant and ROL 1,669,759,157 to the third applicant. 8. On 10 March 2004 the applicants and company R. signed an agreement for the payment of the compensation awarded by the court. Between 2 and 21 April 2004 the company paid about 20% of the amounts granted. 9. On 5 May 2005 the High Court of Cassation and Justice took note of the terms of the agreement of 10 March 2004 and concluded that company R. had withdrawn its appeal on points of law against the decision of 8 November 2002 (see paragraph 7 above), which thus became final. 13. Meanwhile, on 24 November 2004 the judicial administrator had submitted a reorganisation plan to a vote by the creditors. It was proposed that the priority claims (creanţe privilegiate) be paid in full, and the remaining unsecured non-priority claims (creanţe chirografare) be paid at a rate of 20% of their value. In an interlocutory judgment of 8 December 2004 the Bacău County Court validated the plan after examining the objections raised by the unsecured creditors (creditori chirografari). In 2006 company R. paid its debts in accordance with the plan.",TRUE,2,"It's arguable, as the applicants and the County Court represent both sides of, whether this counts as ""public judgment.""", 382,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Istanbul. 6. On 2 October 2004 the Büyükçekmece Magistrates' Court issued a search warrant allowing the gendarmerie to conduct searches of public places and suspected persons in a designated area. 7. Late at night on the same day, the gendarmerie carried out a search at the Sancak Hotel, which is owned by the applicant. The records drawn up afterwards noted that during the course of the search, a certain M.Ş. had approached the plain-clothes officers outside the hotel and told them that he had a girl inside. It was then established that M.Ş. trafficked women. He and a woman in the hotel were both taken to the gendarmerie headquarters. 8. The search records, which were prepared a few hours after the search and signed by the hotel's manager, showed that five women of foreign nationalities had been staying at the hotel with some men and that they had all been taken to the gendarmerie headquarters. 9. On 3 October 2004 the gendarmerie questioned several men as suspects and five women as victims. They all confirmed that they had been staying at the hotel for prostitution purposes. Some of the women were asked whether they knew of any complicity between the traffickers and the management of Sancak Hotel, to which they responded in the negative. 10. On the same day the applicant was arrested and taken into the custody of the gendarmerie on suspicion of facilitating prostitution. 11. On 4 October 2004 the applicant gave statements to the gendarmerie. He denied having provided premises for prostitution. He argued that he did not allow procurers into his hotel and had never seen M.Ş. before. 12. On the same day, the gendarmerie also questioned the hotel's manager, who stated that both he and the applicant were very strict about keeping procurers out of their hotel. 13. On 30 May 2005 the Büyükçekmece Public Prosecutor issued an indictment against the applicant and three other persons. He accused them of failure to obey an order from an official authority under Article 526 § 1 of the Criminal Code (Law no. 765) in force at the time, on the ground that they had provided premises for prostitution in their hotels. 14. On 1 June 2005 the Misdemeanours Act (Law no. 5326) and the new Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no. 5271) entered into force. 15. On 10 June 2005 the Büyükçekmece Magistrates' Court assessed the case without holding a hearing. Establishing that the accused had provided premises for prostitution in their hotels, it held that the applicant had failed to obey the orders of an official authority as charged and should be punished accordingly. It then sentenced him to an administrative fine of 100 Turkish liras (TRY)[1] pursuant to Section 32 of the Misdemeanours Act (Law no. 5326). 16. The applicant objected to that decision, arguing that his defence rights had been restricted in that the court had sentenced him to the fine solely on the basis of the statements taken previously by the police, and without hearing him in person. He maintained that he accepted clients into his hotel in compliance with the relevant regulation and that he could not be expected to refuse to offer accommodation to foreign nationals or to question their motives for staying there. 17. On 3 February 2006 after examining the case on the basis of the case file, the Bakırköy Assize Court upheld the decision of the Magistrates' Court. That decision was final. 18. On 24 May 2006 an official letter was sent to the applicant. It was indicated on the envelope that the applicant was invited to a hearing concerning his case, which would be held on 10 July 2006. The envelope did not show any confirmation that the letter had been served on him. 19. The applicant's lawyer stated that he had received a copy of the final decision at the registry of the Büyükçekmece Magistrates' Court on 11 July 2006. In support of his claim, he submitted a copy of the Assize Court's decision, on which a lawyer working at his office had noted that he had been served with the copy in person on that date. That document was later stamped and certified as an authentic copy by the registry of the domestic court. 20. Following communication of the present application, on 21 December 2009 a public prosecutor prepared an assessment report, summarising the events in the case. He concluded that the final decision had been served on the applicant on 26 May 2006. 21. On 2 January 2014 both the applicant and the Government were asked under Rule 54 § 2 (c) of the Rules of Court to provide the Court with a document indicating the notification date of the final decision by 16 January 2014 at the latest. The parties did not respond to that request. 22. On 3 November 2017 the Government were once again asked to provide documents regarding the commencement of the six-month time‑limit, in particular the content of the envelope from the Büyükçekmece Magistrates' Court dated 24 May 2006 and the document in support of the public prosecutor's claim that the final decision had been served on the applicant on 26 May 2006. On 30 November 2017 the Government informed the Court that they could not find the requested documents.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"11. On 4 October 2004 the applicant gave statements to the gendarmerie. He denied having provided premises for prostitution. He argued that he did not allow procurers into his hotel and had never seen M.Ş. before. 12. On the same day, the gendarmerie also questioned the hotel's manager, who stated that both he and the applicant were very strict about keeping procurers out of their hotel. 13. On 30 May 2005 the Büyükçekmece Public Prosecutor issued an indictment against the applicant and three other persons. He accused them of failure to obey an order from an official authority under Article 526 § 1 of the Criminal Code (Law no. 765) in force at the time, on the ground that they had provided premises for prostitution in their hotels. 14. On 1 June 2005 the Misdemeanours Act (Law no. 5326) and the new Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no. 5271) entered into force. 15. On 10 June 2005 the Büyükçekmece Magistrates' Court assessed the case without holding a hearing. Establishing that the accused had provided premises for prostitution in their hotels, it held that the applicant had failed to obey the orders of an official authority as charged and should be punished accordingly. It then sentenced him to an administrative fine of 100 Turkish liras (TRY)[1] pursuant to Section 32 of the Misdemeanours Act (Law no. 5326). 16. The applicant objected to that decision, arguing that his defence rights had been restricted in that the court had sentenced him to the fine solely on the basis of the statements taken previously by the police, and without hearing him in person. He maintained that he accepted clients into his hotel in compliance with the relevant regulation and that he could not be expected to refuse to offer accommodation to foreign nationals or to question their motives for staying there. 17. On 3 February 2006 after examining the case on the basis of the case file, the Bakırköy Assize Court upheld the decision of the Magistrates' Court. That decision was final. 20. Following communication of the present application, on 21 December 2009 a public prosecutor prepared an assessment report, summarising the events in the case. He concluded that the final decision had been served on the applicant on 26 May 2006. 21. On 2 January 2014 both the applicant and the Government were asked under Rule 54 § 2 (c) of the Rules of Court to provide the Court with a document indicating the notification date of the final decision by 16 January 2014 at the latest. The parties did not respond to that request. 22. On 3 November 2017 the Government were once again asked to provide documents regarding the commencement of the six-month time‑limit, in particular the content of the envelope from the Büyükçekmece Magistrates' Court dated 24 May 2006 and the document in support of the public prosecutor's claim that the final decision had been served on the applicant on 26 May 2006. On 30 November 2017 the Government informed the Court that they could not find the requested documents.",TRUE,2,"It's unclear whether this counts as being ""entitled to a fair and public hearing.""", 383,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. On 4 September 2000 the President of Russia appointed Ms G. to the office of judge of the Syktyvkar Town Court for a period of three years. 5. On 21 May 2004 the State Council of the Komi Republic appointed Ms G. to the office of justice of the peace of Lesozavodskiy Judicial District of Syktyvkar for three years. On 31 May 2007 the Council extended her appointment for another seven years. 6. On 16 January 2008 the Judicial Qualifications Board granted Ms G.'s application for resignation and terminated her judicial status effective as of 1 April 2008. 7. On 19 November 2009 the acting President of the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic appointed Ms G. as acting justice of the peace for Kutuzovskiy district in Syktyvkar as of 23 November 2009 pending the appointment of a permanent justice. According to the Government, Ms G. served as justice of the peace until 8 February 2010. 8. On 8 April 2010 the acting President of the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic appointed Ms G. to the office of justice of the peace in Vylgort as of 16 April 2010 for a period of one year. 9. On 5, 9 and 29 May and 4 June 2010 the applicant was arrested by the police for (1) driving a vehicle without a registration plate, (2) driving without a driving licence, (3) refusal to take a breath test and (4) driving under the influence. 10. On 4 and 22 June and 6 July 2010 Justice of the Peace G. found the applicant guilty on seven counts of road traffic offences and sentenced him to administrative detention and a fine. 11. On an unspecified date the applicant appealed against the five judgments of 4 June 2010, arguing, inter alia, that the justice of the peace who had considered his cases had been appointed to the office in contravention of the applicable laws. 12. On 24 and 30 June 2010 the Syktyvdinskiy District Court of the Komi Republic dismissed the applicant's appeal. The District Court discerned no irregularities as regards the appointment of Ms G. to the office of justice of the peace. 13. The applicant did not appeal against the judgments of 22 June and 6 July 2010 in view of the futility of his previous appeals. 14. On 24 December 2009 Justice of the Peace G. dismissed the applicant's claims against the social-security authorities for interest payments and non-pecuniary damage. 15. The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the justice of the peace who had considered her case had been appointed to the office in contravention of the applicable laws. 16. On 23 April 2010 the Syktyvkar Town Court upheld the judgment of 24 December 2009 on appeal. The Town Court discerned no irregularities as regards the appointment of Ms G. to the office of justice of the peace. 17. On 9 May and 13 July 2010 the applicant was arrested by the police for refusal to take a breath test and driving under the influence respectively. 18. On 13 July 2010 Justice of the Peace G. found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to administrative detention. 19. On an unspecified date the applicant appealed against the two judgments, arguing, inter alia, that the justice of the peace who had considered his cases had been appointed to the office in contravention of the applicable laws. 20. On 6 August 2010 the Syktyvdinskiy District Court upheld the judgments on appeal. The District Court discerned no irregularities as regards the appointment of Ms G. to the office of justice of the peace. 21. On 26 May 1990 Ms Ch. was elected to the office of judge of the Syktyvkar Town Court. 22. On 22 December 1999 the Judicial Qualifications Board granted Ms Ch.'s application for resignation and terminated her judicial status. 23. On 26 August 2010 the President of the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic appointed Ms Ch. as acting justice of the peace in Vylgort for a period of up to one year. 24. On 11 January 2011 the President of the Supreme Court relieved Ms Ch. of her duties of office of acting justice of the peace. 25. On 21 September 2010 the applicant was arrested by the police for leaving the scene of a road traffic accident and refusal to take a breath test. 26. On 15 October 2010 justice of the peace Ch. delivered two judgments, finding the applicant in violation of road traffic rules and sentenced him to administrative detention. The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that Ms Ch. had been appointed to the office in contravention of the applicable laws. 27. On 17 November the Syktyvdinskiy District Court of the Komi Republic upheld both judgments of 15 October 2010 on appeal. The court discerned no irregularity as regards Ms Ch.'s appointment to the office of justice of the peace. 28. On 7 October 2010 Justice of the Peace Ch. allowed an action lodged by Yu. against the applicant and reduced the amount of monthly maintenance Yu. had to pay as child support for the parties' minor daughter. The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that Ms Ch. had been appointed to her office in contravention of the applicable laws. 29. On 8 December 2010 the District Court upheld the judgment of 7 October 2010 on appeal. The court discerned no irregularity as regards Ms Ch.'s appointment to the office of justice of the peace.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While one could argue, as the applicant did, that the judge was appointed against the idea of an ""independent and impartial tribunal established by law,"" it appears from the multiple court decisions that it was not so.", 384,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Oradea. 6. On 29 November 2000 the prosecutor's office attached to the Bihor County Court (""the prosecutor's office"") discontinued the criminal proceedings which it had opened against the applicant on 24 November 2000 for bribe taking. 7. On 10 January 2001 the prosecutor's office attached to the Bihor Court of Appeal quashed the above-mentioned decision of its own motion and ordered that the proceedings against the applicant be reopened. 8. On 5 February and 11 June 2001, respectively, the prosecutor's office reopened the criminal proceedings against the applicant for bribe taking and opened criminal proceedings against him for abuse of office. 9. On 29 July 2002 the State Agency for Capitalisation of Banking Assets (Autoritate Pentru Valorificarea Activelor Bancare – ""AVAB"") joined the criminal proceedings against the applicant as a civil party. It sought the recovery of 27,863,805,105 Romanian lei (ROL) (approximately 1,758,753 US dollars (USD)), the damage that it had allegedly incurred as a result of the applicant's abuse of office. 10. On 16 August 2002 the prosecutor's office ordered the seizure of the applicant's movable and immovable assets up to the value of the damage allegedly incurred by AVAB. The order was enforced by the Bihor Police Department on 19 December 2002 by seizing part of the immovable properties owned jointly by the applicant and his wife, in particular four plots of intra muros agricultural land, a home and annexes. 11. On 29 August 2002 the prosecutor's office indicted the applicant for bribe taking and for abuse of office and sent his case for trial. 12. Between 7 October 2002 and 6 February 2006 the Bihor County Court (""the County Court"") adjourned the proceedings twenty-four times to allow the parties to prepare their defence, for the court to summon the parties and the witnesses, to hear evidence, and for deliberations. Also, at a hearing on 10 February 2003, the court dismissed the applicant's challenge against the order of 16 August 2002 on the grounds that the measure was temporary and had been enforced correctly. This decision was upheld by the Oradea Court of Appeal (""the Court of Appeal"") on 11 March 2003 following an appeal by the applicant. 13. On 13 February 2006 the County Court examined the applicant's case on the merits and acquitted him of abuse of office. However, it held that the applicant had to pay AVAB the damages it claimed because AVAB had suffered damage as a result of his actions. Consequently, the court maintained the measure imposed on the applicant's assets. It also convicted the applicant of bribe taking and sentenced him to three years' imprisonment, suspended. 14. The applicant appealed against the judgment to the Court of Appeal. 15. Between 20 June and 11 July 2006 the Court of Appeal adjourned the proceedings twice to allow the parties to prepare their cases. On 19 September 2006 the court quashed the judgment of 13 February 2006 and referred the case back to the first-instance court for re-examination on procedural grounds. 16. Between 30 November 2006 and 1 April 2010 the County Court adjourned the proceedings thirty-two times to allow the parties to prepare their defence, for the court-assigned expert to produce two expert reports, and for the court to summon the parties and the witnesses, to hear evidence, for deliberations, and to allow the judges to exercise their right to strike. Also, at a hearing on 4 June 2007 the court adjourned the examination of the applicant's request for the measure imposed on his assets to be lifted pending the court's determination of the case. 17. On 8 April 2010 the County Court examined the applicant's case on the merits, acquitted him of abuse of office and dismissed AVAB's civil claim. Consequently, it lifted the seizure measure from his assets. The court convicted the applicant, however, of receiving bribes and gave him a suspended sentence of three years' imprisonment. 18. The applicant and AVAB appealed against the judgment to the Court of Appeal. 19. Between 21 September and 16 November 2010 the Court of Appeal adjourned the proceedings twice to allow the parties to prepare their cases, to summon them, and for the court to deliberate. On 23 November 2010 the court dismissed the appeals of the parties and upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. 20. The applicant and AVAB appealed on points of fact and law against the judgment to the High Court of Cassation and Justice (""the Court of Cassation""). 21. Between 23 February and 20 April 2011 the Court of Cassation adjourned the proceedings once to allow the applicant to prepare his case. 22. By a final judgment of 4 May 2011 the Court of Cassation allowed the applicant's appeal on points of fact and law in part. It held that he was guilty of bribe taking, but his criminal liability for that offence had become time-barred. The court upheld the remaining parts of the judgments delivered by the lower courts. 23. On 4 March 2012, once the applicant had submitted certified copies of all the courts' judgments, the Bihor Land and Immovable Property Register removed the annotation concerning the seizure measure imposed on his immovable property from the above-mentioned register, which had prevented him from freely disposing of it.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. On 10 January 2001 the prosecutor's office attached to the Bihor Court of Appeal quashed the above-mentioned decision of its own motion and ordered that the proceedings against the applicant be reopened. 15. Between 20 June and 11 July 2006 the Court of Appeal adjourned the proceedings twice to allow the parties to prepare their cases. On 19 September 2006 the court quashed the judgment of 13 February 2006 and referred the case back to the first-instance court for re-examination on procedural grounds. 16. Between 30 November 2006 and 1 April 2010 the County Court adjourned the proceedings thirty-two times to allow the parties to prepare their defence, for the court-assigned expert to produce two expert reports, and for the court to summon the parties and the witnesses, to hear evidence, for deliberations, and to allow the judges to exercise their right to strike. Also, at a hearing on 4 June 2007 the court adjourned the examination of the applicant's request for the measure imposed on his assets to be lifted pending the court's determination of the case.",TRUE,2,"The repeated adjourning of courts puts the ""reasonable time"" and ""adequate time and facilities for the preparation of defence"" clauses in tension.", 385,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicants, Ms Bozhana Boyanova Uzunova and Mr Ferad Ismail Seid, were born in 1978 and 1955 respectively, and live in Kardzhali. 5. The applicants co-owned a plot of land of 15,276 square metres near the town of Kapitan Andreevo. 6. On 30 November 2007 the Council of Ministers decided to expropriate 6,218 square metres of the applicants' plot with a view to building a motorway. The decision allowed preliminary enforcement of the expropriation and stated that the owners were to be given BGN 13,023 (the equivalent of approximately EUR 6,657) in compensation. The decision recorded as owner of the expropriated plot the person from whom the applicants had bought the property. 7. The applicants brought judicial review proceedings in respect of the expropriation decision before the Supreme Administrative Court. In a final judgment of 3 April 2009 that court declared the decision null and void as it had failed to specify the actual owners of the plot to whom compensation was due, and referred the case back to the administrative authorities. The Road Infrastructure Agency requested re-opening of the judicial review proceedings on the ground that it had not been able to take part in them as an interested third party even though its participation was mandatory under the State Property Act 1996 as investor in the construction of the motorway. In a judgment of 12 October 2009 a five-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court allowed the request, quashed the judgment of 3 April 2009 and remitted the case to be re-examined by a three-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court. 8. In a final judgment of 28 December 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court found that compensation was due to the applicants as owners of the plot at issue and that it had to be increased to BGN 59,817 (the equivalent of EUR 30,577), in accordance with the conclusions of an expert report obtained in the course of the proceedings. The court also awarded the applicants BGN 600 in costs, to be paid by the Council of Ministers. 9. On 13 January 2011 the applicants invited the Road Infrastructure Agency to pay the compensation due to them. In its response of 21 February 2011, the Agency informed the applicants that due to some changes in the layout of the motorway, a new decision for expropriation of the affected property was being prepared. 10. On 5 July 2011 the Council of Ministers issued a new decision for expropriation, in accordance with which 5,215 square metres of the applicants' plot were to be expropriated against compensation in the amount of BGN 1,794 (the equivalent of EUR 917). The applicants brought judicial review proceedings in respect of this decision. In a judgment of 26 June 2012, the Supreme Administrative Court declared the decision of 5 July 2011 null and void as it had failed to take account of the binding character of the judgment of 28 December 2010, the latter having determined the dispute between the parties with final effect. In March 2012 the Ministry of Finance unsuccessfully sought reopening of the proceedings ending with the judgment of 28 December 2010 before the Supreme Administrative Court. 11. On 4 July 2012 the applicants once again invited the Road Infrastructure Agency to pay the compensation due to them. They subsequently wrote to the agency again on 15 October 2012, to the Council of Ministers on 14 October 2013 submitting also a writ of enforcement in respect of the sum due, and to the regional governor on 21 February 2014. 12. On 26 February 2015, at the time of submitting their observations on the admissibility and merits in this case, the Government informed the Court that on 15 May 2014 the Road Infrastructure Agency had paid to each applicant BGN 29,908.50, or altogether BGN 59,817 pursuant to the final judgment in their favour of 28 December 2010. 13. On 10 December 2014, 20 January 2015 and 23 March 2015 respectively, the applicants wrote to various authorities, without success, seeking the payment of interest on the above amount for the period of over three years when it had remained unenforced. 14. In the meantime, on 22 November 2013 the applicants brought proceedings before the Sofia Administrative Court in relation to the lack of enforcement of the final judicial decision of 28 December 2010. In particular, they claimed they had incurred pecuniary damage as a result of the lack of enforcement; they also claimed interest on the amount determined in the said judgment for the period of its non-enforcement. On 18 December 2013 the court dismissed their claim as inadmissible. It found, on the one hand, that the applicants had not indicated an individual administrative act as the subject of their judicial review proceedings. If, on the other hand, the applicants' claim was about the lack of enforcement of a final judicial decision, the court held that the competent body in that connection was the bailiff and the relevant procedure was under chapter XVII of the Code of Administrative Procedure 2006 (""the 2006 Code""). 15. The applicants appealed before the Supreme Administrative Court, alleging a breach of Article 203 of the 2006 Code and a breach of section 1(1) of the State and Municipalities Responsibility for Damage Act (the ""SMRDA""), and challenging the lower court's decision as being unreasoned. In a final decision of 13 February 2014, the Supreme Administrative Court confirmed the lower court's decision.",Ruled as violated by court,,"12. On 26 February 2015, at the time of submitting their observations on the admissibility and merits in this case, the Government informed the Court that on 15 May 2014 the Road Infrastructure Agency had paid to each applicant BGN 29,908.50, or altogether BGN 59,817 pursuant to the final judgment in their favour of 28 December 2010.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicants did not receive their first hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 386,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Glendale, California, the United States of America. 5. The applicant worked in the British Council's Armenia office (hereinafter ""the British Council"") as a project manager on a full-time, permanent contract starting from 25 November 2002. 6. In the course of her employment the applicant had two children, born on 27 March 2008 and 7 May 2010. The applicant spent her maternity leave in the United States and regularly sent requests to extend that leave every six months for the duration of her absence. In particular, she sent such requests in March and September 2009 as regards her first child and then in April and September 2010 as regards her second child. It appears that the applicant's maternity leave was extended, based on those requests. In March 2011 her leave was further extended until 1 September 2011. 7. According to the applicant, on 19 August 2011 she requested another extension of her maternity leave. She handed an envelope with her written request to that effect to her friend H.K., who was to return to Armenia on 17 August 2011 after a visit to the United States. Upon arrival, H.K. gave the envelope to R.O., a driver, who then handed it to A.K., a security guard at the British Council. 8. On 30 September 2011 the applicant received notice of termination of her employment contract prior to its term. The notice referred to the change in volume and conditions of work at the British Council, as well as the need to reduce the number of staff. In addition, the notice stated the following: ""... [your] employment contract shall be terminated based on [the relevant provisions] of the Labour Code of the Republic of Armenia. We also inform you that your employment contract shall be terminated ... considering the fact that you did not return to work after the completion of your unpaid maternity leave, which was to end on 1 September 2011, as indicated in your letter sent to us by fax on 17 March 2011. The employment contract shall be considered terminated as of 1 December 2011."" 9. It appears that the applicant sent emails to the management of the British Council in relation to the early termination of her employment. 10. On 30 November 2011 Ar.M., a lawyer and a representative of Prudence, a law firm which provided legal services to the British Council, replied to the applicant on behalf of that body. In particular, the email stated that the termination of the applicant's employment had been in full compliance with domestic law and the terms and conditions of the British Council. 11. By an order of 1 December 2011, issued by the director of the British Council, the applicant's employment contract was terminated. 12. On 30 December 2011 the applicant brought a claim against the British Council before the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan, contesting the order of 1 December 2011 and seeking reinstatement. 13. By a decision of 11 January 2012, Judge A.M. of the District Court took over the examination of the applicant's case and scheduled the preparatory hearing. 14. According to a power of attorney executed by a notary public in London on 12 January 2012, the British Council authorised, inter alia, Ar.M. and K.B., another lawyer with Prudence, to represent jointly or separately its interests before courts of all instances in Armenia. 15. On 16 January 2012 the British Council was notified by the District Court of its taking over of the examination of the case and the judge appointed. 16. On 31 January 2012 K.B. applied to the District Court to represent the British Council before the said court, also asking the court to postpone the hearings. On 1 February 2012 Ar.M. informed the District Court that he would not be representing the interests of the British Council in the instant case. It appears that during the whole trial before the District Court, K.B. alone represented the British Council. 17. On 14 February 2012, in its reply to the applicant's claim signed by K.B., the British Council denied that the applicant had submitted a request to extend her maternity leave for another six months as of 1 September 2011. 18. On 9 July 2012 Judge A.M. rejected the applicant's claim, finding that her dismissal had been lawful. 19. After the proceedings before the District Court, it was discovered that Judge A.M. and the lawyer Ar.M. were twin brothers. Furthermore, the law firm Prudence, of which Ar.M. and K.P. were senior associates, had been founded by D.M., A.M.'s and Ar.M.'s elder sister, and was managed by her husband, E.M. 20. On 6 August 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal arguing, inter alia, that Judge A.M. had lacked impartiality when deciding her case owing to his close family ties to the legal representatives of her opponent in the proceedings. The Government claimed that no such issue had been raised, nor had any evidence to support such a claim been provided. 21. On 28 September 2012 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the District Court's judgment. In doing so, the Court of Appeal did not address the applicant's arguments regarding the alleged lack of impartiality of Judge A.M. in the proceedings before the District Court. 22. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar arguments to those submitted in her previous appeal. 23. On 28 November 2012 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant's appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit.",Ruled as violated by court,,"21. On 28 September 2012 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the District Court's judgment. In doing so, the Court of Appeal did not address the applicant's arguments regarding the alleged lack of impartiality of Judge A.M. in the proceedings before the District Court.",TRUE,1,"Although the government denied the claims, it appears that, as the applicant argued, the familial relationship between the involved judges and lawyers threatens ""an independent and impartial tribunal.""", 387,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Katowice. 6. The applicant is a former activist of an anti-communist opposition group, who was interned in 1982. 7. He observed the trial against three high-ranking members of the communist-era Military Council of National Salvation who had ordered the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981. 8. The trial in question, which lasted from 2007 until 2015, attracted a lot of public attention in Poland. 9. On 12 January 2012 the main defendant, General C.K. was convicted and sentenced to four years' imprisonment. This penalty was reduced by half under the Amnesty Act and its execution was suspended for five years in view of the defendant's old age and poor health. Another defendant was acquitted and another had her case discontinued. On 15 June 2015 the appellate court upheld the first-instance judgment. 10. The applicant was in the courtroom when on 12 January 2012 the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) was to deliver its judgment in the case described above. 11. At 1.30 p.m., after the judges had arrived in the courtroom, the applicant jumped behind the judge's table and shouted: ""This is a mockery of justice!"" (Tutaj trwa kpina z wymiaru sprawiedliwości). 12. The judges left the courtroom. 13. Some other members of the audience shouted ""Disgrace!"" and ""Court before the court!"" (Hańba and Sąd pod sąd). They were all holding up photos of victims of the communist regime. 14. The applicant was forcibly removed from the courtroom. 15. Shortly afterwards, he returned and continued shouting out similar statements joint by other members of the audience. In view of the audience's refusal to leave the courtroom, the judge who was presiding over the trial decided to announce the judgment from a different room. 16. At 3 p.m. the trial was resumed in a new room, with the public comprising only journalists. Here, in the applicant's absence, the Warsaw Regional Court imposed on him a disciplinary custodial penalty of fourteen days for contempt of court (""for the breach of the solemn nature, serenity and the course of court proceedings, to the degree making the announcement of the judgment impossible""). 17. On 12 January 2012 a written decision, in the form of an extract from the court minutes as described in the preceding paragraph, was issued to that effect. 18. The applicant submitted that he had not been served with that decision or informed of it. 19. On the day of the trial in question, that is 12 January 2012, a warrant was issued ordering the applicant's placement in a penal facility with a view to his serving the penalty. On 13 January 2012 a warrant to this effect was sent to Katowice police station together with a copy of the court's decision imposing the disciplinary punishment. 20. On 19 January 2012 the applicant was served with a warrant and then arrested so that he could be committed to Warsaw Remand Centre to serve the penalty in a closed regime. 21. On 22 January 2012 the applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal against the decision imposing the custodial penalty. He argued that his one-minute statement had not disturbed the court to such an extent as to make it impossible to announce the judgment. He also submitted that if the presiding judge had told him to return to his seat, he would have complied. Since only a copy of the first page of the applicant's appeal has been submitted to the Court, it is unclear whether the applicant had also raised the argument of the lack of impartiality of the judges who had punished him for contempt of court. 22. On 30 January 2012 this appeal was registered with the Registry of the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny). 23. On 31 January 2012 the applicant's appeal was transferred to the Warsaw Regional Court for comment. 24. On 1 February 2012 the appeal together with the Regional Court's comments was received by the Warsaw Court of Appeal. The appellate hearing was scheduled for 23 February 2012. 25. On 2 February 2012 – the fourteenth day of the applicant's detention – the Prison Board of the Warsaw Remand Centre decided that the applicant should be detained under a semi-open regime (with the possibility to leave his cell during the day). 26. Following that decision, the applicant was transferred for several hours to a remand centre with a semi-open regime. 27. He was released later that day. 28. On an unspecified date, the appellate hearing was rescheduled because of the judge's illness for 22 March 2012. 29. On 22 March 2012 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's interlocutory appeal, finding that the applicant's disrespectful behaviour had interfered with the solemn nature of court proceedings and with the court's dignity, and had disrupted the proceedings. His action had provoked the audience to shout similar slogans. It had been premeditated as the applicant had known that the announcement of the judgment had been scheduled for live media broadcast. The court also considered that the applicant's behaviour could not be explained by an emotional disagreement with the court's ruling because at the time of the incident the applicant had been unaware of the outcome of the trial. The applicant had wished to disturb the order of the proceedings irrespective of their result. In the domestic court's view, imposing a more lenient penalty would have sanctioned unaccountability and would have lacked a deterrent effect.",Ruled as violated by court,,"11. At 1.30 p.m., after the judges had arrived in the courtroom, the applicant jumped behind the judge's table and shouted: ""This is a mockery of justice!"" (Tutaj trwa kpina z wymiaru sprawiedliwości). 17. On 12 January 2012 a written decision, in the form of an extract from the court minutes as described in the preceding paragraph, was issued to that effect.",TRUE,2,"It's arguable whether the applicant was informed promptly of the charge, as he says he did not receive the writ, but was also able to appeal quickly.", 388,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The first applicant (Mr Ryklin) was born in 1958. The second applicant (Mr Sharov) was born in 1956. Both applicants are human rights activists and pro-democracy campaigners. They both live in Moscow. 6. On 21 April 2015 the applicants, with three others, sent written notification to the Moscow Mayor's office of their intention to hold a demonstration with some 15,000 participants from 7 p.m. to 10 p.m. on 6 May 2015 in Bolotnaya Square. After the expiry of the statutory period for the authority's reply, on 28 April 2015 the applicants wrote a letter to the Mayor's office stating that they considered the event of 6 May 2015 to have been approved by the Mayor. 7. On 27 April 2015 the Regional Security and Anti-Corruption Department of Moscow telephoned the applicants and suggested that the event be held on Marshal Vasilevskiy Street. On 30 April 2015 the Department repeated this proposal in a letter. The event organisers were also warned that if they rejected this proposal they would not be allowed to hold a public event at all. 8. According to the applicants, they informed all possible participants in the demonstration about its cancellation by way of posting information on the internet and via various mass-media outlets. 9. At around 7.05 p.m. both the applicants arrived in Bolotnaya Square, where they saw a gathering of some fifty people standing quietly, without any banners. According to the applicants, each positioned himself at a distance from other people with a political banner. The applicants considered that each of them was staging a solo demonstration which did not require prior notification of the authorities. A few minutes later the applicants were arrested and taken to a police van. 10. According to the Government, on 6 May 2015 the applicants, acting in a group of fifty people, organised and held a public assembly without prior notification being given to the authorities. The applicants called upon others to shout the slogans ""Freedom to political prisoners"", ""Death to fascists"" and others; the second applicant held a banner stating that all ""Bolotnaya participants"" were innocent. The applicants did not respond to the multiple demands by the police that they cease their actions, and at 7.35 p.m. they were taken to the Yakimanka district police station. 11. According to the records of transfer to the police station (протоколы доставления) and the administrative arrest records, the first applicant was brought to the police station at 7.40 p.m. on 6 May 2015 and placed under administrative arrest at the same time. The second applicant was brought to the police station at 7.25 p.m. and placed under administrative arrest at 7.40 p.m. The records of the transfer contained an indication that both applicants were taken to the police station for an administrative offence record to be drawn up. 12. According to the Government, the term of the applicants' retention in the police station was extended to forty-eight hours. On 6 May 2015 at 10.15 p.m. the first applicant was transported to the police station in Zamoskvorechye District of Moscow. On 7 May 2015 at 4 p.m. he was taken to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow. The second applicant was taken to that same court on 7 May 2015 at 4.10 p.m. 13. At the police stations both applicants were accused of organising and holding a group public event without notifying the authorities in advance, in breach of Article 20.2 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter ""the CAO""). In particular, they called upon others to shout political slogans; the second applicant had a banner. 14. On 7 May 2015 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court convicted the first applicant under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to ten days' detention. The court found that the first applicant, with the second applicant, had organised and held a group public event in the form of a ""meeting"" with about fifty participants, without notifying the authorities in advance. It dismissed the applicant's argument that he had staged a solo demonstration, after considering it as a line of defence. The court also refused to admit in evidence a video recording of the events in Bolotnaya Square, because it was ""undated and did not contain the entire chronology of events preceding [the applicant's] arrest"". 15. On the same day the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court heard the case against the second applicant. The court reiterated the description of the administrative offence imputed to the first applicant, found the second applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO, and sentenced him to ten days' detention. The court dismissed the evidence of two eyewitnesses who stated that the second applicant had been standing alone on the bridge with a banner. It also refused to admit in evidence video recordings and photographs showing the second applicant, because neither of them contained ""information about the address"". 16. Both the applicants appealed, insisting that they had staged solo demonstrations. On 13 May 2015 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgments. Referring to the statutory definition of a ""meeting"" (the presence of people in a specific place in order to publicly express their opinions, essentially on social and political issues), the appellate court considered that some fifty people had been present in Bolotnaya Square, including the applicants, who had called on others to shout political slogans.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,The applicants were treated guilty before any guilt was proven., 389,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Grimăncăuți. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. The applicant is a farmer who grows and sells potatoes. On 5 February 2008 he and his brother went to the Varnița village, in the vicinity of the city of Bender/Tighina. The latter is controlled by the authorities of the self-proclaimed ""Moldovan Republic of Transdiestria"" (""the MRT""), while Varnița itself is under Moldovan control. 8. Having sold potatoes for some time in various places in Varnița, with authorisation from the local administration, on 5 February 2008 at around 2.30 p.m. the applicant was approached by plain clothed officers of the ""MRT"" customs authority. The latter asked for documents for the merchandise, including evidence of payment of taxes for importing merchandise into the ""MRT"". The applicant explained that he had all the relevant documents and had paid taxes to the Moldovan local authorities in Varnița. Shortly thereafter two more officers from the ""MRT"" security and customs authorities arrived in a car. When the applicant's brother announced that he had called the Moldovan police, the applicant was attacked by the ""MRT"" officers, forced into their car and driven away. The Moldovan police arrived after the impugned event. 9. Later in the evening, the applicant's car with the remainder of merchandise was seized by the ""MRT"" customs authority. According to the applicant, an officer of the Moldovan police was present and did not interfere. 10. On 6 February 2008 the Bender city court (an ""MRT"" court) found the applicant guilty of having committed the administrative offence of resistance to the customs officers. The applicant explained that he considered having been arrested on Moldovan territory (Varnița village) and not having seen any signs warning that he was about to cross into the territory under the ""MRT"" control. The court sentenced him to three days' detention. According to the applicant, the hearing took place in Russian, a language which he understood only to a limited degree, and in the absence of a translator. He was refused the right to be assisted by a lawyer when preparing for the hearing, and a court-appointed lawyer was only present at the court hearing, not assisting him in any manner. The applicant was given neither a copy of the record of his arrest prior to its examination by the court, nor a copy of the court decision of 6 February 2008. 11. The decision was enforced immediately and the applicant served all three days until the evening of 8 February 2008, when he was released. He could recover his car and merchandise at 11 p.m. on the same day. 12. On 15 February 2008 the applicant lodged a summary appeal against the decision of the first-instance court, noting that he would submit a full appeal once he received a copy of the decision of 6 February 2008. At his request, on 17 March 2008 he obtained a copy of that decision. 13. On 18 March 2008 the ""MRT"" Supreme Court quashed the lower court's decision because of the failure to specify the exact place where the offence had been committed. The case was sent for re-examination by the lower court. The applicant was not informed of that decision. On 25 April 2008 the ""MRT"" Supreme Court accepted an extraordinary appeal lodged by the president of that court's chair and decided that the case was to be re-examined by that court. The applicant was not informed of that decision. 14. On 27 May 2008 the applicant received by fax a letter dated 12 May 2008 summoning him to the hearing of the ""MRT"" Supreme Court on 27 May 2008 at 10 a.m. Because of this late summoning he could not appear at the hearing. On the same day the court rejected the applicant's appeal against the decision of 6 February 2008, finding that he had been arrested on the territory of the city of Bender after refusing to abide by orders of the ""MRT"" customs authority. 15. On 6 February 2008 the applicant's brother made a criminal complaint in the applicant's name to various Moldovan authorities, including the Prosecutor General's Office, about the applicant's unlawful arrest by officers from the ""MRT"". He asked for the criminal prosecution of those responsible. 16. On 7 February 2008 the applicant's brother sent a complaint about the applicant's abduction by the ""MRT"" authorities to the embassies of several countries in Moldova, including that of the Russian Federation. On 11 February 2008 the applicant sent letters to various embassies, including that of the Russian Federation, thanking them for their intervention into the case by bringing the matter before the Joint Control Commission.[1] Following this alleged intervention the applicant's car and merchandise were returned to him. 17. On 28 February 2008 the Moldovan police station in Bender started a criminal investigation into the applicant's abduction by ""MRT"" officers. Several witnesses confirmed that the applicant had been forcibly taken away in a car from near a bar in Varnița village and that two of the ""MRT"" officers were identified. In view of the Moldovan prosecuting authorities' inability to effectively prosecute persons on the territory controlled of the ""MRT"", on 28 August 2008, the investigation was suspended. On 30 May 2013 the investigation was resumed and was pending by the time of the last submissions made to the Court (December 2013). The parties did not inform the Court of any subsequent developments in that regard.",Ruled as violated by court,,"9. Later in the evening, the applicant's car with the remainder of merchandise was seized by the ""MRT"" customs authority. According to the applicant, an officer of the Moldovan police was present and did not interfere.",FALSE,0,"The applicant was denied his right to an interpreter, a lawyer for defence, and to be informed promptly of charges against him.", 390,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The first applicant (Ms Makarova) was born in 1989 and lived in Moscow. The second applicant (Ms Astakhova) was born in 1985 and lives in Mytishchi, Moscow Region. The third applicant (Ms Fokht‑Babushkina) was born in 1994 and lives in Moscow. 6. On 14 December 2012 the State Duma, the lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia, adopted at first reading a draft law which, in particular, prohibited the adoption of children of Russian nationality by citizens of the United States of America. 7. On 17 December 2012 the official daily newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta announced that the second reading of the draft law was scheduled for 19 December 2012. 8. According to the first applicant, she had read on various online social networks that many people intended to stage solo demonstrations (одиночные пикеты) on 19 December 2012 in front of the State Duma to express their opposition to the draft law. The format of solo demonstrations was chosen because there was no longer time to observe the minimum statutory three‑day notification period for other types of (group) events. 9. All of the applicants decided to hold solo demonstrations on 19 December 2012. According to them, at around 9 a.m. they positioned themselves, holding banners, in the vicinity of the State Duma at some distance from other protesters (see also Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, nos. 57818/09 and 14 others, §§ 206-15, 7 February 2017). 10. According to the first applicant, she was arrested by the police several minutes later and taken to a police van. There were no orders from police officers to stop the demonstration and leave the area. According to the second and third applicants, after their solo demonstrations they left the area, showing their posters to journalists at their request. At that point, they were arrested by the police and taken to the Tverskoy district police station. 11. According to the Government, at 10 a.m. on 19 December 2012 all of the applicants took part in a group ""picket"" (пикет) held without prior notification of the authorities. The first applicant had a poster reading ""I am looking for an American who will adopt me"", the second and the third applicants had posters reading ""Orphans are guilty for the death of Mr Magnitskiy? Do not disgrace yourself"". The applicants did not react to the lawful demands of the police to stop participating in the event and continued ""picketing"", attracting the attention of passers-by. At 10.30 a.m. they were arrested and taken to the Tverskoy district police station for the purpose of compiling an administrative-offence record. At 1.20 p.m. on that day the applicants were released. 12. At the police station the applicants were charged with participating in a group public event held without prior notification, in breach of Article 20.2 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter, ""the CAO""). The administrative-offence record in respect of the first applicant and the police officers' reports in respect of all the applicants indicated that the offence had been committed at 10 a.m. It was also stated that they had taken part in a non-notified group public event and had refused to end it when requested to do so by the police. 13. On 15 January 2013 the justice of the peace of circuit no. 369 of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the first applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced her to a fine of 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB; about 495 euros (EUR) at the time). The court found it established, on the basis of the administrative-offence record, the police officers' reports and oral testimony by a police officer who had arrested the applicant that the latter had taken part in a public event (""picket"") which had involved fifty people and had been held without prior notification of the authorities. On 14 February 2013 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow upheld the judgment on appeal. The applicant did not attend the appeal hearing, even though she had been duly summoned to it. 14. On 31 January 2013 in two separate proceedings the same justice of the peace convicted the second and the third applicants under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced each of them to fines of RUB 20,000. The court relied on the administrative offence records, the police officers' reports and oral testimony by a police officer who had arrested the applicants. On 21 February and 21 March 2013 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow upheld the judgments in respect of the third and second applicants respectively. Both applicants were absent from the appeal hearings, though the third applicant's lawyer did participate. In the third applicant's case the appellate court examined some documents and interviewed a police officer in a detailed manner before affording the defence counsel an opportunity to cross-examine him; the appeal judge then asked a number of follow-up questions. In its appeal decision the appellate court considered that the third applicant's guilt had been proved by the adverse evidence, such as the administrative-offence record, the escort procedure record and testimonies. 15. On 1 and 5 July 2013 the Moscow City Court examined supervisory review complaints lodged by the second and third applicants. The court reclassified the charges against the applicants as falling under Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO, namely breach of the established procedure for the conduct of public events committed by a participant. Their fines were reduced to RUB 10,000 (about EUR 232 at the time) each.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. On 14 December 2012 the State Duma, the lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia, adopted at first reading a draft law which, in particular, prohibited the adoption of children of Russian nationality by citizens of the United States of America. 7. On 17 December 2012 the official daily newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta announced that the second reading of the draft law was scheduled for 19 December 2012. 8. According to the first applicant, she had read on various online social networks that many people intended to stage solo demonstrations (одиночные пикеты) on 19 December 2012 in front of the State Duma to express their opposition to the draft law. The format of solo demonstrations was chosen because there was no longer time to observe the minimum statutory three‑day notification period for other types of (group) events. 12. At the police station the applicants were charged with participating in a group public event held without prior notification, in breach of Article 20.2 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter, ""the CAO""). The administrative-offence record in respect of the first applicant and the police officers' reports in respect of all the applicants indicated that the offence had been committed at 10 a.m. It was also stated that they had taken part in a non-notified group public event and had refused to end it when requested to do so by the police. 13. On 15 January 2013 the justice of the peace of circuit no. 369 of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the first applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced her to a fine of 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB; about 495 euros (EUR) at the time). The court found it established, on the basis of the administrative-offence record, the police officers' reports and oral testimony by a police officer who had arrested the applicant that the latter had taken part in a public event (""picket"") which had involved fifty people and had been held without prior notification of the authorities. On 14 February 2013 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow upheld the judgment on appeal. The applicant did not attend the appeal hearing, even though she had been duly summoned to it. 14. On 31 January 2013 in two separate proceedings the same justice of the peace convicted the second and the third applicants under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced each of them to fines of RUB 20,000. The court relied on the administrative offence records, the police officers' reports and oral testimony by a police officer who had arrested the applicants. On 21 February and 21 March 2013 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow upheld the judgments in respect of the third and second applicants respectively. Both applicants were absent from the appeal hearings, though the third applicant's lawyer did participate. In the third applicant's case the appellate court examined some documents and interviewed a police officer in a detailed manner before affording the defence counsel an opportunity to cross-examine him; the appeal judge then asked a number of follow-up questions. In its appeal decision the appellate court considered that the third applicant's guilt had been proved by the adverse evidence, such as the administrative-offence record, the escort procedure record and testimonies. 15. On 1 and 5 July 2013 the Moscow City Court examined supervisory review complaints lodged by the second and third applicants. The court reclassified the charges against the applicants as falling under Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO, namely breach of the established procedure for the conduct of public events committed by a participant. Their fines were reduced to RUB 10,000 (about EUR 232 at the time) each.",TRUE,2,"While it depends on the definition of ""fair and public trial,"" it appears that the first applicant not appearing at the hearings threatens this right. However, they were called to the hearing.", 391,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Wrocław. 6. The applicant was detained in Wrocław Remand Centre during various periods between 1991 and 2014, including from 24 June 2009 to 2 October 2010. He was released from detention on 8 July 2017. 7. The applicant submitted that during his detention in Wrocław Remand Centre he had been held in overcrowded cells in which the space per person had been below the Polish statutory minimum standard of 3 sq. m 8. According to documents from the domestic proceedings and the Government's submissions, the applicant was held in overcrowded cells between 29 July and 26 August 2009 (a period of approximately one month). 9. On 5 April 2011 the applicant brought a civil claim before the Wrocław Regional Court against the State Treasury for infringement of his personal rights and for compensation on account of his detention in overcrowded cells in Wrocław Remand Centre. He claimed 20,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) in compensation. His case was transferred to the Wrocław‑Śródmieście District Court in Wrocław (hereinafter ""the court"") and registered under the reference number IX C 295/11. 10. On 6 May 2011 the court exempted the applicant from the court fees and dismissed his application for legal aid. The court held that the applicant was able to formulate his claims in a clear and understandable manner. Hence, the legal aid was not necessary. The applicant did not challenge that decision. 11. In the course of the judicial proceedings the applicant lodged several applications and requests with the court, including a letter of 8 August 2012. The court, by an order of 28 August 2012, instructed the applicant that to comply with formal requirements he should submit an additional copy of that letter. The order further stated: ""At the same time the court informs [you] that all pleadings (pisma) should be submitted in two copies."" 12. On 5 October 2012 the Wrocław‑Śródmieście District Court dismissed the applicant's civil claim. The court found that the applicant's cells had indeed been overcrowded for approximately one month, but that he had failed to demonstrate that the actions of the defendant had been unlawful. 13. On 10 October 2012 the applicant lodged with the court a letter entitled ""application: refers to an appeal against the judgment of the Wrocław‑Śródmieście District Court of 5 October 2012"" which the court treated as an appeal. That pleading was submitted in one copy. 14. On an unspecified date the applicant applied for legal aid. On 26 October 2012 the Wrocław‑Śródmieście District Court rejected the applicant's request on the same grounds as previously (see paragraph 10 above). 15. On 29 October 2012 the applicant was served with the judgment and information about the time and manner of the right to appeal, in the following terms: ""A party who disagrees with the judgment has a right to request the written reasoning of the judgment within seven days of the service of that judgment and later to appeal to the second-instance court via the court that issued the judgment, within two weeks, calculated from the service of the reasoned judgment. If the party does not ask for the reasoned judgment, the appeal is to be submitted directly within 21 days of the service of the judgment. Article 369 § 1: The appeal shall be submitted to the court that issued the judgment within two weeks, calculated from the service of the reasoned judgment."" 16. On 12 November 2012 the applicant received the reasoning of the court's judgment of 5 October 2012. 17. On 21 December 2012 the applicant lodged with the court a request for leave to appeal out of time against the judgment of 5 October 2012, as well as two copies of a letter entitled ""appeal"". On 1 February 2013 the court dismissed the applicant's request for leave to appeal, and explained that he had already lodged his appeal on 10 October 2012, which was within the relevant time-limit. The court underlined that the applicant's appeal of 10 October 2012 did not comply with the formal requirements. 18. Therefore, on 6 February 2013 the court issued an order and instructed the applicant to comply with the formal requirements of his appeal by submitting a copy thereof within seven days of the service of the court order. The order was served on 14 February 2013. 19. On 15 February 2013 the applicant submitted a letter in which he informed the court that he was unable to comply with the order because he did not have the text of his appeal that he could copy or rewrite and he did not remember the exact wording of his pleadings. He added that he had not been aware that he should have submitted his appeal in two copies. 20. On 19 March 2013 the court rejected the applicant's appeal for failure to submit an exact copy thereof. 21. On 30 March 2013 the applicant appealed against that decision. When ordered, he rectified the formal requirements of his interlocutory appeal by submitting a copy of it and stating the amount of his claim. On 21 June 2013 the Wrocław Regional Court dismissed the applicant's interlocutory appeal, holding that the applicant, who had started a civil action and knew that he was deprived of his liberty, could justifiably be expected to keep copies of all letters he sent to the court, especially since he had been informed on 28 August 2012 that all letters to the court should be submitted in two copies. Additionally, after the judgment had been issued the applicant was informed about the means and procedure of submitting appeals.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"10. On 6 May 2011 the court exempted the applicant from the court fees and dismissed his application for legal aid. The court held that the applicant was able to formulate his claims in a clear and understandable manner. Hence, the legal aid was not necessary. The applicant did not challenge that decision. 11. In the course of the judicial proceedings the applicant lodged several applications and requests with the court, including a letter of 8 August 2012. The court, by an order of 28 August 2012, instructed the applicant that to comply with formal requirements he should submit an additional copy of that letter. The order further stated: ""At the same time the court informs [you] that all pleadings (pisma) should be submitted in two copies."" 13. On 10 October 2012 the applicant lodged with the court a letter entitled ""application: refers to an appeal against the judgment of the Wrocław‑Śródmieście District Court of 5 October 2012"" which the court treated as an appeal. That pleading was submitted in one copy. 14. On an unspecified date the applicant applied for legal aid. On 26 October 2012 the Wrocław‑Śródmieście District Court rejected the applicant's request on the same grounds as previously (see paragraph 10 above). 15. On 29 October 2012 the applicant was served with the judgment and information about the time and manner of the right to appeal, in the following terms: ""A party who disagrees with the judgment has a right to request the written reasoning of the judgment within seven days of the service of that judgment and later to appeal to the second-instance court via the court that issued the judgment, within two weeks, calculated from the service of the reasoned judgment. If the party does not ask for the reasoned judgment, the appeal is to be submitted directly within 21 days of the service of the judgment. Article 369 § 1: The appeal shall be submitted to the court that issued the judgment within two weeks, calculated from the service of the reasoned judgment."" 19. On 15 February 2013 the applicant submitted a letter in which he informed the court that he was unable to comply with the order because he did not have the text of his appeal that he could copy or rewrite and he did not remember the exact wording of his pleadings. He added that he had not been aware that he should have submitted his appeal in two copies. 20. On 19 March 2013 the court rejected the applicant's appeal for failure to submit an exact copy thereof.",TRUE,2,"It depends on whether ""the interests of justice"" require legal aid for the applicant, as the applicant and the courts argued both sides of.", 392,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Moscow. 5. On 27 August 2002 the applicant brought civil proceedings against the Administration of the Mirninskiy Ulus of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic (""the Administration""), a private person S., her husband B., and a private company A. claiming a title to a flat, damages, and S.'s eviction from the flat. 6. On 18 September 2002 the Mirninskiy District Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic (""the District Court"") refused to consider his action, because there already had been a decision of 6 February 2001 taken by the District Court concerning the same dispute. 7. On 13 November 2002 the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic overruled the refusal and remitted the case for a new examination, as the action included a new co-defendant, and, therefore, it could not be said that the dispute was among the same parties. 8. On 15 January 2003 the District Court ordered eviction of S. and her family from the flat and dismissed the claim against the Administration. 9. On 3 March 2003 the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic quashed the judgment on appeal and returned the case for a fresh examination, as the lower court had failed to address issues related S.'s property rights. 10. On 29 July 2003 the District Court ordered an expert examination of the flat in order to determine its market value. 11. On 14 August 2003 the court proceedings resumed. 12. In the meantime, the applicant amended his claims and sought to obtain compensation for his belongings allegedly stolen in 1999, non‑pecuniary damage, legal costs, travel expenses and reimbursement of the rent he had to pay after his eviction from the disputed flat back in 1999. 13. On 29 August 2003 the District Court examined the case, ordered the Administration to pay the applicant 800,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of the flat's market value and dismissed the remainder of the claims. In particular, the claim for compensation for the allegedly stolen property was dismissed as unfounded. 14. On 20 October 2003 the judgment was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of Sakha (Yakutiya) and entered into force. 15. On 11 June 2004, upon the applicant's request, the bailiffs initiated the enforcement proceedings. 16. On 27 August 2004 the District Court granted the Administration's request for suspension of the enforcement of the judgment of 29 August 2003 until 15 January 2005 due to financial difficulties encountered by the debtor. 17. On 15 November 2004 the applicant's appeal against the above decision was dismissed. 18. On 18 March 2005 the monetary award in accordance with the judgment of 29 August 2003 was paid to the applicant. 19. On 29 September 2005, upon the applicant's extraordinary appeal, the Presidium of the Supreme Court of Sakha (Yakutiya) quashed the judgment of 29 August 2003 and the decision of 20 October 2003 and remitted the case for a fresh examination. The Presidium found that the courts had incorrectly applied the material law to various aspects of the case, and had failed to join the appropriate financial body as co-defendant. 20. It appears that the amounts paid to the applicant under the quashed judgment of 29 August 2003 have not been reclaimed. 21. On 15 November 2005 the District Court suspended the proceedings, due to B.'s illness and asked the applicant to clarify his claims. 22. On 21 December 2005 the applicant submitted the amended claims. 23. On 16 February 2006 the District Court joined, at the defendant's request, the Ministry of Finance as co-defendant in the proceedings and suspended the examination of the case on account of B.'s poor state of health. 24. On 14 February 2007 the case was assigned to a different judge of the District Court, for the sake of the court's impartiality. 25. On 21 March 2007 the District Court dismissed the applicant's action. 26. On 4 June 2007 the Supreme Court of Sakha (Yakutiya) upheld the judgment on appeal except for the parts concerning the eviction of S. and B., reimbursement of the rent, payments for utility services, a commission fee, and recovering of the cost of the apartment. The decision in those parts was remitted for a fresh examination due to failure by the lower court to assess certain evidence and misapplication of the material law. 27. On 27 August 2007 the District Court suspended the proceedings pending S.'s return from vacation. 28. On 26 October 2007 the court ordered the applicant to clarify his claims and scheduled a new hearing on 23 November 2007. 29. On 23 November 2007 the court issued a special writ ordering the bailiffs to obtain clarifications of the claims from the applicant. 30. It appears that at some point the applicant provided the required information. 31. On 30 April 2008 the District Court dismissed the action as unfounded. The court explained that the applicant had other remedies to use under the civil law in order to protect his property rights. In particular, he could claim that an equivalent apartment or a compensation be provided to him. 32. By the final judgment of 13 August 2008 the Supreme Court of Sakha (Yakutiya) upheld the lower court's findings on appeal. 33. In the meantime, the applicant sued the Administration for statutory interest for the delay in enforcement of the judgment of 29 August 2003. 34. On 7 February 2007 the District Court discontinued the proceedings as the judgment of 29 August 2003 had been quashed and a new decision in the case had not yet been adopted.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears, with the multiple closings and reopenings, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 393,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","7. The applicants are Syrian nationals. Their initials, dates of birth, application numbers and the other details of their cases are set out in the Appendix. At the time of lodging their applications the applicants were detained at detention centres for foreign nationals run by the Federal Migration Service (hereinafter ""the FMS"") in different towns in Russia. 