| "{\"id\": \"2599213\", \"name\": \"The State ex rel. Raymond Terence vs. H. L. Lazarus, Judge\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"State ex rel. Terence v. Lazarus\", \"decision_date\": \"1885-04\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 9431\", \"first_page\": \"314\", \"last_page\": \"316\", \"citations\": \"37 La. Ann. 314\", \"volume\": \"37\", \"reporter\": \"Louisiana Annual Reports\", \"court\": \"Louisiana Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Louisiana\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:26:16.670791+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"The State ex rel. Raymond Terence vs. H. L. Lazarus, Judge.\", \"head_matter\": \"No. 9431.\\nThe State ex rel. Raymond Terence vs. H. L. Lazarus, Judge.\\nCourts have inherent power to pnnisli for contempt and our Code of Practice has expressly conferred ifc, but a judge cannot assume or decide that a witness has sworn untruthfully and punish him for the perjury as a contempt.\\nRefusing to answer a question that a witness is bound to answer is contumacy and is punishable as a contempt. Answering such question untruthfully is perjury, the punishment of which is remitted to the regular action of the criminal law.\\n^PPLICATION for Certiorari.\\nJoseph 1\\u2018. Jlornor and Brands W. Baker for the Relator.\\nRespondent in propria persona.\", \"word_count\": \"1131\", \"char_count\": \"6534\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the Court was delivered by\\nManning, J.\\nRaymond Terence was a witness in a cause on trial before the respondent Judge, and was committed for contempt in this, \\\" that lie refused to testify truthfully to the questions propounded to him by counsel and by the court and this without leading him to accuse himself of a crime.\\\" He was sentenced to imprisonment for thirty days and to pay a line of twenty-live dollars Ho has obtained from us a writ of certiorari under which the proceedings are now before ns for review.\\nThat this writ may be used for the purpose for which it is now invoked was settled in the De Buys case, 32 Ann. 1256, which has since been adhered to and has now passed beyond dispute.\\nThe judge bases his action on art. 136 of the Code of Practice wherein it is provided, if a witness refuse to answer any question put to him except such as might lead him to accuse himself of a crime, the court may line and imprison him.\\nIt is not charged or pretended that this witness refused to answer any question of any kind. On the contrary it is expressly alleged that he did answer the questions put to him by the counsel and the court, but that ho did not answer them truthfully.\\nRefusing to answer a question that a witness is bound to answer is contumacy and is punishable as a contempt. Answering such question untruthfully is perjury, the punishment of which is remitted to the regular action of the criminal law through the established forms of criminal proceedings, i. e. by indictment or information followed by a trial. An act may be at once a contempt of court and a violation of the criminal law, for example an assault and battery committed in open court would be punishable as a contempt and also by prosecution.. The overt physical visible act distinguishes it from perjury.\\nThe law gives to every judge the power to punish for contempt-. It is necessary for the orderly police of the court, but to decide that the-testimony of a witness is false and to inflict summary punishment upon him without atrial is repugnant to the orderly administration of justice and subversive of our ideas of right.\\nWhere flagrant perjury has been committed, a nisi prius judge has not infrequently directed the attention of the prosecuting officer to the man and his offence and has even ordered his committal until the criminal machinery could be set' in motion for his trial. But the respondent' dispensed with any form of trial, determined the guilt of the offendeiwithout accuser or witness, and summarily punished him without an opportunity of defense.\\nIt is therefore ordered and decreed that the order complained of by tlie relator is annulled and vacated.\"}" |