Upload 100 files

guam/5311261.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5311261\", \"name\": \"THE GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, Appellee v. BOLESLAW S. ROLINSKI, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Government of Guam v. Rolinski\", \"decision_date\": \"1957-05-03\", \"docket_number\": \"Criminal No. 14-A\", \"first_page\": 384, \"last_page\": 386, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 384\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"District Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before MCLAUGHLIN and WIIG, United States District Judges, and SHRIVER, United States Judge, District Court of Guam\", \"parties\": \"THE GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, Appellee v. BOLESLAW S. ROLINSKI, Appellant\", \"head_matter\": \"THE GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, Appellee v. BOLESLAW S. ROLINSKI, Appellant\\nCriminal No. 14-A\\nDistrict Court of Guam Appellate Division\\nMay 3, 1957\\nCounsel for Appellee: W. Scott BARRETT, Deputy Island Attorney\\nCounsel for Appellant: E. R. Crain\\nBefore MCLAUGHLIN and WIIG, United States District Judges, and SHRIVER, United States Judge, District Court of Guam\", \"word_count\": \"437\", \"char_count\": \"2596\", \"text\": \"PER CURIAM\\nOPINION\\nThe appellant was convicted in the Island Court of Guam of the offense of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of \\u00a7 23405(a) of the Government Code of Guam. His appeal is based upon the contention that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment.\\nThe evidence showed that the appellant was driving an automobile in an erratic fashion on a public highway in Guam and that such conduct was observed by Guam policemen and armed services police who were in a police car. The police car followed the appellant's car which turned off on a side road. When the appellant's car stopped and he was asked for his driver's license, he got out of his car and was staggering so badly he could hardly stand. An officer smelled the odor of alcohol on the breath of the appellant. The appellant took a pencil from his pocket and slashed at the arresting officer. He used abusive language. He was handcuffed and taken to the police station, booked and placed in a cell. He continued to shout and pound on the cell door for a considerable time. In our view this conduct clearly showed that he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.\\nIn Marte v. Government of Guam, 115 F.Supp. 524, we reversed a conviction of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor upon the ground that the transcript did not show sufficient facts to warrant the conclusion of intoxication. We said in that case:\\nIn this case we find no evidence at all to support a finding that anyone smelled alcohol on the breath of the defendant; we find strong indications that no sobriety test was given, and positive indications that a medical examiner formed his opinion without making an examination of the defendant. The result is that no competent evidence is found in the record on which a finding of intoxication could reasonably have been based, and the conviction on this charge is accordingly reversed.\\nThe present case, as differentiated from the Marte case, presented ample, competent evidence supporting the conclusion of the trial court that the appellant was in fact operating a motor vehicle upon a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.\\nThe conviction is affirmed.\"}"

guam/5311295.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5311295\", \"name\": \"SHELTON MUSIC COMPANY, Plaintiff v. SUSAN TOKI CASTRO, Defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Shelton Music Co. v. Castro\", \"decision_date\": \"1976-10-27\", \"docket_number\": \"Civil No. 1663-75\", \"first_page\": 358, \"last_page\": 360, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 358\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"SHELTON MUSIC COMPANY, Plaintiff v. SUSAN TOKI CASTRO, Defendant\", \"head_matter\": \"SHELTON MUSIC COMPANY, Plaintiff v. SUSAN TOKI CASTRO, Defendant\\nCivil No. 1663-75\\nSuperior Court of Guam\\nOctober 27, 1976\", \"word_count\": \"298\", \"char_count\": \"1827\", \"text\": \"BENSON, Judge\\nFINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW\\nThe above-entitled cause was tried on June 21,1976. The Plaintiff appeared by its attorney, Mr. Stephen A. Cronin and the Defendant appeared by its attorney, Mr. Joaquin C. Arriola.\\nFINDINGS OF FACT\\n1. Plaintiff and Pil Son Whiteman entered into a Contract by which Plaintiff supplied certain amusement devices for use at Mrs. Whiteman's place of business. This Contract was admitted as Exhibit 1.\\n2. Pil Son Whiteman's interest in the business was transferred to Susan Toki Castro, who became obligated under Exhibit 1.\\n3. Susan Toki Castro breached the Contract's provision forbidding use of any devices not supplied by the Plaintiff.\\n4. No actual damages resulting from the breach were proved.\\n5. Actual damages, in case of breach, were ascertainable.\\nCONCLUSIONS OF LAW\\n1. The Plaintiff is entitled to judgment for nominal damages of $1.00 together with his costs of this action.\\n2. The Plaintiff is not entitled to liquidated damages.\\nLet judgment be entered accordingly.\\nJUDGMENT\\nThis cause came on regularly for trial on the 21st day of June, 1976, before the Honorable Richard H. Benson, Judge, presiding, sitting without a jury. The plaintiff appeared by its attorney, Mr. Stephen A. Cronin, and the defendant appeared by her attorney, Mr. Joaquin C. Arriola, and evidence both oral and documentary having been presented by both parties and the cause having been argued and submitted for decision and the court having made and caused to be filed its written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law\\nIT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff have judgment against defendant in the sum of $1.00 together with his costs of this action.\"}"

guam/5311392.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5311392\", \"name\": \"GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, Appellee v. STEPHEN HASEING ATKINS, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Government of Guam v. Atkins\", \"decision_date\": \"1955-04-11\", \"docket_number\": \"Criminal No. 5-A\", \"first_page\": 9, \"last_page\": 16, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 9\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"District Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before SHRIVER, Presiding. Judge, and MCLAUGHLIN and WIIG, Judges\", \"parties\": \"GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, Appellee v. STEPHEN HASEING ATKINS, Appellant\", \"head_matter\": \"GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, Appellee v. STEPHEN HASEING ATKINS, Appellant\\nCriminal No. 5-A\\nDistrict Court of Guam Appellate Division\\nApril 11, 1955\\nCounsel for Appellee: Howard D. Porter, Attorney General; Louis A. Otto, Jr., Deputy Attorney General; Leon D. Flores, Island Attorney; Richard Rosenberry, Deputy Island Attorney\\nCounsel for Appellant: Palting and Arriola\\nBefore SHRIVER, Presiding. Judge, and MCLAUGHLIN and WIIG, Judges\", \"word_count\": \"2539\", \"char_count\": \"15045\", \"text\": \"SHRIVER, District Judge\\nOPINION\\nThis is an appeal, from the Island Court of Guam in which court the appellant was convicted on twenty-one counts of an information charging him with violating Section 653(2) of the Penal Code of Guam by transporting intoxicating liquors on which the prescribed taxes had not been paid. As provided by such section, the Island Court fined the appellant on each count an amount equal to one hundred times the amount of the unpaid taxes, or a total of $13,360.00, and ordered the appellant confined to jail until he worked out the fine at the rate of $3.00 per day, unless such fine is sooner paid, as provided for in Section 1446 of the Penal Code of Guam.\\nA summary of the evidence presented by the government will be of assistance in understanding the assignments of error. The United States Navy maintains an establishment at Point Asan in Guam, which is a military reservation, to provide housing, messing, recreation, etc., for civilian employees of the United States. Such employees maintain an organization known as Employees' Service Association and such association is allowed to purchase intoxicating liquor for resale to qualified members without being required to pay the internal revenue tax otherwise payable to the government of Guam. Each qualified member is furnished an identification card bearing his signature and may purchase liquor at the association store within prescribed limits.\\nBefore resale each bottle of liquor sold has attached to it a decalcomania or decal bearing a serial number. When the member makes a purchase, a purchase slip is issued showing his name, card number, purchase and the serial numbers of the bottles delivered to him.\\nThe appellant did not reside in such community, nor was he authorized to purchase liquor. He borrowed the identification card of a qualified purchaser and by representing himself to be such person made twenty-one purchases of liquor over a period of about forty-six days. The appellant was employed as a bartender and general handyman in a local tavern where he had a room. When it became apparent that unusually large purchases of liquor were being made by the appellant, who was then assumed to be the person he represented himself to be, the operations manager of the association notified the Office of Naval Intelligence. On the 10th day of August 1954 he followed the appellant after the appellant had made a purchase and saw him drive to and enter the tavern.\\nUpon receipt of this information Naval Intelligence investigating officials went to the tavern some days later and followed a trash truck which had picked up trash at the tavern and at the dumping ground found empty bottles that bore the decal numbers which corresponded with purchases made by the appellant.\\nA search warrant was issued by the Island Court for the tavern premises upon the assumption that there was probable cause that the appellant had acquired the liquor for sale over the bar at the tavern. Under the authority of such warrant the tavern premises were searched and four bottles of liquor, three of which were identified as having been sold to the appellant, were found and subsequently introduced in evidence.\\nWhen questioned by Naval Intelligence officers, the appellant readily admitted that he had purchased all of the liquor shown on the sales slips, denied that such purchases were for resale by the drink, and alleged that he had taken the liquor to the tavern or to friends for consumption by them or by him; that the empty bottles found at the dump had been placed in the tavern trash after the contents had been consumed by himself and friends elsewhere.\\nFrom the foregoing it is clear that the government proved that by misrepresenting himself to be an authorized purchaser, the defendant purchased the liquor; that on one occasion he was followed as he transported it; that three bottles of liquor so sold were found at the tavern where he had a room; that some empty bottles were transported from the tavern to a public dump, and that the appellant admitted that all of the liquor so purchased had been transported either to the tavern or to a friend's house.\\nIn accordance with Rule 9 of the Appellate Rules of the District Court, counsel have waived oral argument on appeal and have stipulated as to the assignments of error upon which the appellant will rely. We first consider the question as to whether the judgment of conviction is contrary to the law and the evidence. While the parties have not briefed the question, we must determine whether the extra-judicial confession of the appellant is sufficiently corroborated. The government has .stipulated that its evidence consists of proof of purchases, the finding of three full bottles of liquor at the tavern and seven empty bottles at the dump, and the confession or admission of the appellant that he had in all instances transported the liquor after purchasing it. In addition there is the one instance when the appellant was followed. The appellant was convicted on the several counts of transporting over 150 bottles of liquor and as to all but a few the evidence is limited to purchases and the extrajudicial confession.\\nThe rule in this jurisdiction, at least in federal cases, and which we follow in this nonfederal case, is stated in Davena v. United States, 198 F.2d 230.\\n\\\"Here it is established that the evidence corroborating a confession of the defendant need not independently prove the commission of the crime charged, neither beyond a reasonable doubt nor by a preponderance of proof.\\\"\\nIn Martin v. United States, 264 F. 950, the accused was charged with transporting intoxicating liquor from St. Joseph, Mo. to Hastings, Neb. 102 quarts of liquor were found at the residence of the accused in Nebraska and the accused told the officers making the seizure that he had transported it from Missouri on February 8, 1919. He pleaded guilty to a complaint in the county court of Adams County, Nebraska, charging him with transporting liquor from Missouri between the \\\"1st and the 10th day of February, A.D., 1919.\\\" The possession of the liquor, the statements to the officers, and the plea of guilty in the state court were relied upon to sustain the conviction. The court stated in part:\\n\\\"Counsel, however, maintain that the law is well settled that judicial confessions or admissions, uncorroborated by any other proof of the corpus delicti, are sufficient to support a conviction, and cites many cases in support of his position. It is true that a judicial confession or admission will support a conviction in the case in which it is made, because a plea of guilty is a waiver of proof in that case, and authorizes the court to render judgment against the defendant upon the plea. Counsel for the United States have cited, also, cases which hold that judicial confessions or admissions made in one case are admissible as evidence against the same defendant in other cases, where the plea can be said to admit facts which are relevant and material to the trial in which said confession or admission is offered as evidence. But admissibility and sufficiency to sustain a conviction are two very different propositions. It may be true that judicial confessions or admissions are admissible in other cases than those in which they were made; but this is not saying that, when they are admitted, they will sustain a conviction of the crime charged, without being corroborated by independent evidence of the corpus delicti. What the defendant in this case told the officers concerning the bringing of the whisky from St. Joseph, Mo. to Hastings, Neb. was clearly admissible; but it would not sustain a conviction, unless corroborated as above stated. So the fact that a judicial confession or admission made in one case may be admissible in another does not determine that such judicial confession or admission, when offered in a case other than that in which it was made, is still a judicial confession, and we find no authority which so holds. On the contrary, the text-writers on evidence say that when we leave the sphere of the same cause in which the judicial confession or admission was made, we leave behind all questions of judicial confessions or admissions. The judicial admission or confession, as we have before stated, is a waiver of proof in the case in which it is made; but when this effect ceases with the litigation itself, and we arrive at other litigation, and seek to resort to the parties' statements as embodied in the pleadings of prior litigations, we resort to them, not as judicial confessions or admissions, but as ordinary statements of the defendant, of no more importance, and of no higher character as proof, than other statements of the defendant tending to contradict his evidence or plea in the case on trial. Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 2, p. 1242, p. 1065; Chamberlayne on Evidence, vol. 2, p. 1283, pp. 1568-1624. It therefore results that the statements made by the defendant in the present case to the officers, and his statement made to the court when pleading to the above complaint in the county court for Adams County, Neb. were each and all extrajudicial confessions, and insufficient to support a verdict of guilty, unless corroborated by independent evidence of the corpus delicti.\\\"\\nIn Forte v. United States, 94 F.2d 236, the court reversed a conviction for transporting a stolen automobile found in possession of the accused some time after the theft when there was no proof that the accused knew it was stolen except his confession. In the Forte case the court held that it understood the rule stated in Pearlman v. United States, 10 F.2d 460, 9 Cir., as holding that the evidence, independent of a confession, need not touch the corpus delicti at all and refused to follow it.\\nWe believe that independent of the Pearlman case, the cases in this circuit indicate that at least the first steps in the proof of the corpus delicti were shown aliunde the extrajudicial confession, i.e. the fact of the specific loss or injury sustained. Wigmore on Evidence (3d Edition) Sec. 2072. Both Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954), and United States v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160 (1954), are in accord with the general rule that an accused may not be convicted on his own uncorroborated confession; that to warrant a conviction there must be proof independent of the confession of the corpus delicti.\\nThe evidence of the fraudulent purchase of the liquor was properly admitted as incident to its unlawful transportation, Billingsley v. United States, 274 F. 86. It would also appear that the evidence of the full and empty bottles bearing the decal numbers was properly admitted to show that there had been transportation of those particular purchases. Insofar as the purchases made when the appellant was followed, the charge was also proven.\\nBut we are unable to conclude that the various other offenses charged were shown to have been committed except by the confession. The obvious purpose of the code provision is to protect the internal revenue of Guam by making it illegal to transport liquor upon which the prescribed tax has not been paid. The purpose of the decals with numbers is to indicate that the liquor contained therein, is not subject to the tax when in possession of those authorized to purchase. In accordance with Section 653(1) of the code such authorized persons may not give or otherwise dispose of the liquor so purchased. Possession alone is not made an offense. We find no adequate corroboration of the offense of transportation, except as indicated supra.\\nThe appellant next contends that the section in question is too vague and indefinite to be constitutional. This 4s without merit. Regardless of what the legal position may be as regards an authorized purchaser of. liquor upon which the prescribed tax has not been paid, the appellant was not such a purchaser. After his misrepresentation in acquiring the liquor, any transportation was in violation of law.\\nThe appellant contends that the fine imposed was excessive and that the Island Court was without jurisdiction to impose it. The appellant was not convicted of one offense but of twenty-one offenses. While the fine imposed was a total one, it was broken down into fines for each offense, and it is conceded that such fines were properly computed. Section 82 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Guam vests jurisdiction in the Island Court in all criminal cases not amounting to felonies, Government of Guam v. Pennington, 114 F.Supp. 907-911. Section 17 of the Penal Code of Guam provides:\\n\\\"Felony and misdemeanor defined: A felony is a crime which is: (a) Specifically declared to be a felony; or is (b) Punishable by death; or is (c) Punishable by imprisonment for not less than one year when not specifically declared to be a felony. A 'misdemeanor' is every other crime.\\\"\\nA fine is not a sentence of imprisonment. While it is true that, as originally convicted, the appellant, if unable to pay the fines, could be kept in jail for many years, that necessity would have resulted from his repeated violations and any request for suspension or probation would be properly addressed to the trial court.\\nThe judgment of the Island Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part with instructions to enter a judgment not inconsistent with this opinion.\\nSection 653, Penal Code of Guam. Alcoholic beverages. Disposition, transport, drunkenness. (1) Gift or other disposal: It shall be unlawful to give, or in any other way dispose of, intoxicating liquors upon which the internal revenue tax has not been paid into the treasury of the government of Guam. Anyone who violates this section shall be fined an amount equal to 100 times the amount of the tax involved. (2) Transportation: It shall be unlawful to transport intoxicating liquors on which the prescribed taxes have not been paid. Anyone who shall so do shall be fined 100 times the amount of the unpaid taxes. (3) Drunkenness: The penalty for being under the influences, of any intoxicant shall be a fine not to exceed $25, or by imprisonment not to exceed 30 days unless the offender is convicted of being a common drunkard, when Section 647 shall apply.\\nWiggins v. United States, 9 Cir., 64 F.2d 950, 951, certiorari denied 290 U.S. 657, 54 S.Ct. 72, 78 L.Ed. 569; Chevillard v. United States, 9 Cir., 155 F.2d 929, 935; D'Aquino v. United States, 9 Cir., 192 F.2d 338, 357; cf. Warszower v. United States, 312 U.S. 342, 345, 347, 61 S.Ct. 603, 85 L.Ed. 876. See also Daeche v. United States, 2 Cir., 250 F. 566, 571; Bell v. United States, 4 Cir., 185 F.2d 302, 309.\"}"

guam/5311449.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5311449\", \"name\": \"JESUS T. SIONGCO, et al., Plaintiffs v. GUAM DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION, et al., Defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Siongco v. Guam Development & Investment Corp.\", \"decision_date\": \"1976-10-26\", \"docket_number\": \"Civil No. 343-74\", \"first_page\": 355, \"last_page\": 355, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 355\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"JESUS T. SIONGCO, et al., Plaintiffs v. GUAM DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION, et al., Defendants\", \"head_matter\": \"JESUS T. SIONGCO, et al., Plaintiffs v. GUAM DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION, et al., Defendants\\nCivil No. 343-74\\nSuperior Court of Guam\\nOctober 26, 1976\\nCounsel for Plaintiff: J. C. Dierking\\nCounsel for Inland Builders, Inc. and Commercial Insurance of Newark, New Jersey: Crain & Shoecraft\\nCo-Counsel for Inland'i Builders and Eulogio Del Carmeo: Fred Bordallo\\nRepresenting Government of Guam: Cyril E. Morrison\", \"word_count\": \"169\", \"char_count\": \"1020\", \"text\": \"BENSON, Judge\\nORDER\\nIN ORDER that the trial proceed in an orderly manner,\\nIT IS ORDERED:\\n1. That the parties present for marking every exhibit that they intend to offer in evidence at 3:30 p.m., December 17,1976.\\n2. That at the time and date stated above the parties will exchange lists of every witness each intends to call together with a concise statement of the expected testimony of each witness.\\nNo exhibit not marked and no witness not listed as required by this order shall be offered or called at the trial, except for good cause shown. (Jury trial remains December 21, 1976 at 9:30 a.m.).\"}"

guam/5311509.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5311509\", \"name\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM, Plaintiff v. CARLOS G. CAMACHO; KURT S. MOYLAN; FRANK F. BLAS; JOSE Q. TAITANO; MELVIN S. ILAGAN; JOHN D. GILLIAM; MARIA C. DUENAS, and JOE T. SAN AGUSTIN; GREGORIO SANCHEZ, and JOSE B. SARMIENTO and AUGUSTO M. GOGUE, Defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"People v. Camacho\", \"decision_date\": \"1975-11-24\", \"docket_number\": \"Criminal Nos. 41F-75, 47F-75, 46F-75, 44F-75, 37F-75, 42F-75, 40F-75, 39F-75, 45F-75, 38F-75, 43F-75\", \"first_page\": 501, \"last_page\": 512, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 501\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before RAKER, Associate Justice by designation, WEEKS, Associate Justice by designation, and HEFNER, Associate Justice by designation\", \"parties\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM, Plaintiff v. CARLOS G. CAMACHO; KURT S. MOYLAN; FRANK F. BLAS; JOSE Q. TAITANO; MELVIN S. ILAGAN; JOHN D. GILLIAM; MARIA C. DUENAS, and JOE T. SAN AGUSTIN; GREGORIO SANCHEZ, and JOSE B. SARMIENTO and AUGUSTO M. GOGUE, Defendants\", \"head_matter\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM, Plaintiff v. CARLOS G. CAMACHO; KURT S. MOYLAN; FRANK F. BLAS; JOSE Q. TAITANO; MELVIN S. ILAGAN; JOHN D. GILLIAM; MARIA C. DUENAS, and JOE T. SAN AGUSTIN; GREGORIO SANCHEZ, and JOSE B. SARMIENTO and AUGUSTO M. GOGUE, Defendants\\nCriminal Nos. 41F-75, 47F-75, 46F-75, 44F-75, 37F-75, 42F-75, 40F-75, 39F-75, 45F-75, 38F-75, 43F-75\\nSupreme Court of Guam\\nNovember 24, 1975\\nBefore RAKER, Associate Justice by designation, WEEKS, Associate Justice by designation, and HEFNER, Associate Justice by designation\", \"word_count\": \"3433\", \"char_count\": \"20858\", \"text\": \"HEFNER, Associate Justice by designation\\nJUDGMENT\\nThe various defendants have joined in a motion to dismiss the indictments filed against them on several grounds. The basic issue to be determined is whether Public Law 12-173, the Independent Special Prosecutor Act of 1974, is in conflict with the Organic Act of Guam. After a review of the points and authorities submitted, all of the grounds except one can be summarily dealt with.\\nThe defendants assert that Public Law 12-173 is a Bill of Attainder and therefore violates 48 U.S.C. Sec. 1421b(j) and the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 10. It is clear that all the elements necessary to find a bill of attainder are not present. The defendants may be an ascertainable class and Public Law 12-173 may recite sufficient activities deemed reprehensible but there is no declaration of guilt, or imposition of legislative judgment and verdict or a prescription of punishment. In short, there has been no trial by Legislature.\\nThe defendants next argue that this Court does not exist pursuant to Agana Bay Development Company (Hong Kong) Ltd. v. Supreme Court of Guam, Civil Case No. 74-177.\\nThis Court, at the hearing on August 23,1975, made its position clear. The Supreme Court of Guam is not an appellate court for the purpose of this hearing. The effect of the Agana Bay case, supra, is limited by the decision of Judge Curtis, United States District Judge, in his opinion in Civil Case 75-049, Sanchez, et al. v. Supreme Court of Guam. See also Look v. Government of Guam, 497 F.2d 669, 700 (9th Cir. 1974).\\nThirdly, the defendants claim the Chief Judge of the Superior Court abused his discretion in the appointment of Mr. St. Pierre as Special Prosecutor.. Since no testimony was taken and counsel for the defendants have not advanced this ground further, there is nothing upon which this Court can determine one way or the other whether this argument has merit.\\nOf major concern to the Court is whether the Special Prosecutor Act, Public Law 12-173, violates the basic concept of the separation of powers and therefore violates the Organic Act of Guam.\\nThe pertinent provisions of the law challenged by the defendants are the following:\\nA Special Prosecutor independent of the Executive Branch of government should be properly appointed by the Judicial Branch of government, and Section 6 of the Organic Act of Guam (Chapter 8A, Title 48, U.S.C.A.) provides authority for the Legislature to vest such appointment other than in the Governor of Guam. Public Law 12-173, Section 2(d).\\nThe establishment of an independent Special Prosecutor is an appropriate exercise by the Legislature of the power under Section 11 of the Organic Act of Guam which extends to \\\"all subjects of local application\\\" in that all such activities are alleged to have occurred in Guam. Public Law 12-173, Section 2(e).\\nThe Chief Judge of the Superior Court of Guam is authorized and directed to appoint a Special Prosecutor and a Deputy Special Prosecutor with the experience, abilities and reputation necessary to perform the responsibilities in these offices who shall have the duties and powers prescribed by this Act. The Deputy Special Prosecutor shall have such duties as are assigned by the Special Prosecutor and in his absence shall serve as the Special Prosecutor. The Chief Judge shall establish the salaries for the Special Prosecutor and the Deputy Special Prosecutor. Public Law 12-173, Section 3 as amended.\\nThe Organic Act of Guam, 48 U.S.C. Sec. 1421 et seq., provides in part:\\nThe government of Guam shall consist of three (3) branches, Executive, Legislative and Judicial____Sec. 1421a.\\nThe executive power of Guam shall be vested in an executive officer whose official title shall be the \\\"Governor of Guam.\\\"\\n# $ *\\nThe Governor shall have general supervision and control of all the departments, bureaus, agencies and other instrumentalities of the executive branch of the government of Guam. . . . He shall appoint, and may remove, all officers and employees of the executive branch of the government of Guam, except as otherwise provided in this or any other Act of Congress, or under the laws of Guam, and shall commission all officers that he may be authorized to appoint. He shall be responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of Guam and the laws of the United States applicable in Guam. Sec. 1422.\\nThe Governor shall, except as otherwise provided in this Act or the laws of Guam, appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Legislature, all heads of executive agencies and instrumentalities. Sec. 1422c(a).\\nAll officers shall have such powers and duties as may be conferred or imposed on them by law or by executive regulation of the Governor not inconsistent with any law. Sec. 1422c (b).\\nThe Governor shall, from time to time, examine the organization of the executive branch of the government of Guam, and shall determine and carry out such changes therein as are necessary to promote effective management and to execute faithfully the purposes of this Act and the laws of Guam. Sec. 1422c(c).\\nThe legislative power of Guam shall extend to all subjects of legislation of local application not inconsistent with the provisions of this Chapter and the laws of the United States applicable to Guam. Sec. 1423(a).\\nIt is clear, indeed uncontested, that the Organic Act of Guam does establish the traditional three branches of government and the concept of separation of powers.\\nBoth the Special Prosecutor and the defendants agree that prosecution is an executive function. United States v. Nixon, 94 S.Ct. 3090.\\nThe Special Prosecutor argues that if the Legislative Branch does not have the power to authorize .and direct a member of the Judicial Branch to appoint a prosecutor \\\"or for that matter, any other executive officer,\\\" then the judiciary would have no power to appoint any judicial or nonjudicial officer and therefore the courts could not operate. The Special Prosecutor then relies upon \\u00a7 1422 of the Organic Act to support the conclusion that the Act allows the Legislative Branch to appoint officers and employees of the Executive Branch.\\nThe first matter which must be decided is whether the vesting of the appointment of the Special Prosecutor in a court is a valid exercise of the legislative power of the Guam Legislature.\\nThe same issue confronted the United States House of Representatives when it considered House Resolution 11401 which would have appointed a three judge panel to appoint a Special Prosecutor for the so-called \\\"Watergate affair\\\". Legal scholars as well as members of the House of Representatives differed as to the constitutionality of such an appointment. The U.S. House of Representatives did not pass House Resolution 11401 and solved the problem in another manner and was able to avoid the problem of the validity of such an appointment. The Court in Nader v. Bork, 366 F.Supp. 104 (D.C. 1973), deplored the suggestion of the appointment of a Special Prosecutor by the courts at page 109 but no final judicial determination was made as to its validity.\\nThere are two basic differences between the United States Constitution and the Organic Act of Guam in relation to the power of the Legislative Branch to appoint Executive Branch officials.\\nFirst, Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution provides:\\nHe [the President] shall have power by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointment are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. (Emphasis added.)\\nFor appointment to the Executive Branch by someone other than the Governor, the Special Prosecutor relies on 48 U.S.C. Sec. 1422 which does not have comparable provisions as emphasized above and specifically does not vest appointment power in the courts of law.\\nSecondly, the doctrine of separation of powers has developed by case law and interpretation of the United States Constitution. It does not specifically set up the three branches of Government. However, the Organic Act of Guam, in 48 U.S.C. Sec. 1421a, does this.\\nBy reading the Organic Act of Guam in its entirety and comparing it with the United States Constitution, the conclusion is inescapable that the Guam Legislature is more limited in Executive Branch appointments than that reserved to the United States Congress. Not only does the Organic Act specifically establish the three branches, but it also spells out the power of the Governor as head of the Executive Branch. If one was to conclude from 48 U.S.C. 1422 and 1422(a) that the Guam Legislature had unlimited rights of appointment and removal of Executive Branch officers and employees, the entire concept of separation of powers and the authority granted the Governor would be meaningless. 48 U.S.C. 1423(a) makes it clear that the Legislative Branch does not have that unlimited right of appointment.\\nTherefore, this Court must look to the specifics of Public Law 12-173 and apply the Organic Act of Guam with all the significance and reasoning for the separation of powers in mind.\\nOne of the earliest United States Supreme Court cases dealing with the appointment of executive officials by courts of law is Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879). The court sustained the appointment of supervisors of congressional elections by judges, pursuant to legislation enacted by the United States Congress. The Court discussed the application of Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution. Even though this clause provided clear authority for the Legislative Branch to vest the appointment of executive officers in the courts of law, the court considered whether the Legislative Branch had the power to impose on the courts the appointments.\\nThe Court stated:\\nIt is no doubt usual and proper to vest the appointment of inferior officers in that department of the government, executive or judicial, or in that particular executive department to which the duties of such officers appertain.... But as the Constitution stands, the selection of the appointing power . is a matter resting in the discretion of Congress.\\nIn discussing some older cases where the courts declined to exercise certain duties imposed by Congress, the Court stated:\\nThe law of 1792 which required the circuit courts to examine claims to revolutionary pensions, and the law of 1849, authorizing the district judge of Florida to examine and adjudicate upon claims for injuries suffered by the inhabitants of Florida from the American army in 1812, were rightfully held to impose upon the courts powers not judicial, and were therefore, void. But the duty to appoint inferior officers, when required thereto by law, is a constitutional duty of the courts; and in the present case there is no such incongruity in the duty required as to excuse the courts from its performance, or to render their acts void. It cannot be affirmed that the appointment of the officers in question could, with any greater propriety, and certainly not with equal regard to convenience, have been assigned to any other depositary of official power capable of exercising it. Neither the President, nor any head of department, could have been equally competent to the task.\\nAt first blush one may consider Siebold as authority for the appointment of a special prosecutor by the courts. However, the \\\"incongruity\\\" which concerned the United States Supreme Court also concerns this Court when considering the express establishment of the three branches of Government (Sec. 1421a), the vesting of the executive power in the Governor and that \\\"He shall be responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of Guam and the laws of the United States applicable in Guam.\\\" (From Sec. 1422)\\nAs pointed out in United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (1965), a prosecutor acts as an agent of the executive in carrying out the executive's constitutional duty of enforcement of the laws.\\nThe normal way by which an executive officer is designated is by executive appointment. Once the appointment is vested in the courts it is suspect. Public Law 12-173 not only vests the appointment power in the Chief Judge of the Superior Court of Guam but it also states that the Chief Judge shall establish the salaries for the appointees (Special Prosecutor and the Deputy Special Prosecutor). The Chief Judge shall fill any vacancy and pursuant to Section 12, the Chief Judge of the Superior Court has the sole and exclusive power to dismiss the Special Prosecutor.\\nIt must be noted that none of the statutes considered in the cases referred to herein, which deal with the appoint ment of executive officials by the Judiciary, approach the scope and authority of Public Law 12-173.\\nOne does not need to ponder long on how the Legislative Branch could effectively decimate the Executive Branch by designating a member of the Judicial Branch with the powers given in Public Law 12-173. If a judge is given the power to appoint and remove executive officials along with the power to establish the salaries from funds appropriated by the Legislature, the Legislature then could reduce the funds appropriated for the Executive Branch and divert the funds to the judicially appointed officials.\\nSupport for Public Law 12-173 cannot be found in using the examples cited by the Special Prosecutor. It is true that 28 U.S.C. 546 provides for the appointment by the courts of United States attorneys. The statute was sustained in United States v. Solomon, 216 F.Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), but the power given to the District Courts by the law is only an interim one to fill any vacancy in the office. The President, by filling the vacancy, can divest the appointee of his job. In addition, the President is empowered instantly to remove any United States attorney whom the court may appoint. Solomon, supra at page 843.\\n28 U.S.C. 565 provides for the appointment by the courts of the United States marshals. Once again this is to temporarily fill a post which is vacant until the vacancy is filled permanently. Siebold, supra at page 397.\\nUnder the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, as amended (78 Stat. 552,18 U.S.C. 3006A), the courts appoint defense counsel for a particular case where the defendant cannot afford counsel. A review of Subsection (b) of \\u00a7 3006A demonstrates the great difference in the appointment process there and the one provided for in Public Law 12-173. 18 U.S.C. 3006A simply cannot be used as support for Public Law 12-173.\\nThe appointment of defense counsel on a case by case basis by the court is far removed from the appointment of a prosecutor who serves for a term of at least a year, whose salary is fixed by the court and whose removal and discharge is vested in the court. The ethical problem of such a prosecutor appearing in the appointing judge's court is obvious.\\nAnother problem exists with Public Law 12-178. The Court must look to what the appointee does and what his function is, even assuming he is properly appointed. An appointment by itself may not violate the separation of powers doctrine but once the appointee begins to function, there may be such a violation unless there is some authority to authorize the activity.\\nIn the case of United States v. Nixon, supra, a Special Prosecutor represented the Government. Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution authorizes Congress to vest in the Attorney General the power to conduct the criminal litigation of the United States Government. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 516. Congress also vested in the Attorney General the power to appoint subordinate officers to assist him in the discharge of his duties. 28 U.S.C. \\u00a7 509, 510, 515, 533. Pursuant thereto, the Attorney General delegated the authority to represent the United States in the Watergate matter to a Special Prosecutor.\\nThus, in the Watergate Special Prosecutor cases, a clear line of authority traceable to the Constitution of the United States is evident, whereby the Special Prosecutor could support his existence and activity from the Legislative Branch. In other words, the appointment of the Special Prosecutor was proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 533 and the activity to be engaged in, the prosecution of the cases, was authorized by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 516.\\nAs pointed out above, the Guam Organic Act does not have a provision similar to Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution. Rather, the Organic Act states that the Governor shall have general supervision and control of all departments and agencies of the Executive Branch (48 U.S.C. Sec. 1422) and he shall, except as otherwise provided in the Organic Act of the Laws of Guam, appoint all heads of the executive agencies and instrumentalities with the advice and consent of the Legislature. The issue then is whether the exception underlined above authorizes the appointment of the Special Prosecutor and the activities resulting therefrom.\\nThe legislative power extends to all subjects of legislation of local application not inconsistent with the provisions of the Organic Act. 48 U.S.C. Sec. 1423a.\\nPublic Law 12-173 prescribes the duties, powers and functions of the Special Prosecutor. Simply stated, he is to investigate and prosecute alleged crimes committed by certain persons. As stated in the Special Prosecutor's points and authorities in opposition to defendants' motion for dismissal, the Special Prosecutor is \\\"to invoke the criminal process as provided under the Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Organic Act.\\\"\\nTherefore, it is clear that the Special Prosecutor is to perform the same or substantially similar activity as the Attorney General of Guam who is appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Legislature. Indeed, Public Law 12-173, Section 6(6), affirms this.\\nAt the same time that the Special Prosecutor is exercising his quasi Attorney General powers, he is declared to be independent of the Executive Branch (P.L. 12-173, Section 2(c) and (d)) and shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the offenses alleged to have been committed by the defendants. (P.L. 12-173, Section 5)\\nSuch a prosecutor cannot, consistent with the separation of powers doctrines, perform basic prosecutive functions such as signing indictments, granting immunity, trying cases in the courts and making other basic prosecu tive judgments. The fact remains that the prosecution of offenses is a purely Executive Branch function that must be exercised by an official of that Branch. Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce- them or appoint the agents charged with the duty of such enforcement. The latter are executive functions. Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928). See also United States v. Cox, supra, where the court stated that the United States attorney is an executive official of the Government and he exercises discretion whether there should be prosecution in a particular case. The court went on to say: \\\"It follows as an incident of the constitutional separation of power, that the courts are not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United States in their control over criminal prosecutions.\\\"\\nThe incongruity which the United States Supreme Court spoke about in In re Siebold, supra, is apparent.\\nWe therefore find that Public Law 12-173 is in violation of the Organic Act of Guam. Not only is the appointment process indicated therein invalid but the functions to be performed by the Special Prosecutor run afoul of the intent of the Organic Act. The doctrine of separation of powers has been violated.\\nSince the indictments against the defendants are the fruit of the attempted usurpation of power by the Legislative Branch, they must fall from the improperly planted tree, Public Law 12-173.\\nThe indictments of the defendants shall be and the same are hereby dismissed.\"}"

