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+"{\"id\": \"1008532\", \"name\": \"McDyer v. Eastern Pennsylvania Railways Company, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"McDyer v. Eastern Pennsylvania Railways Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1910-03-07\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal, No. 192\", \"first_page\": \"641\", \"last_page\": \"648\", \"citations\": \"227 Pa. 641\", \"volume\": \"227\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:53:29.462159+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Fell, C. J., Brown, Elkin, Stewart and Moschzisker, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"McDyer v. Eastern Pennsylvania Railways Company, Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"McDyer v. Eastern Pennsylvania Railways Company, Appellant.\\nNegligence \\u2014 Street railways \\u2014 Contributory negligence \\u2014 Oblique angled collision \\u2014 Vehicles\\u2014Milk dealer.\\n1. In an action to recover damages for the death of a milkman who was struck by a trolley car while attempting between intersecting streets to cross from one side of a street to the other at an oblique angle over trolley tracks in the middle of the street, where the testimony of the son of the deceased, who was with him in the wagon, is that immediately before crossing the track they stopped about three feet from the nearest rail and looked and listened but did not see or hear a car; that they then started across the tracks very slowly; and that when the horse had cleared the tracks and about one minute after they had stopped and looked, a car ran into the rear wheel of the wagon, throwing deceased out and upsetting the wagon, pushing it possibly sixty or 100 feet; and where witnesses for the plaintiff testify that the car was going very fast, going from twenty-five to thirty-five miles an hour, that it was about 400 feet away when the horse was on the track, and a witness for the defense testifies that one could see in the direction from which the car approached at least 725 feet, the questions of negligence and contributory negligence are for the jury.\\nPractice, C. P. \\u2014 Evidence\\u2014Motion to strike out testimony \\u2014 Trial\\u2014 Physician \\u2014 Medical license \\u2014 Registration\\u2014Expert testimony \\u2014 Opinion based on conflicting testimony \\u2014 A ssignments of error \\u2014 Instructions.\\n2. After testimony has been received without objection, the refusal to strike it out is not reviewable. In such a case the only course is to request the court to instruct the jury to disregard the testimony and upon a refusal to assign error.\\n3. Where a physician, witness for plaintiff, states on cross-examination that he is licensed and duly registered in Pennsylvania and his testimony is admitted without objection, and thereafter counsel for defendant introduces evidence to show he is not a licentiate, followed by a motion to strike out all his testimony, the refusal of such a motion is not reviewable.\\n4. A doctor cannot be asked to express a professional opinion as to the cause of death based on the hearing of testimony which is conflicting in many essentials.\\n5. An expert witness after being first acquainted with the whole of the particular part upon which he is to pronounce, may be asked to express an opinion upon any defined portion of the testimony, which is not contradictory in itself, and the truth of which is expressly assumed; but he may not be asked to first ascertain and determine the conflicting elements, and then to express an opinion upon his conclusion.\\nPractice, C. P. \\u2014 Evidence\\u2014Earnings\\u2014Husband and, wife.\\n6. The question, \\u201cWhat were the average net earnings of deceased in a year during the time he was engaged in the milk business, per year, if you know?\\u201d addressed to the wife of the deceased, is relevant and competent, although the testimony sought to be elicited, standing alone, would not be sufficient to base an estimate of damages upon.\\nPractice, C. P. \\u2014Trial\\u2014Charge\\u2014Abstracts from charge.\\n7. Abstracts from the judge\\u2019s charge must be read in connection with the charge as a whole.\\nArgued March 7, 1910.\\nAppeal, No. 192,\\nJan. T., 1909, by defendant, from judgment of C. P. Carbon Co., Oct. T., 1908, No. 28, on verdict for plaintiff in case of Mary McDyer v. Eastern Pennsylvania Railways Company.\\nBefore Fell, C. J., Brown, Elkin, Stewart and Moschzisker, JJ.\\nAffirmed.\\nTrespass to recover damages for personal injuries resulting in death. Before Heydt, P. J.\\nVerdict and judgment for plaintiff for $6,000. Defendant appealed.\\nThe opinion of the Supreme Court states the case.\\nErrors assigned were in refusing to strike out testimony; in refusing to permit certain physicians called by the defense to testify as experts; and to portions of the charge of the court.\\nB. II. Koch, with him Frederick Bertolette, for appellant. \\u2014 -\\nThe testimony of the doctors called based upon a knowledge of all the medical testimony in the case was clearly admissible: Good v. Good, 1 Mona. 718; Yardley v. Cuthbertson, 108 Pa. 395; Olmstead v. Gere, 100 Pa. 127; Burkholder v. Tyson, 1 Berks, 37.\\nThe deceased was bound to look until he got to the rail, and to keep on looking: Ehrisman v. Ry. Co., 150 Pa. 180; Omslaer v. Traction Co., 168 Pa. 519; Burke v. Traction Co., 198 Pa. 497; Boring v. Traction Co., 211 Pa. 594; Timler v. Transit Co., 214 Pa. 475; Kannenberg v. Traction Co., 215 Pa. 555; Houston v. Traction Co., 28 Pa. Superior Ct. 374; Sontum v. Railway & Light Co., 226 Pa. 230; Smathers v. Ry. Co., 226 Pa. 212; McKee v. Harrisburg Traction Co., 211 Pa. 47.\\nProfits derived from an investment or the management of a business enterprise are not earnings: Goodhart v. R. R. Co., 177 Pa. 1; Miller v. Gas Co., 206 Pa. 254; Wallace v. R. R. Co., 195 Pa. 127.\\nE. O. Nothstein, with him Wm. G. Freyman, for appellee.\\u2014\\nThe refusal of a motion to strike out evidence received without objection is not re viewable: Yeager & German v. Weaver, 64 Pa. 425; Montgomery v. Cunningham, 104 Pa. 349.\\nThe case was for the jury: Boggs v. Railway Co., 216 Pa. 314; Mortimer v. Traction Co., 216 Pa. 326; Hamilton v. Traction Co., 201 Pa. 351; Woelfel v. Railway Co., 183 Pa. 213; Reilley v. Traction Co., 176 Pa. 335; Holt v. Railroad Co., 206 Pa. 356; Kroesen v. Ry. Co., 198 Pa. 26.\\nWhere loss of earning power is one of the principal items of damages the evidence presented should be sufficiently explicit to enable the jury to form an intelligent judgment: Wallace v. Penna. Co., 219 Pa. 327.\", \"word_count\": \"2856\", \"char_count\": \"16191\", \"text\": \"Opinion by\\nMr. Justice Moschzisker,\\nMarch 28, 1910:\\nMary McDyer, widow of James McDyer, recovered a ver diet for an injury to her husband resulting in his death al leged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant company. The defendant has appealed.\\nJames McDyer was a milk dealer: On the day of the accident he was driving a one-horse wagon, and was accompanied by his son, a lad of seventeen. He had served a customer on the south side of a certain street, in the middle of which was a trolley line. He drove a short distance and before reaching the next intersecting street attempted to cross the trolley tracks at an oblique angle in order to get on the opposite side to serve another customer. According to the testimony of the son, immediately before crossing they stopped about three feet from the nearest rail and looked up and down the trolley line; he was listening, but did not see or hear any car; they then started across the tracks \\\"very slowly\\\"; when the horse had cleared the tracks and the wagon was between them, a car ran into the rear wheel; he says it was about one minute from the time they stopped and looked until they were struck by the car. The wagon was upset and pushed possibly sixty to 100 feet, McDyer being thrown out and so injured that he died about two and one-half months thereafter. Each side produced a number of witnesses, and there was much conflicting testimony, but the plaintiff's witnesses in a general way bear out the story as we have given it. One witness for the plaintiff stated that the car was going very fast; and another that just as the team crossed the track he saw the top of the car over the crest of the hill, and that it came at a rate between twenty-five and thirty-five miles an hour. Another witness stated that the car was about 400 feet away when the horse was on the track; and a witness for the defense testified that one could see in the direction from which the car approached at least 725 feet. On this state of facts it cannot be said as a matter of law that the motorman was free from negligence, or that McDyer was guilty of contributory negligence. Both of these points were for the jury, and were properly submitted in a comprehensive charge. McDyer was not bound to stop before crossing the track, but he did so; and we have positive testimony that he looked at a point about three feet from the nearest rail, and that his companion listened. In the absence of testimony to the contrary, the deceased is entitled to the presumption that he continued to exercise care by looking and listening; and whether or not this presumption was overcome would be for the jury to decide on all the evidence in the case. The only other person in the wagon was produced as a witness and could have been cross-examined on this point had counsel for the defense so desired. This is not a clear case where we can say that the story told by all of the plaintiffs witnesses is impossible and the car must have been in sight when McDyer entered upon the track. A car traveling at the rate of fifteen miles an hour will cover twenty-two feet in one second: Piatt v. Pittsburg Rys. Co., 219 Pa. 583. Here we have testimony that the car was traveling at least thirty miles an hour, which would be forty-four feet in one second, or over 800 feet in twenty seconds. That McDyer had to drive slowly and with care is made apparent by the testimony, \\\"because the rails and sills were so high it would smash your wagon to pieces if you drove fast.\\\" Under these circumstances we cannot say that he was obliged to give his exclusive attention to the possible approach of a trolley car which was not in sight when he started to cross the tracks. Nor can we say that he must have cleared the tracks in twenty seconds or less. On the other hand, we have the testimony produced by the defendant that the trolley car could. be stopped within the distance of sixty feet, and that there was a clear view on the track of over 700 feet. On the testimony as a whole the jury may have concluded that there was no car in sight when he first entered the tracks, or that the car was then at least 700 feet away; that the motorman must have seen the wagon, and had ample time to stop if he had kept his car under proper control. If so, they had the right to find that the motorman was guilty of negligence, and that McDyer was not guilty of contributory negligence.\\nMuch of the argument of counsel for the appellant goes to the weight of the evidence on the various points involved. Whether or not the jury properly weighed the evidence should have been submitted to the court below on a motion for a new trial; and this, so far as the record in the paper-book reveals, was not done.\\nIt is complained that the court erred in overruling defendant's objection to the question addressed to the plaintiff : \\\" What were the average net earnings of Mr. McDyer in a year during the time he was engaged in the milk business, per year, if you know? \\\" We see no error in the ruling. Although the testimony sought to be elicited, standing alone, would not have been sufficient to base an estimate of damages upon, yet the question itself was clearly relevant and competent, and the witness was in a position to give the desired information. As this is the only assignment going to the sufficiency of the evidence on the question of the proof of the damages, we will not further discuss that branch of the case.\\nOn cross-examination as to his qualifications as a physician, Dr. Gallagher, a witness for the plaintiff, stated that he had been licensed and duly registered in Pennsylvania and his testimony was admitted without objection. He stated that he was the attending physician, and gave the details as to McDyer's condition and ailments, expressing the opinion that the patient had died as a result of his injuries from the accident. After this, counsel for the defendant produced evidence to show that Dr. Gallagher was not a licentiate of the medical council of Pennsylvania, and that his statements to the contrary were untrue; which was followed by amotion to strike out all of his testimony.- This was refused, the trial judge stating: \\\"The court declined to strike out the testimony of Dr. Gallagher. He was one of the physicians who attended upon Mr. McDyer, the deceased, and he was the physician de facto if not de jure. It may affect his credibility, but it would not be a warrant for the court to strike out his testimony, the fact he was not registered.\\\" After testimony has been received without objection, the refusal to strike it out is not reviewable. In such a case the only course is to request the court to instruct the jury to disregard the testimony, and upon a refusal, to assign error: Ashton v. Sproule, 35 Pa. 492; Oswald v. Kennedy, 48 Pa. 9; Yeager & German v. Weaver, 64 Pa. 425; Geist's App., 104 Pa. 351. In these days when there is a possible tendency to abuse the privilege of informing the court and jury by medical experts, where one is convinced in any particular instance that the testimony from such a source is in any respect impossible, insincere or unjustified, the matter should be called to the attention of the trial judge by appropriate requests for charge, so that the court may be in a position to properly exercise discretion in submitting the evidence to the jury; but in the present case this course was not pursued. For the reasons stated the assignments going to the point in question cannot be sustained. Before leaving the subject it is but fair to say that the testimony shows Dr. Gallagher to lie a graduate of a medical school of standing in Pennsylvania and a practitioner of many years.\\nSeveral doctors were called by the defendant, and after stating that they had either heard the evidence or read the notes of testimony of the witnesses named in the following question, they were asked: \\\"From your experience as a doctor and your knowledge of medicine, and the information you received from the evidence of Dr. Gallagher, supplemented by the evidence of Drs. Hill, Schnifferstein, and Young, do you have any fixed opinion as to the cause of McDyer's death?\\\" In each instance an objection to this question was sustained. All of the doctors mentioned, with the exception of Dr. Gallagher, were witnesses for the defendant, and their testimony was conflicting in many essentials with the testimony given by him. An expert witness, after being first acquainted with the whole of the particular part upon which he is to pronounce, may be asked to express an opinion upon any defined portion of the testimony, which is not contradictory in itself, and the truth of which is expressly assumed; but he may not be asked to first ascertain and determine the conflicting elements, and then to express-an opinion upon his conclusion: Yardley v.- Cuthbertson, 108 Pa. 395. As the question was framed, this is precisely what the witnesses would have been obliged to do, and for that reason the objection was properly sustained.\\nIn the fifth, sixth and seventh assignments counsel for the defendant complains of three short abstracts from the charge of the trial judge. When these portions are read in connection with the charge as a whole, the criticisms made are found to be unwarranted. The plaintiff's case to a degree rests upon the presumption, to which she was entitled, that the decedent acted with care, and therefore the trial judge made no misstatement of fact in saying that the contention was that McDyer approached the track carefully, and that he listened. As this was followed by a fair statement of the contentions of the defense, and by full instructions as to the care which McDyer was bound to take in order to avoid contributory negligence, no harm could possibly have been done by the manner in which the plaintiff's contention was stated. The charge contains an ample statement of the law on the measure of damages. It is true that the abstract assigned for error simply refers to the sum total of decedent's net yearly earnings as stated in the testimony of his widow; but there was considerable other testimony in detail upon this subject which counsel could have had called to the attention of the jury had he submitted proper requests to the trial judge. Not having pursued this course, he is not in a position to complain.\\nUpon the whole case we discover no reversible error, and no useful purpose will be served by a further discussion of the assignments. They are all overruled and the judgment is affirmed.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1017270\", \"name\": \"The Pennsylvania Railroad Company versus Goodman\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Pennsylvania Railroad v. Goodman\", \"decision_date\": \"1869-07-06\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"329\", \"last_page\": \"339\", \"citations\": \"62 Pa. 329\", \"volume\": \"62\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:18:45.914530+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"The Pennsylvania Railroad Company versus Goodman.\", \"head_matter\": \"The Pennsylvania Railroad Company versus Goodman.\\n1. If a traveller in crossing a railroad is injured either by his own misfortune or fault, the company is not liable.\\n2. Where a traveller is injured crossing a railroad on a public road, negligence is not to be presumed against the company.\\n3. In such case each is in the lawful use of a highway; the traveller is bound to^approach the railroad cautiously and to' observe the approach of trains, and the company to give proper and timely warning of their coming.\\n4. In an action by a husband for the death of his wife by negligence the court charged: \\u201c That damages should be given as a pecuniary compensation, the jury measuring the plaintiff\\u2019s loss by a just estimate of the services and companionship of the wife, of which he was deprived by this accident; that is, of their value in a pecuniary sense \\u2014 nothing is allowable for the suffering of the deceased, nor for the wounded feelings of the plaintiff. Of course, the j ury will examine the testimony to aid them in ascertaining the damages. But if damages are to be given at all, there is no reason why they should be nominal merely; they should be a just compensation for the value of the companionship and services lost to him by reason of this unfortunate collision.\\u201d Held not to be error.\\nMay 24th and 25th 1869. Before Thompson, C. J., Agnew, Sharswood and Williams, JJ. Bead, J., absent.\\nError to the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster county: No. 42, to May Term 1868. <\\nThis was an action by Jacob K. Goodman against The Pennsylvania Railroad Company for negligence which occasioned the death of his wife. On the 5th of November 1864, about 3 o\\u2019clock P. M., the plaintiff, who was a farmer, and his wife were riding in a small market-wagon without a top, drawn by one horse. They were returning from Lancaster to their home, about, ten miles distant, on a much travelled road known as the Colebrook road. About four or five miles from Lancaster the railroad of the defendants crosses the Colebrook road. As the plaintiff and his wife were crossing the railroad at this point, the \\u201cEast Line\\u201d of the defendants struck the hinder part of the plaintiff\\u2019s wagon, upset and broke it, threw him and his wife out, and so injured her as to cause her death in a few hours. The case will be understood from the points of the parties, their answers, and the charge of Judge Hayes, who tried the ease below, and the opinion of the Supreme Court, without any further statement.\\nThe verdict was for the plaintiff for $9150.\\nThe following are points submitted by the plaintiff and their answers:\\u2014\\n2d point. \\u201c If the jury believe that the defendants approached this crossing at an imprudent, unreasonable and dangerous rate of speed (this crossing being upon the Colebrook road, being an ancient, well-known and much travelled road), this would be negligence for which they must answer.\\u201d\\nAnswer: \\u201cIf they did this without the observance of their own regulations, with respect to giving the proper signals for notice and warning, they were guilty of negligence, and if the plaintiff neglected no precaution he ought to have taken under the circumstances, they would be responsible in damages.\\u201d\\n4th point. \\u201c The rules of defendants requiring that notice shall be given a quarter of a mile off, by a railroad train approaching the crossing of a public road, the plaintiff had a right to expect such rules would be observed, and it not even being alleged that such notice was given in this case, negligence is admitted, and the plaintiff, in consequence thereof, would be excused from exercising the same vigilance called for under different circumstances.\\u201d\\nAnswer: \\u201c If such notice was not given, although the plaintiff would not be required to exercise the extreme caution which he would be if he heard the alarm, or saw and heard the train approaching, yet he was bound, as every man in crossing the railroad in ordinary prudence is bound, to look in all directions in which trains may approach, and to pause until he found he could cross with safety.\\u201d\\n9th point. \\u201c In estimating the damages and compensation of the plaintiff, the jury will consider all the circumstances, the situation, that of the family, the frugality, industry and usefulness of the wife 'and mother, and the loss to them, and also the charges and expenses incurred in consequence of the injury to her, and her death.\\u201d\\nAnswer: \\u201c I think the jury may take into consideration the facts and circumstances mentioned in this proposition, if they find the defendants, upon the entire evidence in' this case, responsible, when they are estimating the damages and compensation. of the plaintiff.\\u201d\\nThe following are points submitted by the defendants and the answers:\\u2014\\n6th point. \\u201cBefore the plaintiff can recover in this case he must show affirmatively that he stopped before he reached the. track, and looked along the same and saw no approaching train, and that there is no evidence whatever to sustain a finding that he so stopped or looked, and therefore the law presumes negligence on his part, and the verdict must be for the defendants.\\u201d\\nAnswer: \\u201c So far as this proposition involves the order of proof in the trial of the cause, it seems to. be unnecessary after the evidence is all before the jury, so far as it is intended to exhibit the onus probandi its correctness may be doubted. The plaintiff\\u2019s action may be sustained by showing his injury to have been done by the defendants, and to have been the consequence of their negligence; then the defendants may controvert the fact, and may show also in their defence that the injury was caused wholly or partially by the negligence of the plaintiff himself; and the defendants\\u2019 showing of this defeats his action.\\u201d\\n7th point. \\u201cIt is a fact established by the weight of the evidence in this case, that the approach of the westward-going train was clearly visible to a person passing northward on the Colebrook road for the distance of about 1700 feet along said road; the railroad itself, a single track railroad, being clearly visible for more than 2000 feet all the way to the crossing, and it was negligence in the plaintiff .not to have perceived its approach under these circumstances, he riding in an open wagon, between the hours of 2 and 8 o\\u2019clock in the afternoon, and that such negligence prevents his recovery in this case.\\u201d\\n8th point. \\u201cIt is shown by the evidence on both sides, and is a fact established by the weight of the evidence in this case, that the approach of a train from the east was both visible and audible to one passing along the Colebrook road from the south, at ample distance to have enabled one, either looking or listening, to have stopped in time to have prevented the possibility of a collision; and, under these circumstances, the law presumes negligence in the plaintiff, who was approaching the crossing in an open wagon, between the hours of 2 and 3 o\\u2019clock in the afternoon, and requires that the verdict should be for the defendants.\\u201d\\nAnswer: \\u201c That if, upon a full, careful and deliberate review of all the evidence in this case, the jury find that the approach of the westward-going train was clearly visible to a person passing northward on the Colebrook road, for the distance of about 1700 feet along the said road, the railroad itself, a single track railroad, being visible for more than 2000 feet all the way to the crossing, and that the plaintiff was riding in an open wagon along the Cole-brook road, between the hours of 2 and 3 o\\u2019clock in the afternoon, towards the crossing of the railroad; that the approach of the train from the east was both visible and audible to him, thus passing along the Colebrook road from the south, at ample distance to have enabled one, either looking or listening, to stop in time to prevent the possibility of a collision; if, under these circumstances, he did not stop, but drove on and thereby encountered the collision, these facts so found would amount to such negligence on the part of the plaintiff as would legally debar him from a recovery, and the verdict in that case should he for the defendants.\\u201d\\n9th point. \\u201c Upon the whole evidence, the law of the case is with the defendants, and the plaintiff cannot recover.\\u201d\\nAnswer: \\u201c If, upon the whole evidence, it is proved to the conviction of the jury that the plaintiff, in riding along the Colebrook road, towards the crossing, might have seen, if he had looked for the approaching train, and that he either did not look, or seeing, did not regard its approach, nor stop, but drove forward, and was. struck by it on the crossing, this state of facts would, in point of law, constitute negligence on his part, and prevent his recovery in this suit.\\u201d\\n10th point. \\u201c Damages, if recoverable at all, are to be strictly limited to a pecuniary compensation for a pecuniary loss suffered by the plaintiff, and nothing can be allowed for the suffering of the deceased, or as solace for the wounded feelings of the plaintiff.\\u201d\\n11th point. \\u201c The jury are not at liberty to conjecture these damages, but must find their measure in the evidence actually given in the case, and, as the plaintiff has failed to furnish such proof, damages, if given at all, must be merely nominal.\\u201d\\nAnswer: \\u201c Damages in a case like this, where the plaintiff is entitled to recover, should he given as a pecuniary compensation, the jury measuring the plaintiff\\u2019s loss by a just estimate of the services and companionship of the wife of which he was deprived by this accident \\u2014 that is, of their value in a pecuniary sense \\u2014 nothing is allowable for the suffering of the deceased, nor for the wounded feelings of the plaintiff. Of course, the jury will examine the testimony to aid them in ascertaining the damages, as well as every other point in the issue they are trying. But if damages are to be given at all, there is no reason why they should be nominal merely; they should be a just compensation for the value of the companionship and services lost to him by reason of this unfortunate collision.\\u201d\\nThe court charged:\\u2014\\n\\u201c On the 6th of November 1864, Jacob K. Goodman and his wife, returning home from Lancaster, in the afternoon, came in collision with the fast train of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company passing west, at the intersection of the railroad with the public road or highway over which they were travelling, between 4 and 5 miles from this town; in consequence of which collision, his wagon was broken to pieces and his wife thrown out, caught upon the truck of one of the cars, dragged- to some distance, and crushed, bruised, and mangled to such an extent that she died in seven hours afterwards. The evidence, I think, has enabled you to follow both the train in its schedule speed of 27 miles an hour, and the plaintiff passing over the Colebrook road towards the crossing, at a rate of probably not more than 4 miles in the same time, and to have found a just and true idea of all the incidents accompanying the progress of each, up to the moment of the unfortunate collision.\\n\\u201c Had there been no testimony except what pertained to a single fact of the collision and its result in the injury and death of Mrs. Goodman, your investigation would have been directed to the inquiry alone, whether the injury was owing to the negligence of the defendants or their agents; and in that ease, if the plaintiff showed any want of care or due management on his part \\u2014 no matter how grievous and terrible his loss \\u2014 he would .not have been entitled to recover damages from the defendants.\\n\\u201c On the other hand, if, in such a case, he could have shown and convinced the jury that the company or their agents, the engineers and conductors of the train, had neglected any precautions they were bound to take, and that the accident and injury had occurred in consequence of their negligence, he would be entitled to recover such damages by the verdict of the jury as would afford a pecuniary compensation for his loss.\\n\\u201c If, therefore, the jury, after sifting all the evidence in this case, should come to the conclusion that there was no undue want of care and precaution on the part of the defendants or their agents in approaching the intersection of the Colebrook road with the railroad, on the occasion when this collision took place, the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover.\\n\\u201c But should you believe that something was omitted by them, which they ought to have done, that there was some fault, some negligence in their proceedings, then you will inquire whether the plaintiff encountered this great misfortune by any want of care, of proper vigilance, or by any fault on'his part; whether he did anything or omitted anything, the doing or omission of which contributed to the accident. If he did, though there were negligence or fault on the part of the defendants, yet he cannot recover. If the plaintiff, in driving towards the crossing, heard the train and saw it approaching, and instead of stopping, drove on, under a mistaken belief that he could cross the railroad before it reached the intersection, the fault of such miscalculation was his own, and a proof of such negligence as would prevent a recovery against the defendants. If he saw and heard the train, and yet drove so near that his horse became ungovernable, and ran upon the railroad, it was his fault not to have stopped his horse further from the railroad, and was such negligence as would preclude a recovery by him.\\n\\u201c If, from the relative situation of the Colebrook road and the railroad in the neighborhood of this crossing, the plaintiff, driving along the former towards the intersection, could with ordinary care and attention have seen and heard the train for such a distance on its approach as to have checked his horse, and remained at a safe distance until the train passed by, and he took no care and paid \\u2022 no attention and drove heedlessly on and encountered the collision, this was such negligence as the law condemns, and would preclude him from recovering any damages in a suit against the defendants.\\n\\u201c In all these cases, though there may have been some fault or neglect on the part of the defendants, yet the plaintiff cannot recover because his own negligence contributed to the disaster, and the law is clear that if such be the case, he can have no just claim of damages from another.\\n\\u201c The law is founded in reason, is held to be, and ought to be, the perfection of reason. It is reasonable and just that no man should derive advantage from his own wrongdoing; that no man should claim a benefit from his own mistake; that as no man can come into court seeking equity but with clean hands, so no man should be allowed to recover from another for hurt or damage suffered by him from an accident occasioned wholly or in part by his own misconduct, mistake or carelessness.\\n\\u201c If it be wholly the effect of his own fault, there cannot be a shadow of doubt that his complaint .against another is perfectly groundless, and if he has united by his carelessness or recklessness or want of caution in producing the disaster \\u2014 if, says the law, he has contributed to it \\u2014 the wrong is his own, and he has no right to complain, and no cause of action.\\n\\u201c I thus lay down the law as applicable to cases of this sort. The questions which are raised in regard to the actual history of this case, I leave to the jury, whose province it is to decide them, and who are under a solemn obligation to decide them according to the evidence; that is to, say, you are bound to find the real truth of the facts guiding jour judgment by all the testimony in the case. In considering the diverse statements of the witnesses, you are the sole judges of their credibility, and you also must determine for yourselves the weight to whic\\u00edi their testimony is entititled, where there is a conflict or contrariety in the statements, as there may be without contradiction, as in eases of affirmative and negative testimony, when, for instance, one passenger swears he heard the alarm whistle at a certain time, and another swears that he did not hear it \\u2014 both may speak the truth, though their testimony be diverse; yet in such a \\\"case the whistle did sound, otherwise he who swore that he heard it did not speak truly.'\\n\\u201c And it is a general duty, where there is a contradiction among witnesses, to reconcile the evidence, if possible, and to ascertain the truth by the most careful scrutiny of all the testimony given; the whole testimony, in other words, must be carefully examined by the jury, and the truth must be found as shown by all the evidence thoroughly sifted and-weighed. Of the facts of sounding the alarm whistle by the defendants\\u2019 agents in their train, when approaching the intersection of their road with the Colebrook road, at the proper time, according to the company\\u2019s regulations and in the proper manner, and of the actual speed with which they approached the crossing,, you are thus to judge. Of'the facts with respect to the relative situation of'the two roads, the opportunity of seeing and hearing the approaching train by the plaintiff when driving along the Colebrook road to this crossing; of his having seen and heard the train; whether he tried to cross before it passed, seeing and hearing its approach, or not, you are also to judge by the same means.\\n\\u201c After commending this case to your most careful consideration, I have only to add, that if you should arrive at the conclusion that, according to the evidence in regard to the facts and the law as given to you by the court applicable to the facts which you find to be proved, the plaintiff is entitled to recover, you will inquire and assess the amount of the damages to be awarded to him for the injury he has sustained. The law is, that the damages for such an injury are to be a pecuniary compensation, to be measured by the value of the loss of service and companionship sustained by the plaintiff. -There is evidence before you hi relation to the condition of the family of the plaintiff, his occupation and business, the age, health and character of his wife for industry and careful management. These are all considerations that may enable you to form a correct judgment as to the amount of damages you should award the plaintiff if, according to the law and the evidence, he ought to recover.\\n\\u201c You will have observed, from what has been said, that the natural and. convenient course of your inquiries will be:\\n\\u25a0 \\u201c 1. To consider whether, according to the evidence, negligence on the part of the defendants, or their agents, has been proved in this case. If it has not, you need'not inquire further, but your verdict should be for the defendants.\\n\\u201c 2. If it has, then you will inquire whether the evidence shows that there was also negligence on the part of the plaintiff contributing to this disaster. If there was such negligence, then your investigation will there terminate, and you should find a verdict for the defendants.\\n\\u201c 3. But if negligence be proved on the part of the defendants, and it be not proved that there was negligence on the part of plaintiff, then your verdict ought to be for the plaintiff; and you should proceed to ascertain the damages which will afford him a just pecuniary compensation for his loss.\\u201d\\nThe defendants removed the case to the Supreme Court, and there assigned for error the answers to the points as given above.\\nGr. F. Brenneman and T. Quyler, for plaintiffs in error.\\nThe defendants had a right to change their own regulations : Skelton v. London and N. W. Railway Co., Law Rep. 2 C. P. 631. As to measure of damages: Penna. Railroad Co. v. Kelly, 7 Casey 372; Same v. Zebe, 9 Id. 318; Same v. Ogier, 11 Id. 60; Heil v. Glanding, 6 Wright 493; Penna. Railroad v. Vandever, 12 Casey 298. On the facts, negligence on the part of the plaintiff was a conclusion of law: Railroad Co. v. McClurg, 6 P. F. Smith 297. The law required the plaintiff to prove affirmatively that he stopped and looked along the track: Catawissa Railroad v. Armstrong, 13 Wright 191; Gahagan v. B. & L. Railroad, 1 Allen 190; Wilson v. Charlestown, 8 Id. 187; Shaw v. B. & W. Railroad, 8 Gray 73; Warren v. Litchburg Railroad Co., 8 Allen 137; Butterfield v. Western Railroad Co., 10 Id. 532; O\\u2019Brien v. The Philada. Wilmington & Balt. Railroad Co., 3 Phila. R. 76. The plaintiff is chargeable with knowledge if he had such opportunities of knowledge as with ordinary caution would have saved him from danger: Penna. Railroad v. Henderson, 7 Wright 453; Stubley v. London and N. W. Railway Co., Law Rep. 1 Exch. 13 ; P. F. W. & C. Railroad v. Evans, 3 P. F. Smith 250 ; Heileman v. The N. P. Railroad Co., 13 Wright 60; Telfer v. The Northern Railroad Co., 1 Vroom 188.\\nO. J. Dickey and N. Fllmaker, for defendant in error.\\nThe question of negligence was for the jury: Philada. & T. Railroad v. Hagan, 11 Wright 248; Steamboat N. World v. King, 16 How. 469. Not blowing the whistle was negligence: Penna. Railroad v. Ogier, 11 Casey 71; Reeves v. Del. Lackaw. & W. Railroad, 6 Id. 454; Beatty v. Gilmore, 4 Harris 463; Hanover Railroad Co. v. Coyle, 5 P. F. Smith 401.\\nJuly 6th 1869,\", \"word_count\": \"5186\", \"char_count\": \"29213\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered,\\nby Agnew, J.\\nThe verdict in this case appears to us to have been very unwarranted, and ought to have been set aside. The evidence of negligence on part of the plaintiff below in approaching the railroad crossing is very strong. An accurate survey of the road travelled by the plaintiff and the railroad has been made. Seventeen Jhundred feet of the Colebrook road by which the plaintiff approached the crossing has a descending grade to the railroad of 48 feet, diminishing gradually and with very little unevenness. The civil engineer, in walking these 1700 feet, kept his eye on the whistling post from which the train had come, and which stood 825 feet from the crossing, and he testifies he had the post in sight all the way to the crossing, except at a single spot where he lost the view, but could regain it by a single step backward or forward. The plaintiff's witnesses admit that the railroad track is in sight all the way except at a spot from 15 to 20 yards from the crossing. Thus, for 1700 feet the railroad is clearly in view until the traveller on the Colebrook road reaches within 60 feet of the crossing, and then the view is intercepted only a few feet. This was to the eyes of persons on foot; but the seat of an ordinary light wagon is about 4 feet from the ground, while to the eye of\\\" a man of ordinary height it is about 2J feet more from the seat, making about 6J feet from the ground, thus giving 'to one seated in a wagon a foot or more height. The speed of the train at this point was according to schedule-time 27 miles an hour, and by the testimony of the engineer and another, 28 miles. The speed of the plaintiff was 4 miles an hour or more \\u2014 but assume 4-|- miles. The train then travelled at a speed of 6\\u2020\\u00b6 greater than the plaintiff, the former going 41 feet in a second, and the latter 6\\u00a1% in the same time. Their relative distances from the crossing were therefore as follows: When-the plaintiff was 60 feet off the train was 372 feet \\u2014 plaintiff 133, the train at the whistling post 825 feet, and when the train was one-third of a mile 1760 feet off, the plaintiff was 284 feet. The civil engineer testifies that when standing at a point on the Colebrook road, 50 feet from the- crossing, he could see the rodmen on the railroad 1222 from the crossing \\u2014 at 150 feet he could see 1750 \\u2014 at 250 feet he could see to the mile-post 2000 feet from the crossing, and at the stable 734 feet, he could see along the railroad 2600, and more \\u2014 while at the top of the rise (1700 feet off) he could see from 3000 to 4000 feet along the railroad. Thus it is ascertainable, from the testimony of both sides, that when the train was 1760 feet from the crossing, and the plaintiff 284 feet, he could see the train approaching while he travelled 224 feet, until.ho reached the point 60 feet from the crossing where it is said the view is intercepted a few yards, and when he .had arrived at this point the train was within 372 feet of the crossing. The fact that he did see the train is also testified to by seven witnesses, of whom four were passengers having no interest in the suit, all of whom prove his admissions that he saw the train, but his horse became unmanageable, and he could not hold him. Another important fact is, that the locomotive struck the hind wheel of the wagon, showing that the plaintiff must have crossed just in front of#the train. Now, the seat of an ordinary wagon to the head of the horse is from 12 to 15 feet. Assuming the latter, and the train was within 93 feet when the horse came to the railroad. Thus we have the case of a traveller in an open wagon, in broad daylight, descending a gradual slope for more than a quarter of a mile within plain view of a railroad upon which a train could be seen coming at a great distance, meeting that train and crossing the track so exactly in time that the hind end of his wagon is-struck by the engine. There cannot be a doubt that the event happened either from the unruliness of the horse or from the most culpable negligence of the plaintiff in not looking out for a coming train. It was either his misfortune o.r his fault, for neither of which was the company liable. And as to the company, the weight of the evidence is, that the engineer gave the signal for crossing the road. Eight witnesses, of whom four were passengers, swear affirmatively that they heard the whistle. On part of the plaintiff, five Say they heard no whistle, and five that they heard a whistle at or near the crossing, which some called the downbrake signal. Thus one half contradict the other half, while those who say they heard the downbrake whistle are clearly mistaken, as from the testimony it is clear this train used the Lockridge patent chainbrake, which is controlled by the engineer on the engine. Handbrakes cannot be used with the patent brake, so that there is no need of a signal to the brakeman. The truth, therefore, clearly is, that five of the plaintiff's witnesses corroborate the defendants' witnesses, that the road signal was given, only differing in the place where it was given; to'wit, nearer to the crossing.\\nThis is not a case where negligence can be presumed against the railroad company, the plaintiff not being a passenger. Each party was in the lawful use of an appropriate highway, and each was bound to a correlative duty, the plaintiff to approach the crossing cautiously, and to observe the approach of trains, and the defendants to give the timely and proper warning of the coming of the train. From the facts before us we think the verdict ought to have been different and that the court below should have set it aside. Yet we perceive no means of reaching the injustice on a writ of error, without ourselves undertaking to decide the facts which fell within the province of the jury. The credibility of the witnesses, together with the varied facts and contradictions in the testimony, necessarily carried the case to them; and our difficulty is, we cannot say the court erred in point of law without deciding that the judge should have taken the facts from the jury and instructed them peremptorily that the plaintiff was guilty of concurring negligence. The charge of the court is fair and sound. A judge is not bound to express his opinion on the facts; though we think in this case he would have done a service to justice, had he pointed out to the jury with some emphasis the true attitude of the case on its facts.\\nLooking at the entire charge on the subject of damages, we think it clearly confined the damages to a pecuniary compensation for the loss of Mrs. Goodman's service. The court told the jury in express language that nothing is allowable for the suffering of the deceased, nor for the wounded feelings of the plaintiff. They said also that the plaintiff's loss was to be measured by a just estimate of the services and companionship of the wife. It is thought that this meant by way of solace for the loss of companionship. But all the judge said on this point made it evident he did not mean compensation by way of solace, and could not have been so understood by the jury. Companionship was evidently-used to express the relation of the deceased in the character of the service she performed. He merely meant to say that the loss should be measured by the value of her services as a wife or companion. The form- of expression perhaps was not the best selection of words, yet it certainly meant no more than that the pecuniary loss was to be measured by the nature of the service characterized as it was by the relation in which the parties stood to each other. Certainly the service of a wife is pecuniarily more valuable than that of a mere hireling. The frugality, industry, usefulness, attention, and tender solicitude of a wife and the mother of children, surely make her services greater than those of an ordinary servant, and therefore worth more. These elements are not to be excluded from the consideration of a jury in making a mere money estimate of value. Finding no error we can reach, the judgment must be affirmed.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"103159\", \"name\": \"Commonwealth v. Holloway, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Commonwealth v. Holloway\", \"decision_date\": \"1978-06-28\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal, No. 1583\", \"first_page\": \"607\", \"last_page\": \"607\", \"citations\": \"257 Pa. Super. 607\", \"volume\": \"257\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:05:57.258281+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"SPAETH, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\", \"parties\": \"Commonwealth v. Holloway, Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"390 A.2d 292\\nCommonwealth v. Holloway, Appellant.\\nArgued March 22, 1978.\\nJay S. Gottlieb, for appellant; W. Turnoff, Assistant District Attorney, with him Edward G. Rendell, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"48\", \"char_count\": \"331\", \"text\": \"Judgment of sentence affirmed.\\nSPAETH, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\"}"
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diff --git a/pa/1035032.json b/pa/1035032.json
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+"{\"id\": \"1035032\", \"name\": \"West Mahanoy Township's Contested Election\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"West Mahanoy Township's Contested Election\", \"decision_date\": \"1917-05-14\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeals, No. 260 and 261\", \"first_page\": \"176\", \"last_page\": \"180\", \"citations\": \"258 Pa. 176\", \"volume\": \"258\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:31:44.146605+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Brown, C. J., Mestrezat, Stewart, Mosctizisker and Frazer, ,JJ.\", \"parties\": \"West Mahanoy Township\\u2019s Contested Election.\", \"head_matter\": \"West Mahanoy Township\\u2019s Contested Election.\\nElections\\u2014Contests\\u2014Opening of ballot boxes\\u2014Fraud\\u2014Coercion \\u2014Illegal election. ' * ,\\n1. A petition for the opening of a ballot box should be refused where the petitioners fail to show fraud, irregularity, illegal voting, or illegal counting of votes.\\n2. An election is not to be held void for mere irregularities in the conduct of the election, even though the election officers may be'subject to punishment for misconduct; the rights of voters are not to be prejudiced by the errors or wrongful acts of election officers.\\n3. Where a fair election and honest count were prevented 'so that no election was legally held in an election precinct, the Returns from it may be thrown out.\\n4. The mere casting of fraudulent votes is not sufficient ground\\nfor throwing out returns from an election district, the remedy in such case being to eliminate by striking out fraudulent votes if possible. . >\\n5. At the hearing of an election contest it appeared that in a certain precinct the ballots, tally and return sheets and supplies were generally tampered with; that the records were illegally kept; that voters were threatened before the election and on election day, were prevented from voting, were intimidated,' were coerced by physical violence, were not allowed to vote as they wished, and that personal attacks under the direction of election officers, were made on voters, overseers and watchers while in the performance of their duties. Held, the court did not err in throwing out all the votes polled in such precinct.\\nArgued Feb. 27,1917.\\nAppeals, No. 260 and 261, January T., 1916, by Thomas McCoy and Frank J. Donahue, from order of Q. S. Schuylkill Co., decreeing null and void an election for school directors in Lost Creek precinct, In re Petition of Citizens of the Township of West Mahanoy, County of Schuylkill, to contest the election of Thomas McCoy to the office of School Director in said Township; and In Be Petition of Citizens of the Township of West Mahanoy, County of Schuylkill, to contest the election of Frank J. Donahue to the office of School Director in said Township.\\nBefore Brown, C. J., Mestrezat, Stewart, Mosctizisker and Frazer, ,JJ.\\nAffirmed.\\nPetition for an election contest. Before Brumm, J.\\nThe opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.\\nThe court decreed that the election in Lost Creek precinct was null and void; threw out the returns from such precinct, and found that John D. Edmunds and John Cosgrove were properly elected school directors in the West Mahanoy Township School District. Thomas McCoy and Frank J. Donahue appealed.\\nErrors assigned\\nwere in dismissing various exceptions of fact and law and the order of the court.\\nO. E. Berger, with him M. M. Burke and P. E. Burke, for appellants.\\nM. J. Ryan, for appellees.\\nMay 14,1917:\", \"word_count\": \"1292\", \"char_count\": \"7803\", \"text\": \"Opinion by\\nMe. Chief -Justice Beown,\\nAt an election held November 2, 1915, two school directors were to be elected in the West Mahanoy Township School District, Schuylkill County. There are four election precincts in the township\\u2014Lost Creek, William Penn, Brownsville and Haven Bun. Thomas McCoy and Prank J. Donahue, the appellants, were candidates for school directors on the Democratic ticket, and John D. Edmunds and John Cosgrove, the appellees, were candidates for the same office on the Bepublican ticket. McCoy and Donahue were returned as elected, but, within the period fixed by the statute for contesting an election, qualified electors of West Mahanoy Township instituted a proceeding to contest the election of the appellants, on the ground of fraud and gross irregularities in connection with the election in the Lost Creek precinct. This proceeding was discontinued shortly afterwards by counsel for the petitioners. Subsequently, on the petition of the electors of the township, the discontinuance was stricken off by the court, and the petition for the contest was reinstated. After a full hearing and the taking of a mass of testimony, the court decreed that the election in the Lost Creek precinct was null and void, and its entire returns were thrown out. With the returns from that precinct not counted, those from the other three showed Edmunds and Cosgrove to be elected. Prom the decree so holding, McCoy and Donahue have appealed.\\nThe action of the court below in striking off the discontinuance of the proceeding instituted to contest the election of the appellants, and in reinstating the petition of the contestants after the expiration of the statutory period within which a contest must be instituted, has not been assigned as error, and we do not, therefore, pass upon the authority of the court to reinstate the proceeding.\\nThis appeal brings up a most voluminous record, and there are ninety-two assignments of error, but the sole . question for determination is whether the court erred in throwing out the returns from Lost Creek. Before passing upon this question it is proper that we say no error was committed in refusing to open the ballot box from the William Penn precinct upon the petition of the respondents. They failed to show fraud, irregularity, illegal voting or counting of votes in that precinct, which called for the opening of the box, and the ninetieth assignment of error is overruled.\\nFor mere irregularities in conducting an election it is not to be held void, even though the election officers maybe subject to punishment for misconduct. This is so .because the rights of voters are not to be prejudiced by the errors or wrongful acts of the officers of the election, unless it appears that a fair election and honest count were prevented: Krickbaum's Contested Election, 221 Pa. 521. Nor is the mere casting of fraudulent votes sufficient to throw out the return from an election district. \\\"The remedy in such case is to purge the polls by striking out the fraudulent votes, if possible\\\": Melvin's Case, 68 Pa. 333. But where no election is legally held in an election precinct, the returns from it may be thrown out.\\nIn the case now under consideration the conditions that existed at the election at Lost Creek were as disgraceful as they are inconceivable, and are thus properly summarized by the learned court below, after a review of the testimony and the facts to be found from it: \\\"The ballots, tally, return sheets, and supplies generally, were tampered with; records were irregularly and illegally kept; voters were threatened before the election and on election day; were prevented from voting; were intimi dated; coerced and not allowed to vote as they wished; blackjacks and pistols were used, and personal attacks made on legal voters, overseers and watchers while in the performance of their duty. All of this was done by, or under the direction of the election officers, aided by their 'buffer' and his assistant.\\\" It clearly appeared from the testimony that these ruffians intimidated the overseers, and for this reason the court below was expressly authorized to throw out \\\"all votes polled in the precinct\\\" : Act of January 30, 1874, P. L. 31, Section 4.\\nEach appeal is dismissed on the following correct conclusions reached by the court below: \\\"The whole election was illegally and fraudulently conducted. The number of voters prevented from voting by intimidation, threats and violence, and the number of voters coerced by interference in the booths could not be known, and the correctness or legality of the vote cast and returned could not be ascertained. There was practically no election or opportunity for the voters at this poll to express and have recorded their wish or choice by their ballot, and there is no possible way to ascertain the correct, or approximately correct, result out of this seething mass of corruption, blackguardism and brute force.\\\"\\nAppeals dismissed at costs of appellants.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1037063\", \"name\": \"Rea, Appellant, v. Pittsburgh Railways Company\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Rea v. Pittsburgh Railways Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1941-10-06\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal, No. 73\", \"first_page\": \"251\", \"last_page\": \"256\", \"citations\": \"146 Pa. Super. Ct. 251\", \"volume\": \"146\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:08:44.360349+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Keller, P. J., Baldrige, Stadteeld, Rhodes, Hirt and Kenworthey, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Rea, Appellant, v. Pittsburgh Railways Company.\", \"head_matter\": \"Rea, Appellant, v. Pittsburgh Railways Company.\\nArgued April 29, 1941.\\nBefore Keller, P. J., Baldrige, Stadteeld, Rhodes, Hirt and Kenworthey, JJ.\\nOctober 6, 1941:\\nJ. Thomas Hoffman, for appellant.\\nArthur W. Henderson, with him J. R. McNary, for appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"1427\", \"char_count\": \"8177\", \"text\": \"Opinion by\\nHirt, J.,\\nPlaintiff in the late evening of June 20, 1937 was driving south on Sixth Avenue in Pittsburgh intending to cross the bridge into the Liberty Tunnel and thence to his home in Washington County. He was stopped by traffic signals at Forbes Street but on the change of the lights to green, proceeded into the intersection. He did not see an approaching westbound street car until the front of his automobile was near the first rail of the tracks; he name to a stop but it was then too late to avoid being struck. Plaintiff was permanently injured in the collision. On the trial the jury found in his favor but the verdict was set aside by the court and judgment entered for defendant n. o. v. The entry of this judgment is the one error assigned, raising the single question of plaintiff's contributory negligence.\\nThe lower court accepted the rule as controlling, that a traveler upon a highway when about to cross a street railway track must use his senses and must continue to look and listen for an approaching street car until he has reached the track (Moore v. Erie Rys. Co., 308 Pa. 573, 162 A. 812) and that an absolute duty is imposed upon him to look for street cars immediately before going upon the track and the failure to do so is negligence per se. Goldfine & Brenner, Inc., v\\\" P. R. T., 119 Pa. Superior Ct. 581, 181 A. 514. In its application to the admitted fact that plaintiff did not see the street car until it was 50 or 60 feet from him, when it was too late to avoid being struck, he was held to be barred by his failure to perform an absolute duty imposed on him by law. The above is the familiar rule of a long line of cases and there is no doubt as to its general application. A driver need not stop his automobile before entering a crossing or at a point in the intersecting street where he can see the approaching car but he must be vigilant for his safety and, in a situation where the rule is applicable, must look and listen as he nears the track and must have his car under such control that he can stop in time to avoid his injury. Smathers v. P. & B. St. Ry. Co., 226 Pa. 212, 75 A. 190; Goldfine & Brenner, Inc., v. P. R. T., supra; Kalter v. Phila. R. T. Co., 95 Pa. Superior Ct. 116.\\nThe list of cases recognizing and applying these prin ciples might be further extended. But if the cases be examined it will be found that for the most part they have to do with the drivers of vehicles in the ordinary intersection of two streets, with occasional varying conditions insufficient to affect the \\\"absolute\\\" or \\\"unbending\\\" application of the rule, where the facts are clear.\\nBut this was no ordinary intersection of two lines of travel as the undisputed facts and the plot in evidence will show. The intersection of Sixth Avenue and Forbes Street is within the triangle between the Allegheny and Monongahela Rivers in a most congested section of the City of Pittsburgh near their juncture. Traffic from two boulevards and from many streets, a number of which are main arteries of travel from the east, converge in the neighborhood of the crossing. Sixth Avenue, extended beyond the intersection with Forbes Street, connects with Liberty Bridge which is the sole approach, from the section north of the Monongahela River, to the Liberty Tunnels, a gateway to the densely populated Ohio River valley and to cities and towns in southeastern Pennsylvania. Sixth Avenue also is subjected to much interstate traffic because of its access to the Liberty Tunnels. There probably are few places in the city where motor vehicle traffic is more concentrated than at and in the vicinity of the intersection involved.\\nThe complexity of the traffic problem and the necessity for more than ordinary care on the part of the motorman is indicated by a reference to the map in evidence. In proceeding westwardly on Forbes Street after crossing Boyd Street it is about 150 feet to the intersection of Shingiss Street. The approach to the Liberty Street Bridge is parallel with Shingiss Street and is almost contiguous. To the west of Sixth Avenue along the north side of Forbes Street there is a continuous driveway in front of a gas station and, a short distance further to the west, Forbes Street con verges with Diamond Street at an acute angle. A motorman in operating his street car, therefore, must be alert to the .movement of traffic into Forbes Street from four other highways within a distance of about 500 feet.\\nIn the light of all the attendant circumstances, we think the question of plaintiff's negligence was for the jury. There were four traffic lights at or near the crossing, connected in series, directing traffic at the intersection of Forbes Street and Sixth Avenue. If we give the plaintiff the benefit of reasonable inferences from the testimony, the street car ran through .red \\\"stop\\\" lights convicting defendant of gross negligence. Byrne et al. v. Schultz, 306 Pa. 427, 160 A. 125. From necessity in the solution of the traffic problem presented at this intersection, two things were necessary, namely, multiple lanes of travel for automobiles on Sixth Avenue and its extension to the tunnel, and to keep traffic moving.\\nThere were three southbound vehicular lanes in Sixth Avenue and plaintiff was driving in the westernmost lane next to the curb. In the two lanes to his left there were automobiles approaching the crossing. At Forbes Street they were stopped by red lights but when the signals changed, they all proceeded into the intersection. At that time plaintiff looked to the east and saw no car approaching. As he continued across the intersection his view was obstructed by these automobiles and his first intimation of the approaching street car was when the automobiles in the lanes to his left stopped suddenly. He then applied his brakes but could not stop in time. He had relied upon the invitation of the traffic signals and from necessity, to some extent upon the movement of automobiles to his left and to the judgment ,of those drivers who were in a position to see. But plaintiff inferentially was in the intersection before the street car and he therefore was justified in assuming that his superior right of way would be respected by a street car approaching the intersection thereafter. Galliano v. East Penn Electric Co., 303 Pa. 498, 154 A. 805. In the circumstances the jury undoubtedly found that plaintiff, with traffic signals in his favor, regarded the intersection as a through highway and that he had the right to consider as a factor in his favor the duty of the motorman to obey the law and the probability that he would do so. Rhinehart v. Jordan, 313 Pa. 197, 169 A. 151. If there was an absolute duty on every driver of an automobile to enter upon defendant's track in this intersection only after he had seen for himself that there was no street car approaching, the purpose of the traffic -signals near the intersection and the utility of the multiple lanes of travel would be defeated. Conceivably during rush hours every driver in two of the three lanes would have to come to a stop and await an opportunity for an unobstructed view along defendant's tracks before proceeding, thus causing unnecessary congestion with possible increased hazards of travel.\\nAt the ordinary intersection the duty upon a driver of an automobile is to look for an approaching street car before entering upon the track, with his car under such control that he can stop to avoid injury. This duty is imposed by law and is absolute. In the unusual situation here presented, involving a complex traffic problem, where adequate traffic signals were provided for the direction of travel, we think whether that duty was imposed upon plaintiff was not one of law for the court, but for the jury in applying the test of .reasonable diligence and care under the circumstances.\\nJudgment reversed and directed to be entered for plaintiff on the verdict.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1050883\", \"name\": \"Commonwealth, Appellant, v. Mitchell\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Commonwealth v. Mitchell\", \"decision_date\": \"1943-12-09\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal, No. 99\", \"first_page\": \"582\", \"last_page\": \"587\", \"citations\": \"153 Pa. Super. 582\", \"volume\": \"153\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:11:01.398035+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Keller, P. J., Baldrige, Stadtfeld, Rhodes, Hirt and Kenworthey, JJ. (Reno, J., absent).\", \"parties\": \"Commonwealth, Appellant, v. Mitchell.\", \"head_matter\": \"Commonwealth, Appellant, v. Mitchell.\\nArgued October 5, 1943.\\nBefore Keller, P. J., Baldrige, Stadtfeld, Rhodes, Hirt and Kenworthey, JJ. (Reno, J., absent).\\nFranklin E. Barr, Assistant District Attorney, with him John H. Maurer, District Attorney, for appellant.\\nAngelo L. Scaricamazza, with him Thomas J. Minnick, Jr., for appellee.\\nDecember 9, 1943:\", \"word_count\": \"1571\", \"char_count\": \"9107\", \"text\": \"Opinion by\\nBaldrige, J.,\\nThis appeal presents this question: Does a discharge of the defendant in a habeas corpus proceeding under the \\\"two term\\\" rule, established by section 3 of the Habeas Corpus Act of February 18, 1785, 2 Sm, L. 275, and re-enacted by section 54 of the Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 427, 19 PS \\u00a7781, prevent trial or is it a discharge from imprisonment only?\\nJohn Mitchell was arrested September 9, 1938, charged with robbery, held without bail, and seven days thereafter was indicted by the grand jury. On October 1, 1938, he was arraigned and plead \\\"not guilty.\\\" His case was listed for trial several times and he and his attorney in each instance were in court, but it was never reached due to the trial of other eases. On February 6, 1939, Mitchell petitioned the court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging he was entitled to his discharge under the provisions of section 54 of the Act of 1860, supra. On February 9, 1939, he moved the court to quash the indictment. On February 10, 1939, Judge Bok, after a hearing in the habeas corpus proceeding, discharged the defendant. Judge Finletteu on June 8, 1942, dismissed the motion to quash the indictment. No further action was taken until March 17, 1943, when the case was again listed for trial. The defendant, with his counsel, appeared in court. Relying on his discharge in the habeas corpus proceeding he moved, through his attorney, for his absolute discharge under the \\\"two term\\\" rule, claiming that he should not be subjected to a trial. Judge Bluett, against the protest of the Commonwealth, granted defendant's motion and this appeal by the Commonwealth followed.\\nSection 3 of the Habeas Corpus Act of February 18, 1785, supra, was re-enacted with an immaterial addition in section 54 of the Act of 1S60, supra. The pertinent portion provides: \\\"If any person shall be committed for treason or felony, or other indictable offense, and shall not be indicted and tried some time in the next term, session of oyer and terminer, general jail delivery, or other court where the offense is properly cognizable, after such commitment, it shall and may be lawful for the judges or justices thereof, and they are hereby required on the last day of the term, sessions or court, to set at liberty the said prisoner upon bail, unless it shall appear to them, upon oath or affirmation, that the witnesses for the commonwealth, mentioning their names, could not then be produced; and if such prisoner shall not be indicted and tried the second term, session or court after his or her commitment, unless the delay happen on the application or with the assent of the defendant, or upon trial he shall be acquitted, he shall be discharged from imprisonment(Italics supplied.)\\nThe usual three month term of criminal courts in other counties was changed to a one month term in Philadelphia County by the Act of March 13, 1867, P. L. 420, \\u00a71, 17 PS \\u00a7471. Section 4 of that act, 17 PS \\u00a7473, reads as follows: \\\"Nothing herein contained shall be construed, or taken, to affect the act of February 18, 1785, as now applicable to said court; and no person shall be bailed, under said act, except upon the expiration of the second term, herein created, [i. e. two months] nor be discharged, under said act, except upon th\\u00e9 expiration of the fourth term, herein created [i. e. four months].\\\"\\nNo decision of an appellate court in this state on the question we are now considering has been cited and we have found none. In other jurisdictions there is a conflict in the decisions as to whether a release on habeas corpus of a prisoner held in jail for trial beyond one or more terms, is a final release, or one from imprisonment only: 25 Am. Jur., Habeas Corpus, \\u00a7157, citing In Re Begerow, 136 Cal. 293, 68 P. 773, 56 L. R. A. 528, holding a discharge is not final, and People ex rel Nagel v. Heider, 225 Ill. 347, 80 N. E. 291, 11 L. R. A. (NS) 257, contra.\\nIn Morse v. U. S., 267 U. S. 80, 85, 86, 69 L. Ed. 522, 45 Sup. Ct. 209, the Supreme Court stated that while the authorities passing upon the discharge of a defendant in a habeas corpus proceeding are not entirely harmonious, a rule may be deducible therefrom that when the proceedings are' preliminary and ancillary to the trial upon the merits, \\\"a decision discharging the prisoner neither annuls the indictment nor blots out the offense.\\\"\\nIn U. S. v. Cadarr, 197 U. S. 475, 478, the court said that \\\"generally speaking where the statute has provided that the discharge shall be from imprisonment or bail, without other language, it has been held not to operate as a statute of limitation.\\\"\\nJudge Mitchell, later Chief Justice, when sitting on the Common Pleas, in Commonwealth v. Brown, 11 Phila. Rep. 370, in discussing the act of 1785 said that \\\"all circumstances of physical, moral, or legal necessity, which prevent trial, are exceptions which take a case out of the statute.\\\"\\nThe opinions in our lower courts, which have had this matter for consideration, are not in accord. Only in a very feiv cases was the question of an absolute discharge squarely raised. Judge Bkewstee in Commonwealth v. McBride and Graveland, 2 Brewster 545, where the defendant was charged with homicide, held his discharge from imprisonment for want of trial after two terms (four in Philadelphia County) was absolute.\\nIn Commonwealth v. Sukena, 11 D. & C. 340, also a murder case, the opposite point of view was taken. The defendant there moved for his discharge from imprisonment under section 54 of the Act of 1860, supra, on the ground that his case could have been, but was not, called for trial during two terms of criminal court. Judge Koch held that the language of the act requiring a prisoner's discharge is imperative, but that \\\"his discharge from prison does not imply an end of the case against him. His case simply remains open for trial hereafter upon due and proper notice given to the de fendant of the time when his case will be called.\\\"\\nIn Commonwealth v. Henry, 19 District 393, defendant was charged with statutory rape, and was discharged from imprisonment where delay in trial beyond two terms was caused by the prosecutrix' inability to appear against him. Judge Scott in granting the discharge said, p. 395: \\\"The act of assembly requires the court to discharge the defendant from imprisonment only.\\\" The question of whether an indictment could be prosecuted further or whether the district attorney could authorize a new complaint was not passed upon as those matters did not arise.\\nSection 3 of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1785, supra, which, as above noted, was re-enacted in the Act of 1860, supra, was in substance copied from the British statute of Charles II, chapter 2, and had for its primary purpose the prevention of indefinite imprisonment of a defendant awaiting trial. In William John Clark v. The Commonwealth, 29 Pa. 129, where delay in trial was due to errors in drawing the panel of grand jurors, the court in refusing to discharge the prisoner under the Act of 1785 stated, p. 135: \\\"The statute was made to restrain the malice and oppression of prosecutors, and to relieve wrongful imprisonment; not to embarrass the administration of the criminal law; not to relieve righteous imprisonment, and to defeat public justice.\\\"\\nA discharge in a habeas corpus proceeding does not mean that under all circumstances it is the end of the prosecution: John Zebley, Jr. v. John W. Storey, 117 Pa. 478, 12 A. 569. See, also, a well considered opinion by Judge Braham in Commonwealth v. Seevers, 26 D. & C. 344, 346; Commonwealth v. Trost and Gunkel, 21 District 1081; Commonwealth ex rel McGurk v. Supt. of the County Prison, 97 Pa. 211, 214; Commonwealth v. Zec, 262 Pa. 251, 256, 105 A. 279.\\nThe plain literal meaning of the act is clear \\u2014 \\\"he shall be discharged from imprisonment\\\" \\u2014 nothing more than that. Nor does the constitutional provision in Article 1, Section 9, of our Constitution of 1874, which provides that \\\"in all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to......a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage;......\\\" warrant the granting of anything beyond a discharge from imprisonment. Our interpretation of the constitution and our statute permits a prisoner to be discharged from unlawful imprisonment, but does not permit the guilty to escape prosecution because of a fortuitous circumstance which delays the trial. If we accept the construction as contended for by the appellee, it would mean that a defendant out on bail after two terms must stand trial, while a defendant imprisoned for two terms without trial goes free. Such a result was never intended by the framers of the act.\\nThe judgment is reversed and defendant is ordered to stand trial upon proper notice being given him.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1056568\", \"name\": \"Greenwald & Co. versus Kaster\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Greenwald & Co. v. Kaster\", \"decision_date\": \"1878-01-21\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"45\", \"last_page\": \"48\", \"citations\": \"86 Pa. 45\", \"volume\": \"86\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:25:09.201865+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Agnew, C. J., Sharswood, Mercur, Gordon, Paxson, Woodward and Trunkey, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Greenwald & Co. versus Kaster.\", \"head_matter\": \"Greenwald & Co. versus Kaster.\\n1. The rule of the common law that a release of one partner operates as a release of his co-partners does not apply where it is manifest that the intention was to confine the release to the one partner.\\n2. Where a firm debt is contracted in Pennsylvania and judgment therefor is recovered in that state against one partner alone, and afterwards a release is executed to the other partner in another state, the>effect of the release upon the judgment is to be determined by the law of Pennsylvania.\\nJanuary 7th 1878.\\nBefore Agnew, C. J., Sharswood, Mercur, Gordon, Paxson, Woodward and Trunkey, JJ.\\nError to the Court of Common Pleas, No. 3; of Philadelphia county: Of January Term 1877, No. 206.\\nThis was a feigned issue, ordered upon the opening of a judgment which had been obtained by Greenwald & Co. against Lazarus H. Kaster, in assumpsit, for goods sold and delivered. Defendant pleaded payment. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of this court.\\nWalter J. Budd, for plaintiff in error.\\n\\u2014 The principle of the common law, that a release of one joint obligor or partner operates as a release of all, is applicable only to technical releases under seal: Bennett v. Cadwell, 20 P. F. Smith 253; Burke et al. v. Noble, 12 Wright 168; Solby et al. v. Forbes et al., 6 E. C. L. R. 11; Thompson et al. v. Lack, 54 E. C. L. R. 540. The release to Eckhouse was not under seal. The proceedings to open the judgment were an application for the exercise of the equity powers of the court. There was no equity in the application. The defendant relied on a purely technical defence to release him from the payment of an honest debt, and the court permitted him to prove, under the plea of payment, not that he had ever paid the judgment, or any part thereof, or any facts which in conscience and equity were equivalent to payment; but that the plaintiffs had accepted from Eckhouse, his former co-partner, a sum of money as his share of, and had given him a qualified release from, a debt which, at common law and in the Indiana court, was discharged as against him by this judgment.\\nSharp Alloman, for defendant in error.\\n\\u2014 By the law of Indiana a release of one partner is a release of all, and the release being effective by the law of the place of its delivery, is effective everywhere: Story on Conflict of Laws, sect. 411; Burge on Suretyship 301; Searight v. Calbraith, 4 Dallas 325; Born v. Shaw, 5 Casey 288; Allshouse v. Ramsey, 6 Whart. 332; Levy v. Levy, 2 W. N. C. 117.\\n[Sharswood, J. \\u2014 Which is to be applied, the law of the forum, or of the locus of the contract ?\\nAgnew, C. J. \\u2014 What would be the effect of the law of Indiana, upon a judgment which is fixed by the law of Pennsylvania ? Is not greater effect to be given to the judgment than to the release; and will a payment by a less solemn instrument suffice to release the other partner ?]\\nThe authority was to \\u201ccompromise and compound\\u201d the claim against Josfeph Eckhouse, as late partner in the firm of Easter & Eckhouse, reserving all rights, claims and liens against Lazarus Easter, &c. The release, in terms, reserves all rights against Easter; but it followed, as a legal consequence to the release of Eckhouse, that Easter should be released. The law does not allow Easter to invoke the release so much in his own protection as in protection of Eckhouse. If recovery were allowed against Easter, he would have a right of action over at common law, against Eckhouse, independent of their agreement for contribution; and thus the release to the latter would be a nullity.\\nJanuary 21st 1878.\", \"word_count\": \"1402\", \"char_count\": \"7968\", \"text\": \"Mr. Justice Trunkey\\ndelivered the opinion of the court,\\nLazarus PI. Easter and Joseph Eckhcuse, late partners, doing business in the state of Indiana, contracted a debt for goods, purchased of E. Greenwald & Co., in Philadelphia. In the action brought for recovery of that debt, judgment was taken against Easter for want of appearance. The summons was returned \\\"nihil habet\\\" as to Eckhouse. Afterwards suit was brought against Eckhouse in Indiana. The plaintiffs, by their attorneys in fact, on the 4th February 1875, in consideration of $700 paid by Eckhouse, released all rights of action against him, and surrendered all claims on account of indebtedness of him, or of. the firm of Kaster & Eckhouse, reserving all rights, claims and liens against said Kaster by reason of their judgment against him in the District Court of Philadelphia, for the sum of $4547.98. Upon Raster's application an issue was ordered to determine- the question whether that release operated as a satisfaction of the judgment. At the trial of the issue-the learned judge instructed the jury to find for the defendant, for the reason that a release to Joseph Eckhouse, the defendant's partner, executed in Indiana, is a release of both. .This direction is assigned for error, and is the only assignment that requires consideration.\\nThough the writing is not a technical release, and possibly cOuld be construed as an- agreement not to sue, it may be conceded that, by the laws of Indiana, it is a valid release, and governed by the principles of the common law. The rule that a release of one joint obligor or promisor operates as a release of his co-obligors or promisors -has long been confined to technical releases, and these, by means of recitals and provisos, may be limited to one alone. In Solby v. Forbes, 6 E. C. L. R. 11, a release of one of two partners, with a proviso that it should not prejudice the releasor's claim against the other, was held not to be a discharge of the other. And in Thompson v. Lack, 54 Id. 540, the release of one of two joint and several obligors, with a pro viso,, was held not a release of the other; because the whole deed should be.looked at in order to see the intention of the parties, and when the intention of the parties is clear, strong grounds should be laid to- induce the court not to give effect to the deed according to such intention. So in Burke et al. v. Noble, 12 Wright 168, it was held that a release of one of several joint debtors on payment of his proportion of the debt does not discharge the others, if it was not the intention of the parties. If a deed can operate in two ways, one consistent with the intention and the other repugnant to it, courts will ever be astute so to construe the law as to give effect to the'intent. Therefore, by the rules of the common law, the intention of the parties, clearly expressed in the release to Eckhouse, shall -have effect.\\nAside from the principles stated, how is Kaster discharged from the judgment ? The debt was contracted and judgment thereon obtained in Pennsylvania. By the law of this state the plaintiffs could compromise with and discharge Eckhouse from his proportion of the debt, which would be deemed as payment to them of such proportion, without prejudice to their right to recover the other portion from Kaster, and without prejudice to his right for contribution against Eckhouse. As to the extent of contribution, on settlement between Kaster and Eckhouse, we say nothing No act has been done to defeat the right. The judgment fixed Kaster for the whole indebtedness. The plaintiffs are considered as having received half of it from his former partner, and, in equity, have no claim for more than half the judgment. When Raster comes and demands discharge from the whole, upon averment that he himself has paid no part of it, but that, for a small sum, they released Eckhouse, expressly reserving their rights against him on the judgment, he makes an unconscionable claim, which should not be granted, except in obedience to positive law. No law requires courts to open their judgments to such end. Had the plaintiffs entered credit for a moiety of the judgment, there would have been no reason for an issue.\\nThe jury should have -been instructed to find for the plaintiffs for one-half the amount of the judgment.\\nJudgment reversed, and venire de novo awarded.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1057732\", \"name\": \"Bauer v. Hill, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Bauer v. Hill\", \"decision_date\": \"1920-05-17\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal, No. 249\", \"first_page\": \"559\", \"last_page\": \"564\", \"citations\": \"267 Pa. 559\", \"volume\": \"267\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:08:56.241193+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Brown, C. J., Moschzisker, Frazer, Walling and Simpson, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Bauer v. Hill, Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"Bauer v. Hill, Appellant.\\nLandlord and tenant \\u2014 Lease\\u2014Surrender of possession on sale \\u2014 \\u2022 Time of notice \\u2014 Agreement to sell \\u2014 Title\\u2014Ejectment\\u2014Judgment hy confession \\u2014 Proceedings to open \\u2014 Equity\\u2014Technicality.\\n1. A written agreement for the sale of a building constitutes a sale within the meaning of a lease providing for the surrender of possession by the tenant on notice that the property has been sold, so that a notice to the tenant to vacate is valid although given prior to the passing of the legal title.\\n2. Technical questions in ejectment under a lease, not suggested in the petition to open the judgment, cannot be considered inasmuch as proceedings to open a confessed judgment are purely equitable in form, wherein the petition and answer comprise the pleadings, and the court grants relief only upon the grounds embraced therein.\\n3. Not decided, as to authority to confess judgment on warrant in lease after the lessor has, in efEect, surrendered possession of the premises occupied by him, or whether such judgment could be confessed, under the terms of the lease, before an action of ejectment had actually been brought.\\n4. An application to open a judgment is equitable in substance and must rest on a meritorious and not on a mere technical defense.\\nJudgments \\u2014 Proceedings to open \\u2014 Appeals\\u2014Review of order\\u2014 Merits of case \\u2014 Discretion of court.\\n5. An appeal from an order refusing to open a judgment which depends upon legal questions and deductions from undisputed facts, is before the appellate court for review on the merits, and not to determine whether the court has properly exercised its discretion.\\nArgued April 27, 1920.\\nAppeal, No. 249, Jan. T., 1920, by defendant, from judgment of C. P. No. 1, Phila. Co., Dee. T., 1919, No. 3773, discharging rule to open judgment, in the case of Benjamin Bauer, Jr., v. Peter A. Hill.\\nBefore Brown, C. J., Moschzisker, Frazer, Walling and Simpson, JJ.\\nAffirmed.\\nRule to open judgment confessed in amicable action of ejectment under authority in lease. Before Shoemaker, J.\\nThe facts appear by the opinion of the Supreme Court.\\nThe court discharged the rule. Defendant appealed.\\nError assigned was order discharging rule.\\nJames Francis Ryan, with him Michael J. Ryan, for appellant.\\nThe word \\u201csale\\u201d as applied to real estate, when it affects others than the vendor and vendee, refers only to completed sale: Insurance Co. v. Updegraff, 21 Pa. 513; Walter v. Sun Fire Office, 165 Pa. 381; Hall v. Sugar Val. Mut. F. Ins. Co., 64 Pa. Superior Ct. 333; Strange v. Austin, 134 Pa. 96.\\nJoseph Neff Ewing, with him Clinton O. Mayer and Prichard, Saul, Bayard & Evans, for appellee.\\nThe action of the lower court in refusing to open a judgment will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of power or discretion: Gump\\u2019s App., 65 Pa. 476; Augustine v. Wolf, 215 Pa. 558; Wright v. Linhart, 243 Pa. 221.\\nThere are cases and circumstances where a meaning can be given to the word \\u201csale\\u201d that included a mere ex-ecutory agreement to sell: Williamson v. Berry, 8 Howard (U. S.) 495; Bigley v. Risher, 63 Pa. 152.\\nMay 17, 1920:\", \"word_count\": \"1814\", \"char_count\": \"10474\", \"text\": \"Opinion by\\nMr. Justice Walling,\\nThis appeal involves the validity of a judgment confessed in an amicable action of ejectment, between landlord and tenant. Prior to the time in question the Wilson estate, as owner of the building situate on the northwest corner of 13th and Market streets, Philadelphia, made a lease of a part thereof to the United Cigar Stores Company, for a term of years, which provides, inter alia, \\\"It being agreed that should the building of which the demised premises are a part be sold by the under signed and the undersigned desires possession of the premises under lease by you at the end of any year during the extended term, you agree to give possession to the undersigned upon the payment of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) in cash, by the undersigned to you and upon ninety (90) days' written notice to vacate.\\\" Thereafter said company sublet a portion of the demised premises, including the basement, to Benjamin Bauer, Jr., the plaintiff herein, the lease to him being made subject to the conditions in the original lease and with the right to terminate the same at the end of any year, on sixty days' notice, in the event of a termination of the lease to the cigar company; Bauer in turn sublet the basement to Peter A. Hill, the defendant. The lease to the latter provides, inter alia, \\\"This lease and all the terms, covenants and conditions hereof are in all respects subject and subordinate to the rights of the lessor's landlord and to the lease under which the lessor holds the premises, and to the lease or renewal agreement for the new term, presently given to the said lessor herein.\\\" The leases to both Bauer and Hill were extended until 1922, subject to the right of cancellation as above stated.\\nIn July, 1919, the Wilson estate made and executed an unconditional written agreement for the sale of the building to Jacob Marcus et al., to be consummated by payment of consideration, delivery of deed and possession on January 2, 1920, of which the Wilson estate forthwith gave notice to the cigar company, demanding possession on the day last above mentioned, and the latter gave a like notice and demand to Bauer and he in turn to Hill. Meantime both the cigar company and Bauer made amicable arrangements for the vacation, etc., of the portions of the building embraced in their respective leases, but Hill declined to do so or to vacate the premises occupied by him. Pinal settlement was made and deed for the property delivered according to the agreement, and thereafter Bauer, in order that he might surrender up the property as obligated, entered judgment against Hill in an amicable action of ejectment, pursuant to a stipulation in the latter's lease as follows, viz: \\\"and where the lease shall be so determined by condition broken and notice as aforesaid, and also when and as soon as the term hereby created shall have expired by its own limitation, it shall be lawful for any attorney of any court of this county to appear for the lessee in an action of ejectment to be therein brought by the lessor for the recovery of the demised premises, and therein confess judgment,\\\" etc. The defendant petitioned the court below to open the judgment, to which an answer was filed and testimony taken. Thereafter, upon due consideration, the court discharged the rule to open the judgment, from which defendant brought this appeal.\\nHis main contention is that the building was not sold within the terms of the lease, until delivery of the deed and, hence, the notice to vacate was premature; with this we cannot agree. \\\"Sale is a word of precise legal import, both at law and in equity. It means a contract between parties to pass rights of property for money which the buyer pays, or promises to pay, to the seller for the thing bought and sold\\\": Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. 544; Huthmacher v. Harris's Administrators, 38 Pa. 491, 498; Bigley v. Risher, 63 Pa. 153, 155. Land may be sold by an article of agreement as well as by deed: Fryer v. Rishell, 84 Pa. 521; Phillips v. Swank, 120 Pa. 76. In popular language property under contract of sale is often referred to as sold: see vol. 5, Words & Phrases, p. 654. Whenever an unconditional agreement has been made for the sale of land, such as equity will specifically enforce, it may properly be referred to and treated as sold; then the vendee becomes the equitable owner and the vendor holds the legal title as trustee: see Bender v. Luckenbach, 162 Pa. 18, 25; Morgan v. Scott, 26 Pa. 51; Rangler's App., 3 Pa. 377; Simmons's Est., 140 Pa. 567; Longwell v. Bentley, 23 Pa. 99. The fact that the vendor as holder of the legal title may insure the property, or recover for a fire loss, does not control the question here involved. When the equities require it, he is treated as trustee of such insurance money: Insurance Co. v. Updegraff, 21 Pa. 513; Peoples Street Ry. Co. v. Spencer, 156 Pa. 85. Such sale by agreement, when bona fide, justifies the landlord in warning Ms tenant to vacate, where the lease provides it may be done in case of sale of the premises. It is not a question as to whether, under such circumstances, a tenant can be forced to surrender possession, but of whether notice to do so may be given, prior to the passing of the legal title, and of that we have no doubt; to hold otherwise would unduly hamper sales of leased property. Moreover, the original lease here says, \\\"should the undersigned [lessor] desire possession,\\\" not the vendee, it shall be given, etc.; which strengthens the conclusion that the parties had in mind a sale by agreement rather than one finally consummated by deed. Hence, the sale made by the agreement in July, 1919, followed by due notice given the defendant, operated to terminate his lease at the end of that year, and gave rise to conditions justifying the entry of the judgment in question, especially as the sale had been fully consummated prior to the entry of such judgment.\\nTechnical questions are suggested as to the authority to confess judgment after plaintiff had in effect surrendered possession of the premises occupied by him, and also as to whether such judgment could be confessed, under the terms of the lease, before an action of ejectment had actually been brought; but, as neither is suggested in the petition to open judgment, they cannot be considered. For proceedings to open a confessed judgment are purely equitable in form, wherein the petition and answer comprise the pleadings, and the court grants relief only upon the grounds embraced therein: State Camp of Pennsylvania of the Patriotic Order Sons of America v. Kelley et al., 267 Pa. 19; Carr v. \\u00c6tna A. & L. Co., 263 Pa. 87, 93; Fisher v. King, 153 Pa. 3; Wyman & Colegrove's App., 3 Walker 410; Pfaff v. Thomas, 3 Pa. Superior Ct. 419.\\nAn application to open a judgment is also equitable in substance and must rest on a meritorious and not on a mere technical defense: State Camp of Pennsylvania of the Patriotic Order Sons of America v. Kelley et al., supra, and authorities there cited. As the present case depends upon legal questions and deductions from undisputed facts, it is before us for review upon the merits, rather than to determine whether the chancellor has properly exercised his discretion (see case last above cited), but we find nothing to justify a reversal.\\nThe order discharging the rule to open the judgment is affirmed.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"11089490\", \"name\": \"In the Matter of Andrea Yvette PRINCE\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Prince\", \"decision_date\": \"2001-02-20\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 628 Disciplinary Docket No. 3\", \"first_page\": \"728\", \"last_page\": \"728\", \"citations\": \"774 A.2d 728\", \"volume\": \"774\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:32:20.065162+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"In the Matter of Andrea Yvette PRINCE.\", \"head_matter\": \"In the Matter of Andrea Yvette PRINCE.\\nNo. 628 Disciplinary Docket No. 3.\\nSupreme Court of Pennsylvania.\\nFeb. 20, 2001.\", \"word_count\": \"169\", \"char_count\": \"1023\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nPER CURIAM:\\nAND NOW, this 20th day of February, 2001, Andrea Yvette Prince having been indefinitely suspended from the practice of law before naval tribunals and also having been indefinitely suspended from providing individual legal assistance in the Department of the Navy by Order of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy dated April 26, 2000; the said Andrea Yvette Prince having been directed on November 17, 2000, to inform this Court of any claim she has that the imposition of the identical or comparable discipline in this Commonwealth would be unwarranted and the reasons therefor; and upon consideration of the responses filed, it is\\nORDERED that Andrea Yvette Prince is suspended from the practice of law in this Commonwealth consistent with the Order of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy dated April 26, 2000, and she shall comply with all the provisions of Rule 217, Pa.R.D.E.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"11124884\", \"name\": \"Theresa ALBERICI, Appellee, v. RICHARD, DISANTI, HAMILTON & GALLAGHER, P.C., Howard Richard and Alexander Disanti, Appellants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Alberici v. Richard, Disanti, Hamilton & Gallagher, P.C.\", \"decision_date\": \"2001-02-16\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"548\", \"last_page\": \"548\", \"citations\": \"767 A.2d 548\", \"volume\": \"767\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:27:44.007607+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Flaherty, C.J., Zappala, Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Saylor, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Theresa ALBERICI, Appellee, v. RICHARD, DISANTI, HAMILTON & GALLAGHER, P.C., Howard Richard and Alexander Disanti, Appellants.\", \"head_matter\": \"Theresa ALBERICI, Appellee, v. RICHARD, DISANTI, HAMILTON & GALLAGHER, P.C., Howard Richard and Alexander Disanti, Appellants.\\nSupreme Court of Pennsylvania.\\nArgued Jan. 29, 2001.\\nDecided Feb. 16, 2001.\\nJohn Curchman Smith, Philadelphia, for Richard, Disanti, Hamilton & Gallagher, P.C. et al.\\nMarc Lamer, Philadelphia, for Theresa Alberici.\\nBefore Flaherty, C.J., Zappala, Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Saylor, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"77\", \"char_count\": \"565\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nPER CURIAM:\\nAppeal dismissed as having been improvidently granted.\\nJustice NEWMAN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/pa/11376077.json b/pa/11376077.json
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+"{\"id\": \"11376077\", \"name\": \"COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Chamroeun BY, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Commonwealth v. By\", \"decision_date\": \"2002-12-02\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"1250\", \"last_page\": \"1259\", \"citations\": \"812 A.2d 1250\", \"volume\": \"812\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:10:33.116616+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before: JOYCE, BECK and POPOVICH, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Chamroeun BY, Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Chamroeun BY, Appellant.\\nSuperior Court of Pennsylvania.\\nArgued April 16, 2002.\\nFiled Dec. 2, 2002.\\nMaryJean Glick, Public Defender, Lancaster, for appellant.\\nVincent Mazeski, Assistant District Attorney, Lancaster, for Commonwealth, ap-pellee.\\nBefore: JOYCE, BECK and POPOVICH, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"4109\", \"char_count\": \"24961\", \"text\": \"POPOVICH, J.\\n\\u00b6 1 Appellant Chamroeun By appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on February 6, 2001, in the Court of Common Pleas, Lancaster County. Following a non-jury trial, Appellant was convicted of possession with intent to deliver cocaine and firearms not to be carried without a license. He was sentenced to time served to 23 months, plus five years of probation. Appellant filed the present appeal challenging the suppression court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence. Upon review, we affirm.\\n\\u00b6 2 The relevant facts are as follows. On the evening of January 9, 2000, Officer Charles Wildt, III, of the East Lampeter Township Police Department was on patrol on Lincoln Highway East when he observed a dark gray Mazda RX-7, with darkly tinted windows, in a Super 8 Motel parking lot. The vehicle was parked alongside vehicles known to the police as belonging to persons who dealt narcotics. Officer Wildt observed four individuals enter the Mazda and drive out of the parking lot. He followed the vehicle and initiated a traffic stop based upon the tinted windows violation. Due to the number of persons in the vehicle coupled with the fact that it was beginning to get dark, Officer Wildt radioed for backup. Officers George Quickel of the Lancaster City Police Department and Michael Neff of the East Lampeter Township Police Department arrived on the scene as a safety precaution.\\n\\u00b6 3 Appellant, the driver of the vehicle, identified himself as Chamroeun By and provided his driver's license and vehicle documents to Officer Wildt. Officer Wildt also obtained the identity and birth dates of the remaining persons in the Mazda. He then returned to his police cruiser to conduct a check on the persons in the vehicle. As a result of the check, Officer Wildt learned that one of the passengers gave false information, ie., he gave an incorrect name and birth date. Officer Wildt returned to the Mazda and asked Appellant to exit the vehicle. Appellant did so. Officer Wildt issued Appellant a warning for the tinted windows violation and returned the driver's license and vehicle documents to Appellant. He then advised Appellant that he was free to leave. At this point in time, Officer Wildt asked Appellant if he could ask a couple of questions. Officer Wildt asked him if he had any weapons or drugs. He observed Appellant hesitate, become noticeably nervous and begin to perspire. Officer Wildt then asked Appellant if he could search the vehicle. Appellant hesitated. Again, Officer Wildt reminded Appellant that he was free to leave. Officer Wildt asked again if he could search the vehicle. Appellant consented to a search.\\n\\u00b64 The passengers exited the vehicle. Officer Wildt conducted a search. In the center console, a clear plastic bag contain ing ten smaller bags, which contained a substance later positively identified as crack cocaine, was found. During the search, a female passenger asked to retrieve her coat from the vehicle because she was cold. Before the officers would give her the coat, they patted the coat down to make sure there were no weapons. In doing so, a .25 caliber magazine was found in one of the pockets. The female passenger was asked if there was a handgun in the vehicle. She responded in the affirmative and that it was located behind the driver's seat. A loaded Beretta .25 caliber semi-automatic handgun was recovered. Subsequently, all of the passengers were taken into custody and were transported back to the police station.\\n\\u00b6 5 At the police station, Appellant received his Miranda warnings. He then provided a handwritten, signed confession in which he admitted that the crack cocaine and the handgun were his, that a room at the Super 8 Motel was rented in his name and that he consented to a search of that room.\\n\\u00b6 6 Appellant was charged with possession with intent to deliver cocaine and firearms not to be carried without a license. He filed a motion to suppress the physical evidence and the statement taken at the police station on the basis that each was the product of an illegal detention. The suppression court denied the motion. Appellant waived his right to a jury trial, and he was found guilty on both charges. That same day, Appellant was sentenced. This timely appeal followed.\\n\\u00b6 7 On appeal, Appellant alleges the suppression court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence where his consent to search the vehicle was the product of an unlawful investigative detention in the absence of reasonable suspicion.\\n\\u00b6 8 In considering the denial of a suppression motion, our standard of review is well-settled. We must \\\"determine whether the record supports the suppression court's factual findings and the legitimacy of the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from these findings.\\\" Commonwealth v. Ayala, 791 A.2d 1202, 1207 (Pa.Super.2002). In doing so, we \\\"may consider only the prosecution's [evidence]\\\" and the defendant's evidence to the extent it is not contradictory. Id., 791 A.2d at 1207. If the evidence presented at the suppression hearing supports these findings of fact, we may not reverse the lower court unless its accompanying legal conclusions are in error. See Commonwealth v. Lohr, 715 A.2d 459, 461 (Pa.Super.1998).\\n\\u00b6 9 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures, thereby ensuring the \\\"right of each individual to be let alone.\\\" Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 236, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Commonwealth v. Blair, 394 Pa.Super. 207, 575 A.2d 593, 596 (1990). Specifically, police officers may not conduct a warrantless search or seizure unless one of several recognized exceptions applies. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041; Blair, 575 A.2d at 596-97. One such exception is a search conducted pursuant to consent voluntarily given. See Blair, 575 A.2d at 597 (citation omitted). The Fourth Amendment inquiries in consent cases entail a two-prong assessment: first, the constitutional validity of the citizen/police encounter giving rise to the consent and, second, the voluntariness of said consent. See Commonwealth v. Strickler, 563 Pa. 47, 757 A.2d 884, 888 (2000) (citation omitted). Where the underlying encounter is found to be lawful, voluntariness becomes the exclusive focus. See id., 757 A.2d at 889 (citation omitted). If a defen dant's initial detention violates the Fourth Amendment, then any evidence seized during that stop must be excluded as fruit of an unlawful detention absent a demonstration by the government both of a sufficient break in the causal chain between the illegal detention and the seizure of evidence, thus assuring that the search is not an exploitation of the prior illegality, and of voluntariness. See id., 757 A.2d at 889 (citation omitted).\\n\\u00b6 10 To secure the right of citizens to be free from such intrusions, courts in Pennsylvania require law enforcement officers to demonstrate ascending levels of suspicion to justify their interactions with citizens as those interactions become more intrusive. See Commonwealth v. Key, 789 A.2d 282, 288 (Pa.Super.2001) (citation omitted).\\n\\u00b6 11 The first of these interactions is a \\\"mere encounter,\\\" or request for information, which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or respond. See Strickler, 757 A.2d at 889. The second level is an \\\"investigative detention,\\\" or Terry stop, which must be supported by reasonable and articulated suspicion that the person seized is engaged in criminal activity, and the detention may continue only so long as is necessary to confirm or dispel such suspicion. See id., 757 A.2d at 889. It subjects a suspect to a stop and period of detention but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of arrest. See id., 757 A.2d at 889. Finally, an arrest or \\\"custodial detention\\\" must be supported by probable cause. See id., 757 A.2d at 889. To guide the crucial inquiry as to whether or not a seizure has been effected, the United States Supreme Court has devised an objective test entailing a determination of whether, in viewing the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that he was free to leave. See id., 757 A.2d at 889 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)). In evaluating the circumstances, the focus is directed toward whether, by means of physical force or show of authority, the citizen's movement has in some way been restrained. See id., 757 A.2d at 889 (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870).\\n\\u00b6 12 In Strickler and its companion case, Commonwealth v. Freeman, 563 Pa. 82, 757 A.2d 903 (2000), our Supreme Court has used these principles regarding seizure to examine a subsequent citizen/police interaction following a valid traffic stop. In these cases, the Court recognized that \\\"the transition between detention and a consensual exchange can be so seamless that the untrained eye may not notice that it has occurred.\\\" Strickler, 757 A.2d at 892 (citation omitted). Although there may be no question regarding the validity of the initial traffic stop, the crucial question is when the validity of that stop ceased. See id., 757 A.2d at 891.\\n\\u00b6 13 Where the purpose of an initial, valid traffic stop has ended and a reasonable person would have believed that he was free to leave, the law characterizes a subsequent round of questioning by the officer as a mere encounter. See Strickler, 757 A.2d at 898. Since the citizen is free to leave, he is not detained, and the police are free to ask questions appropriate to a mere encounter, including a request for permission to search the vehicle. However, where the purpose of an initial traffic stop has ended and a reasonable person would not have believed that he was free to leave, the law characterizes a subsequent round of questioning by the police as an investigative detention or arrest. See Freeman, 757 A.2d at 907. In the absence of either reasonable suspicion to support the investigative detention or probable cause to support the arrest, the citizen is considered unlawfully detained. Where a consensual search has been preceded by an unlawful detention, the exclusionary rule requires suppression of the evidence obtained absent a demonstration by the commonwealth both of a sufficient break in the causal chain between the illegality and the seizure of evidence. This assures of the search's voluntariness and that the search is not an exploitation of the prior unlawful detention. See Strickler, 757 A.2d at 889 (citation omitted).\\n\\u00b6 14 In this case, Appellant does not challenge the constitutionality of Officer Wildt's decision to stop his vehicle, the first stop. He challenges the subsequent detention after the valid traffic stop. Appellant contends that Officer Wildt's interrogation of Appellant after he had returned the driver's license and vehicle documents constituted an investigative detention and not a mere encounter. Since Officer Wildt did not have reasonable suspicion to detain .Appellant, he argues that the evidence obtained from the unlawful detention and search should be suppressed. Therefore, we focus solely on the constitutionality of the officer's conduct in obtaining consent to search Appellant's vehicle.\\n\\u00b6 15 The first citizen/police interaction between Appellant and Officer Wildt ended when Officer Wildt advised Appellant that he was free to leave. The subsequent citizen/police interaction, which is the one we are analyzing, began when Officer Wildt questioned Appellant after the officer had informed Appellant that he was free to leave.\\n\\u00b6 16 The factors militating against finding an unlawful detention are the following. Officer Wildt's 'conduct was restrained and non-confrontational. Officer Wildt did not restrain Appellant's freedom of movement by use of or threatened use of force. He spoke in a casual and nonthreatening tone of voice. See N.T., 2/6/2001, at 14. He did not issue any orders to Appellant, such as instructing Appellant to stand at a particular location. See id., at 14. He did not remove his weapon from his holster. See id., at 14. Most importantly, Officer Wildt did not block Appellant's path of exit. See id., at 14. Appellant was free to leave. After Officer Wildt had asked Appellant's permission to search the vehicle but prior to Appellant consenting to the search,. he again informed Appellant that he was free to leave. See id., at 16. Officer Wildt asked again if he could search the vehicle. See id., at 16. Appellant hesitated again and then consented to the vehicle search. See id., at 16.\\n\\u00b6 17 The following factors support a finding of an unlawful detention. The subsequent interaction stemmed from a valid traffic stop, the encounter took place at night and three police officers were present during the interaction. However, the effects of these factors on a reasonable person's belief that he was free to leave were minimal. The valid traffic stop ended when Officer Wildt returned to Appellant the documents and informed him that he was free to leave. Additionally, the three police officers were present during the subsequent interaction but their presence was not of a nature that would make a reasonable person believe that he was not free to leave. We previously addressed Officer Wildt's conduct and found it to be non-coercive. Officer George Quickel stood behind Officer Wildt during the second interaction. He did not prevent Appellant from leaving the scene. He did not speak to Appellant nor did he remove his weapon. We find that there is no evidence in the record that Officer Quickel's conduct was coercive. That leaves Officer Michael Neff. Officer Neff was standing next to the passenger's side of Appellant's vehicle and was speaking with the passengers in the vehicle when the second interaction occurred. See N.T., 2/6/2001, at 12. Appellant argues that Officer Neffs location and conduct would lead a reasonable person to believe that he was not free to leave.\\n\\u00b6 18 In the recent United States Supreme Court case of United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002), the Supreme Court noted how the location and conduct of a second police officer acted on the reasonable person's belief that he was free to leave. In Drayton, Officer Hoover, once aboard the bus, knelt on the driver's seat and faced the rear of the bus. From this position, he could observe the passengers and ensure the safety of the other two police officers without blocking the aisle or obstructing the exit. The defendant argued that Officer Hoover's position caused the interaction to arise to the level of a seizure or detention because a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. The Supreme Court disagreed. \\\"Officer Hoover's position at the front of the bus also does not tip the scales in respondents' favor. Hoover did nothing to intimidate passengers, and he said nothing to suggest that people could not exit and indeed he left the aisle clear.\\\" Id. 536 U.S. at-, 122 S.Ct. at 2112.\\n\\u00b6 19 Likewise, we conclude that Officer Neffs location and conduct in this case does not tip the scales in Appellant's favor. Officer Neffs and Officer Hoover's location and conduct are analogous. Officer Neff had no contact, intimidating or otherwise, with Appellant, and, to ensure the safety of everyone involved, he stood in a location where he could observe what was transpiring. While standing alongside Appellant's vehicle, Officer Neff conversed with the passengers. However, nothing in this conversation would indicate to a reasonable person that they were not free to leave. At the time Officer Neff was talking to the passengers, Officer Wildt was asking Appellant if he would consent to a search of his vehicle. Officer Wildt then told Appellant that he was free to leave. Officer Neff did nothing that would cause a reasonable person to feel that he was not free to leave. Officer Neffs conversation with the passengers was merely that, a conversation. At that point in time, Officer Neff was not conducting an interrogation of the passengers, and, therefore, Officer Neffs conduct was not intimidating. Additionally, Ms location was on the passenger's side of the veMcle. He was not near the driver's door nor was he standing in front of the vehicle, and, therefore, he did not stand in such a manner that would have prevented Appellant from exiting the scene. Most importantly, Officer Neff did not have any contact with Appellant. His contact was limited to a conversation with the passengers in the vehicle. In fact, the parties stipulated that Officer Neff \\\"in no way impeded [Appellant] from leaving the scene.\\\" N.T., 2/6/2001, at 39. Accordingly, we find that Officer Neffs location and conduct did not convey a belief to a reasonable person that they were not free to leave.\\n\\u00b6 20 Weighing the above factors in light of Striekler and Freeman, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it found that Appellant was not being seized or detained when Officer Wildt asked him if he would consent to a search of his vehicle. Since we concluded that the request to search was a mere encounter and did not rise to a second or subsequent seizure under the Fourth Amendment, we now proceed to a voluntariness assessment.\\n\\u00b6 21 In connection with such an inquiry, the Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing that a consent is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice \\u2014 not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied, or a will overborne \\u2014 under the totality of the circumstances. See Strickler, 757 A.2d at 901 (citing Ohio v. Robinette (II), 519 U.S. 33, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996)). While knowledge of the right to refuse to consent to the search is a factor to be taken into account, the Commonwealth is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent. See Strickler, 757 A.2d at 901 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227-28, 93 S.Ct. 2041; Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 558 Pa. 517, 527, 738 A.2d 427, 433 (1999)). Additionally, although the inquiry is an objective one, the maturity, sophistication and mental or emotional state of the defendant are to be taken into account. See Strickler, 757 A.2d at 901 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976)). The United States Supreme Court has also rejected the argument that a defendant's consent is necessarily involuntary where it is given at a time when the defendant knows the search will produce evidence of a crime. See Strickler, 757 A.2d at 901 (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (finding that the reasonable person test presupposes an innocent person)).\\n\\u00b6 22 Since both the tests for a seizure and voluntariness of. consent entail an examination of the objective circumstances surrounding the citizen/police interaction, there is a substantial, necessary overlap in the analyses. The aforementioned reasons supporting the conclusion that Appellant was not seized at the time he gave his consent to search the vehicle also support a determination that his consent was voluntary. Nothing in the record supports a determination that Appellant's individual maturity, sophistication or mental state should have any bearing in this regard.\\n\\u00b6 23 Thus, the Commonwealth's unchallenged evidence was sufficient to satisfy its burden of demonstrating that, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt free to leave, and Appellant's consent to search was given freely. See Strickler, 757 A.2d at 884; Freeman, 757 A.2d at 903.\\n\\u00b6 24 Judgment of sentence affirmed.\\n\\u00b6 25 BECK J. files a Dissenting Opinion.\\n. In Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983), the United States Supreme Court explained that there is no \\\"litmus-paper\\\" test for distinguishing a mere encounter from a seizure as follows:\\nThe test is necessarily imprecise, because it is designed to assess the coercive effect of police conduct, taken as a whole, rather than to focus on particular details of that conduct in isolation. Moreover, what constitutes a restraint on liberty prompting a person to conclude that he is not free to \\\"leave\\\" will vary, not only with the particular police conduct at issue, but also with the setting in which the conduct occurs.\\nRoyer, 460 U.S. at 506, 103 S.Ct. at 1329.\\n. Nor would it appear that such an argument could be sustained. Officer Wildt testified that he observed that tinted windows on Appellant's vehicle were in violation of the Vehicle Code. See 75 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 4524(e).\\n. We note that the trial court did not address Officer Neff's location or conduct during the interaction nor did the court discuss what effect this may have on a reasonable person's belief that he was free to leave. However, since we have found Officer Neff's conduct to be non-coercive, we find that omission did not effect the disposition.\"}"
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diff --git a/pa/11551154.json b/pa/11551154.json
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--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"11551154\", \"name\": \"COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Phares Shirk HURST, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Commonwealth v. Hurst\", \"decision_date\": \"1999-09-09\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"1286\", \"last_page\": \"1286\", \"citations\": \"734 A.2d 1286\", \"volume\": \"734\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:55:48.746673+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Phares Shirk HURST, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Phares Shirk HURST, Appellee.\\nSupreme Court of Pennsylvania.\\nSubmitted Aug. 11, 1999.\\nDecided Sept. 9, 1999.\\nJoseph C. Madenspacher, Dist. Atty., Susan E. Moyer, Asst. Dist. Atty., District Attorney\\u2019s Office, for Com.\\nJames J. Karl, Public Defender, Public Defender\\u2019s Office, for Phares Shirk Hurst.\\nBefore FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"112\", \"char_count\": \"749\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nPER CURIAM.\\nBased upon our disposition in Commonwealth v. Williams, \\u2014 Pa.-, 733 A.2d 593 (1999), we affirm the Order of the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas dated April 30, 1999. Furthermore, we remand the matter to the common pleas court for disposition of any remaining issues.\\nJurisdiction is relinquished.\"}"
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diff --git a/pa/1163613.json b/pa/1163613.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6d8f972dac7f6dde1d8e39c5a25d97e4b88efa47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pa/1163613.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1163613\", \"name\": \"Cooper's Estate\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Cooper's Estate\", \"decision_date\": \"1936-01-31\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal, No. 139\", \"first_page\": \"418\", \"last_page\": \"421\", \"citations\": \"320 Pa. 418\", \"volume\": \"320\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:00:03.113119+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Kephart, C. J., Schaffer, Drew, Linn and Barnes, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Cooper\\u2019s Estate.\", \"head_matter\": \"Cooper\\u2019s Estate.\\nJanuary 31, 1936:\\nArgued January 6, 1936.\\nBefore Kephart, C. J., Schaffer, Drew, Linn and Barnes, JJ.\\nE. Spencer Miller, for appellant.\\nWill M. Boenning, Special Deputy Attorney General, with him Charles J. Margiotti, Attorney General, and E. Russell Shockley, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"461\", \"char_count\": \"2770\", \"text\": \"Opinion by\\nMr. Chief Justice Kephart,\\nWhere a trust is created in which the settlor reserves a life interest in the income, such interest is subject to the tax imposed by the Act of June 20, 1919, P. L. 521: Dean's Est., 279 Pa. 582; Leffman's Est., 312 Pa. 236. Appellant, trustee, claimed decedent's interest as a gift through a release of the income from the settlor. She had therefore the burden of proof: Smith's Est., 237 Pa. 115; Sullivan v. Hess, 241 Pa. 407.\\nIn 1924 Harriet Cooper sold a property and took a purchase-money mortgage for $45,000. She assigned this mortgage to Grace Corliss, under an agreement wherein Grace Corliss was to pay the income on this mortgage to Harriet Cooper for life. In 1931 Harriet Cooper died and the value of this mortgage was appraised as part of her estate so as to subject it to the tax above mentioned. Grace Corliss resisted the assessment and appealed from the appraisement, claiming that the life interest in the income was surrendered to her by Mrs. Cooper in 1930. The court below approved the appraisement.\\nThe Commonwealth, in making out its prima facie case, offered the appraisement in evidence. To this appraisement two affidavits were attached. They were prepared by appellant and her attorney a year or two before the present proceeding as an aid to the inheritance tax appraisers. These affidavits contained statements that decedent had released her interest in the trust in the spring of 1930. Appellant now argues that the Commonwealth, having placed these affidavits in evidence without qualification, is irrevocably bound by the statement that decedent's interest in the trust was released. We held in Heyman v. Hanauer, 302 Pa. 56, 62, that the party who presents in evidence written documents of another party to a dispute, must present the writing in its entirety but that he may thereafter disprove allegations contained therein adverse to his interests. See also Yearsly's App., 48 Pa. 531. The affidavits were not pleadings or part of them. No issue was made therefrom and the cases cited by appellant are therefore not applicable.\\nThe issue depended on the evidence and it supported the court's conclusion that no release of decedent's interest in the trust had taken place. This finding, having been approved by tbe court in banc is, by our settled rule, binding upon us: Foley v. Barnet, 303 Pa. 218; Belmont Lab. v. Heist, 300 Pa. 542, 546.\\nDecree affirmed at appellant's cost.\"}"
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diff --git a/pa/11817569.json b/pa/11817569.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..38caf3980dc4196774744e467b3733633db5ada2