8. The facts of the cases, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows. 9. On various dates between 2012 and 2016 the applicants came to Russia on various visas and did not leave when the period of their stay had expired. They were apprehended by the police and/or officers of the FMS in various regions in Russia for breaching the applicable immigration regulations, and placed in detention centres for foreigners (see the Appendix for the applicants' dates of detention and details of the relevant proceedings). The domestic courts in the respective regions examined their cases and found the applicants guilty of breaching various immigration regulations. Some of the applicants lodged appeals, but they were rejected by the domestic courts, whereas other applicants eventually had their expulsion orders quashed by the appeal courts. One of the applicants did not appeal against his expulsion order (see the Appendix for the details of individual cases) 10. All the applicants sought to obtain refugee status and/or temporary asylum in Russia. Some of the applicants voluntarily withdrew their requests and others' requests were rejected, first by the FMS and then by the domestic courts which examined the appeals against the FMS's refusals. Only Y.A.'s request for temporary asylum was granted (see the Appendix for details). 11. According to the information provided by their lawyers, while the proceedings before the Court were ongoing, six of the applicants (M.S.A., R.K., H.R., B.Z., S.W. and A.A.) left Russia of their own volition on various dates to go to third countries, where they settled (see the Appendix for details). 12. Between 24 January 2014 and 10 June 2014 M.S.A. and R.K. were detained in a detention centre for foreign nationals run by the FMS in Krasnoye Selo, in the Leningrad Region. 13. According to their submissions, the centre was based in an eight-storey building with windows covered with grills; five of the storeys were designed to accommodate 176 people in total. Each storey comprised around ten to eleven cells. The centre was severely overcrowded during the whole period of the applicants' detention. In particular, according to a report of the Human Rights Ombudsman in Saint Petersburg, on 26 February 2014 the centre accommodated 400 foreign nationals. 14. Both applicants were detained in cell no. 511, located on the fifth storey, which measured around 9 square metres and was designed to accommodate six people. All places in the cell were occupied during the whole period of their detention. Thus, each detainee had no more than 1.5 square metres of personal space, despite the statutory requirement that each detainee in a detention centre for foreign nationals have at least 4.5 square metres of personal space. The cell was furnished with three bunk beds and two bedside tables. There was no dining table in the cell. 15. The food was of poor quality, with no fruit or vegetables, and included pork, which the applicants could not eat for religious reasons. No alternative food was offered instead of pork, so they were deprived of any meal when pork was served. There were no kitchen and dining facilities in the centre. Food was delivered to the centre in containers and served cold in the cells. Detainees were forced to eat on their beds because there were no tables in the cells. This shortage in food was exacerbated by arbitrary restrictions on the contents of food parcels delivered from outside. Detainees were not allowed to receive fermented milk products, home‑cooked food, fruit or vegetables. 16. Detainees had no free access to drinking water or devices to boil tap water. The cell where M.S.A. and R.K. were detained was only lit by one light bulb, and the detainees were not allowed to switch on the light after 10 p.m. 17. The applicants and other inmates could move around on that storey to get to sanitary facilities, but they were not allowed to leave the storey or enter other detainees' cells. At the two ends of the common corridor there were bathrooms, each equipped with three lavatories, two washbasins and two showers. The storey was under the control of a dozen ""chosen"" inmates who, with the tacit consent of the centre's administration, dictated their rules to others and created an atmosphere of fear, violence and extortion. One of the bathrooms was for their exclusive use. The other seventy to eighty inmates had to use the other bathroom. 18. Outdoor exercise was sporadic and lasted around 15-20 minutes. In winter, the applicants did not go outside, as they did not possess winter clothes. In the period April-May 2014 they were able to enjoy outdoor exercise only four times. Outdoor exercise took place in a closed yard measuring around 50 metres in length and 10 metres in width. There was gravel on the ground, and there were no benches, plants or sports equipment. 19. The facility did not offer any activities, and no library was available. 20. During the administrative hearing concerning his removal from Russia on 26 February 2016, H.R. was not represented by a lawyer. 21. According to the lawyer representing B.Z., H.D. and S.W., on 25 March 2015 he was not allowed to meet with them in the detention centre.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"21. According to the lawyer representing B.Z., H.D. and S.W., on 25 March 2015 he was not allowed to meet with them in the detention centre.",TRUE,2,"It's arguable whether the applicants were able to defend themselves, as some had lawyers but were not able to meet with them. ", 394,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","4. The applicant was born in 1953 and lived in Martin. In 2006 she was recognised as ""severely disabled"" with 60% ""functional impairment"" pursuant to the relevant national laws. Her monthly disabled person's allowance payments in 2010, 2011 and 2012 were 325.40 euros (EUR), EUR 336.20 and EUR 346.30, respectively. 5. Prior to the above, in 2004, the applicant had lodged a claim with the Martin District Land Office (Obvodný pozemkový úrad) for restitution of a suite of real property consisting of several plots which came under special legislation provisions on restitution. 6. On 20 December 2011 she lodged an action against the Land Office with the Žilina Regional Court, sitting as an administrative tribunal, seeking an order for acceleration of the restitution proceedings. 7. This type of action required mandatory legal representation. Accordingly, the action was submitted through a lawyer. The applicant also sought an order for costs. The latter claim was calculated under the applicable national rules as pertaining to two ""acts of legal assistance"" (úkon právnej služby), in particular a first consultation with a lawyer, and the formulation of the action. EUR 130 was claimed in respect of one such act along with an associated lump sum for overheads; the whole claim came to some EUR 260. 8. On 2 January, 29 February and 23 March 2012 the applicant made further submissions. In the former two, she proactively informed the court that the Land Office had taken decisions in respect of her restitution claim on 23 December 2011 and 12 January 2012 and contended that these decisions did not determine her claim in relation to all the plots concerned and that they had been taken with the aim of creating a false impression that there had been no unjustified delays in the proceedings. The latter submission was made in response to a request by the court to specify the plots in respect of which the applicant's restitution claim was still outstanding. 9. In the submission of 23 March 2012 the applicant reiterated her claim in respect of legal costs, amending its scope as pertaining to five acts of legal assistance, including the three submissions mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 10. On 10 April 2012 the Regional Court granted the action and made an order for costs. As to the latter ruling, it summarised the applicant's claim as pertaining to three acts of legal assistance (the first consultation with a lawyer, the formulation of the action, and the formulation of the submission of 2 January 2012). It found that the applicant had correctly calculated the value of the act of legal assistance and that the undertaking by her lawyer of those acts had been justified. Accordingly, it allowed the claim in respect of those three acts of legal assistance. There is no reference in the Regional Court's decision to the remaining two acts of legal assistance in the summary of the applicant's claim, in the courts' reasoning, or in the operative part of its decision. The Regional Court's decision was not amenable to appeal. 11. On 18 May 2012 the applicant challenged the ruling on costs before the Constitutional Court. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, she complained that the Regional Court had failed to provide any reasons for not allowing her claim for costs with respect to the remaining two acts of legal assistance. As she had been fully successful in the case, she normally should have been compensated in respect of the costs of all justified acts of legal assistance received. A reduction of the award could only have been based on exceptional circumstances within the meaning of Article 150 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, in determining the issue of legal costs, the Regional Court had made no use of that provision and, in any event, no such circumstances pertained, in particular because the case concerned unjustified delays in proceedings before a public authority lasting more than seven years; her efforts to ensure an out-of-court solution had been futile and had left her with no alternative to asserting her rights in the Regional Court; legal representation before that court was mandatory, the applicant was disabled, and she was living on the allowance specified above. 12. On 14 June 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. It noted that it was essentially aimed at the fact that the Regional Court had provided no explanation for deciding on and granting compensation in respect of three acts of legal assistance only. It observed that, as such, the complaint concerned a decision on costs rather than on the merits of the applicant's action. It referred to its established case-law to the effect that decisions on costs could violate fundamental rights and freedoms only exceptionally, in particular if there were an extremely serious interference with such rights and freedoms. It was true that the decision contested in the applicants' case was ""challengeable under the criteria of lawfulness"". However, it was necessary to take into account that the value of the remaining two acts of legal assistance was only some EUR 270. This was less than three times the statutory minimum wage, the limit that was otherwise applicable to admissibility of appeals on points of law. If the amount at stake was this negligible, the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court could only be engaged in very exceptional circumstances and no such circumstances had been established in the applicant's case. Accordingly, her complaint was rejected as manifestly ill-founded. The decision was served on 3 August 2012 and no appeal lay against it.",Ruled as violated by court,,"10. On 10 April 2012 the Regional Court granted the action and made an order for costs. As to the latter ruling, it summarised the applicant's claim as pertaining to three acts of legal assistance (the first consultation with a lawyer, the formulation of the action, and the formulation of the submission of 2 January 2012). It found that the applicant had correctly calculated the value of the act of legal assistance and that the undertaking by her lawyer of those acts had been justified. Accordingly, it allowed the claim in respect of those three acts of legal assistance. There is no reference in the Regional Court's decision to the remaining two acts of legal assistance in the summary of the applicant's claim, in the courts' reasoning, or in the operative part of its decision. The Regional Court's decision was not amenable to appeal. 11. On 18 May 2012 the applicant challenged the ruling on costs before the Constitutional Court. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, she complained that the Regional Court had failed to provide any reasons for not allowing her claim for costs with respect to the remaining two acts of legal assistance. As she had been fully successful in the case, she normally should have been compensated in respect of the costs of all justified acts of legal assistance received. A reduction of the award could only have been based on exceptional circumstances within the meaning of Article 150 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, in determining the issue of legal costs, the Regional Court had made no use of that provision and, in any event, no such circumstances pertained, in particular because the case concerned unjustified delays in proceedings before a public authority lasting more than seven years; her efforts to ensure an out-of-court solution had been futile and had left her with no alternative to asserting her rights in the Regional Court; legal representation before that court was mandatory, the applicant was disabled, and she was living on the allowance specified above. 12. On 14 June 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. It noted that it was essentially aimed at the fact that the Regional Court had provided no explanation for deciding on and granting compensation in respect of three acts of legal assistance only. It observed that, as such, the complaint concerned a decision on costs rather than on the merits of the applicant's action. It referred to its established case-law to the effect that decisions on costs could violate fundamental rights and freedoms only exceptionally, in particular if there were an extremely serious interference with such rights and freedoms. It was true that the decision contested in the applicants' case was ""challengeable under the criteria of lawfulness"". However, it was necessary to take into account that the value of the remaining two acts of legal assistance was only some EUR 270. This was less than three times the statutory minimum wage, the limit that was otherwise applicable to admissibility of appeals on points of law. If the amount at stake was this negligible, the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court could only be engaged in very exceptional circumstances and no such circumstances had been established in the applicant's case. Accordingly, her complaint was rejected as manifestly ill-founded. The decision was served on 3 August 2012 and no appeal lay against it.",TRUE,2,"It depends on whether ""the interests of justice"" require covered legal assistance for the applicant, as the applicant and the courts argued both sides of.", 395,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Palaio Faliro. 6. She has worked as a kindergarten teacher for the Greek Ministry of Education since 1983. On 23 August 2005, following her participation in a selection procedure, she was appointed educational coordinator of the Hellenic Republic at the General Consulate of Greece in Chicago for a period of two years. On 14 August 2007 the Ministers of Education and Foreign Affairs issued a decision informing all educational coordinators abroad of the end of their term of service. On the same date, the Minister of Education issued a decision informing the educational coordinators that they were to remain in their posts until the completion of the next selection procedure. The applicant's name was omitted from the second ministerial decision and the post of educational coordinator in Chicago remained vacant. She applied to have the decision annulled, which the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal agreed to do as the applicant had been omitted from the decision without any specific reasoning (decision no. 1363/2008). The applicant was therefore allowed to occupy the position until the successful completion of the next selection procedure. 7. In the meantime, a call for applications for educational coordinators for the next two-year period was published on 27 November 2007. The applicant submitted an application. On 23 July 2008 the coordinators selection committee published a ranking of candidates in which the applicant, having received 48.00 points, was placed 13th among those who had chosen French as their foreign language. On 22 August 2008 the Official Gazette (Εφημερίδα της Κυβερνήσεως) published a decision by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Education to appoint the candidates who had been selected. The applicant was not included. That decision was revoked and replaced with a ministerial decision dated 29 August 2008 including the same content. 8. On 24 September 2008 the applicant lodged an application for annulment of the ministerial decisions of 22 and 29 August 2008 on appointing the selected educational coordinators with the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal in so far as she had been omitted. The applicant complained that the ranking had not been published in the Official Gazette, as required by law, and that she had been erroneously awarded fewer points than she should have had. 9. On 16 July 2009 the applicant's legal representative requested that the court accelerate proceedings, arguing that an educational coordinator's term of appointment lasted two years and that the contested administrative act would soon expire. The hearing was scheduled to take place on 13 November 2009, but was adjourned to 5 March 2010. 10. On 3 February 2010 the applicant submitted additional grounds of annulment. The 5 March 2010 hearing was adjourned to 4 June 2010 as the Ministry had not provided the court with its submissions regarding the additional grounds for annulment. On 27 May 2010 the applicant sent a memorandum to the Court, requesting that the case be heard speedily, adding that an eventual discontinuation of the trial would violate her rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Nevertheless, the hearing was again adjourned owing to the Ministry's failure to provide submissions. Adjournments took place on 4 June, 17 September and on 8 October 2010. On 26 October 2010, the Ministry sent its observations to the court, and a hearing took place on 10 December 2010, when the two-year term for educational coordinators and the contested ministerial decision had already expired. 11. On 13 December 2010 the applicant submitted a memorandum requesting that the examination of her application for annulment be continued despite the expiry of the administrative act, arguing that she had special locus standi to continue to pursue the annulment process. In particular, she argued that if the contested act was annulled she would be credited with two more years of experience, which would improve her chances of being selected as a deputy coordinator of education in a future selection procedure. 12. On 16 March 2011 the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal published decision no. 508/2011 rejecting the applicant's arguments. As regards her first reason for continuing the proceedings, it held that she had already been awarded the maximum number of points allowed by law for experience abroad. As regards her chances of being selected as a deputy coordinator of education in a future selection procedure, the domestic court held that that was not a lawful reason to continue the procedure in court, because it concerned an uncertain, future administrative procedure. Based on the above and on domestic law, the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal held that there was no need to adjudicate, on the grounds that the contested act was no longer in force (decision). As regards the applicant's arguments that the eventual rejection of her application would violate Article 20 of the Constitution and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the domestic court held that the provision of Article 32 § 2 of Presidential decree no. 18/1989 served the legal aim of avoiding any unnecessary trials. The individual who had lodged the application was no longer in need of judicial protection as the contested act no longer had any unfavourable consequences. Having also regard to the possibility provided for by law to continue the trial if the individual could prove that he or she still suffered from unfavourable consequences that could be removed only by the annulment of the contested act, the right to judicial protection remained intact.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""reasonable time,"" it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.", 396,"Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.","5. The applicants, whose names, dates of birth and places of residence are shown in the Appendix, were all individual small shareholders of Demirbank, a private bank in Turkey. On different dates they purchased different amounts of Turkish and German share certificates in Demirbank through the German stock market. 6. By a decision dated 6 December 2000, the Banking Regulation and Supervision Board (Bankalar Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurulu – hereinafter ""the Board"") decided to transfer the management and control of Demirbank to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu – hereinafter ""the Fund""). In its decision the Board held that the assets of Demirbank were insufficient to cover its liabilities and that the continuation of its activities would threaten the security and stability of the financial system. Accordingly, Demirbank's management and control, and the privileges of its shareholders except for dividends, were transferred to the Fund. The Fund also confiscated all properties belonging to Demirbank. 7. On 6 December 2000 the Board of Directors of the Fund decided to take over the shares of Demirbank in exchange for paying Demirbank's loss corresponding to its paid-up capital, namely 275,000,000 Turkish liras (TRY). 8. On 31 January 2001 all equities of Demirbank were removed from its account at the Istanbul Stock Exchange and were transferred to the account of the Fund. 9. On 2 February 2001, the main shareholder of Demirbank, namely Cıngıllı Holding A.Ş., brought administrative proceedings against the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (Bankalar Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurumu – hereinafter ""the Agency"") before the Ankara Administrative Court, seeking a ruling setting aside the decision of 6 December 2000 to transfer Demirbank to the Fund. The Ankara Administrative Court found that it lacked jurisdiction, and transferred the case to the Supreme Administrative Court. On 5 November 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court set aside the Board's decision of 6 December 2000, holding that the takeover had been illegal. An appeal and a request for rectification lodged by the Agency were rejected on 14 April 2005 and 15 December 2005 respectively. 10. On 20 September 2001 the Fund entered into an agreement with HSBC Bank, and sold Demirbank to the latter. Accordingly, Demirbank's legal personality was extinguished and it was struck off the commercial register on 14 December 2001. 11. On 20 September 2001 Ms S. Cıngıllıoğlu, the main shareholder of Cıngıllı Holding A.Ş., brought administrative proceedings against the Fund before the Ankara Administrative Court, seeking the annulment of the agreement to sell Demirbank to HSBC. On 21 April 2004 the Ankara Administrative Court annulled the agreement on the ground that the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund had been found to be illegal by the Supreme Administrative Court. An appeal and a request for rectification lodged by the Fund were rejected and the decision became final on 24 February 2006. 12. On different dates the applicants applied to the Board and claimed compensation arguing that they had lost their shares in Demirbank, as a result of its transfer to the Fund. The Board did not respond to the applicants' claims within the statutory period. The applicants therefore applied to the administrative courts and requested the annulment of the Board's implied rejection of their compensation claims. However, the administrative courts dismissed the applicants' cases as out of time on the ground that they should have initiated proceedings at the latest within sixty days following 31 January 2001, the date on which Demirbank's equities had been transferred to the Fund's account at the Stock Exchange. The administrative courts' decisions were upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court and thus became final. 13. Following the annulment of the decision concerning the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund by the domestic courts in 2005, the applicants applied to the administrative courts. Relying on the restitutio in integrum principle, the applicants argued that the judgment of the court which annulled the Board's decision dated 6 December 2000 had to be enforced and their rights as shareholders of Demirbank should be reinstated. On different dates the applicants' requests were rejected by the administrative courts and the administrative courts' decisions were upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court. The Supreme Administrative Court held that the judgment regarding the annulment of the Board's decision of 6 December 2000 could be secured by the return of the supervisory and executive rights to Demirbank's shareholders, and did not require the restitution of the actual shares. It also maintained that even if that was the case, the judgment could not be executed, as Demirbank's shares had ceased to exist as a result of the loss of its legal personality following its sale to HSBC. 14. Following the annulment of the agreement to sell Demirbank to HSBC, the applicants in the applications followed by an asterisk (*) in the annexed list, brought a third set of proceedings against the Fund and claimed compensation for their lost shares in Demirbank. The Istanbul Administrative Court dismissed the applicants' compensation claims for being out of time on the ground that they should have brought their claims within sixty-day statutory time-limit after Demirbank's equities had been transferred to the Fund's account at the Stock Exchange on 31 January 2001. The decisions of the administrative courts were upheld, and the applicants' requests for rectification of the decision were rejected.",Ruled as violated by court,,"9. On 2 February 2001, the main shareholder of Demirbank, namely Cıngıllı Holding A.Ş., brought administrative proceedings against the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (Bankalar Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurumu – hereinafter ""the Agency"") before the Ankara Administrative Court, seeking a ruling setting aside the decision of 6 December 2000 to transfer Demirbank to the Fund. The Ankara Administrative Court found that it lacked jurisdiction, and transferred the case to the Supreme Administrative Court. On 5 November 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court set aside the Board's decision of 6 December 2000, holding that the takeover had been illegal. An appeal and a request for rectification lodged by the Agency were rejected on 14 April 2005 and 15 December 2005 respectively. 11. On 20 September 2001 Ms S. Cıngıllıoğlu, the main shareholder of Cıngıllı Holding A.Ş., brought administrative proceedings against the Fund before the Ankara Administrative Court, seeking the annulment of the agreement to sell Demirbank to HSBC. On 21 April 2004 the Ankara Administrative Court annulled the agreement on the ground that the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund had been found to be illegal by the Supreme Administrative Court. An appeal and a request for rectification lodged by the Fund were rejected and the decision became final on 24 February 2006. 14. Following the annulment of the agreement to sell Demirbank to HSBC, the applicants in the applications followed by an asterisk (*) in the annexed list, brought a third set of proceedings against the Fund and claimed compensation for their lost shares in Demirbank. The Istanbul Administrative Court dismissed the applicants' compensation claims for being out of time on the ground that they should have brought their claims within sixty-day statutory time-limit after Demirbank's equities had been transferred to the Fund's account at the Stock Exchange on 31 January 2001. The decisions of the administrative courts were upheld, and the applicants' requests for rectification of the decision were rejected.",TRUE,1,"While it depends on the definition of ""entitled to a hearing,"" it appears that the applicant's right was threatened by repeated procedural dismissals.", 397,"Article 7 No punishment without law 1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. 2. This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.","6. The applicant was born in 1961 and is detained at the Corradino Correctional Facility, Paola. 7. On 25 June 2004 the police searched the applicant's residence and found a quantity of cannabis plants, a canopy, foil and two electric lamps on the roof. 8. The police informed the applicant that he was being charged by the Attorney General, before the Criminal Court, with (i) cultivation and (ii) aggravated possession (not for his exclusive use) of cannabis. 9. A court-appointed expert found that the weight of the dried cannabis leaves found amounted to 3,416.20 grams, from which 6,832 cannabis ‘reefers' could be made or 11,382 ‘sticks of cannabis'. 10. During the trial by jury the applicant, who suffered from chronic depression and severe back pain, admitted the first charge. 11. By a judgment of 5 March 2008 the applicant was found guilty of both charges (the verdict was unanimous in relation to the first charge, and seven votes to two in relation to the second charge) and was sentenced to a term of twelve years' imprisonment and a fine of 25,000 euros (EUR) by the Criminal Court. The fine was to be converted into a further eighteen months' imprisonment if it remained unpaid. In determining the punishment, the Criminal Court noted that, according to the law, if, having considered the age of an accused, his previous conduct, the quantity and quality of the drug in question, as well as all other circumstances, or if the jury's verdict was not unanimous, it considered that the punishment of life imprisonment would not be adequate, it could sentence the accused to a term of imprisonment of between four and thirty years and a fine of between approximately EUR 3,330 and EUR 116,500. In the present case, it considered the conduct of the applicant, the fact that there was agreement that the second charge would be absorbed by the first charge for the purposes of punishment, and the punishments handed down in similar cases. 12. By a judgment of 12 March 2009 the Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed the first-instance judgment. 13. On 9 November 2010, the applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings, complaining under Article 6 § 1 about, inter alia, the discretion of the Attorney General as public prosecutor to decide in which court to try an accused. 14. On 10 October 2012 the case was adjourned for judgment. On 11 February 2013 (following the judgment of the Court in Camilleri v. Malta, no. 42931/10, 22 January 2013) the applicant asked to add a complaint under Article 7 in connection with the discretion of the Attorney General. 15. By a decree of 12 February 2013 the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional competence, rejected the request to suspend the determination of the case and to allow the applicant to add a complaint under Article 7 of the Convention, given that the stage of collection of evidence and pleadings (dibattiment) had come to an end. 16. By a judgment of 21 March 2013, the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional competence, rejected the applicant's claims. Having rejected all other complaints by the applicant, it considered that it was not necessary to determine the complaint concerning the discretion of the Attorney General (under Article 6). 17. By a judgment of 9 December 2013 the Constitutional Court rejected an appeal by the applicant and confirmed the first‑instance judgment. As to the complaint about the Attorney General's discretion, the Constitutional Court considered that the Court had found a violation of Article 7 in that connection (giving no remedy), but had not determined the matter under Article 6. In the Constitutional Court's view, such a finding which related to the lack of foreseeability of the law could not cast doubt on the fairness of the proceedings in general which would paralyse the entire judicial system. Furthermore, local case‑law had previously established that such a discretion did not breach an applicant's fair trial rights. The Constitutional Court also noted that there was no reason to alter the first-instance court's discretion regarding not allowing the addition of the complaint under Article 7, at a time when the collection of evidence had closed.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"It depends on whether cannabis cultivation and aggravated possession are considered ""criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.""", 398,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","4. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Timişoara. 5. On 20 February 2003 the applicant, a bank manager at that time, was placed in pre-trial detention by the Bucharest Anti-Corruption Department of the Prosecutor's Office, on a charge of taking a bribe in order to favourably influence the acceptance of a loan requested by M.G. 6. By a final judgment delivered on 13 April 2012 the High Court of Cassation and Justice (""the High Court"") convicted the applicant of taking a bribe. Among the evidence which led to his conviction was the transcript of a phone conversation between the applicant and M.G. on 16 September 2002. 7. The conversation had been intercepted on the basis of a warrant issued by the prosecutor under the provisions of Law no. 51/1991 on national security (""Law no. 51/1991"") for the period between 13 August and 12 November 2002. 8. The applicant complained before the domestic courts about the lawfulness of the interception of his phone conversation and the accuracy of the transcript. He alleged that the Court had held that Law no. 51/1991 did not afford the guarantees required under Article 8 of the Convention. However, the High Court merely replied that the impugned interception had been lawful and within the scope of Law no. 51/1991.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. By a final judgment delivered on 13 April 2012 the High Court of Cassation and Justice (""the High Court"") convicted the applicant of taking a bribe. Among the evidence which led to his conviction was the transcript of a phone conversation between the applicant and M.G. on 16 September 2002. 7. The conversation had been intercepted on the basis of a warrant issued by the prosecutor under the provisions of Law no. 51/1991 on national security (""Law no. 51/1991"") for the period between 13 August and 12 November 2002. 8. The applicant complained before the domestic courts about the lawfulness of the interception of his phone conversation and the accuracy of the transcript. He alleged that the Court had held that Law no. 51/1991 did not afford the guarantees required under Article 8 of the Convention. However, the High Court merely replied that the impugned interception had been lawful and within the scope of Law no. 51/1991.",TRUE,2,"The phone call is private correspondence, but its usage prevented crime, upheld morals, and upheld economic well-being. It depends on whether that usage was necessary for democratic interests. ", 399,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","4. The applicant was born in 1992 and lives in Bukhara, Uzbekistan. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. The applicant was born in Uzbekistan. In 2003 his father, mother, brother and sister moved to Vladivostok in Russia and subsequently acquired Russian nationality, while he continued to live with his grandfather in Bukhara, visiting them in the summer months. After his grandfather had died and the applicant had finished the secondary school, in June 2011 he joined his family in Russia. 7. The applicant took a mandatory blood test with a view to obtaining a health certificate to support his application for a temporary residence permit. He was found to be HIV-positive. 8. On 23 September 2011 the Consumer Protection Authority declared the applicant's presence in Russian undesirable (the ""exclusion order"") on the ground that he was HIV-positive. 9. By judgment of 19 December 2011, the Sovetskiy District Court in Vladivostok rejected the applicant's challenge to the exclusion order, finding that it was issued in full compliance with Russian law. 10. On 13 February 2012 the Primorskiy Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 11. On 22 February 2012 the applicant left Russia to comply with the exclusion order.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,One could argue the applicant has a right to his family life in Russia. One could also argue that the HIV exclusion order is necessary for health protection., 400,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","5. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Varna. 6. The applicant and his wife divorced on 21 August 2006 pursuant to a court-approved agreement between the two of them. Under the terms of this agreement, the applicant undertook to pay child support to the two children born during the marriage and agreed to his wife's keeping his family name after the divorce. 7. Subsequently, the applicant learned that his former wife had conceived their second child, born in 2003, as a result of a relationship with another man during her marriage to the applicant. The applicant underwent a DNA test to determine whether he was the father of the younger child. The DNA test ‒ the result of which the applicant received on 15 January 2007 ‒ established that he was not the biological father of the second child. The results of this DNA test were never considered by a court. 8. Shortly thereafter, in February 2007, the applicant brought a civil claim in court, seeking to contest his paternity of the child in question. On 1 March 2007 the Varna Regional Court dismissed his request, finding that it was time-barred due to the expiry – in 2004 – of the year-long limitation period counting from the child's birth or from learning thereof (see the section ""Relevant domestic law and practice"" below""). This finding was confirmed by two higher judicial instances, the final decision being pronounced by the Supreme Court of Cassation on 19 September 2007. 9. The applicant brought subsequent proceedings in which he sought to stop paying child support to the second child. On 20 May 2008 his claim was rejected by the Varna District Court, which found that it had not been proven that the applicant was not the child's father, given that he had not rebutted the legal presumption under Article 32 (1) of the Family Code 1985 (""the 1985 Code"").",Ruled as violated by court,,"8. Shortly thereafter, in February 2007, the applicant brought a civil claim in court, seeking to contest his paternity of the child in question. On 1 March 2007 the Varna Regional Court dismissed his request, finding that it was time-barred due to the expiry – in 2004 – of the year-long limitation period counting from the child's birth or from learning thereof (see the section ""Relevant domestic law and practice"" below""). This finding was confirmed by two higher judicial instances, the final decision being pronounced by the Supreme Court of Cassation on 19 September 2007.",TRUE,1,"While one could argue the state has meaningful democratic interests in upholding regulations around paternity, for the sake of preventing disorder and protecting children's rights, it appears that the applicant has been denied his right to determine his family life. ", 401,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","5. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Ivanovo. 6. At the relevant time the applicant was a member of the Ivanovo Region electoral commission. 7. On 23 October 2003 a deputy head of the Ivanovo Region Department of Internal Affairs ordered audio-visual ""surveillance"" (""наблюдение"") of the applicant's office. The parties did not submit a copy of that decision. 8. The surveillance was carried out from 27 October to 5 November 2003 by means of a hidden camera. 9. The applicant was subsequently charged with abuse of power, an offence under Article 285 of the Criminal Code. While studying the criminal case file he discovered that it contained video recordings of him talking on the telephone in his office. 10. At the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty. He claimed, in particular, that the video recordings were inadmissible as evidence as they had been obtained unlawfully without prior judicial authorisation. He also challenged the authenticity of the recordings. 11. On 27 September 2004 the Leninskiy District Court of Ivanovo convicted the applicant of abuse of power and sentenced him to two years' imprisonment, suspended for two years. The court relied on statements by several witnesses, physical evidence, expert reports and the video recordings of the applicant's telephone conversations. It found that the video recordings were authentic and that they had been obtained in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. 12. The applicant appealed. He reiterated, in particular, his argument that the video recordings were inadmissible as evidence. 13. On 12 November 2004 the Ivanovo Regional Court upheld the conviction on appeal. The court held that the District Court had correctly declared the video recordings admissible as evidence because they had been obtained in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"Surveillance infringes upon the applicant's private life, but its usage prevented crime and upheld morals. It depends on whether that usage was necessary for democratic interests. ", 402,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","4. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Sovetskaya Gavan, Khabarovsk Region. 5. On 22 October 2009 the applicant was arrested and brought to the Khabarovsk Administrative Detention Centre where he stayed until 27 November 2009. 6. Since 22 October 2009 he had been detained with more than 12 inmates in the cell no. 9 designed for 12 persons and had to take turns to sleep. A month after he had been transferred to another cell with the area of 6 square meters which he had shared with another inmate. 7. The detention centre had no shower facilities or a place for outdoor walks. The applicant's cell was cold and damp, iron banks were not covered by mattresses. Toilets were not separated from the living area, and the persons using them were in full view of others. Food supply was inadequate, the applicant was served meals only once a day and had no drinking water from within the cell. 8. The Government submitted that the Khabarovsk Administrative Detention Centre comprised two cells: no. 5 with the area of 14.6 square meters for 3 inmates and no. 6 with the area of 18 square meters for 4 inmates. There was no overcrowding; the toilet had been separate by a shoulder length fence. The detainees may take a shower once a week. The temperature was 23oC, there were kettles with boiled water in the cells. 9. On 26 October 2009 the applicant's wife, Mrs Liu, sought to visit the applicant but was refused. 10. On 6 and 10 November 2009 the applicant's wife filed complaints with the Khabarovsk Prosecutor's Office stating that she had not been allowed to see the applicant. 11. In August 2010 the applicant brought a civil claim for compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage, stating that the conditions of his detention had been inhuman and degrading, and that the prohibition on family visits was unlawful. 12. On 9 February 2011 the Industrialnyy District Court of Khabarovsk dismissed his claim. Relying on the statements of a representative of the detention centre, the court held that the Internal Rules of the Administrative Detention Centres approved by the Decree of the Ministry of Defence of Russia of 6 June 2000 no. 605 dsp (""the Rules"") did not make provision for family visits, and that the applicant's right to family life had not been breached as he had met his wife during court hearings. 13. On 18 May 2011 the Khabarovsk Regional Court upheld the above decision on appeal.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"The applicant has a right to family life through prison visitation. However, the state also has meaningful democratic interests in regulating prison visitation. The weighing of these interests determines what the line should be.", 403,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","4. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Malyn, Zhytomyr Region. 5. On 17 November 1993 M. gave birth to a baby girl, K. Given that the applicant had had relations with M. at the relevant time, on 2 December 1993 he accepted paternity of K. by submitting the relevant declaration to the authorities. 6. On 23 March 2000 the applicant married M. They divorced in 2006. 7. In July 2006 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Malyn District Court against M., challenging the paternity of K. The applicant claimed that, even though he had been married to another woman at the relevant time, he had had relations with M. and he had been sure that he was the father of the child and so accepted the paternity. However, in 2005 he had reason to doubt his paternity. 8. On 24 March 2008 the District Court found for the applicant, relying on a genetic expert's opinion which excluded the possibility of the applicant being K.'s biological father. The court noted that the applicant had a right to challenge his paternity given that there was no evidence in the file to suggest that he had known that he was not the father of the child when accepting paternity of K. 9. M. appealed, stating that from January 1993 she and the applicant had lived together without being married and that she had never had any doubts about the applicant's paternity of K. She argued, inter alia, that the genetic expert's opinion was not reliable. 10. On 29 May 2008 the Zhytomyr Regional Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance court's decision and held that, under Article 56 of the Family and Marriage Code, the applicant had not had a right to challenge his paternity because at the time that he accepted paternity of K., he was aware that he was not K.'s father. In support of that finding the Court of Appeal noted that before K.'s birth, the applicant and M. had not been married, they had not lived together (noting, in particular, that between February and April 1993 the applicant lived in another town), and the applicant had been married to another woman at the relevant time. 11. The applicant appealed on a point of law, contending that there were no grounds for the Court of Appeal to find that at the material time he was aware that he was not the biological father of the child. No such evidence was available in the file and the Regional Court of Appeal had exceeded its powers in drawing such a conclusion. 12. On 9 September 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the appeal by the applicant as unfounded.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. In July 2006 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Malyn District Court against M., challenging the paternity of K. The applicant claimed that, even though he had been married to another woman at the relevant time, he had had relations with M. and he had been sure that he was the father of the child and so accepted the paternity. However, in 2005 he had reason to doubt his paternity. 9. M. appealed, stating that from January 1993 she and the applicant had lived together without being married and that she had never had any doubts about the applicant's paternity of K. She argued, inter alia, that the genetic expert's opinion was not reliable. 11. The applicant appealed on a point of law, contending that there were no grounds for the Court of Appeal to find that at the material time he was aware that he was not the biological father of the child. No such evidence was available in the file and the Regional Court of Appeal had exceeded its powers in drawing such a conclusion. 12. On 9 September 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the appeal by the applicant as unfounded.",TRUE,1,"While one could argue the state has meaningful democratic interests in upholding regulations around paternity, for the sake of preventing disorder and protecting children's rights, it appears that the applicant has been denied his right to determine his family life.", 404,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","4. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Adıyaman. 5. On 17 October 1999 the applicant sat an examination in order to become a public servant. She was successful in the examination and on 27 June 2000 she was notified by the State Personnel Department attached to the Prime Minister's office that she had been appointed to the post of security officer in the Kilis branch of TEDAŞ, the state-run Electricity Company. 6. On 4 September 2000 the Kilis branch of TEDAŞ informed the applicant that she would not be appointed to a post in that office as she did not fulfil the requirements of ""being a man"" and ""having completed military service"". 7. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an action against TEDAŞ with the Ankara Administrative Court requesting the annulment of the decision of the Kilis branch of TEDAŞ. In her deposition, the applicant noted that being a man was not a requirement for appointment to the post in question and that she fulfilled all the requirements for that post. 8. On an unspecified date the general directorate of TEDAŞ submitted to the administrative court that one of the requirements for the post in question had been declared by the State Personnel Department as ""having completed military service"" and that therefore only men could be appointed to the post. The applicant, being a woman, could therefore not be recruited as a security officer. 9. On 28 November 2001 the Ankara Administrative Court annulled the decision of the Kilis branch of TEDAŞ. The court held that the requirement of ""having completed military service"" should be considered to apply only to male candidates and that there had been no restriction on women working as security officers in TEDAŞ. 10. On 30 January 2002 TEDAŞ lodged an appeal against the judgment of 28 November 2001. 11. On 1 April 2003 the applicant was recruited by TEDAŞ. 12. On 21 October 2003 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the judgment of the Ankara Administrative Court, holding that the requirement regarding military service demonstrated that the post in question was reserved for male candidates. The high court therefore found that the administration's decision had been in accordance with the law. 13. On 19 March 2004 the applicant was dismissed from her post. 14. On 30 December 2004 the Ankara Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's case, taking into consideration the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court. 15. On 7 May 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's appeal and upheld the judgment of 30 December 2004. 16. On 12 July 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court's judgment was notified to the applicant.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While one could argue an inherent connection between gender and family life, it seems there is no relevance between private life and gender restrictions on positions.", 405,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","5. The applicants were born in 1979 and 1983 respectively. The first applicant is serving a life sentence in Dnipropetrovsk Prison no. 89. The second applicant lives in Obukhiv. 6. On 24 March 2000 the applicants got married. 7. On 16 February 2001 the first applicant was found guilty of a number of criminal offences and was sentenced to life imprisonment. 8. The applicants requested that the prison administration allow them a long-term family visit on many occasions, in particular, in 2006. Their requests were rejected on the grounds that Article 151 of the Code of Execution of Sentences did not provide for long-term visits to life prisoners. 9. In April 2007 the applicants lodged an administrative claim against the State Department for Enforcement of Sentences seeking an entitlement to a long-term conjugal visit every three months. They submitted that they were willing to have a common child and that a denial of that right to them was unlawful and arbitrary. The courts, on three levels of jurisdiction, rejected that claim as not based on law. The final decision of the Higher Administrative Court was delivered on 8 December 2009. 10. According to the information provided by the Government, the first applicant was disciplined on three occasions during the period of his detention from 2001 to 2016: once in 2001 following the discovery of an unreported written message on him; once in 2003 on account of his attempt to get in touch with an inmate in an adjacent cell; and once in 2013 on account of unauthorised possession of a mobile telephone. 11. The applicants got divorced on an unspecified date. According to the Government, it happened ""shortly after the introduction of the application"". According to the applicants, the divorce took place on an unspecified date in 2014. 12. As indicated in the information note issued on 24 June 2016 by the administration of Dnipropetrovsk Prison no. 89, during his detention in that prison starting from 2003, the first applicant had had forty short-term visits and nine long-term family visits. More specifically, on 10 December 2003 and 10 June 2004 he had short-term visits from the second applicant, as well as his mother and sister. The second applicant did not pay him visits thereafter. During the period from 2004 to 2012 the first applicant had regular short-term visits from his mother, sister and some other persons. On 13 September 2012 he had a visit from his sister and a certain Ms L. who was registered in the prison's logbook as his fiancée. Since then he had regular short-term visits from Ms L. On 11 July 2014 the first applicant was allowed for the first time a long-term family visit, which was from his sister. On 5 December 2014 the first applicant got married with Ms L. and they were allowed a long-term family visit on that occasion. Subsequently, they enjoyed long-term conjugal visits about every three months.",Ruled as violated by court,,"9. In April 2007 the applicants lodged an administrative claim against the State Department for Enforcement of Sentences seeking an entitlement to a long-term conjugal visit every three months. They submitted that they were willing to have a common child and that a denial of that right to them was unlawful and arbitrary. The courts, on three levels of jurisdiction, rejected that claim as not based on law. The final decision of the Higher Administrative Court was delivered on 8 December 2009. 10. According to the information provided by the Government, the first applicant was disciplined on three occasions during the period of his detention from 2001 to 2016: once in 2001 following the discovery of an unreported written message on him; once in 2003 on account of his attempt to get in touch with an inmate in an adjacent cell; and once in 2013 on account of unauthorised possession of a mobile telephone. 11. The applicants got divorced on an unspecified date. According to the Government, it happened ""shortly after the introduction of the application"". According to the applicants, the divorce took place on an unspecified date in 2014. 12. As indicated in the information note issued on 24 June 2016 by the administration of Dnipropetrovsk Prison no. 89, during his detention in that prison starting from 2003, the first applicant had had forty short-term visits and nine long-term family visits. More specifically, on 10 December 2003 and 10 June 2004 he had short-term visits from the second applicant, as well as his mother and sister. The second applicant did not pay him visits thereafter. During the period from 2004 to 2012 the first applicant had regular short-term visits from his mother, sister and some other persons. On 13 September 2012 he had a visit from his sister and a certain Ms L. who was registered in the prison's logbook as his fiancée. Since then he had regular short-term visits from Ms L. On 11 July 2014 the first applicant was allowed for the first time a long-term family visit, which was from his sister. On 5 December 2014 the first applicant got married with Ms L. and they were allowed a long-term family visit on that occasion. Subsequently, they enjoyed long-term conjugal visits about every three months.",TRUE,2,"The applicant has a right to family life through prison visitation. However, the state also has meaningful democratic interests in regulating prison visitation. The weighing of these interests determines what the line should be.", 406,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","5. The applicant was born in 1974 in Khabarovsk and is serving a life sentence in the Sverdlovsk Region. 6. From 25 May 2012 to 10 April 2014 the applicant was held in penal colony IK-56 in the Sverdlovsk Region. He was able to have five short visits in 2013 and one short visit in 2014. 7. On 15 July 2013 the applicant asked the governor to allow him a short meeting with four adult relatives, his mother, sister and two cousins. He also asked for the meeting to be held without a glass partition between him and his visitors or the presence of a prison officer. The governor signed his decision on the petition: ""Rejected. Not allowed under the Code of Execution of Sentences"". 8. From 15 May to 16 July 2014 the applicant was transferred to remand prison SIZO-1 in Khabarovsk – where his family still lived – to take part in another investigation. 9. On the day after his arrival at the prison, he asked the prison governor to authorise a short meeting with four family members – his sister, two cousins and aunt – without a physical partition between him and the visitors or the presence of prison officers. By a letter of 21 May 2014, the governor rejected his request. He pointed out that, pursuant to section 18 of the Pre‑trial Detention Act, visits are subject to written authorisation from the official or authority in charge of the criminal case. Furthermore, the Rules of Internal Order in Remand Prisons required that visiting rooms be equipped with a physical partition and that visits be supervised by a prison officer. 10. On 3 June 2014 the applicant asked the governor to authorise a long meeting with his mother and sister. He relied on Article 89 of the Code of Execution of Sentences (CES) and emphasised that the remand prison was equipped with rooms for long-stay visits which could be used by convicted prisoners serving their sentence in that prison. Three days later the governor replied that the applicable law did not make a provision for long-stay visits in respect of remand prisoners. He referred the applicant to Article 77.1 of the CES. 11. The applicant subsequently asked the authorities in charge of the criminal case to authorise short visits from his family members. On 11 June and 1 August 2014 the investigator and the deputy head of the investigations department, respectively, rejected his request. They informed the applicant that ""the authorities in charge of the investigation were not preventing [him] from having short visits from his family members as long as it did not contradict Russian law, including the Code of Execution of Sentences"". 12. The applicant challenged the restrictions on family visits before a court of general jurisdiction. According to the information from the Government, all of his challenges were dismissed as unfounded. 13. According to a certificate issued by the governor on 27 April 2017, the applicant did not have any short or long-stay visits during his time in the Khabarovsk remand prison.",Ruled as violated by court,,"9. On the day after his arrival at the prison, he asked the prison governor to authorise a short meeting with four family members – his sister, two cousins and aunt – without a physical partition between him and the visitors or the presence of prison officers. By a letter of 21 May 2014, the governor rejected his request. He pointed out that, pursuant to section 18 of the Pre‑trial Detention Act, visits are subject to written authorisation from the official or authority in charge of the criminal case. Furthermore, the Rules of Internal Order in Remand Prisons required that visiting rooms be equipped with a physical partition and that visits be supervised by a prison officer. 10. On 3 June 2014 the applicant asked the governor to authorise a long meeting with his mother and sister. He relied on Article 89 of the Code of Execution of Sentences (CES) and emphasised that the remand prison was equipped with rooms for long-stay visits which could be used by convicted prisoners serving their sentence in that prison. Three days later the governor replied that the applicable law did not make a provision for long-stay visits in respect of remand prisoners. He referred the applicant to Article 77.1 of the CES. 11. The applicant subsequently asked the authorities in charge of the criminal case to authorise short visits from his family members. On 11 June and 1 August 2014 the investigator and the deputy head of the investigations department, respectively, rejected his request. They informed the applicant that ""the authorities in charge of the investigation were not preventing [him] from having short visits from his family members as long as it did not contradict Russian law, including the Code of Execution of Sentences"". 13. According to a certificate issued by the governor on 27 April 2017, the applicant did not have any short or long-stay visits during his time in the Khabarovsk remand prison.",TRUE,2,"The applicant has a right to family life through prison visitation. However, the state also has meaningful democratic interests in regulating prison visitation. The weighing of these interests determines what the line should be.", 407,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","4. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Yekaterinburg. 5. On 13 May 2009 he was arrested on suspicion of armed robbery. On the following day the Verkh-Isetskiy District Court in Yekaterinburg remanded him in custody and set the time-limit until 12 July 2009. 6. On 13 July 2009 the District Court granted a two-month extension of the detention period. However, on 31 July 2009 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court quashed the extension order as it had been issued outside the authorised detention period, and ordered the applicant's release. 7. The applicant was not released. He was not allowed to leave the police ward and was re-arrested on the charge of theft. The arrest record mentioned the charge, without specifying when or where the theft had been committed or why the applicant was suspected of it. 8. On 2 August 2009 the District Court adjourned the detention hearing for seventy-two hours, at the request from the applicant's counsel. On 4 August 2009 the District Court issued a detention order which did not set a time-limit for the applicant's detention or give any assessment to the existence of a ""reasonable suspicion"" against the applicant. On 2 September 2009 the Regional Court upheld the detention order on appeal. 9. Further extensions of the applicant's detention were granted by the Leninskiy District Court on 29 September, 20 October and 2 November 2009. The last extension order was issued in the absence of the parties. On 25 November 2009 the Regional Court found that extension order unlawful and set it aside, but extended the applicant's detention for a future period. 10. On 23 December 2009 the Bogdanovichi Town Court in the Sverdlovsk Region opened the trial and extended the applicant's detention. The applicant's appeal against the extension order was rejected by the Regional Court on 11 June 2010. 11. On 2 March and 22 April 2010 the Town Court extended the applicant's detention. Each time the court referred to the gravity of the charges and the applicant's criminal record. The appeals against the orders were rejected on 30 June and 11 June, respectively. 12. Throughout the trial the applicant was held in a metal cage. 13. On 13 May 2010 the applicant was found guilty of theft and armed robbery and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. On 18 August 2010 the Regional Court upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence to three years' imprisonment. 14. On 24 June 2010 the applicant's mother died. His request to be allowed to attend the funeral was rejected by the governor of the IZ-66/1 remand prison and upheld by the courts on the ground that remand prisoners did not have the benefit of a leave of absence under Russian law. When his father died on 5 November 2010, the director of the correctional colony in Sosnovoborsk in the Krasnoyarsk Region also refused his request for a short-term absence, on account of the funeral being held outside of the region where the colony was located. 15. The Sosnovoborsk colony was located some 2,400 kilometres away from Yekaterinburg where the applicant's family lived.",Ruled as violated by court,,"9. Further extensions of the applicant's detention were granted by the Leninskiy District Court on 29 September, 20 October and 2 November 2009. The last extension order was issued in the absence of the parties. On 25 November 2009 the Regional Court found that extension order unlawful and set it aside, but extended the applicant's detention for a future period. 10. On 23 December 2009 the Bogdanovichi Town Court in the Sverdlovsk Region opened the trial and extended the applicant's detention. The applicant's appeal against the extension order was rejected by the Regional Court on 11 June 2010. 11. On 2 March and 22 April 2010 the Town Court extended the applicant's detention. Each time the court referred to the gravity of the charges and the applicant's criminal record. The appeals against the orders were rejected on 30 June and 11 June, respectively. 15. The Sosnovoborsk colony was located some 2,400 kilometres away from Yekaterinburg where the applicant's family lived.",TRUE,2,"The applicant has a right to family life through attending his parents' funerals. However, the state also has meaningful democratic interests in regulating prison leaves. ", 408,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","6. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Makhachkala, Republic of Dagestan. 7. In 1990 the applicant started living with Ms T.K. 8. In 1991 and 1992 they had two daughters, Kr. (born on 1 July 1991) and K. (born on 13 July 1992). The applicant did not register his paternity. 9. In 2002 the applicant and T.K. separated. Both girls continued living with the applicant. 10. In 2004 T.K. married Yu.K. 11. In May 2004 Yu.K. registered his paternity in respect of Kr. and K. However, the girls still remained living with the applicant. 12. In July 2007 K. stopped attending school, frequently ran away from home and exhibited delinquent behaviour. She allegedly stole her mother's jewellery. 13. In December 2007, following an application by T.K., K. was placed in a temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders. 14. On 18 February 2008 the Kirovskiy District Court of Makhachkala (""the District Court""), sitting in a single-judge formation composed of Judge I., granted an application lodged by the administration of the Kirovskiy District of Makhachkala to place K. in a closed educational institution for minors for two years and five months. In taking this decision the District Court relied on the following circumstances: K.'s not attending school, running away from home, vagabonding and leading an anti-social and immoral lifestyle, as well as unsuccessful attempts to discipline K. and her being detained in the temporary detention centre for juvenile offenders. 15. On an unspecified date shortly afterwards K. was placed in a closed educational institution for minors in the town of Pokrov, Vladimir Region, some 2,500 km from her home town of Makhachkala. According to the applicant, his daughter's correspondence with him was subjected to censorship by the facility's administration. 16. In the meantime, the applicant brought proceedings seeking the establishment of his paternity vis-à-vis Kr. and K. 17. On 9 April 2008 the District Court established the applicant's paternity in respect of Kr. and K. and annuled the registration of Yu.K. as the girls' father. 18. At the applicant's request, the Prosecutor of the Republic of Dagestan applied to the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Dagestan for a supervisory review of the decision of 18 February 2008. 19. The present application was already pending before the European Court of Human Rights when, on 7 August 2008, the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Dagestan, by way of a supervisory review, quashed the decision of 18 February 2008 as unlawful and unjustified, and discontinued the proceedings. The court held, in particular, that in violation of the procedure established by the Federal Law on Basic Measures for Preventing Child Neglect and Delinquency of Minors, no. 120-FZ of 24 June 1999 (""the Minors Act""), the District Court had decided to place K. in a closed educational institution for minors in the absence of a decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings or a decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings against the latter, and without her having undergone a prior medical examination. 20. On 30 September 2008 K. was released from the closed educational institution for minors and returned home.",Ruled as violated by court,,"18. At the applicant's request, the Prosecutor of the Republic of Dagestan applied to the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Dagestan for a supervisory review of the decision of 18 February 2008.",TRUE,1,"While one could argue that K. is entitled to her own private and family life, it appears that this has begun to impact the public sphere, which is the state's area to control.", 409,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","4. The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Chisinau. 5. At the material time, the applicant was a student and was undertaking an unpaid internship at a law firm. 6. On 23 October 2008 criminal proceedings were initiated against T., a lawyer with whom the applicant worked, on charges of trading in influence. In particular, T. was accused of receiving 10,500 euros (EUR) from D. to pass on to the judges examining a criminal case against a relative of D.'s in order to obtain his acquittal or a more lenient sentence. The applicant had no procedural standing in those proceedings. 7. On 30 October 2008 the police lodged with an investigating judge a request for a warrant to search the applicant's apartment. The request was granted; the decision to issue the warrant read as follows: ""The criminal investigation against T. was initiated on 23 October 2008 ... In the course of the investigation it has been established that from March until September 2008, T. extorted and received from D. in several instalments the amount of EUR 10,500, [to be given to] the judges who examined D.'s relative's case, in order to obtain his acquittal or a more lenient sentence. On 24 October 2008 T. was caught in flagrante receiving 3,800 US dollars (USD) from D., allegedly for influencing the prosecutor not to appeal against the [subsequent] judgment [acquitting the accused]. The evidence in the file and the material obtained through the operational investigation allow the well-founded assumption that at [the applicant's] home, situated at [address], can be found EUR 10,500 received from D. and relevant documents, Decides To order a search of [the applicant's] residence, situated at [address], with the aim of finding and seizing EUR 10,500 received from D. and documents concerning the criminal case."" 8. On the same day, a prosecutor lodged a request with the Buiucani District Court for a warrant to be issued for the search of the applicant's apartment. His request took the form of a verbatim copy of the police decision. Also on the same day the Buiucani district investigating judge issued a decision authorising the search. The decision read as follows: ""The present criminal proceedings were initiated on 23 October 2008 ... against T. After hearing the prosecutor and examining the material, and taking in consideration the fact that that material had been obtained in [a manner] in compliance with the law, the court finds that the request for the authorisation of the search is well founded and should be upheld. On the basis of Articles 41, 125, 301, 305 and 306 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court: ... 9. On 10 December 2008 the police searched the applicant's apartment in the presence of her elderly mother [but not the applicant]. They did not find anything. 10. On 21 August 2009 the applicant lodged a request for access to the evidence which had been presented to the judge to justify the search. On 3 September 2009 the Buiucani district investigating judge replied that the case file was held at the [premises of] the investigating authority and that access could only be granted pursuant to the law. 11. It appears from the material in the case file that the criminal proceedings against T. ended with the latter's acquittal.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While the search of the residence infringed upon the applicant's private life, its usage appears justified via democratic interests of preventing crime.", 410,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","4. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Dmitrovgrad. 5. Between 2012 and 2014 the applicant lodged numerous complaints with the local police department concerning the allegedly unauthorised use of the plot of land near the block of flats where her family resided. She also alleged that there had been a number of assassination attempts planned against her. 6. On 15 January 2014 the head of the inter-municipal police department forwarded the following letter to the Psychiatric and Narcological Service: ""Following receipt of numerous complaints, the [police department] asks you to examine (check) [the applicant] ... at her place of residence. Her behaviour is inappropriate. She constantly talks about conspiracies against her. Complaints lodged by residents and entrepreneurs about her aggressive behaviour have grown in number. [The applicant] might cause harm to others."" 