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+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_0","query":"Special Operations Forces (SOF) play a significant role in U.S. military operations and, in recent years, have been given greater responsibility for planning and conducting worldwide counterterrorism operations. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has about 70,000 Active Duty, National Guard, and reserve personnel from all four services and Department of Defense (DOD) civilians assigned to its headquarters, its four service component commands, and eight sub-unified commands.\nIn 2013, based on a request from USSOCOM (with the concurrence of Geographic and Functional Combatant Commanders and the Military Service Chiefs and Secretaries), the Secretary of Defense assigned command of the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) to USSOCOM. USSOCOM now has the responsibility to organize, train, and equip TSOCs. While USSOCOM is now responsible for the organizing, training, and equipping of TSOCs, the Geographic Combatant Commands will continue to have operational control over the TSOCs. Because the TSOCs are now classified as sub-unified commands, the services are responsible to provide non-SOF support to the TSOCs in the same manner in which they provide support to the Geographic Combatant Command headquarters.\nThe current Unified Command Plan (UCP) stipulates USSOCOM responsibility for synchronizing planning for global operations to combat terrorist networks. This focus on planning limits its ability to conduct activities designed to deter emerging threats, build relationships with foreign militaries, and potentially develop greater access to foreign militaries. USSOCOM is proposing changes that would, in addition to current responsibilities, include the responsibility for synchronizing the planning, coordination, deployment, and, when directed, the employment of special operations forces globally and will do so with the approval of the Geographic Combatant Commanders, the services, and, as directed, appropriate U.S. government agencies. Further, the proposed changes would give broader responsibility to USSOCOM beyond counterterrorism activities, to include activities against other threat networks. In August 2016, the Obama Administration assigned USSOCOM the leading role in coordinating DOD's efforts to counter WMDs, a mission previously assigned to U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). USSOCOM is also the DOD proponent for Security Force Assistance and recently was assigned the mission to field a transregional Military Information Support Operations (MISO) capability.\nUSSOCOM's FY2020 budget request is for $13.8 billion, and USSOCOM has requested a force structure of 66,553 military and 6,651 civilian personnel.\nA potential issue for Congress is the future of USSOCOM and U.S. SOF.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_0"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_1","query":"Houses, committees, and Members of Congress periodically seek to initiate or participate in litigation to, among other purposes, advance their legislative objectives, argue that the Executive is violating their legislative prerogatives, or defend core institutional interests. However, the constitutionally based doctrine of \"standing\"\u2014which requires a litigant seeking federal judicial relief to demonstrate (1) a concrete and particularized and actual or imminent injury-in-fact (2) that is traceable to the allegedly unlawful actions of the opposing party and (3) that is redressable by a favorable judicial decision\u2014may prevent legislators from pursuing litigation in federal court. The U.S. Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have issued several important opinions analyzing whether\u2014and under what circumstances\u2014a legislative entity has standing to seek relief.\nAlthough legislative standing jurisprudence defies easy characterization, it is possible to distill several principles from existing precedent. For example, whereas courts commonly allow individual legislators to assert injuries to their own personal interests, following the Supreme Court's seminal opinion in Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997), courts have generally (though not universally) been less willing to permit individual legislators to seek redress for injuries to a house of Congress as a whole, at least in the absence of explicit authorization to do so from the legislative body itself. The Supreme Court's case Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), is generally understood as setting forth the lone exception, allowing individual legislators to sue when their vote has been \"nullified\" by some claimed illegal action. In addition, generally speaking, a congressional plaintiff cannot predicate a federal lawsuit solely on a complaint that the executive branch is misapplying or misinterpreting a statute, as litigants must demonstrate concrete and particularized injury to themselves.\nIn addition to initiating litigation, Congress also occasionally seeks to intervene in preexisting litigation. In cases in which the executive branch has declined to defend a federal statute from a constitutional challenge, for example, congressional entities have attempted to intervene as defendants in support of the law. The Supreme Court, in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) and United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013), has allowed Congress to intervene to defend a law that the executive branch has declined to defend but still enforces. Nonetheless, neither case resolved whether significant exceptions to this rule exist, let alone explored what rules are in place when the President both declines to defend and enforce a federal law. Moreover, in cases that do not involve the executive branch's refusal to defend a federal statute, Congress's ability to intervene as a full party to the case may be more circumscribed.\nEven when Congress lacks standing to initiate or intervene in a federal lawsuit as a full-fledged party, Congress may still play a role in litigation by participating as an amicus curiae, or \"friend of the court.\" Courts frequently allow Members, houses, and committees of Congress to file amicus briefs in support of (or opposition to) particular parties or positions.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_1"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_2","query":"Science and technology (S&T) have a pervasive influence over a wide range of issues confronting the nation. Public and private research and development spur scientific and technological advancement. Such advances can drive economic growth, help address national priorities, and improve health and quality of life. The ubiquity and constantly changing nature of science and technology frequently create public policy issues of congressional interest.\nThe federal government supports scientific and technological advancement directly by funding and performing research and development and indirectly by creating and maintaining policies that encourage private sector efforts. Additionally, the federal government regulates many aspects of S&T activities.\nThis report briefly outlines a key set of science and technology policy issues that may come before the 116th Congress. This set is not exhaustive, however. Given the rapid pace of S&T advancement and its importance in many diverse public policy contexts, other S&T-related issues not discussed in this report may come before the 116th Congress. The selected issues are grouped into 10 categories\nOverarching S&T Policy Issues, Agriculture, Biomedical Research and Development, Climate Change Science and Water, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Information Technology, Physical and Material Sciences, and Space.\nEach of these categories includes concise analysis of multiple policy issues. The material presented in this report should be viewed as illustrative rather than comprehensive. Each section identifies CRS reports, when available, and the appropriate CRS experts to contact for further information and analysis.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_2"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_3","query":"In total 365 women have been elected or appointed to Congress, 247 Democrats and 118 Republicans. These figures include six nonvoting Delegates, one each from Guam, Hawaii, the District of Columbia, and American Samoa, and two from the U.S. Virgin Islands, as well as one Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico. Of these 365 women, there have been\n309 (211 Democrats, 98 Republicans) women elected only to the House of Representatives; 40 (25 Democrats, 15 Republicans) women elected or appointed only to the Senate; and 16 (11 Democrats, 5 Republicans) women who have served in both houses.\nA record 131 women currently serve in the 116th Congress. Of these 131 women, there are\n25 in the Senate (17 Democrats and 8 Republicans); 102 Representatives in the House (89 Democrats and 13 Republicans); and 4 women in the House (2 Democrats and 2 Republicans) who serve as Delegates or Resident Commissioner, representing the District of Columbia, American Samoa, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico.\nThis report includes brief biographical information, committee assignments, dates of service, district information, and listings by Congress and state, and (for Representatives) congressional districts of the 365 women who have been elected or appointed to Congress. It will be updated when there are relevant changes in the makeup of Congress.\nFor additional information, including a discussion of the impact of women in Congress as well as historical information, including the number and percentage of women in Congress over time, data on entry to Congress, comparisons to international and state legislatures, tenure, firsts for women in Congress, women in leadership, and African American, Asian Pacific American, and Hispanic women in Congress, see CRS Report R43244, Women in Congress: Statistics and Brief Overview, by Jennifer E. Manning and Ida A. Brudnick.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_3"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_4","query":"When an institution of higher education (IHE) closes, a student's postsecondary education may be disrupted. Students enrolled at closing IHEs may face numerous issues and may be required to make difficult decisions in the wake of a closure. Two key issues students may face when their IHEs close relate to their academic plans and their personal finances.\nThe academic issues faced by students when their schools close include whether they will continue to pursue their postsecondary education, and if so, where and how they might do so. Students deciding to continue their postsecondary education have several options. They may participate in a teach-out offered by the closing institution or by another institution. A teach-out is a plan that provides students with the opportunity to complete their program of study after a school's closure. Students may also be able to transfer the credits they previously earned at the closed IHE to another IHE. If a student is able to transfer some or all of the previously earned credits, he or she would not be required to repeat the classes those credits represent at the new institution; if a student is unable to transfer previously earned credits, the student may be required to repeat the classes those credits represent at the new IHE. Decisions regarding the acceptance of credit transfers are within the discretion of the accepting IHE.\nThe financial issues faced by students when their schools close include whether they are responsible for repaying any loans borrowed to attend a closed school and how they might finance any additional postsecondary education they pursue. In general, a closed school loan discharge is available to a borrower of federal student loans made under Title IV of the Higher Education Act (P.L. 89-329, as amended), if the student was enrolled at the IHE when it closed or if the student withdrew from the IHE within 120 days prior to its closure. Additionally, the student must have been unable to complete his or her program of study at the closed school or a comparable program at another IHE, either through a teach-out agreement or by transferring any credits to another IHE. Borrowers ineligible for a closed school discharge may be able to have eligible Title IV federal student loans discharged by successfully asserting as a borrower defense to repayment (BDR) certain acts or omissions of an IHE, if the cause of action directly relates to the loan or educational services for which the loan was provided. Whether a borrower may have discharged all or part of any private education loans borrowed to attend the closed IHE may depend on the loan's terms and conditions.\nSome students may also face issues regarding how they might finance future postsecondary educational pursuits. If a borrower receives a closed school discharge or has a successful BDR claim, the discharged loan will not count against the borrower's Subsidized Loan usage period, which typically limits certain borrowers' receipt of Direct Subsidized Loans for a period equal to 150% of the published length of his or her academic program, and a borrower's statutory annual and aggregate borrowing limits on Direct Subsidized and Direct Unsubsidized Loans are unlikely to be affected. Students who receive a Pell Grant for enrollment at a school that closed may have an equivalent amount of Pell eligibility restored. Likewise, if the student used GI Bill educational benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs for attendance at a closed school, those benefits can be restored.