guam/5311674.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5311674\", \"name\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. FRANKIE Q. AGUON and FRANCISCO A. SABLAN, Defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"People v. Aguon\", \"decision_date\": \"1976-03-02\", \"docket_number\": \"Criminal No. 184F-75\", \"first_page\": 306, \"last_page\": 307, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 306\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. FRANKIE Q. AGUON and FRANCISCO A. SABLAN, Defendants\", \"head_matter\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. FRANKIE Q. AGUON and FRANCISCO A. SABLAN, Defendants\\nCriminal No. 184F-75\\nSuperior Court of Guam\\nMarch 2, 1976\", \"word_count\": \"186\", \"char_count\": \"1078\", \"text\": \"ABBATE, Judge\\nDECISION\\nThe Court is of the opinion that it is compelled to deny this motion to dismiss. The courts of lower rank cannot deviate from precedents established by courts which possess appellate jurisdiction over same, Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 368 P.2d 97 (1962). In this instance, the issue raised by this motion to dismiss is identical to that issue raised when a writ of prohibition was sought from the District Court of Guam against the Superior Court of Guam in Santos v. Superior Court of Guam, D.C. C.C. No. 75-067. There the District Court spoke rather unequivocally on this issue and ruled that Section 1382(2) of the Penal Code of Guam has no relevance to felony cases. Thus this Court, which is subject to appellate review by the District Court, cannot but consistently rule that this motion must be denied.\\nIn view of the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is hereby denied.\\nSubmit order.\"}"

guam/5311792.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5311792\", \"name\": \"In the Matter of the Adoption of DANG MINH TRI, a child, by IVAN J. EZELL and NANCY EZELL, Petitioners\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re the Adoption of Dang Minh Tri ex rel. Ezell\", \"decision_date\": \"1975-08-05\", \"docket_number\": \"Adoption No. 118-75\", \"first_page\": 285, \"last_page\": 286, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 285\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"In the Matter of the Adoption of DANG MINH TRI, a child, by IVAN J. EZELL and NANCY EZELL, Petitioners\", \"head_matter\": \"In the Matter of the Adoption of DANG MINH TRI, a child, by IVAN J. EZELL and NANCY EZELL, Petitioners\\nAdoption No. 118-75\\nSuperior Court of Guam\\nAugust 5, 1975\", \"word_count\": \"231\", \"char_count\": \"1406\", \"text\": \"ABBATE, Judge\\nDECISION\\nThis adoption proceeding came before the Court on the 5th day of August, 1975. The petitioners, Ivan J. Ezell and Nancy Ezell, seek an order from this Court to have Dang Minh Tri, a child, declared their legal child. The natural parents, together with the child and petitioners, were present in Court.\\nFactually speaking, the minor child to be adopted is a Vietnamese refugee who, with her family, escaped prior to the occupation of South Vietnam by the Provisional Government of North Vietnam. This Court thoroughly questioned the natural parents regarding the voluntariness of their consent directly and through a qualified Vietnamese interpreter. After having examined the natural parents, the Court finds that their consent to adopt was based upon a promise they made to the petitioners, and their inability to provide support to the child. This Court also made an investigation, through its family counselor, which revealed that this adoption should not be granted. A communication was sent to the Court on 31 July 1975 recommending that the child remain with the natural parents.\\nIn view of the foregoing, and looking at the totality of the circumstances, this Court must deny the petition for adoption.\\nSo ordered.\"}"

guam/5311866.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5311866\", \"name\": \"FRANCISCO A. SABLAN, Defendant-Appellant v. THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM, Plaintiff-Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Sablan v. People\", \"decision_date\": \"1978-03-03\", \"docket_number\": \"Criminal No. 76-05A\", \"first_page\": 489, \"last_page\": 492, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 489\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"District Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before DUE\\u00d1AS, SMITH and WONG, District Judges\", \"parties\": \"FRANCISCO A. SABLAN, Defendant-Appellant v. THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM, Plaintiff-Appellee\", \"head_matter\": \"FRANCISCO A. SABLAN, Defendant-Appellant v. THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM, Plaintiff-Appellee\\nCriminal No. 76-05A\\nDistrict Court of Guam Appellate Division\\nMarch 3, 1978\\nBefore DUE\\u00d1AS, SMITH and WONG, District Judges\", \"word_count\": \"783\", \"char_count\": \"4570\", \"text\": \"SMITH, District Judge\\nOPINION\\nDefendant, Francisco Sab\\u00edan (Francisco), with two accomplices, participated in an armed robbery. He was convicted of first degree murder, burglary, and assault with a deadly weapon. He was sentenced on these crimes to life, 15, and 10 years, respectively, all sentences to run concurrently. The evidence indicates that Francisco was the driver of the \\\"get-away\\\" car. His accomplices, David R. Sab\\u00edan and Frankie Q. Aguon, entered the victim's dwelling, and Aguon fired the shots that killed Joseph G. Sab\\u00edan and wounded a baby, Laura Jean Sab\\u00edan.\\nThe law of Guam provides:\\nGuam Penal Code \\u00a7 189. Degrees of Murder.\\nAll murder which, is perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, torture or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing; or which is committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem or kidnapping is murder of the first degree; and all other kinds of murder are of the second degree.\\nGuam Penal Code \\u00a7 190. Punishment for Murder.\\nEvery person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer confinement in prison for life; and every person guilty of murder in the second degree is punishable by imprisonment from 5 years to life.\\nFrancisco contends that this mandatory life sentence, as applied to one in his situation, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a recent case, considered the question and held the Guam statute applied here to be constitutional. Guam v. Root, 524 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1076 (1976). Defendant cites cases to the contrary and law review articles which are critical, but the rule established by Guam v. Root governs. Neither the cases of Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), which deal with the death penalty, nor the language in them, in our opinion, warrant a conclusion that Guam v. Root is not now controlling in the Ninth Circuit.\\nAguon, who fired the fatal shots, was, by virtue of a plea bargain made after Francisco's conviction, permitted to plead guilty to second degree murder and was sentenced to 20 years.\\nIt is now argued that it has been judicially determined that the underlying crime was murder in the second degree; that, hence, Francisco could not be guilty of first degree murder; and that, in any event, the judgments are inconsistent. The fact is that there was a burglary in which Francisco participated, a person was killed in the course of the burglary, and Francisco was guilty of a felony murder. The apparent inconsistency lies in the treatment of Aguon. That treatment was not the result of the law operating upon a given set of facts. It was the result of a compromise. In plea bargaining, a plea, illogical in view of the facts, may be accepted in order to close a case without a trial. It is recognized that the punishments imposed as a result of plea bargaining justifiably may be less than those imposed where the trial process is allowed to run its full course. For that reason alone, a sentence imposed as a result of a plea bargain cannot be compared with a sentence imposed as a result of a trial and a finding of guilty.\\nThe judgments of conviction are affirmed.\\n\\\"Charge and sentence concessions may be utilized to aid in ensuring the prompt and certain application of correctional measures to the defendant for rehabilitative purposes.\\\" Kansas v. Byrd, 203 Kan. 45, 453 P.2d 22, 28 (1969).\\nSee Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (Advisory Comm. Note to 1974 Amendment). Traditionally, in civil cases, the courts have been wary of admitting offers of compromise for the purpose of proving that a person did or did not do a given act. A party making an offer may do no more than make an offer to buy peace. Moore v. Stetson Machine Works, 110 Wash. 649, 188 P. 769 (1920); 2 Wigmore on Evidence \\u00a7 1061 (2d ed. 1923). The state, in view of the necessity of disposing of criminal cases other than by trial (see Advisory Comm. Note, supra), does not, by accepting a plea to a lesser offense, admit (except for the purposes of the instant case) that a more serious offense was not committed; nor does a judge, in approving such a concession, adjudicate (except for purposes of the instant ease) the degree of crime of which the defendant was actually guilty.\"}"

guam/5311944.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5311944\", \"name\": \"GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, Appellant v. JAMES K. KAANEHE, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Government of Guam v. Kaanehe\", \"decision_date\": \"1956-01-23\", \"docket_number\": \"Criminal No. 6-A\", \"first_page\": 17, \"last_page\": 21, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 17\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"District Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before WIIG and MCLAUGHLIN, United States District Judges, and SHRIVER, District Judge\", \"parties\": \"GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, Appellant v. JAMES K. KAANEHE, Appellee\", \"head_matter\": \"GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, Appellant v. JAMES K. KAANEHE, Appellee\\nCriminal No. 6-A\\nDistrict Court of Guam Appellate Division\\nJanuary 23, 1956\\nCounsel for Appellant: Howard D. Porter, Attorney General; Louis A. Otto, Jr., Deputy Attorney General; Leon D. Flores, Island Attorney; Thad Tisdale, Deputy Island Attorney for the Government of Guam\\nCounsel for Appellee: Palting & Arriola, Tamuning, Guam\\nBefore WIIG and MCLAUGHLIN, United States District Judges, and SHRIVER, District Judge\", \"word_count\": \"1259\", \"char_count\": \"7441\", \"text\": \"McLAUGHLIN, District Judge\\nOPINION\\nThe defendant is a resident of Guam. He was charged with failure to file an income tax return for 1953. This was alleged to be in violation of Section 145(a), Internal Eevenue Code of 1939, 53 Stat. 62, 26 U.S.C. \\u00a7 145(a) (1945 Edition), made applicable to Guam by Section 31 of the Organic Act of Guam, 64 Stat. 392, 48 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1421i. The action was brought before the Island Court of Guam. The charge was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.\\nThe questioned soundness of this conclusion describes the issue upon this appeal. We hold the alleged violation to be of Guamanian law and to be of the type committed to the jurisdiction of the Island Court.\\nCongress has the power to directly legislate local law for a territory. National Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129 (1879). A statute of this character is to be distinguished from a law of general application throughout the United States. Am. Security Co. v. Dist. of Columbia, 224 U.S. 491 (1912); Ex Parte Krause, 228 Fed. 547 (D.C., W.D. Wash. 1915).\\nAn entire code of laws, including criminal provisions, may be adopted by reference. In so doing, it is not necessary to repeat the adopted code. Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33 (1926); Ex Parte Krause, supra; United States v. Davis, 71 F.Supp. 749 (D.D.C. 1947). If the reference is clear, the adopted code is to be applied in toto, unless there is an indication to the contrary in the language of the enactment. Here, there is nothing in either the statute or its legislative history to suggest that Congress wished to adopt only part of the income tax laws of the United States for Guam. U.S. Code, Congressional Service, 81st Congress, Second Session 1950, Vol. 2, p. 2856. Any other conclusion would arbitrarily destroy the effectiveness of Section 31.\\nSection 31 of the Organic Act of Guam made the Internal Revenue Code of the United States a territorial tax law of Guam, to be enforced by Guamanian officials. Laguana v. Ansell, 102 F.Supp. 919 (D. Guam 1952), aff'd per curiam, 212 F.2d 207 (9 Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 830 (1954); accord, Binns v. United States, 194 U.S. 486, 492 (1904). Violations of Guamanian law are to be, indeed can only be, prosecuted in the appropriate courts of the Territory. United States v. Pridgeon, 153 U.S. 48 (1894); Ex Parte Krause, supra; United States v. Wright, 15 F.R.D. 184 (D. Hawaii, 1954).\\nRespondent cites Government of Guam v. Kaanehe, 124 F.Supp. 15 (D. Guam 1954), as contrary authority. It is not. All the court held there was that a violation of the income tax laws must be punished exclusively as provided in those laws, and not by reference to other criminal statutes. The question of whether the United States or the Government of Guam should enforce the tax provision was neither involved nor decided.\\nThe Island Court of Guam has jurisdiction of a misdemeanor defined by territorial law. Code of Civil Procedure of Guam Section 82.1. We see no conflict with Section 82.4. It refers to civil cases, not criminal cases. Section 82.4 was adopted practically verbatim from Section 89(1) (a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which pertains to the civil jurisdiction of California municipal courts.\\nThe Organic Act of Guam needs no local implementation nor publication to make it effective, other than as provided by 64 Stat. 393, 48 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1421, note.\\nReversed and remanded.\\n\\\"Failure to file returns, submit information, or pay tax. Any person . . . upon conviction thereof, (shall) be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.\\\"\\n\\\"Applicability of Federal income tax law. The income tax laws in force in the United States of America and those which may hereafter be enacted shall be held to be likewise in force in Guam.\\\"\\nPublic Law 321 of the 84th Congress, 69 Stat. 616, 617, amending Section 340(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 68A Stat. 455, 466, by providing against double withholding of taxes by both the Federal and local governments in possessions of the United States, also embodies this view of Section 31 of the Organic Act of Guam. The amendment specifically prevents double withholding if \\\". . . the employer is required by the law of any . . possession of the United States to withhold income tax . . . See U.S. Code, Congressional and Administrative News, 84th Congress, 1st Session, 1955, p. 4294.\\n\\\"Sec. 82. Original jurisdiction. The Island Court shall have original jurisdiction exclusive of the District Court:\\n1. In all criminal cases not amounting to felonies, arising under the laws of Guam and in all cases of felonies under the laws of Guam, which, if tried in the District Court, would not be fully appealable to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by the defendant if convicted;\\n\\\"Sec. 82. Original jurisdiction. The Island Court shall have original jurisdiction exclusive of the District Court:\\n4. In all cases at law under the laws of Guam in which the demand, exclusive of interest and costs, or the value of the property in controversy does not amount to more than $2,000, except cases which involve the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, toll or fine; . . . .\\\"\\n\\\"Sec. 89. (Original, concurrent and equitable jurisdiction.) (1) Municipal court shall have original jurisdiction of civil cases and proceedings as follows:\\n(a) In all cases at Law in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to three thousand dollars ($3,000) or less, except cases which involve the legality' of any tax, impost, assessment, toll or municipal fine.\\\"\\nThe various codes of law of the Territory of Guam are based primarily upon the codes of law of California. See: Forward, Civil, Civil Procedure, Penal and Probate Codes of Guam.\\n\\\"Section 34 of Act Aug. 1, 1950, provided that: Upon the 21st day of July 1950, the anniversary of the liberation of the island of Guam by the Armed Forces of the United States in World War II, the authority and powers conferred by this Act (this chapter) shall come into force. However, the President is authorized, for a period not to exceed one year from the date of enactment of this Act (Aug. 1, 1950), to continue the administration of Guam in all or in some respects as provided by law, Executive order, or local regulation in force on the date of enactment of this Act (Aug. 1, 1950). The President may, in his discretion, place in operation all or some of the provisions of this Act (this chapter) if practicable before the expiration of the period of one year.\\\"\"}"

guam/5312087.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5312087\", \"name\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM, Appellee v. EDWARD D. ROSARIO, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"People v. Rosario\", \"decision_date\": \"1969-03-12\", \"docket_number\": \"Criminal No. 36-A\", \"first_page\": 186, \"last_page\": 189, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 186\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"District Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before SHRIVER, Judge, District Court of Guam; PEREZ, Judge, Island Court of Guam and SHOE-CRAFT, Chief Justice, High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands\", \"parties\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM, Appellee v. EDWARD D. ROSARIO, Appellant\", \"head_matter\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM, Appellee v. EDWARD D. ROSARIO, Appellant\\nCriminal No. 36-A\\nDistrict Court of Guam Appellate Division\\nMarch 12, 1969\\nCounsel for Appellee: John P. Raker, Island Attorney\\nCounsel for Appellant: Finton J. Phelan, Jr.\\nBefore SHRIVER, Judge, District Court of Guam; PEREZ, Judge, Island Court of Guam and SHOE-CRAFT, Chief Justice, High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands\", \"word_count\": \"984\", \"char_count\": \"5668\", \"text\": \"SHOECRAFT, Chief Justice,\\nHigh Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands\\nOPINION\\nThis is an appeal from the Island Court of Guam, in which Court Edward D. Rosario, hereinafter called the defendant, was convicted on May 15, 1967, of the charge of petty theft, in violation of Section 484 of the Penal Code of Guam, and of the charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, in violation of Section 273a of the Penal Code of Guam. On the first mentioned charge, defendant was sentenced to a jail term of one year, and on the charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, defendant was sentenced to a jail term of two months, to be served concurrently with the first mentioned sentence.\\nOf several assignments of error, the .two which are basic to this appeal are essentially:\\n1. That the evidence does not support the findings of the Trial Court beyond a reasonable doubt.\\n2. That the Island Court of Guam was without jurisdiction to try the defendant for violation of Section 273a, Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor.\\nSection 273a of the Penal Code of Guam was amended by Public Law 9-8, approved on February 20, 1967, and now reads as follows:\\n\\\"Section 273a. Contributing. Any person who commits any acts or omits the performance of any duty, which act or omission causes or tends to cause or encourage a child to become in need of the care and protection of the Juvenile Court, shall be guilty of misdemeanor, may be tried for such offense in the Juvenile Court, and upon conviction may be punished by a fine not exceeding $500, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.\\\"\\nThe evidence shows that on March 18, 1967, in the early afternoon the chief witness for the prosecution went to Ipao Beach, accompanied by her husband and three children. While there she heard a vehicle stop not far from where she was sitting and also heard someone call out. Upon turning around she saw a little boy grab her pocketbook and run toward a blue truck. At the trial, the witness stated that she knew the license plate number of the truck, and also identified a photograph of said truck. She testified that the little boy, who appeared to be between ten and twelve years of age, jumped into the truck and that the truck pulled away very quickly. She further testified that the truck was being driven by someone other than the boy who had taken her pocketbook, and that her pocketbook had contained $215.00 in cash and other personal property.\\nTestimony of the other witnesses was that the defendant, an adult, accompanied by three boys, one of which was twelve years of age and another sixteen years of age (the age of the third boy does not appear in the transcript of the trial), went in a truck owned by the father of the three boys and being driven by one of the boys, to Ipao Beach. While there, the youngest boy, Anthony, took the subject purse and jumped into the truck where the defendant, Edward D. Rosario, was sitting in the front seat. The defendant and the three boys proceeded to Harmon Field where the defendant opened the purse, distributed the money between himself and the three boys and threw the purse away. Later, after being apprehended by the police, defendant voluntarily directed the police to the vicinity of where the purse was thrown away, the purse was found, and the defendant identified it. Testimony of the youngest boy, Anthony, was that the defendant told him to take the purse.\\nThis Court has repeatedly held that we will not disturb the findings of the lower court if there is credible evidence to support .the judgment. Pangelinan v. Government of Guam, Appeal No. CR. 33-A(1965). In this case we have no doubt as to the correctness of the trial court's judgment on both counts of the information. It is clear from the evidence that the defendant did participate in the commission of the offense and that his participation was in furtherance of the offense.\\nAs to defendant's contention that the Island Court of Guam was without jurisdiction to try the defendant for violation of Section 273a, defendant takes the position that Section 266 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Guam places exclusive jurisdiction in the Juvenile Court. Section 266 reads as follows:\\n\\\"Jurisdiction over adults. The court shall have original jurisdiction to try any adult with a violation of Section 273 (a) of the Penal Code of Guam.\\\"\\nWe are of the opinion that the rule ,to be applied in this case is the rule which is constantly applied to ordinary acts of legislation, in which the grant of jurisdiction over a certain subject matter to one court does not, of itself, imply that that jurisdiction is to be exclusive. Bors v. Preston, 4 S.Ct. 407, 409, III U.S. 252. The phrase \\\"original jurisdiction\\\" means the power to entertain cases in the first instance as distinguished from appellate jurisdiction, and does not mean exclusive jurisdiction. Burks v. Walker, 109 P. 544, 545. If the Legislature had intended such jurisdiction to be exclusive, it would have said so. By its use of the word \\\"original\\\" we must conclude that the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction over adults is concurrent with that of the Island Court of Guam.\\nThe judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\"}"

guam/5312136.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5312136\", \"name\": \"BARCELIZA G. CRUZ, individually and on behalf of her infant child RICHARD ANTHONY CRUZ, Appellee v. JOHN W. ASHY, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Cruz ex rel. Cruz v. Ashy\", \"decision_date\": \"1967-09-01\", \"docket_number\": \"Civil No. 55-A\", \"first_page\": 404, \"last_page\": 404, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 404\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"District Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before SHRIVER, Judge, District Court of Guam; FUR-BER, Chief Justice, High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; DUE\\u00d1AS, Judge, Island Court of Guam\", \"parties\": \"BARCELIZA G. CRUZ, individually and on behalf of her infant child RICHARD ANTHONY CRUZ, Appellee v. JOHN W. ASHY, Appellant\", \"head_matter\": \"BARCELIZA G. CRUZ, individually and on behalf of her infant child RICHARD ANTHONY CRUZ, Appellee v. JOHN W. ASHY, Appellant\\nCivil No. 55-A\\nDistrict Court of Guam Appellate Division\\nSeptember 1, 1967\\nCounsel for Appellee: Finton J. Phelan, Jr.\\nCounsel for Appellant: E. R. Crain and Richard H. Benson\\nBefore SHRIVER, Judge, District Court of Guam; FUR-BER, Chief Justice, High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; DUE\\u00d1AS, Judge, Island Court of Guam\", \"word_count\": \"165\", \"char_count\": \"995\", \"text\": \"PER CURIAM\\nOPINION\\nThis is an appeal from the Island Court of Guam, which Court held that the defendant-appellant is the father of Richard Anthony Cruz who was born out of wedlock to the plaintiff-appellee, Barceliza G. Cruz. The only ground alleged for reversal is that the evidence did not support the judgment of the Court.\\nWe have examined the record, transcript of evidence, and heard oral argument. We are of the view that the evidence amply supports the judgment of the Court below and such judgment is therefore affirmed.\"}"

guam/5312158.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5312158\", \"name\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. THEODORE K. WASHINGTON, Defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"People v. Washington\", \"decision_date\": \"1978-10-19\", \"docket_number\": \"Criminal Case No. 148F-78\", \"first_page\": 566, \"last_page\": 569, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 566\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. THEODORE K. WASHINGTON, Defendant\", \"head_matter\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. THEODORE K. WASHINGTON, Defendant\\nCriminal Case No. 148F-78\\nSuperior Court of Guam\\nOctober 19, 1978\", \"word_count\": \"966\", \"char_count\": \"5657\", \"text\": \"WEEKS, Judge\\nDECISION\\nThis case comes before the Court on defendant Theodore Washington's motion to dismiss the indictment filed September 28, 1978, and argued October 12, 1978. The motion is based on the ground that the prosecution violated the mandate of Criminal Procedure Code \\u00a7 50.46 by failing to present to the grand jury a note, allegedly written by the victim, which recites a motive for individuals other than the defendant to have committed the crime which is the basis of this action.\\nCriminal Procedure Code \\u00a7 50.46 reads:\\nThe grand jury shall receive only evidence presented to it by the prosecuting attorney but the prosecuting attorney shall submit any evidence in his possession which would tend to negate guilt and the grand jury shall weigh all evidence submitted.\\nThe People defended their failure to introduce the note on the ground that the note was inadmissible hearsay and as such could not be presented to the grand jury due to the requirements of Criminal Procedure Code \\u00a7 50.42. That Section reads in pertinent part:\\nThe grand jury shall receive only evidence which would be admissible over objection at the trial of a criminal action. . . .\\nDisposition of this motion turns upon the admissibility of the note written by the victim. Defendant maintains it is admissible pursuant to the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.\\nIn a case in which the state of mind of a person is relevant to a material issue in the case, his declarations at that time are admissible as proof on that issue. When evidence of such declarations is introduced solely for the purpose of showing what the state of mind of that person was at the time the declarations were made, the declarations are regarded as acts from which the state of mind may be inferred and the truth of the declaration is immaterial. For this reason some courts treat such declarations as non-hearsay rather than a hearsay exception. See generally McCormick on Evidence (2d ed. 1972) Section 294; Jones on Evidence (6th ed. 1972) Section 8:6.\\nIn the instant case it is difficult to see how the state of mind of the victim is at issue. Even if we assume that the victim's state of mind is at issue, the declaration goes to the motive of persons other than the defendant to commit the crime. The great weight of authority holds that evidence tending merely to show that persons other than the defendant had a motive for the commission of the crime is inadmissible unless coupled with other evidence having an inherent tendency to connect such other person with the actual commission of the crime. People v. Mendez, 193 Cal. 39, 223 P. 65 (1924); People v. Perkins, 8 Cal.2d 502 (1937); State v. Perelli, 125 Conn. 321, 5 A.2d 705; State v. Kwan, 174 Wash. 528, 25 P.2d 104 (1933).\\nIt seems to us that there is a sound basis for this rule and that it rests fundamentally upon the same consideration which led to the early adoption of the elementary rules that evidence to be admissible must be both relevant and material. It rests upon the necessity that trials of cases must be both orderly and expeditious, that they must come to an end, and that it should be a logical end. To this end it is necessary that the scope of inquiry into collateral and unimportant issues must be strictly limited. It is quite apparent that if evidence of motive alone upon the part of other persons were admissible, that in a case involving the killing of a man who had led an active and aggressive life it might easily be possible for the defendant to produce evidence tending to show that hundreds of other persons had some motive or animus against the deceased; that a great many trial days might be consumed in the pursuit of inquiries which could not be expected to lead to any satisfactory conclusion. 193 Cal. 39, 52.\\nIn the case of People v. Peete, 28 Cal.2d 306, 169 P.2d 924 (1946), defendant attempted to introduce the hearsay declaration of the murder victim which recited that a certain third person had threatened to kill her. The Court was upheld in denying the admission on the ground that the victim's state of mind concerning the third person was not at issue until defendant asserted her defense that the third person was the actual perpetrator. In that case, the Court assumed that the declaration would have been admissible after evidence regarding the defense's theory was introduced. However, the defense never attempted to reintroduce the declaration into evidence after evidence of the third party's involvement was before the Court. It should be noted that in Peete there was substantial evidence circumstantially linking the third person with the crime.\\nIn the instant case the state of mind of the victim regarding other persons is not at issue. Furthermore, there is no additional evidence tending to link the third persons with the perpetration of the crime. It is clear that the victim's note was not admissible before the grand jury.\\nIt would be totally unreasonable to require the prosecution to put before the grand jury every bit of evidence which by some speculative theory might be admissible at some later time.\\nIt should be noted that the prosecution's argument that the note was inadmissible because it was not authenticated is unpersuasive. If such were true, the prosecution could withhold exculpatory evidence solely because they were unwilling to lay the necessary foundation. Such a rule would be absurd.\\nFor the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment is hereby denied.\\nSO ORDERED.\"}"