7. On 28 and 29 January 2014 a psychiatrist, Sav., questioned the applicant's neighbours, asking them if they had observed any strange behaviour on the applicant's part. 8. On 30 January 2014 a psychiatrist visited the applicant at her place of residence. 9. On 31 January 2014 the psychiatrist informed the police that the applicant did not have any psychiatric disorders. 10. On 12 March 2014, in response to the applicant's complaint, the Dimitrovgrad Town Court found the psychiatrist's actions unlawful. The court established that, contrary to the applicable legislation, the psychiatrist had failed to obtain the applicant's consent to a psychiatric examination and that the applicant had objected to such an examination. 11. On 17 March 2014 the applicant asked the court to find the police's decision to have her assessed by the psychiatrist unlawful. She considered that the decision had been arbitrary and that it had amounted to an unjustified interference with her private life. 12. On 29 April 2014 the Town Court dismissed the applicant's complaint. The court found that the actions of the police had had a basis in law. The court interpreted the letter of 15 January 2014 issued by the police department as a request for information from the psychiatrist as to whether the applicant suffered from any mental illness. It further reasoned that the police had not asked the psychiatric service to examine the applicant. In 2012 the police had received numerous complaints from the applicant, who had alleged that she had been persecuted by unknown persons, and complaints from owners and employees of concession stands alleging that the applicant had destroyed their property and had disrupted their activities by making scenes. The police had conducted an inquiry, which did not confirm the applicant's allegations. Accordingly, the police had decided to obtain information about the applicant's mental condition. Lastly, the court reasoned that the fact that, in response to the police's request for information, the psychiatric service had examined the applicant unlawfully had no bearing on the lawfulness of the police's actions. 13. On 22 July 2014 the Ulyanovsk Regional Court upheld the judgment of 29 April 2014 on appeal. 14. On 17 December 2014 the Regional Court refused to grant the applicant leave to lodge a cassation appeal. 15. On 26 March 2015 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation issued a similar decision in response to the applicant's application to lodge a cassation appeal.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"The questioning of neighbors infringed upon the applicant's private life, but its usage arguably upheld public safety and prevented disorder. It depends on whether that usage was necessary for democratic interests. ", 411,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","5. The applicant was born in 1946 and currently lives in Berlin, Germany. 6. In 2005 he was an English teacher in a school in Kyiv, Ukraine. At that time he entered into private relations with a married woman living in Kyiv. In 2006 the woman gave birth to a child. Her husband was indicated as the father in the child's birth certificate. In 2007 a DNA test was performed proving that the applicant was in fact the father of the child. The applicant was not prevented from having access to the child by her mother, who accepted financial support from him on a monthly basis. The applicant bought a car for the child's mother. In 2011 he wrote a will bequeathing all his property to the child. 7. The applicant had regular contact with the child until 2015 when the mother informed the applicant that she had divorced her husband and that she had decided to marry a German national and move with the child to Germany. As the applicant opposed the decision to emigrate to Germany, the mother denied him access to the child and prevented him from communicating with the child. 8. In June 2015 the applicant initiated proceedings before the Darnytskyy District Court of Kyiv (""the District Court"") seeking recognition of his paternity and to have the child's birth certificate amended accordingly. 9. During the hearing the mother of the child admitted that the applicant had provided regular financial support and had taken part in the upbringing and education of the child. However, she submitted that the applicant's claims were time-barred under Article 129 § 2 of the Family Code, which provided a one-year time-limit for such claims (see paragraph 15 below). The applicant contended that he had delayed his lawsuit because he had not wished to disturb the child's family situation and he had not been prevented from communicating with the child on a regular basis until 2015. Only when the child's mother had decided to emigrate to another country with the child had he decided to seek formal recognition of his paternity. 10. On 17 November 2015 the District Court allowed the applicant's claims, declaring him the father of the child and ordering the amendment of the child's birth certificate. The District Court considered that the applicant had missed the time-limit for valid reasons. It took into account the applicant's argument that he had not wished to disturb the family and cause any harm to the child with a lawsuit during the long period when the mother had in fact assisted him in having regular access to the child. 11. On 3 February 2016 the Kyiv Court of Appeal overturned the District Court's decision and dismissed the applicant's claim as time-barred. The appellate court stated that Article 129 § 2 of the Family Code provided a one-year time-limit, which had started to run from the moment the applicant had found out or should have found out about his paternity. The applicant had become aware of his paternity in 2007 when the DNA test had been performed (see paragraph 6 above); however he had applied to the court in 2015 (see paragraph 8 above), which had been too late. 12. The applicant appealed on points of law, arguing that the Court of Appeal had applied the statute of limitations without duly taking into account the reasons for which he had delayed his action and without examining the child's interests. 13. On 13 July 2016 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court dismissed the applicant's appeal on points of law, without examining whether the applicant had provided valid reasons which could justify his non-compliance with the time-limit set out in Article 129 § 2 of the Family Code.",Ruled as violated by court,,"9. During the hearing the mother of the child admitted that the applicant had provided regular financial support and had taken part in the upbringing and education of the child. However, she submitted that the applicant's claims were time-barred under Article 129 § 2 of the Family Code, which provided a one-year time-limit for such claims (see paragraph 15 below). The applicant contended that he had delayed his lawsuit because he had not wished to disturb the child's family situation and he had not been prevented from communicating with the child on a regular basis until 2015. Only when the child's mother had decided to emigrate to another country with the child had he decided to seek formal recognition of his paternity. 10. On 17 November 2015 the District Court allowed the applicant's claims, declaring him the father of the child and ordering the amendment of the child's birth certificate. The District Court considered that the applicant had missed the time-limit for valid reasons. It took into account the applicant's argument that he had not wished to disturb the family and cause any harm to the child with a lawsuit during the long period when the mother had in fact assisted him in having regular access to the child. 11. On 3 February 2016 the Kyiv Court of Appeal overturned the District Court's decision and dismissed the applicant's claim as time-barred. The appellate court stated that Article 129 § 2 of the Family Code provided a one-year time-limit, which had started to run from the moment the applicant had found out or should have found out about his paternity. The applicant had become aware of his paternity in 2007 when the DNA test had been performed (see paragraph 6 above); however he had applied to the court in 2015 (see paragraph 8 above), which had been too late. 12. The applicant appealed on points of law, arguing that the Court of Appeal had applied the statute of limitations without duly taking into account the reasons for which he had delayed his action and without examining the child's interests. 13. On 13 July 2016 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court dismissed the applicant's appeal on points of law, without examining whether the applicant had provided valid reasons which could justify his non-compliance with the time-limit set out in Article 129 § 2 of the Family Code.",TRUE,1,"While one could argue the state has meaningful democratic interests in upholding regulations around paternity, for the sake of preventing disorder and protecting children's rights, it appears that the applicant has been denied his right to determine his family life.", 412,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","4. The applicants are Russian nationals. They were owners of flats in Moscow. The municipal authorities reclaimed the flats, and the applicants' title to the real property in question was annulled. 5. In 1977 a number of flats in a residential building located at 15-3 Ulitsa Tsyurupy, Moscow, were assigned by the City of Moscow to the Ministry of Communications. The flats were used as temporary housing for foreign specialists seconded to the Ministry. In 1991 the flats were transferred to the Rostelekom Open Joint Stock Company, the Ministry's successor. On 18 February 2009 the flats were transferred from Rostelekom to the City of Moscow. It appears that the flats remained vacant. 6. In 2008-2009 a group of people, including a police officer, a lawyer, a notary and several Rostelekom employees, forged documents pertaining to three flats located at 15-3 Ulitsa Tsyurupy, Moscow, showing that the flats were owned by private individuals and, following their deaths, were inherited by their ""heirs"". The relevant property deeds were forged by notary K. and then registered by the City Registration Department. Then the ""heirs"" sold the flats to private parties. Subsequently the flats were bought by the applicants. Each transaction with the flats was reviewed and approved by the City Registration Department. 7. On 8 August 2012 a criminal investigation was opened into the City's loss of title to the flats. 8. On 7 December 2012 the Housing Department of the City of Moscow (the ""Housing Department"") was recognised as a victim of the crime. 9. On 9 December 2013 the Perovskiy District Court of Moscow found nine defendants, including several Rostelekom employees, guilty of fraud. The court established, inter alia, that the defendants had forged the documents and had had unlawfully registered the flats as private property to the detriment of the City of Moscow. Notary K. was questioned as a witness. 10. On 11 March 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 9 December 2013 on appeal. 11. According to the Government, notary K. was also found guilty of fraud and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 12. In 2014 the Housing Department brought civil actions seeking restitution of the flats. 13. The Cheremushkinskiy District Court of Moscow granted the Housing Department's claims. The court invalidated the transactions in respect of the flats and the applicants' title to the flats and ordered their eviction. The court applied the domestic law provisions which allowed the owner to recover its property from a bona fide purchaser if the said property left the owner's possession against its will. The court considered that the City of Moscow had not had intent to divest itself of the flats and had a right to recover the stolen flats from the applicants. 14. The Moscow City Court upheld the judgments of the District Court on appeal. As regards Ms Titova (application nos. 4919/16), the City Court discerned no evidence in the material of the case file that would substantiate her claim that she had bought the flat in good faith. The City Court took into account that she had bought the flat a month and a half after the previous transaction and that the purchase price of the flat had been obviously lower than its market value. In the City Court's view, Ms Titova, if having acted with due care and diligence, should have had doubts as to the legitimacy of seller's title and sale of the flat. 15. Subsequently, the City Court refused to grant the applicants leave to bring a cassation appeal against the judgments in their respective cases. 16. According to the Government, the applicants were not evicted and continue to reside in the flats. 17. The details pertaining to each case are summed up in Appendix II below.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While one could argue an inherent connection between flat eviction and the home, the statute's list of private and family life, home, and correspondence does not suggest home as the right to housing.", 413,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","5. The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Batelov. 6. In 1965 he had a sexual relationship with a woman who gave birth to a daughter, Z., on 2 March 1966. 7. As the applicant denied that he was the father, Z.'s legal guardian brought proceedings on her behalf in the Jihlava District Court (okresní soud) for a declaration of paternity. 8. After giving birth to Z., but before initiating the aforementioned proceedings, the mother married another man. 9. On 23 April 1970 the District Court found that the applicant was Z.'s father and ordered him to contribute to her maintenance. 10. The court reached its finding after hearing evidence from several witnesses. It also had regard to documentary evidence and took into consideration the results of a blood test known as a ""bio-hereditary test"" (dědicko-biologická zkouška). In addition, it established that the applicant had had intercourse with the mother sometime between 300 and 180 days before Z.'s birth. In such cases, a presumption of paternity arose under Article 54 of the Family Code, unless there were clear grounds to rebut the presumption. Another man had also had intercourse with the mother at the crucial time, however, the blood test established that he was not the father. 11. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Brno Regional Court (krajský soud) and requested another expert opinion. The Regional Court denied the request because the facts had been proved to a sufficient degree. It eventually upheld the judgment of the District Court on 2 June 1970, which became final on 10 June 1970. 12. In 2011 the applicant requested that the Prosecutor General (Nejvyšší státní zástupce) challenge his paternity in court. By a letter of 21 June 2011 he was informed that the requirements of Article 62 of the Family Code to initiate such proceedings had not been met. Z., by that time an adult, did not want to challenge paternity, it was not in her interests and the applicant had not produced any expert evidence credibly disproving it. 13. On 29 February 2012 the applicant and Z. underwent a DNA examination. The resulting report of 19 April 2012 unequivocally confirmed that the applicant was not Z.'s father. 14. On 9 May 2012 the applicant submitted a new request to the Prosecutor General to challenge his paternity in court. 15. On 12 September 2012 the Prosecutor General informed the applicant that the determination of his paternity had been decided by the Jihlava District Court under Article 54 of the Family Code and that therefore the prosecution service could not initiate proceedings under Article 62 and 62a of the Family Code. The Prosecutor General only had that specific competence as regards statutory presumptions of paternity under Articles 51 § 1 and 52 of the Family Code. When paternity had been established by a judicial declaration under Article 54 of that Code and the judgment had come into legal force, as in the applicant's case, the law did not provide for any possibility to challenge it. 16. Relying on his rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint (ústavní stížnost) against the Prosecutor General's decision of 12 September 2012. He maintained that he had proved that he was not Z.'s biological father and requested that the Constitutional Court (Ústavní soud) order the Prosecutor General to initiate proceedings and challenge his paternity. He also argued that Articles 61 § 1 and 62 § 1 of the Family Code were unconstitutional. 17. On 13 December 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's complaint. It noted that his paternity had been established by a judicial decision which had come into legal force and stated, inter alia, that the competence of the Prosecutor General could only apply if all the legal requirements had been fulfilled, which was not, however, the applicant's case.",Ruled as violated by court,,"13. On 29 February 2012 the applicant and Z. underwent a DNA examination. The resulting report of 19 April 2012 unequivocally confirmed that the applicant was not Z.'s father. 14. On 9 May 2012 the applicant submitted a new request to the Prosecutor General to challenge his paternity in court. 15. On 12 September 2012 the Prosecutor General informed the applicant that the determination of his paternity had been decided by the Jihlava District Court under Article 54 of the Family Code and that therefore the prosecution service could not initiate proceedings under Article 62 and 62a of the Family Code. The Prosecutor General only had that specific competence as regards statutory presumptions of paternity under Articles 51 § 1 and 52 of the Family Code. When paternity had been established by a judicial declaration under Article 54 of that Code and the judgment had come into legal force, as in the applicant's case, the law did not provide for any possibility to challenge it. 17. On 13 December 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's complaint. It noted that his paternity had been established by a judicial decision which had come into legal force and stated, inter alia, that the competence of the Prosecutor General could only apply if all the legal requirements had been fulfilled, which was not, however, the applicant's case.",TRUE,1,"While one could argue the state has meaningful democratic interests in upholding regulations around paternity, for the sake of preventing disorder and protecting children's rights, it appears that the applicant has been denied his right to determine his family life.", 414,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","5. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Weinheim. He is a campaigner against abortion and operates an anti-abortion website. 6. On 12 and 13 April 2005 the applicant distributed leaflets in the vicinity of the medical practice of Dr St., who performed abortions there. The leaflets stated, inter alia, that the abortions performed by Dr St. in his practice, for which he gave the address, were unlawful according to the case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court. In addition the leaflet contained the following statements: ""According to international criminal law: Aggravated murder is the intentional ‘bringing-to-death' of an innocent human being!"" (Sinngemӓβ aus den internationalen Strafgesetzen: Mord ist das vorsӓtzliche ""Zu-Tode-Bringen"" eines unschuldigen Menschen!) ""The murder of human beings in Auschwitz was unlawful, but the morally degraded NS State allowed the murder of innocent people and did not make it subject to criminal liability."" (Die Ermordung der Menschen in Auschwitz war rechtswidrig, aber der moralisch verkommene NS-Staat hatte den Mord an den unschuldigen Menschen erlaubt und nicht unter Strafe gestellt.) 7. The applicant also addressed passers-by and the physician's presumed patients and attempted to engage with them in conversations about abortion. 8. Dr St. lodged an application for a civil injunction against the applicant and on 25 October 2005 the Mannheim Regional Court granted the requested injunction. The court ordered the applicant to desist from speaking to passers-by in the immediate vicinity of the medical practice and labelling the abortions performed by the plaintiff unlawful with the objective of irritating female patients and preventing them from visiting Dr St.'s practice. 9. On 24 February 2007 the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal upheld the decision and slightly modified the wording specifying the geographical area concerned by the injunction. It also refused to grant leave to appeal on points of law. 10. The Regional Court as well as the Court of Appeal both referred to a previous decision of the Federal Court of Justice in which it had confirmed a civil injunction against similar conduct by the applicant (see paragraph 13 below). The courts held that in the case at issue there were no factual or legal differences justifying deviating from the case-law of the Federal Court of Justice. In so far that the doctor in the present case was slightly more well-known than the doctor in the original case, the Court of Appeal held that this was of minor relevance. The fact that Dr St. had appeared as an expert before the German Parliament many years previously did not have any substantial effects on Dr St's public profile at that time. Moreover, the involvement of Dr St. in different legal disputes was irrelevant, as trying to enforce his rights in the appropriate legal procedure could not redound to Dr St.'s disadvantage. In sum, the applicant had vilified the non‑criminal professional activities of Dr St. by implying that he committed criminal acts and interfered with the relationship of trust between doctor and patient, which deserved special protection against the interventions of others. The applicant had therefore severely interfered with Dr St.'s personality rights. This interference was not justified by the applicant's freedom of expression in view of the massive ""pillory effect"" the applicant had created by singling out the plaintiff and criticising him in a harsh way in the immediate vicinity of his practice. 11. On 29 May 2007 the Federal Court of Justice refused a request by the applicant for legal aid on the grounds that the applicant's intended appeal on points of law lacked sufficient prospect of success. On 20 July 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit the applicant's complaint for adjudication for being inadmissible, without providing reasons (no. 1 BvR 1670/07).",NOT ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While one could argue an inherent connection between abortion and family life, it seems there is no relevance between private life and anti-abortion advocacy.", 415,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","5. The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Oryol. He is currently serving his sentence in IK-7 in the village of Areyskoye, Krasnoyarsk Region. 6. The applicant, his partner and his mother were living in Oryol when the applicant was charged with drug-related crimes. 7. On 2 December 2009 the Federal Penal Authority (""Федеральная служба исполнения наказаний"", ""the FSIN"") of Russia sent a telegram to the FSIN department for the Oryol Region (""the Oryol FSIN"") instructing the latter to send each month up to forty people detained in remand prisons and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in a strict-regime facility to the Krasnoyarsk Region. The instruction was valid as of 1 December 2009 until further notice. 8. On 7 December 2009 the Sovetskiy District Court of Oryol convicted the applicant of drug-related crimes and sentenced him to twelve years' imprisonment in a strict-regime post-conviction detention facility. On 2 February 2010 the Oryol Regional Court upheld the conviction on appeal. 9. Acting on the basis of the FSIN of Russia's instruction of 2 December 2009, on an unspecified date the Oryol FSIN decided, in view of the overcrowding in the post‑conviction detention facilities in the Oryol Region, that the issue of which particular facility the applicant would be transferred to should be resolved by the FSIN department for the Krasnoyarsk Region (""the Krasnoyarsk FSIN""). The latter allocated the applicant to IK-7, a strict-regime post-conviction detention facility in the village of Areyskoye, Krasnoyarsk Region (about 4,200 km from Oryol), to serve his sentence. The applicant has been detained there since 20 April 2010. 10. The applicant has repeatedly asked the penal authorities at different levels to transfer him to a detention facility located closer to Oryol so that he could effectively maintain family ties while serving his sentence. 11. On 12 November 2010 the FSIN of Russia rejected the applicant's request, informing him that, under Article 81 of the Code on the Execution of Sentences (""the CES""), in the absence of exceptional circumstances convicts were to serve their prison term in its entirety in the same detention facility, and that there were no such exceptional circumstances in the applicant's case. They noted as follows: ""[a]s regards maintaining the convict's social ties, the right to receive visits and parcels as well as the right to correspondence and phone calls should be realised in accordance with the laws on execution of sentences in force and does not depend on the place in which he is serving the sentence."" 12. The applicant brought civil proceedings against the Oryol FSIN, claiming compensation for pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damage caused by their decision to transfer him to a penal facility in the Krasnoyarsk Region in breach of his right, under Article 73 § 1 of the CES, to serve his prison sentence in his home region, which had adversely affected his capacity to maintain his family and social ties. 13. On 3 August 2012 the Zavodskoy District Court of Oryol dismissed the claims for damages with reference to Article 73 § 2 of the CES and Ruling No. 1700-O-O of the Constitutional Court of Russia. The court held that the Oryol FSIN's decision had been lawful because between December 2009 and February 2010 the penal facilities in the Oryol Region had been overcrowded. It also noted that the defendant had acted in accordance with the FSIN of Russia's instructions. The court did not address the applicant's argument regarding his difficulties in maintaining family ties because of the distance between his family home and the detention facility. It appears that the applicant did not appeal against the judgment. 14. Between July 2011 and October 2013 the applicant's partner made long-term family visits to IK-7 on six occasions. In 2014 she gave birth to the couple's daughter. While in IK-7, the applicant received a number of parcels and phone calls from his mother and partner.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"The applicant has a right to family life through prison visitation. However, the state also has meaningful democratic interests in regulating prison visitation. The weighing of these interests determines what the line should be.", 416,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","5. The applicant was born in 1992 and lives in Tver. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 7 May 2009 the applicant and his classmate A. were arrested on suspicion of causing grievous bodily injuries to a boy from their school. They confessed to their deeds. The applicant was initially released under parental supervision, whilst A. was remanded in custody. The following day they retracted their confessions. 8. On 16 November 2009, after the investigator had reclassified their actions as a more serious offence, the Zavolzhskiy District Court in Tver ordered the applicant's placement in custody, citing the gravity of the charges and the fact that he had recanted. The District Court interpreted the latter element as amounting to the risk of an obstruction of justice. On 11 December 2009 the Tver Regional Court upheld the detention order on appeal, finding as follows: ""[The fact that the defendant] has a permanent place of residence, lives with his family, is studying in high school and does not have a criminal record does not provide a basis for rejecting unconditionally the investigator's application [for a detention order] in the light of the extreme gravity of the charges."" 9. On 12 January 2010 the District Court extended the authorised detention period, pointing out that the applicant ""had changed his attitude to the committed offence from an outright acknowledgement to a downright denial"". In the court's opinion, that implied that the applicant might interfere with justice if released. The District Court also added that the custodial measure was necessary ""to secure the enforcement of the conviction"". On 3 February 2010 the Regional Court upheld the District Court's assessment on appeal, in particular its finding that a non-custodial measure would not be sufficient to secure the enforcement of the conviction. 10. On 20 January 2010 the investigator in charge of the applicant's case refused the parents' request for leave to visit their son, reasoning as follows: ""The investigation appointed Mr V. Smirnov, the father of Mr A. Smirnov, as the legal representative of the underage defendant. However, the investigation considers that Mr V. Smirnov is using all means to interfere with the criminal proceedings because of his vested interests; he has not responded when summonsed by the investigator or court, and is causing all kinds of delays in the proceedings. The investigation considers that this kind of conduct on the part of Mr V. Smirnov may have a negative influence of the defendant Mr A. Smirnov, as well as interfering with the establishment of the truth in the criminal case."" 11. On 25 January 2010 the supervising prosecutor rejected a complaint from the applicant's father about the investigator's decision, recalling that the granting of leave to visit a detainee was at the investigator's discretion rather than being a legal obligation and that the arguments for refusing leave were ""persuasive and well-justified"". 12. On 3 February 2010 the District Court issued a further extension order, holding that the applicant had been charged with a particularly serious offence and that the circumstances warranting the application of a custodial measure still obtained. On 19 February 2010 the Regional Court upheld the order on appeal. 13. The final extension order of 11 March 2010 referred to the gravity of the charges against both co-defendants, without distinguishing between their individual situations. 14. By a judgment of 25 March 2010, the Regional Court found the applicant and his co-defendant guilty of attempted murder and sentenced each of them to five years' imprisonment. On 9 June 2010 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the conviction. 15. Between November 2009 and July 2010 the applicant's parents visited him in prison a total of sixteen times. All visits were carried out under the supervision of a warden while the applicant was separated from his parents by a glass partition.",Ruled as violated by court,,"8. On 16 November 2009, after the investigator had reclassified their actions as a more serious offence, the Zavolzhskiy District Court in Tver ordered the applicant's placement in custody, citing the gravity of the charges and the fact that he had recanted. The District Court interpreted the latter element as amounting to the risk of an obstruction of justice. On 11 December 2009 the Tver Regional Court upheld the detention order on appeal, finding as follows: ""[The fact that the defendant] has a permanent place of residence, lives with his family, is studying in high school and does not have a criminal record does not provide a basis for rejecting unconditionally the investigator's application [for a detention order] in the light of the extreme gravity of the charges."" 9. On 12 January 2010 the District Court extended the authorised detention period, pointing out that the applicant ""had changed his attitude to the committed offence from an outright acknowledgement to a downright denial"". In the court's opinion, that implied that the applicant might interfere with justice if released. The District Court also added that the custodial measure was necessary ""to secure the enforcement of the conviction"". On 3 February 2010 the Regional Court upheld the District Court's assessment on appeal, in particular its finding that a non-custodial measure would not be sufficient to secure the enforcement of the conviction. 10. On 20 January 2010 the investigator in charge of the applicant's case refused the parents' request for leave to visit their son, reasoning as follows: ""The investigation appointed Mr V. Smirnov, the father of Mr A. Smirnov, as the legal representative of the underage defendant. However, the investigation considers that Mr V. Smirnov is using all means to interfere with the criminal proceedings because of his vested interests; he has not responded when summonsed by the investigator or court, and is causing all kinds of delays in the proceedings. The investigation considers that this kind of conduct on the part of Mr V. Smirnov may have a negative influence of the defendant Mr A. Smirnov, as well as interfering with the establishment of the truth in the criminal case."" 11. On 25 January 2010 the supervising prosecutor rejected a complaint from the applicant's father about the investigator's decision, recalling that the granting of leave to visit a detainee was at the investigator's discretion rather than being a legal obligation and that the arguments for refusing leave were ""persuasive and well-justified"". 12. On 3 February 2010 the District Court issued a further extension order, holding that the applicant had been charged with a particularly serious offence and that the circumstances warranting the application of a custodial measure still obtained. On 19 February 2010 the Regional Court upheld the order on appeal. 13. The final extension order of 11 March 2010 referred to the gravity of the charges against both co-defendants, without distinguishing between their individual situations.",TRUE,2,"The applicant has a right to family life through prison visitation. However, the state also has meaningful democratic interests in regulating prison visitation. The weighing of these interests determines what the line should be.", 417,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","5. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Ostia Lido. 6. At birth, the applicant was entered in the civil-status registers as male and was given the forename L. However, the applicant stated that she had always identified as female and lived in society as a woman under the forename S. For instance, her work colleagues (the applicant has worked as a civil servant since 1999) had always called her S., and in the photograph on her identity card issued in August 2000 her appearance was that of a woman. 7. In 1999 S.V. began treatment with feminising hormones as part of the gender transition process. 8. On 9 November 2000 she applied to the Rome District Court on the basis of section 3 of Law no. 164 of 1982, stating that she wished to complete the transition process by permanently changing her primary sexual characteristics, and sought authorisation to undergo gender reassignment surgery. 9. In a judgment of 10 May 2001 the District Court found that the applicant had embarked on the gender transition process after careful consideration. Having taken note of her determination the court authorised her to undergo surgery in order to adapt her primary sexual characteristics to match her female gender identity. 10. On 30 May 2001 the applicant, while awaiting the surgery authorised by the District Court, applied to the prefect of Rome for a change of forename under Article 89 of Presidential Decree no. 396 of 2000. She argued that, given that she had been undergoing a gender transition process for several years, and in view of her physical appearance, the fact that her identity papers indicated a male forename was a constant source of humiliation and embarrassment. She also asserted that the waiting period for surgery was approximately four years. 11. In a decision of 4 July 2001 the prefect refused the applicant's request on the grounds that, under Presidential Decree no. 396 of 2000, a person's forename had to correspond to his or her gender. In the prefect's view, in the absence of a final court ruling ordering the change to her legal gender status for the purposes of Law no. 164 of 1982, the applicant's forename could not be changed. 12. The applicant appealed against that decision to the Lazio Regional Administrative Court and also requested a stay of execution of the prefect's decision. 13. On 23 July 2001 the applicant underwent mammoplasty. On 6 September 2001 she was placed on a waiting list at Trieste University Hospital for surgery to alter her primary sexual characteristics. 14. On 21 February 2002 the Regional Administrative Court refused to grant a stay of execution of the prefect's decision. 15. On 3 February 2003, while the proceedings before the Regional Administrative Court were still pending on the merits, the applicant underwent an operation to change her sexual characteristics from male to female. She subsequently applied to the Rome District Court, on an unspecified date, for legal recognition of her gender reassignment under section 3 of Law no. 164 of 1982. 16. In a judgment of 10 October 2003 the Rome District Court granted the applicant's request and ordered the Savona municipal authorities to alter the indication of the applicant's gender from male to female and to change the forename L. to S. 17. By a judgment of 6 March 2008, deposited with the registry on 17 May 2008, the Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's appeal against the prefect's decision of 4 July 2001. The court held that Article 89 of Presidential Decree no. 396 of 2000 concerning changes of forename was not applicable in the present case, which actually came within the scope of Law no. 164 of 1982 concerning changes to legal gender status. The court stressed in that regard that, under the terms of the latter, the amendment of the civil-status records of a transgender person had to be ordered by the court ruling on his or her gender reassignment. It therefore considered that the prefect had correctly refused the applicant's request. The applicant did not appeal against that judgment.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"While one could argue an inherent connection between transgender identity and private life, the statute's list of private and family life, home, and correspondence does not suggest private life as encapsulating all identity.", 418,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","5. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Weinheim. He is a campaigner against abortion and operates an anti-abortion website (babycaust.de). At the time of the proceedings outlined below, the website included, among other things, the following content. 6. On the starting page a picture of graves was shown and the text underneath read ""then: Holocaust"". Upon clicking on the picture, the user was directed to a page titled: ""Abortion – the new Holocaust?"" on which the Holocaust was compared to abortions. On the left margin of the starting page, there were several links, of which one was called ""Life or death?"". Upon clicking on it, the user was directed to a page with the headline ""Prayer requests for Germany"". From that page, the reader was directed to a location-based alphabetical list mentioning the names and practice addresses of doctors who performed abortions in Germany, and to a request for prayers for those doctors. At the very bottom of the same page, under the highlighted text ""German contemporary history in brief"", a sentence read: ""Perverted doctors murder unborn children at the request of the mothers"" (Pervertierte Ärzte ermorden im Auftrag der Mütter die ungeborenen Kinder) On the same page, clicking on the button ""close page"" forwarded the user to a page where it was stated: ""Pray, if possible regularly, for the doctors ... who personally undertake the AGGRAVATED MURDER of abortion killing"" (Beten Sie – wenn möglich regelmäßig – für die Mediziner ..., welche den MORD der Abtreibungstötung selbst vornehmen ...) (Emphasis in original). Somewhat farther down on the same page, it was stated that counselling centres that issued certifications: ""... are enabling and facilitating the unpunished aggravated murder of children in their mother's womb."" (... ermöglichen und begünstigen einen straffreien Kindermord im Mutterschoβ.) 7. One of the doctors listed on the applicant's website, Dr Q., sought a civil injunction ordering the applicant to remove his name and address from the website. 8. On 23 May 2006 the Mannheim Regional Court rejected Dr Q.'s application on the grounds that it was a fact that Dr Q. performed abortions and that the remainder of the website's content was covered by the applicant's freedom of expression. It observed, in particular, that the present case was not comparable to similar cases which had concerned an interference with personality rights by the distribution of personalised leaflets. The publishing of a doctor's name on a list of abortion performing doctors had no comparable ""pillory effect"". 9. Subsequently Dr Q. appealed and – during the appeal proceedings – modified his application, seeking a civil injunction ordering the applicant to desist from labelling abortions, such as those performed by Dr Q., ""aggravated murder"". 10. On 28 February 2007 the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal granted the sought injunction. The court held that the applicant's website led it to be understood that abortions performed by Dr Q. constituted ""aggravated murder"". While the term ""aggravated murder"" did not have to be understood in a merely legal sense but could also be understood as a moral judgment, the overall presentation of the website at the very least did not exclude a reading that Dr Q. had perpetrated the criminal offence of aggravated murder. Even though the applicant had pointed out that abortions were exempt from punishment, he had not referred to section 218a of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 14 below), which exempted abortions as performed by Dr Q., from criminal liability. In addition, the applicant had emphasised the term ""aggravated murder"" in the relevant parts of the website and had compared abortions with the Holocaust. In sum, the statements of the website could be understood as a personalised accusation against Dr Q. of perpetrating aggravated murder. 11. On 29 May 2007 the Federal Court of Justice refused a request by the applicant for legal aid on the grounds that the applicant's intended appeal on points of law lacked sufficient prospect of success. 12. On 2 July 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit a complaint by the applicant for adjudication for being inadmissible, without providing reasons (no. 1 BvR 1663/07).",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"8. On 23 May 2006 the Mannheim Regional Court rejected Dr Q.'s application on the grounds that it was a fact that Dr Q. performed abortions and that the remainder of the website's content was covered by the applicant's freedom of expression. It observed, in particular, that the present case was not comparable to similar cases which had concerned an interference with personality rights by the distribution of personalised leaflets. The publishing of a doctor's name on a list of abortion performing doctors had no comparable ""pillory effect"". 12. On 2 July 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit a complaint by the applicant for adjudication for being inadmissible, without providing reasons (no. 1 BvR 1663/07).",TRUE,1,"While one could argue an inherent connection between abortion and family life, it seems there is no relevance between private life and anti-abortion advocacy.", 419,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","5. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Zagreb. He was formerly a lawyer practising in Zagreb. 6. In the context of the use of secret surveillance measures in respect of a vice-president of the Croatian Privatisation Fund (Hrvatski fond za privatizaciju, hereinafter ""the Fund""), a legal entity established by the State and tasked with carrying out the privatisation of publicly owned property, the authorities intercepted and recorded a number of the applicant's telephone conversations and messages. The secret surveillance was carried out on the basis of orders issued by an investigating judge of the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu). The reasoning of the relevant orders is outlined in the case of Matanović v. Croatia (no. 2742/12, §§ 11‑13, 4 April 2017). 7. On 16 June 2007 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of corruption involving a number of officials of the Fund and other individuals. 8. Following his arrest, an investigation was opened in the Zagreb County Court (see, for further details, Matanović, cited above, §§ 15-28). 9. On 12 February 2008, upon completion of the investigation, the State Attorney's Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime (Ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta – hereinafter: ""the State Attorney's Office"") indicted the applicant and nine other individuals in the Zagreb County Court on charges of bribe-taking, offering bribes, and abuse of power and authority. The applicant was indicted ‒ in his capacity as the lawyer acting for the Vice-President of the Fund ‒ for facilitating the receipt of a bribe of 150,000 euros (EUR) for his client and aiding and abetting the abuse of power and authority by him. 10. During the proceedings the applicant challenged the lawfulness of the secret surveillance orders, arguing that they lacked the requisite reasoning and had been issued contrary to the provisions of the relevant domestic law (see, for further details on the procedural actions taken, Matanović, cited above, §§ 29-63). 11. On 15 May 2009 the Zagreb County Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to three years' imprisonment. It examined in detail and dismissed the applicant's arguments regarding the unlawfulness of secret surveillance orders on the grounds that they had been issued by the relevant investigating judge in accordance with the law. The trial court also provided detailed reasoning why it considered that the available evidence provided a reliable basis for the applicant's conviction. When convicting the applicant, the trial court had relied on the secret surveillance recordings, the statement of an informant, who had been questioned at the trial, the statements of other witnesses, and the evidentiary material available in the file. 12. On 24 and 28 September 2009, the applicant both personally and through a lawyer lodged appeals against the first-instance judgment before the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske). In the appeals, the applicant argued that he had been unlawfully monitored and that his conviction had been based on evidence obtained unlawfully by the use of secret surveillance. He also extensively challenged the factual findings and conclusions of the first-instance court. 13. On 17 February 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the first-instance judgment. 14. On 22 April 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) alleging in particular that he had been placed under unlawful secret surveillance and that the evidence thereby obtained had been used in the criminal proceedings against him. He also extensively elaborated on the alleged deficiencies in the lower courts' factual conclusions. 15. On 21 February 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's complaints as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the lower courts. It also stressed that the applicant had actively participated in the proceedings and that there had been no arbitrariness in the findings and decisions of the relevant courts. 16. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant's representative on 23 February 2012.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. In the context of the use of secret surveillance measures in respect of a vice-president of the Croatian Privatisation Fund (Hrvatski fond za privatizaciju, hereinafter ""the Fund""), a legal entity established by the State and tasked with carrying out the privatisation of publicly owned property, the authorities intercepted and recorded a number of the applicant's telephone conversations and messages. The secret surveillance was carried out on the basis of orders issued by an investigating judge of the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu). The reasoning of the relevant orders is outlined in the case of Matanović v. Croatia (no. 2742/12, §§ 11‑13, 4 April 2017). 10. During the proceedings the applicant challenged the lawfulness of the secret surveillance orders, arguing that they lacked the requisite reasoning and had been issued contrary to the provisions of the relevant domestic law (see, for further details on the procedural actions taken, Matanović, cited above, §§ 29-63). 11. On 15 May 2009 the Zagreb County Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to three years' imprisonment. It examined in detail and dismissed the applicant's arguments regarding the unlawfulness of secret surveillance orders on the grounds that they had been issued by the relevant investigating judge in accordance with the law. The trial court also provided detailed reasoning why it considered that the available evidence provided a reliable basis for the applicant's conviction. When convicting the applicant, the trial court had relied on the secret surveillance recordings, the statement of an informant, who had been questioned at the trial, the statements of other witnesses, and the evidentiary material available in the file. 12. On 24 and 28 September 2009, the applicant both personally and through a lawyer lodged appeals against the first-instance judgment before the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske). In the appeals, the applicant argued that he had been unlawfully monitored and that his conviction had been based on evidence obtained unlawfully by the use of secret surveillance. He also extensively challenged the factual findings and conclusions of the first-instance court. 13. On 17 February 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the first-instance judgment. 14. On 22 April 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) alleging in particular that he had been placed under unlawful secret surveillance and that the evidence thereby obtained had been used in the criminal proceedings against him. He also extensively elaborated on the alleged deficiencies in the lower courts' factual conclusions. 15. On 21 February 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's complaints as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the lower courts. It also stressed that the applicant had actively participated in the proceedings and that there had been no arbitrariness in the findings and decisions of the relevant courts.",TRUE,2,"Surveillance infringes upon the applicant's private life, but its usage prevented crime and upheld morals. It depends on whether that usage was necessary for democratic interests. ", 420,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","5. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Omsk. 6. The applicant was deputy head of the Omsk Regional Department for the Execution of Sentences. 7. On 22 August 2002 the Novosibirsk Regional Court authorised for 180 days the interception and recording of the applicant's telephone conversations, interception of postal communications and the collection of data from technical channels of communication. The surveillance authorisation read in its entirety as follows: ""Operational-search measures carried out with the aim of combatting corruption within State authorities have revealed indications of a systematic bribery scheme operated by certain prison officials in the Omsk region. According to operative information, there are good reasons to suspect [the applicant], deputy head of the Omsk Regional Department for the Execution of Sentences, of arranging for, and systematically receiving, unlawful payments from confidants of the convicts serving their sentences in Omsk penal institutions in exchange for granting them various privileges (such as a prison leave, improved conditions of detention or transfer to another penal institution within the Omsk region, which was for some reason preferred by the convict in question). Given that [the applicant's] actions contain elements of criminal offences under Article 290 § 4 of the Criminal Code [bribe-taking], classified as a serious offence, and under Article 285 § 1 of the Criminal Code [abuse of power], it is necessary to perform a combination of operational-search measures (interception and recording of telephone conversations, monitoring of correspondence and collection of data from technical channels of communication) in order to collect evidence of his criminal activities, and to receive information about the bribe‑givers and the payment mechanisms used."" 8. On 18 February 2003 the Novosibirsk Regional Court authorised ""audio surveillance"" of the applicant's office for 180 days. The Government did not submit a copy of that decision. 9. Charges of bribe-taking or abuse of power have never been brought against the applicant. 10. In March 2003 the applicant was charged with disclosure of State secrets, an offence under Article 283 § 1 of the Criminal Code, for informing a convict's relative that the convict was under covert surveillance. 11. When studying the criminal case file, the applicant learnt for the first time that his telephone conversations had been recorded and his other communications monitored. He also learnt that a recording of his telephone conversation with Ms L., a sister of a convict detained in a penal institution under his supervision, formed the basis for the charge of disclosure of State secrets. During the conversation, which had taken place on 17 October 2002, the applicant had warned Ms L. that her relative was under covert surveillance and that there were listening devices hidden in his cell. 12. At the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty. He claimed, in particular, that the recording of his telephone conversation with Ms L. was inadmissible as evidence as it had been obtained unlawfully. 13. On 16 February 2005 the Omsk Regional Court found the applicant guilty of disclosure of State secrets, an offence under Article 283 § 1 of the Criminal Code. It relied on the recording of the applicant's telephone conversation with Ms L., among other evidence. It found that the recording was admissible as evidence as it had been obtained in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. In particular, the interception of the applicant's telephone conversations had been authorised by a court on the grounds that he was suspected of the serious criminal offence of bribe‑taking. The applicant was sentenced to three years' imprisonment, suspended for two years. 14. In his appeal submissions the applicant complained, in particular, of a violation of his right to respect for his private life. He argued that the interception of his communications had been unlawful and unjustified, and that the recording of his conversation with Ms L. was inadmissible as evidence. 15. On 21 June 2005 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the conviction on appeal. It noted that all the evidence had been collected in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and was admissible.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. On 22 August 2002 the Novosibirsk Regional Court authorised for 180 days the interception and recording of the applicant's telephone conversations, interception of postal communications and the collection of data from technical channels of communication. The surveillance authorisation read in its entirety as follows: ""Operational-search measures carried out with the aim of combatting corruption within State authorities have revealed indications of a systematic bribery scheme operated by certain prison officials in the Omsk region. According to operative information, there are good reasons to suspect [the applicant], deputy head of the Omsk Regional Department for the Execution of Sentences, of arranging for, and systematically receiving, unlawful payments from confidants of the convicts serving their sentences in Omsk penal institutions in exchange for granting them various privileges (such as a prison leave, improved conditions of detention or transfer to another penal institution within the Omsk region, which was for some reason preferred by the convict in question). Given that [the applicant's] actions contain elements of criminal offences under Article 290 § 4 of the Criminal Code [bribe-taking], classified as a serious offence, and under Article 285 § 1 of the Criminal Code [abuse of power], it is necessary to perform a combination of operational-search measures (interception and recording of telephone conversations, monitoring of correspondence and collection of data from technical channels of communication) in order to collect evidence of his criminal activities, and to receive information about the bribe‑givers and the payment mechanisms used.""",TRUE,2,"Surveillance infringes upon the applicant's private life, but its usage prevented crime and upheld morals. It depends on whether that usage was necessary for democratic interests. ", 421,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","4. The applicants were born in 1966, 1971, 1993 and 1996 respectively. The second applicant is the former spouse of the first applicant and the third and the fourth applicants are their children. The first, the third and the fourth applicants live in Lviv. The second applicant had his registered residence in Lviv as at the time when the application was lodged; his current whereabouts are not known. 5. In August 2001 the second applicant, a military officer at the material time, was provided with a two-room flat for himself and his family in an accommodation hall owned by the Lviv Military Academy. Subsequently all four applicants obtained residence registration with the local authority as tenants of that flat. Since 2001 (and as at the time of the observations exchanges between the parties), the household was paying the relevant maintenance charges and other tenancy-related fees, which were calculated on the premise that the flat was occupied by four persons. 6. On 28 November 2003 the second applicant was dismissed from military service on grounds of redundancy. The dismissal order stipulated that he was eligible for priority allocation of social housing from the waiting list managed by the Ministry of Defence. 7. In 2005 the first and the second applicant divorced and the first applicant and her children were placed on the waiting list for social housing managed by the municipal authority. 8. In August 2011 the Lviv garrison military prosecutor instituted eviction proceedings against the applicants. He referred, essentially, to the fact that the accommodation hall belonged to the Military Academy and was designed for the temporary housing of military personnel. Meanwhile, none of the applicants had any connection to the military or the Military Academy, which owned the building. 9. On 15 November 2012 the Frankivskyy District Court in Lviv dismissed the prosecutor's claim. It found that the applicants had lawfully obtained the tenancy in connection with the second applicant's previous military service. Regard being had to the applicable legal provisions concerning the social protection of former military officers and their families, they could not be evicted from the accommodation hall without first being provided with other housing. In addition to that, the fourth applicant had still been a minor at the material time, and further legislation applicable to the protection of minors warranted the protection of her housing rights. 10. Following an appeal by the prosecutor, on 17 September 2013 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal quashed this judgment and ordered the applicants' eviction. It found that they had settled in the disputed premises without the building owner having taken a formal decision authorising their occupancy and without an occupancy order (""ордер""), having been issued in their favour. Accordingly, the applicants' occupancy was unlawful ab initio. This fact extinguished the applicability of the legal provisions cited by the first-instance court concerning the social protection of retired military officers, their families and minors. 11. The applicants lodged a cassation appeal against this judgment. They noted, in particular, that the disputed housing had been their only home for more than ten years and that their eviction would render them homeless. They also submitted that their income level was not sufficient for them to acquire housing at their own expense and that they did not have any family members in Lviv who could offer shelter to them. Their residence was duly registered and they had been dutifully paying all the applicable fees connected with their occupancy of the flat. The fact that the building owner had failed to comply with certain formalities connected with regularising their occupancy was not their fault. In addition, evicting them on this basis should have become time-barred in 2004 (three years after they had moved into the flat). Lastly, the applicants referred to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Kryvitska and Kryvitskyy v. Ukraine (no. 30856/03, judgment of 2 December 2010), and alleged that their eviction would be in breach of the principles established in that judgment, according to which the courts had to assess whether the eviction was necessary in a democratic society. 12. On 20 November 2013 the Higher Specialised Court of Ukraine dismissed the applicants' cassation appeal. 13. Subsequently, enforcement proceedings were instituted with a view to evicting the applicants. The parties have not informed the Court whether the eviction order has been enforced.",Ruled as violated by court,,"10. Following an appeal by the prosecutor, on 17 September 2013 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal quashed this judgment and ordered the applicants' eviction. It found that they had settled in the disputed premises without the building owner having taken a formal decision authorising their occupancy and without an occupancy order (""ордер""), having been issued in their favour. Accordingly, the applicants' occupancy was unlawful ab initio. This fact extinguished the applicability of the legal provisions cited by the first-instance court concerning the social protection of retired military officers, their families and minors. 11. The applicants lodged a cassation appeal against this judgment. They noted, in particular, that the disputed housing had been their only home for more than ten years and that their eviction would render them homeless. They also submitted that their income level was not sufficient for them to acquire housing at their own expense and that they did not have any family members in Lviv who could offer shelter to them. Their residence was duly registered and they had been dutifully paying all the applicable fees connected with their occupancy of the flat. The fact that the building owner had failed to comply with certain formalities connected with regularising their occupancy was not their fault. In addition, evicting them on this basis should have become time-barred in 2004 (three years after they had moved into the flat). Lastly, the applicants referred to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Kryvitska and Kryvitskyy v. Ukraine (no. 30856/03, judgment of 2 December 2010), and alleged that their eviction would be in breach of the principles established in that judgment, according to which the courts had to assess whether the eviction was necessary in a democratic society.",TRUE,2,"The applicants have a right to their home, but the state has a meaningful interest in national security for maintaining rules around military housing.", 422,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","5. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Dubno. 6. The applicant was the principal of a private school in the town of Dubno, in the Rivne Region. 7. On 30 March 2000 criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant for failure to comply with a court decision ordering the reinstatement of a teacher at the private school. 8. According to the applicant, at about 9.00 a.m. on 29 May 2000 officers from Dubno police broke down the front door of the applicant's house. Inside the house, an investigator from the Dubno inter-district prosecutor's office ordered the applicant to go to his office for questioning. When the applicant refused, the investigator asked the police officers to ensure her compulsory appearance for questioning. The police officers allegedly beat the applicant, twisted her arms behind her back and forced her out of the house barefoot. They placed her in a police car and took her to the office of the investigator. At about 1 p.m. on 29 May 2000 the applicant was released. 9. On the next day, 30 May 2000, the applicant was examined by a doctor, who noted that there were injuries on her shoulders. 10. On 9 April 2001 the Dubno inter-district prosecutor's office discontinued the investigation into the applicant's criminal case, having regard to the insignificance of her offence. 11. On 2 August 2001 the Dubno Town Court quashed the decision of 9 April 2001 as unfounded and ordered that there be further investigation. 12. On 14 August 2001 the investigation was completed and the case file was referred to the Dubno Town Court for trial. 13. On 30 January 2004 and 13 March 2006 the Dubno Town Court issued judgments in the applicant's case, which were quashed as unfounded by the Rivne Regional Court of Appeal. 14. On 30 January 2007 the Dubno Town Court convicted the applicant of failure to comply with a court decision, and decided that it was appropriate to punish her with a fine. However, ultimately it released the applicant from the punishment, as the statute of limitation had expired. 15. On 17 April 2007 the Rivne Regional Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the judgment of 30 January 2007. 16. On 13 November 2007 the Supreme Court refused to examine an appeal by the applicant on points of law, on the grounds that she had failed to comply with procedural rules when submitting it. 17. On 2 June 2000 the applicant complained to the Rivne regional prosecutor's office regarding the events of 29 May 2000 (see paragraph 8 above). She was examined by a medical expert, who found that she had sustained five bruises to her shoulders and had injured her left shoulder ligaments. The expert stated that the injuries had been caused by blunt solid objects; they could have been sustained in the circumstances described by the applicant. 18. On 30 June 2000 the Rivne regional prosecutor's office, having conducted a pre-investigation inquiry, refused to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers because of the absence of the constituent elements of a criminal offence. 19. On 20 March 2001, following a complaint by the applicant, the Prosecutor General's Office reversed the decision of 30 June 2000 as unsubstantiated, and ordered an additional inquiry. The applicant was not informed of the decision taken within the additional inquiry. In 2016 the Office of the Government Agent was informed that the file on those inquiries had been destroyed, along with other files relating to the same period, after the expiry of the statutory period for keeping such records. 20. On 29 May 2003 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Dubno Town Court, seeking damages for the violation of the inviolability of her home and her unlawful arrest and ill-treatment on 29 May 2000. 21. On 9 July 2007 the Dubno Town Court found that on 29 May 2000 the applicant had been ill-treated and unlawfully taken from her home to the investigator's office. The court found that the authorities had acted unlawfully and that they had violated her right to the inviolability of her home, right to liberty and right to respect for human dignity. The court awarded the applicant 500 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH – approximately 73 euros (EUR) at the relevant time) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 22. On 26 May 2008 the Lviv Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 9 July 2007. 23. The applicant appealed on points of law, contesting the amount of the award. 24. On 8 May 2009 the Higher Administrative Court found that the appeal had not been prepared in a proper way. That court set a time-limit within which the applicant could rectify shortcomings in her appeal on points of law. 25. On 13 July 2009 the Higher Administrative Court returned the applicant's appeal without examining it on the merits, after finding that she had failed to comply with the procedural requirements for submitting appeals.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. On 30 March 2000 criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant for failure to comply with a court decision ordering the reinstatement of a teacher at the private school. 16. On 13 November 2007 the Supreme Court refused to examine an appeal by the applicant on points of law, on the grounds that she had failed to comply with procedural rules when submitting it. 18. On 30 June 2000 the Rivne regional prosecutor's office, having conducted a pre-investigation inquiry, refused to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers because of the absence of the constituent elements of a criminal offence. 19. On 20 March 2001, following a complaint by the applicant, the Prosecutor General's Office reversed the decision of 30 June 2000 as unsubstantiated, and ordered an additional inquiry. The applicant was not informed of the decision taken within the additional inquiry. In 2016 the Office of the Government Agent was informed that the file on those inquiries had been destroyed, along with other files relating to the same period, after the expiry of the statutory period for keeping such records. 20. On 29 May 2003 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Dubno Town Court, seeking damages for the violation of the inviolability of her home and her unlawful arrest and ill-treatment on 29 May 2000. 21. On 9 July 2007 the Dubno Town Court found that on 29 May 2000 the applicant had been ill-treated and unlawfully taken from her home to the investigator's office. The court found that the authorities had acted unlawfully and that they had violated her right to the inviolability of her home, right to liberty and right to respect for human dignity. The court awarded the applicant 500 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH – approximately 73 euros (EUR) at the relevant time) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 22. On 26 May 2008 the Lviv Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 9 July 2007. 23. The applicant appealed on points of law, contesting the amount of the award. 24. On 8 May 2009 the Higher Administrative Court found that the appeal had not been prepared in a proper way. That court set a time-limit within which the applicant could rectify shortcomings in her appeal on points of law. 25. On 13 July 2009 the Higher Administrative Court returned the applicant's appeal without examining it on the merits, after finding that she had failed to comply with the procedural requirements for submitting appeals.",TRUE,1,"While one could argue that it was necessary for the prevention of crime for the applicant's house to be broken into, the undue sviolence of the act uggests this degree of home violation was not necessary.", 423,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","5. The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Ploiești. 6. At the relevant time, he was married to I.M.U. and they had a son together, born in 2006. Following a series of conflicts between the parents concerning their son's education, on 13 September 2012 I.M.U. filed for divorce and custody of the child. On 19 October 2012 she left the family home and took the child with her. They moved in with her parents and grandmother. 7. On 2 November 2012 the applicant lodged an application for an interim injunction (ordonanţă preşedenţială), seeking to be granted sole or shared custody of the child during the divorce proceedings, or alternatively the right to visit the child during those proceedings according to a detailed schedule that he submitted to the court. 8. The Ploiești District Court gave its ruling on 8 January 2013. It ruled that it would not be in the child's interests to change his residence temporarily during the divorce proceedings. It also observed that the applicant had not been prevented from visiting his child in the mother's new home, as he himself had confirmed in his statements before the court. The court noted that in any case the law did not provide for the possibility to have visiting rights established during divorce proceedings. It relied on Article 6132 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 18 below). 9. Following an appeal by the applicant, that ruling was upheld by the Prahova County Court, which rejected all the arguments raised by the applicant concerning his right to visit his child. The court reiterated that the law did not allow for the granting of that right during divorce and custody proceedings. The court also ordered the applicant to pay 1,000 Romanian lei (RON – approximately 230 euros (EUR)) to I.M.U., representing the costs that I.M.U. had incurred. The court delivered the final decision in the case on 27 May 2013. 10. In June 2013 the applicant, who was in the habit of visiting his son at school in the mornings, was removed from the school premises by the school guard, who informed him that from then on, he would need the school principal's permission if he wanted to see his son at the school. 11. According to the applicant, after the final decision of 27 May 2013 (see paragraph 9 above), I.M.U. and her family denied him any further contact with his son. It appears from the parties' submissions that the applicant was able to see his son on 27 December 2012, between 31 December 2012 and 2 January 2013, on 20 January, between 2 and 3 March, on 14 and 17 March, on 28 April, on 2, 6 and 12 May 2013, and one last time, on 9 June 2013, after the court had given its ruling in respect of the interim injunction. 