\nStudents may be reimbursed for payments on charges levied by closed IHEs that are not covered by other sources from a State Tuition Recovery Fund (STRF). The availability of and student eligibility for such funds vary by state, and not all states operate STRFs. Finally, the receipt of any of the above-mentioned benefits may have federal and state income tax implications, including the potential creation of a federal income tax liability for borrowers who have certain loans discharged.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_4"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_5","query":"Members of Congress and Administrations have periodically considered reorganizing the federal government's trade and development functions to advance various U.S. policy objectives. The Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (BUILD Act), which was signed into law on October 5, 2018 (P.L. 115-254), represents a potentially major overhaul of U.S. development finance efforts. It establishes a new agency\u2014the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC)\u2014by consolidating and expanding existing U.S. government development finance functions, which are conducted primarily by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and some components of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).\nWhile the IDFC is expected to carry over OPIC's authorities and many of its policies, there are some key distinctions. For example, in comparison to OPIC, the new IDFC, by statute, is to have the following:\nMore \"tools\" to provide investment support (e.g., authority to make limited equity investments and provide technical assistance). More capacity (a $60 billion exposure cap compared to OPIC's $29 billion exposure cap). A longer authorization period (seven years compared to OPIC's year-to-year authorization through appropriations legislation in recent years). More specific oversight and risk management (including its own Inspector General [IG], compared to OPIC, which is under the USAID IG's jurisdiction).\nA key policy rationale for the BUILD Act was to respond to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China's growing economic influence in developing countries. In this regard, the IDFC aims to advance U.S. influence in developing countries by incentivizing private investment as an alternative to a state-directed investment model. The BUILD Act also aims to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of U.S. government development finance functions, as well as to achieve greater cost savings through consolidation.\nThe BUILD Act requires the Administration to submit to Congress a reorganization plan within 120 days of enactment of the act, and the IDFC is not permitted to become operational any sooner than 90 days after the President has transmitted the reorganization plan.\nThe 116th Congress will have responsibility for overseeing the Administration's implementation of the BUILD Act. As the IDFC is operationalized, Members of Congress may examine whether the current statutory framework allows the IDFC to balance both its mandates to support U.S. businesses in competing for overseas investment opportunities and to support development, as well as whether it enables the IDFC to respond effectively to strategic concerns especially vis-\u00e0-vis China. Congress also may consider whether to press the Administration to pursue international rules on development finance comparable to those that govern export credit financing. More broadly, the IDFC's establishment could renew legislative debate over the economic and policy benefits and costs of U.S. government activity to support private investment, and whether such activity is an effective way to promote broad U.S. foreign policy objectives.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_5"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_6","query":"The Small Business Administration (SBA) has provided technical and managerial assistance to small businesses since it began operations in 1953. Initially, the SBA provided its own small business management and technical assistance training programs. Over time, the SBA has relied increasingly on third parties to provide that training.\nCongressional interest in the SBA's management and technical assistance training programs ($226.7 million in FY2019) has increased in recent years, primarily because these programs are viewed as a means to assist small businesses create and retain jobs. These programs fund about \"14,000 resource partners,\" including 63 lead small business development centers (SBDCs) and nearly 900 SBDC local outreach locations, 128 women's business centers (WBCs), and 350 chapters of the mentoring program, SCORE. The SBA reports that more than 1.2 million aspiring entrepreneurs and small business owners receive training from an SBA-supported resource partner each year.\nThe Department of Commerce also provides management and technical assistance training for small businesses. For example, its Minority Business Development Agency provides training to minority business owners to assist them in obtaining contracts and financial awards.\nSome have argued that the SBA could improve program efficiency by eliminating duplication of services across federal agencies and improving cooperation and coordination among the SBA's resource partners. Congress has also explored ways to improve the SBA's measurement of these programs' effectiveness.\nThis report examines the historical development of federal small business management and technical assistance training programs; describes their current structures, operations, and budgets; and assesses their administration and oversight and the measures used to determine their effectiveness. It also discusses legislation to improve program performance, including\nP.L. 114-88, the Recovery Improvements for Small Entities After Disaster Act of 2015 (RISE After Disaster Act of 2015), which, among other things, authorizes the SBA to provide up to two years of additional funding to its resource partners to assist small businesses located in a presidentially declared major disaster area and authorizes SBDCs to provide assistance outside the SBDC's state, without regard to geographical proximity to the SBDC, if the small business is in a presidentially declared major disaster area. This assistance can be provided \"for a period of not more than two years after the date on which the President\" has declared the area a major disaster; and P.L. 115-141, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, among other provisions, relaxed requirements that Microloan intermediaries may spend no more than 25% of Microloan technical assistance grant funds on prospective borrowers and no more than 25% of those funds on contracts with third parties to provide that technical assistance by increasing those percentages to no more than 50%.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_6"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_7","query":"Family violence broadly refers to acts of physical and sexual violence perpetrated by individuals against family members. The federal government has responded to various forms of family violence, including violence involving spouses and other intimate partners, children, and the elderly. The focus of this report is on the federal response to domestic violence under the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act (FVPSA). \"Domestic violence\" is used in the report to describe violence among intimate partners, including those involved in dating relationships. Generally speaking, victims tend to be women, although a sizable share of men are also victimized. A 2015 survey conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) found that approximately one-third of women and men had experienced sexual violence, physical violence, and\/or stalking in their lifetimes. It showed that women were more likely than men to have experienced contact sexual violence (18% vs. 8%), stalking (10% vs. 2%), and severe physical violence (21% vs. 15%). Women were also more likely than men to report an impact related to partner violence over their lifetimes (25% vs 11%). Such impacts included having injuries, being fearful, being concerned for their safety, missing work or school, needing medical care, or needing help from law enforcement.\nThroughout much of the 20th century, domestic violence remained a hidden problem. Victims, or survivors, of this abuse often endured physical and emotional abuse in silence out of fear of retaliation by their spouses or partners. In the 1970s, former battered women, civic organizations, and professionals began to open shelters and provide services to abused women and their children. As a result of these efforts and greater national attention to domestic violence, Congress conducted a series of hearings in the early 1980s to understand the scope of domestic violence and explore possible responses. FVPSA was enacted in 1984 (Title III of P.L. 98-457), and has been reauthorized seven times, most recently by the CAPTA Reauthorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-320).\nFVPSA authorizes three primary sets of activities, all of which are administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). These activities are authorized through FY2015, per P.L. 113-320, and funds have continually been appropriated in each subsequent year. FY2019 funding is $180 million. First, a national domestic violence hotline receives calls for assistance related to this violence. The hotline provides crisis intervention and counseling, maintains a database of service providers throughout the United States and the territories, and provides referrals for victims and others affected by domestic violence. Second, FVPSA funds efforts to prevent domestic violence through a program known as Domestic Violence Prevention Enhancement and Leadership Through Allies (DELTA). The program supports efforts in selected communities to prevent domestic violence. Third, FVPSA supports direct services for victims and their families, including victims in underserved and minority communities and children exposed to domestic violence. Most of this funding is awarded via grants to states, territories, and tribes, which then distribute the funds to local domestic violence service organizations. These organizations provide shelter and a number of services\u2014counseling, referrals, development of safety plans, advocacy, legal advocacy, and other services. This funding also supports state domestic violence coalitions that provide training and support for service providers, and national resource centers that provide training and technical assistance on various domestic violence issues for a variety of stakeholders.\nFVPSA was the first federal law to address domestic violence. Since the law was enacted, it has continued to have a primary focus on providing shelter and services for survivors and has increasingly provided support to children exposed to domestic violence and teen dating violence. With the enactment of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA, P.L. 103-322), the federal response to domestic violence has expanded to include investigating and prosecuting crimes and providing additional services to victims and abusers. VAWA activities are administered by multiple federal agencies.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_7"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_8","query":"The Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act (16 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7669 et seq.), enacted in 1937 and now known as the Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act, provides funding for states and territories to support wildlife restoration, conservation, and hunter education and safety programs. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), within the Department of the Interior, administers Pittman-Robertson. All 50 states (but not the District of Columbia) as well as the 5 inhabited U.S. territories receive Pittman-Robertson funds.\nFunding for FWS to carry out Pittman-Robertson programs comes from excise taxes on firearms, ammunition, and archery equipment. Receipts from these excise taxes are deposited into the Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration Fund in the Treasury, and monies from the fund are made available for FWS in the fiscal year following their collection without any further action by Congress. Between FY1939 and FY2019, FWS disbursed $18.8 billion (in 2018 dollars) for wildlife restoration and hunter education and safety activities for Pittman-Robertson programs.