guam/5312174.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5312174\", \"name\": \"GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, Appellee v. ANACLETO M. ALEGRE, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Government of Guam v. Alegre\", \"decision_date\": \"1963-01-21\", \"docket_number\": \"Criminal Case No. 19-A\", \"first_page\": 107, \"last_page\": 112, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 107\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"District Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before GILMARTIN (deceased), Presiding Judge; FUR-BER, Chief Justice, High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and DUE\\u00d1AS, Judge, Island Court of Guam\", \"parties\": \"GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, Appellee v. ANACLETO M. ALEGRE, Appellant\", \"head_matter\": \"GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, Appellee v. ANACLETO M. ALEGRE, Appellant\\nCriminal Case No. 19-A\\nDistrict Court of Guam Appellate Division\\nJanuary 21, 1963\\nCounsel for Appellee: Robert B. Looby, Deputy Island Attorney, Office of the Attorney General, Government of Guam\\nCounsel for Appellant: Reyes & Lamorena (A. T. Lamorena, of counsel)\\nBefore GILMARTIN (deceased), Presiding Judge; FUR-BER, Chief Justice, High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and DUE\\u00d1AS, Judge, Island Court of Guam\", \"word_count\": \"1309\", \"char_count\": \"7664\", \"text\": \"PER CURIAM\\nOPINION\\nThis is an appeal from a conviction in the Island Court of Guam of the offense of Assault and Battery in violation of Sections 240 and 242 of the Penal Code of Guam.\\nThe appellant in his brief has argued four points of law, namely:\\u2014\\n1. The appellant was justified in committing the offense charged.\\n2. The appellant committed the offense through misfortune or by accident.\\n3. The evidence is insufficient to warrant a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt and the judgment is the result of passion and prejudice.\\n4. The sentence is excessive.\\nIn our opinion, however, these points all boil down to the point that, from the appellant's point of view, the trial judge believed the wrong witness and was unduly influenced by the fact, brought out in cross-examination of the accused, that he had been convicted in the District Court of Guam of the felony of Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon a little over four and one-half years before the incident involved in the present one. There is not a shred of evidence in the record, beyond the finding and sentence to which the appellant objects, to show any passion or prejudice on the part of the trial judge, and we find no legitimate basis for any claim that there was such passion or prejudice.\\nThere was a sharp conflict in the testimony. The only eyewitnesses to the event who testified were the victim and the accused. The only other witnesses were the Department of Public Safety Sergeant to whom the accused reported the incident, and the Department of Public Safety Patrolman who investigated it very shortly after it happened and took the victim to the hospital. It was stipulated at the trial that the victim was intoxicated at the time he reached the hospital and, further, that he had lacerations on his right ear, neck, and shoulder. The victim testified that these lacerations were the result of an unprovoked attack on him by the accused with a bolo knife. The accused admitted he had injured the victim with the bolo knife, but claimed that he had not intended to do this and was merely defending himself against an alleged, threatened attack by the victim with a stick about four feet long and around two inches by two inches thick. Obviously, if the trial judge had believed the accused, he should not have found him guilty, but it is equally clear from the trial judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law that he didn't believe the accused and did believe the victim.\\nAs stated in 3 Am. Jur., Appeal and Error, Section 901:\\n\\\"It is a well-established principle that the trial court's findings of fact upon conflicting evidence are binding on appeal and will not be disturbed by the appellate court where they are reasonably supported or sustained by some substantial, credible, and competent evidence, and where no error prejudicial to the appellant occurred in the ruling on the admission of evidence.\\\"\\nSee also:\\nSymons v. United States (9th Cir., 1949), 178 F.2d 615, in which the court stated at page 620: \\u2014 \\\"It is the duty of the trial court and not this court to weigh such conflicts in the testimony and to determine the credibility and truthfulness of the witnesses.\\\"\\nUnited States v. Bazzell (7th Cir., 1951), 187 F.2d 878, where it is stated by the court at page 881: \\u2014 \\\"Bazzell's first contention is that there was no kidnapping under the statute, that is to say, the evidence did not sustain the verdict. As to this contention, it is well to remember that under the long and well-established law we may consider only that evidence favorable to the plaintiff. We are not permitted to weigh conflicting evidence, but must test the sufficiency of the proof upon the basis of what the jury had the right to believe, and not upon what defendant claims the jury should have believed.\\\"\\nWe consider that the evidence favorable to the Government which the trial judge had the right to believe, was amply sufficient to support the finding.\\nThe appellant also complains of the court's admission, over the objection of the appellant, of the acknowledgment by the accused in cross-examination that he had been found guilty of a felony of Assault and Battery with a Deadly Weapon in the District Court of Guam allegedly some four years and seven months before the incident involved in this case, although the accused stated he was not sure of the date.\\nThe general proposition that an accused who takes the witness stand voluntarily to testify in his own behalf thereby waives his immunity from self-incrimination and subjects himself to cross-examination for purposes of impeachment as well as to cross-examination as to the matters about which he was examined in chief, is well-established. 58 Am.Jur., Witnesses, Sections 96 and 687; Raffel v. United States (1926), 271 U.S. 494, 46 S.Ct. 566.\\nAccording to well-established practice in the Federal Courts in the United States and the great weight of authority in the State Courts, this cross-examination of an accused for purposes of impeaching his credibility may include questioning as to prior conviction of serious crime, where this matter is not controlled by express statute. 58 Am.Jur., Witnesses, Section 749; Weiner v. United States (3rd Cir., 1927), 20 F.2d 522; 6 A.L.R. 1635; 25 A.L.R. 346; 103 A.L.R. 362; 161 A.L.R. 266.\\nIt furthermore makes no difference in the application of this rule that the former offense was similar to the one for which the accused is now on trial, so long as no attempt is made to go into ,the details of the former offense. Hall v. United States (D.C. Cir., 1948), 171 F.2d 347; Newman v. United States (5th Cir., 1955), 220 F.2d 289.\\nThe question of whether the previous conviction was so remote in time or of such a nature as to be plainly without bearing on the witness' credibility is a matter resting largely in the discretion of the trial court, but convictions much more remote in time than that involved here have been held to be admissible, and here the prior conviction was of a felony. We find no abuse of discretion in permitting this conviction to be shown by cross-examination of the accused. 58 Am.Jur., Witnesses, Section 746; Burgess v. State (Md., 1931), 155 Atl. 153, 75 A.L.R. 1471.\\nWe do not concur in the claim of the Government that the accused here might have been sentenced for the maximum allowed by the Code for both the Assault and the Battery with which he was charged, since the Assault was necessarily included in the Battery. 4 Am.Jur., Assault and Battery, Section 3, note 18. The sentence imposed by the trial court, however, was within the limits authorized for Battery by Section 243 of the Penal Code of Guam, and was, therefore, within the discretion of the trial court. Only in a very extreme case would we consider interfering with the trial court's discretion in the matter of sentence. In the present case, in view of the serious nature of the Assault shown by the Government's witnesses and the accused's prior record (not limited to the felony conviction discussed above), we see no reason to modify the sentence.\\nThe finding and sentence of the Island Court are affirmed.\\nDue to his death, Judge Gilmartin did not take part in this opinion.\"}"

guam/5312231.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5312231\", \"name\": \"GEORGE H. FRAZER, Plaintiff v. JAMES S. LEE & CO. (GUAM) LTD., Defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Frazer v. James S. Lee & Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1978-07-10\", \"docket_number\": \"Civil Case No. 364-78\", \"first_page\": 536, \"last_page\": 538, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 536\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"GEORGE H. FRAZER, Plaintiff v. JAMES S. LEE & CO. (GUAM) LTD., Defendant\", \"head_matter\": \"GEORGE H. FRAZER, Plaintiff v. JAMES S. LEE & CO. (GUAM) LTD., Defendant\\nCivil Case No. 364-78\\nSuperior Court of Guam\\nJuly 10, 1978\", \"word_count\": \"466\", \"char_count\": \"2818\", \"text\": \"ABBATE, Presiding Judge\\nDECISION\\nThis matter comes before the Court on defendant James S. Lee & Co. (Guam) Ltd.'s motion to quash service of summons. Defendant's motion is based on the contention that Danny Tsung was not a proper person under Guam Rules of Civil Procedure \\u00a7 4(d)(3) to be served with process on behalf of the corporation.\\nThe affidavit of Tsung submitted in support of the motion stated that he was not \\\"the President or other head of the James S. Lee & Co. (Guam), a Guam domestic corporation, nor a vice-president, a secretary, an assistant secre tary, general manager or a person designated for service of process or authorized to receive service of process on behalf of said corporation.\\\" The affidavit of Jack A. Rosenzweig states that the president of defendant corporation told him to conduct business with Tsung when the president was unavailable, that Tsung signed checks relating to the transaction at issue on behalf of defendant and that Tsung has executed amended mortgages as a representative of defendant. Furthermore, the affidavit of Robert A. Haut states that Tsung has appeared before the Superior Court pursuant to examination of judgment debtor proceedings to answer concerning defendant's property.\\nThe actual title of Tsung is not dispositive of the issue here. Service has been upheld upon a sales manager (Lane Ltd. v. Larus & Bro. Co., 140 F.Supp. 466 (1956)), a fiscal agent (Jacobwitz v. Thomson, 141 F.2d 72 (1944)), a factory representative (Farr Co. v. Gratiot, 92 F.Supp. 320 (1950)), and a technical representative (Stockwell v. Page Aircraft Maintenance, Inc., 212 F.Supp. 102 (1962)).\\nIn determining who may be validly served under Rule 4(d)(3), the following quotation has been cited on numerous occasions with approval:\\nThe rationale of all rules for service of process on corporations is that service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation sued as to make it a priori supposable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers served on him. Goetz v. Interlake S.S. Co., 47 F.2d 753, 757 (1931).\\nIn the instant action, it is clear from the affidavits that Tsung exercised substantial authority and control over the operations of defendant corporation. Although Tsung was not expressly appointed to receive process, the Court is of the opinion that for the purposes of the service of process herein, he was an authorized agent. See, e.g., Cohen v. Physical Culture Shoe Co., etc., 28 F.Supp. 679 (1938).\\nDefendant's motion to quash service of summons is denied.\\nDefendant shall have twenty (20) days from the date of this order in which to answer.\\nSO ORDERED.\"}"

guam/5312425.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5312425\", \"name\": \"GEE DEE ENTERPRISES, INC., a Corporation, Plaintiff v. RAMESH J. MELWANI, individually and DBA LIBERTY FASHIONS or LIBERTY FASHIONS AND SHOES, Defendants; GEE DEE ENTERPRISES, INC., a Corporation v. UNITED RESOURCES, INC., and LIBERTY SHOES, INC., Defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Gee Dee Enterprises, Inc. v. Melwani\", \"decision_date\": \"1976-12-14\", \"docket_number\": \"Civil No. 940-76; Civil No. 941-76\", \"first_page\": 378, \"last_page\": 378, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 378\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"GEE DEE ENTERPRISES, INC., a Corporation, Plaintiff v. RAMESH J. MELWANI, individually and DBA LIBERTY FASHIONS or LIBERTY FASHIONS AND SHOES, Defendants GEE DEE ENTERPRISES, INC., a Corporation v. UNITED RESOURCES, INC., and LIBERTY SHOES, INC., Defendants\", \"head_matter\": \"GEE DEE ENTERPRISES, INC., a Corporation, Plaintiff v. RAMESH J. MELWANI, individually and DBA LIBERTY FASHIONS or LIBERTY FASHIONS AND SHOES, Defendants GEE DEE ENTERPRISES, INC., a Corporation v. UNITED RESOURCES, INC., and LIBERTY SHOES, INC., Defendants\\nCivil No. 940-76\\nCivil No. 941-76\\nSuperior Court of Guam\\nDecember 14, 1976\", \"word_count\": \"159\", \"char_count\": \"954\", \"text\": \"BENSON, Judge\\nORDER\\nThis matter came before the court on motion of Liberty Shoes, and was submitted for decision after oral argument on December 10,1976.\\nThe decision of the court is\\n1) That a 5-day summons is permissible in a case of unlawful detainer.\\n2) That proper notice to pay or to quit must be served before institution of an unlawful detainer action.\\n3) That an unlawful detainer cannot be maintained against one not in possession.\\nIT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion to dismiss be granted as to defendant Liberty Shoes for reason No. 2 above, and also granted as to United Resources for reason No. 3 above.\"}"

guam/5312541.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5312541\", \"name\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. ALBERT SANCHEZ and DAVID SABLAN, Defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"People v. Sanchez\", \"decision_date\": \"1976-10-12\", \"docket_number\": \"Criminal No. 127F-76\", \"first_page\": 347, \"last_page\": 349, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 347\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. ALBERT SANCHEZ and DAVID SABLAN, Defendants\", \"head_matter\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. ALBERT SANCHEZ and DAVID SABLAN, Defendants\\nCriminal No. 127F-76\\nSuperior Court of Guam\\nOctober 12, 1976\", \"word_count\": \"472\", \"char_count\": \"2835\", \"text\": \"ABBATE, Judge\\nDECISION\\nThe Defendants were indicted on June 25, 1976, by the Superior Court of Guam Territorial Grand Jury and charged with violation of Section 626.10(a)(1) of Guam Public Law 11-149 by virtue of acts done on or about October 29, 1975. Defendants in their motion to dismiss filed on July 15,1976, allege both pre-indictment delay and alteration of the indictment. This court finds no cause to dismiss on either .ground as there is no prima facie showing of prejudice here to Defendants' rights to due process or a fair trial.\\nAs to the alteration in the indictment, the case law is clear that a change in the date to correct a typographical or clerical error goes to form only and is not prejudicial. (See Arnold v. U.S., C.A. 9th, 1964, 336 F.2d 347, 353, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 1348, 380 U.S. 982, 14 L.Ed.2d 275; Berg v. U.S., C.A. 9th, 1949, 176 F.2d 122, 126). The indictment here was changed from October 1976 to October 1975 and initialed by the Assistant Attorney General who made the correction. In a very similar case decided by the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals the October 23, 1962, date was corrected to 1961, and the court stated \\\". . . This obvious clerical mistake was in no way prejudicial. As the 1962 date had not yet arrived, the intent of the indictment could not have misled anyone\\\". (U.S. v. Zembito, C.A. 4th, 1963, 315 F.2d 266, certiorari denied 83 S.Ct. 1524, 373 U.S. 924, 10 L.Ed.2d 423). Clearly this is harmless error under Rule 52(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the Superior Court of Guam.\\nAs to the allegation of prejudicial pre-indictment delay, U.S. v. Quinn, C.A. 8th (July 27, 1976) expresses the appropriate standard:\\nIn determining whether a dismissal due to pretrial delay is proper, this court has balanced the reasonableness of the delay against the resulting prejudice to the defendant . . . applying this test we scrutinize the facts surrounding the delay and then determine whether the defendant has been substantially prejudiced . . .\\nThe Quinn Court then cited U.S. v. Jackson, 504 F.2d 337, n. 1, 16 Cr. L. 2020, which states at page 339 \\\". . . at least where the government is not engaging in intentional delay in order to gain a tactical advantage over the accused, the defendant must affirmatively demonstrate prejudice\\\".\\nAs in Quinn undercover activity relating to other offenses might have been jeopardized had prosecutions been brought immediately after these defendants did the alleged acts. Accordingly, a delay of eight (8) months is not unreasonable and Defendants have failed to affirmatively demonstrate prejudice.\\nIn accord with the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is hereby denied.\\nSubmit order.\"}"

guam/5312554.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5312554\", \"name\": \"THE GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, Appellee v. JOHN M. WEBSTER, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Government of Guam v. Webster\", \"decision_date\": \"1962-03-19\", \"docket_number\": \"Criminal No. 21-A\", \"first_page\": 387, \"last_page\": 390, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 387\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"District Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before SHRIVER, Presiding Judge, District Court and PEREZ, Chief Judge, Island Court of Guam\", \"parties\": \"THE GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, Appellee v. JOHN M. WEBSTER, Appellant\", \"head_matter\": \"THE GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, Appellee v. JOHN M. WEBSTER, Appellant\\nCriminal No. 21-A\\nDistrict Court of Guam Appellate Division\\nMarch 19, 1962\\nCounsel for Appellee: Louis A. Otto, Jr., Attorney General; James P. Alger, Deputy Island Attorney\\nCounsel for Appellant: John M. Webster, pro se\\nBefore SHRIVER, Presiding Judge, District Court and PEREZ, Chief Judge, Island Court of Guam\", \"word_count\": \"639\", \"char_count\": \"3745\", \"text\": \"SHRIVER, Judge\\nOPINION\\nThe appellant was convicted in the Island Court for driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. He appeals and assigns as error the failure of the Island Court to expedite his trial, the failure of the Island Court to suppress evidence in advance of trial, and the use of evidence by the government of Guam which was illegally obtained. There is no merit in any of these contentions and we affirm.\\nThe appellant was driving an automobile about midnight when he was stopped by members of the Armed Forces police. In his brief he states that he was asked to show his driver's license, which he produced, and thereafter proceeded toward his quarters. The Government contends that the appellant represented to members of the Armed Forces police that he was a member of the Guam Legislature. The Armed Forces police contacted Guam police by radio and met with Guam police officers. While the two groups of officers were conferring the appellant drove by and was pointed out to the Guam police. The Guam police then proceeded to follow him for a considerable distance until his erratic driving caused them to stop him, take him into custody and escort him to a doctor at the Guam Memorial Hospital. The doctor at Guam Memorial Hospital gave the appellant a sobriety test, which he flunked.\\nOn appeal the appellant does not contend that he was not driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, but does contend that he was not given a fair trial. He contends that he first requested the Island Court to expedite the trial so that he could produce a favorable witness who was about to leave the island. The Island Court was under no obligation to accommodate its trial docket to the demand of the appellant. If the testimony was important, the appellant could have preserved it by deposition. The second complaint is that a motion to suppress evidence before trial was not granted. It is not clear as to what evidence was to have been suppressed. In any event, it was discretionary with the trial court as to whether it would conduct a pre-trial hearing on the motion, or whether it would take the matter up at the time of trial. The third contention is that, having been arrested by the Armed Forces police, if such arrest was illegal, any evidence subsequently obtained by the Guam police was tainted by the initial illegality. The short answer to this allegation is that the appellant was not arrested by the Armed Forces police, according to his own statement. He was stopped, required to produce his driver's license, and then permitted to proceed. The appellant cites a number of cases which we read ily accept which hold that after an illegal arrest, any evidence obtained by search and seizure may not be admitted. While it is true that except for the report made by the Armed Forces police the Guam police may not have been available to detect the driving, it is equally clear that the arrest by the Guam police was the result of their independent observations. Obviously, if the Armed Forces police had made an arrest, they would have detained the appellant until the Guam police arrived. They did not do so. The Guam police followed the appellant for a considerable distance until they were convinced by his erratic driving that he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The conviction is affirmed.\"}"

guam/5312568.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5312568\", \"name\": \"GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, Appellee v. FRANCISCO PLAZA, et al., Appellants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Government of Guam v. Plaza\", \"decision_date\": \"1957-11-21\", \"docket_number\": \"Criminal No. 11-A\", \"first_page\": 23, \"last_page\": 26, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 23\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"District Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before SHRIVER, WIIG, and MCLAUGHLIN, United States District Judges\", \"parties\": \"GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, Appellee v. FRANCISCO PLAZA, et al., Appellants\", \"head_matter\": \"GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, Appellee v. FRANCISCO PLAZA, et al., Appellants\\nCriminal No. 11-A\\nDistrict Court of Guam Appellate Division\\nNovember 21, 1957\\nBefore SHRIVER, WIIG, and MCLAUGHLIN, United States District Judges\", \"word_count\": \"990\", \"char_count\": \"5762\", \"text\": \"MCLAUGHLIN, District Judge\\nOPINION\\nAs evening approached the coastal town of Inara jan on the Island of Guam a group of men gathered on each side of the narrow village street. Why they assembled Is left a mystery, but we do know that those assembled had certain things in common. All in the group were laborers brought to the Island from the Philippines. They were part of the labor force of Guam which far away from homeland and families worked on government projects by day and sought to take the edge off loneliness and idleness in off hours. Despite this common bond, there was a factor of disunity. The group assembled on one side of the village street was quartered at the Marbo Labor Camp, while their co-workers facing them on the opposite side were Rojas Camp boys. To the observer this might seem trivial, but like sailors of two different ships meeting in a beer hall such differences albeit arbitrary in origin proved ample grounds for a free-for-all.\\nThe appellants, eleven in number, consist of Marbo and Rojas contestants of this fight who appeal from the judgment of the Island Court of Guam, wherein they were jointly convicted of committing a riot. Pursuant to this conviction the court has imposed upon each appellant a fine of Fifty Dollars. The appellants assign seven specifications of error. We find that specifications one through six have no merit. Specification 7 cites a ground of basic error in that the evidence presented was not sufficient to support a conviction of riot under the applicable statute. Section 404 of the Penal Code of Guam defines the crime of riot as follows:\\nAny use of force or violence, disturbing the public peace, or any threat to use such force or violence, if accompanied by immediate power of execution, by two or more persons acting together, and without authority of law, is a riot.\\nA review of the record discloses that the acts for which the appellants- were convicted are covered within the scope of Section 404 with the exception of the term \\\"acting together.\\\" The application of this concept must be understood in the context of its common law meaning. Our research has not revealed any significant treatment by American courts of the subject. However, cases in other common law jurisdictions have considered the question, and we find their reasoning persuasive.\\nIn the Indian case of Regina v. Mazhur Hassein, 5 N.W. 208 (1873), reported in 15 (replacement) The English and Empire Digest, case *4968, the members of two separate groups were convicted of rioting. One group consisted of not less than five persons. They as well as their opponents came armed with sticks prepared to fight and did fight. Held: they were not improperly convicted of rioting, their common object being to assault their opponents.\\nAs to the other groups, the court found that they had no object in common with the first and were therefore not part of the same riot. This group consisted of four persons. The fight did not occur in a public place. Held: they were not properly convicted of rioting; had the fight occurred in a public place it might have been held that the common object of both parties was to commit an affray.\\nAnother decision that contending forces in a common melee do not constitute a single riot is the Canadian case of Regina v. Corcoran, 26 Upper Canada Common Pleas Reports 134 (1876). There a religious procession was attacked by rioters. Corcoran, one of the processionists, separated himself from his fellow marchers and fired a pistol above the heads of the attacking rioters. Corcoran and fourteen of the attackers were indicted on a charge of riot, on which charge he and nine others were convicted. On appeal the conviction of Corcoran was reversed. While his actions might be punishable in themselves they do not merge with those of the rioters simply because they are in response to the rioters' attack. His actions stood alone and since he was not proved to be acting in concert with anyone there was no evidence to support a conviction of riot. As we read the opinion, the court states further without deciding that had Corcoran been joined in his acts of violence by some of his fellow processionists this group could have itself been convicted of a separate riot.\\nThe facts which face us here outline the dimensions of a common gang fight. It cannot be maintained that in such an affray the participants exhibit a community of interest to achieve an established goal. Instead it is the fight per se which is the goal, and in such a fight there are two contending forces each with its own ends to accomplish. Both groups cannot be indicted for a single riot.\\nWe further note that although these appellants received modest fines, the punishment for riot under Section 405, Penal Code of Guam, may extend to imprisonment not exceeding one year or by fine not exceeding $200 or both. The offense of disturbing the peace under Section 415 of the Penal Code may be punished by fine not exceeding $50 or by imprisonment for not more than sixty days or both. This difference indicates the more serious nature of riot and the care which must be exercised in distinguishing it from other disturbances. The statutes of Guam clearly lay before us the elements of the crime of riot. While disturbances such as appellants here participated in are injurious to the public peace we must conclude from a reading of the facts that all the required elements specified have not been met.\\nWe find that the judgment of the Island Court of Guam must be reversed and the conviction set aside.\"}"