12. On 30 October 2013 the applicant added a copy of the District Court's ruling of 8 January 2013 (see paragraph 8 above) to the case file. 13. After several postponements that were due mainly to the parties' requests to be allowed to submit additional evidence, on 22 January 2014 the Ploieşti District Court gave its judgment on the divorce proceedings, ruling that the child's sole residence would be with his mother. The applicant was granted the right to have the child stay at his home every other weekend and for two weeks during the summer holidays. On 21 February 2014 the applicant asked the District Court to finish the drafting of its written judgment faster, and reiterated that he had been unable to see his child for the past ten months. 14. On 4 March 2014 the judgment was served on the applicant at his address; on 28 March 2014 he lodged an appeal. On 2 April 2014 I.M.U. also lodged an appeal against the District Court's judgment. Despite requests from the applicant to expedite the proceedings in order to allow him to re-establish contact with his son, the case file could not be sent to the Prahova County Court before 7 May 2014 owing to administrative problems within the District Court. 15. The start of the proceedings before the Prahova County Court was postponed on several occasions in order to allow the parties to get acquainted with the submissions in the file, to hear evidence and to obtain an expert evaluation of the relations between the parents and between each parent and the child. The County Court delivered its ruling on 22 October 2015. It upheld the previous decision adopted by the District Court. 16. Both parties lodged appeals against the County Court's decision. At the applicant's request, the case was sent to the Bucharest Court of Appeal. After several postponements to the proceedings, on 2 November 2016 the Bucharest Court of Appeal delivered the final decision in the case. It upheld the ruling of the District Court, but made some amendments to the applicant's visiting schedule. 17. On 19 February 2018 the child moved in with the applicant, at the boy's own express request and in accordance with an agreement signed before a notary by both parents, following the mother's decision to move permanently to another town.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. At the relevant time, he was married to I.M.U. and they had a son together, born in 2006. Following a series of conflicts between the parents concerning their son's education, on 13 September 2012 I.M.U. filed for divorce and custody of the child. On 19 October 2012 she left the family home and took the child with her. They moved in with her parents and grandmother. 7. On 2 November 2012 the applicant lodged an application for an interim injunction (ordonanţă preşedenţială), seeking to be granted sole or shared custody of the child during the divorce proceedings, or alternatively the right to visit the child during those proceedings according to a detailed schedule that he submitted to the court. 8. The Ploiești District Court gave its ruling on 8 January 2013. It ruled that it would not be in the child's interests to change his residence temporarily during the divorce proceedings. It also observed that the applicant had not been prevented from visiting his child in the mother's new home, as he himself had confirmed in his statements before the court. The court noted that in any case the law did not provide for the possibility to have visiting rights established during divorce proceedings. It relied on Article 6132 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 18 below). 9. Following an appeal by the applicant, that ruling was upheld by the Prahova County Court, which rejected all the arguments raised by the applicant concerning his right to visit his child. The court reiterated that the law did not allow for the granting of that right during divorce and custody proceedings. The court also ordered the applicant to pay 1,000 Romanian lei (RON – approximately 230 euros (EUR)) to I.M.U., representing the costs that I.M.U. had incurred. The court delivered the final decision in the case on 27 May 2013. 10. In June 2013 the applicant, who was in the habit of visiting his son at school in the mornings, was removed from the school premises by the school guard, who informed him that from then on, he would need the school principal's permission if he wanted to see his son at the school. 11. According to the applicant, after the final decision of 27 May 2013 (see paragraph 9 above), I.M.U. and her family denied him any further contact with his son. It appears from the parties' submissions that the applicant was able to see his son on 27 December 2012, between 31 December 2012 and 2 January 2013, on 20 January, between 2 and 3 March, on 14 and 17 March, on 28 April, on 2, 6 and 12 May 2013, and one last time, on 9 June 2013, after the court had given its ruling in respect of the interim injunction. 16. Both parties lodged appeals against the County Court's decision. At the applicant's request, the case was sent to the Bucharest Court of Appeal. After several postponements to the proceedings, on 2 November 2016 the Bucharest Court of Appeal delivered the final decision in the case. It upheld the ruling of the District Court, but made some amendments to the applicant's visiting schedule.",TRUE,2,The applicant has a right to family life with his child. The state also has meaningful democratic interests in protecting children's rights. It depends on the reading of the statute how involved the state should be with these familial issues., 424,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","5. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Charlotte, North Carolina (the United States of America). 6. The case concerns ""non-contentious"" proceedings for the return of the child instituted on 13 October 2011 in which the domestic courts refused to order the return of the applicant's son to the United States after the child's mother (a Croatian national and the applicant's former wife) had in August 2011 ""wrongfully retained"" him in Croatia within the meaning of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (""the Hague Convention""). 7. Specifically, on 15 March 2012 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court (Općinski građanski sud u Zagrebu), without holding a single hearing, dismissed the applicant's request for the return of the child. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 2 July 2012 the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu) quashed the Municipal Court's decision and remitted the case. In so deciding it, inter alia, instructed the Municipal Court to hold a hearing. The relevant part of the County Court's decision reads as follows: ""... the first-instance court based [its] decision in part on undisputed facts, and in the relevant part on the arguments and evidence submitted by the counterparty ... even though it failed to give an opportunity to the petitioner to comment on them ... [T]herefore, the petitioner's appeal has to be allowed, the first-instance decision quashed and the case remitted ... In the fresh proceedings, the first-instance court shall correct the above error by scheduling a hearing (section 309(5) of the Family Act) at which it shall, together with the parties (sections 297-298 of the Civil Procedure Act), examine the circumstances of the case."" 8. In the fresh proceedings the Municipal Court obtained an opinion from a forensic expert in psychiatry on whether returning the child to the United States would expose him to psychological harm – that is, to a risk envisaged in Article 13 paragraph 1 (b) of the Hague Convention (see paragraph 27 below with further references). On 21 May 2014 that court, without holding a hearing, again dismissed the applicant's request for his son to be returned to the United States. This decision was upheld on appeal by the Zagreb County Court on 22 October 2014. The Municipal Court justified its decision not to hold a hearing in the following way: ""... the court did not take evidence by hearing the parties because that would significantly protract the proceedings, bearing in mind that in their testimonies – precisely because they have a personal stake in the outcome of the proceedings and their objectivity is very questionable – the parties mostly want to praise and present themselves in the best light while discrediting the opposing party ... [S]uch testimonies are [therefore] generally not at all suitable [in terms of assisting a court in establishing the facts of a case] and reaching a decision."" 9. Those return proceedings (see paragraphs 6-8 above) were already subject to the examination by the Court. In the first Adžić case the Court in the judgment of 12 March 2015 held that the domestic authorities had failed to act expeditiously in the proceedings in question. The Court had accordingly found a violation of the State's positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention (see Adžić v. Croatia, no. 22643/14, §§ 96-99, 12 March 2015). At the time the Court adopted its judgment, i.e. 17 February 2015, the proceedings were still pending before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) upon a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant. 10. In his constitutional complaint the applicant complained of a violation of his right to fair procedure, in particular of a breach of his right to an oral hearing and a breach of the principle of equality of arms and the adversarial principle. More specifically, the applicant submitted that the ordinary courts had not held a single hearing in the case and that the first‑instance court had not informed him of its decision to obtain an opinion from a forensic expert in psychiatry, thus preventing him from objecting to the choice of expert. He further complained that he had not been involved in the expert's assessment, even though he had previously expressed his willingness to make himself available for such an assessment. The applicant also complained that the domestic court's refusal to order the return of his son constituted a violation of his right to respect for family life. 11. By a decision of 28 October 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's constitutional complaint. It served its decision on his representative on 4 December 2015. The Constitutional Court examined only the alleged violation of the applicant's right to fair procedure, because it considered that the alleged violation of his right to family life had been addressed by the Court in the first Adžić case (see paragraph 9 above). 12. The other relevant facts of the case are set out in detail in the Court's judgment in the first Adžić case (see Adžić, cited above, §§ 6-57).",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. The case concerns ""non-contentious"" proceedings for the return of the child instituted on 13 October 2011 in which the domestic courts refused to order the return of the applicant's son to the United States after the child's mother (a Croatian national and the applicant's former wife) had in August 2011 ""wrongfully retained"" him in Croatia within the meaning of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (""the Hague Convention""). 7. Specifically, on 15 March 2012 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court (Općinski građanski sud u Zagrebu), without holding a single hearing, dismissed the applicant's request for the return of the child. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 2 July 2012 the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu) quashed the Municipal Court's decision and remitted the case. In so deciding it, inter alia, instructed the Municipal Court to hold a hearing. The relevant part of the County Court's decision reads as follows: ""... the first-instance court based [its] decision in part on undisputed facts, and in the relevant part on the arguments and evidence submitted by the counterparty ... even though it failed to give an opportunity to the petitioner to comment on them ... [T]herefore, the petitioner's appeal has to be allowed, the first-instance decision quashed and the case remitted ... In the fresh proceedings, the first-instance court shall correct the above error by scheduling a hearing (section 309(5) of the Family Act) at which it shall, together with the parties (sections 297-298 of the Civil Procedure Act), examine the circumstances of the case."" 8. In the fresh proceedings the Municipal Court obtained an opinion from a forensic expert in psychiatry on whether returning the child to the United States would expose him to psychological harm – that is, to a risk envisaged in Article 13 paragraph 1 (b) of the Hague Convention (see paragraph 27 below with further references). On 21 May 2014 that court, without holding a hearing, again dismissed the applicant's request for his son to be returned to the United States. This decision was upheld on appeal by the Zagreb County Court on 22 October 2014. The Municipal Court justified its decision not to hold a hearing in the following way: ""... the court did not take evidence by hearing the parties because that would significantly protract the proceedings, bearing in mind that in their testimonies – precisely because they have a personal stake in the outcome of the proceedings and their objectivity is very questionable – the parties mostly want to praise and present themselves in the best light while discrediting the opposing party ... [S]uch testimonies are [therefore] generally not at all suitable [in terms of assisting a court in establishing the facts of a case] and reaching a decision."" 9. Those return proceedings (see paragraphs 6-8 above) were already subject to the examination by the Court. In the first Adžić case the Court in the judgment of 12 March 2015 held that the domestic authorities had failed to act expeditiously in the proceedings in question. The Court had accordingly found a violation of the State's positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention (see Adžić v. Croatia, no. 22643/14, §§ 96-99, 12 March 2015). At the time the Court adopted its judgment, i.e. 17 February 2015, the proceedings were still pending before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) upon a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant. 10. In his constitutional complaint the applicant complained of a violation of his right to fair procedure, in particular of a breach of his right to an oral hearing and a breach of the principle of equality of arms and the adversarial principle. More specifically, the applicant submitted that the ordinary courts had not held a single hearing in the case and that the first‑instance court had not informed him of its decision to obtain an opinion from a forensic expert in psychiatry, thus preventing him from objecting to the choice of expert. He further complained that he had not been involved in the expert's assessment, even though he had previously expressed his willingness to make himself available for such an assessment. The applicant also complained that the domestic court's refusal to order the return of his son constituted a violation of his right to respect for family life. 11. By a decision of 28 October 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's constitutional complaint. It served its decision on his representative on 4 December 2015. The Constitutional Court examined only the alleged violation of the applicant's right to fair procedure, because it considered that the alleged violation of his right to family life had been addressed by the Court in the first Adžić case (see paragraph 9 above).",TRUE,1,"While courts have a meaningful democratic interest in protecting children's rights as they weigh cases, it appears they interfered with the applicant's right to family life with his child, through their extensive proceedings.", 425,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","6. The first applicant was born in 1976 and is serving a sentence of imprisonment in the Sverdlovsk region. The second applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Vladivostok. 7. In July 2012 the first applicant's employer, the prosecutor's office of the Primorskiy Region, provided him with a flat and concluded a tenancy agreement with him. The second applicant was included in the agreement as a member of the first applicant's family. 8. In August 2012 the second applicant was classified as having a first‑degree disability. 9. On 7 October 2014 the first applicant retired from the prosecutor's office. On the same date he applied to the General Prosecutor of the Russian Federation with a request for the transfer of the title to the flat in question to him. 10. On 8 October 2014 criminal proceedings were initiated against the first applicant in respect of a suspected criminal offence. On the same date he was arrested and on 10 October 2014 he was detained pending investigation. On an unspecified date in 2016 the first applicant was released and placed under house arrest. 11. On 21 November 2014 the first applicant's request for the transfer of the title to flat in question to him was refused. 12. On 25 November 2014 the first applicant received notice to vacate the flat by 5 December 2014. 13. On 26 November 2014 the first applicant's brother received notice to vacate the flat (the notice was addressed by the prosecutor's office to the second applicant). 14. In December 2014 the prosecutor's office brought eviction claims against the applicants on the grounds that the first applicant no longer worked for the prosecutor's office and that therefore, he and his family had to vacate the flat. 15. The first applicant contested those claims. He submitted that it would be unlawful to evict him and his mother because he, as a retired prosecutor, had a right to acquire ownership of the flat in question. He and his mother had no other housing. In addition, his mother was a retired person and had a first-degree disability. 16. On 27 February 2015 the Frunzenskiy District Court (""the District Court"") dismissed the eviction claims. The prosecutor's office appealed against that judgment to the Primorskiy Regional Court (""the Regional Court""). 17. On 8 June 2015 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 27 February 2015 and delivered a new decision ordering the applicants' eviction, with no alternative accommodation being provided. The first applicant was represented by a lawyer, K. The second applicant was not present and was not represented in those proceedings. In particular, the Regional Court found that the first applicant and his mother had been provided with a flat for the period of the first applicant's service in the prosecutor's office. Under domestic law and the terms of the agreement, the tenants had had to vacate the housing after the termination of the agreement and in the event of their refusal they had had to be evicted with no alternative accommodation being provided. As at the date of the examination of the eviction claims the first applicant had not applied to the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation for title to the flat in question to be transferred to him; therefore, the District's Court conclusion as to the absence of any obstacles to the transfer of ownership of the flat in question to the first applicant was in conflict with the circumstances established in the case. As at the date of the examination of the prosecutor's appeal the question regarding the transfer of ownership of the flat in question to the first applicant had not been decided. 18. The first applicant lodged a cassation appeal against that decision with the presidium of the Regional Court. He complained that the hearing of 8 June 2015 had been held in his absence and that as a result he had been evicted from the only accommodation he had had. 19. On 22 July 2015 a judge of the Regional Court refused to refer the first applicant's appeal to the Civil Chamber of the Regional Court for examination on the merits. The first applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. 20. On 22 September 2015 the second applicant was evicted from the flat. 21. On 30 September 2015 a judge of the Supreme Court refused to refer the first applicant's cassation appeal to the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court for examination. 22. In June 2015 the first applicant's brother (Mr D. Pylayev) initiated court proceedings for the second applicant to be deprived of legal capacity and for him to be appointed as her guardian. 23. On 11 May 2016 the District Court declared that the second applicant lacked legal capacity because she was suffering from illness. In particular, the District Court based its decision on an expert report dated 25 January 2016 which had established that she had been suffering from a mental handicap since 2010 and as a result had not been able to understand or control her actions. That judgment entered into force on 14 June 2016. 24. On 29 June 2016 the local public health department appointed the first applicant's brother as her guardian.",Ruled as violated by court,,"15. The first applicant contested those claims. He submitted that it would be unlawful to evict him and his mother because he, as a retired prosecutor, had a right to acquire ownership of the flat in question. He and his mother had no other housing. In addition, his mother was a retired person and had a first-degree disability.",TRUE,1,"While one could argue an inherent connection between flat eviction and the home, the statute's list of private and family life, home, and correspondence does not suggest home as the right to housing.", 426,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","6. The first, second and third applicants were born in 1981, 1973 and 1984 respectively. Since 2004 they have been serving life sentences in correctional colonies in Ukraine. 7. On 11 July 2003 the Ukrainian Parliament adopted the Code on the Execution of Sentences of Ukraine (""the Code""). Article 150 of the Code (""Place of serving life imprisonment"") provided that life prisoners were to serve their sentences in maximum-security correctional colonies. Article 151 (""Procedure for, and conditions of, the execution and serving of life sentences"") further provided, inter alia, that life prisoners were entitled to one short visit every six months. No reference to prisoners' gender was made in those Articles. At the same time, Article 18 (""Correctional colonies"") provided that female life prisoners were to serve their sentences in medium-security colonies. In turn, Article 139 (""Medium-security correctional colonies"") provided that prisoners serving their sentences in such colonies were entitled, inter alia, to have one short visit every month and one long visit every three months. Article 110 specified that a short visit from relatives or other persons could last for up to four hours and a long visit from close relatives could last for up to three days. 8. By a letter of 27 June 2007 the State Department of Ukraine for the Execution of Sentences informed the second applicant, in reply to a letter sent by him on an earlier date, that female life prisoners were entitled to have one long visit every three months, as provided by Article 139 of the Code, given that they served their sentences in medium-security colonies, as provided by Article 18 of the Code. Referring, in particular, to Article 151 of the Code, the Department further stated that male life prisoners were entitled to have one short visit every six months and that they were not entitled to have long visits. 9. On 21 January 2010 the Code was amended (""the 2010 amendments""). Article 150, as amended, stated that persons sentenced to life imprisonment were to serve their sentences as follows: male prisoners ‑ either in maximum-security sectors of medium-security correctional colonies or in maximum-security correctional colonies; and female prisoners – either in medium-security sectors of minimum-security correctional colonies with general conditions of detention or in medium-security correctional colonies. Article 151, as amended, stated that life prisoners were entitled to one short visit every three months. A newly introduced Article 151² (""Specifics regarding the serving of sentences by female life prisoners"") provided that female life prisoners were to be placed, as a rule, in medium-security sectors of minimum-security colonies with general conditions of detention. It also provided that female life prisoners were to be subject to the regime laid down for prisoners held in medium‑security colonies (that is, the regime provided for in Article 139 of the Code). 10. By the Law of 8 April 2014 on the introduction of amendments to the Code relating to the adaptation of status of convicted persons to European standards the Code was amended again (""the 2014 amendments""). Article 151 was amended to entitle all life prisoners to one short visit every month and one long visit every three months regardless of the type of correctional colony in which they were detained or the security regime to which they were subject. 11. Further amendments to Article 151 of the Code, which were passed by Parliament on 7 September 2016, entitled all life prisoners to one long visit every two months. 12. The first applicant stated that he and his family had wished to maintain their relationships, but as the result of the absence of the right to long visits until 2014 he had had to divorce his wife. His father, grandfather and grandmother had died in 2008, 2009 and 2014 respectively and he had not been able to see them while serving his sentence. The Government submitted that while serving his sentence the first applicant had received twenty-eight short visits on unspecified dates and fifteen long visits (between 17 March 2015 and 6 July 2018) from his new wife, mother and his other grandmother. 13. The second applicant stated that, because of the lack of the opportunity to have long visits until 2014, he had lost contact with his family. His relatives had died – in particular he referred to his father having died in 2012 – and when the 2014 amendments entitled him to long visits, there had no longer been anyone to visit him. The Government submitted that while serving his sentence the second applicant had had one short visit in 2005 (from his sister) and had not requested any long visits. 14. The third applicant stated that, in the absence of the right to long visits until 2014, his right to found a family had been more declaratory than effective as, in particular, he had not been able to have any physical contact in order to conceive children. The Government submitted that while serving his sentence the third applicant had had twelve short visits (between 25 July 2012 and 26 December 2017) and fourteen long visits (between 5 August 2014 and 6 February 2018) from his wife, mother, father and friends.",Ruled as violated by court,,"8. By a letter of 27 June 2007 the State Department of Ukraine for the Execution of Sentences informed the second applicant, in reply to a letter sent by him on an earlier date, that female life prisoners were entitled to have one long visit every three months, as provided by Article 139 of the Code, given that they served their sentences in medium-security colonies, as provided by Article 18 of the Code. Referring, in particular, to Article 151 of the Code, the Department further stated that male life prisoners were entitled to have one short visit every six months and that they were not entitled to have long visits.",TRUE,2,"The applicant has a right to family life through prison visitation. However, the state also has meaningful democratic interests in regulating prison visitation. The weighing of these interests determines what the line should be.", 427,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","5. The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Palanga. 6. On 22 November 2013 the director of company M. lodged a complaint with the Klaipėda police, alleging that the applicant's wife, who had been providing accounting services to company M., had unlawfully transferred large amounts of money from that company's bank account to other companies. The director claimed that company M. had not obtained any services from those companies and that he had not pre-approved those transfers. 7. On 25 November 2013 the Klaipėda police opened a pre-trial investigation into allegations of embezzlement and falsification of documents, under Article 184 § 1 and Article 300 § 1 of the Criminal Code. The director of company M. was questioned as a witness and stated that in May 2012 he had entered into a contract for accounting services with company A., of which the applicant was the director. In accordance with that contract, the applicant's wife had begun providing accounting services to company M. In the beginning he had been happy with her work, but later he had noticed certain bank transfers which appeared suspicious to him. One such suspicious transfer had been a payment of 120,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL) (approximately 34,750 euros (EUR)) to company A. 8. On 4 December 2013 the applicant's wife was granted the status of a ""special witness"" in the investigation; in line with the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter ""the CCP""), she was questioned about her own possibly criminal activity and was exempted from liability for refusing to testify or giving false testimony (see paragraph 27 below). She stated that all the transfers from company M.'s bank account which she had carried out had been pre-approved by its director. She also stated that the transfer to company A. had been made by mistake, and the entire amount had been returned to company M. within a week. 9. On 9 April 2014 the applicant was called as a witness. He refused to give testimony in relation to his wife's actions and the payment of LTL 120,000 received by company A. from company M. 10. On 26 May 2014 a prosecutor from the Klaipėda regional prosecutor's office gave the applicant a fine of LTL 650 (approximately EUR 188) for refusing to testify, as provided for in Article 163 of the CCP (see paragraphs 31 and 32 below). 11. The applicant lodged a complaint with a senior prosecutor. He argued that the status of a ""special witness"" was similar to that of a suspect, and therefore he should not have been compelled to testify against his wife, who had such status. He relied on Article 31 of the Constitution, which prohibits compelling a person to testify against his or her family members (see paragraph 18 below). 12. On 9 June 2014 a senior prosecutor from the Klaipėda regional prosecutor's office dismissed the applicant's complaint on the grounds that, in accordance with the CCP, only the family members of a suspect or an accused were exempt from liability for refusing to testify, but the CCP did not extend such a privilege to the family members of a ""special witness"" (see paragraph 19 below). 13. The applicant lodged a complaint with the Klaipėda District Court, raising essentially the same arguments as those which he had raised before (see paragraph 11 above). He also asked the court to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court for a ruling on whether the CCP provisions which exempted the family members of a suspect or an accused from liability for refusing to testify, but not the family members of a ""special witness"", complied with the Constitution. 14. On 9 July 2014 the Klaipėda District Court dismissed the applicant's complaint and upheld the reasoning in the prosecutor's decision (see paragraph 12 above). It stated that the applicant's right not to testify against his wife would have been breached only if his wife had had the status of a suspect and not that of a witness. It also considered that the applicant's request to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court was ""subjective and legally unfounded"". That decision was final and not open to any further appeal. 15. Subsequently, the applicant lodged an appeal with the Klaipėda Regional Court, but on 22 July 2014 that court refused to examine it, on the grounds that there was no provision for such an appeal in law. The applicant then lodged an application to reopen the proceedings with the Supreme Court, but on 23 September 2014 the court ruled that it had no authority to reopen proceedings concerning procedural penalties imposed under Article 163 of the CCP. 16. On 11 September 2014 the applicant was questioned as a witness in the pre-trial investigation. He stated that he was the director of company A., which provided accounting services to other companies. His wife worked as the financial director of company A., and from May to November 2012 she had provided accounting services to company M. The applicant stated that he had not known how or why LTL 120,000 had been transferred to the bank account of company A. He knew only that that entire amount had been returned to company M. within a week, in a transfer carried out by his wife. 17. On 22 September 2014 the Klaipėda regional prosecutor's office discontinued the pre-trial investigation on the grounds that no criminal offences had been committed. It appears that that decision was not appealed against and became final.",Ruled as violated by court,,"10. On 26 May 2014 a prosecutor from the Klaipėda regional prosecutor's office gave the applicant a fine of LTL 650 (approximately EUR 188) for refusing to testify, as provided for in Article 163 of the CCP (see paragraphs 31 and 32 below). 11. The applicant lodged a complaint with a senior prosecutor. He argued that the status of a ""special witness"" was similar to that of a suspect, and therefore he should not have been compelled to testify against his wife, who had such status. He relied on Article 31 of the Constitution, which prohibits compelling a person to testify against his or her family members (see paragraph 18 below). 12. On 9 June 2014 a senior prosecutor from the Klaipėda regional prosecutor's office dismissed the applicant's complaint on the grounds that, in accordance with the CCP, only the family members of a suspect or an accused were exempt from liability for refusing to testify, but the CCP did not extend such a privilege to the family members of a ""special witness"" (see paragraph 19 below). 13. The applicant lodged a complaint with the Klaipėda District Court, raising essentially the same arguments as those which he had raised before (see paragraph 11 above). He also asked the court to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court for a ruling on whether the CCP provisions which exempted the family members of a suspect or an accused from liability for refusing to testify, but not the family members of a ""special witness"", complied with the Constitution. 14. On 9 July 2014 the Klaipėda District Court dismissed the applicant's complaint and upheld the reasoning in the prosecutor's decision (see paragraph 12 above). It stated that the applicant's right not to testify against his wife would have been breached only if his wife had had the status of a suspect and not that of a witness. It also considered that the applicant's request to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court was ""subjective and legally unfounded"". That decision was final and not open to any further appeal. 15. Subsequently, the applicant lodged an appeal with the Klaipėda Regional Court, but on 22 July 2014 that court refused to examine it, on the grounds that there was no provision for such an appeal in law. The applicant then lodged an application to reopen the proceedings with the Supreme Court, but on 23 September 2014 the court ruled that it had no authority to reopen proceedings concerning procedural penalties imposed under Article 163 of the CCP. 16. On 11 September 2014 the applicant was questioned as a witness in the pre-trial investigation. He stated that he was the director of company A., which provided accounting services to other companies. His wife worked as the financial director of company A., and from May to November 2012 she had provided accounting services to company M. The applicant stated that he had not known how or why LTL 120,000 had been transferred to the bank account of company A. He knew only that that entire amount had been returned to company M. within a week, in a transfer carried out by his wife.",TRUE,2,"While the applicant has a right to privacy in his family life with his wife, the state also has a meaningful interest in pursuing justice here.", 428,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","4. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Klaipėda. 5. On 2 July 2013 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of possession of drugs with intention to distribute. On 9 July 2013 the applicant was brought to Šiauliai Remand Prison and was held there until 31 May 2016. In judgment of 23 December 2015 the applicant was sentenced to four years imprisonment by the Klaipėda District Court. Following an appeal by the applicant, the judgment became final on 25 May 2016. The applicant was then transferred to Alytus Correctional Facility and after serving his sentence was released on 30 June 2017. 6. In April 2014 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Šiauliai Regional Administrative Court about his conditions of detention in Šiauliai Remand Prison. He complained of: overcrowding; of there being no partition wall between toilets and cells; of insufficient ventilation; of insufficient time in the open air; of insufficient time for showering; of the presence of cockroaches; of inmates smoking in the cells; of no long-stay or short visits; of the fact that he had not been allowed to go home; of the low energy value of the food provided; of the prohibition on receiving food from relatives and friends; and of the prohibition on having his own blanket and a music player. 7. On 27 June 2014 the Šiauliai Regional Administrative Court held that for 135 days the applicant had been housed in cell no. 53, and the personal space available to him had varied between 1.87 and 3.12 sq. m. This had been a clear violation of domestic norms. For eighty-seven days the applicant had been held in cell no. 50, where the personal space available to him had varied between 1.86 and 4.65 sq. m, and it had come close to a violation of domestic norms. The court further held that the presence of toilets in the applicant's cell had not corresponded to the requirements of domestic law, that the lighting had been insufficient and the temperature had been too low, and that the food provided had had insufficient energy value. The court noted that inmates could buy food and other necessities in the shops of the facility. The applicant's other complaints were dismissed as unsubstantiated. As regards the prohibition on having his own blanket and a music player, the court held that the use of personal blankets was not allowed in accordance with domestic norms. As for music players, inmates could use television sets, computers, computer-game devices, discs that could not be rewritten, other memory cards of up to 4GB and bedding (except for a pillow, a mattress and a blanket) that could be given to them by their spouses, partners or close relatives. As regards long-stay and short visits, the court held that remand prisoners did not have a right to long-stay visits but he had a right to short visits of up to two hours. The applicant asked for a long-stay visit but on 20 January 2014 the prosecutor decided not to allow him such a visit. The court also held that inmates could be allowed to go home for up to five days in the event of the death or serious illness of a spouse, partner or close relative, or in the event of a natural disaster that had caused serious pecuniary damage to the inmate, his or her spouse, partner or close relatives. However, in his request of 31 January 2014 the applicant did not indicate any of those circumstances. As a result, the applicant was awarded 1,200 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 348 euros (EUR)) in compensation for inadequate material conditions of detention for 222 days during the period between 9 July 2013 and 3 April 2014. 8. The applicant appealed, and on 11 February 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court held that it was impossible to calculate for how many days the applicant had had sufficient personal space at his disposal, and decided to hold that for 245 days the applicant had not had sufficient personal space, and that this had been a breach of Article 3 of the Convention. The court thus decided to increase the compensation to EUR 1,500. 9. In October 2014 the applicant lodged a new complaint concerning his material conditions in Šiauliai Remand Prison. He complained of overcrowding, low temperature, dampness, insufficient lighting, prisoners smoking in the cells, that his partner had not been able to pay him a long‑stay visit and that he had not been allowed to ""take holidays"". It appears that the applicant had asked the prison management to allow him to receive a long-stay visit from his spouse and his sister on 28 April 2014. 10. On 5 December 2014 the Šiauliai Regional Administrative Court held that during the period between 4 April and 5 October 2014 – for 176 days – the applicant had had insufficient cell space. As regards long-stay visits, the court agreed with Šiauliai Remand Prison and stated that the applicant had not been entitled to them under domestic law; he could have had short visits but, however, he had never asked for them. The court accepted the argument of the Šiauliai Remand Prison that remand detainees had been held in prisons or correctional facilities for short periods of time and they were not in a similar situation to convicted inmates. The court awarded the applicant EUR 869 in compensation for the material conditions of his detention. 11. The applicant appealed, and on 21 September 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision in its entirety.",Ruled as violated by court,,"5. On 2 July 2013 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of possession of drugs with intention to distribute. On 9 July 2013 the applicant was brought to Šiauliai Remand Prison and was held there until 31 May 2016. In judgment of 23 December 2015 the applicant was sentenced to four years imprisonment by the Klaipėda District Court. Following an appeal by the applicant, the judgment became final on 25 May 2016. The applicant was then transferred to Alytus Correctional Facility and after serving his sentence was released on 30 June 2017. 7. On 27 June 2014 the Šiauliai Regional Administrative Court held that for 135 days the applicant had been housed in cell no. 53, and the personal space available to him had varied between 1.87 and 3.12 sq. m. This had been a clear violation of domestic norms. For eighty-seven days the applicant had been held in cell no. 50, where the personal space available to him had varied between 1.86 and 4.65 sq. m, and it had come close to a violation of domestic norms. The court further held that the presence of toilets in the applicant's cell had not corresponded to the requirements of domestic law, that the lighting had been insufficient and the temperature had been too low, and that the food provided had had insufficient energy value. The court noted that inmates could buy food and other necessities in the shops of the facility. The applicant's other complaints were dismissed as unsubstantiated. As regards the prohibition on having his own blanket and a music player, the court held that the use of personal blankets was not allowed in accordance with domestic norms. As for music players, inmates could use television sets, computers, computer-game devices, discs that could not be rewritten, other memory cards of up to 4GB and bedding (except for a pillow, a mattress and a blanket) that could be given to them by their spouses, partners or close relatives. As regards long-stay and short visits, the court held that remand prisoners did not have a right to long-stay visits but he had a right to short visits of up to two hours. The applicant asked for a long-stay visit but on 20 January 2014 the prosecutor decided not to allow him such a visit. The court also held that inmates could be allowed to go home for up to five days in the event of the death or serious illness of a spouse, partner or close relative, or in the event of a natural disaster that had caused serious pecuniary damage to the inmate, his or her spouse, partner or close relatives. However, in his request of 31 January 2014 the applicant did not indicate any of those circumstances. As a result, the applicant was awarded 1,200 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 348 euros (EUR)) in compensation for inadequate material conditions of detention for 222 days during the period between 9 July 2013 and 3 April 2014. 8. The applicant appealed, and on 11 February 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court held that it was impossible to calculate for how many days the applicant had had sufficient personal space at his disposal, and decided to hold that for 245 days the applicant had not had sufficient personal space, and that this had been a breach of Article 3 of the Convention. The court thus decided to increase the compensation to EUR 1,500. 9. In October 2014 the applicant lodged a new complaint concerning his material conditions in Šiauliai Remand Prison. He complained of overcrowding, low temperature, dampness, insufficient lighting, prisoners smoking in the cells, that his partner had not been able to pay him a long‑stay visit and that he had not been allowed to ""take holidays"". It appears that the applicant had asked the prison management to allow him to receive a long-stay visit from his spouse and his sister on 28 April 2014. 10. On 5 December 2014 the Šiauliai Regional Administrative Court held that during the period between 4 April and 5 October 2014 – for 176 days – the applicant had had insufficient cell space. As regards long-stay visits, the court agreed with Šiauliai Remand Prison and stated that the applicant had not been entitled to them under domestic law; he could have had short visits but, however, he had never asked for them. The court accepted the argument of the Šiauliai Remand Prison that remand detainees had been held in prisons or correctional facilities for short periods of time and they were not in a similar situation to convicted inmates. The court awarded the applicant EUR 869 in compensation for the material conditions of his detention. 11. The applicant appealed, and on 21 September 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision in its entirety.",TRUE,2,"The applicant has a right to family life through prison visitation. However, the state also has meaningful democratic interests in regulating prison visitation. The weighing of these interests determines what the line should be.", 429,"Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","5. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Moscow. 6. The facts of the cases, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 24 November 2006 the applicant, the owner and CEO of a large dairy producer, was charged with large-scale fraud and money laundering and summoned for questioning. He did not show up for a few initial interviews and the investigator put his name on the list of fugitives from justice. 8. On 26 January 2007 the investigator, acting on the information that the applicant had fled abroad, asked the Ostankinskiy District Court in Moscow for a detention order. 9. The detention hearing was fixed for 1 February 2007. The applicant's lawyers had been notified of the date and time of the hearing on the previous day but did not show up and asked the investigator to postpone the examination of his application because they were busy in other proceedings. The District Court appointed legal-aid counsel to represent the absent applicant, proceeded with the hearing and issued the detention order, referring to the fact of the applicant's absconding to Ukraine and from there to Hungary, the gravity of the charges against him and the risk of interference with the investigation. On 9 February 2007 the applicant's lawyers appealed. 10. On 15 February 2007 the applicant was arrested in Moscow. 11. On 19 March 2007 the Moscow City Court heard an appeal against the detention order. The applicant and his lawyers were present at the hearing. Considering that the risks of flight and obstruction of the investigation were sufficiently established, the City Court upheld the detention order. 12. The applicant's detention was later extended on nine occasions. The applicant appealed against each of the detention orders, lodging statements of appeal within two to ten days of the hearing date. It took the appeal courts between twenty-six and sixty days to examine the complaints. 13. The most recent detention order of 25 July 2008 was quashed on appeal by the Supreme Court on 2 October 2008. The Supreme Court considered that there was no evidence substantiating the risk of absconding or interfering with justice. The investigation had been pending for over two years of which the applicant had spent more than a year and a half in custody. The Supreme Court concluded that that the proceedings had been unreasonably long and ordered the applicant's release on bail. 14. While in custody, the applicant asked the investigator to be allowed to receive visits from his mother, wife and children and also pastoral visits from two Orthodox priests, A. and S. 15. With the investigator's consent, the applicant's mother and daughters visited him on two occasions in April and May 2007. In August and September 2007 the investigator interviewed his wife and mother as potential witnesses but they refused to testify, invoking the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. The investigator refused the applicant's subsequent applications to see his family, stating that such visits could ""have a negative influence on the conduct of the investigation"". As to the Orthodox priests, on 29 March 2007 the investigator invoked the same ground to refuse a visit from S. On 30 August 2007 the investigator once again refused a pastoral visit, stating that the applicant should see the prison chaplain instead. 16. Counsel for the applicant applied for a judicial review of visiting restrictions. 17. On 24 October 2007 and 6 February 2008 the Tverskoy District Court pronounced the refusal of pastoral visits to be lawful and justified, holding that the investigator had full discretion to determine whether or not such visits ran counter to the interests of the investigation. On 18 June 2008 the City Court upheld the latter decision on appeal, holding that a restriction on religious rights was an inherent consequence of the pre-trial detention. 18. As regards family visits, on 30 October 2007 the Tverskoy District Court granted the applicant's complaint in part, finding as follows: (a) restrictions on visits from the applicant's wife and mother in the period after the investigator had interviewed them as witnesses in the criminal proceedings had been lawful and within the discretion of the investigator; (b) restrictions on visits from the wife and mother in the preceding period had not been justified but no relief could be afforded to the applicant because they had already been granted the status of witnesses and the investigator might wish to interview them again at some point in time; (c) restrictions on visits from the applicant's children were not justified and the investigator had an obligation to remedy a breach of the applicant's rights. 19. On 10 December 2007 the applicant's representative before the Court, Ms Kostromina, asked the director of the remand prison to allow her to see the applicant and provided credentials confirming her status. Her application was referred to the investigator. 20. On 24 January 2008 Ms Kostromina lodged a complaint with the Preobrazhenskiy District Court claiming that the prison director should have authorised her visit without any restrictions, on the basis of Article 34 of the Convention guaranteeing unhindered access of an applicant to his representative. 21. On 15 February 2008 the District Court dismissed the complaint, finding that Ms Kostromina was not the applicant's counsel in the domestic criminal proceedings and could not therefore visit him. On 6 May 2008 the Moscow City Court upheld that decision on appeal.",Ruled as violated by court,,"13. The most recent detention order of 25 July 2008 was quashed on appeal by the Supreme Court on 2 October 2008. The Supreme Court considered that there was no evidence substantiating the risk of absconding or interfering with justice. The investigation had been pending for over two years of which the applicant had spent more than a year and a half in custody. The Supreme Court concluded that that the proceedings had been unreasonably long and ordered the applicant's release on bail. 18. As regards family visits, on 30 October 2007 the Tverskoy District Court granted the applicant's complaint in part, finding as follows: (a) restrictions on visits from the applicant's wife and mother in the period after the investigator had interviewed them as witnesses in the criminal proceedings had been lawful and within the discretion of the investigator; (b) restrictions on visits from the wife and mother in the preceding period had not been justified but no relief could be afforded to the applicant because they had already been granted the status of witnesses and the investigator might wish to interview them again at some point in time; (c) restrictions on visits from the applicant's children were not justified and the investigator had an obligation to remedy a breach of the applicant's rights.",TRUE,2,"The applicant has a right to family life through prison visitation. However, the state also has meaningful democratic interests in regulating prison visitation. The weighing of these interests determines what the line should be.", 430,"Article 9 Freedom of thought, conscience and religion 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","5. The applicants were born in 1964, 1957 and 1947 respectively. The first and third applicants live in Ankara. The second applicant left Turkey subsequent to his criminal conviction giving rise to the present application. 6. On 21 August 2006 the applicants took part in a religious ceremony (mevlüt)[1] on the premises of the Altındağ district branch of the Party for a Democratic Society (Demokratik Toplum Partisi – ""the DTP"") in Ankara, at which they paid tribute to three members of the PKK, an illegal armed organisation, who had been killed by the security forces. One of the deceased was the first applicant's nephew. The second applicant was the head of the Ankara branch of the DTP at the relevant time. The third applicant was a member of the DTP and a friend of the first applicant. 7. On 23 November 2007 the Ankara public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Ankara Assize Court, charging the applicants and a number of other persons with dissemination of propaganda in favour of the PKK, under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713), on account of their participation in the ceremony of 21 August 2006. According to the indictment, during the ceremony photographs of the deceased and the PKK's flag were displayed at the venue and a film about the lives of the deceased was shown. In addition, the second applicant, the head of the Ankara branch of the DTP, made the following statement: ""Our fears and worries continue. People are still being killed. In such a context, we would like this mevlüt to be a moment of peace and fraternity."" 8. On 24 September 2008 the Ankara Assize Court convicted the applicants of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK and sentenced them to ten months' imprisonment each. In its judgment, the Assize Court observed, firstly, that the persons in whose memory the ceremony had been held were members of a terrorist organisation and that they had been killed by the security forces during an operation against that organisation. It also took the view that the choice of venue for the ceremony – the premises of a political party – and the fact that the PKK flag had been spread over the tables and photographs of members of the organisation had been displayed, contributed to raising serious doubts as to the applicants' submissions that they had taken part in the ceremony in observance of their religious duties. The court considered that the applicants had committed the offence of dissemination of propaganda given that they had shared the feelings of mourning and sorrow for the deceased who had been involved in terrorism. It further considered that the venue where the ceremony had been held had turned into a propaganda venue in favour of the PKK. 9. Following an appeal lodged by the applicants, their conviction was upheld by a final decision of the Court of Cassation on 8 March 2010. 10. The first and third applicants served their prison sentences.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,The applicants have their rights to religious ceremony. The state expressed meaningful doubts in line with protecting democratic interests of public order., 431,"Article 9 Freedom of thought, conscience and religion 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.","5. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Moscow. 6. The facts of the cases, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 24 November 2006 the applicant, the owner and CEO of a large dairy producer, was charged with large-scale fraud and money laundering and summoned for questioning. He did not show up for a few initial interviews and the investigator put his name on the list of fugitives from justice. 8. On 26 January 2007 the investigator, acting on the information that the applicant had fled abroad, asked the Ostankinskiy District Court in Moscow for a detention order. 9. The detention hearing was fixed for 1 February 2007. The applicant's lawyers had been notified of the date and time of the hearing on the previous day but did not show up and asked the investigator to postpone the examination of his application because they were busy in other proceedings. The District Court appointed legal-aid counsel to represent the absent applicant, proceeded with the hearing and issued the detention order, referring to the fact of the applicant's absconding to Ukraine and from there to Hungary, the gravity of the charges against him and the risk of interference with the investigation. On 9 February 2007 the applicant's lawyers appealed. 10. On 15 February 2007 the applicant was arrested in Moscow. 11. On 19 March 2007 the Moscow City Court heard an appeal against the detention order. The applicant and his lawyers were present at the hearing. Considering that the risks of flight and obstruction of the investigation were sufficiently established, the City Court upheld the detention order. 12. The applicant's detention was later extended on nine occasions. The applicant appealed against each of the detention orders, lodging statements of appeal within two to ten days of the hearing date. It took the appeal courts between twenty-six and sixty days to examine the complaints. 13. The most recent detention order of 25 July 2008 was quashed on appeal by the Supreme Court on 2 October 2008. The Supreme Court considered that there was no evidence substantiating the risk of absconding or interfering with justice. The investigation had been pending for over two years of which the applicant had spent more than a year and a half in custody. The Supreme Court concluded that that the proceedings had been unreasonably long and ordered the applicant's release on bail. 14. While in custody, the applicant asked the investigator to be allowed to receive visits from his mother, wife and children and also pastoral visits from two Orthodox priests, A. and S. 15. With the investigator's consent, the applicant's mother and daughters visited him on two occasions in April and May 2007. In August and September 2007 the investigator interviewed his wife and mother as potential witnesses but they refused to testify, invoking the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. The investigator refused the applicant's subsequent applications to see his family, stating that such visits could ""have a negative influence on the conduct of the investigation"". As to the Orthodox priests, on 29 March 2007 the investigator invoked the same ground to refuse a visit from S. On 30 August 2007 the investigator once again refused a pastoral visit, stating that the applicant should see the prison chaplain instead. 16. Counsel for the applicant applied for a judicial review of visiting restrictions. 17. On 24 October 2007 and 6 February 2008 the Tverskoy District Court pronounced the refusal of pastoral visits to be lawful and justified, holding that the investigator had full discretion to determine whether or not such visits ran counter to the interests of the investigation. On 18 June 2008 the City Court upheld the latter decision on appeal, holding that a restriction on religious rights was an inherent consequence of the pre-trial detention. 18. As regards family visits, on 30 October 2007 the Tverskoy District Court granted the applicant's complaint in part, finding as follows: (a) restrictions on visits from the applicant's wife and mother in the period after the investigator had interviewed them as witnesses in the criminal proceedings had been lawful and within the discretion of the investigator; (b) restrictions on visits from the wife and mother in the preceding period had not been justified but no relief could be afforded to the applicant because they had already been granted the status of witnesses and the investigator might wish to interview them again at some point in time; (c) restrictions on visits from the applicant's children were not justified and the investigator had an obligation to remedy a breach of the applicant's rights. 19. On 10 December 2007 the applicant's representative before the Court, Ms Kostromina, asked the director of the remand prison to allow her to see the applicant and provided credentials confirming her status. Her application was referred to the investigator. 20. On 24 January 2008 Ms Kostromina lodged a complaint with the Preobrazhenskiy District Court claiming that the prison director should have authorised her visit without any restrictions, on the basis of Article 34 of the Convention guaranteeing unhindered access of an applicant to his representative. 21. On 15 February 2008 the District Court dismissed the complaint, finding that Ms Kostromina was not the applicant's counsel in the domestic criminal proceedings and could not therefore visit him. On 6 May 2008 the Moscow City Court upheld that decision on appeal.",Ruled as violated by court,,"13. The most recent detention order of 25 July 2008 was quashed on appeal by the Supreme Court on 2 October 2008. The Supreme Court considered that there was no evidence substantiating the risk of absconding or interfering with justice. The investigation had been pending for over two years of which the applicant had spent more than a year and a half in custody. The Supreme Court concluded that that the proceedings had been unreasonably long and ordered the applicant's release on bail. 18. As regards family visits, on 30 October 2007 the Tverskoy District Court granted the applicant's complaint in part, finding as follows: (a) restrictions on visits from the applicant's wife and mother in the period after the investigator had interviewed them as witnesses in the criminal proceedings had been lawful and within the discretion of the investigator; (b) restrictions on visits from the wife and mother in the preceding period had not been justified but no relief could be afforded to the applicant because they had already been granted the status of witnesses and the investigator might wish to interview them again at some point in time; (c) restrictions on visits from the applicant's children were not justified and the investigator had an obligation to remedy a breach of the applicant's rights.",FALSE,0,There is no mention of religion in the fact pattern., 432,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","3. The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table. 4. The applicants sued different State and municipal unitary companies (the debtor companies) in several unrelated sets of court proceedings. 5. On the dates set out in the appended table domestic courts by separate judgments made pecuniary awards in favour of the applicants to be paid by the debtor companies. In application no. 34145/11 the courts also ordered the debtor company to take certain action in favour of the applicant, as specified in the appended table. 6. The companies were incorporated as State or municipal unitary enterprises. They provided services specified in the appended table. 7. On various dates insolvency proceedings were opened in respect of some of the debtor companies. The companies were subsequently liquidated. The dates on which the insolvency proceedings started and ended are tabulated below.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"It depends if money that is yet to be granted counts as possessions according to the statute, but that seems to be the common understanding.", 433,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","4. The first applicant lives in Sarajevo. He is the grandfather of the second applicant. The second applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Sarajevo. 5. On 10 November 2005 the second applicant initiated administrative proceedings in order to obtain recognition of the veteran status of his late father. His request was rejected on 12 December 2005. The second applicant appealed on an unknown date in December 2005 or January 2006. 6. On 26 January 2006 the competent Ministry upheld the first-instance decision. 7. On 21 January 2008 the Sarajevo Cantonal Court quashed the decisions of 12 December 2005 and 26 January 2006, and remitted the case to the first-instance body. In the new proceedings, the second applicant's request was again rejected. The last decision was given by the Sarajevo Cantonal Court on 25 September 2012. It was served on the second applicant on 23 October 2012. 8. In the meantime, on 10 October 2012, the Constitutional Court found a breach of the second applicant's right to a trial within a reasonable time. It did not award any damages.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"5. On 10 November 2005 the second applicant initiated administrative proceedings in order to obtain recognition of the veteran status of his late father. His request was rejected on 12 December 2005. The second applicant appealed on an unknown date in December 2005 or January 2006. 7. On 21 January 2008 the Sarajevo Cantonal Court quashed the decisions of 12 December 2005 and 26 January 2006, and remitted the case to the first-instance body. In the new proceedings, the second applicant's request was again rejected. The last decision was given by the Sarajevo Cantonal Court on 25 September 2012. It was served on the second applicant on 23 October 2012.",FALSE,0,There is no relevance between property rights and veteran status., 434,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","4. The list of applicants is set out in the appended tables. 5. On the dates indicated in the appended tables the applicants obtained monetary court awards against the Municipal Unitary Enterprise Passenger Transport Company of Kotlas (MUP Kotlas Passazhirskoye avtotransportnoye predpriyatiye – муниципальное предприятие муниципального образования Котлас «Пассажирское автотранспортное предприятие»). 6. Some of the judgments in the applicants' favour have been partly enforced during the insolvency proceedings in respect of the company (see paragraphs 7-10 below), while others remained unenforced to date. 7. The company was incorporated as a municipal unitary enterprise. It was set up by the municipality of Kotlas. The company provided transport services in the town. It had ""the right of economic control"" (право хозяйственного ведения) over the assets allocated to it. 8. As submitted by the applicants, the prices for the transport services in the town of Kotlas were regulated by the Administration of Arkhangelsk region. 9. On 28 September 2007 insolvency proceedings started in respect of the company. 10. On 18 September 2012 the company was declared insolvent and subsequently liquidated.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"It depends if money that is yet to be granted counts as possessions according to the statute, but that seems to be the common understanding.", 435,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table. 6. On 25 September 2000 the Neamț County Court ordered a state‑owned company to pay the applicant due salary rights. 7. On 9 October 2001 the Roman District Court ordered a private person to reimburse a loan to the applicant. 8. On 14 November 2008 the Brașov County Court ordered the municipality of Brașov to leave a plot of land in the applicant's full property and possession. 9. On 3 April 2009 the applicant signed a report, drafted on the occasion of the compulsory enforcement of the above judgment, which attested to the restoration of his possession over the land in dispute by placement of metal bars on the free area and by tracing a line with white paint over the area occupied by roads and bridge pillars belonging to the municipality. 10. On 18 July 2008 the applicant contracted a loan of 250,000 euros (EUR) from a bank, with the plot of land used as guarantee. 11. On 22 August 2011 the bank sold the land at a public auction for EUR 325,000, since the applicant had failed to repay the loan within the set deadline. In accordance with domestic law, the remaining amount after the recovery of the debt must be returned to the debtor.",Ruled as violated by court,,"10. On 18 July 2008 the applicant contracted a loan of 250,000 euros (EUR) from a bank, with the plot of land used as guarantee. 11. On 22 August 2011 the bank sold the land at a public auction for EUR 325,000, since the applicant had failed to repay the loan within the set deadline. In accordance with domestic law, the remaining amount after the recovery of the debt must be returned to the debtor.",TRUE,1,"The applicant was deprived of their property, but it appears to have been so subject to the conditions of debt law in the public interest.", 436,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","4. On 28 February 1996 the applicants and the debtor (JSP ""Tara"" Cetinje) reached a court approved settlement before the Cetinje Municipal Court, whereby the debtor undertook to pay the applicants specified amounts in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. 5. The settlement became final on the same date. 6. The debtor ultimately paid part of the amounts determined in the settlement. 7. On 26 May 1997 the Podgorica Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings against the debtor. 8. On 19 August 1997 the applicants submitted their respective claims based on the settlement. 9. In the course of the insolvency proceedings the Podgorica Commercial Court acknowledged the applicants' claims. 10. On 23 December 2009 the Podgorica Commercial Court terminated (zaključio) the insolvency proceedings against the debtor, but continued the proceedings against the debtor's estate. This decision was upheld by the Appellate Court on 9 April 2010. 11. The proceedings are still pending. 12. On 14 October 2010 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants' constitutional appeal on procedural grounds. 13. The court settlement in question remains partly unenforced to the present day. 14. It transpires from the case file that at the time the court settlement was concluded and became final (see paragraphs 4 and 5 above) the debtor was a company predominantly comprised of State‑controlled capital. The Government neither contested this nor provided any evidence to the contrary.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"It depends if money that is yet to be granted counts as possessions according to the statute, but that seems to be the common understanding.", 437,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","6. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Corjova. 7. He had his car registered with the authorities of the Republic of Moldova and had Moldovan registration plates installed on it. 8. On 16 December 2006 a customs officer of the self-proclaimed ""Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria"" (""MRT"") stopped the applicant at a check‑point and seized his car on the ground that upon entry on the territory of Transdniestria he had failed to stop at the border. He was later obliged to pay a fine of 58 United States dollars in order to recover the car. 9. On 19 December 2006 the applicant's driving licence was seized on the ground that he had failed to comply with traffic rules. His car was also seized, on the ground of his failure to comply with customs regulations, but the seizure report was destroyed and he was able to recover his car five hours later after the intervention of a group of Russian peacekeepers. His driving licence was not returned and he was issued a temporary driving licence. 10. According to the applicant, he complained to the authorities of Moldova, but they informed him that there was nothing they could help him with. The Moldovan Government disputed the fact that the applicant had informed them about the circumstances of the present case. 11. Reports by inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations, the relevant domestic law and practice of the Republic of Moldova, and other pertinent documents were summarised in Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia ([GC], no. 11138/10, §§ 61-77, 23 February 2016).",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"The applicant was deprived of their property, but it appears to have been so subject to the conditions of driving law in the public interest.", 438,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","4. The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Kyustendil. 5. In a judgment of 15 August 2004 the Sofia District Court awarded the applicant BGN 2,120.28 (about 1,100 euros (EUR)) in damages, plus the legal interest for the period starting on 11 February 2003 until full payment, and BGN 200 in costs and expenses, against the National Centre for Recreation, Rehabilitation and Sport (""the Centre""). The Centre was a State body subsidised by the Ministry of Education. It exercised certain functions entrusted by the Ministry. The damages were awarded for loss of salary following the applicant's unlawful dismissal from work. The judgment became final on 11 February 2008. 6. In the meantime, on 25 May 2005 the Minister of Education ordered that the Centre be closed down and its remaining property be managed by the Ministry of Education. The Ministry then established a State-owned joint-stock company with part of the Centre's property. 7. On 26 November 2008 the applicant was issued with a writ of enforcement for the amount awarded against the Centre in the final judgment of 11 February 2008 (see paragraph 5 above). On 18 March 2009 he filed a request with the Minister for Education for payment of that amount. 