\nFWS apportions and disburses funds to states and territories through three formula-based programs: Wildlife Restoration (known as Section 4(b)), Basic Hunter Education and Safety (Section 4(c)), and Enhanced Hunter Education and Safety Grants (Section 10). FWS also allocates nonformula funding for multistate conservation grants and program administration. State apportionments for wildlife restoration projects are based on the land and inland water area and the number of hunting licenses sold in each state. State population is used to determine apportionments for both the Basic and Enhanced Hunter Education and Safety programs. FWS also apportions funding for territories. For Wildlife Restoration, Puerto Rico receives not more than 0.5% of the apportionments made under the act and American Samoa, Guam, the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands each receive not more than 0.17%. Each territory receives 0.17% of the total apportionments for both the Basic and Enhanced Hunter Education and Safety programs.\nAmending Pittman-Robertson is of perennial interest to some in Congress. Members routinely consider legislation to amend how states and territories may use their Pittman-Robertson apportionments, sources of funding to support Pittman-Robertson, and the Pittman-Robertson apportionment formulas. Issues of interest have included whether Pittman-Robertson funds should be available for hunter recruitment and retention activities and the amount available for the expansion or construction of public shooting ranges. Because Pittman-Robertson derives its funding through an excise tax on shooting and archery equipment, the number of people participating in these and related activities influences the amount of available funding for these programs. This, in turn, can lead some to consider issues related to funding sources and whether the existing revenue sources derived from excise taxes on shooting and archery equipment should be modified. Other issues that Congress has addressed include whether to modify the existing apportionment structure, including whether to amend how funding is apportioned for states and territories.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_8"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_9","query":"The President of the United States has available certain powers that may be exercised in the event that the nation is threatened by crisis, exigency, or emergency circumstances (other than natural disasters, war, or near-war situations). Such powers may be stated explicitly or implied by the Constitution, assumed by the Chief Executive to be permissible constitutionally, or inferred from or specified by statute. Through legislation, Congress has made a great many delegations of authority in this regard over the past 230 years.\nThere are, however, limits and restraints upon the President in his exercise of emergency powers. With the exception of the habeas corpus clause, the Constitution makes no allowance for the suspension of any of its provisions during a national emergency. Disputes over the constitutionality or legality of the exercise of emergency powers are judicially reviewable. Both the judiciary and Congress, as co-equal branches, can restrain the executive regarding emergency powers. So can public opinion. Since 1976, the President has been subject to certain procedural formalities in utilizing some statutorily delegated emergency authority.\nThe National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a71601-1651) eliminated or modified some statutory grants of emergency authority, required the President to formally declare the existence of a national emergency and to specify what statutory authority activated by the declaration would be used, and provided Congress a means to countermand the President's declaration and the activated authority being sought. The development of this regulatory statute and subsequent declarations of national emergency are reviewed in this report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_9"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_10","query":"Medicare is a federal program that pays for covered health care services of qualified beneficiaries. It was established in 1965 under Title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide health insurance to individuals 65 and older, and has been expanded over the years to include permanently disabled individuals under the age of 65. Medicare, which consists of four parts (A-D), covers hospitalizations, physician services, prescription drugs, skilled nursing facility care, home health visits, and hospice care, among other services. Generally, individuals are eligible for Medicare if they or their spouse worked for at least 40 quarters in Medicare-covered employment, are 65 years old, and are a citizen or permanent resident of the United States. Individuals may also qualify for coverage if they are a younger person who cannot work because they have a medical condition that is expected to last at least one year or result in death, or have end-stage renal disease (permanent kidney failure requiring dialysis or transplant). The program is administered by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and by private entities that contract with CMS to provide claims processing, auditing, and quality oversight services.\nIn FY2019, the program is expected to cover approximately 61 million persons (52 million aged and 9 million disabled) at a total cost of about $772 billion. Spending under the program (except for a portion of administrative costs) is considered mandatory spending and is not subject to the annual appropriations process. Services provided under Parts A and B (also referred to as \"original\" or \"traditional\" Medicare) are generally paid directly by the government on a \"fee-for-service\" basis, using different prospective payment systems or fee schedules. Under Parts C and D, private insurers are paid a monthly \"capitated\" amount to provide enrollees with required benefits. Medicare is required to pay for all covered services provided to eligible persons, so long as specific criteria are met.\nSince 1965, the Medicare program has undergone considerable change. For example, during the 111th Congress, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 and P.L. 111-152) made numerous changes to the Medicare program that modified provider reimbursements, provided incentives to increase the quality and efficiency of care, and enhanced certain Medicare benefits. In the 114th Congress, the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA; P.L. 114-10) changed the method for calculating updates to Medicare payment rates to physicians and altered how physicians and other practitioners will be paid in the future.\nProjections of future Medicare expenditures and funding indicate that the program will place increasing financial demands on the federal budget and on beneficiaries. For example, the Hospital Insurance (Part A) trust fund is projected to become insolvent in 2026. Additionally, although the Supplementary Medical Insurance (Parts B and D) trust fund is financed in large part through federal general revenues and cannot become insolvent, associated spending growth is expected to put increasing strains on the country's competing spending priorities. As such, Medicare is expected to be a high-priority issue in the current Congress, and Congress may consider a variety of Medicare reform options ranging from further modifications of provider payment mechanisms to redesigning the entire program.\nThis report provides a general overview of the Medicare program including descriptions of the program's history, eligibility criteria, covered services, provider payment systems, and program administration and financing. A list of commonly used acronyms, as well as information on beneficiary cost sharing, may be found in the appendixes.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_10"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_11","query":"The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is the main source of primary flood insurance coverage in the United States, collecting approximately $4.75 billion in premiums, fees, and surcharges for over five million flood insurance policies. This is in contrast to the majority of other property and casualty risks, such as damage from fire or accidents, which are covered by a broad array of private insurance companies. One of the primary reasons behind the creation of the NFIP in 1968 was the withdrawal by private insurers from providing flood insurance coverage, leaving flood victims largely reliant on federal disaster assistance to recover after a flood. While private insurers have taken on relatively little flood risk, they have been involved in the administration of the NFIP through sales and servicing of policies and claims.\nIn recent years, private insurers have expressed increased interest in providing flood coverage. Advances in the analytics and data used to quantify flood risk along with increases in capital market capacities may allow private insurers to take on flood risks that they shunned in the past. Private flood insurance may offer some advantages over the NFIP, including more flexible flood polices, integrated coverage with homeowners insurance, or lower-cost coverage for some consumers. Private marketing might also increase the overall amount of flood coverage purchased, reducing the amount of extraordinary disaster assistance necessary to be provided by the federal government. Increased private coverage could reduce the overall financial risk to the NFIP, reducing the amount of NFIP borrowing necessary after major disasters.\nIncreasing private insurance, however, may have some downsides compared to the NFIP. Private coverage would not be guaranteed to be available to all floodplain residents, unlike the NFIP, and consumer protections could vary in different states. The role of the NFIP has historically been broader than just providing insurance. As currently authorized, the NFIP also encompasses social goals to provide flood insurance in flood-prone areas to property owners who otherwise would not be able to obtain it, and to reduce government's cost after floods. Through flood mapping and mitigation efforts, the NFIP has tried to reduce the future impact of floods, and it is unclear how effectively the NFIP could play this broader role if private insurance became a large part of the flood marketplace. Increased private insurance could also have an impact on the subsidies that are provided for some consumers through the NFIP.\nThe 2012 reauthorization of the NFIP (Title II of P.L. 112-141) included provisions encouraging private flood insurance; however, various barriers have remained. Legislation passed the House in the 114th Congress (H.R. 2901) and 115th Congress (H.R. 2874) which would have attempted to expand the role of private flood insurance; neither bill was taken up by the Senate.\nIn the 116th Congress, no NFIP legislation has advanced past introduction. The NFIP is currently operating under a short-term reauthorization until May 31, 2019; some NFIP legislation may be considered prior to this date.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_11"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_12","query":"The 116th Congress may consider a variety of housing-related issues. These could include topics related to housing finance, federal housing assistance programs, and housing-related tax provisions, among other things. Particular issues that may be of interest during the Congress include the following:\nThe status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that have been in conservatorship since 2008. Congress might consider comprehensive housing finance reform legislation to resolve the status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Furthermore, a new director for the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's regulator and conservator, was sworn in on April 15, 2019. Congress may take an interest in any administrative changes that FHFA might make to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under new leadership. Appropriations for federal housing programs, including programs at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and rural housing programs administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), particularly in light of discretionary budget caps that are currently scheduled to decrease for FY2020. Oversight of the implementation of certain changes to federal assisted housing programs that were enacted in prior Congresses, such as expansions of HUD's Moving to Work (MTW) program and Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program. Considerations related to housing and the federal response to major disasters, including oversight of the implementation of certain changes related to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assistance that were enacted in the previous Congress. Consideration of legislation related to certain federal housing programs that provide assistance to Native Americans living in tribal areas. Consideration of legislation to extend certain temporary tax provisions that are currently expired, including housing-related provisions that provide a tax exclusion for canceled mortgage debt and allow for the deductibility of mortgage insurance premiums, respectively.\nHousing and mortgage market conditions provide context for these and other issues that Congress may consider, although housing markets are local in nature and national housing market indicators do not necessarily accurately reflect conditions in specific communities. On a national basis, some key characteristics of owner-occupied housing markets and the mortgage market in recent years include increasing housing prices, low mortgage interest rates, and home sales that have been increasing but constrained by a limited inventory of homes on the market. Key characteristics of rental housing markets include an increasing number of renters, low rental vacancy rates, and increasing rents. Rising home prices and rents that have outpaced income growth in recent years have led to policymakers and others increasingly raising concerns about the affordability of both owner-occupied and rental housing. Affordability challenges are most prominent among the lowest-income renter households, reflecting a shortage of rental housing units that are both affordable and available to this population.