guam/5312726.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5312726\", \"name\": \"FRANCISCO DE LEON, et al., Appellants v. GEORGE M. BAMBA, et al., Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"De Leon v. Bamba\", \"decision_date\": \"1963-08-21\", \"docket_number\": \"Civil No. 42-A\", \"first_page\": 144, \"last_page\": 155, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 144\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"District Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"FRANCISCO DE LEON, et al., Appellants v. GEORGE M. BAMBA, et al., Appellees\", \"head_matter\": \"FRANCISCO DE LEON, et al., Appellants v. GEORGE M. BAMBA, et al., Appellees\\nCivil No. 42-A\\nDistrict Court of Guam Appellate Division\\nAugust 21, 1963\\nCounsel for Appellants: Ramon V. Diaz, and E. R. Crain\\nCounsel for Appellees: Arriola, Bohn & Gayle\\nCounsel for Election Commissioner: Richard D. Magee, Deputy Attorney General; Fred E. Bordallo, Assistant Attorney General\", \"word_count\": \"3276\", \"char_count\": \"19295\", \"text\": \"PER CURIAM\\nOPINION\\nThis is an appeal in an election contest. One of the Island Court judges supervised the recount and the other heard the case below. We constitute a quorum and our jurisdiction is provided by Section 2620 of the Government Code of Guam. The Guam election law is contained in such Code and our references are to such law unless otherwise indicated. No objections were made below to the pro cedure followed .in instituting the contest and pursuing it. The trial court made extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law and held that certificates of election had properly been issued to the 21 members of the Guam Legislature who received the highest vote. The contestants brought these proceedings upon the assumption that there were so many irregularities involved in the 1962 general election that one or more losing candidates may have been elected.\\nThe Guam election law is so comprehensive and detailed that some irregularities are almost inevitable. In some respects the law is contradictory and obscure. While we might wish that the Guam Legislature had enacted legislation better adapted for this community, we must take the law as we find it and hope that a better law will result. We consider the alleged errors in the order in which they were argued in the briefs of counsel, except that we first consider the dismissal of the Election Commissioner as a party defendant.\\nDISMISSAL OF ELECTION COMMISSIONER\\nThe Election Commissioner was first joined and then dismissed as a party defendant. The dismissal was proper as he should not have been joined as a party defendant. The only proper parties under Section 2600 are the persons who initiate the contest and the defendants who received the certificate of election. The trial court has ample authority under Section 2615 to find that a candidate other than the defendant has been elected and under Section 2616 to direct the Election Commissioner to issue a certificate of election as directed.\\nABSENTEE BALLOTS\\nThe contestants contend that of 167 absentee ballots actually cast at the election, only 67 had previously been re ceived by the Election Commissioner and delivered by him to the precinct officials. We first note that the Election Commissioner did not comply with the appropriate statute. The voter is to be furnished with an envelope in which to place the completed ballot. Section 2461 requires that on the reverse side of the envelope there shall be printed, the blank form of voter's affidavit. No such envelopes were furnished the voters but mimeographed blank forms were affixed to the reverse side of the envelope by tape or glue. Neither party has raised the question and we point it out simply to indicate the safeguards contained in the election law. The printing is required in order to eliminate the possibility that any voter's affidavit could be switched from one envelope to another containing a different ballot from that voted.\\nThe law concerning absentee ballots, when properly construed, provides different methods for obtaining absentee ballots and voting the same. The voter must expect to be off the island or must expect to be unable to go to the polls if'on the island. He must request an application blank within 120 days prior to the election, and must make application on the required form not more than 60 nor less than 5 days prior to election according to Sections 2452 and 2453. A ballot is either mailed to him or, under Section 2459, within 15 days of the election he may obtain a ballot by applying on the proper form at the office of the Election Commissioner and mark it, swear to it and return it to the Election Commissioner. The Commissioner must deliver all absentee ballots received by him to the precinct board, together with the voter's application, Section 2467, before the election and he must do this in person. He must report all absentee ballots not received by him for delivery to the precinct officials before the polls close, Section 2469.\\nIt appears that on election day disabled voters were allowed to make affidavits for absentee ballots, that such ballots were marked in the presence of precinct election officials who left the polling places for this purpose, accompanied by a representative or representatives of each of the two political parties taking part in the election, and that such ballots were voted. There is no evidence that any of these were challenged at that time, in accordance with Section 2477. The defendants contend that this procedure is authorized by Section 2464 which authorizes the absentee voter at any time on or before the day of an election to appear before one of the officers mentioned therein and mark his ballot. While admitting that these provisions are inconsistent with other provisions in the election law, the defendants contend that the courts should construe the law to afford the voter who could not anticipate his disability on election day the opportunity to vote. The law makes no provision for this contingency. Section 2464(b) provides that the absentee voter may only receive an absentee ballot when he \\\"expects\\\" to be prevented from personally going to the polls. This contemplates that the Election Commissioner must anticipate the return of the ballot to protect it and to deliver it to the precinct officials. Presumably the Election Commissioner may deliver ballots received late, Section 2469, before the polls close, but he has no authority to accept applications for ballots on election day. All such absentee ballots which were applied for and issued on election day and voted are illegal.\\nContestants' Exhibits 7A and 7B are envelopes which had contained accepted ballots. It is conceded in the briefs that one was sworn to before the registrar of a school and the other before the secretary of the District Administrator at Majuro, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. We do not take judicial notice of foreign law but it does not appear that the registrar of a school is authorized to administer oaths and the Trust Territory is not a state, territory or municipality within the United States. We again point out that we have no authority to construe a statute so liberally in favor of the voter as to substitute entirely different safeguards for those provided in it. These ballots were improperly cast.\\nVOTERS' IDENTIFYING MARKS\\nA number of ballots were introduced in evidence which contained markings other than those authorized. Section 2390 provides that a voter shall not place any mark upon his ballot by which it may afterwards be identified as the one voted by him. The trial court rejected some of these and accepted others. In doing so, the court followed the general rule of liberal construction indicated by Section 2519. There may be some doubt as to whether, in rejecting some of these ballots, the court was as liberal toward the voters as is intended by Section 2522, which provides as follows:\\n\\\"Sec. 2522. Unauthorized marks on ballot. No mark upon a ballot which is unauthorized by this title invalidates a ballot, unless it appears that the mark was placed there by the voter for the purpose of identifying the ballot.\\\"\\nThe court in such a situation, however, is faced with a difficult decision on very meager evidence as to the intent of the voters. While it is possible that we might differ as to the effect of the markings on individual ballots, particularly as there were so few of them as to make any deliberate improper intent unlikely, we must follow the trial court where, as here, we recognize there is ample room for a difference of opinion.\\nOTHER IRREGULARITIES\\nThere are many other irregularities on the part of the election officials which do not involve the integrity of the voters. Such officials are required by the election manual to have the voters sign a roster before receiving a ballot. It was shown that in one precinct the voters' names were marked off and in another that one person signed for all voters. This is another example of unnecessary safeguards thrown around the election. In this community it is highly improbable that a fraudulent voter could present himself to election officials without being discovered and no such fraud was shown by the contestants. We must clearly distinguish between irregularities which are the fault of the voter and those which are the fault of election officials.\\nSUMMARY OF FACTS\\nAccording to Exhibit 37, the results found by the trial court, the 21 candidates of one party received a total of 117,480 votes and the 21 candidates of the other party a total of 107,728 votes. The individual who received the highest vote had 5,798 votes among the candidates of the winning party and the highest vote for the losing party was 5,359. The lowest vote for a successful candidate was 5,362. We surmise that irregularities took place in other elections but that the results were not sufficiently close to warrant a contest. There is no evidence of fraud or collusion to aid or hinder any candidate, nor is there any evidence of a pattern for identifying ballots by any particular method. There is no indication that any one voted who did not have a right to provided he or she had done it in the proper manner and at the proper time. Of the total number of ballots voted there may be about 100 illegal ballots, or less than one percent. Neither this court, nor any other court, can determine whether the elimination of illegal ballots would have changed the results. Furthermore, it would not only appear that both political parties acquiesced in the acceptance of most of these illegal ballots, but it is clear that the workers of both parties actively cooperated in obtaining at least some of them.\\nTHE LAW\\nThere are four points of law which it seems to us most important to consider in this case.\\n1. In the first place the Guam Election Law does not appear to us to be really as ambiguous as counsel have claimed. It is true there are a number of inconsistencies between the literal wording and implications of certain of the sections and those of others, but this is likely to be true in any lengthy and detailed legislation dealing with a number of situations. It is the duty of all concerned to make a reasonable effort to reconcile such statements and ascertain the real substance of the legislative will. In doing this one of the most widely recognized principles is that the more specific provisions shall control over general ones or the implications that might otherwise be drawn from the general provisions, 50 Am.Jur., Section 367. If this principle is kept clearly in mind, many of the ambiguities alleged by counsel should give no one serious trouble. It is on this basis that we believe the absentee ballots issued on election day must be held to have been illegal.\\n2. It should be borne in mind that, according to the great weight of authority, there is a sharp distinction between the effect to be given provisions of an election law if enforcement is sought before the election and the effect to be given after the election. Before the election practically all the provisions will be considered as mandatory and all concerned should make an honest effort to comply with them; but after the election all will ordinarily, in the absence of any express statutory provision to the contrary, be held directory only, in support of the r\\u00e9sult, unless the variations from them are such as to interfere either with the honest expression of opinion of the electorate or with the honest ascertainment of the result. The crucial question at that point is one of fairness and honesty. The great inter 'est of the public in avoiding the expense and inconvenience of a new election and fairness to those who have lawfully voted require that the will of the electorate shall not be thwarted or delayed by mere honest misunderstandings or inadvertent errors of the election officials or others which do not indicate any fraud or any intention to improperly aid or hinder any candidate, 18 Am.Jur., Elections, Sections 11 and 225; Cameron v. Babcock (S.D. 1935) 262 N.W. 80, 101 A.L.R. 650. This principle makes what we have referred to as \\\"other irregularities\\\" above, of no consequence in the present case.\\n3. Now we come to the troublesome question of how the situation should be handled when illegal votes have been cast in good faith, without any fraud or collusion, in sufficient number to possibly affect the result of the election, but it is not known for whom the votes were cast.\\nThe trial court and, before that, the judge supervising the recount, attempted in certain instances, to offset an unidentified illegal ballot by withdrawing a ballot from the precinct ballot box and deducting the votes therein from the totals of the candidates for whom the vote was cast, apparently by analogy to the situation covered by Section 2505, but we find no warrant for this procedure in either the election law or the decisions that have come to our attention. There appears to be only one instance in which a ballot properly cast can be removed from the ballot box in any such manner. Section 2505 provides that if the number of ballots in the box exceeds the number of names on the tally list, the excess number of ballots shall be withdrawn and destroyed by the precinct judge. It does not appear that this procedure affected the result, and it may therefore be disregarded as harmless error. Since, however, we hold that the unidentified absentee ballots issued on election day were also illegal, it is still important to determine how they should be treated.\\nDifferent jurisdictions within the United States have adopted different rules on this matter. A few would either void the whole election or void the election in the precinct or district in which such votes were cast, if they were confined to one district. The majority, however, hold that in such a situation the contestant has the burden of proving for whom the illegal votes were cast and that these would affect the result \\u2014 in the sense of who won, and not merely changing the margin of victory \\u2014 that, if the contestant does not sustain this burden, he must fail, and that the proper course is then to prorate the improper ballots in proportion to' the votes cast for each candidate or to ignore the fact that illegal votes have been cast, viz. 155 A.L.R. 677; In re Sugar Creek Local School District (Ohio 1962), 185 N.E.2d 809:\\n\\\"If the legality of the votes cast is attacked upon grounds not affecting the vote of the entire precinct, it must be proved for whom the illegal votes were cast; and where it is not possible for either party to prove how the alleged illegal votes affected the result, the contestants having the burden of proof must fail.\\\" 18 Am.Jur., Elections, Section 303.\\nIn the Sugar Creek case the court made an extensive review of the decisions in other states as to whether and when the rule to be applied is that the contestant must prove for whom the illegal votes were cast and that they would affect who won, or is that it is sufficient to void the election if the contestant merely proves there were illegal votes cast in sufficient number so that they might affect who won. In the course of this review the court stated at page 819:\\n\\\"In the following states both rules are applied: California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Carolina, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and Tennessee. If the irregularities are great and flagrant, the election is voided, if they are found not to be great and flagrant, even though there was uncertainty as a result, the contestant was held to prove the illegal votes and for whom they were cast.\\\"\\nThen at page 820 the court summarized the situation as follows :\\n\\\"Thus, it will be seen out of 33 states directly passing upon this issue, nine require that a contestant shall prove his case as in any other case, including the actual vote; four held that it is only necessary in any circumstances to prove the illegal vote and the uncertainty of the election; and twenty apply both rules according to the facts in the case before them \\u2014 the distinguishing mark being whether there was fraud or whether the irregularities are great or flagrant.\\\"\\nIn our present case, we believe that the irregularities, though participated in by many, cannot properly be considered either \\\"great or flagrant\\\" as those words are used by the courts in this connection and certainly not \\\"great and flagrant\\\" which are the words used in stating this dividing line in the first of the above quotations. \\\"Flagrant\\\" here, we take to connote a bad intent and to be used in the sense defined in Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition, as \\\"Flaming into notice; notorious; enormous, heinous; glaringly wicked; as a flagrant error, traitor.\\\"\\nSection 2602 provides that no irregularity or improper conduct by the precinct election board shall void an election result unless this resulted in a defendant being declared either elected or tied for election; and Section 2603 provides that an election shall not be set aside on account of illegal votes unless it appears that such number of illegal votes has been given to the person whose right to the office is contested, or who has been certified as having tied for first place, which if taken from him, would reduce the number of his legal votes below the number of votes given to some other person for the same office, after deducting therefrom the illegal votes which may be shown to have been given to such other person. This is at least consistent with, if it does not require, placing upon the contestants the burden of proving who the unidentified illegal votes were for under the circumstances here disclosed. These unidentified illegal absentee ballots seem to have been so generally accepted in different precincts that we believe any prorating of them would have to be on the, basis of each candidate's, total vote and not by precincts. Therefore, it makes no practical difference whether they are prorated or the fact of their illegality is simply disregarded, viz. Russell v. McDowell (1890) 83 Cal. 70, 23 P. 183, where prorating on the basis of the entire vote was used.\\nWe therefore hold that the contestants have not sustained their burden of proof and that the complaint was properly dismissed.\\n4. While we base our decision on the above, we feel we should also call attention to the fact that by their failure to challenge the illegal 'local\\\" absentee votes in accordance with Section 2477 when they were cast and by the participation of the Territorial Party's workers in obtaining some of them, the contestants may well have been estopped to object to them, In re Sugar Creek Local School District, supra; 18 Am.Jur., Elections, Section 280.\\nCONCLUSION\\nWe conclude that the contestants have not shown that the defendants, or any of them, were improperly elected.\\nThe judgment appealed from is affirmed.\"}"

guam/5312759.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5312759\", \"name\": \"PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. FRANCISCO P. DE JESUS, Defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"People v. De Jesus\", \"decision_date\": \"1978-02-23\", \"docket_number\": \"Criminal Case No. 5F-78\", \"first_page\": 515, \"last_page\": 517, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 515\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. FRANCISCO P. DE JESUS, Defendant\", \"head_matter\": \"PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. FRANCISCO P. DE JESUS, Defendant\\nCriminal Case No. 5F-78\\nSuperior Court of Guam\\nFebruary 23, 1978\", \"word_count\": \"630\", \"char_count\": \"3795\", \"text\": \"ABBATE, Presiding Judge\\nDECISION\\nThis matter comes before the Court on defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment against him filed February 3, 1978, and argued February 10, 1978. Defendant's motion is based on the lack of competent evidence to establish three essential elements: (1) the identity of the murder victim; (2) the voluntariness of defendant's statement; and (3) compliance with procedural safeguards under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436.\\nIn the past this Court was reluctant to dismiss an indictment on the ground of insufficient evidence before the grand jury. See People v. Viloria, S.C. Criminal Case No. 324F-77; United States v. Costello, 350 U.S. 359, 76 S.Ct. 406 (1956). Prior to January 1, 1978, indictments were handed down pursuant to Rules 6 and 7 of the old Guam Rules of Criminal Procedure. Now, however, indictments are measured by the standards set forth in Chapter 50 of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure (Public Law 13-186).\\nSection 50.42 of the new Code reads:\\nThe grand jury shall receive only evidence which would be admissible over objection at the trial of a criminal action but the fact that evidence which would have been excluded at trial was received by the grand jury does not render the indictment void where sufficient competent evidence to support the indictment was received by the grand jury.\\nWhereas under the old rules virtually any evidence would support an indictment, \\u00a7 50.42 specifies that the grand jury may consider only competent evidence which would be admissible over objection at trial.\\nThe indictment handed down against De Jesus was based entirely on a statement given police officers by the defendant. A confession is not admissible into evidence at trial absent the introduction of a proper foundation of voluntariness.\\nCalifornia Penal Code \\u00a7 939.6 is similar to \\u00a7 50.42 in that it requires an indictment to be based upon admissible evidence. In Mott v. Superior Court, 226 Cal.App.2d 617, 38 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1964), the court dismissed an indictment based upon a confession where the grand jury received no preliminary foundation of voluntariness. As. stated at page 618:\\nA grand jury may receive only the same type of evidence which a. court of law may entertain, i.e., legally competent evidence. Hence a foundation of voluntariness must be established. None having been laid here, there was no competent or sufficient evidence to support the indictment.\\nDefendant here maintains that the foundation laid before the grand jury was insufficient to support admission of the confession. The only foundation appeared on page 4 of the grand jury transcript:\\nQ Prior to the interview with him did you advise him of his constitutional rights?\\nA Yes, sir.\\nQ Did you make any promises to him or did you use any force to obtain a statement?\\nA No, sir.\\nThis was the only evidence of voluntariness to be found in the transcript. At least one grand juror had doubts whether the confession was voluntary.\\nQ How did you get De Jesus' statement?\\nA I don't think that would be appropriate under the circumstances. Transcript page 16.\\nThis Court is of the opinion that it was appropriate under the circumstances. The grand jury should have received more than cursory, conclusory statements as to the facts surrounding De Jesus' confession. This Court does not hold that the same technical foundation for admission of evidence at trial is required to be put before the grand jury. See People v. Olf, 195 Cal.App.2d 97, 104, 15 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1961). It is held only that the foundation laid here was insufficient to support the indictment.\\nDefendant's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment is granted.\\nSO ORDERED.\"}"

guam/5312785.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5312785\", \"name\": \"JUAN G. TENORIO, Appellee v. ARWELL TENORIO, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Tenorio v. Tenorio\", \"decision_date\": \"1973-02-06\", \"docket_number\": \"Civil No. 72-A\", \"first_page\": 210, \"last_page\": 215, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 210\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"District Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before PECKHAM, PEREZ, and TURNER, Judges\", \"parties\": \"JUAN G. TENORIO, Appellee v. ARWELL TENORIO, Appellant\", \"head_matter\": \"JUAN G. TENORIO, Appellee v. ARWELL TENORIO, Appellant\\nCivil No. 72-A\\nDistrict Court of Guam Appellate Division\\nFebruary 6, 1973\\nBefore PECKHAM, PEREZ, and TURNER, Judges\", \"word_count\": \"1266\", \"char_count\": \"7460\", \"text\": \"TURNER, Designated Judge\\nOPINION\\nThis was an appeal from an oral interlocutory decree of divorce entered February 24, 1971 and amended by a written decree and findings of fact February 25, 1971. The appellant wife, who was defendant below, challenges the division of the community property. We hold the trial court abused its discretion and we remand, without reversing, for further findings and conclusions and entry of an amended decree in accordance with this opinion.\\nIn its interlocutory decree, the Court awarded divorce to the husband \\\"upon the grounds stated in the complaint\\\"; custody of the three minor children was awarded defendant with support from plaintiff in the amount of $200.00 per month, even though plaintiff agreed to continue paying $400.00 per month (Tr. 12) \\\"as long as I can\\\"; real property in Guam was awarded to plaintiff and the wife was awarded $3,600.00 in monthly installments of $200.00; and an unimproved lot in Florida was awarded plaintiff.\\nThe wife appeals on the ground it was ehror to award all of the community property to the plaintiff. Appellant argues the Guam Civil Code, Sections 146 and 147, require sharing of community property, within the Court's discretion, even when the grounds for the divorce are adultery or extreme cruelty.\\nThe so-called \\\"Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law\\\" prepared by plaintiff's counsel and entered by the Court do not find facts but merely recite conclusions of law. i.e.:\\n\\\"That the defendant has been guilty of acts constituting extreme cruelty towards the plaintiff, and that such acts have caused plaintiff great mental anguish.\\\"\\nFrom our examination of the transcript, we do not agree with this conclusion and without findings of facts from the evidence, we are unable to say whether this was reversible error or not as an abuse of discretion.\\nIn Galbreath v. Homestead Fire Ins. Co., 185 F.2d 361, 364, the Ninth Circuit laid down the rule relating to abuse of discretion as grounds for reversal. A finding of fact is necessary. The court said:\\n\\\"Where the trial court sitting without a jury has made a finding upon an issue of negligence it is the duty of the appellate court as a matter of law to determine whether or not the finding is clearly erroneous even in the face of supporting evidence but only after due allowance of respect for the trial court's conclusion. And it is the appellate court's duty to reverse if, upon viewing the case as a whole, it is convinced that a mistake has been made.\\\"\\nBecause .there are no adequate findings of fact upon which to base the Court's conclusions, we are unable to say whether or not the Court abused its discretion. In this case, the Court concluded the plaintiff was entitled to a divorce upon the grounds alleged in the complaint. These included an allegation the defendant \\\"deserted and abandoned\\\" the plaintiff. The evidence is to the contrary.\\nAs to the award of property, we again are at a loss to determine whether there was \\\"plain error\\\" because of lack of findings or whether .there was an abuse of discretion contrary to the intent of the statute as appellant argues.\\nThe Guam statutes were taken from the California Code prior to their comparatively recent amendments. We look to that state's decisions against which to measure the decree in the case before us.\\nThe trial court cited in support of its award of all real property to plaintiff husband and an award of $3,600.00 to the wife, the California case of Johnston v. Johnston, 91 P.2d 142, which holds that \\\"under various circumstances, an award of money to the wife in lieu of her interest in the real and personal property of the community has been sustained.\\\"\\nAlthough no finding was made as to the value of the real property awarded to the husband, the evidence is not disputed that the wife contributed $6,200.00 of her separate funds to the improvement of the community realty. The award of $3,600.00 in lieu of her interest in the realty is shockingly disproportionate to her contribution to the community assets, both in money and management services. Without findings of facts to support it, we must conclude the award is an abuse of the Court's discretion and is therefore contrary to Section 147 of the Guam Civil Code.\\nWe also note the wife is cut off from any support after payment of the $3,600.00. The record shows she has twice undergone surgery for cancer and at the time of trial was having monthly medical checkups to ascertain whether further surgery will be necessary. No provision was made in the decree for future medical expenses either for the wife or the three minor children.\\nThe evidence shows the wife is without assets of her own, that she is fifty-eight years of age and that it is unlikely she can become gainfully employed. If the wife isn't now on welfare, the probability is she soon will be. Neither the statute nor the exercise of judicial discretion warrants condemning an erring spouse to the welfare rolls no matter how greatly she may have offended her husband.\\nWhen there is discretion to award less than half of the community property to one spouse, the exercise of \\\"reasonable\\\" discretion must be measured by all of the circumstances affecting the parties. The applicable rule is found in Hill v. Hill, 309 P.2d 44, 46:\\n\\\"Apparently the decisions have embraced the concept that it is proper in such cases to visit punishment upon the erring spouse in the apportionment of community property. Nevertheless, divorce having been granted and the time having arrived for apportioning the community property, the amount thereof, the age of the parties, their physical and mental condition, their ability to support themselves, and the needs of the minors, if such there be, are all matters ranking higher in the scale of importance than the mere infliction of punishment for wrongdoing.\\\"\\nIt is true the offending spouse may not receive alimony when the grounds for divorce are extreme cruelty under the pre-amendment California statute, unless the parties have agreed to the contrary. Goldberg v. Goldberg, 301 P.2d 51. The record here shows, as we have seen, the trial court failed to grant the plaintiff's conditional promise to provide support for both his wife and children.\\nA review of the record discloses the findings of facts are so inadequate we cannot know whether the Court's conclusions were in error or were an abuse of discretion.\\nThe evidence shows community property neither valued nor disposed of, nor mentioned in the findings of facts. Because this case must be remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion, it is suggested that the Court make findings of facts on:\\n1. The value of all realty and the rental value of The House of Chin Fee.\\n2. The value of the Florida realty.\\n3. The value of bonds, if any remain in the estate, and if they do not, when and for what purpose they were cashed.\\n4. The value of insurance policies. An order should be made as to their disposition, or their maintenance and continuation for the benefit of the parties and the children.\\n5. The probable cost of future medical expenses. An order should be made to provide for payment of such expenses.\\nIt is ORDERED that the above-entitled case is remanded to the Island Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.\"}"

guam/5312799.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5312799\", \"name\": \"NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY AND FRANKIE C. CRUZ, Plaintiffs v. JOSE P. QUITUGUA & JUANITA P. QUITUGUA, Defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"National Union Fire Insurance v. Quitugua\", \"decision_date\": \"1976-10-27\", \"docket_number\": \"Civil No. 129-74\", \"first_page\": 356, \"last_page\": 358, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 356\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY AND FRANKIE C. CRUZ, Plaintiffs v. JOSE P. QUITUGUA & JUANITA P. QUITUGUA, Defendants\", \"head_matter\": \"NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY AND FRANKIE C. CRUZ, Plaintiffs v. JOSE P. QUITUGUA & JUANITA P. QUITUGUA, Defendants\\nCivil No. 129-74\\nSuperior Court of Guam\\nOctober 27, 1976\", \"word_count\": \"543\", \"char_count\": \"3158\", \"text\": \"BENSON, Judge '\\nFINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW\\nThe Plaintiffs appeared by its attorney, Mr. E. R. Crain and the Defendants also appearing by its attorney, Mr. Mark Cowan. After trial the case was then submitted for decision.\\nThe parties stipulated that Plaintiff company had issued a policy of collision insurance on the car of Frankie C. Cruz; that an accident occurred on September 15, 1973, between the car of Frankie C. Cruz and the car owned by Juanita P. Quitugua; that Plaintiff company expended $627.50 in fulfillment of its obligation to Frankie C. Cruz for the repair of his car; that Frankie C. Cruz had subrogated Plaintiff company to his rights against Defend ants, that the amount of $75.00 had been paid by Juanita P. Quitugua to Frankie C. Cruz, and therefore Frankie C. Cruz was dismissed as a party Plaintiff.\\nThe trial was had on the issues of liability for the accident and whether there had been an accord and satisfaction.\\nFINDINGS OF FACT\\n1. The car owned by Juanita P. Quitugua was being driven by Jose P. Quitugua, her son, at the time of the accident.\\n2. The car owned by Frankie C. Cruz was being driven by Lourdes Cruz, his wife, at the time of the accident.\\n3. At the time of the impact, Defendant's car had been travelling excessively fast and was out of control.\\n4. Just prior to the accident the car of Frankie C. Cruz was being driven slowly. It was entirely within its proper lane of travel at the time of the impact.\\n5. Defendant, Juanita P. Quitugua, paid to Frankie C. Cruz's wife $75.00 on September 29, 1973. The payment was made by the check admitted as Exhibit 1. This sum corresponded to the deductible portion for which Frankie C. Cruz was obligated according to the terms of his policy.\\n6. When Defendant paid, she knew it was Frankie C. Cruz's portion of the payment for repairs; that the insurance company would pay the remainder. She did not .know the total cost of repairing Frankie C. Cruz's car. Although statements may have been made by Frankie C. Cruz to Juanita P. Quitugua indicating a release of her, she made the payment knowing the insurance company had an interest in the matter.\\nCONCLUSIONS OF LAW\\n1. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Defendants for $627.50 with costs.\\nJUDGMENT\\nThis cause came on regularly for trial on the 20th day of September, 1976, before the Honorable Richard H. Benson, Judge, presiding, sitting without a jury. The plaintiffs appeared by their attorney, Mr. Robert Shoecraft, and the defendants appeared by their attorney, Mr. Mark Cowan, and evidence both oral and documentary having been presented by both parties and the cause having been argued and submitted for decision and the court having made and caused to be filed its written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law\\nIT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs have judgment against Jose P. Quitugua and Juanita P. Quitugua, jointly and severally in the amount of $627.50 together with costs of this action.\"}"

guam/5312812.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5312812\", \"name\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM, Appellee v. HENRY W. SANTOS, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"People v. Santos\", \"decision_date\": \"1967-02-09\", \"docket_number\": \"Criminal No. 35-A\", \"first_page\": 399, \"last_page\": 403, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 399\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"District Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before SHRIVER, Judge, District Court of Guam; FUR-BER, Chief Justice, High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; DUE\\u00d1AS, Judge, Island Court of Guam\", \"parties\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM, Appellee v. HENRY W. SANTOS, Appellant\", \"head_matter\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM, Appellee v. HENRY W. SANTOS, Appellant\\nCriminal No. 35-A\\nDistrict Court of Guam Appellate Division\\nFebruary 9, 1967\\nCounsel for Appellee: JOHN P. Raker, Island Attorney\\nCounsel for Appellant: Barrett, Ferenz & Trapp\\nBefore SHRIVER, Judge, District Court of Guam; FUR-BER, Chief Justice, High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; DUE\\u00d1AS, Judge, Island Court of Guam\", \"word_count\": \"1474\", \"char_count\": \"8612\", \"text\": \"SHRIVER, Judge\\nOPINION\\nThe appellant, Henry W. Santos, hereafter called the defendant, was charged in the Island Court of Guam with the offenses of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of \\u00a7 23405(a) of the Government Code of Guam, and reckless driving, causing bodily injury to a person, in violation of \\u00a7 23407(a) and (b) of such Code. He was acquitted of the charge of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and found guilty of the charge of reckless driving, causing a bodily injury. As the penalty imposed by the court was well within the limits for reckless driving, regardless of bodily injury, we consider only the reckless driving aspects. The defendant contends on appeal that the evidence did not support the conviction. We review the evidence upon which the trial court could have relied to support the conviction. As we are convinced that such evidence was sufficient we affirm.\\nBefore the accident the defendant had been drinking. The doctor who examined him at Guam Memorial Hospital after the accident was prevented from making a thorough examination because the defendant became violent, but the doctor testified that he noticed the smell of alcohol very strong (Tr. p. 2). The police officer who investigated the accident testified that the defendant had alcohol on his breath and the police officer ordered a sobriety examination (Tr. p. 21).\\nWhile the mere act of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor is not in itself a sufficient predicate for a conviction of reckless driving the fact that one charged with reckless driving had been drinking is a factor to be considered in determining his guilt, and evidence of such drinking is generally recognized as being admissible in a prosecution for reckless driving. 7 Am.Jur.2d 879.\\nThe defendant and his passenger had attended some racing at Harmon Air Strip when it started to rain and the defendant drove onto the highway, was in the middle lane and \\\"I just miss the car was beside me when I pass him and went inside the first lane\\\" (Defendant's testimony, Tr. p. 30). The car the defendant just missed was apparently being driven by People's witness Bias who testified that he was traveling in a solid-line lane which extended for some distance when he was passed by the defendant. A solid line on this three-lane highway means that traffic must travel in the lane to the right of the solid line, leaving the other two lanes for traffic from the opposite direction and for passing in the middle lane when so marked. Before he reached the Cycle Center in Tamuning the defendant skidded but did not hit anybody (Tr. p. 13). He skidded to the other side of the road on the shoulder. The witness continued his driving when he saw the defendant coming again. The witness passed three cars in front of him to get away from the defendant. The defendant also passed these cars, skidded in the middle lane and hit another car that was waiting to make a left-hand turn (Tr. p. 14). When the defendant first passed the witness he was going 50, 60 miles an hour in a 45-mile zone (Tr. p. 15). The car waiting to turn had been there for about three minutes. After the accident the defendant appeared to be boxing an invisible opponent in his car (Tr. p. 9). The defendant and his passenger were taken to the hospital in an ambulance when the events previously mentioned took place. The defendant was given sedation and, no injuries being found, he was taken to the police station. At the police station the defendant had difficulty speaking and \\\"Mr. Santos was crawling up to his wife and was groaning and under the alcohol beverage, coming from his breath to strong alcohol\\\" (Tr. p. 21).\\nFrom the totality of the evidence, then, the trial court could find (1) the defendant had been drinking; (2) he passed and just missed another car while going above the speed limit on a wet highway, crossing a solid line in the process; (3) some distance farther on went into a skid to the other side of the highway; (4) did not enter the right traffic lane but continued in the center lane while passing other automobiles; (5) could not control his car and went into another skid into the right rear of a car waiting to turn, a car that had been there for some time; (6) subsequent actions consistent with an effort to avoid a sobriety test.\\nSection 23407 of the Government Code of Guam provides that a defendant to be guilty of reckless driving must drive a vehicle in wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. We are cited to a number of California decisions by the defendant and the People in connection with the construction of these words. This opinion would be unnecessarily long if we attempted to discuss the various distinctions involved in terms of the large number of decisions. As the defendant has relied upon the following case in support of his position, we quote from it as controlling here.\\nWhile, however, for the reasons stated, the contentions embraced in the defendant's first three specifications of error appear to us to be without substance, it is otherwise with the fourth specification, namely, that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the judgment. There is no dispute that passengers in the defendant's car were injured in the accident under investigation. We do not doubt that the defendant's conduct in weaving back and forth while on a grade, from one traffic lane to the other, taken together with the physical facts disclosed in the evidence, particularly the appearance and length of the skid marks on the road, and the place where his automobile came to rest, made out a prima facie case of negligence and possibly of gross negligence on his part. It was open to the defendant, of course, to show that what happened was attributable to mechanical defects in his automobile or other circumstances beyond his control. The explanation which he attempted was met by other testimony which produced a conflict. This conflict the trial court resolved against the defendant. We must, therefore, for the purpose of the present decision, assume that he was guilty of negligence, and may for the sake of the argument assume that it amounted to gross negligence. This, however, is not enough to warrant conviction of the violation of \\u00a7 505(b) of the Vehicle Code. It was held in the recent case of People v. McNutt, Cal. Super., 105 P.2d 657, that there is no substantial difference between \\\"wilful misconduct\\\", as used in \\u00a7 403 of the Vehicle Code, which renders a driver liable for injuries to his guest, and \\\"reckless driving\\\" as defined in \\u00a7 505 of said Code and that decisions construing the term \\\"wilful misconduct\\\" may be applied to the statutory provision prohibiting \\\"reckless driving\\\"; and that negligence, even though gross, is not \\\"wilful misconduct\\\" and falls short of constituting \\\"reckless driving.\\\" Without elaborating upon the comprehensive discussion in the opinion in that case, we content ourselves with saying that we agree with the views there expressed.\\nIn the instant case there is nothing to show that the defendant was guilty of \\\"deliberate, intentional, or wanton conduct in doing or omitting to perform acts, with knowledge or appreciation of the fact, on the part of the culpable person, that danger\\\" was \\\"likely to result therefrom\\\" which is the test of the existence or nonexistence of \\\"wilful misconduct\\\" as laid down in Parsons v. Fuller, 8 Cal.2d 463, 468, 66 P.2d 430, 432. In these circumstances he was not shown to be guilty of \\\"reckless driving.\\\" People v. Thompson, 41 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 965, 108 P.2d 105, 107 (App. Dept. S.Ct. 1940).\\nWe hold that when a drinking and speeding defendant on a wet highway has faced one skid which threw his car in front of any traffic coming from the opposite direction, who then continues the same driving pattern until another skid forced his vehicle into collision with a standing car waiting to make a left turn, certainly had knowledge or appreciation of the fact on his part that danger was likely to result therefrom and that he drove his vehicle upon a highway in wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. Affirmed.\"}"