8. The Ministry of Education replied in May 2009 that neither the Ministry, nor the State-owned joint-stock company, was the successor of the Centre and that the amount claimed was not due by them. 9. As of 23 March 2015, the date of the applicant's last communication to the Court, no change in the above circumstances had been recorded.",Ruled as violated by court,,"8. The Ministry of Education replied in May 2009 that neither the Ministry, nor the State-owned joint-stock company, was the successor of the Centre and that the amount claimed was not due by them.",TRUE,1,"It depends if money that is yet to be granted counts as possessions according to the statute, but that seems to be the common understanding.", 439,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. Following judicial proceedings which ended with a final judgment of the Bălţi Court of Appeal of 8 December 2009, the applicant company obtained a final ruling obliging the Cadastral Authority to register immovable property privatised by it in 1999 and in 2004 in its name. 6. On an unspecified date the defendant in the proceedings lodged a request for a review of the judgment of 8 December 2009, seeking its annulment on the grounds that in a technical report dated 25 May 2009 it had been stated that the immovable property in question did not qualify as immovable property (""the review request""). 7. On 24 August 2010 the Bălţi Court of Appeal dismissed the review request on the grounds that the information contained in the technical report of 25 May 2009 did not qualify as new and relevant information which could not have been obtained before the delivery of the final judgment in the case. 8. On 22 December 2010 the Supreme Court quashed the above judgment and ordered a re-examination of the review request. 9. On 16 November 2011 the Chişinău Court of Appeal re-examined the review request and allowed it. The court relied on grounds other than those relied upon by the defendant in framing the request. In particular, the court relied on a Government decision from 2005, in accordance with which the disputed goods had been transferred to the defendant's control. The court quashed the final judgment of 8 December 2009 and ordered a fresh examination of the case. 10. On 16 August 2012, after examining the merits of the case, the Edineţ District Court again found in favour of the applicant company and required the Cadastral Authority to register some of the immovable property privatised by the applicant company in 1999 and in 2004 in its name. The Cadastral Authority challenged that judgment by lodging an appeal and the proceedings are still pending.",Ruled as violated by court,,"9. On 16 November 2011 the Chişinău Court of Appeal re-examined the review request and allowed it. The court relied on grounds other than those relied upon by the defendant in framing the request. In particular, the court relied on a Government decision from 2005, in accordance with which the disputed goods had been transferred to the defendant's control. The court quashed the final judgment of 8 December 2009 and ordered a fresh examination of the case.",FALSE,0,There is no deprivation of property in the fact pattern., 440,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Kraljevo. 6. Between June 2003 and December 2004 the applicant, as an entrepreneur, was providing heating installation services to AD Fabrika za proizvodnju konfekcije i trikotaže Raška, a socially-owned company based in Novi Pazar (hereinafter ""the debtor company""). 7. On 2 December 2010 the Kraljevo Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor company (St. 31/2010). 8. The applicant duly submitted his claim. 9. On 15 March 2011 the Commercial Court rejected his claim and instructed him to initiate a regular civil suit and request determination of his claim. The applicant lodged a separate civil claim. 10. On 1 December 2011 the Commercial Court ruled in favour of the applicant by recognizing his claim and ordered the debtor company to pay the applicant the costs of the civil proceedings. 11. On an unspecified date thereafter, the said judgment having become final, was acknowledged within the insolvency proceedings. 12. On 22 July 2013 the Commercial Court issued a decision ordering payment of approximately 10 % of the total debt to the applicant. The applicant received this payment on an unspecified date. 13. The debtor company was ultimately struck from the relevant public register on 9 July 2014. 14. On 16 December 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal complaining against the Commercial Court's decision of 22 July 2013 and that his right to work and right to compensation for work and providing services were infringed, because he received only 10 % of the total debt. He asked further the Constitutional Court to order the payment of the rest of the debt. 15. On 2 March 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's appeal finding that it is not vested with the power to order such a payment. That decision was delivered to the applicant after 24 April 2015.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"It depends if money that is yet to be granted counts as possessions according to the statute, but that seems to be the common understanding.", 441,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The applicant was employed by HK Komgrap and Komgrap-Makiš doo, a company based in Belgrade (hereinafter ""the debtor""). At the relevant time, the company was predominantly socially-owned (see Stoković and Others v. Serbia, nos. 75879/14 and seq. §§ 10-14, 8 March 2016) 6. Since the debtor had failed to fulfil its obligations towards its employees, the applicant brought a civil claim seeking payment of salary arrears and various social security contributions. 7. On 23 June 2003 the Belgrade Second Municipal Court (Drugi opštinski sud u Beogradu) ordered the debtor to pay to the applicant certain sums in respect of salary arrears and the various social security contributions. This judgment became final and enforceable on 25 July 2005. 8. On 26 September 2005 the applicant applied to the Belgrade Fourth Municipal Court (Četvrti opštinski sud u Beogradu) for enforcement of the judgment of 23 June 2003. 9. On 18 January 2006 the said court ordered the enforcement of the judgment and awarded the applicant the costs incurred in the enforcement proceedings. 10. On 27 October 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal, seeking redress for the non-enforcement of the judgment in question. 11. On 27 November 2013 the Constitutional Court held that the applicant had suffered a breach of the ""right to a trial within a reasonable time"" with regard to the enforcement proceedings. The court ordered the acceleration of these proceedings and declared that the applicant was entitled to compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered in the amount of 800 euros (EUR) converted into the national currency at the rate applicable at the date of settlement. 12. The Constitutional Court held that since the enforcement proceedings in question had not yet been completed, the constitutional appeals were premature in so far as they concerned the pecuniary damage, and dismissed the appeal in that regard.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"It depends if money that is yet to be granted counts as possessions according to the statute, but that seems to be the common understanding.", 442,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The list of applicants is set out in the appended tables. 6. The applicants were employees of a municipal education institution. 7. On 13 June 2001 they brought proceedings before the Kolomna Town Court of the Moscow Region (""the Town Court"") against their employer and the town administration seeking recovery of unpaid wages and taxes to various social funds. 8. On 13 July 2004 the Kolomna Town Court issued a first-instance judgment on the merits of the case. On 22 September 2004 the Moscow Regional Court quashed the judgment on appeal and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 9. On 7 July 2005 the Town Court granted the applicants' claims awarding each of them a certain amount against their employer (see Appendix I). The judgment was upheld on appeal by the Moscow Regional Court on 28 September 2005. 10. Between 26 June 2001 and 7 July 2005 the court hearings were adjourned twenty-five times due to the respondents' or one of the respondents' failure to appear, eighteen times on the claimants' request and eleven times pursuant the requests by the defendants; four times the first‑instance court adjourned the case as the respondent authorities had been requested to submit additional documents. Moreover, on 11 June 2002 the proceedings were suspended pursuant to a decision by the domestic court on account of the claimants' alleged failure to appear; on 4 February 2003 that decision was quashed by the appeal court, due to the first-instance court's failure to notify the applicants of the hearing date. Thus, the period attributable to the authorities amounts to over one year. 11. On an unspecified date in 2005 the employer institution was liquidated. On 18 October 2005 the relevant record was made into the State Register of Legal Entities. 12. According to the Government's submissions of 19 July 2011, on 30 June 2006 the judgment of 7 July 2005 was partially enforced in respect of certain applicants, as specified in Appendix I.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"It depends if money that is yet to be granted counts as possessions according to the statute, but that seems to be the common understanding.", 443,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","4. The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Lisichansk-18, the Lugansk region of Ukraine. 5. In 1972 the applicant suffered 100 per cent disability as a result of a traffic accident. In 1994 the Lisichansk Town Court of the Lugansk Region of Ukraine found the State Health Care Institution of the Sanitary and Epidemiology Monitoring of the Ministry of Railways of the Russian Federation (""the institution"") responsible for the accident and ordered it to pay to the applicant compensation and to reimburse his medical expenses. Since that time, the applicant has been involved in several sets of proceedings concerning various types of allowances and compensation due to him. 6. On 17 July 1995 by the Lisichansk Town Court ordered the increase of the monthly payments due to the applicant in respect of compensation, allowances and medical expenses. It appears that the debtor institution complied with the judgment in part and in May 2000 discontinued payments due under the judgment. 7. On 31 March 2006 the Perm Regional Court of Russia allowed the applicant's request for compulsory execution of the above judgment in Russia as from May 2000. It was enforced on 30 March 2007. 8. The applicant sued the defendant institution for medical expenses, various types of allowances and compensation, as well as index-linking and arrears in the respective payments, and acquired several judgments by Russian courts in his favour listed in Appendixes I and II. 9. In course of the proceedings the defendant institution was replaced by the Federal Health Care Institution ""Hygiene and Epidemiology Center of the Perm Region and the Komi-Perm Autonomous Region"" and subsequently by Federal Health Care Institution ""Hygiene and Epidemiology Center of the Perm Region"", its legal successors. 10. He complained about non-enforcement to the Ministry of Finance, the prosecutor's office and various other authorities, but to no avail. 11. The judgments were enforced fully or in part on dates listed in Appendixes I and II. Some of them have not been enforced, as shown in the tables below.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"It depends if money that is yet to be granted counts as possessions according to the statute, but that seems to be the common understanding.", 444,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Kocaeli. 6. Following a dispute with a private third party, the applicant initiated compensation proceedings. 7. On 12 March 2009 the Tuzla Civil Court of General Jurisdiction granted the applicant compensation, amounting to 386,464.75 Turkish liras (TRY) (approximately 174,000 euros (EUR)). In the operative part of the judgment, the court indicated that the defendant party had to pay TRY 16,000 (approximately EUR 7,400) for court fees pursuant to the Law on Charges. The court registry accordingly sent a payment order to the defendant party. However, no payment was made. 8. On 18 May 2009 the applicant submitted a petition to the registry of the first instance court, requesting that the judgment be served on her in order to commence enforcement proceedings. On the same day, the court rejected the request on the ground that it was impossible under Section 28(1) (a) of the Law on Charges (Law no. 492) to serve a copy of the judgment unless the court costs that should have been born by the defendant party had been discharged. 9. At the time when the application was introduced, the applicant had therefore been unable to bring enforcement proceedings in order to have the above-mentioned judgment executed unless she herself was willing to pay the court fees that the defendant party had failed to pay. 10. Following the introduction of the present application with the Court, the domestic legislation was amended (see paragraphs 11-13 below), and subsequently the judgment in question was served on the applicant. In the absence of an appeal, the judgment became final on 17 October 2012. On 5 March 2013 the applicant initiated enforcement proceedings against her debtor. On 10 April 2013 the applicant further requested the enforcement office to place a lien on the debtor's property. According to the documents in the file, as of 14 April 2017 the debt, which is still not enforced, amounts to TRY 812,648.94 (approximately EUR 193,500) including the initial amount of compensation awarded by the domestic court plus interest running at statutory rate.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"It depends if money that is yet to be granted counts as possessions according to the statute, but that seems to be the common understanding.", 445,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","4. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Smolyan. 5. In two final judgments of 28 February 2005 and 8 May 2006 the Supreme Court of Cassation awarded the applicant pecuniary damages in respect of breach of contract for construction works which she had carried out. The awarded damages comprised BGN 52,784 for the principal amount, plus BGN 17,685 in default interest and BGN 5,433 in costs and expenses, or a total amount of BGN 75,902.93, the equivalent to 38,000 euros (EUR). The damages were awarded to the applicant against the National Centre for Recreation, Rehabilitation and Sport – Ministry of Education and Science (""the Centre"", a State body subsidised by the Ministry of Education and Science and exercising certain functions delegated by the Ministry). 6. By an order of 25 May 2005 the Minister of Education closed down the Centre and ordered that its remaining property be managed by the Ministry of Education. The Ministry then established a State-owned joint‑stock company with part of the Centre's property, including the real estate in which the applicant had carried out the construction works. 7. On 13 May 2005 and 15 March 2007 the applicant was issued with two writs of enforcement for the amounts awarded in the final judgments of 2005 and 2006 (see paragraph 5 above) and on 6 February 2008 she presented the writs to the Ministry of Education asking it to pay. 8. The Ministry replied in writing that it was not the successor to the Centre and did not owe payment to the applicant. In October 2009 the applicant reiterated her request but received a similar reply by the Ministry. The Ministry also pointed out that payment could not be sought from the State-owned joint-stock company either as it had a legal personality separate from that of the Ministry. By a letter of 23 September 2010, the Minister provided a similar explanation to the applicant. 9. The applicant brought judicial review proceedings challenging the Minister's refusal. In a final decision of 8 April 2011 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the appeal as inadmissible. 10. As of 19 March 2015, the date of the applicant's last communication to the Court, no change in the above circumstances had been reported.",Ruled as violated by court,,"8. The Ministry replied in writing that it was not the successor to the Centre and did not owe payment to the applicant. In October 2009 the applicant reiterated her request but received a similar reply by the Ministry. The Ministry also pointed out that payment could not be sought from the State-owned joint-stock company either as it had a legal personality separate from that of the Ministry. By a letter of 23 September 2010, the Minister provided a similar explanation to the applicant. 10. As of 19 March 2015, the date of the applicant's last communication to the Court, no change in the above circumstances had been reported.",TRUE,1,"It depends if money that is yet to be granted counts as possessions according to the statute, but that seems to be the common understanding.", 446,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Chişinău. 6. The applicant had a dispute with H. over ownership of a house. He brought a claim against H. seeking acknowledgement of his property rights, as his father's heir, and H.'s eviction from the house. H. lodged a counterclaim, seeking acknowledgement of her property rights to the house as she had built it. 7. On 20 December 2007 the Buiucani District Court dismissed H.'s counterclaim and allowed the applicant's claim in full. H. lodged an appeal. On 20 May 2008 the Chișinău Court of Appeal upheld the earlier judgment and dismissed H.'s appeal. H. did not attend the appellate hearing, even though the summons had been repeatedly sent to the address she had provided in her appeal. A registered letter was returned with a note stating that H. did not live at the address indicated by her. The judgment became final after the expiry of the two-month time-limit for lodging an appeal on points of law. 8. On 11 May 2009 H. lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court of Justice, stating that she had only learned of the judgment of 20 May 2008 on 23 April 2009. In her application, she indicated the same address as in the proceedings before the Court of Appeal. The applicant asked the Supreme Court of Justice to dismiss the appeal as being lodged outside the legal time-limit. He submitted that since it had been H. who had lodged the appeal with the Chişinău Court of Appeal, it had been her duty to enquire about the progress of the proceedings and not to wait for a year before doing so. 9. On 16 October 2009 the Supreme Court of Justice allowed H.'s appeal on points of law, quashed the previous judgments and delivered a new judgment on the merits of the case dividing the disputed house into equal shares between the applicant and H. The court argued that the appeal had not been lodged outside the time-limit because H. had not attended the hearing before the Court of Appeal and there was nothing in the file to suggest that that court had informed her of the availability of the full judgment. The court concluded that without any evidence of the date when H. had learned of the judgment, her appeal was considered to have been submitted on time. The judgment was final.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"When there are two meaningful claims to property being deprived, it's unclear how the statute should be applied.", 447,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Nizhniy Novgorod. 6. On 25 October 2002 the Military Court of the Vladikavkaz Garrison (""the Military Court"") ordered, inter alia, the head of the respondent military institute to re-calculate the period of the applicant's service, applying the favourable terms of such calculation for a specified period of service. The applicant was also awarded some additional allowances and payments for certain periods. 7. The judgment came into force on 5 November 2002. 8. On 3 March 2003 the Military Court issued a writ of execution. On 4 August 2003 the bailiffs' service instituted the enforcement proceedings. 9. On 19 September 2003 the enforcement proceedings were terminated and the writ of execution was returned to the applicant, as the debt could not be recovered. 10. On 13 November 2003 the head of the respondent military institute issued Order No. 463 requiring to make payments in accordance with the judgment of 25 October 2002. However, no calculations or payments were made at that time. 11. On 4 February 2005 the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the Federal Treasury. 12. On 18 May 2005 the writ was returned to the applicant on the ground that the judgment obliged an official of an organisation to take certain actions rather than ordered to recover payments from a budgetary organisation. Thus, the writ of execution was to be submitted to the bailiffs' service. 13. On an unspecified date in 2005 the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the bailiffs' service. 14. On 14 April 2006 the writ of execution was returned to the applicant from the bailiffs' service without enforcement. The bailiffs explained that for the applicant to be able to receive the payments under the judgment, he should obtain a writ of execution stating the sum of the debt to be recovered. After that, the writ could be submitted to the Federal Treasury for enforcement. 15. In 2005 in accordance with Order No. 463, the defendant military institute calculated the amounts due to the applicant as follows: the compensation for the supplementary ration for the period from October 1998 until March 2000 –11,341.85 Russian roubles (RUB); allowance for special regime of the service in 1998-2002 – RUB 2,720.1; and special allowance – RUB 327,000. In total: RUB 341,061.95.",Ruled as violated by court,,"8. On 3 March 2003 the Military Court issued a writ of execution. On 4 August 2003 the bailiffs' service instituted the enforcement proceedings. 9. On 19 September 2003 the enforcement proceedings were terminated and the writ of execution was returned to the applicant, as the debt could not be recovered. 10. On 13 November 2003 the head of the respondent military institute issued Order No. 463 requiring to make payments in accordance with the judgment of 25 October 2002. However, no calculations or payments were made at that time. 11. On 4 February 2005 the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the Federal Treasury. 12. On 18 May 2005 the writ was returned to the applicant on the ground that the judgment obliged an official of an organisation to take certain actions rather than ordered to recover payments from a budgetary organisation. Thus, the writ of execution was to be submitted to the bailiffs' service. 13. On an unspecified date in 2005 the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the bailiffs' service. 14. On 14 April 2006 the writ of execution was returned to the applicant from the bailiffs' service without enforcement. The bailiffs explained that for the applicant to be able to receive the payments under the judgment, he should obtain a writ of execution stating the sum of the debt to be recovered. After that, the writ could be submitted to the Federal Treasury for enforcement. 15. In 2005 in accordance with Order No. 463, the defendant military institute calculated the amounts due to the applicant as follows: the compensation for the supplementary ration for the period from October 1998 until March 2000 –11,341.85 Russian roubles (RUB); allowance for special regime of the service in 1998-2002 – RUB 2,720.1; and special allowance – RUB 327,000. In total: RUB 341,061.95.",TRUE,1,"It depends if money that is yet to be granted counts as possessions according to the statute, but that seems to be the common understanding.", 448,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","4. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Moscow. 5. S. was the owner of a one-room flat located at 6-60, Smolenskaya Street, Moscow. On 7 February 2008 S. died. 6. An unidentified person presenting a passport in the name of M. and claiming that she was S.'s sister and heir applied to G., a notary, seeking the recognition of her rights in respect of the flat. In support of her claim she submitted a copy of her birth certificate. 7. On 18 March 2009 G. issued a certificate confirming, inter alia, M.'s title to the flat. The city authorities registered M.'s title to the flat in the State land register. 8. On 19 May 2009 an unidentified person posing as M. sold the flat to the applicant. According to the documents submitted by the applicant, the purchase price was 6,499,999 Russian roubles (RUB). The city authorities registered the sale of the flat and the applicant's title to it in the State land register. 9. On an unspecified date the police opened a criminal investigation into the fraudulent acquisition of the flat. It was established that the document presented to the notary as M.'s birth certificate had been forged. 10. On 23 September 2009 the police informed the Department of Housing and Housing Policy of the City of Moscow (the ""Housing Department"") of the pending criminal investigation. 11. On 1 December 2009 the Housing Department brought an action seeking the transfer of the applicant's flat to the City of Moscow (""the City""). 12. On 11 March 2010 the criminal investigation was suspended. 13. On 27 December 2010 the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow allowed the Housing Department's action. It reasoned that M. had died intestate with no surviving kin and that her flat should have been considered bona vacantia. It annulled the applicant's title to the flat and ordered its transfer to the City of Moscow. 14. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 14 July 2011 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 27 December 2010. 15. On an unspecified date the judgments of 27 December 2010 and 14 July 2011 were enforced. Subsequently the City of Moscow sold the flat to a private party under a social assistance scheme that permitted the buyer to pay the purchase price in instalments. 16. On 12 October 2017 the criminal investigation into the fraudulent acquisition of the flat was reopened.",Ruled as violated by court,,"8. On 19 May 2009 an unidentified person posing as M. sold the flat to the applicant. According to the documents submitted by the applicant, the purchase price was 6,499,999 Russian roubles (RUB). The city authorities registered the sale of the flat and the applicant's title to it in the State land register.",TRUE,2,"When there are two meaningful claims to property being deprived, it's unclear how the statute should be applied.", 449,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Tuzla. 6. By judgment of the Mostar Municipal Court of 18 June 2009, which became final on 16 December 2010, company R. was ordered to reinstate the applicant in his previous employment, as well as to pay him a total amount of 16,314 convertible marks (BAM)[1], together with default interest calculated from 20 March 2007 until final payment. The respondent company was further ordered to pay the applicant BAM 2,641 in respect of legal costs, together with default interest calculated from 18 June 2009 until final payment. Lastly, the respondent company was ordered to cover all pension-related contributions in respect of the applicant between 1 January 2003 and 17 January 2007. 7. On 17 October 2011 the Municipal Court issued a writ of execution (rješenje o izvršenju) in this regard. 8. On 23 February 2012, upon the applicant's request, the Municipal Court amended its decision of 17 October 2011 by changing the object of enforcement. 9. On 16 January 2012 the Municipal Court requested the respondent to indicate why it had not reinstated the applicant. On 23 January 2012 it fined the respondent in this connection. 10. On 1 February 2013 the Municipal Court joined the enforcement proceedings in the applicant's case with an earlier enforcement procedure against the respondent. 11. On 25 June 2014 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina found a violation of the applicant's right to enforcement within a reasonable time, and ordered the Municipal Court to urgently finalise the enforcement proceedings. The Constitutional Court considered this to be sufficient just satisfaction and rejected the applicant's claim for non-pecuniary damage. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant on 15 August 2014. 12. On 18 March 2015 the Municipal Court ordered the sale of the respondent's property. On 27 April 2015 it transferred the respondent's real estate to company H., the highest ranked judgment creditor. The applicant did not lodge an appeal against this decision. 13. On 29 March 2016 the Mostar Cantonal Court quashed the decision of the Municipal Court of 27 April 2015 and remitted the case for reconsideration. 14. According to the latest information provided by the parties on 28 July 2017, on that date the enforcement proceedings in the applicant's case were still pending.",Ruled as violated by court,,"11. On 25 June 2014 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina found a violation of the applicant's right to enforcement within a reasonable time, and ordered the Municipal Court to urgently finalise the enforcement proceedings. The Constitutional Court considered this to be sufficient just satisfaction and rejected the applicant's claim for non-pecuniary damage. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant on 15 August 2014. 12. On 18 March 2015 the Municipal Court ordered the sale of the respondent's property. On 27 April 2015 it transferred the respondent's real estate to company H., the highest ranked judgment creditor. The applicant did not lodge an appeal against this decision. 13. On 29 March 2016 the Mostar Cantonal Court quashed the decision of the Municipal Court of 27 April 2015 and remitted the case for reconsideration. 14. According to the latest information provided by the parties on 28 July 2017, on that date the enforcement proceedings in the applicant's case were still pending.",TRUE,1,"It depends if money that is yet to be granted counts as possessions according to the statute, but that seems to be the common understanding.", 450,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","4. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Orhei. 5. In September 2009 the applicant initiated civil proceedings against a company which was in process of insolvency. 6. On 18 December 2009 the Drochia District Court found in favour of the applicant and ordered the defendant company to pay him 24,957 Moldovan Lei (MDL) (the equivalent of 1,413 euros (EUR)) for pecuniary damage and MDL 749 (the equivalent of EUR 42) for costs and expenses. The representative of the defendant company was not present at the hearing. 7. On 28 December 2009 the secretariat of the Drochia District Court sent a copy of the reasoned judgment to the defendant company by ordinary mail. 8. On 11 January 2010 an enforcement writ was issued to the applicant by the same court in respect of the judgment of 18 December 2009. 9. On 10 February 2010, in a different set of proceedings concerning the insolvency of the defendant company, the company's insolvency administrator updated the list of creditors by making express reference to the judgment of 18 December 2009 and to the exact amounts awarded in that judgment. The court which treated the insolvency issued a decision concerning the updated list of creditors on the same date. 10. On 26 April 2010 the insolvency administrator of the defendant company lodged an appeal against the judgment of 18 December 2009. The applicant objected to the appeal by arguing that it had been time-barred. He indicated that the time-limit for lodging the appeal had expired twenty days after the serving of the impugned judgment and that the insolvency administrator of the defendant company had been aware of the judgment of 18 December 2009 since in February 2010 he had informed the court dealing with the insolvency proceedings about the judgment in question. 11. On 28 September 2010 the Bălţi Court of Appeal admitted the appeal lodged by the insolvency administrator of the defendant company and quashed the judgment of 18 December 2009. The Court of Appeal did respond to the objection raised by the applicant and, after re-examining the merits of the case, dismissed the applicant's action against the defendant company. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law raising the same arguments as in his appeal. 12. On 26 January 2011 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant's appeal on points of law and upheld the judgment of the lower court. The Supreme Court did not make any comment about the applicant's objection concerning the late appeal.",Ruled as violated by court,,"9. On 10 February 2010, in a different set of proceedings concerning the insolvency of the defendant company, the company's insolvency administrator updated the list of creditors by making express reference to the judgment of 18 December 2009 and to the exact amounts awarded in that judgment. The court which treated the insolvency issued a decision concerning the updated list of creditors on the same date.",TRUE,1,"It depends if money that is yet to be granted counts as possessions according to the statute, but that seems to be the common understanding.", 451,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","4. The applicants are a family comprising the husband and wife (the first and second applicants) and their child (the third applicant). They were born in 1976, 1978 and 2001 respectively and live in Kayseri. 5. On 9 August 2001, the second applicant was admitted to a State Hospital in Niğde. She gave birth to the third applicant who has irreversible injuries caused by an intervention performed by that hospital's medical staff during labor. 6. In their report of 12 May 2004, the Forensic Medicine Institute concluded that the two members of the medical staff who tended to the labor were equally and solely at fault for the third applicant's injuries. 7. On 1 December 2004, the first and second applicants on their own and on behalf of the third applicant, submitted a claim to the Ministry of Health for compensation arising from the third applicant's injuries. 8. Following the tacit dismissal of the claim by the administrative authorities, the applicants brought an action for damages before the Konya Administrative Court on 2 February 2005. They claimed 30,000 Turkish liras (TRY) in respect of pecuniary damage and TRY 100,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 9. In the course of the proceedings, the domestic court decided proprio motu to seek an expert report to determine the amount of pecuniary damage suffered by the applicants. In his report submitted on 14 June 2006 to the court, the expert assessed the amount of pecuniary damage suffered by the applicants to have been TRY 194,916. 10. On 27 June 2006, the applicants requested to increase the amount of their claim for pecuniary damage in the light of the expert report. 11. On 6 July 2006 the court ruled in favour of the applicants and awarded them the full amount of their initial claims in respect of pecuniary damage, namely TRY 30,000 plus interest running from the date of lodging their claims with the Ministry of Health. It further awarded them a total of TRY 50,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and interest running from the date of the lawsuit. The applicants' request to increase their claim for pecuniary damage were dismissed by the court which considered itself bound by the initial claim indicated by the applicants when they lodged their case. 12. The applicants' ensuing appeals were dismissed by the Supreme Administrative Court on 16 June 2009 and 28 December 2010 respectively. 13. On 22 January 2010, the Ministry of Health paid the applicants a total of TRY 144,144. Approximately TRY 53,830 of that sum represented statutory interest accrued on the principal judgment award.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"13. On 22 January 2010, the Ministry of Health paid the applicants a total of TRY 144,144. Approximately TRY 53,830 of that sum represented statutory interest accrued on the principal judgment award.",FALSE,0,There is no deprivation of property in the fact pattern., 452,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Moscow. 6. On 29 December 2007 N., the owner of two rooms in flat 10 located at 3‑3, ulitsa Anny Severyanovoy, Moscow, signed a deed of gift in respect of the rooms for Ya. The Moscow City Department of the Federal Registration Service (the ""Registration Service"") registered the deed and Ya.'s title to the rooms. 7. On an unspecified date the investigative committee opened criminal investigation into M.'s actions who was suspected of having tricked N. into signing the deed of gift for Ya.'s benefit. 8. On 2 June 2008 Ya. sold the rooms to the applicant. According to the sale contract, the applicant paid 300,000 Russian roubles (RUB) for the rooms. 9. On 11 July 2008 the Preobrazhenskiy District Court of Moscow issued a seizure order in respect of the rooms within the framework of the criminal investigation on the charges of fraud against M. 10. On 16 July 2008 the Registration Service registered the sale agreement between Ya. and the applicant and the applicant's title to the rooms. 11. On 28 September 2009 the District Court found M. guilty of multiple offences, including a fraud in respect of the room later purchased by the applicant, and sentenced him to fourteen years' imprisonment. The Court established that M. had tricked N. into signing the deed of gift in respect of the two rooms whilst M. had actually sold the rooms to Ya. 12. On 16 March 2010 N. died. 13. On 7 February 2014 the Department of Housing of the City of Moscow (the ""Housing Department"") brought a civil action seeking restitution of the title to the two rooms to the City of Moscow and the applicant's eviction. 14. On 29 December 2014 the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow granted the Housing Department's claims. The court found the deed of gift null and void. It further established that N., the lawful owner of the rooms, had died intestate and without heirs. Accordingly the rooms should be considered a bona vacantia and should be transferred to the City of Moscow, even though the applicant had bought the rooms in good faith. The court transferred the title to the rooms to the City of Moscow and ordered the applicant's eviction. 15. On 18 June 2015 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 29 December 2014 on appeal. 16. On 26 October 2015 the City Court refused to grant the applicant leave to a cassation appeal against the judgments of 29 December 2014 and 18 June 2015. 17. On 9 March 2015 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation issued a similar decision. 18. The parties did not provide any information as regards the enforcement of the judgments in the City's favour.",Ruled as violated by court,,9. On 11 July 2008 the Preobrazhenskiy District Court of Moscow issued a seizure order in respect of the rooms within the framework of the criminal investigation on the charges of fraud against M. 10. On 16 July 2008 the Registration Service registered the sale agreement between Ya. and the applicant and the applicant's title to the rooms.,TRUE,2,"When there are two meaningful claims to property being deprived, it's unclear how the statute should be applied.", 453,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The applicants were born in 1976 and 1982 and live in Khust and Kharkiv respectively. 6. The first applicant lodged a claim against a social security authority, seeking an increase in the amount of child allowance she was receiving. A first-instance court allowed her claim in part. That judgment was upheld on appeal but the social security authority lodged a further appeal on points of law. 7. On 6 November 2012 the Higher Administrative Court (""the HAC""), having examined the appeal, quashed the lower courts' judgments and dismissed the applicant's claim. 8. The second applicant moved from the territory of the Republic of Moldova controlled by the so‑called ""Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria"" (""MRT"") (see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, ECHR 2004‑VII) to Ukraine to take up permanent residence. Under domestic law, repatriating Ukrainians were entitled to the tax-free and duty-free import of their foreign-registered vehicles. However, the customs office refused to apply this tax exemption in the applicant's case on the grounds that the car had not been registered by the appropriate authorities of the Republic of Moldova. She challenged this refusal before the administrative courts. A first-instance court allowed her claim and ordered the customs office to clear her car through customs. That judgment was upheld on appeal but the customs office lodged a further appeal on points of law. 9. On 4 April 2013 the HAC allowed the appeal, quashed the lower courts' decisions and dismissed the applicant's claim. 10. Both applicants alleged that the HAC, contrary to domestic law (see paragraph 11 below), had not sent them copies of the appeals lodged in their cases or informed them of the pending appeals by any other means, thus depriving them of an opportunity to respond. They alleged that they had only learned of the appeal proceedings when they had been served with the HAC's final decisions quashing the lower courts' decisions in their favour. 11. As worded at the relevant time, Articles 214 and 215 of the 2005 Code of Administrative Justice provided that a HAC judge-rapporteur would decide, having considered an appeal, whether to initiate proceedings to review the lower courts' decisions on points of law. If the judge decided to initiate such proceedings, he or she was required to inform the parties of that decision and serve a copy of the appeal on the opposing party with a time-limit for responding. 12. The relevant provisions of the Code concerning the procedure for serving court documents are summarised in Lazarenko and Others v. Ukraine (nos. 70329/12 and 5 others, § 15, 27 June 2017).",NOT ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,There is no deprivation of property in the fact pattern., 454,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The applicant company is a limited liability company incorporated under Moldovan Law. 6. On 24 December 2012 and 21 June 2013 respectively the applicant company initiated two sets of civil proceedings challenging two decisions issued by the State Tax Inspectorate of Străşeni (Inspectoratul Fiscal de Stat Străşeni – ""the Inspectorate"") under which it had been fined for non‑compliance with the VAT reporting regulations. On 5 September 2013 these two sets of proceedings were joined. 7. On 26 December 2013 the Străşeni District Court upheld the applicant company's claims and overturned the impugned decisions. The representative of the Inspectorate was not present when the judgment was delivered, despite having been duly informed of the date and the time of the hearing. 8. On 5 February 2014 the Inspectorate lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Străşeni District Court. No request for an extension of the legal time-limit for lodging an appeal was made. The applicant company objected to the appeal and argued that it had been lodged outside the thirty‑day time-limit and that the Inspectorate had not requested an extension of the legal time-limit for lodging it. 9. In a decision of 3 September 2014 the Chişinău Court of Appeal calculated the applicable time-limit and found that it had expired on 27 January 2014 and, accordingly, that the Inspectorate had been late in lodging its appeal. It therefore decided to strike the appeal out of its list of cases as time-barred. The Inspectorate lodged an appeal on points of law against that decision. It argued that the Chişinău Court of Appeal could not strike out the appeal after having commenced its examination of the merits of the case. 10. On 8 October 2014 the Supreme Court of Justice quashed the Chişinău Court of Appeal's strike-out decision of 3 September 2014. Without contesting the Court of Appeal's calculation of the time-limit for lodging the appeal, the Supreme Court of Justice accepted the argument put forward by the Inspectorate and found that the Court of Appeal had breached the rules of procedure by adopting a strike-out decision after having started an examination of the merits of the case. Ultimately, the case was referred back to the Chişinău Court of Appeal for re-examination. 11. On 28 January 2015, after rehearing the case, the Chişinău Court of Appeal upheld the Inspectorate's appeal, quashed the judgment of the Străşeni District Court of 26 December 2013 and rendered a new judgment whereby the applicant company's action was rejected as ill-founded. 12. On 10 June 2015 the Supreme Court of Justice declared an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant company inadmissible.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,There is no deprivation of property in the fact pattern., 455,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Budenovsk, the Stavropol Region of the Russian Federation. He is a former military officer. 6. On an unspecified date the applicant sued his former employer military unit. 7. On 3 May 2001 the Military Court of the Pyatigorsk Garrison (""the military court"") ordered, inter alia, the head of the respondent military unit to re-calculate the period of the applicant's service, applying the favourable terms of such calculation for the time when the applicant had participated in a military operation. The military court obliged the head of the military unit to issue the relevant orders, to calculate and to pay the applicant some additional payments and field allowance for the periods specified in the judgment. The judgment contained information on the indexes and other parameters that should be applied for the awarded amounts to be calculated. 8. On 14 May 2001 the judgment came into force. 9. In March 2002 the applicant obtained the writ of execution and submitted it to the Department of the Federal Treasury in Budenovsk. 10. On 19 March 2002 the Department of the Federal Treasury returned the writ of execution to the applicant on the ground that the military unit did not have an account there, and the judgment contained no specific amounts awarded to the applicant. 11. On 21 March 2002 the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the bailiffs' service. On the same day the enforcement proceedings were initiated. 12. On 19 February 2003 the enforcement proceedings were terminated and the writ was returned to the applicant without enforcement following his request to withdraw the writ. 13. In 2004-2005 the applicant applied to the domestic courts for clarification of the initial judgment with the view to establish the specific amounts due to him. The applicant's requests were dismissed as being lodged out of time. The courts noted that, in any case, the matter concerning the awarded amounts should have been resolved by way of an additional decision rather than clarification of a final judgment, and informed that an application for an additional decision should have been lodged before the entry into force of the main judgment. 14. It is not disputed between the parties that the judgment of 3 May 2001 remained unenforced in the part concerning the payment to the applicant of the second salary and the field allowances for the periods specified in the judgment. 15. On 24 March 2016, after communication of the present case, the Ministry of Finance of Russia calculated the amount due to the applicant under the judgment of 3 May 2001. According to this calculation, the main debt amounted to 80,220.74 Russian roubles.",Ruled as violated by court,,"10. On 19 March 2002 the Department of the Federal Treasury returned the writ of execution to the applicant on the ground that the military unit did not have an account there, and the judgment contained no specific amounts awarded to the applicant. 11. On 21 March 2002 the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the bailiffs' service. On the same day the enforcement proceedings were initiated. 12. On 19 February 2003 the enforcement proceedings were terminated and the writ was returned to the applicant without enforcement following his request to withdraw the writ. 13. In 2004-2005 the applicant applied to the domestic courts for clarification of the initial judgment with the view to establish the specific amounts due to him. The applicant's requests were dismissed as being lodged out of time. The courts noted that, in any case, the matter concerning the awarded amounts should have been resolved by way of an additional decision rather than clarification of a final judgment, and informed that an application for an additional decision should have been lodged before the entry into force of the main judgment. 14. It is not disputed between the parties that the judgment of 3 May 2001 remained unenforced in the part concerning the payment to the applicant of the second salary and the field allowances for the periods specified in the judgment. 15. On 24 March 2016, after communication of the present case, the Ministry of Finance of Russia calculated the amount due to the applicant under the judgment of 3 May 2001. According to this calculation, the main debt amounted to 80,220.74 Russian roubles.",TRUE,1,"It depends if money that is yet to be granted counts as possessions according to the statute, but that seems to be the common understanding.", 456,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Sanski Most. 6. By a judgment of the Banja Luka Court of First Instance of 23 May 2005, which became final on 11 September 2007, the Republika Srpska (an entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina) was ordered to pay the applicant 42,767 convertible marks (BAM)[1] on account of pecuniary damage together with default interest calculated from 23 May 2005 until final payment. 7. On 1 February 2010 the applicant submitted a request for the issuance of the writ of execution in his case, which request he amended on 30 August 2010. 8. On 18 October 2010 the applicant submitted a request for the acceleration of the proceedings before the Banja Luka Court of First Instance. 9. On 15 November 2010 the Banja Luka Court of First Instance issued the writ of execution (rješenje o izvršenju). 10. On 18 March 2011 the Banja Luka Court of First Instance rejected the objections against its decision of 15 November 2010, as well as the applicant's request for the payment of the costs of the enforcement proceedings. 11. On 31 May 2011 the Banja Luka Court of First Instance made certain corrections to its decision of 18 March 2011. 12. On 15 December 2011 the Banja Luka Court of Second Instance quashed the decision of the Banja Luka Court of First Instance of 18 March 2011 and remitted the case for reconsideration. 13. On 26 March 2012 the applicant submitted a request for the acceleration of the proceedings before the Banja Luka Court of First Instance. 14. On 12 April 2012 the Banja Luka Court of First Instance partially granted the objection of the Republika Srpska against the writ of execution. 15. On 23 April 2012 the applicant appealed the decision of the Banja Luka Court of First Instance of 12 April 2012. On 11 June, 13 July, and 21 November 2012, and on 15 January 2013 the applicant submitted further requests for the acceleration of the proceedings before the Banja Luka Court of Second Instance. 16. On 21 January 2013 the Banja Luka Court of Second Instance rejected the applicant's appeal and upheld the decision of 12 April 2012. 17. On 7 October 2014 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina ruled in favour of the applicant that the enforcement proceedings before the Banja Luka Court of First Instance had not been finalised within a reasonable time. It further ordered the Banja Luka Court of First Instance to urgently expedite the enforcement proceedings in the applicant's case. The Constitutional Court considered this to be sufficient just satisfaction and rejected the applicant's claim for non-pecuniary damage. 18. On 8 November 2016 the final decision in question was enforced in cash, regarding the principal amount and the statutory default interests. On 5 July 2017 the costs of the enforcement proceedings and related statutory default interests were also fully paid to the applicant.",Ruled as violated by court,,"18. On 8 November 2016 the final decision in question was enforced in cash, regarding the principal amount and the statutory default interests. On 5 July 2017 the costs of the enforcement proceedings and related statutory default interests were also fully paid to the applicant.",FALSE,0,The applicant was fully paid., 457,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","4. The applicants are a family. They were born in 1971, 1968, 1992, 1995, and live in Samara. 5. On 26 April 2004 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Samara (""the Oktyabrskiy District Court"") ordered, inter alia, the management of the State unitary enterprise ""16th Military Plant"" (""the company"") to provide the applicants with a suitable dwelling, while keeping their names on the list of persons awaiting housing. 6. On 11 May 2004 the judgment came into force. 7. On 28 May 2004 the Department of the Bailiffs' Service for Oktyabrskiy District of Samara opened the enforcement proceedings. 8. On 22 December 2004 the enforcement proceedings were terminated as the company had no available residential accommodation. 9. On 1 October 2007, due to the reorganisation of the company (see paragraph 16 below), the enforcement file was sent to the Department of the Bailiffs' Service for the Engelsskiy District of Saratov Region. 10. On 21 April 2008 the bailiffs ruled that it was impossible to enforce the judgment in the part relating to the housing, as the new debtor, FGUP 9 TSARZ (see paragraph 16 below), had no available accommodation. The enforcement proceedings were terminated. 11. On 26 August 2009 the Engelsskiy District Court of Saratov Region, following the bailiffs' application, replaced the debtor in the enforcement proceedings from FGUP 9 TSARZ to OAO 9 TSARZ (see paragraph 17 below). 12. On 14 October 2009 the Oktyabrskiy District Court clarified the judgment of 26 April 2004 stating that the applicants should be provided with an apartment in Samara. 13. Several times in 2004-2011 the parties applied to the Oktyabrskiy District Court for changing the mode of enforcement of the judgment. Each time the courts rejected the applications finding that a payment of the amount representing the cost of an apartment would be equal to modifying the original judgment. 14. The judgment of 26 April 2004 remained unenforced. 15. The company was incorporated as a municipal unitary enterprise. According to its articles of association, the company's aim was to produce goods and render services for the Ministry of Defense of Russia, as well as for meeting other public needs and making a profit. 16. Under the Order of the Federal Agency for State Property Management dated 22 September 2005 the company was joined to FGUP 9 TSARZ (FGUP 9 Tsentralnyy Avtomobilnyy Remontnyy Zavod – ФГУП 9 ЦАРЗ or ФГУП 9 Центральный Автомобильный Ремонтный Завод). The reorganisation was completed on 13 February 2007, and the latter company became the universal successor of the company. 17. In accordance with the Decree of the President of Russia of 15 September 2008 and the Decree of the Russian Government of 22 November 2008, FGUP 9 TSARZ was further reorganized into OAO 9 TSARZ, a publicly-traded private open joint-stock company incorporated under the laws of Russia.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"It depends if accommodation that is yet to be granted counts as possessions according to the statute, but that seems to be the common understanding.", 458,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The applicants were born in 1968, 1960, 1966, 1962, 1959, 1955 and 1954, respectively, and live in Novi Travnik and Bugojno, Bosnia and Herzegovina. 6. By seven judgments of the Travnik Municipal Court and the Bugojno Municipal Court, of 19 January 2007, 15 May 2008, 19 January 2006, 28 October 2011, 2 February 2009, 1 September 2009 and 9 April 2004, respectively, the applicants' employers, two companies manufacturing weapons and military technology, were ordered to pay them various sums in respect of unpaid work-related benefits together with default interest at the statutory rate and legal costs. The judgments became final on 24 August 2007, 15 May 2008, 19 January 2006, 26 November 2011, 20 August 2009, 13 October 2009 and 13 April 2005, respectively. 7. The applicants' winding-up petitions were rejected on 27 May 2010 and 14 February 2011, respectively, because the Federal Ministry of Energy had refused authorisation (see paragraph 14 below). Consequently, in accordance with the 2003 Insolvency Act, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina became liable for the debts of the applicants' employers (see paragraph 14 below). 8. The Sarajevo Municipal Court issued enforcement orders on 9 November 2011, 21 February 2012, 17 April 2012, 25 April 2012, 5 July 2012, 27 March 2012 and 9 August 2012, respectively, in which the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was designated as a debtor. They were transferred to the competent bank and were listed among the charges in the federal budget. 9. On several occasions thereafter the bank informed the competent courts that the enforcement was not possible because the budgetary funds intended for that purpose had already been spent. 10. The applicants complained of the non-enforcement to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (""the Constitutional Court""). 11. On 17 March 2015 (decision no. AP 2892/13) the Constitutional Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in the applicants' cases on account of the prolonged non-enforcement of the final judgments in their favour. It ordered the government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to take the necessary steps in order to secure the payment of its debt arising from the final judgments within a reasonable time. Although the applicants submitted a claim for non-pecuniary damages, the Constitutional Court did not award any compensation. 12. On the following dates in 2017 the final judgments in the applicants' favour were fully enforced: (i) on 10 January 2017 in respect of Mr Mujo Zahirović; (ii) on 9 January 2017 in respect of Ms Nedžvija Mandara; (iii) on 13 April 2017 in respect of Mr Miralem Mustajbegović; (iv) on 17 January 2017 in respect of Mr Nihad Hrnjica; (v) on 11 January 2017 in respect of Mr Zijad Džugum; (vi) on 17 January 2017 in respect of Ms Đevada Hodžić; and (vii) on 13 April 2017 in respect of Mr Fadil Pandžo. The payments made in the applicants' favour included the reimbursement of the costs sustained for the enforcement procedure.",Ruled as violated by court,,"11. On 17 March 2015 (decision no. AP 2892/13) the Constitutional Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in the applicants' cases on account of the prolonged non-enforcement of the final judgments in their favour. It ordered the government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to take the necessary steps in order to secure the payment of its debt arising from the final judgments within a reasonable time. Although the applicants submitted a claim for non-pecuniary damages, the Constitutional Court did not award any compensation.",FALSE,0,The applicants were fully paid., 459,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","4. The applicant is a Roman Catholic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, based in Sarajevo. 5. By decision of 9 May 2003, which became final and binding on 4 September 2003, the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina (""the Chamber"") found that the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (an entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina) had discriminated against the applicant in its enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention. In order to remedy the situation it ordered the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure the relocation of public schools housed in the Archdiocese High School building in Travnik, and to reinstate the applicant in the premises within one year. The Chamber rejected a request by the applicant for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. 6. By an agreement of 21 May 2004, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina undertook to reinstate the applicant in the impugned premises by 1 July 2006. Shortly thereafter, the Travnik Municipal Council adopted the implementing decisions, and also one of the public schools was moved from the premises. 7. On 23 June 2010 the Travnik Municipal Council issued a writ of execution (rješenje o izvršenju). On 5 October 2011 the Travnik Cantonal Court quashed that decision and remitted the case for reconsideration. On 17 October 2011 the Travnik Municipal Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to deal with the case. On 16 May 2012 the Travnik Cantonal Court quashed that decision and remitted the case for reconsideration. On 3 July 2012 the Travnik Municipal Court held that the decisions of the Chamber were not subject to enforcement proceedings. On 12 July 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision. At the date of the latest information available to the Court (28 August 2017), the Travnik Cantonal Court had not yet ruled on the matter. 8. On 30 October 2012 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina determined that the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had not yet fully enforced the decision of 9 May 2003. 9. On 17 February 2017 the applicant initiated civil proceedings against the public school remaining in its premises, requesting its relocation, as well as damages for the use of the premises for the period between 1 February 2014 and 1 June 2017. 10. On 14 July 2017 the Municipal Court in Travnik rendered a judgment in the applicant's favour, rewarding in full its claims finally specified in the proceedings, namely 270,360 convertible marks (BAM)[1] for pecuniary damages and 6,713 BAM for costs and expenses. The Municipal Court also ordered the respondent to vacate the applicant's premises within 30 days from receiving the judgment. On 20 December 2017 the Cantonal Court in Novi Travnik upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. At the date of the latest information available to the Court (20 February 2018), the Central Bosnia Canton submitted a revision petition to the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina against the final judgment in these proceedings. It also appears that the public school has still not been relocated.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,It depends if property that is yet to be relocated counts as possession according to the statute., 460,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The applicant was born in 1972 and now lives in Odessa, Ukraine. 6. On 31 January 2014 the applicant sold a plot of land and a summer cottage in the Moscow Region for 4,600,000 Russian roubles (RUB). On 20 February 2014 he exchanged RUB 3,605,000 for 100,000 United States dollars (USD). 7. On 19 March 2014 the applicant travelled to Odessa from Domodedovo Airport in Moscow. He was carrying the entire USD 100,000 in his handbag. At the security check, his hand luggage was X-rayed. An officer asked him whether he was carrying any cash. The applicant acknowledged that he had money in his handbag and showed it to the officer. 8. The applicant was subsequently interviewed by a police officer and an investigator on suspicion of smuggling foreign currency. He insisted on the lawful origin of the money and claimed that he had erroneously believed that the customs control would take place after the security check. 9. On 18 April 2014 the investigator refused to initiate criminal proceedings because it could not be established that the applicant had deliberately sought to circumvent customs regulations. 10. On 6 June 2014 the Federal Customs Service prepared a report on a regulatory customs offence under Article 16.4 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The applicant was charged for his failure to make a written declaration in respect of the USD 100,000 he had been carrying on him. 11. A hearing was held on 18 December 2014 before a justice of the peace in the Domodedovo District of the Moscow Region. The court held that the customs report and statements the applicant had given to the police were sufficient evidence of the offence. It was legally irrelevant whether he had deliberately sought to circumvent customs regulations or negligently failed to abide by the applicable declaration requirements. The court issued a confiscation order for USD 90,000, reasoning as follows: ""When deciding on the punishment, the court takes into account the nature and gravity of the offence which is connected to the operation of a hazardous device, the information on the character of Mr Gyrlyan, who has no previous record of similar offences, and considers it appropriate to order confiscation of the object of the administrative offence."" 12. In his grounds of appeal, the applicant relied in particular on the case-law of the Constitutional Court, which emphasised that any punishment had to be fair and proportionate to the nature of the offence, the gravity of the consequences, the extent of the damage and other relevant factors. He pointed out that the money had been lawfully obtained and that his actions had not caused any damage to the State. 13. On 14 January 2015 the Domodedovo Town Court dismissed the appeal in a summary fashion, noting that the punishment had been determined ""within the range of penalties [provided for in Article 16.4 of the Code of Administrative Offences] and with regard to the character of the offender"". 14. An appeal on points of law was dismissed by the deputy president of the Moscow Regional Court on 30 April 2015. He wrote that ""the defence's allegation of a formalistic approach on the part of the [lower] courts [was their] subjective opinion that [did not] shield Mr Gyrlyan from liability.""",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. On 19 March 2014 the applicant travelled to Odessa from Domodedovo Airport in Moscow. He was carrying the entire USD 100,000 in his handbag. At the security check, his hand luggage was X-rayed. An officer asked him whether he was carrying any cash. The applicant acknowledged that he had money in his handbag and showed it to the officer. 9. On 18 April 2014 the investigator refused to initiate criminal proceedings because it could not be established that the applicant had deliberately sought to circumvent customs regulations.",TRUE,2,"The applicant was deprived of his property. At the same time, the state sees a meaningful public interest in regulation on suspicion of smuggling foreign currency. The weighing of these interests determines what the line should be.", 461,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","6. The applicant was born in 1934 and lived in Moscow. 7. In June 1998 he deposited 5,187.40 United States dollars in a three‑month account with Russian Credit, a private bank. 8. In August 1998 the country suffered a financial crisis, the rouble fell, and the bank defaulted. In December 1998 the applicant accepted the bank's offer to settle and close his account in return for the balance in depreciated roubles. By the time the money reached the applicant in March 1999, the rouble had depreciated further. 9. In October 1999 the bank went into external administration and its debt repayments were frozen pending a restructuring. 10. In May 2000 the bank and its creditors negotiated a group settlement of the pre-October 1999 debt and had it approved by the courts. The settlement discharged the bank from fines, penalties, default interest, and damages arising under legislation, contracts with clients, and court decisions. 11. In December 2001 the applicant sued the bank for the loss caused by the exchange-rate fluctuations between the day he had accepted the bank's offer and the day the money had arrived. The bank objected to that claim on the ground that it had extinguished its obligations by repaying the deposit to the applicant. On 17 April 2002 the Golovinskiy District Court of Moscow awarded the applicant 77,603.50 Russian roubles (RUB)[1]. 12. In May 2003 the applicant filed a writ of execution with a bailiff. 13. On 17 June 2003, on the application of the bank, the District Court terminated the enforcement of its judgment in view of the group settlement. The District Court said: Considering the nature of the legal relationship at issue, the court takes into account the fact that the enforcement proceedings have been instituted with the purpose of collecting from [Russian Credit] the liabilities that had come into existence before 18 October 1999 inclusive and, under the ... terms of the friendly settlement, are related to [the bank's] restructured liabilities subject to novation on the terms of the friendly settlement approved by a [court decision] that had defined the procedure and terms of the extinction of the liabilities. Pursuant to section 23 § 2 of the Federal Law on Enforcement Proceedings, the conclusion of a friendly settlement between a creditor and a debtor constitutes a ground for the termination of the enforcement proceedings, and therefore the [bank's] application shall be granted and the [enforcement proceedings] shall be terminated. 14. In July 2003, in reply to the applicant's query, the bank's external administrator informed the applicant that his deposit had not been on the books and that under the terms of the group settlement his judgment debt could not be paid. 15. On 14 August 2003 the Moscow City Court upheld the District Court's decision, finding that the applicant's individual claim was to be settled with the group claim. The City Court said: When terminating the [enforcement] proceedings the [District Court] has referred to the provisions of section 439 of the Code of Civil Procedure and reached the conclusion that the terms of the said friendly settlement regarding the restructuring of the credit obligations of [Russian Credit] extended also to [the applicant]. The [City Court] agrees with the said conclusion of the [District Court] as based on the provisions of the law and confirmed by the circumstances of the present case.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,It depends if the difference in interest for money that is yet to be granted counts as possession according to the statute., 462,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Lipetsk. 6. On 18 September 2007 the applicant signed a private contract for the purchase of a flat in Lipetsk. The seller was Ms E.M.T., acting on behalf of herself and her daughter Maria, a minor. The contract stipulated that the property was not ""mortgaged, encumbered by any claims of third parties, disputed or charged"". 7. The flat in question had been allocated as social housing to Ms E.M.T. and her husband, Mr V.A.V., in 1979. They had lived there with their four children: Yelena, Mikhail, Dmitriy and Maria. Mikhail and Dmitriy were given long prison sentences in 1998 and 2004 respectively and were still serving them at the material time. Yelena moved out in 1997 to continue her studies in Dagestan. In 2006, Ms E.M.T and Maria became the sole owners of the property by way of privatisation, while Mr V.A.V., Mikhail, Dmitry and Yelena declined in writing to exercise their right to obtain their shares of the privatised flat. 8. As the seller Ms E.M.T. delayed submitting the contract for State registration, the applicant sought a court order upholding her full title to the property. The seller Ms E.M.T. brought a counterclaim. She submitted that she was unable to move out because the purchase of the new flat for herself and her daughter Maria had not yet been finalised. However, after Ms E.M.T. failed to appear in court, on 2 April 2008 the Oktyabrskiy District Court in Lipetsk struck out the counterclaim and granted the applicant relief in the form of an order compelling State registration of her full title to the property. On 12 November 2008 the title was registered. 9. The applicant then sued the former owner Ms E.M.T. and members of her family, seeking termination of their right to use the flat, annulment of the registration of their residence at that address, and their eviction. 10. On 7 April 2009 the Oktyabrskiy District Court allowed her claim in part. It ordered the eviction of Ms E.M.T. and Maria, as they were no longer owners of the property, but dismissed the claim in respect of Yelena, Mikhail and Dmitriy on the following grounds: ""According to the parties, the contested property contains personal belongings and chattels of the defendants [Mikhail, Dmitriy and Yelena]; it appears from their written statements that, in declining their shares of the contested property during its privatisation, they did not intend to stop using the flat. Since there was no arrangement between the owner of the contested property and the defendants regarding the discontinuation of the right to use the property, the court considers that [Mikhail, Dmitriy and Yelena] had a right of use over the flat which was identical [in its scope] to that of the owner; accordingly, there are no legal grounds for allowing [the applicant's] claim to declare their right of use over the flat terminated. A change in ownership of the contested property cannot serve as an independent ground for terminating [their] right to use the flat ... The plaintiff's argument to the effect that [Mikhail, Dmitriy and Yelena] do not actually live in the contested property cannot serve as an independent ground for terminating [their] right of use over the flat ... Since the defendants' right of use over the flat is not terminated, there are no grounds for ordering their eviction ..."" 11. On 27 May 2009 the Lipetsk Regional Court dismissed the applicant's appeal, endorsing the District Court's judgment.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. On 18 September 2007 the applicant signed a private contract for the purchase of a flat in Lipetsk. The seller was Ms E.M.T., acting on behalf of herself and her daughter Maria, a minor. The contract stipulated that the property was not ""mortgaged, encumbered by any claims of third parties, disputed or charged"". 