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_12"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_13","query":"Despite a campaign pledge that they \"would not arrest anyone as political prisoners,\" Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD) have failed to fulfil this promise since they took control of Burma's Union Parliament and the government's executive branch in April 2016. While presidential pardons have been granted for some political prisoners, people continue to be arrested, detained, tried, and imprisoned for alleged violations of Burmese laws. According to the Assistance Association of Political Prisoners (Burma), or AAPP(B), a Thailand-based, nonprofit human rights organization formed in 2000 by former Burmese political prisoners, there were 331 political prisoners in Burma as of the end of April 2019.\nDuring its three years in power, the NLD government has provided pardons for Burma's political prisoners on six occasions. Soon after assuming office in April 2016, former President Htin Kyaw and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi took steps to secure the release of nearly 235 political prisoners. On May 23, 2017, former President Htin Kyaw granted pardons to 259 prisoners, including 89 political prisoners. On April 17, 2018, current President Win Myint pardoned 8,541 prisoners, including 36 political prisoners. In April and May 2019, he pardoned more than 23,000 prisoners, of which the AAPP(B) considered 20 as political prisoners.\nAung San Suu Kyi and her government, as well as the Burmese military, however, also have demonstrated a willingness to use Burma's laws to suppress the opinions of its political opponents and restrict press freedoms. The NLD-led government arrested two Reuters reporters who had reported on alleged murders of Rohingya by Tatmadaw soldiers, Kyaw Soe Oo and Wa Lone, in December 2017 and charged them with violating the Official Secrets Act of 1923. On September 3, 2018, the two reporters were sentenced to seven years in prison. Kyaw Soe Oo and Wa Lone were granted a presidential pardon on May 7, 2019, after serving 511 days in prison. In addition, Aung Ko Htwe was sentenced to two years in prison with hard labor on March 28, 2018, following his August 2017 interview with Radio Free Asia about his allegations that he was forced by the Tatmadaw to become a \"child soldier.\"\nThe Union Parliament has repealed or amended a few of the numerous laws that authorities use to arrest and prosecute people for political reasons, and further has passed new laws that some observers see as limiting political expression and protection of human rights. In addition, the Tatmadaw, which directly or indirectly control the nation's security forces (including the Myanmar Police Force), has not demonstrated an interest in ending Burma's history of political imprisonment. Tatmadaw leaders have brought multiple defamation cases against journalists who publish stories critical of Burma's military.\nThe Burma Political Prisoners Assistance Act (H.R. 2327) would make it U.S. policy to support the immediate and unconditional release of \"all prisoners of conscience and political prisoners in Burma,\" and require the Secretary of State to \"provide assistance to civil society organizations in Burma that work to secure the release of prisoners of conscience and political prisoners in Burma.\"\nCongress may consider if and how to integrate concerns regarding political imprisonment into overall U.S. policy in Burma. Congress may also choose to assess how other important issues in Burma should influence U.S. policy, including efforts to end the nation's ongoing low-grade civil war, the forced deportation of more than 700,000 Rohingya from Rakhine State, and prospects for constitutional and legal reform designed to establish a democratically elected civilian government that respects the human rights and civil liberties of all Burmese people.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_13"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_14","query":"A record 131 women currently serve in the 116th Congress. There are 106 women serving in the House (including Delegates and the Resident Commissioner), 91 Democrats and 15 Republicans. There are 25 women in the Senate, 17 Democrats and 8 Republicans.\nThese 131 women surpass the previous record of 115 women at the close of the 115th Congress. The numbers of women serving fluctuated during the 115th Congress; there were 109 women initially sworn in, 5 women subsequently elected to the House, 2 appointed to the Senate, and 1 woman in the House who died in office.\nThe very first woman elected to Congress was Representative Jeannette Rankin (R-MT, served 1917-1919 and 1941-1943). The first woman to serve in the Senate was Rebecca Latimer Felton (D-GA). She was appointed in 1922 and served for only one day. Hattie Caraway (D-AR, served 1931-1945) was the first Senator to succeed her husband and the first woman elected to a six-year Senate term.\nA total of 365 women have ever been elected or appointed to Congress, including 247 Democrats and 118 Republicans. These figures include six nonvoting Delegates (one each from Guam, Hawaii, the District of Columbia, and American Samoa, and two from the U.S. Virgin Islands), as well as one Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico. Of these,\n309 (211 Democrats, 98 Republicans) women have been elected only to the House of Representatives; 40 (25 Democrats, 15 Republicans) women have been elected or appointed only to the Senate; 16 (11 Democrats, 5 Republicans) women have served in both houses; 47 African American women have served in Congress (2 in the Senate, 45 in the House), including 25 serving in the 116th Congress; 13 Asian Pacific American women have served in Congress (10 in the House, 1 in the Senate, and 2 in both the House and Senate), including 10 in the 116th Congress; 20 Hispanic women have served in Congress (including 1 in the Senate), including 15 in the 116th Congress; and 2 American Indian women, both currently serving in the House, have served in Congress.\nIn the 116th Congress, eight women serve as committee chairs (six in the House, two in the Senate).\nThis report includes historical information, including the number of women in Congress over time; means of entry to Congress; comparisons to international and state legislatures; records for tenure; firsts for women in Congress; women in leadership; African American, Asian Pacific American, Hispanic, and American Indian women in Congress; as well as a brief overview of research questions related to the role and impact of women in Congress. The Appendix provides details on the total number of women who have served in each Congress, including information on changes within a Congress. The numbers in the report may be affected by the time periods used when tallying any particular number. The text and notes throughout the report provide details on time periods used for the tallies and the currency of the information.\nFor additional biographical information\u2014including the committee assignments, dates of service, listings by Congress and state, and (for Representatives) congressional districts of the 365 women who have been elected or appointed to Congress\u2014see CRS Report RL30261, Women in Congress, 1917-2019: Service Dates and Committee Assignments by Member, and Lists by State and Congress, by Jennifer E. Manning and Ida A. Brudnick.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_14"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_15","query":"The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) requires U.S. transportation fuel to contain a minimum volume of renewable fuel. The RFS\u2014established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58; EPAct05) and expanded in 2007 by the Energy Independence and Security Act (P.L. 110-140; EISA)\u2014began with 4 billion gallons of renewable fuel in 2006 and aims to ascend to 36 billion gallons in 2022. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has statutory authority to determine the volume amounts after 2022.\nThe total renewable fuel statutory target consists of both conventional biofuel and advanced biofuel. Since 2014, the total renewable fuel statutory target has not been met, with the advanced biofuel portion falling below the statutory target by a large margin since 2015. Going forward, it is unlikely that the United States will meet the total renewable fuel target as outlined in statute.\nEPA administers the RFS and is responsible for several tasks. For instance, within statutory criteria EPA evaluates which renewable fuels are eligible for the RFS program. Also, EPA establishes the amount of renewable fuel that will be required for the coming year based on fuel supply and other conditions although waiver authority in the statute allows the EPA Administrator to reduce the statutory volumes if necessary. Further, the statute requires that the EPA Administrator \"reset\" the RFS\u2014whereby the fuel volumes required for future years are modified by the Administrator if certain conditions are met. EPA monitors compliance for the RFS using a system of tradable credits referred to as renewable identification numbers (RINs).\nCongress has expressed ongoing interest in the RFS, particularly as the mandate relates to other legislative efforts (e.g., Reid Vapor Pressure requirements for ethanol-gasoline fuel blends containing greater than 10% ethanol, a national octane standard) and about oversight of the RIN market, among other things. Some assert it is time to amend or repeal the RFS, while others contend the best course of action is to maintain the status quo. For instance, some Members contend the RFS hurts consumers by creating an artificial market for ethanol. Others see ethanol as a part of a competitive energy strategy.\nCongress may also express interest in how the EPA Administrator applies the RFS \"reset\" authority. EPA reports that in early 2019 it will issue a rulemaking that proposes to modify\u2014or \"reset\"\u2014the cellulosic biofuel, advanced biofuel, and total renewable fuel volume targets for the years 2020-2022.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_15"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_16","query":"A bill or joint resolution that has been vetoed by the President can become law if two-thirds of the Members voting in the House and the Senate each agree to pass it over the President's objection. The chambers act sequentially on vetoed measures: The House acts first on House-originated measures (H.R. and H.J. Res.), and the Senate acts first on Senate-originated measures (S. and S.J. Res.). If the first-acting chamber fails to override the veto, the other chamber cannot consider it. The House typically considers the question of overriding a presidential veto under the hour rule, with time customarily controlled and allocated by the chair and ranking member of the committee with jurisdiction over the bill. The Senate usually considers the question of overriding a veto under the terms of a unanimous consent agreement.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_16"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_17","query":"Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that have occasionally been used to implement U.S. national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many other analysts see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms. The pace of implementation for many of these agreements slowed during the Clinton Administration, and the Bush Administration usually preferred unilateral or ad hoc measures to formal treaties and agreements to address U.S. security concerns. The Obama Administration resumed bilateral negotiations with Russia and pledged its support for a number of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation efforts, but succeeded in negotiating only a few of its priority agreements. The Trump Administration has offered some support for existing agreements, but has announced the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty, citing Russia's violation of that agreement, and has not yet determined whether it will support the extension of the 2010 New START Treaty through 2026. It shows little interest in pursuing further agreements.\nThe United States and Soviet Union began to sign agreements limiting their strategic offensive nuclear weapons in the early 1970s. Progress in negotiating and implementing these agreements was often slow, and subject to the tenor of the broader U.S.-Soviet relationship. As the Cold War drew to a close in the late 1980s, the pace of negotiations quickened, with the two sides signing treaties limiting intermediate-range and long-range weapons. But progress again slowed in the 1990s, as U.S. missile defense plans and a range of other policy conflicts intervened in the U.S.