guam/5312850.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5312850\", \"name\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. RAYMOND QUIDACHAY, et al., Defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"People v. Quidachay\", \"decision_date\": \"1979-07-27\", \"docket_number\": \"Criminal Case No. 199F-78\", \"first_page\": 629, \"last_page\": 632, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 629\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. RAYMOND QUIDACHAY, et al., Defendants\", \"head_matter\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. RAYMOND QUIDACHAY, et al., Defendants\\nCriminal Case No. 199F-78\\nSuperior Court of Guam\\nJuly 27, 1979\", \"word_count\": \"664\", \"char_count\": \"3989\", \"text\": \"ABBATE, Presiding Judge\\nDECISION AND ORDER\\nThis matter came for hearing in the above-titled Court before the Honorable Paul J. Abbate on July 24, 1979. The Government was represented by Assistant Attorney General Paul Pohlen, defend\\u00e1nt Anthony Flores was represented by Stephen Cronin, and defendant Raymond Quidachay was represented by Assistant Public Defender Richard Pipes. Defendant Quidachay moved for severance of defendants in this matter, and co-defendant Flores joined in the motion by moving to reconsider a previously denied motion for severance.\\nDefendants' motion is based on \\u00a7 65.35 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and the Organic Act of Guam (48 U.S.C. Section 1421(b); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (1968)). The gravamen of defendants' complaint is that a joint trial will result in prejudice, deny them the right of confrontation of witnesses against them, and deny them due process of law in that each defendant has allegedly made extrajudicial statements which would be admissible against the defendant who made the statement, but not against the other.\\nGuam Criminal Procedure Code \\u00a7 65.35 is textually the same as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14, and direct reference to this rule is made in the Code as the source of \\u00a7 65.35. A motion made under this Section is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Parker v. Randolph, 99 S.Ct. 2132 (1979); Opper v. United States, 75 S.Ct. 158, 165, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954).\\nIn the instant case, there are several claims that prejudice will result if severance is not granted. The first, of course, is that evidence would be admitted at a joint trial, albeit with a curative instruction that it may not be used against the co-defendant who did not make the statement, which would not be admissible if the co-defendant's trial was severed, and without benefit of cross-examination. It is argued by the Government that this is a case such as Parker v. Randolph, supra, in which the co-defendant has himself made an incriminating statement, and thus lessened the prejudice of admitting his co-defendant's statement. Parker is inapposite on its facts for two reasons: First, defendant Flores has allegedly made not one confession, but several which inculpate his co-defendant Quidachay to varying degrees, and increase the confusion the jury would be subjected to in hearing these confessions and attempting to excise any probative effect on the guilt or innocence of the defendant who did not make the confession. Second, the oral statement attributed to defendant Quidachay in the view of the Court stops short of being a complete confession as to all of the elements of the offense with which he is charged, and is clearly inconsistent with one or more of the confessions made by Flores. Thus, we do not have, as in Parker, a situation in which \\\"the defendant himself has confessed and his confession 'interlocks' with and supports the confession of his co-defendant\\\".\\nA second factor raised by defense counsel is \\\"the possibility that at a separate trial a co-defendant would give exonerating testimony\\\", People v. Massie, 66 Cal.2d 899, at 954.\\nAnd finally, joint trial in this case raises the spectre of comment on the failure of the co-defendant to take the stand by counsel for a defendant. (De Luna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140), thus raising prejudicial error as to the nontestifying defendant.\\nFor the foregoing reasons, it is the decision of the Court that it is in the interest of justice that trial in this matter be severed as to each defendant. Jury selection for defendant Flores is set for the original date set for a joint trial, August 10, 1979, 9:00 a.m. Jury selection as to defendant Quidachay is set for 9:00 a.m., August 24, 1979.\\nIT IS SO ORDERED.\"}"

guam/5312889.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5312889\", \"name\": \"RCA GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS, Plaintiff v. FRANCISCO S. QUENGA, Defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"RCA Global Communications v. Quenga\", \"decision_date\": \"1979-07-26\", \"docket_number\": \"Civil Case No. 748-78\", \"first_page\": 622, \"last_page\": 624, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 622\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"RCA GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS, Plaintiff v. FRANCISCO S. QUENGA, Defendant\", \"head_matter\": \"RCA GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS, Plaintiff v. FRANCISCO S. QUENGA, Defendant\\nCivil Case No. 748-78\\nSuperior Court of Guam\\nJuly 26, 1979\", \"word_count\": \"570\", \"char_count\": \"3467\", \"text\": \"ABBATE, Presiding Judge\\nDECISION AND ORDER\\nThis matter came before the Court on plaintiff RCA Global Communications' Motion for Summary Judgment. Mr. Klitzkie appeared on behalf of the plaintiff and Mr. Manibusan represented the defendant. The motion was heard before the Honorable Paul J. Abbate on July 16, 1979, and decision was reserved.\\nThe plaintiff seeks summary judgment on an action to recover a sum of $3,507.75 from the defendant. The above sum was allegedly incurred and charged to the defendant's RCA account number. The basis for the plaintiff's action are records of the calls, supported by the affidavit from the plaintiff's credit administrator.\\nThe defendant denies any responsibility for the above-mentioned charges. Also, the defendant contends that the plaintiff was negligent in allowing such an amount to accrue since the credit limit on the defendant's RCA account is only $150.00.\\nBefore turning to the question of the existence of any genuine material issue of fact we must examine the records and supporting affidavit submitted by the plaintiff in support of summary judgment.\\nIn order to be admissible as evidence the records in question must fall into the business records exception to the hearsay rule. In order to fall within the above-mentioned exception certain requirements must generally be met. There are a line of California cases which list the basic elements which must be laid for a proper foundation. That would allow the business records to be admissible into evidence. The requirements are as follows:\\n(1) that the books or records are kept in the regular course of business;\\n(2) that the business is of a character in which it is proper and customary to keep such books;\\n(3) that they were made at the time or within a reasonable proximity to the time of the transactions;\\n(4) that the entries are either original entries or the first permanent entries of the transaction; and\\n(5) that the persons making them had personal knowledge of the transaction or obtained such knowledge from a report regularly made to him by some person employed in the business whose duty it was to make the same in the regular course of business; or the sources of information and method and time of preparation were such as to indicate its trustworthiness. Gough v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 162 C.A.2d 90 (1958); Kains v. First National Bank, 30 C.A. 447 (1939); Richmond v. Frederick, 116 C.A.2d 541 (1953); Bufono v. City and County of San Francisco, 233 C.A.2d 61 (1965); Burke v. John E. Marshall, Inc., 42 C.A.2d 195 (1941); Chan Kiu Sing v. Gordon, 171 Cal. 28 (1915).\\nEfforts to enter business records into evidence without laying a proper foundation will render those records incompetent and therefore inadmissible. Pruett v. Burr, 257 P.2d 690 (1953); Pabst Brewing Co. v. E. Clemens Horst Co., 229 F. 913 (1916).\\nIn the present case the plaintiff has failed to lay a sufficient foundation. The affidavit of one Beverly Bushaw does not fulfill the above-mentioned requirements for a proper foundation.\\nEven though the records in question were to be found admissible a summary judgment would be improper for the reason that genuine material issues of fact do exist in this case and accordingly must be litigated at trial.\\nFor the aforementioned reasons, the plaintiff's MOTION IS DENIED.\\nSO ORDERED.\"}"

guam/5312921.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5312921\", \"name\": \"HAWAIIAN LIFE INSURANCE CO., LTD., Plaintiff v. ANNA R. GRAVES, et al., Defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Hawaiian Life Insurance v. Graves\", \"decision_date\": \"1978-09-01\", \"docket_number\": \"Civil Case No. 609-78\", \"first_page\": 556, \"last_page\": 559, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 556\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"HAWAIIAN LIFE INSURANCE CO., LTD., Plaintiff v. ANNA R. GRAVES, et al., Defendants\", \"head_matter\": \"HAWAIIAN LIFE INSURANCE CO., LTD., Plaintiff v. ANNA R. GRAVES, et al., Defendants\\nCivil Case No. 609-78\\nSuperior Court of Guam\\nSeptember 1, 1978\", \"word_count\": \"683\", \"char_count\": \"4202\", \"text\": \"WEEKS, Judge\\nDECISION\\nThis case comes before the Court on plaintiff Hawaiian Life Insurance Company's motion for preliminary injunction, dismissal of plaintiff and award of attorney fees. The motion was filed on August 21, 1978, and argued September 1, 1978. During the September 1 hearing this Court held that there were adverse claimants to the fund deposited and that interpleader pursuant to Rule 22 was proper.\\nInitially, it should be noted that prior to the adoption of the Guam Rules of Civil Procedure, interpleader actions were controlled by Civil Procedure Code \\u00a7 386. After the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure, \\u00a7 386 is of no further effect to the extent that its provisions conflict with Rule 22. See Code of Civil Procedure \\u00a7 123. Examination of Rule 22 and \\u00a7 386 indicates that they are not in conflict as they relate to this action.\\nPlaintiff seeks to enjoin defendants from instituting or prosecuting any action in another court which would affect the subject matter of this action. This Court finds no legal basis for the granting of such injunctive relief.\\nHad plaintiff been able to proceed in Federal District Court pursuant to the Federal Interpleader Statute (28 U.S.C. Sections 1335, 1397, 2361) or Rule interpleader under Rule 22 such relief would have been available. In junctions against state court actions are provided for by \\u00a7 2361 (statutory interpleader) and \\u00a7 2283 (rule inter-pleader) of Title 28. However, interpleader in Guam is based on Civil Procedure Code \\u00a7 386. That Section has been adopted from California and the courts of that state have never recognized the use of injunctions in interpleader actions. Additionally, Federal Court injunctions are directed at court proceedings rather than individuals.\\nPlaintiff also seeks an order dismissing it from this action. As previously noted, this Court held on September 1, 1978, that interpleader was proper procedure under the facts of this case. The fund at issue was deposited with the Clerk of Courts on August 15, 1978. Under these circumstances, plaintiff is entitled to be discharged from liability and freed from the necessity of participating in the litigation between the claimants. See generally Hancock Oil Company v. Hopkins, 24 Cal.2d 497, 150 P.2d 463 (1944); Williams v. Gilmore, 51 Cal.App.2d 684, 125 P.2d 539 (1942).\\nFinally, plaintiff seeks attorney fees. Historically, federal equity courts have awarded attorney fees to the stakeholder if circumstances made such an award appropriate. Thomas Kay Woolen Mill Co. v. Sprague, 259 F. 388 (1919); McNamara v. Provident Sav. Life Assur. Soc., 114 F. 910 (1902). Federal Courts have continued this practice under Rule 22 and the interpleader statutes although fees are not expressly allowed. Davis v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 331 F.2d 346 (1964). Globe Indemnity Co. v. Puget Sound Co., 154 F.2d 249 (1946).\\nThe California Supreme Court ruled in 1939 that the allowance of attorney fees to the stakeholder was without authority. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Nakano, 12 Cal.2d 711, 87 P.2d 700 (1939). The appellate courts have consistently recognized that California cases subsequent to the adoption of the Guam Codes, while not binding, are persuasive. Tabor v. Ulloa, 323 F.2d 823, 824, n.5 (9th Cir. 1963); Roberto v. Aguon, 519 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1975). It is unclear whether the Federal view or the California position is preferable and should be adopted. Therefore, this Court holds only that attorney fees will not be awarded in this action.\\nFor the foregoing reasons plaintiff's motion is granted as to dismissal and denied as to the injunction and attorney fees.\\nPlaintiff to submit order.\\nIt is not immediately clear that such jurisdiction would lie in the District Court of Guam since 28 U.S.C. Section 1335 creates a remedy only and suits thereunder may not \\\"arise under\\\" a Federal law.\\nCalifornia amended its interpleader statute in 1955 to allow the award of costs and reasonable attorney fees to the stakeholder. See: California Code of Civil Procedure, Section 386.6.\"}"

guam/5312963.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5312963\", \"name\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM, Plaintiff v. GREGORY ROSS DALLY, Defendant; THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM, Plaintiff v. RICHARD J. LANDGRAF, Defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"People v. Dally\", \"decision_date\": \"1975-05-27\", \"docket_number\": \"Criminal No. 56F-75; Criminal No. 59F-75\", \"first_page\": 274, \"last_page\": 279, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 274\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM, Plaintiff v. GREGORY ROSS DALLY, Defendant THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM, Plaintiff v. RICHARD J. LANDGRAF, Defendant\", \"head_matter\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM, Plaintiff v. GREGORY ROSS DALLY, Defendant THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM, Plaintiff v. RICHARD J. LANDGRAF, Defendant\\nCriminal No. 56F-75\\nCriminal No. 59F-75\\nSuperior Court of Guam\\nMay 27, 1975\", \"word_count\": \"1425\", \"char_count\": \"8500\", \"text\": \"ABBATE, Judge\\nDECISION\\nI have carefully reviewed the objections and statements submitted by defendants Dally and Landgraf requesting that I disqualify myself for reasons of bias and prejudice. These documents include assertions that \\\"by reason of bias and prejudice of the Honorable Paul J. Abbate, a fair and impartial trial cannot be had before him.\\\" Annexed to these documents are \\\"Exhibit A's, which are copies of indictments of a one Frank Rodney Reyes and a one Gordon Steve Clay charging same with the murders of Gregory Valer Abbate, Jan Marie Faria, and Mary Louise Farrell. Included in the document is the notation that \\\"Gregory Valer Abbate is the son of the Honorable Paul J. Abbate.\\\"\\nThere was presented no evidence nor was any allegation made that defendants Dally and Landgraf bear any relationship with those defendants whose names appear in the attached indictments. Further, there was presented no evidence nor were any allegations made that I have had any direct or remote relationship with defendants Dally and Landgraf.\\nOn first impression, I am at a loss to understand upon what legal theory these requests for disqualification are supported by the annexed exhibits. Therefore, having failed to receive same, I have been compelled to attempt to extrapolate from these disparate elements the legal theory upon which defendants Dally and Landgraf rest their requests, in order that I might intelligently and judiciously respond.\\nApparently, it is their theory that the experiencing of this personal tragedy by myself has resulted in a warping of my judicial faculties. More specifically, it would appear that defendants Dally and Landgraf are alleging that this event has heightened my abhorrence to crime to such an extent as to blur my judicial vision, thereby preventing me from viewing them (or, for that matter, any defendants) as other than as a guilty party.\\nAfter examining the decisional law relative to the issues raised by both the facts presented, and the theory I was forced to impose upon same, I cannot but conclude that this request fails for the most fundamental of reasons. Simply stated, it fails to present any evidence or make any allegation of facts which relate defendants Dally and Landgraf to myself.\\nIn 1937, the Supreme Court of California in People v. Swett, 65 P.2d 899, while reviewing a petition pursuant to \\u00a7 170(4) of the California Code (essentially the same as Guam Code \\u00a7 170(4)), enunciated for the first time that an essential element of any claim under this section need be a showing of facts which give rise to a probable inference of bias or prejudice against the specific moving litigant. At page 901 of that decision, the court stated \\\"... furthermore it is well established that before bias or prejudice can disqualify a judge it must be shown to exist against the particular party moving for the substitution of the judge.\\\" It is worth noting that the factual setting of that decision is rather analogous to the present, inasmuch as the bias or prejudice, which was alleged, was claimed to have arisen from the Judge's prior status as Attorney General. The allegation being that that former status made him biased against all criminal defendants.\\nThe principle of law established in Swett has been affirmed on numerous occasions, however, perhaps never as succinctly as In re Osslo, 334 P.2d 1, where at page 10 the court opined.\\nThe degree of bias and prejudice which disqualifies a trial judge is more than a nebulous belief that the judge had some preconceived ideas about a piece of litigation, it is personal bias and prejudice or a bent or leaning for or against the litigant, which regardless of the merits of the cause, makes it impossible for the judge to view the case dispassionately.\\nAnd as recently as 1974, this substantive issue of law has been upheld by the Oregon Supreme Court in Brauhn v. Brauhn, 518 P.2d 1089 where the court states at p. 1093:\\nIt is often held that to disqualify a judge from sitting, it is not enough that the claimed bias be with respect to the subject matter of the law suit; it must be with respect to the person of the party litigant.\\nWith respect to the extrapolated theory that abhorrence to crime may give rise to grounds for disqualification, I would like to address counsel's attention to the language in Crawford v. Ferguson, 115 P.278 at 282 which I look upon favorably as a sound piece of both judicial and social sense.\\n[6] There is a great and manifest difference between prejudice against a crime and being prejudiced against a person who may be charged with the commission of such crime. Every good citizen is prejudiced against the commission of crime. If being prejudiced against the commission of \\u00a1crime is a disqualification, then the members of this court are disqualified to decide any case pending before them....\\nWith respect to the authority of In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 which defense counsel offers as support for his position, I cannot but ironically note that if anything this case supports the overwhelming weight of authority which I believe this decision to be in accord with. Specifically, In re Murchison reasserts rather forcefully the principle that if there are facts which relate the judge with the defendant, which may give rise to bias or prejudice, then a disqualification is required to satisfy the dictates of due process. In this instance, no such facts were submitted or alleged.\\nIn addition to examining the legal precedents surrounding this issue, I have as well examined the factual record to determine if there perhaps could be found there any substantiation to the theory I was compelled to extrapolate from the documents submitted. In essence, I examined the cases heard before me during the 10 months prior to July 21, 1974; and the cases heard during the 10 months subsequent thereto. Specifically, I examined the verdicts rendered in all those cases. The raw data is as follows:\\n1. # cases heard prior to July 21: 17\\n(a) # guilty verdicts : 7\\n(b) # not guilty verdicts : 10\\nnon-conviction rate : 58%\\n2. # cases heard subsequent to\\nJuly 21 15\\n(a) # guilty verdicts 4\\n(b) # not guilty 11\\nnon-conviction rate 73%\\nFrom a most cursory analysis of these figures, it is strikingly apparent that: 1.1 have not been critically biased or prejudiced towards all criminal defendants whose trials have been heard before me, inasmuch as 11 of those defendants appearing before me since July 21 have been found not guilty. II. A more careful analysis of these records in fact reveals that the conviction and non-conviction rate of criminal defendants heard before me in the respective time periods are essentially identical. Actually, the non-conviction rate in the subsequent time period is greater than the prior period (prior 58%; subsequent 73%):\\nThis empirical analysis perhaps best answers the question of whether I have become irreparably biased or prejudiced against all criminal defendants. The answer inescapably is an emphatic NO!\\nI have taken great pains to research and write this decision. I have done so for three reasons. First, because I have received this request in essentially this identical form on numerous occasions. Second, because I wish this to be the definitive opinion on this issue and therefore, dispositive of these numerous requests. And third, because I wish, in addition, to identify myself with that line of cases which have held unanimously that where a judge determines a request of this nature to be \\\"frivolous\\\" or a \\\"sham\\\" it may strike same from the record and disregard it. Therefore, the court wishes to allow this opinion to serve as adequate notice that requests of this nature are viewed as frivolous and as shams and I will not address myself to same in the future, but rather, disregard them and have them struck from the record.\\nSee Neblett v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of California, 139 P.2d 934 (1943) \\\". . . Where the statement of disqualification is legally insufficient and is based on frivolous grounds, he may disregard it or strike it from the record.\\\" p. 938;\\nSee also People v. Sweeney, 357 P.2d 1049 (1961); In re Rodda's Estate, 346 P.2d 441 (1959); Calhoun v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 331 P.2d 648 (1958); Mackie v. Derr, 316 P.2d 366 (1957).\"}"

guam/5312976.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5312976\", \"name\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. GORDON STEVE CLAY, Defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"People v. Clay\", \"decision_date\": \"1975-02-04\", \"docket_number\": \"Criminal No. 5F-74\", \"first_page\": 263, \"last_page\": 266, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 263\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. GORDON STEVE CLAY, Defendant\", \"head_matter\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. GORDON STEVE CLAY, Defendant\\nCriminal No. 5F-74\\nSuperior Court of Guam\\nFebruary 4, 1975\", \"word_count\": \"647\", \"char_count\": \"3706\", \"text\": \"'BENSON, Judge\\nORDER\\nThis matter came before the court on defendant Gordon Steve Clay's motion for an order suppressing the report of a hair comparison on the ground that the hair found at the scene which is reported similar to a hair taken from defendant Clay was no longer in existence.\\nCertain facts are undisputed. The hair found at the scene was compared by the People's chemist with one taken from the defendant pursuant to a warrant and were reported as similar. The hair found at the scene was subject to several tests and in a normal course of performance of the last test it was crushed and exposed to certain substances. The remnants were discarded. The defendant is obviously unable now to make independent tests (which were authorized by the court and were not objected to by the People) to either corroborate or impeach the findings of the People's chemist. No bad faith on the part of the People or its agents exists.\\nThe factual issue is whether or not it was proper procedure and warranted to have used the entire hair in the final test and then discarded the remnants.\\nAt the hearing of this motion, the chemist for the People and the chemist for the defendant testified extensively.\\nThe final test conducted by the People's chemist was to determine the blood grouping of the hair. The hair was one to one and one-half inches long (2.54 to 3.81 centimeters). In conducting the final test the chemist divided the hair into three sections for the testing to determine A, B or 0 blood grouping. He testified that sections of one-half to three-quarters. of an inch were the shortest .sections that he had used in any blood grouping tests.\\nThe People's chemist's tests were to compare 4 pubic hairs and one head hair found at the scene with hairs of the 3 victims and the 2 defendants. The only similarity found by him were the pubic hair in question and the defendant's pubic hair.\\nThe defendant's chemist testified that the shortest section he had tested was about b centimeter and he usually tested sections of to 1 centimeter. Thus the defendant's chemist would require a hair of Vh to 3 centimeters in length.\\nThe defendant's chemist also stated that the circumstances of this case indicated that the best procedure required the retaining of a portion of the hair unaltered so that later tests by others could be made; that it wouldn't be \\\"absolutely necessary\\\" to have used the entire hair; that rather than a comparison test as was done with a \\\"known hair\\\", better results are achieved by \\\"blind\\\" testing where the source of all hairs is unknown; that even the remnants of the hair following the blood grouping tests might have some value for later testing.\\nThe People's chemist testified on this last point that he would not rely on the results of subsequent testing of the hair remnants after the blood grouping test.\\nBoth experts testified as to a general policy of the importance of evidence preservation that is a part of their field, but did not cite specific procedures covering a case such as this.\\nThe court finds that the destruction of the hair occurred during an investigatory test conducted by a qualified chemist using reasonable means.\\nI conclude that the People have met their burden of explaining the non-production of the hair which was their duty to preserve once it was taken as evidence. U.S. v. Bryant (1971 C.A.D.C.) 439 F.2d 642, at p. 651. See also U.S. v. Sewar (9th Cir. 1972) 468 F.2d 236; People v. Eddington (C.A. Mich. 1974) 218 N.W.2d 831.\\nIt is therefore ordered that the defendant's motion be, and the same is hereby denied.\"}"

guam/5313072.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5313072\", \"name\": \"JOSE G. CRUZ and ROSA S. CRUZ, Appellees v. ANA LEON GUERRERO WHITE, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Cruz v. White\", \"decision_date\": \"1958-09-15\", \"docket_number\": \"Civil No. 12-A\", \"first_page\": 32, \"last_page\": 33, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 32\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"District Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before FURBER, Chief Justice, and TOOMIN, Associate Justice, High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and SHRIVER, United States Judge, District Court of Guam\", \"parties\": \"JOSE G. CRUZ and ROSA S. CRUZ, Appellees v. ANA LEON GUERRERO WHITE, Appellant\", \"head_matter\": \"JOSE G. CRUZ and ROSA S. CRUZ, Appellees v. ANA LEON GUERRERO WHITE, Appellant\\nCivil No. 12-A\\nDistrict Court of Guam Appellate Division\\nSeptember 15, 1958\\nCounsel for Appellees: Paul D. Palting\\nCounsel for Appellant: Turner & Novak\\nBefore FURBER, Chief Justice, and TOOMIN, Associate Justice, High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and SHRIVER, United States Judge, District Court of Guam\", \"word_count\": \"416\", \"char_count\": \"2500\", \"text\": \"PER CURIAM\\nOPINION\\nThis is an appeal from the Island Court of Guam in which that court decreed specific performance of the transfer of land from the appellant to the appellees. The issue was clouded by bad procedures and constant bickering between counsel. The trial court finally placed the issue in proper perspective and made findings of fact and conclusions of law with judgment decreeing the conveyance from the appellant to the appellees of the land in question after survey and proper description. We must remand the case to the trial court for this purpose as it is evident that there is no description at the present time, in the absence of survey, which describes the land to be conveyed and which the appellant could be required to convey.\\nThe appellant offered no evidence. The appellees attempted to obtain an order requiring the appellant to produce a deed alleged to have been obtained from the appellees for the purpose of surveying the land to be conveyed. The trial court held that since secondary evidence could be received as to the contents of the deed, no extraordinary remedy was indicated and set the case for trial on the issue of specific performance. It appeared that the appellees took possession of the land in 1947 and constructed part of a house; that about four years later they constructed another house; that the appellant may not have owned the land but obtained title in 1951 after which the portion in question was conveyed to the appellees for consideration. We assume that the deed which was the subject of contradictory evidence bound the appellant to transfer the land. Her failure to deny that she had obtained the deed from the appellees under the promise to have the land surveyed and her subsequent refusal to return it strongly indicate support for the appellees' contentions.\\nWhile we affirm the court's holding that specific performance is indicated, we remand for the purpose of having the land surveyed and a description satisfactory to the court obtained, after which specific performance may be required under the usual powers of the court.\"}"

guam/5313086.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5313086\", \"name\": \"G. RICARDO SALAS, Appellant v. MANUEL FLORES LEON GUERRERO, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Salas v. Guerrero\", \"decision_date\": \"1964-02-17\", \"docket_number\": \"Civil No. 45-A\", \"first_page\": 159, \"last_page\": 162, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 159\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"District Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before SHRIVER, Judge, District Court of Guam; FUR-BER, Chief Justice, and KINNARE, Associate Justice, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands\", \"parties\": \"G. RICARDO SALAS, Appellant v. MANUEL FLORES LEON GUERRERO, Appellee\", \"head_matter\": \"G. RICARDO SALAS, Appellant v. MANUEL FLORES LEON GUERRERO, Appellee\\nCivil No. 45-A\\nDistrict Court of Guam Appellate Division\\nFebruary 17, 1964\\nCounsel for Appellant: Barrett, Ferenz & Trapp (Howard G. Trapp, of counsel)\\nCounsel for Appellee: Harold W. Burnett, Attorney General, Government of Guam\\nBefore SHRIVER, Judge, District Court of Guam; FUR-BER, Chief Justice, and KINNARE, Associate Justice, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands\", \"word_count\": \"1031\", \"char_count\": \"6199\", \"text\": \"SHRIVER, District Judge\\nOPINION\\nOral argument has been waived by stipulation. The Island Court issued an alternative writ of mandate to the appellee, the Governor of Guam. The Governor moved to quash and answered. After oral argument the Island Court quashed the alternative writ and denied a peremptory writ. This appeal followed.. We agree that the courts of Guam have no jurisdiction to require the Governor to appoint a Commissioner for the Municipality of Agana when the of fice becomes vacant as such appointment involves the exercise of a discretion vested in the Governor over the exercise of which the courts have no control.\\nThe office of municipal commissioner in Guam is an elective office. Section 15007 of the Government Code originally-required that any vacancy in the office was to be filled by special election but this provision was changed by Public Law 6-81, effective March 11, 1962, to provide:\\nVacancies in the office of Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner shall be filled by appointment of the Governor of Guam by and with the advice and consent of the Guam Legislature, and such appointee shall serve the unexpired portion of the term for which his predecessor was elected and qualified.\\nSection 15011(f) of the Government Code provides that if there is no Assistant Commissioner the Chief Commissioner shall perform the duties of Commissioner until the vacancy is filled by special election. We first note that Section 15007 requires that a vacancy shall be filled by appointment of the Governor of Guam, but it does not provide who shall be appointed or when he shall be appointed.\\nThe famous case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137; 2 L.Ed. 60, established the principle that the Secretary of State of the United States could be required by the courts to deliver an appointment commission even though the President had directed him not to do so. In Marbury the appointment had been made. The Secretary of State was required to perform only a ministerial act. The books are replete with cases involving the authority of state courts to require governors to perform ministerial functions or to refrain from acts which were in violation of law. We rely heavily on Felix v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 167 F.Supp. 702. In Felix the opinion was prepared by now Senior Circuit Judge Albert B. Maris, who was sitting by assignment as Judge of the Virgin Islands District Court. One of the issues involved the question as to whether the Governor of the Virgin Islands was subject to mandate for authorizing the removal of a classified employee without complying with a law which gives such employee a right to file a written statement contesting his removal.\\nThe opinion states in part:\\nThe defendant contends that this court is without power to direct a mandatory order to the Governor because the exercise of his official duties is not subject to control or review by the courts. I agree that this is true with respect to actions of the Governor which involve the exercise by him of the discretionary and political power which is conferred upon him by the Eevised Organic Act as head of the executive branch of the territorial government. As to such matters his action is final and unreviewable. But the same is not necessarily true as to purely ministerial acts of the Governor not involving the exercise of discretion or judgment or as to acts which are prohibited to him by law.\\nThe opinion quotes with approval the following from Martin v. Ingham (1888), 38 Kan. 641, 17 P. 162:\\nThe only acts of public functionaries which the courts ever attempt to control by either injunction or mandamus, are such acts only as are in their nature strictly ministerial; and a ministerial act is one which a public officer or agent is required to perform upon a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, and without regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning the propriety or impropriety of the act to be performed .\\nKeference to the Organic Act of Guam, 48 U.S.C.A. 1421, et seq., will clearly indicate that the use of the word \\\"shall\\\" in legislation does not necessarily eliminate the exercise of discretion. Under Section 1421g the Governor shall establish, maintain and operate public health services; shall provide an adequate public educational system. Under 1422 (a) he shall have general supervision and control of all executive agencies. Under 1422c (a) the Governor shall, except as otherwise provided in this chapter or the laws of Guam, appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the legislature, all heads of executive agencies and instrumentalities, but under 1422c (b) the Governor may appoint or remove any officer whose appointment or removal is not otherwise provided for. And under 1422 the Governor shall be appointed by the President. It would not be contended that any court can require the President to appoint a Governor until he sees fit to do so, 14 Am. Jur. 396.\\nWhether the person to be appointed is to be the head of an executive agency or a municipal Commissioner is solely a matter of degree. The Governor is held responsible for the appointment. He must exercise his discretion in determining: whether a suitable person is available, whether such person will be satisfactory to the legislature, whether the selection of one person will offend the legislative sponsors of others and possibly spark conflict between the Executive and the Legislative. Whether, when the work is being done by the Chief Commissioner, it is best to wait until the people make their selection at election time? In any event, and fortunately so, the courts may neither help nor hinder the Governor in the discretionary exercise of the appointive power. Affirmed.\"}"