7. The flat in question had been allocated as social housing to Ms E.M.T. and her husband, Mr V.A.V., in 1979. They had lived there with their four children: Yelena, Mikhail, Dmitriy and Maria. Mikhail and Dmitriy were given long prison sentences in 1998 and 2004 respectively and were still serving them at the material time. Yelena moved out in 1997 to continue her studies in Dagestan. In 2006, Ms E.M.T and Maria became the sole owners of the property by way of privatisation, while Mr V.A.V., Mikhail, Dmitry and Yelena declined in writing to exercise their right to obtain their shares of the privatised flat. 8. As the seller Ms E.M.T. delayed submitting the contract for State registration, the applicant sought a court order upholding her full title to the property. The seller Ms E.M.T. brought a counterclaim. She submitted that she was unable to move out because the purchase of the new flat for herself and her daughter Maria had not yet been finalised. However, after Ms E.M.T. failed to appear in court, on 2 April 2008 the Oktyabrskiy District Court in Lipetsk struck out the counterclaim and granted the applicant relief in the form of an order compelling State registration of her full title to the property. On 12 November 2008 the title was registered. 10. On 7 April 2009 the Oktyabrskiy District Court allowed her claim in part. It ordered the eviction of Ms E.M.T. and Maria, as they were no longer owners of the property, but dismissed the claim in respect of Yelena, Mikhail and Dmitriy on the following grounds: ""According to the parties, the contested property contains personal belongings and chattels of the defendants [Mikhail, Dmitriy and Yelena]; it appears from their written statements that, in declining their shares of the contested property during its privatisation, they did not intend to stop using the flat. Since there was no arrangement between the owner of the contested property and the defendants regarding the discontinuation of the right to use the property, the court considers that [Mikhail, Dmitriy and Yelena] had a right of use over the flat which was identical [in its scope] to that of the owner; accordingly, there are no legal grounds for allowing [the applicant's] claim to declare their right of use over the flat terminated. A change in ownership of the contested property cannot serve as an independent ground for terminating [their] right to use the flat ... The plaintiff's argument to the effect that [Mikhail, Dmitriy and Yelena] do not actually live in the contested property cannot serve as an independent ground for terminating [their] right of use over the flat ... Since the defendants' right of use over the flat is not terminated, there are no grounds for ordering their eviction ...""",TRUE,2,"When there are two meaningful claims to property being deprived, it's unclear how the statute should be applied.", 463,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","4. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Yerevan. 5. The applicant was employed by the State Revenue Service (""the Service""), division no. 2. On 23 February 2009 the head of the Service decided to terminate the applicant's employment. 6. On 2 April 2009 the applicant initiated proceedings in the Administrative Court against the Service seeking to 1) have the decision of 23 February 2009 annulled; 2) be reinstated in her previous position; and 3) recover her average salary starting from the moment of her dismissal until her reinstatement to the previous position. 7. On 17 September 2009 the Administrative Court granted the applicant's three claims. In particular, it annulled the decision of 23 February 2009, ordered the Service to reinstate her to her previous position and to pay her her average monthly salary starting from 23 February 2009 until her reinstatement. It reasoned its decision, inter alia, by stating that while the Service had been under an obligation to offer the applicant another position within the Service before deciding to dismiss her, it had failed to do so, even though such a position had existed in the Service at the material time. 8. This judgment was upheld in the final instance by the Court of Cassation and it became final on 4 November 2009. 9. On 29 November 2009 the Service paid the applicant 1,197,748 Armenian drams (AMD) (approximately 2,131 euros (EUR) at the material time) as compensation for her unemployment during the period from 23 February to 29 November 2009. 10. On 11 December 2009 the Administrative Court issued a writ of execution. 11. On 25 February 2010 the Department for the Enforcement of Judicial Acts (""the DEJA"") initiated enforcement proceedings. On the same day the DEJA gave a decision obliging the Service to comply with the writ of execution of 11 December 2009 within two weeks. 12. It appears that no further actions were taken by the DEJA and the Service in relation to the enforcement of the judgment of 17 September 2009 between the period of 25 February 2010 and 18 July 2011. 13. On 18 July 2011 the bailiff decided to discontinue the enforcement proceedings on the basis of section 41(1)(8) of the Enforcement of Judicial Acts Act. The bailiff reasoned that the Service had already paid the applicant AMD 1,197,748 while the reinstatement of the applicant in her previous position in the Service was impossible because that position was no longer vacant. 14. On 29 May 2012 the applicant asked the DEJA to resume the enforcement proceedings. 15. On 1 June 2012 the bailiff granted the applicant's request and decided to resume the enforcement proceedings. On the same day the bailiff gave a decision on obliging the Service to take certain actions. In particular, the bailiff obliged the Service to 1) annul the decision of the head of the Service of 23 February 2009; 2) reinstate the applicant to her previous position; and 3) pay her her average monthly salary for the period between her dismissal and her reinstatement to the previous position. 16. On 2 July 2012 the bailiff decided once again to terminate the enforcement proceedings on the basis of section 41(1)(8) of the Enforcement of Judicial Acts Act. In particular, the bailiff reasoned that the Service had already paid the applicant AMD 1,197,748 as ordered by the judgment of 17 September 2009 while the reinstatement of the applicant in her previous position in the Service was impossible because Division no. 2, where the applicant had previously worked, no longer existed.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. On 17 September 2009 the Administrative Court granted the applicant's three claims. In particular, it annulled the decision of 23 February 2009, ordered the Service to reinstate her to her previous position and to pay her her average monthly salary starting from 23 February 2009 until her reinstatement. It reasoned its decision, inter alia, by stating that while the Service had been under an obligation to offer the applicant another position within the Service before deciding to dismiss her, it had failed to do so, even though such a position had existed in the Service at the material time. 8. This judgment was upheld in the final instance by the Court of Cassation and it became final on 4 November 2009. 9. On 29 November 2009 the Service paid the applicant 1,197,748 Armenian drams (AMD) (approximately 2,131 euros (EUR) at the material time) as compensation for her unemployment during the period from 23 February to 29 November 2009. 10. On 11 December 2009 the Administrative Court issued a writ of execution. 11. On 25 February 2010 the Department for the Enforcement of Judicial Acts (""the DEJA"") initiated enforcement proceedings. On the same day the DEJA gave a decision obliging the Service to comply with the writ of execution of 11 December 2009 within two weeks. 13. On 18 July 2011 the bailiff decided to discontinue the enforcement proceedings on the basis of section 41(1)(8) of the Enforcement of Judicial Acts Act. The bailiff reasoned that the Service had already paid the applicant AMD 1,197,748 while the reinstatement of the applicant in her previous position in the Service was impossible because that position was no longer vacant. 14. On 29 May 2012 the applicant asked the DEJA to resume the enforcement proceedings. 15. On 1 June 2012 the bailiff granted the applicant's request and decided to resume the enforcement proceedings. On the same day the bailiff gave a decision on obliging the Service to take certain actions. In particular, the bailiff obliged the Service to 1) annul the decision of the head of the Service of 23 February 2009; 2) reinstate the applicant to her previous position; and 3) pay her her average monthly salary for the period between her dismissal and her reinstatement to the previous position. 16. On 2 July 2012 the bailiff decided once again to terminate the enforcement proceedings on the basis of section 41(1)(8) of the Enforcement of Judicial Acts Act. In particular, the bailiff reasoned that the Service had already paid the applicant AMD 1,197,748 as ordered by the judgment of 17 September 2009 while the reinstatement of the applicant in her previous position in the Service was impossible because Division no. 2, where the applicant had previously worked, no longer existed.",TRUE,1,"It depends if money that is yet to be granted counts as possessions according to the statute, but that seems to be the common understanding.", 464,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The applicants were born in 1954, 1952, 1964, 1926, 1952, 1960 and 1956 respectively and live in Donetsk. 6. From the beginning of April 2014 armed groups started to seize official buildings in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and announced the creation of self-proclaimed entities known as the ""Donetsk People's Republic"" and ""Luhansk People's Republic"" (the ""DPR"" and ""LPR""). 7. In response, on 14 April 2014 the Government, who consider the armed groups to be terrorist organisations, authorised the use of force against them in the legal form of an ""anti-terrorist operation"". 8. In June 2014 the armed groups started to seize offices of the National Bank of Ukraine and other regional financial institutions in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. 9. On 24 July 2014 the Ukrainian postal service Ukrposhta suspended its operations on the territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions that were outside the control of the Government, because of frequent attacks on its vehicles and employees by armed groups. 10. On 6 August 2014 the National Bank of Ukraine suspended all financial transactions on the territories outside the control of the Government (see paragraph 20 below). 11. Government forces recaptured some territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but certain parts of the regions have remained outside the Government's control since that time. One part of the Donetsk region not under the Government's control is the city of Donetsk. 12. On 2 September 2014, following changes in the law, jurisdiction of the courts in the non-controlled areas was transferred to the relevant courts in the neighbouring regions on the territory controlled by the Government (see paragraphs 34 to 36 below). 13. On 11 November 2014 all social benefit payments in the settlements of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions that were outside the control of the Government were suspended (see paragraph 26 below) 14. In December 2014 the Donetsk Regional Administrative Court and the Donetsk Regional Administrative Court of Appeal were relocated to the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, territory controlled by the Government (see paragraphs 37 and 38 below). 15. The applicants were registered as recipients of social benefits with different departments of the Pension Fund of Ukraine in Donetsk. Some applicants had been receiving their social benefits until 30 June 2014, others until 31 August 2014. 16. On 16 June 2015 the first and second applicants registered themselves with the Labour and Social Security Department of the Krasnoarmiysk District of the Donetsk region (currently the city of Pokrovsk), controlled by the Government. On the same day their social benefits was reinstated, including social benefits due to them for the period 1 July 2014 to 16 June 2015. 17. The sixth applicant was registered with the Labour and Social Security Department of the Obolonskiy District in Kyiv on 9 September 2015. However, she did not apply for reinstatement of her social benefits. 18. The other applicants did not apply to the relevant social authorities on the territory controlled by the Government for reinstatement of their social benefits. 19. According to the Government, the sixth and seventh applicants travelled from Donetsk to the territory controlled by the Government after their social benefits had been suspended. The Government provided a certificate from the State Customs Office stating that the sixth and seventh applicants had entered the territory controlled by the Government on 31 October 2015, through an authorised checkpoint near the frontline between Ukrainian forces and ""DPR"" armed groups in the town of Zaitseve.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"16. On 16 June 2015 the first and second applicants registered themselves with the Labour and Social Security Department of the Krasnoarmiysk District of the Donetsk region (currently the city of Pokrovsk), controlled by the Government. On the same day their social benefits was reinstated, including social benefits due to them for the period 1 July 2014 to 16 June 2015. 17. The sixth applicant was registered with the Labour and Social Security Department of the Obolonskiy District in Kyiv on 9 September 2015. However, she did not apply for reinstatement of her social benefits. 19. According to the Government, the sixth and seventh applicants travelled from Donetsk to the territory controlled by the Government after their social benefits had been suspended. The Government provided a certificate from the State Customs Office stating that the sixth and seventh applicants had entered the territory controlled by the Government on 31 October 2015, through an authorised checkpoint near the frontline between Ukrainian forces and ""DPR"" armed groups in the town of Zaitseve.",TRUE,2,It depends if unpaid social benefits count as possession according to the statute., 465,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","8. The applicants are owners of residential buildings or apartments which were subject to the rent-control scheme. Under the relevant legislation they were obliged to let their flats to tenants while charging no more than the maximum amount of rent fixed by the State. The legislation precluded them from unilaterally terminating the leases or selling the flats in question to anyone other than the respective tenants. The particulars of the flats affected by the rent control are set out in Appendices 10 ‑ 17 (columns A ‑ F). 9. The situation of the applicants is structurally and contextually the same as that of the applicants in Bittó and Others v. Slovakia (no. 30255/09, 28 January 2014 (merits) and 7 July 2015 (just satisfaction)), and subsequently decided cases concerning the rent-control scheme in Slovakia (see Krahulec v. Slovakia, no. 19294/07; Bukovčanová and Others v. Slovakia, no. 23785/07; Rudolfer v. Slovakia, no. 38082/07, 5 July 2016; Riedel and Others v. Slovakia, nos. 44218/07, 54831/07, 33176/08, 47150/08; and Mečiar and Others v. Slovakia, no. 62864/09, 10 January 2017; Matuschka and Others v. Slovakia [Committee], nos. 33076/10, 14383/11, Balan and Others v. Slovakia [Committee], nos. 51414/11, 46098/12, and Bajzík and Others v. Slovakia [Committee], nos. 46609/13, 9892/14, 27 June 2017). 10. Two residential building at 27 Panenská St. and 14 Konventná St. in Bratislava were acquired in 2002 by a religious organisation with legal personality, Cirkevný zbor Evanjelickej cirkvi Augsburského vyznania na Slovensku Bratislava (hereinafter ""the Bratislava Evangelical Church""). This body established three other entities with legal personalities, including the applicant organisation the Old Town Evangelical Church. 11. The property in question was conveyed by the Bratislava Evangelical Church to the Old Town Evangelical Church by way of donation on 6 February 2013. On 15 February 2013 the previous owner ceased legally to exist and was legally succeeded by the Old Town Evangelical Church and the other two entities. 12. On 22 February 2012 the Old Town Evangelical Church gave formal notices of termination of their lease to the two tenants residing in flat no. 11 situated in the residential building at 27 Panenská St. in Bratislava. By law, these tenants had under certain circumstances the right to claim that the municipality provide them with a substitute flat on the termination of their lease. They did not avail themselves of that right. 13. On 6 August 2013 the Old Town Evangelical Church applied to the Bratislava I District Court for an eviction order against the occupants of this flat who had failed to vacate it by the expiry of the twelve‑month notice period. As the occupants eventually vacated the flat on 25 February 2015, the Old Town Evangelical Church withdrew its action and the proceedings in respect of it were discontinued on 9 March 2015. Until the vacation of the flat, the occupants had paid the Old Town Evangelical Church compensation in an amount equal to the regulated rent. 14. The tenants residing in flats nos. 1 and 9 on 22 Moyzesova St. in Žilina moved in 2002 into flats nos. 5 and 12 within the same building owing to rebuilding of the original flats. The tenants continued to pay the regulated rent. In 2003 flat no. 5 was rebuilt and its area was changed from 110.27 sq. m to 59.18 sq. m. 15. A similar situation arose in the residential building on 33 Pražská St. in Bratislava where in 2014 the tenant residing in flat no. 16 moved to flat no. 9, and in the residential building located on 15 Vrbovská cesta St. in Piešťany, where the tenant living in the flat no. 14 moved to flat no. 25.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"One could argue deprivation of property given the applicants' rights to flats, but it seems overall there is no deprivation of property in this fact pattern.", 466,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","4. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Kazan. 5. In 1969 the Shumelka river in Tveretinovka, Republic of Tatarstan, was dammed and an artificial lake was created. 6. The original owner of the plot of land that contained the lake was a State fur farm. 7. In 2003 the fur farm sold the plot of land and the lake to a private limited liability company through a public sale by tender. The new owner's title to the plot of land was registered in the State land register. 8. On 5 May 2008 the company sold the land to the applicant through a public sale by tender. The applicant's title to the plot of land was registered in the State land register and on 28 June 2008 the applicant was issued with the relevant certificate. 9. On 18 October 2011, following bankruptcy proceedings, the limited liability company was de-registered as a legal entity. 10. On 29 March 2012 the regional agency for management of State property brought a civil action against the applicant, seeking to reclaim the plot of land and the lake. 11. On 5 May 2012 the Pestrechinskiy District Court of the Republic of Tatarstan granted the claims in full. The Court noted that, pursuant to the applicable legislation, the lake could not be owned by a private entity or a person and should be returned to the State. The court further noted that the public sale by tender in 2008 had been conducted in contravention of certain regulations (in particular, the announcement concerning the sale had not been published in the newspapers indicated in the State-approved list) and refused to apply the three-year statute of limitations to the agency's claims. 12. On 5 July 2012 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan quashed the judgment of 5 May 2012 on appeal and rejected the claims in full. The court considered that the District Court had erred in the interpretation of the applicable legislation and that the plot of land with the lake could be owned by a private party. It further noted that, in any event, the agency's claim should be dismissed for its failure to bring its action within the three-year time-limit. In this connection the court referred to the fact that (1) the State had been aware that the contested property had left its possession back in 2003 when the plot of land had been sold by the State farm to a private company and the new owner's title to the property had been registered in the State land register and (2) the State had been aware that the applicant had owned the plot of land since 2008 when the applicant's title to the property had been registered in the State land register. The agency appealed. 13. On 14 September 2012 the Supreme Court referred the matter for a review of points of law. 14. On 10 October 2012 the Presidium of the Supreme Court quashed the appeal judgement of 5 July 2012 and upheld the judgment of 5 May 2008, by way of a points-of-law review. It rejected the applicant's request to apply the statute of limitations, considering that the agency had learnt about the infringement of the State's rights in respect of the plot of land only in 2012 after receiving a letter from the Federal Water Resources Agency (Федеральное агентство водных ресурсов России). 15. On 22 February 2013 the plot of land was registered as federal property in the State land register. 16. On an unspecified date the applicant challenged the imposition of a fine on her in 2011 as the owner of the plot of land. She claimed that she had not been the owner of the plot of land. 17. On 19 April 2013 the Vakhitovskiy District Court of Kazan dismissed the applicant's claims. It noted that the applicant had been the owner of the plot of land in 2011 and that the parties had not furnished any evidence to the contrary.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"When there are two meaningful claims to property being deprived, it's unclear how the statute should be applied.", 467,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","4. The applicants are Russian nationals. They were owners of flats in Moscow. The municipal authorities reclaimed the flats, and the applicants' title to the real property in question was annulled. 5. In 1977 a number of flats in a residential building located at 15-3 Ulitsa Tsyurupy, Moscow, were assigned by the City of Moscow to the Ministry of Communications. The flats were used as temporary housing for foreign specialists seconded to the Ministry. In 1991 the flats were transferred to the Rostelekom Open Joint Stock Company, the Ministry's successor. On 18 February 2009 the flats were transferred from Rostelekom to the City of Moscow. It appears that the flats remained vacant. 6. In 2008-2009 a group of people, including a police officer, a lawyer, a notary and several Rostelekom employees, forged documents pertaining to three flats located at 15-3 Ulitsa Tsyurupy, Moscow, showing that the flats were owned by private individuals and, following their deaths, were inherited by their ""heirs"". The relevant property deeds were forged by notary K. and then registered by the City Registration Department. Then the ""heirs"" sold the flats to private parties. Subsequently the flats were bought by the applicants. Each transaction with the flats was reviewed and approved by the City Registration Department. 7. On 8 August 2012 a criminal investigation was opened into the City's loss of title to the flats. 8. On 7 December 2012 the Housing Department of the City of Moscow (the ""Housing Department"") was recognised as a victim of the crime. 9. On 9 December 2013 the Perovskiy District Court of Moscow found nine defendants, including several Rostelekom employees, guilty of fraud. The court established, inter alia, that the defendants had forged the documents and had had unlawfully registered the flats as private property to the detriment of the City of Moscow. Notary K. was questioned as a witness. 10. On 11 March 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 9 December 2013 on appeal. 11. According to the Government, notary K. was also found guilty of fraud and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 12. In 2014 the Housing Department brought civil actions seeking restitution of the flats. 13. The Cheremushkinskiy District Court of Moscow granted the Housing Department's claims. The court invalidated the transactions in respect of the flats and the applicants' title to the flats and ordered their eviction. The court applied the domestic law provisions which allowed the owner to recover its property from a bona fide purchaser if the said property left the owner's possession against its will. The court considered that the City of Moscow had not had intent to divest itself of the flats and had a right to recover the stolen flats from the applicants. 14. The Moscow City Court upheld the judgments of the District Court on appeal. As regards Ms Titova (application nos. 4919/16), the City Court discerned no evidence in the material of the case file that would substantiate her claim that she had bought the flat in good faith. The City Court took into account that she had bought the flat a month and a half after the previous transaction and that the purchase price of the flat had been obviously lower than its market value. In the City Court's view, Ms Titova, if having acted with due care and diligence, should have had doubts as to the legitimacy of seller's title and sale of the flat. 15. Subsequently, the City Court refused to grant the applicants leave to bring a cassation appeal against the judgments in their respective cases. 16. According to the Government, the applicants were not evicted and continue to reside in the flats. 17. The details pertaining to each case are summed up in Appendix II below.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"When there are two meaningful claims to property being deprived, it's unclear how the statute should be applied.", 468,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Assemini (Italy). 6. By a decision of 4 December 2006 of the Cantonal Prosecutor of the Hercegovina-Neretva Canton (Hercegovačko-neretvanski kanton; one of the ten cantons of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) the applicant was granted the reimbursement of costs which she had incurred as a witness in the amount of 519 convertible marks (BAM)[1]. 7. On 29 February 2008 the Mostar Municipal Court (""the Municipal Court"") rejected the applicant's request for the enforcement of this decision, deeming it unenforceable. 8. On 18 September 2008 the Mostar Cantonal Court (""the Cantonal Court"") quashed this decision and remitted the case for reconsideration. 9. On 19 November 2008 the Municipal Court issued a writ of execution (rješenje o izvršenju). 10. On 19 June 2009 the Municipal Court upheld the objection lodged against this decision. 11. On 1 April 2010 the Cantonal Court quashed this decision and again remitted the case to the Municipal Court. 12. On 18 February 2011 the Municipal Court partly accepted the objection against the writ of execution specifically as regards the interest on the main debt calculated from 4 January 2007, and the interest on the total costs of the enforcement proceedings. 13. On 2 December 2011 the Cantonal Court upheld this decision. 14. On 19 September 2013 the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina dismissed the applicant's request for revision as inadmissible. 15. On 23 December 2013 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina partially accepted the applicant's appeal and thereby found a violation of her right to a trial within a reasonable time, due to the non-enforcement of the decision of the Municipal Court of 18 February 2011 (see paragraph 12 above). It also ordered the Hercegovina-Neretva Canton to undertake measures in order to enforce the decision within a reasonable time. The Constitutional Court, however, did not award the non-pecuniary damage requested by the applicant. 16. On 21 October 2014 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina confirmed that the final decision in question had not yet been enforced. 17. On 18 December 2014 the said final decision was enforced and the applicant was paid in cash. 18. By a judgment of the Municipal Court of 3 April 2009, which became final on 16 December 2009, a certain P.M. was ordered to pay the applicant the costs of civil proceedings in the amount of BAM 1,959. 19. On 31 October 2010 the applicant submitted to the Municipal Court a request for the enforcement of this judgment. 20. On 14 September 2011, 4 November 2011 and 5 October 2012 the applicant submitted requests for the acceleration of the enforcement proceedings. 21. On 5 December 2012 the Municipal Court issued a writ of execution. 22. On 13 June 2013 the Municipal Court dismissed the objection lodged against its decision of 5 December 2012, and P.M. subsequently appealed this decision to the Cantonal Court. 23. On 17 September 2013 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina found a violation of the applicant's right to a trial within a reasonable time, due to the duration of the enforcement proceedings before the Municipal Court. It further ordered the Cantonal Court to urgently rule on the appeal lodged by P.M. The Constitutional Court, however, did not award the non-pecuniary damage requested by the applicant. 24. On 16 October 2013 the Cantonal Court dismissed the appeal lodged by P.M. 25. On 11 June 2015 the Municipal Court issued a writ of execution. 26. On 4 August 2016 the said final judgment was enforced and the applicant was paid in cash on her bank account in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It appears that the applicant was still living in Italy at that time.",Ruled as violated by court,,26. On 4 August 2016 the said final judgment was enforced and the applicant was paid in cash on her bank account in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It appears that the applicant was still living in Italy at that time.,FALSE,0,The applicant was fully paid., 469,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The applicant company, Virprod-Lux S.R.L., is a company incorporated in Moldova. 6. On 13 April 2000 the Tax Authority seized a building from a State‑owned company, company V., on account of taxes which were due. 7. On 1 October 2000, at the request of the Tax Authority, the building was valued by an estate agency at 352,000 Moldovan lei (MDL). 8. On 29 January 2001 the Department of Privatisation and Administration of State Property sold the building in question to company B. for MDL 360,500 (approximately 29,678 Euros (EUR), following a public auction. 9. On 25 April 2003 the applicant company bought the building from company B. for MDL 628,000 (approximately EUR 22,053). 10. On 29 March 2007 the Prosecutor General's Office initiated court proceedings in which it sought the annulment of both the sale of the building on 29 January 2001 and the subsequent transaction between company B. and the applicant company. It also sought the return of the building to its initial owner, company V. The reason relied upon by the Prosecutor's General's Office was that the valuation of the building conducted by the estate agency had not been carried out in accordance with the provisions of the law. The applicant company opposed the Prosecutor General's action and argued, among other things, that it was time-barred. 11. On 21 August 2007 the Economic Court of Appeal dismissed the Prosecutor General's action as time-barred. The court held, inter alia, that in accordance with the statute of limitations, the Prosecutor General's action could not be initiated more than three years after the events in dispute had taken place. 12. On 11 October 2007 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld an appeal by the Prosecutor General, reversed the judgment of the Economic Court of Appeal, and upheld the action in its entirety. The Supreme Court considered that the Prosecutor General's action concerned a declaration of the absolute nullity of the contracts in question and that therefore, in accordance with Article 217 of the Civil Code, enacted on 12 June 2003, it could not be limited in time. Following this judgment, the transactions of 29 January 2001 and 25 April 2003 were annulled and each party involved was ordered to return to the other parties whatever they received by virtue of those transactions. 13. On 7 December 2007 the applicant company lodged a revision request against the above judgment in which it indicated that it had carried out an expert evaluation of the disputed building by an independent expert who determined its value at MDL 8,550,000 (approximately EUR 511,440) after the improvements made by the applicant company to it. 14. In the meantime, the applicant company did not leave the disputed building because it had its production line there and it needed time and resources to find another suitable building and to move its production line. 15. Since company V. did not need the disputed building, the applicant company proposed to it and the latter accepted to conclude a friendly settlement agreement in accordance with which company V. agreed that the applicant company would retain ownership of the building in exchange for MDL 325,092 (approximately EUR 19,328). 16. On 20 March 2008, within the framework of the review proceedings, the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the parties' request to settle the case. It confirmed the friendly settlement agreement between the applicant company and company V., and on that basis it quashed its previous judgment and rejected the Prosecutor General's action. 17. It is unclear from the materials of the case and the parties' submissions whether after the adoption of the judgment of 11 October 2007 by the Supreme Court of Justice, company B. returned to the applicant company the amount received as a result of the transaction of 25 April 2003.",Ruled as violated by court,,"11. On 21 August 2007 the Economic Court of Appeal dismissed the Prosecutor General's action as time-barred. The court held, inter alia, that in accordance with the statute of limitations, the Prosecutor General's action could not be initiated more than three years after the events in dispute had taken place.",TRUE,2,"When there are two meaningful claims to property being deprived, it's unclear how the statute should be applied.", 470,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The applicant is a construction company, which was established in 2003 and has its seat of business in Mersin. 6. In 2005, after having obtained a permit to operate a mine, the applicant opened a mine in a plot of land of 8,700 m² which it owned. 7. During the course of its mining activities, on 31 January 2006 an audit commission under the Mersin Provincial Administration conducted an inspection. Subsequently, the commission drew up a report, proposing that the applicant should be ordered to pay 131,250 Turkish liras (TRY)[1] for quarrying substantial amounts of sand in the neighbouring plots of 5,000 m², outside of its licensed area. 8. On 8 March 2006 the Tarsus Provincial Administration informed the applicant that it had decided to impose the proposed administrative fine pursuant to Article 19 of the Regulation Concerning Group A Mines (A Grubu Madenlerle İlgili Uygulama Yönetmeliği). 9. On 8 February 2006 the applicant company's president, Ü.T., filed a complaint with the Mersin Public Prosecutor's office, stating that one of the auditors in the commission, M.A.L., had told him that the fine had initially been calculated as TRY 500,000 and that he had reduced that amount. Ü.T. claimed that M.A.L. had asked him to pay TRY 10,000 in return and had threatened to have his mine closed if he refused to do so. He indicated that M.A.L. had acted together with a certain F.G., an official at the Provincial Administration. 10. In his police statements on 9 February 2006, Ü.T. described his conversations with M.A.L. in detail. He noted, inter alia, that after the inspection of the audit commission, he had conducted another inspection with an official from the Directorate of Land Registration, and had calculated that he had trespassed on the neighbouring plots by only 400 metres. He also explained that he had acted as an undercover agent in line with the directions of the Public Prosecutor to catch the perpetrators in flagrante delicto. Accordingly, the police gave him TRY 10,000 and noted down the serial numbers of the banknotes. He stated that in line with the instructions of M.A.L. and F.G., he had given the money to a third person, who had received it in the name of the other two. 11. Subsequently, on 16 February 2006 the Mersin Public Prosecutor issued an indictment against M.A.L. and F.G., accusing them of extortion. 12. On 13 May 2011 the Mersin Assize Court found the two officials guilty as charged. The appeal proceedings with regard to that judgment are still pending before the Court of Cassation as of September 2017. 13. In the meantime, on 17 April 2006 the applicant had filed an objection with the Tarsus Magistrates' Court and requested a stay of execution of the fine. It informed the court of the criminal proceedings pending against certain officials involved, in which they were being tried for extortion. By a subsequent petition dated 5 June 2006, the applicant also requested the court to hold an oral hearing, to carry out an on-site examination, and to hear its witnesses in order to better evaluate the credibility of the inspection report the fine was based on. 14. On 13 June 2006, the Tarsus Magistrates' Court rejected the applicant's requests for an oral hearing and on-site examination without indicating any reasons for its decision. Relying on the inspection report drawn up on 31 January 2006, the court rejected the applicant's objection. 15. The applicant objected to that decision, arguing that the fine had been unlawfully imposed on it and that the Magistrates' Court had failed to adequately assess the case as it had not held a hearing. It drew the court's attention once again to the criminal proceedings against the officials involved. 16. On 10 July 2006 the Tarsus Assize Court rejected the applicant's objection without holding a hearing. 17. On 7 March 2008 the administration seized the plot of land where the applicant conducted mining activities due to the latter's failure to pay the administrative fine.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"7. During the course of its mining activities, on 31 January 2006 an audit commission under the Mersin Provincial Administration conducted an inspection. Subsequently, the commission drew up a report, proposing that the applicant should be ordered to pay 131,250 Turkish liras (TRY)[1] for quarrying substantial amounts of sand in the neighbouring plots of 5,000 m², outside of its licensed area. 10. In his police statements on 9 February 2006, Ü.T. described his conversations with M.A.L. in detail. He noted, inter alia, that after the inspection of the audit commission, he had conducted another inspection with an official from the Directorate of Land Registration, and had calculated that he had trespassed on the neighbouring plots by only 400 metres. He also explained that he had acted as an undercover agent in line with the directions of the Public Prosecutor to catch the perpetrators in flagrante delicto. Accordingly, the police gave him TRY 10,000 and noted down the serial numbers of the banknotes. He stated that in line with the instructions of M.A.L. and F.G., he had given the money to a third person, who had received it in the name of the other two.",TRUE,2,"The applicant was deprived of their property, but it appears to have been so subject to the conditions of administrative law; however, it's arguable whether that law was in the public interest.", 471,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","4. The applicant, is a company specialising in air transportation. 5. At the time of the events it had a valid air operator certificate (an ""AOC"") issued by the Moldovan Civil Aviation State Authority (the ""CASA""). 6. On 1 June 2007 the CASA issued an order banning all flights of aircraft registered in Moldova to Iraq and Afghanistan, with effect from 15 July 2007. 7. Between 4 and 8 June 2007, all Moldovan aviation companies were subjected to a check by the European Union Safety Committee. As a result, some irregularities concerning compliance with the European norms in the field of aviation safety were detected. The European Union Safety Committee also found that some aviation companies did not comply with the rule according to which the companies have to have their principal place of business in the state of registration. One of the conclusions set down in the visit report drawn up by the European Union Safety Committee was that the CASA failed to demonstrate the ability adequately to enforce and implement the relevant safety standards. According to the report, the CASA had undertaken to remedy the situation within three months. 8. On 18 June 2007 the CASA sent the applicant company aviation instruction no. 2584 and asked it to present by 21 June 2007 a plan for remedying the irregularities found by the EU Safety Committee. The corresponding plan was sent by the applicant company to the CASA on 21 June 2007. 9. Also on 18 June 2007 the CASA sent the applicant company aviation instruction no. 2585 requesting it to undertake measures with a view to remedying some of the irregularities before 20 July 2007 and other irregularities before 20 September 2007. 10. On 21 June 2007 the CASA issued order no. 102/GEN withdrawing the applicant company's AOC, and thereby terminating its activity. The CASA relied on the fact that the applicant company flew to destinations such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Congo, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, New Zealand and United Arab Emirates. The CASA argued that those destinations involved security risks and that it had no resources to ensure flight security in those territories. 11. On 22 June 2007 the applicant company wrote to the CASA and asked it to reverse its decision on the grounds that it had not explained exactly what irregularities formed the basis for the withdrawal of the AOCs and that the CASA had not afforded it enough time to remedy the alleged irregularities. 12. The CASA refused to reverse its decision, and on 28 June 2007 the applicant company challenged it in the Chişinău Court of Appeal. The applicant submitted, inter alia, that according to section 23 of the Law on Civil Aviation, the CASA was entitled to suspend or withdraw the AOCs only if the companies failed to remedy the irregularities found by the CASA within the prescribed time-limit. It also made reference to section RAC‑AOC 0170 from the Regulations in the Field of Civil Aviation according to which an AOC could be revoked only after being initially suspended. Since the CASA had not observed those legal provisions, its actions were unlawful. 13. On 3 December 2008 the Chişinău Court of Appeal rejected the applicant company's action, finding that the CASA had been entitled to withdraw its AOC because serious irregularities threatening the safety of the flights had been found by European experts, and because those irregularities had not been remedied. The Court of Appeal did not indicate the irregularities to which it referred. The court also found that the applicant company had failed to comply with the CASA's order of 1 June 2007 prohibiting flights to Iraq and Afghanistan as of 15 July 2007. The applicant companies challenged the decision before the Supreme Court of Justice. 14. On 29 April 2009 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal after finding that the CASA was entitled to revoke the AOC since the applicant company had failed to comply with its instructions concerning the ban on all flights of aircraft registered in Moldova to Iraq and Afghanistan, with effect from 15 July 2007.",Ruled as violated by court,,"10. On 21 June 2007 the CASA issued order no. 102/GEN withdrawing the applicant company's AOC, and thereby terminating its activity. The CASA relied on the fact that the applicant company flew to destinations such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Congo, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, New Zealand and United Arab Emirates. The CASA argued that those destinations involved security risks and that it had no resources to ensure flight security in those territories. 13. On 3 December 2008 the Chişinău Court of Appeal rejected the applicant company's action, finding that the CASA had been entitled to withdraw its AOC because serious irregularities threatening the safety of the flights had been found by European experts, and because those irregularities had not been remedied. The Court of Appeal did not indicate the irregularities to which it referred. The court also found that the applicant company had failed to comply with the CASA's order of 1 June 2007 prohibiting flights to Iraq and Afghanistan as of 15 July 2007. The applicant companies challenged the decision before the Supreme Court of Justice. 14. On 29 April 2009 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal after finding that the CASA was entitled to revoke the AOC since the applicant company had failed to comply with its instructions concerning the ban on all flights of aircraft registered in Moldova to Iraq and Afghanistan, with effect from 15 July 2007.",FALSE,0,There is no relevance between deprivation of property and international flight restrictions., 472,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","4. The applicant lives in Shnogh village. 5. In the 1970s a copper-molybdenum deposit (‘Teghout') was discovered about four and six km away from the villages of Teghout and Shnogh respectively, in the Lori Region. 6. In 2001 a private company, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC, was granted a mining licence for the exploitation of the Teghout copper‑molybdenum deposit for a period of twenty-five years. 7. On 1 November 2007 the Government adopted Decree no. 1279-N approving the expropriation zones of territories situated within the administrative boundaries of the rural communities of Shnogh and Teghout in the Lori Region to be taken for State needs and changing the category of land use. According to the Decree, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC or Teghout CJSC, founded by the former for the purpose of the implementation of the Teghout copper-molybdenum deposit exploitation project, were to acquire the units of land listed in its annexes. 8. The plot of land belonging to the applicant was listed among the units of land falling within these expropriation zones. 9. The applicant lives in Shnogh village and earns his living from agriculture. He owned a plot of arable land in the village measuring 0.186 ha. The land was used for growing crops for the family, feeding the livestock and beekeeping. 10. On an unspecified date Teghout CJSC addressed a letter to the applicant containing an offer to buy his plot of land. The amount of compensation offered was 134,000 Armenian Drams (AMD, approximately 290 euros (EUR)), plus an additional 15% as required by law. 11. The applicant did not reply to the offer, not being satisfied with the amount of compensation. It appears that the applicant tried to obtain an alternative evaluation of his property by other companies but did not succeed. He claims that no other evaluation company was willing to make an independent evaluation of the market value of his land. 12. On 13 May 2008 Teghout CJSC lodged a claim against the applicant seeking to oblige him to sign the agreement on taking of his property for State needs. The company based its claim, inter alia, on the evaluation report prepared at its request by Oliver Group LLC, a licensed evaluation company. According to the report, the market value of the applicant's plot of land was estimated at AMD 134,000 (approximately EUR 290). 13. In the proceedings before the Lori Regional Court, the applicant argued that the market value of his land had been underestimated. He further submitted that the evaluation of his property had not been carried out correctly since no account had been taken of the number of fruit trees, their profitability and the existence of a fence and a water pipeline on the territory in question. He also claimed to be unable to submit an alternative evaluation of the real market value of his land since other companies refused to perform an evaluation. 14. In the course of the proceedings, Teghout CJSC submitted another evaluation report of the applicant's property stating that, after the institution of the proceedings, Oliver Group LLC had prepared a corrected report according to which the market value of the applicant's plot of land was estimated at AMD 137,000 (approximately EUR 298). The final amount of compensation, including the additional 15% required by law, would thus be AMD 157,550 (approximately EUR 343). 15. On 28 November 2008 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC's claim, awarding the applicant a total of AMD 157,550 in compensation. 16. The applicant lodged an appeal. Relying, inter alia, on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, he complained that the Regional Court had deprived him of his property. 17. On 19 March 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court's judgment, finding that the latter had properly determined the market value of the property based on the corrected evaluation report prepared by Oliver Group CJSC. 18. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law raising similar arguments to those submitted in the previous appeal. 19. On 17 June 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant's cassation appeal inadmissible for lack of merit.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,It's unclear whether the statute applies to evaluations of property for exchanges for compensation., 473,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The applicant was born in 1973 and currently lives in Vienna, Austria. 6. In 2002 the applicant purchased a flat in Baku at a location near the Tezepir Mosque, with a living space of 17.6 sq. m. 7. In 2004 the applicant carried out some renovation and construction works at the flat, as a result of which the total area of the flat became 84 sq. m, while the living space increased to 33.6 sq. m. 8. On 7 March 2005 the head of Yasamal District Executive Authority issued an order recognising the fact that by building additional rooms (living rooms, hall, kitchen, mansard, and so on), the applicant had increased the total area of her flat to 84 sq. m. 9. On 3 June 2005 the Baku City Department of Technical Inventory and Registration of Property Rights issued a certificate of title to the applicant certifying that her flat comprised a total area of 84 sq. m, 33.6 sq. m of which was living space and the remainder of which was auxiliary space. 10. In July 2006 the Tezepir Mosque lodged a claim against the applicant with the Yasamal District Court, asking that the applicant be dispossessed of her title to the flat in exchange for monetary compensation, and be evicted from the flat. The Tezepir Mosque argued that the area where the applicant's flat was located was within the area of works required for the renovation and development of the mosque complex, and that the applicant and her family were the only residents who had refused to relinquish their flat in exchange for the compensation offered to them. The Tezepir Mosque was ready to pay 100,000 United States dollars (USD) in compensation. 11. During the court hearing, the representative of the Tezepir Mosque argued that the market price of comparable flats was USD 500 per sq. m, and that the applicant was only entitled to be paid for the living space of her flat (33.6 sq. m). It appears that, in support of this claim, he submitted copies of some sale announcements published in unidentified issues of the local newspaper. The applicant argued that the total area of her flat was 84 sq. m, that the market value of comparable flats was USD 3,000 per sq. m, and that she would sell her flat only if she was paid USD 252,000. 12. The Yasamal District Court noted that, under Article 157.9 of the Civil Code, private owners could be dispossessed of their title to property for State and public needs, in exchange for compensation. It also referred to an order by the Soviet of Ministers of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (""the Azerbaijan SSR"") dated 22 May 1986 (hereinafter ""the order of 22 May 1986""), concerning renovation work on the land of the Tezepir Mosque and the relocation of people residing in that area to other accommodation. It also noted, without referring to any specific decisions, that subsequently the Baku City Executive Committee and its successor, the Baku City Executive Authority, had issued several other decisions on the continuation of the renovation work on that land and the ""gradual relocation"" of the area's residents. 13. In deciding the amount of compensation payable, the court found that the area of the applicant's flat was 33.6 sq. m. It also took note of the Tezepir Mosque's submissions that, despite the fact that the applicant had purchased a flat which was located on land already allocated to the Mosque and that she had subsequently carried out renovation and construction work in the flat ""without obtaining rights to the land"" and ""without authorisation"", the Mosque had offered to pay her USD 100,000, an amount which exceeded the flat's market value. The court considered that the proposed amount of compensation was reasonable. 14. By a judgment of 2 August 2006, the Yasamal District Court revoked the applicant's title to the flat, ordered the Tezepir Mosque to pay her the equivalent of USD 100,000 in Azerbaijani manats, and ordered the eviction of the applicant and her family from the flat. By a separate decision delivered on the same day, the Yasamal District Court also ordered the immediate execution of the judgment. 15. On 27 September and 27 December 2006 the judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court respectively.",Ruled as violated by court,,"9. On 3 June 2005 the Baku City Department of Technical Inventory and Registration of Property Rights issued a certificate of title to the applicant certifying that her flat comprised a total area of 84 sq. m, 33.6 sq. m of which was living space and the remainder of which was auxiliary space. 12. The Yasamal District Court noted that, under Article 157.9 of the Civil Code, private owners could be dispossessed of their title to property for State and public needs, in exchange for compensation. It also referred to an order by the Soviet of Ministers of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (""the Azerbaijan SSR"") dated 22 May 1986 (hereinafter ""the order of 22 May 1986""), concerning renovation work on the land of the Tezepir Mosque and the relocation of people residing in that area to other accommodation. It also noted, without referring to any specific decisions, that subsequently the Baku City Executive Committee and its successor, the Baku City Executive Authority, had issued several other decisions on the continuation of the renovation work on that land and the ""gradual relocation"" of the area's residents.",FALSE,0,The applicant was not deprived of property; she ultimately exchanged her flat property for compensation., 474,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Łomża. 6. On 7 August 2010 the applicant had a motorcycle accident in which he broke his right arm and right thigh. Between 13 and 22 December 2010 the applicant underwent an arthroscopy on his right knee. Between 25 January and 15 February 2011 the applicant underwent rehabilitation treatment in Łomża Regional Hospital and during this stay no dysfunction was diagnosed in his right foot. 7. Subsequently, between 28 March and 26 July 2011, he was detained in Białystok Remand Centre. While in prison, he was examined three times (on 1 and 18 April and on 13 May 2011) by an orthopaedist, who observed that the applicant required physical therapy in the light of a limitation of his knee-joint movement, the atrophy of a thigh muscle, and an injury to a peroneal nerve. On 11 April 2011 the applicant was examined by a neurologist who likewise found atrophy of the thigh muscle and impaired bending of the right foot, which he attributed to an injury to the peroneal nerve. The applicant never received any physical therapy during his imprisonment, instead being offered only nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory medicines. 8. On an unspecified date, but not later than 27 March 2012, the applicant brought a civil action against the State Treasury/Białystok Remand Centre for infringement of his personal rights, claiming that the prison healthcare system had failed to provide him with appropriate medical care during his detention and, moreover, that the cells had not met the minimum spatial requirement of 3 square metres per person and had been mouldy and infested with insects. He requested 200,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) in compensation, the equivalent of approximately 48,300 euros (EUR). 9. On 27 March 2012 the Białystok Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) exempted the applicant from the court fees. 10. On 20 January 2014 the Białystok Regional Court granted the applicant PLN 23,000 (approximately EUR 5,550) and dismissed the remainder of his action. The court held, particularly on the basis of the medical expert opinion, that the applicant had had a motorcycle accident and had required physical therapy as recommended by the prison orthopaedist. However, he had not been given any, either in prison or outside, which had resulted in a deterioration of his health. The court established that, due to the lack of physical therapy, the applicant had suffered atrophy of the thigh muscle and foot drop affecting his right foot. The court compared this finding with the fact that upon his arrival the applicant had not been suffering from foot drop, the pain in his knee had not been severe, and his right leg muscles had been working more effectively. The court emphasised that the applicant had not been offered proper treatment despite a worsening of his symptoms. These changes in his physical condition would not have been irreversible, but the break in the therapy had entailed a prolonged rehabilitation process. The court stated that the rehabilitation process for the applicant would be long and arduous, a situation which could have been avoided had the defendant acted appropriately. The court held that the applicant had suffered physical pain of significant seriousness, which, in turn, had had negative psychological consequences. The court therefore found the applicant's claim for compensation for lack of adequate medical care partly justified. The claim concerning the alleged overcrowding and inadequate sanitary conditions was dismissed in full. The court also ordered the applicant to reimburse PLN 3,186 (EUR 766) for the costs of the defendant's legal representation and PLN 10,932 (EUR 2,628) in court fees (in total: PLN 14,118 (EUR 3,394)). 11. The applicant did not lodge an appeal against the first-instance judgment. 12. Following the defendant's appeal against the judgment, on 12 September 2014 the Białystok Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) amended the judgment, reduced the compensation granted to the applicant to PLN 13,000 (EUR 3,095), and upheld the first-instance court's findings of fact and law. The applicant was not ordered to pay the court fees for the proceedings before that court. This court pointed out that in the experts' opinions it was not specified, even approximately, what the effects of the negligence might be, how much longer the rehabilitation process would take, or how much stronger the pain had become in comparison to pain experienced previously by the applicant.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. Subsequently, between 28 March and 26 July 2011, he was detained in Białystok Remand Centre. While in prison, he was examined three times (on 1 and 18 April and on 13 May 2011) by an orthopaedist, who observed that the applicant required physical therapy in the light of a limitation of his knee-joint movement, the atrophy of a thigh muscle, and an injury to a peroneal nerve. On 11 April 2011 the applicant was examined by a neurologist who likewise found atrophy of the thigh muscle and impaired bending of the right foot, which he attributed to an injury to the peroneal nerve. The applicant never received any physical therapy during his imprisonment, instead being offered only nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory medicines. 10. On 20 January 2014 the Białystok Regional Court granted the applicant PLN 23,000 (approximately EUR 5,550) and dismissed the remainder of his action. The court held, particularly on the basis of the medical expert opinion, that the applicant had had a motorcycle accident and had required physical therapy as recommended by the prison orthopaedist. However, he had not been given any, either in prison or outside, which had resulted in a deterioration of his health. The court established that, due to the lack of physical therapy, the applicant had suffered atrophy of the thigh muscle and foot drop affecting his right foot. The court compared this finding with the fact that upon his arrival the applicant had not been suffering from foot drop, the pain in his knee had not been severe, and his right leg muscles had been working more effectively. The court emphasised that the applicant had not been offered proper treatment despite a worsening of his symptoms. These changes in his physical condition would not have been irreversible, but the break in the therapy had entailed a prolonged rehabilitation process. The court stated that the rehabilitation process for the applicant would be long and arduous, a situation which could have been avoided had the defendant acted appropriately. The court held that the applicant had suffered physical pain of significant seriousness, which, in turn, had had negative psychological consequences. The court therefore found the applicant's claim for compensation for lack of adequate medical care partly justified. The claim concerning the alleged overcrowding and inadequate sanitary conditions was dismissed in full. The court also ordered the applicant to reimburse PLN 3,186 (EUR 766) for the costs of the defendant's legal representation and PLN 10,932 (EUR 2,628) in court fees (in total: PLN 14,118 (EUR 3,394)). 12. Following the defendant's appeal against the judgment, on 12 September 2014 the Białystok Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) amended the judgment, reduced the compensation granted to the applicant to PLN 13,000 (EUR 3,095), and upheld the first-instance court's findings of fact and law. The applicant was not ordered to pay the court fees for the proceedings before that court. This court pointed out that in the experts' opinions it was not specified, even approximately, what the effects of the negligence might be, how much longer the rehabilitation process would take, or how much stronger the pain had become in comparison to pain experienced previously by the applicant.",TRUE,1,"It depends if money that is yet to be granted counts as possessions according to the statute, but that seems to be the common understanding.", 475,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","4. The applicants live in Shnogh village. 5. In the 1970s a copper-molybdenum deposit (‘Teghout') was discovered about four and six km away from the villages of Teghout and Shnogh respectively, in the Lori Region. 6. In 2001 a private company, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC, was granted a mining licence for the exploitation of the Teghout copper‑molybdenum deposit for a period of twenty-five years. 7. On 1 November 2007 the Government adopted Decree no. 1279-N approving the designation of territories situated within the administrative boundaries of the rural communities of Shnogh and Teghout in the Lori Region as expropriation zones, to be taken for State needs, thus changing the land use category. According to the decree, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC or Teghout CJSC, founded by the former for the purpose of the implementation of the Teghout copper-molybdenum deposit exploitation project, were to acquire the units of land listed in its annexes. 8. The plot of land belonging to the applicants was listed among the units of land falling within these expropriation zones. 9. The applicants, a family of five, live in Shnogh village and earn their living from agriculture. They jointly owned a plot of arable land in the village measuring 1.622 ha. The land was used for growing crops for the family and feeding their livestock. 10. On an unspecified date Teghout CJSC addressed a letter to the applicants containing an offer to buy their plot of land for 818,000 Armenian drams (AMD, approximately 1,780 euros (EUR)) plus an additional 15% as required by law, making the final offer AMD 940,700 (approximately EUR 2,045). 11. The applicants did not reply to the letter, not being satisfied with the amount of compensation offered. 12. On 12 May 2008 Teghout CJSC lodged a claim against the applicants, seeking to oblige them to sign an agreement for their property to be taken for State needs. The company based its claim, inter alia, on a valuation report prepared at its request by Oliver Group LLC, a licensed valuation company. According to the report, the market value of the applicants' plot of land was estimated at AMD 818,000 (approximately EUR 1,780). 13. In the proceedings before the Lori Regional Court, the fourth applicant represented the other applicants and argued that the market value of their land had been underestimated. He requested additional time to be able to submit an alternative valuation report. 14. It appears that the applicants were unable to obtain a valuation of their property by another company. They claim that no other valuation company was willing to make an independent assessment of the market value of their land. 15. During the proceedings Teghout CJSC submitted another valuation of the applicants' property, stating that Oliver Group LLC had prepared a corrected report according to which the market value of the property was AMD 900,000 (approximately EUR 1,960). The final amount of compensation, including the additional 15% required by law, would thus be equal to AMD 1,035,000 (approximately EUR 2,250). 16. On 26 September 2008 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC's claim, awarding the applicants a total of AMD 1,035,000 in compensation. 17. The applicants lodged an appeal complaining, inter alia, that the market value of their land had been seriously underestimated and that the amount of compensation offered to them was inadequate. They further argued that the fact that Oliver Group LLC had submitted two different valuation reports during the proceedings raised doubts as to the credibility of its reports, and that the court should have initiated an independent valuation of their property. 18. On 29 January 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court's judgment, finding, inter alia, that the market value of the property to be taken for State needs had been correctly estimated, on the basis of the valuation report contained in the case file. 19. The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law. They argued, inter alia, that the Regional Court had failed to order an independent valuation of the property, despite having the power to do so under the law. They submitted that they had disagreed with the valuation report submitted by the other party to the proceedings, which was moreover not an expert opinion and therefore could not be admitted as evidence. 20. On 24 June 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the applicants' cassation appeal inadmissible for lack of merit.",Ruled as violated by court,,"12. On 12 May 2008 Teghout CJSC lodged a claim against the applicants, seeking to oblige them to sign an agreement for their property to be taken for State needs. The company based its claim, inter alia, on a valuation report prepared at its request by Oliver Group LLC, a licensed valuation company. According to the report, the market value of the applicants' plot of land was estimated at AMD 818,000 (approximately EUR 1,780). 13. In the proceedings before the Lori Regional Court, the fourth applicant represented the other applicants and argued that the market value of their land had been underestimated. He requested additional time to be able to submit an alternative valuation report. 14. It appears that the applicants were unable to obtain a valuation of their property by another company. They claim that no other valuation company was willing to make an independent assessment of the market value of their land. 15. During the proceedings Teghout CJSC submitted another valuation of the applicants' property, stating that Oliver Group LLC had prepared a corrected report according to which the market value of the property was AMD 900,000 (approximately EUR 1,960). The final amount of compensation, including the additional 15% required by law, would thus be equal to AMD 1,035,000 (approximately EUR 2,250). 16. On 26 September 2008 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC's claim, awarding the applicants a total of AMD 1,035,000 in compensation.",TRUE,2,It's unclear whether the statute applies to evaluations of property for exchanges for compensation., 476,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The applicants were owners of plots of land. The municipal authorities reclaimed the plots of land, and the applicants' title to the real property in question was annulled. The details pertaining to each application are provided below. 6. The applicant in this case is Oleg Dmitriyevich Sergunin, who was born on 10 December 1967 and lives in Kazan. 7. On 5 September 2009 the local council transferred the title to a plot of land in Privolzhskiy district, Kazan, to G. The relevant documents confirming that the plot of land had been earlier assigned to G. had been prepared by Gib. The State land registry verified the legitimacy of the transaction and registered G.'s title to the plot of land. 8. On 10 December 2009 G. sold the plot of land to M. On 8 February 2010 M. sold the plot of land to N. On 16 March 2012 N. sold the plot of land to the applicant. Each time the transfer of the title to a new owner was verified and registered by the State authorities with the issuance of the relevant certificate. 9. On 13 March 2013 the Privolzhskiy District Court of Kazan found Gib. guilty of having committed fraud in respect of the transfer of the plot of land to G. 10. On 5 July 2013 a prosecutor acting on behalf of the local council brought an action seeking invalidation of the decision of the local council of 5 September 2009, invalidation of the applicant's title to the plot of land and return of the plot of land to the municipality. 11. On 17 October 2013 the District Court granted the claims in full. 12. On 23 January 2014 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan upheld the judgment of 17 October 2013 on appeal. 13. On 14 April 2014 the Supreme Court rejected an appeal on points of law by the applicant. 14. On 30 May 2014 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation rejected a second appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant. 15. The applicant in this case is Dmitriy Gennadyevich Isupov who was born on 7 May 1978 and lives in Kirov. 16. On 3 December 2009 the applicant bought a plot of land and a share in another plot of land in Sloboda Solomintsy, Kirov, from S. and T. respectively. The State land registry verified the legitimacy of the transaction and registered the applicant's title to the plots of land. 17. On an unspecified date the district prosecutor brought an action on behalf of the Kirov City Council with the aim of reclaiming the real property. 18. On 14 May 2014 the Novovyatskiy District Court of Kirov delivered two judgments, allowing the prosecutor's claims in full. The court noted that the decisions allegedly issued by the local council assigning the plots of land to T. and S. had been forged and could not have served as a legal basis for the transactions in respect of the plots of land. The court recognised the town's title to the plots of land and ordered their transfer to the town administration. 19. On 15 and 23 July 2014 the Kirov Regional Court upheld the judgments of 14 May 2014 on appeal. 20. On 22 August the Regional Court dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant against the above judgments. 21. On 11 March 2015 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dismissed a second appeal on points law lodged by the applicant against the judgments of 14 May and 15 June 2015. 22. The applicant in this case is Sergey Vasilyevich Prokudin who was born on 19 October 1958 and lives in Kirov. 23. The applicant bought six plots of land in Sloboda Lyangasy, Kirov, from S., A., M., K., Kuz., and R. respectively. The State land registry verified the legitimacy of the transactions and registered the applicant's title to the plots of land. 24. On an unspecified date the district prosecutor brought an action on behalf of the Kirov City Council with the aim of reclaiming the real property. 25. On 9 and 10 June 2014 the Novovyatskiy District Court of Kirov delivered six judgments, granting the prosecutor's claims in full. The court noted that the decisions allegedly issued by the district administration assigning the plots of land to S., A., M., K., Kuz., and R. had been forged and could not have served as a legal basis for the transactions in respect of the plots of land. The court recognised the city's title to the plots of land and ordered their transfer to the council. 26. On 21 and 28 August and 2 September 2014 the Kirov Regional Court upheld the judgments of 9 and 10 June 2014 on appeal. 27. On 19 January 2015 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant against the above judgments.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"When there are two meaningful claims to property being deprived, it's unclear how the statute should be applied.", 477,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","4. The applicants live in Shnogh village. 5. In the 1970s a copper-molybdenum deposit (‘Teghout') was discovered about four and six km away from the villages of Teghout and Shnogh respectively, in the Lori Region. 6. In 2001 a private company, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC, was granted a mining licence for the exploitation of the Teghout copper‑molybdenum deposit for a period of twenty-five years. 