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+"{\"id\": \"11817569\", \"name\": \"TITUS & McCONOMY, Appellee, v. Hasan JALISI, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Titus & McConomy v. Jalisi\", \"decision_date\": \"1998-06-02\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 1433\", \"first_page\": \"646\", \"last_page\": \"649\", \"citations\": \"713 A.2d 646\", \"volume\": \"713\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:13:00.547262+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before POPOVICH, STEVENS and MONTEMURO , JJ.\", \"parties\": \"TITUS & McCONOMY, Appellee, v. Hasan JALISI, Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"TITUS & McCONOMY, Appellee, v. Hasan JALISI, Appellant.\\nSuperior Court of Pennsylvania.\\nSubmitted Jan. 5, 1998.\\nFiled June 2, 1998.\\nJohn T. Bender, Pittsburgh, for appellant.\\nDavid G. Oberdick, Pittsburgh, for appel-lee.\\nBefore POPOVICH, STEVENS and MONTEMURO , JJ.\\nRetired Justice assigned to Superior Court.\", \"word_count\": \"1779\", \"char_count\": \"10997\", \"text\": \"POPOVICH, Judge:\\nThe defendant/appellant, Hasan Jalisi, appeals the order compelling arbitration on the basis that the trial court erred in finding that his \\\"uncounseled consent to arbitrate a fee dispute cannot be withdrawn[.]\\\" We reverse.\\nThe facts of record disclose that the appellant was provided legal services by the plaintiffiappellee, Titus & McConomy. The appellant disputed the legal fees and filed a complaint with the Special Fee Determination Committee of the Allegheny County Bar Association (ACBA) to resolve the matter. Thereafter, both parties executed an \\\"Agreement to Arbitrate\\\" on December 16, 1996, which read:\\nThe undersigned, intending to be legally bound hereby, agree to submit the above captioned fee dispute to the Special Fee Determination Committee of The Allegheny County Bar Association for arbitration and determination, hereby waiving any objection to the arbitrators who are to determine this matter, and agreeing that the award made shall be binding in accordance with the terms of the award and in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania pertaining to arbitration matters. [Emphasis added]\\nPrior to arbitration, the appellant withdrew his complaint and consent to have the dispute heard by the ACBA Committee. After receipt of the appellant's withdrawal, the ACBA Committee informed the parties that resolution of the dispute would go forward despite the notice of withdrawal. A hearing was held on March 10, 1997, and resulted in an award of $28,691.50 for the appellee. A Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award was filed by the appellee alleging that the ACBA Committee's decision was \\\"binding\\\" per the terms of the \\\"Agreement to Arbitrate\\\". The appellant's rejoinder was his \\\"discontinuance\\\" of the complaint prior to arbitration rendered any healing thereafter \\\"a nullity\\\". The court disagreed and held \\\"the defendant [wa]s bound by the arbitration agreement[.]\\\" Also, the court referred the dispute back to the ACBA Committee \\\"for resolution in accordance with the executed arbitration agreement\\\" because the appellee was willing to permit the appellant to offer evidence. This appeal ensued challenging the court's directive to arbitrate.\\nInitially, we need to decide the finality of the order appealed, an issue which was reserved by this Court after the appellee filed a post-appeal \\\"Motion to Quash\\\".\\nGenerally, our Courts have held that an order which has the effect of compelling arbitration is not final and appealable. Maleski v. Mutual Fire, Marine and Inland Ins. Co., 534 Pa. 575, 633 A.2d 1143, 1145-1146 (1993); Erie Ins. Exchange v. Midili, 450 Pa.Super. 279, 675 A.2d 1267, 1269 (1996); Gardner v. Prudential Ins. Co., 332 Pa.Super. 358, 481 A.2d 654, 655 (1984); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. \\u00a7 7320. At bar, however, this does not translate into a foreclosure of the appellant's appeal. Albeit the court directed the parties to binding arbitration, the directive was beyond the court's authority to order given the stage of the litigation, i.e., the dispute had been decided. Cf. Brown v. D. & P. Willow, Inc., 454 Pa.Super. 539, 686 A.2d 14 (1996) (Court acted ultra vires when in ordered the parties, absent an agreement, to binding arbitration).\\nTo explicate, \\\"[t]he only matter properly before [the court] was whether an agreement to arbitrate the dispute existed.\\\"' Santiago v. State Farm Ins. Co., 453 Pa.Super. 343, 683 A.2d 1216, 1218 (1996). Once such a finding had been made, the court could order arbitration. Id. Here, such a directive need not have been issued because the dispute had already been resolved by the (first) arbitration.\\nStated otherwise, the (first) arbitration process was not subject to unilateral withdrawal by the appellant absent (as in any contract) a mutual mistake of fact, fraud in the inducement or coercion in its securement. Schneider, Inc. v. Research-Cottrell, Inc., 474 F.Supp. 1179 (D.C.1979) (A fraudulently induced agreement to arbitrate is not enforceable); Project Builders, Inc. v. Zeiders, 87 Dauphin Cty.Rpts. 344, 346-347 (1967) (Arbitration agreement can be revoked only by mutual consent); Dunn v. Lewis, 11 Chester Cty.Rpts. 370, 372 (1964) (Semble); Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 52 Lackawanna Jur. 226, 228 (1952) (\\\"The parties are bound by their own promises, and, if the dispute is such as the parties contract to arbitrate, redress cannot be sought elsewhere until the arbitration is carried out.\\\"). No such grounds were proffered by the appellant. Accordingly, the contract to arbitrate was valid, enforceable and irrevocable after both disputants executed the \\\"Agreement to Arbitrate\\\", of which the submission was the moving consideration.\\nIn Mendelson v. Shrager, 432 Pa. 383, 248 A.2d 234 (1968), our Supreme Court reversed the trial court's holding that one party may unilaterally revoke an agreement to arbitrate a dispute between members of the Allegheny County Bar, both of whom consented to submit disputes arising under the agreement to the final and conclusive decision of an arbitrator. When a dispute did arise relative to the division of fees and the appellant sought submission of the controversy to arbitration, the trial court's sustaining the appellee's preliminary objections and dismissing the complaint in favor of allowing the action to proceed in assumpsit was held to be error. In doing so, the Mendelson Court wrote:\\nWe have held on numerous occasions that a submission to arbitration is not revocable when it is part of a contract containing other terms to be performed by the parties. \\\"... a submission is not revocable when it is part of a contract containing other terms to be performed by the parties, especially where those terms have been wholly or partly executed, or where it partakes of the nature of a contract by which important rights reciprocally are gained and lost, and of which the submission is the moving consideration.\\\"\\n. Settlement of disputes by arbitration are no longer deemed contrary to public policy. In fact, our statutes encourage arbitration and with our dockets crowded and in some jurisdictions congested arbitration is favored by the courts.\\nContracts that provide for arbitration are valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist in law and equity for the revocation of any other type of contract. This is equally true of common law arbitration and the arbitration provided in the Act of 1927.\\n432 Pa. at 385, 248 A.2d 234 (Citations omitted). Accord Bashford v. West Miami Land Co., 295 Pa. 560, 567, 145 A. 678 (1928); Frederick v. Margwarth, 221 Pa. 418, 420, 70 A. 797 (1908); McCune v. Lytle, 197 Pa. 404, 412-413, 47 A. 190 (1900); White's Appeal, 108 Pa. 473 (1885); 19 Stand.Pa.Prac.2d, \\u00a7 103:1, 103:8, 103:13, 103:18 (1983).\\nSub judice, the parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate a fee dispute. A panel of three attorneys would be appointed to hear the case, and their decision was to be final and conclusive, implying that the parties renounced the right to except thereto or to take an appeal. However, when an award was issued, the appellee's effort to confirm it was'objected to by the appellant as invalid by his withdrawal.\\nThe court acted properly in denying the appellant's efforts to render the award a nullity. Nevertheless, the court exceeded its authority when it ordered the case to be reheard because the appellee had agreed to allow the appellant to present evidence before a new board of arbitrators. This was error.\\nQuestions which were the subject of dispute in the arbitration proceedings may not be retried in an action brought upon the award. As Mr. Justice Stem stated in Goldstein et al. v. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union et al., 328 Pa. 385, 196 A. 43 [(1938)], at page 389 [196 A. 43]: \\\"An arbitrator, in the absence of any agreement limiting his authority, is the final judge of both law and fact, and his award will not be reversed or set aside for mistake of either; otherwise arbitration proceedings, instead of facilitating the settlement of controversies, would serve but to delay the final determination of the rights of the parties: Pierce Steel Pile Corporation v. Flannery, 319 Pa. 332, 339 [179 A. 558].\\\" See also Canuso et al. v. Philadelphia, 326 Pa. 302, 308, 192 A. 133.\\nGowen v. Pierson, 166 Pa. 258, 31 A. 83, was a' suit on an award made by certain architects as named arbitrators in a building contract. The lower court discharged plaintiff's rale for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense. In reversing and ordering judgment entered for plaintiff, Chief Justice Sterret, pointed out that a party to an arbitration agreement who refuses to take part in arbitration proceedings \\\"is not in a position to raise questions which he might have presented to the arbitrators, or to re-open, in this action on their award, questions upon which they were authorized to pass and did in fact determine in making up their award.\\\"\\nUnder these authorities, it is clear that the rale principally relied , upon by the court below is not applicable here.\\nBritex Co. v. Schwab & Sons, 139 Pa.Super. 474, 480-481, 12 A.2d 473 (1940). See also Wyoming Radio, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcast Employees & Technicians, AFL-CIO, 398 Pa. 183, 157 A2d 366, 367 (1960).\\nAt bar, the court below attempted to ameliorate the appellant's voluntary absence from the initial arbitration hearing by availing him the opportunity to appear at a second arbitration hearing. As in Britex, the court's efforts to accommodate the appellant and reopen the case does violence to the precepts upon which arbitration is based \\u2014 a conclusive tribxmal from which no appeal may be perfected except for common law reasons, i.e., fraud, not here applicable. Mendelson, supra. Therefore, the order of the court below is reversed and judgment is to be entered in favor of the appellee on remand.\\nOrder reversed, case remanded for a pro-cedendo, and jurisdiction is relinquished.\\nMONTEMURO, J., concurs in the result.\\n. The provisions for submission, showing the intent of the parties, contemplate common law arbitration. No specific reference is made in the terms of submission to the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1980. P.L. 693, No. 142, \\u00a7 501(a), 42 Pa.C.S.A. \\u00a7 7301 et seq., and by their conduct the parties have not undertaken in any particular to follow the provisions of the Act. Therefore, contrary to the appellee's citation to Section 7303 of the Act at page 7 of its brief, we hold the Act does not apply. Cf. Dunn v. Lewis, 11 Chester Cty.Rpt. 370, 371 (1963) (Arbitration Act of 1927 not applicable to an arbitration-dispute-clause where parties made neither mention of it nor acted in a fashion to make it germane to the case).\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"12143760\", \"name\": \"Holingsworth versus Ogle et. al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Holingsworth v. Ogle\", \"decision_date\": \"1788-04\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"257\", \"last_page\": \"260\", \"citations\": \"1 Dall. 257\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Dallas\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:19:22.748618+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Rush, and Bryan, Justices, concurred.\", \"parties\": \"Holingsworth versus Ogle et. al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Holingsworth versus Ogle et. al.\\nTHIS was an action of debt brought upon a bond, dated the 5th June, 1779; the penalty of the bond being in \\\"\\u00a3 200 hard Money computing half Joes at \\u00a33;\\\" and the condition, for the payment of \\\"the full and just sum of \\u00a3 100 hard Money, or Specie, computing half Joes at \\u00a3 3; on the expiration of five Years, from the date with lawful interest &c.\\\" The Defendants pleaded Payment, to which the Plaintiff replied, Non Solverunt, and issue was thereupon joined.\\nIt appeared at the trial, that the bond was given in consideration of a sum of \\u00a3 500 Continental Currency, lent by the Plaintiff to the Defendants in June, 1779, when the scale of depreciation estimates that money at twenty for one.\\nIngersol and Sergeant, for the Defendants,\\ncontended, that the Plaintiff\\u2019s demand was of an usurious nature, and so unreasonable, that it ought not in equity and good conscience to be allowed. They admitted, that the Jury could not sett aside the contract of the parties; but insisted, that they might, and in this case ought to give only damages, according to what was just and reasonable; and that they were not bound to find the sum expressed in the bond. 2 Vern. 402. 121. 1 Atk. 351. 2. Kaims Princ. Eq, 70. 2 Eq. Abr. 186. pl. 9. 2 Vern. 14. 10 Mod. 503.\\nLewis, for the Plaintiff\\nThis is an action of debt upon a bond, and therefore the case of damages is not applicable, unless the Jury shall think proper to give any thing beyond the penalty. There is nothing usurious or unreasonable in the contract; for, at the expiration of the five years, in which the bond was made payable, if the continental money had appreciated, the Plaintiff would have been a considerable loser. Besides, an Act of Assembly declared, that a continental dollar should be equal to gold and silver; and the money, being a legal tender when lent, the Defendant may have paid a specie debt with it. Nor can a question of usury be considered in this action; for, the Act of Assembly does not make the contract void on that account, as the English statute does, but only inflicts a forfeiture, equivalent to the money or other article lent, which must be recovered in another suit. In the case of Lee vs. Biddis, ant. 175. this Court refused to let in evidence to shew what was meant by current lawful Money, expressed in the contract, because it would tend to contradict, not only the contract, but likewise the Act of Assembly establishing the scale. Here the contract is expresly for the payment of hard Money, and as the law only fixes a scale for the payment of contracts in continental Money, where no Tender has been made, the Jury cannot set aside the solemn act of the parties, but ought to find a verdict generally for the Plaintiff. 2 State Laws 7. 448. 494. 1 State Laws 120.\", \"word_count\": \"2008\", \"char_count\": \"11378\", \"text\": \"M'Kean, Chief Justice.\\nThe Plaintiff states that the Defendants owe him \\u00a3 100, and in order to prove his allegation, he produces their bond, dated on the 5th of January, 1779, payable five years afterwards, that is, on the 5th of June, 1784. In answer to this demand, the Defendants have pleaded Payment (which in such cases, is made the general issue by a law of this State) and they have shewn in support of their plea, that the bond in question was given in consideration of \\u00a3 500 of continental paper, lent by the Plaintiff to the Defendants, at their instance, when it was worth no more than at the rate of twenty continental dollars for one in specie. Upon these circumstances it is to be determined, how much, if any thing, the Plaintiff ought to recover in the present action.\\nIn cases for which the positive law has clearly and expresly provided, it is the duty of Courts and Juries to be governed in their decisions, by the rule that is there prescribed; for Courts of Chancery, and the general principles of equity, can never be allowed to contradict or defeat the express provisions of a statute: And even where there is no Act of Assembly to direct us, the common law, recognized and ascertained by the adjudications of the Courts upon the same subject, often furnishes a guide to which we are bound to yield attention and obedience; for, the maxim is certainly just, that it is better the law should be determinate and fixed, although it were originally erroneous, than that it should be precarious and fluctuating, according to the different talents and dispositions of the Judges, who are appointed to administer it. But, in the present case, the positive law is silent; and, though many authorities in the books have been refered to, not one has been discovered, which is strictly analogous to the question under our immediate consideration. There is, indeed, an Act of Assembly, passed on the 21st of June, 1781, 2 State Laws 494. the 5th section of which seems to relate, in some degree, to the present controversy, when it enacts, that \\\"all debts \\\"&c. granted and contracted for by any deed, will &c. since the \\\"1st day of January, 1777, which were expressed to be paid and\\n\\\"discharged in any foreign money, or in gold or silver money of a-\\\"ny denomination, or in bullion, or in any commodity, and which \\\"have not since been paid and satisfied or discharged, shall be \\\"deemed,construed and taken to be yet due and owing from debtors \\\"to creditors, in such money or other commodity, as in the said \\\"contracts were expressed, and the same may be sued for and re\\\"covered in any Court &c. in so much gold or silver money as shall \\\"be equal in value to the debt or duty, according to the contract.\\\" But the meaning of this section (and in the interpretation of laws, recourse must always be had to the meaning of the Legislature) is only this; that, where a contract had been made for payment in specie,\\nin foreign gold, in bullion, or in any specific commodity, the creditor is entitled to recover according to the stipulations of that contract. This therefore, does not reach the present point; for, although the bond is payable in hard money, the dispute arises upon the actual depreciation, which rendered \\u00a3 500, continental money of considerably less real value, at the time of entering into the Contract, notwithstanding the laws of the State had declared it to be equivalent to specie, of any denomination then circulating. If, indeed, this had been a bond for the payment of continental money, there is no doubt that, by the Act of Assembly just cited, only so much specie, as the \\u00a3 500 was really worth, could be recovered by the Plaintiff; but it is a bond for the payment of hard Money, in consideration of a loan of continental Money, and hence the difficulty occurs.\\nIt is unnecessary to review all the authorities that have been read, from the different reports of decrees in chancery; which have, in general, proceeded upon the ground either of fraud, of surprize, of the suggestion of a falsehood, of the suppression of a truth, or of the unreasonable and unconscionable nature of the contract itself. The last of these being the only case that can be applicable to the subject before us, our enquiry is reduced to one point, to wit, whether the contract now litigated is so unreasonable in its nature, at to have become iniquitous, and, therefore, ought not to be countenanced in a Court of Justice? The arguments appear to be strong on both sides, particularly in the two cases, which have been opposed to each other, by the contending council. On the one hand, where a man has borrowed, \\u00a3 1000 in continental money which, before the day of payment, had unexpectedly risen seventy-sold in value, it would certainly he hard to compel him to return \\u00a3 70,000, for the use of the \\u00a3 1000 which he received: And, on the other hand, it is equally true, that where \\u00a3 500 continental money has been loaned in consideration of a bond for \\u00a3 100 specie, the lender can never claim any more than the last mentioned sum, though a change in the public credit and circumstances, should have made the \\u00a3 500 continental money equal to specie, and by that means he has sustained a loss of the difference between the two sums.\\nIt is likewise to be considered that when the contract was entered into between the Plaintiff and Defendants, the paper medium of the United States was in a very fluctuating condition; and, though the event has shewn the fallacy of the opinion, there were not wanting many good and intelligent men, who strongly maintained, that the continental money would eventually be redeemed, according to its nominal value. This far, however, is clear, that the law, at that time, did not acknowledge the current depreciation, so that the Defendant might legally have satisfied any specie debt, with the money which the Plaintiff had advanced. Nor was it then customary to lend merely for the interest; but a practice had prevailed of making loans upon bonds payable in dollars, or for bills of exchange payable in France; and, although very usurious and exhorbitant profits were thus accumulated, yet it is said (and I believe it to be true) that there was no law that could prevent, or suppress the mischief. Indeed, after much consideration, this Court entertains the opinion, that there would not be any thing illegal in taking a bond for \\u00a3 200 of the last state emission of bills of credit, when only 100 had been lent; for that paper-money is only made a tender and payment of debts due to the Commonwealth, and, in every other respect, must be considered merely as an article of merchandize. But the case before us, is of another nature; it is that of a bond payable in hard Money, given in consideration of a sum lent in continental Money, which the law then declared to be, in all cases, a good and sufficient tender and payment.\\nSince, therefore, we have no rule to guide us, but the exercise of a legal discretion, it may be proper to reflect, that it will be as inconsistent with equity to give too little, as to give too much. If the Plaintiff's demand would amount to seventy or a hundred sold the value of the money he advanced, it would, perhaps, be wrong to allow it; but,whether a less, and what,sum would be an unreasonable profit, must depend upon a consideration of the advantage which the Defendant might have derived from the loan, the loss which the Plaintiff might have sustained, the length of the credit given upon the bond, and the possible insolvency of the obligors. These circumstances certainly entitle the Plaintiff to something more than the common interest of money;-what advance a Court of Chancery would decree, we cannot ascertain with precision; but, it seems, that more than double the sum, has been generally determined to be unreasonable and unconscionable.\\nThe Court, upon the whole, are unanimously of opinion, that in an action of debt, brought upon a bond, and where the issue is joined upon a plea of payment, the Jury may, and ought to presume every thing to have been paid, which ex equo et bono, in equity and good conscience, ought not to be paid. Such is the current of the determinations in the Court of Chancery of England; and the same principle is recognized in the case of Moses and M'Parian; 2 Burr. 1005. for, though the Courts of Justice cannot alter or destroy the contract of the parties, they may interpose to render it conformable to reason, justice, and conscience.\\nRush, and Bryan, Justices, concurred.\\nThe Jury found a verdict for the Plaintiff in the sum of \\u00a3 76. 10. with six-pence costs.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"122110\", \"name\": \"TURNWAY CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania Corporation, Appellant, v. Joseph SOFFER and Violet Soffer, his wife, Appellees, v. The SHERIFF OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, Pennsylvania\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Turnway Corp. v. Soffer\", \"decision_date\": \"1979-04-13\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 550\", \"first_page\": \"357\", \"last_page\": \"363\", \"citations\": \"265 Pa. Super. 357\", \"volume\": \"265\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:46:50.466800+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before VAN der VOORT, SPAETH and LIPEZ, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"TURNWAY CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania Corporation, Appellant, v. Joseph SOFFER and Violet Soffer, his wife, Appellees, v. The SHERIFF OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, Pennsylvania.\", \"head_matter\": \"401 A.2d 1345\\nTURNWAY CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania Corporation, Appellant, v. Joseph SOFFER and Violet Soffer, his wife, Appellees, v. The SHERIFF OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, Pennsylvania.\\nSuperior Court of Pennsylvania.\\nArgued Oct. 24, 1978.\\nDecided April 13, 1979.\\nJohn Daley, Pittsburgh, for appellant.\\nDavid H. Ehrenwerth, Pittsburgh, for appellees.\\nBefore VAN der VOORT, SPAETH and LIPEZ, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1644\", \"char_count\": \"10096\", \"text\": \"SPAETH, Judge:\\nThis is an appeal from an order directing that execution upon a judgment may proceed only against a supersedeas bond.\\nThe origins of the present case lie in an action in equity brought by appellant to require appellees to remove certain sanitary and storm sewer lines from appellant's property. The decree entered in that case directed the removal of the lines and awarded appellants damages of $7,500 per year, starting August 1970 and continuing until such time as the lines were removed, plus the additional sum of $245 for expenditures on repairs. Appellees appealed the decree and posted a bond of $75,000, so that the appeal would act as a supersedeas. In April 1975 the Supreme Court affirmed the decree. 461 Pa. 447, 336 A.2d 871 (1975). Appellees petitioned the lower court to modify the decree as affirmed, and to stay execution, but the lower court denied the petition, and on June 10, 1976, by per curiam order, we affirmed. 241 Pa.Super. 564, 358 A.2d 64 (1976).\\nThus, it cannot be questioned that appellees were subject to a final decree requiring them to remove the sanitary and storm sewer lines from appellant's property. However, on November 19, 1976, before appellees had removed the lines, the Department of Environmental Resources issued an order stating that if the appellees removed the sanitary sewer lines there would be a \\\"discharge of sewage onto the surface of the ground and into the waters of the Commonwealth.\\\" Record at 30a. The order went on to say that this would be a \\\"nuisance\\\" under Section 202 of the Clean Streams Act, 35 P.S. \\u00a7 691.202 (Purdon's 1977), since appellees did not possess a discharge permit. Record at 31a. Accordingly, the order directed appellees to \\\"take no steps to comply with [the final decree in this case] as to any sewers covered by Sewerage Permit 464S37, which steps would cause or permit a violation of the Clean Streams Law, supra, to occur in Wilkins Township.\\\" Record at 32a.\\nWilkins Township has appealed this order to the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board. In the meantime, however, in early 1977, appellant caused a writ of execution to be issued against appellees in the amount of $57,306.20 and instructed the sheriff of Allegheny County to post appellees' residence for sale. Appellees petitioned to strike or stay the execution. On June 30,1977, the lower court did stay the execution \\\"until further order of this Court.\\\" On January 9, 1978, the court entered the order that is the subject of this appeal. This order precluded appellant from recovering any damages incurred after November 19, 1976, that is, after the order issued by the Department of Envi ronmental Resources. The order further provided that in recovering damages incurred before November 19,1976, that is, damages of $7,500 per year starting August 1970, appellant could proceed only against appellees' bond of $75,000, entered incident to the original appeal.\\nAppellant argues that the lower court was without power to enter its order, and also that the court should not have limited execution to appellees' supersedeas bond.\\nIt is settled that an aggrieved party may petition for reconsideration of a final decree in equity. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1522. There is a paucity of case law as to whether the same possibility exists once the final decree has been affirmed by an appellate court. However, in In re Estate of Bell, 463 Pa. 109, 114, 343 A.2d 679, 681 (1975), the Supreme Court stated that the Orphan's Court \\\"may still, in accordance with the long-established practice, entertain a petition for review notwithstanding a decree of confirmation by this Court, but only where the questions were not raised or passed upon appeal. This would naturally include cases of after-discovered evidence or fraud.\\\" (Emphasis supplied.)\\nIn the case before us, neither after-discovered evidence nor fraud was alleged in the petition to strike or stay execution. Nevertheless, the petition did allege a compelling change of circumstances; for if the allegations of the petition are accepted, it would appear that appellees are caught in a most awkward position, with one branch of the government \\u2014 the courts \\u2014 requiring them to remove the sanitary sewer lines, while another \\u2014 the Department of Environmental Resources \\u2014 forbids them to remove the lines. It is arguable that these allegations set out a more convincing reason to grant relief than if appellees had alleged after-discovered evidence. The parties had no control over the entry of the Department of Environmental Resources order; a party alleging after-discovered evidence must show not only that the evidence might result in relief, but that he had previously exercised \\\"due diligence\\\" in proceeding to trial without it. See Hydro-Flex Inc. v. Alter Bolt Company, Inc., 223 Pa.Super. 228, 296 A.2d 874 (1972); Commonwealth v. Rambo, 250 Pa.Super. 314, 378 A.2d 953 (1977). We therefore conclude that the lower court may have had the power to enter its order modifying the original final judgment.\\nThis conclusion, however, does not end our consideration of the issue of the lower court's power, for appellant argues that in any event the court's procedure was defective. We agree. In the first place, it was somewhat anomalous to modify a final decree in the context of a stay of execution proceeding. Goodrich-Amram state that \\\"[ujnder the guise of controlling execution process, a court may not rewrite the judgment.\\\" 9 Goodrich-Amram 2d \\u00a7 3121(c):1.1. It would have been preferable if the lower court had directed appellees to file a separate petition seeking modification of the judgment. Of greater concern, however, is that the lower court decided the case on the basis of the petition to strike or stay execution, the answer, and the accompanying exhibits. No testimony was taken. Evidently the lower court believed that testimony was unnecessary, for it stated in the opinion accompanying its order that \\\"[t]he facts are not in dispute.\\\" Slip opinion at 1, Record at 34a. This is a puzzling conclusion, however, inasmuch as appellant's answer to appellees' petition specifically disputed appellees' claim that the prior final decree of the court and the Department of Environmental Resources order were in conflict. The case must therefore be remanded to the lower court to give appellant, and appellees, an opportunity to present testimony on the issue of whether the final decree and the Department of Environmental Resources order were in conflict.\\nGiven this conclusion, we need not determine whether the lower court erred in limiting execution to appellees' supersedeas bond. We do note, however, that Pa.R.Civ.P. 3121 states that\\n(a) Execution shall be stayed as to all or any part of the property of the defendant\\n# \\u2021\\n(2) upon the entry of bond with the prothonotary, by any person or party in interest, with security approved by the prothonotary, in the amount of plaintiff's judgment, including probable interest and costs, or in such lesser amount as the court may direct, naming the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as obligee, and conditioned to pay the amount due within ninety (90) days of the entry of bond, unless the for payment be further extended by the court; time\\nReversed and remanded for proceedings consistent this opinion. with\\n. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1522 states: \\\"A petition for a rehearing shall set forth the special matter or cause for which such rehearing is sought. The petition for rehearing shall be filed within a reasonable time after the discovery of the grounds for rehearing and in no event later than the time for taking an appeal.\\\"\\n. We disagree with appellees' assertion that appellant has waived, by not making, the argument that the lower court's procedure was defective. Appellees' Brief at 6. Appellant's Brief states: \\\"It is submitted that the lower court converted the petition to strike or stay the execution filed on behalf of the Soffers in the lower court into a Bill of Review and on the basis of same and without taking any testimony it modified a decree which had been reviewed and affirmed by both the Supreme and Superior Courts of this Commonwealth.\\\" Appellant's Brief at 13.\\n. Traditionally, the proper procedure would have been to file a bill or review, which Goodrich-Amram describe as \\\"in effect a new suit in equity to set aside or reexamine an outstanding final decree in a prior equity suit.\\\" 5 Goodrich-Amram 2d \\u00a7 1522:4 n. 6. Apparently, the bill of review has been replaced by the petition for rehearing. 5 Goodrich-Amram 2d \\u00a7 1522:4.\\n. Appellant's view of the effect of the order issued by the Department of Environmental Resources differs from appellees'. Appellant's answer stated in pertinent part: \\\"The Department of Environmental Resources of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania at no time directed the Defendants not to comply with the Decree of Judge LEWIS. It only directed the Defendants to make provisions for complying with Judge LEWIS'S Order not to create a nuisance or to endanger the health and safety of the public. There is no reason for the failure on the part of the Defendants to have complied with Judge LEWIS'S Decree following June 10, 1976. It was the Defendants who trespassed on the Plaintiffs property by placing the sanitary and storm sewer lines on same and it is their responsibility under the law to remove same. Naturally, in removing the sanitary sewer line they must comply with state and local ordinances that apply.\\\" Supplemental Record at 6. On remand, the lower court should resolve this issue. Also, as was noted above, Wilkins Township has appealed the Departmental or Environmental Resources order. The outcome of this appeal may have some bearing on the lower court's decision.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/pa/12281687.json b/pa/12281687.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ed0911ff687a2b80e98e04c17fcfde8e8f1ecb2d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pa/12281687.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"12281687\", \"name\": \"Gray v. Denaples; Faruqi v. Solfanelli; Solfanelli, In re\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Gray v. Denaples\", \"decision_date\": \"2016-06-22\", \"docket_number\": \"91 MAL (2016)\", \"first_page\": \"650\", \"last_page\": \"650\", \"citations\": \"636 Pa. 650\", \"volume\": \"636\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:28:01.933928+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Gray v. Denaples; Faruqi v. Solfanel-li; Solfanelli, In re\", \"head_matter\": \"Gray v. Denaples; Faruqi v. Solfanel-li; Solfanelli, In re\\n06/22/2016\\n91 MAL (2016)\", \"word_count\": \"18\", \"char_count\": \"116\", \"text\": \"Denied\\nPa.Super., 136 A.3d 1024\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/pa/12285625.json b/pa/12285625.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2a5d5b1edfc9fac46bd58ef641280e88051cb4c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pa/12285625.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"12285625\", \"name\": \"Mangan v. Safe Auto Ins. Co.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Mangan v. Safe Auto Ins. Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"2016-08-10\", \"docket_number\": \"126 WAL (2016)\", \"first_page\": \"678\", \"last_page\": \"678\", \"citations\": \"636 Pa. 678\", \"volume\": \"636\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:28:01.933928+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Mangan v. Safe Auto Ins. Co.\", \"head_matter\": \"Mangan v. Safe Auto Ins. Co.\\n08/10/2016\\n126 WAL (2016)\", \"word_count\": \"15\", \"char_count\": \"86\", \"text\": \"Denied\\nPa.Super., 135 A.3d 666\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/pa/12286852.json b/pa/12286852.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cc6a247492e75c8765774f33c9901a906e818468
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pa/12286852.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"12286852\", \"name\": \"Com. v. Baldwin\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Com. v. Baldwin\", \"decision_date\": \"2016-05-11\", \"docket_number\": \"992 MAL (2015)\", \"first_page\": \"768\", \"last_page\": \"768\", \"citations\": \"635 Pa. 768\", \"volume\": \"635\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:24:32.320788+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Com. v. Baldwin\", \"head_matter\": \"Com. v. Baldwin\\n05/11/2016\\n992 MAL (2015)\\n. Justice WECHT did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.\", \"word_count\": \"25\", \"char_count\": \"158\", \"text\": \"Denied\\nPa.Super., 135 A.3d 648\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/pa/12286936.json b/pa/12286936.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..245666731179873080685c6c006aa85e78e156d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pa/12286936.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"12286936\", \"name\": \"Com. v. Burik\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Com. v. Burik\", \"decision_date\": \"2016-05-04\", \"docket_number\": \"58 MAL (2016)\", \"first_page\": \"769\", \"last_page\": \"769\", \"citations\": \"635 Pa. 769\", \"volume\": \"635\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:24:32.320788+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Com. v. Burik\", \"head_matter\": \"Com. v. Burik\\n05/04/2016\\n58 MAL (2016)\\n. Justice DONOHUE did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.\", \"word_count\": \"25\", \"char_count\": \"157\", \"text\": \"Denied\\nPa.Super., 135 A.3d 662\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/pa/12331098.json b/pa/12331098.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..334d1df8de00808b0f8d932ef19361899a52960c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pa/12331098.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"12331098\", \"name\": \"Robert W. HILL, Petitioner v. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Hill v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review\", \"decision_date\": \"2017-08-01\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 75 EM 2017\", \"first_page\": \"1080\", \"last_page\": \"1080\", \"citations\": \"169 A.3d 1080\", \"volume\": \"169\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:13:16.683938+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Robert W. HILL, Petitioner v. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW\", \"head_matter\": \"Robert W. HILL, Petitioner v. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW\\nNo. 75 EM 2017\\nSupreme Court of Pennsylvania.\\nAugust 1, 2017\", \"word_count\": \"43\", \"char_count\": \"253\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nPER CURIAM\\nAND NOW, this 1st day of August, 2017, the \\\"Petition for Allowance of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc\\\" is DENIED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/pa/12350593.json b/pa/12350593.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9f08b1c0d89404895717109b05e8497f2ff57630
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pa/12350593.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"12350593\", \"name\": \"COM. v. EBO, M.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Com. v. Ebo\", \"decision_date\": \"2017-06-21\", \"docket_number\": \"92 WDA 2016\", \"first_page\": \"91\", \"last_page\": \"91\", \"citations\": \"174 A.3d 91\", \"volume\": \"174\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:18:45.103399+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"COM. v. EBO, M.\", \"head_matter\": \"COM. v. EBO, M.\\n92 WDA 2016\\nSuperior Court of Pennsylvania.\\n06/21/2017\", \"word_count\": \"15\", \"char_count\": \"131\", \"text\": \"CP-02-CR-0002821-2012\\n(Allegheny)\\nAffirmed/Vacated/Remanded\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/pa/12353798.json b/pa/12353798.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9b1d5f560d43cafce3f9217d9b38011af26a5f76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pa/12353798.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"12353798\", \"name\": \"COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Petitioner v. Rishad WILLIAMS, Respondent\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Commonwealth v. Williams\", \"decision_date\": \"2017-11-07\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 480 EAL 2016\", \"first_page\": \"562\", \"last_page\": \"562\", \"citations\": \"174 A.3d 562\", \"volume\": \"174\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:18:45.103399+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Petitioner v. Rishad WILLIAMS, Respondent\", \"head_matter\": \"COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Petitioner v. Rishad WILLIAMS, Respondent\\nNo. 480 EAL 2016\\nSupreme Court of Pennsylvania.\\nNovember 7, 2017\", \"word_count\": \"38\", \"char_count\": \"243\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nPER CURIAM\\nAND NOW, this 7th day of November, 2017, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/pa/1240407.json b/pa/1240407.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e08ca61574fe382ae6dccda202f61122219c7a13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pa/1240407.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1240407\", \"name\": \"Crane v. Crane (et al., Appellant)\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Crane v. Crane\", \"decision_date\": \"1953-02-13\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal, No. 21\", \"first_page\": \"1\", \"last_page\": \"7\", \"citations\": \"373 Pa. 1\", \"volume\": \"373\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:38:31.692687+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Stern, C. J., Stearne, Jones, Bell, Chidsey and Arnold, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Crane v. Crane (et al., Appellant).\", \"head_matter\": \"Crane v. Crane (et al., Appellant).\\nArgued January 9, 1953.\\nBefore Stern, C. J., Stearne, Jones, Bell, Chidsey and Arnold, JJ.\\nreargument refused March 24, 1953.\\nW. Davis Graham, for appellant.\\nWilliam J. Kenney, for appellee.\\nFebruary 13, 1953:\", \"word_count\": \"1561\", \"char_count\": \"9093\", \"text\": \"Opinion by\\nMr. Chief Justice Horace Stern,\\nThe issue here is one of jurisdiction.\\nPlaintiff, Jean M. Crane, a resident of Armstrong County, brought a bill of complaint in that county against her husband, Radford R. Crane, and Eljer Company, a corporation incorporated under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, with its principal office in Armstrong County. Th\\u00e9 bill alleged that her husband had separated himself from h\\u00e9r without reasonable cause and was now living in Miami, Florida; that he has refused and neglected to contribute to her maintenance and has fled from the Commonwealth for the purpose of evading his obligation to support her; that he has property within the jurisdiction of the court consisting of (a) approximately $16,000 on deposit in a bank in Kittanning; (b) real property situate in Kittanning, the title to which is held by them as tenants by the entireties; (c) a large number of shares of stock of Eljer Company, the certificates evidencing the ownership of this stock being in their names jointly; (d) dividends declared upon the stock but remaining unpaid by the Company.\\nThe prayer of the bill was that the Eljer Company be enjoined from distributing any portion of the stock or paying out the accumulated dividends in which her husband has an interest until his liability for her support is determined by decree of the court; that the court fix the amount of money to which plaintiff is entitled for past and future maintenance; and that the court decree the seizure, sale or mortgage of the real estate and make such order for payment from the personal property as may be required to provide the necessary funds for her maintenance.\\nThe court made an order that the defendant husband be served with a copy of the bill of complaint at Miami or wherever he may be found; whether or not such service has been made does not appear in the record. The Eljer Company filed a petition raising a question of jurisdiction under the Act of March 5, 1925, P. L. 23, contending that jurisdiction as to it depends upon the situs of its stock and the dividends declared thereon, and that any interest or right of the husband in such stock and dividends has its situs only where he resides; it was also asserted that the Act of May 23, 1907, P. L. 227, pursuant to which the proceedings were instituted, was unconstitutional, and that any decree which would result in the taking of the stock and dividends would be in violation of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; apparently, however, these latter contentions have been abandoned. The court refused to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction and directed the Eljer Company to answer the averments of the complaint. The Eljer Company appeals from that order.\\nThe Act of May 23, 1907, P. L. 227, as amended, provides that if any man shall separate himself from his wife without reasonable cause, and, being of sufficient ability, shall neglect or refuse to provide suitable maintenance for his wife, she shall be empowered to bring her action, at law or in equity, against her husband for maintenance, in the court of common pleas of the county where the desertion occurred, or where she is domiciled. It is further provided that proceedings may be had against any property, real or personal, of the husband necessary for the suitable maintenance of the wife, and the court may direct a seizure and sale, or mortgage, of sufficient of such estate as will provide the necessary funds for such maintenance. It further provides for service upon the defendant in the manner provided by the Act of April 6, 1859, P. L. 387.\\nAn action such as the present is in the nature of an attachment proceeding \\u2014 in rem or at least quasi in rem \\u2014 and if service cannot be made on the principal defendant within the jurisdiction of the court it is imperative that there be property, real or personal, within the jurisdiction: Jones v. Jones, 344 Pa. 310, 312, 25 A. 2d 327, 328.\\nThere are two questions here involved: (1) Are the shares of stock in the Eljer Company to be deemed property within the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County such as to confer jurisdiction upon the court? (2) Can plaintiff in this proceeding obtain satisfaction out of property the title of which is in the name of herself and husband as tenants by the entireties?\\nIt was generally held in most jurisdictions prior to the enactment of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act that shares of stock should be considered as located at the domicile of the state of incorporation of the company, the certificate being merely evidence of the fact of ownership of the shares and not itself constituting attachable property (see cases cited 122 A.L.R. 340, 358). What the Uniform Stock Transfer Act (in Pennsylvania, the Act of May 5, 1911, P. L. 126) aimed to remedy was the possibility that where shares of stock were attached in the state of incorporation the certificate evidencing the ownership of such shares might be transferred in another jurisdiction to a purchaser for value and without notice of the attachment: Leff v. N. Kaufman's Inc., 342 Pa. 342, 348, 349, 20 A. 2d 786, 790. Accordingly it was provided, section 13, that no attachment or levy upon shares of stock for which a certificate was outstanding should be valid until such certificate be actually seized by the officer making the attachment or levy, or be surrendered to the corporation which issued it, or its transfer by the holder be enjoined. In the present case, however, the danger thus sought to be avoided could not possibly exist, inasmuch as no effective transfer of the certificates of the stock could be made without the plaintiff's joinder; therefore, the purpose of the Act not being affected, the statute is here inapplicable. The Uniform Stock Transfer Act has not changed the actual situs of the shares nor deprived the courts of this state from exercising jurisdiction over stock in a Pennsylvania corporation owned by nonresidents (cf. Harvey v. Harvey, [C.C.A. 7], 290 Fed. 653, 659). What it has done is to make the certificate also a res for the. purpose of attachment and levy; thus, in Mills v. Jacobs, 333 Pa. 231, 4 A. 2d 152, it was held that, where the state of incorporation had adopted the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, the certificates of stock of a corporation of that state might be the subject of attachment execution in our own state. In short, as stated in Restatement, Conflict of Laws, \\u00a753 and 104, shares in a corporation are subject to the jurisdiction of the state in which the corporation was incorporated, and the share certificate is subject to the jurisdiction of the state within whose territory it is. The only requirement is that where the shares are attached in the state where the company was incorporated the certificate evidencing the ownership of the shares must be seized or surrendered or its transfer enjoined, except where, as in the present case, such a requirement becomes unnecessary by reason of the fact that the defendant cannot convey title by transfer of the certificate without the joinder of the attaching creditor.\\nAs far as the declared, but unpaid, dividends On the stock of the Eljer Company are concerned, they constitute a debt of the corporation (Given's Estate, 323 Pa. 456, 185 A. 778) and, as such, have a situs in this state for proceedings in the nature of a foreign attachment: Restatement, Conflict of Laws, \\u00a7108.\\nThe second question for consideration is whether plaintiff can obtain satisfaction of her claim for maintenance out of the stock held in the joint names of herself and husband as tenants by the' entireties and the dividends declared thereon. This question does not really go to the matter of jurisdiction, but becomes a proper subject of inquiry only after the court has assumed jurisdiction of the proceeding. It may be pointed out, however, that the Act of May 23, 1907, P. L. 227, \\u00a72, provides that proceedings ' for' a \\u2022 decree for '\\u2022 main tenance of the wife \\\"may be had against any property, real or personal, of said husband, necessary for the suitable maintenance of the said wife.\\\" The husband certainly has an interest in all property owned as tenants by the entireties, and there is no reason why that interest should not be applied to the support of the wife whom he has deserted; (see Acts of June 11, 1913, P. L. 468, and May 24, 1923, P. L. 446, as to execution against real property owned by the entireties). Accordingly, after an order shall have been made by the court for plaintiff's maintenance it may be implemented by proceedings which will enable her to enforce it by liquidation of the shares of stock and the accumulated dividends thereon owned by them as tenants by the entireties so as to enable her to obtain satisfaction out of her husband's interest therein.\\nOrder affirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/pa/12421291.json b/pa/12421291.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..47dbf3c2f5f1eeb4e0db21896051bcbb1952fcfc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pa/12421291.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"12421291\", \"name\": \"COM. v. LARAMY, E.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Com. v. Laramy\", \"decision_date\": \"2017-07-19\", \"docket_number\": \"150 MDA 2017\", \"first_page\": \"397\", \"last_page\": \"397\", \"citations\": \"175 A.3d 397\", \"volume\": \"175\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:55:08.220270+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"COM. v. LARAMY, E.\", \"head_matter\": \"COM. v. LARAMY, E.\\n150 MDA 2017\\nSuperior Court of Pennsylvania.\\n07/19/2017\", \"word_count\": \"22\", \"char_count\": \"182\", \"text\": \"CP-01-CR-0000143-2010, CP-01-CR-0000146-2010 (Adams)\\nAffirmed \\u2014 Application to Withdraw as Counsel Granted\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/pa/12425357.json b/pa/12425357.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b81f08e3b90c5bfcef7b2e3e7da56595fbe3f896
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pa/12425357.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"12425357\", \"name\": \"COM. v. HERNANDEZ, T.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Com. v. Hernandez\", \"decision_date\": \"2017-08-22\", \"docket_number\": \"1974 MDA 2016\", \"first_page\": \"1104\", \"last_page\": \"1104\", \"citations\": \"175 A.3d 1104\", \"volume\": \"175\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:55:08.220270+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"COM. v. HERNANDEZ, T.\", \"head_matter\": \"COM. v. HERNANDEZ, T.\\n1974 MDA 2016\\nSuperior Court of Pennsylvania.\\n08/22/2017\", \"word_count\": \"15\", \"char_count\": \"128\", \"text\": \"CP-14-CR-0000980-2016\\n(Centre)\\nReversed/Remanded\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/pa/1309564.json b/pa/1309564.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ad77e3e907c28b12d5ba5396c6f98c5e5bbafd24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pa/1309564.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1309564\", \"name\": \"Ei Bon ee Oscar Holly, Petitioner v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Crime Victim's Compensation Board, Respondent\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Holly v. Commonwealth\", \"decision_date\": \"1983-06-06\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 145 C.D. 1983\", \"first_page\": \"609\", \"last_page\": \"614\", \"citations\": \"74 Pa. Commw. 609\", \"volume\": \"74\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:47:43.440047+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\\u25a0 Submitted on briefs to Judges Rogers, Craig and MacPhail, sitting as a panel of three.\", \"parties\": \"Ei Bon ee Oscar Holly, Petitioner v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Crime Victim\\u2019s Compensation Board, Respondent.\", \"head_matter\": \"Ei Bon ee Oscar Holly, Petitioner v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Crime Victim\\u2019s Compensation Board, Respondent.\\n\\u25a0 Submitted on briefs to Judges Rogers, Craig and MacPhail, sitting as a panel of three.\\nEi Bon ee Oscar Holly, petitioner, for himself.\\nGregory R. Neuhauser, Deputy Attorney General, with him Francis R. Filipi, Deputy Attorney General, and LeRoy 8. Zimmerman, Attorney General, for respondent.\\nJune 6, 1983:\", \"word_count\": \"1172\", \"char_count\": \"7181\", \"text\": \"Memorandum Opinion and Order,\\nBefore us for disposition are the preliminary objections of the Crime Victim's Compensation Board to a pro se application filed in this court by Ei Bon ee Oscar-Holly (applicant) and styled a \\\"COMPLAIN [sic] IN EQUITY AND/OR PETITION FOR TEMPORTARY [sic] INJUNCTION.\\\"\\nThe dispute between the parties evidently concerns the failure of the board to respond affirmatively to the applicant's request for \\\"hardship money\\\" pur suant to Section 477.8 of the Administrative Code, 71 P.S. 180-7.8 having to do with emergency awards and providing that the board member to whom a crime victim's compensation claim is assigned may, if it appears that a compensation award probably will be made and that undue hardship will result if immediate interim payment is not forthcoming, grant an emergency award in an amount no greater than $1,000. The applicant here avers that he requested such an emergency award; that he will be irreparably harmed by the failure of the board to make the emergency award; and that the emergency award has not been granted. The applicant then prays that this court compel or enjoin the board to grant an emergency award in the maximum amount permitted, $1,000.\\nThe board has interposed preliminary objections in which it asserts that the applicant has failed to pursue available remedies at the administrative level and that the applicant has here improperly invoked the original jurisdiction of this court because the exclusive judicial remedy in this class of case is by way of an appeal from the board's refusal to grant an emergency award. We agree with the principle contained in the board's preliminary objection last described but disagree that the application of the principle in the instant case, without more, requires the dismissal of the applicant's petition with prejudice. Instead, we are constrained to dismiss the petition without prejudice to the applicant's right to renew the appeal and to remand the matter to the board for the further proceedings we are about to describe.\\nThis court will not interfere with the due course of administrative proceedings by means of injunction, mandamus, or prohibition where, as in this case, there is an adequate remedy by means of an appeal. Robertshaw Controls v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 67 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 613, 447 A.2d 1083 (1982); Pye v. Insurance Department, 29 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 545, 372 A.2d 33 (1977). See also Brew v. Mathews, 425 F. Supp. 727 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (injunctive relief will not be granted to compel payment of disability insurance benefits; exclusive remedy is by means of appeal from decision of Secretary of HEW). However, an appeal improvidently sought by means of a complaint in mandamus or an application for injunctive or extraordinary relief in the form of a request for the issuance of a prerogative writ may not for that reason alone be dismissed. Section 708(c) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C. S. \\u00a7708(c); Pa. R.A.P. No. 1503. Instead, we will treat the petition as if it had been addressed to our appellate jurisdiction. Bronson v. Board of Probation and Parole, 491 Pa. 549, 421 A.2d 1021 (1980).\\nUnfortunately, we are unable to now decide the cause as an appeal. First, the petition contains only conclusory averments as to the propriety of injunctive relief and contains no averments relevant to the central issues on appeal, whether the applicant probably would have been granted a crime victim's compensatory award and whether the board abused a sound discretion in refusing the application for an interim emergency award. In addition, the adjudication of the board from which this appeal has been taken cannot be reviewed in its present form because it does not include an order of the board or factual findings or an evidentiary record certified to this Court. In this regard, Section 477.7 of the Administrative Code, 71 P.S. \\u00a7180-7.7, provides that appeals from the board's adjudications shall be governed by the requirements of the Administrative Agency Law which in turn, in Sections 504 and 507, 2 Pa. C. S. \\u00a7504 and 507, provides that adjudications of Commonwealth agencies shall be invalid unless predicated on reasonable notice to the applicant of a hearing stenographically recorded and further requires that all adjudications of Commonwealth agencies be in writing and contain factual findings and a statement of reasons.\\nFor these reasons we are compelled to return this matter to the board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and to dismiss the applicant's petition without prejudice to the right to renew the appeal in the event of an adverse decision of the board following the required hearing.\\nOrder\\nAnd Now, this 6th day of June, 1983, the record in the above-captioned matter is remanded to the Crime Victim's Compensation Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction is hereby relinquished.\\nWhen the complaint was first filed we entered an order directing that the so-called complaint be regarded as a petition for review seeking relief within our original jurisdiction.\\nAct of April 9, 1929, P.L. 177, No. 175, added ^y Section 2 of tlie Act of July 9,1976, P.L. 574, No. 139.\\nIt is clear that the applicant's petition does not state a cause of action in mandamus or aver the necessary factual predicates to the issuance of injunctive relief. A writ of mandamus will not is sue where the duty sought to be compelled is one charged to the discretion of a public official. Shaler Area School District v. Salakas, 494 Pa. 630, 432 A.2d 165 (1981). Here, the decision as bo whether the emergency award should be granted and, if so, the amount of the award is within the board's discretion. Injunctive relief will be granted only when, inter alia, the rights of the applicant are clear. Christoffel v. Shaler Area School District, 60 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 17, 430 A.2d 726 (1981). The applicant's right to an award in the maximum amount permitted is far from clear since, as we have indicated, the applicable provision of the Administrative Code provides for an emergency award only when the crime victim's compensation claim \\\"probably\\\" will be upheld and the petition contains no averments from which the existence of such a probability could be deduced.\\nIt is not even clear whether the board bias taken final action to deny the applicant's emergency request. The petition contains only the following averment: \\\"5. Said [board] did not award to [the applicant] said hardship money as required by law.\\\" Since the board has not asserted or argued that it is still considering the emergency request, we infer that a final negative determination has been reached and that the pro se petition's ambiguity is insignificant.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1316226\", \"name\": \"Elijah Gauden, Appellant v. Borough of Roscoe, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Gauden v. Borough of Roscoe\", \"decision_date\": \"1984-01-17\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal, No. 2659 C.D. 1982\", \"first_page\": \"589\", \"last_page\": \"594\", \"citations\": \"79 Pa. Commw. 589\", \"volume\": \"79\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:26:31.755949+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"before Judges Williams, Jr., MaoPhail and Blatt, sitting 'as a panel of three.\", \"parties\": \"Elijah Gauden, Appellant v. Borough of Roscoe, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"Elijah Gauden, Appellant v. Borough of Roscoe, Appellee.\\nArgued October 5, 1983,\\nJanuary 17, 1984:\\nbefore Judges Williams, Jr., MaoPhail and Blatt, sitting 'as a panel of three.\\nPaul A. Tershel, with him D. Keith Melenyser, for appellant.\\nJohn E. Costello, for appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"1220\", \"char_count\": \"7519\", \"text\": \"Opinion by\\nJudge Williams, Jr.,\\nElijah Gauden appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County dismissing his exceptions and affirming \\u00a1the trial court's opinion and order which dismissed his complaint in mandamus against the Bor ough of Roscoe.\\nSeeking reinstatment and back pay, Gauden filed a complaint in mandamus .alleging that he was dismissed as chief of police in violation of the provisions of the Act of June 15, 1951, P.L. 586, as amended, 53 P.S. \\u00a7811-816 (known as the Police Tenure Act) in that he was never furnished with a written statement of the charges against him and was not granted a hearing prior to dismissal. Section 4 of the Act, 53 P.S. \\u00a7814. The Borough denied that Gauden had been dismissed and averred that he had chosen not to con tiime as the Borough's chief of police under .a mew condition of employment.\\nThe 'Common pleas court, ,afte>r a hearing on the mandamus complaint, decided, inter alia, that G-auden Was not discharged hut voluntarily chose not to work under \\u00a1the new condition of \\u00a1employment; that the Police Tenure Act was therefore not applicable; and, that the mandamus 'action was not appropriate. This appeal followed.\\nAfter a thorough review of the record w\\u00e9 conclude that the trial court .erred in finding that Ganden had resigned from his \\u00a1chief \\u00a1of police position. In 1981, Ganden's personal vehicle was .twelve years old, could not pass inspection and was not economically \\u00a1serviceable. Additionally, Ganden apprised -the Borough that he could not afford to purchase a vehicle suitable for police work. Although Ganden never abandoned his employment (when the Borough police ear was sold he performed foot patrol duties), the borough council declared .the chief of police position vacant upon Ganden's failure to accept 'the new condition of employment.\\nUnless there is some special meaning to be attributed to it, the word \\\"resign\\\" should be given its nor mal and customary meaning which is \\\" [t]o give up deliberately: renounce by a considered or formal act. . . .\\\" Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1932 (1966). Thus in light of the absence of an expression of intention to relinquish his duties and the accompanying act of relinquishment, Ganden did not resign from his position. See, City of Chicago v. O'Malley, 69 Ill. 2d 474, 372 N.E. 2d 671 (1978); see also, 67 C.J.S. Officers, \\u00a7103 (1978).\\nBecause Ganden was dismissed by the Borough, it follows that such removal was governed by the provisions of the Police Tenure Act which prohibit 'the discharge of a covered police officer for reasons other than those set forth in Section 2 of the Act, 53 P.S. \\u00a7812. Further, Section 4 of the Act expressly requires the filing of written charges and the adjudication of the propriety of the disciplinary action (suspension or removal) in a hearing if demanded by the police officer. The statutory remedy is completed by the 'according of a right of appeal to common pleas court to the suspended or dismissed police officer. Section 5 of the Act, 53 P.S. \\u00a7815.\\nInstead of availing himself of the Act's adequate and appropriate administrative remedy by demanding the furnishing of written \\u00a1charges and the benefit of a hearing, Ganden immediately instituted an action in mandamus seeking, not Borough compliance with the Act's procedural requirements, but reinstatement and back pay. As \\u00a1our Supreme Court stated in Valley Forge Racing Association, Inc. v. State Horse Racing Commission, 449 Pa. 292, 295, 297 A.2d 823, 824-25 (1972),\\nmandamus is an extraordinary writ which lies to compel the performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty where there is a clear legal right in the plaintiff, a corresponding duty in the defendant, and a want of any other appro priate and adequate remedy. (Citation omitted.) (Emphasis added.)\\nTherefore when an appropriate and adequate statutory remedy exists it must be pursued and mandamus does not lie. See Packler v. State Employes' Retirement Board, 33 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 452, 382 A.2d 158 (1978), aff'd, 487 Pa. 51, 408 A.2d 1091 (1979) (mandamus action dismissed because of failure to exhaust adequate and appropriate statutorily mandated administrative hearing and appeal process).\\nThe Police Tenure Act clearly provides adequate procedures by which Gauden could have challenged the Borough's .actions. See Stull v. Robinson, No. 1977-0977 \\u2014 Civil Division (C.P. Pa., filed April 24, 1978), aff'd mem., 49 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 96, 411 A.2d 270 (1980) (mandamus action for .reinstatement to position of acting police chief was improper where no resort had been made to the administrative remedy available in the Police Tenure Act); see also, Spaulding v. Township Supervisors, 22 Cumb. L.J. 56 (C.P. Pa. 1972) .(Police Tenure Act provided an adequate remedy thus rendering unavailable a former police chief's mandamus remedy where he .sought reinstatement and back pay).\\nAlthough the instant mandamus action is inappropriate, Section 708(c) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C. S. \\u00a7708'(c), precludes a simple affirmance .of the trial court's dismissal of Gauden's complaint. In light of Ganden's removal and the consequent applicability of the Police Tenure Act, we remand for additional proceedings and findings necessary to determine whether Ganden was properly discharged under the provisions of the Police Tenure Act.\\nAccordingly, we reverse the order .of the common pleas' court and remand for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.\\nOrder\\nAnd Now, this 17th day of January, 1984, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, dated October 5, 1982, is vacated and the matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.\\nJurisdiction relinquished.\\nThe dispute arose upon the Borough's decision in May 1981 to sell, for reasons of economy, \\u00a1the 'Borough's sole police oar. Ganden was advised that \\u00a1he would be reimbursed 'ait a fixed rate for the use 'of \\u00a1his personal automobile while on' police business. After advising the Borough that he lacked 'access to a suitable automobile, Gauden did not comply with \\u00a1the Borough's directive that he provide his own vehicle as a condition for continued employment. By letter dated July 27, 1981, the Borough apprised Gauden that a positive response to the new requirement should be made by August 21, 1981. Upon Gauden's failure to accept .the new condition of employment, borough council declared the chief of police position to be vacant on August 24,1981.\\nOur scope of review is to determine whether the common pleas court committed an abuse of discretion or an error of law. In Re: Appeal of Redo, 42 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 468, 401 A.2d 394 (1979).\\nSection 708(c) of the Judicial Code pertinently states:\\nIf a complaint in .the mature of . . . mandamus . is commenced in any court against a government unit . . . objecting to a governmental determination . . . where the proper mode of relief is an appeal from the determination of the government unit, this alone shall not .be ground for dismissal, but the papers whereon the process against the government unit . . . was commenced shall be regarded and acted on as an appeal from such determination of the government unit and as if filed at the time such process was commenced.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
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+"{\"id\": \"1356764\", \"name\": \"Raymond Russo, Appellant v. Zoning Hearing Board of Perkiomen Township, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Russo v. Zoning Hearing Board\", \"decision_date\": \"1987-02-20\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal, No. 1894 C.D. 1986\", \"first_page\": \"155\", \"last_page\": \"159\", \"citations\": \"104 Pa. Commw. 155\", \"volume\": \"104\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:03:36.872372+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"before Judges MacPhail and Colins, and Senior Judge Kalish, sitting as a panel of three.\", \"parties\": \"Raymond Russo, Appellant v. Zoning Hearing Board of Perkiomen Township, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"521 A.2d 111\\nRaymond Russo, Appellant v. Zoning Hearing Board of Perkiomen Township, Appellee.\\nArgued December 8, 1986,\\nbefore Judges MacPhail and Colins, and Senior Judge Kalish, sitting as a panel of three.\\nMarc D. Jonas, Silverman, Jonas & Lawrence, for appellant.\\nFrank R. Bartle, Dischell, Bartle, Yanoff & Dooley, for appellee.\\nJohn F. Walsh, Philip R. Detwiler & Associates, P.C., for intervenor, Perkiomen Township Board of Supervisors.\\nJames J. Heffernen, for intervenor, Cranberry Corporation.\\nFebruary 20, 1987:\", \"word_count\": \"952\", \"char_count\": \"6168\", \"text\": \"Opinion by\\nSenior Judge Kalish,\\nAppellant, Raymond Russo, appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County which dismissed his appeals from the trial courts approval of the decision of the Zoning Hearing Board of Perkiomen Township (Zoning Hearing Board) affirming the Perkiomen Township Board of Supervisors (Board of Supervisors) approval with conditions of an application from the Cranberry Corporation for a planned residential development.\\nOn December 7, 1976, Cranberry Corporation submitted to the Supervisors an application for tentative approval of a planned residential development. Following public hearings, the Board of Supervisors unanimously voted to reject the application. On appeal, the trial court remanded the matter to the Board of Supervisors, directing it to make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law. On April 10, 1979, the Board of Supervisors granted tentative approval subject to certain conditions.\\nRusso, a neighboring landowner, filed an appeal from the Board of Supervisors' decision with the Zoning Hearing Board. The Zoning Hearing Board filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the trial court seeking a determination as to whether it had jurisdiction to act on Russo's appeal. Russo filed a complaint in mandamus in the trial court, asking the court to require the Zoning Hearing Board to hold hearings on the appeal. These cases were consolidated for appeal, and in 1985 the trial court remanded the 1979 appeal to the Zoning Hearing Board for a hearing. The Zoning Hearing Board held a hearing, and on February 10, 1986, issued a decision approving the decision of the Board of Supervisors. Russo appealed the decision to the trial court.\\nDuring the pendency of the Zoning Hearing Boards petition for declaratory judgment and Russos complaint in mandamus in the trial court, Cranberry Corporation filed an appeal in the trial court from the Board of Supervisors' grant of tentative approval subject to conditions, alleging that the conditions were onerous. The trial court dismissed the appeal on October 10, 1979, on the ground that Cranberry Corporation had failed to timely notify the Board of Supervisors of its objections to the conditions, and therefore had constructively accepted the conditions. Cranberry Corporation appealed the decision to this court.\\nPrior to this court's reaching a decision in Cranberry Corporation's appeal, Cranberry Corporation and the Board of Supervisors entered into an agreement which terminated the litigation. The agreement followed two years of negotiation, and ended the litigation in exchange for the tentative approval of Cranberry Corporation's application with modifications of the conditions set forth in the April 10, 1979 tentative approval. This agreement was approved at a public hearing on July 7, 1981, and Cranberry Corporation withdrew its pending appeal in this court. Russo, who had not been a party to this agreement because he had not intervened at any stage of these proceedings, filed an appeal with the Zoning Hearing Board, challenging the agreement.\\nThe Zoning Hearing Board held four public hearings, and issued a decision stating that Russo lacked standing to file an appeal. However, the Zoning Hearing Board's decision went on to consider the merits, and made extensive findings of fact, affirming the Board of Supervisors. Russo appealed to the trial court, which held that Russo lacked standing to file the appeal. On appeal, this court, by opinion and order dated November 26, 1984, remanded the case to the Zoning Hearing Board for a decision on the merits.\\nOn August 22, 1985, the Zoning Hearing Board dismissed Russos appeal on the merits. Russo again appealed to the trial court. The trial court consolidated this appeal with Russos appeal from the Zoning Hearing Boards decision dated February 10, 1986. On June 11, 1986, the trial court dismissed both of Russos appeals. Russo now appeals from the trial courts decision dismissing both of his appeals.\\nRusso argues that: (1) the Board of Supervisors' agreement with Cranberry Corporation which granted tentative approval of a planned residential development should be overturned because the plan approved by the agreement was a new and illegal sketch plan; (2) the agreement violates substantive and procedural requirements of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. \\u00a710101-11108A and the Perkiomen Township Zoning Ordinance; (3) the Zoning Hearing Board's conclusions misapplied the law and exercised manifestly unreasonable judgment in blatant disregard of the evidence; (4) the Board of Supervisors lacked the authority and power to enter into the agreement with Cranberry Corporation; (5) the tentative approval of the planned residential development was deemed revoked because development plans for final approval were not submitted in accordance with the terms of the conditions of the tentative approval; and (6) the tentative approval of the planned residential development should be reversed because the plan does not comply with the Perkiomen Township Planned Residential Development Ordinance.\\nJudge Salus of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County addressed and rejected all of these arguments. After a careful review of the record, we are satisfied with that disposition. Accordingly, we will affirm on the basis of the well-reasoned opinion authored by Judge Salus, reported at 40 Pa. D. & C. 3d 505 (1986).\\nOrder\\nNow, February 20, 1987, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Nos. 83-07806 and 86-03112, dated June 11, 1986, is affirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/pa/1391677.json b/pa/1391677.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fb237aee360b5db2c3e32dfce4af1e1e188e93dc
--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"1391677\", \"name\": \"Stella TAYLOR, Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, STATE EMPLOYES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Respondent\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Taylor v. Commonwealth\", \"decision_date\": \"1989-05-31\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2147 C.D. 1988\", \"first_page\": \"606\", \"last_page\": \"610\", \"citations\": \"127 Pa. Commw. 606\", \"volume\": \"127\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:35:59.911531+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before CRAIG and DOYLE, JJ., and KALISH, Senior Judge.\", \"parties\": \"Stella TAYLOR, Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, STATE EMPLOYES\\u2019 RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Respondent.\", \"head_matter\": \"562 A.2d 920\\nStella TAYLOR, Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, STATE EMPLOYES\\u2019 RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Respondent.\\nCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.\\nArgued May 4, 1989.\\nDecided May 31, 1989.\\nPublication Ordered Aug. 15, 1989.\\nThomas A. Crawford, Jr., Pittsburgh, for petitioner.\\nRichard D. Michlovitz, Harrisburg, for respondent.\\nBefore CRAIG and DOYLE, JJ., and KALISH, Senior Judge.\", \"word_count\": \"860\", \"char_count\": \"5390\", \"text\": \"KALISH, Senior Judge.\\nThis is a petition to review the decision and order of the State Employes' Retirement Board (Board), which denied Stella Taylor's (petitioner) application for disability retirement benefits. We affirm.\\nPetitioner worked for the State Department of Public Welfare, beginning March 17, 1972, and was enrolled in the State Employes' Retirement System. She was hospitalized with a foot injury in February, 1978, and returned to work on a part-time basis. On September 22, 1978, she was notified that her part-time work would terminate as of October 2, 1978. She was advised that she could request either a leave of absence without pay for six months, or a full time job if released by her physician. She was instructed to communicate with the personnel department.\\nPetitioner's job was terminated on October 2, 1978. Petitioner did not withdraw her pension contributions and admits that she could have done so, and admits that she was further advised that she may have been qualified for a disability annuity. Instead, she filed a grievance with her union, which was subsequently settled with the Commonwealth. The agreement contained the proviso that petitioner would be placed on leave without pay status from October 3, 1978 through February 15, 1981. In addition, she could apply for disability retirement if she were on leave without pay. Her employer placed her on leave without pay, but petitioner did not apply for disability retirement. Petitioner rejected the agreement, and instead filed with the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB) an unfair practices charge against the state and her union. This charge was dismissed and petitioner appealed to this court, which affirmed the PLRB.\\nOn August 15, 1986, about eight years after the termination of her employment, petitioner sought disability retirement, which was denied.\\nOur scope of review is limited to a determination of whether the Board violated constitutional rights, committed an error of law, or whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 704; Estate of McGovern v. State Employees' Retirement Board, 512 Pa. 377, 517 A.2d 523 (1986).\\nThe present issue is whether the Board committed an error of law in interpreting the provisions of the State Employees' Retirement Code (Code), 71 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 5101-5956. The Code provides:\\nDisability Annuity.\\u2014An active member or inactive member on leave without pay . shall, upon compliance with section 5907(k), be entitled to a disability annuity if prior to attainment of superannuation age he becomes mentally or physically incapable of continuing to perform the duties for which he is employed and qualifies in accordance with the provisions of section 5905(c)(1)____\\nSection 5308(c) of the Code.\\nAn active member is defined as, \\\"A state employee, or a member on leave without pay, for whom pickup contributions are being made to the fund.\\\" Section 5102 of the Code.\\nAlthough petitioner was neither an active member nor a member on leave without pay when she requested her disability retirement benefits, she relies on section 5704(a) of the Code which provides that one found to be eligible for a disability annuity shall receive a disability annuity payable effective from the date of disability as determined by the Board.\\nPetitioner's reliance on this provision is misplaced. This Code provision must be read in its proper context, not only in connection with sections 5102 and 5308(c) as cited above, but also in conjunction with section 5907(k). Section 5907(k) of the Code provides that a member under superannuation age, who is terminated because of a physical incapacity, may file an application for disability annuity. Section 5704(a) of the Code must also be read in conjunction with section 5905(c)(1), which describes the duties of the Board upon the filing of such application, namely, a finding of disability and the date of such disability.\\nHere, the petitioner did not file a disability retirement application when she became physically incapacitated and, of course, the Board could not find disability nor establish its date. Pursuant to the limitations on eligibility set forth in section 5308(c), petitioner was required to be either an active member or an inactive member on leave without pay in order to be eligible for a disability annuity. Petitioner failed to apply while she was either an active or inactive member.\\nPetitioner must qualify first for disability retirement before it becomes effective. The fact that petitioner had been contesting her employment termination during this period did not relieve her of this obligation.\\nAccordingly, we affirm.\\nORDER\\nNOW, May 31, 1989, the order of the State Employes' Retirement Board, dated August 5, 1988, is affirmed.\\nORDER\\nNOW, August 15, 1989, it is ORDERED that the above-captioned opinion filed May 31, 1989, shall be designated OPINION, rather than MEMORANDUM OPINION, and it shall be reported.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/pa/1401286.json b/pa/1401286.json
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+"{\"id\": \"1401286\", \"name\": \"In re Estate of Abdoe\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Estate of Abdoe\", \"decision_date\": \"1999-12-21\", \"docket_number\": \"no. 10054 of 1997, O.C.A.\", \"first_page\": \"564\", \"last_page\": \"576\", \"citations\": \"45 Pa. D. & C.4th 564\", \"volume\": \"45\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania District and County Reports\", \"court\": \"Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:19:58.991884+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"In re Estate of Abdoe\", \"head_matter\": \"In re Estate of Abdoe\\nC.P. of Lawrence County,\\nno. 10054 of 1997, O.C.A.\\nLawrence M. Kelly, for petitioner.\\nDavid E. Henderson, for respondent.\\nDecember 21, 1999\", \"word_count\": \"3343\", \"char_count\": \"20275\", \"text\": \"MOTTO, J.,\\nThis case is before the court on exceptions to a duly-filed master's report. Exceptions were initially filed by Omar Abdoe, petitioner, to the estate's first and final account and proposed decree of distribution. A master was appointed, and after a hearing, he filed his report. The report makes recommendations to the court regarding executor and counsel fees, and distribution of the decedent's property.\\nThe petitioner excepts to executor and attorney fees as determined in the master's report. The petitioner also objects to the distribution of decedent's personal property, and the manner in which the stock holdings were distributed. All exceptions are now properly before the court for disposition.\\nFindings and conclusions of a master may only be set aside by trial court upon finding an error in applying the law to the facts, or failure by the master to fully consider all matters required to be heard. In re Sweeney, 695 A. 2d 426, 428 (Pa. Super. 1997). Upon the trial judge's review, the trial court has the power to accept or reject the master's report and recommendations in whole or in part. Id. The role of the orphans' court judge in reviewing a master's report is similar to a review by a judge of the findings of a jury. Krepinevich Estate, 433 Pa. 78, 248 A.2d 844 (1969). With this standard in mind, the following is a discussion and disposition of all exceptions.\\nAccording to the master's report, the decedent, Al S. Abdoe died testate on June 1, 1990. Julie Abdoe, decedent's sister, executrix, was named executor in the will. The will, dated January 25, 1991, bequeathed all tan gible personal property and residue to the decedent's children, the petitioner, Martha Jo Jensen, and Greg Abdoe, in equal shares. The decedent's home was devised to the executrix. To help her administer the estate, the executrix retained the assistance of Attorney S. Sanford Kantz.\\nI. EXECUTOR FEES\\nThe petitioner's first exception to the master's report is that the executor's fee is excessive. In the report, the master recommends that the executrix be paid $16,500. The court disagrees with the petitioner, and adopts the master's facts and legal conclusions as set forth in the report.\\nSection 3537 of the Pennsylvania Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code sets forth the standard the court must use in establishing compensation for executors. Section 3537 states as follows:\\n\\\"The court shall allow such compensation to the personal representative as shall in the circumstances be reasonable, and just, and may calculate such compensation on a graduated percentage.\\\" 20 Pa.C.S. \\u00a73537.\\nAn executor is entitled to reasonable and just compensation for the services he/she provides. In re Estate of Sonovick, 373 Pa. Super. 396, 541 A.2d 374 (1988). The basis for determining whether compensation is reasonable depends upon the value of the services actually rendered, and not upon some arbitrary formula. In re Estate of Geniviva, 450 Pa. Super. 54, 675 A.2d 306 (1996), alloc. denied, 546 Pa. 666, 685 A.2d 545 (1996); In re Estate of Rees, 425 Pa. Super. 490, 625 A.2d 1203 (1993); see In re Estate of Breyer, 475 Pa. 108, 119, 379 A.2d 1305, 1311 (1977). While, as a matter of convenience, compensation of a fiduciary may be arrived at by way of a percentage, the true test is always what the services were actually worth and to award a fair and just compensation thereof. Estate of Rees at 497, 625 A.2d at 1206. \\\"[E]xecutors seeking compensation from an estate have the burden of establishing facts which show the reasonableness of their fees and entitlement to the compensation claimed.\\\" Estate of Rees at 497, 625 A.2d at 1206. The determination of whether the executor's fees are reasonable is left to the sound discretion of the orphans' court, and the Superior Court will not disturb the orphans' court determination absent a clear error or an abuse of discretion. Id. The orphans' court also has the authority to reduce to a \\\"reasonable and just\\\" level those fees and commissions claimed by the fiduciary. Id.\\nHere, the executrix presented both testimonial and written evidence of the services she provided to the estate of the decedent. The executrix met with Attorney Kantz regularly and often. She dropped off mail at Attorney Kantz's office and frequently met with him to sign documents and to discuss the estate. The executrix also performed the general executor duties such as being sworn in, obtaining death certificates, transferring the decedent's titles to property, and overseeing the disposition of the decedent's property to the beneficiaries.\\nA long and detailed log was presented to the master by the executrix. The log describes in detail each of the executrix's activities and the dates she performed them. The court notes that although the executrix's duties were not difficult, the executrix had to perform her duties with great care and diligence because the value of the estate was significant, and the executrix was responsible for handling a substantial quantity of mail and documents. If the executrix had not performed her duties in a careful manner, she could have disturbed the efficient administration of the estate.\\nFor the reasons listed above, as well as those stated in the master's report, the court agrees with the executor fee recommendation made by the master. The executrix has proven that a fee of $16,500 is a reasonable and just fee. Therefore, the petitioner's first exception regarding the executor's fee is denied.\\nII. ATTORNEY FEES\\nPetitioner next argues the attorney fee of $24,400, as recommended by the master, is excessive. The court is bound to agree.\\nIn the case sub judice, Attorney Kantz originally set his fee at $24,440 based on a flat 5 percent calculation of the gross probate estate. In response to the petitioner excepting to the fee, Attorney Kantz prepared an itemized bill setting forth the hours he worked on the estate. The itemized bill indicates Attorney Kantz expended a total of 135.5 hours. Attorney Kantz charged $150 per hour for a total of $20,325. Attorney Kantz was paid $15,000 by the estate for his services. The amount of $6,187 of that money was paid to Attorney David E. Henderson for his services in administering the estate. Attorney Henderson's fee is not contested.\\nAttorney fees in an estate are to be based on the reasonable value of the service actually rendered. Estate of Rees at 497, 656 A.2d at 1206; Dorsett v. Hughes, 53 Pa. Super. 129, 509 A.2d 369 (1986). Attorneys seeking compensation from an estate have the burden of establishing facts which show the reasonableness of their fees and entitlement to the compensation claimed. Estate of Sonovick at 400, 541 A.2d at 376 (1988). The court has the authority to reduce to a \\\"reasonable and just\\\" level those fees and commissions claimed by counsel. Id. at 399, 541 A.2d at 376. The test for determining the appropriateness of a fee for legal services in an estate is reasonableness. Dorsett, 353 Pa. Super. 129, 509 A.2d 369. Primarily, the responsibility for passing upon the reasonableness of counsel fees rests with the auditing judge. Thompson Estate, 426 Pa. 270, 232 A.2d 625 (1967).\\nIn In re Estate of Preston, 385 Pa. Super. 48, 560 A.2d 160 (1989), an attorney and executor calculated their fees based on a fixed fee schedule. The court found the use of the schedule for the purpose of setting fees was clearly proscribed. Compensation for the administration of an estate cannot be awarded based simply upon a percentage basis. Id. An inquiry must be made by the orphans' court into the reasonableness of fees and commissions disbursed. The court ultimately held that egregious error is committed when a court awards commissions and fees simply on a percentage basis without inquiry into the reasonableness of the compensation. Id.\\nIn the instant case, the master correctly found, in accordance with Estate of Preston, that Attorney Kantz's bill based upon the 5 percent flat fixed fee was improper. The proper method to be employed by the court to calculate attorney fees in an estate case is to determine the reasonable value of the services actually rendered. Estate of Rees at 497, 656 A.2d at 1206.\\nThe issue of what is a fair and reasonable attorney fee in an estate case can sometimes be a delicate and difficult question. The facts and factors to be taken into consideration in determining the fee or compensation payable to an attorney include: the amount of work performed, the character of the services rendered, the difficulty of problems encountered, the importance of the litigation, the value of the property in question, the degree of responsibility involved, whether the fund involved was \\\"created\\\" by the attorney, the professional skill of the attorney rendering services, the standing of the attorney in her profession, the results the attorney was able to obtain, and the ability of the estate to pay a reasonable fee. LaRocca Estate, 431 Pa. 542, 246 A.2d 337 (1968). See Estate of Bruner, 456 Pa. Super. 705, 691 A.2d 530 (1997); In re Estate of Burch, 402 Pa. Super. 314, 586 A.2d 986 (1991).\\nHere, the facts contained within the record indicate that the type of work performed by Attorney Kantz was basically administrative in nature. Attorney Kantz was required to identify stocks owned by the decedent at the time of his death. It was Attorney Kantz's duty to either locate the stock certificates or prepare forms necessary to replace the stock certificates. There were a total of 10 lost stock certificates.\\nAccording to his itemized bill, Attorney Kantz prepared letters testamentary, spoke to the executrix on the telephone, checked and reviewed documents, met with a stockbroker, and performed the general services of an attorney retained to help administer an estate. Attorney Kantz wrote letters to the petitioner's attorney, and met with the petitioner and executrix on numerous occasions as well.\\nAlthough the value of the estate is significant, $488,805.45, it was not complicated or procedurally involved. The only real difficulty encountered in the case was that some of the decedent's stock certificates owned by the decedent at the time of his death were lost. Attorney Kantz had to determine which stock certificates were missing and then he had to replace them. In order to replace the stock certificates, Attorney Kantz was required to fill out a basic application to send to the corporation along with some informational documents. No fund was created by Attorney Kantz, and he was aided by the executrix in administering the estate.\\nThe master suggests that the behavior of the petitioner in the administration of the estate is a significant factor in setting the attorneys' fee. The court does not agree.\\nAfter a close reading of the testimony at the master's hearing and a detailed review of the record, the court cannot agree with the master that the acts of the petitioner provides strong justification for the attorney's fee. The petitioner contacted Attorney Kantz often and was a bit intrusive into the details of the estate administration. On two occasions, the petitioner told Attorney Kantz that he would attempt to locate the missing stock certificates, and both times the petitioner delayed in informing Attorney Kantz regarding the results of the search.\\nThe court notes that the petitioner's acts did not substantially interfere with the administration of the estate. The petitioner's intrusiveness is best characterized as that of a beneficiary son concerned over the administration of his father's estate. An attorney must many times come into contact and deal with the children and beneficiaries of a decedent on whose estate he works. As a result, the court will not give as great weight to the petitioner's behavior as the master did in setting the attorney's fee.\\nA fee based upon an itemized bill is not in and of itself necessarily proper. It is questionable to automatically assume a lawyer's efforts and time are always worth his hourly rate. Estate of Burch at 318-19, 586 A.2d at 988. In Homer Trust, 10 Fiduciary Rep.2d 382, 383 (O.C. Chester Cty. 1990), the court stated: \\\"[I]t has long been recognized that time alone does not measure the value of services, nor hourly rate the quality.\\\" The determination of reasonable compensation to an attorney for an estate is not relegated to a clock and computer. Estate of Burch at 318-19, 586 A.2d at 988. The time expended does not replace the test of reasonableness, and while time involved is a factor in setting a fair and reasonable fee, it is only one of several factors set forth in LaRocca.\\nAttorney Kantz is a skilled lawyer of good standing in the community, but the court cannot justify a $150 per hour bill for Attorney Kantz's services, especially in light of the nature of the work he performed. It is of significance that Attorney Kantz did not prepare the inheritance tax return, nor did he prepare the final account and audit. Those services were performed by Attorney Henderson. Attorney Kantz's duty was primarily to determine and/or replace the decedent's stock certificates.\\nIn performing his duty, Attorney Kantz charged the estate first for $24,400 based on the 5 percent flat fee calculation. Attorney Kantz then charged the estate for 135.5 hours at $150 in lieu of the $24,400 amount. In his itemized bill, Attorney Kantz charged the estate 30.5 hours at $150 per hour solely to determine the stocks and investments held by the decedent at the time of his death. Attorney Kantz then logged 23 hours at $150 per hour to prepare the forms to replace the stock certificates. As for telephone calls, Attorney Kantz charged the estate $3,712.50 for an indeterminable number of telephone calls to the executrix which the executrix herself testified usually lasted \\\"a couple of minutes.\\\"\\nAttorney Kantz's bill did not state the charges with particularity. Instead, many hours appearing on the bill are grouped together. For example, Attorney Kantz has charged the estate for nine hours for \\\"mise, calls with client for 1996\\\" and for five hours at $150 for \\\"mise, calls with client for 1997.\\\"\\nIn consideration of the foregoing factors, especially that most of the work performed by Attorney Kantz was principally administrative in nature, the court cannot justify an hourly rate of $150 per hour; rather, the court finds that the reasonable services provided by Attorney Kantz are valued at $100 per hour. Attorney Kantz expended 135.5 hours administering the estate. Therefore, Attorney Kantz is entitled to attorney fees in the amount of $13,550.\\nAttorney Henderson's payment of $6,187 is uncontested and must be paid by the estate. The total attorney fees due, therefore, are the amount that Attorney Kantz is entitled ($13,550) plus Attorney Henderson's payment ($6,187), equaling $19,737.\\nIII. DISTRIBUTION IN KIND\\nThe petitioner next argues that he has the right to accept in kind any stocks which are included in the estate so long as there is no objection from the other benefici aries. The court cannot agree and adopts the conclusions and recommendations of the master.\\nThe petitioner, during the course of the administration of the estate, requested AT&T and Lucent stocks in kind. However, the executrix had sold the stocks for distribution to the beneficiaries.\\nArticle Four of the decedent's will states as follows:\\n\\\"In addition to the power conferred by law, my executor shall have the discretionary power to retain for distribution in kind, without duty of diversification, all property owned by me at my death, or to sell any part of such property, upon such terms as my executor shall deem advisable . \\\" (emphasis added)\\nA plain reading of the decedent's will shows that it was the decedent's intent to give the executrix the power to liquidate the stocks and distribute the proceeds. The executrix had no duty to retain the assets for distribution in kind. Petitioner cites no law in his brief supporting his contention that he be entitled to an in-kind distribution of the stock certificates, and the court is not persuaded by his argument.\\nIn conclusion, the petitioner did not show cause for the court to order the stock be distributed in kind. The master's factual and legal findings are adopted, and the petitioner's exception is denied.\\nIV. DISPOSITION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY\\nFor his final exception, the petitioner argues that the executrix did not properly dispose of the decedent's personal property. The court does not agree, and adopts the factual and legal findings as set forth in the master's report.\\nIn his will, the decedent leaves all tangible personal property to his surviving children to be divided amongst them as they may agree, or in the absence of such agreement, as the executrix shall determine. The record indicates that much of the decedent's personal property was left inside his residence, to which the executrix had a key. The executrix allowed each of the decedent's three children to enter the residence and retrieve personal property as they chose. After the children went to the residence on numerous occasions to take the decedent's personal property, few items remained. The remaining items all had either a de minimis value or no value at all, and the executrix donated the items to charity.\\nAn executor, as a fiduciary of the estate, \\\"is required to use such common skill, prudence and caution as a prudent man, under similar circumstances, would exercise in connection with the management of his own estate.\\\" Lohm Estate, 440 Pa. 268, 273, 269 A.2d 451, 454 (1970).\\nAlthough the executrix could have been more careful in itemizing the property and controlling entry into the residence, her actions were understandable. The beneficiaries were children of the decedent, and the beneficiaries' aunt, the executrix, was the decedent's sister. As an aunt, to not permit the decedent's own children into the house of their father would certainly have caused unnecessary family discord. Once the beneficiaries all had ample opportunity to take whichever property they chose from the residence, the executrix could assume that the few, valueless items remaining were not wanted by the beneficiaries and were abandoned.\\nIn conclusion, the court adopts the findings of fact and law made by the master. The items left in the home by the children were abandoned and had no value. The executrix exercised the skill and prudence that a common person would have used under similar circumstances. Therefore, the petitioner's exception is denied.\\nORDER\\nAnd now, December 21, 1999, exceptions to the supplemental master's estate hearing report having been filed and argued, after consideration of the argument of counsel and briefs filed on behalf of the parties, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows:\\n(1) Petitioner's exception 1 regarding the executor's fee is denied. The total fee of the executrix, Julie Abdoe, is fixed at $16,500.\\n(2) Exception 2 regarding attorneys' fees is granted in part. The attorney fee of Attorney S. Sanford Kantz is fixed at $13,550 for services he provided to the estate. The fee of Attorney David E. Henderson is fixed at $6,187. Total attorney fees in the case are therefore fixed at $19,737.\\n(3) Exception 3 is denied. The executrix's disposition of the personal property of the decedent was proper. The remaining items of decedent's personal property not taken from his residence by the beneficiaries had no value and was abandoned.\\n(4) Exception 4 is denied. The beneficiaries have no right to an in-kind distribution of the decedent's stock.\\n(5) The first and final account and proposed decree of distribution of the executrix, as modified by the terms of this order, are hereby confirmed absolutely, and distribution shall be made in such manner as to conform with the account and modifications contained herein.\\n. The executrix submitted an inheritance tax return which first calculated her fee at $24,400. The fee was computed on a flat 5 percent calculation of the gross estate.\\n. The schedule used by the attorney and executor in arriving at fees was that recommended by the attorney general's office.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"140610\", \"name\": \"Commonwealth v. Johnson, A., Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Commonwealth v. Johnson\", \"decision_date\": \"1979-10-26\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 1172\", \"first_page\": \"605\", \"last_page\": \"605\", \"citations\": \"275 Pa. Super. 605\", \"volume\": \"275\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:09:24.070917+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before VAN der VOORT, SPAETH and WATKINS, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Commonwealth v. Johnson, A., Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"423 A.2d 1315\\nCommonwealth v. Johnson, A., Appellant.\\nArgued April 11, 1979.\\nDennis B. Rafferty, for appellant; John F. Dent, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.\\nBefore VAN der VOORT, SPAETH and WATKINS, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"43\", \"char_count\": \"281\", \"text\": \"The judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed.\"}"
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diff --git a/pa/142641.json b/pa/142641.json
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+"{\"id\": \"142641\", \"name\": \"COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. Edith B. MAGAZINER v. David A. MAGAZINER, Jr., Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Commonwealth ex rel. Magaziner v. Magaziner\", \"decision_date\": \"1980-03-21\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 1974\", \"first_page\": \"169\", \"last_page\": \"175\", \"citations\": \"276 Pa. Super. 169\", \"volume\": \"276\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:48:27.423886+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before WIEAND, LOUIK and ROBINSON, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. Edith B. MAGAZINER v. David A. MAGAZINER, Jr., Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"419 A.2d 149\\nCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. Edith B. MAGAZINER v. David A. MAGAZINER, Jr., Appellant.\\nSuperior Court of Pennsylvania.\\nArgued June 28, 1979.\\nFiled March 21, 1980.\\nSamuel Reveron, Philadelphia, for appellant.\\nSidney Ginsberg, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.\\nBefore WIEAND, LOUIK and ROBINSON, JJ.\\nJudge DONALD E. WIEAND is sitting by special designation. President Judge OTTO P. ROBINSON of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania, and Judge MAURICE LOUIK of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, are sitting by designation.\\nThis decision was reached following the death of ROBINSON, J.\", \"word_count\": \"1283\", \"char_count\": \"7746\", \"text\": \"WIEAND, Judge:\\nOn January 18, 1968, an agreed order was entered directing appellant, David A. Magaziner, Jr., to pay the sum of $100 per week for the support of three minor children, Robert, Jonathan and Diane. The amount of the order was not allocated in any way among the children. Robert, having attained his majority, was removed from the order on January 24, 1974. Appellant, however, did not seek a reduction in the amount of the order. Therefore, it continued at $100 for the support of the remaining two children. Jonathan reached the age of eighteen on June 19, 1976, and in October, 1976, Diane went to live with her father. A petition was thereafter filed in the court below by which appellant sought to have the support order vacated. Diane reached the age of eighteen on February 6,1978, prior to the date on which appellant's petition to vacate was heard.\\nAt the hearing it was stipulated that Jonathan should be removed from the support order as of June 19, 1976. It was also stipulated that the order should be fully terminated and vacated as of February 6, 1978. Additional stipulations fixed arrearages as of June 15,1978, the date of the hearing in the court below, at $12,500 and the amount paid by appellee, Edith B. Magaziner, for Diane's high school tuition while she lived with her father at $5,368.95. It was agreed finally that arrearages as of February 6, 1978, according to the trial court's modification of the 1968 order, should be reduced to a judgment which was to be entered against appellant.\\nThe trial court determined that no one of these circumstances or any cofhbination thereof warranted a modification in the amount of the order. Therefore, it calculated arrearages to February 6, 1978 at the rate of $100 per week, and directed the entry of judgment for $10,600. It is from this order that the present appeal is taken.\\nIn Bell v. Bell, 228 Pa.Super. 280, 282, 323 A.2d 267, 268-69 (1974), this Court reviewed the pertinent legal principles as follows:\\n\\\"Orders of support are not final and may be increased or decreased where the financial conditions of the parties change. Commonwealth ex rel. Kaplan v. Kaplan, 219 Pa.Super. 163, 280 A.2d 456 (1971); Commonwealth ex rel. Meth v. Meth, 188 Pa.Super. 553, 149 A.2d 488 (1959). However, the order may be modified only by a good faith showing that circumstances existing when the original order was made have materially and substantially changed. Commonwealth ex rel. Naselsky v. Naselsky, 199 Pa.Super. 270, 184 A.2d 288 (1962); Commonwealth ex rel. Crandall v. Crandall, 145 Pa. Super. 359, 21 A.2d 236 (1941). In considering whether the support order should be reduced, the court must take into consideration all relevant facts, Commonwealth ex rel. Fryling v. Fryling, 220 Pa.Super. 68, 283 A.2d 726 (1971), and it is the burden of the party seeking to modify the order to show by competent evidence such a change in conditions as will justify a modification. Commonwealth ex rel. Brennan v. Brennan, 202 Pa.Super. 255, 195 A.2d 150 (1963); Commonwealth ex rel. Bassion v. Bassion, 199 Pa.Super. 541, 185 A.2d 822 (1962).\\\"\\nIn proceedings to modify existing support orders, an appellate court will not interfere with the determination of the trial court unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Bell v. Bell, supra, 228 Pa.Super. at 283, 323 A.2d at 269; Commonwealth ex rel. Friedman v. Friedman, 223 Pa.Super. 66, 67, 297 A.2d 158, 159 (1972); Commonwealth ex rel. Kreiner v. Scheidt, 183 Pa.Super. 277, 280, 131 A.2d 147, 149 (1957).\\nIt cannot be questioned that Jonathan's attaining majority and Diane's going to live with her father constituted changes in circumstances which are usually sufficient to justify modifications in an existing order. Despite the changed circumstances, the trial court ordered appellant to continue paying $100 per week for the support of Diane from June 19, 1976, until she attained majority on February 6,1978. The trial judge found that appellant had the ability to pay such an order and based its refusal to reduce the amount thereof upon (1) the cost of psychiatric care for Jonathan, and (2) the cost of Diane's high school education.\\nUnder normal circumstances, a parent's duty to support a child may continue even after the child attains majority where the child requires psychiatric care and is unemployable or otherwise unable to support himself or herself. Commonwealth ex rel. Cann v. Cann, 274 Pa.Super. 274, 418 A.2d 403 (1980); Commonwealth ex rel. Welsh v. Welsh, 222 Pa.Super. 585, 588, 296 A.2d 891, 893 (1972). In the instant case, however, there was no evidence that Jonathan was unemployable or unable to support himself. More importantly, the parties had stipulated that he was to be removed from the order as of June 19,1976. The trial court could not properly ignore this stipulation and, under the guise of an order for the support of Diane, compel appellant in these proceedings to contribute to the cost of Jonathan's psychiatric care. The cost of such care was relevant only to the extent that it adversely affected appellee's ability to contribute to the support of Diane. The trial court's concern, in fixing the amount of the order after June 19, 1976, should have been for the needs of Diane and for the financial abilities of her parents to meet those needs. See: Commonwealth ex rel. Berry v. Berry, 253 Pa.Super. 268, 384 A.2d 1337 (1978). The record, however, discloses insufficient facts to permit a finding of Diane's needs between June 19, 1976 and the date she went to live with appellant.\\nAfter Diane went to live with her father, he provided her with most of her needs. Appellee, however, paid Diane's high school tuition for two years in the amount of $5,368.95. Because, as the trial court observed, appellant had agreed to contribute to the cost of Diane's education, the trial judge determined that the amount of the order for Diane's support, even after she went to live with the appellant, should be in an amount that would reimburse appellee for her daughter's tuition. The trial court required appellant to pay support for Diane at the rate of $100 per week during a period estimated to be from November 1, 1976 to February 6, 1978. The total amount assessed against appellant for this period was $6,600. This amount was greater than the amount of tuition which appellee had paid for Diane from September, 1976 to June, 1978. The order, therefore, was exorbitant.\\nAn appropriate order would be determined not only according to appellant's financial ability to pay support but should also reflect the cost to appellee of providing for Diane's care, support, maintenance and education between June 19,1976 and February 6,1978. This cost might well be greater before October, 1976 than after that time when Diane took up residence with and was provided for by appellant.\\nUpon remand, the trial court should receive evidence which will enable it to fashion an order and enter judgment in accordance with the foregoing opinion.\\nReversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion.\"}"
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diff --git a/pa/1438724.json b/pa/1438724.json
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+"{\"id\": \"1438724\", \"name\": \"WORLD'S FINEST CHOCOLATE, INC., Petitioner, v. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW, Respondent\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"World's Finest Chocolate, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review\", \"decision_date\": \"1992-11-05\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 1158 C.D. 1992\", \"first_page\": \"370\", \"last_page\": \"377\", \"citations\": \"151 Pa. Commw. 370\", \"volume\": \"151\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:02:16.227799+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before CRAIG, President Judge, PELLEGRINI, J., and BLATT, Senior Judge.\", \"parties\": \"WORLD\\u2019S FINEST CHOCOLATE, INC., Petitioner, v. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW, Respondent.\", \"head_matter\": \"616 A.2d 1114\\nWORLD\\u2019S FINEST CHOCOLATE, INC., Petitioner, v. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW, Respondent.\\nCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.\\nSubmitted on Briefs Sept. 25, 1992.\\nDecided Nov. 5, 1992.\\nLawrence A. Nathanson, for petitioner.\\nRandall Brandes, Asst. Counsel, and Clifford F. Blaze, Deputy Chief Counsel, for respondent.\\nBefore CRAIG, President Judge, PELLEGRINI, J., and BLATT, Senior Judge.\", \"word_count\": \"2288\", \"char_count\": \"13953\", \"text\": \"PELLEGRINI, Judge.\\nWorld's Finest Chocolate, Inc. (Employer/WFC) appeals from an order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) which reversed the Referee's decision and granted William Witkowski (Claimant) unemployment compensation benefits. The Board reversed on the basis that Claimant was an employee of WFC during the time he worked there and not an independent contractor, and he had voluntarily terminated his employment from WFC for a necessitous and compelling reason.\\nClaimant was hired by WFC in early October of 1991 as a sales representative to sell its chocolate for fund raising purposes. Prior to beginning his employment, Claimant signed a Distributor Agreement (Agreement) with his Employer which stated that he would be considered an independent contractor and not an employee for federal tax purposes or any other purposes. The Agreement further stated that Claimant would be paid on a straight commission basis, the Employer would provide Claimant with price schedules and an assigned territory to which he would be restricted, Claimant would be required to file weekly status reports for the first year, and would be prohibited from working for any competitors while employed by WFC for two years after he left its employment.\\nClaimant had worked for WFC for approximately one and one-half months when he terminated his employment. On November 29, 1991, he began working part-time as a salesclerk in the appliance department at K-Mart at the rate of $4.35 per hour plus commission. In December of 1991, Claimant filed a claim petition for unemployment compensation benefits in which he indicated that he had voluntarily left his previous employment at WFC because his expenses had exceeded his income. The Office of Employment Security (OES)granted Claimant benefits pursuant to Section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law), 43 P.S. \\u00a7 802(b), on the basis that his reason for leaving his employment at WFC was necessitous and compelling. The OES further determined that although Claimant was subsequently employed by K-Mart and had earned a total of $70.53, he was partially unemployed due to conditions which were not disqualifying pursuant to Section 401(f) of the Law, 43 P.S. \\u00a7 801(f), and was not precluded from receiving benefits.\\nThe Employer filed an appeal from the OES' decision and a hearing was held. At the hearing, the Referee indicated that he would hear testimony on the issue of Claimant's voluntary termination, as well as on the type of employment relationship Claimant had with WFC, even though the OES did not rule on that subject. Regarding the issue of voluntary termination, Claimant testified that he had left WFC of his own volition because he could not pay his bills and his expenses were exceeding his income.\\nAs to his employment relationship with WFC, Claimant testified that regardless of the language in his Agreement stating he was an independent contractor, he was treated as an employee because he was subject to supervision during the time he was being trained, was required to submit weekly status reports to a supervisor, and was restricted in terms of his territory. Claimant also testified that he made cold calls to customers in addition to the leads he received from WFC, had no control over setting prices of WFC's product, was not responsible for collecting payments from his customers, and made no deliveries to the customers. More importantly, Claimant testified that he was prohibited from working for another fund-raising company while working for WFC, and was not allowed to do any other work as far as income was concerned. The Employer agreed that Claimant had left its employ because he could not make a go of the job as far as money was concerned, but contrary to Claimant's testimony, testified that Claimant was aware that he was an independent contractor from the beginning of the employment relationship because he signed the Agreement which specified as much.\\nBased on the testimony presented, the Referee reversed the OES' decision and denied Claimant benefits. The Referee determined that because Claimant had voluntarily left his employment at WFC due to his dissatisfaction with his earnings, he did not establish a necessitous and compelling cause for resigning. The Referee further determined that although Claimant was an employee of WFC rather than an independent contractor pursuant to Section 4(7)(2)(b) of the Law, 43 P.S. \\u00a7 753(/, )(2)(b), he had not earned six times his weekly benefit rate at K-Mart as required by Section 401(f) of the Law and did not qualify for benefits.\\nClaimant appealed the Referee's decision to the Board which affirmed that portion of the Referee's decision determining that Claimant was an employee of WFC rather than an independent contractor, but reversed that portion of the decision concluding that Claimant had not voluntarily terminated his employment for a necessitous and compelling reason. The Board concluded that leaving one job to take another job is a necessitous and compelling reason for resigning, and because the only relevant consideration is whether the new job is available, Claimant's lack of income as a reason for leaving WFC was irrelevant because he had a job waiting for him at K-Mart. The Board then ordered the Employer to pay Claimant benefits, and the Employer filed this appeal.\\nA claimant who becomes unemployed by voluntary termination bears the burden of proving that his termination was for a cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. Kligge v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 89 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 30, 491 A.2d 325 (1985). The Employer argues that the Board erred in its determination that Claimant met this burden because there is no evidence in the record to support its finding that Claimant had obtained the job at K-Mart prior to his resignation at WFC. The Employer directs our attention to Claimant's testimony which indicated that he did not have a position with K-Mart until after he left WFC's employ:\\nQ. All right, now then the Unemployment Compensation Office made mention in its determination that you had alternate employment when you left World's Finest Chocolate, is that true?\\nA. Yeah, I went from there to K-Mart.\\nQ. Well, did you already have the job?\\nA. Yes, sir.\\nQ. Was that .\\nA. Well, it was a couple of days later, I don't recall the exact circumstances, but I was within my unemployment right, I do know that.\\n(Reproduced Record at 12a.)\\nThe Employer further argues that even if Claimant had been employed by K-Mart prior to leaving WFC, he did not leave WFC because he had a job at K-Mart lined up, but rather because he was dissatisfied with his wages at WFC:\\nQ. And did you leave that job (WFC) voluntarily?\\nA. Yes, sir.\\nQ. For what reason or reasons?\\nA. My expenses were exceeding my income, I could \\u2014 just couldn't afford to meet my bills at the present time with the job itself, I just couldn't do it.\\nQ. Did the employment at K-Mart have anything to do with your decision to leave World's Finest Chocolate?\\nA. No, sir.\\n(Reproduced Record at 10a, 12a-13a.)\\nThe Employer contends that dissatisfaction with one's wages is not a compelling reason for terminating employment, and cites Leshock v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 46 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 486, 406 A.2d 1182 (1979) in support of this contention. In Leshock, claimant worked as a truck driver hauling fill in his own truck at a construction site. He agreed with other truck drivers working on the site to be paid $17 per hour by the employer. Claimant voluntarily quit his job and filed a claim for benefits alleging that he quit for a necessitous and compelling reason because the wages were inadequate. On appeal, this court affirmed the Board's decision denying him benefits because his complaint was not that his employer failed to pay him in accordance with their agreement, but simply because the expenses of maintaining his truck made the compensation inadequate. \\\"His complaint in this regard rises to no more than dissatisfaction with the compensation, not a compelling reason for quit ting work.\\\" Leshock, 46 Pa. Commonwealth at 489, 406 A.2d at 1184.\\nThe law is well settled that dissatisfaction with one's wages is insufficient to establish the necessary justification for terminating employment. See also Querry v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 63 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 170, 437 A.2d 1048 (1981); Snyder v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 54 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 425, 421 A.2d 530 (1980); Mosley v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 15 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 447, 327 A.2d 199 (1974). Nonetheless, the Board argues that the reason Claimant left his job at WFC was because he had a job waiting for him at K-Mart, as evidenced by his testimony, as well as the fact that he had applied and interviewed for the job at K-Mart while still employed with WFC, and voluntarily leaving work to go to another job constitutes cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. In support of this argument, the Board cites Brennan v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 95 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 114, 504 A.2d 432 (1986), where we granted claimant benefits when she left her position as a nurse paying $6.49 for another position which paid her more money.\\nHowever, while Claimant may have interviewed for the position at K-Mart while employed at WFC, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that Claimant was, in fact, hired prior to leaving WFC. Also, Claimant's testimony seemingly implies that he did not accept the position with K-Mart until after he had left WFC's employ. Regardless, though, of whether Claimant actually left his position at WFC because he had a position waiting at K-Mart, Claimant is not entitled to benefits. The Board misinterprets our decision in Brennan because claimant in that case was granted benefits because she had accepted an offer for a new position, had quit her job based on her acceptance, and was notified prior to beginning that new job that the position was no longer available.\\nIn this case, Claimant did not quit his job at WFC and then find out that the position at K-Mart was no longer available. Claimant began working at K-Mart and, as of the date of this appeal, was still working there. Consequently, because the purpose of unemployment compensation is to assist those individuals who have become unemployed by no fault of their own, not those who simply want to change jobs to earn more money, and Claimant voluntarily terminated his employment simply because he was dissatisfied with his wages at WFC, his termination was not for a necessitous and compelling reason.\\nAccordingly, the decision of the Board is reversed and Claimant is precluded from receiving benefits for that reason.\\nORDER\\nAND NOW, this 5th day of November, 1992, the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, dated April 30, 1992, No. B-298451, is reversed.\\n. The record is devoid of information indicating Claimant's last day of employment with WFC.\\n. Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex.Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. \\u00a7 802(b). Section 402(b) of the Law provides in pertinent part that an employee will be ineligible for compensation for any week in which his unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving work without cause of a necessitous and compelling' nature, irrespective of whether such work is \\\"employment\\\" as defined in this act.\\n. Section 401(f) of the Law provides:\\n[CJompensation shall be payable to any employee who is or becomes unemployed and who has earned, subsequent to his separation from work under circumstances which are disqualifying under the provisions of subsections 402(b) \\u2014 voluntary termination without a necessitous and compelling reason, 402(e) \\u2014 unemployment due to discharge for willful misconduct, and 402(h) of this act \\u2014 claimant is self-employed, remuneration for services in an amount equal to or in excess of six times his weekly benefit rate irrespective of whether or not such services were in \\\"employment\\\" as defined in this act.\\nThe OES determined that the $70.53 earned by Claimant was less than the amount of $1,506 required to remove the disqualification from employment benefits.\\n. Because the OES did not rule upon the type of relationship which Claimant had with WFC, the parties stipulated that the Referee could rule on that issue rather than remand it to the OES for disposition.\\n. Section 4(/)(2)(b) of the Law defines \\\"employment\\\" in pertinent part as follows:\\nServices performed by an individual for wages shall be deemed to be employment subject to this act, unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the department that \\u2014 (a) such individual has been and will continue to be free from control or direction over the performance of such services both under his contract of service and in fact; and (b) as to such services such individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business.\\n. Our scope of review is limited to determining whether an error of law was committed, constitutional rights were violated, or the Board's findings of facts were not supported by substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 704.\\n. Because we have determined that Claimant is precluded from receiving benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law, we need not address the type of employment relationship which Claimant had with his Employer or whether he was entitled to benefits pursuant to Section 401(f) of the Law.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1439902\", \"name\": \"Raymond H. SMITH, Petitioner, v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (Gary L. MILLER and James Skinner), Respondents\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Smith v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board\", \"decision_date\": \"1992-12-02\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2637 C.D. 1991\", \"first_page\": \"77\", \"last_page\": \"84\", \"citations\": \"152 Pa. Commw. 77\", \"volume\": \"152\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:53:59.239124+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before SMITH and PELLEGRINI, JJ., and LORD, Senior Judge.\", \"parties\": \"Raymond H. SMITH, Petitioner, v. WORKMEN\\u2019S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (Gary L. MILLER and James Skinner), Respondents.\", \"head_matter\": \"618 A.2d 1101\\nRaymond H. SMITH, Petitioner, v. WORKMEN\\u2019S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (Gary L. MILLER and James Skinner), Respondents.\\nCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.\\nArgued Oct. 19, 1992.\\nDecided Dec. 2, 1992.\\nPamela Cochenour, for petitioner.\\nRichard G. Spagnolli, for respondents.\\nBefore SMITH and PELLEGRINI, JJ., and LORD, Senior Judge.\", \"word_count\": \"2077\", \"char_count\": \"12845\", \"text\": \"SMITH, Judge.\\nRaymond H. Smith (Smith) appeals from the order of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Board) which affirmed the referee's decision granting the claim petition filed by Gary L. Miller (Claimant) against Smith and awarding Claimant total disability benefits. The issue raised on appeal is whether Smith is a statutory employer secondarily liable to Claimant for the payment of compensation benefits pursuant to Section 302(b) of. The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act (Act), Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. \\u00a7 462. For the following reasons, the Board's order is reversed.\\nSmith has been a self-employed developer since 1982. In 1984, he purchased approximately twenty-two acres of land in the Borough of Oakmont, Allegheny County, for the purpose of constructing a townhome development. After obtaining the Borough's approval for subdivision, Smith solicited bids for development work such as roads, sewers, and other common facilities. One of the successful bidders for carpentry work was James W. Skinner (Skinner) who was to erect wooden framing for the townhomes and later perform the trim work. Thereafter, Skinner hired Claimant to do rough carpentry work at the construction site. On December 20, 1988, approximately one month after beginning work for Skinner, Claimant sustained a work-related injury to his left ankle. He filed claim petitions against Skinner and Smith which were consolidated by the referee.\\nAt hearings before the referee, the parties stipulated, inter alia, that Smith is in the business of developing land and that he is building the townhomes for sale. The referee found that Claimant sustained a work-related injury which rendered him totally disabled; Skinner did not carry worker's compensation insurance on the date of Claimant's injury; Smith was in a dual capacity as an owner and a general contractor for the development; and the construction site was under the control of Smith through his employees who oversaw that the work of various contractors was done properly and who occasionally directed Claimant as to the manner in which his work was to be performed when Skinner was not on the job site. The referee concluded that Smith was liable as a statutory employer to Claimant and awarded him total disability benefits to be paid by Smith who then would have the right to recover from Skinner the amount paid. On appeal, the Board affirmed the referee's decision.\\nOn appeal to this Court, Smith does not challenge the referee's finding that Claimant was totally disabled due to his work-related injury. He contends, however, that because he was an owner of the development, he cannot be considered a statutory employer under Section 302(b) of the Act which provides:\\nAny employer who permits the entry upon premises occupied by him or under his control of a laborer or an assistant hired by an employe or contractor, for the performance upon such premises of a part of such employer's regular business entrusted to that employe or contractor, shall be liable for the payment of compensation to such laborer or assistant unless such hiring employe or contractor, if primarily liable for the payment of such compensation, has secured the payment thereof as provided for in this act. Any employer or his insurer who shall become liable hereunder for such compensation may recover the amount thereof paid and any necessary expenses from another person if the latter is primarily liable therefor.\\nFor purposes of this subsection (b), the term 'contractor' shall have the meaning ascribed in section 105 of this act.\\nSection 105 of the Act, 77 P.S. \\u00a7 25, defines \\\"contractor\\\" as follows:\\nThe term 'contractor,' as used in article two, section two hundred and three, and article three, section three hundred and two (b), shall not include a contractor engaged in an independent business, other than that of supplying laborers or assistants, in which he serves persons other than the employer in whose service the injury occurs, but shall include a subcontractor to whom a principal contractor has sublet any part of the work which such principal contractor has undertaken.\\nIn Section 302(b) of the Act, the legislature evinced a clear intent to place primary responsibility for payment of worker's compensation benefits upon the first financially responsible employer in the subcontractor chain, even if that employer is not the one primarily liable. Ace Tire Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Hand), 101 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 186, 515 A.2d 1020 (1986), appeal denied, 515 Pa. 610, 529 A.2d 1083 (1987).\\nThe Courts of this Commonwealth have consistently held that in order for the statutory employer doctrine to apply, five elements must be present: (1) an employer who is under contract with an owner or someone in the position of an owner; (2) premises occupied by or under the control of such employer; (3) a subcontract made by such employer; (4) part of the employer's regular business is entrusted to such subcontractor; and (5) a claimant who is an employee of such subcontractor. McDonald v. Levinson Steel Co., 302 Pa. 287, 153 A. 424 (1930); Caldarelli v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Mastromonaco), 115 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 611, 542 A.2d 181, appeal denied, 520 Pa. 592, 551 A.2d 218 (1988). These elements are to be strictly construed by the appellate courts. Mathis v. United Engineers & Constructors, Inc., 381 Pa.Superior Ct. 466, 554 A.2d 96, appeal denied sub nom. Mathis v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 523 Pa. 632, 637, 564 A.2d 1260, 1261, 565 A.2d 445 (1989).\\nIn McDonald, the Levinson Steel Company hired Uhl, another steel company, to construct a shed for Levinson on property which it leased. Levinson argued that it was the statutory employer of an injured worker hired by Uhl. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that an owner in erecting his or her own building does so as an owner, not as a principal contractor or statutory employer, although his or her regular course of business may be that of a builder. The Court stated:\\nWhere an owner contracts with another for work on his premises in furtherance of his regular business, the employment is an independent one, establishing the relation of contractee and contractor and not that of master and servant or statutory employer and employee, and a workman injured on that work is not entitled to compensation from the owner as statutory employer or master unless the relation of master and servant is established by the contract reserving control over the means of accomplishing the work as well as over the result to be accomplished.\\nId. at 296-97, 153 A. at 427.\\nSmith argues that a property owner may be liable for negligence at common law, but cannot be held liable as a statutory employer under the Act. According to Smith, a statutory employer status may not be found unless the owner and the employer hiring the subcontractor are two different people. Thus, he asserts, the dual capacity theory advanced by the referee and the Board is not consistent with the McDonald holding that an owner is not a principal contractor or employer although his or her regular course of business may be that of a builder.\\nWhile the analysis applied by the referee and the Board is an enticing one, it simply is not the law in this Commonwealth. The Supreme Court's holding in McDonald is clear that the Act \\\"specifically excludes an owner from liability to the employees of an independent contractor.\\\" Id. at 294, 153 A. at 426. The finding that Smith exercised occasional direction over Skinner's employees does not justify the conclusion that there was between Smith and Skinner's employees the master-servant relationship necessary under the Act to hold that Smith was a statutory employer. It is undisputed that Skinner hired and paid Claimant, directed Claimant's day-to-day activities, and provided him with the necessary equipment.\\nFurthermore, even if this Court were to assume that Smith had a dual capacity of owner and general contractor, statutory employer status cannot be found because there is no evidence of the existence of a contract between a builder/developer and the owner as required by McDonald. There is no evidence to support the Board's inherent assumption that Smith contracted with himself to build on his own property. Consequently, the first element set forth in McDonald for determining statutory employer status has not been met, thus rendering unnecessary this Court's examination of the remaining elements.\\nClaimant contends, however, that Section 302(b) makes no exception for property owners and instead provides that the general contractor, or in this case a builder/developer, require subcontractors to secure the payment of worker's compensation benefits to their employees. He points to this Court's observation in Ace Tire that a general contractor could have avoided its liability by requiring the subcontractor to procure insurance coverage but chose not to do so. Ace Tire is inapposite to the matter sub judice because it was not a case in which one of the parties was an \\\"owner\\\" for purposes of the Act.\\nClaimant and the Board attempt to distinguish McDonald and Caldarelli by noting that the properties upon which the employees were injured were being held for the owners' personal use, whereas Smith's development was held in ownership for the purpose of resale once the townhomes were constructed. Such a position at once both misperceives the holdings of those cases and attempts to carve out exceptions for which no authority may be found. McDonald clearly states: \\\"[a]n owner in erecting his own building, does so as an owner, not as a principal contractor or its synonym, 'employer,' although his regular course of business may be that of a builder.\\\" Id., 302 Pa. at 295, 153 A. at 427 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Board's reliance on Caldarelli is misplaced. In that case, the owner of the property on which the claimant was injured was constructing a model home in furtherance of a residential construction business. Despite the clearly-expressed business intent of the owner, this Court held that the owner could not be a statutory employer under the Act. See also Zizza v. Dresher Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 358 Pa.Superior Ct. 600, 518 A.2d 302 (1986), appeal denied, 516 Pa. 643, 533 A.2d 714 (1987). This Court therefore specifically rejects the Board's approach, which Claimant terms a \\\"profit-oriented business purpose\\\" analysis, since it has no basis in the law.\\nThe Board also concluded that Claimant was a \\\"borrowed employee\\\" of Smith because his employees directed Claimant as to his work responsibility when Skinner was not available. In order to fall within the scope of the borrowed employee doctrine, the borrowing employer must control or have the right to control the borrowed employee with regard to both the work to be done and the manner of performing it. Mathis. Claimant's testimony establishes that only Skinner had the right to control the details of Claimant's work, and there is no finding by the referee that Smith assumed control of the manner in which Claimant performed his job. Therefore, the borrowed servant doctrine cannot justify an award of benefits against Smith. In light of this Court's holding, the other issues raised by Smith need not be further addressed. Accordingly, the Board's order is reversed.\\nORDER\\nAND NOW, this 2nd day of December, 1992, the order of ' the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board dated November 20, 1991 is reversed.\\n. Skinner appeared without counsel at the first hearing before the referee, but failed to appear at tiny further hearings or depositions despite being duly notified.\\n. This Court's scope of review is limited to determining whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed, or whether there was a violation of constitutional rights. Yezovich v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (USX Corp.), 144 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 601, 601 A.2d 1341 (1992).\\n. The Board also attempts to distinguish the line of statutory employer doctrine cases by noting that in most of these cases the employer was defensively using the doctrine in an attempt to obtain immunity from common law negligence actions. While this is an accurate assessment of the procedural aspect in many of these cases, it is nevertheless a meaningless distinction and does not affect the proper McDonald analysis to be applied in determining statutory employer status.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1511116\", \"name\": \"In re Slovak American Beneficial Union of Philadelphia\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Slovak American Beneficial Union\", \"decision_date\": \"1933-12-30\", \"docket_number\": \"no. 4771\", \"first_page\": \"93\", \"last_page\": \"94\", \"citations\": \"20 Pa. D. & C. 93\", \"volume\": \"20\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania District and County Reports\", \"court\": \"Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:02:24.384219+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"In re Slovak American Beneficial Union of Philadelphia\", \"head_matter\": \"In re Slovak American Beneficial Union of Philadelphia\\nWilliam C. Schwebel, for petitioners.\\nDecember 30, 1933.\", \"word_count\": \"361\", \"char_count\": \"2158\", \"text\": \"Alessandroni, J.,\\nThe master in his report finds that the proposed corporation is in all respects legitimate and proper except that:\\n(\\u0430) The application does not recite the post office address of the proposed corporation's initial registered office.\\n(\\u0431) The application does not recite the amount of assets which the corporation will have to start its corporate functions, which according to the testimony consists of $150 to $175 in cash.\\n(c) The name of the proposed corporation contravenes the provisions of section 202 of the Nonprofit Corporation Law of May 5, 1933, P. L. 289, and he accordingly recommends that, upon the amendment of the application to show the proposed post office address and the amount of assets and to change the corporation's name to one in accordance with law, and upon the further registration of the new name with the Department of State and the re-advertising of this application, if no remonstrance be received, the court grant a decree incorporating the proposed corporation.\\nThe objections found by the master are predicated upon his opinion that this application for charter is ruled by the provisions of the Nonprofit Corporation Law of 1933. The Act of Assembly was approved May 5, 1933, but was not to become effective until July 3, 1933. This application -was filed with the prothonotary of our court on July 1, 1933, two days before the effective date of the new act. The Secretary of the Commonwealth accepted and approved the registration of the title of the proposed corporation on June 15,1933, and the petition for charter was signed by the applicants on June 3d. We cannot agree with the master that, in the absence of a saving clause in the new Nonprofit Corporation Law, this application is subject to the provisions of the new act. We believe the effective date to be controlling, and since the application is in proper form and the testimony shows the corporation to be otherwise lawful and not injurious to the community, we grant the prayer of the petition in the manner and form prayed for.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/pa/1531305.json b/pa/1531305.json