guam/5313141.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5313141\", \"name\": \"GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, Appellee v. HERMAN G. GUMATAOTAO, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Government of Guam v. Gumataotao\", \"decision_date\": \"1962-12-26\", \"docket_number\": \"Criminal No. 26-A\", \"first_page\": 91, \"last_page\": 95, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 91\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"District Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before SHRIVER, Judge, District Court of Guam; KINNARE, Associate Judge, High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and DUE\\u00d1AS, Judge, Island Court of Guam\", \"parties\": \"GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, Appellee v. HERMAN G. GUMATAOTAO, Appellant\", \"head_matter\": \"GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, Appellee v. HERMAN G. GUMATAOTAO, Appellant\\nCriminal No. 26-A\\nDistrict Court of Guam Appellate Division\\nDecember 26, 1962\\nCounsel for Appellee: Leon D. Flores, Island Attorney; James P. Alger, Deputy Island Attorney\\nCounsel for Appellant: Howard G. Trapp\\nBefore SHRIVER, Judge, District Court of Guam; KINNARE, Associate Judge, High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and DUE\\u00d1AS, Judge, Island Court of Guam\", \"word_count\": \"913\", \"char_count\": \"5279\", \"text\": \"PER CURIAM\\nOPINION\\nThe defendant was convicted of the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor in the Juvenile Court of Guam, jurisdiction over which is exercised by the Island Court of Guam. Section 273(a) of the Penal Code of Guam provides:\\nContributing. Any person who commits any act or omits the performance of any duty, which act or omission causes a child to become in need of the care and protection of the Juvenile Court, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, may be tried for such offense in the Juvenile Court, and upon conviction may be punished by a fine not exceeding $500, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.\\nIn his appeal the defendant contends (a) that the age of the minor was not shown; and (b) that under the law of Guam an adult cannot contribute to the delinquency of a minor who at the time of the offense had been declared a juvenile delinquent. Neither contention is tenable.\\nThe prosecution failed to make inquiry as to the age of the minor, but an order of the Juvenile Court was produced showing that the minor had been born September 20, 1945. The defendant then proceeded to show that the minor on many occasions had been before the Juvenile Court, was currently a ward of the Juvenile Court when the offense took place. This was done in furtherance of the defense contention that an adult cannot in Guam be guilty of contributing to the delinquency of a minor if the minor was a delinquent at the time. The defendant relies upon the California statute which is not the same as Guam's.\\nWhile such statutes, being penal in nature, are to be strictly and precisely construed as a general rule, they are not to be construed in such a way as to aid in their evasion, 31 Am.Jur. 344.\\nIt is only necessary to cite the general law in this type of case to indicate that while the courts have differed on the question as to whether the minor must have been a juvenile delinquent at the time or have been declared a juvenile delinquent prior to the filing of the charge of contributing, there is uniformity on the question of contributing when juvenile delinquency exists:\\nNecessity of Delinquency or Dependency of Minor. \\u2014 The general rule is that it is not necessary to a prosecution for contributing to the delinquency or dependency of a minor that the minor shall have been delinquent or dependent prior to the alleged acts or conduct of the defendant, although there is authority to the contrary. A finding or adjudication in a separate proceeding that a minor is delinquent is not a condition precedent to the mainte nance of a prosecution for contributing to the delinquency of the minor, where the affidavit filed against the one charged with so contributing and the evidence on his trial shows that the minor is delinquent.\\nUnder some statutes, however, the jurisdiction of the juvenile court must have attached to the minor before the conviction of another for contributing to the minor's delinquency, or the minor must actually have been adjudged delinquent before the prosecution of the accused, 31 Am. Jur., pp. 345 and 346.\\nIt would be absurd to hold that an adult cannot contribute to the delinquency of a minor who is in the process of being reformed after having been declared a juvenile delinquent. We do not care to indulge in any absurdity.\\nThe remaining question gives us greater concern. This appellate division does not have a rule similar to Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court, but as this court is bound by the Federal Rules we should probably consider plain error. It was alleged in the amended information that the defendant \\\"assisted a minor in the making of fictitious checks.\\\" The evidence was and the court so found that the defendant had filled in and signed the forged checks, then induced the minor to pass them at two stores. Section 476, Penal Code of Guam, includes the offenses of making, uttering, passing and publishing forged checks in one section with the same penalty, but making and uttering are usually considered separate and distinct offenses. The defendant did not include the variance in his motion to dismiss at the close of the government's case, Tr. p. 10, nor has he contended for error here. We therefore hold that in the circumstances of this case we need not note plain error. The making and passing of these checks was part of one continuous transaction. The defendant did not contend that he was sur prised. The minor was present when the checks were filled in and an adult could have been held jointly responsible for the making of the forged checks. The defendant could have been held jointly responsible for the passing. We affirm.\"}"

guam/5313198.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5313198\", \"name\": \"ASH-MARGULIS, Appellant v. FASHIONS, INC., Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Ash-Margulis v. Fashions, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"1958-09-26\", \"docket_number\": \"Civil No. 14-A\", \"first_page\": 40, \"last_page\": 47, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 40\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"District Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before SHRIVER, United, States Judge, District Court of Guam; FURBER, Chief Justice and TOOMIN, Associate Justice, High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands\", \"parties\": \"ASH-MARGULIS, Appellant v. FASHIONS, INC., Appellee\", \"head_matter\": \"ASH-MARGULIS, Appellant v. FASHIONS, INC., Appellee\\nCivil No. 14-A\\nDistrict Court of Guam Appellate Division\\nSeptember 26, 1958\\nCounsel for Appellant: Turner & Novak (W. Scott Barrett of Counsel)\\nCounsel for Appellee: Finton J. Phelan, Jr.\\nBefore SHRIVER, United, States Judge, District Court of Guam; FURBER, Chief Justice and TOOMIN, Associate Justice, High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands\", \"word_count\": \"1846\", \"char_count\": \"10743\", \"text\": \"FURBER, Chief Justice,\\nHigh Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands\\nOPINION\\nThis is an appeal from a judgment of the Island Court of Guam in favor of the defendant in an action for goods sold and delivered in which the defendant claimed the account was overpaid. We sit as an appellate court under authority of the Guam Code of Civil Procedure, Part I, Title I, Chapter II, and Public Law 85-444, 85th Congress, approved June 4, 1958, 72 Stat. 178. The Trust Territory justices were assigned by the Chief Judge of the Ninth Judicial Circuit of the United States under the authority vested in him by Public Law 85-444.\\nThe appellant raises three points as grounds of appeal, namely, (1) that the fourth and crucial paragraph of the Island Court's findings of fact is contrary to and inconsistent with the evidence; (2) that the court erred in admitting over the plaintiff's objection a recapitulation or summary, admittedly made by the President of the defendant corporation, of the account between the parties containing many items running over a period from 1952 to 1955; and (3) that the court erred in its interpretation of the evidence and in assuming that the plaintiff presented its claims in two conflicting amounts.\\nThe paragraph of the findings of fact which the appellant complains of reads as follows:\\n\\\"4. Defendant produced all invoices and cancelled checks showing payment in full for each invoice previous to the trial of this action. The total invoices and payments made exceeded' the amount testified to by witnesses for the plaintiff. Plaintiff has failed to show that defendant is indebted to plaintiff in any amount.\\\"\\nCounsel for the appellant objects especially to the statement, \\\"Defendant produced all invoices and cancelled checks showing payment in full for each invoice previous to the trial of this action.\\\" It is clear that the documents referred to were not introduced in evidence and counsel for the appellant claims in his closing brief that he \\\"was not allowed to see those papers.\\\" This argument is too technical to be entitled to weight in view of Section 475 of the Guam Code of Civil Procedure, which provides, in part, as follows:\\n\\\"Sec. 475. Errors and defects and reversal of judgment. The court must, in every stage of an action, disregard any error, improper ruling, instruction, or defect, in the pleadings or proceedings which, in the opinion of said court, does not affect the substantial rights of the parties____\\\"\\nWhile the word \\\"produce\\\" as applied to documents is sometimes used in the sense of \\\"produce, and offer in evidence,\\\" that is not its only possible meaning. Section 1939 of the Guam Code of Civil Procedure shows this clearly. It reads as follows:\\n\\\"Sec. 1939. Writings called for and inspected may be withheld. Though a writing called for by one party is produced by the other, and is thereupon inspected by the party calling for it, he is not obliged to produce it as evidence, in the case.\\\"\\nTaken in the context of this case, the word \\\"produced\\\" in the finding in question quite obviously means physically brought into the court room and made available for examination.\\nThe record does not bear out at all counsel for the appellant's claim that he was not allowed to see the papers in question. The only fair construction of repeated statements by the defendant's President on the witness stand and by the defendant's counsel is that they were offering her for examination on all the supporting documents she had brought with her and which she testified covered all the items in her recapitulation. Mr. Barrett, who represented the appellant at the trial as well as on this appeal, not only failed to inquire about these documents in his cross-examination of the defendant's President'but tried, to discourage their consideration, first, when the defendant's counsel, Mr. Phelan, started to offer them in evidence, and, second, when the court was inquiring into them. The record speaks for itself on this.\\nTranscript, pp. 23-24-\\n\\\"MR. PHELAN: While you have a record there, are there any invoices or documents that you would like the court to see?\\nMISS WEBB: I have them all here. Wouldn't this record of payment be important.\\nMR. PHELAN: Yes.\\nMISS WEBB: May I show this to him?\\nMR. PHELAN: Yes, I am offering this.\\nMR. BARRETT: I think that the issue in this case is whether the amount prayed for in the complaint was owing at the time the company filed in [it] and any amounts that were paid before that is immaterial. What she says is owing, is her statement and what they say is owing, is another thing, but if she can show receipts or checks paid for any amounts after the date of the last invoice, then I think it would be material, otherwise not.\\nMR. PHELAN: That is the obvious approach but it does not work. We are going to start from the first and bring the accounts right up to date.\\nBY MR. PHELAN: Carol, starting with the first page of this recap invoice 14084, will you produce that invoice ?\\nA. Yes.\\nMR. BARRETT: The judge has accepted the re-cap in evidence. That is the best evidence. If he wants to accept it as it is, I don't care.\\nMR. PHELAN: Have you any questions, Judge, on the re-cap? Are there any supporting documents that you desire to see?\\\" Transcript, p. 29.\\n\\\"MR. PHELAN: We have all the supporting documents to back up this statement.\\nTHE COURT: You have some supporting documents here. These payments that you allege in check No. 1320.\\nA. Yes.\\nQ. Cabled by RCA?\\nA. Yes.\\nQ. Could you substantiate that ?\\nA. Yes there is a receipt from RCA.\\nQ. This check 1343 for $100____\\nA. (Hands document to the court)\\nQ. And the 1355?\\nA. (Hands document to the court)\\nQ. Money Order 263186?\\nA. (Hands document to the court)\\nQ. 1233090,244?\\nA. (Hands document to the court)\\nMR. BARRETT: I want the record to show that there is no issue that these amounts have not been paid, Your Honor. I would like the record to show that. The issue is whether or not there was a thousand and some odd dollars owing as of October, 1955. I again state that the only material payments would be any payments made after that date.\\\"\\nThe above quotations from the transcript give the impression that counsel for the plaintiff was then relying primarily on the theory that he had proved an account stated as of October 1955 and, therefore, did not wish to go into matters prior to that. The complaint, however, does not allege an account stated and the evidence that there ever was one or that any such amount was due in October, 1955, as the plaintiff claims, is not persuasive. On appeal their counsel has not argued that he proved an account stated, but whatever his reasons were for discouraging further examination of the supporting documents at the trial, we consider it unfair for him to now claim he \\\"was not allowed\\\" to see them.\\nIn connection with his first two points, counsel for the appellant seems to have completely overlooked a well recognized exception to the general rule that the contents of documents must be proved by the originals. Section 1855 of the Guam Code of Civil Procedure provides in part as follows:\\n\\\"Section 1855. Contents of writing, how proved. There can be no evidence of the contents of a writing, other than the writing itself, except in the following cases.\\n1. .\\n2. .\\n3. .\\n4. .\\n5. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents, which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time, and the evidence sought from them is only the general result of the whole____\\\"\\nThe exception set forth in subdivision 5 of this section is in accord with and must be construed in the light of the usual common law exception applying to such a situation. The essential elements of this common law exception are stated as follows in Section 1230 of Wigmore on Evidence (Third Ed.):\\n\\\"Where a fact could be ascertained only by the inspection of a large number of documents made up of very numerous detailed statements \\u2014 as, the net balance resulting from a year's vouchers of a treasurer or a year's accounts in a bank ledger \\u2014 it is obvious that it would often be practically out of the question to apply the present principle by requiring the production of the entire mass of documents and entries to be perused by the jury or read aloud to them. The convenience of trials demands that other evidence be allowed to be offered, in the shape of the testimony of a competent witness who has perused the entire mass and will state summarily the net result. Such a practice is well established to be proper.\\n\\\"Most courts require, as a condition, that the mass thus summarily testified to shall, if the occasion seems to require it, be placed at hand in court, or at least be made accessible to the opposing party, in order that the correctness of the evidence may be tested by inspection if desired, or that the material for cross-examination may be available:\\n1854, Bigelow, X, in....\\n\\\"The most commonly recognized application of this principle is that by which the state of pecuniary accounts or other business transactions is allowed to be shown by a witness' schedule or summary. So, also,....\\\"\\nUnder the circumstances in this case, involving an active account running oyer a period of years and including over two hundred (200) entries according to the recapitulation in question, we find no error in the court's admission of the recapitulation.\\nThere is a plain inconsistency between some of the figures in two (2) of the exhibits introduced by the plaintiff, which inconsistency was not explained by the evidence. This was a proper factor for the court to consider in de termining the reliability and accuracy of the plaintiff's records and computations. We find no error in the court commenting on this nor do we feel it imports any misinterpretation of the evidence. The plaintiff had plenty of opportunity to present to the trial court any explanation there might be for the inconsistency. The explanation which counsel for the appellant offers in his brief, that the inconsistency was due to an understandable error on the part of the plaintiff's own accountant, does little to strengthen his case.\\nOn the entire record we feel that the trial court was fully justified in finding that the plaintiff had not sustained the burden of proving that the defendant owed the plaintiff anything.\\nJudgment affirmed.\"}"

guam/5313210.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5313210\", \"name\": \"DANNY HERNANDEZ, et al., Petitioners-Appellees v. HENRY F. TAITANO, Acting Director of Public Safety, et al., Respondents-Appellants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Hernandez v. Taitano\", \"decision_date\": \"1978-01-24\", \"docket_number\": \"Civil No. 77-0007-A\", \"first_page\": 470, \"last_page\": 471, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 470\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"District Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before DUE\\u00d1AS, SMITH and WONG, District Judges\", \"parties\": \"DANNY HERNANDEZ, et al., Petitioners-Appellees v. HENRY F. TAITANO, Acting Director of Public Safety, et al., Respondents-Appellants\", \"head_matter\": \"DANNY HERNANDEZ, et al., Petitioners-Appellees v. HENRY F. TAITANO, Acting Director of Public Safety, et al., Respondents-Appellants\\nCivil No. 77-0007-A\\nDistrict Court of Guam Appellate Division\\nJanuary 24, 1978\\nBefore DUE\\u00d1AS, SMITH and WONG, District Judges\", \"word_count\": \"341\", \"char_count\": \"2075\", \"text\": \"PER CURIAM\\nOPINION\\nBriefly stated, this appeal results from a mandamus suit against certain officials of the government of Guam, in which they were ordered to pay the additional compensation to firemen provided for by Public Law 12-183. At oral argument, the Deputy Attorney General conceded two issues, leaving two others to be decided by this Court. These two issues are whether attorney's fees and interest on the judgment were properly awarded.\\nPursuant to the Organic Act of Guam, the government of Guam has sovereign immunity which can be waived only by an act of the local legislature:\\nThe government of Guam . . . with the consent of the Legislature evidenced by enacted law may be sued upon any contract entered into with respect to, or any tort committed incident to, the exercise by the government of Guam of its lawful powers. 48 U.S.C. \\u00a7 1421a.\\nThe appellees have not cited any enactment where the Guam Legislature has consented to a waiver of governmental immunity in a mandamus suit. We also have been unable to find any section in the Guam Code which would provide for an award of interest or attorney's fees. The general rule is that the absence of such statutory authorization precludes the awarding of attorney's fees and interest. Aycrigg v. United States, 124 F.Supp. 416 (N.D. Calif., 1954). We are not persuaded that any of the exceptions to the general rule is applicable in this case.\\nIn view of the fait accompli of the payment of the additional compensation in this case, we do not reach the propriety of the mandamus issued in this case and- the payment apparently made pursuant thereto.\\nThe award of attorney's fees and interest on judgment is hereby removed from the judgment on appeal. Reversed.\\nCompare Guam Code \\u00a7 1021 which clearly differentiates between attorneys' fees and costs.\"}"

guam/5313247.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5313247\", \"name\": \"ANTONIO P. SO and GILDA SO, Plaintiffs v. S. DELA LLANA and JOHN DOE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"So v. Dela Llana\", \"decision_date\": \"1976-09-01\", \"docket_number\": \"Civil No. 544-76\", \"first_page\": 339, \"last_page\": 340, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 339\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"ANTONIO P. SO and GILDA SO, Plaintiffs v. S. DELA LLANA and JOHN DOE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants\", \"head_matter\": \"ANTONIO P. SO and GILDA SO, Plaintiffs v. S. DELA LLANA and JOHN DOE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants\\nCivil No. 544-76\\nSuperior Court of Guam\\nSeptember 1, 1976\", \"word_count\": \"239\", \"char_count\": \"1415\", \"text\": \"BENSON, Judge\\nORDER\\nThis matter came before the court on the motion of S. D\\u00e9la Liana for an order dismissing the complaint under Rule 12. After oral argument on August 6,1976, the matter was submitted for decision.\\nDefendant first asserts that Section 6500.10 precludes action against him. The complaint does not allege that Defendant was an agent of the Government at the time of the alleged negligence. This assertion is rather contained in the Defendant's memorandum filed June 30, 1976. Al though this assertion was not contested by the Plaintiff, the court refuses to rule on the merits of Defendant's first ground in his motion because of the inadequacy of the showing of the factual basis upon which Defendant relies and the unappropriateness in a Rule 12 motion. His motion is therefore denied, with leave to renew in appropriate proceedings, if he is so advised.\\nDefendant next asserts that Public Law 13-115 requires certain screening procedures as a prerequisite to commencing a civil action and that such requirements have not been met. This motion is denied for the reasons set forth in the order in the case of van der Brag v. Paramaguru, Civil Case No. 518-76 filed today.\\nIT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion be, and it hereby is, denied.\"}"

guam/5313302.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5313302\", \"name\": \"JOSEPHINE R. MESA, Plaintiff v. ATKINS, KROLL (GUAM) LTD., and CITIBANK, N.A., Defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Mesa v. Atkins, Kroll (Guam) Ltd.\", \"decision_date\": \"1979-02-26\", \"docket_number\": \"Civil Case No. 445-78\", \"first_page\": 590, \"last_page\": 591, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 590\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"JOSEPHINE R. MESA, Plaintiff v. ATKINS, KROLL (GUAM) LTD., and CITIBANK, N.A., Defendants\", \"head_matter\": \"JOSEPHINE R. MESA, Plaintiff v. ATKINS, KROLL (GUAM) LTD., and CITIBANK, N.A., Defendants\\nCivil Case No. 445-78\\nSuperior Court of Guam\\nFebruary 26, 1979\", \"word_count\": \"171\", \"char_count\": \"1076\", \"text\": \"RAKER, Judge\\nDECISION\\nThis matter came before the Court on plaintiff's Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories. Joan Baumgarten appeared on behalf of the plaintiff and Aurora Jose appeared for defendant, Citibank. The matter was heard before the Honorable John P. Raker and decision was reserved.\\nThe Court finds that the scope of discovery is very broad, and that the burden is on the objecting party to show why discovery should not be permitted. See Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil \\u00a7 2165 and 2176. The Court further finds that, although cases speak of trade secrets as being privileged, the privilege is, at best, only a qualified privilege which has been more readily applied to disclosure of valuable commercial information rather than to disclosure of merely sensitive information. See Wright and Miller, supra, \\u00a7 2020, n.56 and 57.\\nPlaintiff's Motion is therefore GRANTED.\\nSO ORDERED.\"}"

guam/5313385.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5313385\", \"name\": \"In the Matter of the Estate of ROSA C. QUINATA, deceased, Appellee JOSE PEREZ GUERRERO, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re the Estate of Quinata\", \"decision_date\": \"1970-07-30\", \"docket_number\": \"Civil No. 64-A\", \"first_page\": 193, \"last_page\": 195, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 193\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"District Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before GOODWIN, District Judge, and ABB ATE, Judge, Island Court of Guam\", \"parties\": \"In the Matter of the Estate of ROSA C. QUINATA, deceased, Appellee JOSE PEREZ GUERRERO, Appellant\", \"head_matter\": \"In the Matter of the Estate of ROSA C. QUINATA, deceased, Appellee JOSE PEREZ GUERRERO, Appellant\\nCivil No. 64-A\\nDistrict Court of Guam Appellate Division\\nJuly 30, 1970\\nBefore GOODWIN, District Judge, and ABB ATE, Judge, Island Court of Guam\", \"word_count\": \"742\", \"char_count\": \"4372\", \"text\": \"PER CURIAM\\nOPINION\\nJose V. Quinata and Rosa Cruz Quinata, husband and wife, acquired a parcel of real estate located at Chalan Pago, Sinajana, Guam. He died, and their son, Jose Cruz Quinata, was appointed administrator of his father's estate. During the pendency of the probate proceedings (they are still pending), the wife executed a deed granting the parcel to her daughter and son-in-law. This deed was executed in March of 1954. It is regular in form and signed by the wife as grantor.\\nQuaere: Under the law of Guam, was the widow capable of transferring this real estate absent a decree of distribution of the Probate Court?\\nThe property was community property at the time of the husband's death, and Section 201 of the Probate Code of the Territory of Guam provides that upon the death of the husband one-half of the community property vests in the surviving spouse, in this case, the wife, and, absent any testamentary disposition by the decedent of his undivided one-half interest, it is inherited by operation of law by the wife.\\nImmediately upon the death of the husband, the wife in this instance was the sole owner of this parcel, and her title was clouded only by the possibility of claims against the husband's estate and the expenses of administration. Her right to transfer, grant, or assign the property in question to any third person is not impaired because of a lack of a decree of distribution in the husband's estate. 16 Cal.Jur.2d 20, Sec. 18:\\n\\\"The title to property of a decedent passes to his heirs immediately upon the decedent's death. Accordingly, the heirs may thereafter enter into contracts. affecting inherited property or convey or assign their interest in it, subject to the payment of administrative expenses and debts of the decedent and to the temporary possession of the personal representative.\\\" Michels Estate, 18 C.A.2d 201, 63 P.2d 333.\\n\\\"When Oscar L. Shatter departed this life, in 1873, the title to the land in question being vested in him, such title at once, and by operation of law, passed to his heirs, subject only to administration. 'The property, both real and personal, of one who dies without disposing of it by will, passes to the heirs of the intestate, subject to the control of the probate court, and to the possession of any administrator appointed by that court for the purposes of administration.' . . . The title of the heirs did not originate in the decree of distribution, but came to them from their ancestor; and the settlement of the estate in the probate court, and the final decree of distribution in that court, only served to release their property from the conditions to which, as the estate of a deceased person, it was subject.\\\" Bates v. Howard, 38 Pac. 715 (Supr. Ct. of Cal., Dec. 22, 1894).\\n\\\" 'Title to the real estate of the deceased intestate vests immediately in his heirs, . . . [which] title they may convey without administration . . . [subject to payment of debts].' True, the title thus conveyed is not a perfect title, in that the title will always be subject to the right of possession in a[n] administrator for the payment of claims of . . . creditors [and expenses of administration] .\\\"\\nThe Island Court held that the claim of the appellant grantee filed in the probate proceedings in the estate of the deceased grantor was barred (1) by the statute of limitations, and (2) because of a failure of the grantor to comply with the Probate Code of Guam requiring court approval of transfers of real estate in probate proceedings.\\nThe deed from the deceased widow to her daughter and son-in-law is a completed contract. Nothing remained to be done. Therefore, the statute of limitations has no application to the facts of the instant case.\\nThe Court concludes that the lower court was in error in nullifying the transaction evidenced by the deed from Rosa Cruz Quinata to Jose Perez Guerrero and his wife, Dolores Quinata Guerrero, and that said cause should be remanded to the lower court and a decree entered confirming title to said property in the appellant, subject to any liens, as provided by the Probate Code of the Territory of Guam.\"}"

guam/5313467.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5313467\", \"name\": \"THE GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, Appellee v. WILLIAM R. FORRESTER, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Government of Guam v. Forrester\", \"decision_date\": \"1958-09-15\", \"docket_number\": \"Criminal No. 15-A\", \"first_page\": 386, \"last_page\": 387, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 386\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"District Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before FURBER, Chief Justice, High Court of Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; TOOMIN, Associate Justice, High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; SHRIVER, United States Judge, District Court of Guam\", \"parties\": \"THE GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, Appellee v. WILLIAM R. FORRESTER, Appellant\", \"head_matter\": \"THE GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, Appellee v. WILLIAM R. FORRESTER, Appellant\\nCriminal No. 15-A\\nDistrict Court of Guam Appellate Division\\nSeptember 15, 1958\\nCounsel for Appellee: Louis A. Otto, Jr., Attorney General; Leon D. Flores, Island Attorney; Richard D. Magee, Deputy Island Attorney\\nCounsel for Appellant: Turner & Novak, Attorneys-at-Law\\nBefore FURBER, Chief Justice, High Court of Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; TOOMIN, Associate Justice, High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; SHRIVER, United States Judge, District Court of Guam\", \"word_count\": \"165\", \"char_count\": \"1052\", \"text\": \"PER CURIAM\\nOPINION\\nThe appellant was convicted in the Island Court of Guam of the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. No serious attempt was made to show that the appellant did not commit the offense. The objections raised are purely procedural. We hold that there is nothing in the record to show that the defendant was denied any rights which would prevent him from having a fair and impartial trial. Accordingly, we affirm the conviction.\"}"

guam/5313492.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5313492\", \"name\": \"MICHAEL ROYOS CRUZ, Appellee v. MANUEL C. MESA, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Cruz v. Mesa\", \"decision_date\": \"1958-09-15\", \"docket_number\": \"Civil No. 8-A\", \"first_page\": 30, \"last_page\": 31, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 30\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"District Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before FURBER, Chief Justice, and TOOMIN, Associate Justice, High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and SHRIVER, United States Judge, District Court of Guam\", \"parties\": \"MICHAEL ROYOS CRUZ, Appellee v. MANUEL C. MESA, Appellant\", \"head_matter\": \"MICHAEL ROYOS CRUZ, Appellee v. MANUEL C. MESA, Appellant\\nCivil No. 8-A\\nDistrict Court of Guam Appellate Division\\nSeptember 15, 1958\\nCounsel for Appellee: Robert E. Duffy\\nCounsel for Appellant: Joaquin C. Arriola\\nBefore FURBER, Chief Justice, and TOOMIN, Associate Justice, High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and SHRIVER, United States Judge, District Court of Guam\", \"word_count\": \"231\", \"char_count\": \"1398\", \"text\": \"PER CURIAM\\nOPINION\\nThe appellee, plaintiff below, brought this action against the appellant, defendant below, for specific performance of a contract to sell land. At the time the contract was made the land was part of a larger lot. The appellee caused a survey to be made of the land which was the subject of sale which survey included a right-of-way not included in the original sale.\\nThe testimony showed that the survey was made after the appellant had pointed out the boundaries, including the right-of-way and that the appellant signed the survey map.\\nWe agree that the appellee was entitled to specific performance of the contract. The appellant filed a cross-complaint which was not ruled upon by the trial court as should have been done. The findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment make it clear that the trial court had held against the allegations made in the cross-complaint and it would serve no useful purpose to remand solely for the purpose of dismissing it.\\nThe judgment is affirmed.\"}"

guam/5313506.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5313506\", \"name\": \"In the Matter of the Estate of ANTONIO S. N. SAN NICOLAS, deceased\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re the Estate of San Nicolas\", \"decision_date\": \"1974-08-16\", \"docket_number\": \"Civil Action No. 103-A\", \"first_page\": 227, \"last_page\": 229, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 227\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"District Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before WILLIAMS, TURNER, and BENSON, Judges\", \"parties\": \"In the Matter of the Estate of ANTONIO S. N. SAN NICOLAS, deceased\", \"head_matter\": \"In the Matter of the Estate of ANTONIO S. N. SAN NICOLAS, deceased\\nCivil Action No. 103-A\\nDistrict Court of Guam Appellate Division\\nAugust 16, 1974\\nCounsel for Appellants: Ana S. N. Ofeciar, Administratrix of the Estate' of Antonio S. N. San Nicolas, deceased, and Pedro Ofeciar\\nCounsel for Appellee: Francisca B. San Nicolas, as Administratrix of the Estate of Enrique S. San Nicolas, deceased\\nBefore WILLIAMS, TURNER, and BENSON, Judges\", \"word_count\": \"401\", \"char_count\": \"2390\", \"text\": \"PER CURIAM\\nOPINION\\nBoth Ana S. N. Ofeciar and Enrique S. San Nicolas are children, heirs, and devisees of Antonio S. N. San Nicolas. Enrique was appointed administrator of his father's estate in 1953. In 1970 his father's will was admitted to probate and Enrique was appointed executor. After the death of Enrique in 1971 Ana was appointed administratrix.\\nThe will devised the middle portion of Lot 94-1, Talofofo to Enrique. This appeal arises out of a hearing on the petition for partial distribution of the appellee seeking distribution of Lot 94-2 (sic), Talofofp to the Estate of Enrique. The appellant Ana S. N. Ofeciar as administratrix objected to the distribution on the grounds that no survey had been made of the assets of the estate, that title to some assets was uncertain, and thus injury to the estate could result from the granting of the petition.\\nIt is apparently uncontested that Ana S. N. Ofeciar and Pedro Ofeciar erected improvements on that portion of Lot 94, Talofofo, which was devised to Enrique.\\nThis appeal arises out of a hearing (extending over several days and including a view of the property by the court) at which by agreement only one issue was litigated. The'issue was whether the Ofeciars had made the improvements in good faith and with the express or implied consent of Enrique. The evidence was conflicting.\\nThe court resolved this issue in favor of the Estate of Enrique and the finding is supported by evidence. There is no basis for this court to say that the finding was clearly erroneous. Section 64 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\\nAffirmance of this finding does not conclude the matter. Before the trial court is the petition for partial distribution. The trial' court should make appropriate findings and conclusions of law, and enter its order as required by Section 1001 of the Probate Code.\\nAffirmed and remanded to the Superior Court of Guam for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.\"}"