7. On 1 November 2007 the Government adopted Decree no. 1279-N approving the designation of territories situated within the administrative boundaries of the rural communities of Shnogh and Teghout in the Lori Region as expropriation zones, to be taken for State needs, thus changing the category of land use. According to the Decree, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC or Teghout CJSC, founded by the former for the purpose of the implementation of the Teghout copper-molybdenum deposit exploitation project, were to acquire the units of land listed in its annexes. 8. The plots of land belonging to the applicants were listed among the units of land falling within these expropriation zones. 9. The applicants, a family of five, live in Shnogh village and earn their living from agriculture. They jointly owned two plots of arable land in the village. The first plot of land measured 0.334 ha and the second one consisted of two distinct parts measuring 0.932 ha and 0.723 ha. The land was used for growing crops for the family and feeding their livestock. 10. On an unspecified date Teghout CJSC addressed a letter to the applicants containing an offer to buy their plots of land. Compensation of 163,000 Armenian drams (AMD, approximately 355 euros (EUR)) and AMD 950,000 (approximately EUR 2,065) was offered for the two plots of land respectively, plus an additional 15% as required by law. 11. The applicants did not reply to the offer, not being satisfied with the amount of compensation. It appears that they tried to obtain an alternative valuation of their property by another company but did not succeed. They claim that no other valuation company was willing to make an independent assessment of the market value of their land. 12. On 14 May 2008 Teghout CJSC lodged a claim against the applicants, seeking to oblige them to sign an agreement on the taking of their property for State needs. The company based its claim, inter alia, on valuation reports prepared at its request by Oliver Group LLC, a licensed valuation company. According to the reports, the market value of the applicants' plots of land was estimated at AMD 163,000 (approximately EUR 355) and AMD 950,000 (approximately EUR 2,065) respectively. 13. In the proceedings before the Lori Regional Court the applicants argued that the market value of their land had been underestimated. They further submitted that the valuation of their property had not been carried out correctly, since no account had been taken of the number of trees and their profitability and they were unable to submit an alternative valuation of the market value of their land, since other companies had refused to carry out a valuation. 14. In the course of the proceedings, Teghout CJSC submitted other valuation reports of the applicants' property, stating that, after the institution of the proceedings, Oliver Group LLC had prepared corrected reports according to which the market value of the applicants' two plots of land was estimated at AMD 173,000 (approximately EUR 376) and AMD 986,000 (approximately EUR 2,143). The final amount of compensation, including the additional 15% required by law, would thus be equal to AMD 198,950 (approximately EUR 433) for the first plot of land and AMD 1,133,900 (approximately EUR 2,465) for the second. 15. On 7 November 2008 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC's claim, awarding the applicants compensation of a total of AMD 198,950 for the first plot of land and AMD 1,133,900 for the second plot. 16. The applicants lodged an appeal. Relying, inter alia, on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, they complained that the Regional Court had deprived them of their property. 17. On 25 March 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court's judgment, finding that the latter had properly determined the market value of the property on the basis of the corrected valuation reports prepared by Oliver Group CJSC. 18. The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar arguments to those submitted in the previous appeal. 19. On 17 June 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the applicants' cassation appeal inadmissible for lack of merit.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,It's unclear whether the statute applies to evaluations of property for exchanges for compensation., 478,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","4. The applicants were born in 1942 and 1969 respectively. The first applicant lives in Gabrovo and the second applicant lives in Varna. 5. Mr Ts. Mihalev, father of the first applicant and grandfather of the second applicant, owned a machinery factory in Gabrovo, which was nationalised in 1947. After the nationalisation the property was allocated for use to a State-owned enterprise, which in 1991 was transformed into a State-owned company named T.. Under domestic law, such a transformation entailed the newly-created company becoming, in principle, the owner of the assets which had until then been allocated to it for use and management; some assets allocated to State-owned enterprises or companies could nevertheless be the subject of restitution (see paragraph 15 below). 6. After the Restitution of Ownership of Nationalised Real Property Act (hereinafter ""the Restitution Act"", see paragraphs 15-16 below) came into force in 1992, the first applicant and his brother asked the mayor of Gabrovo to strike the factory building out of the register of State properties. Their request was allowed in a decision of the mayor of 28 August 1992, which explicitly referred to the Restitution Act. On that basis in 1993 the first applicant and his brother obtained a notary deed, which also stated that the property had been subject to restitution under the Restitution Act. 7. In 1994 the first applicant and his brother concluded a rent contract with company T., which undertook to pay rent in exchange of the use of the building. The term of the contract was extended on several occasions, the last of which in 2002. 8. In 1997 the first applicant's brother transferred his share in the building to his daughter, the second applicant. 9. After the entry into force of the Compensation of Owners of Nationalised Real Property Act (hereinafter ""the Compensation Act"", see paragraph 17 below), in January 1998 the first applicant and his brother applied to receive compensation for moveable properties such as industrial equipment and materials which had been nationalised together with the factory. In a decision of 21 December 1999 the Minister of Economy awarded them compensation for these properties, noting in addition that the factory building had been the subject of restitution and no compensation was due for it. That decision was upheld in a final judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 17 September 2002, after the first applicant and his brother sought its judicial review, contesting the manner of compensation. Eventually, in 2005 they received compensation bonds with a face value of 19,494 Bulgarian levs (BGN, the equivalent of 9,970 euros (EUR)). 10. Company T. was privatised in 2003 and the new management stopped paying rent to the applicants for the factory building, arguing that it had in fact never been subject of restitution. 11. In January 2009 company T. brought proceedings against the applicants, claiming to be the factory building's owner. It argued that the restitution of the property had not taken place, because the preconditions under the Restitution Act had not been complied with, and that it had become the owner of the building as a result of its transformation into a company (see paragraph 5 above). 12. In a judgment of 27 October 2009 the Gabrovo Regional Court dismissed the claim. However, on 17 May 2010 the Veliko Tarnovo Court of Appeal quashed the lower court's judgment and allowed the action against the applicants, finding that the preconditions for restitution had indeed not been met. On the basis of expert evidence and witness testimony, it concluded that after the nationalisation the building had been modified in a manner and to a degree which meant that in 1992 it had not existed in its state prior to 1947. Accordingly, the applicants could not rely on restitution and company T. had become the owner of the building on the strength of its transformation from a State-owned enterprise into a company in 1991 (see paragraph 5 above). In a final decision of 30 March 2011 the Supreme Court of Cassation refused to accept for examination the applicants' appeal on points of law. 13. In June 2011 the applicants applied to the Gabrovo regional governor to receive compensation for the factory building under the Compensation Act. In a decision of 19 July 2011 the governor dismissed their request, as it had not been submitted within the time-limit provided for under that Act (see paragraph 17 below). After the applicants applied for its judicial review, the governor's decision was upheld in a final judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 14 June 2012.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. After the Restitution of Ownership of Nationalised Real Property Act (hereinafter ""the Restitution Act"", see paragraphs 15-16 below) came into force in 1992, the first applicant and his brother asked the mayor of Gabrovo to strike the factory building out of the register of State properties. Their request was allowed in a decision of the mayor of 28 August 1992, which explicitly referred to the Restitution Act. On that basis in 1993 the first applicant and his brother obtained a notary deed, which also stated that the property had been subject to restitution under the Restitution Act. 9. After the entry into force of the Compensation of Owners of Nationalised Real Property Act (hereinafter ""the Compensation Act"", see paragraph 17 below), in January 1998 the first applicant and his brother applied to receive compensation for moveable properties such as industrial equipment and materials which had been nationalised together with the factory. In a decision of 21 December 1999 the Minister of Economy awarded them compensation for these properties, noting in addition that the factory building had been the subject of restitution and no compensation was due for it. That decision was upheld in a final judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 17 September 2002, after the first applicant and his brother sought its judicial review, contesting the manner of compensation. Eventually, in 2005 they received compensation bonds with a face value of 19,494 Bulgarian levs (BGN, the equivalent of 9,970 euros (EUR)). 10. Company T. was privatised in 2003 and the new management stopped paying rent to the applicants for the factory building, arguing that it had in fact never been subject of restitution. 11. In January 2009 company T. brought proceedings against the applicants, claiming to be the factory building's owner. It argued that the restitution of the property had not taken place, because the preconditions under the Restitution Act had not been complied with, and that it had become the owner of the building as a result of its transformation into a company (see paragraph 5 above). 12. In a judgment of 27 October 2009 the Gabrovo Regional Court dismissed the claim. However, on 17 May 2010 the Veliko Tarnovo Court of Appeal quashed the lower court's judgment and allowed the action against the applicants, finding that the preconditions for restitution had indeed not been met. On the basis of expert evidence and witness testimony, it concluded that after the nationalisation the building had been modified in a manner and to a degree which meant that in 1992 it had not existed in its state prior to 1947. Accordingly, the applicants could not rely on restitution and company T. had become the owner of the building on the strength of its transformation from a State-owned enterprise into a company in 1991 (see paragraph 5 above). In a final decision of 30 March 2011 the Supreme Court of Cassation refused to accept for examination the applicants' appeal on points of law. 13. In June 2011 the applicants applied to the Gabrovo regional governor to receive compensation for the factory building under the Compensation Act. In a decision of 19 July 2011 the governor dismissed their request, as it had not been submitted within the time-limit provided for under that Act (see paragraph 17 below). After the applicants applied for its judicial review, the governor's decision was upheld in a final judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 14 June 2012.",TRUE,2,It's unclear how the statute should be applied to determine compensation when property is deprived., 479,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Dublin, Ireland. 6. On 28 October 2008 the applicant was travelling on a passenger bus from Moldova to Romania, with Ireland as his final destination. 7. At 12.30 a.m. his bus arrived at the Albiţa border crossing between Moldova and Romania. Romanian custom officers stopped the bus, got on and started searching the passengers. Two silver ingots were found in the applicant's pockets. 8. A customs officer decided that the applicant had failed to declare the ingots and confiscated them. An offence report drafted by the officer stated that the applicant had failed to declare two silver ingots of 1 kg each and had thereby breached the provisions of Article 653 (a) of the Customs Regulations (see paragraph 12 below). In addition to the confiscation the applicant was fined 3,000 Romanian lei (approximately 750 euros (EUR)). The report also stated that according to documents produced by the applicant he had bought the two ingots from a bank. 9. The applicant lodged an administrative complaint with the Albiţa Customs Office, asking for the annulment of the offence report of 28 October 2008 and the restitution of the confiscated goods. He explained that he had legally acquired the two ingots, which had a value of EUR 500. He had kept them on him in order to prevent them being stolen during the bus trip and not to elude customs. He also stated that it had not been possible to declare goods to customs in a discrete manner or in writing. The passengers had not been allowed to get off the bus before the customs officers had got on and he had wished to avoid saying what he was carrying in front of the other passengers. 10. On 26 January 2009 the Huşi District Court dismissed the applicant's complaint as ill-founded. Based on the elements in the case file, the court observed that the customs officer had asked the applicant whether he had anything to declare and the applicant had said no. Under those circumstances the court held that the applicant had been correctly sanctioned by the customs officer. 11. An appeal on points of law by the applicant (recurs) was dismissed with final effect on 3 June 2009 by the Vaslui County Court. The court held that the applicant, who had signed the offence report, had failed to produce any evidence to challenge the customer officer's findings in that document. 12. The relevant provisions of the Romanian Customs Regulations, as approved by Government Decision No. 707/2006, are as follows: Article 156 ""(1) A written customs declaration shall be submitted for the following goods: .... c) objects made of precious metals, with or without precious stones, which exceed the purposes of personal use as set forth in legal provisions; (2) For the goods listed in paragraph (1) travellers shall submit the written customs declaration on standard forms which are made available free of charge, upon request, by customs offices."" Article 653 ""The following is considered an offence and shall be sanctioned with a fine between 3,000 and 8,000 lei: a) concealing from customs any goods or merchandise which should be placed under a customs regime. In such situations the goods shall be confiscated; ..."" Article 657 ""The offences set forth in the present chapter are subject to the regulations provided for by Government Ordinance No. 2/2001 on the legal system concerning offences ..."" 13. According to the Romanian Integrated Customs Tariff in force at the relevant time silver imported from the Republic of Moldova was not subject to any duties. 14. The relevant provisions of Government Ordinance No. 2/2001 on the legal system concerning offences in force at the relevant time are as follows: Article 5 ""(1) Offences may be punished with principal and complementary sanctions. (2) The principal sanctions are: ... b) a fine ... (3) The complementary sanctions are: a) the confiscation of goods destined, used or derived from offences; ... (4) Special laws may provide for additional principal or complementary sanctions. (5) The sanction must be proportionate to the degree of social danger of the offence committed. (6) Complementary sanctions are applied in line with the nature and gravity of the offence. (7) Only one principal sanction can be applied for the same offence and one or more complementary sanctions."" 15. The Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1214/2007 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff entered into force on 1 January 2008 and from that date was directly applicable in all Member States. In Section XIV, Chapter 71 the regulation does not provide for any customs duties for silver in unwrought or semi-manufactured forms or in powder.",Ruled as violated by court,,"8. A customs officer decided that the applicant had failed to declare the ingots and confiscated them. An offence report drafted by the officer stated that the applicant had failed to declare two silver ingots of 1 kg each and had thereby breached the provisions of Article 653 (a) of the Customs Regulations (see paragraph 12 below). In addition to the confiscation the applicant was fined 3,000 Romanian lei (approximately 750 euros (EUR)). The report also stated that according to documents produced by the applicant he had bought the two ingots from a bank. 12. The relevant provisions of the Romanian Customs Regulations, as approved by Government Decision No. 707/2006, are as follows: Article 156 ""(1) A written customs declaration shall be submitted for the following goods: .... c) objects made of precious metals, with or without precious stones, which exceed the purposes of personal use as set forth in legal provisions; (2) For the goods listed in paragraph (1) travellers shall submit the written customs declaration on standard forms which are made available free of charge, upon request, by customs offices."" Article 653 ""The following is considered an offence and shall be sanctioned with a fine between 3,000 and 8,000 lei: a) concealing from customs any goods or merchandise which should be placed under a customs regime. In such situations the goods shall be confiscated; ..."" Article 657 ""The offences set forth in the present chapter are subject to the regulations provided for by Government Ordinance No. 2/2001 on the legal system concerning offences ..."" 13. According to the Romanian Integrated Customs Tariff in force at the relevant time silver imported from the Republic of Moldova was not subject to any duties. 15. The Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1214/2007 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff entered into force on 1 January 2008 and from that date was directly applicable in all Member States. In Section XIV, Chapter 71 the regulation does not provide for any customs duties for silver in unwrought or semi-manufactured forms or in powder.",TRUE,2,"The applicant was deprived of his property. At the same time, the state sees a meaningful public interest in regulation on suspicion of money laundering. The weighing of these interests determines what the line should be.", 480,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","6. The cases concern the 1982 State internal premium loan bonds (облигации государственного внутреннего выигрышного займа 1982 года - ""1982 premium bonds"") which are in the applicants' possession. The applicants submitted lists of serials numbers or photocopies of their bonds. 7. On 30 December 1980 the USSR Cabinet of Ministers decided to issue bonds of an internal premium loan to finance certain State programmes. The bonds had nominal values of 25, 50 and 100 Soviet roubles (SUR). Their period of circulation was set at twenty years, from 1 January 1982 to 1 January 2002, and they were redeemable at any time during the term of the loan with interest at 3% per annum. Soviet citizens could either buy the 1982 premium bonds with their own money or obtain them in exchange for bonds from an earlier 1966 State internal premium loan. The average monthly wage in 1982 was SUR 177.30 across all branches of the economy plus SUR 68.70 in various social benefits (People's Economy of the USSR 1982, a statistical yearbook by the USSR Central Statistics Directorate, Moscow, 1983). 8. By the late 1980s the Soviet economy was suffering from a structural imbalance due a rapidly increasing money supply and decreasing availability of consumer goods sold at State-controlled prices. In January 1991 the USSR Government freed 40% of prices and carried out a monetary reform eliminating the largest banknotes in circulation and restricting the withdrawal of money from bank deposit accounts to SUR 500 a month. This led to a two to threefold increase in prices. On 22 March 1991 the USSR President issued Decree no. UP-1708, ordering a one-time increase to savings instruments, including the 1982 premium bonds, of 40% to offset the price rise. 9. On 26 December 1991 the USSR was dissolved by Declaration no. 142-N of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The declaration invited the heads of newly independent States to reflect on the issues of succession. 10. On 19 February 1992 the Russian Government issued Resolution no. 97, recognising its succession in respect of the obligations of the former USSR under the 1982 loan: ""1. To confirm succession of the [Russian] Government in respect of the obligations of the former USSR vis-à-vis Russian Federation citizens arising out of the bonds of the 1982 State internal premium loan. ... 6. To give Russian Federation citizens who are holders of bonds of the 1982 State internal premium loan the right to voluntarily exchange their bonds against State securities, including 1992 Russian internal premium loan bonds, shares in the Savings Bank ... and also to credit the proceeds of sale of the bonds into deposit accounts open in the Savings Bank ... from 1 October 1992 ..."" 11. Between 1995 and 2000 a series of Russian laws and regulations were passed which provided for the conversion of Soviet securities, including the 1982 premium bonds, into special Russian promissory notes nominated in ""promissory roubles"" (DOR) (for details, see Yuriy Lobanov v. Russia, no. 15578/03, §§ 16-21, 2 December 2010). 12. From 2003 to the present day, the application and implementation of those laws and regulations have been continuously suspended, most recently for the period 1 January 2017 to 1 January 2020, by Law no. 429‑FZ of 19 December 2016 and Resolution no. 1437 dated 22 December 2016. 13. The applicants applied to the Russian financial authorities and the courts, seeking the redemption of their bonds. Their claims were rejected on procedural and substantive grounds. Mr Ruzanov's claim was allowed at first instance but the judgment was later overturned on appeal. On 5 May 2014 Mr Israfilov obtained a decision from the Leninskiy District Court in Makhachkala, requiring the Russian Government to convert his bonds into special promissory notes. 14. Mr Losyakov and Ms Losyakova's claim was referred by the Supreme Court to the Constitutional Court. By decision no. 632-O of 3 April 2012, the Constitutional Court declared it inadmissible, finding that it was not competent to rule on the issue of an alleged failure of federal lawmakers to enact laws guaranteeing the protection of savings which had been recognised as Russia's internal debt. In its view, the federal lawmakers had adequate discretion to legislate on those issues in the interests of everyone, taking into account the specific social and economic conditions prevailing in Russia and the balance between the rights and lawful interests of various categories of citizens, including those who acted as creditors of the State and others in respect of whom the State had public policy obligations. The legislature was entitled to restrict the rights, including property rights, of some people for the protection of rights and lawful interests of others.",Ruled as violated by court,,"12. From 2003 to the present day, the application and implementation of those laws and regulations have been continuously suspended, most recently for the period 1 January 2017 to 1 January 2020, by Law no. 429‑FZ of 19 December 2016 and Resolution no. 1437 dated 22 December 2016. 14. Mr Losyakov and Ms Losyakova's claim was referred by the Supreme Court to the Constitutional Court. By decision no. 632-O of 3 April 2012, the Constitutional Court declared it inadmissible, finding that it was not competent to rule on the issue of an alleged failure of federal lawmakers to enact laws guaranteeing the protection of savings which had been recognised as Russia's internal debt. In its view, the federal lawmakers had adequate discretion to legislate on those issues in the interests of everyone, taking into account the specific social and economic conditions prevailing in Russia and the balance between the rights and lawful interests of various categories of citizens, including those who acted as creditors of the State and others in respect of whom the State had public policy obligations. The legislature was entitled to restrict the rights, including property rights, of some people for the protection of rights and lawful interests of others.",TRUE,2,"One could argue, as the applicant did, that they were deprived of their monetary property. One could also argue, as the Constitutional Court did, that the government acted subject to the law for the public interest.", 481,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Chernivtsi. 6. In October 2002 the Zalishchytskyy Local Court of Ternopil Region issued a writ of enforcement in a case against a private company, U. The parties did not provide any documents related to the proceedings against company U. 7. Under that writ in March 2005 the State Bailiffs' Service seized, among other property items which belonged to company U., an industrial construction (a 2,000 sq. meters metallic shed) of a declared worth of 98,000 Ukrainian hryvnas (UAH) equivalent at the material time to around 13,950 euros (EUR). 8. In December 2005 the State Bailiffs' Service concluded an agreement with a private company M. to hold an auction in order to sell the seized shed. 9. On 3 April 2006 the applicant participated in this auction and bought the above construction for UAH 26,000 (at the material time around EUR 4,200). The applicant submitted copies of the bills according to which he had paid the above amount in full. 10. On 10 August 2006 the applicant sold the shed to a private person T. for UAH 50,000. 11. On an unidentified date, a third person S. lodged an administrative claim against the bailiffs and the applicant seeking to declare the bailiff's seizure and sale of the shed unlawful as in fact it belonged to him. In view of this claim, in October 2006 the sales contract between the applicant and T. was annulled by the parties and the applicant returned the money to T. On 23 November 2006 the Zalishchytskyy Local Court of Ternopil Region found that the shed belonged to S. and thus the bailiffs had unlawfully seized and sold it. There is no information as to whether there was an appeal against this decision. 12. In parallel, criminal proceedings for abuse of office were initiated against bailiff D. in charge of the respective enforcement proceedings. On 16 March 2007 the applicant was given victim status in these proceedings. In the relevant resolution it was noted that the applicant sustained pecuniary damage and had not been reimbursed the money he had paid at the auction. The amount of the damage aggravated the charges against the bailiff. 13. On 2 August 2007 the Zalishchytskyy Local Court convicted the bailiff as charged. In the text of the sentence the applicant is referred to as a witness. Apparently, no civil claim was submitted by the applicant in the course of these criminal proceedings. There is no information whether there was an appeal against this sentence. 14. In May 2008 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the Bailiffs' Service and the local department of the State Treasury claiming compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. The applicant referred to provisions on compensation of damage of the Civil Code of Ukraine, in particular Article 1174, and to Article 11 of the Law of Ukraine ""On the State Bailiffs' Service"" according to which damage caused to an individual by actions or omissions of a state official, in particular, by a bailiff during enforcement proceedings, had to be compensated by the State (see paragraphs 19 and 21 below). 15. On 1 December 2008 the Sadgirskyy District Court of Chernivtsi found for the applicant based on the above legislative provisions. It awarded the applicant UAH 60,262 (equivalent to around EUR 6,884) which comprised: i) cost of the shed (UAH 26,000); ii) bank commission (UAH 262); iii) lost income (UAH 24,000) and iv) non-pecuniary damages (UAH 10,000). 16. Following the defendant's appeal, on 12 March 2009 the Chernivtsi Regional Court of Appeal quashed this decision and rejected the applicant's claims as unsubstantiated. The court held that since the applicant was not a party to the enforcement proceedings in the case against company U. he could not claim damages from the bailiffs under Article 11 of the Law of Ukraine ""On the State Bailiffs' Service"" (see paragraph 21 below). The court of appeal did not examine the applicability of the Civil Code provisions, relied upon by the applicant and the local court. The court further noted that the applicant failed to demonstrate that the shed had been in fact seized from him without any compensation, or that the sales contract with company M. in charge of the auction had been dissolved. 17. The applicant appealed in cassation stating that he no longer owned or used the shed as its seizure and sale were found unlawful by the court decision of 23 November 2006 (see paragraph 11 above) and it had been returned to S. He noted that the money he paid at the auction had not been reimbursed. He thus sustained damages. To support his claim the applicant reiterated again the Civil Code provisions. 18. On 23 July 2009 the Supreme Court of Ukraine refused to open cassation proceedings finding the cassation appeal ill-founded.",Ruled as violated by court,,"8. In December 2005 the State Bailiffs' Service concluded an agreement with a private company M. to hold an auction in order to sell the seized shed. 9. On 3 April 2006 the applicant participated in this auction and bought the above construction for UAH 26,000 (at the material time around EUR 4,200). The applicant submitted copies of the bills according to which he had paid the above amount in full. 11. On an unidentified date, a third person S. lodged an administrative claim against the bailiffs and the applicant seeking to declare the bailiff's seizure and sale of the shed unlawful as in fact it belonged to him. In view of this claim, in October 2006 the sales contract between the applicant and T. was annulled by the parties and the applicant returned the money to T. On 23 November 2006 the Zalishchytskyy Local Court of Ternopil Region found that the shed belonged to S. and thus the bailiffs had unlawfully seized and sold it. There is no information as to whether there was an appeal against this decision. 12. In parallel, criminal proceedings for abuse of office were initiated against bailiff D. in charge of the respective enforcement proceedings. On 16 March 2007 the applicant was given victim status in these proceedings. In the relevant resolution it was noted that the applicant sustained pecuniary damage and had not been reimbursed the money he had paid at the auction. The amount of the damage aggravated the charges against the bailiff. 13. On 2 August 2007 the Zalishchytskyy Local Court convicted the bailiff as charged. In the text of the sentence the applicant is referred to as a witness. Apparently, no civil claim was submitted by the applicant in the course of these criminal proceedings. There is no information whether there was an appeal against this sentence. 14. In May 2008 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the Bailiffs' Service and the local department of the State Treasury claiming compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. The applicant referred to provisions on compensation of damage of the Civil Code of Ukraine, in particular Article 1174, and to Article 11 of the Law of Ukraine ""On the State Bailiffs' Service"" according to which damage caused to an individual by actions or omissions of a state official, in particular, by a bailiff during enforcement proceedings, had to be compensated by the State (see paragraphs 19 and 21 below). 15. On 1 December 2008 the Sadgirskyy District Court of Chernivtsi found for the applicant based on the above legislative provisions. It awarded the applicant UAH 60,262 (equivalent to around EUR 6,884) which comprised: i) cost of the shed (UAH 26,000); ii) bank commission (UAH 262); iii) lost income (UAH 24,000) and iv) non-pecuniary damages (UAH 10,000). 16. Following the defendant's appeal, on 12 March 2009 the Chernivtsi Regional Court of Appeal quashed this decision and rejected the applicant's claims as unsubstantiated. The court held that since the applicant was not a party to the enforcement proceedings in the case against company U. he could not claim damages from the bailiffs under Article 11 of the Law of Ukraine ""On the State Bailiffs' Service"" (see paragraph 21 below). The court of appeal did not examine the applicability of the Civil Code provisions, relied upon by the applicant and the local court. The court further noted that the applicant failed to demonstrate that the shed had been in fact seized from him without any compensation, or that the sales contract with company M. in charge of the auction had been dissolved.",TRUE,2,"When there are two meaningful claims to property being deprived, it's unclear how the statute should be applied.", 482,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","4. The applicants live in Shnogh village. 5. In the 1970s a copper-molybdenum deposit (‘Teghout') was discovered about four and six km away from the villages of Teghout and Shnogh respectively, in the Lori Region. 6. In 2001 a private company, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC, was granted a mining licence for the exploitation of the Teghout copper‑molybdenum deposit for a period of twenty-five years. 7. On 1 November 2007 the Government adopted Decree no. 1279-N approving the designation of territories situated within the administrative boundaries of the rural communities of Shnogh and Teghout in the Lori Region as expropriation zones, to be taken for State needs, thus changing the category of land use. According to the Decree, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC or Teghout CJSC, founded by the former for the purpose of the implementation of the Teghout copper-molybdenum deposit exploitation project, were to acquire the units of land listed in its annexes. 8. The plots of land belonging to the applicants were listed among the units of land falling within these expropriation zones. 9. The applicants, a family of four, live in Shnogh village and earn their living from agriculture and apiculture. They jointly owned two plots of arable land in the village measuring 0.373 ha and 0.448 ha. They also owned a beekeeper's house measuring 69.4 square metres situated on the second plot of land. The land was used for growing crops for the family, feeding their livestock and beekeeping. 10. On an unspecified date Teghout CJSC addressed a letter to the applicants containing an offer to buy their plots of land. Compensation of 183,000 Armenian drams (AMD, approximately 398 euros (EUR)) and AMD 304,000 (approximately EUR 661) was offered for the two plots of land respectively, plus an additional 15% as required by law. 11. The applicants did not reply to the offer, not being satisfied with the amount of compensation. It appears that they tried to obtain an alternative valuation of their property by another company, but did not succeed. They claim that no other valuation company was willing to make an independent assessment of the market value of their land. 12. On 12 May 2008 Teghout CJSC lodged a claim against the applicants seeking to oblige them to sign an agreement on the taking of their property for State needs. The company based its claim, inter alia, on the valuations prepared at its request by Oliver Group LLC, a licensed valuation company. According to the reports, the market value of the applicants' plots of land was estimated at AMD 183,000 (approximately EUR 398) and AMD 304,000 (approximately EUR 661) respectively. 13. In the proceedings before the Lori Regional Court the applicants argued that the market value of their land had been underestimated. They further submitted that the valuation of their property had not been carried out correctly, since no account had been taken of the number of trees, the beekeeper's house situated on the second plot of land, and a number of other factors that should have affected the calculation of the amount of compensation. 14. In the course of the proceedings, Teghout CJSC submitted new valuations of the applicants' property, also prepared by Oliver Group LLC. The representative of Teghout CJSC stated that a new valuation of the applicant's second plot of land had been conducted in order to include the building situated on it. According to the new valuations, the market value of the applicants' second plot of land including the building was estimated to be AMD 1,728,000 (approximately EUR 3,760). As to the first plot of land, it was stated that Oliver Group LLC had prepared a corrected report according to which the market value of the property was AMD 189,000 (approximately EUR 410). The final amounts of compensation for the two plots of land, including the additional 15% required by law, would thus be equal to AMD 217,350 (approximately EUR 473) and AMD 1,987,200 (approximately EUR 4,320) respectively. 15. On 28 November 2008 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC's claim, awarding the applicants compensation of AMD 217,350 for the first plot of land and AMD 1,987,200 for the second plot of land. 16. The applicants lodged an appeal. Relying, inter alia, on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, they complained that the Regional Court had deprived them of their property. 17. On 18 June 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court's judgment finding, inter alia, that the latter had struck a fair balance between the applicants' interests and the legitimate aim pursued, and that the market value of the property had been properly determined, on the basis of the corrected valuation reports prepared by Oliver Group CJSC. 18. The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar arguments to those submitted in the previous appeal. 19. On 12 August 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the applicants' cassation appeal inadmissible for lack of merit.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,It's unclear whether the statute applies to evaluations of property for exchanges for compensation., 483,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Bogdany. 6. On 26 January 2004 the applicant obtained from the State a deed of title to an agricultural plot of land (an official Land Registry title) based on a decree issued by the Varvynska local administration on 22 December 2003. This amounted to the official registration of her title to the land in accordance with the domestic procedures. At that point the applicant had not filed a request for the boundaries of the plot to be marked out and was not farming the land. 7. On 26 July 2004 the local administration concluded a lease agreement with the private company B., according to which the company would rent the applicant's land and pay the rent to the local administration. The applicant was not informed about this agreement. She learnt of the lease agreement only in September 2004, after the private company B. had planted seeds on the land. 8. On 4 October 2004 the applicant requested the local administration to allow her to establish the boundaries of her land. In this connection, on 19 October 2004, the local administration ordered the termination of the lease agreement with company B. and authorised the applicant to carry out work to mark out of the boundaries of her land. 9. In July 2005 the company removed its crop from the applicant's land. On 25 July 2005 amendments were introduced to the lease agreement of 26 July 2004, excluding the applicant's plot of land from the list of leased lands. From then on the applicant's land ceased to be a leased property, and company B. has not used it since. In the same month the boundaries of the applicant's land were established. 10. On 20 January 2006 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the domestic courts against the local administration and company B. Claiming that the lease agreement of 26 July 2004 infringed her property rights and should have been declared invalid, she sought compensation for the use of the land by company B. She argued that the amount of compensation to be paid to her should correspond to the value of the crop that had been harvested from her land. 11. On 2 June 2006 the Varva Local Court of Chernigiv Region allowed the applicant's claim. In particular, the court found that once the applicant had received a title to the plot of land in question, the local administration should not have concluded any agreement concerning the land with other parties. As to the boundaries, the court found that the local administration had unlawfully linked their establishment with the existence of the applicant's ownership rights. It also noted that despite the fact that the boundaries had not been marked out, the local administration should have learned about the applicant's title to the land in question from the land registry and local land plans. The court added that after lodging her request on 4 October 2004 for the boundaries of the plot to be marked out, the applicant had tried to accelerate the process by applying to the local administration and other authorities, to no avail. The court concluded that the lease agreement of 26 July 2004 had violated the applicant's property rights and was to be declared invalid. The court also held that under domestic law the applicant was entitled to compensation for the use of her property equal to the value of the crops taken from her land (29,210 Ukrainian hryvnas (UAH); 4,493 euros (EUR) at the material time). The compensation, in the court's view, should have been paid to the applicant both by the local administration and by company B., as they were jointly and severally liable for the unauthorised use of the applicant's land. 12. The local administration appealed. On 12 September 2006 the Chernigiv Regional Court of Appeal quashed the above-mentioned judgment. The court noted that the use of the applicant's land by company B. had been lawful since it had been based on the lease agreement. The court further stressed that under Article 125 of the Land Code of Ukraine, the right of the owner of a plot of land to use it arose only once its boundaries had been marked out and after receipt by the owner of the document certifying that right. The appellate court concluded that the applicant was not entitled to compensation as the boundaries of her land had been marked out only in July 2005; as she could not have used the land before that date, she could not claim an interest in the harvested crop. 13. The applicant appealed on points of law. On 4 January 2007 the Supreme Court of Ukraine refused to examine the merits of the applicant's appeal on points of law, finding that it was frivolous. 14. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged another civil claim against company B., claiming the value of the land that had been used by B., as well as rental charges for the use of her land. On 7 June 2006 the Varva Local Court of Chernigiv Region left this claim unexamined because of the applicant's attitude, citing the fact that she had been absent from the court hearings in her case on numerous occasions without good reason.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,"When there are two meaningful claims to property being deprived, it's unclear how the statute should be applied.", 484,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","6. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Zagreb. 7. On 21 July 2000 the police temporarily seized the applicant's vehicle, which had Canadian number plates, suspecting that it had been stolen by an unknown perpetrator. 8. On 24 July and 1 September 2000 police experts examined the car and established that its vehicle identification number (VIN) was genuine. 9. In the meantime, on 21 July 2000 the police asked the Canadian Interpol office to check whether the applicant's car and two other vehicles were being sought by the police in Canada, under whose name they had been registered, whether they had been registered for export, and whether the car documents were genuine. 10. On 29 December 2000 the police asked the Zagreb State Attorney's Office (Općinsko državno odvjetništvo u Zagrebu) to decide on the status of the vehicle. 11. On 23 March 2001 the Zagreb State Attorney's Office instructed the police to ask for the relevant information from the Canadian Interpol office. 12. On 18 March 2002 the police asked the Canadian Interpol office to expedite the handling of their request for information. 13. According to the available data, the Canadian Interpol office did not respond to the request of the police. 14. By a decision of 2 May 2002 the Zagreb State Attorney's Office ordered that the car be returned to the applicant, whereupon, on 7 May 2002, the police did so. 15. On 22 July 2003 the applicant brought a civil action for compensation against the State in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu). He argued that the car had been returned to him in a state of disrepair because it had not been stored properly and, in any event, it had fallen in value during the two years it had been kept by the police, which had been an unreasonably long period. He sought 55,275.95 Croatian kunas (HRK; approximately 7,126 euros (EUR) at the relevant time) in compensation. 16. The opinion of an expert obtained by the court during the proceedings suggested that the cost of repairing the applicant's car amounted to HRK 35,275.95 and that its value had dropped by HRK 22,000. 17. By a judgment of 16 December 2008 the Municipal Court dismissed the applicant's civil action. Its decision was upheld on 30 June 2009 by the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu). 18. The courts held that the temporary seizure of the applicant's car had been lawful as it had been based on Articles 177, 184 and 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that therefore the State could not be held liable for damages. 19. The applicant then concurrently lodged an extraordinary appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) and a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske). 20. In his appeal on points of law the applicant asked the Supreme Court to pronounce itself on a legal question which he considered important for the uniform application of the law, namely, whether the owners of objects temporarily seized for the purposes of criminal proceedings were entitled to compensation for the inability to use those objects, in a situation where, eventually, no criminal or minor-offence proceedings had been instituted. 21. In his constitutional complaint the applicant argued that the judgments of the first and second-instance courts had been in breach of his right of ownership, guaranteed by Article 48 of the Croatian Constitution. 22. By a decision of 21 February 2012 the Supreme Court declared the applicant's appeal on points of law inadmissible, finding that the legal question he had raised was not important for the uniform application of the law. 23. On 23 January 2014 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's constitutional complaint and served its decision on his representative on 7 February 2014. The court examined the case primarily under Article 29 § 1 of the Croatian Constitution, which guarantees the right to fair procedure, and held that the contested judgments had not been arbitrary. As regards the applicant's argument that his right of ownership guaranteed by Article 48 of the Constitution had been violated, the Constitutional Court held as follows: ""The Constitutional Court protects the right of ownership at the constitutional level in a manner that prevents any restriction or taking of [property] by the State authorities, unless the restriction or taking is provided for by law ... ... interferences with ownership by other legal subjects (natural or legal persons) are property disputes of a private-law nature. The Constitutional Court also examines such decisions by judicial and other authorities if it finds that the contested decision, having regard to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, is based on an unacceptable legal view or is so wrong and lacking in sound legal reasoning that it can be described as arbitrary. The Constitutional Court did not find any such circumstances in the complainant's case. Therefore, the complainant's right of ownership guaranteed by Article 48 of the Constitution was not breached by the contested judgments.""",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. On 21 July 2000 the police temporarily seized the applicant's vehicle, which had Canadian number plates, suspecting that it had been stolen by an unknown perpetrator. 14. By a decision of 2 May 2002 the Zagreb State Attorney's Office ordered that the car be returned to the applicant, whereupon, on 7 May 2002, the police did so. 16. The opinion of an expert obtained by the court during the proceedings suggested that the cost of repairing the applicant's car amounted to HRK 35,275.95 and that its value had dropped by HRK 22,000.",TRUE,2,It's unclear how the statute should be applied to determine compensation when property is deprived., 485,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Oradea. 6. On 29 November 2000 the prosecutor's office attached to the Bihor County Court (""the prosecutor's office"") discontinued the criminal proceedings which it had opened against the applicant on 24 November 2000 for bribe taking. 7. On 10 January 2001 the prosecutor's office attached to the Bihor Court of Appeal quashed the above-mentioned decision of its own motion and ordered that the proceedings against the applicant be reopened. 8. On 5 February and 11 June 2001, respectively, the prosecutor's office reopened the criminal proceedings against the applicant for bribe taking and opened criminal proceedings against him for abuse of office. 9. On 29 July 2002 the State Agency for Capitalisation of Banking Assets (Autoritate Pentru Valorificarea Activelor Bancare – ""AVAB"") joined the criminal proceedings against the applicant as a civil party. It sought the recovery of 27,863,805,105 Romanian lei (ROL) (approximately 1,758,753 US dollars (USD)), the damage that it had allegedly incurred as a result of the applicant's abuse of office. 10. On 16 August 2002 the prosecutor's office ordered the seizure of the applicant's movable and immovable assets up to the value of the damage allegedly incurred by AVAB. The order was enforced by the Bihor Police Department on 19 December 2002 by seizing part of the immovable properties owned jointly by the applicant and his wife, in particular four plots of intra muros agricultural land, a home and annexes. 11. On 29 August 2002 the prosecutor's office indicted the applicant for bribe taking and for abuse of office and sent his case for trial. 12. Between 7 October 2002 and 6 February 2006 the Bihor County Court (""the County Court"") adjourned the proceedings twenty-four times to allow the parties to prepare their defence, for the court to summon the parties and the witnesses, to hear evidence, and for deliberations. Also, at a hearing on 10 February 2003, the court dismissed the applicant's challenge against the order of 16 August 2002 on the grounds that the measure was temporary and had been enforced correctly. This decision was upheld by the Oradea Court of Appeal (""the Court of Appeal"") on 11 March 2003 following an appeal by the applicant. 13. On 13 February 2006 the County Court examined the applicant's case on the merits and acquitted him of abuse of office. However, it held that the applicant had to pay AVAB the damages it claimed because AVAB had suffered damage as a result of his actions. Consequently, the court maintained the measure imposed on the applicant's assets. It also convicted the applicant of bribe taking and sentenced him to three years' imprisonment, suspended. 14. The applicant appealed against the judgment to the Court of Appeal. 15. Between 20 June and 11 July 2006 the Court of Appeal adjourned the proceedings twice to allow the parties to prepare their cases. On 19 September 2006 the court quashed the judgment of 13 February 2006 and referred the case back to the first-instance court for re-examination on procedural grounds. 16. Between 30 November 2006 and 1 April 2010 the County Court adjourned the proceedings thirty-two times to allow the parties to prepare their defence, for the court-assigned expert to produce two expert reports, and for the court to summon the parties and the witnesses, to hear evidence, for deliberations, and to allow the judges to exercise their right to strike. Also, at a hearing on 4 June 2007 the court adjourned the examination of the applicant's request for the measure imposed on his assets to be lifted pending the court's determination of the case. 17. On 8 April 2010 the County Court examined the applicant's case on the merits, acquitted him of abuse of office and dismissed AVAB's civil claim. Consequently, it lifted the seizure measure from his assets. The court convicted the applicant, however, of receiving bribes and gave him a suspended sentence of three years' imprisonment. 18. The applicant and AVAB appealed against the judgment to the Court of Appeal. 19. Between 21 September and 16 November 2010 the Court of Appeal adjourned the proceedings twice to allow the parties to prepare their cases, to summon them, and for the court to deliberate. On 23 November 2010 the court dismissed the appeals of the parties and upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. 20. The applicant and AVAB appealed on points of fact and law against the judgment to the High Court of Cassation and Justice (""the Court of Cassation""). 21. Between 23 February and 20 April 2011 the Court of Cassation adjourned the proceedings once to allow the applicant to prepare his case. 22. By a final judgment of 4 May 2011 the Court of Cassation allowed the applicant's appeal on points of fact and law in part. It held that he was guilty of bribe taking, but his criminal liability for that offence had become time-barred. The court upheld the remaining parts of the judgments delivered by the lower courts. 23. On 4 March 2012, once the applicant had submitted certified copies of all the courts' judgments, the Bihor Land and Immovable Property Register removed the annotation concerning the seizure measure imposed on his immovable property from the above-mentioned register, which had prevented him from freely disposing of it.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. On 10 January 2001 the prosecutor's office attached to the Bihor Court of Appeal quashed the above-mentioned decision of its own motion and ordered that the proceedings against the applicant be reopened. 15. Between 20 June and 11 July 2006 the Court of Appeal adjourned the proceedings twice to allow the parties to prepare their cases. On 19 September 2006 the court quashed the judgment of 13 February 2006 and referred the case back to the first-instance court for re-examination on procedural grounds. 16. Between 30 November 2006 and 1 April 2010 the County Court adjourned the proceedings thirty-two times to allow the parties to prepare their defence, for the court-assigned expert to produce two expert reports, and for the court to summon the parties and the witnesses, to hear evidence, for deliberations, and to allow the judges to exercise their right to strike. Also, at a hearing on 4 June 2007 the court adjourned the examination of the applicant's request for the measure imposed on his assets to be lifted pending the court's determination of the case.",TRUE,1,"While the decision was made in a court of law and in the judicially-decided public interest, this is a clear deprivation of property that does not seem entirely principled.", 486,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","4. The applicants, Ms Bozhana Boyanova Uzunova and Mr Ferad Ismail Seid, were born in 1978 and 1955 respectively, and live in Kardzhali. 5. The applicants co-owned a plot of land of 15,276 square metres near the town of Kapitan Andreevo. 6. On 30 November 2007 the Council of Ministers decided to expropriate 6,218 square metres of the applicants' plot with a view to building a motorway. The decision allowed preliminary enforcement of the expropriation and stated that the owners were to be given BGN 13,023 (the equivalent of approximately EUR 6,657) in compensation. The decision recorded as owner of the expropriated plot the person from whom the applicants had bought the property. 7. The applicants brought judicial review proceedings in respect of the expropriation decision before the Supreme Administrative Court. In a final judgment of 3 April 2009 that court declared the decision null and void as it had failed to specify the actual owners of the plot to whom compensation was due, and referred the case back to the administrative authorities. The Road Infrastructure Agency requested re-opening of the judicial review proceedings on the ground that it had not been able to take part in them as an interested third party even though its participation was mandatory under the State Property Act 1996 as investor in the construction of the motorway. In a judgment of 12 October 2009 a five-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court allowed the request, quashed the judgment of 3 April 2009 and remitted the case to be re-examined by a three-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court. 8. In a final judgment of 28 December 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court found that compensation was due to the applicants as owners of the plot at issue and that it had to be increased to BGN 59,817 (the equivalent of EUR 30,577), in accordance with the conclusions of an expert report obtained in the course of the proceedings. The court also awarded the applicants BGN 600 in costs, to be paid by the Council of Ministers. 9. On 13 January 2011 the applicants invited the Road Infrastructure Agency to pay the compensation due to them. In its response of 21 February 2011, the Agency informed the applicants that due to some changes in the layout of the motorway, a new decision for expropriation of the affected property was being prepared. 10. On 5 July 2011 the Council of Ministers issued a new decision for expropriation, in accordance with which 5,215 square metres of the applicants' plot were to be expropriated against compensation in the amount of BGN 1,794 (the equivalent of EUR 917). The applicants brought judicial review proceedings in respect of this decision. In a judgment of 26 June 2012, the Supreme Administrative Court declared the decision of 5 July 2011 null and void as it had failed to take account of the binding character of the judgment of 28 December 2010, the latter having determined the dispute between the parties with final effect. In March 2012 the Ministry of Finance unsuccessfully sought reopening of the proceedings ending with the judgment of 28 December 2010 before the Supreme Administrative Court. 11. On 4 July 2012 the applicants once again invited the Road Infrastructure Agency to pay the compensation due to them. They subsequently wrote to the agency again on 15 October 2012, to the Council of Ministers on 14 October 2013 submitting also a writ of enforcement in respect of the sum due, and to the regional governor on 21 February 2014. 12. On 26 February 2015, at the time of submitting their observations on the admissibility and merits in this case, the Government informed the Court that on 15 May 2014 the Road Infrastructure Agency had paid to each applicant BGN 29,908.50, or altogether BGN 59,817 pursuant to the final judgment in their favour of 28 December 2010. 13. On 10 December 2014, 20 January 2015 and 23 March 2015 respectively, the applicants wrote to various authorities, without success, seeking the payment of interest on the above amount for the period of over three years when it had remained unenforced. 14. In the meantime, on 22 November 2013 the applicants brought proceedings before the Sofia Administrative Court in relation to the lack of enforcement of the final judicial decision of 28 December 2010. In particular, they claimed they had incurred pecuniary damage as a result of the lack of enforcement; they also claimed interest on the amount determined in the said judgment for the period of its non-enforcement. On 18 December 2013 the court dismissed their claim as inadmissible. It found, on the one hand, that the applicants had not indicated an individual administrative act as the subject of their judicial review proceedings. If, on the other hand, the applicants' claim was about the lack of enforcement of a final judicial decision, the court held that the competent body in that connection was the bailiff and the relevant procedure was under chapter XVII of the Code of Administrative Procedure 2006 (""the 2006 Code""). 15. The applicants appealed before the Supreme Administrative Court, alleging a breach of Article 203 of the 2006 Code and a breach of section 1(1) of the State and Municipalities Responsibility for Damage Act (the ""SMRDA""), and challenging the lower court's decision as being unreasoned. In a final decision of 13 February 2014, the Supreme Administrative Court confirmed the lower court's decision.",Ruled as violated by court,,"12. On 26 February 2015, at the time of submitting their observations on the admissibility and merits in this case, the Government informed the Court that on 15 May 2014 the Road Infrastructure Agency had paid to each applicant BGN 29,908.50, or altogether BGN 59,817 pursuant to the final judgment in their favour of 28 December 2010.",TRUE,2,It's unclear how the statute should be applied to determine compensation when property is deprived., 487,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","4. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Moscow. 5. On 27 August 2002 the applicant brought civil proceedings against the Administration of the Mirninskiy Ulus of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic (""the Administration""), a private person S., her husband B., and a private company A. claiming a title to a flat, damages, and S.'s eviction from the flat. 6. On 18 September 2002 the Mirninskiy District Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic (""the District Court"") refused to consider his action, because there already had been a decision of 6 February 2001 taken by the District Court concerning the same dispute. 7. On 13 November 2002 the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic overruled the refusal and remitted the case for a new examination, as the action included a new co-defendant, and, therefore, it could not be said that the dispute was among the same parties. 8. On 15 January 2003 the District Court ordered eviction of S. and her family from the flat and dismissed the claim against the Administration. 9. On 3 March 2003 the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic quashed the judgment on appeal and returned the case for a fresh examination, as the lower court had failed to address issues related S.'s property rights. 10. On 29 July 2003 the District Court ordered an expert examination of the flat in order to determine its market value. 11. On 14 August 2003 the court proceedings resumed. 12. In the meantime, the applicant amended his claims and sought to obtain compensation for his belongings allegedly stolen in 1999, non‑pecuniary damage, legal costs, travel expenses and reimbursement of the rent he had to pay after his eviction from the disputed flat back in 1999. 13. On 29 August 2003 the District Court examined the case, ordered the Administration to pay the applicant 800,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of the flat's market value and dismissed the remainder of the claims. In particular, the claim for compensation for the allegedly stolen property was dismissed as unfounded. 14. On 20 October 2003 the judgment was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of Sakha (Yakutiya) and entered into force. 15. On 11 June 2004, upon the applicant's request, the bailiffs initiated the enforcement proceedings. 16. On 27 August 2004 the District Court granted the Administration's request for suspension of the enforcement of the judgment of 29 August 2003 until 15 January 2005 due to financial difficulties encountered by the debtor. 17. On 15 November 2004 the applicant's appeal against the above decision was dismissed. 18. On 18 March 2005 the monetary award in accordance with the judgment of 29 August 2003 was paid to the applicant. 19. On 29 September 2005, upon the applicant's extraordinary appeal, the Presidium of the Supreme Court of Sakha (Yakutiya) quashed the judgment of 29 August 2003 and the decision of 20 October 2003 and remitted the case for a fresh examination. The Presidium found that the courts had incorrectly applied the material law to various aspects of the case, and had failed to join the appropriate financial body as co-defendant. 20. It appears that the amounts paid to the applicant under the quashed judgment of 29 August 2003 have not been reclaimed. 21. On 15 November 2005 the District Court suspended the proceedings, due to B.'s illness and asked the applicant to clarify his claims. 22. On 21 December 2005 the applicant submitted the amended claims. 23. On 16 February 2006 the District Court joined, at the defendant's request, the Ministry of Finance as co-defendant in the proceedings and suspended the examination of the case on account of B.'s poor state of health. 24. On 14 February 2007 the case was assigned to a different judge of the District Court, for the sake of the court's impartiality. 25. On 21 March 2007 the District Court dismissed the applicant's action. 26. On 4 June 2007 the Supreme Court of Sakha (Yakutiya) upheld the judgment on appeal except for the parts concerning the eviction of S. and B., reimbursement of the rent, payments for utility services, a commission fee, and recovering of the cost of the apartment. The decision in those parts was remitted for a fresh examination due to failure by the lower court to assess certain evidence and misapplication of the material law. 27. On 27 August 2007 the District Court suspended the proceedings pending S.'s return from vacation. 28. On 26 October 2007 the court ordered the applicant to clarify his claims and scheduled a new hearing on 23 November 2007. 29. On 23 November 2007 the court issued a special writ ordering the bailiffs to obtain clarifications of the claims from the applicant. 30. It appears that at some point the applicant provided the required information. 31. On 30 April 2008 the District Court dismissed the action as unfounded. The court explained that the applicant had other remedies to use under the civil law in order to protect his property rights. In particular, he could claim that an equivalent apartment or a compensation be provided to him. 32. By the final judgment of 13 August 2008 the Supreme Court of Sakha (Yakutiya) upheld the lower court's findings on appeal. 33. In the meantime, the applicant sued the Administration for statutory interest for the delay in enforcement of the judgment of 29 August 2003. 34. On 7 February 2007 the District Court discontinued the proceedings as the judgment of 29 August 2003 had been quashed and a new decision in the case had not yet been adopted.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,1,"It depends if money that is yet to be granted counts as possessions according to the statute, but that seems to be the common understanding.", 488,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","4. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Vratsa. 5. In 1991, following the adoption of the Agricultural Land Act which provided, inter alia, for the restitution of formerly collectivised land, the applicant applied for the restitution of land previously owned by her father. 6. In a decision of 20 May 1996 the competent body, the Oryahovo land commission, held that the heirs of the applicant's father (the applicant and her sister) were entitled to the restitution of, inter alia, a plot of land of 11,800 square metres enlisted as ""forest"". The decision indicated that the heirs of the applicant's father had established his property title with a notarial deed. It stated additionally that the plot of land was ""situated in an area under section 4"". 7. That provision (section 4 of the transitional provisions of the Agricultural Land Act, hereinafter ""section 4"") concerns plots of land which were offered by the Communist authorities for use of private persons, and stipulates that those persons' right of use is to be discontinued. Under further conditions, those plots are subject to restitution in favour of the pre‑collectivisation owners. Such restitution is to be carried out after the elaboration of a detailed cadastral plan of the respective area and, on its basis, a so-called plan of the newly-created plots. 8. During the years after 1996 the applicant kept sending letters to different bodies, seeking the completion of the restitution procedure. She was informed that she had to await the elaboration of the above-mentioned plans. 9. Such plans for the territory of the Oryahovo municipality were prepared and approved by the relevant authorities in 2010. 10. In 2012, responding to a letter from the applicant, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests informed her that the completion of the restitution procedure as concerns plots under section 4 was within the competence of the municipality. 11. The applicant contacted the municipality, which informed her in a letter of 23 April 2013 that her plot was not situated within the boundaries of the area concerned by section 4 and not covered by the plan of the newly‑created plots. Thus, the municipality was not competent to take any decision to finalise the restitution procedure. It informed the applicant that the plot claimed by her was considered State property and was held and managed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests. 12. After the applicant contacted once again the Ministry, it informed her, in an undated letter, that she was to address its local branch, the Oryahovo Agriculture Department (former land commission). 13. The applicant wrote to the Oryahovo Agriculture Department, requesting it to finalise the restitution procedure and transfer to her possession of her father's plot. In a letter dated 21 August 2013 the Department, while confirming that the municipality had no competence as concerns this plot, explained that the applicant had had to do one of the following: either have the exact borders of her plot identified in a different procedure, which had already been completed, concerning land which is not covered by section 4; or apply for the restitution of the land under the Forests Restitution Act, for which the relevant time-limits had already expired (see paragraph 22 below). 14. In another letter dated 11 April 2017, replying to a further request by the applicant to finalise the restitution procedure, the Oryahovo Agriculture Department stated that its decision of 20 May 1996, indicating that the applicant's plot was covered by section 4 and was to be restituted under the procedure concerning such plots, was final, and that the time-limit for seeking its revocation or rectification had expired. 15. In a further undated letter, replying to a fresh complaint by the applicant, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests instructed her to submit a written request under section 45d of the Regulations on the Application of the Agricultural Land Act (hereinafter ""section 45d"", see paragraph 21 below). 16. On 5 June 2017 the Vratsa Regional Directorate of Agriculture (superior body of the Oryahovo Agriculture Department) instructed the applicant to submit to the Agriculture Department the relevant documents concerning the plot of land. The same was reiterated by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests on 30 August 2017, after it was once again contacted by the applicant. 17. On 8 September 2017 the Oryahovo Agriculture Department sent a letter to the applicant, listing the documents she needed to submit to enable the completion of the restitution procedure. These were: a written request under section 45d; an inheritance certificate; notarial deeds, court decisions and any other documents establishing the title to property; documents sent to the applicant by the Oryahovo municipality concerning the procedure under section 4; a plan prepared by a certified geodesist, indicating the exact borders of the plot of land. 18. On 19 September 2017 the applicant submitted a written request under section 45d, which was not accompanied by the remaining documents. 19. The necessity to submit those documents was reiterated in three additional letters sent to the applicant by the Oryahovo Agriculture Department, dated 23 October and 15 and 23 November 2017. In the meantime, the Department requested ex officio from the municipality any relevant documents concerning the procedure conducted by the latter under section 4. It appears that there were no other relevant developments after that.",Ruled as violated by court,,"6. In a decision of 20 May 1996 the competent body, the Oryahovo land commission, held that the heirs of the applicant's father (the applicant and her sister) were entitled to the restitution of, inter alia, a plot of land of 11,800 square metres enlisted as ""forest"". The decision indicated that the heirs of the applicant's father had established his property title with a notarial deed. It stated additionally that the plot of land was ""situated in an area under section 4"". 