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+"{\"id\": \"1531305\", \"name\": \"Stoddart, etc., v. Frank & Seder of Phila., Inc.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Stoddart v. Frank & Seder of Phila., Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"1937-11-26\", \"docket_number\": \"no. 2156\", \"first_page\": \"572\", \"last_page\": \"575\", \"citations\": \"30 Pa. D. & C. 572\", \"volume\": \"30\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania District and County Reports\", \"court\": \"Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:04:53.382485+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Stoddart, etc., v. Frank & Seder of Phila., Inc.\", \"head_matter\": \"Stoddart, etc., v. Frank & Seder of Phila., Inc.\\nBlumberg & Sork, for plaintiff.\\nZoob & Matz, for defendant.\\nRaymond A. White, Jr., for additional defendant.\\nNovember 26, 1937.\", \"word_count\": \"1008\", \"char_count\": \"5996\", \"text\": \"MacNeille,\\nA rule was taken by the additional defendant to quash the writ of sci. fa. One ground assigned by the additional defendant is that the sci. fa. was not issued within 60 days after service of the statement of claim. But, on May 24th, defendant's petition was granted allowing an additional period of 30 days in which to issue a sci. fa., and during this time the sci. fa. was issued. We find no merit, therefore, in this contention.\\nThe additional defendant further contends that it should not be joined in this case because its liability to defendant, if any, is based on its contract of indemnity, whereby it issued a \\\"depositor's and/or commercial forgery policy\\\" to defendant.\\nThe additional defendant issued to the original defendant a policy wherein it provided that it would indemnify defendant against any loss by reason of the forgery of the signature or of any endorsement of any checks issued by defendant.\\nPlaintiff brought an action in assumpsit against defendant, alleging that he supplied truck service to defendant and that there is a balance due on account thereon. Defendant filed an affidavit of defense, alleging payment and also new matter to the effect that the payments were made to David L. Wagner, the duly authorized representative of plaintiff, by means of checks payable to plaintiff. Plaintiff filed an answer to defendant's new matter, denying the authority of Wagner and alleging in substance that Wagner improperly endorsed and retained certain of the checks. Whereupon, defendant issued a sci. fa. to the New Amsterdam Casualty Company, the sci. fa. defendant, on the theory that it was liable over to defendant in the event that the checks were improperly endorsed by Wagner, on account of the forgery policy referred to above.\\nIt is, therefore, apparent that the original defendant is proceeding against the additional defendant on an indemnity agreement, and that this cannot be done was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Murray v. Pittsburgh Athletic Co. et al., 324 Pa. 486, 497, where the court said:\\n\\\"Subsequently, on November 9, 1933, the writ of scire facias was amended by adding an averment that the additional defendants were liable over to the original defendant, not only because of their employee's negligent act, but also by reason of an alleged indemnity agreement, whereby the Jacobs Brothers agreed to indemnify and hold harmless appellant 'of and from all actions and injuries arising out of [the additional defendant's] activi ties'. . . . But such a cause of action, based on contract, is separate and distinct from the cause of action forming the basis of plaintiff's suit, which is the injury caused plaintiff by defendant's negligence. Under the decision in Jones et al. v. Wohlgemuth, 313 Pa. 388, 169 A. 758, the additional defendants were improperly joined, and on application the scire facias could have been stricken off for this reason. In that case we said, at page 390: 'The Act of 1929, supra, was not intended to complicate legal proceedings by combining entirely separate causes of action in one suit. By the wording of the act, defendant may bring in as an additional defendant \\\"any person alleged to be liable over to him for the cause of action declared upon.\\\" [Italics supplied.] In the present case, the liability, if any, of the parents to appellant arises, not on account of the injuries received by the minor plaintiff (which are alleged to have resulted from defendants' negligence) but by virtue of the indemnity agreement. . . . One action is in trespass and the other in assumpsit. The causes of action are separate and distinct and no sufficient reason exists for joining them in one proceeding,\\u2014 indeed, such result was never contemplated by the Act of 1929, supra.' \\\"\\nA similar conclusion was reached in the case of Bass v. Bass et al., 19 D. & C. 230.\\nOn behalf of the original defendant, there have not been cited any cases in which the exact question was involved and in which a different conclusion was arrived at, and we have not been able to find any. Under those circumstances, we are bound by the decisions indicated above to hold that an additional defendant could not be brought by sci. fa. into a proceeding on an indemnity agreement.\\nThe case of Gentile et al. v. American State Bank & Trust Co. et al., 315 Pa. 123, cited by defendant, is the only case in which an indemnity contract was involved, but there the propriety of issuing a sci. fa. under those circumstances was not raised. The other cases cited by defendant have very little bearing on the question here involved. Cases involving endorsers on cheeks are in a different classification, because the suit against them is based on the same instrument as against the principal defendant.\\nIt has always been well settled law that at least in negligence cases there must be excluded from the trial the fact that defendants are insured, and there is nothing in the sei. fa. acts to indicate any change in this policy, and it is apparent that indemnity or insurance contracts must, to make the law uniform, either be excluded or admitted in all cases.\\nMoreover, while apparently a great deal of time of the court would be saved in trying both cases together, yet, when it is remembered that in the vast majority of cases the insurance company pays without any litigation as soon as the amount of its liability is determined in the suit between plaintiff and original defendant, it is apparent that to open the door to insurance companies being brought in as additional defendants in cases like these would clog the courts with suits involving insurance companies which have every intention to pay.\\nFor the reasons indicated, the motion to quash the writ of sei. fa. to join the New Amsterdam Casualty Company as additional defendant is made absolute.\"}"
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diff --git a/pa/1570579.json b/pa/1570579.json
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+"{\"id\": \"1570579\", \"name\": \"Sewage in Second Class Townships\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Sewage in Second Class Townships\", \"decision_date\": \"1947-09-11\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"325\", \"last_page\": \"336\", \"citations\": \"60 Pa. D. & C. 325\", \"volume\": \"60\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania District and County Reports\", \"court\": \"Pennsylvania District and County Reports\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:49:24.616425+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Sewage in Second Class Townships\", \"head_matter\": \"Sewage in Second Class Townships\\nSeptember 11, 1947.\", \"word_count\": \"3680\", \"char_count\": \"21891\", \"text\": \"Gafford, Deputy Attorney General,\\nThis department is in receipt of your communication reinstating a former request for an opinion as to whether the Sanitary Water Board has the authority to require the supervisors of a second class township, the population of which discharges sewage into the waters of the Commonwealth, to abate such discharge or to submit for the approval of the board plans for the construction of sewers or a sewer system and a sewage disposal works, or a plant for the treatment of such sewage. In the latter instance, it would follow that after the approval of the submitted plans, the board would issue a subsequent order to such supervisors either to construct the sewer system and the plant called for by the plans designed to render the discharge of such sewage innocuous or to abate the discharge. It is our understanding that the sewers of the second class townships discharging sewage into the waters of the Commonwealth to which you refer are not municipal sewers but are private sewerage systems which fall into three general categories: (a) those which are laid under the surface but in or across township thoroughfares or township property; (6) those which are laid under the surface but in and across State highways and which may not lie in or across township thoroughfares or township property; and (c) those which are laid in private property from the point of origin to the point of discharge.\\nThe Sanitary Water Board was created by section 202 of The Administrative Code of June 7, 1923, P. L. 498, as amended, 71 PS \\u00a712, as a departmental administrative board within the Department of Health. The board was continued under the corresponding section of The Administrative Code of April 9, 1929, P. L. 177, as amended, 71 PS \\u00a762.\\nUnder the recent amendment to section 439 of The Administrative Code of 1929, by the Act of May 2, 1947 (no. 65), H. B. no. 1016, the board now consists of seven members including the Secretary of Health, the Secretary of Forests and Waters, the Secretary of Mines, the Commissioner of Fisheries and three appointive members. Certain powers and duties relating to the study of the means to eliminate pollution of the waters of the Commonwealth, the adoption of rules and regulations in conformity with existing laws prohibiting such pollution, the exercise of powers previously exercised by the \\\"former Department of Fisheries, the former Commissioner of Fisheries and the former Water Supply Commission of Pennsylvania\\\" to prevent such pollution, and the exercise of all powers which were formerly exercised by the Department of Health or the \\\"Commissioner (now Secretary) of Health\\\" with regard to the granting of permits for the construction of sewage disposal plants and sewer systems were vested in the board by section 2110 of the same code, as amended by the Act of June 21, 1937, P. L. 1865, 71 PS \\u00a7540. The Department of Health is specifically charged with the duty of acting as the enforcement agent of the board (section 2109 of the code, supra, 71 PS \\u00a7539) and the board may call upon that department to do such \\\"acts as may be necessary and proper in the exercise of the powers and the performance of the duties of the board\\\": sec. 2110 {g) of the code, supra, 71 PS \\u00a7540 (g).\\nThe general statute concerning anti-pollution, which has been frequently referred to as the \\\"Pure Streams Law\\\", is the Act of June 22, 1937, P. L. 1987, as amended by the Act of May 8, 1945, P. L. 435, 35 PS \\u00a7691.1 et seq. The'pollution of the waters of the Commonwealth by the discharge therein of sewage, industrial waste, or any noxious and deleterious substance which is or may become inimical and injurious to the public health, or to animal or aquatic life, or to the uses of such waters for domestic, industrial or recreational purposes is declared in section 3 of the act, 35 PS \\u00a7691.3, to be against public policy and to constitute a public nuisance. Under the provisions of the statute the Sanitary Water Board is charged with the important duty of protecting the Commonwealth's waters from pollution and, in turn, has conferred upon it great powers to regulate the same or to abate any nuisance resulting therefrom: Sanitary Water Board Records, 36 D. & C. 27 (1939).\\nJudicial recognition has long been taken of the fact that the drainage of untreated sewage into any flowing stream is a menace to public health. The reason was clearly stated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 240 Pa. 214, 219 (1913), as follows:\\n\\\"Because sewage is the most efficient medium for the dissemination of infecting germs which do their deadly work in such an infinite variety of insidious ways, not at all dependent upon free access of the public to the stream which the germs pollute, it cannot be said that the 'riparian owners alone have an interest in the stream'. When this deleterious substance pollutes any running stream the public health is endangered thereby.\\\"\\nThe legislature's presently applicable enactment on the subject is the Act of June 22,1937, P. L. 1987, 35 PS \\u00a7691.1 et seq. Inasmuch as the amendatory Act of May 8, 1945, P. L. 435, makes no change in the original act with reference to sewage pollution, and in the absence of any duty imposed by any other statute on the supervisors of second class townships to abate the discharge of sewage into the Commonwealth's waters caused by private persons through private sewer lines or to comply with, orders of the Sanitary Water Board with respect thereto (which will be hereafter considered), it is the interpretation of the provisions of the 1937 act that is here controlling.\\nAn analytical consideration of the provisions of the Act of June 22, 1937, P. L. 1987, supra, 35 PS \\u00a7691.1 et seq., discloses that there was a manifest intent on the part of the legislature to carefully designate those provisions applicable to \\\"municipalities\\\" and those applicable to \\\"persons\\\".\\nSection 201 of the act, 35 PS \\u00a7691.201, flatly prohibits either persons or municipalities from discharging any sewage into any of the waters of the Commonwealth except as provided in the act. Section 202, 35 PS \\u00a7691.202, requires any municipality discharging sewage \\\"from any sewer system owned and maintained by the municipality\\\" and any person discharging sewage into waters of the Commonwealth, or in such a manner as to cause pollution thereof, to discontinue such discharge upon the order of the Sanitary Water Board at such time as the board shall be of opinion that the discharge is or may become inimical or injurious to the public health, animal or aquatic life, or to the use of the water for domestic, industrial or recreational purposes.\\nSection 203 of the act, 35 PS \\u00a7691.203, provides that orders of the board to discontinue existing discharges of sewage, in the case of a municipality, shall be by written notice, after investigation and hearing and an opportunity for all persons interested to be heard, which notice shall be served personally or by registered mail on the corporate authorities of the municipality \\\"owning or maintaining and using the sewage system\\\". The same section of the act provides that an order of the board directed to a person to discontinue existing discharges of sewage shall be by written notice served on such person but does not set forth any requirement for a prior hearing. Such order, whether against a municipality or a person, must specify the time within which the offending discharge shall be discontinued, which in the case of a municipality shall not exceed two years and in that of a person one year. Section 204 of the act, 35 PS \\u00a7691.204, prescribes the penalty to be imposed upon persons, convicted in summary proceedings, who continue to discharge sewage contrary to the act or after the time fixed in the notice of the board for discontinuance. Municipal officers are not designated in this section.\\nSection 205 of the act, 35 PS \\u00a7691.205, requires the corporate authorities having \\\"charge of the sewer system of each municipality\\\" from which sewage is discharged into the Commonwealth's waters to file reports with the board from time to time as the board may require. Under this same section of the act it is declared that \\\"no municipal sewer system\\\" shall be exempt from the provisions of the act for which a satisfactory report shall not be filed. It is further declared that the continued discharge of sewage \\\"from any such sewer system\\\" without the filing of such reports constitutes a nuisance and is abatable as such.\\nSection 206 of the act, 35 PS \\u00a7691.206, provides that upon application made to the board by the \\\"corporate authorities having by law the charge of the sewer system of any municipality\\\", otherwise prohibited by the act from discharging sewage into the waters of the Commonwealth, the board may permit such discharge under stipulated conditions provided it finds said discharge necessary and not injurious to the public health or to animal or aquatic life, or to domestic, industrial or recreational uses. The section also provides that a similar application may be submitted by persons.\\nSection 207 of the act, 35 PS \\u00a7691.207, provides that all plans for the construction or extension of a sewer system \\\"by a municipality\\\" or for the construction of treatment works or intercepting sewers \\\"by a person or municipality\\\" shall be approved by the board prior to construction.\\nSection 208 of the act, 35 PS \\u00a7691.208, provides for the revocation or modification of permits issued by the board for the discharge of sewage from a sewer system or for the construction of a sewer system or treatment works after investigation and hearing and upon due notice served on the \\\"corporate authorities of the municipality or the person owning, maintaining or using the sewer system, or the person or municipality operating the treatment works\\\". Such notice shall state the time when the discharge or inadequate treatment of such sewage shall be discontinued which shall not exceed \\\"two years in the ease of a municipality, or a reasonable time, not exceeding one year, in the case of a person\\\".\\nSection 210 of the act, 35 PS \\u00a7691.210, provides that whenever the board serves an order upon a municipality to abate \\\"its discharge of untreated or inadequately treated sewage\\\" which is not reversed on appeal, such municipality shall take steps for the acquisition, construction, alteration, repair, extension or completion of a sewerage system or sewage treatment works or both, \\\"as may be necessary for the treatment of its sewage\\\" in compliance with such order.\\nSection 302 of the act, 35 PS \\u00a7691.302, relates to the discharge of industrial wastes, as differentiated from sewage, into the Commonwealth's waters. It provides that after due investigation by the board and a declaration that such discharge is or may become inimical and injurious to the public health, to animal or aquatic life, or to the use of the waters for domestic, industrial or recreational purposes, the board may order any person to discontinue the discharge of such industrial wastes into said waters or \\\"into any municipal sewer system\\\". Section 306 of the act, 35 PS \\u00a7691.306, forbids either a \\\"municipality or person\\\" to discharge into the clean waters of the Commonwealth any sewage or industrial waste.\\nSection 606 of the act, 35 PS \\u00a7691.606, provides that notwithstanding the pollution of the waters of the State by other sources, nothing contained in existing law of the Commonwealth shall estop the board from proceeding under the act against \\\"any particular municipality or person\\\" discharging polluting substances into said waters.\\nAll of the foregoing statutory provisions, considered as a whole, impel us to the conclusion that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to impose upon municipalities the responsibility for the pollution of the State's waters by private persons discharging sewage into said waters through private sewer lines. It is immaterial whether such private sewer lines lie wholly in private property, or partly in township property, or run beneath township or State thoroughfares, for it is the persons causing the unauthorized discharge in the manner indicated who alone are made responsible by the statute for the pollution. By its very terms the act imposes liability for such offending discharges upon a municipality only when it is the municipality which \\\"owns and maintains\\\", or \\\"owning, maintaining and using\\\" the particular sewer system or whose cor porate authorities have by law \\\"charge of the sewer system\\\" which causes the pollution.\\nA like result was reached in a judicial consideration of previous statutory provisions relating to the discharge of sewage into the waters of the State and embodied in the statute known as the \\\"Purity of Waters Act\\\" of April 22, 1905, P. L. 260, secs. 4 to 11 inclusive, now superseded by the Act of June 22,1937, P. L. 1987, supra, and specifically repealed by section 801, 35 PS \\u00a7691.801, of the latter act. With respect to the prior act, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted the opinion of the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Emmers, 221 Pa. 298 (1908), wherein it is stated as follows (p. 310) :\\n\\\"These public sewer systems and the house drains which lead into them have by the legislation of the state been made subject to the regulation, inspection and control of the municipalities, and the duty of exercising such supervision has been imposed upon the municipal authorities.\\\" (Italics supplied.)\\nIn this connection it should be also noted that when a municipality does own and maintain a sewer system it does so in its proprietary capacity and not in its governmental cacapity. As stated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Hamilton's Appeal, 340 Pa. 17, 20 (1940) :\\n\\\" 'The construction, operation, or maintenance of sewer systems, water systems and gas systems by a municipal corporation is in the nature of a private enterprise. A municipality is not required to construct, own, or operate such public utilities.' \\\"\\nSimilarly, we find nothing in the provisions of The Second Class Township Law of May 1,1933, P. L. 103, 53 PS \\u00a719093-101 et seq., which was reenacted, amended and revised by the last session of the legislature as the Act of July 10, 1947 (no. 567), and en titled \\\"The Second Class Township Code\\\", which would impose upon the supervisors of such municipalities the duty to abate or to submit to the Sanitary Water Board plans calling for the construction of sewers or treatment plants, or both, which when constructed would bring about the abatement of pollution of the State's waters caused by the discharge of untreated sewage into such waters, not by municipal sewerage systems, but by private sewers. It is true that under section 31 of the code, which reenacts and amends section 1501 of the former act (53 PS \\u00a719093-1501) such supervisors are vested with the authority to construct sewer systems for that section provides, in part, as follows:\\n\\\"Townships may establish and construct a system of sewers and drainage, locating the same as far as practicable along and within the lines of the public roads of the townships as seems advisable to the board of supervisors. The supervisors may permit and, where necessary for the public health, require adjoining and adjacent property owners to connect with and use the same. .\\\"\\nHowever, the mere grant of authority to a municipal corporation to construct sewers does not amount to the imposition of a duty to do it: Carr v. The Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. 324, 330 (1860). It is only where a person has a right to demand the exercise of a public function, and authority, which is not discretionary in character, is vested in an officer or set of officers to exercise that function, that the right and the authority give rise to a duty: Carr v. The Northern Liberties, idem.\\nIt is also true that section 9 of the code, supra, which reenacts and amends section 702 (XII) of The Second Class Township Law, 53 PS \\u00a719093-702 (XII), empowers the supervisors of such municipalities to prohibit nuisances and authorizes them \\\"to remove any nuisance . on public or private grounds after notice to the owner to do so\\\". However, in the absence of an appropriate ordinance on the subject, a municipality is under no duty to abate a nuisance for which it is in nowise responsible, although it may be authorized by statute to abate the same. As was stated by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Allebrand v. Borough of Duquesne, 11 Pa. Superior Ct. 218, 223 (1899) :\\n\\\"There is a wide difference between the commission of an act, which, whether committed by a municipal corporation or by a private person, would be an actionable nuisance, and the mere failure of the corporation to exercise its charter power to abate nuisances, not rendering its streets unsafe, and for the creation of which it was nowise responsible: 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. See. 951; McDade v. Chester, 117 Pa. 414.\\\"\\nSee also Martinowsky v. City of Hannibal, 35 Mo. App. 70 (1889); St. Albans v. Noble, 58 Vt. 525 (1884); Crystal Spring Brook Trout Hatchery Co. v. Lomira, 165 Wis. 515, 162 N. W. 658 (1917); Wilson v. City of Ottumwa, 181 Iowa 303, 164 N. W. 613 (1917), and 19 R. C. L. 1102, \\u00a7385.\\nThe case of Commonwealth ex rel. v. Borough of Dravosburg, 38 Mun. L. R. 169 (1947), which is referred to in your request for advice, is not, by reason of its factual differences, applicable to the question before us. In that case an individual developer of land induced the municipality to apply to the Sanitary Water Board for a sewerage permit for a tract of land on which he was engaged in building houses. The board issued the permit to the borough to construct the sewer system in accordance with the plans which the individual developer, as agent for the borough, had prepared and submitted to the board. The developer finished the building project but left the sewerage system uncompleted. The court awarded a mandatory injunction against the borough directing it to complete the sewer system in compliance with the permit issued to it, and ordered that the developer reimburse the borough for the costs of completing the work. In the question here presented to us, the second class townships have not applied to the board for permits, nor have permits been issued, to allow private persons to discharge sewage through presently existing private sewer lines. On the contrary, these persons are using these lines and effecting unauthorized discharges without permits.\\nOf greater weight in the situation before us is the ease of Wanamaker v. Benzon, 63 Pa. Superior Ct. 401 (1916). In that case a syndicate purchased land and built houses thereon from which sewage was discharged into a covered stream which ran under a street in the Borough of Jenkintown. The street was dedicated to and accepted by the municipality. The borough cut openings into the covered drain to provide for surface drainage. It was contended that the mandatory injunction sought by a lower riparian owner against the upper proprietors to discontinue the use of the covered stream as a sewer was improper and that the action should have been brought against the borough on the ground that the sewer was a borough sewer. However, the Superior Court rejected this contention, refused to hold the municipality liable for the pollution, and sustained the injunction awarded against the individual defendants. The court's reasoning is set forth, in part, as follows (p. 405) :\\n\\\"The borough never adopted the underground stream as part of its sewerage system. In fact, in the entire borough the ordinary method of disposing of sewage was by means of cesspools. The conduit in question was not built or constructed by the borough, and the borough never exercised any control or supervision over it. The stream of water that passes through the covered watercourse would naturally be augmented at times by surface water. Where the borough drained surface water into this conduit, it was merely putting the water to the place where it would have naturally gone. We cannot see that by this action the borough became responsible for the act of the defendant in the depositing of sewage into it. . . . As the defendant with others is directly responsible for the pollution of this stream, unless compelled by the facts, we would not shift the responsibility of the defendant onto the borough, nor can we disturb the finding of the learned trial judge that 'under the facts, the enclosed water course under Mather Road is not a sewer of the Borough of Jenkintown.' There is nothing that the borough has done that has contributed to the damage complained of.\\\"\\nWe are, therefore, of the opinion and you are accordingly advised that the Sanitary Water Board has no authority to require supervisors of second class townships to abate the pollution of the waters of the Commonwealth caused by the discharge of sewage therein by private persons through private sewer lines \\u2014irrespective of whether said lines lie wholly in private property, partly in township property, or under State highways or township thoroughfares \\u2014 or to require such supervisors to submit plans to the board with the ultimate view that the board will subsequently order the construction of a sewerage system or' treatment works, or both, in accordance with such plans when approved by the board, in order, in that manner, to bring about the abatement of the discharge of such untreated sewage. Although section 701 of the Act of June 22, 1937, P. L. 1987, 35 PS \\u00a7691.701, provides that the remedies prescribed in the act to abate pollution are not exclusive, it would be necessary, nonetheless, that any proceeding taken by the board on any cause of action arising by reason of any pollution of the character such as is herein considered be instituted against the person or persons responsible therefor.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1594516\", \"name\": \"Wards of Juvenile Courts\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Wards of Juvenile Courts\", \"decision_date\": \"1951-10-08\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"279\", \"last_page\": \"282\", \"citations\": \"78 Pa. D. & C. 279\", \"volume\": \"78\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania District and County Reports\", \"court\": \"Pennsylvania Department of Justice\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:38:23.489723+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Wards of Juvenile Courts\", \"head_matter\": \"Wards of Juvenile Courts\\nOctober 8, 1951.\", \"word_count\": \"991\", \"char_count\": \"5930\", \"text\": \"Woodward, Deputy Attorney General,\\n\\u2014 The Department of Justice is in receipt of your letter requesting us to clarify the extent of authority and jurisdiction of a juvenile court, acting as a substitute parent of its ward, where the natural parents are still alive and available.\\nYou state that your question arises out of the case of a 20-year-old mental defective of moron grade who was declared a dependent child by the Juvenile Court of Bedford County, housed in the county home, and subsequently committed to Polk State School for care and training as a mental defective; and that it developed that the patient has an inguinal hernia which is of opportune condition for surgical correction and repair, in order to restore the patient's physical condition and ability, but that this condition of hernia is as yet uncomplicated, and not a matter of life and death, but only a matter of restoring physical health to its best possible condition.\\nYou further state that the father, who has been deprived of the custody of his son, and who protested the admission of his son to the institution, absolutely refused to grant permission for the operation; and that the juvenile court, on being approached in behalf of the boy, stated:\\n\\\"This boy is a ward of the juvenile court. If you think he should have an operation for hernia, I see no reason why you need the father's consent. You may consider this letter as authority to proceed.\\\"\\nYou further inquire whether the juvenile court, whose ward is a minor, and mentally handicapped, and an inmate duly committed by that court to the custody of a State institution for mental defectives, may consent and authorize an elective surgical operation to be performed upon its ward in the interest of his physical welfare and improvement, notwithstanding the lack of consent and the protest of the parents; and if so, whether the superintendent and an attending surgeon are relieved of any and all liability in any subsequent legal action instituted by the parent.\\nIt is an elementary principle of the law of torts that any touching of the person whatever, without his consent, constitutes a battery. Clearly, a surgical operation would fall within this definition. The following statement appears in Bonner v. Moran, 126 F. (2d) 121, 122 (1941):\\n\\\"We think there can be no doubt that a surgical operation is a technical battery, regardless of its re- suits, and is excusable only when there is express or implied consent by the patient; or, stated somewhat differently, the surgeon is liable in damages if the operation is unauthorized. . . .\\\"\\nIt is likewise well settled that should the person involved be a minor or otherwise incapable of giving consent, the consent of his parent or guardian should be obtained. A. L. I. Restatement of the Law of Torts, \\u00a759, is as follows:\\n\\\" (1) If a person whose interest is invaded is at the time by reason of his youth or defective mental condition, whether permanent or temporary, incapable of understanding or appreciating the consequences of the invasion, the assent of such a person to the invasion is not effective as a consent thereto.\\n\\\"(2) The assent of a parent, guardian or other person standing in like relation to one described in Subsection (1) has the same effect as though given by the person whose interest is invaded, if such parent, guardian or other person has the power to consent to the invasion.\\\"\\nThe principal question presented is whether such consent may be given by a person or agency other than the parent.\\nBy definition, the adjudication as a dependent child constitutes a finding that the parent is incapable of exercising the ordinary parental functions. The term \\\"dependent child\\\" is thus defined in section 1(6) of The Juvenile Court Law of June 2, 1933, P. L. 1433, 11 PS \\u00a7243, as follows:\\n\\\"(6) The words 'dependent child' include:\\n\\\" (a) A child who is homeless or destitute, or without proper support or care, through no fault of his or her parent, guardian, custodian or legal representative;\\n\\\"(b) A child who lacks proper care by reason of the mental or physical condition of the parent, guardian, custodian or legal representative.\\\"\\nIn such case the State provides for the performance of certain parental functions; the following statement appears in Commonwealth ex rel. Children's Aid Society v. Gard et ux., 162 Pa. Superior Ct. 415, 421 (1948) :\\n. . the Commonwealth is the paramount guardian (parens patriae) and will look to the interests of the minor and to the interests which the sovereign has in the proper care and training of children upon which it is to depend for its future existence. . . .\\\"\\nAccordingly, through the medium of The Juvenile Court Law, supra, this duty is delegated to the juvenile court. The juvenile court, with regard to its wards, stands in the place of the parent from whose custody the ward has been removed. It is stated in Commonwealth v. Jordan, 136 Pa. Superior Ct. 242, 251 (1939), inter alia, as follows:\\n\\\" 'Every statute which is designed to give protection, care and training to children, as a needed substitute for parental authority and performance of parental duty, is but a recognition of the duty of the state, as the legitimate guardian and protector of children where other guardianship fails. . . (Italics supplied.)\\nSince the court's authority is substituted for that of the parent, the court's consent should be sufficient to authorize the operation herein mentioned.\\nWe are of the opinion, therefore, and you are accordingly advised, that the juvenile court, whose ward is a minor, mentally handicapped, and an inmate duly committed by that court to the custody of a State institution for mental defectives, may consent and authorize an elective surgical operation to be performed upon its ward in the interest of his physical welfare and improvement, notwithstanding the lack of consent and the protest of the parent.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"163608\", \"name\": \"Kevin TOOGOOD, Respondent, v. OWEN J. ROGAL, D.D.S., P.C. and Owen J. Rogal, D.D.S., Individually and Both d/b/a the Pain Center and Hrant Stone, M.D., by Thomas Stone, Executor of the Estate of Hrant Stone, M.D., Petitioners\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Toogood v. Owen J. Rogal, D.D.S., P.C.\", \"decision_date\": \"2002-03-19\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal Nos. 95, 96 EAL 2001\", \"first_page\": \"38\", \"last_page\": \"38\", \"citations\": \"568 Pa. 38\", \"volume\": \"568\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:24:15.181134+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Kevin TOOGOOD, Respondent, v. OWEN J. ROGAL, D.D.S., P.C. and Owen J. Rogal, D.D.S., Individually and Both d/b/a the Pain Center and Hrant Stone, M.D., by Thomas Stone, Executor of the Estate of Hrant Stone, M.D., Petitioners.\", \"head_matter\": \"791 A.2d 1154\\nKevin TOOGOOD, Respondent, v. OWEN J. ROGAL, D.D.S., P.C. and Owen J. Rogal, D.D.S., Individually and Both d/b/a the Pain Center and Hrant Stone, M.D., by Thomas Stone, Executor of the Estate of Hrant Stone, M.D., Petitioners.\\nSupreme Court of Pennsylvania.\\nMarch 19, 2002.\", \"word_count\": \"94\", \"char_count\": \"584\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nPER CURIAM.\\nAND NOW, this 19th day of March, 2002, appeal is allowed, limited to the question of whether the trial court erred in failing to grant Petitioner's motions for nonsuit and/or directed verdict based upon the absence of expert liability evidence to establish medical malpractice.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"1697809\", \"name\": \"Weston v. Reading Company\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Weston v. Reading Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1967-01-17\", \"docket_number\": \"no. 6107\", \"first_page\": \"231\", \"last_page\": \"236\", \"citations\": \"41 Pa. D. & C.2d 231\", \"volume\": \"41\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania District and County Reports\", \"court\": \"Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:51:42.727024+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Weston v. Reading Company\", \"head_matter\": \"Weston v. Reading Company\\nBernard J. Smolens, for plaintiffs.\\nErnest R. von Starck and Fairfax Leary, Jr., for defendants.\\nJanuary 17, 1967.\", \"word_count\": \"1309\", \"char_count\": \"8044\", \"text\": \"Spaeth, J.,\\nReading Company and Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company have filed preliminary objections to the complaint.\\nThe complaint may be summarized generally as follows : Plaintiffs are minority shareholders of Reading. Reading is controlled by B & O and C & 0, which together own 49 per cent of Reading's voting stock, and B & 0 is controlled by C & 0, which owns 90 percent of B & O's voting stock. C & 0 has used the power it thus has to nominate and elect Reading's officers and directors, who have operated Reading not in Reading's interests, but B & O's and C & O's, to the end that Reading will be made poorer and may be merged more easily into the B & O-C & 0 system. This may be illustrated by certain transactions, each disadvantageous to Reading: In 1963, Reading transferred certain warehouse and terminal facilities to B & 0 and some rehabilitated boxcars to 'a C & 0 subsidiary; in 1964, Reading leased to B & 0 some reconditioned hopper cars; and at a time not stated, Reading leased some other railroad equipment from B & O. Accordingly, B & O and C & 0 must be enjoined from voting their Reading stock, from continuing their mismanagement of Reading and from misusing Reading's assets for their advantage; they must 'account not only with respect to the transactions just described, but with respect to all intercorporate transactions that have resulted in injury to Reading; and they must pay such sums as the accounting shows are due.\\nReading and B & 0 will quarrel with this summary. For example, they say that the complaint also charges that their stock in Reading was illegally acquired, and that some of the complaint is so generally worded that one cannot tell what it means and, hence, cannot summarize it. For present purposes, however, the summary as stated will do.\\nReading's and B & O's preliminary objections are not quite alike, but among the issues they raise are these: First, the objections say that the Interstate Commerce Commission has exclusive or primary jurisdiction to determine whether B & O and C & 0 have properly acquired control of Reading, and whether B & O and C & 0 may be enjoined from voting their Reading stock. Second, the objections say that the transactions between B & O, C & 0, and Reading have not been pleaded specifically enough to state either when they occurred or why they should be considered to have been illegal. Third, the objections demur to the complaint. And finally, they say that plaintiffs have not shown capacity to sue.\\nInteresting as many of the questions presented by the preliminary objections are, and they are interesting and may later become critical, it is necessary and hence appropriate at this point to consider only one issue, which fits most easily under the demurrer, and which is raised by paragraph 3 of the complaint.\\nParagraph 3 says: \\\"Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and, representatively and derivatively, on behalf of themselves and all other stockholders of Reading similarly situated. Reading 'has approximately 2,800,000 shares of voting stock outstanding held by shareholders so numerous as to make it impractical to bring them all before the Court. The rights herein sought to be enforced involve common questions of law and fact affecting the rights of all shareholders of Reading and common relief is sought\\\".\\nThe difficulty with this paragraph is the opening sentence. An action cannot be brought \\\"on behalf of [shareholders] . . . representatively and derivately. . . .\\\" In a representative action, a shareholder sues in his own right and on behalf of others like himself; he must, therefore, show an injury to himself as compared to an injury to the corporation. In a derivative action, the shareholder complains of no injury to himself, but rather of an injury to the corporation, which he is attempting to redress because the corporation will not: Reifsnyder v. Pittsburgh Outdoor Advertising Co., 405 Pa. 142 (1961); Reader, \\\"Suits Against Corporations\\\", 12 PS, pages 1-4, preceding \\u00a71221.\\n'Because of these differences, there used to be some question whether a representative action and a derivative action could be joined: Hornsby v. Lohmeyer, 364 Pa. 271, 274 (1950). Under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1508, however, if both actions are cognizable in equity, they may be joined, provided each is stated in a separate count: Wolf v. Young Supply Co., 19 D. & C. 2d 404, 409-10 (C. P. Delaware Co., 1959).\\nThe difficulties created by not pleading the two actions separately may be illustrated by considering the complaint here. For example: Why was the transfer of the warehouse and terminal facilities wrong? The complaint says because the consideration \\\"was grossly inadequate and resulted in a substantial loss to Reading\\\". Assuming this averment to be sufficiently specific, why do plaintiffs say it states a \\\"representative\\\" action? No injury to them is suggested; only an injury to Reading. Perhaps plaintiffs recognize this and mean that with respect to this transaction their complaint is \\\"derivative\\\". If so, Why must they assert it on Reading's behalf? In a derivative action, plaintiff must plead and prove that he asked the corporation to assert its rights and that it refused, or that if he had asked, it would have refused: Pa. R. C. P. 1506. Plaintiffs here only say that C & O and B & 0 dominate Reading and its officers and directors; they do not plead a request that Reading assert its rights; perhaps they do imply that the request would have been futile, but implication is not allegation.\\nTo illustrate again: Plaintiffs pray for an accounting of \\\". . . transactions between defendants which have resulted in loss or injury to Reading\\\", and for an order \\\"That defendants pay such sums as shall be found due as a result of such accounting\\\". But pay to whom? If to Reading, how is the action \\\"representative?\\\" And if to plaintiffs, why?\\nSimilar questions may be asked of each act referred to in the complaint in uncomplimentary terms. Plaintiffs' answer to such questions, that \\\". . . there is only the single set of operative facts, defendants' wrongful .exercise of control over Reading, from which may be distilled as many rights of action as these facts warrant\\\", is insufficient. For who is to do the distilling, if not plaintiffs? The art of drafting a complaint may be said to be to plead with such exactness that one's opponent in answering must make damaging admissions, and yet to be vague enough so that if something surprising turns up at the trial, somewhere in the complaint there will be room for it. Here, however, plaintiffs have saved so much room that their entire complaint is vague, not just its edges. The complaint must, therefore, be dismissed.\\nPlaintiffs will, however, be given leave to plead again; for they may be able to plead either a representative cause of action, or a derivative one, or both. If plaintiffs can plead both causes of action, and if they distinguish in their amended complaint between them with sufficient specificity, it will become apparent whether they do have capacity to seek relief, and if they do, whether what they seek can or should be granted only by the Interstate Commerce Commission; it will also become apparent to what extent plaintiffs and defendants need discovery.\\nAccordingly, the court enters the following:\\nOrder\\nAnd now, January 17, 1967, the demurrers filed by defendants Reading 'Company and Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company are sustained, and the complaint is dismissed with leave to file within 20 days an amended complaint in accordance with the opinion accompanying this order.\\nChesapeake & Ohio Railway Company has also filed preliminary objections, which challenge the jurisdiction of this court, and each party has filed various motions regarding discovery; consideration of these was continued pending decision on Reading's and B & O's preliminary objections.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/pa/1704272.json b/pa/1704272.json
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/pa/1704272.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1704272\", \"name\": \"Commonwealth v. Carroll\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Commonwealth v. Carroll\", \"decision_date\": \"1968-07-01\", \"docket_number\": \"no. 6\", \"first_page\": \"632\", \"last_page\": \"635\", \"citations\": \"45 Pa. D. & C.2d 632\", \"volume\": \"45\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania District and County Reports\", \"court\": \"Cumberland County Court of Quarter Sessions\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:07:49.041771+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Commonwealth v. Carroll\", \"head_matter\": \"Commonwealth v. Carroll\\nJohn B. Fowler, 3rd, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth.\\nGeorge Carroll, p. p.\\nJuly 1, 1968.\", \"word_count\": \"917\", \"char_count\": \"5324\", \"text\": \"Weidner, J.,\\nDefendant, George Carroll, was charged with operating a motor vehicle at 80 miles per hour on Interstate Route 81 where the speed limit is 65 miles per hour, on December 10, 1967.\\nThe charge was brought under The Vehicle Code of April 29, 1959, P. L. 58, sec. 1002(b) (9), as amended, 75 PS \\u00a71002(b) (9), which provides as follows:\\n\\\"Subject to the provision of subsection (c) of this section, the Secretary of Highways may after due investigation, establish certain speed zones with a sixty (60) mile an hour speed limit on State highways outside of business and residence districts, where traffic conditions and other conditions of the highway make it safe to operate motor vehicles at the maximum speed provided by this clause.\\n\\\"Any such established speed zone shall be indicated by the erection of official signs, spaced not less than one-eighth (1/8) of a mile apart, on the right-hand side of the highway facing the traffic to be controlled, and at the end of the speed zone there shall be an official sign indicating the end of such speed zone\\\".\\nDefendant waived a summary hearing before the justice of the peace and the hearing was held before the court on May 6, 1968. At the hearing, Trooper Roberts, of the Pennsylvania State Police, and Trooper Rendish, of the Pennsylvania State Police, testified for the Commonwealth that defendant was traveling 80 miles per hour for a clocked distance of 2.4 miles in Penn Township, Cumberland County, Pa. The Commonwealth offered no evidence that official speed signs were erected on the highway. .\\nDefendant moved to dismiss the action on two grounds:\\n1. That section 1002(b) (9) of the act does not authorize the secretary to set a 65 mile per hour limit on Interstate Highway Route 81 and that the violation should have been brought under section 1002 (b) - (8) of The Vehicle Code;\\n2. That official speed limit signs were not erected as required by the act.\\nUnder section 1002(b) (9) of the act, the Secretary of Highways is authorized to establish certain speed zones with a 60 mile-an-hour speed limit on State highways where traffic conditions and other conditions of the highway make it safe to operate motor vehicles at the maximum speed provided by this clause. It is apparent that under this section the secretary may set a speed zone with a 60 mile-per-hour speed limit but there is no authority under this section for the secretary to set a speed zone with a 65 mile an hour speed limit.\\nIt is obvious that section 1002(b) (8) of the act is the section under which the prosecution should have been brought.\\nSection 1002(b) (8) of The Vehicle Code was amended August 23,1961, P. L. 1118, sec. 2, to provide as follows:\\n\\\"The Secretary of Highways may, after due investigation, establish any speed limit on State highways where traffic conditions or other conditions of the highway make it safe to operate motor vehicles at the speeds other than as provided by this act.\\n\\\"Any such established speed limit shall be indicated by the erection of official signs, spaced not less than one-eighth (%) of a mile apart, on the right-hand side of the highway facing the traffic to be controlled, and at the end of the speed zone there shall be an official sign indicating the end of such speed zone, except that on limited access highways the signs shall be placed at the beginning and end of said limited access highways and at reasonable intervals in the discretion of the Secretary of Highways\\\".\\nUnder section 1002(b)(8) of The Vehicle Code, it is obvious that the secretary may establish \\\"any speed limit\\\", which would include the 65-mile-speed limit here established on Interstate Highway Route 81. Actually, under section 1002(b)(9), the Secretary of Highways had no authority to affix a limit higher than 60 miles per hour and, therefore, the limit of 65 set by the Secretary of Highways for Interstate Highway Route 81 had to be under section 1002(b)-(8) of The Vehicle Code.\\nIn further support of this interpretation, the amendment of 1961 to section 1002(b) (8) mentions for the first time limited access highways in the section dealing with the placing of signs. Therefore, in enacting the amendment of 1961 to subsection 1002-(b) (8), the legislature must have had in mind lim ited access highways such as Interstate Highway Route 81.\\nAccordingly, any violation of the speed limitation of 60 miles per hour set by the Secretary of Highways should be brought under section 1002(b) (9) and any alleged violation of the 65-mile-per-hour limit should be brought under section 1002(b) (8), and if brought otherwise, is defective. Section 1002(e) requires that reference be made to the section and subsection alleged to have been violated.\\nDefendant also objected and moved to dismiss on the ground that there was no evidence introduced as to the posting of signs as required by the act setting the speed limit. However, the posting of signs limiting the speed limit, where over the minimum of 55 miles per hour, is discretionary and not mandatory: Commonwealth v. Holte, 209 Pa. Superior Ct. 498 (1967).\\nOrder\\nAnd now, July 1, 1968, defendant's motion is sustained and the action dismissed. Costs on the County of Cumberland.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/pa/1746605.json b/pa/1746605.json
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+"{\"id\": \"1746605\", \"name\": \"Commonwealth v. Estes\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Commonwealth v. Estes\", \"decision_date\": \"1973-11-21\", \"docket_number\": \"no. 73-1631-02-6\", \"first_page\": \"330\", \"last_page\": \"336\", \"citations\": \"63 Pa. D. & C.2d 330\", \"volume\": \"63\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania District and County Reports\", \"court\": \"Bucks County Court of Common Pleas\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:38:57.337943+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Commonwealth v. Estes\", \"head_matter\": \"Commonwealth v. Estes\\nAlfred F. Shea, for appellant.\\nMaurice Levin, for Commonwealth.\\nNovember 21, 1973.\", \"word_count\": \"1545\", \"char_count\": \"9078\", \"text\": \"MONROE, J.,\\nThis is an appeal from the order of the Secretary of Transportation suspending appellant's operating privileges, under section 619.1 of The Vehicle Code of April 29, 1959, P. L. 58, as amended, 75 PS \\u00a7619.1. The matter was before the undersigned on a prior occasion, but was dismissed as premature inasmuch as the appellant's driving privilege had not yet been suspended. A hearing de novo having been held herein on June 4, 1973, we make the following\\nFINDINGS OF FACT\\n1. On July 18, 1968, at or around 12:30 a. m., appellant was clocked for speeding while operating his vehicle on Route 95 in Philadelphia.\\n2. Upon being stopped, the arresting police officer issued to appellant a \\\"Traffic Violation Information\\\" which stated on its face that appellant had violated section \\\"1002 B 9\\\" of The Vehicle Code by \\\"speeding\\\" in a \\\"posted speed zone\\\" at a rate of \\\"78 MPH in a 68 MPH Zone.\\\"\\n3. Upon examining the information which the officer had given him, appellant did not notice the reference to the code section \\\"1002 B 9\\\" but observed \\\"the figures 78 and 68\\\" and was \\\"quite amazed\\\" thereby. The numbers did not make sense to him and he realized that he was 10 miles over the speed limit and did not believe that he would get a license suspension therefor.\\n4. On July 24, 1968, appellant voluntarily paid a fine of $10 to the Philadelphia Traffic Court. Hearing was not held on the violation.\\n5. At the time that appellant paid the fine, he was not acquainted with section 1002(b)(9) of The Vehicle Code nor had he made any attempt to inform himself about the subject.\\n6. In his report of disposition of this case, filed with the Secretary of Transportation, the magistrate to whom appellant had paid the fine reported that the violation was for speeding in a posted speed zone, a violation of section 1002 B 9, \\\"lawful speed 60 clocked speed 78\\\" and that appellant waived a hearing, paid fine and costs. The report does not state that the appellant pleaded guilty or that he was found guilty or found not guilty.\\n7. By official notice dated December 17, 1968, the secretary assigned six points to appellant's record and ordered him to attend a driver improvement school. Defendant appealed therefrom to this court which, by order dated September 11, 1972, dismissed the appeal on the ground that appellant's driving privileges had not yet been suspended, and on September 29, 1972, the secretary reissued the order.\\n8. By official notice dated February 5, 1973, received February 8, 1973, the secretary suspended appellant's operating license for 15 days and reduced his point total to five on account of satisfactory completion of the driver training course.\\nDISCUSSION\\nIn a case such as this, the burden is upon the Commonwealth to produce the records of conviction received by the Department of Transportation from the district justices or magistrates and courts of record in the proper form, and the Secretary of Transportation s records compiled therefrom, which justified the suspension. If these documents show that the suspension was given in accordance with the mandate of section 619.1 of The Vehicle Code, the Commonwealth has produced a prima facie case for suspension. If defendant wishes, he may then proceed to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that he was not convicted or that the records or computations of the secretary are incorrect. He may not go into the facts of his violation or mitigating circumstances thereof because the issue is whether he was convicted and not whether he should have been convicted: Schaefer, Jr. v. Commonwealth, 8 Comm. Ct. 539 (1973), at page 543; Commonwealth v. James, 6 Comm. Ct. 493 (1972). Here, the Commonweath has placed in evidence the appropriate records to sustain its prima facie case. This is so even though the report of disposition of the case forwarded by the magistrate to the Secretary of Transportation does not show a plea of guilty or a finding of guilt, as the payment of the fine and costs constitutes an admission of conviction. See Wilson Motor Vehicle Operator License Case, 218 Pa. Superior Ct. 309 (1971); Virnelson Motor Vehicle Operator License Case, 212 Pa. Superior Ct. 359 (1968); Commonwealth v. Halteman, 192 Pa. Superior Ct. 379 (1960); Commonwealth v. James, 6 Comm. Ct. 493, 496 (1972).\\nThe traffic violation information issued to appellant by the arresting officer at the time of the alleged offense is in evidence as a part of paragraph 5 of appellant's petition on this appeal, the averments of which said paragraph were admitted by the Commonwealth at the time of the hearing herein. That shows upon its face an apparent repugnancy, i.e., that the alleged violation was speeding at 78 MPH in a 68-mile zone and a violation of section 1002(b)(9) of The Vehicle Code, which section authorized the secretary to establish speed limit zones of 60 MPH. We know of no areas where the secretary has established a speed limit zone of 68 MPH, but it does not follow that he has not done so and that the area in which appellant was clocked was not such a zone. Section 1002(b)(8) authorizes the secretary, after due investigation, to \\\"establish any speed limit on State highways where traffic conditions or other conditions of the highway make it safe to operate motor vehicles at the speeds other than as provided by [The Vehicle Code].\\\"\\nThere is no evidence of record before us as to what, in fact, the speed limit was in the area in which appellant was clocked. Therefore, the apparent repugnancy in the traffic violation information, which could only be resolved by evidence outside of the information and outside of the present record, remains. The purpose of an information, as with a criminal complaint or citation, is to give a defendant fair and reasonable notice of the violation supposedly com mitted. See Commonwealth v. Olson, 20 D. & C. 2d 709 (1959). The herein information fails its purpose.\\nIt cannot be convincingly argued that the citation of section 1002(b)(9) in the traffic violation information is controlling as to the offense charged. At the time of this alleged offense, Rule 104 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure required that \\\"Every complaint shall be substantially in the form set forth in Rule 105 and shall contain: . . . (6) . . . a summary of the facts sufficient to advise the defendant of the nature of the offense charged, but neither the evidence nor the statute allegedly violated need be cited in the complaint, nor shall a citation of the statute allegedly violated, by itself, be a sufficient compliance with this sub-section.\\\"\\nThis rule indicates that the recitation of the statute allegedly violated is surplusage in the complaint or information and that the factual situation related is controlling. To what then did appellant plead guilty? And, there having been no hearing before the magistrate in connection with the violation by what authority did he make the election or determination that the section of the code violated was, in fact, section 1002(b)(9)? We are of the opinion that appellant by his evidence has overcome the prima facie case of the Commonwealth tending to establish the conviction of appellant for a violation of section 1002(b)(9).\\nORDER\\nAnd now, November 21, 1973, the within appeal is sustained and the order of the Secretary of Transportation dated September 29, 1972, assigning six points to appellant's driving record and the order of the secretary dated February 5, 1973, suspending appellant's operator license for a period of 15 days, are vacated.\\nSection 1002(b)(9) provides as follows:\\n\\\"(b) Subject to the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, speeds in excess of the maximum limits hereinafter provided shall be unlawful:\\n\\\"(9) Subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, the Secretary of Highways may, after due investigation, establish certain speed zones with a sixty (60) mile an hour speed limit on State highways outside of business and residence districts, where traffic conditions of the highway make it safe to operate motor vehicles at the maximum speed provided by this clause.\\\"\\n\\\"The use of the capital letter 'B' instead of the lower case (b) in referring to a violation of Section 1002 is not a fatal error to the Commonwealth's case\\\": Commonwealth v. Thomas, 4 Chester 139 (1949).\\nSection 619.1 of The Vehicle Code, 75 PS \\u00a7619.1, directs that upon the conviction of an operator of a motor vehicle for a violation of section 1002(b)(9) by a speed of 16 to 20 miles in excess of the lawful speed limit his driving record shall be assigned six points and his license suspended for 15 days.\\nThe provision of subsection (e) of section 1002 of The Vehicle Code, requiring every information charging a violation of section 1002 to contain a statement of that section and the subsection violated and the speed at which defendant is alleged to have driven, was suspended by the rule quoted. See Act of July 11, 1957, P. L. 819, sec. 1, 17 PS \\u00a72084.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/pa/1787681.json b/pa/1787681.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..131eca3ff5ab54f8bc00a915bd4f187995ed3032
--- /dev/null
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1787681\", \"name\": \"In re Petition of Edward J. THOMPSON for the Nomination of the Republican Party for the Forty-Fifth (45th) Senatorial District\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Thompson\", \"decision_date\": \"1984-03-16\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal No. 17 M.D. Appeal Dkt. 1984\", \"first_page\": \"366\", \"last_page\": \"367\", \"citations\": \"504 Pa. 366\", \"volume\": \"504\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:01:46.612118+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, HUTCHINSON, ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"In re Petition of Edward J. THOMPSON for the Nomination of the Republican Party for the Forty-Fifth (45th) Senatorial District.\", \"head_matter\": \"474 A.2d 41\\nIn re Petition of Edward J. THOMPSON for the Nomination of the Republican Party for the Forty-Fifth (45th) Senatorial District.\\nSupreme Court of Pennsylvania.\\nArgued March 13, 1984.\\nDecided March 16, 1984.\\nThomas L. Wenger, Harrisburg, for appellant.\\nJohn F. Lyons, Harrisburg, for appellee.\\nBefore NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, HUTCHINSON, ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"64\", \"char_count\": \"428\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nPER CURIAM:\\nOrder affirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/pa/1809571.json b/pa/1809571.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..207cf7295605f514d673ced70bbb1d9c2a320fb6
--- /dev/null
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"1809571\", \"name\": \"The Commonwealth against Deacon\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Commonwealth v. Deacon\", \"decision_date\": \"1822-04-01\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"47\", \"last_page\": \"50\", \"citations\": \"8 Serg. & Rawle 47\", \"volume\": \"8\", \"reporter\": \"Reports of cases adjudged in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Sergeant & Rawle)\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:11:07.099911+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"The Commonwealth against Deacon.\", \"head_matter\": \"The Commonwealth against Deacon.\\nThe keeper of the prison \\u00a1abound tore, an-estertTn\\u2122 }>;\\u2019ousht to him by a constable, and charged with a breach of the peace in his presence.\\nTHIS was an indictment found in the Mayor\\u2019s Court J of the city of Philadelphia, against Israel Deacon, keeper of the prison of Philadelphia, and removed to this Court by certiorari. It charged the defendant with refusing to receive into his custody, Albert Canjire, who was arrested \\u00a1-,y John Topham, a constable of the said city, for committing a breach of the peace in his presence. The indictment was tried in December last, before Duncan J. at Nisi Prius, when a verdict was found for the Commonwealth, subject to the opinion of the Court, whether the offence described in the indictment was indictable.\\nKilter a, for the Commonwealth.\\nThe inspectors of the prison wish the question decided, whether the keeper of the prison is bound to receive into his custody, persons arrested by a constable, under the circumstances described in the indictment. There can be no doubt that the constable had a right to arrest the party, and keep him safe till he could have a hearing before a magistrate. Where is he to keep him? His own house is not safe. The authorities shew, that in every case of treason, feiony, and actual breach of the peate, the offender may be apprehended without warrant; and even though no crime were actually committed, a peace officer would be justified if he acted on the information of another. 6 Bac. Ab. 572. 1 Chitt. Cr. L. 14. 16. 40. Hawk. B. 2. Ch. 16. S. 3. A justice who detains one for further hearing, (which should not exceed three days,) should keep him in the common jail.\\nBradford, contra.\\nThe object is to settle the law as respects the duty of the keeper. We contend, that he is not bound to receive a prisoner without a previous warrant from a justice. Dalton, (Justice 4,) lays it down, that if any man shall make an affray or assault upon another, in the presence of the constable, or threaten to kill, beat, or hurt another, or shall be in a fury ready to break the peace, the constable may commit the offender to the stocks, or to some other safe custody for the present, as his or their quality requireth, and after, may carry them before some justice of the peace or to the jail, until they shall find surety for the peace, which the constable may take by obligation, &c. Hawkins, in treating of this subject, confines it to cases of felony or treason. It would be of dangerous consequence to say that a constable .may arrest whom he chooses to charge, and lodge him in jail. This Court has held, that common report will not justify a Judge ia issuing a warrant. 3 Binn. 38. At all events, if the constable can commit, he should do it in writing, so that the ground of it may be distinctly stated.\", \"word_count\": \"1033\", \"char_count\": \"5688\", \"text\": \"Gibson J.\\ndelivered the opinion of the Court.\\nAlthough the authorities are not decisive on this subject, they go a considerable length to establish the right of a constable to deposit a prisoner arrested without warrant, in the common jail for safe keeping, till he can be carried before a magistrate. Even a private person, who may have apprehended another for treason or felony, may convey him to the jail of the county; although it is said, the safer course is to cause him, as soon as convenience will permit, to be brought before a justice of the peace, and I cannot see any reason why a private person should not have the same authority on an arrest during an affray, which has taken place in his presence. A constable may put a party arrested for an affray in the stocks; and, in case of any offence for which the party suspected may be arrested, may convey him to the Sheriff, or jailer of the county ; although in this case also, and in every other of the kind, it is said to be the safest and best course, to carry the offenders before a magistrate as soon as circumstances will permit. This is the sum of what is found in the books on the subject; and without saying what would be the duty of a jailer in case of an arrest by a private person, I think it may fairly be inferred, he is bound to receive a prisoner offered by a constable for safe keeping. A constable is a known officer, charged with the conservation of the peace, and whose business it is to arrest those who have violated it. It would therefore be strange if, while all private persons are bound to obey and assist him in suppressing an affray, an officer of justice should be at liberty to refuse the most efficient assistance of all, the confinement of the parties engaged. The officers of justice are bound to assist each other in their several departments, and to afford each other all the facilities which the public means have put in their power. There may be cases of such urgency as not to admit of delay till a warrant of commitment can be procured,-\\u2014 as in the case of an affray near the jail; and there the necessity of the case would prove that the jailer ought to take charge of the parties actually engaged ; and if he is bound t0 receive in one case, on the bare charge of a peace officer, I know not why he should not be in another. There is no danger to the liberty of the citizen in this ; for if the arrest anc* detention be improper, the prisoner can have instant redress by the writ of habeas corpus, and the constable may be punished by-indictment, or subjected to damages in an action of trespass. On the other hand, were the law otherwise, .the means- of securing the. persons of prisoners, and of acting with decisive effect in quelling affrays and riots, would be greatly and unnecessarily lessened. I am therefore of opinion, that the indictment is sufficient.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/pa/1809869.json b/pa/1809869.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..401fbbd468a99a6c878a7ad1cef6252d06d1ca96
--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"1809869\", \"name\": \"COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Troy ANDREWS, Petitioner\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Commonwealth v. Andrews\", \"decision_date\": \"1987-09-24\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 1080 E.D. Allocatur Docket 1986\", \"first_page\": \"1\", \"last_page\": \"1\", \"citations\": \"517 Pa. 1\", \"volume\": \"517\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:26:15.387565+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Troy ANDREWS, Petitioner.\", \"head_matter\": \"534 A.2d 452\\nCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Troy ANDREWS, Petitioner.\\nNo. 1080 E.D. Allocatur Docket 1986.\\nSupreme Court of Pennsylvania.\\nSept. 24, 1987.\", \"word_count\": \"93\", \"char_count\": \"570\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nAND NOW, this 24th day of September, 1987, the Motion for Appointment of Counsel is remanded to COMMONWEALTH COURT for the consideration of the eligibility of petitioner for appointed counsel. If it is determined that petitioner is entitled to the appointment of counsel, the Court is to appoint counsel. Amended petition for allowance of appeal is to be filed within 30 days of the entry of the order below.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/pa/182987.json b/pa/182987.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..98dc5126f2adba95b668168e8b6cbc2900e42067
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pa/182987.json
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+"{\"id\": \"182987\", \"name\": \"Commonwealth v. Brown, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Commonwealth v. Brown\", \"decision_date\": \"1981-11-30\", \"docket_number\": \"Nos. 1415 and 1628\", \"first_page\": \"634\", \"last_page\": \"634\", \"citations\": \"296 Pa. Super. 634\", \"volume\": \"296\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:33:05.176005+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before SPAETH, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Commonwealth v. Brown, Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"440 A.2d 1256\\nCommonwealth v. Brown, Appellant.\\nArgued September 9, 1981.\\nDavid R. Black, for appellant; Kristine F. Hughey, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.\\nBefore SPAETH, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"37\", \"char_count\": \"267\", \"text\": \"Judgment of sentence and order affirmed.\"}"
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diff --git a/pa/1892971.json b/pa/1892971.json
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--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"1892971\", \"name\": \"Commonwealth ex rel. Gaito, Appellant, v. Maroney\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Commonwealth ex rel. Gaito v. Maroney\", \"decision_date\": \"1964-11-24\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeals, Nos. 315 and 316\", \"first_page\": \"199\", \"last_page\": \"204\", \"citations\": \"416 Pa. 199\", \"volume\": \"416\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:07:40.244576+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Bell, C. J., Musmanno, Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O\\u2019Brien and Roberts, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Commonwealth ex rel. Gaito, Appellant, v. Maroney.\", \"head_matter\": \"Commonwealth ex rel. Gaito, Appellant, v. Maroney.\\nArgued October 6, 1964.\\nBefore Bell, C. J., Musmanno, Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O\\u2019Brien and Roberts, JJ.\\nStanley J. Reisman, with him Zigmund L. Dermer, for appellant.\\nEdwm J. Martin, Assistant District Attorney, with him Louis \\u00c1bromson, Assistant District Attorney, and Robert W. Duggan> District Attorn\\u00e9y, for appellee.\\nNovember 24, 1964:\", \"word_count\": \"1030\", \"char_count\": \"6132\", \"text\": \"Opinion by\\nMr. Chief Justice Bell,\\nAppellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus which was dismissed without hearing. The Superior Court affirmed the Order dismissing petition, and we allowed an allocatur. The Order must be reversed.\\nFrank Gaito and Joseph Gaito, brothers, were tried and convicted by a jury of (1) burglary, and (2) assault with intent to kill. On July 12, 1960, substantial prison sentences were imposed on both brothers.\\nThe judgments were affirmed by the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Gaito, 195 Pa. Superior Ct. 356, 172 A. 2d 184. This Court denied an allocatur. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, 368 U.S. 998. As a result of the above mentioned convictions, Gaito was recommitted to prison for violation of parole to serve the balance of previously imposed sentences. The prior sentences have not yet expired and consequently Gaito has not commenced to serve the sentences imposed for his aforesaid crimes of burglary and assault with intent to kill. Cf. Ex Parte Cleio Hull, 312 U.S. 546.\\nGaito's petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleges, inter alia, that his oral confession of (1) burglary, and (2) assault with intent to kill was erroneously admitted at the trial of his case. The pertinent facts may be thus summarized:\\nSeveral burglaries had been committed in Dormont Borough, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. On the occasion involved, an off-duty policeman was hiding in his darkened home anticipating a visit by the burglars. They arrived. Shots were exchanged. The policeman and one of the burglars suffered shotgun wounds. The burglars escaped.\\nSeveral hours later, Frank Gaito was found outside the Mercy Hospital in a critical condition, suffering from a bullet wound in the abdomen. He was operat ed on almost immediately. About four hours after the operation was completed, Gaito was questioned by an assistant district attorney, who testified at Gaito's trial that Gaito orally admitted participating in the burglary. Gaito testified that he had no recollection of anything that happened for about twenty-four hours after the operation. The hospital records show that at the time of the questioning, Gaito was under the influence of drugs injected before and after the operation, and that about the time involved, he was speaking incoherently.\\nGaito's oral confession was admitted at his trial, over his objection, and the question of its voluntariness was left to the jury who, as above noted, found him guilty. This practice of having a jury determine the voluntariness of a confession was in accord with the long established principles enunciated and the practice followed in Pennsylvania for more than a century, and had been approved by the Supreme Court of the United States. See: Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953).\\nJackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (June 22, 1964) abruptly changed the law. It decided: (1) that the voluntariness of a confession made by an accused or by a defendant in a criminal case must be determined in the first instance by the Court, either prior to the jury trial or in any event outside the presence of the jury trying his guilt; (2) that an accused is entitled to a hearing in a State Court \\u2014 (a) by a Judge, or (b) by a Court, or (c) by a jury which is not the jury deciding guilt or innocence, if the State requires or allows such jury determination \\u2014 on the issue of the voluntariness of his confession; (3) thereafter, if the Judge or Court or jury finds the confession was voluntary, it is admissible in the trial of the case on the merits of guilt or innocence and may be considered by this jury together with all the other evidence in the case, with, however, the right of this jury to itself determine the voluntariness of the confession and of course its truthfulness and weight; (4) if the Court decides that the confession was involuntary (or coerced), it is a violation of due process (a) to admit it in evidence; or (b) to support a conviction which is based in whole or in part thereon, regardless of the truth of the confession and even though there may be other evidence amply sufficient to support the conviction; and (c) in such a case, a new trial must be granted. (5) If, on appeal from the conviction or in habeas corpus, the record discloses that prior to Jackson v. Denno, (a) a defendant had been found guilty in a trial in which the voluntariness of the confession was controverted or was in issue under the evidence, and (b) the confession was admitted without a prior hearing and ruling thereon by the Court as to its voluntariness, the case must be remanded to the trial Court for a hearing on the question of voluntariness of the confession. If the Court of original jurisdiction or the appellate Court, in the event of an appeal, decides that the confession was voluntary, the judgment and sentence shall be sustained.\\nGoverned by Jackson v. Denno, supra, and the mandate therein contained, we make the following Order:\\nThe Order of the Superior Court is reversed; the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County is reversed; and the record is remanded to the Court of Quarter Sessions with directions to promptly hold a hearing, in the presence of the defendant and consistent with the requirements of due process, to determine the voluntariness of Gaito's oral confession which was introduced in evidence at his trial before that Court for burglary and assault with intent to kill. If Gaito is without counsel at that hearing, the Court shall appoint counsel to represent Gaito in said proceedings. After such hearing, that Court shall enter an appropriate Order based upon its findings and conclusions and consistent with this Opinion.\\nRecord remanded, with directions.\\nand in 15 other states.\"}"
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diff --git a/pa/1897691.json b/pa/1897691.json
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+"{\"id\": \"1897691\", \"name\": \"Joseph H. Reiter, Petitioner v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Justice and Governor of Pennsylvania, Respondents\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Reiter v. Commonwealth\", \"decision_date\": \"1979-05-24\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 2351 C.D. 1977\", \"first_page\": \"61\", \"last_page\": \"64\", \"citations\": \"43 Pa. Commw. 61\", \"volume\": \"43\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:55:19.917211+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"before Judges Crumlish, Jr., Wilkinson, Jr. and Mencer, sitting as a panel of three.\", \"parties\": \"Joseph H. Reiter, Petitioner v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Justice and Governor of Pennsylvania, Respondents.\", \"head_matter\": \"Joseph H. Reiter, Petitioner v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Justice and Governor of Pennsylvania, Respondents.\\nArgued February 5, 1979,\\nbefore Judges Crumlish, Jr., Wilkinson, Jr. and Mencer, sitting as a panel of three.\\nHarry D. Shargel, for petitioner.\\nJoseph L. McCann, Deputy Attorney General, with him Norman J. Watkins, Deputy Attorney General, and J. Justin Blewitt, Jr., Acting Attorney General, for respondents.\\nMay 24, 1979:\", \"word_count\": \"758\", \"char_count\": \"4766\", \"text\": \"Opinion by\\nJudge Crumlish, Jr.,\\nThe Governor and the Department of Justice of Pennsylvania, by preliminary objections, demur to a mandamus action instituted by Joseph H. Reiter. Reiter asks us to order the Department to reinstate him with back pay as Deputy Attorney General and to enjoin the Governor from future interference with Reiter's employment.\\nWe sustain the preliminary objections.\\nDid the Governor dismiss him without the consent and over the objection of the Attorney General arbitrarily, without cause, and without authority in law so as to support an action in mandamus?\\nReiter's complaint recites that the Attorney General appointed him Special Deputy Attorney General and Director of the Office of Drug Law Enforcement in August, 1973, and that his performance in both capacities was satisfactory to the Attorney General. The then-Governor Shapp sent Reiter a letter of dismissal on March 30, 1977, which was confirmed by a letter dated the same day from the Personnel Director of the Justice Department, a copy of which was also sent to the Attorney General.\\nOur cases have repeatedly stressed the extraordinary nature of a writ of mandamus and hold that mandamus \\\"lies only to compel the performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty where there is a clear legal right in the plaintiff, a corresponding duty in the defendant, and a want of any other adequate remedy.\\\" Kaplan v. Smith, 40 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 95, 97, 396 A.2d 493, 494 (1979).\\nAs an appointed Assistant Attorney General, Reiter was an employee-at-will afforded neither tenure nor protection against dismissal without cause. See Rosenthal v. Rizzo, 555 F.2d 390 (3rd Cir. 1977); Scott v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 402 Pa. 151, 166 A.2d 278 (1960); Mahoney v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 13 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 243, 320 A. 2d 459 (1974). This being so, can we compel his reinstatement on the grounds that he was peremptorily dismissed without cause? Obviously, no.\\nReiter contends that, because he was appointed by the Attorney General pursuant to Section 906 of The Administrative Code of 1929, 71 P.S. \\u00a7296, the Attorney General alone is constitutionally empowered to displace him.\\nIt is axiomatic that \\\"the power of removal is correlative with the power of appointment.\\\" Commonwealth ex rel. Schofield v. Lindsay, 330 Pa. 120, 123, 198 A. 635, 636 (1938). Unless the legislature, when creating an office of public employment, provides a method of removal, Article VI, Section 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution by which one ' ' shall be removed at the pleasure of the power by which they shall have been appointed\\\" controls. Commonwealth ex rel. Houlahen v. Flynn, 348 Pa. 101, 34 A.2d 59 (1943).\\nThe Attorney General serves at the pleasure of the Governor who is constitutionally empowered to appoint and, thus, may remove him at will. The legislature gives the Attorney General authority to appoint assistants \\\"with the approval of the Governor.\\\" Appointed Assistant Attorneys General remain accountable to the Attorney General who, in turn, remains accountable to the Governor. See Gwinn v. Kane, 465 Pa. 269, 348 A.2d 900 (1975). Argument that the Governor may not \\\"interfere with the employment\\\" of an Assistant Attorney General is patently untenable.\\nFinally, Reiter's argument that only the Attorney General is empowered to dismiss him is also without merit. The Attorney General's power to dismiss an appointed assistant on his own initiative does not militate against a similar power in the Governor who, as the elected Chief Executive of the Commonwealth, may dismiss Ms subordinates in the Justice Department, at will.\\nAccordingly, we\\nOrder\\nAnd Now, this 24th day of May, 1979, the preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer raised by Respondents are hereby sustained and Petitioner Joseph H. Reiter's complaint is hereby dismissed.\\nThe Petition for Review in Mandamus was filed during Governor Milton Shapp's term of office.\\nFormer Attorney General Israel Packel.\\nFormer Attorney General Robert Kane.\\nSection 906 of The Administrative Code of 1929, Act of April 9, 1929, P.L. 177, as amended, 71 P.S. \\u00a7296.\\nWe Rave considered cases dealing with legislative attempts to restrict the Chief Executive's power to remove appointed officers at will and find them to be inapposite to the case at bar.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/pa/1921119.json b/pa/1921119.json
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--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"1921119\", \"name\": \"Basehore v. Hampden Industrial Development Authority; Walker, Appellant, v. Butler County Industrial Development Authority\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Basehore v. Hampden Industrial Development Authority\", \"decision_date\": \"1968-11-22\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal, No. 167\", \"first_page\": \"40\", \"last_page\": \"67\", \"citations\": \"433 Pa. 40\", \"volume\": \"433\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:07:51.552096+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Bell, C. J., Musmanno, Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O\\u2019Brien and Roberts, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Basehore v. Hampden Industrial Development Authority. Walker, Appellant, v. Butler County Industrial Development Authority.\", \"head_matter\": \"Basehore v. Hampden Industrial Development Authority. Walker, Appellant, v. Butler County Industrial Development Authority.\\nArgued April 24, 1968; reargued June 27, 1968.\\nBefore Bell, C. J., Musmanno, Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O\\u2019Brien and Roberts, JJ.\\nRichard G. Snelbalcer, for plaintiff (Basehore).\\nPaul E. Rhoads, with him Walter K. SwarMcopf, Jr., and Rhoads, Sinon and Reader, for defendant, Ralston Purina Company.\\nTom E. Bietsch, for defendant, Hampden Industrial Development Authority.\\nWilliam, C. Sennett, Attorney General, and Vincent X. Yakowicz, Deputy Attorney General, with them Edward Friedman, Counsel General, for Commonwealth, intervenor.\\nEdward G. Bauer, Jr., City Solicitor, with him James L. J. Pie, Deputy City Solicitor, and Matthew W. Bullock, Jr., Second Deputy City Solicitor, for City of Philadelphia, intervenor.\\nWalter Stein, with him Frederick D. Wood, for Philadelphia Authority for Industrial Development, intervenor.\\nSilvio P. Gerchie, with him Saul J. Bernstein, for plaintiff, Walker, appellant.\\nPaul G. Perry, with him David E. Johnson, and Burgwin, Puffin, Perry, Pohl \\u00e9 Springer, for defendant, Armco Steel Corporation, appellee.\\nNorman D. Jaffee, for Butler Authority, appellee.\\nCharles T. Chew, for Board of County Commissioners of Butler County, appellee.\\nNovember 22, 1968:\\nThe above appeals were consolidated for argument specially on June 27, 1968.\", \"word_count\": \"7573\", \"char_count\": \"46828\", \"text\": \"Opinion by\\nMe. Justice Jones,\\nBoth these cases originated as equity actions to enjoin the respective defendants (municipal authorities, certain officials and private concerns) from taking any action pursuant to acquisition agreements (\\\"Agreements\\\") entered into by the respective defendants pursuant to the Industrial Development Authority Law (Act of August 23, 1967, P. L. 1609, 73 P.S. \\u00a7371) (\\\"Act\\\"), and the Amendment to the County Code (Act of January 12, 1968, P. L. , \\u00a71999g, 16 P.S. \\u00a71999g) (\\\"Amendment\\\"), authorizing the issuance of nondebt revenue bonds by counties of the third to eighth class. In effect, these are taxpayers' suits to test the constitutionality of the Industrial Development Authority Law, supra, and the amendment to The County Code and to test the constitutionality and legality of Agreements entered into between the Butler County Industrial Development Authority and Armco Steel Corporation and between the Hampden Industrial Development Authority and Ralston Purina. Company. In both cases, the parties have stipulated the facts. In appeal No. 167, the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County upheld the constitutionality both of the Act and of the Acquisition Agreement and in appeal No. 91, this Court granted special certiorari to the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County.\\nThe two Agreements here in question are similar in their provisions. The Hampden Authority was formed pursuant to an ordinance of the Board of Township Commissioners of Hampden Township for the purpose of constructing or acquiring industrial development projects. On January 16, 1968, the Authority and Ralston entered into an Acquisition Agreement under which the Authority agreed to buy the industrial site on which the proposed factory will be built and the site would be leased to Ralston for a term of 30 years and the Authority will provide funds for the construction of the new industrial plant by floating revenue bonds issued by the Authority in the principal amount of $8 million. Ralston agreed to construct the industrial plant with the funds and to lease it from the Authority at an annual rent sufficient to pay the interest on and amortization of the principal of all bonds and other obligations incurred by the Authority in setting up the project; if the amount raised by the bonds does not cover the cost of construction, Ralston agreed to complete the project and, in addition, to pay all costs of maintaining and operating the project once it is completed. Moreover, Ralston agreed to pay annually in lieu of taxes an amount equal to the taxes it would have to pay if the project were not owned by a tax-exempt authority.\\nRalston was the assignee of an option to purchase the site on which the project will be built. On July 13, .1967, Ralston gave notice of its election to exercise the option and paid $12,000 toward the purchase price; no conveyance was made, but Ralston proposes to assign the contract to purchase the site to the Authority. Under the Agreement, Ralston has the right to assign or sublet the project once it is completed, but, if it does so, it will remain primarily liable for the performance of the Agreement.\\nRalston has the further right to purchase the project during the term of the lease or after retirement of all debt obligations and, under no circumstances, would Ralston purchase the project without first providing sufficient funds to retire all debt obligations; in addition to paying all expenses of the Authority in winding up the project, Ralston would pay $1000 upon purchase of the project.\\nThe bonds to be issued will be revenue bonds. It will be stated on the bonds that all principal and interest will be payable exclusively from the income, rentals and revenues of the project and that neither the general credit nor the taxing power of the town ship or the Commonwealth is pledged for payment of the bonds. The bonds will state further that they are not obligations of the township or Commonwealth. All bonds will mature before the life of the Authority expires. The bond indenture prohibits foreclosure or execution on any property involved in the project.\\nThe project envisages the construction of a new plant which will employ 100 persons at the outset and will not replace a plant already in existence in Pennsylvania. Under Section 12 of the Act, Ralston will let the construction contracts and purchase machinery without competitive bidding.\\nThe Secretary of Commerce of the Commonwealth approved the project on January 18, 1968, as required by Section 7(f) of. the Act.\\nIndustrial development authorities are not new, the first such authority having been set up in Mississippi in 1936. Today over 40 states have established such authorities. The principle behind the projects is relatively simple. Tax-exempt authorities are established to build plants for private manufacturing companies and the funds used to construct the projects come from revenue bonds which are tax-exempt under Section 103(a) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Obviously, the projects are enticing to private manufacturers since the authority can build the plant at a lower cost utilizing tax-exempt revenue bonds than the company could by utilizing its own nontax-exempt bonds. The projects are enticing to the Commonwealth since presumably they will attract industry to the state or encourage industries already located in Pennsylvania to increase their facilities and increase employ ment. In effect, the federal government subsidizes the construction of plants for private manufacturers to enhance and increase employment.\\nIn most states having such projects, taxpayers have brought suits to test their constitutionality and, in most instances, the courts have held that the projects are constitutional. As in most of these suits, the taxpayers in the present suit have alleged that the Act and the Agreements violate several provisions of the State and National Constitutions. We will deal with their major contentions in turn.\\nI.\\nThere is no question that the Authorities are instrumentalities of the Commonwealth, that the projects are owned by the Authorities and that these requirements are essential in order for the revenue bonds to receive a tax-exempt status under Section 103(a) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code. The instant taxpayers claim that the Authorities are using public money for what is essentially a private purpose, i.e., constructing plants for two private manufacturing corporations. The Authorities argue, on the other hand, that the projects are primarily public in nature, that the Act is designed to attract businesses to Pennsylvania or enhance existing businesses and to increase employment, that new plants will create jobs, and that taking steps to create jobs is within the police power of the Commonwealth.\\nThe Act details legislative findings that unemployment is a serious problem in the state and that industrial development projects are effective means to fight unemployment. The taxpayers argue that it is for the courts and not the legislature to evaluate the public purpose of a statute when that statute's constitutionality is attacked. On several occasions, this Court has stated that legislative findings of fact are entitled to a prima facie acceptance of their correctness: \\\"It is to be noted, too, that the Housing Authorities Law declares the purposes of the act to be 'public purposes for which public money may be spent and private property acquired by the exercise of the power of eminent domain,' and, while such a legislative declaration is not conclusive \\u2014 it being for the ultimate decision of the courts as to whether a proposed use is a public one \\u2014 it is entitled not only to respect but to a prima facie acceptance of its correctness.\\\": Dornan v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 331 Pa. 209, 222, 200 Atl. 834 (1938). See also: McSorley v. Fitzgerald, 359 Pa. 264, 268, 59 A. 2d 142 (1948); Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority of Philadelphia, 357 Pa. 329, 334, 54 A. 2d 277 (1947). Such a rule is salutary for courts are not in a position to assemble and evaluate the necessary empirical data which forms the basis for the legislature's findings. The Authorities present data indicating that there is and has been an unemployment problem in Pennsylvania and that industry is and has been declining and the taxpayers counter with evidence that demonstrates that the unemployment problem is not presently very serious and acute. Courts should not be called upon to sift through such data. It is the province of the legislature, not the judiciary, to determine the extent of the unemployment problem in Pennsylvania and to determine the means necessary to combat that problem. Furthermore, the concept of \\\"public purpose\\\" changes through the years. \\\"Views as to what constitutes a public use necessarily vary with changing conceptions of the scope and functions of government, so that today there are familiar examples of such use which formerly would not have been so considered. As governmental activities increase with the growing complexity and integration of society, the concept of 'public use' naturally expands in proportion.\\\": Dornan, supra, at 221. Generally, the legislature, which is more responsive to the people and has more adequate facilities for gathering and assembling the requisite data, is in a better position to evaluate and determine public purpose than are the courts, especially at the appellate level.\\nAll parties are agreed that unemployment is a problem which falls within the police power of the state. See: Commonwealth v. Perkins, 342 Pa. 529, 21 A. 2d 45, aff'd, 314 U.S. 586 (1941). The legislature has found that the unemployment problem is sufficiently serious now to warrant that steps be taken to remedy the problem and such legislative finding is entitled to great respect by us. The taxpayers have not convinced us that the legislative findings are unrealistic nor are we convinced by their argument that the legislature has not proved that there is a present unemployment problem but that the Act is designed to prevent unemployment in the future. Even if their characterization of the legislature's findings were correct, the taxpayers have not cited any cases holding that it is not within the police power to prevent a potentially serious problem from developing in the future. There is no requirement in the law that the legislature wait until the proverbial horse has escaped before acting.\\nThe taxpayers' main concern is that the party who is really benefiting from this program is the private manufacturer who acquires an industrial plant at a much lower cost than he would have incurred had he built it himself. It is beyond question that private manufacturers receive a very large benefit from this program; however, this fact alone should not invalidate the program. If the legislative program is reasonably designed to combat a problem within the competence of the legislature and if the public will benefit from the project, then the project is sufficiently public in nature to withstand constitutional challenge.\\nIn the cases at bar, the parties have stipulated that the plants will employ 500 persons at the outset and that the projected plants will not replace already existing plants in Pennsylvania. The projects would, therefore, appear to be effective means of combating unemployment since they will create jobs directly. Moreover, there is no constitutional requirement that the entire public benefit from a program before that program can be termed \\\"public.\\\" \\\"It is not essential that the entire community or even any considerable portion of it should directly enjoy or participate in an improvement in order to make its use a public one.\\\": Dornan, supra, at 222. There is another important factor to consider. Industrial development authorities are so prevalent throughout the country that Pennsylvania is at a competitive disadvantage in attracting industry to this state should we declare this act unconstitutional. Even the taxpayers do not maintain that it is not within the police power of the legislature to attract industry into the state or aid industry presently located in the state if such attraction and aid will alleviate unemployment and increase the opportunities for employment.\\nOn at least three previous occasions we have upheld the creation of authorities which have substantially benefited private citizens. In Doman, we upheld an act creating authorities for the purpose of slum clearance, a project of primary benefit to those persons living in slums for the authorities built new housing for them and we held that the act was an effective means to combat the spread of slums, a problem admittedly within the police power, and the fact that certain private persons benefited substantially and that the public in general received no direct benefit did not derogate from the fact that this was a public project. In Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority of Philadelphia, 357 Pa. 329, 54 A. 2d 277 (1947), we upheld the constitutionality of the Urban Redevelopment Law of Philadelphia; Belovshy involved essentially the same issues as in Doman and we held that Doman was controlling. In McSorley v. Fitzgerald, 359 Pa. 264, 59 A. 2d 142 (1948), we upheld the constitutionality of the Parking Authority Law under the provisions of which authorities were set up to acquire areas for parking lots. The taxpayer in MeSorley made a similar argument to that made in the instant cases: the authority, although a public body, was engaging in what is essentially a private activity. This Court responded, \\\"It is no constitutional objection to the statute, nor does it derogate from the public character of its objective, that the Authority will to some extent conduct what may heretofore have been regarded as a private enterprise; to hold otherwise would mean that the State would be powerless, within constitutional limitations, to act in order to preserve the health and safety of its people even though such action were imperative and vital for the purpose.\\\": McSorley, supra, at 270.\\nWe conclude, therefore, the Agreements entered into by the Authorities pursuant to the Act are for a public purpose, a conclusion which effectively answers several of \\u2022 the taxpayers' objections. First, the taxpayers maintain that public money is being used for private purposes; while we agree that the money raised through the bonds is public money, the expenditure of this money under this program is for a public, not a private, purpose. Second, the taxpayers maintain that the Act violates the State Constitution in that the plants are tax-exempt as long as the Authorities own the properties, but that in reality it is the private manufacturers who are receiving the benefit of the tax exemption. The taxpayers rely on a line of eases holding that public bodies may not use their property for private purposes and still receive a tax exemption. See: Moon Township Appeal, 387 Pa. 144, 127 A. 2d 361 (1956); West View Borough Municipal Authority Appeal, 381 Pa. 416, 113 A. 2d 307 (1955); Pittsburgh v. Allegheny County, 351 Pa. 345, 41 A. 2d 639 (1945); Pittsburgh School District v. Allegheny County, 347 Pa. 101, 31 A. 2d 707 (1943); Kittanning Borough v. Armstrong County, 347 Pa. 108, 31 A. 2d 710 (1943). The Authorities counter with a series of cases holding that, if the public body is acting for a public purpose, it does not lose the tax exemption even though the activity in question seems to be nongovernmental in nature. See: Pittsburgh Public Parking Authority v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review, 377 Pa. 274, 105 A. 2d 165 (1954); Commonwealth, Department of Public Assistance v. Schuylkill County, 361 Pa. 126, 62 A. 2d 922 (1949); Commonwealth v. Dauphin County, 354 Pa. 556, 47 A. 2d 807 (1946); Commonwealth, State Employes' Retirement System v. Dauphin County, 335 Pa. 177, 6 A. 2d 870 (1939). The distinction between the lines of authorities lies in whether a definite public purpose exists in the proposed project. Since we conclude that the instant Authorities are acting for a public purpose in erecting the plants, the line of cases cited by the Authorities must control. In Pittsburgh Public Parking Authority v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review, 377 Pa. 274, 105 A. 2d 165 (1954), the parking authority leased some of its garages to private parties and the taxing authorities claimed that the garages were no longer tax-exempt. We responded: \\\"Without some element of private profit to someone the enterprise could not be conducted at all; the determinative question is whether these public properties are being used for a public purpose.\\\" Pittsburgh, supra, at 280. In the instant cases, even though the properties are tax-exempt while still owned by the Authorities, the two manufacturing companies are required to pay an amount equal to the taxes which would have to be paid if the properties were not tax-exempt.\\nThe taxpayers place great reliance on our decision in Price v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 422 Pa. 317, 221 A. 2d 138 (1966). In Price the parking authority agreed with two private concerns to build combination parking garages and high rise apartments and, under the project as planned, when the buildings would have been completed, very little additional parking space would have been made available to the public. \\\"This net increment to the public, in light of the magnitude of the garage project and the substantial benefits accruing to public therefrom, is not sufficient to warrant the public involvement here proposed.\\\" Price, supra, at 338. Not only will there be a substan tial benefit to the public in the instant projects but Price is inapposite in another respect. We held that the agreements in Price violated the enabling act and not the State Constitution whereas, in the instant cases, we are, of course, dealing with a different enabling act and we find no conflict between the enabling act and the two projects.\\nII\\nThe taxpayers next allege that the Act and Agreements violate Sections 4 and 8 of Article IX of the State Constitution in that the Authorities are empowered to create debts in excess of the limits imposed on the Commonwealth by Section 4 and on municipalities by Section 8. The taxpayers urge that the word \\\"debt\\\" should not be given a limited, technical meaning intended to emasculate the intent of these two Sections. \\\"Debt and indebtedness in the section in question are not used in any technical way, but in their broad general meaning of all contractual obligation to pay in the future for considerations received in the present.\\\": Keller v. Scranton, 200 Pa. 130, 135, 49 Atl. 781 (1901). Relying on this definition, the taxpayers argue that the debt of the Authorities is in reality the debt of the Commonwealth and of the municipalities and thus in contravention of Sections 4 and 8.\\nThe Act specifically states that any money borrowed by an authority shall not be the debt of either the Commonwealth or any political subdivision: \\\"6(c) An authority created hereunder shall have no power at any time or in any manner to pledge the general credit or taxing power of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or any political subdivision, and the obligations of the authority shall be limited as provided in section 7(a) hereof. The bonds of the authority shall on the face thereof clearly set forth the foregoing limitation.\\\"\\nThe instant revenue bonds issued by the two authorities were issued pursuant to the Amendment, which states: \\\"The board of commissioners of any county are empowered to issue non-debt revenue bonds of the county pursuant to provisions of the act of June 25, 1941 (P. L. 159), known as the 'Municipal Borrowing Law,' and its amendments, to provide sufficient moneys for the . . . construction . . . and . . . equipping . of an industrial development project . . . .\\\" Section 621(f) of the Municipal Borrowing Law requires that the bond ordinance state \\\"That the bonds are not general obligations of the municipality and that no property or revenues of the municipality shall be pledged to the payment thereof or the interest and state taxes cove nanted to be paid thereon . . . and that no tax shall in any event be levied for the payment of the interest or principal of, or state taxes on, such bonds.\\\" (Act of June 25, 1941, P. L. 159, Art. VI, \\u00a7621 (f), 53 P.S. \\u00a76621(f).) In short, the statutes controlling the bonds issued by the Authorities and the bonds themselves explicitly and unequivocally state that the bonds are not debts of the Commonwealth nor of any political subdivision of the Commonwealth. Such revenue bonds are quite common in this Commonwealth and purchasers of such bonds are well aware that they cannot look to the Commonwealth or any political subdivision for security.\\nOur case law supports this position. On numerous occasions we have held that revenue bonds are not debts of the Commonwealth or of any political subdivision : Conrad v. Pittsburgh, 421 Pa. 492, 218 A. 2d 906 (1966); Beam v. Ephrata Borough, 395 Pa. 348, 149 A. 2d 431 (1959); Detweiler v. Hatfield Borough School District, 376 Pa. 555, 104 A. 2d 110 (1954); Greenhalgh v. Woodworth, 361 Pa. 543, 64 A. 2d 659 (1949); Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority of Philadelphia, 357 Pa. 329, 54 A. 2d 277 (1947); Williams v. Samuel, 332 Pa. 265, 2 A. 2d 834 (1938); Gemmill v. Calder, 332 Pa. 281, 3 A. 2d 7 (1938); Dornan v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 331 Pa. 209, 200 Atl. 834 (1938); Kelley v. Earle, 325 Pa. 337, 190 Atl. 140 (1937); Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority, 316 Pa. 65, 173 Atl. 289 (1934).\\nThe Authorities raise two other points for our consideration. First, the Authorities argue that Section 8 does not apply because the Authorities are creatures of the State and cannot be considered alter egos of the municipalities: however, since we have concluded that no debt was created in the sense that word is used in Sections 4 and 8, this contention need not be con sidered. Second, the Authorities urge that we consider Section 10 of Article IX of Proposal 6 of the recently enacted Amendments to the State Constitution which provides that the municipal debt limitation shall not include indebtedness for any project to the extent that it is self-liquidating or self-supporting. Since we believe this to be the present law, we need not consider the effect of this Amendment.\\nThe taxpayers maintain that an illegal debt is created because the Act permits the Authorities \\\"to pledge, mortgage, hypothecate or otherwise encumber all or any part of the property, real or personal, including but not limited to the revenues or receipts of the authority as security for all or any of the obligations of the authority.\\\" [\\u00a76(b) (13) ]. The taxpayers maintain that the right to mortgage the Authorities' property makes the bonds debts of the municipalities, relying on Lesser v. Warren Borough, 237 Pa. 501, 85 Atl. 839 (1912). In Lesser we held that the constitutional debt limit was violated when the borough floated bonds to buy the water works and used the property of the water works as security for the bonds.\\nThe Authorities counter with the arguments that Sections 4 and 8 do not apply to the Authorities because the Authorities are public corporations and not either departments of the Commonwealth or alter egos of the municipalities and, further, that while the Act permits the Authorities to mortgage the property, both Agreements in the instant cases specifically state that the Authorities shall not have this right. In view of this factual posture of the instant litigation we need not consider this contention of the taxpayers because it is clearly irrelevant.\\nIll\\nThe taxpayers argue that the Act and the Agreements violate Sections 6 and 7 of Article IX which prohibit the Commonwealth and any municipality from pledging or loaning their credit to \\\"any individual, company, corporation or association . . . .\\\" In effect, the taxpayers maintain that both the Commonwealth and the two municipalities are lending their credit to the manufacturing companies who are parties to the Agreements.\\nThe Act specifically states that the Authorities shall not have the power to pledge the credit of the Commonwealth or any political subdivision of the Commonwealth. However, we need not rest on the language of the Act alone for there is a fatal flaw in the taxpayers' chain of logic. The money raised by the bonds will go to the Authorities and not to the industrial corporations; the Authorities will own the fac tories; the corporations will lease the plants from the Authorities. Therefore, if credit is being lent to anyone, it is being lent to the Authorities. On several occasions we have held that authorities similar to the Industrial Development Authorities involved in this case were not individuals, companies, corporations or associations within the meaning of Sections 6 and 7. See: Bernstein v. Pittsburgh, 366 Pa. 200, 210, 77 A. 2d 452 (1951); McSorley v. Fitzgerald, 359 Pa. 264, 271, 59 A. 2d 142 (1948); Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority of Philadelphia, 357 Pa. 329, 345, 54 A. 2d 277 (1947); Williams v. Samuel, 332 Pa. 265, 275, 2 A. 2d 834 (1938); Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority, 316 Pa. 65, 81, 173 Atl. 289 (1934).\\nThe Authorities have also directed our attention to Section 9, Article IX, Proposition 6 of the newly-adopted Constitutional Amendments. The second sentence of that Section states: \\\"The General Assembly may provide standards by which municipalities or school districts may give financial assistance or lease property to public service, industrial or commercial enterprises if it shall find that such assistance or leasing is necessary to the health, safety or welfare of the Commonwealth or any municipality or school district.\\\" The taxpayers do not maintain that this Section does not control the present situation but they argue instead that this Section should only be applied prospectively. However, since we have already determined that the Act does not violate old Sections 6 and 7 of the Constitution, we need not consider the impact of the newly adopted Section 9, Article IX, Proposition 6 of the new Constitutional Amendments. We note in passing, however, that we should be most reluctant to declare this Act unconstitutional and then state that the legislature coTild re-enact the same law after January 1, 1969 when it would become constitutional.\\nIV\\nThe taxpayers allege that the Act, bond ordinances and Agreements all violate Section 81 of Article III of the State Constitution in three particulars. Section 31 states: \\\"The General Assembly shall not delegate to any special commission, private' corporation or association, any power to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement, money, property or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, or to levy taxes or perform any municipal function whatever.\\\"\\nThe taxpayers argue initially that the Authorities are special commissions within the meaning of Section 31 because the primary beneficiaries of the Act are private corporations and not the public. First, we have already rejected this latter argument in the first part of this opinion. Second, we have held on several occasions that authorities similar to these Industrial Development Authorities are not special commissions in the sense that term is used in Section 31. See: Evans v. West Norriton Township Municipal Authority, 370 Pa. 150, 154, 87 A. 2d 474 (1952); Williams v. Samuel, 332 Pa. 265, 274, 2 A. 2d 834 (1938); Dornan v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 331 Pa. 209, 230, 200 Atl. 834 (1938); Poor District Case (No. 1), 329 Pa. 390, 404, 197 Atl. 334 (1938); Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority, 316 Pa. 65, 78, 173 Atl. 289 (1934).