guam/5313532.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5313532\", \"name\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM, Appellant v. VICENTE Q. AGUON, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"People v. Aguon\", \"decision_date\": \"1968-03-22\", \"docket_number\": \"Criminal No. 39-A\", \"first_page\": 183, \"last_page\": 185, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 183\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"District Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before SHRIVER, Judge, District Court of Guam; SHOE-CRAFT, Chief Justice, High Court of the Trust Territory, Pacific Islands and PEREZ, Chief Judge, Island Court of Guam\", \"parties\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM, Appellant v. VICENTE Q. AGUON, Appellee\", \"head_matter\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM, Appellant v. VICENTE Q. AGUON, Appellee\\nCriminal No. 39-A\\nDistrict Court of Guam Appellate Division\\nMarch 22, 1968\\nCounsel for Appellant: Harold W. Burnett and John P. Raker, Attorney General\\u2019s Office\\nCounsel for Appellee: Barrett, Ferenz, Trapp & Gayle (Howard G. Trapp, of counsel)\\nBefore SHRIVER, Judge, District Court of Guam; SHOE-CRAFT, Chief Justice, High Court of the Trust Territory, Pacific Islands and PEREZ, Chief Judge, Island Court of Guam\", \"word_count\": \"559\", \"char_count\": \"3345\", \"text\": \"SHRIVER, District Judge\\nOPINION\\nThe' People appeal from the dismissal by the Island Court of a charge against Aguon that he engaged in gambling by entering into a contract with others by which they agreed to play by a contrivance, the outcome or result of a prize fight, in violation of Section 330 of the Penal Code of Guam, which provides:\\nGambling a misdemeanor. Penalty. Gambling is defined as a contract between two or more persons by which they agree to play by certain rules at cards, dice, or other contrivances, and that one shall be the winner and the other or others the loser or losers of money or other objects. Every person who gambles is guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall upon conviction by a court of proper jurisdiction be punished by a fine of not more than $100 or by imprisonment not exceeding 3 months, or by both such fine and imprisonment. Wagering on cockfights is excepted from the provisions of this section only where persons wagering are present in person at a licensed cockpit and are 18 years of age or above. (Emphasis added.)\\nThe contention of the People is that by including the italicized exception as to cockfights, the Legislature in tended to cover all types of wagering. On oral argument the Island Attorney conceded that in the absence of the cockfight exception, wagering on the outcome of a prize fight would not be covered.\\nAt the outset we are confronted with the fact that this statute does not appear to have been taken from any other jurisdiction but appears to have been adopted during the Naval Administration. In response to a question, Chief Judge Perez pointed out that while boxing exhibitions were common during the Naval Administration, he had never heard of any prosecution for wagering on the outcome. The use of the words \\\"cards, dice, or other contrivances\\\" would appear to indicate that the prohibition was limited to the use of physical things in the contract. Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition, defines, in part, a contrivance as \\\"A mechanical device; an appliance.\\\" In Hannifin v. United States, 248 F.2d 173 (9 Cir. 1957), the Court had before it the construction of a Federal statute which prohibited the movement in interstate commerce of mechanical devices. The machines in question were ordered forfeited by the United States District Court. In reversing, the Court pointed out that while the forfeited machines were clearly gambling devices, they were not devices which were covered by the description in the Federal statute and that \\\"A statute whereby a man may be deprived of his personal property by way of punishment should be construed with strictness;\\\".\\nWe are of the view that the exception as regards cockfights in Section 330 may not be construed as covering all types of wagering and that therefore the Island Court was correct in dismissing. We affirm.\"}"

guam/5313569.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5313569\", \"name\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM, Appellee v. ANTONIO L. BAUTISTA, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"People v. Bautista\", \"decision_date\": \"1967-10-05\", \"docket_number\": \"Criminal No. 37-A\", \"first_page\": 405, \"last_page\": 406, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 405\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"District Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before SHRIVER, Judge, District Court of Guam; FUR-BER, Chief Justice, High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; PEREZ, Chief Judge, Island Court of Guam\", \"parties\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM, Appellee v. ANTONIO L. BAUTISTA, Appellant\", \"head_matter\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM, Appellee v. ANTONIO L. BAUTISTA, Appellant\\nCriminal No. 37-A\\nDistrict Court of Guam Appellate Division\\nOctober 5, 1967\\nCounsel for Appellee: Paul J. Abbate, Deputy Island Attorney, Government of Guam\\nCounsel for Appellant: Arriola, Bohn \\u25a0& Dierking (John C. Dierking), Agana, Guam\\nBefore SHRIVER, Judge, District Court of Guam; FUR-BER, Chief Justice, High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; PEREZ, Chief Judge, Island Court of Guam\", \"word_count\": \"221\", \"char_count\": \"1296\", \"text\": \"SHRIVER, Judge\\nOPINION\\nAntonio L. Bautista was convicted in the Island Court of the offense of petty theft and appeals to the Appellate Division of the District Court of Guam. Judge Perez did not hear oral arguments in this case but it was stipulated that he should participate in any determination. We affirm.\\nWe have examined the transcript and the record in this case and find no basis for the appeal. It is clear that Bau tista participated with two others in the theft of the property involved. One of the others entered a plea of guilty and the other did not appeal. It is equally clear that the motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence is completely without merit as all of the alleged new evidence was within the knowledge of the defendant at the time of his original trial.\"}"

guam/5313594.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5313594\", \"name\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. ANTONIO SALAS CHARGUALAF, Defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"People v. Chargualaf\", \"decision_date\": \"1978-11-01\", \"docket_number\": \"Criminal Case No. 191F-78\", \"first_page\": 573, \"last_page\": 577, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 573\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. ANTONIO SALAS CHARGUALAF, Defendant\", \"head_matter\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. ANTONIO SALAS CHARGUALAF, Defendant\\nCriminal Case No. 191F-78\\nSuperior Court of Guam\\nNovember 1, 1978\", \"word_count\": \"1143\", \"char_count\": \"7074\", \"text\": \"WEEKS, Judge\\nDECISION AND ORDER\\nThis matter comes before the Court on defendant's Motion to Suppress. The motion was heard on October 5, 1978, and decision was reserved.\\nDefendant seeks to suppress heroin seized from his person under a warrant executed on September 9, 1978. Defendant was searched pursuant to the \\\"persons present therein\\\" language of the search warrant. It is defendant's contention that this violates his rights under \\u00a7 35.20(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Fourth Amendment.\\nSection 35.20(b) and the Fourth Amendment require a warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The issue presented by defendant is whether presence at a specified place is a constitutionally sufficient description of a person to allow a search under a warrant. Defendant cites State v. De Simone, 288 A.2d 849 (1972), and People v. Nieves, 330 N.E.2d 26 (1975), in support of his position that the description \\\"persons present therein\\\" is inadequate and therefore fails as a general warrant. However, both these cases recognized that under certain circumstances \\\"persons present therein\\\" language is sufficiently descriptive to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.\\nIn State v. De Simone, 288 A.2d 849, a passenger in a car was searched under a warrant directing a search of a specifically described automobile and \\\"any and all persons found therein.\\\" The automobile had been observed participating in a floating lottery drop. The court upheld the search. Addressing the question of the sufficiency of a description in a warrant under the Fourth Amendment, the court stated:\\nAnd, with regard to the Fourth Amendment demand for specificity as to 'the subject to be searched, there is none of the vice of a general warrant if the individual is thus identified by physical nexus to the on-going criminal event itself. In such a setting, the officer executing the warrant has neither the authority nor the opportunity to search everywhere for anyone violating a law. So long as there is good reason to suspect or believe that anyone present at the anticipated scene will probably be a participant, presence becomes the descriptive fact satisfying the aim of the Fourth Amendment. The evil of the general warrant is thereby negated. To insist nonetheless that the individual be otherwise described when circumstances will not permit it, would simply deny Government a needed power to deal with crime, without advancing the interest the Amendment was meant to serve. 288 A.2d at 851.\\nIn People v. Nieves, 830 N.E.2d 26, the court found the particular circumstances of that case did not support a reasonable inference that any person present at the restaurant and cocktail lounge possessed gambling records. However, the court clearly pointed out that \\\"any person present\\\" language could, in some circumstances, survive constitutional attack. The court stated that:\\n. . . what will amount to forbidden generality or, to put it another way, insufficient particularity in a warrant necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 330 N.E.2d at 32.\\nUpon similar facts and circumstances to the case at bar, the court in Commonwealth v. Smith, 348 N.E.2d 101 (1976), held the warrant to be constitutionally sufficient. In that case, heroin was found on defendant's person during a search pursuant to a warrant for the apartment, the known occupant, and \\\"any person present who may be found to have heroin in his possession or under his control or to whom such property may have been delivered\\\". The defendant contended that the search under the \\\"any person present\\\" language of the warrant violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in that the warrant lacked specificity since it did not describe the person of the defendant as the object of the search. The court, however, looked at both the affidavit and the search warrant and concluded that there was probable cause to believe that any person on the premises was involved in the illegal trafficking of heroin. In so holding the court found that the search under the \\\"any persons present\\\" language fell within the narrowly circumscribed range of searches which because of their peculiar facts are consistent with the Fourth Amendment. In reaching its decision the court found several factors particularly relevant:\\n. . . the premises or area to be searched are small, confined and private; the nature of the criminal activity is such that the participants (in general) constantly shift or change so that it is, practically, impossible for the police to predict that any specific person or persons will be on the premises at any given time; and the items specifically described in the warrant as the target of the search are of a size or kind which renders them easily and likely to be concealed on the person. 348 N.E.2d at 107.\\nThis Court finds the reasoning in Commonwealth v. Smith persuasive. The premise to be searched, the Pedro San Agust\\u00edn residence, was confined and private. Secondly, the affidavit stated that traffic in illicit drugs continued both day and night, and that the informant advised the affiant that the activity was of a continuing nature. In this type of situation it is reasonable to assume that the participants are constantly shifting so it is practically impossible for the police to predict that any specific person or persons would be at the Pedro San Agust\\u00edn residence at any given time. Additionally, the affidavit states that;\\n. . . based on my experience and training, I am aware that useable quantities of controlled substances are quite small, and may readily be concealed on the person; That, in my experience, controlled substances are often found concealed upon the person of those individuals who are present on the premises where controlled substances may be found; That in my experience persons present on a premises where a warrant is being executed will often hide the controlled substance sought, or a portion thereof, on their person.\\nThis Court is satisfied that relying on the particular facts in this case the warrant to search \\\"persons present therein\\\" was based upon probable cause to believe that such person would be involved in heroin trafficking. The fact that one of the persons present did not actually possess narcotics is not determinative. A search under the \\\"persons present therein\\\" language is valid where the underlying circumstances clearly demonstrate probable cause to believe that all persons are involved in the criminal activity. But this does not require that, judging by hindsight, every person on the premises was in fact involved in the criminal activity. Under the particular circumstances of this case, the Court finds that defendant's presence at the Pedro San Agustin residence satisfied the specificity requirements of \\u00a7 35.20 (b) and the Fourth Amendment.\\nFor the aforementioned reasons, defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied.\"}"

guam/5313619.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5313619\", \"name\": \"CARMEN S. PANGELINAN, Petitioner v. JOAQUIN A. PANGELINAN, Respondent\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Pangelinan v. Pangelinan\", \"decision_date\": \"1976-11-04\", \"docket_number\": \"Domestic No. 419-74\", \"first_page\": 373, \"last_page\": 375, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 373\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"CARMEN S. PANGELINAN, Petitioner v. JOAQUIN A. PANGELINAN, Respondent\", \"head_matter\": \"CARMEN S. PANGELINAN, Petitioner v. JOAQUIN A. PANGELINAN, Respondent\\nDomestic No. 419-74\\nSuperior Court of Guam\\nNovember 4, 1976\", \"word_count\": \"537\", \"char_count\": \"3396\", \"text\": \"ABBATE, Judge\\nDECISION\\nPetitioner married Respondent in Saipan May 20, 1965, and four (4) children were born in wedlock. Petitioner filed a 23 September, 1974, complaint in the High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to compel Respondent. to pay support and alleging desertion commencing June 17, 1974. Respondent resides not in the Trust Territories, but in Guam, according to sworn allegations of Petitioner, who now asks the Superior Court of Guam to take jurisdiction over this case under Guam Civil Code I Section 1500 et seq. and to compel Respondent to pay $250.00 per month support for dependents.\\nThis Court could not possibly feel greater compassion for Petitioner's position or sympathy for Petitioner's public policy arguments. Indeed, we want to discourage estranged fathers escaping support obligations by fleeing from a Trust Territory to Guam. On Guam this Court has consistently dealt harshly with fathers in non-compliance with child support orders. Certainly reciprocity is the key to a system wherein Guam support orders will be mutually respected and enforced in the Trust Territories.\\nTherefore, it is with sorrow and regret that this Court must deny Petitioner jurisdiction over Respondent under Guam Civil Code Section 1500 et seq. which applies only to sovereignties of the United States. The United Nations assigned the Trust Territories to the United States as trustee, not as sovereign. Although remedial acts are usually construed liberally, this Court cannot stretch the meaning of Section 1501(a) to cover this case. There is authority (Callas v. U.S., 253 F.2d 838 (1958); Brunnell v. U.S., 77 F.Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1948)) for considering Trust Territories more akin to \\\"foreign countries\\\" than sovereignties vis a vis the United States.\\nThe version of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) enacted in Guam in 1954 provides for enforcement of support decrees of other states, defining \\\"state\\\" as:\\nAny state, territory, or possession of the United States and the District of Columbia in which this or a substantially similar reciprocal law has been enacted.\\nAt present, then, Trust Territory support orders cannot be enforced in Guam Courts under URESA because the former are neither territories nor possessions of the United States. The future will likely see closer ties between the Trust. Territories and Guam as each enacts a new constitution drafted with, sensitivity to the need for cooperation and legal reciprocity. The world has changed' since, .1954.. and we: are hopeful - the' Fourteenth Guam Legislature will see the urgency of an amendment in URESA to include the Trust Territories, but it would be a judicial encroachment upon Guam Legislative prerogative' for this Court to rule today .in a manner inconsistent with the present law. The Guam Legislature chose not to include the Trust Territories when in 1954 URESA was enacted, nor has any Guam Legislature since then chosen to amend that statute, although it could easily have done so with clear express language like that contained in the Trust Territory URESA, 39 T.T.C. \\u00a7 301 et seq. (Supp. 1973). Therefore, this Court is without justification for extending Guam's URESA beyond the sovereign jurisdiction of the United States.\"}"

guam/5313647.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5313647\", \"name\": \"DONNA LAWRENCE, Plaintiff v. LOAN KIM BARKER, et al., Defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Lawrence v. Barker\", \"decision_date\": \"1979-07-26\", \"docket_number\": \"Civil Case No. 357-79\", \"first_page\": 625, \"last_page\": 626, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 625\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"DONNA LAWRENCE, Plaintiff v. LOAN KIM BARKER, et al., Defendants\", \"head_matter\": \"DONNA LAWRENCE, Plaintiff v. LOAN KIM BARKER, et al., Defendants\\nCivil Case No. 357-79\\nSuperior Court of Guam\\nJuly 26, 1979\", \"word_count\": \"302\", \"char_count\": \"1773\", \"text\": \"ABBATE, Presiding Judge\\nDECISION AND ORDER\\nThis matter came before the Court on the defendant Loan Kim Barker's Motion for Summary Judgment on June 25, 1979. Randall Fennell appeared on behalf of the defendant and the plaintiff was represented by Ronald Geedman.\\nThis is a wrongful death action in which the plaintiff seeks damages for pain and suffering, loss to the estate, and punitive damages. The present question is whether the damages prayed for by the plaintiff are properly recoverable in the context of a wrongful death action.\\nGenerally, the only type of damages awarded in a wrongful death action are compensation for the pecuniary loss suffered by the plaintiff. Estate of D'India, 63 C.A.3d 942; Bond v. United Railroad, 113 P. 366; Steel v. Imperial Airlines, 12 C.3d 115.\\nThe rule in this jurisdiction is that damages to a decedent's estate are an improper basis for damages in a wrongful death action. Bradford v. Brock, 140 C.A. 47. Therefore, we find that damages for loss to the estate are not properly recoverable in this case.\\nIt is also clear that punitive damages may not be had in a wrongful death action. Doak v. Superior Court, 257 C.A.2d 825; Lange v. Schoettler, 47 P. 139.\\nThe last type of relief sought concerns the pain and suffering of the decedent. It is established that no recovery, based on the pain and suffering of the decedent, will be awarded in a wrongful death action. Carr v. Pacific Telephone Co., 26 C.A.3d 537; Bond v. United Railroad, supra.\\nFor the aforementioned reasons, the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to the issue of the damages prayed for in the complaint.\\nSO ORDERED.\"}"

guam/5313672.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5313672\", \"name\": \"PATRICK J. PALOMO, Defendant-Appellant v. PEOPLE OF GUAM, Plaintiff-Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Palomo v. People\", \"decision_date\": \"1978-03-13\", \"docket_number\": \"Criminal No. 112F-75\", \"first_page\": 492, \"last_page\": 498, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 492\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"District Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before DUE\\u00d1AS and THOMPSON, District Judges, and BURNETT, Designated Judge\", \"parties\": \"PATRICK J. PALOMO, Defendant-Appellant v. PEOPLE OF GUAM, Plaintiff-Appellee\", \"head_matter\": \"PATRICK J. PALOMO, Defendant-Appellant v. PEOPLE OF GUAM, Plaintiff-Appellee\\nCriminal No. 112F-75\\nDistrict Court of Guam Appellate Division\\nMarch 13, 1978\\nBefore DUE\\u00d1AS and THOMPSON, District Judges, and BURNETT, Designated Judge\", \"word_count\": \"1356\", \"char_count\": \"8587\", \"text\": \"THOMPSON, District Judge\\nMEMORANDUM OPINION\\nPatrick J. Palomo was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon for his role in aiding and abetting an attempted shooting of a Guam police officer, Sergeant Frank Sab\\u00edan. Direct evidence of the defendant's participation in the crime was provided by the testimony of Bennie Gogue, one of three other persons involved in the shooting incident. He testified that Patrick Palomo joined in the discussion of shooting Officer Sab\\u00edan and was present in his red Datsun pickup on both occasions when shots were fired into the Sab\\u00edan house. Corroborative evidence was provided by two of Sablan's neighbors who testified to seeing a vehicle similar to that usually driven by Patrick Palomo at the scene of the shootings. One of the neighbors also testified that the driver of the red Datsun pickup had a hairstyle somewhat similar to that of the defendant.\\nThe People also called Vincent Palomo, cousin of the defendant and another of the participants in the assault on Officer Sab\\u00edan and his family, as a Government witness. Vincent testified that the defendant was not at the scene during the shootings, and denied ever making a statement to the contrary. The People were permitted to counter with Vincent's prior inconsistent statement that Patrick had been present. Defense counsel vigorously objected to the admissibility of the prior statement on the ground that it had been coerced by a threat to certify Vincent for trial as an adult. The trial court denied a defense request that the court make a preliminary determination of voluntariness, ruling that evidence of coercion went to the weight rather than the admissibility of Vincent's prior statement.\\nThe defendant's first two appellate contentions attack the sufficiency of the evidence. The defendant first contends that there was insufficient evidence to corroborate the accomplice testimony of Bennie Gogue. Assuming adequate corroboration, the defendant next contends that the evidence as a whole was insufficient to prove that the defendant was an active participant in rather than a passive observer of the offense charged. The evidence in this case was far from overwhelming, but viewing it in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, as we must, we cannot say that it is insufficient either as to corroboration or proof of the defendant's active participation.\\nEvidence corroborating the testimony of an accomplice is sufficient to avoid appellate reversal if it \\\"reasonably tend[s] to connect a defendant with the commission of a crime.\\\" People v. Perry, 7 C.3d 756, 774, 103 Cal. Rptr. 161, 499 P.2d 129 (1972). The testimony of Sergeant Sablan's two neighbors meets this test. Their undisputed testimony that a red Datsun pickup, identical to one usually driven by the defendant, raced through the Sab\\u00edan neighborhood with its lights off at the time of both shootings reasonably tends to connect the defendant with the assault on the Sab\\u00edan household. The existence of plausible explanations for the presence of the red Datsun pickup other than evidencing the presence, support and encouragement of this defendant \\\"is relevant to the weight of the evidence . . . but not to its admissibility or sufficiency for the purpose of corroboration.\\\" People v. Perry, id. at 773-774.\\nThe defendant also attacks the sufficiency of the evidence as a whole claiming that it only proves him to have been a passive observer of a crime committed by others. He asserts that the following crucial testimony of Bennie Gogue is too ambiguous and incomplete to support a finding that he was an active participant in the Sab\\u00edan shooting incident.\\nQ. What, if anything, did Eddie Olsen say at this time when you met him at the house?\\nA. Just to shoot \\u2014 what's his name \\u2014 just to shoot Serg-eant Sab\\u00edan.\\nQ. Serg-eant Frank Sab\\u00edan?\\nA. Yes.\\nQ. Was Patrick Palomo here at that discussion ?\\nA. Yes, Sir.\\nQ. Do you remember whether Patrick Palomo joined in that conversation?\\nA. Yes.\\nReporter's Transcript, p. 134, lines 4-14.\\nThe defendant complains that this testimony is ambiguous in that it is unclear whether Gogue's \\\"Yes\\\" response meant that Patrick Palomo joined in the conversation or that Gogue remembered whether he did. He further complains that the testimony is incomplete because it does not reveal the extent or nature of Patrick Palomo's participation in the conversation. But on appeal we must assume that the jury resolved ambiguity and incompleteness in favor of the prevailing party. Therefore, otherwise sufficient evidence is not rendered insufficient by speculation premised on the opposite assumption. Furthermore, it was the responsibility of defendant's trial counsel, not the prosecutor, to eliminate the ambiguity and incompleteness by fleshing out Gogue's testimony on this point during cross-examination. As an appellate court we can only assume that defense counsel's failure to do so sprang from a conscious recognition that clarification or amplification of this crucial portion of Gogue's testimony would not be beneficial to his client.\\nThe defendant's third appellate contention poses a difficult and rarely raised legal issue: must a trial judge make a preliminary determination that a statement by a witness, other than the defendant, was made voluntarily? Were there not two excellent appellate opinions discussing this issue, we would be compelled to discuss it at length. LaFrance v. Bohlinger, 499 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1974) and People v. Underwood, 61 C.2d 113, 37 Cal. Rptr. 313, 389 P.2d 937 (1964), however, make extended discussion unnecessary. We accept the reasoning of the First Circuit and its holding:\\n. . . [When] there is a substantial claim by the defendant that the impeaching statement offered by the Government was obtained by police threats and other blatant forms of physical and mental duress . . . the court has a duty to conduct its own inquiry and to exclude the statement if found to have been unconstitutionally coerced.\\nLaFrance v. Bohlinger, supra at 35; accord, People v. Underwood, id.\\nThere was a substantial claim raised by defendant that Vincent Palomo's impeaching statement was obtained by threatening him with trial as an adult for his part in the Sab\\u00edan assault. The trial court did not make its own inquiry into this claim. Therefore, this case must be remanded for a determination of whether Vincent Palomo voluntarily gave the statement used to impeach his trial testimony. If, after holding an evidentiary hearing and considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court is convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was made voluntarily, the defendant will be entitled to no further relief. On the other hand, should the court conclude that the statement was coerced by a threat to subject Vincent to trial as an adult, the statement must be suppressed and the defendant retried.\\nThe defendant's final appellate contention is that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct sufficiently serious to require reversal. We have carefully examined each of the defendant's claims of prosecutorial misconduct and find them neither singly nor collectively adequate to warrant reversal. This should not be construed, however, as an appellate seal of approval for the prosecutorial conduct complained of. The prosecutor, particularly in his misuse of Vincent Palomo's impeaching statement in his closing argument, at times treads dangerously close to misconduct of reversible dimensions.\\nThis case is remanded for the aforementioned determination of voluntariness. In all other respects the conviction is affirmed.\\nThis conclusion, although not dependent on the somewhat speculative testimony of Mary Lou Griffen regarding the similarity of the defendant's hairstyle to that of the driver of the red Datsun pickup on the night in question, is, nonetheless, bolstered by this additional bit of circumstantial evidence.\\nVincent Palomo testified under oath that Detective Palacios threatened to certify him for adult prosecution if he did not cooperate. His testimony in this regard was confirmed by the later sworn testimony of Keith L. Walker, Assistant Attorney General for the government of Guam.\\nSee Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).\\nLego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972); LaFrance v. Bohlinger, supra, 499 F.2d at 36.\\nJackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).\"}"

guam/5313686.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5313686\", \"name\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. PEDRO C. DUENAS, Defendant; THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. VICENTE C. SAN AGUSTIN, Defendant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"People v. Duenas\", \"decision_date\": \"1974-12-13\", \"docket_number\": \"Criminal No. 338-74; Criminal No. 12F-74\", \"first_page\": 255, \"last_page\": 258, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 255\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. PEDRO C. DUENAS, Defendant THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. VICENTE C. SAN AGUSTIN, Defendant\", \"head_matter\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. PEDRO C. DUENAS, Defendant THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM v. VICENTE C. SAN AGUSTIN, Defendant\\nCriminal No. 338-74\\nCriminal No. 12F-74\\nSuperior Court of Guam\\nDecember 13, 1974\", \"word_count\": \"804\", \"char_count\": \"4780\", \"text\": \"BENSON, Judge\\nORDER\\nMotions in both of these cases raise the question of whether any Rules of Criminal Procedure exist for this court.\\nPrior to the enactment of P.L. 9-256, effective January 8,1969, there were no jury trials in the Island Court, whose criminal jurisdiction was limited to misdemeanors. Provision for jury trials was required by the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968).\\nP.L. 10-2 was effective February 3, 1969. The central question raised by the motions is whether this law was intended as an interim measure or not. I conclude that it was. P.L. 9-256 which enacted a new Sec. 123 of the Code of Civil Procedure provided that the Judicial Council prescribe rules, but such rules should not become effective until 90 days elapsed after the reporting of such rules to the Legislature. Prior to P.L. 10-2 the Court had Rules of Criminal Procedure, but no rules at all regarding jury trials. Pending prescription of rules by the Judicial Council and the passage of 90 days prior to their effectiveness, P.L. 10-2 filled this need for rules governing jury trials.\\nGiving support to the view that P.L. 10-2 was an interim measure is\\n(1) the wording of the act itself which does not \\\"repeal\\\" Sec. 123;\\n(2) the fact that the Attorney General of Guam and the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the Legislature were both members of the Judicial Council, present at meetings where the rules were decided upon, and who, in their respective roles, worked in concert with the decisions of the Judicial Council; and\\n(3) the history of the rules prescribed, by the Judicial Council and reported to the Legislature after the enactment of P.L. 10-2 and the retention of Sec. 123 following the effective date of P.L. 10-2. These latter matters are summarized below.\\nOn April 25,1969, the Judicial Council adopted rules and on April 30, 1969, the chairman of the Judicial Council reported proposed rules to the Legislature. The Legislature failed to annul or amend any rule (see Sec. 123, Code of Civil Procedure), and they became effective after 90 days. This failure to act constitutes approval by the Legislature. On July 31, 1969 the rules were filed with the Secretary of Guam and a notice given that the rules were in effect.\\nIt is conceded in argument that until very recent date these rules, published in the Penal Code of Guam, 1970, beginning on page 325 were assumed to be in effect. They were invoked by counsel and cited by the Court in Island Court cases. People v. Santos, et al., Case No. 144-71; People v. Lizama, et al., Case No. 349-69.\\nThe terms of Sec. 123 state that any law in conflict with the rules after their effective date shall have no further effect. This provision would nullify P.L. 10-2 once rules were prescribed, reported and became effective.\\nSection 123, as enacted by P.L. 9-256, was amended by P.L. 10-180, effective August 15,1970, and by P.L. 11-151, effective July 13, 1972, thus demonstrating that the Legislature did not repeal Sec. 123 by P.L. 10-2.\\nThese rules then fall within the specific language of Sec. 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure enacted by P.L. 12-85, effective July 1,1974. They were prescribed by the Judicial Council and reported to the Legislature. The rules entitled Rules of Criminal Procedure for the Island Court of Guam, published in the Penal Code on page 325, by authority of Sec. 66, became the Rules for this Court.\\nIn reaching this result the following principles of statutory construction have been applied:\\n1. The best construction of a statute is the construction and application received by the Legislature, the Courts and the profession, and such construction should not be disturbed or overturned except for cogent and convincing reasons. 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes, Sec. 162.\\n2. Where two constructions are possible, the Legislature is presumed to intend the beneficial consequences, and not the undesirable consequences. Ibid., Sec. 258.\\n3. It is presumed that the Legislature knew of the construction, long acquiesced in, and intended the same construction when the provision was re-enacted. (Referring to Sec. 123, now Sec. 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure) Ibid., Sec. 322.\\n4. Where statutes are inconsistent, the last one passed is presumed to be the last declaration of Legislative will, and should prevail. Ibid., Sec. 332.\\n5. Resort to legislative history is permitted no matter how clear the words may appear on superficial examination. Ibid., Sec. 150.\\nThe motions to dismiss are therefore denied.\"}"

guam/5313736.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5313736\", \"name\": \"CHARLES UTZ and ROBERTA UTZ, Plaintiffs v. LEE CHUNG SOOK, et al., Defendants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Utz v. Lee Chung Sook\", \"decision_date\": \"1979-06-28\", \"docket_number\": \"Civil Case No. 155-79\", \"first_page\": 618, \"last_page\": 619, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 618\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"CHARLES UTZ and ROBERTA UTZ, Plaintiffs v. LEE CHUNG SOOK, et al., Defendants\", \"head_matter\": \"CHARLES UTZ and ROBERTA UTZ, Plaintiffs v. LEE CHUNG SOOK, et al., Defendants\\nCivil Case No. 155-79\\nSuperior Court of Guam\\nJune 28, 1979\", \"word_count\": \"394\", \"char_count\": \"2335\", \"text\": \"ABBATE, Presiding Judge\\nDECISION AND ORDER\\nThis matter came before this Court, the Honorable Paul J. Abbate presiding, on June 6, 1979, on defendant Lee Chung Sook's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs' Motion for default judgment, and on June 27, 1979, on defendant Agusto Paulino's Motion for summary judgments. Both defendants were represented by Timothy Stewart and the plaintiff was represented by John Dierking.\\nDefendant's motion to dismiss is based on an allegation of defective service on defendant Lee Chung Sook by service on her attorney-in-fact, Mr. Paulino. This motion is essentially the same as that raised previously by counsel for defendant by a motion to quash service, and was decided adversely to defendant in the Court's decision of April 3, 1979. The motion is therefore DENIED.\\nDefendant Paulino has moved for summary judgment in his favor on the grounds that he is not in possession of the premises. However, the affidavit by which he seeks to establish this fact was not served with the motion as required by Rule 6 (d), or ten (10) days in advance of the hearing as required by Rule 56(c). In this case there is no prejudice to the plaintiff for the plaintiff does not seek to contradict the affidavit or allege that due to the shortened time he has been prejudiced in obtaining evidence to contradict the affidavit. (See Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Civil Section 2719 (1973).) In fact, both parties have stated that based on such an affidavit they would stipulate to a dismissal, albeit on different terms. In this case either continuing the matter or denying the motion with leave to refile it would only serve to waste judicial resources, and as the plaintiff has claimed no prejudice to his rights, the summary judgment motion as to defendant Paulino is hereby GRANTED.\\nThe final motion outstanding in this matter is plaintiffs' motion for default judgment. Such a motion is addressed to the discretion of the Court (see Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Section 2685 (1973)) and based on the record in this matter the motion is DENIED. The defendant is given ten (10) days from the date of this order to plead further.\\nSO ORDERED.\"}"