-Russian relationship. At the same time, however, the two sides began to cooperate on securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Through these efforts, the United States has allocated more than $1 billion each year to threat reduction programs in the former Soviet Union. These programs have recently reached their conclusion.\nThe United States is also a prominent actor in an international regime that attempts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. This regime, although suffering from some setbacks in recent years in Iran and North Korea, includes formal treaties, export control coordination and enforcement, U.N. resolutions, and organizational controls. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) serves as the cornerstone of this regime, with all but four nations participating in it. The International Atomic Energy Agency not only monitors nuclear programs to make sure they remain peaceful, but also helps nations develop and advance those programs. Other measures, such as sanctions, interdiction efforts, and informal cooperative endeavors, also seek to slow or stop the spread of nuclear materials and weapons.\nThe international community has also adopted a number of agreements that address non-nuclear weapons. The CFE Treaty and Open Skies Treaty sought to stabilize the conventional balance in Europe in the waning years of the Cold War. Other arrangements seek to slow the spread of technologies that nations could use to develop advanced conventional weapons. The Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons Conventions sought to eliminate both of these types of weapons completely.\nThis report will be updated annually or as needed.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_17"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_18","query":"The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was established by the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (NFIA, 42 U.S.C. \u00a74001 et seq.), and was most recently reauthorized to May 31, 2019, through a series of short-term reauthorizations. The general purpose of the NFIP is both to offer primary flood insurance to properties with significant flood risk, and to reduce flood risk through the adoption of floodplain management standards. Communities volunteer to participate in the NFIP in order to have access to federal flood insurance, and in return are required to adopt minimum standards.\nThe NFIP is managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), through its subcomponent the Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration (FIMA). FEMA manages a Risk Mapping, Assessment and Planning (Risk MAP) process to produce Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs). Depicted on FIRMs are Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs), which are areas exposed to a 1% or greater risk of annual flooding. FIRMs vary in age across the country, and are updated on a prioritized basis. The Risk MAP process provides extensive outreach and appeal opportunities for communities. Updating a community's FIRMs can take three to five years or more. Participating communities must adopt a flood map and enact minimum floodplain standards to regulate development in the SFHA. FEMA encourages communities to enhance their floodplain standards by offering reduced premium rates through the Community Rating System (CRS). FEMA also manages a Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) grant program using NFIP revenues to further reduce comprehensive flood risk. Participating communities that fail to adopt FIRMs or maintain minimum floodplain standards can be put on probation or suspended from the NFIP. In communities that do not participate in the NFIP, or have been suspended, individuals cannot purchase NFIP insurance. Individuals in these communities also face challenges receiving federal disaster assistance in flood hazard areas, and have difficulties receiving federally backed mortgages.\nNFIP insurance uses one of three types of Standard Flood Insurance Policies (SFIPs). SFIPs have maximum coverage limits set by law. Any federal entity that makes, guarantees, or purchases mortgages must, by law, require property owners in the SFHA to purchase flood insurance, generally through the NFIP. In moderate risk areas, community members may purchase Preferred Risk Policies (PRPs) that offer less costly insurance. The day-to-day sale, servicing, and claims processing of NFIP policies are conducted by private industry partners. Most policies are serviced by companies that are reimbursed through the Write Your Own (WYO) Program.\nThe premium rate for most NFIP policies is intended to reflect the true flood risk. However, Congress has directed FEMA to subsidize flood insurance for properties built before the community's first FIRM (i.e., the pre-FIRM subsidy). In addition, FEMA \"grandfathers\" properties at their rate from past FIRMs to updated FIRMs through a cross-subsidy.\nCongress has provided appropriations to the NFIP for some of the cost of Risk MAP. Congress also authorizes the use of premium revenues for other NFIP costs, including administration, salaries, and other expenses. NFIP premiums also include other charges, such as a Federal Policy Fee, a Reserve Fund assessment, and a surcharge to help fund the NFIP. In October 2017, Congress cancelled $16 billion of NFIP debt, making it possible for the program to pay claims for Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. The NFIP currently owes $20.525 billion to the U.S. Treasury, leaving $9.9 billion in borrowing authority from a $30.425 billion limit in law. This debt is serviced by the NFIP and interest is paid through premium revenues.\nAfter May 31, 2019, key authorities of the NFIP, such as the authority to issue new insurance contracts, will expire if they are not reauthorized by Congress.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_18"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_19","query":"Concurrent receipt refers to the simultaneous receipt of two types of federal monetary benefits: military retired pay and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) disability compensation. Prior to 2004, existing laws and regulations dictated that a military retiree could not receive two payments from federal agencies for the same purpose. As a result, military retirees with physical disabilities recognized by the VA would have their military retired pay offset or reduced dollar-for-dollar by the amount of their nontaxable VA compensation. Legislative activity on the issue of concurrent receipt began in the late 1980s and culminated in the provision for Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC) in the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-314). Since then, Congress has added Concurrent Retirement and Disability Payments (CRDP) for those retirees with a disability rated at 50% or greater, extended concurrent receipt to additional eligible populations, and further refined and clarified the program.\nThere are two common criteria that define eligibility for concurrent receipt: (1) all recipients must be military retirees and (2) they must also be eligible for VA disability compensation. An eligible retiree cannot receive both CRDP and CRSC. The retiree must choose whichever is most financially advantageous to him or her and may change the type of benefit to be received during an annual open season.\nIn FY2017, approximately one-third of the retired military population was receiving either CRSC or CRDP at a cost of $12.4 billion. Nevertheless, there are also military retirees who receive VA disability compensation but are not eligible for concurrent receipt. Determining whether to make some or all of this population eligible for concurrent receipt remains a point of contention in Congress. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated that to extend benefits to all veterans who would be eligible for both disability benefits and military retired pay would cost $30 billion from 2015 to 2024. In 2016, CBO estimated that eliminating concurrent receipt would save the government $139 billion between 2018 and 2026.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_19"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_20","query":"President Trump has used Section 232 authority to apply new tariffs to steel and aluminum imports and potentially on automobile and automobile parts and other sectors currently under investigation. These actions have raised a number of policy issues and some Members of Congress have introduced legislation to revise various Section 232 authorities. Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. \u00a71862) provides the President with the ability to impose restrictions on certain imports based on an affirmative determination by the Department of Commerce (Commerce) that the product under investigation \"is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.\" Section 232 actions are of interest to Congress because they are a delegation of Congress's constitutional authority \"To lay and collect \u2026 Duties\" and \"To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.\"\nGlobal overcapacity in steel and aluminum production, mainly driven by China, has been an ongoing concern of Congress. The George W. Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations each engaged in multilateral discussions to address global steel capacity reduction through the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). While the United States has extensive antidumping and countervailing duties on Chinese steel imports to counter China's unfair trade practices, steel industry and other experts argue that the magnitude of Chinese production acts to depress prices globally.\nEffective March 23, 2018, President Trump applied 25% and 10% tariffs, respectively, on certain steel and aluminum imports. The President temporarily exempted several countries from the tariffs pending negotiations on potential alternative measures. Permanent tariff exemptions in exchange for quantitative limitations on U.S. imports were eventually announced covering steel for Brazil and South Korea, and both steel and aluminum for Argentina. Australia was permanently exempted from both tariffs with no quantitative restrictions. In August 2018, President Trump raised the tariff to 50% on steel imports from Turkey. The proposed United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) would not resolve or address the Section 232 tariffs on imported steel and aluminum from Canada and Mexico.\nCommerce is managing a process for potential product exclusions in order to limit potential negative domestic effects of the tariffs on U.S. businesses and consumers. Of the nearly 70,000 steel exclusion requests, over 16,000 have been granted, and about 46,000 have been denied to date. Commerce also received about 10,000 aluminum exclusion requests, with 3,000 exclusions granted and 500 denied. Several Members have raised issues and concerns about the exclusionary process.\nU.S. trading partners are challenging the tariffs under World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement rules and have threatened or enacted retaliatory measures. Some analysts view the U.S. unilateral actions as potentially undermining WTO rules, which generally prohibit parties from acting unilaterally, but provide exceptions, including when parties act to protect \"essential security interests.\"\nCongress enacted Section 232 during the Cold War when national security issues were at the forefront of national debate. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 sets clear steps and timelines for Section 232 investigations and actions, but allows the President to make a final determination over the appropriate action to take following an affirmative finding by Commerce that the relevant imports threaten to impair national security. Prior to the Trump Administration, there were 26 Section 232 investigations, resulting in nine affirmative findings by Commerce. In six of those cases the President imposed a trade action.\nThe Trump Administration has launched three additional Section 232 investigations. On May 23, 2018, Commerce initiated an investigation on U.S. automobile and automobile part imports; on July 18, 2018, Commerce launched a Section 232 investigation into uranium ore and product imports; and on March 4, 2019, Commerce began an investigation into titanium sponge imports. The latter two investigations were in response to petitions by U.S. firms. These investigations, as well as the Administration's decision to apply the steel and aluminum tariffs on imports from Canada, Mexico, and the EU\u2014all major suppliers of the affected imports\u2014have prompted further questions by some Members of Congress and trade policy analysts on the appropriate use of the trade statute and the proper interpretation of threats to national security on which Section 232 investigations are based. These actions have also intensified debate over potential legislation to constrain the President's authority with respect to Section 232.