\\nThe taxpayers next contend that the provisions whereby the Authorities are empowered to lease the property to private industrial concerns violates Section 31 since the industrial concerns are \\\"private corporations\\\" within the meaning of the Section. Section 31 does not prohibit the leasing of public property to private individuals. While the taxpayers have cited no authorities holding that public property cannot be leased to private individuals, several cases have come before us in which we have, impliedly, approved the leasing of public property to private concerns. See: e.g., Pittsburgh Public Parking Authority v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review, 377 Pa. 274, 105 A. 2d 165 (1954); Clark v. Public Parking Authority of Pittsburgh, 372 Pa. 481, 94 A. 2d 576 (1953).\\nFinally, the taxpayers object to provisions in the bond ordinances appointing local banks as depositories for the funds of the Authorities. All moneys received from the sale of the bonds will be handed over to the Authorities which will deposit the funds in an account held with the depositories and all rentals will go into separate accounts with the depositories. The Authorities will maintain various accounts such as a Principal and Interest Account, Redemption Account and Special Redemption Account. The taxpayers allege that the depositories are \\\"private corporations\\\" within the meaning of Section 31, relying on Beam v. Ephrata Borough, 395 Pa. 348, 149 A. 2d 431 (1959) and Lighton v. Abington Township, 336 Pa. 345, 9 A. 2d 609 (1939). In both Beam and Lighton the depository had definite duties in addition to holding the money whereas in the instant cases, the depositories are banks, nothing more, and they do nothing except hold the Authorities' money. While we have held that the delegation of details of administration is not a violation of the State Constitution (Evans v. West Norriton Municipal Authority, 370 Pa. 150, 160, 87 A. 2d 474 (1952)) it is difficult to conclude in this case that even administrative details have been delegated to the depositories. We conclude that there is no violation of Section 31.\\nV\\nThe taxpayers allege that the provisions in the Agreements permitting the two companies to purchase the properties for $1000 after all debts have been paid violate Sections 1 and 9 of Article I, Section 31 of Article III and Section 7 of Article IX of the State Constitution. In effect, they argue that a sale for such a small sum amounts to a wasting of public assets and, when the bonds have been retired, the property still has great value and should be sold at a competitive price. Moreover, they argue that the public purpose still exists and property used for a public purpose should not be conveyed to private companies.\\nUnder no circumstances can the two companies purchase the properties without assuring that the bonds will be retired. When the Authorities sell the properties, they are not losing money for, through their rent payments, the companies have paid for the projects. The $1000 is a windfall of sorts. Furthermore, if the Authorities are going to charge competitive prices for the plants, private corporations will be less interested in industrial development projects because the cost in the long run will be no cheaper than if they constructed the plants themselves. What is more, just because a plant is sold to a private corporation does not mean that the public benefit ceases for, as long as the plant is used, citizens of the Commonwealth will be employed. Finally, our case law supports this position. In the redevelopment cases, we have approved the sale-of homes acquired by the redevelopment authorities to private individuals. See: Starkey v. Philadelphia, 397 Pa. 512, 156 A. 2d 101 (1959); Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority of Philadelphia, 357 Pa. 329, 54 A. 2d 277 (1947); Dornan v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 331 Pa. 209, 200 Atl. 834 (1938).\\nThe taxpayers have raised s\\u00e9veral other objections, to the Act many of which have been raised in earlier cases attacking the constitutionality of similar acts and have been rejected. We have considered all of, the taxpayers' remaining objections and find them without merit.\\nIn Basehore (Appeal No. 91 Mise. Dkt. 16) injunction is denied.\\nIn Walker (Appeal No. 167 March Term, 1968) decree affirmed.\\nEach party to pay own costs.\\nMr. Justice Cohen dissents.\\nMr. Justice Musmanng did not participate in the decision of this case.\\nWe will set forth the terms of the agreement between Hampden Industrial Development Authority (Hampden Authority) and Ralston Purina Company (Ralston). Differences between this Agreement and the Agreement between Butler County Industrial Development Authority (Butler Authority) and Armco Steel Corporation (Armco) will be noted in the footnotes.\\nThe cost of the Armco Steel project will be $26 million.\\nThe land on which the Armco Steel plant will be located has not been purchased yet.\\nThe Armeo Steel plant will employ 400 persons.\\nA new Subsection O dealing specifically with industrial development bonds has recently been added to Section 103. See 1 O.C.H. 1968 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. \\u00a7103, \\u00b6942A.\\nThe latest count indicates that 26 state Supreme Courts have validated industrial development programs and 10 have invalidated such programs. For a complete list as of 1966, see City of Gaylord v. Beckett, 378 Mich. 273, 144 N.W. 2d 460, 469 n. 9 (1966).\\nIndustrial Development Authority Daw, Act of August 23, 1967, \\u00a72, P. D. 1609, 73 P.S. \\u00a7371(2). Some commentators have argued that industrial development bonds have not been nearly as successful as hoped. See: Note, The Proliferation of Industrial Revenue Bond Financing: Ban the Bond?, 41 Temple D. Rev. 289 (1968) ; Comment, Financing Industrial Development with Municipal Revenue Bonds, 1967 Ill. L. Forum 331; 7 C.C.H. 1968 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. \\u00b66128A. See also: Abbey, Municipal industrial Development Bonds, 19 Vand. D. Rev. 25 (1965) ; Pinsky, State Constitutional Dimitations on Public Industrial Financing: An Historical and Economic Approach, 111 \\u00dc. Pa. L. Rev. 265 (1963).\\nSee: Note, The Proliferation of Industrial Revenue Rond Financing: Ban the Bond?, 41 Temple L. Rev. 289, 309, n. 86 (1968).\\n\\\"No debt shall be created by or on behalf of the State, except to supply casual deficiencies of revenue, repel invasions, suppress insurrection, defend the State in war, or to pay existing debt; and the debt created to supply deficiencies in revenue shall never exceed, in the aggregate at any one time, one million dollars . . . .\\\": Section 4, Article IX.\\n\\\"The debt of any county, city, borough, township, school district, or other municipality or incorporated district, except as provided herein, and in section fifteen of this article, shall never exceed fifteen (15) per centum upon the assessed value of the taxable property therein, nor shall any such county, municipality or district incur any debt, or increase its indebtedness to an amount exceeding five (5) per centum upon such assessed valuation of property, without the consent of the electors thereof at a public election in such manner as shall be provided by law. . . Section 8, Article IX.\\n\\\"An authority shall have the power to issue bonds for any of its corporate purposes, provided, however, the principal, interest and other charges thereon are payable solely and exclusively (i) from the income, revenues and property of the project financed, in whole or in part, with the proceeds of such bonds; (ii) from the income and revenues of certain designated projects whether or not they were financed, in whole or in part, with the proceeds of such bonds; or (iii) from its revenues generally.\\\"\\n\\\". . . The debt limit to be prescribed in every such case shall exclude all indebtedness (1) for any project to the extent that it is self-liquidating or self-supporting or which has heretofore been defined as self-liquidating or self-supporting. . . .\\\"\\n\\\"This bond is not a general obligation of the County and no tax shall in any event be levied for the payment of the principal of, the interest on, the premium (if any), or state taxes (if any) \\u00f3n this bond, such principal, interest, premium and state taxes being payable solely from the aforesaid rentals derived by the County from the Project.\\\": Article III, Acquisition Agreement, between Butler Authority and Armeo. The other Agreement contains a similar provision.\\n\\\"The credit of the Commonwealth shall not be pledged or loaned to any individual, company, corporation or association, nor shall the Commonwealth become a joint owner or stockholder in any company, association or corporation.\\\" Section 6 of Article IX.\\n\\\"The General Assembly shall not authorize any county, city, borough, township or incorporated district to become a stockholder in any company, association or corporation, or to obtain or appropriate money for, or to loan its credit to, any corporation, association, institution or individual.\\\" Section 7 of Article IX.\\nindustrial Development Authority Law, Act of August 23, 1967, \\u00a76(c), P. L. 251, 73 P.S. \\u00a7371(6) (c).\\nBond Ordinance, Article VII, Sections 7.1, 7.3; Article VIII, Sections 8.1-8.4, Agreement between Butler Authority and Armco. The Bond Ordinance in the Agreement between Hampden Authority and Ralston contains similar provisions.\\n\\\"All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness.\\\": Article I, Section 1.\\n\\\"In all criminal prosecutions the accused [shall not] . be deprived of his life, liberty or property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.\\\": Article I, Section 0.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"2573076\", \"name\": \"HEMPT BROTHERS, INC., Appellant v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Hempt Bros. v. Commonwealth\", \"decision_date\": \"2006-09-27\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal No. 24 MAP 2006\", \"first_page\": \"359\", \"last_page\": \"359\", \"citations\": \"589 Pa. 359\", \"volume\": \"589\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:29:17.028556+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"HEMPT BROTHERS, INC., Appellant v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"909 A.2d 298\\nHEMPT BROTHERS, INC., Appellant v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee.\\nSupreme Court of Pennsylvania.\\nSept. 27, 2006.\", \"word_count\": \"31\", \"char_count\": \"209\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nPER CURIAM.\\nThe Order of the Commonwealth Court is hereby AFFIRMED.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"261455\", \"name\": \"HEBNER VS. SHIRK\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Hebner v. Shirk\", \"decision_date\": \"1884-05-19\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 231\", \"first_page\": \"165\", \"last_page\": \"169\", \"citations\": \"2 Walk. 165\", \"volume\": \"2\", \"reporter\": \"Reports of cases decided by the supreme court of pennsylvania which have been omitted from the regular reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:35:25.074980+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"HEBNER VS. SHIRK.\", \"head_matter\": \"HEBNER VS. SHIRK.\\nWhere a son who is entitled to a portion of' the principal of a dower, purchases land upon which the dower is charged, his interest in the principal of the dower, is merged in the fee.\\nError to the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County, No. 231 July Term, 1883.\\nThis was an attachment execution against Cyrus Shirk, as \\u25a0garnishee of Jacob Kalbach. Conrad Loos died in 1855, leaving widow and four children, among which was Eliza, married to Cyrus Shirk, the garnishee. He (Loos) owned among other properties, a farm in Lebanon County. By deed dated Sept. 20, 1855, an interest in this farm was conveyed to William and Isaac Loos, two of the children, subject to the . payment of the interest on $5,653.18, unto Elizabeth Loos, widow, as her dower, .\\u2022and after her death to the payment of $2,826.59 to Lavina Ilert.zler and Elizabeth Shirk, in equal shares, or to their legal representatives. William Loos assigned his interest to Isaac Loos, .subject to the payment of the dower. Afterwards Isaac sold the property to Cyrus Shirk, the garnishee. Subsequently Cyrus ;Shirk and Jacob Kalbach purchased the dower interest from William K. Loos. After the death of Elizabeth Loos, the widow, Jacob Hebner, a judgment creditor of Jacob Kalbach, issued attachment .execution, attaching Kalbach\\u2019s .interest in the hands of Cyrus Shirk. On the trial of the case, a verdict was-rendered for the plaintiff, subject to a reserved point. The Court subsequently directed judgment to be entered for the-defendant, garnishee, on the reserved point in the following-opinion, per:\\nMcPherson, J.\\nConrad Loos died in, or about, 1855, intestate, owning a farm in this county, and leaving a widow and four children, William,. Isaac, Lavinia, married to Levi Hertzler, and Eliza, married to-Cyrus Shirk, the garnishee. No partition was had by proceedings in Court, but an agreement was made by the parties, which is evidenced by a deed dated September 20, 1855. This instrument was executed by Mr. and Mrs. Ilertzler and Mr. and Mrs.. Shirk, and conveyed to Isaac and William all the right and title of the grantors to the farm above mentioned, \\u201cunder and subject-\\u201cto the payme\\u00fat of the yearly interest of the sum of $5,653.18J,, \\u201c(being $339.19 interest,) unto Elizabeth Loos, widow and relict \\u201cof said Conrad Loos, deceased, * * * so long as she may live, \\u201cand immediately after her death, to the payment of the sum of \\u201c$2,826.59J, (being $1,413.29|- to each,) to the said Lavina Hartzler and Elizabeth Shirk, in equal shares, or to their legal representatives.\\u201d To this arrangement the widow assented, and received her interest in accordance therewith, until her death, in 1878. What then, wtas the legal effect of this deed ? Plainly,, to vest the entire fee in Isaac and William, as tenants in common,, subject to the annual payment- of interest .to the widow, \\u00e1nd,, upon-her \\u00abfeath; to the payment of $1,413.29 to each of their sisters. Their own interest in the principal sum of $5,653.18 was-merged in the fee. This would certainly have been the result-if partition had been made in Court, and the widow\\u2019s interest in the appraised value had been secured in the usual way upon the-land, taken by one or more of the heirs; Reigel vs. Seiger, 1 P. & W., 340; Edwards vs. Hoopes, 2 Wh. 420; Stecker vs. Shimer, 5 Wh. 452; Shelly vs. Shelly, 8 W. & S., 153; Stoner\\u2019s Adm\\u2019s vs. Clemens, 1 Barr 118; Updegrove vs. Updegrove, Ib., 136; Erb vs. Huston, 6 Har. 369; Williams vs. White, 11 Cas. 514; Dech vs. Gluck, 11 Wr. 403.\\nAnd the parties here have done by agreement precisely what the Court would have done; they have valued the land and the widow\\u2019s interest therein, have transferred the title to such of the heirs as were willing to accept it at the valuation, and have charged the land with the interest due the widow while she lived, and with that part of the principal which at her death would be due the non-accepting heirs. This kind of agreement is favored by the Courts. McConnel vs. Carey, 12 Wr. 345 ; as was said in Long vs. Long, 1 Watts 268-9, \\u201cwhenever parties have done \\u201camicably what the law would have compelled, it will if possible \\u201cbe doubly binding upon them,\\u201d and we regard this deed as having the same effect upon the rights of the parties as if partition had been made by legal proceedings.\\nThis being so, when William, on February 20, 1862, conveyed to Isaac by assignment endorsed upon the above mentioned deed, \\u201cthe one-half of all that, the within-mentioned messuage, tenement and tract of land,\\u201d subject only to the payment of the \\u201cyearly interest due, and to become due and payable unto Elizabeth Loos, widow and relict of said Conrad Loos, deceased,\\u201d the entire fee vested in Isaac, encumbered only in favor of his mother and sisters. This interest Isaac conveyed to Cyrus Shirk, the garnishee, by two deeds, which were not put in evidence, but both of which were executed before December, 1866. On the 22d of that month William executed another deed, conveying to Cyrus Shirk and Jacob Kalbach \\u201call that estate, right, title; \\u201cinterest, property, claim and demand whatsoever of them, the \\u201csaid William K. Loos and Emma Loos, in law or equity, or \\u201cotherwise howsoever, of, in, &c., or out of\\u201d the above farm, and covenanting thereby to warrant specially \\u201cone-fourth interest in \\u201csaid farm, subject to the dower or right of said widow, hereby \\u201cgranted, or mentioned, or intended so to be.\\u201d\\nThe plaintiff, who is a judgment creditor of Kalbach, contends that William had an interest in the principal sum of $5,653.18, which was impliedly reserved from the conveyance to Isaac in 1862, that it passed by the deed of December, 1866 to' Shirk and Kalbach in equal parts, and that \\u2022 the share of Kalbach, being now due from Shirk as present owner of the farm, is bound by this attachment.\\nThis view, however, as already intimated, we cannot adopt. \\\"When \\\"William conveyed to Isaac in 1862, it was of course in his power to charge the land in his own favor, as was done in several of the cases cited above, and he could have reserved the interest which the plaintiff contends he did reserve, but we look in vain for the language which will bear such a construction. His interest in the land was one-half the fee, encumbered for the benefit of his mother and- sisters; and this he conveyed to Isaac in unambiguous terms. There is not a word which indicates that he was reserving anything for himself, and the language of the deed must have its full and natural meaning, and be held to convey his whole interest in the land. If this is true, William\\u2019s deed of December, 1866, conveyed nothing, because he had nothing to convey, and Kalbach has no interest to be attached. It is no doubt true that both Shirk and Kalbaeh believed that William still had an interest to sell, but if in fact he had none it is hard to see how their, belief and his intention combined could create a subject matter for his deed.\\nIt is argued, however, that Shirk is estopped as against Kalbach, and his attaching creditor, from saying that the deed of December, 1866, was of no effect, because he was a party to the transaction, and paid out money for the interest which he now says was at that time already his own. But how does this estop him ? The evidence do\\u00e9s not even show that he induced Kalbaeh to join in the purchase; both seem to have been innocent, and both ignorant of the true state of affairs. Bach has lost the money he has paid, and there is no proof of any fact which in equity requires Shirk to hear Kalhach\\u2019s burden. So far as now appears, the latter has no claim upon the former, by reason of the deed of December, 1866, and has therefore no interest which the plaintiff could attach.\\nWe direct judgment to be entered for the defendant garnishee, Cyrus Shirk, on the reserved point, non obstante veredicto.\\nHebner then took a writ of error, complaining of the action of the Court, in entering judgment for the defendant, on the point reserved.\\nJ. P. S. Gobin, Esq., for plaintiff in error\\nargued that the parties had no intention that a merger should take place ; Peele vs. Greene, 1st L. L. Rec. 405; Williams vs. White, 55 Penna. 514.\\nBassler Boyer, Esq. for defendant in error\\nargued that the law was well known as to merger. He also cited Long vs. Long, 1 W. 268; Dech vs. Gluck, 11 Wr. 407; Riegel vs. Seiger, 2 P. & W. 340; and relied on the opinion of the Court below.\", \"word_count\": \"1527\", \"char_count\": \"8717\", \"text\": \"The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Common Pleas on May 19th, 1884, in the following opinion:\\nPer Curiam.\\nThe opinion of the learned judge on entering judgment on the reserved point, fully vindicates the conclusion at which he arrived. We do not deem it necessary to add anything thereto.\\nJudgment affirmed.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"281980\", \"name\": \"The Philadelphia Bourse v. William C. Downing and Robert W. Downing, Jr., Copartners, trading as Downing Brothers, Appellants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Philadelphia Bourse v. Downing\", \"decision_date\": \"1898-02-19\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal, No. 138\", \"first_page\": \"590\", \"last_page\": \"593\", \"citations\": \"6 Pa. Super. 590\", \"volume\": \"6\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:26:12.149558+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Wickham, Beaver, Reeder, Orlad y, Smith and Porter, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"The Philadelphia Bourse v. William C. Downing and Robert W. Downing, Jr., Copartners, trading as Downing Brothers, Appellants.\", \"head_matter\": \"The Philadelphia Bourse v. William C. Downing and Robert W. Downing, Jr., Copartners, trading as Downing Brothers, Appellants.\\nContract \\u2014 Rescission of \\u2014 Slock subscription \\u2014 Misrepresentation.\\nBenefits to be derived from the founding- of an institution to the stock of which the defendant was invited to subscribe, may or may not result as alleged, but disappointment as to the result cannot be set up in defense to a suit to recover a subscription to stock when the subscriber had quite as good opportunities of judging as the person who solicited and secured the subscription.\\nPractice, C. P. \\u2014 Insufficient affidavit \\u2014 Contract\\u2014Misrepresentation.\\nAn affidavit is insufficient, which, setting up two distinct representations as inducing a subscription to stock of a corporation, is indefinite in its allegations as to which is false; it is insufficient moreover, when alleging mere expressions of opinion, it fails to aver a distinct statement of material fact known to the solicitor and unknown to the subscriber, which if false would justify a rescission of the contract.\\nArgued Dec. 15, 1897.\\nAppeal, No. 138, Oct. T., 1897, by-defendant, from judgment of C. P. No. 3, Phila. Co., Sept. T., 1893, No. 726, for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense.\\nBefore Wickham, Beaver, Reeder, Orlad y, Smith and Porter, JJ.\\nAffirmed.\\nAssumpsit to recover subscription to the capital stock of the Philadelphia Bourse amounting to $500 with interest from respective dates of calls thereon.\\nThe statement alleged that defendant subscribed for ten shares par value $50.00 of the capital stock of the Philadelphia Bourse, to which the terms of the subscription were fully complied with, and which became due on the first days of the months of April, May and June. That demands for said payments were \\u25a0 duly made upon the days and payment refused. Defendants filed the following affidavit and supplemental affidavit of defense.\\nThe affidavit of defense ivas as follows :\\nDeponent avers that on or about December 10, 1891, the agent of the said plaintiff, specially authorized for that purpose, did solicit the subscription of the said defendants to the capital stock of the said plaintiff, and acting within the scope of the said authority, did represent to the said defendants, that all of the largest retail coal dealers in the city of Philadelphia had or were about to subscribe to the said stock, and that the enterprise was intended to foster and encourage the trade of the retail coal dealers in the city of Philadelphia, and who, if thus interested as stockholders, would be of service to each other.\\nDeponent avers that the said representations so made were false and were made with the intention of deceiving and misleading the said defendants; wherefore and whereby the said defendants do elect to rescind the said contract for said subscription to the stock of the plaintiff, and repudiate all liability thereunder.\\nThe supplemental affidavit of defense was as follows :\\nThat the representations referred to in the affidavit of defense heretofore filed, made to defendants by said agent of plaintiff, were false, and at the time they were so made they were known by said agent to be false. That said false and fraudulent misrepresentations were the inducing cause to obtain the said subscription of these defendants, and said subscription was made solely and entirely bjr reason of the said misrepresentations being made to these defendants, and believed and relied upon by them, and that said subscription would not have been made except that the defendants relied and believed that the statements and representations made by the agent of the said plaintiff at the time of obtaining the said subscription were true. That these defendants did elect to rescind the said contract to subscribe to the stock of the said plaintiff as soon as the fraud practiced upon them, as above referred to and set forth in the \\u2022original affidavit of defense, was discovered by them.\\nFebruary 19, 1898:\\nJudgment for plaintiff for $500 with interest. Defendant \\u2022appealed.\\nError assigned was making the rule absolute for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense.\\nF. E. ShattueJc, for appellants.\\nThere is no distinction to be drawn between the facts in this case and those in the case of Lare v. Westmoreland Specialty Company, 155 Pa. 38. To the same effect, also, is the case of Howard, Receiver, v. Turner, 155 Pa. 349.\\nCJiarles A. QJiase, with him QJiarles Q. Lister, for appellee.\\u2014\\nA subscription to a joint stock company is not only an undertaking to the company, but with all other subscribers, and even if fraudulent as between the parties is to be enforced for the benefit of the others in interest: Graeff v. R. R., 31 Pa. 489.\\nIn Guarantee Co. v. Mayer, 141 Pa. 511, an allegation that a stock subscription was obtained upon the representation that branch offices would be established, which were not, was held to be insufficient to prevent summary judgment.\", \"word_count\": \"1202\", \"char_count\": \"7248\", \"text\": \"Opinion by\\nBeaver, J.,\\nThe affidavit of defense in this case was clearly insufficient. It was indefinite. There are at least two distinct representations set out in the affidavit. Which of them is alleged to be false? Upon which of them did the defendants rely? We cannot tell. It is important, from every point of view, that the affidavit should set forth whether they relied upon the representation \\\" that all of the largest retail coal dealers in the city of Philadelphia had or were about to subscribe to the said stock \\\" or upon that which alleged \\\" that the enterprise was intended to foster and encourage the trade of the retail coal dealers in the city of Philadelphia and who, if thus interested as stockholders, would be of service to each other.\\\"\\nIndependently of this, however, were the representations such as would justify the rescission of the contract set forth in the plaintiff's statement? We think not. At the most they constituted the expression of an opinion as to what would be done by the largest retail coal dealers in the city of Philadelphia, and as to the effect which such subscription would have in bringing these traders together for their mutual benefit. There was no distinct statement of a material fact known to the person alleged to have been the agent of the plaintiff, and unknown to the defendants, which would justify the rescission of the contract. The benefits to be derived from the founding of the institution, to the stock of which the defendants were invited to subscribe, may or may not result as alleged, but as to this they had quite as good opportunities of judging as the person who secured their subscription.\\nThere is no allegation that they made inquiry as to who the largest retail coal dealers, whose subscriptions were expected, were. Indeed the answer to such a question would necessarily have been a matter of conjecture. Equally difficult would it have been to determine who the largest retail coal dealers were. Opinions as to that question would doubtless differ. The representations lack all the essential elements necessary to establish fraud, which will justify the rescission of a written contract: Southern Development Co. v. Silva, 125 U. S. 247; Brown v. Eccles, 2 Pa. Superior Ct. 192.\\nThe judgment is affirmed.\"}"
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diff --git a/pa/3852188.json b/pa/3852188.json
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+"{\"id\": \"3852188\", \"name\": \"COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent, v. Fernando L. RIVERA, Petitioner\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Commonwealth v. Rivera\", \"decision_date\": \"2007-01-05\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 459 MAL 2006\", \"first_page\": \"627\", \"last_page\": \"627\", \"citations\": \"590 Pa. 627\", \"volume\": \"590\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:32:56.593829+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent, v. Fernando L. RIVERA, Petitioner.\", \"head_matter\": \"914 A.2d 869\\nCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent, v. Fernando L. RIVERA, Petitioner.\\nNo. 459 MAL 2006.\\nSupreme Court of Pennsylvania.\\nJan. 5, 2007.\", \"word_count\": \"85\", \"char_count\": \"542\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nPER CURIAM.\\nAND NOW, this 5th day of January 2007, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is granted limited to the following issue:\\nWhether, under the Constitutions of the United States or Pennsylvania a subject may partially or selectively invoke his right to remain silent to certain topics of interrogation, despite having previously and validly waived the right to remain silent?\"}"
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diff --git a/pa/418950.json b/pa/418950.json
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+"{\"id\": \"418950\", \"name\": \"Summerville versus Wann\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Summerville v. Wann\", \"decision_date\": \"1860-10-28\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"182\", \"last_page\": \"187\", \"citations\": \"37 Pa. 182\", \"volume\": \"37\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:26:48.431887+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Thompson, J., dissented.\", \"parties\": \"Summerville versus Wann.\", \"head_matter\": \"Summerville versus Wann.\\nMechanics\\u2019 Lien for Machinery. \\u2014 Alterations in Building. \\u2014 New Erections under Act of 1836.\\n1. The Act of 21st of April 1856, supplemental to the Mechanics\\u2019 Lien Law of 1836, must be construed with reference to it. It introduces no new principle into the lien law, nor does it authorize a lien on personal property. It specifies the objects for which, and not on which, a lien may be had.\\n2. The supplement of 1856 does not authorize the filing of a lien for work done about, or materials furnished for, the alteration or repairs of an old building, but only extends the provisions of the Act of 1836 to certain things or accessions for which claims may be filed.\\n3. Where the frame of an old building is neither raised nor enlarged, but one kind of machinery, of a different kind, and character, is merely substituted in place of that which was before in the building, it is not a \\u201c new erection,\\u201d within the meaning of the Act of 1836, relative to mechanics and material-men.\\nError to the Common Pleas of Jefferson county.\\nThis was a scire facias sur mechanics\\u2019 lien, brought in the Common Pleas of Jefferson county, to December Term 1858, No. 32, by John P. Wann against James Summerville.\\nSummerville was the owner of a frame saw-mill, about 27 by 52 feet, which had been roofed and boarded up soon after its erection, and worked, some ten or twelve years, by water-power.\\nIn the summer of 1857, he employed Wann to construct and put up in this mill an engine, with the fixtures necessary to run it by steam.\\nThe exterior of the building was unchanged, except by the erection of a shed which covered the boilers, which, with the smoke-stack, was put up outside of the mill; but all the old machinery in the mill was removed.\\nTo secure the price of this engine and machinery this lien was filed against the building (describing it), and the curtilage appur tenant thereto. On the trial of the sci. fa. the court ruled that, although there was no \\u201c new erection\\u201d within the meaning of the Act of 16th of June 1836, yet the lien was good under the Act of 21st of April 1856, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover.\\nA verdict was accordingly rendered for the plaintiff for $203.56, and judgment having been entered thereon, the defendant sued out this writ, and assigned for error\\u2014\\n1. The court erred in answering in the negative, the third point put by the defendant below, which point is as follows:\\u2014 \\u201c That if the building sought to be charged with the lien in this case was not a new erection, but that the work done in 1857 and 1858 was a mere repairing or even a remodelling of the inside of the old building, it is not the subject of a mechanics\\u2019 lien, and, therefore, the plaintiff cannot recover.\\u201d\\n2. The court erred in instructing the jury that \\u201c It was a new mill, but not a new building.\\u201d\\n3. The court erred in instructing the jury \\u201c that the Act of the 21st April 1856 covers this case.\\u201d\\n4. The court erred in charging the jury that \\u201cin this case the materials were furnished for fixtures about the mill connected with the steam-engine which changed the character of the entire structure; and if such is the case, the lien is valid.\\u201d\\nB. F. Lucas, for plaintiff in error, who was defendant below, contended:\\n1. That the court should have affirmed the point mentioned in the first assignment of error. The Act of 1836, and all the cases under it, confine the lien of mechanics, &c., to \\u201cbuildings erected:\\u201d Miller v. Oliver, 8 Watts 514; Landis\\u2019s Appeal, 10 Barr 379; Perigo v. Vanhorn, 2 Miles 359; Driesbach v. Keller, 2 Barr 77; Armstrong v. Ware, 8 Harris 520; Norris\\u2019s Appeal, 6 Casey 124.\\nIn this case the building was unaltered: the change was all in the interior of the mill.\\n2. That the court erred in attempting to distinguish between the mill and the building; There could be no mill in this case without the building. The building is that on which the lien operates; the machinery, like the ground, is only an incident: Wigton & Brooks\\u2019s Appeal, 4 Casey 161.\\nIf the old water-machinery had been worn out, and was replaced by new machinery of the same kind, it would have been a \\u201crepaired,\\u201d not a \\u201cnew mill,\\u201d even if the arrangement of the machinery had been modified or improved.\\n\\u25a0 3. The Act of 1856 does not cover this case. It is in these words:\\u2014\\n\\u201c Prom and after the passage of this act, the provisions of the act entitled \\u2018 An act relating to the lien of mechanics and others upon buildings, passed the 16th day of June, A. d. 1886, and the supplements thereto, bo, and the same are hereby extended as fully as the same are now applicable to buildings, to every steam-engine, coal-breaker, or parts thereof, pump-gearing, hoisting-gearing, fixture or machinery in and about mills of any kind, iron or coal-works, coal-mines and iron-mines.\\u2019 \\u201d\\nIt covers the machinery named, but was not meant to reach cases provided for in the Act of 1836. If the alterations in this case were equal to a \\u201cnew erection,\\u201d the now act is not needed. The new act extends to the things named in it, as fully as the Act of 1836, and not more fully, as seems intended by this lien. It covers the machinery, but not the building. This claim is filed against the building, and not against the machinery. That which is to be bound by the lien, must be accurately described: Wigton & Brooks\\u2019s Appeal, 4 Casey 161.\\n4. The court erred in answering this point also : the new machinery, it is submitted, did not \\u201c change the character of the entire structure.\\u201d It remained a saw-mill, after the introduction of the new machinery, as before. The structure was unchanged.\\nJ. G. Gordon & Brother, for the defendant in error,\\nargued that the change made by the labour of Wann, was radical, and was equivalent to a \\u201cnew erection,\\u201d under the Act of 1836: Norris\\u2019s Appeal, 6 Casey 120; Pennock v. Hoover, 5 Rawle 307; and admitting that the court below erred in charging that the case was covered by the Act of 1856, this plaintiff was entitled to a binding charge on the other point. This court will therefore not reverse. McCullough v. Norris, 5 Barr 285; Gast v. Porter, 1 Harris 533.\\nBut the Act of 1856 does cover this case. It was not intended for machinery in new buildings, for the Act of 1836 is sufficient for that purpose : 17 S. & R. 413; 3 Watts 140 ; 5 Watts 115.\\nNor was it intended to cover buildings and fixtures of lessees for years, and thus meet the cases in 9 Barr 117, and 2 Harris 118, for no such reason is expressed. The Act of April 21st 1854, for Schuylkill county, was designed for such cases, and might have been extended through the state, if that had been the intention of the legislature. The provisions of the Act of 1836 are extended to machinery by the Act of 1856, and it was, therefore, designed for cases where new and costly machinery is put into old buildings, as is often done. The lien is filed against the building \\u201cfor the machinery,\\u201d as the schedule shows. It could not be filed against each separate piece of the machinery: Nelson v. Campbell, 4 Casey 156; Lauman\\u2019s Appeal, 8 Barr 477.\\nOctober 28th 1860,\", \"word_count\": \"2501\", \"char_count\": \"13955\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered, by\\nStrong, J.\\n\\u2014 The Act of April 21st 1856, which, it is con tended, supports the claim filed in this ease, is exceedingly obscure, and it is not easy to determine satisfactorily what the legislature intended. Did they mean that the person who might furnish a steam-engine or fixture should have a lien upon the engine or fixture alone; that he who might furnish a part of a coal-breaker, should have a lien upon that part only which he furnished ? If such was their intention, if the purpose was to designate the object upon which the lien should fasten, rather than the materials or thing furnished, for which a claim may be filed, the execution of the law will lead to some very singular results. It would afford no adequate security to the mechanic or material-man for the debt due him. He could then only sell under his levari facias the identical article which he had furnished, which, after having been set in place and removed, would probably sell for less than its cost. Its separation, also, from other parts of a building or machinery, would be attended with destruction to them, and might thus impair the security of other lien-creditors. Again, if the things enumerated in the act are designed to be placed upon the same footing with buildings, and the claim is to be enforced against them separately, as the act declares that the provisions of the Act of 1836 shall be extended to them as fully as they are applicable to buildings, and as the lien upon buildings extends to the ground upon which they stand, a sale under a judgment obtained in a scire facias would carry the ground covered by the steam-engine, or the pump-gearing, or the fixture; and as there might be many such liens on the machinery, or parts of machinery, in a single building, there might be numerous sales of the ground upon which it stood. Distribution among the different lien-creditors would be impossible. A construction that leads to such results is unreasonable. It is not to be supposed that such was the legislative intention. The Act of 1856 was supplementary to the Act of 1836, and should be construed with reference to that. The policy of that act was to give a lien upon real estate, to which accessions had been made by the labour and property of a mechanic or material-man. Never, before the Act of 1856, certainly, was any attempt made to extend the lien beyond the realty, except to coal leases in Schuylkill county. But the things described in that act are all personalty; and if they are the objects upon which the lien fastens, an entirely new principle has been introduced. We think, therefore, that whatever may have been the purpose of the legislature, they could not have had in view anything else than a lien upon real estate; and if not, then it is for the steam-engine, coal-breaker, or parts thereof, pump-gearing, hoisting-gearing, fixture, or machinery, &c., not on them, that the lien is given.\\nWas it then intended to authorize filing a claim for debts contracted, work done, or materials furnished for or about the alteration or repairs of an old building, and not about its erection or construction ? We think not. The act declares that the provisions of the Act of 1836, and its supplements, as fully as they are now applicable to buildings, shall be extended to certain things for which claims may be filed. How fully are those things applicable to buildings ? The answer is, only to buildings in the erection or construction of which they have been used, or for the erection of which they have been procured. To any other than such buildings, the provisions of the Act of 1836 are not applicable; and, to say the least, it is not apparent that the legislature designed to extend them to others. The extension spoken of in the act is not to another class of buildings, or to buildings at all, but to certain accessions, including machinery in and about mills of any kind, iron or coal works, and iron-mines. True, it is to machinery in and about mills of any Icind, but this evidently refers to the genus of the mill, as an oil-mill, a grist-mill, or a saw-mill, rather than to varieties in age, or differences in the time of construction.\\nIt is argued, however, that such an interpretation of the Act of 1856 makes it unmeaning. It is said, that without the act, there was a lien upon new mills for steam-engines and machinery used in their construction, and that, unless the lien be now extended to buildings altered or repaired, the act has accomplished nothing. It must be conceded, that for engines and machinery, constituting a part of a new mill, there was a lien under the Act of 1836; but, if placed in the mill, or about it, and no constituent part of the erection, they were not within the lien laws. So, if used in or about iron or coal works, but not furnished for or about the erection -or construction of a building, they could not be made the ground of a lien. There is, therefore, something upon which the Act of 1856 can operate, without its being held' applicable to old buildings altered or repaired.\\n\\u2022 We have said enough to indicate that, in our opinion, it was erroneous to instruct the jury that the case of the plaintiff below Was covered by the Act of April 21st 1856.\\nIt is, however, argued by the defendant in error, that, even if the court erred, in holding that the Act of 1856 authorized filing a claim, although the mill was not a new erection, yet that no harm was done by the instruction, because the mill was a new erection within the meaning of the Act of 1836. Without undertaking to review the cases which have discussed what changes made in an old building constitute it a new one, within the sense of the mechanics' lien law, cases not easily reconcilable, it may suffice now to say, we are all of opinion that the alterations made in the saw-mill, against which this claim was filed, were not an erection of the building. They were very great, but they were principally changes in the internal structure and arrangement. The old machinery was taken out and replaced by new, of a different character. But the frame of the old mill was left. The building was not raised higher, nor enlarged. Were we to rule that a mere substitution of one kind of machinery for another, within a mill, without any change in the frame which encloses it, amounts to a new erection of the building, we should go much beyond what has been decided in any other case. We concur, therefore, with the opinion of the Court of Common Pleas, that what was done to the building did not constitute a new erection within the meaning of the Act of 16th June 1836. The case is sent back only because the learned judge ruled that it was covered by the Act of 1856, and that the claimant might have a lien for alterations of an old mill.\\nJudgment reversed, and a venire de novo awarded.\\nThompson, J., dissented.\"}"
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diff --git a/pa/425148.json b/pa/425148.json
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+"{\"id\": \"425148\", \"name\": \"Evans versus The Philadelphia Club\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Evans v. Philadelphia Club\", \"decision_date\": \"1865\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"107\", \"last_page\": \"127\", \"citations\": \"50 Pa. 107\", \"volume\": \"50\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:37:56.524196+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Evans versus The Philadelphia Club.\", \"head_matter\": \"Evans versus The Philadelphia Club.\\nAmotion and disfranchisement of members of private corporations, discussed and distinguished.\\n1. The power of amotion for adequate cause is an inherent incident of all corporations, whether municipal or private, except, perhaps, such as are literary or eleemosynary; but the exercise of this power does not affect the private rights of the corporator in the franchise.\\n2. The power of disfranchisement which does destroy the member\\u2019s franchise, must in general be conferred by statute, and is never sustained as an incidental power except on conviction of the member in a court of justice for an infamous offence, and for the commission of some act against the society which tends to its destruction or injury.\\n3. Though the power to make by-laws is incidental to corporations and is generally expressly conferred by statute, yet by-laws which vest in a majority the power of expulsion for minor offences are, in so far, void, and expulsions made under them will not be sustained in courts of justice.\\n4. In joint stock companies or in any corporation owning property, no power of expulsion can be \\u25a0 exercised unless expressly conferred by the charter.\\n5. Where two members of a private corporation or club were sitting together in conversation in the bar-room of the club-house, a third came in and used insulting language, understood by one of the two to be applied to himself, who thereupon struck the offender: the act was held not such as would justify his expulsion from the club, by the members thereof.\\nCertificate from the Court at Nisi Prius.\\nThis was a proceeding by Rowland E. Evans against The Philadelphia Club, commenced by a petition of the relator January 30th 1864, in which he set forth that he was, on the 1st day of June 1863, and for a long time previously thereto had been, a member of The Philadelphia Club, which was incorporated by an Act of Assembly of this Commonwealth, approved the 9th day of May 1850, under the name of \\u201c The Philadelphia Association and Reading-Room,\\u201d with authority to elect officers, to establish bylaws for their government, and to hold real estate not exceeding in yearly value three thousand dollars, and that the name was subsequently duly changed to The Philadelphia Club?\\nThat the corporation owns certain real estate, and has its only place of business within the city and county of Philadelphia.\\nThat he was, many years ago, duly made a member of the said corporation, and as such had and has a right and interest in the said real estate and property, and has always, since his becoming a member as aforesaid, until the time of the grievance hereinafter complained of, enjoyed the benefits and exercised the privileges of such membership, and has committed no act by reason of which he could justly be deprived of his said right and memhership.\\nThat on or about the 19th day of May 1863 he received a printed notice, stating that a special meeting of the said corporation would be held on the 1st day of June then next, to take into consideration \\u201c the circumstances of an alleged violation by Row land E. Evans of Ms duty as a corporator, by being guilty of disorderly conduct within the walls of the club, in offering a blow to Samuel B. Thomas, one of its members, on the evening of the 24th of February 1863, and the propriety of expelling the said Rowland E. Evans from his membership of the club, he having been heretofore, to wit, on the 7th of March 1863, requested by the board of direction to resign from the olub, by reason of such conduct, and having thereupon refused so to do. By order of the board of direction, and signed M. Edward Rogers, Secretary and that at a meeting so held on the 1st day of June 1863, certain proceedings were had by which a certain number of the persons then and there present undertook to pass and passed a resolution to expel him from his membership of the said club, and to deprive him of his rights as a member and corporator thereof, and that he was subsequently notified by the said corporation, or by some one on its behalf, of his said expulsion or attempted expulsion and deprivation of membership.\\nHe then averred that by reason of the premises his said attempted expulsion and deprivation was unjust, illegal, and contrary to the rules and laws by which corporations are governed and controlled, and that he has been greatly wronged and injured in being deprived of his rights of membership of the said corporation as aforesaid; and praying for a writ of mandamus to be directed to the said The Philadelphia Club, commanding it forthwith to restore him to the exercise of his rights of a member and corporator of the said corporation, or to show cause if any it has why he should not be restored to his rights as aforesaid.\\nOn the 30th of January 1864 a writ of alternative mandamus was sued out, to which the defendants filed a return, in which they admitted their incorporation and change of name, as stated in the j>etition of the relator.\\nThey further averred that for more than twenty years before the passage of this act, the Philadelphia Club had existed as an unincorpord\\u00edfced association, was originally formed solely for purposes of social intercourse, and never had any other end or purpose either before or since its incorporation. That its existence and continuance required the adoption of, and the strict compliance with, certain rules of internal discipline, regulating the intercourse of its members, and that they had established certain by-laws for this purpose, which provided that the affairs of the club should be managed by a board of direction, consisting of the president and six directors, who should be elected at the stated meeting in April in every year, wfio should have and exercise a general superintendence of the affairs of the club, control and manage its property and effects, and enforce the preservation of order, and obedience to the rules.\\nThat the said by-laws provided that if the conduct of a member should be disorderly, or injurious to the interest of the club, or contrary to its by-laws, the board should inform him thereof in writing, and if the nature of the offence require it, should request him to resign; and that should such information or request be disregarded,, the board should refer the matter to the next stated meeting of the club, or to a special meeting to be called for the purpose, of which due notice should be given to the offending member ; at which meeting the circumstances of the case should be considered, and the member might be expelled.\\nThat the sixty-eighth by-law provided that the board of direction, by a unanimous vote by ballot of all its members, might expel a member of the club for an infraction of either of the bylaws numbered 28, 58, and 78, or for intentional violation of the by-laws relating to the ballot, or for other gross misconduct, immediate notice of which expulsion should be given him. Such expulsion should be final, unless reversed by a special meeting of the club, which, at the written request of the member so expelled, made within thirty days thereafter, should be called by the board. A copy of the notice of the said meeting should be sent to the offender, who should have the right to be present and to be heard thereat.\\nThat the thirty-ninth by-law provided that all interest in the property of the club, of members resigning, or otherwise ceasing to be members, should be vested in the club.\\nThat the by-laws regulating meetings of the club were and are, so far as respects the present case, as follows:\\u2014\\nThe fourteenth provided that notice of every meeting of the club, whether stated or special, should be posted upon the noticeboard at least ten days before the time assigned for such meeting.\\nThe next provided that it should be the duty of the board to call a special meeting of the club, upon the written request of ten members, and such a meeting might also be called whenever the board might deem it expedient.\\nThe next provided that the notice of a special meeting should specify the time, and also the purpose for which it might be called; and such meeting should not consider Or take action on any matter other than that specified in said notice.\\nThe next provided that at any meeting of the club for action on the conduct of a member, which might involve his expulsion, or for an alteration of the by-laws, one-fourth of the whole number of the members of the club should be a quorum.\\nAnd the twentieth provided, that a motion involving the expulsion of a member, should be decided by ballot, and the decision of a majority should be final.\\nThe defendants annexed a copy of all the by-laws of the club, which they prayed might be taken as part of their return; and averred further \\u201c that the club owns no other real estate than its club-house.\\n\\u201c That the relator was elected a member of the club in the year 1848, and became a member thereof, and thereby bound himself to the observance of such by-laws as had been established for its government.\\n\\u201c That on the evening of the 24th of February 1863, the defendant was guilty of breaking the sixty-fifth by-law, by having an altercation within the walls of the club-house, with Samuel B. Thomas, another of its members, and by striking him a blow. An investigation of the case by the board of direction, after due notice Do the relator, and hearing and considering all the circumstances of the case as detailed in writing by the relator, by the said Samuel B. Thomas, and by all the eye-witnesses of the transaction, resulted in the request from\\\" the board to the relator, that he should resign his membership of the club. This the relator declined to do. Whereupon a special meeting of the club was called on the 23d of March 1863, the object of the call being stated to be, \\u2018 to take into consideration the refusal of a member to resign from the club, on the request of the board of directors, as provided for in by-laws 65 and 66.\\u2019 At the meeting so called, certain proceedings were had (the whole of which are set forth in the exhibits annexed hereto), which resulted in the expulsion of the relator from his membership.\\n\\u201c That upon his said expulsion, the relator obtained from the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia county a writ of alternative mandamus, commanding the defendants to restore him to his rights and privileges as a member of the club, or to show cause why the same should not be done. To which writ the defendants filed their return, to which the relator demurred.\\n\\u201c That on the 16th of May 1863, the said court gave judgment for the relator on the demurrer, and granted his prayer for a peremptory mandamus, on the ground that although the conduct of the relator had been such as to warrant his disfranchisement, yet that his mere refusal to resign, upon the request of the board of direction, was not, of itself, a ground of expulsion within either the express or the inherent powers of the charter, and the meeting of the club having been called for the sole purpose of taking action upon such refusal to resign, its proceedings, which resulted in such expulsion, were irregular.\\n\\u201c That the defendants were advised to comply with the said decision, and without testing its correctness by removing the proceedings to this court, to restore the relator to his membership', and take new action in the case; and, that at a special meeting, therefore, of the board of direction, held on the 18th of May 1863, a quorum being present, it was resolved that the secretary be requested to inform the relator, that, in obedience to the decision on the 16th day of that month, of the Court of Common Pleas, in the case of The Commonwealth v. The Philadelphia Club, he was restored to Ms rights and privileges as a member thereof; and it \\u25a0WEis further resolved, that a special meeting of the club be called at the time and for the purpose mentioned in the following notice, to be posted upon the notice-board according to the by-laws: That notice of such meeting be given to the relator, and that such notice be accompanied by a copy of the testimony presented to the board of direction on the 7th of March 1863.\\n[The notice was the same which the relator in his suggestion admits to have received on the 19th of May 1863, as above.]\\n\\u201c That with this notice, the testimony which was before the club at the time of his first expulsion, consisting of letters from certain persons who were present when the alleged -offence was committed, was sent to the relator.\\n\\u201c That notice of the meeting to be held on the 1st of June 1863 was duly given, and that a meeting consisting of over one hundred members was held, before whom the previous proceedings and the testimony were laid, read, and considered, after which a motion to expel was passed by a vote of sixty-eight to thirty-two of the members.\\u201d\\nAll which the defendants set forth as the cause for which the \\u2022relator was disfranchised from his membership of the said corporation, and the proceedings by which this disfranchisement was effected; and prayed to be hence dismissed with their costs and charges.\\nTo this return the relator demurred specially, and for cause of demurrer showed:\\u2014\\nI. That the said return does not set forth and show any power in the defendants to expel the said relator from the said Philadelphia Club.\\nII. That the said return does not set forth and show any sufficient grounds or cause for the expulsion of the said relator from the said Philadelphia Club.\\nIII. That no specific act or offence whatsoever is charged in the said return against the said relator, or alleged to have been committed by him either against the said Philadelphia Club, or against the said relator\\u2019s duty as a corporator thereof, by reason of which there was any ground, cause, or right to expel him from the said corporation.\\nIV. That the alleged proceedings under and by virtue of which the said relator was expelled from the said corporation, as set forth and shown in the said return, are wholly irregular and void:\\n1. Because the notice of the said meeting to be held on the 1st day of June 1863, should have been served upon and given to the members of the said corporation in person or specifically, whereas it does not appear in the said return that such personal or specific notice was given to the said' members.\\n2. Because there was no proper examination made or proofs given at the said meeting, held on the 1st day of June 1863, of any offence committed or act done by the said relator, by reason of which he was expelled from the said corporation; and\\n3. Because there was no conviction had or found at the said meeting, held on the 1st day of June 1863, of any offence committed or act done by the said relator, by reason of which he was expelled from the said corporation.\\nThose proceedings raised the following questions:\\u2014\\n1. Had the defendants any power to expel the relator ?\\n2. Had the conduct of the relator been such as to justify an exercise of this power ? and\\n3. Were the proceedings, by which he was expelled, regular ?\\nThese questions were argued at Nisi Prius on the 24th of February 1864, before the chief justice. On the 11th of March, the learned judge (Woodward, C. J.) delivered the following opinion:\\n44 This case touches the power of a private corporation to disfranchise one of its members, and it will be necessary and proper to examine, somewhat minutely, the authorities of the law bearing upon the point.\\n44 The leading case upon this branch of law is that of James Bagg, decided in the reign of James I. (a. d. 1616), and reported^ in Coke\\u2019s Reports, part xi,,p. 93. Bagg was one of twelve chief burgesses of the borough of Plymouth, in England, and having-been guilty of the most scandalous and disorderly speeches to the mayor and his fellow burgesses, was expelled, but the King\\u2019s Bench restored him by mandamus. Among other things it was \\u201cresolved, 4 that no freeman of any corporation can be disfranchised by the corporation, unless they have authority to do it, either by the express words of the charter or by prescription; but if they have not authority, neither by charter nor prescription, then he ought to be convicted by course of law before he can be removed.\\u2019 And in support of this, Lord Coke quotes that famous clause of Magna Charta, beginning 4 JVullus liber homo,\\u2019 &c.\\n44 Though much was said about disfranchisement in Bagg\\u2019s case, it was really a case of amotion, and not of disfranchisement. Bagg was removed from the office of burgess, and not expelled from the borough by the action of the corporation. Mr. Willcock, in his excellent treatise on corporations, page 270, defines amotion as applicable only to officers, and says it causes \\u25a0 a cessation of the particular offices from which they are amoved, but in no manner affects their right to the freedom of the municipality ; whilst disfranchisement is applicable only to the freedom, and cuts off the corporator from all rights and privileges of the corporation. It appears, he says, that there is not an incidental right in corporations to disfranchise their members, but it must be claimed by prescription or express grant of the charter. For this he refers himself to Bagg\\u2019s case, which, he says, has never been expressly overruled; the cases in which it has been questioned having been cases of amotion. He then goes on to make some general observations on the subject, all of which are so excellent, and some of which are so pertinent to the case in hand, that I am tempted to transcribe them. He says: \\u2018At the time when James Bagg\\u2019s case was before the court, their attention had been rarely attracted to the consideration of corporate causes, and the distinction between the right to the offices' and the right to the freedom of a municipality had been little considered. The particular case was of amotion from office; the arguments were in general more applicable to disfranchisement. But there is a material difference in principle. The enjoyment of office is not for the private benefit of the corporator, but an honourable distinction which he holds for the welfare of the corporation, and therefore, though it be an office of a freehold nature, it is entirely conditional. * * * But the franchise of a freeman is wholly for his own benefit, and a private right; a right in the municipality similar to that of a natural subject in the state, of which he ought not to be deprived for any minor offence against his corporate fealty, any more than that for which, as a subject, he ought to be deprived of his franchise as a liegeman. For this reason, all minor corporate offences, such as improper behaviour to his fellow-corporators, where not punishable by the general law of the land, as well as violations of his corporate duties, ought to be punished by penalties imposed by the ordinances of the municipality, and not by disfranchisement. But such offences against the general law as occasion a forfeiture of all civil rights, import in themselves a forfeiture of the corporate franchise; and offences against the corporation which tend to its destruction, such as defacing the charters, altering the corporate records so as to destroy the evidence of their title to privileges, or that of the title of his fellow-corporators to their franchises, are of course causes of disfranchisement.\\u2019\\n\\u201c These observations relate to municipal corporations ; but why are they not equally applicable to private corporations ? The interest or \\u2018 freedom\\u2019 which a member has in a private corporation is as truly a \\u2018 franchise\\u2019 as that which any of the burgesses mentioned in Bagg\\u2019s Oase had in the borough' of Plymouth, and may often be a much more valuable franchise. Where it has been obtained by the payment of a pecuniary consideration, and property is held in connection with it, it is a vested estate, and certainly ought not'to be sacrificed on account of minor offences, which would not be permitted to forfeit individual interests in a municipal corporation. And if a power to disfranchise in a municipal corporation does not exist unless expressly granted, it is very safe to conclude that it is not inherent in a private corporation, and must have an express grant to support it.\\n\\u201c The extent to which Bragg\\u2019s Case has been overruled is clearly-indicated in Lord Bruce\\u2019s Case, 2 Strange 819, which was a case of amotion, not disfranchisement, and where it was said \\u2018 the modern opinion has been that a power of amotion is incident to the corporation, though Bagg\\u2019s Case seems contrary.\\u2019 Richardson\\u2019s Case, 1 Burr. 517, was amotion from a municipal office \\u2014 that of portman of the borough of Ipswich. Lord Mansfield went very fully into the law of corporations, and whilst the amotion was not sustained, he sanctioned, very distinctly, the \\u2018 modern opinion\\u2019 referred to in .Lord Bruce\\u2019s Case, and stated three sorts of offences for which an officer or a corporator may be discharged:\\n\\u201c \\u2018 1. Such as have no immediate relation to his office ; but are in themselves of so infamous a nature as to render the offender unfit to execute any public franchise.\\n\\u201c \\u2018 2. Such as are only against his oath and the duty of his office as a corporator, and amount to breaches of the tacit condition annexed to his franchise or office.\\n\\u201c \\u00a3 3. Such as are of a mixed nature, as being an offence not only against the duty of his office, but also a matter indictable at common law.\\u2019\\n\\u201c Of these distinctions, limited originally to municipal corporations, I shall have something to say hereafter, when I come to speak of them in connection with private corporations.\\n\\u201c In Earle\\u2019s Case, Carthew 173, it was held that a member of a corporation cannot be disfranchised except for that which works to the destruction of the body corporate, or of the liberties and privileges thereof, and not for any personal offence of one member to another.\\n\\u201c Tidderly\\u2019s Case, 1 Siderfin 14, was a question of restoring a municipal officer who had voluntarily resigned, and Chief Justice Hale held that every corporation had power to receive a resignation, and might, for good cause, amove.\\n. \\u201cThese cases are sufficient to reflect the opinion of the English courts on Bagg\\u2019s Case. A more full reference to the authorities will be found in the notes to Willcock\\u2019s chapter on disfranchisement, 'in his work on Corporations. The result seems to be, that the resolution I quoted from Bagg\\u2019s Case has been so far modified that the power of amotion is inherent in the nature of corporations and not dependent upon prescription or charter, but the authorities do not establish the point that corporations have inherent power to disfranchise a private member. But Bagg\\u2019s Case is an authority against the power of disfranchisement no farther than the reasonings therein are entitled to respect, for the point of the case had not reference either to private corporations or the power of disfranchisement. Whilst, therefore, the very point of the case may be regarded as overruled, the reasonings, as ex pounded by Mr. Willcock, are such as to commend them to universal acceptance. Where corporations are founded upon private capital, the modern English eases are very unanimous in holding that no stockholder can be disfranchised, and thereby deprived of his interest in the property of the corporation, without an express authority for the purpose in the charter.\\n\\u00a3\\u00a3 In Pennsylvania, The Commonwealth ex rel. John Binns v. The St. Patrick Benevolent Society, 2 Binn. 441, is the leading case. The society, under a power conferred by its charter, made a by-law that vilifying a member by another member should be punished as a crime against the society, by removal from office, fine, or expulsion. Binns having -been convicted of grossly vilifying a fellow-member, was expelled therefor under this by-law. The Supreme Court restored him upon mandamus, mainly on the ground that the by-law was not necessary for the good government and support of the affairs of the corporation \\u2014 that it subjected 'the rights of membership to the uncertain will of a majority\\u2014 that \\u00a3 the offence of vilifying a member, on a private quarrel, is totally unconnected with the affairs of the society, and therefore its punishment cannot be necessary for the good government of the corporation.\\u2019 Chief Justice Tilghman, delivering the opinion of the court, quoted Lord Mansfield\\u2019s three sorts of offences as laid down in Richardson\\u2019s Case, and said Binns\\u2019s offence did not come within either of them, and he concluded by declaring that \\u00a3 without an express power in the charter, no man can be disfranchised unless he has been guilty of some offence which either affects the interest or good government of the corporation, or is indictable by the law of the land.\\u2019\\n\\u201c In Fuller v. The Trustees of the Plainfield Academy, 6 Conn. 532, Judge Dagget alluded to the doctrine that a power of amotion is incidental to corporations, but seemed to doubt whether it was applicable to any but municipal corporations, and quoted Judge Story as saying in the Dartmouth College Case that there could be no amotion of the trustees of that institution, and he restored the trustee of the Plainfield Academy, who had been expelled for disrespectful and contemptuous language towards his associates, and for neglect of duty as a trustee. \\u00a3 The court,\\u2019 he said, \\u00a3 cannot justify expulsion from office on such charges. What the trustee might have done to one of their number who had committed a crime which would banish him from society, it is not necessary to decide.\\u2019 Another principle was asserted in this case, that the place of a trustee in an eleemosynary corporatidto,\\\" though no emoluments are attached to it, is a franchise of such a nature that a person improperly dispossessed of it is entitled to redress by mandamus. See also Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 676.\\n\\u201cIn the ease of Gray v. The Medical Society of Erie, 24 Barb. 570, a physician was asking to be restored to a'society from which he had been expelled for violating a by-law that prescribed a tariff of fees for medical services. The Supreme Court of New York went very fully into the authorities upon corporate powers, and held that the power given to medical societies by statute to make by-laws and regulations relative to the admission and expulsion of members, was not an arbitrary or unlimited power, and that a by-law must be reasonable, and adapted to the purposes of the corporation.\\n\\u201c In the case of The Commonwealth v. Philanthropic Society, 5 Binn. 486, we have in our own courts what is very rare in the authorities, an instance of expulsion that was sustained. A member made a demand upon the society for relief agreeably to the rules of the institution, and presented a physician\\u2019s bill which he' had altered from $4 to $40, and which he claimed to have paid. Upon the ground that this ivas a scandalous crime, amounting almost, if not quite, to technical forgery, and that it was directly injurious to the society, his expulsion was supported.\\n\\u201c In The Commonwealth v. The Franklin Beneficial Association, 10 Barr 857, a member was restored who had been expelled for enlisting in violation of a by-law of the society.\\n\\u201c In The Commonwealth v. The German Society, 3 Harris 251, a society for \\u2018 mutual support and assistance,\\u2019 the cause of disfranchisement was that the member had assisted, as president of the society, in defrauding it out of fifty cents, and had defamed and injured the society in public taverns. It was held not to be a sufficient cause, and he was restored.\\n\\u201c When the charter of the Butchers\\u2019 Beneficial Association was presented to our Supreme Court, it was rejected on the ground, among others, that it allowed the associatiop to expel members who should be e guilty of actions which may injure the association.\\u2019 This, said the chief justice, we cannot approve ; for it gives the association an entirely indefinite power over its members. For any action which may injure them they may expel, and therefore they may expel a member for becoming insolvent. It is totally incompatible with the whole spirit of our institutions, to clothe any body with such indefinite power over its m\\u00e9mbers; for it is equivalent to socialism, and is a rejection of all individual rights within the association. It is common in such charters to found the right of expulsion on the fact that the member has been found fuilty of some crime on a trial in court, and this is quite proper: 1 Harris 151.\\n\\u201c In the case of The Beneficial Association of Brotherly Unity, 2 Wright 299, a charter was rejected because it gave a majority the power to expel any member \\u2018 guilty of an offence against the law\\u2019 \\u2014 the court holding that a constitution that puts all power over rights in the hands of a majority is no constitution at all.\\n\\u201c Gathering now, into one group, the principles of decision that lie scattered through the authorities, they may be stated thus:\\u2014\\n\\u00a3\\u00a3 1. That the power of amotion for adequate cause, is an inherent incident of all corporations, whether municipal or private, except, perhaps, sueh as are literary or eleemosynary, but the exercise of this power does not affect the private rights of the corporator in the franchise.\\n\\u00a3\\u00a3 2. That the power of disfranchisement which does destroy the member\\u2019s franchise, must, in general, be conferred by statute, and is never sustained as an incidental power, without statute grant, except in two cases \\u2014 first, on conviction of the member in a court of justice of an infamous-offence ; and second, where he has committed some act against the society which tends to its destruction or injury.\\n\\u00a3\\u00a3 8. That the power to make by-laws is incidental to corporations, and generally expressly conferred by statute ; but by-laws which vest in a majority the power of expulsion for minor offences, are, in so far, void, and courts of justice will not sustain expulsions made under them.\\n\\u00a3\\u00a3 4. In joint stock companies, \\u2018 or, indeed, in any corporation owning property\\u2019 (Angell & Ames on Corporations, \\u00a7 410), no power of expulsion can be exercised unless expressly conferred by the charter.\\n\\u201c With these principles in view, I take up the charter of the Philadelphia Club, and find that it was incorporated on the 8th May 1850, under the name of the \\u00a3 Philadelphia Association and Reading-Room\\u2019 (afterwards changed to that of the \\u00a3 Philadelphia Club\\u2019), with authority to \\u00a3 elect officers, to establish by-laws for their government, and to hold real estate, the yearly value of which shall not exceed three thousand dollars;\\u2019 but there is no power either of amotion or disfranchisement expressly conferred. They make no pretence to this power by prescription,\\n\\u00a3\\u00a3 The by-laws established by the corporation provide for the election of officers, and the order of proceedings, and fix \\u00a3 the entrance-money\\u2019 to be paid by resident members at $100, with a semi-annual subscription of $20 ; and for non-resident members at $50, with a semi-annual subscription of $15. The 65th, 66th, and 67th by-laws enact that\\u00a3 if the conduct of a member be disorderly, or injurious to the interest of the club, or contrary to its by-laws, he shall be requested to resign, and if the request be disregarded, the board shall refer the matter to the next stated meeting of the club, and \\u00a3 at such meeting the circumstances of the case shall be considered, and the member may be expelled.\\u2019\\n\\u00a3\\u00a3 The relator became a member of the club in 1848, and it is not alleged that he has failed to pay any of his dues, or perform any of his duties to the club, but the return alleges that on \\u00a3 the evening of the 24th of February 1863, the defendant was guilty of breaking the 65th by-law by having an altercation within the walls of the club-house with Samuel B; Thomas^ and by striking \\u2022him a blow.\\u2019 Eor this he was expelled.\\n\\u201c Now, undoubtedly, such conduct was disorderly ; for though the objects and purposes of the society are not set forth in the charter, it is said to be a club for the cultivation of social relations, and these are friendly and kind relations, and are not promoted by such conduct as is imputed to the relator. But does a single instance of disorderly conduct justify disfranchisement ? It is not alleged that the relator is a quarrelsome person, or habitually disorderly. On the contrary, it was admitted in argument that he is\\u2019 a respectable gentleman, and it is shown that when the offence occurred he was sitting in the bar-room of the club-house in quiet and friendly conversation with another person, when Thomas entered and uttered defamatory words which the relator understood to be applied to himself. It was therefore an assault upon Thomas provoked by himself. It was not an interruption of any deliberations or proceedings of the club in a state of organization \\u2014 it occurred not in a reading-room, or an eating-room, nor at a card or billiard table, but in what is called the office or bar-room of the house.\\n\\u201c I look upon the occurrence as disorderly and injurious to the interest of the club, within the meaning of the'65th by-law, but as one of those 1 minor offences,\\u2019 of which Mr. Willcoek speaks, and for which a majority have no power, even under the by-laws, to disfranchise a member. And upon the doctrine of the cases I have referred to, I hold the by-law void so far as it inflicts this extreme penalty for such an offence. I would be very sorry to say that anything short of a statute could confer on a majority of the members of any corporation power to expel a fellow-member for merely disorderly conduct. Talking or whispering in a reading-room, or wandering from the question in debate, or interrupting another when he is speaking, and very many mere breaches of good manners are disorderly, and injurious to such a club, and fit to be visited by reprimands and fines, but are not such offences against corporate duty as forfeit the franchise. Unless this unhappy occurrence be viewed through an atmosphere of passion and prejudice that shall distort and magnify its proportions, it must be regarded as belonging to the class of minor offences not punishable by expulsion. The relator\\u2019s offence was not directed against the society, but against his fellow-member, as in Earle\\u2019s Oase and Binns\\u2019s Case. The law affords no precedent for punishing an offence between fellow-members by disfranchisement. I am unwilling to make so bad a precedent of this ease.\\n\\u201c But what is conclusive of this case is, that the corporation \\u2022possesses property, real and personal, and is at liberty to accumulate more, until an annual revenue of \\u00a1\\u00a73000 comes to be enjoyed,; and the re ator has purchased and paid for th\\u00e9 right *to participate in that franchise. It is not a joint stock company at present, for under its by-laws no pecuniary profits are divisible among the members, but it may become so, and whether it does or not, the relator has a vested interest in its estate, and cannot be deprived of it by the proceedings that were had against him. On this point the. authorities are clear, and without conflict. Nothing but an express power in the charter can authorize a money corporation to throw overboard one of its members. I have shown that the act of incorporation contained no such power. On the contrary, it excluded it, for the proviso reads \\u2018 that nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to authorize said Philadelphia Association and Reading-Room to do any other act or acts in their corporate capacity than are herein expressed.\\u2019\\n\\u201c For these reasons a peremptory mandamus must be awarded, and because the view I have taken of the case results in this conclusion, it is not necessary for me to discuss the formalities of the proceedings of -the club under their by-laws, which led to the expulsion.\\n\\u201c Let a peremptory mandamus issue.\\u201d\\nThe case was then certified to the court in banc, where the judgment of the learned judge at Nisi Prius was assigned for error.\\nWilliam Henry Rawle and William M. Meredith, for plaintiffs in error.\\nIn this case four questions arise:\\u2014\\nI. Is the interest of the relator in the property of the club, as a moneyed corporation, such as he cannot be deprived of under its charter ?\\nThe pleadings show that the club was originally formed, long before its incorporation, \\u201c solely for purposes of social intercourse, and it never had any other end or purpose, either before or since its incorporationthat \\u201c it owns no other real estate than its club-house,\\u201d and that its 89th by-law provides that \\u201c all interest in the property of the club, of members resigning, or otherwise ceasing to be members, shall be vested in the club.\\u201d This is admitted by the demurrer.\\nPrivate corporations are joint stock, or moneyed; or corporations other than these, such as literary, religious, charitable, scientific, social, and the like. The broadest distinction has always existed between these two. A joint stock corporation is defined to be \\u201c such a corporation as has for its object a dividend of profit among its stockholders:\\u201d Angell & Ames on Corp. \\u00a7 656. And a member thereof by original subscription or conveyance cannot be refused the rights and privileges of a member, and cannot be. disfranchised for any cause whatsoever \\u201c by a majority of the corporators, unless such power has been expressly conferred by the charter Id. \\u00a7 118, 410, 411. All the cases cited by the authors on this subject are those of \\u201c moneyed corporations.\\u201d See also Commonwealth v. Philanthropic Society, 5 Binn. 486; Binns\\u2019s Case, 2 Id. 441.\\nIn the cases of literary, philanthropic, or social corporations, it is of the very essence of their usefulness that they should \\u201c own property.\\u201d But this common feature does not therefore confuse them with moneyed corporations.\\nThe court below conceived that the prohibition to the defendants \\u201cto do any other act or acts in their corporate capacity than are herein expressed,\\u201d absolutely excluded the power of expulsion.\\nIn another part of its opinion, the court below quoted with approbation the following language of Mr. Willcock: \\u201c Offences against the corporation which tend to its destruction, such as defacing the charters, altering the corporate records so as to destroy the evidence of their title to privileges, or that of the title of his fellow-corporators to their franchises, are of course causes of disfranchisement,\\u201d and added, \\u201c These observations relate to municipal corporations, but why are they not equally applicable to private corporations ?\\u201d\\nAnd yet, upon the doctrine held below, if such corporations possess \\u201c any property,\\u201d the interest of the member therein must prevent his disfranchisement, no matter what his conduct may have been. The effect of the affirmance of such a doctrine by this court upon the thousands of literary and philanthropic corporations which exist within this Commonwealth would be very serious.\\nA member under the by-laws may by resignation, voluntarily deprive himself of his interest in the property of the club. But if he cannot be deprived of it for any cause of misconduct, it must follow, and a fortiori, that he. should not be deprived of it by the accident of his death; which, however desirable, would, to some extent, interfere with the end and purpose which this corporation designed for itself.\\nII. Apart from the question of moneyed interest, had the defendants any right to expel the relator ?\\nIt would seem to be reasonable to hold that the grant of corporate powers gave to the corporation the right to do all lawful things needful for its welfare \\u2014 such right being variable according to the end and purpose for which the corporation was erected. Erom this it follows that the law will not deny to a corporation the right of disfranchisement when the exercise of that right is necessary to preserve the end and purpose for which the corporation was created.\\nIt is believed that this proposition is supported by all the modern authorities. The court below based its decision upon the ruling in Bagg\\u2019s Case, and the comments of Mr. Willcock upon it; and on Sir Thomas Earle\\u2019s Case, decided in 1691, and reported in Carthew, p. 178.\\nHow far are these cases law at the present day ? 1. Neither of them were cases of disfranchisement \\u2014 both of them were cases of amotion from office, and therefore all that was said about disfranchisement was mere obiter dieta.\\n2. These cases have been overruled as to the exact point decided, and doubted as to the obiter dicta. See Lord Bruce\\u2019s Case, decided in 1728, and reported in 2 Strange 19, and The King v. Richardson, 1 Burr. 517-538.\\nIn the present case the court below considered, that the result of the English authorities was, that although they now admit the power of amotion, \\u201c they do not establish the point that corporations have any inherent power to disfranchise a private member.\\u201d Yet Lord Mansfield seemed not so to consider it when he said in the case of The King v. Richardson: \\u201cThere are three sorts of offences for which an officer or corporator maybe discharged,\\u201d or when he said: \\u201c The cause was insufficient, the offence not being any of the three kinds for which a corporator could be disfranchised.\\u201d\\nBut if any doubt exist as to the result of the English cases, there is none as, to American authority. See 2 Comm. 297. Also Angell & Ames on Corporations 411; The Commonwealth ex rel. John Binns v. The St. Patrick Benevolent Society, 2 Binn. 441; The Commonwealth v. Philanthropic Society, 5 Id. 487; Fuller v. The Trustees of the Plainfield Academy, 6 Conn. 532; The People v. The Medical Society of the County of Erie, 24 Barb. 570; Barrow v. The Massachusetts Medical Society, 12 Cushing 402.\\nIf these cases are law, they establish the proposition contended for, that the law gives to a corporation the right of disfranchisement when the exercise of that right is necessary to preserve the end and purpose for which the corporation was created.\\nIII. Was the conduct of the relator such as to bring his case within their jurisdiction ?\\nThe defendants were incorporated as \\u201c The Philadelphia Association and Reading-Room, with power to establish by-laws for their government.\\u201d Apart from such an express grant of power, the corporation possessed it at common law: 2 Kent 296 ; Angell & Ames, \\u00a7 325. What by-laws they might lawfully enact, depended upon the nature of the corporation. The pleadings admit that in this ease \\u201c its sole end and purpose was the promotion of social intercourse.\\u201d The mind almost involuntarily suggests the nature of by-laws necessary to promote this end. The rules which govern the intercourse of several hundred members meeting daily within the walls of a single house, may be different in kind from those which govern the officers and crew of a ship, but in their. way they require the same attention to discipline, and power to enforce obedience. The by-laws give to the board of direction (whose duty it is \\u201c to control and manage the property and effects, and enforce the preservation of order and obedience to its rules\\u201d) a summary power of expulsion for violation of the by-laws prohibiting certain enumerated offences. The 65th by-law provides that \\u201c..if the conduct of a member should be disorderly, or otherwise injurious to the interest of the club,\\u201d he might be requested to resign, and in default thereof be expelled, &c.\\nThe words \\u201c disorderly conduct\\u201d have a wide latitude, and that which would be proper at one time or place would be disorderly at another; and, when applied to a \\u201c Philadelphia Association and Reading Room,\\u201d or to a club formed solely for social purposes, have a very suggestive and well-defined meaning.\\nThe relator\\u2019s conduct came within the third class of causes enumerated by Lord Mansfield and Chief Justice Tilghman \\u2014 it was \\u201c an offence against his duty as a corporator, and against the law of the land:\\\" 3 Inst. 177, 140, 4 Bl. Com. 125.\\nThis court will not undertake to discriminate nicely as to the exaot weight of the offence. The corporation considered one instance of disorderly conduct sufficient to justify disfranchisement, and having had the jurisdiction, and exercised it in the manner usual to corporation courts, it is submitted that this court will not reverse the proceedings merely because it might differ from the defendants as to their judgment. See Ex parte Amy Long, 29 Eng. Law and Eq. Rep. 194 (Q. B. 1855); The Queen v. Grant, 14 Q. B. 43; The Queen v. Rowland Evans, 3 E. & B. 367 ; The Queen v. Bolton, 1 Q. B. 66; The Black and White Smiths\\u2019 Society v. Vandyke, 2 Whart. 309 ; The Commonwealth v. The Pike Beneficial Society, 8 W. & S. 247; Toram v. The Howard Beneficial Association, 4 Barr 519 ; The Commonwealth v. Green (the Presbyterian Church Case), 4 Whart. 599 ; German Reformed Church v. Seibert, 3 Barr 291; Taverner\\u2019s Case, T. Raymond 447.\\nIY. Were the proceedings regular ?\\nThe relator contends that they wete not, because\\n1. The notice of the said meeting to be held on the 1st day of June 1863, should have been served upon and given to the members of the said corporation in person or specifically, whereas it does not appear in the \\u2022 said return that such personal or specific notice was given to the said members.\\n2. There was no proper examination made or proofs given at the said meeting, held on the 1st day of June 1863, of any offence committed or act done by the said relator, by reason of which he was expelled from the said corporation.\\n\\u25a0 3. There was no conviction had or found at the said meeting, held.on the 1st day of Jpne 1863, of any offence committed or act done by the said relator, by reason of which he was expelled from the said corporation.\\nTo these, it is answered,\\n1. The by-laws provide that \\u201c a notice of every meeting of the club, whether stated or special, shall be put upon the notice-board, at least ten days before the time assigned for such meetingbut in addition to this, the return shows that \\u201c a copy of the notice marked A., was sent, as far as was practicable, to every member.\\u201d\\n2. Courts of review will not narrowly scan the proceedings of these corporation courts: The Queen v. Rowland Evans, 3 E. & B. 367. In this case there was no irregularity. The whole testimony of all the eye-witnesses was spread before the meeting. At the argument below it was asked by the learned chief justice, \\u201c Is there any case where a corporation court proceeded without the production of sworn testimony ?\\u201d It is answered that no case can be found where such testimony was ever deemed necessary ; and in this case it may be asked, who was authorized to administer an oath ? and if the witnesses had sworn falsely, how could they have.been made liable to the pains and penalties of perjury ? This corporation court, though a judicial proceeding in one sense, was not so within the meaning of the statutes of perjury. See The Commonwealth v. The Philanthropic Society, 5 Binn. 486.\\nIf this meeting had attempted to administer oaths to the parties, the members would have been themselves indictable for the misdemeanor at common- law of administering unnecessary and extrajudicial oaths.\\nThe proceedings of this corporation court were carefully regular in the following particulars:\\u2014\\n1. The notibe to the relator of the proposed meeting was very full, and a copy of all the testimony was sent to him.\\n2. The notice of the meeting was also very full; it contained the clause that the relator had been requested to resign, and had refused so to do, because the by-laws give the corporators no power of expulsion, unless after such refusal upon request. The words, \\u201c offering a blow,\\u201d were those of the relator himself.\\n3. The notice was duly posted,- and was also personally served.\\n4. The quorum was sufficient, being one hundred members out of one hundred and eighty-eight, whereas the by-laws only required one-fourth of the whole number of members, or forty-seven, to be present.\\n5. At the meeting, every word of testimony was read which had any connection with the case.\\n3. The conviction sufficiently appears in the resolution:\\u2014\\n\\u201c Whereas, Rowland E. Evans has violated his duty as a corporator of the Philadelphia Club, by being guilty of disorderly conduct within the walls of the club, in offering a blow to Samuel B. Thomas, one of' its members, on the evening of the 24th of February 1863;\\n\\u201c Resolved, That the said Rowland E. Evans be therefore expelled from his membership of the club.\\u201d\\nG. W. Biddle and P. McCall, for the defendant,\\nargued I. That the club, owning property real and personal, could not expel the relator, the charter conferring no power of expulsion.\\nIt is contended, on the other side, that this proposition holds good only in the case of joint stock corporations. But on what principle should it be confined to corporations having for their object a dividend of profits among the stockholders ? The mere division of profits is not the criterion. The reason of the rule lies deeper than the mode of enjoyment of the property, whether by distribution of the profits or otherwise. It rests on the broad principle confirmed by Magna Charta, that no freeman shall be deprived of his property except by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land. If the corporation have power by their charter to expel, that*will be per legem, terree \\u2014 otherwise not. See Angell & Ames, \\u00a7 410.\\nIt'is argued, on the other side, that literary and philanthropic corporations must \\u201c own property;\\u201d and if the interests of the members therein prevented their disfranchisement, the effect of the doctrine would be serious. It is believed, however, that the charters of these associations usually confer the power of expulsion. See the cases in 2 Binn. 441 and 5 Id. 486.\\nII. and III. As the charter confers no express power of expulsion, the whole question turns on the incidental power of the club to expel a member.\\nWhile the members of the club remained unincorporated, they could make regulations for their discipline ad libitum, involving, of course, expulsion. But the moment they obtained a charter, they parted with powers which they before possessed, and came under the law which governs corporate bodies.\\nThe proposition advanced by plaintiffs in error that the grant of corporate powers gives the' corporation the right to do all lawful things needful for its welfare, is at variance with the well-settled doctrine that a corporation possesses no powers which are not expressly delegated, or which are necessary to the exercise of expressly, delegated powers. Does a corporation possess the incidental power of disfranchising a member; and if so, in what cases ? Disfranchisement and amotion are frequently confounded, although entirely distinct. Amotion is removal from office in a corporation. Disfranchisement is the taking away the franchise of being 'a corporator: Grant on Corp. 263. \\u201cDisfranchisement\\u201d applies to members. \\u201cAmotion\\u201d only to such members as are officers; consequently, if an officer be removed for good cause, he may still continue to be a member: Angell & Ames, \\u00a7 408. It does not follow that, because a corporation possesses an incidental power of amotion, it therefore possesses an incidental power of disfranchisement.\\nWhile the decisions in Lord Bruce\\u2019s Case, 2 Strange 19, and Rex v. Richardson, 1 Burr. 517, do, in opposition to Bagg\\u2019s Case, hold the power of amotion to be inherent in public corporations, there is no case which extends this inherent power to disfranchisement. And therefore Mr. Willcock is right in his treatise on Municipal Corporations, p. 271, 16 Law Lib. 150.\\nAs a Pennsylvania question, in the light of the decision of this court in Binns\\u2019s Case, 2 Binn. 441, recognised in subsequent cases, it may be admitted that corporations possess an incidental power of disfranchisement in the three classes of cases enumerated by Lord Mansfield in 1 Burr. 538, viz.:\\n1. When an offence is committed, which has no immediate relation to a member\\u2019s corporate duty, but is of so infamous a nature as renders him unfit for the society of honest men, such as perjury, forgery, &c., and then only after previous conviction by jury.\\n2. When.the offence is against his duty as a corporator, and amounts to a breach of the tacit condition annexed to his franchise.\\n3. Where the offence is mixed, or compounded of the other two ; that is to say, not only against his duty, as a corporator, but also of an infamous nature.\\nThe alleged offence of the relator in the case at bar does not fall within the first or third of these classes. Does it fall within the second class ? The phrase \\u201c against his duty as a corporator\\u201d is vague, and the question at once is suggested, What are and what are not offences against the duty of a corporator, .within the meaning of the rule authorizing disfranchisement? We are not without authority on this point. 'They are offences \\u201c that work to the destruction of the body corporate, or to the destruction of the liberties and privileges thereof.\\u201d See Grant on Corp. 264; also, 24 Barb. 578 ; Bagg\\u2019s Case ; Yates\\u2019s Case, Styles 477 ; Rex v. Mayor of Derby, Rep. Temp. Hardw. 153; 2 Bac. Abr. 476; and Lane\\u2019s Case, 11 Mod. 270 ; Fortescue 275. Grant on Corp. 264, treating of offences against a corporator\\u2019s duty, says: \\u201cAt any rate, another part of what was laid down at the same time remains the law, viz., that a mere personal offence from one member to another is not a ground.\\u201d See also, Buller N. P. 208, and Sir Thomas Earle\\u2019s Case, Carth. 173.\\nThe force of these authorities is not impaired by the case of the Philanthropic Society, in 5 Binn. 486, because no question of the inherent power to disfranchise was involved in it. The charter authorized the expulsion of any member concerned in scandalous or improper proceedings, which might injure the reputation of the society. The case of Commonwealth ex rel. Fischer v. The Ger man Society, 3 Harris 251, is also important in this connection. In the case of Fuller v. The Plainfield School, 6 Conn. 532, it was held that neither disrespectful and contemptuous language towards his associates in the hoard of trustees, nor neglect of official duty in not acting on committees, would justify the expulsion of a trustee.\\nThese cases establish the proposition, that mere offences against decorum, personal offences of one member against another, so long as they do not tend to the subversion of the government pf the corporation and the management of its affairs, do not justify disfranchisement on the ground of being against the duty of the corporator. This court is asked to extend this class in the case of a corporation for social purposes, so as to take in a personal altercation between two members, occurring in the bar-room, and not in the slightest degree interfering with the government of the corporation, or the due management of its affairs.\\nFailing to show that the club possessed the inherent power to disfranchise Mr. Evans, it is sought to derive the power from the 65th, 66th, and 67th by-laws, relating to conduct disorderly and injurious to the interest of the club. But it is clear that the power of disfranchisement, under a by-law, cannot be more extensive than the inherent power. If franchises depended upon bylaws, their tenure would be infinitely more insecure than the law has declared them to be. But this pretension is at once destroyed by Binns\\u2019s Case, 2 Binn. 441, and The People v. The Medical Society, 24 Barb. 570.\\nIn the case of the Massachusetts Medical Society, 12 Cush. 402, where the court refused to entertain a petition for 'mandamus, the charter gave full power to expel, and the application for a mandamus appears to have been a novelty in that state.\\nThe recent decisions of this court show the care with which it guards the rights of members of a corporation against what Chief Justice Tilghman calls \\u201c the uncertain will of a majority of the members.\\u201d See The Butchers\\u2019 Beneficial Association, 11 Casey 151; The Butchers\\u2019 Beneficial Association, 2 Wright 298; and The Beneficial Association, &c., Id. 299.\\nIt is argued, on the other side, that the decision of the meeting which expelled Mr. Evans was the decision of a tribunal of his own choosing, and that the merits of his expulsion cannot be reexamined here. And for this, certain English cases, under Acts of Parliament relating to friendly societies which are not corporate bodies, or governed by the law of corporations, are cited. The acts declare that when the rules of any such society provide for a reference to arbitrators, their decision shall be final; and the cases merely decide that where the arbitrators had jurisdiction, the reasonableness of their decision cannot be inquired into by the courts, and have therefore 'no bearing on the question now before the court. The cases of The Black and White Smiths v. Vandyke, 2 Wh. 309, Commonwealth v. The Pike Beneficial Society, 8 W. & S. 247, and Toram v. The Howard Association, 4 Barr 519, are disposed of by The Commonwealth ex rel. Fischer v. The German Society, 3 Harris 251.\\nIV. The proceedings were irregular.\\n1. The notice of the meeting to be held on the 1st day of Jun\\u00e9 1863, should have been served on the members in person.\\nThe return states that it was duly posted on the notice-board of the club for the period required by the by-laws, and that a copy of the printed notice was sent, as far as was practicable, to each member. Posting on the notice-board was not sufficient notice. Personal notice to all the members was necessary. The return is defective in not stating to whom or when the printed notice was sent. The statement, \\u201c as far as was practicable,\\u201d is vague and uncertain. It ought to have stated the facts, so that the court could judge. See Kynaston v. The Mayor of Shrewsbury, 2 Str. 1051.\\n2. There was no proper examination made. or proofs given at the meeting held June 1st 1863.\\nThe evidence laid before the meeting consisted partly of ex ,\\u00a1parte statements or letters. Even supposing that there was no authority to administer an oath, at least the witnesses ought to have been produced, and opportunity for cross-examination allowed.\\n3. There was no conviction had at the meeting held June 1st 1863, of any offence committed or act done by the relator by reason of which he was expelled.\\nThe preamble recites that Mr. Evans had been guilty of disorderly conduct; but the resolution does not find him guilty, and the preamble is no part of the resolution.\\nProceedings to disfranchise must be strictly construed; for a removal being an act of an odious nature, all' clauses concerning it must receive a strict interpretation: Rex v. Sutton, 10 Mod. 76.\", \"word_count\": \"10033\", \"char_count\": \"58605\", \"text\": \"The judgment of the learned judge before whom the case was argued at Nisi Prius, was affirmed by an equal division of the court in banc.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"439565\", \"name\": \"Stevens v. Adams Express Company, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Stevens v. Adams Express Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1913-12-01\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal, No. 114\", \"first_page\": \"366\", \"last_page\": \"371\", \"citations\": \"55 Pa. Super. 366\", \"volume\": \"55\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:21:22.110704+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Rice, P. J., Henderson, Morrison, Orlady, Head and Porter, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Stevens v. Adams Express Company, Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"Stevens v. Adams Express Company, Appellant.\\nNegligence \\u2014 Automobiles\\u2014Damages\\u2014Depreciation in value \\u2014 Opinion of nonexpert witness.\\nIn an action to recover damages for injuries to an automobile resulting in a collision, where the plaintiff has shown the cost and the expense of putting the machine in good condition, and the amount that he had spent for the use of another machine while his own was being repaired, he cannot be permitted to show by nonexpert testimony that a motor car after a collision depreciates twenty-five per cent in value by reason of the collision.\\nArgued Oct. 23, 1913.\\nAppeal, No. 114, Oct. T., 1913, by defendant, from judgment of C. P. No. 1, Phila. Co., Sept. T., 1910, No. 3,411, on verdict for plaintiff in case of Joseph F. Stevens v. Adams Express Company.\\nBefore Rice, P. J., Henderson, Morrison, Orlady, Head and Porter, JJ.\\nReversed.\\nTrespass to recover damages for injuries to an automobile. Before Kinsey, J.\\nDecember 1, 1913:\\nAt the trial the plaintiff was asked this question:\\n\\u201cQ. I am about to show you a bill of the FossHughes Motor Company, which appears by the receipt on it-\\n\\u201cMr. Evans: I am willing to admit that the FossHughes Motor Company did repairs for which they charged the plaintiff $153.53; that he had paid this bill, and that in those items, $112.63 worth were for repairs of the damage caused by this accident.\\n\\u201cQ. Repairs having been made to this car, I want to know whether or not the car was in as good condition after the repairs were made as it was prior to the accident? A. No, sir; it was not. Any car that is in a smash-up or wrecked, depreciates in value at least-(Objected to.) Q. Was your car depreciated in value? A. At least twenty-five per cent.\\u201d\\nThere was no evidence that the plaintiff was an expert on the subject of automobiles.\\nThe court refused to strike out the evidence. [1, 2]\\nVerdict for plaintiff for $1,000, on which judgment was entered for $500, all above that sum having been remitted. Defendant appealed.\\nError assigned were (1, 2) rulings on evidence, quoting the bill of exceptions.\\nJohn Lewis Evans, with him Thomas DeWitt Cuyler, for appellant.\\nFletcher W. Stites, with him Charles H. Edmunds, for appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"1605\", \"char_count\": \"9057\", \"text\": \"Opinion by\\nMorrison, J.,\\nThis action of trespass was brought by plaintiff to recover damages for injuries to his automobile caused by a collision with a two-horse team and wagon at the corner of Arch and Juniper streets in Philadelphia. Plaintiff's chauffeur drove the automobile up Broad street and turned down Arch street by mistake and he then proceeded to turn around in Arch street. He turned north from the south side of Arch just where Juniper street crosses the former. In making the turn the automobile and the defendant's two-horse wagon collided and while at the trial there was much dispute as to whose fault caused the collision that question was properly referred to the jury and it was disposed of by the verdict.\\nUnder the statement of the question involved and the two assignments of error we only have to consider one question, which is stated by appellant's learned counsel as follows, to wit: \\\"Should a non-expert witness have been allowed to testify that a motor car was depreciated twenty-five per cent by the collision, when all the injuries proven to have been sustained have been repaired and the opinion is based on the assumption that every engine that has been in a collision depreciates that much?\\\" What the witness really testified to was that his automobile was depreciated in value at least twenty-five per cent; that any .car that is in a smash-up or wreck depreciates in value at least twenty-five per cent. Appellant's counsel objected to this evidence and promptly moved the trial judge to strike it out, but this motion was refused and an exception granted to appellant. The ground of the objection and motion to strike out this testimony was that the witness (plaintiff) had not qualified to give such an opinion. In this connection it should be noted that all of the items of expense for repairing the automobile and for the necessary loss of the use of it had been shown to the jury by testimony, and appellant's counsel was not contending that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover a sufficient sum to pay for these items, provided, the jury found that the injury was caused by the fault or negligence of defendant's driver.\\nIn our opinion the plaintiff ought not to have been permitted to give his opinion as to the percentage of the loss in value of his ear, in addition to the proof of how much it cost him to repair it and how much he paid for the use of another car while he was necessarily-deprived of the use of his own automobile on account of the injury it received in the collision. This for the reason that the plaintiff was not shown to be qualified to give such an opinion. He was not shown to be an expert in the construction and repair of such machines nor was he shown to have been an experienced dealer in automobiles. His testimony, as he gave it, tended strongly to show that he was not qualified to speak of the percentage of loss in value of an automobile caused by . such a collision.\\nThe learned counsel for appellee argue at length that the court did not err in admitting this testimony of the plaintiff and refusing to strike it out, and in support of the action of the court they cite several authorities, among which are the following: Markowitz v. Pittsburg & Connellsville R. R. Co., 216 Pa. 535. In our judgment that case does not support the position for which it is cited. That was a question of the competency of a witness to testify to the value of his own property which he had owned for eleven or twelve years. He was familiar with the development of the borough in which his lot was located and had general knowledge of the value of property in that neighborhood. The.next case cited is Boehm v. Borough of Bethlehem, 4 Pa. Superior Ct. 385, but that was the case of a plaintiff testifying to the character of the injury to his property caused by the construction and operation of a defective sewer, and it was held that he was competent to give an opinion as to the depreciation in the value of his lot. We do not think that case reaches the question we are considering. Dugan v. Arthurs, 230 Pa. 299, is also cited but is an action for damages for personal injuries sustained by a pedestrian in a collision with an automobile and it holds that non-expert witnesses are competent to express an opinion as to the rate of speed of the automobile, their everyday experience giving them sufficient knowledge to form an intelligent judgment on the subject. In that case it was well said by Mr. Justice Mestbezat: \\\"An intelligent person having a knowledge of time and distance is capable of forming an opinion as to the speed of a passing railroad train, a street car or an automobile. His conclusion is the result of a comparison with the speed of other moving objects of which he has knowledge by constant experience. . . . He simply compares the speed of one moving object' with that of another with which he is made familiar by the daily affairs of life.\\\"\\nIt seems to us that there is a wide difference between the principle in the last above cited case and the one we are considering. All persons do not have everyday experience enabling them to testify as to the construction and repairs of automobiles. Nor do they have such experience enabling them to estimate the percentage of depreciation caused to an automobile by a collision after the machine has been fully repaired and put in operation. Counsel also cite and appear to rely with confidence upon our case of Price v. Newell, 53 Pa. Superior Ct. 628, decided on July 16, 1913. While it is true that one of the assignments of error in that case (No. 16) raised the question we are considering yet it was not urged at the argument as ground for reversal. The real contention of appellant's counsel in that case was that the judgment should be reversed because the learned trial judge submitted to the jury an erroneous measure of damages. We are fully sustained in this view by the opinion of our Brother Oblad y who spoke for the court, and we here quote from his opinion: \\\"On the trial and in this court the only substantial controversy is as to the measure of damages to be applied, and this question was fully disposed of by the court below.\\\" Our opinion, by Judge Oblady, does not discuss the question of the competency of the witnesses to testify to the quantum of damages to the automobile. And, therefore, we do not consider that case an authority that a witness may give such testimony as the plaintiff did in the present case without qualifying himself by showing that he is possessed of the requisite knowledge to enable him to estimate the percentage of depreciation caused to an automobile by a collision, in addition to the cost and expense of putting it in good condition and the loss of the use of it.\\nThe assignments of error are sustained, and the judgment is reversed with a venire facias de novo.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"459234\", \"name\": \"Albert F. CAFAZZO, and Tammy J. Cafazzo, his wife, Appellants, v. CENTRAL MEDICAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a corporation, Central Medical Pavilion, Inc., a corporation, and Norman Stern, D.M.D., Appellees\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Cafazzo v. Central Medical Health Services, Inc.\", \"decision_date\": \"1995-11-28\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"526\", \"last_page\": \"541\", \"citations\": \"542 Pa. 526\", \"volume\": \"542\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:17:27.942826+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Albert F. CAFAZZO, and Tammy J. Cafazzo, his wife, Appellants, v. CENTRAL MEDICAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a corporation, Central Medical Pavilion, Inc., a corporation, and Norman Stern, D.M.D., Appellees.\", \"head_matter\": \"668 A.2d 521\\nAlbert F. CAFAZZO, and Tammy J. Cafazzo, his wife, Appellants, v. CENTRAL MEDICAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a corporation, Central Medical Pavilion, Inc., a corporation, and Norman Stern, D.M.D., Appellees.\\nSupreme Court of Pennsylvania.\\nArgued March 7, 1995.\\nDecided Nov. 28, 1995.\\nRobert W. Deer, Lorrie K. Albert, Law Offices of Robert W. Deer, Pittsburgh, James F. Mundy, Philadelphia, for Appellants.\\nLaurence M. Kelly, Kelly & Kelly, Montrose, for Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers.\\nDavid B. White, Stella L. Smetanka, Sherry L. Halfhill, Burns, White & Hickton, Pittsburgh, for Norman Stern.\\nLouis C. Long, Julie Fields Sweeney, Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck, Pittsburgh, for Central Medical Health Services, Inc. & Central Medical Pavillion, Inc.\\nRoland D. Morris, Mark B. Schoeller, Duane,' Morris & Heckscher, Philadelphia, for Hospital Association of Pennsylvania.\\nRobert B. Hoffman, Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, Harrisburg, for Pennsylvania Medical Society.\\nBefore NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"4517\", \"char_count\": \"27944\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nMONTEMURO, Justice.\\nIn this case of first impression, we are presented with the question of whether a hospital and a physician can be held subject to strict liability under the Restatement of Torts (Second) \\u00a7 402A, for defects in a product incidental to the provision of medical services.\\nIn 1986, appellant Albert Cafazzo underwent surgery for implantation of a mandibular prosthesis. In 1992, some time after it was discovered that this device was defective, a complaint was filed against appellees, the physician who performed the surgery and the hospital where the operation took place, claiming that \\\"all defendants sell, provide or use certain prosthetic devices,\\\" and that they should be held strictly liable as having \\\"provided, sold or otherwise placed in the stream of commerce products manufactured by Vitek, Inc., known as Proplast TMJ Implants.\\\" The complaint alleged that the prosthesis was defectively designed, unsafe for its intended use, and lacked any warning necessary in order to ensure safety.\\nAppellees' preliminary objections in the nature of a demurer were granted by the trial court which concluded that appellant had failed to state a claim cognizable under Pennsylvania law, and the Superior Court affirmed. We granted allocatur to determine whether liability will attach under the circumstances of this case.\\nIn reviewing a dismissal on the pleadings in the nature of a demurrer, the averments of the complaint must be taken as true except to the extent that they constitute conclusions of law. Cianfrani v. Commonwealth, State Employees Retirement Board, 505 Pa. 294, 479 A.2d 468 (1984). Thus we are not compelled to accept appellants' legal analysis, only their recitation of the facts. Whether appellees are sellers for the purposes of 402A is the central issue in this matter, and, therefore, appellants' assertion that appellees are in fact, sellers, need not be accepted out of hand. Moreover, even if the central question is answered in the affirmative, the corollary issue arises as to whether appellees, by virtue of their position as providers of health care, are exempted from the consequences of having so acted.\\nThis Court finds that the answer to the initial question is a negative, and further holds that even if appellees could be shown to have \\\"marketed\\\" the prothesis, strict liability does not apply.\\nSection 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, provides in relevant part as follows:\\n(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if:\\n(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and\\n(b) it is expected to and does reach the consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.\\nWhile we do not slavishly adhere to the language of 402A, the rule enunciated there, as with other non-statutory declarations, is a common law pronouncement by the court, which \\\"always retains the right and the duty to test the reason behind a common law rule in determining the applicability of such a rule to the facts before it.\\\" Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 526 Pa. 208, 212, 584 A.2d 1383, 1385 (1981). What appellants would have us do is to apply the rule while ignoring the facts of this case, after having accepted as a \\\"fact\\\" the central issue which must be resolved in order to determine whether application of the rule is proper. Such a procedure makes a mockery of the idea behind strict liability, i.e., that it inheres only in situations where a defective product has been provided by a seller \\\"engaged in the business of selling such a product.\\\"\\nIn Musser v. Vilsmeier Auction Co., Inc., 522 Pa. 367, 562 A.2d 279 (1989), this Court observed that \\\"the broadened concept of \\\"supplier,\\\" for purposes of predicating strict liability, is not without practical limits. The limits obtain in the purposes of the policy. When those purposes will not be served, persons whose implication in supplying products is tangential to that undertaking will not be subjected to strict liability for the harms caused by defects in those products.\\\" Id. at 372, 562 A.2d at 281. The policy behind strict liability is \\\"to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers who put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to help themselves.\\\" Shepard v. Alexian Brothers Hospital, 33 Cal.App.3d 606, 610, 109 Cal.Rptr. 132, 132 (1973) (emphasis omitted), and to further insure that defective products are removed from the market.\\nIn this instance, the manufacturer is in bankruptcy, and unable to sustain liability. Thus, an alternative, and solvent, payor was sought. All other considerations were subordinated to this objective, hence the unequivocal necessity, in appellants' view, for appellees to be designated as sellers irrespective of the actual facts of this matter. However, to ignore the ancillary nature of the association of product with activity is to posit surgery, or indeed any medical service requiring the use of a physical object, as a marketing device for the incorporated object. This is tantamount to deciding that the surgical skills necessary for the implantation of, e.g., mandibular prostheses, are an adjunct to the sale of the implants. Moreover, under such a theory, no product of which a patient in any medical setting is the ultimate consumer, from CT scanners to cotton balls, could escape the assignment of strict liability. Clearly, the relationship of hospital and/or doctor to patients is not dictated by the distribution of such products, even if there is some surcharge on the price of the product. As the New York Court of Appeals has aptly stated,\\nConcepts of purchase and sale cannot be separately attached to the healing materials . supplied by the hospital for a price as part of the medical services. That the property or title to certain items of medical material may be transferred, so to speak, from the hospital to the patient during the course of medical treatment does not serve to make such a transaction a sale. \\\"Sale\\\" and \\\"transfer\\\" are not synonymous, and not every transfer of personal property constitutes a sale.\\nPerlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 104, 123 N.E.2d 792, 794 (1954).\\nThe thrust of the inquiry is thus not on whether a separate consideration is charged for the physical material used in the exercise of medical skill, but what service is performed to restore or maintain the patient's health. The determinative question becomes not what is being charged, but what is being done. See Hoff v. Zimmer, 746 F.Supp. 872 (W.D.Wis.1990) (strict liability not applied to hospital for failure of hip prosthesis); Easterly v. HSP of Texas, Inc., 772 S.W.2d 211 (Tex.Ct.App.1989) (strict liability not applied to hospital which supplied epidural kit containing defective needle); Hector v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 180 Cal.App.3d 493, 225 Cal.Rptr. 595 (1986) (strict liability not applied to hospital for defective pacemaker); Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hospital, 20 Cal.App.3d 1022, 98 Cal.Rptr. 187 (1971) (strict liability not applied to dentist whose drill broke during use on patient; Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J.Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (1971), aff'd 100 N.J.Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 and 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (strict liability not applied to dentist whose drill broke while in use on patient).\\nThe cases cited above have been labelled by some the exponents of a \\\"service exception\\\" to 402A. However, the very term \\\"service exception\\\" is misleading, since it presupposes that the distinction drawn where medical personnel/hospitals are involved is an artificial one. The cases, however, make clear that provision of medical services is regarded as qualitatively different from the sale of products, and, rather than being an exception to 402A, is unaffected by it. See Hector v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, Inc., 180 Cal.App.3d 493, 225 Cal.Rptr. 595 (1986). To quote the Superior Court's holding in Podrat v. Codman-Shurtleff, Inc., 384 Pa.Super. 404, 558 A.2d 895 (1989), alloc, dn'd., 524 Pa. 609, 569 A.2d 1368 (1989),\\n[appellees] could not be liable under a theory of strict liability because [they were] not in the business of selling th[e implant], its use was only incidental to [appellees'] primary function of providing medical services, and the medical services could not have been rendered without the use of this product.\\nId. at 410, 558 A.2d at 898.\\nThis distinction is made clearer by the fact that case law also supports the application of 402A where what has been provided is not medical service or products connected with diagnosis and treatment, but rather materials related to mechanical or administrative functions. See Thomas v. St. Joseph Hospital, 618 S.W.2d 791 (Tex.Civ.App.1981) (hospital held strictly liable where hospital gown ignited when lighted match fell on it); Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hospital, 20 Cal.App.3d 1022, 98 Cal.Rptr. 187 (1971) (hospital would be found liable where not engaged in activities integrally related to primary function of providing medical services, e.g., defective product sold in gift shop).\\nIn this connection, it must be noted that the \\\"seller\\\" need not be engaged solely in the business of selling products such as the defective one to be held strictly liable. An example supporting this proposition appears in comment f of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, \\u00a7 402A and concerns the owner of a motion picture theater who offers edibles such as popcorn and candy for sale to movie patrons. The analogue to the instant case is valid in one respect only: both the candy and the TMJ implant are ancillary to the primary activity, viewing a film or undergoing surgery respectively. However, beyond that any comparison is specious. A movie audience is free to purchase or not any food items on offer, and regardless of which option is exercised the primary activity is unaffected. On the other hand, while the implant was incidental to the surgical procedure here, it was a necessary adjunct to the treatment administered, as were the scalpel used to make the incision, and any other material objects involved in performing the operation, all of which fulfill a particular role in provision of medical service, the primary activity. Once the illness became evident, treatment of some kind became a matter of necessity to regain health.\\n[W]hen one enters the hospital as a patient[,] he goes there, not to buy medicines or pills, not to purchase bandages or iodine or serum or blood, but to obtain a course of treatment in the hope of being cured of what ails him.\\nPerlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 106, 123 N.E.2d 792, 795 (1954).\\nWe find, consistent with the decisions cited above which distinguish medical services from merchandising, that in the first instance, appellees are not sellers, providers, suppliers or distributors of products such as to activate 402A.\\nThen, even assuming that providers of medical services could reasonably be termed sellers, in examining the test relied upon by appellants to \\\"prove\\\" their major premise, the policy reasons for strict liability are not present.\\nThe test was posited by this Court in Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 472 Pa. 362, 372 A.2d 736 (1977), to determine whether a particular supplier of products, whose status as a supplier is already determined, is to be held hable for damages caused by defects in the products supplied. It was first concluded that a lessor of hauling equipment could properly be considered a supplier after the application of a four part inquiry, which focusses initially on which members of the marketing chain are available for redress; then asks whether imposition of liability would serve as an incentive to safety; whether the supplier is in a better position than the consumer to prevent the circulation of defective products; and, finally, whether the supplier can distribute the cost of compensation for injuries by charging for it in his business. Id. at 368-369, 372 A.2d at 739.\\nAppellants, ignoring the precondition necessary for application of this analysis, that is, establishment of the appellees as sellers, would nevertheless apply it. Even were we to do so, appellees would not be found liable.\\nFirst, as to the availability of some entity for redress, medical personnel and hospitals are already subject to liability, albeit only where the quality or quantity of the services they provide may be called into question. It is perfectly reasonable to assume, for example, that a physician or hospital possesses the necessary skill and expertise to select a product for use in medical treatment which is fit for its intended purpose. An error of choice might indeed be attributed to negligence or ignorance. However, no allegation has been made that the selection of the Vitek TMJ was made either carelessly or intentionally despite knowledge of its defects. To assign liability for no reason other than the ability to pay damages is inconsistent with our jurisprudence. See Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 526 Pa. 208, 584 A.2d 1383 (1991). Where the liability is sought to be imposed on a party which is not a seller under 402A, such liability would indeed be assigned for no reason at all.\\nNext comes the matter of whether applying strict liability would provide an incentive to safety. As the Superior Court correctly pointed out, the safety of the product depends on the judgment of those connected to the research, development, manufacture, marketing and sale of the product. Cafazzo v. Central Medical Health Services, 430 Pa.Super. 480, 487, 635 A.2d 151, 154 (1993). Moreover, the safety testing and licensing for use of medical devices is a responsibility specifically undertaken by the federal government. Therefore, imposing liability for a poorly designed or manufactured product on the hospitals and doctors who use them on the assurances of the FDA is highly unlikely to effect changes of this sort. Again, selection of the wrong product becomes a matter of professional negligence for which recovery is available.