guam/5313754.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5313754\", \"name\": \"SANI-SYSTEM, INC., AND PAUL D. PALTING, Appellants v. CAPITAL INSURANCE & SURETY COMPANY, INC., Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Sani-System, Inc. v. Capital Insurance & Surety Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1967-02-09\", \"docket_number\": \"Civil No. 51-A\", \"first_page\": 168, \"last_page\": 175, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 168\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"District Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before SHRIVER, Judge, District Court of Guam; FUR-BER, Chief Justice, High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and PEREZ, Chief Judge, Island Court of Guam\", \"parties\": \"SANI-SYSTEM, INC., AND PAUL D. PALTING, Appellants v. CAPITAL INSURANCE & SURETY COMPANY, INC., Appellee\", \"head_matter\": \"SANI-SYSTEM, INC., AND PAUL D. PALTING, Appellants v. CAPITAL INSURANCE & SURETY COMPANY, INC., Appellee\\nCivil No. 51-A\\nDistrict Court of Guam Appellate Division\\nFebruary 9, 1967\\nCounsel for Appellants: David M. Shapiro\\nCounsel for Appellee: Barrett, Ferenz & Trapp\\nBefore SHRIVER, Judge, District Court of Guam; FUR-BER, Chief Justice, High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and PEREZ, Chief Judge, Island Court of Guam\", \"word_count\": \"2363\", \"char_count\": \"14028\", \"text\": \"SHRIVER, District Judge\\nOPINION\\nThe unserved defendant, Judith V. Edge, insured by Capital, left her car with motor running and without set ting the brakes. The car either went into gear or otherwise was set in motion and struck a building, damaging it in the amount of $1,160.00. There is no serious question as .to the negligence or damage. Capital defended both on the merits and on its contention that the insured had failed to notify the company of the accident or assist the company. It can be assumed that she left Guam shortly after the accident and that her present whereabouts are unknown to Capital.\\nThe trial court was of the view that opinions of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have construed Guam legislation to mean that the injured person cannot recover from an insurance company if the company has a defense against the insured under the policy for failure of the insured to comply with conditions subsequent in .the policy. We reverse and direct that judgment be entered for the appellants in the amount of $1,160.00, plus costs and interest at 6% per annum from September 21, 1966 when the judgment of dismissal was entered.\\nThe amount involved here is small but the principle involved is of the utmost importance. To sustain the trial court we would be required to hold that neither the Direct Action Statute nor the Financial Eesponsibility Law of Guam gives the injured person any rights against an insurance company if the insured has failed to comply with policy conditions after the accident which require notification, availability to assist, either or both. The trial court was of the view that this conclusion was required by Sumait v. Capital Fire and Casualty Company, 296 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1961), and Capital Insurance and Surety Company, Inc. v. Kelly, 361 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1966).\\nIn Sumait the court simply held that an injured plaintiff under the terms of the policy in effect at the time of the accident could not recover against the company without bringing himself within the terms of the policy. Condition 7 of the policy provided that recovery could not be had against the company until the liability of the insured had been determined by judgment or agreement. The Direct Action Statute was not in effect at the time of the accident. Kelly involved a case in which the insured was killed in the accident. The appellate court reversed the holding of the district court that the action did not abate against the insurance company even if it abated against the deceased tortfeasor. But Judge Ely, in Kelly, made it clear that the opinion went no further than to hold that under Guam law a defense available to the insured was available to the company, that if by death no action existed against the insured there could be no liability on the part of the company. This situation has now been corrected in Guam by permitting survival of actions. Judge Ely said, p. 569\\nThere was a strongly valid reason for Guam's action in authorizing a direct proceeding against the insurer of an automobile operating upon Guam's roadways. It is well known that the population of the Territory, military personnel and others, has been unusually transient in its nature. Obviously, it was believed that an insurer of an automobile should not escape a just obligation because of the removal of its insured from the Territory and the consequent difficulty or impossibility of subjecting the insured himself to the jurisdiction, in personam, of the courts of Guam. It is hardly to be questioned, however, that the legislature contemplated that an insurer, sued in a direct action, might encounter no insurmountable obstacle in presenting its insured's testimony, either in deposition form or by production of the witness personally.\\nIn analyzing the case at hand, different considerations of policy are apparent. An alleged tortfeasor who is deceased may have been the only witness to events which might fairly exculpate him from legal responsibility. The rule that a tort action against him abates with his death was predicated upon the belief that public policy would be best served by avoiding the possibility that heirs suffer injustice because death foreclosed the opportunity for successful defense.\\nIn this case, we cannot undertake to weigh conflicting considerations of public policy. We are not properly empowered to supply additions to an insurance contract, and we cannot enlarge statutory provisions and extend them beyond the limit of such legislative objectives as may reasonably be inferred from the provisions themselves.\\nSection 43354 of the Government Code of Guam provides for direct action against the insurer which may be brought against the insurer alone or against both the insured and insurer \\\"within the terms and limits of the policy.\\\" It can be assumed that this statute, standing alone, simply places the injured person in the shoes of the insured as regards the liability of the insurer. The cause of action against the insurer exists at once. If at the time of the accident the insurer has a valid defense against its insured that defense is valid against the injured plaintiff within the terms and limits of the policy. The opinion in Kelly infers that it is the responsibility of the insurer to obtain the testimony of its insured when and if the insured has left the jurisdiction. The court opinions on the question of breach of conditions subsequent in the policy have been the subject of much dispute. 7 Am.Jur.2d, p. 574, Sec. 225, states the general rule to be that such breach by the insured is a defense against the injured but, at p. 576\\nThe general rule stated above is not followed in all jurisdictions, however. In a few, a different rule is applied, which may be attributable to the nature of the statutes in such jurisdictions. Thus, it has been held that where the public policy, expressed by the legislature through various statutes, is to protect the interests of injured third persons with respect to enforcing their claims against an automobile liability insurance carrier, the insurer is not relieved of liability where the interest of an injured third party intervenes before an insured's breach of a liability policy condition, unless the breach is material. Also, some courts take the view that the failure of the insured to give notice of an accident and of the pendency of an action against him by the injured person as provided for by the insurance policy does not prevent such injured person from bringing an action against the insurer.\\n\\u00a7 226. \\u2014Policies issued pursuant to compulsory insurance or financial responsibility statutes.\\nIn the case of automobile liability policies issued pursuant to and in compliance with compulsory insurance or financial responsibility statutes, the rule followed generally, for the reason that such statutes are for the benefit of members of the public and not of the insured, is that the injured person is not subject to defenses arising out of the breach of conditions subsequent to the action even though they would be available to the insurer as against the insured. Thus, failure to give notice of the accident does not constitute a defense to an action by an injured party to recover from the insurer, and this principle has also been applied or recognized in a number of cases where the statutory compulsion related only to taxicab or passenger bus owners, or other motor carriers, or to those engaged in the car rental business.\\nAlso, in accordance with the general rule, lack of cooperation on the part of the insured has been held not to constitute a defense to an action by an injured member of the public to recover from the insurer. Furthermore, a statute may specifically provide that lack of cooperation by the insured shall not operate to defeat the right of recovery from the insurer by the injured person, and such a provision has been held valid. However, where the particular accident or injured person was not within the intended coverage of the compulsory insurance statute, lack of cooperation on the part of the insured has been held to be available as a defense to the compulsory insurer.\\nThe Direct Action Statute is part of the Insurance Code of Guam but the Financial Responsibility Law of Guam is part of the Motor Vehicle Code and its provisions are clearly intended for the protection of third persons. This law, Section 23525, et seq., of the Government Code requires the person who has driven a motor vehicle involved in an accident to report it to the Department of Finance. The report is confidential except as to certain information including insurance. If the driver has insurance in the prescribed amounts he is exempted from posting security as a condition precedent to his continued driving. Such insurance must be in a company authorized to write insurance in Guam and upon receipt of the notice of the accident from the Department the insurer must report as to whether the policy was in effect at the time of the accident. The failure to report the accident by the driver is a misdemeanor.\\nThis comprehensive scheme, short of compulsory insurance, falls down when the driver fails to report the accident. In the case before us it is not questioned that the insurance was in existence and that if the insured had reported the accident as required the insurer, upon inquiry, would have reported coverage. The system becomes meaningless if, after reporting coverage, the insurer could rely on lack of notice or failure to cooperate as a defense against the injured third party. The existence of insurance protects the driver against having his license to drive suspended. In these circumstances is the insurer prejudiced by the failure of the insured to report the accident either to the insurer or the government? As the Court pointed out in Kelly, the insurer can obtain the testimony of the insured for any defense on the merits. The injured person, on the contrary, for whose benefit the law exists, has no local recourse against the insured who has left the jurisdiction. The insurer can choose its insurance risks but the victim cannot choose by whom he would be injured. In Royal Indemnity Co. v. Olmstead, 193 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1951), the court pointed out that as a general rule, unless a policy could be construed as creating an independent right of action in the injured person, his right to recover is subject to any defenses the company might have against the insured. But that an exception exists where the insurance policy was issued to satisfy the requirements of a statute having as its purpose the protection of the public. Olmstead involved compulsory insurance and the court held that the defense of lack of notice or other technical defenses \\\"under the policy relating to conditions wholly outside the ability of the injured person to secure performance of\\\" were not available to the insurer. The general law appears to support this view as to financial responsibility laws as well as compulsory insurance laws, 7 Am.Jur.2d p. 576, Sec. 226, supra.\\nAssuming that the policy involved here was issued pursuant to the Guam Financial Responsibility Law we must determine whether defenses of lack of notice or failure to cooperate are available to the insurer. In a Guam case it was stated Gumataotao v. Government of Guam, 322 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1963)\\nIt is well settled that, in recognition of the fact that local needs, customs and legal systems may differ from those with which we are more familiar, decisions of local courts of United States territories on matters of purely local law will not be reversed unless clear and manifest error is shown. De Castro v. Board of Com'rs of San Juan, 322 U.S. 451 (1944); Bonet v. Texas Co. (P.R.), Inc., 308 U.S. 463 (1940); Advertiser Publishing Company v. Fase, 279 F.2d 636 (9 Cir. 1960); Lord v. Territory of Hawaii, 79 F.2d 761 (9 Cir. 1935). In the Bonet case the Supreme Court at page 471 states, \\\"[T]o justify reversal in such cases, the error must be clear or manifest; the interpretation must be inescapably wrong; the decision must be patently erroneous.\\\"\\nThere is another factor in Guam, possibly a controlling factor. This was not discussed in the briefs or in oral argument but in practice there is de facto compulsory insurance in Guam which involves a high percentage if not most of the private automobiles. Guam has many military installations and many closed military bases (bases with guarded entrances). The uniform requirement by military commands is that no private vehicle, whether owned by a civilian or a member of the armed services, may enter the base without a showing of the minimum insurance coverage provided for by the Guam Financial Responsibility Law. This is absolute as regards those who are issued decals to be placed on the windshield but may be modified for a visitor. When it is considered that commercial planes land on the closed base of the Naval Air Station and that there are few local car owners who do not have occasion to enter such bases at some time during the year, the practical necessity for insurance becomes apparent. Those who live on base must have insurance; those who live off base but are employed on base, including large numbers of Guamanians, must have insurance; others, such as the writer of this opinion, who go on base for social or business reasons at regular intervals must demonstrate the existence of insurance before being given a windshield permit good for a year.\\nReversed and remanded to the Island Court for entry of judgment for the appellants, against Capital, Capital to pay all costs.\"}"

guam/5313781.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5313781\", \"name\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM, Plaintiff-Appellee v. ALLAN FLORES, Defendant-Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"People v. Flores\", \"decision_date\": \"1978-01-24\", \"docket_number\": \"Criminal No. 76-003-A\", \"first_page\": 463, \"last_page\": 464, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 463\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"District Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before DUE\\u00d1AS, SMITH and WONG, District Judges\", \"parties\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM, Plaintiff-Appellee v. ALLAN FLORES, Defendant-Appellant\", \"head_matter\": \"THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY OF GUAM, Plaintiff-Appellee v. ALLAN FLORES, Defendant-Appellant\\nCriminal No. 76-003-A\\nDistrict Court of Guam Appellate Division\\nJanuary 24, 1978\\nBefore DUE\\u00d1AS, SMITH and WONG, District Judges\", \"word_count\": \"289\", \"char_count\": \"1824\", \"text\": \"PER CURIAM\\nOPINION\\nOn July 25, 1975, the defendant, Allan Flores, was indicted by the local grand jury for delivering a quantity of marijuana (a controlled substance) in violation of \\u00a7 626.10 of the Guam Penal Code. On December 12, 1975, the defendant was convicted as charged in the indictment.\\nDefendant's first contention that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict is without merit.\\nDefendant next argues that the trial court gave an erroneous jury instruction regarding entrapment. The trial court gave a proper instruction on the theory of entrapment (taken from CAL-JIC 4.60). (RT 178.) It is true that the trial court failed to take the language of an additional instruction verbatim from CAL-JIC 4.61 (dealing with whether furnishing the opportunity to commit a crime is entrapment). However, the court on appeal is satisfied that the trial judge accurately stated the law and therefore the jury could not have been confused by this. If defendant had any objection to the entrapment instruction, he should have made it at trial.\\nDefendant also urges that certain hearsay statements should have been excluded, but he made no objection to these statements at trial. Clearly, a proper objection must have been made at trial. Witkin, California Evidence 2d 1207, People v. Moore, 91 CR 538, 13 Cal.App.2d 424 (1970).\\nFinally, defendant was brought to trial within five months after he was indicted. The record does not show that any prejudice resulted from this delay. Under these circumstances the delay is not of constitutional proportion and does not warrant reversal. Affirmed.\"}"

guam/5313836.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"5313836\", \"name\": \"PACIFIC INSURANCE ASSOCIATES, LTD., Appellee v. FASHIONS, INC., Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Pacific Insurance Associates, Ltd. v. Fashions, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"1963-01-31\", \"docket_number\": \"Civil No. 25-A\", \"first_page\": 112, \"last_page\": 124, \"citations\": \"1 Guam 112\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Guam Reports\", \"court\": \"District Court of Guam\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Guam\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:51.366479+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before GILMARTIN (deceased), Presiding Judge; FURBER, Chief Justice, High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and DUE\\u00d1AS, Judge, Island Court of Guam\", \"parties\": \"PACIFIC INSURANCE ASSOCIATES, LTD., Appellee v. FASHIONS, INC., Appellant\", \"head_matter\": \"PACIFIC INSURANCE ASSOCIATES, LTD., Appellee v. FASHIONS, INC., Appellant\\nCivil No. 25-A\\nDistrict Court of Guam Appellate Division\\nJanuary 31, 1963\\nCounsel for Appellee: W. Scott Barrett, Esq.\\nCounsel for Appellant: Finton J. Phelan, Jr., Esq.\\nBefore GILMARTIN (deceased), Presiding Judge; FURBER, Chief Justice, High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and DUE\\u00d1AS, Judge, Island Court of Guam\", \"word_count\": \"3576\", \"char_count\": \"20772\", \"text\": \"PER CURIAM\\nOPINION\\nThis is a second appeal in an action for unlawful detainer under Sections 1159 to 1179a of the Guam Code of Civil Procedure. In Appeal Case Civil No. 13-A the action was remanded to the Island Court with instructions to grant the present appellant a new trial in accordance with the opinion on that appeal,, which indicated that this appellant should be allowed to be fully heard on its defense (even though pleaded as a counter-claim and cross-complaint) of partial eviction. As a result of the new trial, the Island Court found there had been no partial eviction and entered judgment decreeing that all sums then on deposit in the Island Court which had been paid over pursuant to the orders of this Court to secure the rights of the parties be paid to the plaintiff-appellee, that the sublease in question had been forfeited, and that a writ of restitution issue. The action is now before us on appeal from that judgment.\\nThe plaintiff-appellee was the lessor in a sublease agreement assigned to the present defendant-appellant covering portions of lots numbers 1040 and 1051 in Agana, Guam, on which the defendant-appellant or its assignor was to erect a store building. The sublease was for a period of ten (10) years less one (1) day, with provision for renewal for an additional term of ten (10) years under certain conditions, or for a lesser additional term under other conditions.\\nAt the new trial the defendant-appellant endeavored to prove two distinct partial evictions \\u2014 one continuing since about the inception of the sublease based on an alleged error in the location of the wall between the plaintiffappellee's building and that of the defendant-appellant, and the other based on the alleged use of the joint parking lot by a tenant or tenants of the plaintiff-appellee for a used and new car business during the period from July 15, 1954, to mid-December 1955.\\nSo far as the alleged partial eviction from about the inception of the sublease is concerned, it is clear that the defendant-appellant acquiesced in the placing of the building in question and made no complaint whatever about it until long after the trouble arose about the parking lot and the sublease had already run several years. Although the rent had been paid for five (5) years in advance, at the inception of the sublease, we believe that any partial eviction based on the location of the plaintiff-appellee's building must be considered to have been waived by the conduct of the parties. See Duncan v. Granas, 166 Cal. 41, 134 Pac. 979 (1913). We recognize, however, that in that case there was the additional element of payment of rent after the alleged partial eviction. In fact the parties seem to have been so friendly during the period of construction of the buildings and surfacing of the parking lot that they paid little attention to the exact terms of the sublease agreement. The provision with regard to the parking lot reads as follows : \\u2014\\n\\\"9. The parties hereto agree that the area between the buildings standing upon Lots Nos. 1040 and 1037, Agana, shall be used as a joint parking space for the convenience of the occupants of said buildings.\\\"\\nYet it clearly appears from defendant's Exhibit 2 and the testimony concerning it, that .the plaintiff-appellee's building on Lot 1037 as actually built abutted immediately against the defendant-appellant's building on Lot 1040, and left no room for a parking lot at the point specified in the agreement. Instead the parties shared the cost of putting a hard top on a parking lot in front of the buildings, the defendant-appellant paying half the cost. Prior to and throughout the new trial all concerned seem to have acquiesced in considering this parking lot as the one covered by the sublease. We accordingly believe that it must be considered to have been substituted by mutual agreement for that described in the sublease agreement.\\nThe question of whether there was a substantial partial eviction from this substituted parking lot turns, in our opinion, on the correct interpretation of the provisions of the sublease with regard to the original parking lot, quoted above. The trial court made findings that the sublease \\\"gave defendant a right to share in the use of said parking lot and that defendant and its patrons had the use of said parking lot. That the parking lot was also used from time to time by other persons but that there were during the period complained of by defendant, sufficient empty parking spaces during business hours so as to accommodate any of the defendant's customers and employees.\\\" We feel, however, that those findings do not cover the point at issue, and that the defendant-appellant was entitled to greater right in the parking lot than these findings indicate. It is well settled that a lease should be construed to give effect to the intention of the parties as shown in the lease and that, in arriving at this intention, the surrounding circumstances and the object in view and intended to be accomplished by the parties at the time, are to be considered. 32 Am.Jur., Landlord and Tenant, Section 127.\\nThe sublease in question here contained (in paragraph 4) an express acknowledgment by the sublessor that the sublessee was, at his own expense, constructing a store building upon the subleased premises and that it was the intent of the parties that the sublessee should have the use and enjoyment of said building as owner consistent with the sublessor's then existing leases. It also contained in paragraph 7 a covenant by the sublessor not to lease any additional units of the buildings upon Lots Nos. 1040 and 1051 to anyone in competition with or engaged in a like kind of business as the sublessee. The only reasonable inference is that the building in question was to be used for .business catering to the public. We believe that, under the proper construction of paragraph 9 of the sublease, quoted above, in the light of the objectives sought by the sublease and the conduct of the parties, the defendant-appellant was entitled not merely to share in the use of the parking lot for itself and its customers, but also to have the parking lot kept free from use other than for access to the buildings and for such parking as was normally incident to businesses carried on within the buildings, and not to have the parking lot itself used for carrying on business or as a space for dead storage or as a demonstration area.\\nThe evidence shows that the plaintiff-appellee, either directly or indirectly, authorized a tenant of its adjoining building, over the repeated objections of the defendant- appellant, to use this parking lot for buying and selling of automobiles, storage of used cars and equipment, and as a stand for its demonstrators. There is no conflict in the testimony as to such use from July 15, 1954, through September 1954, and such conflict as there is as to the period from October 1954 to mid-December 1955 relates to the part and proportion of the parking lot used for this automobile business, rather than to any showing that the lot was not itself used as a place of business for other than normal parking incident to a business carried on within the buildings in question. While it may be difficult to ascertain with a reasonable degree of certainty the exact extent to which this use of the parking lot damaged the defendant-appellant, it was clearly detrimental to the latter and its business and we believe was a substantial wrongful interference by the sublessor with the rights of its sublessee.\\nWe recognize that, according to the great weight of authority, an interference with a lessee's rights by his lessor which amounts to merely a constructive eviction will not relieve the lessee from the payment of the rent contracted for, unless he surrenders or abandons the leased premises, although generally recoupment of damages for breach of a covenant of quiet enjoyment is allowable in an action for the rent reserved. 32 Am.Jur., Landlord and Tenant, Sections 479 and 538. On the other hand it is generally accepted that a partial eviction by the lessor from a part of the premises will relieve the lessee from liability for future rents, and that the legal effect of such eviction from a part of the premises is to suspend the rent entirely, even though the lessee remains in occupancy of the remainder of the premises. 32 Am.Jur., Landlord and Tenant, Section 480; Skaggs v. Emerson (1875) 50 Cal. 3.\\nIt is difficult to reconcile all of the cases drawing a distinction between constructive eviction and an actual partial eviction and it is not in all cases clear whether a particular breach complained of has been considered as an actual partial eviction or a constructive eviction. As stated in 20 American Law Reports Annotated at page 1373:\\n\\\"It has been said that it is extremely difficult to define with technical accuracy what is an eviction. The word 'eviction' was formerly used to denote an expulsion by the assertion of a paramount title, or by process of law. But that sort of an eviction is not necessary to constitute a suspension of the rent, because it is now well settled that, if a tenant loses the benefit of the enjoyment of any portion of the demised premises, by the act of the landlord, the rent is thereby suspended. Upton v. Townend (Eng.) supra.\\\" (The reference is to Upton v. Townend (1855) 17 C.B. 80, 139 Eng. Reprint, 976, 25 L.J.C.P.N.S. 44, 1 Jur. N.S. 1089, 4 Week. Rep. 56.)\\nWe believe that the present rule is correctly stated in Holden v. Tidwell (1913) 37 Okla. 553, 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 369, 133 Pac. 54, Ann. Cas. 1915C 394, quoted in 20 A.L.R. at page 1374 as follows:\\u2014\\n\\\"Originally an eviction was understood to be a dispossession of the tenant by some act of his landlord, or the failure of his title. Of late years it has come to include any wrongful act of his landlord which may result in an interference with the tenant's possession in whole or in part. The act may be one of omission as well as of commission. The rent is suspended by an eviction, because it is plainly unjust that the landlord should be permitted to collect it, while by his own act he deprives the tenant of the possession which is the consideration for it. But the landlord is not responsible for the actions of others lawfully done on their own premises. He is liable only for his own acts and for such acts of others as it was his duty to protect his tenant from.\\\"\\nSee the entire section of the annotation concerning the tenant's right to claim partial actual eviction in 20 A.L.R. 1372 to 1378.\\nIt is well established that the appurtenances, including easements and servitudes, granted either expressly in the lease or by implication, are included in the leased premises which the tenant is entitled to the quiet possession and enjoyment of to the extent of such rights, even though they may be shared with others. 32 Am.Jur., Landlord and Tenant, Section 169, including the portion added following note 14 by the 1962 Cumulative Supplement to that volume, page 18; Owsley v. Hamner (1951) 36 Cal.2d 710, 227 P.2d 263, 24 A.L.R.2d 112 and the annotation following it in 24 A.L.R.2d.\\nThe closest case to the present one, which has come to our attention, is Hamilton v. Graybill (1907) 19 Misc. 521, 43 N.Y.Supp. 1079, cited with brief summary in 20 A.L.R. 1377. In that case it appears that a tenant had leased some rooms which had two entrances, which the court considered as appurtenances to the leased rooms. The tenant was actually and physically ousted and kept expelled from the use of one of these entrances. The court considered that this was not merely a constructive eviction from the rooms, but constituted an actual eviction from a part of the premises, which, though the tenant continued to occupy the rooms, had the effect of suspending the entire rent so long as the eviction endured.\\nWe are of the opinion that similarly here, the physical use of the parking lot as a place of business which the sublessor authorized in violation of the sublessee's right, as explained above, constituted an actual partial eviction and suspended the whole rent as such during the period of this partial eviction from July 15, 1954, to mid-December 1955. The rent for the first five (5) years of the sublease, including the period of this partial eviction, had been paid in advance. So, as far as the rent reserved in the sublease is concerned, as distinguished from any question of payment for use and occupation of the remainder of the premises, the rent was over-paid at the time of the bringing of this action, even though there may be question as to how much it was over-paid or how much of it, if any, the defendant-appellant might have been entitled to get back.\\nAccording to a number of authorities a tenant in such a situation is not even liable in quantum meruit for use and occupation of such part of the premises as he retains while the partial eviction continues, while others hold that he is entitled to a reduction in the rent, and it has been held that, where the rent has been paid in advance, the tenant may recover back the rent paid, or at least a proportionate part of it. The defendant-appellant has indicated in its brief and throughout these appeals a willingness to pay for the portion of the premises actually occupied and has evidenced its good faith by the payments made into the registry of this court to secure the rights of the parties. We believe that, under all the circumstances, the defendant-appellant was entitled to at least an allowance for such damages as it could show with reasonable certainty flowed from the partial eviction or if it could not so show the damages, then in any event, to an allowance for nominal damages. 32 Am.Jur., Landlord and Tenant, Sections 265 (especially notes 8, 13, and 14), 480 and 490; 20 A.L.R. 1369; 28 A.L.R. 1334; 64 A.L.R. 905.\\nThe whole theory on which a partial eviction is held to suspend the entire rent is that there can be no apportionment because the partial eviction is the wrongful act of the landlord himself and no one should be encouraged to disturb a tenant in the possession of that which, according to the policy of the law, he ought to protect and defend, and that a tenant should not be expected, at its peril, to estimate the exact amount due for partial occupancy under pain of possible further eviction through a proceeding for unlawful detainer. We believe that this theory applies equally to the present situation. It is a fundamental principle in equity that a person will not be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. 19 Am.Jur., Equity, Section 471. It has also been held several times that forcible entry and detainer, or unlawful detainer, should not be allowed where that would be inequitable. See Farmer v. Pitts (Nebr. 1922) 187 N.W. 95, 24 A.L.R. 719, in which a judgment in forcible entry and detainer based on nonpayment of rent was reversed, the court stating at page 722 of 24 A.L.R.:\\n\\\"The writer of this opinion cannot but be impressed with the idea, which seems to come from a reading of the record, that it was not the rent the lessor wanted, but rather a forfeiture of the lease contract. Now, the provision of the statute regarding a forcible entry and detention, as well as the provision in the lease as to the nonpayment of the rent, is for the security of such rental to the lessor, not for the purpose of giving him an undue advantage and permitting him unjustly to obtain a forfeiture of the lease.\\\"\\nAlso: Abrams v. Watson (1877) 59 Ala. 524, cited and quoted from in 16 A.L.R. 444; Humphrey v. Humphrey (1950) 254 Ala. 395, 48 So.2d, 424, 31 A.L.R.2d 315, and the annotations following it in A.L.R.2d.\\nThe plaintiff-appellee by its own wrong having created this uncertainty as to what deduction should be made from the rent already paid and therefore, as to the period for which the defendant-appellant should equitably be considered to have paid, we believe the plaintiff-appellee's right to relief through the summary procedure of unlawful detainer was barred until such time as the allowance for the partial eviction was either agreed upon or adjudicated and, if it then developed that any rent was in default, a proper notice was given in accordance with Section 1161 of the Guam Code of Civil Procedure specifying the correct amount due.\\nIt accordingly follows that the plaintiff-appellee was not entitled to recover possession of the property at the time it brought this action, and therefore is not entitled to recover any rent in this action for unlawful detainer.\\n\\\"The primary purpose of such an action is for the recovery of the possession of the property. The recovery of rent is a mere incident to the main object. . . . When the main object of the action fails, the incidents fall with it.\\\" Markham v. Fralik (1934) 2 Cal.2d, 221, 227.\\nThis leaves the question, however, of how the monies, which have been paid into the Registry of the District Court pursuant to the order of this Court to secure the rights of the parties, should be distributed. In order to avoid circuity of action, it is believed that these should be divided in this action on the basis of the amounts due for either rent or use and occupation and the costs in this action. We have already indicated in our former opinion in Appeal Case Civil No. 13-A that, under the circumstances, the defendant-appellant has an obligation to pay, upon a quantum meruit basis, for use and occupation of such part of the premises as it retained during the period of the partial eviction. We believe, however, that this cannot equitably and fairly be held to exceed the rent stipulated in the lease, less an allowance for the partial eviction, and that for the period subsequent thereto the rent should be merely that provided in the lease, and that the defendant-appellant should be allowed its costs out of the sums deposited. The effect of the trial court's judgment and the \\\"order for payment\\\" pursuant to it, which recited that it was a special order pursuant to Section 942 of the Guam Code of Civil Procedure, has been to allow the plaintiffappellee, because of the supposed forfeiture of the sublease, an increase of about eighty percent (80%) above the rent stipulated, for a considerable period following the alleged default in the rent. We consider this inequitable and that in the distribution of the funds now on hand sufficient should be allowed the defendant-appellant (in addition to the other allowances discussed herein) to counterbalance this payment in excess of the rent stipulated in the sublease so as not to allow the plaintiff-appellee to profit from its own wrong.\\nWe consider that the defendant-appellant has failed to show with reasonable certainty what its damages were flowing from the partial eviction, but that even under these circumstances it is entitled, as stated above, to an allowance of nominal damages, which we fix at one dollar ($1.00) a month, for the period from July 15,1954, to December 15, 1955, or a total of seventeen dollars ($17.00), from the rent stipulated.\\nThe judgment of the Island Court of Guam, entered May 6, 1960 in its Civil Case 13-58, is hereby set aside. The funds now held in this action in the Registry of the District Court of Guam are ordered transferred to the Registry of the Island Court of Guam and this action is remanded to the Island Court of Guam with the following instructions :\\u2014\\nA. To enter judgment for the defendant Fashions, Incorporated, with costs.\\nB. To divide the funds now in the Registry of this Court in such a manner as to allow the plaintiff, Pacific Insurance Associates, Ltd., out of all funds distributed through the Registry of the Court in this action, a total (including the $1,750.00 ordered on March 11, 1960, paid to the plaintiff pursuant to stipulation of counsel and the $6,636.28 ordered paid to the plaintiff pursuant to the judgment herein set aside) of only the amount stipulated as due for rent in the sublease in question from the time of the alleged default in payment of rent up to the time of the order making the division of the funds now on hand, less $17.00, and further less the taxable costs of the defendant Fashions, Incorporated, in this action, and then to give the balance to the defendant Fashions, Incorporated.\\nDue to his death, Judge Gilmartin did not take part in this opinion.\"}"