| "{\"id\": \"1632286\", \"name\": \"CENTRAL COMMUNITY CHAUTAUQUA SYSTEM v. RENTSCHLER et\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Central Community Chautauqua System v. Rentschler\", \"decision_date\": \"1929-04-05\", \"docket_number\": \"No 196\", \"first_page\": \"291\", \"last_page\": \"292\", \"citations\": \"7 Ohio Law Abs. 291\", \"volume\": \"7\", \"reporter\": \"The Ohio Law Abstract\", \"court\": \"Ohio Court of Appeals\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Ohio\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:24:26.839044+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Judges Hughes, Justice & Crow.\", \"parties\": \"CENTRAL COMMUNITY CHAUTAUQUA SYSTEM v RENTSCHLER et\", \"head_matter\": \"CENTRAL COMMUNITY CHAUTAUQUA SYSTEM v RENTSCHLER et\\nOhio Appeals, 3rd Dist, Henry Co\\nNo 196.\\nDecided April 5, 1929\\nJames P Ragan, Napoleon, for Chautauqua.\\nFred Gribbell, Deshler, for Rentschaler et.\", \"word_count\": \"508\", \"char_count\": \"3109\", \"text\": \"JUSTICE, J.\\nSeveral errors are assigned. One of them alludes to the overruling of plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdicts.\\nSection 11601, of the General Code, provides that:\\n\\\"When, upon the statements in the pleadings, one party is entitled by law to judgment in his favor, judgment shall be so rendered by the court, although a verdict has been found against such party.\\\"\\nThis Section is mandatory, but it authorizes a judgment non obstante verdicto, only when the pleadings require it. Challen v. Cincinnati, 40 O. S. 113. McCoy et al., Trustee, v. Jones, et al., 61 O. S. 119. No such requirement appears in the instant case. To the contrary, however, the pleadings clearly disclose an issuable fact, which the trial court was required to submit to the jury under proper instructions. The motion, therefore, was properly overruled.\\nAnother claimed error pertains to the admission of testimony.\\nCounsel for plaintiff insists that the trial 'court, in admitting testimony, violated the so-called \\\"Parol Evidence Rule.\\\" With this contention we do not agree. Parol contemporaneous evidence, of course, is inadmis sible to contradict, vary, add to or substraet from, the terms of a valid written instrument. 1 Grenl. Ev. Section 275. But the testimony under consideration, as we see it, did not tend to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from, the contract of guaranty. It simply tended to show the inducing and moving cause of said written contract and, in addition thereto, tDnat said contract in law never existed.\\nCommentaries on Evidence, 2nd Edition:\\nClearly the testimony was relevant to the issues as made by the pleadings. It, therefore, was not only competent but obviously of much moment to the defendants. Its reception by the trial court was proper.\\nAnother claimed error refers to the charge.\\nDid the trial court, in so charging, place upon the plaintiff an unwarranted burden? We do not think so.\\nThe pleadings reveal that plaintiff predicated a recovery in this cause upon an alleged present and absolute contract, while the defendants bottomed their defense upon an alleged conditional signing of said contract.\\nIn Leisy & Company v. Zuellig, 7 O. C. C. Reports, 433, the Circuit Court of the Sixth District, held:\\n(Here follows quotation)\\nIn the instant case the trial court correctly put the burden upon the plaintiff of proving the material- allegations of its petition. The defense, being based upon a different agreement than that upon which plaintiff sued, was nothing more or less than a general denial. Simmons v. Green, 35 O. S. 104.\\nWe have carefully examined the charge and are of the opinion that, when construed as ,a whole, it is free from prejudicial error. Ohio & Indiana Torpedo Company v. Fishburn, et al., 61 O. S. 608.\\nEntertaining these views, it follows that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.\\nBefore Judges Hughes, Justice & Crow.\"}" |