\\nAs to the related matter of restricting circulation of defective products, appellees and those similarly situated have no control over distribution. In Musser v. Vilsmeier Auction Co., Inc., 522 Pa. 367, 562 A.2d 279 (1989), this Court noted that the \\\"[control] factor implies the existence of some ongoing relationship with the manufacturer from which some financial advantage inures to the benefit of the latter and which confers some degree of influence on the [putative seller.]\\\" Id. at 374, 562 A.2d at 282.\\nThe influence described is that of the putative seller, i.e., doctor/hospital, on the manufacturing process. Id. However, in finding the relationship between auctioneer and product too tenuous to justify assignment of liability, the Musser Court notes that the catalogue of items for sale listed more than ninety different tractors, for each of which the auctioneer would have to be held strictly liable were 402A applied in the auction context. The list is easily comparable to the many items employed in surgery, which includes but is not limited to surgical instruments, medical devices such as the implant, anesthesia machine and accoutrements, drugs, bandages and dressings, surgical apparel and operating suite furniture, such as the table on which the procedure is performed.\\nThe implications of the ruling espoused by appellants extend far beyond responsibility for a defective TMJ, and thus bring into sharp relief the problems surrounding any notion that it is enumerated products which should be exempted from the application of 402A. The difficulties inherent in such a course are obvious; particularly in medicine, the changes in technology are such that even definitional problems may arise. As an example, for purposes of 402A, is gene therapy a drug, and thus exempt under comment k, or a device or something else altogether? Who is to determine such exemptions, and at what time intervals?\\nThe fourth question posed is whether the supplier of the product can distribute the cost of compensating for injuries resulting from defects by spreading the charges therefor. The Superior Court, in addressing this element in conjunction with redress for potential plaintiffs, notes that the only considerations for extending strict liability, ability to pay plaintiffs and ability to charge others, would result in absolute rather than strict liability, Coyle, and further observed that relying on cost factors alone without a logical basis would confine the focus of the 402A principle to the search for a deep pocket. The net effect of this cost spreading would further endanger the already beleaguered health care system. As a practical matter costs would merely be absorbed by the insurers of physicians and hospitals, whose charges would reflect the increase in policy rates without corresponding improvement to any aspect of the health care system. Rather, research and innovation in medical equipment and treatment would be inhibited. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis.2d 444, 256 N.W.2d 379 (1977), has observed, albeit in a slightly different context, that on balance, the peculiar characteristics of medical services outweigh any of the reasons which might exist to assign strict liability in the medical setting. These include the tendency to be experimental, which would certainly be adversely affected if 402A were applicable; a dependence on factors beyond the control of the professional; and a lack of certainty or assurance of the desired result. Id. at 467-472, 256 N.W.2d at 390-93. In short, medical services are distinguished by factors which make them significantly different in kind from the retail marketing enterprise at which 402A is directed.\\nFinally,\\n[Bjefore a change in the law is made, a court, if it is to act responsibly must be able to see with reasonable clarity the results of its decision and to say with reasonable certainty that the change will serve the best interests of society.\\nId. at 471, 256 N.W.2d at 391.\\nThe consequences of a step such as appellant would have us take are of such magnitude, and of such potentially negative effect as to require more examination than has yet been afforded this issue. It is, for example, not clear enough that strict liability has afforded the hoped for panacea in the conventional products area that it should be extended so cavalierly in cases such as the present one.\\nFor these reasons, the order of the Superior Court is affirmed.\\nCAPPY, J., files a dissenting opinion.\\nMONTEMURO, J., participates by designation as a senior judge as provided by Rule of Judicial Administration 701(f).\\n. Appellant Tammy J. Cafazzo instituted an action for loss of consortium.\\n. The Dissent warns that recognizing the availability of medical providers for suit in negligence \\\"will exclude from liability those defendants which may be amenable to causes of action other than strict liability.\\\" Such a globalization of the holding in this case misses its point entirely: the question here concerns only whether providers of medical services are sellers for purposes of 402A.\\n. Appellants allege in their Brief that some time prior to 1990, warnings on the use of the TMJ implant were issued by the United States Government and Vitek. Prior to appellants' receipt of these warnings, there was apparently no indication of a problem with the implant. The Complaint in this matter was filed in August of 1992.\\nSee Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. \\u00a7 321 et seq., Medical Device Amendments of 1976\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"465912\", \"name\": \"O'Farrell et al., Appellants, v. Milgram\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"O'Farrell v. Milgram\", \"decision_date\": \"1946-03-25\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeals, Nos. 180 and 181\", \"first_page\": \"468\", \"last_page\": \"469\", \"citations\": \"353 Pa. 468\", \"volume\": \"353\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:26:33.198324+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Maxey, C. J., Drew, Einn, Stern,- Patterson and Stearne, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"O\\u2019Farrell et al., Appellants, v. Milgram.\", \"head_matter\": \"O\\u2019Farrell et al., Appellants, v. Milgram.\\nArgued January 10, 1946.\\nBefore Maxey, C. J., Drew, Einn, Stern,- Patterson and Stearne, JJ.\\nJoseph <J. Feldman, with him Edward M. Golds-borough, for appellants.\\nSamuel I. Sachs, with him Sachs & Piwoshy, for appellee.\\nMarch 25, 1946:\", \"word_count\": \"490\", \"char_count\": \"2886\", \"text\": \"Opinion\\nPep Curiam,\\nThis is an action in trespass by William O'Farrell, a minor, by his guardian, John O'Farrell, and John O'Farrell and Anna O'Farrell in their own right, appellants, against Joseph Milgram, appellee, to recover damages for injuries sustained when the minor appellant was struck between intersections by appellee's truck. A jury returned verdicts in favor of appellants. The court below refused appellee's motion for a new trial but sustained his motion for judgment non obstante veredicto.\\nOn April 3, 1944, about 10:30 A. M., at 1224 North Fourth Street, Philadelphia, William O'Farrell, approxi mately seven and one-half years of age, minor appellant, was standing on' the south sid\\u00e9 of a coal truck, parked with the rear wheels at the curb and the front wheels at the west rail of a single trolley car track. Joseph Milgram, appellee, operating a one-half ton International truck, was driving south on Fourth Street between 15 and 18 miles per hour. As he approached the coal truck he proceeded toward his left, to pass. The minor appellant remained standing along side of the bumper of the coal truck when appellee was fifty feet away. He intended to cross Fourth Street, looked, saw appellee approaching, but thought he \\\"could make it across.\\\" When about two feet from the east curb he was struck by the' left side of the front bumper of appellee's truck, \\u00e1s \\u00e1 result of which' he sustained the injuries complained of. Appellee stated that he did not see the boy until he was within four or five feet from the bumper and he immediately applied his brakes. There were skid marks on the road from 12 to' 14 feet in length. There was no other traffic on the street at the time of this accident.\\nThe court below properly entered judgment non obstante veredicto in favor of appellee. There is no evidence of negligence upon which liability of appellee could be based. He testified that he saw the child for the first time when within a few feet from the point of the accident. There is no evidence of excessive speed or inattention. Appellant minor, himself, admits that he had seen appellee's truck approaching but thought he could \\\"make it across\\\": There is nothing in the record which would impose upon appellee the duty of extra precaution. There were no children playing in the street. The accident occurred between intersections. The Operator of a motor vehicle is not bound to have it under instant control between crossings: Davidonis v. The Philadelphia Gas Works Co., 347 Pa. 314, 315, 32 A. 2d 304; Whalen v. Yellow Cab Company, 313 Pa. 97, 99, 169 A. 97, 98.\\nJudgment affirmed.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"466765\", \"name\": \"OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, Petitioner, v. Terence Alan PLIZGA, Respondent\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Plizga\", \"decision_date\": \"1996-12-04\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 279, Disciplinary Docket No. 3\", \"first_page\": \"513\", \"last_page\": \"514\", \"citations\": \"546 Pa. 513\", \"volume\": \"546\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:49:02.251201+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, Petitioner, v. Terence Alan PLIZGA, Respondent.\", \"head_matter\": \"686 A.2d 1278\\nOFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, Petitioner, v. Terence Alan PLIZGA, Respondent.\\nNo. 279, Disciplinary Docket No. 3.\\nSupreme Court of Pennsylvania.\\nDec. 4, 1996.\", \"word_count\": \"112\", \"char_count\": \"667\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nPER CURIAM:\\nAND NOW, this 4th day of December, 1996, upon consideration of the Report and Recommendations of the Disciplinary Board dated October 16,1996, it is hereby\\nORDERED that TERENCE ALAN PLIZGA, be and he is SUSPENDED from the Bar of this Commonwealth for a period of one (1) year and one (1) day, and he shall comply with all the provisions of Rule 217 Pa.R.D.E.\\nIt is further ORDERED that respondent shall pay costs to the Disciplinary Board pursuant to Rule 208(g), Pa.R.D.E.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"478319\", \"name\": \"Buchanan versus Duncan et al.\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Buchanan v. Duncan\", \"decision_date\": \"1861-07-24\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"82\", \"last_page\": \"89\", \"citations\": \"40 Pa. 82\", \"volume\": \"40\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:07:12.400067+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Buchanan versus Duncan et al.\", \"head_matter\": \"Buchanan versus Duncan et al.\\nTenancy by the Curtesy, Seisin necessary to create.\\u2014 Construction of Will. \\u2014 Life Estate in Land not created by Bequest of Rights and Privileges in it.\\n1. In Pennsylvania a surviving husband is entitled to curtesy of land of his deceased wife, though she had no actual possession, but only a potential seisin during her life. If she had possession by a tenant for years, or only the right to present possession, it is sufficient.\\n2. A testator by will provided that his widow, during her life, should live upon the homestead farm, upon which she was to have certain rights and privileges; as, a portion of the dwelling-house, one-half of the garden, one-half of the share of the grain coming from the tenant, pasture in summer and hay in winter for her cow and horses, firewood, &e. lie then made a distribution of his whole estate, and after making a few legacies and bequests, gave to each of his two daughters, who were both married, the \\u201c one-half part of his real and personal estate for the use and benefit of her legal heirsafterwards, and before the death of the widow, one of the daughters, the wife of B., died, and her husband claimed his curtesy as to one-half of the farm. In an action of ejectment, brought by him, it was held, that the widow had not an estate for life in the homestead farm, but only certain rights and privileges in it.\\nThat, subject to the provisions in favour of the widow, it descended to the two daughters at the death of the testator, the wife of B. taking an estate in fee simple in one undivided moiety of the farm, in which hernusband was entitled to an estate by curtesy at her death.\\nError to tbe Common Pleas of Blair county.\\nThis was an action of ejectment brought in the Common Pleas to July Term 1854, by George Buchanan, against Daniel Duncan and Samuel Duncan, for the undivided half of a tract of land in Tyrone township, Blair county, in which the following case was stated for the opinion of the court, in the nature of a special verdict:\\u2014\\nThe premises described in the writ of ejectment, was the mansion tract of Samuel Kyle, late of Sinking Valley, Blair county, deceased, and was the only tract of cultivated land owned by him in Sinking Valley, and is the land described, in the will hereinafter mentioned as the \\u201c Sinking Valley Farm.\\u201d\\nThe said Samuel Kyle died in the year 1827, leaving a widow, Jennet Kyle, and two daughters, viz., Nancy, then intermarried with George Buchanan, the plaintiff in this case, and Margaret, intermarried with Samuel Duncan (one of the defendants).\\nThe said Samuel Kyle left a last will and testament, dated the 16th of February, a. d. 1827, which was admitted to probate on the 23d of August, A. d. 1827, and which is in the following \\u25a0words, viz.:\\u2014\\n\\u201cIn the name of God, Amen. I, Samuel Kyle, of Tyrone township, Huntingdon county, and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, being somewhat indisposed in body, but of sound and perfect mind and memory, and knowing the uncertainty of life, and that it is appointed for all living once to die, and in order to premise peace and unanimity amongst those concerned, and for the more easy and ready settling and disposing of that portion of the good things which it hath pleased the Lord to bestow upon me in this life: [Imprimis), I do truly resign my immortal and never-dying soul to Him from whom I received it, who is God of gods and Lord of lords, and my mortal body to the earth from whence it came, to be interred in a Christian-like manner, in full belief that it shall rise in that great and general day when all shall come forth that God may judge them.\\n\\u201c Item first. I order that ail my just and lawful debts be first punctually paid, together with the costs and expenses accruing from my funeral, out of my personal estate.\\n\\u201c Item second. I leave and bequeath to my well beloved wife, Jennet Kyle, the use and benefit of the old end of the dwelling-house, both above and below, during her natural life, the one-half of the- garden, and part of the spring-house for her milk; and I also bequeath to my said wife two of her choice of my beds, bedsteads, and clothes filling for the same; and I bequeath to her the half of what grain that would come to me yearly from the tenant, of wheat, rye, corn, buckwheat, and oats, and ten bushels of potatoes yearly, and also fifteen dollars in cash yearly during her natural life; and she is to have the bay horse, known by the name of Charley, and the bald mare\\u2019s colt, and her choice of two of the. milk cows, and her choice of six sheep out of the flock; and my said wife is to have a sufficiency of pasture in the summer for horses, cows, and sheep, and also a sufficiency of hay of the farm yearly for them in the winter, and stable for horses and cows in the winter; and my said Avife is to have half a bushel of flaxseed soAved for her yearly on the farm, and to be put in for her in good ground in good order; and she is to have use of the clock and carpets in the house during her life; and I leave her fifty dollars of the Huntingdon bank stock, with interest on the same until paid; and she is also to have the large copper cottle, and tubs, and kitchen furniture, as much as she thinks necessary for her to keep during her life; and her saddle; and to a sufficient quantity of firewood cut and hauled to her yearly during her life, and to Susanna Campbell during the time of her indenture; and my said Avife is to have six of her choice of the chairs in the house; and she is to have also the Avoollen and linen yarn and cloth, and the wool of flock of the sheep this spring, if not shorent at my decease.\\n\\u201c Third. I leave and bequeath to Nancy Haggerty one Avhite coat, known by the name of her cow, and I leave also to her six sheep, if there be so many of her mark alive.\\n\\u201c Fourth. I leave and bequeath to Samuel Edie Kyle Duncan the sum of two hundred dollars, laAvful money of the United States, to be paid to his guardian for the use of the said Samuel Edie Kyle Duncan, four years after my decease, and I leave to the said Samuel Edie Kyle Duncan my watch. I leave and bequeath to my dutiful daughter, Nancy Kyle, alias Nancy Buchanan, for the use and benefit of her legal heirs, the one-half of the remaining part of my real and personal property after the aforesaid bequests and legacies are fully satisfied and paid. I leave my said daughter Nancy the one-half of the remainder of the Huntingdon Bank stock belonging to me after what is already bequeathed; also the half of my part of the Indiana and Cambria Turnpike stock, and the one-half of a tract of land in Indiana county, to her and to her legal heirs for ever, and also the half of AYhat money is due me by James Richards, of Armstrong county, or otherwise, if not paid by said Richards, the half of said tract purchased by him from me; and I also bequeath to my said daughter, Nancy Buchanan, the one-half of my land in Sinking- Valley, after the decease of my beloved wife, to her and her heirs for ever.\\n\\u201c Sixth. I leave and bequeath to my dutiful daughter Margaret Kyle, alias Margaret Duncan, for the use and benefit of her legal heirs, the one-half of my estate real and personal, in equal proportion with my daughter Nancy, after the forementioned legacies are fully paid or satisfied, that is, the half of the remainder of the Huntingdon Bank stock, after the first bequest out of it is fully paid, the half of my part of the Indiana and Cambria Turnpike stock, and the half a tract of land in Indiana county, to her and her legal heirs forever, and also the half of what money is due me by James Richards, for a tract of land bought by said Richards from me, lying in Armstrong county, and in case said James Richards are not able to pay for said tract of land, I leave and bequeath the half of said tract to my said daughter Margaret, to her and her heirs forever; and I bequeath the half of my estate in Sinking Valley, after the decease of my beloved wife Jennet Kyle, to Margaret Duncan and her heirs forever. I do hereby bequeath and leave to wife and executors my library of books, to be amicably, those of a religious nature them, those on arithmetic, mathematics, or the law, to be divided between George Buchanan and Samuel Duncan. And I do hereby constitute, make, and ordain Jennet Kyle executrix, and George Buchanan and Samuel Duncan my sole executors of this my last will and testament, and do authorize these my executors to make sale of any of my back lands or any part of said back lands sold by me, for my said executors to make a deed or deeds of conveyance for the same, as available in law or equity as if I myself were personally present, to the said purchaser or purchasers ; and I do hereby utterly disallow, revoke, disannul all and every other and former will, testament, wills, legacies, bequests and executors by me or any before named, willed and bequeathed, ratifying and confirming this and no other to be last will and testament. In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal this sixteenth day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and twenty-seven (1827).\\n\\u201c Samuel Kyle. [l. s.]\\n\\u201c Signed, sealed, pronounced, and declared in presence of us.\\n\\u201c William McCormick,\\n\\u201cEdie Stewart.\\u201d\\nGeorge Buchanan, the plaintiff, and Nancy his wife, had issue one child, a daughter, who died in 1833.\\nNancy Buchanan died in 1843.\\nJennet Kyle, the widow of testator, died in 1851.\\nMargaret Duncan, wife of Samuel Duncan, died in 1829, leaving a husband, one of the defendants, and issue, Samuel E. K. Duncan, one of the defendants, Joseph Duncan, Matilda Duncan, Margaret Duncan.\\nSamuel Duncan and George Buchanan, who Avere the acting executors of Samuel Kyle, by the consent of Jennet Kyle, the AvidoAv, leased the premises from the death of Samuel Kyle till the death of Jennet Kyle, to William McCormick.\\nIf the court should be of the opinion that George Buchanan is entitled to the possession of the undivided half of the tract of land described in the Avrit, then judgment to be entered for the plaintiff, that he do have and recover the same with costs of suit. Or if the court should be of the opinion that the said George Buchanan is entitled to the possession of any portion of said tract of land, less than the undivided half thereof, then judgment to be entered that the plaintiff do have and recover such portion.\\nIf the court should be of the opinion that the said George Buchanan is not entitled to the possession of any part of said tract of land, then judgment to be entered for defendant.\\nThe court beloAV entered judgment for defendants; whereupon the plaintiff sued out this writ, assigning the giving of said judgment for error.\\nS. S. Blair, for plaintiff,\\nargued that under the will of Samuel Kyle, his daughter Nancy, the Avife of the plaintiff, was so seised of the premises claimed in the writ as to entitle her surviving husband to a tenancy therein by the curtesy, she having died, without issue living, in 1843; and that the isolated clause by Avhich he gives \\u201c to his daughter, Nancy Buchanan, one-lialf of his land in Sinking Valley, after the decease of his AA'ife, to her and her heirs for ever,\\u201d was not in itself sufficient to support the \\u00a1Dosition of defendants; that the widoAv of testator had a life estate in the whole tract, which did not terminate until Mrs. Buchanan\\u2019s death; and that Mrs. Buchanan\\u2019s interest therein AAas only a remainder over after the death of Mrs. Kyle.\\nThat this clause by itself Avas an executory devise, to take effect on the widoAv\\u2019s death, without any disposition of the freehold in the interim; that therefore the laAA, on the death of the widoAv, Avould cast it on the heirs, and thus give Mrs. Buchanan an undivided moiety thereof, and make her seisin complete: 4 Kent 284. But that the other parts of the aaIII shoAV that testator did not intend to give his widoAv the freehold for life only, because by giving her a portion of the dAvelling-house, stable, and garden, Avith a certain quantity of hay, pasture, grain, potatoes, and fruit, he evidently contemplated that some other person should have possession of the land. There was, therefore, under the will, a potential seisin or right of seisin in Mrs. Buchanan, which was sufficient to raise an estate by the curtesy: Stoolfoos v. Jenkins, 8 S. & R. 175; Chew v. Commissioners of Southwark, 5 Rawle 160.\\nJuly 24th 1861,\\nSamuel Calvin, for defendants.\\nThe words \\u201c I also bequeath to my said daughter, Nancy Buchanan, the one-half of my lands in Sinking Yalley, after the decease of my beloved wife, to Irel- and her heirs for ever,\\u201d gave to her a vested remainder, and therefore the plaintiff cannot be tenant by the curtesy : Hitner v. Ege, 11 Harris 305. The law favours vested estates; and no remainder will be construed to be contingent which may, consistently with the intention, be deemed vested: 4 Kent 201-206. \\u201cA limitation is not to be deemed an executory devise, if it may, by any practicable construction, be sustained as a contingent remainder Stehman et al. v. Stehman, 1 Watts 466. But, whether an executory devise or not, was Nancy Buchanan seised ? \\u201c To entitle the husband to curtesy, the wife must have had such a seisin as will enable her issue to inherit: 4 Kent 29-31; Pritt v. Ritchey, 5 Casey 71. The cases in 8 S. & R. and 5 Rawle, cited by plaintiff\\u2019s counsel, show that there must be either an actual or \\u201cpotential seisin, or right of seisin;\\u201d that there must be an actual or constructive possession, or present right of possession during coverture, to entitle the husband to curtesy. The question is not whether there was an actual or potential seisin in Jennet Kyle, widow of the testator, but whether there was such actual or potential seisin, possession, or the right of possession in Nancy Buchanan. Had she \\u201ca right to demand and receive the rent,\\u201d or otherwise to \\u201c demand and receive the immediate possession?\\u201d Certainly, no such possession, or right of possession, or such receipt of rent, or right to receive it, or to recover the possession, is shown to have been in her.\\nHad not Jennet Kyle a life estate in at least a portion of the land, and had she not a right to receive at least a portion of the rents and profits during her life ? Is the income given to her in the will no disposition of the freehold ? The widow gets the actual possession of a part of the premises, is to receive one-half of the rents, and to enjoy divers other rights and privileges in the land. And how is the will to be carried into effect ? How is she to enjoy these rights and privileges ? The testator intended that his widow should have a life estate, or that his executors, his widow being one of them, should have possession or control of the farm during her life, and either rent it or so conduct and manage it, that the widow should enjoy all the rights and privileges granted to her.\", \"word_count\": \"3703\", \"char_count\": \"20418\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered,\\nby Strong, J.\\nIn this state a surviving husband is entitled to curtesy of land of his deceased wife of which he had only a potential seisin during her life. Actual possession by the wife or by the husband in her right is not necessary. If she had possession by a tenant for years, or if she had a right to present possession, it is sufficient. The effect is equivalent to that of actual'seisin: Stoolfoos v. Jenkins, 8 S. & R. 175; Chew v. Southwark, 5 Rawle 160. If, therefore, the wife of the plaintiff was, during her lifetime, either actually or potentially seised of the Sinking Yalley Farm (the property in dispute), his curtesy became complete at her death, and he is entitled to recover. The whole question in this case then is, what estate in that farm did Mrs. Buchanan take either by descent or under the will of her father ? .From the will, as well as the case stated, it appears that he left a widow and two daughters \\u2014 Mrs. Buchanan and Mrs. Duncan. He first made provision for his widow. To her he left during her natural life \\\"the use and benefit of'the old end of the dwelling-house\\\" (on the farm), \\\" the one-half of the garden and part of the spring-house for her milk,\\\" \\\"half of the grain that would come to him from the tenant,\\\" \\\" a sufficiency of pasture during the summer\\\" for her cow and horses, \\\" a sufficiency of hay for them\\\" in the winter, \\\"the right to have half a bushel of flax-seed sowed for her yearly on the farm, and to be put in for her in good ground in good order,\\\" and a right to have a sufficient quantity of firewood cut and hauled to her yearly during her life. He also gave to her an annuity, and various articles of personal property.\\nIt seems quite clear that neither any one of these provisions, nor all combined, amounted to a devise of the farm to the widow during her life. The benefits secured to her were, at most, certain rights and privileges upon the farm \\u2014 not the farm itself nor all its usufruct. As against the owner she could enforce the provisions made in her behalf, but those provisions looked to an owner other than herself to whom she could resort.\\n' Now had the will stopped here, the Yalley Spring Farm would have descended, on the death of the testator, to Mrs. Buchanan and to Mrs. Duncan, encumbered with the charge in favour of the widow, and would have been clearly subject to the curtesy of a husband. But the testator proceeded to make a disposition of all his property. He gave two specific legacies, and also a small pecuniary one to a grandson, and then gave to Mrs. Buchanan, for the use and benefit of her legal heirs, the one-half of the remaining part of his real and personal property after the aforesaid legacies and bequests should be fully satisfied and paid, and he made a similar disposition of the other half in favour of Mrs. Duncan. It is manifest that under this clause of the will the two daughters took a fee simple in all the real estate of which the testator died seised, a.nd which he had not previously devised. If, then, as we think, the farm was not devised to the widow for life, the right to its enjoyment passed to the daughters immediately, subject to the charge, the privileges, and easements created for the widow. Nor is this construction inconsistent with the directions of the will which follow this devising clause. The testator, having made this comprehensive disposition, proceeded to specify the more important items of his property given, both real and personal. With this view he left to Mrs. Buchanan one-half of certain stocks, one-half of a tract of land in Indiana county, one-half of a sum of money due to him for a tract of land sold, or the tract itself, and added: \\\" and I also bequeath to my said daughter Nancy Buchanan the one-half of my land in Sinking Valley, after the decease of my beloved wife, to her and to her heirs for ever.\\\" If the rights of Mrs. Buchanan were such only as this last clause standing alone would have conferred upon her, the defendants in error would be right, for then she would have had no title to the enjoyment of the farm until after the death of the widow, and the widow survived her. But such is not the case. This provision is not to be construed without reference to the other parts of the will. Full effect is to be given, if possible, to every provision; and if this is taken by itself the previous gift of all the testator's real and personal property is unmeaning. Placing ourselves in the testator's situation, endeavouring to catch his intention as expressed by his entire will, he seems to have said: I have made provision for my wife, and for all except my two children; I now leave to them all the remainder of my property ; of a part, which I specify, there will be no hindrance to their full and immediate enjoyment. Out of the Sinking Valley Farm, however, they must render certain duties to my wife during her life. Of that, therefore, they can only have partial enjoyment while she lives, but after her death their enjoyment shall be unclogged. Such being the meaning of the will, the're was a seisin of the farm in Mrs. Buchanan, as to one-half, immediately on the death of her father, even during the life of the widow, and, on Mrs. Buchanan's death, the plaintiff's right to curtesy was complete. It follows that he is entitled to recover.\\nThe judgment is reversed, and judgment is entered on the case stated for the plaintiff and against the defendants, for an undivided moiety of the tract of land described in the writ.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"481501\", \"name\": \"Wadhams versus The Lackawanna and Bloomsburg Railroad Company\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Wadhams v. Lackawanna & Bloomsburg Railroad\", \"decision_date\": \"1862-04-21\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"303\", \"last_page\": \"311\", \"citations\": \"42 Pa. 303\", \"volume\": \"42\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:08:36.081932+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Wadhams versus The Lackawanna and Bloomsburg Railroad Company.\", \"head_matter\": \"Wadhams versus The Lackawanna and Bloomsburg Railroad Company.\\nBond of Railroad Company as Security for Damages, includes Damages for Location and Construction.\\u2014 What is implied by Tender of Bond, and, Approval' of Sureties.\\n1. A bond filed by a railroad company when locating their road is a security for all damages that may occur from the construction also: both are but one injury, and a bond filed for one is therefore a security for all.\\n2. The offer of a bond by a railroad company is an assertion by one of the parties that they cannot agree upon the damages caused to the property of the landowner: and the action of the court approving the sureties and directing the bond to be filed, involves an adjudication that everything had been done to entitle the company to have the bond filed.\\nError to the Common Pleas of Luzerne county.\\nThis was an action of ejectment, brought January 1st 1857, by Samuel Wadhams against The Lackawanna and Bloomsburg Railroad Company, to recover possession of seventy-six and six-tenths perches of land in Plymouth township, occupied by a portion of the road of defendant.\\nIn 1852 an Act of Assembly was passed, and in March 1853 a charter ivas obtained incorporating the Lackawanna and Blooms-burg Railroad Company.\\nSometime in the year 1854 a survey was made for the location of the railroad, but precisely when it was made, or by whom, does not appear.\\nOn the 3d of November 1854, a damage bond was tendered to Mr. Wadhams, and at the same time a notice was served on him that on the 15th instant the bond would be presented to the Court of Common Pleas, &c. Exceptions were presented to the court, and filed, on the part of Mr. Wadhams against the propriety and regularity of the bond, which were overruled by the court, the sureties were approved of by the court and the bond filed.\\nNothing further was done in the premises until the 15th August 1855, when additional exceptions were filed, on the part of Mr. Wadhams, to the bond and the proceedings under it, with an application to strike off the bond, which the court in a written opinion refused to do.\\nSometime in November 1855, the company took possession of the land, and commenced grading the road. On the 1st day of January 1857 this ejectment was brought by Mr. Wadhams. On the 6th of April 1857, at the instance of the defendant, the court granted a rule on- the plaintiff, in the case of No. 72 January Term 1855 (the docket number of filing the bond), to show cause why the description of land may not be amended in accordance with facts.\\nOn the 30th October 1858, on motion in open court, the defendant was permitted by the court to withdraw the application to amend the bond. On the 11th of January 1860, the cause came on for trial, when the plaintiff asked the court to charge the jury\\n1. That the bond filed in this case was not conditioned as the Act of Assembly requires, because it provides only for the damages sustained by the location of the road. It should have covered the damages arising from the construction of the road.\\n2. There is no evidence of any attempt by the company to settle and agree upon the damages with the plaintiff before entering upon his land, and before the filing the bond in this case. A fair and bond fide attempt to settle must be made by the company before they had a right to tender a bond to Mr. Wadhams, or to file it in the Court of Common Pleas, and before any entry can be legally made upon the land to occupy it for the construction of the road. And no evidence has been presented to show that the company made or took the preliminary steps required by law in order to appropriate the land for a road.\\n3. The plaintiff can be divested of his land only by a strict compliance with the terms of the Act of Assembly on the part of the defendants in ' order 'to appropriate it for a road. Until this is done the defendants cannot set up any legal defence against the plaintiff\\u2019s recovery in this case.\\n4. Upon the whole evidence in this case the plaintiff is entitled to recover.\\nThe defendants als.o requested the court to charge:\\u2014\\n1. That the attempt to agree, the character of the bond, and all the proceedings preliminary to the building of the railroad, are, so far as regards the present action, in the nature of res adjudieata, and cannot be collaterally inquired into.\\n2. That where a remedy is provided by statute, and the parties have proceeded under it as in the case of the proceedings upon the bond, the remedy must be continued, and-neither party can resort'to another form-of proceedings, and that therefore the defendants are entitled to a verdict.\\n3. The defendants having located their road upon the plaintiff\\u2019s land, filed this bond, and procured the decree of the court as to its sufficiency, cannot resort to a remedy by ejectment.\\n4. That under the statute the filing of a bond by the defendants creates a legal inference of an inability of the parties to agree as to the amount of damages.\\n5. That, under all the evidence in the case, the defendants are entitled to a verdict.\\nThe court below (Conyngham, P. J.) charged in substance as follows:\\u2014\\n\\u201c The plaintiff has shown title to the land, as is conceded, and must recover in this suit, unless something else will prevent it.\\n\\u201c The defendants, not denying the original title of the plaintiff, claim that they legally occupy the ground for the purposes of their railroad, and are thus in possession; and the only question before us is, whether they have the right so to do, and can legally claim the possession of it.\\n\\u201c The defendants claim, that under authority constitutionally vested in the legislature, to take, when necessary, the' lands of an individual, for public purposes, upon tendering proper compensation therefor, or securing the owner for such pompensation, with means provided, for ascertaining the amount of his proper demand, for thus taking his property and transferring his enjoyment of it to the company, they have lawfully taken possession of the piece of land in dispute, having first, in pursuance of the provisions of law, tendered to the plaintiff, and filed in this court, for his protection and use, a bond securing to him the value of the property taken, with damages thereby incurred, and that thereby the right to occupy the land for their road purposes has become vested in them. If this be so, the plaintiff cannot recover here.\\n\\u201c On the 19th of February 1849, the General Bailroad Law of our state was passed, and by Act of 5th April 1852, authority was given to charter the Lackawanna and Bloomsburg Railroad Company, \\u201cwith all the powers, and subject to all the restrictions, of the above-mentioned general act.\\u201d Under this authority, on the 24th of March 1853, the governor of the state duly issued a charter and letters patent to this company, and thus gave them legitimate existence.\\n\\u201cBy the 10th section of the general act, full power was given to the company, by their officers, engineers, agents, &c., to enter upon and take the necessary land, &c., but it is also provided, that before appropriating, that is, entering upon and taking such possession, they shall make ample compensation to the owners, or tender adequate security therefor.\\n\\u201c By the 5th section of the Act of 1852, authorizing the charter of\\u2019this present company, a mode is provided for ascertaining this compensation, and properly securing the payment of it, viz., according to the provisions of the 2d section of an act relating to the Pennsylvania Coal Company, passed the 7th March 1849, P. L. 135.\\n\\u201c The defendants contend now, that, before taking the land occupied by them, they did pursue the provisions of this section so as to secure to the plaintiff proper compensation.\\n\\u201c They produce, and give in evidence, a bond, dated October 20th 1854, filed in this court November 20th of the same year, proved by undisputed testimony, to have been previously tendered to the plaintiff, and refused by him, and at the time of the order of filing, made by this court, the sufficiency of the sureties having been approved by us. This bond is produced in evidence, hut various objections against its effect and validity are advanced by the counsel of the plaintiff in the course of their arguments, and in the points upon which we are requested to charge.\\n\\u201c [We read the plaintiff\\u2019s first point, and say we do not so construe the bond.. The words of the condition, in our opinion, as expressed at the time of its being filed, and now again re-expressed, will cover any damages which may be assessed under the provisions of the Acts of Assembly already cited.\\n\\u201c The term location will cover the construction of the road, and all incidental damages; an equally comprehensive meaning being given to the term in the 10th section of the General Railroad Law of 1849.\\n\\u201cWe also say that the amount of damages, under the terms of the condition, may be recovered by action upon the bond, whether it exceed the penalty of the bond or not.\\n\\u201cIn receiving such bonds, and approving of them, we did not regard the amount of the penalty as so important as it otherwise might have been, but for the special clause in the condition.\\n\\u201c According to the evidence, the reference and description of the third piece of land mentioned in the bond applies to the land now in dispute upon which the road is located.\\n\\u201c It is objected, however, that the reference is too vague, inasmuch as it does not describe the exact land, or over what part of the land the road is intended to be located, or how or in what manner the road will be made.\\n\\u201cWe cannot sustain these objections, so as to avail the plaintiff in the present suit.]\\n\\u201c There is, however, one objection to proceedings connected with the filing of the bond, and the effect of such filing, which is worthy of most particular inquiry and consideration.\\n\\u201c This is raised by the second point of the plaintiff, which we read, and say that such an attempt to settle must be first made as therein stated is correct.\\n\\u201c Whether there be evidence or not of this, as the case now stands, or whether it should have been particularly proved now, are other questions.\\n\\u201c There is no direct evidence now shown of any such attempt, but the defendants contend that, under the other proceedings shown to us here, it is now to be presumed and inferred.\\n\\u201c The bond was tendered to Mr. Wadhams, who refused to receive it, on some objections to the amount of the penalty.\\n\\u201c Notice was then served upon him under the rule established in our court for such cases, to appear before us -on a day certain, when the bond would be presented to the court for their legitimate action under the Act of Assembly. Mr. Wadhams, at such time, appeared by his counsel, and the case was postponed to another day, when the order of the court was -made, overruling objections, approving of the sureties, and directing it to be filed. This we consider \\u2018 approving of the security,\\u2019 required by the act.\\n\\u201c The objections advanced, then, by Mr. Wadhams, as appears by the record, were only, first, because the bond is no lien on the estate; and, second, because the company had no legal existence, and had no right to take private property. Both of\\\" these reasons were overruled by the court, and, the security being considered sufficient, the bond was ordered to be filed. Mr. Wadhams made no objections at the time of the tender, or here in court, at such time of hearing, so far as now appears, of any neglect in not previously endeavouring to procure an agreement on the subject of damages.\\n\\u201c Nothing appears to have been said on this subject until some nine months afterwards, when he filed additional objections to the bond, which the court then overruled as out of time, and tod late.\\n\\u201c It is very manifest that the court should not have permitted this bond to have been filed, and thus taken jurisdiction of the matter without some evidence, either by direct proof, or the express or implied admission of the parties, or other circumstances of a previous inability to procure this amicable arrangement. We now consider, however, that in this collateral proceeding, we must hold it as a necessary presumption and inference that such preliminary agreement to settle was attempted, and could not be made.\\n\\u201c It was the decree and order of a court over a subject, w'hen they had jurisdiction, when the facts were properly proved.\\n\\u201c It might have been more accurate to require the filing, of a petition and deposition as to such facts, but when the matter was done, upon motion, and the parties upon notice appeared, took action in the case without any objection on this ground, the same court, in a collateral proceeding, of an entirely different kind, cannot examine their former action, but must presume all things then to have been rightly done.\\n\\u201cThe bond is certainly good against the company, and the sureties in any suit upon it. They would be estopped from alleging such a defence, and we cannot hold that the other party who, upon notice appeared, and had his day in court at the time of filing the bond, and permitted that to be done without then suggesting the present objection, can do it upon his- part in an adverse suit of a different character, brought about three years after the original order was made, and after the company had principally constructed their road.\\n\\u201c A contrary ruling might be attended with very great evil.\\n\\u201c Suppose that a company employ a general agent to effect cojnpromises, who fails in many cases to agree with parties, and bonds-are filed upon notice, and without objection, the company carry on to completion their road.\\n\\u201cEither from doubt of recovering damages, or from some other reason, some parties leave their cases undisposed of, and the employed agent suddenly dies,. Unless we give .the force of final action, to the preliminary proceedings, as now suggested, and hold that the company are not bound to make proof of such early step in their course in collateral matters, the road might be completely destroyed, unless the court, by exercising a greater power of arbitrary and extraordinary construction, should stay the execution of a verdict until the company renew their proceedings..\\n\\u201cWe think it safer to infer, from the conduct of the parties, facts which-will supersede such a technical objection as the present, made at so late a period, when all legal rights are fully protected, than to leave at the hazard of the discretion of any court, action necessary only in extraordinary cases, to save parties and the public from serious injury and great inconvenience. We think, too, that the reasoning of the court, in the case of Taylor v. Clemson, 3 Eng. Railw. Cases 50; sustains this view of the case, and meets our own judgment, arid therefore we refuse to charge to second point of the plaintiff in the affirmative.\\n\\u201c The general doctrine of the plaintiff\\u2019s third point is correct, but, in our view of the case, we cannot draw the inference stated in the point.\\n\\u201c The general charge answers the first, second, third, and fourth points of the defendant. The last point is answered in the negative, and the last point of the defendant in the affirmative. This cause is an important one. The rights of the plaintiff to receive compensation for the land taken for the road are fully secured by the bond as filed. We have already said in any such issue, the defendant could raise no objection to the validity of the proceeding. If, under such circumstances as appear in the present case, the plaintiff can recover the land claimed, and take one link out of this valuable and important chain and line of improvement, it must be so said by the Supreme Court, instructing, us that our views are erroneous.\\n\\u201c There are no facts affecting the issue here in dispute, :and: under the views we have thus set forth'we\\u2019 say that-ybur verdict', should be rendered for the defendants, which charge, the plaintiffs\\u2019 request may be reduced to writing, and filed of record for exception, w'hich is done.\\u201d]\\nUnder these instructions, there was a verdict and judgment for the defendant. The case was thereupon removed into this court, where so much of the charge of the court as is printed, above in brackets, was assigned for error.\\nHakes, Shoemaker, and Wadhams, for plaintiff in error.\\nStanly Woodward, for defendant in error.\", \"word_count\": \"3721\", \"char_count\": \"21209\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the court was delivered, April 21st 1862, by\\nStrong, J.\\nThe objections urged against the charge of .the' court in this case are hypercritical in a supereminent degree. They indicate clearly that whatever other object the plaintiff in error may have in view, he is not now seeking compensation for an injury received. Technical and formal, not affecting in the least the merits of his controversy with the defendants, if sustained they could not further the ends of-justice, or benefit the plaintiff himself.\\nIt is first contended that the bond of the defendants and their sureties was not the adequate or sufficient security which the law required them to give before entering upon the land of the plaintiff, locating and constructing their railroad. It is said it was not conditioned as the Act of Assembly required, because it. pro vided only for the damages sustained in consequence of the location of the road, whereas it should have covered the damages arising from the construction, and the court is complained of for construing it comprehensive enough to include both. It bound the obligors in a penalty conditioned for the payment to the plaintiff of such amount of damages as he should be entitled to receive in consequence of the location of the said road, after the same should have been agreed on by the parties on appeal by and under the provisions of the Acts of Assembly in such cases made, whether the same exceed the amount of the penalty in the bond mentioned or not. The court below held, and with obvious correctness, that the bond covered all the damages which the plaintiff under any circumstances could recover. The legislature made no attempt to distinguish between .damages caused by the location and those caused by the construction of the railroad. It is one injury. Where the railroad has been located, the land has been taken and appropriated for the public use, the right of the landowner to sue for his damages is complete, and he may recover all which may be caused by the location, and by the subsequent construction. He can have but one action. The damages cannot .be severed, and security for one is therefore security for all: Neal v. The Pittsburgh and Connellsville Railroad Company, 2 Grant's Cases 137.\\nIt is next insisted that there was no evidence of any attempt by the defendants to settle with the plaintiff, and agree upon the damages before they entered upon his land and before they filed the bond given as a security. Hence it is inferred that the tender of the bond, and the filing of the same, was unauthorized by law, and that the defendants were not empowered to appropriate the_ land for the said road.\\nThough the Acts of Assembly do not in terms; require any attempt to make a settlement before a tender of a bond or filing it in the Common Pleas, it is perhaps a just inference from their language that there should be some evidence of inability of the parties to agree before the court should undertake to pass upon the security offered. But the very offer of a bond is an assertion by one of tbe parties that they cannot agree, and it is in itself some proof of such inability, for without the consent of both such an agreement cannot'be made. And if it were not so, the action of the court approving the sureties, and directing the bond to be filed, involves an adjudication that everything had been done which entitled the company to have the bond filed. If an attempt to settle was a prerequisite, the order of the court is conclusive that the attempt had been made. The decree of the court, like any other judgment, is final between the parties, as to all matters adjudicated therein directly, and to all facts which were essential to the adjudication.\\nOn the trial it was proved that the bond was tendered to the plaintiff on the 3d day of November 1854. He refused the tender, objecting only that the penalty was insufficient. He did not then assert that there was no inability to agree upon the damages, or that no attempt at' a settlement had been made. Notice was at that time given to him that the bond would be presented to the Common Pleas on the 15th of November for approval. He appeared in court on the day appointed, and protested against the reception and filing of the bond for two reasons only; first, that it was deficient as a security, because it was no lien on real estate, and second, because the company had no legal existence, and had no right to take personal property. He made no other objection; if he had any other he waived it. The court overruled those which he made, and ordered the bond to be filed. It is too late for him now to say that there never had been any attempt to effect a settlement with him, or that there was no proof that the parties could not agree; even if he were not estopped by the adjudication, he is by his conduct.\\nWe need say no more; the case was well tried, and the judgment is\\nAffirmed.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"568089\", \"name\": \"APPEAL OF JOHN W. MADORE ET AL. [John W. Madore et al. v. G. N. Horn.]\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Madore v. Horn\", \"decision_date\": \"1889-05-27\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 342\", \"first_page\": \"15\", \"last_page\": \"26\", \"citations\": \"129 Pa. 15\", \"volume\": \"129\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:00:50.596217+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Paxson, C. J., Green, Clark, Williams and McCollum, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"APPEAL OF JOHN W. MADORE ET AL. [John W. Madore et al. v. G. N. Horn.]\", \"head_matter\": \"APPEAL OF JOHN W. MADORE ET AL. [John W. Madore et al. v. G. N. Horn.]\\nfrom the decree of ti-ie court of common fleas of BEDFORD COUNTY, IN EQUITY.\\nArgued May 14, 1889 \\u2014 Decided\\nMay 27, 1889.\\nRe-argument refused October 14, 1889.\\n[To be reported.]\\n1. The language of a deed poll, conveying a lot of ground, to wit : \\u201c The said piece of ground to be used for milling or manufacturing purposes only,\\u201d is not a covenant, expressed or implied, that the grantee would erect a mill of any kind upon the property. '\\n2. There being no averment of fraud, accident, or mistake, in the execution and delivery of the deed, and no attempt to re-form it, the previous understanding of the parties, if there was one, was merged in the deed, and a bill to restrain the use of the lot for other purposes than those expressed will be dismissed.\\nBefore Paxson, C. J., Green, Clark, Williams and McCollum, JJ.\\nNo. 342 January Term 1889, Sup. Ct.; court below, No. 1 April Term 1885, C. P. in Equity.\\nOn February 16, 1885, John W. Madore, trustee, and John W. Madore, John Wilhelm, William M. Hall, James C. Devore and Michael Carpenter filed a bill in equity against G. Newton Horn, praying, upon the grounds of relief therein set forth, relating to the conveyance by the plaintiffs to the defendant of a certain lot with water-power and water privileges, by deed dated May 10, 1883, duly delivered and recorded,\\n1. That the defendant be restrained and enjoined from using the said lot for any other purpose than for a mill, or, in lieu thereof, some other manufactory with water-power.\\n2. That he be required to remove said building he has erected thereon.\\n3. That he be specially enjoined and restricted from using said 'building for a printing office and place of residence, and the said lot, in connection with the B. & O. Railroad, \\u00e1s a coal yard or place for unloading coal.\\n4. That he be required to erect a mill on said lot, or other manufactory in lieu thereof.\\n5. That he be ordered, adjudged, and decreed to pay to plaintiffs such compensation in damages as will recompense them for his use of the lot in violation of the limitation of the deed, and for the non-erection of a mill or other manufactory thereon.\\nAnd for such other and farther order and relief, etc.\\nThe cause having been put at issue by answer and replication, it was referred to Mr. Alexander King, as examiner and master, who subsequently filed a report with the following findings of fact:\\n1. On March 12,1883, the plaintiffs, John W. Madore, John Wilhelm, William M. Hall, James C. Devore, and Michael Carpenter, composed a company called the Bridgeport Land Association, and were the owners of a body of land in and adjoining the borough of Hyndman, Bedford county, which had been by them laid out in town lots and outlots. On that day they entered into an article of agreement, in writing, with the defendant, G. Newton Horn, to sell and convey to him a certain \\u201c mill seat \\u201d for the consideration of $500, which is described in the agreement as follows, viz.: \\u201c The above mill or manufacturing seat is more fully described as follows: Commencing at post corner on George\\u2019s street and running N. W. with George\\u2019s street 125 feet to line of B. & O. Railroad; thence in a northern direction along line of said railroad to a point near the railroad culvert; then in an eastern direction across the race to bank about 60 feet; then down along bank to place of beginning; the deed for above to be in fee simple, and to be used only for milling or manufacturing purposes.\\u201d\\n2. A deed for said piece or lot of ground was executed and delivered to said G. Newton Horn on May 10, 1888, and recorded. This deed describes the lines definitely and contains the following clause: \\u201c The said piece of ground to be used for milling and manufacturing purposes only, and party of the first part shall also be allowed to erect a dam in Will\\u2019s creek near the Peerless Lime Co.\\u2019s quarry, and divert as much water from said creek as may be necessary to run a mill or manu factory that may be erected thereon; and shall have the right to clean out channel below said piece of ground, so as to allow a free flow of water from tail race, and prevent back water. In case the dam is so erected in Will\\u2019s creek as to divert all the water from said creek, grantors reserve the right to a two-inch flow of water from race or creek above dam; but if the water of said creek is not all diverted, whatever water is needed by said grantors or their assigns it shall be taken from a point below the dam.\\u201d It was evidently intended that the party of second part should have this right.\\n8. There is a natural water-course extending from Will\\u2019s \\u2022creek, at or near the point above mentioned, which is suitable for a mill race, extending over other lands of the grantors to and over the lot conveyed and on below it over grantors\\u2019 lands.\\n4. The defendant, G. Newton Horn, accepted the deed, had it placed on record, and took actual .possession of the lot, under this conveyance, on May 10,1883, and has been and is still in possession of it.\\n5. A short time after said purchase, the defendant, at a cost of about $1,200 erected a two-story frame building on said lot, at the corner of the intersection of the B. & O. Railroad and George\\u2019s street, which said building was intended for a chair manufactory, but was never so used. It was used for a dwelling-house and printing office, fora short time, and since has been used and occupied as a store and dwelling-house.\\n6. On another part of this lot the defendant has a coal-yard and coal-tipple along the B. & O. Railroad. A portion of this coal-yard or tipple is on the right of way of the said railroad, and part on the lot in controversy. It is used in connection with the lot, and could not be operated as a coal-yard, except in connection with the lot.\\n7. From the time of the purchase, up to the time of the institution of this suit, the defendant did not use this lot for milling or manufacturing purposes, but used it for a storehouse, dwelling-house, printing office, and coal-yard.\\n8. After the purchase of this lot, the defendant purchased a mill in the upper part of the town of Hyndman; or rather, he took back from a man named Samuel Hendrickson a mill property he had sold to him previous to the purchase of this lot.' He took it back for the reason that Mr. Hendrickson was unable to pay for it.\\n9. The title to the water-right, as sold to the defendant, was in the plaintiffs at the time they made the conveyance. The calls in the old surveys, and the marks upon the ground that under the evidence were there a number of years ago, fix the line of the plaintiffs\\u2019 property on the north or Evans side of Will\\u2019s creek, so that Jacob Evans had no title to any part of Will\\u2019s creek. Even if this were not so, the conveyance from Jacob Evans to the Bridgeport Land Company, dated August 28, 1878, recorded, gives to the plaintiffs the right to divert all the water from Will\\u2019s creek. The evidence produced to show that this conveyance from said Jacob Evans to the said land company was fraudulent and without consideration, falls far short of establishing such fact.\\n10. The evidence produced to establish an outstanding title in Cornelius Devore\\u2019s heirs to that part of the land owned by the said plaintiffs, over or through which the water of Will\\u2019s creek would have to be carried to reach the lot conveyed to said defendant, is entirely too vague and indefinite to show a title better than plaintiffs. If any such outstanding title exists, the evidence fails to show it.\\nUpon the facts so found by him, the master reported as follows:\\nUnder the foregoing statement of facts the material question raised is, Does the clause in the deed above recited create an estate upon condition? Or, is it a mere limitation of the use which the grantee shall make of the propertj'-,. \\u2014 a naked prohibition, inconsistent with the title conveyed and therefore void?\\nUnless it is an estate upon condition, the plaintiffs\\u2019 case is without foundation. If not clearly expressed, but the intention of the parties that it was to be an estate upon condition can be gathered from the whole paper, then it is enforceable in a court of equity, and the defendant should be restrained in any use of the property, other than for milling or manufacturing purposes and the uses necessarily and reasonably connected therewith. In a proceeding in the common law form, it would be necessary to inquire into the form in which the right is reserved, in order to decide whether it should be sued for as a condition, or as a simple contract or covenant; but in the equity form- of proceeding it is the substantial element, the intention of the parties, that is inquired into.\\nIt is very evident from the article of agreement and the deed, that the grantors intended to sell the lot for a mill or other manufactory, and it is just as evident that the grantee purchased it for that express purpose and intended to use it for such purpose only. The language is: \\u201c The said piece of ground to be used for milling or manufacturing purposes only.\\u201d If this has any meaning, it is that the grantors conveyed the lot upon the condition that the grantee use it for milling or manufacturing purposes only. Without such construction the language of the clause is without meaning. It was put there for some purpose, surely, and the only reasonable or common sense purpose that can be ascribed is, that it was upon the condition that the grantee use the property so conveyed for the sole purpose of milling or other manufacturing purposes. It is very clear that such was the intention of the parties, and that this was the condition upon which the grant was made. The bill of the plaintiffs alleges it, and the answer of the defendant admits it; and he further says, \\u201c that he still intends to do so at such time as will suit his purposes.\\u201d\\nThis was not a reservation, for the grantors have not reserved anything out of that which they before granted. Nor is it an exception, for that is always a portion of the thing granted and can be enjoyed separately from the thing granted.\\nAn estate upon condition is such whose existence depends upon the happening or not happening of some uncertain event, whereby the estate may be originally created, enlarged, or finally defeated; a condition being a qualification or restriction annexed to a conveyance and so connected with it in the deed as to qualify or restrain it. This, then, could only be an estate upon condition subsequent. It is not very clearly expressed, but taking the whole instrument together, I think the clear implication is, that the parties intended to create an estate upon condition.\\nHas there been a breach of the condition? No time being specified in the deed for the performance of the condition, it must be complied with in a reasonable time. Has the defend ant had such reasonable time ? The deed was made and delivered on May 10, 1888. This suit was instituted on February 16, 1885. Thus, the defendant has had a period of less than two years to comply with or perform the condition. He made no visible efforts to comply with it in that time. Yet if he had not used the property for other purposes, I am of the opinion that a court of equity would not compel him to proceed to erect a mill or manufactory within that period, nor would such non-compliance work a forfeiture of the estate.\\nI do not understand that the plaintiffs seek a forfeiture. The prayer for relief is that he be restrained from using the property for other purposes than that of milling or manufacturing. This prayer should be granted and a decree entered restraining the defendant from using the land for a coal-yard. But inasmuch as he has erected a steam grist-mill on the property since the beginning of this suit, I cannot see that he should be compelled to remove the building used for a store and dwelling-house. He might very consistently with the terms of the deed have a dwelling and store on the property, and having such, in connection with a mill or manufactory, would not be a breach of the condition.\\nThe condition having been broken by the defendant, he should be adjudged to pay some amount in damages; but in view of the fact that less than two years expired from the date of the deed until the bringing of the suit, and the further fact that the evidence does not show any actual, direct damages to the plaintiffs by reason of such breach, the amount should be small; and the master deems it proper, under the circumstances of the case, that the defendant be adjudged to pay the siirn of fifty dollars to the plaintiffs, and the costs of this proceeding ; and as this arises from the breach of the condition upon which he holds title to the land, the decree should be so entered that the defendant\\u2019s title remains subject to the payment of said damages and costs.\\nThe plaintiffs\\u2019 counsel have requested the master to find and report, among other matters, the following:\\n\\u201c That if there is any ambiguity in the deed, the parol evidence of J. W. Madore and William M. Hall, and the letter of defendant dated and marked E, establish the fact that the defendant was to forthwith erect a grist-mill to be run by water power, with the right to convert it into some other manufactory in which water-power would be used, if the future made that change desirable.\\u201d\\n\\u201cThat the plaintiffs have a right to the flow of water through the defendant\\u2019s lot, so as to use it on their land below, the same as if the defendant had erected a grist-mill and run the same by water-power on the lot conveyed to him ; and they are entitled to a decree by which they can turn the water down through the lot of the defendant and use it on their land below, where, the evidence shows, they have a seat or seats for other manufacturing establishments.\\u201d\\nThe evidence does not satisfy the master that there was any such contemporaneous parol agreement between the parties, at the tim\\u00e9 of the purchase and acceptance of the deed for the land by the defendant, that would sustain such finding. I cannot see how the conversations and parol agreements of the parties, when negotiations were going on in 1880, can be part of and contemporaneous with the contract and sale made in 1883. . That the defendant bought the lot for the purpose of erecting a mill or other manufactory has already been found; but the kind of mill or manufactory, or that he was to use water-power and divert the water from Will\\u2019s creek and use it for such mill or manufactory, and so divert it that the plaintiffs would have the use of it below, is not established. He has the right to so use the water if he sees proper to do so, and otherwise conforms to the terms of his deed; but the evidence does not show -that it was compulsory upon him.\\nTo the foregoing report, a large number of exceptions were filed by both the plaintiffs and the defendant. These exceptions were overruled by the master and then renewed in court. After argument thereof, the court, Bajen, P. J., on January 28, 1889, filed the following opinion and decree:\\nThis cause came on to be heard on exceptions to the report of the master, and was ably argued by counsel.\\nThe learned master has presented his report in a form to be commended. His finding of facts is as concisely and tersely stated as the facts warranted, and his opinion on the facts found and authorities presented to him is able. He holds that the main question in the case is, Does the clause in the deed recited in plaintiffs\\u2019 bill create an estate on condition? and holds, also, that unless it is an estate on condition, the plaintiffs\\u2019 case is without foundation.\\nWe entirely concur with the master in this. But notwithstanding his well-considered opinion, we are constrained to differ from him in his finding that the estate is an estate on condition: Wheeler v. Walker, 2 Conn. 196 (7 Am. Dec. 264) ; Methodist Ch. v. Public Ground Co., 103 Pa. 164; Cook v. Trimble, 9 W. 15; 1 Shars. & B., L. C., 124, 149 ; Packard v. Ames, 16 Gray 327; Biglow v. Barr, 4 Ohio 358 ; McKissick v. Pickle, 16 Pa. 140; Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. 289; Johnson v. Guriy, 52 Tex. 222.\\nThe master, though he held the estate to be a conditional one, nevertheless found damages only. If it is not an estate on condition the remedy for damages, if any, must in our opinion be by an action of law. If it be said the grantee did not seal the deed, and hence could not be sued in covenant for non-performance, the answer would be that if he were liable in covenant in case he had sealed it, he would in Pennsylvania, be liable in assumpsit, though he had not sealed. As we consider the estate is not an estate on condition, the ruling of the case necessarily turns on this point alone, and as a consequence all exceptions inconsistent with this ruling are now dismissed.\\nAnd now January 28, 1889, this cause came on for hearing and was fully argued at the last stated argument court, and the court upon due consideration does now order, adjudge, and decree that the bill of the plaintiffs be dismissed at the costs of the plaintiffs, and said costs as reported by the master as to amount are approved.\\nThereupon the plaintiffs took this appeal, specifying that the court erred in dismissing the bill at the costs of the plaintiffs.\\nMr. William M. Hall, J'r., and Mr. William M. Hall, for the appellants:\\n1. As a general rule, covenants prohibiting the purchaser from the erection of dwellings, or restricting the size or manner of erection, or the purposes for which the premises may be used, will be enforced in equity, by restraining the purchaser or his assigns, having notice, from their violation: Seymour v. McDonald, 4 Sandf. Ch. 502; Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. 289; Hills v. Miller, 8 Paige 254 (24 Am. Dec. 218); Trustees v. Cowan, 4 Paige 510; Mann v. Stephens, 15 Sim. 377; Latimer v. Livermore, 72 N. Y. 174; Haswell v. Wright, 8 C. E. Green 389; Kirkpatrick v. Perslime, 9 C. E. Green 206; Stivers v. Dorman, 25 Ohio 580; Palmer v. Graham, 1 Pars. 476; McClurg\\u2019s App., 58 Pa. 52; St. Andrews Luth. Ch.\\u2019s App., 67 Pa. 512; Linzee v. Mixer, 101 Mass. 512; Dorr v. Harrahan, 101 Mass. 531; Fuller v. Ames, 45 Vt. 400; Ph\\u0153nix Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 14 Abb. Pr., N. S., 266; Bagwell v. Davies, 140 Mass. 76; Witney v. Railroad Co., 11 Gray 359; Peck v. Conway, 119 Mass. 546; Barrow v. Richard, 8 Paige 351; Blecker v. Bingham, 3 Paige 246; Trustees of Watertown v. Cowen, 4 Paige 510.\\n2. Both covenant at law and a bill in equity to restrain, will lie to enforce an agreement not to erect a building of a particular kind. The acceptance of a deed and the enjoyment of the estate estops the person claiming it from denying the covenant even though he has not sealed the deed: Atlantic Dock Co. v. Leavitt, 54 N. Y. 35 (13 Am. Rep. 556); Trustees v. Lynch, 70 N. Y. 440; Rogers v. Eagle Fire Co., 9 Wend. 618; Trotter v. Hughes, 2 Kern. 74; Randall v. Latham, 36 Conn. 38; Thornton v. Tranwell, 39 Ga. 202; Harriman v. Park, 15 N. H. 471; Emerson v. Mowery, 50 N. H. 315; Burbank v. Pillsbury, 48 N. H. 475 (97 Am.. Dec. 633). The learned master fell into an error in supposing that our case depended on its being an estate upon condition, and held it was an estate upon condition. The learned court held it was not an estate upon condition, and dismissed the bill. Both overlooked the true state of the case; that it is not put on the ground of being an estate upon condition, and that the bill seeks to enforce a covenant or contract, a negative covenant as it is called, restricting the use to which the grantee could put the lot, Which we claim to be our right.\\nMr. John M. Reynolds (with him Mr. F. F. Kerr and Mr. R. \\u2019 O. McNamara), for appellee:\\n1. We confidently maintain that the deed in this ease does not create a covenant on the part of the grantee, from the mere fact of his acceptance of the same. It does not purport to be signed or intended to be signed by both; and the clause in relation to the use of the property can in no sense be termed a covenant on the part of the grantee. Whatever may be the authorities elsewhere, it has long been settled in this state that the mere acceptance of a deed does not create a covenant on the part of the grantee. The authorities presented by plaintiffs holding a different view in other states, have no bearing in determining the question before us: Maule v. Weaver, 7 Pa. 829; Shoenberger v. Hay, 40 Pa. 137.\\n2. It seems to be conceded by the plaintiffs that, standing on the deed alone, there is no covenant on the part of the grantee, but to aid them they call in the article of agreement between the parties. To this, it may be urged, there are two objections : (1), the remedy is not sought in the bill on the terms of the agreement, but solely by reason of the terms of the deed; and (2), the contract between the parties was terminated and all prior contracts were merged in the deed, which contains substantially the same provisions as those set forth in the agreement, and in such case there is a merger and the deed must speak the contract, the remedy and the rights of the parties: Jones v. Wood, 16 Pa. 25; Shontz v. Brown, 27 Pa. 123; 1 Sugden on Vendors, 327, note y. Moreover, by accepting the deed all prior parol contracts were merged: Gregory v. Griffin, 1 Pa. 208. The case is ruled by Craig v. Wells, 11 N. Y. 315.\\n3. This court should also refuse the relief prayed for, on other grounds: (1) It does not appear from the bill filed in this case, nor from the proof offered, nor from any finding of the master, that the injury complained of is irreparable. Prom all that does appear, it is manifest that if the rights of the plaintiffs have been invaded, they have an adequate remedy at law : Clark\\u2019s App., 62 Pa. 450; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Railroad Co., 9 Phila. 494; Harkinson\\u2019s App., 78 Pa. 204. (2) There is no allegation in the bill that the defendant has violated any covenant, or that he ever covenanted that the property should be used by him. for \\u201cmilling or manufacturing purposes only.\\u201d In the absence of such an allegation, plaintiffs have no right to the decree they pray for: Lafferty\\u2019s App., 20 W. N. 36; 1 High on Inj., \\u00a7 34; Bispham\\u2019s Eq., 491.\", \"word_count\": \"4531\", \"char_count\": \"24863\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam :\\nThe learned judge below differed from the master in his construction of the words, \\\" the said piece of ground to be used for milling or manufacturing purposes only,\\\" contained in the deed from J. W. Madore et al. to G. Newton Horn. The master held that the words referred to created an estate upon condition; the court, that they did not. We are not-called upon to decide which was right, as we think upon the merits the bill was properly dismissed.\\nThe deed contains no covenant to erect a mill of any kind upon the property; the grantee acquired a right to do so, and to make use of the water power. The grantor has no legal cause to complain that his grantee does not exercise all the rights and privileges which he purchased and paid for. And even if a covenant to build a mill could be implied, no time was fixed within which it was to be done. It appears, however, that since the bill was filed the grantee has erected a grist-mill, which was intended to be operated by steam. The appellants object to this and say he should have used the waterpower. There is nothing in the deed which requires him to do so, and we cannot look elsewhere for it. The previous understanding of the parties, if there was one, must be presumed to have been merged in the deed. There is no averment of fraud,' accident, or mistake in its execution. There was no attempt to reform it. It was alleged, however, that the appellee is using the property for other than milling or manufacturing purposes. He did erect a building for manufacturing purposes, but was unable to use it as such. It is now occupied as a store and dwelling-house. If we give the language quoted from the deed the effect of a covenant, we do not regard this as a breach. It must have a reasonable construction. A covenant to use property_for manufacturing purposes would imply the right to use it for all purposes incident to such object. There must be a house or houses, for those who operate the establishment to live in, and we cannot say that a store to supply their wants is not germane. The matter of the coal-yard does not require discussion. There was no coal-yard upon the lot. It is true the master finds there was, but in this he was mistaken. The only evidence upon this subject is that of J. W. Madore, one of the plaintiffs, who said, \\\" I am not certain tbat any part of Horn's coal-yard proper is on this lot. He gains access to tbe coal yard and tipple over tbe lot.\\\" Upon tbe merits tbe plaintiffs bad no case.\\nTbe decree is affirmed, and tbe appeal dismissed at tbe costs of tbe appellants.\\nOn October 14, 1889, a motion by tbe appellants for a re-argument was refused.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"588044\", \"name\": \"David ZERBY, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (READING ANTHRACITE COMPANY). Petition of Reading Anthracite Company\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Zerby v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board\", \"decision_date\": \"2003-07-18\", \"docket_number\": \"Petition No. 338 MAL 2003\", \"first_page\": \"146\", \"last_page\": \"146\", \"citations\": \"574 Pa. 146\", \"volume\": \"574\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:32:57.961790+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"David ZERBY, v. WORKERS\\u2019 COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (READING ANTHRACITE COMPANY). Petition of Reading Anthracite Company.\", \"head_matter\": \"829 A.2d 297\\nDavid ZERBY, v. WORKERS\\u2019 COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (READING ANTHRACITE COMPANY). Petition of Reading Anthracite Company.\\nSupreme Court of Pennsylvania.\\nJuly 18, 2003.\", \"word_count\": \"86\", \"char_count\": \"552\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nPER CURIAM.\\nAND NOW, this 18th day of July, 2003, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED. It is further ordered that the matter be CONSOLIDATED with Colpetzer v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Standard Steel), 802 A.2d 1233 (Pa.Commw.2002), appeal granted, 573 Pa. 660, 820 A.2d 163 (Pa.2003) (Nos. 646 MAL 2002 & 63 MAP 2003, granted April 22, 2003).\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
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+"{\"id\": \"594469\", \"name\": \"COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. John KIMBLE, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Commonwealth v. Kimble\", \"decision_date\": \"1984-01-06\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 879\", \"first_page\": \"499\", \"last_page\": \"512\", \"citations\": \"323 Pa. Super. 499\", \"volume\": \"323\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:53:02.276887+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before CERCONE, President Judge, and HESTER, CAVANAUGH, WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY, WIEAND and POPOVICH, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. John KIMBLE, Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"470 A.2d 1369\\nCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. John KIMBLE, Appellant.\\nSuperior Court of Pennsylvania.\\nSubmitted July 12, 1983.\\nFiled Jan. 6, 1984.\\nRobert F. Pappano, Assistant Public Defender, Media, for appellant.\\nDavid Fritchey, Assistant District Attorney, Media, for Commonwealth, appellee.\\nBefore CERCONE, President Judge, and HESTER, CAVANAUGH, WICKERSHAM, ROWLEY, WIEAND and POPOVICH, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"3797\", \"char_count\": \"23320\", \"text\": \"CERCONE, President Judge:\\nThis is a direct appeal from the judgment of sentence imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County on March 24, 1981 following appellant's conviction in a jury trial of Failure to File Tax Returns and Failure to Remit Tax Monies Collected. In pressing the instant appeal, appellant advances several arguments, none of which we perceive as enjoying any merit. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of sentence.\\nAppellant, in his capacity as President and Treasurer of K.B.D.S. Associates, Inc. (hereafter \\\"KBDS\\\"), a manufacturing concern doing business in Drexel Hill, Delaware County, signed and filed a sales tax license application with the Sales and Use Tax Division of the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue (hereafter \\\"Department of Revenue\\\"). Upon the granting of that application, appellant assumed responsibility for the collection of sales tax on the products manufactured and sold by KBDS, the preparation of tax forms, the filing of tax returns, and the remitting of taxes collected to the Department of Revenue.\\nAppellant fulfilled his responsibilities to the Commonwealth until spring, 1975. During the \\\"2A\\\" quarter of that year (April and May), he failed to file a return or remit any taxes prior to the filing deadline of June 15. Moreover, appellant did not remit the taxes owed by KBDS for the \\\"2B\\\" quarter of 1975 (June), although he did file a return by the July 31 deadline.\\nAs a result of these omissions, appellant's sales tax license was rescinded on August 31, 1975. Although appellant was contacted on numerous occasions by agents of the Department of Revenue, and despite the fact that he re ceived three notices of delinquency, the problem was not rectified. On December 21, 1976, a private criminal complaint was filed against appellant by Nathaniel Namerow, an agent of the Department of Revenue. A summons was issued the following day, December 22, 1976.\\nOn January 25, 1977, appellant signed a bail recognizance in response to the complaint and summons, and a preliminary hearing was scheduled for February 1, 1977. That hearing, together with eleven subsequent hearings, was continued in order to allow appellant to obtain counsel and arrange for payment of his tax liabilities. Appellant later executed a promissory note and liquidated a portion of his debt to the Department of Revenue. One check submitted in partial satisfaction of the tax obligation was not honored due to insufficient funds.\\nAppellant then inquired if the complaint would be withdrawn if he paid the delinquencies, noting that he was experiencing some difficulty in erasing his liabilities since KBDS was failing as a commercial enterprise. The corporation later became involved in Chapter Eleven bankruptcy proceedings in federal court. As a consequence, appellant asserted that he was unable to resolve his tax problems with the Commonwealth insofar as federal authorities had advised him that no payment on the Pennsylvania liability could occur until he had been discharged in the federal bankruptcy litigation.\\nAfter having been granted numerous continuances of his preliminary hearing, appellant failed to appear at the hearing scheduled for August 17, 1978. The district justice then issued a warrant for appellant's arrest which was executed on October 2, 1978. After the granting of yet another continuance, the preliminary hearing was conducted on January 31, 1979. Appellant was charged by information and arraigned that same day.\\nAppellant's counsel filed a pre-trial motion which alleged, inter alia, that the charges should be dismissed because the information was not signed personally by the District Attorney but was instead stamped with a facsimile of his signature. The motion was denied by the lower court and appellant proceeded to trial on July 23, 1980. The following day, July 24, 1980, appellant was found guilty of Failure to File Tax Returns and Failure to Remit Tax Monies Collected.\\nPost-verdict motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial were filed, briefed, argued and ultimately denied by an order of the lower court dated February 6, 1981. On March 24, 1981, appellant appeared for sentencing and was ordered to pay the costs of his prosecution as well as a fine totalling $1,400, make restitution in the amount of $391.70 for back taxes owed to the Department of Revenue, and serve a term of probation of two years. The instant appeal then followed.\\nAppellant argues initially that the lower court erred in failing to discharge him at a pre-trial habeas corpus hearing on the basis that the information filed against him by the Commonwealth was affixed solely with a rubber-stamped facsimile signature of the district attorney. Appellant cites our opinion in Commonwealth v. Emanuel, 285 Pa.Superior Ct. 594, 428 A.2d 204 (1981), as support for his contention that Pa.R.Crim.P. 225(b) requires that an information bear the handwritten signature of the prosecuting attorney.\\nWe acknowledge that insofar as appellant challenged the validity of the information through a pre-trial motion to dismiss, our opinion in Emanuel would seem to require his discharge. Unfortunately for appellant, however, our Supreme Court, in review of our decision in Emanuel, rejected in toto our disposition of that case. Commonwealth v. Emanuel, 501 Pa. 581, 462 A.2d 653 (1983). Speaking for a majority of the Court, Justice Flaherty quoted from our Opinion in Commonwealth v. Veneri and Thomas requiring handwritten signatures on criminal informations:\\nThe district attorney or his designee is . mandated to inquire into and make full examination of all the facts and circumstances connected with each case to determine if the filing of an information is warranted 42 Pa.C.S.A. \\u00a7 8931(d). Thus the act of approving the information is one fraught with grave consequences not the least of which may be the career, reputation and very freedom of the defendant. It would demean the significance of this fateful document if we were to interpret the words \\\"shall be signed\\\" to permit affixing a rubber stamp facsimile to the information.\\nCommonwealth v. Veneri and Thomas, quoting 306 Pa.Superior Ct. at 402, 452 A.2d at 787.\\nHowever, in reversing our decision in Emanuel, the Court dismissed such an argument, holding that\\ncontrary to the view of the Superior Court, a handwritten signature does not signify more or less than is signified by a facsimile signature. Manually signed informations may be subscribed without having been read, or they may even be signed in blank. On the other hand, it may be in a particular case that a facsimile signature has been affixed only after a full review by a duly authorized person. There is nothing in the physical appearance of either type of signature which requires the conclusion that a proper review by an authorized person has or has not been made. Thus, a per se rule against facsimile signatures is inadvisable, and in any event, would not address the evil sought to be prevented. (501 Pa. at 587, 462 A.2d at 656).\\nThe Court noted that Pa.R.Crim.P. 225 has as its goal the protection of a citizen from \\\"unjust or unduly oppressive government interference\\\". Id., 501 Pa. at 587, 462 A.2d at 656. This interest is advanced by requiring that the government official who authorizes the commencement of a prosecution be identified on the face of the information should the official be later called upon by a court to establish that the information complies with all legal requirements. Thus, once the authorizing official is identified, whether by a manually-subscribed signature of a rubber-stamped facsimile signature, there arises a rebuttable presumption that the information is legally sound. Id.\\nAppellant does not contend that his prosecution was undertaken in the absence of due deliberation by the prosecuting authorities, nor does he argue that his defense at trial was in some way impaired by the fixing of a facsimile signature to the information by the Commonwealth. Given the recent decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Emanuel, we conclude that because the identity of the authorizing official appears on the face of the information, albeit in facsimile form, the requirements of due process and Pa.R.Crim.P. 225(b) have been satisfied. Consequently, we reject appellant's claim to the contrary.\\nAppellant next maintains that the lower court erred in failing to dismiss the information on the ground that it yvas filed subsequent to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. More specifically, appellant argues that the filing of the complaint on December 21, 1976 was not sufficient to toll the statute of limitations because, insofar as appellant was not charged with a violation of the Crimes Code, the statute of limitations could only be tolled by the filing of an information. Appellant argues that since the violations of the Tax Code were committed between May and July 1975, and since the information was not filed until January 31, 1979, the applicable statute of limitations expired prior to the institution of criminal proceedings against him, thus requiring his discharge. We cannot agree.\\nIn Commonwealth v. Bidner, 282 Pa. Superior Ct. 100, 422 A.2d 847 (1980), the Superior Court, speaking through Judge Hester, ruled that \\\"the clear intent of the legislature by virtue of \\u00a7 107(a) ,\\\" 282 Pa.Superior Ct. at 114, 422 A.2d at 854, authorized the application of the Crimes Code statute of limitations, 18 Pa.C.S.A. \\u00a7 108, to an election code violation which was perpetrated after the effective date of the Crimes Code. Id. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Milano and Terra, 300 Pa.Superior Ct. 251, 446 A.2d 325 (1982), Judge Hoffman, in holding that prose- rations for violations of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act were timely instituted, had occasion to observe that \\\"(t)he Crimes Code was passed in December, 1972 as a comprehensive effort to collate, modernize, and codify the criminal law of the Commonwealth.\\\" Id., 300 Pa.Superior Ct. at 256, 446 A.2d at 328. As a result, Judge Hoffman concluded that Section 108 of the Crimes Code must be regarded as constituting all-encompassing statutes of limitations for all crimes and offenses. Thus, in view of our rulings in Bidner and Milano and Terra, the two year statute of limitations afforded by the Crimes Code is that which is properly applied in the instant prosecution for violations of the Tax Code.\\nInsofar as we have concluded that Section 108 is to be applied in prosecutions commenced both within and without the Crimes Code, we reject appellant's assertion that the date of origin of his prosecution is that upon which the information was filed. As our Opinion in Commonwealth v. Milano and Terra explains, the legislature, in enacting a new statute of limitations applicable to all crimes and offenses, \\\"repudiated the position that a prosecution could only be commenced by filing an indictment or information.\\\" Id., 300 Pa.Superior Ct. at 257-258, 446 A.2d at 328. Indeed the very language of 18 Pa.C.S.A. 108(e) (repealed) belies appellant's contention that his prosecution was not officially initiated until the filing of the information. Section 108(e) provides that a \\\"prosecution is commenced either when an indictment is found or when a warrant or summons is issued if such warrant or summons is executed without reasonable delay.\\\" (Emphasis supplied). In the case at bar, the Tax Code offenses were committed by appellant between May and July of 1975. The complaint and summons were issued on December 21, 1976 and December 22, 1976 respectively. Inasmuch as the Commonwealth could have instituted proceedings against appellant as late as May, 1977, under the applicable two year statute of limitations, it is apparent that the Commonwealth commenced appellant's prosecution in timely fashion, and that the court below committed no error in denying appellant's pre-trial motion to dismiss.\\nAppellant advances the additional argument that the lower court erred in failing to dismiss the information as violative of Pa.R.Crim.P. 225(c) in that it cites appellant for infringement of a statute which, at the time the information was filed, had been repealed. Count One of the information alleged in pertinent part that appellant\\n. did wilfully and maliciously fail, neglect or refuse to file Tax Returns required by the sales and Use Tax Act of March 6, 1956, P.L. 1228 or Tax Reform Code of 1971 as amended, to Pennsylvania Department of Revenue or any of its agents.\\nCount Two charged in pertinent part that appellant\\n. did wilfully and maliciously fail, neglect or refuse to remit the monies collected under the Sales and Use Tax imposed by the Act of March 6, 1956, P.L. 1228 or Tax Reform Code of 1971, as amended, to the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue or any of its agents.\\nIn the lower left corner of the information, under the caption \\\"Citation-Statute-Section,\\\" there were typed the words \\\"Violation of the Sales and Use Tax Failure Etc. to Remit Tax Monies Act of March 6, 1956 P.L. 1228 (72 P.S.Sect. 3403-573).\\\" Appellant contends that insofar as the cited statute (72 P.S. \\u00a7 3403-573) has been repealed, the information is defective under Pa.R.Crim.P. 225(c) and should have been quashed. We are unable to address the merits of this claim since it is clear that challenges to the legitimacy of an information must be raised in a pre-trial motion to quash the information. Pa.R.Crim.P. 306. All grounds for the relief demanded must be set forth in the motion and failure to state a ground results in its waiver. Pa.R.Crim.P. 306(e). See also Commonwealth v. Boerner, 281 Pa.Superior Ct. 505, 422 A.2d 583 (1980); and Commonwealth v. Williams, 252 Pa.Superior Ct. 587, 384 A.2d 935 (1978). In the case at bar, appellant filed a pre-trial motion to dismiss the information on the ground that it did not contain the handwritten signature of the prosecuting official. The motion did not, however, state as an additional reason for dismissal the citation of a repealed statute by the Commonwealth in the information. Because appellant's challenge to the information in the latter regard is untimely, we view it as having been waived.\\nFinally, appellant argues that the lower court erred in instructing the jury that a \\\"willful\\\" violation of the tax statute would be a basis for criminal liability and that appellant's good faith in withholding from the Common wealth the tax monies due it was not a defense to the crime charged. At trial, appellant alleged that his failure to remit sales tax monies which he had collected on KBDS' sales was involuntary because the money was in a bank account that had be\\u00e9n frozen by the actions of his creditors. On appeal, appellant urges that an act is willful when it is both intentional and voluntary, and that the lower court's instructions to the jury that an act may be willful despite the good faith with which it is performed, is tantamount to creating a strict liability crime.\\nWe agree with the conclusion reached by the lower court that a charge which would direct the jury to acquit appellant, should it conclude that appellant acted in good faith in refusing to remit sales tax monies to the Commonwealth, was not proper in the case at bar since the criminal statute in question, 72 P.S. \\u00a7 7268, does not provide for such a \\\"good faith\\\" defense. We regard the fact that 72 P.S. \\u00a7 7265 does provide for a limited good faith defense in a limited civil context, coupled with the fact that the preceding criminal section presently subject to our scrutiny (Section 7268) is totally barren of such ameliorative language, are reflective of a conscious election by our legislature to limit the application of a good faith defense to civil tax litigation. Section 7268 requires that a violation of its provisions be \\\"willful.\\\" Insofar as the lower court correctly charged the jury concerning the necessity of a will-full failure to remit tax monies as grounds for appellant's conviction, we reject appellant's contention that the court below usurped the function of the jury by removing from its consideration the possible good faith of appellant as it may have impacted upon the willfullness and voluntariness of appellant's behavior.\\nJudgment of sentence affirmed.\\n. 72 P.S. \\u00a7 7268.\\n. Appellant's sales tax license was finally cancelled on February 18, 1977. His current arrearages total $391.70.\\n. 11 U.S.C.A. \\u00a7 101 et seq.\\n. The third count of the information, charging appellant with Failure to Permit Inspection of Records, was withdrawn by the Commonwealth prior to trial.\\n. Rule 225(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure 'provides in part that an \\\"information shall be signed by the attorney for the Commonwealth...\\\" (emphasis supplied).\\n. See Commonwealth v. Veneri and Thomas, 306 Pa.Superior Ct. 396, 452 A.2d 784 (1982).\\n. Justice Flaherty's Opinion Emanuel elaborates on the different goals sought to be achieved by Pa.R.Crim.P. 225(b) and Section 8931 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. \\u00a7 8931. Justice Flaherty notes that the former seeks only to assure that the identity of the prosecuting authority is perceptible and in no way implicates the latter provision which is concerned solely with the duty of the district attorney to inquire fully into all facts and circumstances attendant to a particular case before causing the initiation of criminal proceedings against a defendant. Section 8931 provides in pertinent part:\\n(d) Duties of prosecuting attorneys. \\u2014 Whenever a transcript of proceedings, complaint and all related papers in a criminal proceeding where the defendant has been held for court have been transmitted to the clerk of court or the officer designated by the court, such officer, after recording the same, shall immediately transmit the documents or a copy thereof to the district attorney. The district attorney or his designee shall have the duty to inquire into and make full examination of all the facts and circumstances connected with each such case to determine if the facts and circumstances warrant the filing of an information or informations premised upon the transcript. No information shall be filed by the district attorney concerning alleged criminal violations where a preliminary hearing has not been held or properly waived except as prescribed by general rules.\\n. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482 No. 334, Section 1, eff. June 6, 1973.\\n. 18 Pa.C.S.A. \\u00a7 107(a) provides as follows:\\n\\\"The provisions of Part I of this title [18 Pa.C.S.A. \\u00a7 101-1106] (relating to preliminary provisions) are applicable to offenses defined by this title or by any other statute.\\\"\\n. 18 Pa.C.S.A. 108(b)(2) repealed states:\\n\\\"A prosecution for any other offense under this code must be commenced within two years after it is committed.\\\"\\n18 Pa.C.S.A. \\u00a7 108 now states that\\n\\\"[a] prosecution for any offense under this title must be commenced within the period, if any, limited by Chapter 55 of Title 42 (relating to limitation of time).\\\" [Footnote omitted].\\nThe time limitation currently prescribed by 42 Pa.C.S.A. \\u00a7 5552 is, like that provided in 18 P.S. \\u00a7 108(b)(2), supra, two years.\\n. 18 Pa.C.S.A. \\u00a7 108(e) (repealed) has been replaced by 42 Pa.C.S.A. \\u00a7 5552(e), which states as follows:\\n(e) Commencement of prosecution. \\u2014 except as otherwise provided by general rule adopted pursuant to section 5503 (relating to commencement of matters), a prosecution is commenced either when an indictment is found or an information under section 8931(b) (relating to indictment and information) is issued, or when a warrant, summons or citation is issued, if such warrant, summons or citation is executed without unreasonable delay.\\n. 72 P.S. \\u00a7 7101 et seq., known as the \\\"Tax Reform Code of 1971,\\\" became effective immediately upon its enactment on March 4, 1971. The Tax Reform Code repealed the Act of March 6, 1956, P.L. (1955) 1228, commonly referred to as the \\\"Selective Sales and Use-Tax.\\\" The criminal provisions of the old and new statutes, 72 P.S. \\u00a7 3403 \\u2014 573 and 72 P.S. \\u00a7 7268 respectively, are materially identical. In fact, the comment to 72 P.S. \\u00a7 7268 discloses that that section was derived from the former section 3403-573 of Title 72.\\n. Rule 304 was amended and renumbered as the present Rule 306 by order of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on June 29, 1977, effective January 1, 1978.\\n. We note parenthetically that appellant's claim enjoys no substantive merit whatsoever. Pa.R.Crim.P. 225(c) is designed to afford a defendant with adequate information regarding the charges filed against him. Given the protracted naturp of the pre-trial proceedings in this case, appellant could hardly be said to have been prejudiced by the citation of the repealed statute in the information. Moreover, the repealed statute was cited in Counts One and Two of the information in alternative fashion together with the correct citation to the Tax Reform Code of 1971. Finally, the very language of Pa.R.Crim.P. 225(c) renders appellant's contention specious:\\nThe information shall contain the official or customary citation of the statute and section thereof, or other provision of law which the defendant is alleged therein to have violated; but the omission of or error in such citation shall not affect the validity or sufficiency of the information. (Emphasis supplied.)\\n. 18 Pa.C.S.A. \\u00a7 302(g) provides in pertinent part that:\\n\\\"A requirement that an offense be committed willfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense...\\\" (Emphasis supplied).\\n18 Pa.C.S.A. \\u00a7 302(b)(2) states that:\\nA person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when:\\n(I) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and\\n(II) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. (Emphasis supplied).\\n. With respect to the element of willfullness, the lower court instructed the jury as follows:\\n. It implies an act which is done intentionally, designedly. It is an act done intentionally, knowingly and purposely.\\nIn other words, a willful act is that sort of act which results from a person being consciously aware of particular elements and here aware of requirements to report or remit sales tax. Being aware then it implies a decisional process, intent actually, made. Willfully posits the free act to implement that decision which a person has made.\\nSo, related to the charge here you must find that the defendant was aware of provisions of the act, that is of the responsibility to remit the sales tax and determined not to do so. That is willfully failed to do so and that there was no lack of voluntariness, that it was his own free and voluntary decision which he implemented willfully or purposely or with design.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"597662\", \"name\": \"Commonwealth v. Wormley, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Commonwealth v. Wormley\", \"decision_date\": \"1984-03-16\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 567\", \"first_page\": \"603\", \"last_page\": \"603\", \"citations\": \"325 Pa. Super. 603\", \"volume\": \"325\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:48:18.952260+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before McEWEN, BECK and MONTEMURO, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Commonwealth v. Wormley, Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"473 A.2d 674\\nCommonwealth v. Wormley, Appellant.\\nSubmitted October 19, 1983.\\nWilliam T. Cannon, for appellant;\\nRobert B. Lawler, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.\\nBefore McEWEN, BECK and MONTEMURO, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"49\", \"char_count\": \"337\", \"text\": \"The judgment of sentence of the learned Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court Judge John A. Geisz is affirmed.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"630348\", \"name\": \"EAGLE ENVIRONMENTAL II, L.P., Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Protection and Chest Township, Respondents\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Eagle Environmental II, L.P. v. Commonwealth\", \"decision_date\": \"2003-11-12\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal No. 173 MAL 2003\", \"first_page\": \"164\", \"last_page\": \"164\", \"citations\": \"575 Pa. 164\", \"volume\": \"575\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:59:44.127730+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"EAGLE ENVIRONMENTAL II, L.P., Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Protection and Chest Township, Respondents.\", \"head_matter\": \"835 A.2d 707\\nEAGLE ENVIRONMENTAL II, L.P., Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Protection and Chest Township, Respondents.\\nSupreme Court of Pennsylvania.\\nNov. 12, 2003.\", \"word_count\": \"80\", \"char_count\": \"521\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nPER CURIAM.\\nAND NOW, this 12th day of November, 2003, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is granted. It is further ordered that the matter be CONSOLIDATED with Tri-County Industries, Inc., et al. v. Department of Environmental Protection, No. 179 MAL 2003, 575 Pa. 163, 164, 835 A.2d 706, 2003 WL 22681332.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"631076\", \"name\": \"COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. James R. HECK, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Commonwealth v. Heck\", \"decision_date\": \"1985-04-04\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 1457\", \"first_page\": \"183\", \"last_page\": \"217\", \"citations\": \"341 Pa. Super. 183\", \"volume\": \"341\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:58:23.450973+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before CIRILLO, OLSZEWSKI and MONTGOMERY, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. James R. HECK, Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"491 A.2d 212\\nCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. James R. HECK, Appellant.\\nSuperior Court of Pennsylvania.\\nArgued Sept. 4, 1984.\\nFiled April 4, 1985.\\nJames H. Thomas, Lancaster, for appellant.\\nJoseph C. Madenspacher, Assistant District Attorney, Lancaster, for Commonwealth, appellee.\\nBefore CIRILLO, OLSZEWSKI and MONTGOMERY, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"9719\", \"char_count\": \"59939\", \"text\": \"CIRILLO, Judge:\\nAppellant James Heck challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for a violation of the Pennsylvania vehicular homicide statute, 75 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 3732; he also argues on several grounds that the statute is unconstitutional. We find the evidence sufficient to support- Heck's conviction, but reverse the judgment of sen tence on the ground that the conviction unconstitutionally deprives Heck of due process of law by imposing criminal liability upon a showing of no more than ordinary negligence.\\nHeck was prosecuted for vehicular homicide based on an accident occurring on the morning of July 26, 1982. He was driving his car northbound on Route 141 in Lancaster County, a route he drove every working day. The sun was up and the weather clear and dry. Heck had to make a left-hand turn onto Union Schoolhouse Lane at its intersection with Route 141; the turn was gradual enough that he could negotiate it at a moderate speed. As he entered the intersection and started to turn left, his car collided with a motorcycle traveling southbound on Route 141. The motorcycle struck the front right fender of the car and bounced backward about eighteen feet. The motorcycle operator, Dennis Ginder, was hurled through the air and fell to the pavement about seventy feet south of the point of impact. Heck sustained a concussion and his car was totalled. Ginder, tragically, died as a result of the injuries he received.\\nThe statute defining the offense of vehicular homicide provided:\\nAny person who unintentionally causes the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any law of this Commonwealth or municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic is guilty of homicide by vehicle, a misdemeanor of the first degree, when the violation is the cause of death.\\n75 Pa.C.S.A. \\u00a7 3732.\\nIn this case the traffic violation Heck was committing at the time of the accident is that proscribed in 75 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 3322, \\\"Vehicle turning left\\\": \\\"The driver of a vehicle intending to turn left within an intersection . shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is so close as to constitute a hazard.\\\"\\nThe troubling questions raised on this appeal center on the level of culpability necessary to prove vehicular homi cide. On its face the vehicular homicide statute does not prescribe any particular degree of fault or mens rea as an element of the crime. It imposes liability upon the happening of a certain set of circumstances, namely, a death caused by a person engaged in a traffic violation. The requirement that an underlying traffic violation be the cause of death does not necessarily supply any element of fault to the crime of vehicular homicide. For example, the traffic violation described in Section 3322 of the Vehicle Code does not inherently depend on culpable conduct. One may reasonably misjudge whether an approaching auto is so close as to constitute a hazard; Section 3322 does not expressly forgive such a miscalculation. See generally Mancke, Homicide by Vehicle in Pennsylvania: A Question of Meaning and Constitutionality, 85 Dick.L.Rev. 391 (1981) (on this latter proposition, see especially nn. 43-44 and accompanying text).\\nThus, an early interpretation of the vehicular homicide law held that it created a strict liability offense. Commonwealth v. Barone, 276 Pa.Super. 282, 419 A.2d 457 (1980) (per two concurring and three dissenting judges).\\nHowever, in Commonwealth v. Field, 490 Pa. 519, 417 A.2d 160 (1980), our Supreme Court determined that the vehicular homicide statute does require a showing of culpable conduct and therefore does not create a strict liability offense. The Court defined the level of culpability required by the statute as a showing that the defendant \\\"has deviated from the standard of care established by . the underlying Vehicle Code provision,\\\" id., 490 Pa. at 524, 417 A.2d at 163, and that he \\\"knew, or should have known, he engaged in the conduct claimed to be in violation of that section,\\\" id., 490 Pa. at 525, 417 A.2d 160. In Field the underlying Vehicle Code violation was driving on a sidewalk, 75 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 3703. The Court held that at trial the Commonwealth would have to prove that a \\\"reasonable driver could . know\\\" that there was a sidewalk where the defendant was driving when his vehicle struck the victim. Field, supra, id.\\nThus, the Supreme Court set up a \\\"reasonable man\\\" standard as the test of culpability for vehicular homicide to save the statute from the constitutional objection that it imposed liability without fault. Subsequent decisions have made it clear that the Field standard for judging vehicular homicide cases differs little if at all from the standard of reasonableness governing negligence claims in civil damage suits.\\nIn Commonwealth v. Houtz, 496 Pa. 345, 437 A.2d 385 (1981), the Supreme Court distinguished the Commonwealth's burden of proof in a vehicular homicide case from its burden in an involuntary manslaughter prosecution. The Court held that the degree of culpability required to prove homicide by vehicle is less than that necessary to establish involuntary manslaughter, which involves a \\\"reckless or grossly negligent\\\" killing. 18 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 2504. See Commonwealth, v. Lobiondo, 501 Pa. 599, 462 A.2d 662 (1983) (recklessness and gross negligence under the involuntary manslaughter statute construed as the same). The Crimes Code defines recklessness as a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk amounting to a \\\"gross deviation\\\" from a reasonable standard of conduct, 18 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 302(b)(3); the Supreme Court in Houtz found that the requirement in vehicular homicide that the driver \\\"knew or should have known\\\" of his culpable conduct is a \\\"relaxation\\\" of the standard of recklessness required to make out involuntary manslaughter. 496 Pa. at 348-49, 437 A.2d at 387.\\nBased on Field and Houtz, this Court in Commonwealth v. Koch, 297 Pa.Super. 350, 443 A.2d 1157 (1982) summarized the elements of the crime of vehicular homicide as follows:\\n1. The defendant deviated from the standard of care established by a traffic law or regulation;\\n2. The defendant knew or should have known he was engaged in the conduct violating the traffic law;\\n3. A death occurred;\\n4. The death was a probable consequence of the defendant's violation.\\nWe explained further in Koch that the level of culpability embodied in the requirement that the defendant \\\"knew or should have known\\\" of his violation is lesser than \\\"criminal negligence\\\" as defined in the Crimes Code. Criminal negligence is present where the actor's failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk is a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. 18 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 302(b)(4). While both criminal negligence and recklessness involve \\\"gross\\\" deviations from reasonable conduct, recklessness includes conscious disregard of a risk whereas criminal negligence is accompanied by lack of awareness of a risk.\\nBy defining a level of culpability for vehicular homicide below criminal negligence, the courts interpreting the statute have lessened the Commonwealth's usual burden in a criminal case to prove at least reckless conduct, see id. \\u00a7 302(c), and have done away with any requirement that a \\\"gross\\\" deviation from reasonable conduct be shown. A mere deviation from reasonableness therefore suffices. Thus, where the defendant did not know he was committing the traffic violation which caused death, but judged by the standard of the reasonable driver he should have known, he may be found guilty of homicide by vehicle.\\nOf course, as the Field Court pointed out, because vehicular homicide is a crime the Commonwealth must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. However, all it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant was unaware when he should have been aware of committing the traffic violation which resulted in death (unless it can prove the higher threshold under Field of actual knowledge of the violation). A driver's failure to act with reasonable care or attention in the circumstances is nothing more than proof of his negligence as that term is used in the civil law. See 27 P.L.E. Negligence \\u00a7 1, 3 (1960). Hence vehicular homicide is a crime predicated on \\\"civil,\\\" \\\"simple,\\\" or \\\"ordinary\\\" negligence; Spaeth, J., concurring in Koch, supra; see 30 Words and Phrases, \\\"Ordinary Negligence\\\" (1970 & 1984 Supp.); and in that respect our law is similar to the vehicular homicide laws of several other states, see Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 473 (1968).\\nI. Sufficiency of the Evidence\\nWe now turn to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Heck's traffic infraction was negligent. In making this assessment we must accept all evidence and inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner. The Commonwealth's evidence showed that Heck had 150 feet of visibility from the intersection north to the crest of a hill. Corporal Studenroth of the Pennsylvania State Police, who happened to be stopped at the intersection on Union Schoolhouse Lane at the time of the accident, clearly saw Ginder's motorcycle approaching. The Corporal estimated the speed of the motorcycle as at least 55 MPH, an estimate confirmed by a defense witness. (A third witness's estimate of Ginder's speed about a mile before the accident was so self-contradictory and inconclusive that we find it unusable for establishing Ginder's speed at impact).\\nBased on the credible estimates of speed and distance, it took Ginder nearly two seconds to reach the point of impact from the crest of the hill (150 ft. divided by 81 ft./sec. [approx. 55 MPH] = approx. 1.85 secs.). Thus Ginder's motorcycle was visible to Heck for these two seconds before the crash. (Had Heck started his turn before Ginder crested the hill, undoubtedly Heck's car would not have been struck in the right front fender as it was). We cannot as a matter of law overturn the finding of the Lancaster County jury that beyond a reasonable doubt Heck should have seen Ginder in time to avoid the accident. We therefore must conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish a negligent violation of the traffic law, and thereby vehicular homicide under the Field standard. Cf., e.g., Commonwealth v. Setsodi, 303 Pa.Super. 482, 450 A.2d 29 (1982) (prima facie case of vehicular homicide made out where defendant failed to perceive approaching motorcycle while turning left into driveway); Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 282 Pa.Super. 549, 423 A.2d 381 (1980) (failure to yield right-of-way at stop sign); see also Commonwealth v. Koch, supra (same).\\nAlthough we find the evidence sufficient to uphold a finding that Heck should have known he was violating Section 3322 of the Vehicle Code (Vehicle turning left), we find it insufficient to establish any degree of culpability higher than ordinary negligence. Specifically, the evidence failed to prove that Heck knew when he began his turn that Ginder was so close as to constitute a hazard. Had this prong of the Field test for sufficiency been proven, it could be said that Heck proceeded in the face of a known illegal risk, and we could conclude that Ginder's death was the result of greater than ordinary negligence. However, Heck testified that he did not see Ginder until the moment before impact. Of course, the jury was free to disbelieve this testimony; but there was insufficient evidence aside from it to corroborate a theory of guilty knowledge. The intersection itself was on a high spot of ground and afforded the Corporal a vantage point from which to watch both vehicles approaching. Each vehicle entered a slight dip or \\\"gully\\\" immediately before the intersection. This configuration of the road would not have altogether prevented someone in Heck's position from seeing the motorcycle after it crested the hill. However, Corporal Studenroth saw no outward indication that the driver of the automobile in fact noticed the motorcycle; the car did not skid or slide before impact, nor did it speed up; it simply turned in front of the cycle. See Commonwealth v. Barone, supra (similar evidence relevant to negate mens rea).\\nAnother officer who attempted to reconstruct the accident after the fact found skid marks at the scene which he linked to the Heck vehicle. We must view this evidence with caution because the trooper was unable to say with certainty that the skid marks came from Heck's car. Even if believed, the trooper's testimony viewed in light of the other credible evidence established at most that Heck perceived the motorcycle too late to conform his conduct to what he saw. See also Reed v. Hutchinson, 331 Pa.Super. 404, 480 A.2d 1096 (1984) (inadmissibility of non-eyewitness police officer's opinion as to cause of accident).\\nMoreover, we find the evidence insufficient to prove that Heck's failure to apprehend the hazard in time was a \\\"gross\\\" deviation from a reasonable standard of care. We perceive Barone, supra, to be controlling on this issue. In that case a motorcycle operator was killed when Barone waited \\\"patiently\\\" at a stop sign, then tried to cross the intersection after she \\\"apparently either failed to look to her right or misjudged the distance and rate of speed of the oncoming traffic.\\\" 276 Pa.Super. at 299, 419 A.2d at 466-67 (lead opinion by then-President Judge Cercone). The Barone Court was in agreement that the evidence failed to prove conduct amounting to \\\"gross\\\" negligence or criminal negligence. (Barone was decided at a time when the culpability element of vehicular homicide remained unsettled).\\nWe follow Barone in holding the evidence in this case insufficient to prove criminal negligence. All the evidence points unerringly to the single conclusion that Heck was at most ordinarily negligent in causing the accident; his momentary inadvertence led to Ginder's death.\\nII. Constitutionality of the Law\\nThe constitutional issue thus framed for our review is whether due process of law permits a conviction under Section 3732 based on the defendant's ordinary negligence in violating a traffic law, where the violation was neither knowing nor criminally negligent. We conclude that such liability offends due process.\\nBefore reaching the reasons for the holding, we comment briefly on appellant's other challenges to the constitutionality of Section 3732. In Commonwealth v. Burt, 490 Pa. 173, 415 A.2d 87 (1980) and in Field, supra, it was held that the statute was not violative of due process for being vague and indefinite. We find the analysis presented in these cases sufficient to refute appellant's analogous claim that Section 3322, the underlying Vehicle Code provision in this case, is vague and indefinite. Appellant next contends that the Field requirement that death be a \\\"probable consequence\\\" of the violation renders the statute unconstitutional because it imposes criminal liability on an \\\"absolute liability\\\" theory of causation, see 18 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 303(d). In light of our primary holding that the present conviction violates substantive due process, we will not address whether the causation element of vehicular homicide is constitutional. We will mention that there is dictum to the effect that Field precludes such a claim. See Commonwealth v. Pavlocak, 299 Pa.Super. 439, 445 A.2d 834 (1982); but see Commonwealth v. Dell, 301 Pa.Super. 387, 447 A.2d 1021 (1982) (leaving question open). Appellant also claims that the vehicular homicide law permits cruel and unusual punishment. We dismissed that contention in Commonwealth v. Gotto, 306 Pa.Super. 434, 452 A.2d 803 (1982). Appellant's argument that the statute violates equal protection under the law was rejected in Commonwealth v. Hicks, 502 Pa. 344, 466 A.2d 613 (1983), appeal dism'd, \\u2014 U.S. \\u2014, 104 S.Ct. 1260, 79 L.Ed.2d 668 (1984). Finally, appellant's claim that the statute violates procedural due process misconceives the Commonwealth's burden under Field to prove every element of the crime of vehicular homicide beyond a reasonable doubt.\\nWe have assured ourselves, however, that neither Field nor Koch, supra, nor any other case has dispositively decided appellant's remaining contention that it violates substantive due process to impose liability under the vehicular homicide statute upon a mere showing of ordinary negligence. Field and Koch held that because the crime contains an element of fault, the statute could not be constitutionally challenged for imposing liability without fault. See also Commonwealth v. King, 298 Pa.Super. 499, 444 A.2d 1294 (1982). The separate question now to be decided is whether the element of fault defined in those decisions passes constitutional muster in the case at bar. The constitutionality of premising liability for vehicular homicide on ordinary negligence was not raised in either Field or Koch, which leads us to conclude that the question remains open. See Jameson v. Pittsburgh, 381 Pa. 366, 113 A.2d 454 (1955) (portions of statute previously construed by Supreme Court could be found unconstitutional where constitutional issue neither raised nor passed upon in prior case). Our conclusion is the same one reached by our eminent President Judge (then Judge) Spaeth, who in his concurring opinion in Koch, supra, opined that the Field decision had not decided nor precluded a due process challenge to liability for vehicular homicide based on ordinary negligence. See also Dell, supra (opining that Field's determination of causation element of vehicular homicide did not preclude later challenge to that element) (dictum). Thus, we proceed to the merits of the substantive due process issue.\\nThe constitutional protection upon which appellant relies is independently based in the due process clause of the United States Constitution and the law of the land clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Pa. Const, art. 1, \\u00a7 9. These provisions guarantee that a person is not to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law (14th Amendment) or unless by the law of the land (Article 1, Section 9). The terms \\\"law of the land\\\" and \\\"due process of law\\\" are legal equivalents. Eiffert v. Pennsylvania Central Brewing Co., 141 Pa.Super. 543, 15 A.2d 723 (1940).\\nDue process of law insures respect for those personal immunities so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental, or those implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Commonwealth v. Mayhugh, 233 Pa.Super. 24, 336 A.2d 379 (1975) (allocatur denied). The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary government action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 339 Pa.Super. 32, 488 A.2d 293 (1985).\\nIncluded in the concept of due process is a degree of protection against the imposition of criminal liability without criminal intent on the part of the actor.\\nThe contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.\\nMorissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250, 72 S.Ct. 240, 243, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1951). See also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951) (lead opinion, Part I).\\nThe High Court has discovered no absolute due process requirement that the legislature condition criminal liability on the intent, knowledge, or diligence of the actor; in certain cases mens rea may be dispensed with completely if the legislative intention is to create a strict liability crime. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 78 S.Ct. 240, 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (1957). However, the legislature's power to eliminate mens rea is not without limitation, and the exercise of that power must comport with constitutional principles. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 80 S.Ct. 215, 4 L.Ed.2d 205 (1959).\\nMorissette, supra, is the seminal case for the precept that there are due process limitations on the legislative power to remove intent from a criminal enactment. The Court there distinguished common law crimes from the \\\"public welfare\\\" offenses of more recent origin, the latter consisting mainly of violations of regulatory provisions brought on by the industrial revolution and enacted to \\\"heighten the duties of those in control of particular industries, trades, properties or activities that affect public health, safety or welfare.\\\" 342 U.S. at 254, 72 S.Ct. at 245, 96 L.Ed. at 296. The Court noted that regulatory offenses do not come under any\\naccepted classifications of common-law offenses, such as those against the state, the person, property, or public morals. Many of these offenses are not in the nature of positive aggressions or invasions, with which the common law so often dealt, but are in the nature of neglect where the law requires care, or inaction where it imposes a duty. Many violations of such regulations result in no direct or immediate injury to person or property but merely create the danger or probability of it which the law seeks to minimize. While such offenses do not threaten the security of the state in the manner of treason, they may be regarded as offenses against its authority, for their occurrence impairs the efficiency of controls deemed essential to the social order as presently constituted. In this respect, whatever the intent of the violator, the injury is the same, and the consequences are injurious or not according to fortuity. Hence, legislation applicable to such offenses, as a matter of policy, does not specify intent as a necessary element. The accused, if he does not will the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than society might reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities. Also, penalties commonly are relatively small, and conviction does no grave damage to an offender's reputation. Under such considerations, courts have turned to construing statutes and regulations which make no mention of intent as dispensing with it and holding that the guilty act alone makes out the crime. This has not, however, been without expressions of misgiving.