\nThe steel and aluminum tariffs are affecting various stakeholders in the U.S. economy, prompting reactions from several Members of Congress, some in support of the measures and others voicing concerns. In general, the tariffs are expected to benefit some domestic steel and aluminum manufacturers, leading to potentially higher domestic steel and aluminum prices and expansion in production in those sectors, while potentially negatively affecting consumers and many end users (e.g., auto manufacturing and construction) through higher costs. To date, Congress has held hearings on the potential economic and broader policy effects of the tariffs, and legislation has been introduced to override the tariffs that have already been imposed, or to revise or potentially limit the authority previously delegated to the President in future investigations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_20"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_21","query":"Congressional interest in market-based greenhouse gas (GHG) emission control legislation has fluctuated over the past 15 years. During that time, legislation has often involved market-based approaches, such as a cap-and-trade system or a carbon tax or fee program. Both approaches would place a price\u2014directly or indirectly\u2014on GHG emissions or their inputs (e.g., fossil fuels), both would increase the price of fossil fuels, and both would reduce GHG emissions to some degree. Both would allow emission sources to choose the best way to meet their emission requirements or reduce costs, potentially by using market forces to minimize national costs of emission reductions. Preference between the two approaches ultimately depends on which variable policymakers prefer to precisely control\u2014emission levels or emission prices.\nA primary policy concern with either approach is the economic impacts that may result from the program. Expected energy price increases could have both economy-wide impacts (e.g., on the U.S. gross domestic product) and disproportionate effects on specific industries and particular demographic groups. The degree of these potential effects would depend on a number of factors, including the magnitude, design, and scope of the program and the use of tax or fee revenues or emission allowance values.\nThis report includes a separate table for each Congress, comparing GHG emission reduction legislation by the following characteristics:\nGeneral framework: the proposed program structure and scope in terms of emissions covered, multiple GHG emissions, or just carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Covered entities\/materials: a list of the industries, sectors, or materials that would be subject to the program. Emissions limit or target: the GHG or CO2 emissions target or cap for a specified year. Distribution of allowance value or tax revenue: how emission allowance value or carbon tax or fee revenue would be distributed. Offset and international allowance treatment: the degree to which offsets and international allowances could be used for compliance purposes and the types of offset activities that would qualify. Mechanism to address carbon-intensive imports: a U.S. GHG reduction program may create a competitive disadvantage for some domestic businesses, particularly carbon-intensive, trade-exposed industries. Additional GHG reduction measures: other mechanisms designed to further reduce GHG emissions that are not covered in the central program.\nAs the figure below illustrates, between the 108th and 111th Congresses, most of the introduced bills would have established cap-and-trade systems. Between the 112th and 115th Congresses, most of the introduced bills would have established carbon tax or emissions fee programs.\nThe proposals from the 116th Congress range in their scope of emissions covered from CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion to multiple GHG emissions from a broader array of sources. In addition, the proposals differ by how, to whom, and for what purpose the fee revenues or allowance value would be applied. Some economic analyses indicate that policy choices to distribute the tax, fee, or emission allowance revenue would yield greater economic impacts than the direct impacts of the carbon price.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_21"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_22","query":"Congress has broad authority to impose requirements upon the federal procurement process, that is, the process whereby agencies obtain goods and services from the private sector. One way in which Congress has exercised this authority is by adopting measures to promote contracting and subcontracting between \"small businesses\" and federal agencies.\nThese measures, among other things, declare a congressional policy of ensuring that a \"fair proportion\" of federal contract and subcontract dollars is awarded to small businesses; establish government-wide and agency-specific goals for the percentage of federal contract and subcontract dollars awarded to small businesses; establish an annual Small Business Goaling Report to measure progress in meeting these goals; generally require federal agencies, under specified circumstances, to reserve contracts that have an anticipated value greater than the micro-purchase threshold (currently $10,000), but not greater than the simplified acquisition threshold (currently $250,000) exclusively for small businesses; authorize federal agencies, under specified circumstances, to set aside contracts that have an anticipated value greater than the simplified acquisition threshold exclusively for small businesses; authorize federal agencies to make sole source awards to small businesses when the award could not otherwise be made (e.g., only a single source is available, under urgent and compelling circumstances); authorize federal agencies to set aside contracts for, or grant other contracting preference to, specific types of small businesses (e.g., 8(a) small businesses, HUBZone small businesses, women-owned small businesses (WOSBs) and service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses (SDVOSBs)); and task the Small Business Administration (SBA) and other federal procurement officers with reviewing and restructuring proposed procurements to maximize opportunities for small business participation.\nSmall business contracting programs generally have strong bipartisan support. However, that does not mean that these programs face no opposition, or that issues have not been raised concerning the impact and operations of specific programs. For example, small business advocates note that implementing regulations in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) narrow the reach (and impact) of some small business contracting preferences by excluding specific types of contracts, such as those listed in the Federal Supply Schedules, from FAR requirements pertaining to small business contracting. Advocates want the federal government to enact policies that reduce or eliminate such exclusions. Critics have questioned some of these programs' effectiveness, in terms of both promoting small business opportunities to win federal contracts and promoting a more diversified, robust economy.\nMany observers judge the relative success or failure of federal efforts to enhance small business contracting opportunities by whether federal government and individual federal agencies meet the predetermined procurement goals in the annual Small Business Goaling Report. In recent years, the federal government has generally succeeded in meeting the government-wide goals of awarding 23% of the total value of all small business eligible prime contract awards to small businesses, 5% to small disadvantaged businesses (SDBs), and 3% to SDVOSBs. It has had difficulty meeting the goals of 5% to WOSBs and 3% to HUBZone small businesses.\nThe Small Business Goaling Report is the most convenient measure available to compare federal small business contracting performance over time, but it has limitations. For example, the SBA excludes some contracts from the report in its determination of what is \"small business eligible\" and some federal procurement activities are not included because they are not recorded in the Federal Procurement Data System\u2014Next Generation. It also does not evaluate the effect these contracts have on small businesses, industry competitiveness, or the overall economy.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_22"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_23","query":"In recent decades, the process for appointing judges to the U.S. circuit courts of appeals and the U.S. district courts has been of continuing Senate interest. The President and the Senate share responsibility for making these appointments. Pursuant to the Constitution's Appointments Clause, the President nominates persons to fill federal judgeships, with the appointment of each nominee also requiring Senate confirmation. Although not mentioned in the Constitution, an important role is also played midway in the appointment process by the Senate Judiciary Committee.\nThe statistics presented in this report reflect congressional interest in issues related to the confirmation process for lower federal court nominees. Statistics are provided for each stage of the nomination and confirmation process\u2014from the frequency of judicial vacancies that require a presidential nomination for a judgeship to be filled to the frequency of roll call votes (rather than the use of unanimous consent or voice votes) to confirm judicial nominees. Statistics are also provided related to the length of the confirmation process itself. Additional statistics provided relate to the demographic characteristics of circuit and district court nominees confirmed by the Senate.\nThe period covered by the report, 1977 through 2018, includes every Administration from the Carter presidency to the first two years of the Trump presidency. This period also includes every Congress from the 95th (1977-1978) through the 115th (2017-2018).\nBecause the statistics presented for the Trump presidency are for the first two years of his Administration (while statistics for other presidencies reflect each President's entire Administration, whether four or eight years), the statistics presented for the Trump presidency may be different at the conclusion of his Administration.\nThis report will be next updated by CRS at the conclusion of the 116th Congress.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_23"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_24","query":"Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX) provides an avenue of legal relief for victims of sexual abuse and harassment at educational institutions. It bars discrimination \"on the basis of sex\" in an educational program or activity receiving federal funding. Although Title IX makes no explicit reference to sexual harassment or abuse, the Supreme Court and federal agencies have determined that such conduct can sometimes constitute discrimination in violation of the statute; educational institutions in some circumstances can be held responsible when a teacher sexually harasses a student or when one student harasses another. Title IX is mainly enforced (1) through private rights of action brought directly against schools by or on behalf of students subjected to sexual misconduct; and (2) by federal agencies that provide funding to educational programs.\nTo establish liability in a private right of action, a party seeking damages for a Title IX violation must satisfy the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, decided in 1998, and Davis Next Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Board of Education, decided the next year. Gebser provides that when a teacher commits harassment against a student, a school district is liable only when it has actual knowledge of allegations by an \"appropriate person,\" and so deficiently responds to those allegations that its response amounts to deliberate indifference to the discrimination. Davis instructs that, besides showing actual knowledge by an appropriate person and deliberate indifference, a plaintiff suing for damages for sexual harassment committed by a student must show that the conduct was \"so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive\" that it denied the victim equal access to educational opportunities or benefits. Taken together, the Supreme Court's decisions set forth a high threshold for a private party seeking damages against an educational institution based on its response to sexual harassment. In turn, federal appellate courts have differed in how to apply the standards set in Gebser and Davis, diverging on the nature and amount of evidence sufficient to support a claim.\nIn each of the last several presidential administrations, the Department of Education (ED) issued a number of guidance documents that instruct schools on their responsibilities under Title IX when addressing allegations of sexual harassment. These documents\u2014while sometimes subject to change\u2014generally reflected a different standard than the Supreme Court case law addressing private rights of action for damages for sexual abuse or harassment (the Court in Davis acknowledged that the threshold for liability in a private right of action could be higher than the standard imposed in the administrative enforcement context). Those guidance documents had, among other things, established that sometimes a school could be held responsible for instances of sexual harassment by a teacher, irrespective of actual notice; and schools could be held responsible for student-on-student harassment if a \"responsible employee\" knew or should have known of the harassment (constructive notice). ED's previous guidance also instructed educational institutions that they sometimes could be responsible for responding to incidents of sexual harassment occurring off campus. ED also cautioned schools on the use of mediation to resolve allegations of sexual harassment. With regard to the procedures used by schools to resolve sexual harassment allegations, ED informed schools that they must use the preponderance of the evidence standard to establish culpability, and the agency strongly discouraged schools from allowing parties in a hearing to personally cross-examine one another. In response to guidance from ED, as well as increased oversight from the department's Office for Civil Rights (OCR) between 2011 and 2016, schools developed several procedures to ensure that their responses to allegations of sexual harassment and assault complied with Title IX. A number of students faced with disciplinary action by public universities raised constitutional challenges to the Title IX procedures used to find them responsible for sexual misconduct, arguing that universities violated the Due Process Clause in handling their case.