| "{\"id\": \"2176244\", \"name\": \"Walrath vs. Thompson\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Walrath v. Thompson\", \"decision_date\": \"1844-05\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"540\", \"last_page\": \"543\", \"citations\": \"6 Hill & Den. 540\", \"volume\": \"6\", \"reporter\": \"Hill's Reports\", \"court\": \"New York Supreme Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"New York\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:14:45.113105+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Walrath vs. Thompson.\", \"head_matter\": \"Walrath vs. Thompson.\\nThe terms of a guaranty must be strictly complied with, or the guarantor will not be bound. Per Bronson, J.\\nJ., being desirous of purchasing goods of the plaintiff on credit, procured a letter of guaranty from the defendant to the plaintiff containing the following clause: \\u201c Mr. J. thought it would be an accommodation to him to have you wait [for payment] until the 1st of January, 1840; if that will answer your purpose, I will be surety for the amount to be paid at that time.\\u201d The plaintiff sold the goods to J. on the receipt of the letter, but took his note for the price payable on the 25th of December, 1839. J. was not called on to pay the note, however, and after the 1st of January, 1840, the plaintiff brought an action to enforce the guaranty. Held, that inasmuch as he had not agreed to wait for payment until the day proposed by the guaranty, the defendant was not liable.\\nIn general, an action to recover money received by the defendant in the character of trustee cannot be maintained until after a demand, or proof in some other way that there has been an abuse of the trust.\\nThis case was before the court in January, 1843, and is reported in 4 Hill, 200. On a second trial it appeared that the castings were delivered to Johnson on the 22d of May, 1839, and on that day Johnson gave the plaintiff his promissory note for the amount, payable seven months from date. The plaintiff said he took the note because he considered Johnson good. It was proved that the defendant afterwards had Johnson\\u2019s books in his hands, and remarked that the plaintiff\\u2019s demand must be paid from the accounts; but he said nothing about his being holden to the plaintiff. The defendant delivered the accounts to one Topliff, and told him to collect and pay over the money to the plaintiff. Topliff collected five or six dollars, and offered the money to the plaintiff, which he refused to receive. The defendant moved for a nonsuit, on the ground, among others, ' that there had not been a compliance with the terms of the guaranty, by which the plaintiff was to wait until the 1st of January, 1840; and he took Johnson\\u2019s note payable on the 22d of December preceding, or, with grace, on the 25th. The action was not commenced until after the 1st of January, 1840: and it did not appear that the plaintiff had ever called upon Johnson. The judge refused the motion for a nonsuit, saying, he supposed all the questions had been examined when the case was before this court on the former occasion. The defendant excepted, and a verdict having been found against him, he now^ moved for a new trial on a bill of exceptions.\\nJ. Watson & B. D. Noxon, for the defendant.\\nA. Taber, for the plaintiff.\", \"word_count\": \"1067\", \"char_count\": \"5857\", \"text\": \"By the Court, Bronson, J.\\nThe terms of a guaranty must be strictly complied with, or the guarantor will not be bound. If he proposes a credit, that particular .credit must be given to the principal. It is not enough that the creditor waits until the time has expired before he calls for payment. He must agree to wait, so that he cannot sue in the meantime. (Wright v. Johnson, 8 Wend. 512; Bacon v. Chesney, 1 Stark. Rep. 192; and see Dobbin v. Bradley, 17 Wend. 422.) If the note was out of the way, the fact that the plaintiff received the guaranty, delivered the property, and did not call for payment until the specified time had expired, would be a sufficient ground for presuming that he agreed to give the required credit. But the note takes away all ground for such an inference; and proves that the plaintiff did not give the specified credit to the principal. On the contrary, he made an agreement which obliged Johnson to pay at an earlier period. The fact that the credit was abridged only a few days, is not important. Cutting off a week is as fatal as though it had been a month. The defendant may have had special reasons for fixing on the first of January as the time for payment. But whether he had or not, it is fatal to the action that there has not been a compliance with the terms of the guaranty. The condition on which the defendant proposed to contract has not been accepted. (Dobbin v. Bradley, 17 Wend. 422; Birckhead v. Brown, 5 Hill, 634.) The objection cannot be got over.\\nBut it is said that the plaintiff could recover under the money counts the five dollars which the defendant had collected on Johnson's accounts, and consequently that the motion for a non-suit was properly overruled. There are two answers to this argument. The first is, that no such question appears to have been made on the trial. The defendant moved for a nonsuit on the ground that no action could be maintained upon the guaranty. That was the question which the judge decided, and the defendant excepted to his opinion. The plaintiff cannot take away the right of review by starting a question now, which was not made on the trial, about the. little sum of five dollars. The .effect would be to charge the defendant with the principal debt, for which he is not liable. The other answer is, that as to the five dollars th\\u00e9 defendant stands in the character of a trustee', and an action will not lie until after a demand of the money, or proof in some other way that there has been an abuse of the trust. (Sears v. Patrick, 23 Wend. 528; Cooley v. Betts, 24 id. 203.) The case here is still worse; for the money was offered to the plaintiff and he refused to receive it.\\nThis brings us back again to the defendant's objection, which is fatal to the action. The circuit judge was evidently of that opinion; but he refused the nonsuit on the supposition that the question had been disposed of by us when the case was up before. I think this point could not have been distinctly made on the first trial. But if it was, we must have overlooked it. It certainly was not decided.\\nNew trial granted. .\\nid) See Smith & Crittenden v. Dann, infra.\"}" |