\\nId. at 255-57, 72 S.Ct. at 245, 96 L.Ed. at 296-97 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added). In a footnote to this passage, the Court tacitly gave credence to the proposition that mere negligence may not satisfy the demand of the common law for criminal intent as a prerequisite to criminal liability:\\nRadin, Intent, Criminal, 8 Ene Soc Sci 126, 130, says, \\\"... As long as in popular belief intention and freedom of the will are taken as axiomatic, no penal system that negates the mental element can find general acceptance. It is vital to retain public support of methods of dealing with crime.\\\" Again, \\\"The question of criminal intent will probably always have something of an academic taint. Nevertheless, the fact remains that determination of the boundary between intent and negligence spells freedom or condemnation for thousands of individuals. The watchfulness of the jurist justifies itself at present in its insistence upon the examination of the mind of each individual offender.\\\"\\nId. at 255 n. 14, 72 S.Ct. at 245 n. 14, 96 L.Ed. at 296 n. 14 (emphasis added).\\nIn Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1960), Justice Blackmun, then a Circuit Judge, distilled from Morissette and other cases the wisdom of the Supreme Court on the permissibility of imposing criminal sanctions on actions done without intent:\\nFrom these cases emerges the proposition that where a federal' criminal statute omits mention of intent and where it seems to involve what is basically a matter of policy, where the standard imposed is, under the circumstances, reasonable and adherence thereto properly expected of a person, where the penalty is relatively small, where conviction does not gravely besmirch, where the statutory crime is not one taken over from the common law, and where congressional purpose is supporting, the statute can be construed as one not requiring criminal intent. The elimination of this element is then not violative of the due process clause.\\nId. at 310.\\nOf course, logic leads to the conclusion that should the factors enumerated by Justice Blackmun be otherwise, then elimination of intent from criminal legislation may violate due process of law. See Barone, supra (Spaeth, J., concurring) (collecting federal cases applying Holdridge analysis).\\nIn Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825 (1959), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found an independent state constitutional principle of due process requiring an element of intent in a criminal statute. The statute at issue purported to impose absolute vicarious liability upon the holder of a liquor license whose employees or agents violated certain provisions of the Liquor Code. The license-holder had been convicted and sentenced to serve three months in jail. Employing an analysis similar to that used in Morissette, the Court distinguished between \\\"true crimes\\\" and\\nregulatory provisions in fields which are essentially noncriminal, e.g., pure food and drug acts, speeding ordinances, building regulations, and child labor, minimum wage and maximum hour legislation. Such statutes are generally enforceable by light penalties, and although violations are labelled crimes, the considerations applicable to them are totally different from those applicable to true crimes, which involve moral delinquency and which are punishable by imprisonment or another serious penalty. Such so-called statutory crimes are in reality an attempt to utilize the machinery of criminal administration as an enforcing arm for social regulations of a purely civil nature, with the punishment totally unrelated to questions of moral wrongdoing or guilt. It is here that the social interest in the general well-being and security of the populace has been held to outweigh the individual interest of the particular defendant. The penalty is imposed despite the defendant's lack of a criminal intent or mens rea.\\n397 Pa. at 580, 155 A.2d at 827 (emphasis added).\\nFinding any term of imprisonment to be too severe a penalty for a crime based on absolute vicarious liability, the Court struck down the three-month sentence imposed on Koczwara as abhorrent to the law of the land clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution.\\nIn recent dicta the Supreme Court has moved toward limiting the Koczwara holding to vicarious crimes. See Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 504 Pa. 244, 470 A.2d 1339 (1983) (Opinion by Larsen, J., joined by Zappala, J.); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 497 Pa. 49, 54 n. 3, 438 A.2d 964, 967 n. 3 (1981), appeal dism'd, 457 U.S. 1101, 102 S.Ct. 2898, 73 L.Ed.2d 1310 (1982). However, the language of Koczwara indicates a broader concern with retaining mens rea as a general prerequisite to criminal liability:\\nThe Supreme Court of the United States has had occasion only recently to impose due process limitations upon the actions of a state legislature in making unknowing conduct criminal. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225; 78 S.Ct. 240, [2 L.Ed.2d 228] (1957). Our own courts have stepped in time and again to protect a defendant from being held criminally responsible for acts about which he had no knowledge and over which he had little control. Commonwealth v. Unkrich, 142 Pa.Superior Ct. 591, 16 A.2d 737 (1940); Commonwealth v. Schambers, 105 Pa. Superior Ct. 467, 161 Atl. 624 (1932); Commonwealth v. Rovnianek, 12 Pa.Superior Ct. 86 (1899). We would be utterly remiss were we not to so act under these facts.\\n397 Pa. at 586, 155 A.2d at 830 (emphasis added). Of the cases cited in this passage, only Rovnianek involved an attempt to impose vicarious criminal liability.\\nAs Judge Spaeth noted in Barone, supra, \\\"While Koczwara involved vicarious liability . [t]he Court made it clear that to imprison someone for anything other than a true crime was unconstitutional; and it defined a true crime as one that involves both 'moral delinquency' and 'personal causation.' \\\" 276 Pa.Super. at 331, 419 A.2d at 483. Moreover, our Court has used Koczwara as a tool of statutory interpretation to supply an element of intent to crimes based on personal causation. See Commonwealth v. Black, 251 Pa.Super. 539, 380 A.2d 911 (1977) (retail theft); Commonwealth v. Bready, 220 Pa.Super. 157, 286 A.2d 654 (1971) (allocatur denied) (magistrate's failure to make monthly report).\\nThe task of statutory interpretation of the vehicular homicide law has already been completed, with Field and Koch having decided that vehicular homicide is not a strict liability crime, but one based on ordinary negligence. The question is whether it is consistent with due process to permit such liability. We have borne in mind that an act of the legislature enjoys a presumption of constitutional validi ty which is not overcome unless the law \\\"clearly, palpably, and plainly\\\" violates the constitution. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, supra; Commonwealth v. Grady, 337 Pa.Super. 174, 486 A.2d 962 (1984). Nevertheless, we are compelled to find that a vehicular homicide law predicated on ordinary negligence violates the constitution.\\nJudged by the considerations set out in Morissette, Holdridge, and Koczwara, vehicular homicide as presently constituted in Pennsylvania cannot be dismissed as a \\\"public welfare\\\" offense for which an absence of mens rea is of minor constitutional significance. The crime is graded, punished, and must be treated as a \\\"true crime.\\\"\\nNo doubt the statute seeks to heighten the duty of care owed by drivers, and thereby to promote the public welfare by curbing the tide of senseless carnage on our highways. This important goal of the law is comparable to the public welfare interest in regulating the liquor trade, which the statute considered in Koczwara sought to do. However, all other relevant factors demonstrate overwhelmingly that the law is penal in nature. The penalties under the statute are not light but severe; a conviction \\\"gravely besmirches\\\" the reputation of the offender; and the very label \\\"vehicular homicide\\\" identifies the crime as one taken over from the common law hierarchy of crimes involving moral condemnation.\\nAs a misdemeanor of the first degree, vehicular homicide carries a maximum possible jail sentence of five years. 18 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 1104(1). Since a violator's driver's license is revoked, 75 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 1532(a), the penalty for vehicular homicide actually can be greater than that for involuntary manslaughter, a crime with a higher level of culpability.\\nThe fact alone that a substantial term of imprisonment may be imposed for vehicular homicide is perhaps the best evidence of the gravity of the offense. Undoubtedly it is \\\"the imprisonment in a penitentiary, which now renders a crime infamous.\\\" United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 447, 42 S.Ct. 368, 373, 66 L.Ed. 700, 706 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting, joined by Taft, C.J., and Holmes, J.). Short of the death penalty, a prison sentence is the worst stamp of criminality that society can place on a man, wherefore an influential commentator on mens rea in criminal law has stated:\\nif the offense be punishable by imprisonment, the individual interest of the defendant weighs too heavily to allow conviction without proof of guilty mind. To subject defendants entirely free from moral blameworthiness to the possibility of prison sentences is revolting to the community sense of justice; and no law which violates this fundamental instinct can long endure.\\nSayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Col.L.Rev. 55, 72 (1933). See also Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup.Ct.Rev. 107, 150.\\nThis severity of possible punishment combined with the statutory classification of the crime indicate beyond any doubt the onerous moral stigma that attaches to someone convicted of vehicular homicide. As a first-degree misdemeanor it is classified and punished the same as other crimes of that degree, which include possession of instruments of crime or prohibited offensive weapons, 18 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 907, 908; aggravated assault on a police officer or with a deadly weapon, id. \\u00a7 2702(a)(3), (4); theft of property valued under $2,000, id. \\u00a7 3921-3932; providing weapons to or possessing weapons by an inmate, id. \\u00a7 5122(a)(1), (2); various firearms offenses, id. \\u00a7 6105-6111; and, of course, involuntary manslaughter, id. \\u00a7 2504. All of these other serious misdemeanors require at least reckless conduct before their serious consequences are visited on the offender. Cf. Commonwealth v. Frisbie, 506 Pa. 461, 485 A.2d 1098 (1984) (\\\"Among [the purposes of the Crimes Code] are that of insuring that punishment is proportionate with criminal liability, 18 Pa.C.S.A. \\u00a7 104(3), and that of differentiating among offenders based on the seriousness of their offenses, 18 Pa.C.S.A. \\u00a7 104(5).\\\") 506 Pa. at 467, 485 A.2d at 1100-1101.\\nThe burdens of stigma and punishment accompanying a vehicular homicide conviction can only be aggravated when the negligent driver who has caused a death goes down on the public record as guilty of \\\"homicide.\\\" As Judge Spaeth aptly observed in Commonwealth v. Koch, supra, 297 Pa.Super. at 365, 443 A.2d at 1165, this designation blots the defendant's name with the ignominy of having been found a \\\"criminal killer.\\\" He also pointed out, in Commonwealth v. Barone, supra, that\\none cannot truthfully say to any defendant that there is nothing wrong with being labeled a criminal. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp.Prob. 401, 423 n. 57 (1958). Especially is this so when the crime is \\\"homicide by vehicle.\\\" Labels may not be ignored. To be labeled a rapist or murderer places a far more onerous stigma on a person than to be labeled as someone convicted of misbranding a drug.... While the word \\\"homicide\\\", by itself, means only the killing of a human being, included within this definition are the terms \\\"murder\\\" and \\\"manslaughter.\\\" Indeed, the Crimes Code defines the term \\\"criminal homicide\\\" so as to include \\\"murder\\\" .and \\\"manslaughter.\\\" See 18 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 2501(b). Adding the phrase \\\"by vehicle\\\" does little to lessen the stigma attached to the word \\\"homicide,\\\" except perhaps among lawyers. In popular parlance, \\\"homicide\\\" is usually equated with \\\"murder.\\\"\\n276 Pa.Super. at 323-24, 419 A.2d at 479 (Spaeth, J., concurring, joined by Hoffman, J.); see also id. (lead opinion by Cercone, P.J., joined by Cavanaugh, J.).\\nWe are led to the inevitable conclusion that a conviction for violating the vehicular homicide law carries with it the stamp of criminality and the kind of opprobrium that under the common law was reserved for true crimes of moral turpitude. The only factor remaining to be considered is the reasonableness of imposing such grave consequences upon a driver whose violation of a traffic law is only ordinarily negligent.\\nTo demonstrate the unreasonableness of such liability, let us clarify the nature of an act of simple negligence to show how far it differs from an act that would traditionally be thought of as a crime. Ordinary negligence is the \\\"antithesis\\\" of willful or intentional conduct. Stenson v. Laclede Gas Co., 553 S.W.2d 309 (Mo.Ct.App.1977). Hall, in Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 Col.L.Rev. 632, 634 (1963), illuminates the \\\"vast difference\\\" between negligent and conscious wrongdoing:\\nIt should from the outset be borne in mind that negligent behavior implies inadvertence and must therefore be sharply distinguished from voluntary harm-doing, i.e. from conduct that includes at least an awareness of possible harm. If, for example, one who is about to drive an automobile knows that he is ill or very tired or if he drinks alcoholic beverage knowing this will incapacitate him, subsequent damage may justifiably be attributed to the immediately prior conduct. Taking all the directly relevant facts into account, it is tenable, though far from self-evident, to hold that he was reckless, not merely negligent. This would seem to fall within the Model Penal Code's definition of recklessness as conscious disregard for \\\"a substantial and unjustifiable risk.\\\" . With respect to negligent damage, however, neither at the time of the damage nor shortly prior to it, i.e., the time immediately related to the dangerous behavior in issue, does the defendant have knowledge, belief, or suspicion that he is endangering anything socially valued. The vast difference between voluntary harm-doing and negligent damage was expressed in Mr. Justice Holmes's graphic terms that even a dog understands the difference between being kicked and being stumbled over.\\nModern legal systems which maintain respect for the individual's free will have refused to punish negligent harm-doing as criminal precisely because, as was stated in Westrup v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 95, 101, 93 S.W. 646, 648 (1906), \\\"One cannot be said in any manner to neglect or refuse to perform a duty unless he has knowledge of the condition of things which require performance at his hands.\\\" (Emphasis added). In other words \\\"knowledge,\\\" broadly understood, is the least common denominator of the various levels of \\\"criminal intent.\\\" Intentional, knowing, and reckless actions all involve the actor's consciousness of \\\"endangering something socially valued\\\"; the precise culpability level that applies depends on whether the actor intends a risk as the consequence of his actions, or knows the risk will be created by his actions, or is aware of the likelihood of the risk but chooses to disregard it. See 18 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 302(b)(l)-(3).\\nIn a fundamental sense the harshness of criminal punishment is fitting only for these types of consciously inflicted wrongs, and so traditionally the criminal law has concerned itself exclusively with conscious wrongdoing. See Morissette, supra; United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 64 S.Ct. 134, 88 L.Ed. 48 (1943); Turner, Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law 34 (1962) (English common law). Where harm is perpetrated inadvertently without awareness or choice, recovery for negligence may be had under the civil law, consistent with its aim to fairly shift the economic costs of injuries onto those responsible for them. See Packer, 1962 Sup.Ct.Rev., supra, at 148. Of course, when someone is killed through inadvertence or negligence, monetary recovery can never make up for the loss. But even though there may be an unreasoning desire for retribution on the part of the victim's heirs, it can serve no rational purpose of the criminal law to subject the merely negligent actor to the additional punitive sanctions of the criminal law. See 1 Working Papers of the National Commission on the Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, 129. Cf Stenson v. Gas Co., supra (punitive civil damages unavailable for ordinary negligence).\\n[S]uch sanction serves none of the principal, preferred purposes of criminal prosecutions \\u2014 deterrence, rehabilitation and isolation of dangerous people from society. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. at 251, 72 S.Ct. at 243, 96 L.Ed. at 294; . W. LaFave & A. Scott, [Hand book on Criminal Law ] \\u00a7 5, at 22-23 [ (1972) ]. \\\"Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law.\\\" Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1084, 93 L.Ed. 1337, 1343 (1949). One who is not aware of the criminality of his conduct cannot be deterred from performing it. And one who is morally blameless need not be isolated from society or rehabilitated. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra \\u00a7 32, at 222....\\nState v. Conner, 292 N.W.2d 682, 687 (Iowa 1980) (Opinion by Allbee, J., joined by Reynoldson, C.J., and Larson, J.).\\nIn Pennsylvania it had long been the law that one could not be held criminally liable for homicide unless he freely willed the act causing death in circumstances where he was at least cognizant of the probable consequences of his act. See Commonwealth v. Gilliland, 281 Pa.Super. 354, 422 A.2d 206 (1980) (involuntary manslaughter; boat accident). One of the purposes of the vehicular homicide law was to ease the prosecutor's burden of proof in cases arising from automobile accidents. See Houtz, supra; but see Mancke, 85 Dick.L.Rev., supra, at 394 (no legislative history on the statute). But the legislative decision to criminalize negligent driving if it happens to result in death does not make a true criminal of a merely negligent driver. Obviously such a driver never intends to take a life, and to make his negligence criminal based purely on this fortuitous outcome can have little deterrent effect on the incidence of negligent driving. A driver engaged in the negligent but unknowing commission of a traffic offense does not reflect at all on the possibility of killing someone; and it is almost absurd to suggest that he would drive more carefully if he knew it was a serious criminal offense to kill someone while driving negligently. A commentator has remarked thusly on \\\"the fallacy of convicting the unfortunate driver\\\":\\nOur finest citizens drive on the highways and are, at times, guilty of traffic infractions. When such an infraction results in the death of another, a jail sentence is not needed for them to realize their wrong. They did not mean to kill the first time, and the resulting mental torture from feeling they took another's life will more than insure that their driving habits will be corrected in the future.\\nComment, The Fallacy and Fortuity of Motor Vehicle Homicide, 41 Neb.L.Rev. 793, 812-13 (1962).\\nAt this point we must recognize that there is a state of mind involving \\\"lack of awareness\\\" that requires a very different judicial attitude than the type of negligence we have been talking about. This exception to our discussion is \\\"criminal negligence.\\\" Pennsylvania has adopted the Model Penal Code concept of criminal negligence, 18 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 302(b)(4), and our Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of criminal liability based on criminal negligence. Commonwealth v. Lobiondo, supra (simple assault under 18 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 2701(a)(2)) (Court cited Field and Koch for proposition that it is constitutional to make less than reckless conduct criminal; insofar as the statement may be applied to less than criminally negligent conduct, it is dictum).\\nIt is not all that difficult to harmonize the idea of criminal negligence with the dominant theme of the criminal law to punish only acts done with a guilty mind. We must remember that criminal negligence involves a gross deviation from reasonable care such that it would be shocking to allow the actor's lack of awareness to excuse his actions in the circumstances. The criminally negligent act has been done so heedlessly, so indifferently, and so grossly contrary to common experience that it becomes intolerable to reasoning minds that the actor did not perceive the risk of harm created by his conduct. In such cases the law presumes wantonness even though the circumstances do not allow proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the actor's subjective awareness of wrongdoing. \\\"Criminal negligence\\\" is a breach of duty so flagrant in the circumstances that we may safely indulge the legal fiction that it was committed with actual intent to injure; see Schultz v. State, 89 Neb. 34, 130 N.W. 972 (1911); it is far from mere ordinary negligence or inadvertence; it is \\\"great\\\" negligence incompatible with a proper regard for human life; People v. Peabody, 46 Cal.App.3d 43, 119 Cal.Rptr. 780 (1975); State ex rel. Zent v. Yanny, 244 Wis. 342, 12 N.W.2d 45 (1943). See also W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra, \\u00a7 30, at 209-15. The judicial conscience therefore does not revolt at labelling it criminal.\\nWe have already eliminated the possibility that Mr. Heck was criminally negligent in the matter of Ginder's death, and shown that Heck was convicted for ordinary negligence. Aside from vehicular homicide, we remain \\\"unaware of any other criminal offense in Pennsylvania for which ordinary negligence is the required level of liability.\\\" Spaeth, J., concurring in Koch, supra, 297 Pa.Super. at 365, 443 A.2d at 1165. Indeed, we can discover no offense in Pennsylvania as serious as vehicular homicide for which even criminal negligence is a sufficient level of culpability. See Lobiondo (second-degree misdemeanor of \\\"negligent\\\" assault with a deadly weapon); cf. Commonwealth v. Kauffman, 323 Pa.Super. 363, 470 A.2d 634 (1983) (summary offense of leaving the scene of an accident); cf. also 18 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 3304(a)(1), (b) (summary offense of criminal mischief by negligence).\\nThe serious felony of statutory rape is a likely candidate for a crime that may be committed without guilty knowledge, see 18 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 3122, 3102; but closer inspection reveals that there is an element of mens rea to the crime. In Commonwealth v. Robinson, supra, our state high Court held that the legislature may constitutionally bar the defense of reasonable mistaken belief as to age in a statutory rape prosecution. Said the Court, \\\"In an exercise of its police powers, the legislature rationally may require that one eighteen years of age or older who engages in sexual intercourse with a child below fourteen years of age does so at his own peril. Such activity may be punished criminally if the child is indeed under fourteen years.\\\" 497 Pa. at 54, 438 A.2d at 966 (emphasis added). Thus, it is legislatively declared to be per se unreasonable to engage in sexual intercourse with someone under fourteen years old. Contra, State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836 (Alk. 1978) (upholding reasonable-belief defense to statutory rape). The \\\"sound doctrine\\\" underlying the rule that knowledge of age is not required to accomplish statutory rape is said to be that the defendant who enters upon an admittedly immoral act does so at his own peril and therefore cannot be exonerated merely because he may not have known the exact enormity of his act. White v. State, 44 Ohio App. 331, 185 N.E. 64 (1933). One need not fully accept the morality lesson espoused in White to agree that an act of fornication with a person of tender years requires knowledge of the nature and consequences of one's actions even though the precise age of the victim may not be known. Cf. Bell v. State, 668 P.2d 829 (Alk.App. 1983) (rejecting reasonable-belief defense to promoting prostitution of a minor because intent to promote prostitution present). The wisdom of the legislative decision to rule out a reasonable-belief defense to statutory rape can be debated, but it cannot be denied that the statute punishes purposive rather than inadvertent conduct undertaken in circumstances usually giving rise to a fair presumption of guilty knowledge. See People v. Olsen, 36 Cal.3d 638, 685 P.2d 52, 205 Cal.Rptr. 492 (1984) (rejecting reasonable mistake defense to charge of lewd and lascivious conduct with child under 14, based on strong public policy to protect children of tender years).\\nAnother profitable comparison on the element of mens rea can be had with the drunk driving law, 75 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 3731. While it has been suggested that subsection 3731(a)(4) of the law defines an \\\"absolute liability\\\" offense, Commonwealth v. Mikulan, supra (lead opinion by Larsen, J., upholding constitutionality of law), a better rationale for upholding the law is that while a person may not know the exact quantity of alcohol he can consume and still legally drive, he has some awareness of and control over the possible consequences of his decision to drink and drive. See id. (concurring opinions by Roberts, C.J., and Nix, J.) (drunk driving does include mens rea). Compare also the crime of homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence, 75 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 3735. With regard to such drunk driving offenses, it has been said that it is by definition criminally negligent to drive while intoxicated. See Lupro v. State, 603 P.2d 468 (Alk. 1979); see also State v. Myers, 88 N.M. 16, 536 P.2d 280 (1975). \\\"Most people who drive can tell when their ability to drive is impaired, much as they can tell when they themselves are intoxicated.\\\" Commonwealth v. Neiswonger, 338 Pa.Super. 625, 629, 488 A.2d 68, 70 (1985).\\nBut returning our attention to ordinary-negligence vehicular homicide, the defendant's conduct does not approach criminality under any of the traditional mens rea requirements, nor would anyone think to label it criminal if not for the fortuitous result of death on the highway. The injustice of letting serious criminal liability turn on such a fortuity is illustrated by the following hypothetical examples.\\nEx. 1: Suppose D's speedometer is off by 5 MPH. For the past hour he has been travelling along the freeway at 60 MPH, although his speedometer registers only 55 MPH. He should know (a jury decides) that his speedometer is slow, and thus should know that he is violating the law by speeding. D kills A, who is stopped by the roadside changing a tire and steps onto the highway while D is passing. D's violation of the maximum speed law caused A's death, for if D hadn't been speeding A would have been finished with his chore and gone before D arrived at that spot on the road. D is liable for vehicular homicide.\\nEx. 2: (Stated in the alternative). Suppose D inadvertently fails to dim his headlights, blinding A and causing him to run his car off the road and kill himself; or suppose D forgetfully neglects to turn on his lights before starting on a trip one night, with the result that A, while attempting to turn his vehicle onto the highway, is broadsided and killed. Either way, D is guilty of vehicular homicide, and under the statutory scheme becomes a \\\"criminal killer.\\\"\\nEx. 3: In this example, we hypothecate \\u2713 that D is a reputable and law-abiding citizen driving to work one morn ing. He attempts to turn at an intersection with limited visibility, and fails to see a motorcycle approaching from the opposite direction at 55 MPH, 15 MPH over the speed limit. He is not aware of the motorcycle until it is too late, nor can his momentary inattention be characterized as a \\\"gross\\\" deviation from reasonable care in the circumstances. D may be found guilty of vehicular homicide.\\nThe possible contributory negligence of the victims in these cases will not prevent the defendants from being held criminally liable. This holds true even if the victim's negligence contributing to the accident is greater than the defendant's, so as to bar the victim's estate from winning damages in a civil suit. The rule is that the contributory negligence of the victim is not a defense to a criminal charge of homicide by vehicle if the defendant's actions were a substantial factor in causing the death. See Commonwealth v. Clowser, 212 Pa.Super. 208, 239 A.2d 870 (1968). Accord, Wren v. State, 577 P.2d 235 (Alk.1978); State v. Shumway, 137 Ariz. 585, 672 P.2d 929 (1983); State v. Arena, 46 Hawaii 315, 379 P.2d 594 (1963); State v. Rotella, 196 Neb. 741, 246 N.W.2d 74 (1976); Cleveland v. Pellech, 8 Ohio Misc.2d 37, 457 N.E.2d 961 (1983); Hart v. State, 75 Wis.2d 371, 249 N.W.2d 810 (1977).\\nNor can these hypothetical defendants expect to be acquitted on the ground that there is an insufficient causal relationship between their traffic violations and the deaths. We acknowledge the enlighted view of the \\\"probable consequence\\\" requirement taken by our brother Judge Zoran Popovich, dissenting in Koch, supra, under which these defendants might have escaped liability. Judge Popovich expressed the idea that in order to qualify as the \\\"probable consequence\\\" of a traffic violation, death has to occur as the \\\"likely result.\\\" 297 Pa.Super. at 373-74, 443 A.2d at 1169. Since death is not in general a \\\"likely result\\\" of exceeding the speed limit by 5 MPH past a bystander on the road, or of passing another car with one's lights off, perhaps under Judge Popovich's rule these defendants would have to be acquitted. However, his restrictive view of the \\\"probable consequence\\\" requirement, though appealing, does not prevail in our appellate courts. His understanding appears to restrict'the fact finder to the facts that would have been known to a reasonable driver in the defendant's situation for the purpose of determining the \\\"probable consequences\\\" of the defendant's traffic violation. The decisions, however, have taken a harsher and even less subjective approach to causation, and frame the issue in terms of tort concepts of proximate cause. See Commonwealth v. Houtz, supra; (\\\"probable consequence\\\" is a relaxation of the direct causation standard used for involuntary manslaughter); see also Commonwealth v. Dell, supra; Commonwealth v. Pavlocak, supra; Johnson v. State, 170 Ga.App. 433, 317 S.E.2d 213 (1984) (cert. denied) (citing 7A AmJur.2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic \\u00a7 325 (1980) as supporting civil standard of causation); but see Commonwealth v. Root, 403 Pa. 571, 576, 170 A.2d 310, 312 (1961) (\\\"Legal theory which makes guilt or innocence of criminal homicide depend upon such accidental and fortuitous circumstances as are now embraced by modern tort law's encompassing concept of proximate cause is too harsh to be just.\\\"). In determining the sufficiency of causation under the civil standards, we must use more hindsight to ascertain the facts as they actually existed at the time of the accident and pay less attention to what the defendant subjectively could have predicted. See Restatement (Second) of Torts \\u00a7 435, Comment d (1965). The crucial inquiry is whether the defendant's violation was a \\\"substantial factor\\\" in producing the victim's death, see id. \\u00a7 433; we do not inquire whether the defendant should have been able to foresee that his conduct would result in death; see id. \\u00a7 435; see also 27 P.L.E. Negligence \\u00a7 76 (\\\"Foreseeability\\\"). Incidentally, the \\\"should have known\\\" language used in Field and Koch clearly refers only to the defendant's mental state with regard to violating the Vehicle Code; it does not refer to his capacity to know that his conduct would result in death. See Commonwealth v. Dell, supra.\\nAccordingly all three of our hypothetical defendants can be convicted of vehicular homicide. Our third hypothetical defendant, of course, is Mr. Heck, and he was in actuality convicted under those very facts. We are unable to conclude otherwise than that he was the victim of prosecution under a substantively irrational law. Heck was fortunate in the sense that the learned judge who heard the case imposed only probation and a fine for his momentary error. Nevertheless, Heck has been saddled with a conviction for the serious crime of vehicular homicide. We think the result is too unfair to be countenanced by rule of law, and so we strike down appellant's conviction as a violation of his constitutional right to due process of law. Our decision, we believe, is in harmony with decisions in other states which have held that a citizen may not be convicted of a serious crime for ordinarily negligent or inadvertent conduct. Speidel v. State, 460 P.2d 77 (Alk. 1969) (failure to return rental car); People v. Washburn, 197 Colo. 419, 593 P.2d 962 (1979) (theft of rental property; citing People v. Johnson, 193 Colo. 199, 564 P.2d 116 (1977)); see also State v. Billings, 242 N.W.2d 736 (Iowa 1976) (following Speidel ); but see State v. Conner, supra. Compare Alaska cases dealing with \\\"public welfare\\\" type offenses, e.g., State v. Rice, 626 P.2d 104 (Alk.1981) (game laws); Reynolds v. State, 655 P.2d 1313 (Alk.Ct.App.1982) (fishing in closed waters).\\nWe emphasize that our holding does not purport to decide the constitutionality of vehicular homicide prosecutions where the offender was conscious of wrongdoing or grossly deviated from a reasonable standard of conduct. Moreover, as we would not attempt to define the parameters of the federal Constitution on these uncharted seas, we rest our holding exclusively on the law of the land clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution, art. 1, \\u00a7 9. See Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 470 A.2d 457 (1983) (state may provide broader protections for individual rights under state constitution than are recognized under federal Constitution).\\nFinally, let us assure the concerned student of traffic law that we have considered that the Pennsylvania vehicular homicide statute is derived from Section 11-903 of the Uniform Vehicle Code (1968 rev.), and that numerous States have enacted similar provisions based on the Code. See National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances, Traffic Laws Annotated 272-75 (1979). We have surveyed cases from these States and from all other jurisdictions in the Union in search of a coherent constitutional rationale supporting an ordinary-negligence vehicular homicide law. See 1 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 1927 (statutory construction of uniform acts). The statutes in a substantial minority of ten jurisdictions appear to allow a conviction to rest on culpable conduct not rising above the level of ordinary negligence. See Ala.Code \\u00a7 32-5A-192 (1983) (no judicial interpretations); Cal.Penal Code \\u00a7 192(c)(2) (West Supp.1985) (see In re Dennis B., 18 Cal.3d 687, 557 P.2d 514, 135 Cal.Rptr. 82 (1976)); D.C.Code Ann. \\u00a7 40-713 (1981 & Supp.1984) (see also Sanderson v. United States, 125 A.2d 70 (D.C.1956)), Ga.Code Ann. \\u00a7 40-6-393(b) (Supp.1984) (see Walker v. State, 163 Ga.App. 638, 295 S.E.2d 574 (1982) (mere violation)); Hawaii Rev.Stat. \\u00a7 707-704 (1976) (see also State v. Arena, supra), Idaho Code \\u00a7 18-4006(3)(c) (1979 & Supp. 1984) )(see State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483, 680 P.2d 1383 (Ct.App.1984) (dictum)); Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. \\u00a7 750.324 (West 1968) (see People v. McKee, 15 Mich.App. 382, 166 N.W.2d 688 (1968)); Neb.Rev.Stat. \\u00a7 28-306 (1979) (see State v. Mattan, 207 Neb. 679, 300 N.W.2d 810 (1981)); N.C.Gen.Stat. \\u00a7 20-141.4(a) (1983) (see State v. Freeman, 31 N.C.App. 93, 228 S.E.2d 516, cert. denied, 291 N.C. 449, 230 S.E.2d 766 (1976)); Vt.Stat.Ann. tit. 13, \\u00a7 2304 (1974 & Supp.1984) (involuntary manslaughter statute) (see State v. Poirier, 142 Vt. 595, 458 A.2d 1109 (1983), State v. Labonte, 120 Vt. 465, 144 A.2d 792 (1958)). Cf. Ohio Rev.Code Ann. \\u00a7 2903.07(a) (Page 1982 & Supp.1984) (see In re Hanshaw, (No. 83 CA 35, filed Dec. 11, 1984) (construing statute to require criminal negligence)); Wis.Stat. \\u00a7 940.08 (1982) (see State v. Cooper, 117 Wis.2d 30, 344 N.W.2d 194 (Ct.App. 1983) (\\\"ordinary negligence to a high degree\\\")). Of these jurisdictions, only Alabama, the District of Columbia, and Vermont would appear to allow the merely negligent driver to suffer incarceration for more than two years. See, e.g., Ala.Code \\u00a7 32-5A-192(b) (one to five years plus fine); cf Cal.Penal Code \\u00a7 193(c)(2) (imprisonment for not more than one year); accord, Ga.Code Ann. \\u00a7 17-10-3. Most of the statutes here set out have not yet come under constitutional attack in the reported cases. In any event decisions that have addressed the constitutional issue and held that ordinary negligence is a sufficient level of culpability upon which to predicate liability for vehicular homicide have failed to convince us of the unsoundness of our position taken in this opinion. State v. Russo, 38 Conn.Supp. 426, 450 A.2d 857 (Conn.Super.Ct.1982) (decided under Conn. Gen.Stat. \\u00a7 53a-58a (1977) (repealed 1981)); State v. Edwards, 236 Ga. 104, 222 S.E.2d 385 (1976); People v. McKee, supra.\\nThe judgment of sentence is reversed and appellant is discharged.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"6676665\", \"name\": \"COCHRAN v. DAWSON\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Cochran v. Dawson\", \"decision_date\": \"1836-07-02\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"276\", \"last_page\": \"279\", \"citations\": \"1 Miles 276\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Reports of cases determined in the district court for the city and county of Philadelphia\", \"court\": \"Philadelphia District Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:33:32.373782+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"COCHRAN v. DAWSON.\", \"head_matter\": \"COCHRAN v. DAWSON.\\nJuly 2, 1836.\\nRule to show cause why a new trial should not be granted.\\nIn the case of general guarantee, where the contract is indefinite as to the time and manner of default in the principal, the creditor, in order to recover on such contract, is in general bound to show the default and the insolvency of the principal, or that coercive measures have been used against him without effect.\\nBut where the contract defines the time of default when the surety is to pay, or to see the debt paid, the creditor, when that period arrives, has his right of action on the contract, without pursuing the principal or showing his insolvency.\\nThus, where the defendant gave an order on A, in favour of B, for lumber, which specified, \\u201c I will see you paid between this and the closing of the year,\\u201d the defendant at the expiration of the year is liable, although, the plaintiff has not pursued B, nor shown his insolvency, nor pursued his lien against the buildings for which the lumber was furnished.\\nIn such case B is a competent witness for the plaintiff to prove the delivery of the lumber in pursuance of the order.\\nTHIS was an action on the case tried before Jones, J., to recover the price of a quantity of lumber delivered by the plaintiff to William P, Jones, upon an order in the following- words :\\n\\u201c August 13, 1834.\\n\\u201cMr A.Cochraiiy \\u2014 Please to let the bearer, Mr William P. Jones, have lumber for the completion of the houses belonging to the Mr Armstrongs, and I will see you paid between this and the close of the year. Yours, S. II. Dawson.\\u201d\\nOn the trial, the signature of the defendant to this order was admitted. William P. Jones was tiren called to prove the delivery of lumber in pursuance of this order, to the value of 159 dollars 53 cents. It was objected that he was incompetent on the ground of interest; but the objection was overruled. The defendant, among other matters, gaye in evidence two records of this claim, filed the 17th of March 1835, against two buildings ; one owned by Alexander Armstrong and the other by William Armstrong.\\nThe defendant requested the court, to charge the jury upon several points, of which the following is the substance, viz, \\u201c that the order of the defendant is a conditional undertaking, and that he is not liable upon it until the plaintiff has pursued the original debtor; that (be plaintiff must aver and prove a consideration for the order; that Jones was the original debtor, as the credit was given to him ; and that the plaintiff ought to have used due diligence in pursuing him. That before the plaintiff can recover lie must have pursued his lien against the buildings of the Messrs Armstrong.\\u201d\\nThe jury were instructed however, \\u201cthat the only condition in the order was the delivery of the lumber; that upon tlie delivery, the undertaking became absolute according to its terms, viz., an undertaking to see the plaintiff paid for it before the close of lire year; that the delivery of the lumber was consideration enough ; that the plaintiff was under no obligation to pursue Jones in the first instance, whether he was the original debtor or not, nor need he pursue his lien upon the buildings before lie could resort to the defendant upon his contract to see the plaintiff paid before the close of the year 1834; that the order being admitted, if the jury found that the lumber mentioned in the bill was delivered, and has not been paid for (and there was no evidence of payment), the plaintiff was entitled to their verdict.\\u201d\\nThe jury found for the plaintiff) and assessed the damages at 172 dollars 55 cents.\\nThe plaintiff moved for and obtained a rule to show cause why a new trial should not be granted, and assigned for reasons the error of the judge who tried the cause, in charging the jury as aforesaid ; and also that Jones was not a competent witness for the plaintiff to prove the delivery of the lumber, on the ground of interest.\\nI. Norris, in support of the rule,\\ncited : 1 Lord Raym. 224; 2 3b Rep. 80 ; 1 Cowp. 227; Fell on Guarantees 25, 26, 31 ; J //. 131. Rep. 120 ; 1 Bos. & Pul. 158 ; 5 Binn. 195; 2 Camp. Rep. SIS ; I Watts 280 ; 14 Eng. Com. Law Rep, 238 ; 1 Wilson\\u2019s Rep. 305 ;: 2 B. & A. 613; 5 Com. Law 381; Theob. 28, by Hammond; IS Eng. Com. Law Rep. 90 ; 8 Johns. 29 ; 2 Hen. & Aitmf. 603; 12 Serg. & Rawle 103.\\nW. Fisher, contra,\\ncited : 4 Dali. 135; 8 Serg. & Rawle 110; 15 Serg. & Rawle 30; 1 Watts 143, 280.\", \"word_count\": \"1386\", \"char_count\": \"7587\", \"text\": \"The opinion of the Court was delivered by\\nJones, J.\\nThe contract of guarantee is a secondary liability. It is a promise to be answerable for a debt or duty in case of the failure or default of another person, who is liable in the first instauce. Johnson v. Chapman, 3 Penns. Rep. 19 ; 3 Kent's Comm. 85. When the contract is indefinite as to the time or manner of the default, the creditor or person to whom the duty is due, is bound to show the failure or default upon which the contract of guarantee is suspended ; and to show this, he is in general obliged to show the insolvency of the principal debtor, or that coercive means have been used against him without effect.\\nBut there is no doubt that the contract of guarantee may be so modified as to dispense with active duties on the part of the person entitled to the benefit of it.\\nIn this case however the doubt is, whether the defendant was not the original debtor, and liable under a count for goods sold and delivered to him at his special instance and request. But adopting the defendant's view of the nature of his liability, he guarantied that Jones should pay the plaintiff for the lumber before the close of the year, and in case of his default, that he would see it paid ; that is, pay it at the expiration of that period.\\nThe effect and even the literal purport of the agreement was to exonerate the plaintiff from the duty of pursuing Jones. It imposed upon the defendant the duty of preventing a default in Jones after the close of the year. As he did not do so, he was himself in default; his agreement was broken ; and upon the breach he became liable as a principal debtor, as really so as if he had joined with Jones in the execution of a joint and several bond. It is a universal rule that the breach of a contract gives an immediate right of action. In the case of general guarantee, the contract, generally speaking, is not broken until the creditor has used means to compel payment _by the principal debtor without effect. But it seems impossible to read the contract of this defendant without seeing that it was broken on the 1st of January 1835. The defendant undertook that the plaintiff should be paid before a given day, and the payment was not made before that day or afterwards. If that do not constitute a breach of contract, it must be because the undertaking itself was not a contract, or the violation of its terms was not a breach.\\nAs to the point of evidence, Jones was called by the plaintiff to prove the delivery of the lumber to him, in pursuance of the order. If we suppose Jones to be the principal debtor, he would be liable to the defendant in the event of a recovery and satisfaction from him. He could therefore gain nothing in that event. The creditor only would be changed. If the defendant was the principal debtor, Jones was liable to neither: but if the defendant was only liable as surety for Jones, and Jones bad boon raUed by him to defeat the action, the plaintiff ought ii.ue cU\\u00a1 ved io hi- ivmp'-inicy ; but he was introduced by \\u00a1be |i'a\\\"it ff to eb:'i ,v tit\\\" d.nendanl.\\nThen* is tbeielbif no ibuudniion Ibr a new trial in this case.\\nRule discharged.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"6762433\", \"name\": \"CASE OF GEORGE WIDMIER, an Insolvent Debtor\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Case of Widmier\", \"decision_date\": \"1873-10-18\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"341\", \"last_page\": \"342\", \"citations\": \"1 Foster 341\", \"volume\": \"1\", \"reporter\": \"Legal Chronicle reports of Cases decided in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Foster)\", \"court\": \"Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:45:46.493103+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"CASE OF GEORGE WIDMIER, an Insolvent Debtor.\", \"head_matter\": \"First Judicial District. In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia.\\nCASE OF GEORGE WIDMIER, an Insolvent Debtor.\\n1. An insolvent debtor will be discharged, although it is opposed because he was \\u25a0arrested on process on a judgment in an action for actual force, if the court by going be-Tnnd the judgment ascertain that the cause of action was not founded on actual force.\\n2. If an insolvent petitioner omits to return a debt due to him from an honest conviction of its worthlessness, it will not defeat the petition.\", \"word_count\": \"900\", \"char_count\": \"5224\", \"text\": \"Opinion delivered October 18, 1873, hy\\nAllison, P. J.\\nThe petitioner, George Widmier, prays to be dis-charged as an insolvent debtor. This is opposed on the ground that he was arrested on process founded on a judgment against him, in an action for actual force. The affidavit to hold to bail, and the declaration foun'd-\\u2022ed thereon, charged, that defendant did break and enter the stable and close of the plaintiff, and then without the leave, and against the will of defendant, one mare of the value of $200 seized and carried away. If the force mentioned in the affidavit was actual force, the defendant cannot be discharged until he has been in actual confinement for at least sixty days; this is required by the 17th section of the act of 16th June, 1836, relating, \\u2022to insolvent debtors. In Ex parte Southerland, 17 Amer. L. R. 39, it was held, that the court will look behind the judgment, to ascertain the real cause of the action, in order to determine the question of the right of a petitioner to a discharge. This must be so; otherwise it would be in the power of the pleader to determine the question, by the statement of the .affidavits and narr. In this case force is charged, but the question remains was it actual force. To enter the close of another- without permission, constitutes trespass, and to open a fastening of a close, if it be no more than to lift a latch, or to let down bars, amounts in law to an unlawful breaking with force, &c. But this is not actual but technical force, and does not fall within the restriction upon the right to a discharge covered by the act. The distinction between actual and constructive force is, clearly recognized in the law; as in forcible entry and detainer; the force must be such.,as to put one standing in defence of possession, in fear of personal injury; and the force to. invalidate a marriage must amount to duress per minas: Stevenson v. Stevenson, 7 Philadelphia Reports, 386. The same rule of construction was applied to the words \\\"actual fraud,\\\" which, in the act of 1836, are coupled with the words actual force, in re Thomas H. Craig, 2 Philadelphia Reports, 391, where the judgment was in an action founded upon a breach of promise of marriage.\\nGeorge H. Earle, Esq., for petitioner; 5. N. Rich, Esq., contra..\\nThe examination of the petitioner by-the judgment creditor, who opposes the discharge, shows the force to have been technical, and not actual,, and this established, the objection falls out of the case.\\nThere is more force in the objection, that the conduct of the petitioner gives rise to a presumption of fraud, having stated in his petition that he has no property of any kind except his personal clothing. He admitted in his answers at bar, that he has claims against several persons,, one amounting to over $500, and that after filing his petition he brought suit before an alderman, against Brotz, who opposes the discharge, to recover ninety dollars, for money loaned. All the claims except that against .Brotz, he says, are worthless, because of the insolvency of the persons indebted to him. And this did not seem to be disputed' by the opposing-creditor. In the case of William Oliver, 1 Ashmead, 112, Judge King held, that where a petitioner omits to.return a debt due to him, from an honest conviction of the worthlessness of the claim, which rendered its. return useless, it will not defeat the petition. The property not returned, in Oliver's case, amounted to over $20,000, but because it was without value, and fraud was not made to appear, the petitioner was discharged.. In the suit brought against Brotz, who contests the validity of the claim,, there is no just ground for an inference of fraudulent concealment of' property; the bringing of the suit of itself answers the charge of concealment; it was the most direct notice to Brotz, and constructively to all. creditors; if established it could not pass to the petitioner, but to his as-signee for the benefit of creditors. In Oliver's case, Judge King says: Fraudulent concealment of his property by an insolvent, is a most heinous, crime, and like all other crimes, its actual and positive commission must be brought home to the party charged; and that an omission to spread, upon the petition all the.lights which a creditor may fairly demand, in the-absence of a fraudulent design, cannot subject a suitor to the perils of a. penitentiary. A fraudulent intent is not, I think, established against the-petitioner in the case under consideration ; it is therefore ordered that the-petition be amended by inserting a list of his claims against those alleged to be indebted to the petitioner, and upon this being done, that he be discharged.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"6837399\", \"name\": \"Ramos v. Jones\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Ramos v. Jones\", \"decision_date\": \"2014-06-18\", \"docket_number\": \"No. C-48-CV-2012-2141\", \"first_page\": \"32\", \"last_page\": \"47\", \"citations\": \"39 Pa. D. & C.5th 32\", \"volume\": \"39\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania District and County Reports\", \"court\": \"Northampton County Court of Common Pleas\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:55:55.127339+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Ramos v. Jones\", \"head_matter\": \"Ramos v. Jones\\nC.P. of Northampton County,\\nNo. C-48-CV-2012-2141\\nMichael A. Snover, for plaintiff.\\nJill M. Moffitt, for defendant.\\nJune 18, 2014\", \"word_count\": \"3883\", \"char_count\": \"23795\", \"text\": \"BARATTA, J.,\\nORDER OF COURT\\nAnd now, this 18th day of June, 2014, upon consideration of the defendants, Michael Jones and Barbara Jones's, motion for partial summary judgment, and the plaintiff, Melanie Ramos's, response thereto, it is hereby ordered that said motion is granted, and the plaintiff is precluded from asserting and recovering any and all non-economic damages due to her selection of the limited tort option.\\nIt is further ordered that any and all claims for non-economic damages are dismissed with prejudice.\\nSTATEMENT OF REASONS\\nFacts and Procedural History\\nOn March 2, 2012, the plaintiff, Melanie Ramos, filed a praecipe for writ of summons. On March 27, 2012, the defendants, Michael Jones and Barbara Jones, filed a praecipe for rule to file complaint.\\nOn April 9, 2012, the plaintiff filed her complaint, in which she avers that on March 21, 2010, a motor vehicle accident occurred between defendant Michael Jones and the plaintiff at the intersection of Union Boulevard and Airport Road. Defendant Michael Jones was allegedly negligently driving a vehicle with the permission of defendant Barbara Jones. The plaintiff avers in her complaint that she suffered \\\"severe, serious and disabling\\\" injuries, directly and proximately caused by the defendants' negligence. Specifically, she complains of sprains and strains of her neck and back, as well as injuries to her discs, shoulders, head and right knee. She also asserts that she suffers mental damages that were directly and proximately caused by this motor vehicle accident: PTSD, depression, fear, anxiety, and/or other mental and psychic injuries. The plaintiff also complains of economic injuries, including lost wages, the incurrence of large bills due to treatment, and out-of-pocket expenses. Finally, the plaintiff complains that, as a result of the accident, she is unable to pursue her usual occupation.\\nOn April 25, 2012, the defendants filed an answer and new matter. In their answer, the defendants aver that defendant Michael Jones had defendant Donna Jones's permission to use the vehicle, but he did not use the vehicle to run an errand for her or under her direction. In their new matter, the defendants chiefly contend that the plaintiff's claim for any non-economic losses is barred pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act (the \\\"MVRL\\\"), 75 Pa.C.S.A. \\u00a7 1701, et seq., because the plaintiff selected the limited tort option when applying for the insurance policy in effect at the time of the accident. See answer with new matter at \\u00b6 25-27. Additionally, the defendants contest causation. Id. at \\u00b6 28. Other affirmative and equitable defenses are also raised in the new matter.\\nOn May 9, 2012, the plaintiff filed her response, asserting that the averments in the defendants' new matter amounted to conclusions of law. Id. at \\u00b6 29-33. The parties engaged in discovery, which included obtaining medical records and conducting depositions.\\nThe defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment on February 21, 2014, arguing that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiff selected the limited tort option in her insurance policy and did not sustain an injury which constitutes a serious impairment of a body function. As such, they argue, she is not entitled to non-economic damages. The defendants filed a memorandum of law supporting their motion on the same date.\\nOn March 24, 2014, the plaintiff filed an answer and brief in opposition, in which she argued that this determination is one for the jury because reasonable minds could differ. On April 29, 2014, the defendants filed a reply to plaintiff's brief in opposition to motion for partial summary judgment. On May 1, 2014, the plaintiff filed reply to defendants' submission at oral argument.\\nThis matter was placed on the April 25,2014, argument list and argument was heard.\\nLegal Standard\\nPennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2 states:\\nAfter the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to unreasonably delay trial, any party may move for summary judgment in whole or in part as a matter of law\\n(1) whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action or defense which could be established by additional discovery or expert report, or\\n(2) if, after the completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to the jury.\\nPa.R.C.P. 1035.2..\\nFurther, under Pa.R.C.P. 1035.3(a), the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the pleadings but must file a response within thirty (30) days after service of the motion. In other words, the nonmoving party has a clear and affirmative duty to respond to a motion for summary judgment. Harber Phila. Ctr. City Office Ltd. v. LPCI Ltd. P'ship, 764 A.2d 1100, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2000). Also, Pa.R.C.P. 1035.3(d) specifically provides that \\\"[sjummary judgment may be entered against a party who does not respond.\\\" Ld.\\nSummary judgment may be granted only in the clearest of cases where the record shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. P.J.S. v. Pa. State Ethics Comm'n, 723 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa. 1999) (citing Marks v. Tasman, 589 A.2d 205 (Pa. 1991)). Summary judgment is only appropriate in the clearest of cases, because an order favorable to the moving party will prematurely end an action. Scopel v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., 698 A.2d 602, 605 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citations omitted). The moving party has the burden of proving the non-existence of any genuine issue of material fact. O'Rourke v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 730 A.2d 1039, 1041 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (citing Kee v. Turnpike Comm'n, 722 A.2d 1123 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998)). \\\"Failure of a non-moving party to adduce sufficient evidence on an issue essential to his case and on which it bears the burden of proof... establishes the entitlement of the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.\\\" Murphy v. Duquesne Univ. of the Holy Ghost, 777 A.2d 418, 429 (Pa. 2001) (quoting Young v. PennDOT, 744 A.2d 1276, 1277 (Pa. 2000)) (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Ertel v. Patriot-News Co., 674 A.2d 1038, 1041 (Pa. 1996) (citation omitted).\\nUnder the Nanty-Glo Rule, summary judgment may not be granted where the moving party relies exclusively on oral testimony, either through testimonial affidavits or deposition testimony to establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Nanty-Glo Borough v. American Surety Co., 163 A. 523, 524 (Pa. 1932); see also Penn Center House, Inc. v. Hoffman, 553 A.2d 900, 903 (Pa. 1989); White v. Owens Corning Fiberglas, Corp., 668 A.2d 136, 142 (Pa.Super. 1995); Garcia v. Savage, 586 A.2d 1375, 1377-78 (Pa. Super. 1991); O'Rourke, 730 A.2d at 1041 (citing Kaplan v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 688 A.2d 736 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997)).\\nDiscussion\\nUnder Section 1705 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (\\\"MVFRL\\\"), an insured motorist may elect a \\\"limited tort\\\" option in exchange for lower insurance rates. 75 Pa.C.S.A. \\u00a7 1705; see also Washington v. Baxter, 719 A.2d 733, 737-38 (Pa. 1998). Under this limited tort option, an insured driver who is injured by another driver may \\\"seek recovery for all medical and other out-of-pocket expenses, but not for pain and suffering or for other non-monetary damages unless the injuries suffered fall within the definition of 'serious injury' as set forth in the policy.\\\" 75 Pa.C.S.A. \\u00a7 1705(a). While the insured who elects the limited tort alternative remains eligible to pursue a cause of action for economic loss, \\\"[ujnless the injury sustained is a serious injury, each person who is bound by the limited tort option shall be precluded from an action for any non-economic loss .\\\" 75 Pa.C.S.A. \\u00a7 1705(d). Further, the MVFRL defines \\\"serious injury\\\" as \\\"[a] personal injury resulting in death, serious impairment of a body function or permanent serious disfigurement.\\\" 75 Pa.C.S.A. \\u00a7 1702.\\nInitially, we note that in Washington v. Baxter, supra, our Supreme Court established the standard by which trial courts are to determine whether a plaintiff has suffered a \\\"serious injury\\\" by which the plaintiff is permitted to recover non-economic damages despite her selection of the \\\"limited tort option\\\" under the MVFRL. Our Supreme Court determined, after a review of case law and the legislative history of the MVFRL, that: \\\"the traditional summary judgment standard [is] to be followed and... the threshold determination [is] not to be made routinely by a trial court judge in [these] matters . but rather [is] to be left to a jury unless reasonable minds could not differ on the issue of whether a serious injury has been sustained.\\\" Washington, 719 A.2d at 740. Moreover, all inferences must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Id. Thus, \\\"the ultimate determination should be made by the jury in all but the clearest of cases.\\\" McGee v. Muldowney, 750 A.2d 912, 914 (Pa. Super. 2000).\\nThe Washington Court adopted the following definition of \\\"serious impairment of a bodily function\\\" as stated by the Michigan Supreme Court: Washington, 719 A.2d at 740 (quoting DiFranco v. Pickard, 398 N.W.2d 896, 901 (Mich. 1986)) (omission in original). Further, our Supreme Court emphasized that \\\"[t]he question to be answered is not whether appellant has adduced sufficient evidence to show that appellant suffered any injury; rather, the question is whether appellant has shown that he suffered a serious injury such that a body function has been seriously impaired.\\\" Id. at 741 (emphasis in original); see also McGee, 750 A.2d at 914.\\nThe 'serious impairment of a bodily function' threshold contains two inquiries:\\na) What body function, if any, was impaired because of injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident?\\nb) Was the impairment of the body function serious? The focus of these inquiries is not on the injuries themselves, but on how the injuries affected a particular body function. Generally medical testimony will be needed to establish the existence, extent, and permanency of the impairment . In determining whether the impairment was serious, several factors should be considered: the extent of the impairment, the length of time the impairment lasted, the treatment required to correct the impairment, and any other relevant factors. An impairment need not be permanent to be serious.\\nWe look to first at what body function, if any, was injured as a result of the motor vehicle accident of March 21, 2010. Here, the plaintiff complains of neck and shoulder pain, which she contends resulted solely from the motor vehicle accident. See complaint \\u00b6 10.\\nSecond, we consider whether the impairment of the body function is serious. The record reveals the following with regard to the impairment:\\n(1) The plaintiff was examined in the emergency room of Sacred Heart Hospital following the motor vehicle accident of March 21, 2010, and discharged with soft tissue injuries and painful tenderness in the right knee. No abnormalities or tenderness in the back or neck was noted. With regard to the severity of the symptoms, the physician documentation states: \\\"[a]t their worst the symptoms were mild, in the emergency department the symptoms are unchanged.\\\"\\n(2) The plaintiff was examined at Airport Road EmergiCenter on March 30, 2010, nine days later, and was diagnosed with right knee pain and a musculoskeletal strain. An x-ray of her cervical spine was performed and the cervical spine was found to be within the normal limits. A CT scan of the brain revealed no abnormalities.\\n(3) On April 13, 2010, and May 4, 2010, the plaintiff was seen by Dr. Joseph Grassi, M.D., of Orthopedic Associates of the Greater Lehigh Valley, P.A. His clinical impressions included ongoing cervicalgia (neck pain) whiplash-type syndrome in the upper back and neck, right knee contusion, and myofasciitis (inflammation of a muscle and its fascia), lower back sprain/strain.\\n(4) On June 29, 2010, the plaintiff was seen by Dr. Grassi for a follow-up appointment, three months after the accident. Dr. Grassi noted some continuing upper, mid and lower back pain, but found no radiation of symptoms. Further, he found: \\\"Regarding the cervical adenopathy, she's been instructed many times to get this checked by her family physician and/or a general surgeon as this is not part of the cervical injury related to her MVA.\\\" (emphasis added) Dr. Grassi advised the plaintiff to use a rolling backpack to take weight off of her shoulders and back. He stated that she could continue with her academics, and noted that she was not currently working.\\n(5) On June 17, 2010, the plaintiff went to Dr. Grassi for another follow-up appointment. Dr. Grassi noted a reduction in pain levels and that the plaintiff was \\\"active, moving about today.\\\" He also found some tightness in her muscles. His clinical impressions included a continuation, but improvement, of whiplash-type syndrome, and myofasciitis (inflammation) of the cervical, thoracic and lumbar spine. Dr. Grassi stated: \\\"I will see her back in three weeks' time, hopefully moving her along so that we can release her for her work. She continues with her college activities.\\\"\\n(6) On September 28,2010, Dr. Grassi saw the plaintiff again due to some recurring back and neck pain. He again noted some soft tissue tightness and discomfort. Dr. Grassi stated: \\\"She is working on trying to get her insurance re-established so she can get back to physical therapy. If this is necessary, we can reorder it but at this time I do not see her as needing a long-term formal physical therapy program.\\\"\\n(7) The plaintiff went to Lehigh Valley Hospital \\u2014 Muhlenberg on January 10, 2011, complaining of severe neck pain. A neck exam revealed mild soft tissue tenderness in the right and left neck. No restrictions were imposed as to the plaintiff's activities.\\n(8) The plaintiff went to Pennsylvania Pain Specialists, P.C., on March 4,2011. The report describes tenderness and cervicalgia (neck pain). Pain medicine was prescribed.\\n(9) The plaintiff sought emergency medical attention at Pinnacle Health Community Campus on June 13, 2011, complaining of neck and shoulder pain. An examination of the neck revealed: \\\"Trachea midline, no meningeal signs, no jugular venous distention, no cervical adenopathy, no contusions, no ecchymosis, Tenderness entire spine from Cl to Tl. No step off[,] no discrete midline tendemess[,] pain is greater in the left trapezius and right trapezius.\\\" The diagnosis was \\\"MVC chronic neck pain.\\\"\\n(10) The plaintiff sought medical attention at Pinnacle Health on August 29, 2011, for other health issues. There is no mention of neck or back pain in the medical report.\\n(11) The plaintiff sprained her ankle while at work, for which she received treatment on December 31, 2012. There was no mention of neck or back pain in the medical reports.\\n(12) On September 17, 2013, the plaintiff went to Dr. David Weiss, D.O., for an orthopedic Independent Medical Evaluation. Dr. Weiss diagnosed the patient with chronic post-traumatic cervical and lumbosacral strain and sprain; post-traumatic cervical facet joint syndrome; cervical radiculitis; lumbar radiculitis; and chronic post-traumatic cervical and lumbar myofascial pain syndrome.\\nWe next look at the length of the injury. Following the accident, the plaintiff requested and received a note from her employer which granted her a leave of absence in which to recover from her accident until April 23, 2010. See motion for partial summary judgment, exhibit \\\"Q\\\" \\u2014 letter from Dottie Kurpat, Director of Brookmont/Blough Healthcare Centers, to the plaintiff (April 6, 2010). The plaintiff did not return to her job, citing her degree of physical pain, that her position could only be held open for a certain amount of time, and that her employer did not offer light duty for a certified nursing assistant (CNA) position. See deposition testimony of Melany Ramos (\\\"N.T.\\\"), 23-25. The plaintiff asserts that her tasks and duties for her new/current employment do not match those required of a CNA, the job she had prior to the motor vehicle collision, due to her neck and back pain. See id.\\nWhile there has been a gap in the plaintiff's employment history, however, she testified during her deposition that she did not seek to secure employment until she moved to Harrisburg after she was evicted from her residence. Id. The plaintiff also notes that she had difficulty obtaining a job because it took her awhile to obtain another vehicle. See id. at 26:9-10. She did not obtain documentation from a medical provider to excuse her from work until a later date. Id. at 24. Likewise, she did not contact her former employer to request light duty, nor did she file for disability. See id. at 29. During the time period in which the plaintiff was out of work, she was able to continue with her education by taking a class on campus and a class online. See id.\\nWith regard to treatment, the plaintiff sought emergency medical attention immediately after the accident, in which her injuries were described as minor. See motion for partial summary judgment, exhibit \\\"E.\\\" The plaintiff went to an orthopedic specialist, Dr. Grassi, and to a few physical therapy treatments. See id. at exhibit \\\"M.\\\" Apparently, the plaintiff could not continue with certain treatments due to her financial circumstances, but sought emergency medical attention as necessary. See deposition N.T. at 25. As noted above, however, Dr. Grassi found on July 29, 2010, that her cervical adenopathy, which contributed to her pain levels, was not caused by the motor vehicle accident, but rather from her failure to seek treatment from a family doctor or a general surgeon. See motion for partial summary judgment, exhibit \\\"K.\\\"\\nFinally, we examine any other relevant considerations regarding the impact of the injury on the plaintiff's performance of her job functions and engagement in personal activities. The plaitniff is able to continue with her education and with work, but she has difficulty sitting at times and uses a rolling backpack, according to Dr. Grassi's instructions. See id. Dr. Grassi gave these instructions, however, after noting that the cervical adenopathy experienced by the plaintiff did not result from the motor vehicle accident. See id.\\nThe plaintiff alleges that she has difficulty sleeping and requires her children's help to do laundry. See deposition N.T. at 67:20-25, 10:6-10. She indicates that this injury has had a negative impact on her relationships with her children, as they cannot participate in physical activities that they once enjoyed together, but admits that she can still watch them play sports and spend meaningful time with them. See id. at 68:22-25, 69:1-21. The plaintiff also alleges that this accident has impacted her mental state by worsening her depression, which she already suffered from prior to the accident after she had her daughter. See id. at 67:1-16. All of these restrictions are self-imposed, as her physicians did not impose any limitations on her activities.\\nIn terms of her employment, the plaintiff is currently hired as a personal care assistant and a connections club associate at Country Meadows, where she works approximately thirty hours per week. See deposition N.T. at 14:20-24; 16:22. Her job responsibilities include helping to take care of the residents, participating in activities with them, and assisting residents in getting dressed.\\\" Id. at 15:3-6. She also had helped to \\\"develop and implement cognitive support programs or activities for residents with varied stages of dementia and Alzheimer's,\\\" a group of patients with whom the plaintiff enjoys working. Id. at 15:12-14. Further, the plaintiff has fully participated in farthering her education, obtaining a degree in business administration for Northampton Community College, a bachelor's degree from Central Penn for Health Care Administration in 2013, and attending classes at Eastern University in Harrisburg for Health Care Administration, expecting her degree in 2014. See id. at 10:15-24,11:3-13, 11:15-22.\\nIn Washington, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the plaintiff had not sustained a serious injury. Washington, 719 A.2d at 741. In that case, the plaintiff had been diagnosed by the emergency room physician with mild injuries and was discharged after a few hours. Id. He missed a few shifts at his jobs, where he was required to do most of his work on his feet. Id. The court found that the treatment for his injuries was not extensive. Id. Further, the arthritis in his right foot \\\"seem[ed] to have had little or no impact on [the plaintiff's] performance of his job functions and engagement in personal activities.\\\" Id. As a result, the Washington court found the impairment resulting from the injury to be de minimis. Id.\\nSimilarly, the plaintiff in the instant case has shown that she has suffered injury, which based upon the medical records generated between the date of the accident and Dr. Gxassi's note of June 29, 2010, we would describe to be in the nature of soft tissue injuries to her back and neck. Plaintiff has failed to show that \\\"these injuries resulted in such substantial interference with any bodily function as to permit a conclusion that the injuries have resulted in a serious impact on [her] life for an extended period of time.\\\" McGee, 750 A.2d at 915. We note that after the accident, she was discharged from the hospital on the same day with mild injuries. Further, she has failed to present objective medical evidence that any pain that she has experienced during this time period resulted from the motor vehicle accident. In fact, her treating physician, Dr. Grassi, determined that the cervical adenopathy did not result from the motor vehicle accident. Dr. Grassi noted that: \\\"Regarding the cervical adenopathy, she's been instructed many times to get this checked by her family physician and/or a general surgeon as this is not part of the cervical injury related to her MVA.\\\" See id.; see also motion for partial summary judgment, exhibit \\\"K.\\\" It is apparent that complaints about neck pain existed long before the accident. In addition, the treatment for the plaintiff's pain and symptoms has not been extensive or consistent, but sporadic.\\nWhile the plaintiff chooses to attribute her neck and back pain to the motor vehicle accident, there is no support in the medical records for her claim. Further, the record establishes that the pain does not interfere with her life, other than the claim that the pain makes it difficult to participate in sports with her children. Again, we note that plaintiff's complaints of occasional stiffness and pain does not prevent her from working, attending school, viewing her children's athletic events, or engaging in her everyday routine. The evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, shows soft tissue injuries from the accident, but the impairment from that injury is clearly de minimis in this case. Reasonable minds could not differ here as to the absence of a serious impairment of a body function.\\nTherefore, we grant the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"706238\", \"name\": \"In the Matter of Cynthia Ford CASEY. Petition for Reinstatement from Inactive Status\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Casey\", \"decision_date\": \"2001-07-10\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 31 DB 2001\", \"first_page\": \"205\", \"last_page\": \"205\", \"citations\": \"566 Pa. 205\", \"volume\": \"566\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:17:36.088370+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"In the Matter of Cynthia Ford CASEY. Petition for Reinstatement from Inactive Status.\", \"head_matter\": \"779 A.2d 488\\nIn the Matter of Cynthia Ford CASEY. Petition for Reinstatement from Inactive Status.\\nNo. 31 DB 2001.\\nSupreme Court of Pennsylvania.\\nJuly 10, 2001.\", \"word_count\": \"140\", \"char_count\": \"842\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nPER CURIAM.\\nAND NOW, this 10th day of July, 2001, The Report and Recommendations of The Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania dated June 14, 2001, are approved and IT IS ORDERED that CYNTHIA FORD CASEY, who has been on inactive status, has never been suspended or disbarred, and has demonstrated that she has the moral qualifications, competency and learning in law required for admission to practice in the Commonwealth, shall be and is, hereby reinstated to active status as a member of the Bar of this Commonwealth. The expenses incurred by the Board in the investigation and processing of the Petition for Reinstatement shall be paid by the Petitioner.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
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+"{\"id\": \"7280665\", \"name\": \"BOROUGH OF ST. CLAIR v. ST. CLAIR POLICE DEPARTMENT, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Borough of St. Clair v. St. Clair Police Department\", \"decision_date\": \"2011-07-13\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"1107\", \"last_page\": \"1112\", \"citations\": \"24 A.3d 1107\", \"volume\": \"24\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:24:20.720118+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"BEFORE: McGINLEY, Judge, and COHN JUBELIRER, Judge and LEAVITT, Judge.\", \"parties\": \"BOROUGH OF ST. CLAIR v. ST. CLAIR POLICE DEPARTMENT, Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"BOROUGH OF ST. CLAIR v. ST. CLAIR POLICE DEPARTMENT, Appellant.\\nCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.\\nArgued March 7, 2011.\\nDecided July 13, 2011.\\nAnthony M. Caputo, Harrisburg, for appellant.\\nEdward M. Brennan, Pottsville, for ap-pellee.\\nBEFORE: McGINLEY, Judge, and COHN JUBELIRER, Judge and LEAVITT, Judge.\", \"word_count\": \"2094\", \"char_count\": \"13492\", \"text\": \"OPINION BY\\nJudge McGINLEY.\\nSt. Clair Police Department (Depai'tment) appeals the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County (trial court) which reversed and vacated the disputed portion of an Interest Arbitration Award (Award) entered pursuant to 43 P.S. \\u00a7 217.1-217.10 commonly referred to as \\\"Act 111.\\\"\\nThe Borough of St. Clair (Borough) is a political subdivision of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The Department is the exclusive representative of the police employees of the Borough.\\nOn August 24, 2009, an arbitration board modified various provisions of the parties' existing Award, including overtime during unscheduled absences and emergencies. The term of the Award was from January 1, 2008, through December 31, 2011.\\nArticle VIII, Section 3 of the Interest Award provided that overtime would be offered to full-time officers first using a rotating system based on seniority, to fill vacancies during unscheduled absences and emergencies:\\nOvertime would be defined to be hours worked in excess of eight (8) hours in a day for scheduled eight (8) hour shifts or in excess of ten (10).hours in a day for scheduled ten (10) hours shifts or in excess of forty (40) hours in a work week.\\nOveHime shall be offered to full-time officers first, using a rotating seniority system. If no full-time officer accepts the shift, the vacancy may be offered to part-time officers. For purposes of this section, overtime shall mean unscheduled absences that arise after the schedule for full-time and part-time officers has been posted and in emergency situations.\\nAbsent any emergency situation, no officer shall work in a police capacity for more than sixteen (16) hours in a twenty-four (24) hour period.\\nInterest Arbitration Award, June 30, 2009, Article VIII, Section 3 at 1; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 9a (Emphasis added).\\nOn September 17, 2009, the Borough filed a Petition for Review. It alleged that the Award \\\"improperly limits the power of the Mayor of the Borough to control the Chief of Police and the police force and direct a time during which, the place where, and the manner in which the Chief of Police and the police force shall perform their duties as provided by Section 1121 of the Borough Code, 53 P.S. \\u00a7 46121.[ ]\\\" Petition for Review, \\u00b6 6 at 2.\\nSpecifically, the Borough argued that Section 1121 of the Borough Code, 53 P.S. \\u00a7 46121, gives the Mayor the statutory right to \\\"have full charge and control of the chief of police and the police force, and he shall direct the time during which, the place where and the manner in which, the chief of police and the police force shall perform their duties.... \\\"\\nThe Borough did not dispute that \\\"regularly scheduled overtime\\\" may be a subject of collective bargaining. However, the Borough contended that the arbitration board exceeded its jurisdiction and powers because the Award unduly restricted the Mayor's ability to schedule police officers under the unusual circumstances of last minute absences and emergencies.\\nThe Department countered that the overtime provision, which incorporated a rotating system of overtime based on seniority, did not infringe on the Borough's managerial prerogative to determine \\\"if' overtime will be offered. According to the Department the Award merely determined, in advance, the order in which the officers must be called to fill the vacancies, based on full-time/part-time status and ro tating seniority; thereby eliminating the chance that overtime would be awarded based on partiality or some other unfair practice.\\nThe Department further argued that an arbitration board had jurisdiction over matters that constitute mandatory subjects of bargaining under Act 111. Those subjects include \\\"the terms and conditions of . employment, including compensation, hours, working conditions, retirement, pensions and other benefits.\\\" Section 1 of Act 111, 43 P.S. \\u00a7 217.1. According to the Department, nothing in the Award contravened these subjects. The Department further noted that the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board determined on many occasions that overtime and seniority are mandatory subjects of bargaining.\\nOn July 6, 2010, the trial court reversed and vacated the disputed portion of the Award. The trial coui't agreed that the disputed language infringed on the Borough's \\\"managerial prerogatives\\\" and undermined the Mayor's exclusive scheduling authority granted by the Borough Code because it \\\"interferes with the statutory right of the Mayor to adjust schedules for Borough police officers.\\\" Trial Court Decision, July 6, 2010, at 6. The trial court found that the Award went beyond the parameters of the mandatory subjects of collective bargaining so far as it required that certain officers be given overtime before other officers, specifically full-time officers over part-time officers. The trial court also found that the arbitration board \\\"exceeded its jurisdiction\\\" because it \\\"improperly affected the Mayor's statutory right to have free charge and control of the police department concerning the manner in which and the time the police perform their duties with regard to scheduling of overtime for emergency situations and unscheduled absences.\\\" Trial Court Order and Opinion, July 6, 2010, at 4-5.\\nOn appeal, the Department contends that the trial court erred when it vacated the overtime provision. The Department argues that overtime and seniority issues are mandatory subjects of bargaining. Therefore, the trial court erred when it concluded that the arbitration board exceeded its jurisdiction. The Department also contends that the trial court erred when it concluded that the arbitration board exceeded its powers because the Award neither usurped any authority deposited with the Mayor nor the Borough's managerial prerogative to determine if and when overtime was necessary. The Mayor still retained all rights essential for the proper and efficient function of a police force, including the right to determine when overtime was necessary, whether there were enough officers on shift to cover the emergency, whether it was necessary to call off-duty officers, and the number of officers required. The Award simply established a system, in advance, which determined the priority in which the off-duty officers would be offered overtime, and eliminated any potential for favoritism.\\nReview of an Act 111 Interest Arbitration Award is limited to narrow certiorari wherein the award may only be reviewed for: (1) jurisdiction; (2) the regularity of the proceedings; (3) excess in the exercise of powers; and (4) deprivations of constitutional rights. City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Order of Police, 595 Pa. 47, 938 A.2d 225 (2007). This Court's standard of review of an order of the trial court is plenary. Pennsylvania State Police v. Pennsylvania Troopers Association (Styers), 840 A.2d 1059 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004).\\nOur Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently set forth the principles this Court must follow when applying the narrow certiorari review in Act 111 cases in City of Philadelphia v. International Association of Firefighters, Local 22, 606 Pa. 447, 473, 999 A.2d 555, 570-571 (2010):\\nWhen reviewing a disputed provision in an Act 111 interest arbitration award, a court should first inquire whether the provision concerns a topic that is subject to the right of collective bargaining, i.e., is rationally related to the terms and conditions of employment. If the topic is so subject, the court should next inquire whether the award also implicates the non-bargainable managerial prerogatives of a public employer. If the award does, the court must then determine whether the award unduly infringes upon the exercise of those managerial responsibilities. If the award does not unduly infringe upon their exercise, the award concerns a subject that lies within the scope of collective bargaining under Section 1, falls within the arbitration board's Act 111 powers, and is confirmable. If, however, the award unduly infringes upon the exercise of managerial responsibilities, then the award concerns a managerial prerogative that lies beyond the scope of collective bargaining, reflects an excess of the board's Act 111 powers and is voidable.\\nApplying the test enunciated in City of Philadelphia, this Court must first determine whether the provision concerns a topic that is rationally related to the terms and conditions of employment. This Court finds that the subjects of seniority and overtime are clearly related to the terms and conditions of employment. Appeal of Ross Township, 21 Pa.Cmwlth. 541, 346 A.2d 836 (1975).\\nNext the Court must inquire whether the Award implicates the employer's non-bargainable \\\"managerial prerogatives.\\\" Non-bargainable \\\"managerial prerogatives\\\" are ones that substantially outiveigh any impact an issue will have on an employee. Plumstead Township v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 713 A.2d 730 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998) (Emphasis in original). Any regulation which might be considered \\\"essential for the proper and efficient function of a police force may remain subject to municipal management.\\\" Plumstead, 713 A.2d at 735. It is well settled that a municipality decides the extent to which it will provide police coverage and services and that such decisions fall within the municipality's managerial prerogative. City of Jeannette v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 890 A.2d 1154 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006).\\nAgain, the Department does not dispute that the Borough has the right to determine the extent to which overtime is necessary, and the Award does not infringe on that right.\\nThis controversy, however, quintessentially involves determining whether it is a \\\"managerial prerogative\\\" to designate which Borough police officers will work overtime during an unscheduled absence or emergency.\\nThe Borough argues that the right to choose which officers work overtime, regardless of seniority or full-time/part-time status, is a \\\"managerial prerogative\\\" given the necessity to move quickly to fill the manpower needs of its police department. However, the Borough does not explain how the Award impedes the Borough's necessity to move quickly or what alternate means it would employ to fill the vacancy. It seems that the Borough believes that it may call whomever it wants based on whatever subjective method it chooses.\\nThis Court does not agree that the Borough possesses a \\\"managerial prerogative\\\" to unilaterally select the order or preference in which overtime is offered to the Department's officers during an unsche duled absence or emergency. The disputed overtime provision goes to \\\"who\\\" must first be awarded overtime, not whether or when it should be offered.\\nFor officers, the opportunity to work overtime means more income. The Award recognizes this status differential and rewards those full-time officers who have been with the Borough the longest by providing them with the first opportunity to earn more by working more hours. If the Borough needs to \\\"call-out,\\\" i.e., contact officers to fill a vacancy, the Award simply provides that the Borough must first call full-time officers, based on rotating seniority , before calling part-time officers.\\nThe Award does not infringe on the Borough's right to determine if and when overtime is required to fill its manpower needs. It merely institutes a system to determine the order in which officers are contacted to fill those vacancies. This Court is not convinced that the Award affects the Borough's ability to respond to an emergency situation. The Award sets forth the list and order in which the officers must be called based on a common sense system of seniority and employment status and which is free from favoritism and subjective factors that could otherwise result in preferential treatment.\\nAccordingly, this Court finds that the order in which the Department's officers must be offered overtime, whether or not it relates to an emergency or unscheduled absence, is a subject of collective bargaining. Unilaterally deciding which officers may work overtime during unscheduled absences and emergencies was not a non-bargainable \\\"managerial prerogative\\\" of the Borough. Because the arbitration board's overtime provision did not unduly infringe on any \\\"managerial prerogative,\\\" the arbitration board did not exceed its powers when it entered the disputed portion of the Award.\\nApplying the narrow standard of review in this Act 111 controversy this Court is convinced that overtime rationally relates to the terms and conditions of employment and that it does not implicate a non-bar-gainable \\\"managerial prerogative.\\\"\\nFor the reasons set forth above, the order of the trial court which vacated a portion of Article VIII, Section 3 of the Interest Arbitration Award, entitled \\\"Overtime\\\" is reversed.\\nORDER\\nAND NOW, this 13th day of July, 2011, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County in the above-captioned matter is hereby reversed.\\n. Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, No. Ill, 43 P.S. \\u00a7 217.1-217.10\\n. Act of February 1, 1966, P.L. (1965), as amended..\\n. Rotating means that the most senior officer may not always be called first, i.e., all full-time officers are called in order of decreasing seniority.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/pa/7280701.json b/pa/7280701.json
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..81b00a36cbc2378a74812bc1eece87950cd30445
--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"7280701\", \"name\": \"GRACE BUILDING CO., INC., Petitioner v. RICHLAND TOWNSHIP BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, Respondent\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Grace Building Co. v. Richland Township Board of Supervisors\", \"decision_date\": \"2011-06-13\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"678\", \"last_page\": \"678\", \"citations\": \"21 A.3d 678\", \"volume\": \"21\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T19:01:13.018731+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"GRACE BUILDING CO., INC., Petitioner v. RICHLAND TOWNSHIP BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, Respondent.\", \"head_matter\": \"GRACE BUILDING CO., INC., Petitioner v. RICHLAND TOWNSHIP BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, Respondent.\\nSupreme Court of Pennsylvania.\\nJune 13, 2011.\", \"word_count\": \"52\", \"char_count\": \"327\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nPER CURIAM.\\nAND NOW, this 13th day of June, 2011, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is hereby DENIED.\\nPetition for leave to file response to answer of Richland Township is DENIED.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/pa/7282750.json b/pa/7282750.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c1237c2aa053e674b8311f173aaf984445ab9185
--- /dev/null
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"{\"id\": \"7282750\", \"name\": \"Troy BAYLOR, Petitioner v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Baylor v. Commonwealth\", \"decision_date\": \"2011-01-25\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 150 EM 2010\", \"first_page\": \"462\", \"last_page\": \"462\", \"citations\": \"13 A.3d 462\", \"volume\": \"13\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:50:22.349017+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Troy BAYLOR, Petitioner v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.\", \"head_matter\": \"Troy BAYLOR, Petitioner v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Respondent.\\nNo. 150 EM 2010.\\nSupreme Court of Pennsylvania.\\nJan. 25, 2011.\", \"word_count\": \"81\", \"char_count\": \"504\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nPER CURIAM.\\nAND NOW, this 25th day of January, 2011, the Application for Leave to File Original Process and the \\\"Writ of Habeas Corpus Motion in Violation Pursuant to Pa. Rule 600\\\" are DISMISSED. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 537 Pa. 167, 642 A.2d 453 (1994) (hybrid representation not allowed). The Prothonotary is directed to forward the filings to counsel of record.\"}"
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diff --git a/pa/7283976.json b/pa/7283976.json
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--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"7283976\", \"name\": \"COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Nicholas RUFFIN, Appellee\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Commonwealth v. Ruffin\", \"decision_date\": \"2010-12-01\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"336\", \"last_page\": \"341\", \"citations\": \"10 A.3d 336\", \"volume\": \"10\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:22:42.424406+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"BEFORE: MUSMANNO, PANELLA and SHOGAN, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Nicholas RUFFIN, Appellee.\", \"head_matter\": \"COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Nicholas RUFFIN, Appellee.\\nSuperior Court of Pennsylvania.\\nArgued Aug. 25, 2010.\\nFiled Dec. 1, 2010.\\nStanton M. Lacks, Bensalem, for appellant.\\nDavid W. Hecker, Assistant District Attorney, Doylestown, for Commonwealth, appellee.\\nBEFORE: MUSMANNO, PANELLA and SHOGAN, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"2221\", \"char_count\": \"13813\", \"text\": \"OPINION BY PANELLA, J.:\\nAppellant, Nicholas Ruffin, appeals the judgment of sentence entered on June 25, 2009, by the Honorable Rea Behney Boy-lan, Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County. After careful review, we affirm.\\nThe record in the case sub judice reveals that following a jury trial on June 24-25, 2009, Ruffin was found guilty of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, 18 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. \\u00a7 903, 3701(a)(1)(ii). Subsequent thereto, the trial court sentenced Ruffin to a period of not less than four nor more than ten years' imprisonment. This timely appeal followed.\\nOn appeal, Ruffin raises the following issues for our review:\\nI. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE DEFENSE MOTION TO TRANSFER THE CASE TO JUVENILE COURT?\\nII. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN REFUSING DEFENSE REQUEST THAT SGT. RACE NOT BE ALLOWED TO DISCUSS DE FENDANT'S NON-COOPERATION?\\nAppellant's Brief, at 3.\\nWe begin by reviewing Ruffin's first issue wherein he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to transfer the case to juvenile court.\\nDecisions of whether to grant decertifi-cation will not be overturned absent a gross abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment but involves the misapplication or overriding of the law or the exercise of a manifestly unreasonable judgment passed upon partiality, prejudice or ill will. Commonwealth v. Sanders, 814 A.2d 1248, 1250 (Pa.Super.2003).\\nCommonwealth v. Ramos, 920 A.2d 1253, 1257(Pa.Super.2007), appeal denied, 594 Pa. 678, 932 A.2d 1288 (2007).\\nPursuant to 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. \\u00a7 6322(a) and \\u00a7 6355(e), when a juvenile has been charged with a crime listed under paragraph (2)(ii) or (iii) of the definition of \\\"delinquent act\\\" in 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. \\u00a7 6302, the criminal division of the Court of Common Pleas is vested with jurisdiction. \\\"Conspiracy to Commit Robbery\\\", when the juvenile is 15 years of age or older at the time of the alleged conduct, and where a deadly weapon as defined in 18 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. \\u00a7 2301 was used during the commission of the offense, is one of the offenses listed which requires jurisdiction to vest in the criminal division. See 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. \\u00a7 6302(ii)(D), (I).\\nWhen a case goes directly to the criminal division the juvenile has the option of requesting treatment within the juvenile system through the transfer process of decertification. See Commonwealth v. Aziz, 724 A.2d 371, 373 (Pa.Super.1999), appeal denied, 563 Pa. 670, 759 A.2d 919 (2000). In determining whether to transfer such a case from the criminal division to the juvenile division, \\\"the child shall be required to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the transfer will serve the public interest.\\\" 42 Pa.Cons. Stat.Ann. \\u00a7 6322(a). See also Aziz, 724 A.2d at 373.\\nPursuant to \\u00a7 6322(a), the decertification court must consider the factors contained in \\u00a7 6355(a)(4)(iii) in determining whether the child has established that the transfer will serve the public interest. The statutorily set factors to be considered are as follows:\\n(A) the impact of the offense on the victim or victims;\\n(B) the impact of the offense on the community;\\n(C) the threat to the safety of the public or any individual posed by the child;\\n(D) the nature and circumstances of the offense allegedly committed by the child;\\n(E) the degree of the child's culpability;\\n(F) the adequacy and duration of dispo-sitional alternatives available under this chapter and in the adult criminal justice system; and\\n(G) whether the child is amenable to treatment, supervision or rehabilitation as a juvenile by considering the following factors:\\n(I) age; (II) mental capacity; (III) maturity; (IV) the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the child; (V) previous records; if any; (VI) the nature and extent of any prior delinquent history, including the success or failure of any previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the child; (VII) whether the child can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court jurisdiction; (VIII) probation or institutional reports, if any; (IX) any other relevant factors; 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.AnN. \\u00a7 6355(a)(4)(iii)(A)-(G).\\nAlthough the Juvenile Act requires that a decertification court consider all of the amenability factors, it is silent as to the weight that should be assessed to each factor. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 555 Pa. 37, 45, 722 A.2d 1030, 1033 (1999). The ultimate decision of whether to certify a minor to stand trial as an adult is within the sole discretion of a decertifi-cation court. See id., 555 Pa. at 45, 722 A.2d at 1034. A decertification court must consider all the facts set forth in \\u00a7 6355 of the Juvenile Act, but it need not address, seriatim, the applicability and importance of each factor and fact in reaching its final determination. See id.\\nIn Jackson, our Supreme Court offered the following instruction regarding the extent to which the decertification court must explain its reasoning in order to provide meaningful appellate review:\\nThe presumption in this Commonwealth remains that if a court has facts in its possession, it will apply them. See Commonwealth v. Devers, 519 Pa. 88, 102, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (1988) (presuming that trial court considered pre-sentencing report); Commonwealth v. Lee, 703 A.2d 470, 474 (Pa.Super.1997); Commonwealth v. McGinnis, 450 Pa.Super. 310, 317, 675 A.2d 1282, 1286 (1996); Commonwealth v. McDonald, 399 Pa.Super. 250, 258, 582 A.2d 328, 331 (1990). When evaluating the propriety of a certification decision, absent evidence to the contrary, a reviewing court must presume that the juvenile court carefully considered the entire record.\\nNo law explicitly requires juvenile courts in this Commonwealth to provide a detailed explanation to justify a certification decision....\\nMeaningful appellate review of a certification decision becomes onerous when the reviewing court can not discern a juvenile court's reasons for finding a youth not amenable to juvenile treatment. However, a juvenile court need not annunciate each of its reasons in a formal certification statement....\\nId., 555 Pa. at 46-47, 722 A.2d at 1034-1035 (footnote omitted).\\nHere, Ruffin contends that in assessing the factors outlined in \\u00a7 6335, \\\"the trial court overemphasized the negative factors including Defendant's age while overlooking extensive testimony supporting amenability to treatment.\\\" Appellant's Brief, at 11. We disagree and find that the trial court correctly concluded that Ruffin failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a transfer will serve the public interest.\\nWhile Ruffin argues that he is amenable to treatment, and in support thereof admitted four certificates demonstrating his good conduct, employability and achievement, see N.T. Trial, 6/24/09, at 6, the record clearly supports the opposite conclusion. At a decertification hearing held prior to trial on June 24, 2009, the trial court received testimony from Ruffin's juvenile probation officer, Detective Nieves and the victim. Bucks County Juvenile Probation Officer John Gryn testified that Ruffin is eighteen years old and has been in the juvenile system since 2003. See id., at 9-10. Since 2003, Ruffin has been routinely adjudicated delinquent and placed in treatment programs. See id., at 10-19.\\nRuffin's past has caught up with him. In October 2003, Ruffin was adjudicated delinquent on two counts of aggravated assault, two counts of simple assault, two counts of recklessly endangering another person, two counts of terroristic threats, and one count of possession of instrument of crime. Ruffin was placed on indefinite probation, and later participated in the ACT outward bound program and assigned to work in the community-based Neighborhood First Program for juveniles. See id., at 10. In April 2005, Ruffin was adjudicated delinquent of misdemeanor disorderly conduct and carrying a BB gun on a highway. See id., at 10-11. Ruffin was once again given indefinite probation and two ACT weekends. See id., at 11. Ruffin continued to violate the terms of his probation by missing school, smoking on school property, and harassing other students. See id. As a result of adjudications for harassment, disorderly conduct and receiving stolen property, Ruffin was placed on probation and ordered to complete 31 days of the outward bound program. See id. In November 2005, Ruffin was again adjudicated delinquent of robbery, this time of an undercover police detective who was posing as a pizza deliveryman. See id., at 12. As a result, Ruf-fin was placed in an Alternative Rehabilitation Community Secure Program for one year and then stepped down into an ARC residential program for approximately six to seven months. Id.\\nThen, less than one month after being released from the ARC program, Ruffin submitted a urine test that was positive for marijuana. See id., at 13. By the time a probation violation had been assessed against Ruffin, he was routinely missing appointments and mandatory group meetings, and again tested positive for marijuana. See id. He was found delinquent and ordered to work with the Community Service Foundation Home and Community School Program. See id., at 14-15.\\nIn 2007, Ruffin was adjudicated delinquent of resisting arrest. See id. The juvenile court again placed Ruffin in a treatment program called Youth Services Camp Adams for 60 days. See id. Upon completion of the program, Ruffin returned home on probation; however, in May 2008 he violated his probation due to drug use and was ordered in Today Incorporated program for two months. See id., at 15. Ruffin's last involvement with the juvenile system came in September of 2008 when he was adjudicated delinquent for receiving stolen property, firearms not to be carried by a minor, possession of a firearm of a minor, possession of an instrument of crime, terroristic threats and simple assault. See id., at 16.\\nBased upon the foregoing, it was evident to the trial court that Ruffin had been given multiple opportunities by the juvenile court for rehabilitation, and yet Ruffin kept re-offending, putting the safety of the public at risk. According to Probation Officer Gryn, there are currently no juvenile programs that would be suitable for Ruffin as he has exhausted his treatment plans. See id., at 17-19.\\nRuffin is 18 years old and his actions are those of an adult. We therefore agree with the trial court that Ruffin should be treated in the criminal division since he has proven time and again that the rehabilitation offered has not been effective. As the juvenile court's jurisdiction over Ruffin ends when he turns 21, we are in agreement that deceitification was not warranted. Based upon this record, the trial court ably considered all of the relevant factors at the time of the hearing.\\nIn his second issue raised for our review, Ruffin asserts that the trial court erred in refusing the defense request that Sergeant Race not be allowed to discuss Ruffin's non-cooperation. See Appellant's Brief, at 12. Specifically, Ruffin argues that Sergeant Race's testimony was in contravention of the trial court's ruling resulting in a tacit admission by silence violating Ruffin's constitutional rights. We disagree.\\nThe admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, wherein lies the duty to balance the evidentiary value of each piece of evidence against the dangers of unfair prejudice, inflaming the passions of the jury, or confusing the jury. See Commonwealth v. Dillon, 592 Pa. 351, 367, 925 A.2d 131, 141 (2007). We will not reverse a trial court's decision concerning admissibility of evidence absent an abuse of the trial court's discretion. See Commonwealth v. Champney, 574 Pa. 435, 457, 832 A.2d 403, 416 (2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 939, 124 S.Ct. 2906, 159 L.Ed.2d 816 (2004).\\nAt the time of trial, the Commonwealth asked Sergeant Race to \\\"describe your interactions with the defendant\\\" which resulted in an objection by defense counsel and a subsequent conversation at side bar. N.T. Trial, 6/25/09, at 70-71. At sidebar, the trial court requested an offer of proof for Sergeant Race's testimony to which the Commonwealth responded:\\nMR. SIEGLE: When I spoke to him\\u2014 the police report said the defendant was generally uncooperative, and when I spoke to him yesterday he said the defendant was, his best way he could say it was, verbally confrontational and refused to give identification. He kept talking or pretending to talk on his cell phone. The others were generally cooperative and provided identification.\\nId. The trial court carefully weighed the Commonwealth's offer of proof and permitted Sergeant Race to testify that Ruffin was confrontational and ignored the Sergeant by talking on his cell phone. See id., at 72-73. Testimony resumed on the record and the following exchange took place:\\nBY MS. SIEGLE:\\nQ: The defendant was confrontational with you, yes?\\nA: He was noncompliant with our initial attempts of the investigation. Q: Did he continually speak or pretend to spoken [sic] on his cell phone?\\nA: He did [.]\\nId., at 72.\\nThe testimony elicited from Sergeant Race was clearly within the parameters set forth by the trial court's ruling. As such, we can find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in so ruling and allowing such testimony over defense counsel's objection. Ruffin was not unfairly prejudiced by said testimony nor did it violate his constitutional rights.\\nJudgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"7308782\", \"name\": \"Troy MULLEN, Petitioner v. Michael WENEROWICZ, Superintendent SCI @ Graterford, John Wetzel, Secretary of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et al., Respondents\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Mullen v. Wenerowicz\", \"decision_date\": \"2013-01-30\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 199 EM 2012\", \"first_page\": \"190\", \"last_page\": \"190\", \"citations\": \"61 A.3d 190\", \"volume\": \"61\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Third Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T00:22:47.734138+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Troy MULLEN, Petitioner v. Michael WENEROWICZ, Superintendent SCI @ Graterford, John Wetzel, Secretary of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et al., Respondents.\", \"head_matter\": \"Troy MULLEN, Petitioner v. Michael WENEROWICZ, Superintendent SCI @ Graterford, John Wetzel, Secretary of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et al., Respondents.\\nNo. 199 EM 2012.\\nSupreme Court of Pennsylvania.\\nJan. 30, 2013.\", \"word_count\": \"69\", \"char_count\": \"452\", \"text\": \"ORDER\\nPER CURIAM.\\nAND NOW, this 30th day of January, 2013, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and the Application for an Immediate Hearing are DENIED.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"738533\", \"name\": \"Philadelphia-Pittsburgh Carriers, Inc. et al., Appellants, v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Philadelphia-Pittsburgh Carriers, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission\", \"decision_date\": \"1958-02-11\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeals, Nos. 170 to 175\", \"first_page\": \"588\", \"last_page\": \"598\", \"citations\": \"185 Pa. Super. 588\", \"volume\": \"185\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:33:12.175217+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Rhodes, P. J., Hirt, Gunther, Wright, Woodside, Ervin, and Watkins, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Philadelphia-Pittsburgh Carriers, Inc. et al., Appellants, v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission.\", \"head_matter\": \"Philadelphia-Pittsburgh Carriers, Inc. et al., Appellants, v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission.\\nArgued November 12, 1957.\\nBefore Rhodes, P. J., Hirt, Gunther, Wright, Woodside, Ervin, and Watkins, JJ.\\nR. H. Shertz, with him Paul F. Barnes, and Shertz, Barnes & Shertz, for appellants.\\nJerome Solomon, for appellant.\\nJames W. Hagar, with him McNees, Wallace & Nurick, for appellant.\\nLouis J. Carter, Assistant Counsel, with him Edward Munce, Assistant Counsel, and Thomas M. Kerrigan, Acting Counsel, for Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, appellee.\\nSamuel P. Delisi, with him Henry M. Wick, Jr., John A. Vuono, and Delisi and Wick, for applicant, intervening appellee.\\nCarl Helmetag, Jr., with him Paul R. Duke, for railroad, intervening appellee.\\nFebruary 11, 1958:\", \"word_count\": \"2539\", \"char_count\": \"16044\", \"text\": \"Opinion by\\nHirt, J.,\\nA partnership operating as Pittsburgh Stores Fast Freight applied to Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission for authority to operate as a freight forwarder for shipment by railroad, motor vehicle, by water or air, between points in the three counties of Philadelphia, Bucks and Northampton, and all points in 13 other counties in Western Pennsylvania including Allegheny County. (All italics throughout this opinion will be ours). The partnership, at the first hearing on September 4, 1952, amended the application by stipulating: \\\"1. Any certificate of public convenience issued in this proceeding shall he limited to the right and privilege of performing service as a freight forwarder as defined in Section 2(11) of the Public Utility Law [as amended, 66 PS \\u00a71102]. 2. Any such right and privilege shall not authorize applicants to operate any motor vehicle equipment over public highways in performance of the freight forwarder service to be provided. 3. To provide the actual transportation of shipments moving in freight forwarder service in intrastate commerce between points in Pennsylvania, applicants will utilize only the services of carriers au thorized by this Commission.\\\" Twenty-fonr carriers, principally trucking companies, had filed protests to the application and their witnesses were heard at four hearings before the Commission. The testimony of these protestants together with that of the applicant at these hearings comprise 320 pages of the present printed record in this appeal. On July 26, 1954, the Commission by order, dismissed the application \\\"for lack of necessity\\\". The Pennsylvania Railroad, subsequently, on its petition in support of the application was allowed to intervene and on motion, the Commission reopened the proceeding. On August 11, 1955, the petitioners again amended their application by further limiting its scope thus: \\\"6. The freight forwarder service which applicant proposes to perform is as follows: The transportation of property as a freight forwarder for shipment by railroad or motor vehicle from points in the County of Philadelphia to points in the County of Allegheny.\\\" Further hearings were held on the reopened application in Pittsburgh during the month of August 1955, after notice to all protestants and other parties in interest.\\nIn its final order of April 22, 1957, the Commission, following a review of the testimony, stated: \\\"We find the applicant has met the burden and that the grant of this application is necessary and proper for the service, accommodation and convenience of the public. After consideration of all the evidence, this matter having been duly heard and submitted by the parties and full investigation of the matters and things involved having been had: Therefore, It Is Ordered,: That the order of the Commission of July 26, 1954, refusing the application of A. Kohrman, I. J. Sheer and J. A. Feldmeier, copartners, trading and doing business as Pittsburgh Stores Fast Freight, be rescind ed and that the application, as amended, be and is hereby approved, limited to the following right: To operate as a forwarder for the transportation of property (excluding commodities in bulk in tank vehicles) via railroad or motor vehicle from points in the County of Philadelphia to points in the County of Allegheny; . . . [and that the operation, subject to conditions Avith which we are not concerned] is necessary or proper for the service, accommodation or convenience of the public.\\\" Thus, the approved service Avas limited to forwarder service as an adjunct to one-way freight transportation from Philadelphia to points in Allegheny County. These are the appeals of six of the protestants who have intervened in the proceeding and who seek to set aside the order.\\nIn \\u00a7801 of the Public Utility Law, as established by the basic Act of May 28, 1937, P. L. 1053, 66 PS \\u00a71301, under the heading \\\"Declaration of policy\\\" it, in part, is said: \\\"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Legislature to regulate in this act the service of common carriers by motor vehicle and forwarders in such manner as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, and foster sound economic conditions in such service, and among such carriers and forwarders in the public interest; to promote safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service by common carriers by motor vehicle and forwarders, and just and reasonable rates therefor Avithout unjust discrimination, and unfair or destructive practices . . .\\\" The statement of policy also recognized the necessity for Commission regulation of the various phases of the \\\"service of common carriers by motor vehicle, forwarders . . .\\\" or other agencies and facilities, because \\\"closely interwoven and interdependent.\\\" By \\u00a72(11) of the Public Utility Law, supra, a freight forAvarder is de fined thus: \\\" 'Forwarder' means any person or corporation not included in the terms 'motor carrier' or 'broker', as herein defined, who or which issues receipts or billings for property received by such person or corporation for transportation, forwarding, or consolidating, or for distribution by any medium of transportation or combination of media of transportation, other than solely by motor vehicle.\\\"\\nThe evidence before the Commission disclosed numerous points in Philadelphia County from which forwarder traffic for Allegheny County would originate. The potential shipments covered a wide range in the character of the commodities and in their weight, varying from 20 to as much as 5000 pounds. The applicant undertook to handle any commodity coming within the original classification on file with the Commission. Although a forwarder has the status of a common carrier (\\u00a7801 of the Act of May 28, 1937, P. L. 1053, 66 PS \\u00a71301) and in the proposed service the applicant assumed the responsibility for the transportation of freight from point of origin to destination, yet it was contemplated that freight would be transported not by this applicant but in every instance by certified common carriers operating under authority of the Commission. Applicant undertook to receive, assemble, and consolidate shipments of freight for Allegheny County at its concentration point located in the Shackamason Station of The Pennsylvania Bail-road Company in Philadelphia County; the proposed service to the public normally would start at this concentration point. On request of a shipper the applicant as forwarder would arrange for pick-up by a local certified carrier but only for shipments originating within the County of Philadelphia. Freight brought to its concentration center however, by shippers from adjacent counties would be accepted by applicant and would be handled as forwarder on bills of lading originating at Philadelphia. The function of a forwarder is to consolidate pieces of freight of individual shippers into carload or truck-load lots which he offers to a railroad or a motor carrier for movement to the destination area. In this proceeding the applicant undertook to perform that service and, on arrival of the consolidated shipments at its Pittsburgh terminal, to break the bulk and to distribute the freight and make deliveries to the several consignees by means of the services of local certified motor carriers. No authority was sought to operate equipment in the applicant's name, but as forwarder the applicant would be responsible for the safe transportation of the property moving in its service from point of receipt to point of delivery. Thus a common carrier liability would be assumed.\\nOur function on this appeal (under \\u00a71107 of the Public Utility Lawr of May 28, 1937, as amended, 66 PS \\u00a71437) is limited to a determination of whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the Commission. The burden on an applicant is met by showing that the proposed service is reasonably necessary for the accommodation or convenience of the public. \\\"Absolute necessity for additional service is not the test, although 'accommodation' or 'convenience' of the public are factors to be considered. Ruettger et al. v. Pa. P. U. C., supra, [164 Pa. Superior Ct. 388, 392, 64 A. 2d 675]. It is sufficient to show that the existing service is not of a type or character which satisfies the public need and convenience and that the proposed service would tend to correct or substantially improve that condition\\\": Garner et al. v. Pa. P. U. C., 177 Pa. Superior Ct. 439, 450, 110 A. 2d 907; Mod. Trans. Co. v. Pa. P. U. C., 139 Pa. Superior Ct. 197, 12 A. 2d 458; Kulp v. Pa. P. U. C. et al., 153 Pa. Superior Ct. 379, 382, 33 A. 2d 724; Furst v. Pa. P. U. C., 184 Pa. Superior Ct. 330, 134 A. 2d 435.\\nRepresentives of ten important business establishments in the Allegheny County area including a number of large department stores testified in effect that the proposed service would eliminate a deficiency in the existing service. The order of the Commission fairly summarizes their testimony in this language: \\\"Executives, whose duties included traffic management, receiving, marketing, freight handling and warehousing, testified on behalf of the following merchants: Kaufman's Department Store, Vanity Luggage Company, Rosenbaum Company, Harris Stores, Spear and Company, Bernstein and Mann, Standard Auto and Radiator Supply Company of Pittsburgh, Boggs and Buhl's Inc., Papercraft Corporation and G-imbel Brothers. These Pittsburgh firms include department stores, a wholesale luggage dealer, a large retailer of home furnishings, a millinery house, a dealer in automotive accessories, radio tubes and toys, a manufacturer of paper products and related items. (A manufacturer and distributor of mine safety equipment, a distributor of store display fixtures, and a distributor of toys and games testified at the rehearing.) The shipments these companies receive range in size from 20 to 5,000 pounds. They receive merchandise from Philadelphia and other eastern Pennsylvania cities. These firms presently use in various degrees all forms of common carriers carrying freight to Pittsburgh including air freight, bus lines, and railway express, and even parcel post. For the faster service they had higher costs which they wanted to avoid. Several presently use the [interstate forwarder] service'of the applicant from New York to Pittsburgh and found it dependable and satisfactory. These firms receive shipments . . . from Philadelphia three or four times a week on the average. They all had particular problems concerning their need for consolidation of shipments, and the need for easier means of tracing lost or delayed shipments . . . scattered among several carriers. Primarily, their need was for increased speed of delivery by overnight or second day delivery. For the most part these witnesses believed the present direct motor-carrier service was not what they wanted and needed. Their needs for speed and greater dependability arose from production line requirements, store openings and the necessity of having merchandise in the store for scheduled advertised sales. None of them knew of or used any [other] forwarding service from Philadelphia. They testified that they needed one; they preferred it to direct service. Certain witnesses were using a consolidator in Philadelphia but the service was poor and not dependable.\\\"\\nIt should be noted that two of the appellants, Philadelphia-Pittsburgh Carriers, Inc., and Highway Express Lines Inc., in addition to certification as common carriers were authorized to supply forwarder service. But throughout the years they have never exercised their certified rights as forwarder and they cannot be regarded as preempting the field simply by nonuser. As stated by the Commission, \\\"Consideration cannot be given to a carrier who has not been giving the public service to which it is reasonably entitled, until another enterprising carrier seeks to render competitive service in the manner demanded by the shipping public\\\": Hall's Motor Tran. Co. v. Pa. P. U. C. et al., 150 Pa. Superior Ct. 60, 27 A. 2d 428. And the offer of these carriers made at the hearings in this case to supply the service of a forwarder is no bar to the validity of the present order. No certified forwarder with the status of a common carrier in law has the right to a guaranty of protection from competition. And the extent of competition to he allowed is generally an administrative question within the sound discretion of the Commission. Cf. Noerr Motor Freight Inc. v. Pa. P. U. C., 181 Pa. Superior Ct. 322, 331, 124 A. 2d 393; Zurcher v. Pa. P. U. C., 173 Pa. Superior Ct. 343, 348, 98 A. 2d 218. That discretion certainly has not been abused in the determination of this case.\\nAfter reopening the proceeding after the first order of July 26, 1954, the Commission held further hearings but in its final disposition of the case, considered the testimony taken at all hearings from the very inception of the proceeding. The appellants suffered no prejudice from the failure of the Commission to compel the reappearance of the witnesses to repeat their testimony given at prior hearings. Cf. Garner et al. v. Pa. P. U. C., supra, p. 446. And this is especially so because their original testimony was in support of an application for broader rights than ultimately before the Commission under the applicant's final amendment of its petition.\\nThe service of a forwarder has a distinctive character. It does not supplant existing line haul or over-the-road transportation service but is complementary to it. By consolidation methods the forwarder improves the quality of that service in the interest of both consignor and consignee. The forwarder is a specialist who provides an added service to those dependent upon common carriers for the delivery of package freight. His function is to consolidate pieces of package freight into full carload or truckload lots with resulting faster delivery and often in reduction of traffic costs. Items of package freight when handled as separate shipments create problems, according to the testimony, among them: The practical difficulty confronting every individual carrier of assembling a sufficient volume of freight from various shippers to justify carrier service and delivery to a destination area each day; irregularities may occur in the service for this reason. There is also the difficulty of tracing shipments when lost or when delivery has been delayed.\\nThe advantages of a forwarder service in operation, under our Public Utility Law, has been lacking in Pennsylvania, but such service is no stranger to shippers, merchants and others in this State. The forwarder and the service rendered by him has been recognized by Congress and as regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission has become an integral part of the transportation system of the nation and has been used in the interest of consignees of freight in Pennsylvania by carriers in interstate commerce.\\nUpon ample supporting testimony, the Commission has decided that the contemplated forwarder service is proper for the service, accommodation and convenience of the public and in so concluding the Commission is not chargeable with error of law; no constitutional question is involved. The order therefore may not he disturbed.\\nOrder affirmed.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"766915\", \"name\": \"Commonwealth, Appellant, v. Giaccio\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Commonwealth v. Giaccio\", \"decision_date\": \"1963-12-12\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal, No. 123\", \"first_page\": \"294\", \"last_page\": \"317\", \"citations\": \"202 Pa. Super. Ct. 294\", \"volume\": \"202\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:07:21.859071+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Rhodes, P: J., Ervin, Wright, Woodside, Watkins, Montgomery, and Flood, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Commonwealth, Appellant, v. Giaccio.\", \"head_matter\": \"Commonwealth, Appellant, v. Giaccio.\\nArgued September 10, 1963.\\nBefore Rhodes, P: J., Ervin, Wright, Woodside, Watkins, Montgomery, and Flood, JJ.\\nAppeal, No. 123,\\nJohn S. Halsted, Assistant District Attorney, with him Samuel J. Halaren, District Attorney, for appellant.