\nED issued a notice of proposed rulemaking in late 2018, after revoking some of its previous guidance to schools in 2017. The proposed regulations would, in several ways, tether the administrative requirements for schools to the standard set by the Supreme Court in Gebser and Davis. In doing so, the proposed regulations would depart from the standards set by ED in previous guidance documents (some of which have since been rescinded). The new regulations would require \"actual notice,\" rather than constructive notice, of harassment by an education institution to trigger a school's Title IX responsibilities, and provide that a school's response to allegations of sexual harassment will violate Title IX only if it amounts to deliberate indifference. In addition, the new regulations would more narrowly define what conduct qualifies as sexual harassment under Title IX, and also impose new procedural requirements, which appear to reflect due process concerns, when schools investigate sexual harassment or assault allegations and make determinations of culpability.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_24"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_25","query":"In the exercise of its constitutional authority over the Armed Forces, Congress has enacted an array of laws which govern important aspects of military officer personnel management, including appointments, assignments, grade structure, promotions, and separations. Some of these laws are directed specifically at the most senior military officers, known as general and flag officers (GFOs). Congress periodically reviews these laws and considers changes as it deems appropriate. Areas of congressional interest have included the number of GFOs authorized, the proportion of GFOs to the total force, compensation levels of GFOs, and duties and grades of certain GFOs.\nAs of November 1, 2018, there were 891 active duty GFOs subject to statutory caps, which is 72 less than the maximum of 963 authorized by law. There were also another 29 exempt from the statutory caps. The current number is about average for the post-Cold War era, though substantially lower than the number of GFOs in the 1960s-1980s, when the Armed Forces were much larger in size than they are today. However, while always very small in comparison to the total force, the general and flag officer corps has increased as a percentage of the total force over the past five decades. GFOs made up about one-twentieth of one percent (0.048%) of the total force in 1965, while they made up about one-fifteenth of one percent (0.069%) of the total force in 2018, indicating that the share of the total force made up of GFOs increased by 44%. Some argue that this increased proportion of GFOs is wasteful and contributes to more bureaucratic decisionmaking processes. Others counter that the increased proportion is linked to the military's greater emphasis on joint and coalition operations, core organizational requirements, and the increasing use of advanced technologies.\nCompensation for GFOs varies. One commonly used measure of compensation, known as regular military compensation (RMC), includes basic pay, basic allowance for housing, basic allowance for subsistence, and the federal tax advantage associated with allowances, which are exempt from federal income tax. In 2019, the lowest-ranking GFOs make about $204,000 per year in RMC, while the highest-ranking GFOs make about $238,000 per year.\nCongress has also used its authority to specify the grade and duties of certain GFO positions. For example, Congress increased the grade of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) from Lieutenant General to General in 2008. Three years later, Congress again changed the law to specify that the CNGB was a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff whose duties included \"the specific responsibility of addressing matters involving non-Federalized National Guard forces in support of homeland defense and civil support missions.\" In 2016, Congress removed the statutory grade requirement from 54 GFO positions.\nThis report provides an overview of active duty GFOs in the United States Armed Forces\u2014including authorizations, duties, and compensation\u2014historical trends in the proportion of GFOs relative to the total force, criticisms and justifications of GFO to total force proportions, and statutory controls. National Guard and Reserve GFOs are not addressed in this report, unless they are serving on active duty in a manner that counts against the active duty caps on GFOs.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_25"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_26","query":"International trophy hunting is a multinational, multimillion-dollar industry practiced throughout the world. Trophy hunting is broadly defined as the killing of animals for recreation with the purpose of collecting trophies such as horns, antlers, skulls, skins, tusks, or teeth for display. The United States imports the most trophies of any country in the world. Congressional interest in trophy hunting is related to the recreational and ethical considerations of hunting and the potential consequences of hunting for conservation. For some, interest in trophy hunting centers on particular charismatic species, such as African lions, elephants, and rhinoceroses. Congress's role in addressing international trophy hunting is limited, because hunting is regulated by laws of the range country (i.e., the country where the hunted species resides). However, Congress could address trophy hunting through actions such as regulating trophy imports into the United States or providing funding and technical expertise to conserve hunted species in range countries.\nInternational trophy hunting generates controversy because of its potential costs and benefits to conservation, ethical considerations, and its contribution to local economies in range states. Proponents of trophy hunting contend that the practice provides an estimated millions of dollars for the conservation of species in exchange for the hunting of a proportionally small number of individuals. Further, they argue that trophy hunting can create incentives for conserving habitat and ecosystems where hunted animals roam and, in some impoverished areas in range countries, can provide a means of income, employment, and community development. Critics of trophy hunting contend that the practice can lead to the decline of rare and endangered species and that the pathway of moving funds from hunting to conservation can be fraught with corruption and mismanagement. Further, some contend it is unethical to kill animals for sport, or at all, and that animals should not be valued according to how much a hunter would pay to hunt them.\nThe international community, including the United States, has laws and regulations related to international trophy hunting. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) is an international agreement that creates a series of incrementally more stringent restrictions on imports and exports of wildlife, depending on the sustainability of such trade. The European Union (EU) also addresses trophy hunting through regulating trade of trophies, issuing permits for trade of trophies, and suspending certain species from trade with the EU if the species is in peril. In the United States, international trophy hunting is addressed by several laws, including the Endangered Species Act (ESA; 16 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a71531-1543), which implements CITES. ESA does not regulate trophy-hunting activities within range countries directly; rather, the law governs what can be imported into the United States. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) regulates trophy hunting, in part, by issuing permits to import trophies of species that are listed as threatened or endangered under ESA.\nCongress could address international sport hunting by regulating trophy imports and funding conservation and research activities overseas, among other options. Some activities that Congress could consider, according to observers, include\ndirecting the U.S. government to work with foreign governments and partners to monitor hunting practices and game species to help ensure a positive impact from trophy hunting in range states; creating uniform standards for evaluating trophy import permits, specifically whether trophy hunting could enhance the survival of a population as addressed under ESA or be nondetrimental to a population as defined by CITES; mandating that permit applications and decisions be made publicly available; and creating an independent third-party certification system to evaluate trophy hunting operations.\nCongress also might evaluate alternatives to trophy hunting in the wild. In Africa, for example, some countries have banned trophy hunting altogether and support wildlife viewing and tourism in its place. Some countries, such as South Africa, have large, fenced game ranches where animals can be hunted in a practice called captive hunting. Some contend these operations do not allow for fair chase hunting (i.e., hunting wild animals without boundaries) or contribute to conservation, whereas others argue that they facilitate wildlife management and reduce poaching.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_26"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_27","query":"The Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program\u2014commonly known as the \"8(a) Program\"\u2014provides participating small businesses with training, technical assistance, and contracting opportunities in the form of set-aside and sole-source awards. A set-aside award is a contract in which only certain contractors may compete, whereas a sole-source award is a contract awarded, or proposed for award, without competition. In FY2017, 3,421 8(a) firms were awarded more than $27.1 billion in federal contracts, including $8.0 billion in 8(a) set-aside awards and $8.4 billion in 8(a) sole-source awards. Other programs provide similar assistance to other types of small businesses (e.g., women-owned, HUBZone, and service-disabled veteran-owned).\n8(a) Program eligibility is generally limited to small businesses \"unconditionally owned and controlled by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals who are of good character and citizens of and residing in the United States\" that demonstrate \"potential for success.\"\nMembers of certain racial and ethnic groups are presumed to be socially disadvantaged, although individuals who do not belong to these groups may prove they are also socially disadvantaged. To be economically disadvantaged, an individual must have a net worth of less than $250,000 (excluding ownership in the 8(a) firm and equity in his or her primary residence) at the time of entry into the program. This amount increases to $750,000 for continuing eligibility. In determining whether an applicant has good character, the SBA takes into account any criminal conduct, violations of SBA regulations, or debarment or suspension from federal contracting. For a firm to demonstrate potential for success, it generally must have been in business in its primary industry classification for two years immediately prior to applying to the program. However, small businesses owned by Alaska Native Corporations, Community Development Corporations, Indian tribes, and Native Hawaiian Organizations are eligible to participate in the 8(a) Program under somewhat different terms. Each of these terms is further defined by the Small Business Act, Small Business Administration (SBA) regulations, and judicial and administrative decisions.\nThis report examines the 8(a) Program's historical development, key requirements, administrative structures and operations, and the SBA's oversight of 8(a) firms. It also discusses two SBA programs designed to support 8(a) firms, the 7(j) Management and Technical Assistance Program and the 8(a) Mentor-Prot\u00e9g\u00e9 Program, and provides various program statistics. It concludes with an analysis of the following current 8(a) Program issues:\nThe SBA's decision to address recent declines in the number of program participants by revising and streamlining the program's application process, an action which the SBA's Office of Inspector General (SBA OIG) reports \"may erode core safeguards that prevented questionable firms from entering the 8(a) Program.