7. That provision (section 4 of the transitional provisions of the Agricultural Land Act, hereinafter ""section 4"") concerns plots of land which were offered by the Communist authorities for use of private persons, and stipulates that those persons' right of use is to be discontinued. Under further conditions, those plots are subject to restitution in favour of the pre‑collectivisation owners. Such restitution is to be carried out after the elaboration of a detailed cadastral plan of the respective area and, on its basis, a so-called plan of the newly-created plots. 8. During the years after 1996 the applicant kept sending letters to different bodies, seeking the completion of the restitution procedure. She was informed that she had to await the elaboration of the above-mentioned plans. 9. Such plans for the territory of the Oryahovo municipality were prepared and approved by the relevant authorities in 2010. 10. In 2012, responding to a letter from the applicant, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests informed her that the completion of the restitution procedure as concerns plots under section 4 was within the competence of the municipality. 11. The applicant contacted the municipality, which informed her in a letter of 23 April 2013 that her plot was not situated within the boundaries of the area concerned by section 4 and not covered by the plan of the newly‑created plots. Thus, the municipality was not competent to take any decision to finalise the restitution procedure. It informed the applicant that the plot claimed by her was considered State property and was held and managed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests. 13. The applicant wrote to the Oryahovo Agriculture Department, requesting it to finalise the restitution procedure and transfer to her possession of her father's plot. In a letter dated 21 August 2013 the Department, while confirming that the municipality had no competence as concerns this plot, explained that the applicant had had to do one of the following: either have the exact borders of her plot identified in a different procedure, which had already been completed, concerning land which is not covered by section 4; or apply for the restitution of the land under the Forests Restitution Act, for which the relevant time-limits had already expired (see paragraph 22 below). 16. On 5 June 2017 the Vratsa Regional Directorate of Agriculture (superior body of the Oryahovo Agriculture Department) instructed the applicant to submit to the Agriculture Department the relevant documents concerning the plot of land. The same was reiterated by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests on 30 August 2017, after it was once again contacted by the applicant. 17. On 8 September 2017 the Oryahovo Agriculture Department sent a letter to the applicant, listing the documents she needed to submit to enable the completion of the restitution procedure. These were: a written request under section 45d; an inheritance certificate; notarial deeds, court decisions and any other documents establishing the title to property; documents sent to the applicant by the Oryahovo municipality concerning the procedure under section 4; a plan prepared by a certified geodesist, indicating the exact borders of the plot of land. 19. The necessity to submit those documents was reiterated in three additional letters sent to the applicant by the Oryahovo Agriculture Department, dated 23 October and 15 and 23 November 2017. In the meantime, the Department requested ex officio from the municipality any relevant documents concerning the procedure conducted by the latter under section 4. It appears that there were no other relevant developments after that.",TRUE,2,It's unclear how the statute should be applied to older restitution cases., 489,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The first and third applicants were born in 1941, the second applicant was born in 1974, and the fourth applicant was born in 1967. The first, second and third applicants live in Kazanlak and the fourth applicant lives in Sofia. 6. Ms Maria Kopankova and her grandson, the fourth applicant (son of the first applicant) co-owned a house with a garden in Kazanlak. At the time Ms Maria Kopankova lived in the house with her two sons, the first applicant and Mr Kancho Kopankov, and their families, which included the remaining applicants (the second and third applicants are Mr Kancho Kopankov's wife and son). 7. By a decision of the town mayor of 18 July 1988 the property was expropriated under the Territorial and Urban Planning Act with a view to constructing a residential building. The decision stated that each of the two owners (Ms Maria Kopankova and the fourth applicant) were to be compensated with a flat in a building which the municipality planned to construct. 8. After the expropriation the municipal authorities opened a blocked housing savings account with the State Savings Bank in the name of Ms Maria Kopankova and the fourth applicant and transferred to it 13,420 old Bulgarian levs (BGL) – the equivalent of the expropriated property's value as assessed at the time. 9. In 1989 Ms Maria Kopankova and the applicants were moved out of the expropriated property and the house was pulled down. Construction work started on the plot of land and the foundations of a future building were laid. However, the site was soon after that abandoned. 10. Throughout the years that followed Ms Maria Kopankova and the applicants petitioned on many occasions the municipal authorities to provide them with the compensation due, but to no avail. The mayor never took a decision specifying the exact future flats to be offered in compensation (see paragraph 20 below). 11. In 1998 Ms Maria Kopankova passed away and was succeeded by her sons, the first applicant and Mr Kancho Kopankov. The latter passed away in 2011 and was succeeded by the second and third applicants. 12. On 16 February 2009 the applicants and Mr Kancho Kopankov made a request to the mayor under section 9(2) of the transitional provisions of the Territorial Planning Act of 2001 (hereinafter ""section 9(2)"") for the revocation of the expropriation order of 18 July 1988. As no response followed, they applied for judicial review of the mayor's tacit refusal. 13. The Stara Zagora Administrative Court (hereinafter ""the Administrative Court"") gave a judgment on 27 May 2010. It found, firstly, that the fourth applicant and Ms Maria Kopankova, and subsequently her heirs, had not received the compensation due to them, namely two flats. It pointed out in this connection that the transfer of money to a blocked housing savings account in their name (see paragraph 8 above) was not equivalent to the provision of compensation. The Administrative Court found further that the authorities had not ""taken possession"" of the applicants' property, within the meaning of section 9(2), because there had been no formal decision to take possession (as had been required at the time), and because in any event the construction work which had started on the plot had eventually been abandoned. Thus, the preconditions for the revocation of the 1988 expropriation under section 9(2) had been fulfilled. On that basis the Administrative Court quashed the mayor's tacit refusal and revoked the expropriation order. 14. The judgment above was not appealed against and became final. 15. In 2011 the applicants brought a tort action against the Kazanlak municipality under section 1 of the State and Municipalities Responsibility for Damage Act (see paragraph 23 below). They claimed the value of the house and of other objects (such as trees, the pavement and outbuildings) which had stood on the plot of land and had been destroyed, but for which they had never received any compensation. The applicants also made claims in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 16. In the context of the ensuing proceedings the Administrative Court, examining the case, appointed experts, who estimated the value of the house and the remaining objects at 37,868 new Bulgarian levs (BGN – the equivalent of approximately 19,370 euros (EUR)). 17. In a decision of 26 January 2012 the Administrative Court found the applicants' claims inadmissible and refused to examine them on the merits. It reasoned that the applicants' situation had been regulated by sections 9(1) and 9(2) of the transitional provisions of the Territorial Planning Act of 2001 (see paragraph 22 below, hereinafter ""section 9(1)"" and ""section 9(2)""), and that the existence of such a special avenue of redress meant that the general tort provisions of the State and Municipalities Responsibility for Damage Act did not apply. 18. These conclusions were upheld in a final decision of 20 April 2012 of the Supreme Administrative Court, which added that since the expropriation of the applicants' property had been quashed and the expropriation proceedings completed, the municipality could not be liable for any damage stemming from these proceedings. It pointed out in addition that the applicants' claims did not fall to be examined by the civil courts, under the general rules of tort, and that the administrative courts remained competent to examine them, even though the claims were inadmissible. It thus refused to apply Article 135 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (see paragraph 25 below) and transfer the case to the civil courts, as the applicants had requested.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. By a decision of the town mayor of 18 July 1988 the property was expropriated under the Territorial and Urban Planning Act with a view to constructing a residential building. The decision stated that each of the two owners (Ms Maria Kopankova and the fourth applicant) were to be compensated with a flat in a building which the municipality planned to construct. 9. In 1989 Ms Maria Kopankova and the applicants were moved out of the expropriated property and the house was pulled down. Construction work started on the plot of land and the foundations of a future building were laid. However, the site was soon after that abandoned. 10. Throughout the years that followed Ms Maria Kopankova and the applicants petitioned on many occasions the municipal authorities to provide them with the compensation due, but to no avail. The mayor never took a decision specifying the exact future flats to be offered in compensation (see paragraph 20 below). 13. The Stara Zagora Administrative Court (hereinafter ""the Administrative Court"") gave a judgment on 27 May 2010. It found, firstly, that the fourth applicant and Ms Maria Kopankova, and subsequently her heirs, had not received the compensation due to them, namely two flats. It pointed out in this connection that the transfer of money to a blocked housing savings account in their name (see paragraph 8 above) was not equivalent to the provision of compensation. The Administrative Court found further that the authorities had not ""taken possession"" of the applicants' property, within the meaning of section 9(2), because there had been no formal decision to take possession (as had been required at the time), and because in any event the construction work which had started on the plot had eventually been abandoned. Thus, the preconditions for the revocation of the 1988 expropriation under section 9(2) had been fulfilled. On that basis the Administrative Court quashed the mayor's tacit refusal and revoked the expropriation order. 15. In 2011 the applicants brought a tort action against the Kazanlak municipality under section 1 of the State and Municipalities Responsibility for Damage Act (see paragraph 23 below). They claimed the value of the house and of other objects (such as trees, the pavement and outbuildings) which had stood on the plot of land and had been destroyed, but for which they had never received any compensation. The applicants also made claims in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 18. These conclusions were upheld in a final decision of 20 April 2012 of the Supreme Administrative Court, which added that since the expropriation of the applicants' property had been quashed and the expropriation proceedings completed, the municipality could not be liable for any damage stemming from these proceedings. It pointed out in addition that the applicants' claims did not fall to be examined by the civil courts, under the general rules of tort, and that the administrative courts remained competent to examine them, even though the claims were inadmissible. It thus refused to apply Article 135 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (see paragraph 25 below) and transfer the case to the civil courts, as the applicants had requested.",TRUE,1,"It depends if money that is yet to be granted counts as possessions according to the statute, but that seems to be the common understanding.", 490,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","4. The applicant lives in Shnogh village. 5. In the 1970s a copper-molybdenum deposit (‘Teghout') was discovered about four and six km away from the villages of Teghout and Shnogh respectively, in the Lori Region. 6. In 2001 a private company, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC, was granted a mining licence for the exploitation of the Teghout copper‑molybdenum deposit for a period of twenty-five years. 7. On 1 November 2007 the Government adopted Decree no. 1279-N approving the designation of territories situated within the administrative boundaries of the rural communities of Shnogh and Teghout in the Lori Region as expropriation zones, to be taken for State needs, thus changing the category of land use. According to the Decree, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC or Teghout CJSC, founded by the former for the purpose of the implementation of the Teghout copper-molybdenum deposit exploitation project, were to acquire the units of land listed in its annexes. 8. The plots of land belonging to the applicant were listed among the units of land falling within these expropriation zones. 9. The applicant lives in Shnogh village and earns his living from agriculture and bakery production. He owned eight plots of agricultural land in the village measuring 0.420 ha, 0.890 ha, 0.904 ha, 1.206 ha, 0.780 ha, 0.900, 0.974 and 0.354 ha. The land was used for growing crops for the family, gardening, beekeeping and feeding their livestock. 10. On an unspecified date Teghout CJSC addressed a letter to the applicant containing an offer to buy his eight plots of land for 194,000 Armenian drams (AMD, approximately 422 euros (EUR)), AMD 422,000 (approximately EUR 917), AMD 417,000 (approximately EUR 907), AMD 555,000 (approximately EUR 1,207), AMD 328,000 (approximately EUR 713), AMD 426,000 (approximately EUR 990), AMD 409,000 (approximately EUR 890), and AMD 240,000 (approximately EUR 522) respectively, plus an additional 15% on each amount offered as required by law, making the final offer AMD 3,439,650 (approximately EUR 7,478) in total. 11. The applicant did not reply to the offer, not being satisfied with the amount of compensation. It appears that he tried to obtain an alternative valuation of his property by other companies but did not succeed. He claims that no other valuation company was willing to make an independent assessment of the market value of his land. 12. On 13 May 2008 Teghout CJSC lodged a claim against the applicant, seeking to oblige him to sign the agreement on the taking of his property for State needs. The company based its claim, inter alia, on valuation reports prepared at its request by Oliver Group LLC, a licensed valuation company. According to the reports, the market value of the applicant's plots of land was estimated at 3,439,650 (approximately EUR 7,478) in total. 13. In proceedings before the Lori Regional Court, the applicant argued that the market value of his land had apparently been underestimated. He further submitted that the valuation of his property had not been carried out correctly, since no account had been taken of the amounts he had actually paid for the plots of land in question and of the significant investments he had made. He also claimed that the deprivation of his property was not in the public interest since it was aimed at securing high profits for several individuals. 14. In the course of the proceedings, Teghout CJSC submitted other valuation reports in respect of the applicant's property, stating that after the institution of the proceedings Oliver Group LLC had prepared corrected reports according to which the market value of the applicant's eight plots of land was estimated at respectively AMD 187,000 (approximately EUR 407), AMD 456,000 (approximately EUR 991), AMD 437,000 (approximately EUR 950), AMD 535,000 (approximately EUR 1,163), AMD 343,000 (approximately EUR 746), AMD 411,000 (approximately EUR 893), AMD 427,000 (approximately EUR 928), and AMD 268,000 (approximately EUR 583). The representative of Teghout CJSC asked the court to take into account the relatively higher amounts of the initial valuations in respect of those plots of land that were valued lower as a result of the new valuation. The final amounts of compensation would therefore be equal to the amounts mentioned in the corrected reports for those plots of land valued higher than previously, and would stay the same as in the initial offer for the rest, together with the additional 15% required by law. 15. On 7 November 2008 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC's claim, awarding the applicant AMD 223,100 (approximately EUR 485), AMD 524,400 (approximately EUR 1,140), AMD 502,550 (approximately EUR 1,093), AMD 638,250 (approximately EUR 1,388), AMD 394,450 (approximately EUR 858), AMD 489,900 (approximately EUR 1,065), AMD 491,050 (approximately EUR 1,068). and AMD 308,200 (approximately EUR 670) respectively in compensation for his eight plots of land. 16. The applicant lodged an appeal. Relying, inter alia, on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, he complained that the Regional Court had deprived him of his property. 17. On 18 March 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court's judgment, finding that the latter had properly determined the market value of the property on the basis of the corrected valuation reports prepared by Oliver Group CJSC. 18. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar arguments to those submitted in the previous appeal. 19. On 18 June 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant's cassation appeal inadmissible for lack of merit.",Ruled as violated by court,,,TRUE,2,It's unclear whether the statute applies to evaluations of property for exchanges for compensation., 491,"Protocol 1 Article 1 Protection of property Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.","5. The applicants, whose names, dates of birth and places of residence are shown in the Appendix, were all individual small shareholders of Demirbank, a private bank in Turkey. On different dates they purchased different amounts of Turkish and German share certificates in Demirbank through the German stock market. 6. By a decision dated 6 December 2000, the Banking Regulation and Supervision Board (Bankalar Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurulu – hereinafter ""the Board"") decided to transfer the management and control of Demirbank to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu – hereinafter ""the Fund""). In its decision the Board held that the assets of Demirbank were insufficient to cover its liabilities and that the continuation of its activities would threaten the security and stability of the financial system. Accordingly, Demirbank's management and control, and the privileges of its shareholders except for dividends, were transferred to the Fund. The Fund also confiscated all properties belonging to Demirbank. 7. On 6 December 2000 the Board of Directors of the Fund decided to take over the shares of Demirbank in exchange for paying Demirbank's loss corresponding to its paid-up capital, namely 275,000,000 Turkish liras (TRY). 8. On 31 January 2001 all equities of Demirbank were removed from its account at the Istanbul Stock Exchange and were transferred to the account of the Fund. 9. On 2 February 2001, the main shareholder of Demirbank, namely Cıngıllı Holding A.Ş., brought administrative proceedings against the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (Bankalar Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurumu – hereinafter ""the Agency"") before the Ankara Administrative Court, seeking a ruling setting aside the decision of 6 December 2000 to transfer Demirbank to the Fund. The Ankara Administrative Court found that it lacked jurisdiction, and transferred the case to the Supreme Administrative Court. On 5 November 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court set aside the Board's decision of 6 December 2000, holding that the takeover had been illegal. An appeal and a request for rectification lodged by the Agency were rejected on 14 April 2005 and 15 December 2005 respectively. 10. On 20 September 2001 the Fund entered into an agreement with HSBC Bank, and sold Demirbank to the latter. Accordingly, Demirbank's legal personality was extinguished and it was struck off the commercial register on 14 December 2001. 11. On 20 September 2001 Ms S. Cıngıllıoğlu, the main shareholder of Cıngıllı Holding A.Ş., brought administrative proceedings against the Fund before the Ankara Administrative Court, seeking the annulment of the agreement to sell Demirbank to HSBC. On 21 April 2004 the Ankara Administrative Court annulled the agreement on the ground that the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund had been found to be illegal by the Supreme Administrative Court. An appeal and a request for rectification lodged by the Fund were rejected and the decision became final on 24 February 2006. 12. On different dates the applicants applied to the Board and claimed compensation arguing that they had lost their shares in Demirbank, as a result of its transfer to the Fund. The Board did not respond to the applicants' claims within the statutory period. The applicants therefore applied to the administrative courts and requested the annulment of the Board's implied rejection of their compensation claims. However, the administrative courts dismissed the applicants' cases as out of time on the ground that they should have initiated proceedings at the latest within sixty days following 31 January 2001, the date on which Demirbank's equities had been transferred to the Fund's account at the Stock Exchange. The administrative courts' decisions were upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court and thus became final. 13. Following the annulment of the decision concerning the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund by the domestic courts in 2005, the applicants applied to the administrative courts. Relying on the restitutio in integrum principle, the applicants argued that the judgment of the court which annulled the Board's decision dated 6 December 2000 had to be enforced and their rights as shareholders of Demirbank should be reinstated. On different dates the applicants' requests were rejected by the administrative courts and the administrative courts' decisions were upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court. The Supreme Administrative Court held that the judgment regarding the annulment of the Board's decision of 6 December 2000 could be secured by the return of the supervisory and executive rights to Demirbank's shareholders, and did not require the restitution of the actual shares. It also maintained that even if that was the case, the judgment could not be executed, as Demirbank's shares had ceased to exist as a result of the loss of its legal personality following its sale to HSBC. 14. Following the annulment of the agreement to sell Demirbank to HSBC, the applicants in the applications followed by an asterisk (*) in the annexed list, brought a third set of proceedings against the Fund and claimed compensation for their lost shares in Demirbank. The Istanbul Administrative Court dismissed the applicants' compensation claims for being out of time on the ground that they should have brought their claims within sixty-day statutory time-limit after Demirbank's equities had been transferred to the Fund's account at the Stock Exchange on 31 January 2001. The decisions of the administrative courts were upheld, and the applicants' requests for rectification of the decision were rejected.",Ruled as violated by court,,"9. On 2 February 2001, the main shareholder of Demirbank, namely Cıngıllı Holding A.Ş., brought administrative proceedings against the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (Bankalar Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurumu – hereinafter ""the Agency"") before the Ankara Administrative Court, seeking a ruling setting aside the decision of 6 December 2000 to transfer Demirbank to the Fund. The Ankara Administrative Court found that it lacked jurisdiction, and transferred the case to the Supreme Administrative Court. On 5 November 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court set aside the Board's decision of 6 December 2000, holding that the takeover had been illegal. An appeal and a request for rectification lodged by the Agency were rejected on 14 April 2005 and 15 December 2005 respectively. 11. On 20 September 2001 Ms S. Cıngıllıoğlu, the main shareholder of Cıngıllı Holding A.Ş., brought administrative proceedings against the Fund before the Ankara Administrative Court, seeking the annulment of the agreement to sell Demirbank to HSBC. On 21 April 2004 the Ankara Administrative Court annulled the agreement on the ground that the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund had been found to be illegal by the Supreme Administrative Court. An appeal and a request for rectification lodged by the Fund were rejected and the decision became final on 24 February 2006. 14. Following the annulment of the agreement to sell Demirbank to HSBC, the applicants in the applications followed by an asterisk (*) in the annexed list, brought a third set of proceedings against the Fund and claimed compensation for their lost shares in Demirbank. The Istanbul Administrative Court dismissed the applicants' compensation claims for being out of time on the ground that they should have brought their claims within sixty-day statutory time-limit after Demirbank's equities had been transferred to the Fund's account at the Stock Exchange on 31 January 2001. The decisions of the administrative courts were upheld, and the applicants' requests for rectification of the decision were rejected.",TRUE,1,"It depends if money that is yet to be granted counts as possessions according to the statute, but that seems to be the common understanding.", 492,"Protocol 1 Article 2 Right to education No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.","5. The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Milcovățu. In 2008 he was convicted of burglary and served a sentence of imprisonment until 30 August 2011, when he was conditionally released. 6. Between 2007 and 2009 the applicant completed the last two years of his primary education (grades III and IV) in Rahova Prison, within the framework of the ""Second Chance"" educational programme for prisoners. 7. Following a transfer to Jilava Prison, between May and August 2010 the applicant lodged three requests with the prison administration, asking to be enrolled in secondary education (the educational stage corresponding to grades V-VIII) as a fifth grade student. 8. On 29 July 2010 the Jilava prison governor wrote to the Ilfov County Schools Inspectorate (""the schools inspectorate"") pointing out that, under legislation enacted earlier that year (see paragraph 16 below), prisoners were required to receive compulsory education. He included information on the number and educational levels of the prisoners concerned and asked the schools inspectorate to consider the possibilities available to them to complete their compulsory education. In a reply of 24 August 2010 the schools inspectorate notified the prison governor that a class had been set up at School No. 1 in Jilava (""the school"") for primary education and that, as regards secondary education, it was necessary to submit, to the same school, the documents necessary for the prisoners' enrolment, as required by ministerial Order no. 4370/2000 on part-time secondary education (see paragraph 18 below). 9. In the meantime, the prison administration informed the applicant that his request to be enrolled had been considered and that he was required to provide his academic record from his previous school. On 2 September 2010 the applicant gave his written consent for the prison administration to request his academic record. 10. On 21 September 2010 Jilava Prison and the school signed a collaboration protocol concerning the education of prisoners at primary and secondary level in the academic year 2010/2011. Following this, on 28 October 2010 the prison governor wrote to the school asking to be informed of the starting date of the secondary education courses. The letter also stated that the schools inspectorate had given its approval for the courses to be organised on the prison premises, that the conditions for organising them had been met, and that additional documents concerning the prisoners' previous education were to be sent to the school once they became available. 11. On the same day the applicant lodged a complaint with the judge delegated to supervise the observance of prisoners' rights (""the post‑sentencing judge""), alleging that the prison administration had violated his right to education. At a hearing of 29 October 2010 he stated that the prison administration had approved his request to be allowed to study, but had informed him that no teacher wished to teach in the prison. 12. While the proceedings before the post-sentencing judge were ongoing, in a letter of 4 November 2010 the school informed the prison administration that the prisoners' enrolment applications did not contain the necessary documents, as required by ministerial Order no. 4370/2000 (see paragraph 18 below). The letter also pointed out, without reference to any individual situation, that academic records had been submitted in respect of only five of the sixteen prisoners who had requested to be enrolled. It then listed the number of prisoners who could potentially be enrolled in grades VI to VIII and concluded that it was not possible to arrange for teachers to teach each subject to a class containing only one student, as was the case in respect of grade VII. The letter also stated that the schools inspectorate had been notified accordingly. 13. In a decision of 16 November 2010 the post-sentencing judge dismissed the applicant's complaint as ill-founded. The decision stated that the Education Act and the Execution of Sentences Act (see paragraphs 15‑16 below) imposed a positive obligation on prison administrations, together with the educational authorities, to ensure prisoners' access to compulsory education. The prison administration had taken all the necessary steps to ensure that the applicant and other prisoners had access to secondary education in prison, in accordance with the law. In particular, it had duly approached the competent institutions, and on 29 October 2010 it had sent the school the applicant's and other prisoners' study documents and academic records. Therefore, the applicant's inability to pursue his studies was not imputable to the prison administration, but to the insufficient number of students, which constituted an impediment to the establishment of a class for secondary education. 14. The applicant appealed against that decision. He argued that prison administrations were under a clear legal obligation to ensure prisoners' access to secondary education, irrespective of their number. On 12 January 2011 the Bucharest County Court gave a final judgment which upheld the ruling made by the post-sentencing judge. It concluded that the applicant's inability to continue his studies had been due to a situation outside of everyone's control, namely an insufficient number of students to set up a class in accordance with the law.",Ruled as violated by court,,"8. On 29 July 2010 the Jilava prison governor wrote to the Ilfov County Schools Inspectorate (""the schools inspectorate"") pointing out that, under legislation enacted earlier that year (see paragraph 16 below), prisoners were required to receive compulsory education. He included information on the number and educational levels of the prisoners concerned and asked the schools inspectorate to consider the possibilities available to them to complete their compulsory education. In a reply of 24 August 2010 the schools inspectorate notified the prison governor that a class had been set up at School No. 1 in Jilava (""the school"") for primary education and that, as regards secondary education, it was necessary to submit, to the same school, the documents necessary for the prisoners' enrolment, as required by ministerial Order no. 4370/2000 on part-time secondary education (see paragraph 18 below). 10. On 21 September 2010 Jilava Prison and the school signed a collaboration protocol concerning the education of prisoners at primary and secondary level in the academic year 2010/2011. Following this, on 28 October 2010 the prison governor wrote to the school asking to be informed of the starting date of the secondary education courses. The letter also stated that the schools inspectorate had given its approval for the courses to be organised on the prison premises, that the conditions for organising them had been met, and that additional documents concerning the prisoners' previous education were to be sent to the school once they became available. 12. While the proceedings before the post-sentencing judge were ongoing, in a letter of 4 November 2010 the school informed the prison administration that the prisoners' enrolment applications did not contain the necessary documents, as required by ministerial Order no. 4370/2000 (see paragraph 18 below). The letter also pointed out, without reference to any individual situation, that academic records had been submitted in respect of only five of the sixteen prisoners who had requested to be enrolled. It then listed the number of prisoners who could potentially be enrolled in grades VI to VIII and concluded that it was not possible to arrange for teachers to teach each subject to a class containing only one student, as was the case in respect of grade VII. The letter also stated that the schools inspectorate had been notified accordingly. 13. In a decision of 16 November 2010 the post-sentencing judge dismissed the applicant's complaint as ill-founded. The decision stated that the Education Act and the Execution of Sentences Act (see paragraphs 15‑16 below) imposed a positive obligation on prison administrations, together with the educational authorities, to ensure prisoners' access to compulsory education. The prison administration had taken all the necessary steps to ensure that the applicant and other prisoners had access to secondary education in prison, in accordance with the law. In particular, it had duly approached the competent institutions, and on 29 October 2010 it had sent the school the applicant's and other prisoners' study documents and academic records. Therefore, the applicant's inability to pursue his studies was not imputable to the prison administration, but to the insufficient number of students, which constituted an impediment to the establishment of a class for secondary education. 14. The applicant appealed against that decision. He argued that prison administrations were under a clear legal obligation to ensure prisoners' access to secondary education, irrespective of their number. On 12 January 2011 the Bucharest County Court gave a final judgment which upheld the ruling made by the post-sentencing judge. It concluded that the applicant's inability to continue his studies had been due to a situation outside of everyone's control, namely an insufficient number of students to set up a class in accordance with the law.",FALSE,0,"Regardless of cause, the applicant was denied his right to education.", 493,"Protocol 1 Article 2 Right to education No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.","5. The applicants were born in 1993, 1992, 1992, 1994, 1993, 1993, 1995, 1993, 1996, 1994 and 1951 respectively and live in Tighina (Bender). 6. The applicants are ten pupils of the Romanian (Moldovan) language boarding school in Tighina (Bender) for orphans and other children taken into public care, and their head teacher and also legal guardian, at the time of lodging the application. Not all the applicants are orphans and some of them had sporadic contacts with their parents. The children studied and lived at the school. During the summer holidays, they either went to summer camps or stayed with the families of the school staff. In 2004 the children spent their summer holidays together with the families of school staff. The applicants' school was registered with the Moldovan Ministry of Education and was therefore using the Latin script and a curriculum approved by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Moldova. 7. According to Article 12 of the Constitution of the ""Moldovan Republic of Trandniestria"" (""MRT""), the official languages within the ""MRT"" are ""Moldavian"", Russian and Ukrainian. Article 6 of the ""MRT"" Law on languages, which was adopted on 8 September 1992, states that, for all purposes, ""Moldavian"" must be written with the Cyrillic alphabet. The ""law"" provides further that use of the Latin alphabet may amount to an offence. In particular Article 200-3 (currently Article 5.28) of the ""MRT"" Code of Administrative Offences states that: ""Failure by persons holding public office and other persons in the executive and State administration, in public associations, as well as in other organisations, regardless of their legal status and form of ownership, and in other entities, situated on the territory of the MRT, to observe MRT's legislation on the functioning of languages on the territory of MRT ... entails liability in the form of a fine which may amount to 50 (fifty) minimal salaries."" 8. On 18 August 1994 the ""MRT"" authorities forbade the use of the Latin script in schools. By a decision of 21 May 1999, the ""MRT"" ordered that all schools belonging to ""foreign States"" and functioning on ""its"" territory had to register with the ""MRT"" authorities, failing which they would not be recognised and would be deprived of their rights. The registration meant that the schools had to follow the ""MRT"" school curriculum, use the Cyrillic alphabet and learn history in the interpretation of the MRT authorities. 9. More details about the general background of the facts of the case are described in the Court's judgment in Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia ([GC], nos. 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06, §§ 13‑42, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). 10. On 4 June 2004 the school administration was informed that the Bender city administration rescinded the utilities contracts because the school had failed to register with ""MRT"" authorities. However, the school was given a new time-limit, until 27 June 2004, to provide ""MRT"" authorities with documents in order to obtain such registration. 11. The school administration did not comply with the request and on 27 June 2004 the water supply to the school was disconnected. 12. On 30 June 2004 the Bender city administration requested the school to provide, by 1 July 2004, documents certifying its legal status, its entitlement to use the building and utilities as well as its bank account. 13. On 5 July 2004 the school was disconnected from the electricity supply. 14. On 15 July 2004 the Bender city administration issued a decision formally closing the school, because it operated without registration and license. 15. In the evening of 26 July 2004, unidentified persons and around thirty ""MRT"" militia officers, acting on behalf of the Bender city administration, sealed the school buildings and restricted access to the school area. Russian peacekeeping forces were present but did not intervene. The following day, the children and teachers forcefully re-entered the school dormitory. They were still occupying it when the application was submitted. 16. On 27 July 2004 the school administration sent a fax to the President of the Russian Federation complaining about the acts of the ""MRT"" authorities which affected 300 children, and about the inaction of Russian peacekeepers on 26 July 2004. 17. On 4 August 2004 the school was given a new time-limit, until 15 August 2004, to register with the ""MRT"" authorities, otherwise the children risked being transferred by force to a Transdniestrian boarding school for children with disabilities. On 11 August 2004 the ""MRT"" authorities suggested to the school administration that children would have been safer if they were transferred to kindergarten no. 10 in Bender where appropriate living conditions would be available. 18. The school was disconnected from all utilities and its administration was denied access to the school kitchen or storehouses. From 27 July to 10 August 2004 the Moldovan authorities provided the children with food and water, which was brought to the entrance of the city of Bender, the OSCE mission securing its transportation from there to the school. From 11 August 2004 OSCE employees were not allowed to deliver food and water more than once per day. 19. On 21 August 2004 the school administration asked the Russian Embassy in Chișinău to intervene in order to remedy the situation of the children deprived of water, electricity and food.",Ruled as violated by court,,"17. On 4 August 2004 the school was given a new time-limit, until 15 August 2004, to register with the ""MRT"" authorities, otherwise the children risked being transferred by force to a Transdniestrian boarding school for children with disabilities. On 11 August 2004 the ""MRT"" authorities suggested to the school administration that children would have been safer if they were transferred to kindergarten no. 10 in Bender where appropriate living conditions would be available.",FALSE,0,"MRT infringed upon the right to ensure education with conformity to one's own beliefs, not the state's.", 494,"Protocol 1 Article 3 Right to free elections The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.","4. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Tbilisi. 5. On 29 March 2006 the applicant was convicted of conspiracy to commit extortion and sentenced to four years' imprisonment. The sentence was upheld on appeal on 30 June 2006. Pursuant to Article 5 § 2 of the Electoral Code and Article 28 § 2 of the Constitution, the applicant was debarred, as a convicted prisoner, from participating in any elections. 6. On 25 July 2007 the applicant challenged the constitutionality of the ban under Article 5 § 2 of the Electoral Code in relation to Article 28 of the Constitution. He referred to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on prisoners' voting rights and submitted, among other things, that he would be unable to participate in the parliamentary elections in 2008. 7. On 31 March 2008 the Constitutional Court declared the application inadmissible in view of an identical restriction contained in the Constitution. It noted the following: ""It would be absolutely futile for the Constitutional Court to abolish the impugned provision [Article 5 § 2 of the Electoral Code] as this will not relieve the complainant of the restriction placed upon him by Article 28 § 2 of the Constitution. To achieve [this latter result] it would be necessary to introduce amendments with respect to the relevant provision of the Constitution, which is beyond the Constitutional Court's competence. ... ... the Parliament of Georgia has directly copied the prohibition contained in Article 28 § 2 of the Constitution into Article 5 § 2 of the Electoral Code. The impugned provision is [thus] analogous to the rule contained in Article 28 § 2 of the Constitution and its constitutionality ‒ which implies the assessment of a constitutional norm's constitutionality ‒ is not within the Constitutional Court's jurisdiction."" 8. As a result, the applicant was unable to vote in the parliamentary elections held on 21 May 2008.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. On 31 March 2008 the Constitutional Court declared the application inadmissible in view of an identical restriction contained in the Constitution. It noted the following: ""It would be absolutely futile for the Constitutional Court to abolish the impugned provision [Article 5 § 2 of the Electoral Code] as this will not relieve the complainant of the restriction placed upon him by Article 28 § 2 of the Constitution. To achieve [this latter result] it would be necessary to introduce amendments with respect to the relevant provision of the Constitution, which is beyond the Constitutional Court's competence. ... ... the Parliament of Georgia has directly copied the prohibition contained in Article 28 § 2 of the Constitution into Article 5 § 2 of the Electoral Code. The impugned provision is [thus] analogous to the rule contained in Article 28 § 2 of the Constitution and its constitutionality ‒ which implies the assessment of a constitutional norm's constitutionality ‒ is not within the Constitutional Court's jurisdiction.""",TRUE,2,"It depends on whether prisoners are to be counted as ""the people.""", 495,"Protocol 4 Article 2 Freedom of movement 1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence. 2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own. 3. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are in accordance with law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the maintenance of ordre public, for the prevention of crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 4. The rights set forth in paragraph 1 may also be subject, in particular areas, to restrictions imposed in accordance with law and justified by the public interest in a democratic society.","5. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Moscow. 6. On 2 June 2015 the applicant asked the Federal Migration Service to issue him a travel passport. His application was refused by reference to the fact that he had been convicted on two occasions and given suspended sentences which had not yet expired (see, for details, as regards the first conviction, Navalnyy and Ofitserov v. Russia, nos. 46632/13 and 28671/14, 23 February 2016, and, as regards the second conviction, Navalnyye v. Russia, no. 101/15, 17 October 2017). 7. The applicant asked the court of general jurisdiction to overturn the refusal, relying in particular on the Court's finding of a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 in a similar case of Nalbantski v. Bulgaria (no. 30943/04, 10 February 2011). 8. On 30 September 2015 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court in Moscow upheld the refusal as lawful, finding as follows: ""The complainant's reference to the European Court's judgment of 10 February 2011 in the case of Nalbantski v. Bulgaria is unsubstantiated because, in view of Mr Navalnyy's personality, there are clear indications of a real public interest that outweigh the [complainant's] right to freedom of movement."" 9. On 4 December 2015 the Moscow City Court upheld the District Court's judgment in a summary fashion. On 14 January 2016 the City Court corrected a clerical error in the date of the judgment. 10. On 27 April 2017 the applicant was assaulted when leaving his office. The attacker threw green dye in his face and he suffered a chemical burn to his right eye. 11. Faced with the risk of losing sight, on 3 May 2017 the applicant asked for authorisation to go to Spain for eye surgery. On the following day he was issued with a travel passport on humanitarian grounds.",Ruled as violated by court,,"8. On 30 September 2015 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court in Moscow upheld the refusal as lawful, finding as follows: ""The complainant's reference to the European Court's judgment of 10 February 2011 in the case of Nalbantski v. Bulgaria is unsubstantiated because, in view of Mr Navalnyy's personality, there are clear indications of a real public interest that outweigh the [complainant's] right to freedom of movement.""",TRUE,2,The applicant has a right to travel. The state also has a meaningful democratic interest for public safety here. The weighing of these interests determines what the line should be., 496,"Protocol 4 Article 2 Freedom of movement 1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence. 2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own. 3. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are in accordance with law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the maintenance of ordre public, for the prevention of crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 4. The rights set forth in paragraph 1 may also be subject, in particular areas, to restrictions imposed in accordance with law and justified by the public interest in a democratic society.","5. The applicants' dates of birth and places of residence are listed in the Appendix. 6. On different dates between 2012 and 2016 (see Appendix) the applicants learned that their right to leave the country had been restricted and that they were no longer allowed to leave Azerbaijan. 7. It appears from the documents in the case files that in all the cases the restriction in question was imposed by the investigating authorities, in the absence of any judicial decision, within the framework of various criminal proceedings in which the applicants were not convicted, accused or suspected persons, but were only questioned as witnesses. 8. The travel bans imposed in respect of the applicants in applications nos. 62775/16 and 43327/16 were lifted by the investigating authorities on 29 January and 21 April 2016 respectively. 9. On various dates the applicants brought an action claiming that the restriction imposed on them was unlawful, either by lodging a complaint with the administrative courts or applying to the ordinary courts for a review of the lawfulness of procedural actions or decisions by the prosecuting authorities under the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter ""judicial review""). Some of the applicants used both of the above-mentioned remedies. 10. The applicants claimed, in particular, that the domestic law did not provide for the imposition of travel bans on witnesses in criminal proceedings and that the restriction on their right to leave the country was not justified. 11. In the domestic proceedings relating to all the applications, except application no. 66650/13, the domestic courts refused to examine the applicants' complaint on the merits. Final decisions were adopted on various dates, by the Supreme Court in the administrative proceedings and the Baku Court of Appeal in the proceedings for judicial review (see Appendix). In their decisions, both the administrative and ordinary courts declared that they did not have competence to examine a complaint relating to the lawfulness of travel bans imposed by the investigating authorities. 12. As regards the applicant in application no. 66650/13, by a decision dated 1 April 2013, a judge at the Sabail District Court dismissed his complaint after examining it on the merits. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: ""Having assessed all the examined evidence, I conclude that the actions of the Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Azerbaijan restricting the right of Mursaliyev Azad Oktay oglu to leave the country are lawful, that the procedure for judicial review as defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Azerbaijan does not provide for a [decision] on the payment of pecuniary or non-pecuniary damages, [and] that, for these reasons, the complaint should not be allowed."" 13. On 5 April 2013 the applicant in application no. 66650/13 appealed against that decision, reiterating that there was no legal basis for restricting his right to leave the country under domestic law. 14. On 12 April 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the first-instance court's decision justified. The appellate court repeated the reasoning provided by the first-instance court and made no mention of the complaint concerning the legal basis for the imposition of the travel ban.",Ruled as violated by court,,"11. In the domestic proceedings relating to all the applications, except application no. 66650/13, the domestic courts refused to examine the applicants' complaint on the merits. Final decisions were adopted on various dates, by the Supreme Court in the administrative proceedings and the Baku Court of Appeal in the proceedings for judicial review (see Appendix). In their decisions, both the administrative and ordinary courts declared that they did not have competence to examine a complaint relating to the lawfulness of travel bans imposed by the investigating authorities. 12. As regards the applicant in application no. 66650/13, by a decision dated 1 April 2013, a judge at the Sabail District Court dismissed his complaint after examining it on the merits. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: ""Having assessed all the examined evidence, I conclude that the actions of the Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Azerbaijan restricting the right of Mursaliyev Azad Oktay oglu to leave the country are lawful, that the procedure for judicial review as defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Azerbaijan does not provide for a [decision] on the payment of pecuniary or non-pecuniary damages, [and] that, for these reasons, the complaint should not be allowed."" 14. On 12 April 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the first-instance court's decision justified. The appellate court repeated the reasoning provided by the first-instance court and made no mention of the complaint concerning the legal basis for the imposition of the travel ban.",FALSE,0,"The applicants' rights to travel were clearly violated, with no justification provided by the state.", 497,"Protocol 7 Article 1 Procedural safeguards relating to expulsion of aliens 1. An alien lawfully resident in the territory of a State shall not be expelled therefrom except in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall be allowed: (a) to submit reasons against his expulsion, (b) to have his case reviewed, and (c) to be represented for these purposes before the competent authority or a person or persons designated by that authority. 2. An alien may be expelled before the exercise of his rights under paragraph 1.(a), (b) and (c) of this Article, when such expulsion is necessary in the interests of public order or is grounded on reasons of national security.","6. The applicant was born in 1991 and lives in Skopje. 7. In 1999 the applicant (eight years old at the time) and her family (parents and three siblings) fled Kosovo[1] and settled in the respondent State, where she has been living ever since. In 2005 she was granted asylum and a residence permit. She entered into a common-law partnership with a Macedonian national, with whom she has three minor children (the children also have Macedonian nationality). Her residence permit was extended each year until 3 February 2014, when the Ministry of the Interior terminated her asylum, holding that she was ""a risk to [national] security."" The decision was preceded by an interview at which the applicant, who had been legally represented, had confirmed her family situation and her intention to marry her partner. That the applicant represented a security risk was not discussed at the interview. The decision further stated: ""[the applicant] is obliged to leave the respondent State within twenty days of receipt of the final decision."" 8. The applicant, through her lawyer, challenged the decision as arbitrary. She argued that there was no evidence that her presence in the respondent State represented a threat to national security. Furthermore, she had not been given an opportunity to challenge any such evidence. 9. On 3 July 2014 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's appeal and upheld the decision of the Ministry, noting that the latter had obtained a classified written note (службена белешка со назнака за доверлив документ) from the Security and Counter Intelligence Agency (""the Intelligence Agency"") indicating that she represented a threat to national security. The court did not provide any further details regarding that document. It ruled accordingly that the impugned proceedings had been lawful. 10. The applicant's representative appealed against that decision before the Higher Administrative Court, reiterating the arguments raised previously. She further alleged that the wording used by the Administrative Court implied that there were some documents on which the impugned decision had been based. However, she had not been given an opportunity to have knowledge of or to comment on that evidence. 11. By a decision of 1 July 2015, served on the applicant on 6 October 2015, the Higher Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's appeal and upheld the Ministry's decision. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: ""... [The Ministry] decided on the basis of ... classified information obtained from a relevant body (which) proves indisputably that her presence in (the respondent State) represents a threat to its security. The Higher Administrative Court has examined the (applicant's) allegations ... that information provided by the relevant body within the Ministry of the Interior was not forwarded to her and her representative, but it considers them irrelevant ..."" 12. In the proceedings before the Court, the Government submitted a redacted version of the classified note that the Intelligence Agency had sent on 19 September 2013 to the Ministry of the Interior. The relevant parts of the note read as follows: ""... following security checks of [the applicant], it has been established that recognition of her asylum status would be a threat to the (national) security of the [respondent State]. It has been established that her (hidden text) ... are perpetrators of tens of crimes (serious thefts, thefts and acts of concealment). The applicant was aware of and supported all crimes committed by her (hidden text) ... She has also been living in a common-law partnership with M.M. in order to obtain the monetary allowance to which she was entitled having been granted asylum. In such circumstances, we are of the opinion that she should not be granted asylum in [the respondent State]."" 13. On 11 November 2015 the Ministry granted a request by the applicant to leave the respondent State in order to obtain, as she had stated, documents from the Serbian authorities for marrying her common-law partner in the respondent State. She was allowed re-entry to the respondent State in January 2016, which was one month after the expiry of the time‑limit for returning to the respondent State. In February 2016 she contacted the Ministry with a view to submitting the relevant documents.",Ruled as violated by court,,"7. In 1999 the applicant (eight years old at the time) and her family (parents and three siblings) fled Kosovo[1] and settled in the respondent State, where she has been living ever since. In 2005 she was granted asylum and a residence permit. She entered into a common-law partnership with a Macedonian national, with whom she has three minor children (the children also have Macedonian nationality). Her residence permit was extended each year until 3 February 2014, when the Ministry of the Interior terminated her asylum, holding that she was ""a risk to [national] security."" The decision was preceded by an interview at which the applicant, who had been legally represented, had confirmed her family situation and her intention to marry her partner. That the applicant represented a security risk was not discussed at the interview. The decision further stated: ""[the applicant] is obliged to leave the respondent State within twenty days of receipt of the final decision."" 12. In the proceedings before the Court, the Government submitted a redacted version of the classified note that the Intelligence Agency had sent on 19 September 2013 to the Ministry of the Interior. The relevant parts of the note read as follows: ""... following security checks of [the applicant], it has been established that recognition of her asylum status would be a threat to the (national) security of the [respondent State]. It has been established that her (hidden text) ... are perpetrators of tens of crimes (serious thefts, thefts and acts of concealment). The applicant was aware of and supported all crimes committed by her (hidden text) ... She has also been living in a common-law partnership with M.M. in order to obtain the monetary allowance to which she was entitled having been granted asylum. In such circumstances, we are of the opinion that she should not be granted asylum in [the respondent State]."" 13. On 11 November 2015 the Ministry granted a request by the applicant to leave the respondent State in order to obtain, as she had stated, documents from the Serbian authorities for marrying her common-law partner in the respondent State. She was allowed re-entry to the respondent State in January 2016, which was one month after the expiry of the time‑limit for returning to the respondent State. In February 2016 she contacted the Ministry with a view to submitting the relevant documents.",FALSE,0,The state expelled the applicant on grounds of public safety. The applicant was able to make her case., 498,"Protocol 7 Article 2 Right of appeal in criminal matters 1. Everyone convicted of a criminal offence by a tribunal shall have the right to have his conviction or sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal. The exercise of this right, including the grounds on which it may be exercised, shall be governed by law. 2. This right may be subject to exceptions in regard to offences of a minor character, as prescribed by law, or in cases in which the person concerned was tried in the first instance by the highest tribunal or was convicted following an appeal against acquittal.","5. The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Palanga. 6. On 22 November 2013 the director of company M. lodged a complaint with the Klaipėda police, alleging that the applicant's wife, who had been providing accounting services to company M., had unlawfully transferred large amounts of money from that company's bank account to other companies. The director claimed that company M. had not obtained any services from those companies and that he had not pre-approved those transfers. 7. On 25 November 2013 the Klaipėda police opened a pre-trial investigation into allegations of embezzlement and falsification of documents, under Article 184 § 1 and Article 300 § 1 of the Criminal Code. The director of company M. was questioned as a witness and stated that in May 2012 he had entered into a contract for accounting services with company A., of which the applicant was the director. In accordance with that contract, the applicant's wife had begun providing accounting services to company M. In the beginning he had been happy with her work, but later he had noticed certain bank transfers which appeared suspicious to him. One such suspicious transfer had been a payment of 120,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL) (approximately 34,750 euros (EUR)) to company A. 8. On 4 December 2013 the applicant's wife was granted the status of a ""special witness"" in the investigation; in line with the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter ""the CCP""), she was questioned about her own possibly criminal activity and was exempted from liability for refusing to testify or giving false testimony (see paragraph 27 below). She stated that all the transfers from company M.'s bank account which she had carried out had been pre-approved by its director. She also stated that the transfer to company A. had been made by mistake, and the entire amount had been returned to company M. within a week. 9. On 9 April 2014 the applicant was called as a witness. He refused to give testimony in relation to his wife's actions and the payment of LTL 120,000 received by company A. from company M. 10. On 26 May 2014 a prosecutor from the Klaipėda regional prosecutor's office gave the applicant a fine of LTL 650 (approximately EUR 188) for refusing to testify, as provided for in Article 163 of the CCP (see paragraphs 31 and 32 below). 11. The applicant lodged a complaint with a senior prosecutor. He argued that the status of a ""special witness"" was similar to that of a suspect, and therefore he should not have been compelled to testify against his wife, who had such status. He relied on Article 31 of the Constitution, which prohibits compelling a person to testify against his or her family members (see paragraph 18 below). 12. On 9 June 2014 a senior prosecutor from the Klaipėda regional prosecutor's office dismissed the applicant's complaint on the grounds that, in accordance with the CCP, only the family members of a suspect or an accused were exempt from liability for refusing to testify, but the CCP did not extend such a privilege to the family members of a ""special witness"" (see paragraph 19 below). 13. The applicant lodged a complaint with the Klaipėda District Court, raising essentially the same arguments as those which he had raised before (see paragraph 11 above). He also asked the court to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court for a ruling on whether the CCP provisions which exempted the family members of a suspect or an accused from liability for refusing to testify, but not the family members of a ""special witness"", complied with the Constitution. 14. On 9 July 2014 the Klaipėda District Court dismissed the applicant's complaint and upheld the reasoning in the prosecutor's decision (see paragraph 12 above). It stated that the applicant's right not to testify against his wife would have been breached only if his wife had had the status of a suspect and not that of a witness. It also considered that the applicant's request to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court was ""subjective and legally unfounded"". That decision was final and not open to any further appeal. 15. Subsequently, the applicant lodged an appeal with the Klaipėda Regional Court, but on 22 July 2014 that court refused to examine it, on the grounds that there was no provision for such an appeal in law. The applicant then lodged an application to reopen the proceedings with the Supreme Court, but on 23 September 2014 the court ruled that it had no authority to reopen proceedings concerning procedural penalties imposed under Article 163 of the CCP. 16. On 11 September 2014 the applicant was questioned as a witness in the pre-trial investigation. He stated that he was the director of company A., which provided accounting services to other companies. His wife worked as the financial director of company A., and from May to November 2012 she had provided accounting services to company M. The applicant stated that he had not known how or why LTL 120,000 had been transferred to the bank account of company A. He knew only that that entire amount had been returned to company M. within a week, in a transfer carried out by his wife. 17. On 22 September 2014 the Klaipėda regional prosecutor's office discontinued the pre-trial investigation on the grounds that no criminal offences had been committed. It appears that that decision was not appealed against and became final.",NOT ruled as violated by court,,"10. On 26 May 2014 a prosecutor from the Klaipėda regional prosecutor's office gave the applicant a fine of LTL 650 (approximately EUR 188) for refusing to testify, as provided for in Article 163 of the CCP (see paragraphs 31 and 32 below). 11. The applicant lodged a complaint with a senior prosecutor. He argued that the status of a ""special witness"" was similar to that of a suspect, and therefore he should not have been compelled to testify against his wife, who had such status. He relied on Article 31 of the Constitution, which prohibits compelling a person to testify against his or her family members (see paragraph 18 below). 12. On 9 June 2014 a senior prosecutor from the Klaipėda regional prosecutor's office dismissed the applicant's complaint on the grounds that, in accordance with the CCP, only the family members of a suspect or an accused were exempt from liability for refusing to testify, but the CCP did not extend such a privilege to the family members of a ""special witness"" (see paragraph 19 below). 13. The applicant lodged a complaint with the Klaipėda District Court, raising essentially the same arguments as those which he had raised before (see paragraph 11 above). He also asked the court to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court for a ruling on whether the CCP provisions which exempted the family members of a suspect or an accused from liability for refusing to testify, but not the family members of a ""special witness"", complied with the Constitution. 14. On 9 July 2014 the Klaipėda District Court dismissed the applicant's complaint and upheld the reasoning in the prosecutor's decision (see paragraph 12 above). It stated that the applicant's right not to testify against his wife would have been breached only if his wife had had the status of a suspect and not that of a witness. It also considered that the applicant's request to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court was ""subjective and legally unfounded"". That decision was final and not open to any further appeal. 15. Subsequently, the applicant lodged an appeal with the Klaipėda Regional Court, but on 22 July 2014 that court refused to examine it, on the grounds that there was no provision for such an appeal in law. The applicant then lodged an application to reopen the proceedings with the Supreme Court, but on 23 September 2014 the court ruled that it had no authority to reopen proceedings concerning procedural penalties imposed under Article 163 of the CCP. 16. On 11 September 2014 the applicant was questioned as a witness in the pre-trial investigation. He stated that he was the director of company A., which provided accounting services to other companies. His wife worked as the financial director of company A., and from May to November 2012 she had provided accounting services to company M. The applicant stated that he had not known how or why LTL 120,000 had been transferred to the bank account of company A. He knew only that that entire amount had been returned to company M. within a week, in a transfer carried out by his wife.",TRUE,2,"The applicant was able to lodge appeals, but they were rejected. It depends on what exactly the statute means by appeal.", 499,"Protocol 7 Article 4 Right to education Right not to be tried or punished twice 1. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State. 2. The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent the reopening of the case in accordance with the law and penal procedure of the State concerned, if there is evidence of new or newly discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the case. 3. No derogation from this Article shall be made under Article15 of the Convention.","4. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Reykjavík. 5. On 21 October 2010 the Directorate of Tax Investigation (Skattrannsóknarstjóri ríkisins) initiated an audit of the applicant's tax return for the income year 2006. On 5 November 2010, the applicant was interviewed by the Directorate. 6. The investigation was concluded with a report issued on 13 January 2011. By a letter of 14 January 2011 the Directorate informed the applicant that the case would be referred to the Directorate of Internal Revenue (Ríkisskattstjóri) for reassessment of his taxes. It also informed the applicant about the Directorate of Tax Investigation's upcoming decision on possible criminal proceedings, listed possible ways of finalising the criminal procedure in the case and gave the applicant 30 days to comment. By letter of 18 February 2011, 5 days after the deadline, the applicant replied and requested the finalisation of the case with a decision by the Directorate, ordering him to pay a fine, or for the case to be sent to the State Internal Revenue Board (Yfirskattanefnd). 7. On the basis of the Directorate of Tax Investigation's report, the Directorate of Internal Revenue, ruling on 23 November 2011, found in particular that the applicant had failed to declare significant capital gains received in 2006. Therefore, it revised upward the amount declared as capital gains in his tax return for the income year 2006 and, consequently, re-assessed his taxes and imposed a 25% surcharge. The applicant paid the additional tax and tax surcharges. 8. The applicant did not appeal to the State Internal Revenue Board against the decision, which thus acquired legal force three months later, in February 2012, when the time-limit for an appeal had expired. 9. On 28 March 2012 the Directorate of Tax Investigation reported the matter to the Special Prosecutor. By a letter of the same day, the applicant was informed about it. On 14 September 2012 the applicant was interviewed by the police for the first time. 10. On 10 October 2012 the Special Prosecutor indicted the applicant for aggravated tax offences. In particular, the applicant was charged with having under declared his income in his tax return of 2007. This included failure to declare significant capital gains received in 2006. 11. By judgment of 16 May 2013, the District Court found that the applicant had acted with gross negligence, which was sufficient for criminal liability under the relevant provisions of the tax law, and therefore convicted the applicant of the charges against him. The court sentenced him to three months' imprisonment, suspended for two years, and the payment of 24,006,000 Icelandic krónur (ISK; approximately 152,000 euros (EUR) at the material time). Furthermore, the applicant was ordered to pay legal costs of ISK 878,500 plus value added tax for his defence counsel. 12. The applicant lodged an appeal against the District Court's judgment. 13. By a judgment of 22 May 2014, the Supreme Court rejected the applicant's request to dismiss the case on the basis of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention. The court upheld the applicant's conviction and confirmed his prison sentence. However, the Supreme Court sentenced the applicant to pay a fine of ISK 21,000,000 (approximately EUR 136,000 at the material time). In fixing the fine, the court had regard to the tax surcharge imposed. The applicant was ordered to pay legal costs of ISK 1,286,614, ISK 1,255,000 of that amount for his defence counsel.",Ruled as violated by court,,,FALSE,0,The applicant was punished twice.,