\\\"\\nPeter Near\\u00bb,'with him James' O. N. Paul, for appellee. ' '\\nDecember 12, 1963:\", \"word_count\": \"6805\", \"char_count\": \"40067\", \"text\": \"Opinion by\\nWoodside, J.,\\n. This is. an appeal by the Commonwealth from an order of the Court of Quarter Sessions of Chester Couf\\u00edty vacating \\u00e1 sentence to pay the costs of a criminal prosecution; The sentence' had been imposed upon k defendant after a jury had found him not guilty of the misdemeanor with which he was charged, but had directed him to pay the costs of prosecution.\\nThe defendant was charged with wantonly pointing and discharging a firearm in violation of The Penal Code of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, \\u00a7716, 18 P.S. \\u00a74716.\\nThe legislature has provided for the disposition of costs in misdemeanor cases by providing, inter alia, that \\\". . . in all cases of acquittals by the petit jury on indictments for the offences aforesaid, the jury trying the same shall determine, by their verdict, whether the county, or the prosecutor, or the defendant, shall pay the costs, or whether the same shall be apportioned between the prosecutor and the defendant, and in what proportions; . . .\\\" Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 427, 445, \\u00a762, 19 P.S. \\u00a71222. This was a reenactment of a substantially similar provision contained in the Act of December 7, 1804, 4 Smith's Laws 204, which was a temporary act, \\\"continued and made perpetual\\\" by an act passed March 29, 1809, 5 Smith's Law 48. Thus, the statutory law of this Commonwealth has permitted the imposition of costs upon acquitted defendants for over a century and a half.\\nThe court below found that the above provision of the Act of 1860 permitting the imposition of' costs upon an acquitted defendant was unconstitutional for a variety of reasons. The court in its opinion suggested that the statutory provision is unconstitutionally vague; that it is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power; that it violates the doctrine of fundamental fairness; that it affords no hearing; that it is a denial of the equal protection of the law; that it does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt; that it provides for an unreasonable classification; and that it is an instrument of oppressive cruelty. To our knowledge, no court has ever found a Pennsylvania statute in such flagrant violation of the Constitution! If the statute were so flagrantly unconstitutional, it would indeed be a sad commentary upon the scores of appellate court judges who have examined the provision and the hundreds of trial judges who have applied it without seeing in it any of the infirmities conceived by the court below.\\nThe validity of a statute imposing costs upon an acquitted defendant was before the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 4 S. & R. 127 (1818), where Mr. Justice Gibson prophesied that the provision in the Act of 1804 would \\\"prove highly beneficial\\\" even though it, \\\"at first view, may appear unjust.\\\" One hundred thirteen years later Judge Keller, speaking for this Court said of the provision imposing costs upon acquitted defendants, \\\"However anomalous the course may appear to jurisdictions unfamiliar with our procedure, it is the law of this Commonwealth and it works substantial justice.\\\" Commonwealth v. Cohen, 102 Pa. Superior Ct. 397, 401, 157 A. 32 (1931). Between these two decisions the statutory provision here questioned was examined by the appellate courts, and its use approved many times: Harger v. Commissioners of Washington Co., 12 Pa. 251 (1849); Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 26 Pa. 171 (1856); Commonwealth v. Keenan, 67 Pa. 203, 207, 208 (1871); Linn v. Commonwealth, 96 Pa. 285 (1881). In Commonwealth v. Tremeloni, 93 Pa. Superior Ct. 432 (1927), this Court reversed the court below which had set aside the costs imposed upon a defendant by a jury.\\nIn addition to the above cases which affirmed the imposition of costs upon acquitted defendants, other appellate court cases have recognized the legality of the provision. For examples see, County of Wayne v. Commonwealth, 26 Pa. 154 (1856); Commonwealth v. Kocher, 23 Pa. Superior Ct. 65 (1903); Berks County v. Pile, 18 Pa. 493 (1852). The provision here questioned was examined and applied in scores of lower court cases, including Commonwealth v. King, 33 Pa. D. & C. 2d 235, decided this year.\\nOur Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the provision of the Act of 1860 imposing costs upon an acquitted defendant. In Wright v. Commonwealth, 77 Pa. 470 (1875), the appellant, who had been acquitted of a misdemeanor but sentenced to pay the costs, contended that \\u00a762 of the Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 427, 445, supra, was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court rejected the contention and affirmed the sentence imposing the costs upon the defendant. In the argument before us it was suggested that cases decided prior to the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution and prior to the adoption of our Constitution of 1874 are of little authority in presently considering the constitutionality of the statutory provision here being attacked. The argument is not pertinent for our Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the questioned statutory provision after the adoption of Pennsylvania's present constitution and after the adoption of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution.\\nThe Supreme Court has sustained the validity of the Act of 1804 and the Act of 1860.. When the validity of a statute is attacked and a decision rendered sustaining it, there is a presumption that all existing reasons for declaring the act unconstitutional were considered and deemed insufficient. Keator v. Lacka wanna County, 292 Pa. 269, 272, 141 A. 37 (1928); Dole v. Philadelphia, 337 Pa. 375, 379, 11 A. 2d 163 (1940); Nester Appeal, 187 Pa. Superior Ct. 313, 319, 144 A. 2d 623 (1958).\\nAs the Supreme Court has twice passed upon the constitutionality of the very provision here questioned, the court below and this Court have no standing to overrule that Court's holding. Ordinarily, we would rest our decision on Wright v. Commonwealth, supra, without further comment. However, the appellee has suggested that \\\"no one has heretofore challenged the constitutionality under present day constitutional concepts of Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, \\u00a71222.\\\" Of course, the constitutionality of the provision has been challenged and its validity upheld by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, so we must assume that counsel is asking us to apply to the statute a new test based upon \\\"present day constitutional concepts,\\\" which, he says, \\\"accord a fuller measure of protection to accused persons.\\\" It is not clear to what extent this Court is being asked to ignore existing decisions of our Commonwealth's highest court, but it is clear that counsel is suggesting that the legislature has less power to deal with matters of this nature today than it did when \\\"old\\\" concepts of the constitution existed. But, consider what one of the most distinguished proponents of the \\\"present-day concept\\\" said this year on the question of declaring unconstitutional a state act which made it a misdemeanor to carry on a business theretofore considered to be legal. Mr. Justice Black, in speaking for at least eight members of the Supreme Court of the United States, said that that Court has \\\"returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.\\\" Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730, 83 S. Ct. 1028 (1963). An examination of 7 P.L.E. Consti tutional Law \\u00a717 and cases there cited will demonstrate .how far our own courts have gone in applying this rule.\\nThe defendant in this case has a heavy burden to set aside the verdict of his peers based upon a statute of the legislature. As stated by Mr. Justice Cohen in \\u2022the ease of Realty Corp. v. Philadelphia, 390 Pa. 197, 205, 134 A. 2d 878 (1957), \\\"No act or portion thereof -should be declared unconstitutional unless 'it violates the Constitution clearly, palpably plainly; and in such manner as to leave no doubt or hesitation in our minds.' Kelley v. Baldwin, 319 Pa. 53, 54, 179 A. 736 (1935); Sablosky v. Messner, 372 Pa. 47, 59, 92 A. 2d 411 (1952).\\\" \\\"The burden of proof is upon the one who claims that the statute is unconstitutional.\\\" Commonwealth v. Bristow, 185 Pa. Superior Ct. 448, 458, 138 A. 2d 156 (1958).\\nWe know of no Pennsylvania statute whose validity has been attacked after so many years of constant application. Since the Act of 1804, two new constitutions have been adopted and scores of amendments ;have been made to the present constitution. There have been over a hundred regular sessions of the legislature and a score of special sessions since the Act of 1804 was enacted. Hundreds of judges have examined and passed upon the statutory provision here questioned. As stated by Mr. Justice Agnew, and repeated by the Supreme Court in Booth & Flinn, Ltd. v. Miller, 237 Pa. 297, 306, 85 A. 457 (1912), concerning a some what similar situation, \\\"The continued exercise of the power . . . cannot be accounted for except on the ground that all men, learned and unlearned, believed it to be a legitimate exercise of the legislative power. This belief is further strengthened by the fact that no judicial decision has been made against it.\\\"\\nA construction of the constitution adopted and acted upon by the legislature and acquiesced in by the people for many years is entitled to great weight. Summit Hill Borough, 240 Pa. 396, 399, 87 A. 857 (1913); 7 P.L.E. Constitutional Law \\u00a712. It is true that mere passage of time does not give validity to an unchallenged statute, but the fact that a statute has been in effect for many years, even when unchallenged, is a strong argument in favor of validity. James v. Public Service Commission, 116 Pa. Superior Ct. 577, 177 A. 343 (1935); 7 P.L.E. Constitutional Law \\u00a720. The provision questioned here has not only been in existence since the earliest days of our Commonwealth but it has been twice challenged and its validity sustained.\\nThe questioned provision of the Act of 1860 has been equated in the opinion of the court below and throughout the brief of the appellee with the practice which this Court condemned in Commonwealth v. Franklin, 172 Pa. Superior Ct. 152, 92 A. 2d 272 (1952). Prior to the decision in the Franldin case, which held the practice unconstitutional, certain judges, almost exclusively in Philadelphia, frequently held a defendant in bail to keep the peace after he had been acquitted by a jury. New of the defendants thus held' could raise the bail, and as a result they spent months and often years in jail. From 1939 to 1949, .478 acquitted defendants in Philadelphia served a total of over 600 years in prison, an average of well over a year each. The practice was unknown to most of the areas of the Commonwealth, and generally shocked \\\"up state\\\" judges who encountered it in Philadelphia.\\nThere is no comparison between the statutory provision here questioned and the practice condemned in the Franklin case. Here the General Assembly of Pennsylvania thrice authorized the imposition of costs by a jury upon defendants found not guilty; the practice condemned in the Franklin case was not based upon an act of our legislature, but was a procedure adopted by the courts from an English Statute, 34 Edw. Ill c 1, enacted in 1360. Here a jury composed of the defendant's peers directed the imposition of the costs; the practice condemned in the Franklin case flouted the findings made by a jury of the defendant's peers. Here the purpose and usual effect of the procedure is limited to the recovery of expenses for which the defendant's conduct was at least partially responsible; the practice in the Franklin case and its practical effect was to commit acquitted defendants to jail for long periods of time. Here the appellate courts of this Commonwealth considered and approved the practice in numerous cases; the Franklin case was the first, at least since the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution, to examine the constitutionality of a practice which had never been specifically sanctioned by our legislature.\\nCounsel for the appellee with light regard for the legislature and the courts suggests that the words \\\"or the defendant\\\" were inserted in the Act of 1804 \\\"either by mistake or without clear recognition of their ramifications\\\"; that in 1860 the legislature inserted the provision \\\"without consideration of its merits\\\"; that Mr. Justice Gibson was not familiar with the common law of Pennsylvania on imposition of costs when he ivrote about it in 1818, that he misled subsequent' judges and textbook writers, and that the imposition of costs upon acquitted defendants was unknown ex-, cept in Pennsylvania. As we view this case, the common law relating to costs prior to 1804 is no longer important. If other states have different ideas on the disposition of costs in misdemeanor cases, that is an argument to be addressed to the legislature and not the courts. The argument that the legislatures of 1804, 1809 and 1860 did not know what they were doing de^ serves no reply.\\nWe cannot follow the defendant's argument that the questioned statutory provision constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power. It is obvious that in authorizing the disposition of costs, the legislature has not delegated the power to the jury to make a law, but only the power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes its action depend. This it may do. Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491, 498 (1873); Nester Appeal, supra, 187 Pa. Superior Ct. 313, 316, 144 A. 2d 623 (1958). It is not an exercise of a legislative power by the judiciary for it, through a jury, to dispose of the costs in accordance with a statutory provision, but it would be an unconstitutional assumption of a legislative power by the judiciary were the courts to ignore the statute and dispose of costs contrary to its provisions.\\nThe defendant contends that it is an unconstitutional classification to separate the crimes into summary convictions, misdemeanors and felonies for the purpose of determining in which cases the costs may be placed upon defendants and in which cases they may not be placed upon them. The separation of crimes into these classes and the application of different rules to the different classes has been so uniformly recognized and so firmly established in our law that the validity of legislation dealing with these classes separately need no longer be examined. Although the classification of particular crimes by the legislature may not always appear consistent, the separation of crimes into these classes and the application of different rules to each class is a matter for the legislature and its exercise of that power in separating crimes for the payment of costs is not a violation of the constitution. A classification may be discriminatory and not unconstitutional if any state of facts can be conceived that would sustain it. Jones & Laughlin Tax Assessment Case, 405 Pa. 421, 436, 175 A. 2d 856 (1961).\\nContrary to the defendant's contention, the statutory provision here questioned meets the requirements of the due process clause of Art. 1, \\u00a79 of the Constitution of this Commonwealth and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The defendant in a criminal case is presumed, as all of us are, to know the law. Thus, when brought to trial on an indictment charging a misdemeanor, the defendant has notice that the jury may impose the costs of prosecution upon him even if he is acquitted. He has an opportunity to be heard on the question of costs. The decision of the jury is based upon evidence heard by it. The defendant has a right to question the charge of the court on the question of costs. He has the right to subsequently challenge the amount of the costs taxed, and to challenge any arbitrary verdict by the jury in imposing the costs upon him.\\nThe defendant assumes that the imposition of costs under the Act of 1860, supra, is the infliction of punishment upon a person for undefined conduct. The imposition of costs on either the prosecutor or defendant is not punishment for the commission of a crime. Imposition of costs does not form a part of the penalty of even guilty defendants. Commonwealth v. Soudani, 193 Pa. Superior Ct. 353, 356, 165 A. 2d 709 (1960); Commonwealth v. Cauffiel, 97 Pa. Superior Ct. 202, 205 (1929); Commonwealth v. Moore, 172 Pa. Superior Ct. 27, 29, 92 A. 2d 238 (1952). It is true that \\u00e1'person sentenced to pay the costs in a criminal case may be committed to prison for refusing to pay them. But if he is unable to pay the costs, he may be exonerated from paying them by proceeding under the insolvency act. This procedure is available to him not only after he has been committed to prison for failure to pay the costs, but also before he is committed. Thus, an acquitted defendant upon whom costs have been imposed may be discharged from paying them without having to undergo any actual imprisonment. Kishbaugh's Petition, 135 Pa. 468, 19 A. 1063 (1890); In re: Collection of Fines, Costs, etc., 76 Pa. D. & C. 456, 469, 471 (1950).\\nThe costs of a case do not always fall upon the unsuccessful party. There are situations in divorce cases, support cases, equity cases and orphans' court cases where costs, in whole or in part, may be imposed upon the party successful in the action.\\nThere are many crimes made punishable by the legislature which have never been defined by it. The legislature looks to the common law, i.e., court decisions, to define many serious offenses for which it provides punishment. The Act of 1860, supra, is as- specific as any statute can be concerning the right of the jury to dispose of costs in a misdemeanor case, the manner in which the jury may divide the costs and the parties upon whom it may impose the costs. Of course, costs of a trial cannot be imposed upon a defendant for conduct not related to the prosecution, nor for conduct concerning which there is no relevant evidence before the jury. The imposition of costs other than upon the county must be based upon conduct by either the prosecutor or the defendant or both which is related to the case. It is not necessary, indeed it would be impossible, for the legislature to detail all the cir-. cumstances and conditions under which the jury should or should not impose the costs upon the parties. The legislature need not set forth with the same particularity the circumstances under which- a jury, under the control of the court, may exercise the power given to it, as it must set forth the area within which a govern: mental board or commission must act. Nester Appeal, supra, 187 Pa. Superior Ct. 313, 320, 144 A. 2d 623 (1958).\\nThe statute itself does not produce unconstitutional unfairness. Should the verdict in a particular case be arbitrary or should there be a gross abuse of discretion in the imposition of the costs upon either the prosecutor or the defendant, the court has the power to relieve the party from such arbitrary or unjust verdict. Commonwealth v. Cohen, supra, 102 Pa. Superior Ct.. 397, 401, 157 A. 32 (1931); Dunn Appeal, 191 Pa. Superior Ct. 346, 349, 156 A. 2d 349 (1959). The public is frequently put to the cost of trying a defendant'because of reprehensible conduct by him. When the jury is warranted by the evidence and authorized by the legislature to collect these costs from .such defendants there is no reason why the will of the legislature and the jury should be set aside when it is not arbitrary or unwarranted under the evidence.\\nThose who think it is inconsistent and basically unfair to place the costs upon acquitted defendants insist upon cataloguing all conduct as either wholly right or wholly wrong. But most human conduct does not fit into these absolutes. Any effort to show life in black and white, without gray, fails to accurately portray the truth. Judges, jurors, and legislators for over a century and a half have recognized the \\\"substantial justice\\\" of this provision for the simple reason that in practice it produces results that are fair and just.\\nThere are endless situations in which the jury might find that the defendant's improper conduct was responsible for the prosecution even though he was not guilty of the crime charged. It is not unjust for a jury to impose costs upon a defendant where the defendant may have clearly committed the offense charged but was able to raise a reasonable doubt that the offense was brought within the statute of limitations; or where the prosecutor and the defendant involved in a fist fight were guilty of conduct not reprehensible enough for a criminal conviction but sufficiently reprehensible to deserve an equal distribution of costs; or where the defendant in a \\\"drunken driving\\\" case drank and then drove while in that twilight zone that exists at some stage of the drinking; or where defendants charged with adultery registered at a hotel as husband and wife but convinced the jury that they had not actually committed adultery. As stated in Commonwealth v. Franklin, supra, 172 Pa. Superior Ct. 152, 193, 92 A. 2d 272 (1952) : \\\"A most important portion of the administration of our system of criminal justice is the fact that the jury in subtle ways may temper the rigidity of our criminal code in the application of the letter of the law to particular cases and may perhaps thereby mitigate the rigors of the law.\\\"\\nIf the test of constitutionality is to be based solely upon a concern for the accused, that concern may not be well placed, for there are undoubtedly many cases where a verdict of \\\"not guilty but pay the costs,\\\" would have been a verdict of guilty had there been no compromise position for the jury to take. See discussion by Judge Burton R. Laub of Erie County in his Pennsylvania Trial Guide, \\u00a7171.\\nThe defendant in this case was charged with violation of The Penal Code of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, \\u00a7716, 18 P.S. \\u00a74716, supra, which provides that \\\"Whoever playfully or wantonly points or discharges a gun, pistol or other firearm at any other person, is guilty of a misdemeanor . . .\\\" Prom the part of the record before us, it appears that a woman, her child and her dog were visiting next door to the defendant. The dog started toward the defendant's property, the child followed it, and the mother pursued both of them to keep them from the defendant's property. The defendant presumably seeing the child coming toward his property rushed from his home with a pistol and fired it in the direction of the people, all of whom remained on the neighbor's property. Whether or not this conduct constitutes a violation of \\u00a7716 is not before us. The jury acquitted the defendant apparently believing that the defendant had fired a blank from a starting revolver which was not aimed directly at the people in the neighbor's yard. The people in whose direction the defendant fired had no way of telling whether he was shooting- blanks or just failing in an attempt- to hit them. The conduct of the defendant was improper and such as to warrant bringing the prosecution. He was fortunate to have been acquitted, but substantial justice was done to all concerned by the imposition of the-costs upon him.\\nThe statutory provision here attacked has thrice been enacted by the legislature; it has twice been held constitutional by tbe Supreme Court; it has been examined, tested, construed and applied for a century and a half; it is believed by many able trial and appellate court judges to do substantial justice; it constitutes a practical and realistic answer to the problem of costs. We can find no reason that would justify our holding it unconstitutional.\\nOrder reversed, sentence reinstated.\\nFew students of Pennsylvania courts would fail to include Chief Justice Gibson and President Judge Keller among the greatest half dozen appellate court judges of this Commonwealth.\\nThe opinion in this ease was written by President Judge J. Prank Graff, one of the most revered trial judges of this Commonwealth with over 39 years judicial experience, specially presiding in Allegheny County and sitting with two other able and experienced trial judges, Judges Samuel Weiss and Lloyd Weaver. The defendant's brief on the question of costs filed in that case appears to be identical with the defendant's brief filed with us.\\nNo reference to this case is made in the opinion of the court below or in the briefs of the parties.\\nThe appellee argues that we should declare the questioned provision unconstitutional because the constitutions of a few other 'states prohibit the practice. If the statute were unconstitutional in the manner appellee suggests these states would not need a specific constitutional prohibition. The fact that our constitution, twice rewritten and frequently amended, does not prohibit the imposition of costs is a strong argument that the people of this Commonwealth have joined with their legislature and their courts in approving the practice.\\nHe ignores that the identical provision was examined by the legislature of 1809 which decided that it should be continued and made perpetual.\\nIn 1949 a legislative Committee on Penal Laws and Criminal Procedure of the Joint State Government Commission, after care-, ful consideration of the then existing laws governing procedures in criminal matters, retained the provision here under review in its proposed reeodification. See Senate Bill 988, 1949 Session, \\u00a71601. Serving on that committee as legislators were five present members of tbe judiciary: Judges Lord, Brown, Rahatjser, Readinger, and Woodring.\\nOn tbe early law of this Commonwealth on this point see Commonwealth v. Tilghman, supra, 4 S. & R. 127 (1818) ; Berks County v. Pile, supra, 18 Pa. 493, 496 (1852); Long v. Lancaster County, 16 Pa. Superior Ct. 413, 417 (1901); Commonwealth v. Kocher, supra, 23 Pa. Superior Ct. 65, 67, 68 (1903); Kessler on Criminal Procedure in Pennsylvania, Vol. 1, page 235, and cases there cited. On whether this provision has been unique to Pennsylvania see: State v. Butcher, 1 Del. Cases 334 (1793); State v. Miller, 1 Del. Cases 512 (1814); Delaware Constitution of 1792, Art. VIII, \\u00a78; Keith v. State, 27 Ga. 483 (1859); State v. Hargate, 1 N.C. 284 (1800).\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"778071\", \"name\": \"Commonwealth v. Young, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Commonwealth v. Young\", \"decision_date\": \"1967-05-15\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal, No. 86\", \"first_page\": \"773\", \"last_page\": \"774\", \"citations\": \"209 Pa. Super. 773\", \"volume\": \"209\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:36:14.631870+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Commonwealth v. Young, Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"Commonwealth v. Young, Appellant.\\nSubmitted March 20, 1967.\\nRichard Cecil Young, appellant, in propria persona; Yram Nedurian, Jr. and Ralph B. D\\u2019lorio, Assistant District Attorneys, John R. Graham, First Assistant District Attorney, and Paul R. Sand, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"43\", \"char_count\": \"315\", \"text\": \"Order affirmed.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"7870449\", \"name\": \"BRITAMCO UNDERWRITERS, INC., Appellant, v. Edward R. GRZESKIEWICZ and Joan Grzeskiewicz, h/w, t/a Dagwood's Pub and Donna Lee Smith\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. Grzeskiewicz\", \"decision_date\": \"1994-04-07\", \"docket_number\": \"\", \"first_page\": \"1208\", \"last_page\": \"1212\", \"citations\": \"639 A.2d 1208\", \"volume\": \"639\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T02:28:55.547831+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before CIRILLO, BECK and HOFFMAN, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"BRITAMCO UNDERWRITERS, INC., Appellant, v. Edward R. GRZESKIEWICZ and Joan Grzeskiewicz, h/w, t/a Dagwood\\u2019s Pub and Donna Lee Smith.\", \"head_matter\": \"BRITAMCO UNDERWRITERS, INC., Appellant, v. Edward R. GRZESKIEWICZ and Joan Grzeskiewicz, h/w, t/a Dagwood\\u2019s Pub and Donna Lee Smith.\\nSuperior Court of Pennsylvania.\\nArgued Jan. 11, 1994.\\nFiled April 7, 1994.\\nR. Bruce Morrison, Philadelphia, for appellant.\\nPhilip L. Blackman, Philadelphia, for Grzeskiewicz, appellees.\\nBefore CIRILLO, BECK and HOFFMAN, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"2472\", \"char_count\": \"15534\", \"text\": \"CIRILLO, Judge:\\nThis is an appeal from the order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County denying appellant Britamco Underwriters, Inc.'s (Britamco) petition for reconsideration of the order denying summary judgment, and denying Britamco's petition to certify the order to permit appeal. We reverse.\\nDonna Lee Smith (Smith) filed suit against Edward F. Grzeskiewicz and Joan Grzesk-iewicz h/w individually & t/a Dagwood's Pub (collectively as Dagwood's Pub) and William Hopania alleging that William Hopania, a patron of Dagwood's Pub, violently attacked Smith with a broken beer bottle, striking her in the face. Smith's complaint also asserted that her injuries were caused by Dagwood's Pub's carelessness, recklessness, negligence and/or gross and wanton disregard, through its agents, servants, or employees.\\nDagwood's Pub sought coverage for Smith's claims under its Multi-Peril policy with Britamco. In response, Britameo's claim representative sent to Dagwood's Pub a reservation of rights letter in which Bri-tamco denied and disclaimed coverage due to policy exclusions for claims arising from incidents of assault and battery and for liquor liability/dram shop claims. Thereafter, Bri-tamco filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Dagwood's Pub in connection with Smith's claims. After Smith and Dagwood's Pub filed their answers, Bri-tamco filed a motion for summary judgment on three grounds: (1) the incident in question was not an \\\"occurrence\\\" under the language of the policy; (2) the claims were excluded from coverage under the language of the assault and battery endorsement to the policy; and (3) the dram shop claim was excluded from coverage under the language of the liquor liability exclusion of the policy. The Honorable John W. Herron denied Bri-tamco's motion for summary judgment. Bri-tamco's petitions for reconsideration and, in the alternative, for certification of this matter for review were denied. This court granted Britamco's petition for review. See Pa. R.A.P. 1311; 42 Pa.C.S.A \\u00a7 702(b). Britam-co presents three issues for our review:\\n(1) Whether the trial court erred in denying Britamco's motion for summary judgment holding that factual questions exist as to whether the alleged negligence of defendants (Dagwood's Pub) constitutes an \\\"occurrence\\\" under the insurance policy?\\n(2) Whether the trial court erred in failing to set forth any reason why it denied Bri-tamco's motion for summary judgment where the underlying claim is excluded by the assault and battery exclusion of the policy?\\n(3) Whether the trial court erred in failing to set forth any reason why it denied Bri-tamco's motion for summary judgment where the underlying liquor liability claim is excluded by the liquor liability exclusion of the policy?\\nWhen we review the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment made under Pa.R.C.P. 1035, our scope of review is well settled: summary judgment is properly granted where \\\"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\\\" Pa.R.C.P. 1035(b). Summary judgment may be granted only where the right is clear and free from doubt. Musser v. Vilsmeier Auction Co., Inc., 522 Pa. 367, 369, 562 A.2d 279, 280 (1989). The moving party has the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co., 488 Pa. 198, 412 A.2d 466 (1979). The record and any inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and any doubt must be resolved against the mov ing party. Davis v. Pennzoil, 438 Pa. 194, 264 A.2d 597 (1970). The trial court will be overturned on the entry or denial of summary judgment only if there has been an error of law or a clear abuse of discretion. Hetrick v. Apollo Gas Co., 415 Pa.Super. 189, 608 A.2d 1074 (1992).\\nThe duty to defend is a distinct obligation, separate and apart from the insurer's duty to provide coverage. Erie Ins. Exchange v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 516 Pa. 574, 582, 533 A.2d 1363, 1368 (1987). Moreover, the insurer agrees to defend the insured against any suit arising under the policy \\\"even if such suit is groundless, false, or fraudulent.\\\" Gedeon v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 410 Pa. 55, 56, 188 A.2d 320, 321 (1963). Since the insurer agrees to relieve the insured of the burden of defending even those suits which have no basis in fact, the obligation to defend arises whenever the complaint filed by the injured party may potentially come within the coverage of the policy. Id.; see also Wilson v. Maryland Cos. Co., 377 Pa. 588, 105 A.2d 304 (1954); Biborosch v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 412 Pa.Super. 505, 603 A.2d 1050 (1992); Youngman v. CNA Ins. Co., 401 Pa.Super. 381, 585 A.2d 511 (1991). In order to determine whether a claim may potentially come within the coverage of the policy, we must first ascertain the scope of the insurance coverage and then analyze the allegations in the complaint. Biborosch, 412 Pa.Super. at 509, 603 A.2d at 1052 (citing Cadwallader v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 396 Pa. 582, 152 A.2d 484 (1959)).\\nThe standards to be applied in reviewing insurance contracts are well settled. The proper focus regarding issues of coverage under insurance contracts is the reasonable expectation of the insured. Dibble v. Security of America Life Ins. Co., 404 Pa.Super. 205, 210, 590 A.2d 352, 354 (1991). In determining the reasonable expectations of the insured, courts must examine the totality of the insurance transaction involved. Id. However, while reasonable expectations of the insured are the focal points in interpreting the contract language of insurance policies, see Collister v. Nationwide Life Insurance Co., 479 Pa. 579, 388 A.2d 1346 (1978) and Winters v. Erie Insurance Group, 367 Pa.Super. 253, 532 A.2d 885 (1987), an insured may not complain that his or her reasonable expectations were frustrated by policy limitations which are clear and unambiguous. Bateman v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 527 Pa. 241, 245, 590 A.2d 281, 283 (1991); see also Neil v. Allstate Insurance Co., 379 Pa.Super. 299, 549 A.2d 1304 (1988); St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Corbett, 428 Pa.Super. 54, 630 A.2d 28 (1993) (en banc). Where a provision of an insurance policy is ambiguous, the provision is construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer. Bateman, 527 Pa. at 245, 590 A.2d at 283.'\\nFirst, Britamco contends that the trial court erred in finding that factual questions exist as to whether the alleged negligence of Dagwood's Pub constitutes an \\\"occurrence\\\" under the policy. We agree.\\nThe policy provides:\\n\\\"occurrence\\\" means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured,\\n(emphasis added). In support of its position, Britamco relies on Gene's Restaurant, Inc. v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 519 Pa. 306, 548 A.2d 246 (1988). There, Nationwide issued Gene's Restaurant a comprehensive general liability insurance policy which defined \\\"occurrence\\\" in the same manner as does the policy in this case. After reviewing the policy and the underlying complaint, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held:\\nUnder this definition an 'occurrence' is an accident. The willful and malicious assault alleged in the complaint is not an accident but rather is an intentional tort. As such, it is not covered by the policy and, therefore, the insurer owed no duty to defend.\\nId. at 309, 548 A.2d at 247.\\nHere, Count II of Smith's complaint sets forth Smith's claims against Hopania. Smith avers that \\\"the injuries and damages she sustained . occurred as [a result of] the intentional, willful and purposeful acts of William Hopania.\\\" Smith does not allege that the incident in question amounted to an \\\"accident,\\\" nor does she claim that her injuries were incurred as a result of any negligence by Hopania. In light of these allegations and the Supreme Court's decision in Gene's Restaurant, supra, we find that Smith's claims against Dagwood's Pub, arising out of Hopa-nia's assault, do not constitute an \\\"occurrence\\\" as defined by the instant policy.\\nThis case is distinguishable from our recent decision in Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. Weiner, \\u2014 Pa.Super.-, 636 A.2d 649 (1993). In Weiner, a patron of a bar (plaintiff) sued the bar, the owners of the bar, and an employee for neck injuries that the plaintiff sustained as a result of an altercation at the bar one evening. The bar sought coverage for the plaintiffs claims under its general liability policy with Britamco. As in this ease, Britamco filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the bar in connection with the plaintiffs claims. After examining the underlying complaint and the insurance policy in Weiner, however, this court found that Britamco owed the bar a duty to defend. Id.\\nIn contrast to this case, the plaintiff in Weiner did not set forth a separate count against the individual(s) who allegedly struck him in the neck. In fact, the underlying complaint in Weiner alleged that he was struck by one of the owners of the bar and/or by one of the bar's employees. In addition, the plaintiff there did not allege that he received his injuries solely as the result of the intentional acts of one or more of the defendants. Specifically, paragraph 23 of the Weiner complaint averred that the \\\"defendants (including the bar, the owners of the bar, and an employee) intentionally, recklessly and/or negligently performed the aforementioned acts.... \\\" We held, therefore, that because the plaintiffs claims may potentially come within the coverage of the Bri-tamco policy, Britamco owed the bar a duty to defend. Id.; Gedeon, supra. Such is not the ease here.\\nNotwithstanding the above, the assault and battery endorsement to the policy clearly excludes coverage in this case:\\nAssault & Battery Endorsement\\n[T]he Company [Britamco] is under no duty to defend or to indemnify an insured in any action . alleging such damages:\\n1. Assault;\\n2. Battery;\\n3. Harmful or offensive contact between two or more persons .\\nRegardless of degree of culpability or intent and without regard to:\\nC. The alleged failure of the insured or his officers, employees, agents or servants to attempt to prevent, bar or halt any such conduct.\\n(emphasis added).\\nIn paragraph eight (8) of her complaint, Smith alleges various claims of negligence and/or recklessness against Dagwood's Pub through its agents, servants, or employees. Some of these averments can be paraphrased as follows:\\n(a) permitting Hopania to remain on the premises when it (Dagwood's Pub) knew or should have known of his dangerous propensities (boisterous, threatening gestures, etc.);\\n(b) failing to take reasonable measures to prevent Hopania from becoming boisterous, loud, etc., when they knew or should have known .;\\n(c) failing to warn Smith of the above-mentioned hazards and/or dangers;\\n(d) failing to use due care under the circumstances;\\n(e) failing to exercise the highest degree of care as required by an innkeeper;\\n(f) failing to protect Smith from the negligence or intentional acts of Hopania when such propensities were known or should have been known;\\n(g) failing to instruct employees concerning their duties to protect patrons....\\nThese allegations are clearly excluded by the above-quoted assault and battery endorsement to the policy.\\nDagwood's Pub contends that the assault and battery exclusion in the policy does not conform to its agreement with Britamco that the policy would cover injury to third parties caused by Dagwood's Pub's negligence or the negligence of its employees. Dagwood's Pub points to its signed application for insurance where it agreed to an assault and battery exclusion, which provides as follows:\\nThe policy will contain the following specific insuring agreements:\\n* Assault & Battery Exclusion \\u2014 excludes claims arising out of Assault & Battery for any cause including negligence in hiring, retention and control of employees....\\n(emphasis added). Dagwood's Pub argues that the final assault and battery exclusion contained in the policy is much broader than the exclusion that it agreed to in the application for insurance. Nonetheless, we find that the exclusion contained in the application unambiguously precludes recovery under the instant set of facts. Bateman, supra. Again, Smith's underlying complaint against Dagwood's Pub and Hopania claims that her injuries were solely the result of Hopania's \\\"intentional, willful and purposeful acts.\\\" Her claims, therefore, are expressly barred as they \\\"ar[ose] out of [an] Assault [and] Battery.\\\"\\nFinally, Britamco contends that the liquor liability exclusion of the policy precludes recovery as to Smith's dram shop claim against Dagwood's Pub. We agree.\\nParagraph 8(c) of Smith's complaint avers that Dagwood's Pub violated \\\"various provisions of the Pennsylvania Liquor Code.\\\" However, the instant insurance policy contains a liquor liability exclusion, which reads in part:\\nLIQUOR LIABILITY EXCLUSION\\nIt is agreed that this policy shall not apply to Bodily injury or Property Damage for which the Insured or his indemnitee may be held liable.\\n1. as a person or organization engaged in the business of manufacturing, selling or serving alcoholic beverages, by reason of selling, serving or giving any alcohol[ie] beverage[;]\\n(a) in violation of any statute, ordinance, or regulation....\\n(underlining added). We find that this provision clearly and unambiguously excludes coverage for Smith's general claim under the liquor code (dram shop claim). Bateman, supra. See Curbee, Ltd. v. Rhubart, 406 Pa.Super. 505, 594 A.2d 733 (1991); United States Fidelity and Guar. v. Griggs, 341 Pa.Super. 286, 491 A.2d 267 (1985).\\nOrder denying summary judgment is reversed. Jurisdiction is relinquished.\\nBECK, J., files a concurring statement.\\n. Also couched in Britamco's first question presented is a challenge to the trial court's denial of its request for certification for review to this court. We find this issue mooted by this court's order granting Britamco's petition for review.\\n. Dagwood's Pub argues that Britamco is precluded from raising this issue because Britamco failed to raise it in its complaint for declaratory judgment. We disagree. This issue is properly before this court because Britamco raised it in the trial court in its motion for summary judgment. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) and Princeton Sportswear Corp. v. H & M Associates, 510 Pa. 189, 507 A.2d 339 (1986).\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"811081\", \"name\": \"Commonwealth v. Hall, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Commonwealth v. Hall\", \"decision_date\": \"1973-11-08\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeals, Nos. 1084, 1085 and 1367\", \"first_page\": \"718\", \"last_page\": \"718\", \"citations\": \"228 Pa. Super. 718\", \"volume\": \"228\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:37:21.497331+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Commonwealth v. Hall, Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"Commonwealth v. Hall, Appellant.\\nArgued June 14, 1973.\\nLawrence Prattis, for appellant; James Shellenberger, Assistant District Attorney, with him Milton M. Stein, Assistant-District Attorney, Richard A. Sprague, First Assistant District Attorney, and Arlen Specter, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"43\", \"char_count\": \"345\", \"text\": \"Judgment of sentence affirmed.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"828447\", \"name\": \"COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Raymond JONES, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Commonwealth v. Jones\", \"decision_date\": \"1976-12-15\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 928\", \"first_page\": \"346\", \"last_page\": \"368\", \"citations\": \"246 Pa. Super. 346\", \"volume\": \"246\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:28:12.733448+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before WATKINS, President Judge, and JACOBS, HOFFMAN, CERCONE, PRICE, VAN der VOORT and SPAETH, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Raymond JONES, Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"371 A.2d 874\\nCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Raymond JONES, Appellant.\\nSuperior Court of Pennsylvania.\\nSubmitted June 16, 1975.\\nDecided Dec. 15, 1976.\\nJohn W. Packel, Assistant Public Defender, Philadelphia, for appellant.\\nSteven H. Goldblatt, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for appellee.\\nBefore WATKINS, President Judge, and JACOBS, HOFFMAN, CERCONE, PRICE, VAN der VOORT and SPAETH, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"6812\", \"char_count\": \"41402\", \"text\": \"CERCONE, Judge:\\nThe instant appeal is from the denial of appellant's request for a. new trial pursuant to a PCHA petition filed in the court below. The principal issue on appeal is whether a conviction is valid if it is obtained in part by use of a prior conviction which is invalidated after it has been so used. We agree with the court below that, on the facts of this case, appellant's request for a new trial was properly denied.\\nIn November, 1969 appellant was arrested and charged with rape, robbery and carrying a concealed deadly weapon. After a jury trial in May of 1970, appellant was found guilty of all charges. He was subsequently sentenced to concurrent terms of five to ten years on the rape and robbery convictions, and sentence was suspended on the weapons offense. Suffice it to say that the outcome of the trial rested squarely on the credibility of the victims versus the credibility of appellant. Without a doubt, a damaging blow to appellant's defense occurred when he testified in his own behalf and, from cross-examination by the Commonwealth, the jury learned that appellant had been convicted of rape in 1961 and assault and battery in 1965. Although this revelation was objected to at trial, raised in post-trial motions, and argued on appeal to this court as a violation of due process, we affirmed the judgments of sentence per curiam, and the Supreme Court denied allocatur. Commonwealth v. Jones, 219 Pa.Super. 723, 280 A.2d 446 (1971), No. 242 Allocatur Docket Nos. 1414-16, October Term, 1970. There began a series of unsuccessful efforts to collaterally attack the conviction in both the courts of this Commonwealth and the federal courts.\\nOn July 30, 1973, appellant filed a Post Conviction Hearing Act petition alleging that his waiver of his right to appeal from the 1961 rape conviction was not knowing and intelligent. The hearing court agreed on the basis of Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L. Ed.2d 811 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956); and Commonwealth v. Wilson, 430 Pa. 1, 241 A.2d 760 (1968), and granted ap pellant the right to file post-trial motions nunc pro tunc. It was then discovered that the stenographic notes of testimony of the 1961 trial had not been preserved, so the court ordered a new trial. Because of the staleness of the case, the Commonwealth nol prossed it on April 16, 1974.\\nAppellant's now long-running show returned to a familiar theater, the PCHA court, but this time it had a new script. Appellant argued that, because an unconstitutional conviction had been used to impeach his credibility at his 1970 rape and robbery trial, Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 92 S.Ct. 1014, 31 L.Ed.2d 374 (1972) and United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed. 2d 592 (1972) compelled that he be granted a new trial on those rape and robbery offenses for which he was convicted. The hearing court found appellant's argument sufficiently persuasive to reduce his sentence, since the 1961 rape conviction had been used to enhance punishment, but disagreed that the use of the conviction for impeachment was unconstitutional so as to require a new trial. We will affirm that decision.\\nTucker and Loper were cases which involved the use of convictions invalid under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) at subsequent trials, although the Gideon errors were not raised until the judgments on the subsequent convictions had become final. Relying on Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S. Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1968), the Court stated in Lo- per: \\\"Unless Burgett is to be forsaken, the conclusion is inescapable that the use of convictions constitutionally invalid under Gideon v. Wainwright to impeach a defendant's credibility deprives him of due process of law.\\\" 405 U.S. at 483, 92 S.Ct. at 1019. The result, of course, was fully retroactive application of Gideon even for the purposes of collateral attack.\\nHowever, to apply the doctrine of Loper, Tucker and Burgett to the case at bar is to expand that doctrine beyond all reasonable limits. First, the rationale proposed by appellant and accepted by the dissent would grant a new trial in any case where a conviction used to impeach appellant's credibility is subsequently invalidated for any reason which arguably bears upon the integrity of the fact-finding process involved in that conviction. Even if we were to accept only that point of view, our decision would be manifestly impractical and portend havoc in the administration of criminal justice, especially in the context of the Post Conviction Hearing Act. However, appellant and the dissent compound their error by arguing that convictions invalidated as a consequence of Griffin v. Illinois and Douglas v. California are convictions which fall within that class. This aspect of appellant's argument is palpably erroneous, both logically and constitutionally.\\nDouglas and Griffin have been misconstrued in the dissenting opinion. Simply put, Douglas and Griffin are not decisions involving violations of an individual's \\\"appellate rights\\\" in any sense other than incidentally; Douglas and Griffin are equal protection cases where the privilege, in a constitutional sense, to have an attorney on appeal or to have available a transcript of a trial record is denied to an individual because of his poverty. Discrimination on the basis of wealth is the essence of those decisions, not due process of law (i. e., appellate rights). Of course, if one casts those cases in terms of due process, the argument that a prior conviction cannot be presumed valid when there is no transcript of trial is far more persuasive. However, that is not the principle upon which Douglas and Griffin rest.\\nIn Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 L. Ed.2d 341 (1974), not cited in the dissenting opinion, the Supreme Court confronted the question of whether Douglas and Griffin were decisions resting on due process or equal protection. In concluding that the foundation for those decisions was the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the court stated:\\n\\\"The defendant needs an attorney on appeal not as a shield to protect him against being 'haled into court' by the State and stripped of his presumption of innocence, but rather as a sword to upset the prior determination of guilt. This difference is significant for, while no one would agree that the State may simply dispense with the trial stage of proceedings without a criminal defendant's consent, it is clear that the State need not provide any appeal at all. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 14 S.Ct. 913, 38 L.Ed. 867 (1894). . Unfairness results only if indigents are singled out by the State and denied meaningful access to the appellate system because of their poverty. That question is more profitably considered under an equal protection analysis.\\\" Id. at 610-11, 194 S.Ct. at 2444. See also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. at 18, 76 S.Ct. 585.\\nIt is obvious, therefore, that Douglas and Griffin do not hold that the lack of an appeal unconstitutionally taints the reliability of a conviction. On the contrary, as Ross v. Moffitt reiterates, a criminal conviction from which a state allows no appeal is presumptively valid under the constitution; but, where an appeal is provided by a state, the question of the right to an attorney and to a transcript of the trial record is one of equal protection under the law and not one of due process.\\nPredictably I think, most of the federal courts which have come to grips with the problem presented in the instant cause have refused to be as expansive as the dissent today proposes. In United States v. Penta, 475 F.2d 92 (1st Cir. 1973) the court expressly stated that it would limit Loper to Gideon situations and refused to apply the Loper rationale in situations where convictions used to impeach were subsequently invalidated because of an illegal search and seizure. But see Beto v. Stacks, 408 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1969). In United States v. Graves, 394 F.Supp. 429 (W.D.Pa.1975), the court again limited Loper to its facts and rejected applying a similar rationale to convictions unconstitutional under Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966) (constitutional rights of juvenile offenders in cases to be certified to criminal court). And, in United States v. White, 463 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1972), the court refused to apply Burgett to convictions which occurred under a criminal statute subsequently determined to be unconstitutional. In our estimation, both practically and logically, these are the better reasoned decisions.\\nThus, we have concluded that there is no basis constitutionally to determine that the reliability of a criminal conviction is suspect simply because an appellate court has not affirmed it on the merits. That being the case, the applications of the principle of Loper v. Beto to convictions invalidated as a consequence of Douglas and Griffin would be wholly inappropriate even under the broadest reading of Loper's holding. Furthermore, as noted above, given the extraordinary burden that such a decision would put on the criminal justice system, the result approved by the dissent would be highly impractical.\\nOrder of the lower court is affirmed.\\nPRICE, J., files a concurring opinion.\\nHOFFMAN, J., files a dissenting opinion in which SPAETH, J., joins.\\n. The propriety of this aspect of the hearing court's decision has not been challenged.\\n. The essence of the Court's rationale in Burgett v. Texas is capsulized in Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. at 481, 92 S.Ct. at 1018 as follows:\\n\\\" 'To permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright to be used against a person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense . is to erode the principle of that case. Worse yet, since the defect in the prior conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the accused in effect suffers anew from the deprivation of that . . right' 389 U.S. at 115, 88 S.Ct. at 262, 19 L.Ed. at 324.\\\"\\n. It should be noted that under its rationale the dissent suggests not only that a new trial is required when the conviction used to impeach is invalidated subsequent to the conviction appealed, but by the very posture of the instant case the dissent also suggests that convictions which became final prior to Loper are equally susceptible to attack. Consequently, any person who testified at his trial and was impeached by prior convictions would have new grounds and renewed motivation for attacking impeaching convictions long since thought final. In other words, the dissent would make its \\\"penumbral\\\" Loper rationale fully retroactive. If one may further extrapolate from the dissent's rationale that convictions invalid under the Loper-type rationale similarly cannot be used to impeach, combined with the fact that the impeaching conviction may be overturned after the trial of the case appealed, the array of dominoes would be complete. Should any of those convictions fall, then all the convictions which follow would fall also. Indeed, it might be that an appellant need not have testified at his trial in order to attack it under such a Loper-type rationale. For example, suppose the instant appellant's argument were that he did not testify at his rape trial because of the existence of another rape conviction which would have been used to impeach him, but which has since been invalidated? This question was raised, but not decided, in United States v. Cole, 463 F. 2d 163, 170 (2d Cir. 1972).\\n. Instead, the dissent prefers citing decisions which made Douglas and Griffin retroactive, and asserts that retroactivity is \\\"a result indicating the Court's view that the denial of the right to appeal creates the possibility of an unreliable verdict.\\\" [Emphasis added.]\\n. Although United States v. Martinez, 413 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1969) is sometimes cited as supporting Beto v. Stacks, its procedural posture was completely different. Therein the question was whether, at sentencing, a convicted defendant could challenge the constitutional validity of prior convictions which the government sought to introduce to enhance punishment under a recidivist statute. The court held that such challenges should be permitted, and that unconstitutional convictions may not be considered thereafter to increase the sentence.\\n. I might add that the lead opinion in Loper was merely a plurality opinion. Mr. Justice White wrote a concurring opinion, and Chief Justice Burger, along with Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist dissented. Given the close division in Loper, which involved convictions void under Gideon, I doubt that the High Court will leap at the opportunity of extending it to convictions which are constitutionally impaired in any fashion. See, e. g., United States v. Penta, supra, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 870, 94 S.Ct. 89, 38 L.Ed.2d 88 (1973).\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"829779\", \"name\": \"Carson v. Federal Street and Pleasant Valley Ry. Co., Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Carson v. Federal Street & Pleasant Valley Ry. Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1892-01-25\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal, No. 134\", \"first_page\": \"219\", \"last_page\": \"225\", \"citations\": \"147 Pa. 219\", \"volume\": \"147\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-09-21T20:02:18.861595+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"Harvard\", \"judges\": \"Before PAX-SON, O. J., Gkeen, Clakk, Williams, , McCollum, and Mitchell, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Carson v. Federal Street and Pleasant Valley Ry. Co., Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"Carson v. Federal Street and Pleasant Valley Ry. Co., Appellant.\\nMaster and servant \\u2014 Contributory negligence of servant.\\nThe owner of a wagon which is destroyed by collision with a street car is affected by the contributory negligence of his driver.\\nStreet railways \\u2014 Duty in crossing trades.\\nIt is the duty of a person about to cross a street railway track to look, so-that he may not walk or drive directly in front of a moving car to be struck by it.\\n\\u201c Stop, loole and listen.\\u201d\\nIt seems that a person is not bound to stop before crossing a street railway track, but he must look and listen.\\nContributory negligence \\u2014 Crossing.\\nThe driver of a wagon who approaches a street railway crossing, drives-upon the track without looking, and immediately comes into collision-with a car, is guilty of contributory negligence.\\nArgued Oct. 29, 1891.\\nAppeal, No. 134, Oct. T., 1891, by defendant from judgment of C. P. No. 2, Allegheny Co., July T., 1890, No. 94, on verdict for plaintiff.\\nBefore PAX-SON, O. J., Gkeen, Clakk, Williams, , McCollum, and Mitchell, JJ.\\nTrespass by Thomas Carson, against the Federal Street and Pleasant Valley Railway Co., to recover damages for injuries-to a team of horses, wagon and harness caused by collision with one of defendant\\u2019s electric cars.\\nThe facts appear in the opinion of the Supreme Court.\\nEwing, J., charged in part as follows :\\n\\u201cThe Supreme Court of this state have laid down as an absolute rule, regardless of any circumstances, or almost regardless of any surrounding circumstances, that it is the duty of a man driving a vehicle, or even walking, when he approaches a railroad crossing, to stop and look and listen \\u2014 not merely to look and listen, but to stop and look and listen before he goes over,. and if he does not, that is of itself negligence. Such a rule, I think, cannot be held to apply to the ordinary street crossings in the city of a street railway. If it did, with the rapidity with which these cars go each way along the streets which they pass, as said in this case, one every two or three minutes, a rule that would require a party to stop and look and listen, before crossing the track with a vehicle, bearing in mind that the cars are going each way, would be almost equivalent to saying that ordinary traffic must be abandoned in all parts' of the city where these rapid transit railways pass, or that a vehicle must have two men with it, one to get out and look while the other is ready to drive on as soon as called, because if the driver is to stop and look and listen in ordinary cases it would be of no use, by the time he could get started he would be in more danger than he would be if he had gone without stopping at all. The time taken to get up the motion would endanger him frequently more than to have driven right ahead. It would be much more reasonable to require either that the city should furnish a policeman to stand at every crossing, or that the motor companies themselves should furnish a man to warn the people. I do not think the time has come for either of them in all cases, so that you will determine this question of the alleged negligence of the driver under all the circumstances of the case. He was familiar with the crossing; he knew that these cars passed there frequently. He says he was accustomed to hearing them ringing the gong and listened for it. It appears that Washington avenue is 50 feet wide. It is level, or nearly so, for a considerable distance from this point. There are streets \\u201cA,\\u201d \\u201c B \\u201d and \\u201c C \\u201d crossing, and there are two tracks, and they claim that each track is eight feet from the curb. One of the witnesses says that it is less ; that they measured it seven feet eight inches. The sidewalk is said to be ten feet, the two tracks being reasonably close together. It seems that \\u201c O \\u201d street, where this occurred, is the course in which the plaintiff\\u2019s wagon was going, has a down grade, how steep does not appear, but the witnesses speak of it being a down grade, and counsel have also discussed that. On the right hand side going down the street to the avenue, there seems to be no house at the corner, so that the view to the right \\u2014 I do not know whether that is up or down the street \\u2014 the view from the west would be better a great deal than from the east. At the corner, or along the street to the left, or to the east, and towards the direction from which the electric car was coming, there is a row of houses that would obstruct the view until the eye would get past the corner, and it is near 18 feet from that corner to the track. Now it would be the duty of the plaintiff\\u2019s driver, going down that street, to look for a car both ways. \\u2022 He would not be limited to looking one way, because he is bound to look both ways. I imagine there are more accidents occur by people only looking one way for a car, than from all other reasons, where .the fault is on the part of the party injured. They very naturally look only one way when they ought to look both. Now the plaintiff\\u2019s driver was sitting in the wagon probably about the middle of it, he says he cannot tell; he may have been back near the end; may have been the middle, or may have been a little farther front. You have heard the testimony in regard to the length of the wagon, horses in front, coming down. Now he says that he heard no gong, and therefore drove on, and he saji-s that his horses were at the track, or about the track, when he saw the car was on him. He says also, that he was looking just as his eye would pass the corner. His testimony is not altogether consistent. On cross-examination, he said his horses were on the track already when he saw the car, and said also that he looked; he saw it just as soon as the houses would permit him to see it. Well, what the fact is, is for you. The court cannot determine that. He was in motion. The length of the tongue, or the horses and wagon to where he was sitting, would not make up the 18 feet probably between the line of the house and the track. How much wider the cars are than the track no one has said; I think they are a little wider, but I am not certain about that. Plaintiff\\u2019s counsel says about ten inches on each side, so that that would not leave much margin, and the wagon was in motion. Now, under these circumstances, it is for the jury to say whether, or not, the plaintiff\\u2019s driver was guilty of negligence ; whether he exercised reasona ble care under the circumstances. I will venture to suggest this, that I would not attribute negligence to the man in regard to an alleged mistake in not backing off when he found his horses on the track in front of the car instead of trying to go ahead, because it is a situation that it is very hard to tell what to do. My own impressions, from experience, and if I were to take the knowledge that we get from trying accident cases in this court, are that three accidents occur by people trying to back off for one that occurs by going forward in such cases, and yet there are cases where it would be better to back off. It seems, judging by the testimony in the numerous cases we have had, rather the instinct of the average man, when he sees danger, to try to back off instead of pushing ahead, and he generally fails, but that is for the jury. The question is much more ; was he guilty of negligence in getting into the position he was before he saw the car ? It would seem to have been some considerable distance back, because at the rapid rate the3r run, 200 feet would be run in a very short time, and the horses got over and the wagon was struck. It would appeal' to have been struck about' the middle of it, and the street car would run a very considerable distance in the time it would take horses to go over the space that they had gone.\\u201d\\nThe jury having retired, the court sent for them and made the following explanation:\\n\\u201c After you went out, it occurred to me that there was room for misapprehension in regard to a part of my charge, in relation to the claim that it was necessarily negligence if a man did not stop, as well as look and listen before \\u25a0 crossing one of these motor company\\u2019s tracks, or the tracks in this case. In stating the rule adopted in relation to ordinary steam railroads and trains of cars running at a high speed and in saying that it would not apply in a city, at ordinary crossings by these roads, [I did not mean to exclude from the jury in this case, the question as to whether or not, the driver should not have stopped and looked and listened. I simply say it is not a fixed rule of law, but it is for the jury. If it were an ordinary steam railway crossing, I would have had to say to you as a matter of law, it was negligence if he did not stop, as well as look and listen, no difference what I might have thought or you might have thought about it. But in this case that is not a rule of law. \\u2022 It is a question for you, under all the circumstances, as to what he should have done.\\u201d] [4]\\nDefendant\\u2019s points, all of which were refused, were as follows:\\n1. The evidence does not authorize the conclusion that the defendant was guilty of negligence. [1]\\n2. The evidence shows that in driving upon the track in front of the advancing car in the manner and under the circumstances as shown, the driver of the team was guilty of negligence, contributing to produce the accident of which complaint is made. [2]\\n3. Under all the evidence and the law of this case, the verdict should be for the defendant. [3]\\nYerdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appealed.\\nErrors assigned were (1 \\u2014 3) defendant\\u2019s points, quoting them; and (4),the portion of the charge in brackets.\\nWm. A. Stone, of Stone Potter, for appellant.\\nThe driver was bound to look and see whether a car was coming. Thomas v. Pass. Ry. Co., 132 Pa. 514.\\nThe court left to the jury no rule of law to guide them; they were permitted to make any rule which seemed good to them.\\nThere was no evidence of negligence on the part of the company.\\nJacob H. Miller, with him McBride, for the appellee.\\nThe company was negligent in not ringing a bell: Phila. Traction Co. v. Bernheimer, 23 W. N. C. 568.\\nThe case was properly submitted to the jury. Schum v. Railroad Co., 107 Pa. 8; McNeal v. Railroad Co., 131 Pa. 186.\\nThere can be no absolute rule of \\u201cstop and look and listen \\u201d applied to street car crossings. Such a rule is unnecessary and would cause almost continual blockades at crossings where there are traction lines on both streets, each line operating in two directions. It would drive all other traffic from the streets occupied by such lines and surrender the streets to them.\\nJan. 25, 1892.\", \"word_count\": \"2705\", \"char_count\": \"14568\", \"text\": \"Opinion bv\\nMb. Justice Gbeen,\\nThe facts of this case do not seem to be involved in controversy. -The defendant operates a line of street cars passing through Washington street, in the city of Allegheny. The plaintiff's team, in charge of Orr, the driver, was engaged in hauling along C street, in the same city. In going along C street to his destination, Orr's route crossed Washington street, and the defendant's tracks therein, at right angles. When he reached the intersection he neither stopped nor looked, but drove' directly upon the defendant's track. When in this position, he looked up, and saw the car just upon him. There was no time to escape. His wagon was crushed and he was injured.\\nThis action is brought by his employer, who is affected by the contributory negligence of his employee. The question upon which the case turned in the court below was, whether the evidence of the plaintiff established contributory negligence in Orr, the driver. Upon this subject the learned judge instructed the jury that there was no rule of law that required the driver to \\\" stop, look and listen,\\\" but that it was for them to determine what it was his duty to do, and whether he actually did it on this occasion. They were thus left without any rule of law to apply, at liberty to make one to suit themselves for the purposes of this case, which the next jury might change to suit themselves, or disregard altogether. We cannot agree to this. The street railway has become a business necessity in all great cities. Greater and better facilities and a higher rate of speed are being constantly demanded. The movement of cars by cable or electricity along crowded streets is attended with danger, and renders a higher measure of care necessary, both on the part of the street railways, and those using the streets in the ordinary manner. It is the duty of the railway companies to be watchful and attentive, and to use all reasonable precautions to give notice of their approach to crossings and places of danger. Their failure to exercise the care which the rate of speed and the condition of the street demand, is negligence. On the other hand, new appliances, rendered necesssary by the advance in business and population in a given city, impose new duties on the public.\\nThe street railway company has a right to the use of its track, subject to the right of crossing by the public at street intersections ; and one approaching such a place of crossing must take notice of it, and exercise a reasonable measure of care to avoid contact with a moving car. It may not be necessary to stop on approaching such a crossing, for the rate of speed of the most rapid of these surface cars is ordinarily from six to nine miles per hour; but it is necessary to look before driving upon the track. If, by looking, the plaintiff could have seen and so avoided an approaching train, and this appears from his own evidence, he may be properly nonsuited: Marland v. R. R., 123 Pa. 487. It is in vain for a man to say he looked and listened who walks directly in front of a moving locomotive. An injury so received is due to his own gross carelessness: R. R. v. Bell, 122 Pa. 58; Moore v. R. R., 108 Pa. 349. Orr testifies that he knew the crossing, that he listened for the sound of a gong, but, not hearing it, drove on the track, and was instantly struck. He drove in front of a moving car so near to him as to make a collision inevitable. If he had looked, he could have seen the car and stopped, and the accident would have been avoided. Not to do so was, in the language of R. R. v. Bell, \\\"gross negligence,\\\" and justly defeats the action brought to recover from another damages that were self-inflicted. It is the duty of one about to cross a street railway track to look, so that he may not walk directly in front of a moving car to be struck by it. The first assignment of error is sustained. So, also, are the second and third.\\nThe judgment is reversed.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"835230\", \"name\": \"Garrity v. Pennsylvania Casting and Machine Company\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Garrity v. Pennsylvania Casting & Machine Co.\", \"decision_date\": \"1901-07-25\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal, No. 3\", \"first_page\": \"623\", \"last_page\": \"626\", \"citations\": \"17 Pa. Super. 623\", \"volume\": \"17\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:53:24.715293+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Rice, P. J., Beaver, Orlady, W. W. Porter and W. D. Porter, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Garrity v. Pennsylvania Casting and Machine Company.\", \"head_matter\": \"Garrity v. Pennsylvania Casting and Machine Company.\\nNegligence \\u2014 Master and servant \\u2014 Caving in of ditch.\\nWhere a master subjects his servant to dangers such as in good faith he ought to provide against, he is liable for any accident arising therefrom.\\nIn an action to recover damages for personal injuries by an employee against bis employer, a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff will be sustained where the evidence for the plaintiff, although contradicted, tends to show that he was employed to lay pipe in a ditch already constructed ; that he was not responsible for negligence in the construction or condition of the ditch; that the dangerous condition of the ditch was not apparent to him; .that the defendants\\u2019 foreman in charge of and inspecting the work knew the place to be dangerous, and gave no warning; and that the defendants failed in their duty of placing the ditch in a reasonably safe condition before setting the plaintiff to work therein to lay pipe.\\nArgued May 11, 1901.\\nAppeal, No. 111, April T., 1901, by defendant, from judgment of C. P. No. 3, Allegheny County, Feb. T., 1900, No. 65, on verdict for plaintiff in case of Coleman Garrity v. Pennsylvania Casting and Machine Company.\\nBefore Rice, P. J., Beaver, Orlady, W. W. Porter and W. D. Porter, JJ.\\nAffirmed.\\nTrespass to recover damages for personal injuries. Before Kennedy, P. J.\\nAt the trial it appeared that on August 16, 1899, the plaintiff, while in the employ of the defendant company, was seriously injured by the caving in of a sewer trench in which he was working. The circumstances of the accident are fully stated in the opinion of the Superior Court.\\nVerdict and judgment for plaintiff' for $1,000. Defendant appealed.\\nError assigned was in refusing binding instructions for defendant.\\nJuly 25, 1901:\\nEdwin W. Smith, with him F. O. Perkins and Knox & Reed,\\nfor appellant. \\u2014 The danger was apparent: Durst v. Carnegie Steel Co., 173 Pa. 162; McKinzie v. Phila., 46 Leg. Int. 606; Rasmussen v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 65 Iowa, 236; Anderson v. Winston, 31 Fed. Repr. 523.\\nF. C. McGirr, of Marron & McGirr,\\nfor appellee. \\u2014 The case was for the jury: Breen v. Field, 157 Mass. 277; Hennessy v. Boston, 161 Mass. 502; Lynch v. Allyn, 160 Mass. 248; Coan v. Marlborough, 164 Mass. 206; Norton v. New Bedford, 166 Mass. 48; Reese v. Clark, 198 Pa. 312.\", \"word_count\": \"1128\", \"char_count\": \"6525\", \"text\": \"Opinion by\\nWilliam W. Porter, J.,\\nThe plaintiff was employed by the defendant company to lay pipe in a sewer trench some eight feet deep. While engaged in the work a part of the embankment fell in. The plaintiff was seriously injured. A verdict has been rendered in his favor. The appellants requested binding instructions. The refusal to give them is the only error assigned.\\nTo sustain the assignment the defendants allege that the cause of the accident developed as the work progressed; that-the danger to which the plaintiff was exposed was obvious; and that there was contributory negligence in undermining the sides of the trench. Were we to consider these propositions only in the light of the testimony adduced by the defendant company, there is little doubt that we would find some of them applicable. There is, however, testimony on behalf of the plaintiff which contradicts the statements of fact involved. To show this is to answer the appellants' contention. The plaintiff says he was employed as a pipe fitter; but that he had no experience in the laying of pipe in deep trenches. He entered upon his work in a trench some eight feet deep and three or four feet wide. He says that he received no warning from the foreman in charge of the work that the place was dangerous. This foreman on cross-examination admits that the ditch was dangerous. In part it was cut through \\\" made ground.\\\" It was not shored up nor sheeted. The evidence for the plaintiff was that the former is necessary for safety in ordinary cases, and the latter, (by which is meant the planking up and supporting of both sides of the ditch), is necessary where the digging is through \\\" made ground.\\\" A part of the ditch, before the plaintiff's employment, was braced, but none thereafter. The defendants' foreman alleges and the plaintiff denies that the latter was warned of danger and was instructed to look after the bracing of the sides of the ditch and was furnished with materials therefor. The plaintiff's witnesses deny and the defendants allege that material was accessible suitable for use in protecting the sides of the ditch. ' The plaintiff denies and the defendants' witnesses allege that the former undermined the sides of the ditch in the laying of the' pipe and thus caused the accident. Two witnesses for the plaintiff testify that the foreman was notified by them of the dangerous condition of the ditch, and that they quit work because of this danger. The plaintiff asserts that the foreman gave him no instructions in respect to the work, save that he was to lay the pipe. The plaintiff's claims upon the testimony adduced in his behalf, were prima facie made out, namely, that he was employed to lay pipe in a ditch already constructed; that he was not responsible for negligence in the construction or condition of the ditch; that the dangerous condition of the ditch was not apparent to him; that the defendants' foreman, in charge of and inspecting the work, knew the place to be dangerous and gave no warning; and that the defendants failed in their duty of placing the ditch in a reasonably safe condition before setting him to work therein to lay pipe; thus bringing the plaintiff's case within the rule that, where the master subjects his servant to dangers such as in good faith he ought to provide against, he is liable for any accident arising therefrom: Patterson v. Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co., 76 Pa. 393; Reese v. Clark, 198 Pa. 319.\\nFrom the above review of the facts it seems to us that on the plaintiff's evidence the danger did not arise during the progress of the work, and that the case does not come within the ruling on this subject in Durst v. Carnegie Steel Co., 173 Pa. 162. The question whether the danger of the bank caving in and injuring the plaintiff was so obvious as to make it incident to the employment, was submitted to the jury with instructions substantially following the ruling in Johnston v. Ott Bros., 155 Pa. 17. The allegation that the plaintiff undermined the ditch was met by his denial that the ditch was in fact undermined. Here was also a question which the court below properly submitted to the jury.\\nThe judgment is affirmed.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"837261\", \"name\": \"Hothersall v. Rust, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Hothersall v. Rust\", \"decision_date\": \"1901-12-16\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal, No. 17\", \"first_page\": \"495\", \"last_page\": \"498\", \"citations\": \"18 Pa. Super. 495\", \"volume\": \"18\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:28:38.601711+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Rice, P. J., Beaver, Orlady, W. W. Porter and W. D. Porter, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Hothersall v. Rust, Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"Hothersall v. Rust, Appellant.\\nMechanic\\u2019s lien \\u2014 Alteration\\u2014New building \\u2014 Act of May 18, 1887, P. L. 118.\\nWhere an old factory building has been extended, and the old work and the new have been so combined that in external appearance and internal arrangement, the entire structure forms a homogeneous mass, the extension is an addition to and alteration of an old building, and a mechanic\\u2019s lien can only be sustained against it by complying with the Act of May 18, 1887, P. L. 118, as to notice.\\nArgued Oct. 25, 1901.\\nAppeal, No. 17, Oct. T., 1901, by defendant, from judgment of O. P.No. 2, Phila. Co., Dec. T., 1898, No. 965, M. L. D., on verdict for plaintiff in case of Stephen J. Hothersall and John H. Cloak, trading as Hothersall & Cloak, v. Anna E. Rust, Owner, Appellant, and Alfred J. Rust, Contractor.\\nBefore Rice, P. J., Beaver, Orlady, W. W. Porter and W. D. Porter, JJ.\\nReversed.\\nScire facias sur mechanic\\u2019s lien. Before Wiltbank, J.\\nThe court refused binding instructions for defendant.\\nVerdict and judgment for plaintiffs for $531.23. Defendant appealed.\\nError assigned was in refusing binding instructions for defendant.\\nJ. Howard Morrison, for appellant, cited:\\nLaw v. Levine, 13 Pa. Superior Ct. 152; Mehl v. Sapper, 13 Pa. Superior Ct. 330.\\nCharles J. Sharkey, with him F. Pierce Buckley, for appel lee cited :\\nDecember 16,1901:\\nArmstrong v. Ware, 20 Pa. 520 ; Grable v. Helman, 5 Pa. Superior Ct. 328 ; Miller v. Hershey, 59 Pa. 69 ; Hall v. Blackburn, 173 Pa. 313; Warren v. Freeman, 187 Pa. 458; Goeringer v. Schappert, 17 Pa. Superior Ct. 295; McDowell v. Riley, 16 Pa. Superior Ct. 519; Thompson\\u2019s App., 3 Pa. Superior Ct. 653.\", \"word_count\": \"1189\", \"char_count\": \"6754\", \"text\": \"Opinion by\\nW. D. Porter, J.,\\nAn old brick factory building two stories high and having a basement, fronting forty-one feet on Emerald street and extending back sixty-five feet along Wishart street, in the city of Philadelphia, was enlarged by the building operation out of which this litigation arose. The rear wall of the building was removed, and the bricks taken therefrom were used in the construction of the new work; the new work extended the building back along Wishart street 136 feet, this extension of the building being of the same height with the old building; the floors of the extension were made continuous with those of the old building, so that each floor of the completed building constituted one room, embracing both the old and new parts of the structure; the roof of the new building was made continuous with that of the old, the entire roof being upon one level; the old and the new parts of the structure were designed to be used as one building. A small building was erected on the Emerald street front of the lot, attached to and structurally incorporated with the old part of the factory building on the northeast side thereof; this small building was intended to be used as an office and in it were placed the elevator and staircase intended for the use of both parts of the structure, and portions of the wall of the old building were taken out on the several floors, so as to make this addition readily accessible to the main building. The office building was not attached to the new portion of the main structure, but access from one of those parts of the building to the other was afforded through the old building. The plaintiffs filed a mechanic's lien against the office building and that part of the main building which was newly constructed, excluding from the lien that part of the main building which had stood there before the work began. There were no alterations in the old part of the building, except the removal of the walls for the purpose of incorporating into it the new portions of the structure, as above indicated. The evidence presented no disputed question of fact as to the changes which had by the building operation. been wrought in the structure, and whether under the undisputed facts the lien as filed could be sustained was a question of law for the court.\\nThe lien was filed for erection and construction under the act of 1886, and the old part of the building was manifestly intended to be excluded from the operation of the lien, for in the description of the curtilage appurtenant to the building against which the lien was filed, one of the walls of the old building is called for as a boundary. There was no question under the evidence that the work in the addition to the building was new, both in the external walls and interior constrcution, but there was no evidence as to the external appearance of the building or its internal arrangement which warranted the court in permitting the jury to pass upon the question of whether the entire structure, old and new, constituted one building. The old work and the new had been so combined as to form a homogeneous structure, a building which was a unit, and which could not be cut into fragments for the purposes of lien. The lien was not filed, against the entire building, upon the theory that the changes in the old part had made the entire structure new in its main mass, and it may well be doubted whether such a lien could have been sustained under the evidence. The plaintiffs having filed their lien against the new section of the building, as a distinct structure, it was incumbent upon them to produce evidence sustaining the lien as filed. The evidence produced established that the work was done in the enlargement of a pre-existing building and that the new work had been so blended with the old as to form one building against a part of which the plaintiffs were attempting to enforce a lien. While the lien was regular upon its face and could not have been stricken off there was between it and the evidence offered a variance of which the defendant was in position to take advantage : Lee v. Burke, 66 Pa. 336; Klinefelter v. Baum, 172 Pa. 652. The extension of the old building in this case was very considerable, but the old still constituted no inconsiderable part of the new structure, which fact the plaintiffs recognized by attempting to segregate the parts of the building and treat the old and the new as distinct structures. The new work con stituted an addition to and alteration of an old building and a mechanic's lien could only be sustained by complying with the Act of May 18, 1887, P. L. 118: Thomas v. Hinkle, 126 Pa. 478; Groezinger v. Ostheim, 135 Pa. 604; Morrison v. Henderson, 126 Pa. 216; Wharton v. Real Estate Investment Co., 180 Pa. 168; Purvis v. Ross, 158 Pa. 20; Smyers v. Beam, 158 Pa. 57, and the opinion in Kolb v. The Reformed Episcopal Church, decided by this court at the present term. The defendant was entitled to an affirmance of her fifth point in which she prayed for binding instructions in her favor.\\nThe judgment is reversed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
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+"{\"id\": \"8417753\", \"name\": \"In re ESTATE OF Regis F. BURGER, M.D. Appeal of Janice B. Leckey\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"In re Estate of Burger\", \"decision_date\": \"2006-05-25\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 16 WAP 2005\", \"first_page\": \"547\", \"last_page\": \"559\", \"citations\": \"898 A.2d 547\", \"volume\": \"898\", \"reporter\": \"West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:52:48.239396+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"BEFORE: CAPPY, C.J., and CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR, EAKIN, and BAER, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"In re ESTATE OF Regis F. BURGER, M.D. Appeal of Janice B. Leckey.\", \"head_matter\": \"In re ESTATE OF Regis F. BURGER, M.D. Appeal of Janice B. Leckey.\\nSupreme Court of Pennsylvania.\\nArgued Sept. 12, 2005.\\nDecided May 25, 2006.\\nWilliam R. Caroselli, Esq., Edward C. Leckey, Esq., Pittsburgh, for Janice B. Leckey.\\nKevin L. Colosimo, Esq., Samuel Herman Simon, Esq., Pittsburgh, for Linda Nash.\\nBEFORE: CAPPY, C.J., and CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR, EAKIN, and BAER, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"7134\", \"char_count\": \"44109\", \"text\": \"OPINION\\nJustice SAYLOR.\\nIn this appeal, Appellant challenges a determination that she lacks standing to pursue a will contest. The outcome turns on a statutory rule of interpretation applicable to wills, which embodies the public policy disfavoring partial intestacy.\\nIn March 2000, Regis F. Burger, M.D. (\\\"Dr. Burger\\\") prepared the last of a series of several wills, in which he named five beneficiaries to share in the residue of his estate. Dr. Burger was a widower with no children of his own, and the residuary legatees were the heirs of his deceased sister, Anzelma Burger Nash, including her granddaughter, Linda Nash (\\\"Appel-lee\\\"), each of whom was designated to receive a specified, fractionalized share of the residue. For example, with regard to Appellee, who was to receive the largest share, the will provided as follows:\\nI give 50% of my residuary estate to LINDA NASH, 120 Bingay Drive, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15237. If LINDA NASH does not survive me, the assets which would have been distributed to her had she survived me shall be distributed proportionally to the other persons entitled to distribution pursuant to this paragraph SEVENTH.\\nThe residuary clause was similar to those that were contained in prior wills, but Dr. Burger had increased Appellee's share of the residuary estate in each new will, from twenty-five percent in 1998, to thirty-four percent in 1999, to fifty percent in 2000. The March 2000 will also named Appellee and National City Bank of Pennsylvania as executors, as distinguished from earlier wills in which solely the bank was designated. This will, however, like the prior wills, did not mention Dr. Burger's brother James, or James' daughter and heir, Janice Burger Leckey (\\\"Appellant\\\").\\nDr. Burger died in November 2002, leaving an estate valued at over $2.5 million, the bulk of which qualified as residue under his March 2000 will. The executors caused the will to be admitted to probate and procured letters testamentary. Appellant filed a notice of appeal and initiated a limited will contest in the orphan's court via a petition for citation to show cause why the instrument should not be set aside in part.\\nIn her petition, Appellant did not question Dr. Burger's capacity to execute his last will and did not challenge the particular legacies or the residuary bequests to his sister's heirs other than Appellee. Appellant alleged, however, that the increases in the residuary bequest to Appellee, and her appointment as executrix, were the product of undue influence. In this regard, Appellant averred that, as of March 1999, Dr. Burger had granted a broad power of attorney in favor of Appellee and, by the end of that year, Dr. Burger's physical and mental condition had weakened and Appellee had assumed responsibility for his finances, terminated the services of a twenty-four-hour caregiver, and otherwise engendered and exploited a confidential relationship. According to Appellant, the twenty-five percent increase in the residuary bequest to Appellee should therefore be deemed void, and the result should be a partial intestacy, from which Appellant should benefit as the person nearest by degree of consanguinity to Dr. Burger, and his fifty-percent intestate heir.\\nAppellee filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, contending that Appellant lacked standing to pursue her limited will contest, because Dr. Burger's will provided for a complete distribution of his residuary estate; Appellant was not a beneficiary thereof; and she would not otherwise benefit from a determination that the will was partially invalid. See generally Carother's Estate, 300 Pa. 185, 188, 150 A. 585, 586 (1930) ('Where the contestant to a will that is void in part receives no benefit from the contest he is not entitled to sustain a caveat nor take an appeal from the action of the court be-lowEJ\\\"). Appellee recognized that, in the absence of a will, Appellant would be an intestate heir; nevertheless, she contended that Dr. Burger's provision for an alternate disposition of residuary bequests that would fail by reason of the beneficiary's death evinced an intention that the same disposition should ensue should a residuary bequest fail for any other reason. Further, in her supporting brief, Appellee cited a rule of interpretation set forth in Section 2514(11) of the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code, which applies in the absence of a contrary intent discernable from a will. See 20 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 2514 (\\\"In the absence of a contrary intent appearing therein, wills shall be construed as to real and personal estate in accordance with the following rules[.]\\\"). Clause (11), which resides among several others that are designed to avoid partial intestacy and function as anti-lapse and void legacy provisions, prescribes as follows:\\n(11) Lapsed and void devises and legacies; shares in residue. When a devise or bequest as described in clause (10) hereof shall be included in a residuary clause of the will and shall not be available to the issue of the devisee or legatee under the provision of clause (9) hereof, [ ] and if the disposition shall not be otherwise expressly provided for by law, it shall pass to the other residuary devisees or legatees, if any there be, in proportion to their respective shares or interests in the residue.\\n20 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 2514(11). According to Ap-pellee, this clause, and the associated deci-sional law, dictate that any failed devise or bequest, including a share of the residuary estate, would fall to the remaining residuary beneficiaries.\\nIn her response, Appellant relied on clause (ll)'s specific cross-reference to the preceding clause, clause (10), which estab lishes a presumption applicable to specific devises and bequests, as follows:\\n(10) Lapsed and void devises and legacies; shares not in residue. A devise or bequest not being part of the residuary estate which shall fail or be void because the beneficiary fails to survive the testator or because it is contrary to law or otherwise incapable of taking effect or which has been revoked by the testator or is undisposed of or is released or disclaimed by the beneficiary, if it shall not pass to the issue of the beneficiary under the provisions of clause (9) hereof, and if the disposition thereof shall not be otherwise expressly provided for by law, shall be included in the residuary devise or bequest, if any, contained in the will.\\n20 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 2514(10) (emphasis added). Since under a literal reading clause (11) of Section 2514 applies only to \\\"a devise or bequest as described in clause (10),\\\" and clause (10) pertains only to specific or particular gifts, Appellant maintained that clause (11) cannot apply to a lapsed or void residuary bequest as such. See Brief In Opposition to Preliminary Objections of Linda Nash, at 5 (\\\"In short, the Rule in clause (11) of the section, by its terms, applies to bequests which were originally not part of the Residuary, but, by the provisions of clause (10), are made part of the Residuary. The plain language of 20 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 2514(11) does not apply to a failed bequest which was originally part of the Residuary.\\\").\\nThe orphan's court sustained the preliminary objections, agreeing with Appel-lee's position that Appellant lacked standing. The court noted that Appellant's interpretation of Section 2514(11) was a novel one that ignored the plain meaning of the language used in the headings for clauses (10) (\\\"Lapsed and void devises and legacies; shares not in residue\\\") and (11) (\\\"Lapsed and void devises and legacies; shares in residue\\\"). In conformity with such headings, the court concluded that clause (10) offers guidance on the disposition of lapsed or void specific bequests, whereas clause (11) provides the same direction for residuary bequests. The court read clause (ll)'s cross-reference to clause (10) as merely incorporating the specified reasons why a bequest or devise might fail, see 20 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 2514(10) (providing a presumption of intent to accomplish a substitute gift where \\\"the beneficiary fails to survive the testator or because it is contrary to law or otherwise incapable of taking effect or which has been revoked by the testator or is undisposed of or is released or disclaimed by the beneficiary\\\"), but not as requiring that a specific devise or bequest must be involved in the first instance to implicate clause (11). In any event, the orphan's court agreed with Appellee's argument that Dr. Burger's provision for an alternative disposition in the event of Appellee's death should be treated as evincing an intention to effect the same distribution in a broader range of circumstances, including partial invalidity of his will on account of undue influence. Thus, the court determined that a partial intestacy would not be created, even if Appellant were able to prove undue influence.\\nThe Superior Court affirmed in a published decision. See In re Estate of Burger, 852 A.2d 385 (Pa.Super.2004). At the outset, the court recognized that, in order to sustain a demurrer, the orphan's court was required to find that no recovery was possible on the facts averred, and that the appellate review of this legal question was plenary. See id. at 388. The court also cited the generally prevailing presumption against intestacy, see generally In re Estate of Hill, 432 Pa. 269, 273, 247 A.2d 606, 609 (1968); highlighted that the anti-lapse and void legacy provisions of Section 2514 operate in furtherance of such policy; and observed that a testator's \\\"contrary intent\\\" to provide for a different disposition of his property need not be express, see In re Estate of Corbett, 430 Pa. 54, 61 n. 7, 241 A.2d 524, 527 n. 7 (1968), but need only appear \\\"with reasonable certainty,\\\" Estate of Kehler, 488 Pa. 165, 167, 411 A.2d 748, 750 (1980). See Estate of Burger, 852 A.2d at 388-89.\\nThe Superior Court then rejected Appellant's argument that the provision of Dr. Burger's will directing an alternative disposition for the residuary bequest to Ap-pellee in the event of her death should not apply should the gift fail for a different reason. In the first instance, the Superior Court criticized Appellant's citation to In re Berger's Estate, 360 Pa. 366, 61 A.2d 855 (1948), which defined the concept of \\\"lapse\\\" narrowly in terms of \\\"the failure of a testamentary gift in consequence of the death of the devisee or legatee during testatrix's lifetime,\\\" and refused to apply a testator's instructions for a lapse where the beneficiary did not predecease the testator. See id. at 371, 61 A.2d at 857. The court reasoned that the decision was directed to the actual disposition of a bequest, as opposed to the question of whether a testamentaiy instrument manifests sufficient indicia of \\\"contrary intent\\\" to prevent Section 2514 from affecting the disposition of a potentially lapsed or void bequest. See Estate of Burger, 852 A.2d at 390. The court further deemphasized a testator's prescription of a specific reason for failure as the trigger for an alternative disposition, reasoning as follows:\\nWhether a testator's bequest \\\"lapses\\\" because the beneficiary has predeceased him, or has failed for some other reason, the testator's expression of intent for the disposition of the affected property remains to be honored to the extent possible. Thus, if a bequest fails, (albeit under a scenario less common than the beneficiary's death) and an alternative disposition is specified, we cannot presume that had the bequest failed for a different reason the testator's intent for the descent of the property to someone else would change. Simply stated, there is no necessary connection between the reason for the failure of a bequest and the testator's determination of a secondary beneficiary. Where, as here, the Will makes clear that the testator was cognizant of the possibility that his bequests might not be effectuated as written and gave specific direction for the treatment of those bequests, we are compelled to conclude that his intent to dispose of the property via Will is at least \\\"reasonably certain.\\\" Estate of Kehler, [488 Pa. 165, 167,] 411 A.2d [748,] 750 [ (1980) ].\\nEstate of Burger, 852 A.2d at 390. Consequently, the Superior Court held that \\\"the provisions of the anti-lapse statute cannot be applied and the disposition of [Appel-lee's] interest, if deemed void, is controlled by the Will. Intestacy does not result and [Appellant] is thereby deprived of standing to raise her claim.\\\" Id. Finally, in view of its disposition, the court declined to address the parties' dispute concerning the meaning of clause (11) of Section 2514.\\nPresently, Appellant contends that the decisions of the orphan's court and the Superior Court are tantamount to a judicial reformation or rewriting of Dr. Burger's will. In this regard, Appellant reiterates that the will provided for an alternative disposition of the residuary bequest to Appellee only in the event that she would not have survived him, and that it made no provision for an alternative disposition of any part of this residuary bequest should it lapse or fail for any other reason. Since the potential for a failure due to undue influence is a contingency that is not addressed in the will, Appellant argues that this Court's decisions mandate a finding of partial intestacy should undue influence be found. With regard to the statutory anti-lapse and void legacy provisions, Appellant maintains that Section 2514(11) can only be read to apply exclusively to gifts that fail or lapse under Section 2514(10), in light of the plain terms of the clause. Appellant acknowledges that this Court, in various decisions, has applied a contrary construction of the statute, but relies on the fact that the construction that she advocates was never raised in those cases.\\nAppellee, on the other hand, maintains that Dr. Burger's will evinces a clear intention that any lapsing or failing share in the residuary estate should be divided among the remaining residuary beneficiaries rather than pass through intestacy. In this regard, and like the Superior Court, Appellee highlights decisions that have not required an express provision to demonstrate contrary intent, see Estate of Corbett, 430 Pa. at 61 n. 7, 241 A.2d at 527 n. 7, but only that contrary intent appear with reasonable certainty, see Estate of Kehler, 488 Pa. at 167, 411 A.2d at 750. Assuming, arguendo, that this Court would find that Dr. Burger's will failed to provide sufficient direction, Appellee contends that clause (11) of Section 2514 plainly mandates that the residuary gift would pass to the other residuary beneficiaries. In this regard, Appellee notes that the purpose of Pennsylvania's anti-lapse and void legacy statute is to prevent precisely what Appellant seeks to achieve, namely, a partial intestacy. Appellee observes that, in contravention of this legislative purpose, Appellant's interpretation would render the statute devoid of any provision addressing the disposition of lapsed and void residuary gifts, leaving a substantial, unexplained, and inexplicable gap in its coverage. Furthermore, Appellee contends that Appellant's construction would render clause (11) superfluous, since clause (10) already directs that a failed non-residuary bequest shall pass to the residuary beneficiaries. Like the orphan's court, Appellee views clause (ll)'s cross-reference to clause (10) as merely incorporating the latter's broad enumeration of reasons why a bequest may fail. In conformity with the clause headings, the orphan's court's reading of the statute, and this Court's treatment of Section 2514's immediate predecessor, Appellee maintains that clause (10) governs the disposition of lapsed or void non-residuary devises or bequests, and clause (11) governs the disposition of lapsed/void residuary devises or bequests.\\nAs the Superior Court observed, appellate review of the legal question concerning whether the orphan's court properly sustained the demurrer is plenary.\\nAs noted, in finding a reasonably clear manifestation of Dr. Burger's intent for an alternative disposition of his residuary bequest to Appellee in the event of its failure on account of undue influence, the Superi- or Court relied on Dr. Burger's specification of a substitute residuary bequest in the event of Appellee's death. Such approach, however, is in substantial tension with holdings of this Court to the effect that a circumstance-specific, alternative bequest is not, in and of itself, sufficient to support a substitute gift occasioned by a different circumstance, at least in the absence of some additional presumption. See, e.g., Berger's Estate, 360 Pa. at 371, 61 A.2d at 857 (\\\"[W]here the testator had thus failed to make provision for a contingency which actually happened, or to cover circumstances which subsequently result ed, a decree of intestacy [is] unavoidable.\\\" (quoting Verner's Estate, 358 Pa. at 285, 56 A.2d at 670)); Filbert's Estate, 195 Pa. 295, 299, 45 A. 733, 734-35 (1900) (characterizing as \\\"entirely inapplicable\\\" provisions of a testator for contingencies that never occurred); cf. Estate of Corbett, 430 Pa. at 62 n. 8, 241 A.2d at 528 n. 8 (\\\"[T]he mere fact that the testatrix made specific provision that certain legacies . would lapse did not demonstrate an intent that legacies not covered by the statute would not lapse.... [I]t would be conjecture to assume that by providing for lapse in some bequests, testatrix therefore intended that other bequests should not lapse\\\") (citing In re McFerren Estate, 365 Pa. 490, 76 A.2d 759 (1950)). In light of this line of cases, the Superior Court's reasoning cannot be justified as an authorized finding of intention based upon a directed examination of Dr. Burger's will as viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances. Rather, we believe that the court implemented a presumption concerning Dr. Burger's intention relative to an unforeseen (or at least unaddressed) circumstance, as gleaned from the testamentary document.\\nWe do not regard this presumption as necessarily unreasonable; indeed, the result of its application (a substitute gift to the other residuary beneficiaries) is precisely the same as the result obtaining upon applying the presumption of clause (11) of Section 2514 as its language has been interpreted in prior decisions of this Court, see supra note 5, by the orphan's court, and by Appellee herein. Rather, for present purposes, it is sufficient merely to recognize that a judicial presumption was employed. With the understanding that there is enough of a gap or an ambiguity in Dr. Burger's will to require resort to this sort of a presumption, the relevance of Section 2514 becomes clear, since the arena of such presumptions is precisely that which the Legislature sought to occupy with the enactment of Pennsylvania's anti-lapse and void legacies statute. Significantly, in this arena, there is substantial room for disagreement as to what presumptions are most appropriate. Indeed, when a testamentary instrument fails to provide for a contingency, some find it most reasonable merely to assume that the testator simply did not anticipate its happening. See, e.g., Roberts, Lapse Statutes: Recurring Construction Problems, 37 Emo-RY L.J. at 346-47. Given this and other difficulties associated with presumptions of this kind, we find it most appropriate to adhere to the direction of the representative branch of government, where it is available. Moreover, the interests of justice are better served by implementing pre-existing, legislatively prescribed rules of interpretation that were available to the testator for consideration at the time that the will was drafted, as opposed to crafting subsequent, judicial presumptions that are independent of the statute.\\nIn summary, we hold that the Superior Court erred in finding that Dr. Burger's specification of a substitute residuary gift in the event of Appellee's death was, in and of itself, a sufficient manifestation of his intentions in the event of a failure of the residuary bequest on account of undue influence to preclude application of the presumptions delineated in Section 2514. Therefore, we proceed to resolve the dispute as to the meaning of the relevant provisions of the anti-lapse and void legacy statute.\\nAs noted, Appellant's approach to the opening phrase of clause (11) of Section 2514 is a literally correct one. Since the clause at the outset purports to pertain to \\\"a devise or bequest as described in clause (10),\\\" facially, it appears to address only the lapsed and void special devises and legacies that comprise clause 10's subject matter. See 20 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 2514(10). This interpretation, however, is in tension with several of the words that follow. For example, clause (11)'8 reference to a \\\"devise or bequest as described in clause (10)\\\" is qualified by subsequent words of limitation restricting the subject matter to devises and bequests which \\\"shall be included in a residuary clause of the will.\\\" By definition, however, the specific devises and bequests that are the subject matter of clause (10) are those \\\"not being part of the residuary estate.\\\" Additionally, in the event of a relevant lapse or invalidity, clause (11) provides for a substitute gift to \\\"the other residuary devisees or legatees,\\\" 20 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 2514(11) (emphasis added), suggesting that the Legislature contemplated a situation in which the gift to at least one residuary beneficiary has been thwarted. Under Appellant's interpretation, however, it. is only the beneficiary of a particular devise or bequest who necessarily will have been displaced.\\nThese apparent inconsistencies in Section 2514(11) foster ambiguity, and the application of prevailing principles of statutory construction is therefore appropriate. See Walker v. Eleby, 577 Pa. 104, 123, 842 A.2d 389, 400 (2004). Of these, we find it most relevant here to bear in mind the principle of liberal construction to promote the remedial statute's objects, see 1 Pa. C.S. \\u00a7 1928(e); the authorization to consider the occasion and necessity for the statute, the mischief to be remedied, the consequences of a particular interpretation, and former laws, see 1 Pa.G.S. \\u00a7 1921; and the latitude to consider that headings included by the General Assembly as an aid, see 1 Pa. C.S. \\u00a7 1924.\\nAnti-lapse and void legacy statutes represent a legislative effort to advance the policy against intestacy that evolved in the common law. See generally 80 Am.JuR.2d Wills \\u00a7 1445 (2005). Appellant concedes that a predecessor statute to Section 2514 reflected the Legislature's attempt to implement a fairly comprehensive set of presumptions across the range from particular to residuary devices and bequests. This approach is consistent with that which prevails in most jurisdictions; indeed, to the extent that Section 2514(11) is read (consistent with its heading, the bulk of its body, and the policy that it serves), as directing a presumption of intent relative to lapsed residuary gifts, it is in harmony with the comprehensive scheme of void legacy presumptions that are recommended under the Uniform Probate Code. Accord 80 Am.JuR.2d Wills \\u00a7 1037 (2005) (\\\"The presumption against an intestacy is particularly strong where the subject of the gift is the residuary estate.\\\"). In this landscape, it seems unlikely that, in revising and codifying the anti-lapse and void legacy provisions within Section 2514, the Legislature intended to effect a substantial retreat by eliminating the presumption applicable to residuary devises and bequests. Indeed, as to such gifts, in material respects Section 2514(11) closely tracks the specific language of the Uniform Probate Code which prevailed at the time of its enactment. Compare Unifoem Probate Code \\u00a7 2-606 (1969) (indicating that, upon failure of a residuary gift not addressed by the anti-lapse provision favoring the heirs of the designated beneficiary, the \\\"share passes to the other residuary devisee, or to other residuary devisees in proportion to their interests in the residue\\\"), with 20 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 2514(11) (\\\"it shall pass to the other residuary devisees or legatees, if any there be, in proportion to their respective shares or interests in the residue\\\").\\nConsistent with the above, the clause headings, and this Court's prior decisions, see supra note 5, we believe that it is reasonably clear that the General Assembly intended clause (11) to supply the presumption that should be applied to lapsed and failed residuary devises and bequests not otherwise addressed under the presumption favoring the heirs of the named beneficiary, see supra note 2, in the absence of reasonable certainty concerning the testator's intent derived from the will instrument and surrounding circumstances. Like the orphan's court, we therefore understand clause (ll)'s cross-reference to clause (10) to refer to the various circumstances that may give rise to a lapse or failure of a residuary gift. Hence, absent some factor or factors not presently before the Court, clause (ll)'s presumption would govern in the event of a partial failure of Dr. Burger's will on account of undue influence attributable to Appellee, and Appellee's fifty-percent share of the residue would be directed as a substitute gift to the other residuary beneficiaries, not to Appellant as an intestate heir.\\nAccordingly, the orphan's court did not err in finding that Appellant lacked standing to pursue a will contest, in light of the arguments that have been preserved to be addressed here.\\nThe order of the Superior Court is affirmed.\\nChief Justice CAPPY, Justice CASTILLE, and Justice BAER join the opinion.\\nFormer Justice NIGRO did not participate in the decision of this case.\\nJustice EAKIN files a concurring opinion in which Justice NEWMAN joins.\\n. Carother's Estate involved a circumstance similar to the present one, in that an intestate heir sought to pursue a will contest on an undue influence theory. See id. at 186-87, 150 A. at 585-86. The case is distinguishable primarily because the challenged bequests were specific ones, rather than residuary. See id. Indeed, the holding that the appellant lacked standing to pursue the contest was predicated on the uncontested specification of a residuary legatee. See id. at 188, 150 A. at 586 (\\\"Where legacies or bequests are declared void for any reason and the will contains a residuary clause disposing of the residue of an estate, the bequests invalidated pass under the residuary clause unless the scheme of the will or testator's intention provides otherwise: Page on Wills, section 507.\\\").\\n. Clause 9 of Section 2514, a pure anti-lapse provision, provides for substitution of issue in the event that certain related beneficiaries predecease the testator. See 20 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 2514(9). Since neither Appellant nor her father were beneficiaries under Dr. Burger's will, there is no argument presented that clause (9) has any direct bearing on the outcome of this case.\\n. The Superior Court's analysis in this regard is confusing, since Section 2514 contains rules of interpretation for the disposition of property that pertain in absence of an expressed contrary intention in a will, and any expression or implication of contrary intention must therefore go to the direction of the disposition of the property at issue. Indeed, the Superior Court otherwise recognized the close relationship between the applicability of the anti-lapse and void legacy provisions of Section 2514 and the indication of an alternative disposition in a will. See Estate of Burger, 852 A.2d at 390 (indicating that, in light of its finding that Dr. Burger's will evinced a contrary intent with reasonable certainty, \\\"the provisions of the anti-lapse statute cannot be applied and the disposition of [Appel-lee's] interest, if deemed void, is controlled by the Will \\\" (emphasis added)).\\n. In this regard, Appellant cites to a myriad of cases that have distinguished between proper interpretation based on the terms of a will in light of the surrounding circumstances, and efforts to move beyond such terms to address how the testator may have wished to confront circumstances that were not contemplated and are not addressed by the will viewed in its surrounding circumstances. See, e.g., In re Estate of Stancik, 451 Pa. 20, 24, 301 A.2d 612, 614 (1973) (describing as equally basic the presumption against intestacy and the principle that a \\\"court must not and cannot reform or rewrite a will\\\"); In re Woodward's Estate, 407 Pa. 638, 640, 182 A.2d 732, 733 (1962) (\\\"[I]t is not what the Court thinks [that a testator] might or would or should have said in the existing circumstances, or even what the Court thinks he meant to say, but what is the meaning of the words.\\\"); In re Estate of Walton, 409 Pa. 225, 231, 186 A.2d 32, 36 (1962) (same); In re Estate of Conlin, 388 Pa. 483, 493, 131 A.2d 117, 122 (1957) (same); In re Estate of Wright, 380 Pa. 106, 108, 110 A.2d 198, 199 (1955) (same); Berger's Estate, 360 Pa. at 371, 61 A.2d at 857 (\\\" '[W]here the testator . failed to make provision for a contingency which actually happened, or to cover circumstances which subsequently resulted, a decree of intestacy [is] unavoidable.' \\\" (quoting In re Verner's Estate, 358 Pa. 280, 285, 56 A.2d 667, 670 (1948))); In re Jacob's Estate, 343 Pa. 387, 392, 22 A.2d 744, 746 (1941) (\\\" 'Words and limitations may be supplied or rejected when warranted by the immediate context or the general scheme of the will, but not merely on a conjectural hypothesis of the testator's intention, however reasonable, in opposition to the plain and obvious sense of the instrument[.]' \\\" (quoting Bender v. Bender, 226 Pa. 607, 613, 75 A. 859, 862 (1910))); Estate of Nebinger, 185 Pa. 399, 404, 39 A. 1049, 1051 (1898) (\\\"[W]hile a construction is not to be adopted, if it can be avoided, which will lead to an intestacy, interpretation is never to assume the proportion of reformation.\\\").\\n. The relevant line of cases concerned clause (10) of Section 14 the Wills Act of 1947, P.L. 89, 20 P.S. \\u00a7 180.14 (superseded), which was substantively identical to clause (11) of Section 2514. See, e.g., In re Estate of McLaughlin, 441 Pa. 538, 542-45, 273 A.2d 742, 744-45 (1971) (equally divided Court) (reasoning that clause (10) of the Wills Act of 1947 resulted in enhancement of the shares of residuary legatees upon failure of a testator to provide for a complete disposition of the residuary estate); Estate of Corbett, 430 Pa. at 60, 241 A.2d at 527 (same, relative to a lapsed bequest); In re Slater's Estate, 377 Pa. 285, 289, 105 A.2d 59, 61 (1954) (same). See generally W.W. Allen, Devolution of lapsed portion of residuary estate, 36 A.L.R.2d 1117 \\u00a7 3b (1954 & Supp.1995) (collecting Pennsylvania cases in which the prevailing Pennsylvania anti-lapse and void legacy statute caused the share associated with a lapsed or void residuary bequest to be retained in the residue and divided among the other residuary beneficiaries).\\nAlthough the Estate of McLaughlin decision from this line was decided by operation of law on account of the Court having been equally divided, the division resulted from a difference of opinion concerning the reasonable certainty of the terms of the will under consideration in the first instance, not from any difference over the meaning of the then-prevailing anti-lapse and void legacies statute. Again, as Appellant acknowledges, her interpretation is a novel one that has never been recognized by the Court in any of the several decisions implementing a contrary interpretation.\\n. Appellant has couched her arguments entirely in terms of her interpretation of Dr. Burger's will and Section 2514; she has not otherwise asserted that she was entitled to an evidentiary hearing relative to the standing inquiry. Therefore, our review is directed exclusively to the legal questions presented.\\n. For the reasons previously stated, we find the Superior Court's reasons for distinguishing Berger's Estate to have been ineffective. See supra note 3. Since, however, Berger's Estate makes no mention of the then-prevailing anti-lapse and void legacy statute, we do not find it controlling with regard to the significance of such statute.\\n. The decision cited by the Superior Court in articulating its holding, Estate of Kehler, does indicate that reasonable certainty, as opposed to express prescription, is the appropriate criterion in assessing whether a will manifests a sufficient intention to avoid application of the anti-lapse and void legacy provisions of Section 2514. See Estate of Kehler, 488 Pa. at 167, 411 A.2d at 750. Nevertheless, in applying the reasonable certainty standard to the facts of the case, involving a testator's failure to make an express statement concerning his intended disposition of residue in the event of a named beneficiaiy's death, the Estate of Kehler Court concluded that, despite the inclusion of an express survivorship provision in the residuary clause, the testator's intent was not sufficiently specific to avoid the application of Section 2514. See id. The decision has been repeatedly referenced as embodying a minority position that elevates the threshold for reasonable certainty and enhances the effect of the relevant anti-lapse and void legacy statute, as opposed to diminishing it. See, e.g., Patricia J. Roberts, Lapse Statutes: Recurring Construction Problems, 37 Emory L.J. 323, 351-52 (1988).\\n.See generally In re Estate of McFarland, 167 S.W.3d 299, 305 (Tenn.2005) (finding it \\\"just as likely\\\" in the event of a failed residuary bequest, that a testator would have considered a devolution to the heirs of the residuary beneficiary as opposed to a substitute gift enhancing the shares of the other residuary legatees); Susan B. French, Antilapse Statutes Are Blunt Instruments: A Blueprint for Reform, 37 Hastings L.J. 335, 335 (1985) (\\\"Any mechanical rule for the disposition of a lapse in the residue \\u2014 whether it be by the common law in favor of intestacy or, oppositely, leading to survivorship, or by statutory provision \\u2014 is, standing alone, likely to be quite arbitrary.\\\"); cf. Roberts, Lapse Statutes: Recurring Construction Problems, 37 Emory L.J. at 348 (observing that \\\"lapse statutes are designed to reflect average intent, but since the statutes vary significantly and since a testator's intent can differ from the average, it is inevitable that cases will arise where the application of a lapse statute would be contrary to intent\\\").\\n. Were this a contest between the heirs of a named residuary legatee and the other residuary beneficiaries occasioned by the failure of a residuary bequest based on some occurrence that would undermine the gift to the named residuary legatee but not his heirs, the judicial presumption implemented by the Superior Court would assume heightened significance. In such circumstance, the disposition directed by the Superior Court to the other residuary beneficiaries based upon a judicial presumption would be directly contrary to the legislative presumption, under clause (9) of Section 2514, of a substitute gift in favor of the heirs of the named residuary legatee. See supra note 2.\\n. Appellant's view appears to be that the requirement for the gifts covered by clause (11) to be included within the residuary clause of the will merely reflects a legislative conception that lapsed or void particular devises or legacies would fall within the residuary by operation of clause (10) upon lapse or invalidation of the gift. Since, however, the statute speaks directly to the subject matter of the actual \\\"residuary clause,\\\" 20 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 2514(11) (emphasis added), Appellant's view does not reflect the same literal approach to the statute that she seeks to have applied to another of its parts.\\n. As noted, Subsections (10) and (11) are a re-enactment of Subsections (9) and (10) of Section 14 of the Wills Act of 1947; these supplanted Section 15(c) of the Wills Act of 1917, Act of June 7, 1915, P.L. 403 (superseded). Appellant acknowledges that she would .have no interest in the outcome of the present will contest if the presumption as directed in Section 15(c) were to be applied to Dr. Burger's will. See Brief of Appellant at 24 (citing In re Armstrong's Estate, 347 Pa. 23, 25-26, 31 A.2d 528, 529 (1943) (holding that under Section 15(c) lapsed residuary gifts fell to the remaining residuary beneficiary); In re Morgan's Estate, 340 Pa. 465, 467, 17 A.2d 454, 455 (1941) (same)).\\n. The Uniform Probate Code directs, subject to an exception favoring the devisee's or legatee's heirs that is analogous to clause (9) of Section 2514, see supra note 2, that \\\"if the residue is devised to two or more persons, the share of a residuary devisee that fails for any reason passes to the other residuary devisee, or to the other residuary devisees in proportion to the interest of each in the remaining part of the residue.\\\" See Uniform Probate Code \\u00a7 2-604 (1990). The version prevailing as of the time of the enactment of Section 2514 was substantively identical. See Uniform Probate Code \\u00a7 2-606 (1969). Notably, a similar result has obtained under common law decisions in some jurisdictions, even in the absence of a statutory prescription. See, e.g., Commerce Nat. Bank v. Browning, 158 Ohio St. 54, 107 N.E.2d 120 (Ohio 1952).\\n. Appellant also contends that, as between clauses (10) and (11) of Section 2514, only clause (11) actually directs the disposition of a lapsed or void residuary devise or bequest, since clause (10) merely indicates that the devise or bequest \\\"shall be included in the residuary!)]\\\" 20 Pa.C.S. \\u00a7 2514(10). See Brief for Appellant at 24-25 (contending that \\\"Subsection (10) does not direct how the failed or void bequests are to be distributed\\\"). The language of clause (10), however, is also directly parallel to Section 2-604 of the Uniform Probate Code (formerly Section 2-606 in the pre-1990 version). See Uniform Probate Code \\u00a7 2-604(a) (1990) (\\\"Except as provided in [the anti-lapse provision favoring the heirs of the devisee or legatee], a devise, other than a residuary devise, that fails for any reason becomes a part of the residue.\\\"). The difference in phraseology as between clauses (10) and (11), as well as their counterparts in the Uniform Probate Code, is apparently accounted for by the fact that the subject matter of clause (11) requires some additional elaboration pertinent to the treatment of the residue, since the express residuary scheme will have been disrupted. Moreover, clause (10) is phrased in substantially the same manner as the common law formulation of the relevant presumption, which this Court has understood to direct a disposition for the property. See supra note 1.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"848272\", \"name\": \"Bigley, Appellant, v. Bellevue Borough\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Bigley v. Bellevue Borough\", \"decision_date\": \"1893-11-13\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal, No. 304\", \"first_page\": \"495\", \"last_page\": \"497\", \"citations\": \"158 Pa. 495\", \"volume\": \"158\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:27:33.447957+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Williams, McCollum, Mitchell, Dean and Thompson, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Bigley, Appellant, v. Bellevue Borough.\", \"head_matter\": \"Bigley, Appellant, v. Bellevue Borough.\\nConstables \\u2014 Boroughs\\u2014Reducing salary \\u2014 Art. 3, sec. 13, const.\\nWhere a borough employs a constable to light lamps and patrol the streets at a fixed compensation per day, the wages received by the constable for such work are not an official salary which cannot be reduced Without violating art. 3, \\u00a7 13, of the constitution, which forbids the decrease of an officer\\u2019s salary during his term of office.\\nArgued Nov. 10, 1893.\\nAppeal, No. 304, Oct. T., 1893, by plaintiff, William Bigley, from judgment of C. P. No. 3, Allegheny Co., Nov. T., 1892, No. 107, on verdict for defendant.\\nBefore Williams, McCollum, Mitchell, Dean and Thompson, JJ.\\nAssumpsit for services. Before McClung, J.\\n\\u25a0 Plaintiff claimed to recover $240 for services rendered to defendant as constable, lamplighter and patrolman for the months of April, May, June and July, 1892, at two dollars per day. At the trial, it appeared that on April 1, 1890, the town council of the borough passed the following resolution: \\u201c Resolved, that William Bigley, high constable of the borough, be and is hereby appointed borough policeman and lamplighter for the year commencing March 4,1890, and that his compensation be fixed at two dollars per day.\\u201d Appellant performed the duties of borough policeman and lamplighter in 1890, 1891 and up until April 18, 1892, and received the compensation of two dollars per dajr provided for such services, up to and including March, 1892. For the services rendered by appellant in April, 1892, he was tendered compensation at the rate of two dollars per day, but refused to accept it. On March 7, 1892, plaintiff qualified as high constable for a new term. On April 15,1892, the town council passed a new ordinance repealing the prior ordinance, and all conflicting ordinances, and on April 18,1892, the burgess notified appellant that he was discharged as policeman and lamplighter, and that Charles P. Carson was appointed in his place.\\nBinding instructions were given for defendant. Verdict and judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appealed.\\nError assigned was instruction, quoting it.\\nGeorge E. Quaill, for appellant,\\ncited: Acts of April 1, 1884, \\u00a7\\u00a7 6, 14, 15, P. L. 164; Purd. 206; April 3, 1851, \\u00a7\\u00a7 5, 13, P. L. 320; Purd. 210; \\u201cHigh Constable\\u201d in Trickett\\u2019s Borough Law; Dillon, Mun. Corp. \\u00a7 231; People v. Crissey, 91 N. Y. 616.\\nLawrence Johnston, E. M. Scott with him, for appellee,\\ncited: Shaub v. Lancaster, 156 Pa. 362; 1 Dillon, Mun. Corp., 4th ed., p. 384; Act of April 3, 1851, P. L. 320; Barker v. Pittsburgh, 4 Pa. 49; Com. v. Bacon, 6 S. & R. 322; Shafer v. Senseman, 125 Pa. 310; Constable\\u2019s Case, 7 Pa. C. C. R. 550; s. c., 25 W. N. 555; Weikel\\u2019s Bond, 8 Pa. C. C. R. 121; Tyson\\u2019s Bond, 2 Dist. R. 633; Womer\\u2019s Bond, 2 Dist. R. 670.\\nNovember 13, 1893:\", \"word_count\": \"752\", \"char_count\": \"4344\", \"text\": \"Opinion by\\nMr. Justice Williams,\\nThe plaintiff was the high constable of Bellevue. As such he was entitled to fees for the service of process issued by the burgess for the enforcement of the ordinances and the preservation of the public peace. For serving notices and similar services rendered the borough he has a right to compensation, either by a salary or fees, as the borough may determine. But his official duties were not onerous. He obtained employment from the borough in lighting the street lamps, and patrolling the streets from 2 o'clock p. m. of each day until 2 o'clock A. M. of the next, at the price of two dollars per day. He served in this capacity for one or more years. At length the borough decided for some reason to discontinue the employment and gave the plaintiff notice. This action is brought to recover three months pay, alleged to have accrued since the discontin uance of the service on the ground that the per diem was an official salary that could not be reduced during the term of office of the incumbent. As the borough might have employed any other person to perform the same service we cannot agree that the plaintiff's wages are to be regarded as an official salary. The borough could discontinue the work it employed him to do, or change the workman, without coming in conflict with the constitutional provision which forbids the decrease of an officer's salary during his term of office.\\nThe learned judge of the court below was quite right in his view of this case and the judgment must be affirmed.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"8729254\", \"name\": \"Whelen Estate\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Whelen Estate\", \"decision_date\": \"1954-03-22\", \"docket_number\": \"no. 3203\", \"first_page\": \"5\", \"last_page\": \"15\", \"citations\": \"88 Pa. D. & C. 5\", \"volume\": \"88\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania District and County Reports\", \"court\": \"Philadelphia County Orphans' Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:39:41.047614+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Whelen Estate\", \"head_matter\": \"Whelen Estate\\nGeorge B. Ross, for Bournes, Dechert, Price, Myers & Rhoads, for accountant.\\nBen W. Ingber, for John Howard Whelen, legatee.\\nThomas S. Weary, of Duane, Morris & Heckscher, for possible remaindermen.\\nArthur M. Cooper, for Commonwealth.\\nMarch 22, 1954.\", \"word_count\": \"3085\", \"char_count\": \"18415\", \"text\": \"Lefever, J.,\\n\\u2014 Emily Whelen, who died November 1, 1929, by her will, inter alia, gave the sum of $15,000 to the accountant, in trust, to pay the net income therefrom to her niece, Charlotte Frazer, for life, and by codicil, dated July 14, 1920, inter alia, also gave a share of her residuary estate to the accountant, in trust, for the benefit of the niece, Charlotte Frazer, for life, and directed that upon the decease of Charlotte Frazer the $15,000 trust fund and residuary trust fund be equally divided among testatrix's nieces and nephews, by name, viz., Isabella H. Dolan, Agnes W. Duffus, Christine C. Whelen, John Howard Whelen, Persifor Frazer, and John Frazer. By a later codicil, dated September 25, 1922, testatrix, because of the death of Christine C. Whelen, niece, revoked the bequests which had been made for her benefit (as to which there is no dispute concerning the completeness and all embracing effect of such revocation) . By still another later codicil, dated September 11, 1925, testatrix, \\\"for the reason\\\" that her nephew, Persifor Frazer, had died, proceeded to revoke certain bequests which she had made for his benefit (as to which there is a dispute as to the effect of such revocation's and which will hereinafter be adverted to).\\nThe funds accounted for relate to the above trusts and were awarded to the present accountants by adjudication of Henderson, J., dated November 5, 1930, sur the audit of the executor's account. The funds of both trusts have been merged \\u2014 apparently for the reason that Charlotte Frazer was the cestui que trust as to both trusts \\u2014 it being stated that the $15,000 trust constitutes 51.44 per cent of the commingled fund (see statement of proposed distribution).\\nThe account is filed because of the death of Charlotte Frazer, the life tenant, which occurred July 30, 1953, whereupon the trusts, the subject of the present accounting, wholly terminated.\\nTestatrix was survived by no issue.\\nPersifor Frazer, one of the nephews, died in the \\\" lifetime of testatrix (as noted by testatrix herself in the codicil aforementioned), leaving to survive him three children, Maria N. Dougherty, Isabel F. Bell and Persifor Frazer, 3rd, who are still living.\\nAgnes W. Duffus, one of the nieces, died November 29, 1933, leaving a will, which was duly probated, and whereby she gave one half of her estate to her son, Kenneth Sutherland Duffus, and the other one half in trust for the benefit of her husband, Francis Ferguson Duffus, until his death or remarriage, with remainder over (and the husband died December 1, 1953) to her son, Kenneth Sutherland Duffus.\\nIsabel H. Dolan, one of the nieces, died November 10, 1953, leaving a will, duly probated on November 13,1953, by the Register of Wills of Delaware County, whereunder letters testamentary were granted to H. Hoffman Dolan, executor.\\nThe nephews, John Howard Whelen and John Frazer, still survive.\\nThe question presented for determination is whether testatrix revoked all provisions in her will and codicils with respect to bequests made to her nephew, Persifor Frazer, or merely revoked those items specifically referred to in her codicil, dated September 11, 1925, with the consequence that under the antilapse provision of section 15(6) of the Wills Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 403, the three children of Persifor Frazer are entitled to the unrevoked gifts as were made to him.\\nBy her will and second and third codicils, testatrix made a total of nine provisions for Persifor Frazer. He subsequently died, and following his death testatrix wrote the codicil, dated September 11,1925, which reads, as follows:\\n\\\"I revoke the clauses in my Will where I say I leave $15,000 to my nephew Persifor Frazer my Father's gold watch, all silverware, jewelry, pictures, furniture, books and any other articles also the share of money which he would receive from my residuary estate for the reason that he has died. I direct my executor to pay the interest on the fifteen thousand dollars which I had left to Persifor Frazer to his wife Virginia K. Frazer during the term of her life at her death the $15,000 is to go to my residuary estate. I revoke the clause in my Will where I leave my portion of Pew 56 in the Church of the Holy Trinity to Persifor Frazer and to John Frazer because they did not care to keep it. I now give and bequeath to the corporation known as The Rector, Church Wardens and Vestrymen of The Church of the Holy Trinity my portion of three seats in the pew to be free forever as an endowed memorial to my Father Edward L. Whelen for the sum of $2000. . . .\\\"\\nIt may be discerned from the codicil, dated September 11,1925, as above quoted, that testatrix specifically revoked five provisions, namely: (1) $15,000; (2) \\\"My Father's gold watch\\\"; (3) \\\"all silverware, jewelry, pictures, furniture, books and any other articles\\\"; (4) \\\"the share of money which he would receive from my residuary estate,\\\" and (5) \\\"my portion of Pew 56 in the Church of the Holy Trinity\\\". There is no specific reference to (1) Persifor's one-fifth share of the remainder of the principal of trust of $15,000 for Charlotte Frazer for life; (2) Persifor's one-fifth share of the remainder of the trust of a share of residue for Charlotte Frazer, for life, or (3) Persifor's one-sixth share in the $15,000 legacy (originally given Christine C. Whelen by the will but revoked, because of her death, by codicil dated September 26,1922) bequeathed under that codicil, dated September 26,1922. As to the latter legacy of $15,000 (originally given Christine), it should be here noted that by adjudication of Henderson, J., dated November 5, 1930, sur the audit of the executor's account, or at least pursuant to schedule of distribution thereon filed and approved December 13, 1930, the $15,000 was awarded or distributed, as follows: $3,000, each, to John Howard Whelen, Mrs. Isabel H. Dolan, John Frazer, Miss Charlotte Frazer and Mrs. Agnes W. Duffus. Thus the three children of Persifor Frazer, deceased, were excluded from sharing in the $15,000 legacy. At the present audit, it was conceded that the three children of Persifor Frazer, deceased, had never received any notice of the audit of the executor's account in 1930, nor notice of any question relating to the effect of testatrix's revocation of bequests made to her nephew, Persifor Frazer.\\n\\\"The established rule is that a codicil shall not be construed to disturb or change the dispositions of a will further than is necessary to give effect to the provisions of the codicil. As we said in Dutton's Estate, 301 Pa. 94, 97: '. . . The clear provisions of a will are only affected by a codicil to the extent absolutely necessary to give effect to the codicil.' See Reichard's Appeal, 116 Pa. 232; Schattenberg's Estate, 269 Pa. 90; Vernier's Estate, 282 Pa. 194; Baugh's Estate, 288 Pa. 308; Rainear's Estate, 304 Pa. 539; Frechie's Estate, 62 Pa. Superior Ct. 48.\\\": Chauncey's Estate, 335 Pa. 73, 76 (1939).\\nHad testatrix intended to revoke all the provisions for Persifor Frazer, the simple and logical thing for her to have done would have been to say, \\\"I revoke all provisions in my will and codicils for Persifor Frazer.\\\" Testatrix did this precise thing in the third codicil, viz.:\\n\\\"Christine C. Whelen having died after my Will was made I revoke all money, pictures, rings, silver, jewelry and other articles which by division she would have received from my Estate.\\\"\\nSince testatrix knew how to write a broad, all-inclusive revocation, and since she did not use such language with regard to Persifor Frazer, she must be held to have intended not to revoke all provisions for him but only those provisions which she specifically enumerated.\\nIf testatrix wanted to make some adjustment in her bequests because of Persifor Frazer's death, that is, to eliminate some of them but to preserve others for his children, she could have accomplished this in two ways: (1) By specifically revoking certain items and specifically bequeathing and devising the other items to Persifor Frazer's children; (2) to have done exactly what she did, namely, to enumerate the bequests which she wished revoked. The first would have been the lawyerlike way. But this codicil was apparently holographic. However, it would do injustice to the intention appearing from the actual language of the codicil to hold that the second method was not as efficacious in law as the first. The well-known doctrine, inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, is applicable. Testatrix specifically referred to certain items which she revoked. A fortiori, she did not revoke the provisions not mentioned.\\nIt should be noted that Mr. Frazer's three children will be the beneficiaries of the unrevoked items in testatrix's will and codicils. She is presumed to have known the law that his children are entitled to take the unrevoked gifts. It is at least reasonable to believe that she intended them to benefit therein.\\nIt is to be noted that Acelie Whelen and Christine Whelen, who also predeceased testatrix, did not have children. This may explain why there is sweeping revocation as to their gifts, and revocations as to only specific items with regard to bequests to Persifor Frazer. As Judge Penrose said in Page's Estate, affirmed on his opinion in 227 Pa. 288, 289 (1910), \\\" '. . . where a testator uses a different word or phrase it will be presumed to have a different meaning' \\\".\\nTo hold that testatrix's statement in the questioned codicil \\\"for the reason that he has died\\\" demonstrated an intention upon her part to revoke all provisions in the will and codicils for him, would amount to speculation as to her intention. It is well settled that the court may not do this.\\n\\\" 'Conjecture is not permitted to supply what the testator has failed to indicate . . . The question is confined to the meaning of what the testator has said, and does not extend to the consideration of what he might have said hut did not' . . Jacobs Estate, 343 Pa. 387, 394 (1941).\\n\\\"It will not do for the courts to undertake to guess at the intention of a testator and declare that to be his will. If he sees fit for any reason not to dispose of any part of his estate, or such is the result of ignorance or oversight, the courts cannot supply the gap or hiatus and reconstruct the will.\\\" Grothe's Estate, 229 Pa. 186, 192 (1910).\\n\\\"Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in Eaton v. Brown, 193 U. S. 411, said, p. 413: 'The English Courts are especially and wisely careful not to substitute a lively imagination for what a testator might have said but did not. This court has rigidly adhered to this rule.' \\\": Morrison Will, 361 Pa. 419, 421 (1949). It follows, and I hereby rule, that testatrix did not revoke the un mentioned items, but only those items which were specifically mentioned in the codicil in dispute.\\nThis leads to a consideration of the meaning of the words in the questioned codicil:\\n\\\"I revoke the clause in my will where I say I leave . . . also the share of money which he would receive from my residuary estate . .\\nThe provision with regard to the disposition of testatrix's residuary estate is as follows:\\n\\\"All the rest residue and remainder of my estate I give, bequeath and devise to my nieces and nephews here mentioned Isabel H. Dolan, Agnes W. Duffus, Christine C. Whelen, Persifor Frazer, John Frazer, John Howard Whelen. I instruct my executor to pay the income of the equal share of this amount to Charlotte Frazer during her life upon her decease to divide the principal between my nieces and nephews here mentioned, Isabel H. Dolan, Agnes W. Duffus, Christine C. Whelen, John Howard Whelen, Persifor Frazer, John Frazer.\\\"\\nIt appears that Persifor Frazer was entitled to: (1) An outright undivided equal share of the residuary estate upon testatrix's death, and (2) an undivided equal share of principal in remainder of the share of the residue given in trust for life to Charlotte Frazer. Both of these interests are in the residuary estate. The first share is due on testatrix's death. The second share is payable upon the death of Charlotte Frazer, life tenant. Although the intent of testatrix is not free from doubt, it seems to me that a reasonable construction of the language, \\\"the share of money which he would receive from my residuary estate\\\", includes his interest in the residuary estate both as a direct beneficiary and as a remainderman of the trust for Charlotte Frazer. I so rule. It follows that the children of Persifor Frazer are not entitled to share in the residuary estate either directly or in the remainder of the trust of a share of the residuary estate for Charlotte Frazer.\\nOn the other hand, Persifor Frazer's children are' entitled to receive his share in the remainder of the trust for Charlotte Frazer in the amount of $15,000 created by testatrix's third codicil. This is because that trust was not specifically mentioned in the revoking codicil at issue. Awards will be so made.\\nFollowing the same line of reasoning, the children of Persifor Frazer were entitled to a one-sixth share of the $15,000 legacy (originally given Christine C. Whelen) which testatrix directed, by codicil dated September 26, 1922, be divided \\\"equally among my nieces and nephews of the following names . . . Persifor Frazer . . .\\\" since the disputed codicil, dated September 11, 1925, did not specifically revoke that gift.\\nAs pointed out above, in his adjudication Judge Henderson treated this gift to Persifor Frazer as revoked and awarded the fund to the other five nephews and nieces. However, no notice of the account and audit was given to the children of Persifor Frazer. The same nephews and nieces (or their issue or heirs), except and excluding, however, Charlotte Frazer, are entitled to the funds now before me and received a one-fifth share of the $15,000 legacy (Christine's revoked legacy) under the adjudication of Judge Henderson. It is well settled that in such circumstances this court has the power to, and should, equalize the participation of all parties in the $15,000 bequest: Albertson's Estate, 329 Pa. 372 (1938), Reed's Estate, 237 Pa. 125 (1912) ; Yetter's Estate, 160 Pa. 506 (1894); see Edward Estate, 360 Pa. 504 (1948). This can be accomplished by adding to the total share which the three children of Persifor Frazer would receive out of the funds presently before the court, an additional amount equal to one sixth of the fund of $15,000, namely, $2,500, less, however, $500 which was overpaid to Charlotte, a net sum of $2,000 and thus by deducting $500 from each share so awardable to the other nephews and nieces. No interest on this fund is claimed, nor will be allowed. Such equalization is directed and awards will be made accordingly.\\nIt is noted in the statement of proposed distribution that by writing, dated November 19, 1958, John Howard Whelen assigned up to $3,000 of his distributive share to the Pennsylvania Company for Banking and Trusts as security for loans from that company.\\nIt is further noted that Charlotte Frazer, the deceased life tenant, died owning gross assets, including accrued income from this trust of less than $500 and that her estate was settled and ordered distributed pursuant to petition under section 202 of the Fiduciaries' Act of 1949, by decree of this court (no. 3573 of 1953), dated December 18, 1953, her entire estate, subject to payment of counsel fee and such inheritance tax as may be due, having been awarded to Academy of Assumption. The award of undistributed income to July 30, 1953 (date of her death), to which her estate is entitled in the instant trust, will accordingly be awarded in pursuance of the decree of December 18, 1953, above referred to.\\nAccordingly, of the balance as shown by the account, principal, $18,917.83, composed as therein set forth, less costs of filing account, and less additional costs, $4.63: 51.44% thereof (representing the interest of the $15,000 trust in the commingled fund accounted for and as to which trust the remainder interest of Persifor Frazer was not revoked), is awarded, as follows: One fifth (less $500) to H. Hoffman Dolan, executor of will of Isabel H. Dolan, deceased; one fifth (less $500) to John Howard Whelen, subject to his assignment hereinabove mentioned; one fifth (less $500) to John Frazer; one fifth (less $500) to Kenneth Sutherland Duffus, subject to such inheritance tax as may be due in estate of Agnes W. Duffus, and one fifth, plus the $2,000 deducted and charged to prior four-fifth shares, equally among Marion Frazer Dougherty, Persifor Frazer, 3rd, and Isabel Frazer Bell (the three children of Persifor Frazer, deceased nephew); and what remains (representing the interest of the trust of share of residue for Charlotte Frazer, life tenant (now deceased) and as to which the remainder interest of Persifor Frazer was revoked), is awarded: One fourth thereof, each, to H. Hoffman Dolan, executor of will of Isabel H. Dolan, deceased, John Howard Whelen (subject to his assignment), John Frazer and Kenneth Sutherland Duffus (the latter's share subject to such tax as may be due in estate of Agnes W. Duffus).\\nPayment and distribution is so decreed with leave to make any and all necessary assignments and transfers.\\nThe balance, income, $1,851.70, less distribution made to Charlotte Frazer, life tenant, aggregating $1,807.75, as shown by the account, leaving $43.95, with any additional collections to time of actual distribution, is awarded, so that the undistributed accrued income due estate of Charlotte Frazer, deceased, passes pursuant to decree of the court, dated December 18, 1953 (no. 3573 of 1953) to Academy of Assumption, subject to payment of transfer inheritance tax as may be due; and the rest to and among the parties to whom the principal is above awarded and in the same proportions as indicated. Payment is so decreed.\\nAccountant will submit a schedule of distribution, in duplicate, certified by counsel to be correct and in conformity with this adjudication, which schedule, when and if approved by the auditing judge, will be annexed hereto and form part hereof.\\nAnd now, to wit, March 22, 1954, the account is confirmed nisi.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"8729330\", \"name\": \"Ryan Estate\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Ryan Estate\", \"decision_date\": \"1952-03-05\", \"docket_number\": \"no. 91 of 1951\", \"first_page\": \"18\", \"last_page\": \"29\", \"citations\": \"81 Pa. D. & C. 18\", \"volume\": \"81\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania District and County Reports\", \"court\": \"Delaware County Orphans' Court\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:41:50.133573+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Ryan Estate\", \"head_matter\": \"Ryan Estate\\nFrank I. Ginsburg, for appellant.\\nRaymond E. Larson, for First National Bank of Media et al.\\nElgin E. Weest, for Commonwealth.\\nMarch 5, 1952.\", \"word_count\": \"3467\", \"char_count\": \"20094\", \"text\": \"van Roden, P. J.,\\nJoseph M. Ryan died on October 12, 1950, intestate, leaving to survive him a widow, Effie P. Ryan (who has subsequently remarried and is now known as Effie R. Meissner), and by one child by a former marriage, Mary A. Ryan, who is a minor and for whose estate the First National Bank of Media has duly qualified as guardian.\\nThe widow, Effie R. Meissner, duly qualified as ad-ministratrix of her husband's estate.\\nThe Register of Wills of Delaware County valued and appraised the personal estate of decedent for inheritance tax purposes in the sum of $9,001.73, which included the restaurant liquor license (held by decedent at the time of his death) as an asset of his estate valued in the appraisement at $5,000.\\nA summary of the pertinent facts, which are not disputed, follows:\\nThis decedent operated for some time prior to his death a restaurant and taproom at 7905 West Chester Pike, Upper Darby Township, in this county. He was the sole owner of the restaurant business, including the fixtures and equipment, stock, liquor and beer used in the business. He was the lessee of the real estate where this business was conducted up until the time of his death.\\nAfter decedent's death, for a period of several months, the administratrix continued to operate the business of decedent, using the funds of decedent which were on deposit in a bank account in her name as ad-ministratrix, as well as the liquor license issued by the Pennsylvania State Liquor Control Board. About one week after her husband's death, October 18, 1950, as administratrix of the estate of Joseph M. Ryan, deceased, she made an application for the transfer of the liquor license to herself in her individual capacity, stating that there was no other person primarily interested in the original license in the name of decedent, although she knew at that time the minor child of decedent was an heir and also primarily interested in his estate.\\nThe liquor license was transferred to Effie R. Meiss-ner on October 31, 1950, and shortly thereafter she negotiated for a sale of the license to certain persons for the price of $11,800.\\nMrs. Meissner testified that as administratrix she transferred to herself as an individual the fixtures and equipment of the restaurant and taproom including the stock, liquor and beer which decedent owned at the time of his death. It may be significant that nowhere in the evidence adduced at the hearing does she produce any checks or other evidence of payment for these items. It is only in the account, filed some 10 months after decedent's death that she charges herself with the inventory value of the fixtures, equipment, stock, liquor and beer, totaling $800.\\nObjection is made by the widow to \\\"assessing the restaurant liquor license formerly in the name of Joseph M. Ryan, deceased, as an asset of the estate\\\" for inheritance tax purposes by the register of wills. From this assessment and appraisement an appeal has been taken by her to this court.\\nThe contention of appellant, Effie R. Meissner, \\\"as administratrix and heir\\\" of present decedent is that the liquor license issued to decedent was never a property right, but only a- personal privilege which terminated with the licensee's life, and therefore was not an asset of his estate. For this reason she claims that the assessment and appraisement for inheritance tax purposes should be suspended and the assessment and appraisement reduced in the amount of the valuation placed upon the restaurant liquor license.\\nFor the same reason the claim is made that the value of the license is not an asset of decedent's estate to be accounted for in the settlement of his estate. Her position regarding the transfer of the license to her appears to be that such transfer constituted the issuance of a new and independent personal license or privilege to her in her individual capacity having no connection whatever with the original license (which was actually transferred to her).\\nIn opposition to the above-recited contention of appellant, counsel for the Commonwealth argues that a liquor license has a peculiar pecuniary value, the amount of which can, be determined by the circumstances of the case; and in cases where the same has been transferred upon the death of the licensee to the personal representative or spouse of decedent, in accordance with the terms and provisions of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Act of November 29, 1933 (special sessions), P. L. 15, as amended, such valuation is taxable for inheritance tax purposes.\\nBy exceptions and objections filed by the First National Bank of Media as guardian of the estate of Mary A. Ryan, a minor daughter of decedent, to the first and final account of the widow, Effie R. Meissner, as admin-istratrix of her husband's estate, and which is presently before the court for audit, it is contended that the administratrix should account for the amount of the value of the license as an asset of the estate, and charge herself for that amount in her accounting of her administration of the estate.\\nAfter careful examination of the reported cases, it does not appear that the exact point raised in this case has ever been decided, to wit, whether a liquor license issued by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board held by a decedent until the time of his death and transferred to the personal representative or wife of the deceased licensee in accordance with the provisions of section 408 of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Act of November 29, 1933 (special sessions), P. L. 15, as amended, is subject to assessment and tax under the provisions of the Pennsylvania Inheritance Tax Laws, as a taxable asset of the estate of decedent.\\nIn the case of In re Lynaugh's Estate, 4 Chester 149 (1949), the court refused to surcharge an accountant with the value of the good will of a taproom. In that case, the owners (heirs of decedent), of real estate leased the same and assented to the transfer of the hotel liquor license and the assignment of the furniture and the equipment. It was held that the good will passed inseparably with the leasehold and insofar as that good will was the outgrowth and an incident of a liquor licensed establishment, it followed inevitably the transfer of the license, the privilege of which was to be enjoyed upon that hotel premises. However, that case is easily distinguishable from the instant case, for there was no transfer of the license by the personal representative to himself in his individual capacity, nor was there any evidence of market value of the license.\\nIn the case at bar the court is fortunate to have the benefit of careful and efficient preparation and presentation of the respective contentions of their clients by exceptionally able counsel for all of the parties in interest. Their briefs as well as oral arguments were prepared and submitted with extraordinary care, skill and ability. This together with the evidence submitted has been of great value and assistance to the court in arriving at a proper determination of the questions raised.\\nCounsel for appellant (widow and heir of decedent, as well as administratrix of his estate) relies chiefly upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pichler v. Snavely, 366 Pa. 568 (1951). In this case the court held that an action in assumpsit would not lie because the value of a retail liquor license could not accurately be determined in such an action. The court (Mr. Justice Bell) said, purely as dictum, at page 569:\\n\\\"The law is well settled that a liquor license is not a property right, but only a purely personal privilege for a specific limited time, which is subject to termination by the Liquor Control Board for cause and which, in any event, terminates with the licensee's life. A liquor license or the privilege to sell liquors for a specified time, although often very valuable, is not assign able, (as that term is generally understood) nor does it go to the personal representatives or become an asset of the holder's estate in case of death.\\\" (Italics supplied.)\\nIn the same case, Mr. Justice Bell further said, also as dictum, at page 570:\\n\\\"We believe the reasons why equity will act demonstrate why an action of assumpsit will not lie herein; and that the following language in the Court's opinion in Cochrane v. Szpakowski, 355 Pa. 357, 362, 49 A. 2d 692, applies equally to the instant case \\u2014 ' \\\"this contract involves the transfer and ownership of a retail liquor license, the value of which cannot be accurately determined in an action at law. It seems unrealistic . to close our eyes to the fact that under the Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 806, the Quota Act, new retail liquor licenses cannot be issued by the Board in the City of (Philadelphia) because the number allowed by that Act is greatly exceeded by the existing licenses. This gives to the license here involved a peculiar value depending upon the business ability and the popularity of the owner, which cannot be accurately or adequately measured or compensated for in an action at law.\\\"'\\\" (Italics supplied.)\\nThus, the effect of the decision in the case of Pichler v. Snavely is that an action in assumpsit (at law) will not lie for damages resulting from defendant's failure to perform an agreement to transfer a liquor license to plaintiff for the reason that, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Cochrane v. Szpakowski, 355 Pa. 357 (1946), the value of a liquor license cannot accurately be determined in an action at law, and the court indicates, following Cochrane v. Szpakowski (at p. 569), that such a license is \\\"often very valuable\\\", and (at page 570), \\\"This gives to the license here involved a peculiar value depending upon the business ability and the popularity of the owner\\\".\\nExamination of the facts in the case of Grimm's Estate, 181 Pa. 233 (1897), discloses that the widow was not the personal representative of decedent, and she purchased from the executor the fixtures of the saloon and stock of liquors at a fair price (the appraised valuation) . She then rented the same premises which had been used by her husband, and upon her petition to the court under the provisions of the liquor license law then in force, secured the transfer of the liquor license to herself. Later, she sold the business and on her petition the license was transferred to the purchaser. The estate proving to be insolvent,- upon objection by a creditor, the auditing judge surcharged the executor in the amount which the widow had received from the sale of the business. The Supreme Court reversed the court below upon the ground that the widow came into possession of the stock and fixtures as a purchaser at a fair value, that the license was a purely personal privilege which did not pass to the executor as an asset of the estate, and a creditor has no standing to object to the transfer to her.\\nThus, we note a substantial dissimilarity in regard to the facts in the Grimm Estate and those in the instant case, by reason of which the decision in that case cannot apply to the issue to be determined here.\\nWe are not unmindful of the fact that the Supreme Court has said many times that as an abstract proposition (a) a liquor license is not a property right, (b) is only a personal privilege, (c) is subject to termination for cause and in any event with the licensee's life, (d) is not assignable by the holder, and (e) at his death does not go to his personal representative as an asset of his estate.\\nHowever, an examination of the undisputed facts in the instant case, as hereinabove recited, makes it clear that these general statements appearing in opinions in cases where the facts as well as the principles of law to be decided are not similar to those of this case, cannot be invoked to sustain the appeal by the administra-trix and heir, Effie R. Meissner, from the assessment and appraisement of the value of the estate for inheritance tax purposes.\\nThe question to be decided on the appeal filed in this case is whether the assessment of the restaurant liquor license as an integral part of the business of decedent and the appraisement thereof for inheritance tax purposes was lawful. The determination of this question will dispose of the objection to the account of the admin-istratrix that she failed to account for the value of the liquor license.\\nIt is the opinion of the court that when Effie R. Meiss-ner continued for some time to operate the restaurant business of decedent as administratrix of her husband's estate, using the funds on deposit in a bank account in her name as administratrix, the stock of liquors, fixtures and other equipment of decedent's business, she acted in a fiduciary capacity (as administratrix). In fact, her testimony is all to this effect, notwithstanding her claim that she purchased the restaurant business in her individual capacity from the estate, which is entirely unsupported by competent evidence. It is admitted that the liquor license, although transferred to her individual name, was used in the conduct of this business by her as administratrix. Although she testified that the business was a losing proposition notwithstanding all of her efforts to salvage it (for the estate) it would appear that the continued existence and operation of the business was an essential factor in the securing of a purchaser of the liquor license.\\nIn this case there is no problem before the court at this time of ascertaining the value of the liquor license, which was the crucial point in Pichler v. Snavely, because it is admitted that the administratrix had negotiated a sale thereof for $11,800.\\nIn this case, the widow did not purchase the business from the estate, as was done in Grimm's Estate, but she retained the same as an asset of the estate, accounting, however, only for the amount of the original inventory as of the date of Mr. Ryan's death.\\nA transfer of the liquor license to her individual name was accomplished by her under the provisions of section 408 of the Act of November 29,1933, as amended June 16, 1937, P. L. 1762, she being the surviving spouse and personal representative of the deceased licensee. In fact, she seeks in her first and final account as administratrix to charge the estate for counsel fees for services relating to the transfer of the liquor license.\\nThere was some difference of opinion expressed as to whether the quota for the municipality where the restaurant business was located, and for which the liquor license was issued, was filled, but the fact is that someone is willing to pay the sum of $11,800 for this license.\\nEven if the liquor license cannot be considered as a \\\"'property right\\\", and not marketable as such, and which terminates upon the death of the licensee, it would be unrealistic to ignore the fact that it was granted for a particular place and must have added materially to the value of the restaurant business of decedent.\\nThe acts of the widow administratrix bring this case very close to the case of Aschenbach v. Carey, 224 Pa. 303 (1909), where it was held that where an administrator has a liquor license, originally granted to decedent, transferred to himself individually, but pays transfer charges and subsequent renewals out of moneys of the estate, deposits moneys from the business in a bank for the benefit of the estate, and pays therefrom the expenses of the business, the proceeds of the sale of the license cannot be attached by the ad ministrator's creditors, but belong to the estate. The court held that the liquor license may add materially to the value of the fixtures, good will and unexpired term of the lease, if there be any, and that the administrator has the duty to obtain the best possible price for these as assets of the estate. The court said, at page 310:\\n\\\"Though a liquor license is not, per se, an asset of the estate of a decedent to whom it was issued, the representative of such estate can make no personal profit through it, and if he chooses to make of it a valuable asset for the estate, on no principle ought it to be taken from the estate and made an asset of his own to satisfy his creditors. If a license is not, per se, an asset of an estate, it certainly is not an asset of anyone else.\\\" (Italics supplied.)\\nUnder the facts of the case at bar, for the reasons given, it is the opinion of this court that the liquor license which was held by decedent as licensee at the time of his death and which was transferred by his personal representative to herself shortly after his death and used by her in the restaurant business of decedent, which she continued to operate as administratrix of his estate, is an integral part of the business of the estate, and as such is subject to assessment and appraisement for inheritance tax purposes under the law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.\\nIn conformity with the above, the court holds that Effie R. Meissner had no legal right to benefit personally and individually by the transfer of the liquor license by her as administratrix of the estate of her husband to herself as an individual, for the reason that she was able to secure such transfer only by virtue of the provisions of section 408 of the Liquor Control Act, because she was the spouse or personal representative of her husband's estate, and because she certified incorrectly to the Liquor Control Board that there was no other person than herself as an individual primarily interested in the original license in the name of decedent, although she knew of the interest of the other heir, the minor child of decedent, which was equal to her own. It would be unconscionable for her to capitalize upon her capacity as administratrix to secure such a valuable thing, use it in conjunction with the business asset of this estate, and thereby secure for herself, to the detriment of the estate, a large sum of money for the license. She chose to make the license a valuable asset for the estate, and she may not take it from the estate and make it her own property.\\nUnder the facts of this case the court holds that by law and justice the liquor license which was originally in the name of the decedent was a valuable asset of the estate, even though the personal privilege to decedent terminated with his death; thus, by reason of the fiduciary relationship of Effie R. Meissner, she will not be permitted to invoke this relationship to deprive the estate of this asset and secure it for herself; and that, therefore, as administratrix of the estate of Joseph M. Ryan, deceased, she must account for the value of the liquor license as an asset of the estate, and further, the value of the liquor license is subject to tax under the provisions of the Pennsylvania State Inheritance Tax laws. Accordingly, the court enters the following\\nDecree\\nAnd now, to wit, March 5, 1952, the above matter having come on to be heard on appeal from the assessment and appraisement of the restaurant liquor license formerly in the name of Joseph M. Ryan, as an asset of his estate by the register of wills for inheritance tax purposes, and after a hearing in open court, and after full and careful consideration of the evidence adduced, and after oral argument and submission of briefs, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows:\\n1. The appeal of Effie R. Meissner, formerly Effie P. Ryan, administratrix and heir, from the assessment and appraisement of the Register of Wills of Delaware County, insofar as it includes the assessment and ap-praisement for inheritance tax purposes of the restaurant liquor license as an asset of the estate of Joseph M. Ryan, deceased, be and the same is hereby dismissed, with the provision, however, that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, as well as appellant, will not be deprived of any right they may have to seek an increase or decrease of the amount of the appraisement of the license, depending upon the ascertained value thereof.\\n2. The costs of this proceeding shall be borne by appellant.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"8730999\", \"name\": \"Hays v. Hays\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Hays v. Hays\", \"decision_date\": \"1945-06-30\", \"docket_number\": \"no. 37\", \"first_page\": \"292\", \"last_page\": \"296\", \"citations\": \"53 Pa. D. & C. 292\", \"volume\": \"53\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania District and County Reports\", \"court\": \"Adams County Court of Common Pleas\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:58:38.843954+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Hays v. Hays\", \"head_matter\": \"Hays v. Hays\\nBulleit & Bulleit, for libellant.\\nJune 30, 1945.\", \"word_count\": \"1144\", \"char_count\": \"6415\", \"text\": \"Sheely, P. J.,\\n\\u2014 Libellant has filed exceptions to the report of the master in which it is recommended that the libel be dismissed and a divorce refused. Respondent did not appear to contest the action and there are no facts in dispute.\\nThe parties were married on February 2,1937, when libellant was 21 years of age and respondent 18 years. Libellant had just completed school but respondent was attending high school. Prior to the marriage they had agreed that libellant would follow the occupation of a fruit grower, and to carry out this purpose libellant's father purchased a fruit farm in this county. Libel-lant and respondent lived on the farm from March 1938 until about November 1, 1941, when respondent left, except for a period of 11 months from October 1940 until September 1941, when, at respondent's insistence, they lived at Rancocas, N. J., and libellant's mother and sister moved to the farm (libellant's father had died in February 1939). About six weeks after their return to the farm in September 1941, respondent left the home and has refused to return in spite of several requests so to do from libellant.\\nThe only reason assigned for the wife's separation was that she did not like the farm because of the inconveniences and loneliness of farm life and said she did not want to waste her life on a farm \\u2014 she had been a resident of Burlington, N. J., a city of 15,000 population. When the parties moved to the farm there were no conveniences whatever in the house, but while they lived there they installed electricity, a pump, and a pipeless furnace. It was due to the wife's dissatisfaction that they went to Rancocas in October 1940, but they later decided to return to the farm.\\n\\\"It is the duty of a wife to live with her husband in any home provided by him which is reasonably suitable according to his means. The choice of a home by the husband is controlling if made in good faith\\\": Pfeiffer v. Pfeiffer, 154 Pa. Superior Ct. 154, 156 (1948). The learned master was of the opinion that the home provided by libellant in this case was not reasonably suitable according to his means. He construed the word \\\"means\\\" to include wages which the husband might derive from an occupation which he was qualified to follow, and then stated that:\\n\\\"In view of the fact that he had no training or experience as a fruit grower and did not show that such occupation would produce the equivalent or more remuneration than the jobs available in New Jersey and further that he failed to show that he was unable to follow a gainful occupation in New Jersey, it is our opinion that when libellant returned from New Jersey to Wenksville in 1941 the choice of said home was not made in good faith.\\\"\\nThe question of the good faith of libellant in the choice of a home is not involved in this case for several reasons. First, this is not a case where the husband chose a new home to which the wife refused to follow him. The home in this case had been the original home of the parties to which they returned and from which the wife left. Consequently the burden was not upon the husband to prove that the home was suitable according to his means and was selected in good faith, but the burden was upon the wife to justify her separation : Thomas v. Thomas, 138 Pa. Superior Ct. 12, 14 (1938) ; which she has not done. Secondly, there is no testimony to show that the home was not suitable or that it did not compare favorably with other farm homes in the county. The mere absence of convenience in a farm home is definitely no justification for the withdrawal of a wife. A wife cannot insist on arbitrary standards of living which she has set for herself: Sharp v. Sharp, 65 Pa. Superior Ct. 181. Thirdly, it is apparent that the wife's real objection was to living in the country because she said she did not want to waste her life on a farm. The view of the learned master would compel libellant to give up his chosen occupation and to accept work whether or not it might be agreeable to him merely because his wife was dissatisfied with life on a farm. It has been repeatedly held that a husband \\\"may lawfully change his residence. The wisdom of such a change is not a subject for the judgment of the court. There would be a serious abridgment of personal liberty if this right were subject to legal review\\\": Monahan v. Auman, 39 Pa. Superior Ct. 150, 153; Buela v. Buela, 33 Dauph. 238, 241. This is even more true of the right of the husband to choose his own occupation.\\nEven if the good faith of libellant were an issue, which it is not, the fact that the parties had agreed before marriage to take up fruit growing (see Caldwell v. Caldwell, 70 Pa. Superior Ct. 332, and MacDonald v. MacDonald, 108 Pa. Superior Ct. 80), and the fact that libellant has lived there and been a fruit grower nearly all of eight years and has never followed any other occupation, would be strong evidence of his good faith. The evidence clearly shows that respondent wilfully and maliciously deserted libel-lant because she placed a higher value on material conveniences and pleasures than upon her home and her marriage. If any bad faith is shown it is hers; not his.\\nThe master also points out that the parties had made a collusive agreement to secure a divorce in New Jersey and that there is no evidence that libellant rescinded that agreement. The agreement, fully testified to by libellant, was that respondent should secure a divorce and libellant would pay half of the cost. He testified he did not comply with the agreement because he was not satisfied with the arrangement for custody of the child, and that there1 was no agreement concerning the present action. His refusal to carry out the collusive agreement completely abrogated that agreement.\\nThere is no material variance between the allegation and the proof of the date of the desertion. The allegation was that the desertion occurred \\\"on or about November 1, 1941\\\". The proof showed that the parties returned to the farm \\\"in September 1941\\\", and that the wife left about six weeks later, which would have been on or about November 1, 1941. This situation is far different from such cases as Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 84 Pa. Superior Ct. 430 (1925).\\nAnd now, June 30,1945, the exceptions to the report of the master are sustained and a decree in divorce will be entered upon payment of costs.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"8735679\", \"name\": \"Humbertson v. City of Connellsville\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Humbertson v. City of Connellsville\", \"decision_date\": \"1926-12-06\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 909\", \"first_page\": \"674\", \"last_page\": \"678\", \"citations\": \"9 Pa. D. & C. 674\", \"volume\": \"9\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania District and County Reports\", \"court\": \"Fayette County Court of Common Pleas\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T21:26:19.821184+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Humbertson v. City of Connellsville.\", \"head_matter\": \"Humbertson v. City of Connellsville.\\nDean D. Sturgis, for plaintiff.\\nS. R. Goldsmith and J. Kirk Renner, for defendant.\\nDec. 6, 1926.\", \"word_count\": \"2543\", \"char_count\": \"14511\", \"text\": \"Morrow, J.,\\nThis suit is an action of assumpsit brought I Chauncey Humbertson against the City of Connellsville. The parties I agreement filed dispensed with trial by jury and submitted the decision of the case to this court, as provided by Act of Assembly of April 22, 1874, P. L. 109. Some time after the testimony was taken, the matter was argued and it is now before us for adjudication.\\nIn certain rulings on the admission of evidence, the offers were received with a statement to the effect that the competency thereof might be determined later. In all such instances the rulings are allowed to stand, the evidence so admitted being considered as in the record.\\nWe find as facts:\\n1. The plaintiff is a resident of the City of Connellsville, and on Nov. 27, 1920, after passing the civil service examination, was employed as a policeman or patrolman in said city at a salary of $185 per month, and continued as such police officer until Sept. 21, 1923.\\n2. The defendant is a municipal corporation and a city of the third class.\\n3. On Sept. 21, 1923, complaint was made against the plaintiff in the discharge of his duties; that he had conducted himself in a way unbecoming an officer; that he had committed an assault and battery upon Harry McClain, and had unlawfully and wantonly pointed a revolver at him.\\n4. A hearing on said complaint and charges was held before the Hon. C. C. Mitchell, Mayor, on the evening of Sept. 21, 1123, at which hearing witnesses were called and heard, the plaintiff herein, Humbertson, testifying in his own oehalf.\\n5. The mayor found that Humbertson was guilty of the charge of assault ind battery and recommended that he be discharged from the service of the Police Department of the City of Connellsville, the same to be presented to :ity council at'its first regular meeting. All this was reported by the mayor o council for its action thereon. And in the meantime, pending action by the ity council in the matter, the mayor suspended the said Humbertson from 'uty.\\n6. The next meeting of city council was Oct. 8, 1923. Humbertson went to his meeting, taking with him his attorney, John Duggan, Esq., who was there dvised by one of the councilmen to the effect that council would go along with he mayor in the matter, and no further hearing was held, but council that ight, four of its five members being present and voting affirmatively,.adopted iis resolution:\\n\\\"Resolved, that Council sustain the action of the Mayor in the dismissal com the service of the Police Department of Patrolman C. E. Humbertson, filowing charges of assault and battery as preferred under date of Septem-ir 21st.\\\"\\n7. Mr. Duggan advised Humbertson to the effect that he didn't have time > bother further with this matter and did not bother with it after that night. s. Humbertson did nothing more towards getting the matter considered irther by council, prior to instituting the present suit in August, 1925, Kept that, shortly before suit was entered, he did, on advice of Mr. Duggan, > to a council meeting and inquire what was going to be done about his case, id was told by the mayor that he had given him a hearing, which was all \\u00a1at was necessary. He never did anything else by action in court or otherise except enter the present suit in assumpsit for salary. On Oct. 1, 1923, ; surrendered his badge of office and police equipment to the city upon \\u00a1mand, was paid the money then due him, and never thereafter, prior to this it, did he demand payment of any salary. He failed to take any action for instatement, and neither attempted to perform any act of police duty nor rered his services as policeman, although he states that he was ready and willing to work. There is no evidence that he asserted that he was of right a member of the police force or that he claimed the right to be put on duty. During a considerable portion of the period for which salary is sought in this suit he was employed outside the City of Connellsville. His earnings at other work during this period amounted to $2035.\\n8. The mayor advised Humbertson to the effect that he had been dismissed, and that he could do nothing about putting him back on the service until after his hearing in Uniontown, a criminal prosecution having been brought against Humbertson in this same matter.\\n9. The criminal action instituted against Humbertson included charges of assault and battery, pointing firearms and carrying concealed weapons. The prosecutor was Harry McClain. On Dec. 6, 1923, the grand jury found a true bill. On Dec. 13, 1923, the defendant did not appear in court for trial and his bail was forfeited. A year later, Dec. 10, 1924, the defendant was in court and plead not guilty. A jury was sworn and the case was tried. On Dec. 11, 1924, the jury returned a verdict that the defendant, Humbertson, was not guilty, but that he pay the costs.\\nDiscussion.\\nAnd now we come to a consideration of the law applicable to the facts herein.\\nArticle VII, section 7, of the Act of June 27, 1913, P. L. 568 (597), providing for the government of cities of the third class, as amended by Act of May 27. 1919, P. L. 310 (330), provides in part as follows:\\n. . . Policemen shall obey the orders of the mayor and make report to him which report shall be laid by him before council whenever required. Thf mayor shall exercise a constant supervision and control over their conduct and hear and determine all complaints against them in the discharge of theii duties; and upon finding any such complaint well-founded shall submit hi: report thereon to council for its action, and in the meantime, pending actioi by council, the mayor shall have power to suspend such policeman from duty.'\\nSection 6 of the Act of June 20, 1917, P. L. 618, as amended by the Act o: May 17,.1919, P. L. 204, and as further amended by the Act of July 11, 1923 P. L. 997, provides:\\n\\\"All employees of said police department shall be subject to suspension b; the superintendent of the department of public affairs for misconduct or vio lation of any law of this Commonwealth, any ordinance of the city, or regula tion of the said police department, pending action by the city council upoi the charges made against any such employees; and on hearing before the eit council, where they may be represented by counsel, they may be fined or sue pended for a period not to exceed thirty days, with or without pay, or the may be discharged by city council, if found guilty of the charges made agaim them: Provided, however, that the said superintendent of the department o public affairs may, for misconduct or violation as aforesaid, suspend an employee of said department of police for a period not to exceed ten day: with or without pay, without preferring charges and without a hearing c council: Provided further, however, if it should become necessary to redut the number of men in said department for purposes of economy, seniorit rights shall prevail, and any and all removals for such cause or causes sha be from the members last appointed, and the member or members serving tt shortest time shall be removed first, but members with longer times of servfi may be discharged for cause.\\\"\\nThe amendment of 1923 simply adds to the section, as amended in 1919, the provision relative to reduction in the number of men in the police department when necessary.\\nThe plaintiff contends that this Act of 1923 repeals the Act of May 27, 1919, authorizing the mayor to hear and determine all complaints against employees of the police department in the discharge of their duties, and, upon finding any such complaint well-founded, to submit his report thereon to council for its action; that this Act of 1923 was not complied with, in that he was not given such a hearing by the city council as therein contemplated; that he was not legally discharged, and that he can recover in this action of assumpsit salary from the date of the alleged discharge to the date of entry of this suit.\\nPrior to this amendment of 1923, the Supreme Court, in Buttorff et al. v. York City et al., 268 Pa. 143, held that the above-mentioned Acts of May 17 and May 27, 1919, must be construed together, and that, so construed, the right of council to hear and determine complaints against employees of the police department in the discharge of their duties is limited to those submitted by the mayor after finding them well-founded. This Act of 1923 contains no repealing clause, and it does not seem to provide an exclusive method of hearing such complaints. Construing these acts together, it is not clear why procedure under the Act of May 27, 1919, may not be followed, and why it cannot also be held that council has original jurisdiction, by virtue of said Act of 1923, to hear a complaint against a policeman without waiting till the mayor reports that the complaint is well-founded. The jurisdiction as to hearing the complaint originally may be concurrent. That there should be two methods of hearing complaints originally, that is, in the first instance, may have been one purpose or effect of this last amendment. The result in practice would be that the mayor would, for the most part, hear such complaints originally, since council is not in session more than once or twice a month. If determined to be well-founded, the complaint would then be submitted to council for final action. In other cases where the mayor and council did not work in harmony and the council felt that the mayor had failed to report to it as well-founded complaints that should have been so reported, council would have jurisdiction to hear them in the first instance and act thereon independently of the mayor. This original jurisdiction council does not have, unless it is given by this amendment of 1923: Buttorff et al. v. York City et al., 268 Pa. 143. It would not follow from this construction that the council must hear originally each complaint. It would mean that council has the right to do so.\\nThe evidence submitted and facts found, in our opinion, show compliance with the Act of May 27, 1919, supra, in the discharge of the plaintiff. If we are wrong in the view that this act is not repealed by the Act of July 11, 1923, supra, then the fact remains that council, on Oct. 8, 1923, adopted a resoution that was in effect at least an attempted dismissal of the plaintiff. Under this Act of 1923, the council had authority to discharge the plaintiff if it found him guilty of the charge of assault and battery, and we think the effect of the action of council was to discharge the plaintiff even under this Act of July 11, 1923.\\nIn this view of the case, it is not necessary to discuss the proposition that, even conceding the plaintiff's discharge illegal, then his suspension is still in [force, because it was to continue pending action by council on the charges, and council has never dismissed these charges.\\nThe plaintiff went to this meeting of council on Oct. 8, 1923, in company with his attorney, and, assuming that he did not get the hearing he desired and to which he was entitled under the Act of July 11, 1923, yet he remained wholly passive for almost two years thereafter. Actions may be such as to warrant the conclusion that a claim, if any, is waived: Gibbs v. Manchester, 61 Atl. Repr. 128 (130).\\nIrrespective of the fact whether the plaintiff's discharge is regulated by the above-mentioned Acts of May 27, 1919, and July 11, 1923, construed together, or by the latter act solely, it is our opinion that he cannot, under the facts, recover in this action of assumpsit brought for salary. \\\"In order to recover salary, his title to the office must first be proven. An action to recover the salary is not the proper way to determine that fact. The proper practice is to seek reinstatement in direct proceeding brought for that purpose: Hadley v. Mayor of City of Albany, 33 N. Y. 603; Thompson v. Board of Education, 201 N. Y. 457. Reinstatement by a competent legal tribunal in a direct proceeding for that purpose is a condition precedent to the right of recovery. Title to office cannot be tried in an action to recover salary incident thereto: 28 Cyc., 450; Dillon on Mun. Corp. (5th ed.), \\u00a7 429, note:\\\" Rush v. Philadelphia, 62 Pa. Superior Ct. 80 (84).\\nThe plaintiff relies upon Storm v. City of Scranton, 77 Pa. Superior Ct. 283, as authority sustaining his right to maintain this action of assumpsit for salary. In that case the question was not whether the plaintiff had been illegally dismissed, but whether any person who had authority to dismiss him had done so or attempted to do so. The record contained no evidence which even remotely tended to establish that any person connected with the city government had attempted to dismiss the plaintiff. The facts distinguish it from the instant case, where the city council having authority to dismiss the plaintiff did discharge him or attempted to do so. \\\"A municipal officer who is discharged from service is not entitled to recover his salary for any period during which he did not actually perform service, unless the illegality of his discharge is admitted or ascertained by a direct proceeding to set aside the dismissal. It cannot be inquired into collaterally in a suit to recover salary for services not performed:\\\" Keegle v. Hudson County, 122 Atl. Repr. 606, affirmed in 130 Atl. Repr. 919. See, also, Van Sant v. Atlantic City, 53 Atl. Repr. 701; Lee v. Mayor, etc., of Wilmington, 40 Atl. Repr. 663.\\nWe, therefore, state as follows our conclusions of law:\\n1. The plaintiff was legally suspended from duty as a police officer of the City of Connellsville by the mayor on Sept. 21, 1923, this suspension continuing pending action by the city council.\\n2. The plaintiff was legally discharged from employment as a police officer of the City of Connellsville by action of its council on Oct. 8, 1923.\\n3. The plaintiff cannot, under the facts in this case, maintain this action of assumpsit.\\n4. Judgment-should be for the defendant.\\nOrder.\\nAnd now, Dec. 6, 1926, the prothonotary is directed to file this decision and the requests of counsel for findings of fact and conclusions of law, with the answers thereto, and forthwith give notice thereof to the parties or their attorneys, and, if no exceptions thereto are filed within thirty days after service of such notice, he shall enter judgment herein for the defendant.\\nProm Luke H. Prasher, Uniontown, Pa.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
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+"{\"id\": \"875772\", \"name\": \"Samuel Huston, to the use of Charles P. Perot, Assignee, for the benefit of creditors, v. E. W. Clark, William Sellers and John Sellers, Jr., Appellants\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Huston ex rel. Perot v. Clark\", \"decision_date\": \"1896-01-27\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal, No. 483\", \"first_page\": \"361\", \"last_page\": \"363\", \"citations\": \"173 Pa. 361\", \"volume\": \"173\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T17:26:58.868807+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Sterrett, C. J., Green, Williams, McCollum, Mitchell, Dean and Fell, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Samuel Huston, to the use of Charles P. Perot, Assignee, for the benefit of creditors, v. E. W. Clark, William Sellers and John Sellers, Jr., Appellants.\", \"head_matter\": \"Samuel Huston, to the use of Charles P. Perot, Assignee, for the benefit of creditors, v. E. W. Clark, William Sellers and John Sellers, Jr., Appellants.\\nEquity \\u2014 Equity practice\\u2014 Costs \\u2014 Master's fee.\\nWhere the Supreme Court affirms a decree of a court of equity and dismisses the appeal with costs, the master\\u2019s fee is included in the costs to be paid by the appellant; and the fact that the specific amount of the fee is not ascertained at the time of decree does not change the conclusive effect of the decree.\\nArgued Jan. 14, 1896.\\nAppeal, No. 483, Jan. T., 1895, by defendants, from decree of C. P. No. 1, Phila. Co., March T., 1882, No. 373, dismissing exceptions to taxation of costs.\\nBefore Sterrett, C. J., Green, Williams, McCollum, Mitchell, Dean and Fell, JJ.\\nAffirmed.\\nExceptions to taxation of costs in equity.\\nFrom the record it appeared that a bill in equity was filed by the appellee against the appellants on May 13, 1882, claiming to be entitled to an interest in a certain new corporation which had been formed called \\u201c The Midvale Steel Company,\\u201d by virtue of an ownership which he had had in the property of a corporation known as \\u201c The Midvale Steel Works,\\u201d which had been purchased by the first named company. There was an alternative prayer for relief.\\nUnder this bill a large amount of testimony was taken, for the purpose of establishing a resulting interest in said Midvale Steel Company on the part of the appellee. The Hon. Amos Briggs, as master, reported in favor of the existence of such interest and a form of decree that the appellee was entitled to the same.\\nUpon exception to said report, filed February 7, 1888, it was decreed by the court of common pleas No. 1 that said exceptions should be sustained and that the bill should be dismissed.\\nUpon appeal to this court by the appellee, it was decided that he had no interest in said Midvale Steel Company, but that he was entitled to an account of the receipts and disbursements of moneys by the appellants under a certain agreement which had been entered into between him and them.\\nThe matter was then referred to Boies Penrose, Esq., as master, with directions to report such account. A large amount of testimony was taken by the appellee in support of his claim that he was entitled to have a sum of money.\\nThe master reported in his favor, ordering the payment of $75,896.60.\\nUnder exceptions to this report the court below held that all but one or two of the objections by the appellee, to the account rendered, were without foundation. It reduced the amount in his favor to the sum of $1,546.87, with interest from December 31, 1880, but decreed that costs should be paid. Both parties appealed to this court. Both appeals were dismissed.\\nThe appellee filed a bill of costs which was taxed in his favor by the prothonotary in the amount of $7,441.62. This included a fee to the former master, Hon. Amos Briggs, of $3,000, which had been paid to him by the appellee many years before, and one to the second master, Boies Penrose, Esq., of $4,000. The fee of the latter included a charge in favor of an expert accountant whom he had employed.\\nThe court below, upon appeal from this taxation, reduced the fee of the Hon. Amos Briggs to $2,000, and struck off the taxation of costs for printing, viz, $210, leaving an amount taxed against the appellants of $6,231.62.\\nError assigned was in dismissing exceptions to taxation of costs.\\nJohn G. Johnson, Crawford & Loughlin with him, for appellants.\\n\\u2014 It is monstrous that after setting up against the appellants the claim which tins court denied, viz, that the appellee was interested in the Midvale Steel Company; after seeking,, without merit, as the court below and this court held, to sux charge them with an immense amount -of money; after subjecting them to a most vexatious, expensive and long continued litigation, without merit; and after he was found entitled to but $1,546.87, with interest, though he had been claiming hundreds of thousands of dollars, the appellants shall be compelled to pay master\\u2019s fees to the extent of $6,000, occasioned almost exclusively by litigation over matters in which they have been held to be without blame.\\nA. T. Freedley, for appellee.\\n\\u2014 Upon July 1, 1894, this court affirmed the decree of the court below, ordering that the costs should be paid by the defendants, and dismissed the appeal: Clark\\u2019s App., 162 Pa. 435.\\nIf the defendants desired to contend that they were not liable to this master\\u2019s fee as costs, they should at that time have had the costs taxed before taking their appeal: Gibson v. Cummings, 25 Pa. 231.\\nThe exact point was ruled by this court in Janes\\u2019 App., 87 Pa. 428.\\nJanuary 27, 1896:\", \"word_count\": \"891\", \"char_count\": \"5110\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam,\\nIt is unnecessary to cite authorities to show that the only question presented in this case was concluded by the final decree of this court in Clark's Appeal, 162 Pa. 435. The question of costs, including of course the master's fee now complained of, was directly involved in that case and must now be regarded as rem adjudicatam.\\nDecree affirmed and appeal dismissed with costs to be paid by appellants.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
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--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"8820989\", \"name\": \"Plessinger v. Mattocks\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Plessinger v. Mattocks\", \"decision_date\": \"1985-04-24\", \"docket_number\": \"no. 986-84\", \"first_page\": \"243\", \"last_page\": \"246\", \"citations\": \"40 Pa. D. & C.3d 243\", \"volume\": \"40\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania District and County Reports\", \"court\": \"Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:46:23.797078+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Plessinger v. Mattocks\", \"head_matter\": \"Plessinger v. Mattocks\\nCraig A. Stone, for plaintiff.\\nGeorge C. Werner, for defendant.\\nApril 24, 1985\", \"word_count\": \"973\", \"char_count\": \"5830\", \"text\": \"PEREZOUS, J.,\\nBefore the court is the petition of defendant Jeff Mattocks for stay of proceedings under the Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C. App. \\u00a7521.\\nThis action arises out of an automobile accident in which plaintiff Beth Ann Plessinger was a passenger in a car operated by defendant and was injured when the vehicle left the roadway and struck a small bridge and marker pole.\\nThe pertinent section of the act provides:\\n\\\"At any stage thereof any action or proceeding in any court in which a person in military service is in volved, either as plaintiff or defendant, during the period of such service or within 60 days thereafter may, in the discretion of the court in which it is pending, on its own motion, and shall, on application to it by s\\u00fcch person or some person on his behalf, be stayed as provided in this act, . . . unless, in the opinion of the court, the ability of plaintiff to prosecute the action or the defendant to conduct his defense is not materially affected by reason of his military service.\\\" 50 U.S.C. App. \\u00a7521.\\nDefendant's petition avers that he is a member of the United States Air Force currently stationed at Chanute Air Force Base in Illinois, following which he will be assigned to another Air Force base, possibly outside the continental United States. He asserts that his ability to conduct his defense in this action is materially affected by reason of his military service and requests a stay in this action pursuant to the act. Defendant submits that while certain portions of discovery can proceed without his presence, specifically, the deposition of plaintiff and the medical examination of her, beyond such discovery investigation and preparation of the case for trial becomes impossible inasmuch as depending upon what develops at the disposition of plaintiff, it will be necessary to discuss the matter with defendant, perhaps leading to additional depositions. Defendant also asserts that the local procedure for scheduling civil trials creates a difficult burden since, if the case were allowed to proceed, it would be placed upon a trial fist without a date certain. He contends that without knowing at this point the tentative trial date and without knowing where he will be stationed at that time, it is impossible to say whether or not he could even request leave and, assuming that leave could be arranged, a problem develops because he would be required to return to the area be fore trial week to prepare for the trial without being . certain that the matter would proceed to trial.\\nWhile each party cites authority for the proposition that the burden of proof is on the other, the United States Supreme Court in Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561 (1943), stated that:\\n\\\"The act makes no express provision as to who must carry the burden of showing that a party will or will not be prejudiced, in pursuance no doubt of its policy of making the law flexible to meet the great variety of situations no legislator and no court is wise enough to foresee. We, too, refrain from declaring any rigid doctrine of burden of proof in this matter, believing that courts called upon to use discretion will usually have enough sound sense to know from what direction their information should be expected to come.\\\" Id., 319 U.S. at 569.\\nThe court in Boone also stated that:\\n\\\"The act cannot be construed .to require continuance on mere showing that the defendant was . in the military service. Canons of statutory construction admonish us that we should not needlessly render as meaningless the language which, after authorizing stays, says: 'Unless, in the opinion of the court, the ability of plaintiff to prosecute the action or the defendant to conduct his defense is not materially affected by reason of his military service.' \\\" Id., 319 U.S. at 565.\\nRegardless of whom the burden is upon, we are persuaded by plaintiffs argument that the case can proceed at this point without any prejudice incurred by defendant. The case involved a relatively uncomplicated one-car accident. Any pretrial consultation with defendant can be accomplished by use of the telephone. Also, discovery can be obtained by either interrogatories directed to defendant's military station or depositions taken when defendant is able to meet with counsel. Furthermore, taking into account defendant's situation, this court can set a date certain on which the trial will commence, as well as grant a liberal amount of time to conduct discovery. As plaintiff argues, defendant submits only hypothetical situations which might prejudice him and does not contend that he is currently prejudiced by his being in the military service. Should a situation arise where defendant would be prejudiced by proceeding with this case, defendant can again petition for a stay based upon such prejudice. However, as the ability of defendant to conduct his defense at this stage of the proceedings is not materially affected by reason of his military service, defendant's petition to stay will- be dismissed.\\nAccordingly, we enter the following\\nORDER\\nAnd now, April 24, 1985, for reasons set forth in the attached opinion, defendant's petition for stay of proceedings under the Civil Relief Act of 1940 is dismissed and the case shall proceed.\\nSee Coburn v. Cuburn, 412 So. 2d 947 (Fla. App. 3d Dist., 1982), placing the burden on- the party opposing the postponement of trial to show that the serviceman's ability to conduct his defense is not materially affected and Norris v. Superior Court of Mohave County, 481 P. 2d 553 (Ariz. App. 1971), placing a burden on'the party requesting the stay to make a showing of his actual unavailability and that his rights would be adversely affected because of his absence from the trial.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
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--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"8859471\", \"name\": \"Moseman, Appellant, v. Arundel Corporation\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Moseman v. Arundel Corp.\", \"decision_date\": \"1944-12-13\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal, No. 26\", \"first_page\": \"318\", \"last_page\": \"321\", \"citations\": \"156 Pa. Super. 318\", \"volume\": \"156\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:44:09.997062+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Keller, P. J., Baldrige, Rhodes, Hirt, Reno and James, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Moseman, Appellant, v. Arundel Corporation.\", \"head_matter\": \"Moseman, Appellant, v. Arundel Corporation.\\nSubmitted November 13, 1944.\\nBefore Keller, P. J., Baldrige, Rhodes, Hirt, Reno and James, JJ.\\n8. V. Hosterman and Harvey B. Luts, for appellant.\\nPaul A. Mueller, Louis Wagner and Richard A. Smith, for appellee.\\nDecember 13, 1944:\", \"word_count\": \"815\", \"char_count\": \"4761\", \"text\": \"Opinion by\\nReno, J.,\\nTbe court below dismissed claimant's appeal from the workmen's compensation board holding that it had no jurisdiction. .\\nThe Workmen's Compensation Act, amended by the Act of June 21, 1939, P. L. 520, \\u00a71 (\\u00a7427), 77 PS \\u00a7872, provides in part: \\\"Any party may appeal from any action of the board on matters of the law to the court of common pleas of the county in which the accident occurred or of the county in which the adverse party resides or has a permanent place of business, or, by agreement of the parties, to the court of common pleas of any other county of this Commonwealth .\\\"\\nThe accident occurred in Fulton County. The claimant resides in Lancaster 'County. The employer is a corporation, and has no corporate residence or permanent place of business in either Lancaster or Fulton County. The parties did not agree to submit the appeal to the Lancaster County court.\\nThe jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas in workmen's compensation cases, apart from agreements of the parties, is founded upon either of two bases: (a) the place of the accident or (b) the residence or permanent place of business of the adverse party. In this case, the claimant appealed from the decision of the board. He was the aggrieved party and, thinking he was also the adverse party, he took his appeal to the court of the county in which he resides. This was error. The adverse party is the party who is interested in upholding the decision from which the appeal is taken. The adverse party is claimant's employer, and since it has no residence or permanent place of business in Lancaster County, the court of common pleas of the county in which the accident occurred, Fulton County, has jurisdiction of the appeal.\\nIn Jester v. Electric Power Construction Co., 113 Pa. Superior Ct. 177, 172 A. 154, upon which claimant relies, the situation was reversed. There the employe was appellee, and consequently some of the language of the opinion is not applicable here. Bnt the central doctrine is controlling, and an adverse party, within the meaning of the act, is the party who upon the appeal is in opposition to the party who takes the appeal. Should any doubt remain after a careful study of that case, it will be wholly dissipated by consideration of the further provisions of \\u00a7427, supra. It is provided that \\\"the party taking the appeal\\\" shall serve written notice of his appeal \\\"upon the adverse party\\\". Thus the statute, by its very terms, clearly indicates that \\\"the party taking the appeal\\\" is not \\\"the adverse party\\\", and that the adverse party is he who stands upon the decision from which the appeal is taken.\\nThe board assigned claimant's petition to the referee whose office is in Lancaster and whose district embraces seven counties, not including Fulton County. Doubtless the board sought to serve claimant's convenience by providing the initial tribunal at his home instead of requiring him to litigate his claim before the more distant referee whose district does embrace Fulton County. Claimant argues that the effect of the assignment was to confer jurisdiction of the appeal upon the court of Lancaster County. The argument is without merit. The compensation districts are administrative units of the Department of Labor and Industry. Administrative Code of April 9, 1929, P. L. 177, \\u00a72208 (e), 71 PS \\u00a7568. Referees are assigned by the board for service in each district. Id. \\u00a7442, 71 PS \\u00a7152. The board assigns petitions to the referees under the Workmen's Compensation Act (\\u00a7414, 77 P'S \\u00a7775), but it is hot required to assign the claims originating in a certain district to the referee of that district. It may assign the cases to any referee, regardless of the place of origin, under its power to fix the time and place of the hearing. The power of the board in this respect cannot be challenged so long as it does not thereby defeat the humanitarian purposes of the statute. Seit zinger v. Ft. Pitt Brewing Co., 294 Pa. 253, 144 A. 79. Tlie assignment of cases to referees has no bearing upon and does not control the jurisdiction of reviewing courts. An appeal from a referee's decision is not taken to a court, but to the board. The case reaches a court only upon an appeal from the board. The act designates the courts to which appeals from the decisions of the board shall be taken, and the board cannot and does not in assigning cases to referees confer appellate jurisdiction contrary to the explicit statutory mandate.\\nOrder affirmed.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"901311\", \"name\": \"F. W. Bealafeld, Appellant, v. Borough of Verona\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Bealafeld v. Borough of Verona\", \"decision_date\": \"1898-11-14\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal, No. 101\", \"first_page\": \"627\", \"last_page\": \"630\", \"citations\": \"188 Pa. 627\", \"volume\": \"188\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T18:39:48.521878+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Green, McCollum, Mitchell, Dean and Fell, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"F. W. Bealafeld, Appellant, v. Borough of Verona.\", \"head_matter\": \"F. W. Bealafeld, Appellant, v. Borough of Verona.\\nBoroughs \\u2014 Sewers\\u2014Inadequacy of sewer.\\nA municipality in constructing a sewer exercises a judicial discretion, and is not responsible ior an error of judgment in furnishing a sewer inadequate for the purpose contemplated. Fair v. Philadelphia, 88 Pa. 809, followed.\\nArgued Nov. 3, 1898.\\nAppeal, No. 101, Oct. T., 1898, by plaintiff, from order of C. P. No. 2, Allegheny Co., Oct. T., 1896, No. 769, refusing to take off nonsuit.\\nBefore Green, McCollum, Mitchell, Dean and Fell, JJ.\\nAffirmed.\\nTrespass to recover damages for injuries to land caused by an overflow of water from a sewer.\\nAt the trial the court granted a nonsuit, on the ground that the borough was not liable for .the inadequacy of the sewer.\\nThe facts appear by the opinion of Shaeer, J., on the motion to take off the nonsuit, which was as follows:\\nThe plaintiff is the owner of a house and lot at the corner of East Ilailroad and South avenues, in the borough of Verona. The action is for injury done to the house by the water of a rain storm by which a part of the cellar wall was thrown down and other damage done to the house and contents. The negligence alleged in the borough is the inadequacy of the sewer to carry off the water flowing to that point, and that the sewer rvas negligently allowed to be filled and obstructed.\\nTbe town of Verona is situated on the bank of tbe Allegheny river. When the Allegheny Valley Railroad was constructed parallel with the river, and near to it, the road at this point was constructed on a fill which prevented the surface water from flowing to the river and thereby caused the pond along the south side of the railroad between the railroad and the river hill. When East Railroad avenue was graded, running along the railroad it was filled to the level of the railroad, and South avenue was graded to conform to it, thereby reducing the size of the pond. The plaintiff\\u2019s house at the corner of these streets is-built in the pond; the whole of the cellar wall being above ground on the sides not adjoining the streets. By the grading and improvement of the streets of the borough water was made to flow along these two streets and to the corner in question along the gutters of these streets, which before found its way into the pond at other points. Before the grading of these streets the railroad company had constructed a sewer under the railroad at this point for the purpose of draining the pond, and when the streets were graded the borough constructed its sewer into and connected ifc with the sewer so built by the railroad. There was no evidence that the sewer was improperly constructed or that it was out of repair or had been suffered to be clogged up and remain so. The complaint practically is that the sewer was not adequate in size. There was evidence that notice had been given to several borough officers that the sewer was not taking all the water in heavy rains.\\nA nonsuit was granted on the ground that the borough was not liable for the inadequacy of the sewer, under the principles laid down in Fair v. Philadelphia, 88 Pa. 309, and many other cases.\\nIt was suggested at the trial that the notice given to the borough officers of the inadequacy of the sewer might affect the application of the general rule to the ease in hand. The diligence of the counsel has not discovered any Pennsylvania case where that matter was discussed, although some cases from other jurisdictions were produced which tend to support the suggestion. We are not satisfied however that this is not a case for the application of the general rule and, therefore, re-, fuse the motion.\\nNovember 14, 1898:\\nAnd now, March 26, 1898, motion to take off compulsory nonsuit refused.\\nJError assigned was the order of the court.\\nJ. M. Hunter, with him J. A. Beatty, for appellant.\\nWhen the obstruction or dilapidation is an ordinary result of the use of the sewer, which ought to have been anticipated, the omission to make an occasional examination and to keep the sewers in apparent good repair is a neglect of duty which renders the city liable: McCarthy v. Syracuse, 46 N. Y. 194; Requa v. Rochester, 45 N. Y. 129; Vanderslice v. Philadelphia, 103 Pa. 107; Haus v. Boro. of Bethlehem, 134 Pa. 12; Markle v. Berwick, 142 Pa. 84.\\nThe cases to the effect that a municipal corporation is not liable for an omission to supply drainage or sewerage do not apply to a case where the necessity for the drainage or outlet is caused by the act of the corporation itself: Byrnes v. Cohoes, 67 N. Y. 204.\\nWhere a borough constructs gutters in a street in such a way as to cause the surface water of a large territory to be diverted from its natural flow, and to be gathered into a body and precipitated on the premises of the owner whose property abuts on the street, and the property is thereby injured, the borough is liable in damages: Bohan v. Avoca Borough, 154 Pa. 404; Huddleston v. West Bellevue, 111 Pa. 110; Allentown v. Kramer, 73 Pa. 406; Elliott v. Oil City, 129 Pa. 570; Weir v. Plymouth, 148 Pa. 566; Frederick v. Lansdale, 156 Pa. 613; Noonan v. Albany, 79 N. Y. 470; Torrey v. Scranton, 133 Pa. 173.\\nJ. P. Hunter, for appellee, was not heard, but cited in his printed brief:\\nCarr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. 329; Fair v. Philadelphia, 88 Pa. 309; Collins v. Philadelphia, 93 Pa. 272; Bear v. Allentown, 148 Pa. 80; Sullivan v. City of Pittsburg, 5 Pa. Superior Ct. 357.\", \"word_count\": \"1062\", \"char_count\": \"5929\", \"text\": \"Per Curiam:,\\nWe are thoroughly convinced that the case of Fair v. Philadelphia, 88 Pa. 309, and the rulings of this Court in many kindred cases, must control the decision of this case. The learned court below followed, and correctly so, these authorities in disposing of the motion to take off the compulsory nonsuit, and expressed such convincing reasons in the opinion that we do not think anything can be added thereto. For the reasons there set forth we sustain the judgment.\\nJudgment affirmed.\"}"
\ No newline at end of file
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dbbf8e95b12bddb72f4decdb055d255a3291de56
--- /dev/null
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+"{\"id\": \"920358\", \"name\": \"Commonwealth v. Major\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Commonwealth v. Major\", \"decision_date\": \"1901-01-07\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal, No. 263\", \"first_page\": \"290\", \"last_page\": \"300\", \"citations\": \"198 Pa. 290\", \"volume\": \"198\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T22:47:06.462497+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before McCollum, C. J., Mitchell, Fell, Brown, Mestrezat and Potter, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Commonwealth v. Major.\", \"head_matter\": \"Commonwealth v. Major.\\nCriminal law&emdash;Murder&emdash; Threats&emdash;Burglary&emdash;Evidence.\\n/ On the trial of an indictment for the murder of a policeman where it\\n/ appears that the prisoner had threatened to kill the deceased, evidence of a burglai\\u2019y which he had committed at' another place than at the place of the killing and prior thereto, is admissible, not for the purpose of fixing the grade of the crime, nor to show that the prisoner was likely to commit it, but because the burglary was connected with the threat, and the evidence tends to show that the killing was intentional, wilful and premeditated. The evidence is also admissible because it tended to show why the policeman was at the house to which the prisoner had fled, and where the killing was committed.\\nOn the trial of an indictment for murder of a policeman where it appears that the prisoner, after having committed a burglary at one place flees to a house where he proceeds to commit a second burglary, and while engaged in that shoots the policeman who had followed him from the scene of the first burglary, evidence of the second burglary is admissible, and it is immaterial whether, at the time of the killing, the policeman knew of the second burglary or not./'\\nCriminal law&emdash;Murder&emdash;Common purpose.\\nIf a killing is the probable consequence of a crime in which the prisoner and others are engaged, the prisoner is chargeable even though the killing was done by another in the execution of the common purpose.\\nCriminal law\\u2014Indictment\\u2014Time.\\nIt is not necessary except where time enters into the nature of an offense to prove the exact time alleged in the indictment. Any other time may be shown on the trial if it is prior to the finding of the indictment, and within the period prescribed by the statute of limitation.\\nWhere an indictment charges a killing on a day named, it may be shown at the trial that the deceased was shot on the day named in the indictment, and that he died of his wound four days thereafter.\\nArgued Oct. 30, 1900.\\nAppeal, No. 263, Jan. T., 1900, by-defendant, from judgment of O. & T. Crawford Co., Nov. T., 1899, No. 42, on verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree in case of Commonwealth v. Frank Major.\\nBefore McCollum, C. J., Mitchell, Fell, Brown, Mestrezat and Potter, JJ.\\nAffirmed.\\nIndictment for murder. Before Thomas, P. J.\\nAt the trial it appeared that Daniel McGrath, chief of police of Titusville, was shot on November 11, 1899, and died from his wound on November 15, 1899.\\nThe circumstances of the killing are stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court.\\nWhen C. C. Fritz, a witness for the commonwealth, was on the stand, he was asked this question:\\n\\u201c Q. I wish you to state what you saw there with reference to dynamite caps, if anything.\\u201d\\nDefendant\\u2019s counsel: The next morning after what? What is that offered for?\\nCommonwealth\\u2019s counsel: It is offered for the purpose of showing that at the Dunkirk, Allegheny Valley station in the night on Friday, after 9 o\\u2019clock, the Dunkirk, Allegheny Valley station was entered by burglars and the safe in the station was blown open by some explosive, and the safe robbed of its contents, and that some dynamite caps of the kind sold by the witness to the defendant were found at the station on the floor. That this defendant and two others, hereafter to be described and identified, went to the house of Bertha Bloom in Titusville where Daniel McGrath was afterwards killed the same night, or shot on the same night, and that the defendant and those with him stated there, in the presence of witnesses, hereafter to be called, that they had been at the Dunkirk, Allegheny Valley station and blown the safe open and got the money out of it.\\nThat for the purpose of showing federation of the defendant and the persons with him and their combination for the purpose of committing felonies.\\nThe Court: I understand that your offer is to prove that a burglary was committed.\\nCommonwealth\\u2019s counsel: The offer is to prove that this burglary was committed the same night after the dynamite caps were sold, and some dynamite caps were found at the station, and that later in the evening, at the house of Bertha Bloom, the defendant and those with him, declared they had been down at the station and exploded the safe and had taken money and valuables therefrom.\\nDefendant\\u2019s counsel objects because it is not yet apparent that it has anything to do with the defendant. They are not connected together.\\nThe Court: Under the offer made we think the evidence is competent.\\nObjection overruled and bill of exceptions sealed for the defendant. [1]\\nEdward Darby.was asked this question:\\n\\u201c Q. What station was it ? Passenger or freight ? A. Passenger. Q. What occurred there ? \\u201d .\\nDefendant\\u2019s counsel: When did you say this was ?\\nCommonwealth\\u2019s counsel: It was the same morning, but earlier in the morning as alleged by the commonwealth, as we propose to show by this and other witnesses.\\nDefendant\\u2019s counsel object.\\nThe Court: You will observe that we have no evidence of any crime yet.\\nDefendant\\u2019s counsel: They are putting in question an occurrence which they say they will hereafter connect with another occurrence with which this man stands charged.\\nThe Court: What is your allegation\\u2014that this is irrelevant and incompetent ?\\nDefendant\\u2019s counsel: I say that in the present stage of the case it is irrelevant. The first evidence in a criminal prosecution is the corpus delicti, and after that is established, then any suspicious circumstances that occurred that point towards the accused, the defendant, may come in, but as your honor has remarked, there is no evidence that any crime has been com mitted. It seems to me the way to prove this is to prove a crime; he is indicted for shooting.\\nCommonwealth\\u2019s counsel: Is this a motion to strike out, or\\u2014\\nDefendant\\u2019s counsel: No, it is an objection to the testimony in this way, because this testimony is not pertinent. There is no connection between the testimony they are now introducing, and the death of Daniel McGrath. The death of Daniel Mc-Grath is the gravamen of this offense, and it is the corpus delicti, and it must be proven first, and then they may gather in all the suspicious circumstances.\\nThe Court: I understand that this evidence is offered under the offer you made before.\\nCommonwealth\\u2019s counsel: Yes, sir. The common-wealth proposes to show by this and other witnesses that the passenger station of the Dunkirk, Allegheny Valley and Pittsburg Railroad was broken and entered and the safe exploded by a dynamite cartridge or cartridges, and that money and other valuables that were in the safe were taken away. That Daniel McGrath and Mr. Sheehy, policemen of the city of Titusville, were informed of the fact; that they immediately came to the station, received information of what had taken place, followed a track which led into the vicinity of the house of one Bertha Bloom; that they were so doing in discharge of their duty as public officers in pursuit of the persons who had been guilty of committing a felony, and that in the discharge of that duty they went to the house of Bertha Bloom, and there found the defendant and two other persons who were at that time engaged in the commission of a similar felony in that house. That to be followed by evidence that in the arrest of the defendant in the house Daniel McGrath received his death wound, the officer was severely wounded by a gun shot, and that one of the persons in the house engaged in the commission of the felony there, was killed by one of the officers and that the person so killed was one of the persons who committed this felony at the station an hour or so before, and that before the time of the arrest by the officers at the house of Bertha Bloom, each of these three persons declared in the presence of witnesses to be produced by the commonwealth that they came from the station where they had committed this felony and where they had stolen property from the Dunkirk, Allegheny Valley Railroad Company, for two purposes :\\n1. To show the federation of these three persons to commit a felony; and secondly to show that Daniel McGrath was killed in the discharge of Ms duty as a peace officer, in pursuit of these persons, in an attempt to arrest them, and wMle at that time they were engaged in the commission of a felony at the house of Bertha Bloom.\\nDefendant\\u2019s counsel object.\\nThe Court: Objection overruled and bill of exceptions sealed for the defendant. [2]\\nDefendant\\u2019s points were as follows:\\nB. That unless there was a precedent common purpose on the part of the defendant Major and those with him, to kill Daniel McGrath or do him great bodily harm, the defendant cannot be convicted in the absence of satisfactory proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he aided, assisted and abetted him, who did it. Answer: This point is refused and not read. [4]\\n5. That if the jury believe from the evidence that Daniel Mc-Grath received the wound which caused his death in the front yard of the Bloom residence, and that the defendant Major was not present assisting, aiding and abetting in the killing of the deceased at the time, he cannot be convicted as charged in the indictment.' Answer: This point is refused and not read. [5]\\n6. That if the jury believe from the evidence that the killing of Daniel McGrath was done by a confederate as collateral to an escape and to avoid being taken, the defendant cannot be considered as a principal' in such act, and therefore cannot be guilty of murder in the first degree. Answer: This point is refused and not read. [6]\\n10. That before there can be a verdict of murder in the first degree the evidence must satisfy the jury that the defendant had in his mind the formed and conscious purpose to take the life of Daniel McGrath, and that in pursuance of that purpose he fired the shot which resulted in the death of the deceased, and although the defendant may be guilty of murder in the second degree because of his common concurrence and participation in the unlawful undertaking to resist an arrest by the officer, he could be held liable only for his particular and individual purpose and intent to take life, and unless the jury find such intent beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict should not be one of murder in the first degree. Answer: This point is refused and not read. [7]\\n9. That in this case the evidence of the commonwealth shows that the killing of Daniel McGrath did not occur'in pursuance of the robbery at the Bloom residence, nor was it one of the incidental or probable consequences of such robbery, but that the killing occurred in the attempted arrest of the criminals by the deceased, and that unless the jury believe that the prisoner fired the fatal shot or was present, aiding and abetting the person who did fire the fatal shot, he cannot be convicted of the crime of murder in the first degree. Answer: This point is refused and not read. [8]\\n11. That if the jury cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt which of the men engaged in resisting the arrest of the officers at the Bloom residence on the morning of November 11, 1899, fired the fatal shot, then this defendant at most can only be convicted of murder in the second degree. Answer: This point is refused and not read. \\u00a39]\\n12. That if the jury believe and find from the evidence that Daniel McGrath came to his death from a pistol shot after he came out of the Bloom residence and in the attempted arrest of the robbers, that then this defendant cannot be convicted of murder in the first degree unless they further find beyond a reasonable doubt that the fatal shot was fired by his hand or that he was present, aiding and abetting in the killing of the deceased. Answer: This point is refused and not read. [10]\\n18. That if the jury believe that the officer made a sudden attack in ordinary citizen\\u2019s dress and without notice of his character as such officer, and that the tumult and excitement of the attack prevented the defendant or did not give time for deliberation and premeditation, and that the killing occurred without such deliberation and premeditation, then the defendant cannot be convicted of murder in the first degree, even if the deceased received the fatal shot in the house. Answer: This point is refused and not read. [11]\\nVerdict of guilty of murder of the first degree, upon which sentence was passed.\\nErrors assigned amongst others were (1, 2) rulings on evidence, quoting the bill of exceptions; (4-11) above instructions, quoting them; (15) that the court erred in not saying that as the indictment charged the defendant with killing the deceased on November 11, 1899, and the evidence showed that the deceased did not die until November 15, 1899, there could be no conviction of the defendant for murder.\\nH. J. Humes, for appellant,\\ncited on the question of the admittance of evidence as to the burglary: Turner v. Com., 86 Pa. 54; Shaffner v. Com., 72 Pa. 60; Com. v. Pipes, 158 Pa. 25; Com. v. Ferrigan, 44 Pa. 386; Kramer v. Com., 87 Pa. 299; Goersen v. Com., 99 Pa. 388; Com. v. Johnson, 133 Pa. 293.\\nCited as to the variance in dates, Heydon\\u2019s Case, 4 Coke, 42 ; 2 Hawkins\\u2019s Pleas of the Crown, ch. 23, sec. 88.\\nWillis R. Vance, district attorney, and Charles W. Benedict, for appellee,\\ncited to the rulings on evidence: Goersen v. Com., 99 Pa. 388; Goersen v. Com., 106 Pa. 477; Shaffner v. Com., 72 Pa. 60; McConkey v. Com., 101 Pa. 416 ; Com. v. Roddy, 184 Pa 274; Weston v. Com., 111 Pa. 272.\\nCited as to the variance in dates: State v. Baker, 1 Jones L. (N. C.) 267; State v. Haney, 67 N. C. 467; Cudd v. State, 28 Tex. App. 124; Livingston v. Com., 14 Grattan, 59.\\nJanuary 7, 1901:\", \"word_count\": \"4170\", \"char_count\": \"23763\", \"text\": \"Opinion by\\nMb. Justice Potteb,\\nThe appellant, Frank Major, together with one Frank Woodward, was charged with the murder of Daniel McGrath at the house of Bertha Bloom, on East Spring street, Titusville, Pa., in the early morning of November 11,1899. Two days before, on November 9, the two men above mentioned, together with a third, whose name is unknown, came to Titusville in company, and remained almost continuously together until the commission of the crime. It appeared that about 3 o'clock in the morning of November 11, the passenger station of the Dunkirk, Allegheny Valley and Pittsburg railroads, at Titusville, was entered and the safe blown open; shortly after, the appellant, Frank Major, accompanied by Frank Woodward and the unknown man, who was afterwards found dead in the vicinity, gained admittance to the Bloom house in Titusville. The man who was afterwards found dead, was identified by the night watchman at the railway station as one of the burglars. This man was placed on guard at the Bloom house, outside the door, while the other two went inside, and with revolvers in hand, demanded money, jewelry, and other valuables, of the inmates. Several articles were obtained in this manner; but not being satisfied, Major, and his companion demanded more money from Bertha Bloom, alleging that she had it concealed in a box, and threatening to burn her feet if she did not produce it. During the parley another inmate of the house called the attention of Major to the condition of his hands which were blackened and apparently smoked, and asked about them. Whereupon he told her, that they had just come from the Dunkirk, Allegheny Yalley and Pittsburg railway station, where they had blown open the safe.\\nIn the mean time the police officers, of whom Daniel McGrath was chief, had been notified of the burglary at the railway station, and had begun a search for the perpetrators, and had followed in pursuit of them to the house of Bertha Bloom. As the officers approached, the outside man gave the alarm and McGrath grappled with him at the door. Shooting began almost immediately, and according to the testimony, Major fired the first shot. McGrath and another policeman named Sheeliy were badly wounded, and the parties separated without any arrests being made at that time. The next morning the man wdto had acted as outside guard, was found dead nearby. The appellant, Major, was arrested on the afternoon of the same day at a point several miles distant. Woodward escaped without arrest. The policeman, Sheehy, recovered from his injuries, but Daniel McGrath, chief of police, died from the effects of his wounds, on November 15, some four days later.\\nCharged with his murder the appellant was tried, convicted and sentenced, in the court below. The case is now here upon appeal, and industrious and painstaking counsel have assigned fifteen errors to the rulings of the trial judge.\\nAll of the specifications may be grouped, as they were in the argument, into, first, those relating to the admission of testimony concerning the burglary at the railway station; second, those relating to the admission of testimony as to the perpetration of the robbery at the Bloom house; and lastly, one relating to the validity of the indictment, which charged the appellant with having killed McGrath upon November 11, 1899, whereas the evidence showed that while he was shot upon that day, he did not die for four days thereafter.\\nThe evidence as to the burglary at the railway station was offered, not for the purpose of fixing the grade of the crime for which the prisoner was being tried, nor to show that he was likely to commit the offense charged; but because the burglary was connected with the threat made, and this testimony tended to show that the action was intentional, wilful and premeditated. The statements made by the appellant as to what had taken place at the depot and in explanation of the blackened condition of his hands, and his threats as to what he would do to McGrath, the chief of police, if he came to the Bloom house, were evidence of malice, and showed that the idea of murder was in his mind.\\nFor these purposes the evidence was clearly admissible (Goer-sen v. Commonwealth, 99 Pa. 398) ; the evidence was also relevant for the purpose of explaining the presence and the action of the officers at the Bloom house at that time. According to the testimony, they had been notified of the burglary at the railway station, and went in immediate pursuit of the perpetrators, overtaking them at the Bloom house, where they were evidently not unexpected by Major and his confederates. The testimony is clearly within the rule permitting evidence of other offenses to be given. There was, therefore, no error in receiving the testimony relating to the burglary at the railway station.\\nAs to the alleged errors set forth in the second class, being to the admission of testimony as to the perpetration of a robbery at the Bloom house at the time of the shooting, the objection is based chiefly upon the allegation, that the officers were not aware at the time, of the robbery of the inmates of the Bloom house, and that, therefore, all evidence thereof should have been excluded. The complaint is unwarranted. It was immaterial whether or not the officers were aware at the time of the robbery then being committed at the Bloom house. They had followed in close pursuit from the scene of the burglary at the railway station; and when the officers came upon the burglars they were still within the house, and having taken property from the inmates at intervals, continued to intimidate them up to the time of the homicide. The court could not say, as a matter of law, that the robbery had been completed; and was fully justified in submitting that question to the jury. The knowledge of the officers as to the fact of the robbery had no bearing upon the case. The law in fixing the grade of the crime at murder in the first degree, if committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate robbery, necessarily contemplated the admission of evidence as to the robbery. These assignments are therefore overruled.\\nCertain of the specifications of error also relate to the refusal of direct instructions to the jury, that unless there was a precedent, common purpose on the part of the appellant and those with him to kill or do great bodily harm to the deceased, he could not be convicted, except on satisfactory proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant aided and abetted the one who did the killing. These features, however, were not pressed in the argument, and we see no particular in which there was error in this respect. As was well said by the learned court below, in the opinion refusing a new trial: \\\"It was not necessary that there should have been any common purpose to kill Daniel McGrath, or any one else. If the killing was the probable consequence of the offense in which the appellant and his companions were engaged, the appellant was chargeable even though the killing was done by another in the execution of the common purpose.\\\"\\nWhat this court said, in Weston v. Commonwealth, 111 Pa. 272, also properly applies: \\\" If there was a common purpose to kill, and the prisoner was present, aiding and abetting in that purpose, of course he was liable for the act of one of the party he was aiding in carrying out that purpose. Equally true is it that he would be so liable if the killing was a probable consequence of the common purpose.\\\" Thus, it is said, in Wharton's Criminal Law (8th ed.), section 220: \\\"It is not necessary that the crime should be a part of the original design; it is enough if it be one of the incidental probable consequences of the execution of that design, and should appear at the moment to one of the participants to be expedient for the common purpose. Thus where A. and B. go out for the purpose of robbing C., and A., in pursuance of the plan, and in the execution of the robbery, kills C., B. is guilty of murder.\\\"\\nThe last assignment of error complains that the court did not instruct the jury, that there could be no conviction of the appellant for murder, because the indictment charged him with having killed McGrath upon November 11, 1899, when the evidence showed that he was shot upon that day, but did not die until November 15, 1899. If this question was to be raised at all, it should have been by motion in arrest of judgment; but there is no merit in the suggestion. If such instruction had been given, it would have been error. The variance between the allegation and the proof in this respect was not material. It is necessary in nearly all cases to allege that the offense was committed at a specified time, in order that the indictment may be certain. It is not necessary, however, except where time enters into the nature of the offense, to prove the exact time alleged. Any other time may be shown on the trial, if it is prior to the finding of the indictment and within the period prescribed by the statute of limitation: 1 Chitty's Crim. Law, 224.\\nNone of the assignments of error are sustained. The jury were properly instructed upon every question of law legitimately raised by the evidence; the different requirements of the law as to murder and its various degrees, and as to manslaughter, were all explained to them and they were instructed that the commonwealth must satisfy them, beyond a reasonable well founded doubt, of the guilt of the prisoner, before he could be convicted. The fixing of the crime was left entirely to the jury. The court said to them: \\\"Your verdict maybe not guilty, it may be guilty of murder in the first degree, or guilty of murder in the second degree, or guilty of manslaughter, accordingly as you believe the evidence.\\\" The charge of the court, as a whole, was an impartial presentation of the case without any tendency to -mislead or confuse the jury. The portions to which exceptions are taken, are fully sustained by the authorities.\\nThe judgment is affirmed and the record remitted for the purpose of execution according to law.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"92644\", \"name\": \"Max A. HANKIN and Janet Hankin v. Moe Henry HANKIN, Sabina Hankin, Perch P. Hankin, Gertrude Hankin, Benjamin R. Shanken and Pauline Shanken, Estate of Samuel Hankin and Harriet Hankin. Appeal of Moe Henry HANKIN, Sabina Hankin, Perch P. Hankin, Gertrude Hankin, Benjamin R. Shanken and Pauline Shanken\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Hankin v. Hankin\", \"decision_date\": \"1983-09-23\", \"docket_number\": \"No. 1290\", \"first_page\": \"147\", \"last_page\": \"152\", \"citations\": \"319 Pa. Super. 147\", \"volume\": \"319\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T23:30:16.000335+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before ROWLEY, McEWEN and WATKINS, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Max A. HANKIN and Janet Hankin v. Moe Henry HANKIN, Sabina Hankin, Perch P. Hankin, Gertrude Hankin, Benjamin R. Shanken and Pauline Shanken, Estate of Samuel Hankin and Harriet Hankin. Appeal of Moe Henry HANKIN, Sabina Hankin, Perch P. Hankin, Gertrude Hankin, Benjamin R. Shanken and Pauline Shanken.\", \"head_matter\": \"465 A.2d 1272\\nMax A. HANKIN and Janet Hankin v. Moe Henry HANKIN, Sabina Hankin, Perch P. Hankin, Gertrude Hankin, Benjamin R. Shanken and Pauline Shanken, Estate of Samuel Hankin and Harriet Hankin. Appeal of Moe Henry HANKIN, Sabina Hankin, Perch P. Hankin, Gertrude Hankin, Benjamin R. Shanken and Pauline Shanken.\\nSuperior Court of Pennsylvania.\\nArgued June 17, 1983.\\nFiled Sept. 23, 1983.\\nPetition for Allowance of Appeal Granted Aug. 22, 1984.\\nSee also 279 Pa.Super. 179, 420 A.2d 1090.\\nPhilip D. Weiss, Norristown, for appellants.\\nFranklin Poul, Philadelphia, for Max Hankin, etc., appel-lees.\\nTheodore R. Mann, Philadelphia, for Moe Hankin, et al, appellees.\\nBefore ROWLEY, McEWEN and WATKINS, JJ.\", \"word_count\": \"1222\", \"char_count\": \"7482\", \"text\": \"ROWLEY, Judge:\\nThis action involves the liquidation of a family partnership, which was dissolved in 1977. This is the fourth time that the controversy has been before our court. See Hankin v. Hankin, 279 Pa.Super. 179, 420 A.2d 1090 (1980); Hankin v. Hankin, 302 Pa.Super. 295, 448 A.2d 1049 (1981) ; Hankin v. Hankin, 298 Pa.Super. 559, 442 A.2d 362 (1982) . The facts of the case are set out in detail in Hankin v. Hankin, 279 Pa.Super. 179, 420 A.2d 1090 (1980) and will not be repeated here.\\nThe present appeal is from an order denying appellant's petition for an extension of time to complete the liquidation and appointing a receiver to liquidate the remaining partnership assets. We note that on two previous occasions, the trial court refused to appoint a receiver. Both of those decisions were appealed to this court. We affirmed. Hankin v. Hankin, 279 Pa.Super. 179, 420 A.2d 1090 (1980); Hankin v. Hankin, 298 Pa.Super. 559, 442 A.2d 362 (1982).\\nThe decision whether to appoint a receiver is vested in the discretion of the trial court. Northhampton National Bank of Easton v. Piscanio, 475 Pa. 57, 379 A.2d 870 (1977). However, a receiver should only be appointed in an extreme case and under extraordinary circumstances. Waddell v. Shriber, 465 Pa. 20, 348 A.2d 96 (1975). Because of the drastic effect a receiver will have on the business entity involved, the court will only impose the remedy where it is necessary to prevent the waste or dissipation of assets; for example, where there is fraud or mismanagement. Hankin v. Hankin, 279 Pa.Super. at 201, 420 A.2d at 1102.\\nIn this case, there has been no finding of waste, dissipation of assets, fraud or mismanagement. Appellee's main complaint seems to be that the liquidation is taking too long. At the time of dissolution, the partnership possessed assets, primarily real estate, valued at 77 million dollars. According to the findings of fact of the trial court, as of January 13, 1983, approximately $27,015,000.00 worth of property remained unsold. The court specifically found that pursuant to the Superior Court's order in Hankin v. Hankin, 302 Pa.Super. 295, 448 A.2d 1049 (1981), appellants have continued their efforts to liquidate the balance of properties owned by the partnership. In fact, the record indicates that since the date of the order, $20,327,000.00 worth of property has been sold. The mere fact that appellants have failed to wind up the partnership affairs and liquidate all assets at this time is not sufficient to establish that a receiver is necessary. Waddell v. Shriber, 465 Pa. 20, 348 A.2d 96 (1975). Since there is no evidence indicating that assets are being wasted or dissipated, the court committed an abuse of discretion in appointing a receiver. Therefore, the order denying appellants an extension of time and appointing a receiver will be reversed.\\nWe understand appellees' concern that appellants' desire to purchase certain properties themselves may conflict with their obligation to seek out buyers willing to pay the highest prices. However, court supervision of the liquidation process will protect against that danger.\\nAppellants also challenge the order of the trial court denying their petition to sell certain properties in Willow Grove, Pennsylvania, to two of appellants, Moe and Sabina Hankin, for the sum of $15,000,000.00. The court denied the petition on the ground that in prior proceedings, Moe Hankin had stated that the property was worth $24,-000,000.00. The court therefore concluded that the property could be sold at a price higher than the $15,000,000.00 offered by appellants. (\\nIn exercising its broad supervisory powers over the liquidation of a partnership, the court has discretion to determine the terms and method of the sale of assets. See Hankin v. Hankin, 279 Pa.Super. at 213, 420 A.2d at 1108. We find no abuse of discretion in the court's denial of the above-mentioned sale. Therefore, that order will be affirmed.\\nAppellants also argue that the court erred in changing its Finding of Fact 6, unsold properties, by deleting \\\"1300 Easton Road\\\" from the list of partnership properties. The property has been the home of appellees for thirty-five years. In January of 1981, appellants filed a petition claiming that the 1959 deed to appellees was invalid because one of appellants, Moe Hankin, had forged his wife's signature. This claim was never pursued. Prior to making findings of fact in its adjudication, the trial court asked Moe Hankin to write a letter setting forth the value of unsold partnership properties. Moe Hankin included appellees' home on that list. Rather than formally filing an exception, appellees wrote a letter to the court pointing out the mistake. In its final decree, the court amended the list of unsold property to delete said residence.\\nAppellant claims that the court had no power to correct the finding in the absence of a formal exception. This argument is without merit. Clearly, the proper procedure for appellees to follow would have been to file an exception. However, the trial court may, indeed should, reverse or reject unsupported or illogical findings. Billinger Estate, 451 Pa. 77, 301 A.2d 795 (1973). There is nothing in the record to support inclusion of 1300 Easton Road as partnership property. The recorded deed to the property, which is a matter of public record, shows that it is owned by appel-lees, Max and Janet Hankin. It was therefore entirely proper for the trial court to correct this error when it was brought to the court's attention.\\nAppellants also argue that the trial court should act on various petitions which have been filed with it and should direct the remaining partnership property sold by auction. These applications are not, however, matters to which we can provide consideration since the matters are not before us in this appeal proceeding. Rather, any request for disposition of the outstanding applications that have been made to the trial court should be addressed to that court. Since the trial court has become so familiar with this sad tale of family discord by reason of the protracted course of litigation the parties have pursued, there is no apparent reason why the parties may not expect immediate disposition by the trial court of the applications that have been made to it. It is our expectation, of course, that the trial court will also rule in prompt- fashion upon all applications that will be brought to it until the long overdue time that the litigation between and among these parties is finally and completely concluded.\\nOrders affirmed in part and reversed in part. Case remanded for further proceedings to- be conducted in a prompt and expeditious fashion and in a manner not inconsistent with this opinion.\\nJurisdiction relinquished.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"96782\", \"name\": \"Caldwell v. Caldwell, Appellant\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Caldwell v. Caldwell\", \"decision_date\": \"1978-03-03\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal, No. 1576\", \"first_page\": \"594\", \"last_page\": \"594\", \"citations\": \"254 Pa. Super. 594\", \"volume\": \"254\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports\", \"court\": \"Superior Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-11T01:46:48.050301+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"Caldwell v. Caldwell, Appellant.\", \"head_matter\": \"387 A.2d 103\\nCaldwell v. Caldwell, Appellant.\\nArgued December 9, 1977.\\nDenis James Lawler, with him Ostroff & Lawler, for appellant; Arthur Lefkoe, with him Wisler, Pearlstine, Talone, Craig and Garrity, for appellee.\", \"word_count\": \"34\", \"char_count\": \"234\", \"text\": \"Order affirmed.\"}"
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+"{\"id\": \"986624\", \"name\": \"Kelly's Estate\", \"name_abbreviation\": \"Kelly's Estate\", \"decision_date\": \"1912-04-08\", \"docket_number\": \"Appeal, No. 347\", \"first_page\": \"54\", \"last_page\": \"56\", \"citations\": \"236 Pa. 54\", \"volume\": \"236\", \"reporter\": \"Pennsylvania State Reports\", \"court\": \"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania\", \"jurisdiction\": \"Pennsylvania\", \"last_updated\": \"2021-08-10T20:28:12.051720+00:00\", \"provenance\": \"CAP\", \"judges\": \"Before Pell, C. J., Brown, Piotter, Elkin and Stewart, JJ.\", \"parties\": \"Kelly\\u2019s Estate.\", \"head_matter\": \"Kelly\\u2019s Estate.\\nWills \\u2014 Charitable bequests \\u2014 Attesting witness \\u2014 Interested witness \\u2014 Act of April 26, 1855, P. L. \\u00a728.\\nInasmuch as a will and codicil are in contemplation of law one testamentary act, where a will is itself without subscribing witnesses but a codicil thereto is attested the attestation of the latter is the attestation of the former, and saves charitable bequests in the former from the operation of the Act of April 26, 1855, P. L. 328, which otherwise would defeat it, providing the attesting witnesses to the codicil are without interest in the will.\\nA charitable bequest in a will made prior to the passage of the Act of June 7, 1911, P. L. 702, is defeated by the mere fact that one of the attesting witnesses is a legatee under the will; and it is immaterial that the legatee was required to pay to a third person a designated sum as a condition of taking the property bequeathed to him, even though the designated sum may have been more than the value of the property.\\nArgued March 18, 1912.\\nAppeal, No. 347, Jan. T., 1911, by The Philadelphia Theological Seminary of St. Charles Borromeo, from decree of O. C. Phila. Co., Jan. T., 1909, No. 573, dismissing exceptions to adjudication in Estate of Patrick M. Kelly, deceased.\\nBefore Pell, C. J., Brown, Piotter, Elkin and Stewart, JJ.\\nAffirmed.\\nExceptions to adjudication.\\nThe facts are stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court.\\nError assigned was decree dismissing exceptions to adjudication.\\nJohn G. Johnson, with him Anthony A. Hirst, for appellant.\\nThe interest of Hahn was not such as disqualified him: Kessler\\u2019s Est., 221 Pa. 314; Jeanes\\u2019s Est., 228 Pa. 537; Historical Society v. Kelker, 226 Pa. 16.\\nApril 8, 1912:\\nT. M. Daly, for appellees.\\nThe will having no attesting witnesses, the gift to charities therein was void: Paxson\\u2019s Est., 221 Pa. 98; Walton\\u2019s Est., 194 Pa. 528.\\nThe codicil in this case did not expressly republish the will, and besides had for one of its witnesses a legatee named in the will, who received property worth $2,541.79 as such legatee, and who, therefore, was not a disinterested witness within the meaning of the statute: Kessler\\u2019s Est., 221 Pa. 314; Fetterhoff\\u2019s Est., 228 Pa. 535; Stinson\\u2019s Est., 232 Pa. 218.\\nA legatee in a will becomes disqualified to either prove the will or any codicil thereto as affecting charities because of his interest as such legatee: Historical Society v. Kelker, 226 Pa. 16.\", \"word_count\": \"769\", \"char_count\": \"4453\", \"text\": \"Opinion by\\nMr. Justice Stewart,\\nThe only attestation to the execution of this will is in connection with the codicil thereto. The will proper is signed by the testator, but there are no subscribing witnesses to the signing. To the execution of the codicil, made a year or more subsequent, there are two attesting witnesses. It follows that without the codicil the will would be invalid as to the several charitable bequests therein contained. The will and codicil being in contemplation of law one testamentary act, the attestation of the latter is the attestation of the former, and saves the former from the operation of the statute which otherwise would defeat it, providing the attesting witnesses to the codicil are without interest in the will. And this is the only question here. One of the attesting witnesses is John D. Hahn. The will contains the following provision with respect to him: \\\"I leave my drug business and house furniture to my clerk John H. Hahn on condition that he pays one thousand dollars to Miss Ella Cowan, my housekeeper.\\\" It is argued that inasmuch as it has not been shown that at the time of the execution of the will the drug business and furniture exceeded in value the amount the legatee was to pay to Ella Cowan, it cannot be said that Hahn has a pecuniary interest in the will. A clear presumption aifises from the gift itself that benefit and advantage to Hahn was intended. The subsequent appraised value shows that there was no disappointment or failure in this regard. But aside from this, Hahn is a legatee under the will, and this circumstance alone disqualified him as a witness under the distinct ruling in Kessler's Estate, 221 Pa. 314. The law will not attempt to weigh and measure the advantage resulting to the legatee in order to determine the question of his competency as an attesting witness to a will of this character. It will assume his interest from the single fact that he is a legatee named in the will.\\nThe assignments of error are dismissed and the decree is affirmed.\"}"
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