\" Reported variation in 8(a) Program service delivery. Reported deficiencies in the oversight of 8(a) Program participant's continuing eligibility. Disagreements concerning the financial thresholds used to determine economic disadvantage, including the SBA's decision to exclude equity in a primary residence from the calculation of an individual's net worth. The adequacy of the performance measures used to evaluate the program's effectiveness in meeting its statutory goals.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_27"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_28","query":"Historically, most aspects of election administration have been left to state and local governments, resulting in a variety of practices across jurisdictions with respect to voter registration. States can vary on a number of elements of the voter registration process, including whether or not to require voter registration; where or when voter registration occurs; and how voters may be removed from registration lists. The right of citizens to vote, however, is presented in the U.S. Constitution in the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-sixth Amendments. Beginning with the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in 1965, Congress has sometimes passed legislation requiring certain uniform practices for federal elections, intended to prevent any state policies that may result in the disenfranchisement of eligible voters. The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) was enacted in 1993 and set forth a number of voter registration requirements for states to follow regarding voter registration processes for federal elections.\nNVRA is commonly referred to as the motor-voter bill, as it required states to provide voter registration opportunities alongside services provided by departments of motor vehicles (DMVs), although NVRA required other state and local offices providing public services to provide voter registration opportunities as well. NVRA also created a federal mail-based voter registration form that all states are required to accept and created criteria for state voter registration forms. Certain procedures states must follow for performing voter registration list maintenance or removing voters from registration lists are also set forth in NVRA. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) provided guidance to state election officials and issued biennial reports to Congress on NVRA implementation and voter registration in each state until these roles were transferred to the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) in 2002.\nNVRA remains a fundamental component of federal voter registration policy and has not undergone many significant revisions since its enactment, though voter registration remains a subject of interest to Congress. The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 enacted a number of election administration measures, several of which were based on recommendations from the FEC's biennial NVRA reports, and affected federal voter registration. These included the computerization of state voter lists; grants to states for election technology upgrades; changes to the federal mail-based voter registration form; and the transfer of the FEC's role in administering NVRA to the newly created EAC. More comprehensive information on HAVA can be found in CRS Report RS20898, The Help America Vote Act and Election Administration: Overview and Selected Issues for the 2016 Election.\nIn the 115th Congress, 66 bills were introduced related to federal voter registration or NVRA. Some of these measures were narrow in scope, whereas others were more comprehensive electoral reforms. Many of these bills sought to expand the ways in which states must allow individuals to register to vote. This can include adding other public service agencies to the list of NVRA voter registration agencies, or requiring online voter registration, same-day voter registration, preregistration of teenagers not yet eligible to vote, or automatic voter registration. A number of other bills reflected ongoing concerns about the technology used to maintain voter registration data and about balancing the efficiency technology provides for citizens and election officials with sufficient cybersecurity protections.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_28"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_29","query":"The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is considered a key U.S. partner in the Middle East. Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues over the years. Jordan's strategic importance to the United States is evident given ongoing instability in neighboring Syria and Iraq, Jordan's 1994 peace treaty with Israel, and uncertainty over the trajectory of Palestinian politics. Jordan also is a longtime U.S. partner in global counterterrorism operations. U.S.-Jordanian military, intelligence, and diplomatic cooperation seeks to empower political moderates, reduce sectarian conflict, and eliminate terrorist threats.\nU.S. officials frequently express their support for Jordan. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan address serious vulnerabilities, both internal and external. Jordan's small size and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and various Arab sources. President Trump has acknowledged Jordan's role as a key U.S. partner in countering the Islamic State, as many U.S. policymakers advocate for continued robust U.S. assistance to the kingdom.\nAnnual aid to Jordan has nearly quadrupled in historical terms over the last 15 years. The United States has provided economic and military aid to Jordan since 1951 and 1957, respectively. Total bilateral U.S. aid (overseen by the Departments of State and Defense) to Jordan through FY2017 amounted to approximately $20.4 billion. Jordan also hosts over 2,000 U.S. troops.\nPublic dissatisfaction with the economy is a pressing concern for the monarchy. In 2018, widespread protests erupted throughout the kingdom in opposition to a draft tax bill and price hikes on fuel and electricity. Though peaceful, the protests drew immediate international attention because of their scale. Since then, the government has frozen or softened the proposed fiscal measures, but also has continued to work with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on fiscal reforms to address a public debt that has ballooned to 96.4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).\nAs the Trump Administration has enacted changes to long-standing U.S. policies on Israel and the Palestinians, which the Palestinians have criticized as unfairly punitive and biased toward Israel, Jordan has found itself in a difficult political position. While King Abdullah II seeks to maintain strong relations with the United States, he rules over a country where the issue of Palestinian rights resonates with much of the population; more than half of all Jordanian citizens originate from either the West Bank or the area now comprising the state of Israel. In trying to balance U.S.-Jordanian relations with Palestinian concerns, King Abdullah II has refrained from directly criticizing the Trump Administration on its recent moves, while urging the international community to return to the goal of a two-state solution that would ultimately lead to an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.\nThe 116th Congress may consider legislation pertaining to U.S. relations with Jordan. On February 18, 2016, President Obama signed the United States-Jordan Defense Cooperation Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-123), which authorizes expedited review and an increased value threshold for proposed arms sales to Jordan for a period of three years. It amended the Arms Export Control Act to give Jordan temporarily the same preferential treatment U.S. law bestows upon NATO members and Australia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. S. 28, the United States-Jordan Defense Cooperation Extension Act, would reauthorize the United States-Jordan Defense Cooperation Act (22 U.S.C. 275) through December 31, 2022.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_29"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_30","query":"Congress enacted the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) in 2003 in response to the increased deployment of Reserve and National Guard military and as a modernization and restatement of the protections and rights previously available to servicemembers under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (SSCRA). The SCRA has been amended since its initial passage, and Congress continues to consider amendments from time to time.\nCongress has long recognized the need for protective legislation for servicemembers whose service to the nation compromises their ability to meet obligations and protect their legal interests. The SCRA is an exercise of Congress's power to raise and support armies and to declare war. The purpose of the act is to provide for, strengthen, and expedite the national defense by protecting servicemembers, enabling them to \"devote their entire energy to the defense needs of the Nation.\" The SCRA protects servicemembers by temporarily suspending certain judicial and administrative proceedings and transactions that may adversely affect their legal rights during military service. The SCRA does not provide forgiveness of all debts or the extinguishment of contractual obligations on behalf of active-duty servicemembers, nor does it grant absolute immunity from civil lawsuits. Instead, the SCRA provides for the suspension of claims and protection from default judgments against servicemembers. In this way, it seeks to balance the interests of servicemembers and their creditors, spreading the burden of national military service to a broader portion of the citizenry. Some protections are contingent on whether military service materially affects the servicemember's ability to meet obligations, while others are not. Courts are to construe the SCRA liberally in favor of servicemembers, but retain discretion to deny relief in certain cases. The Services are required to provide information to servicemembers explaining their rights under the SCRA.\nMany of the SCRA provisions are especially beneficial for Reservists activated to respond to a national crisis, but many provisions are also useful for career military personnel. One measure that affects many who are called to active duty is the cap on interest at an annual rate of 6% on debts incurred prior to a person's entry into active-duty military service. Creditors are required to forgive the excess interest and are prohibited from retaliating against servicemembers who invoke the 6% interest cap by submitting adverse credit reports solely on that basis. Other measures protect military families from being evicted from rental or mortgaged property; from cancellation of life insurance and professional liability insurance; from taxation in multiple jurisdictions; from losing domicile for voting and other purposes due to being stationed elsewhere; from losing child custody due to deployment or the possibility of deployment; from foreclosure of property to pay taxes that are due; and from losing certain rights to public land.\nThe SCRA makes it unlawful for lienholders or lessors to foreclose or seize property owned or used by servicemembers without a court order. It also permits servicemembers to prematurely terminate leases and other term contracts without incurring any early termination penalties. Statutes of limitations that might otherwise prevent servicemembers from pursuing remedies in court or before any governmental agency, including state and local entities, are tolled for the duration of the servicemember's military service. Servicemembers may initiate an action in court for relief prior to defaulting on any pre-service obligation or liability, in order to obtain restructuring of loan repayments or other equitable relief without incurring any penalty. Servicemembers may bring an action in court to enforce their rights under the SCRA, or the Attorney General may bring a civil action in U.S. district court for violations of the SCRA by a person who (1) engages in a pattern or practice of violating the act; or (2) engages in a violation that raises an issue of significant public importance.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_30"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_31","query":"This report provides information on federal financial assistance provided to the Gulf States after major disasters were declared in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas in response to the widespread destruction that resulted from Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma in 2005 and Hurricanes Gustav and Ike in 2008.\nThough the storms happened over a decade ago, Congress has remained interested in the types and amounts of federal assistance that were provided to the Gulf Coast for several reasons. This includes how the money has been spent, what resources have been provided to the region, and whether the money has reached the intended people and entities. The financial information is also useful for congressional oversight of the federal programs provided in response to the storms. It gives Congress a general idea of the federal assets that are needed and can be brought to bear when catastrophic disasters take place in the United States. Finally, the financial information from the storms can help frame the congressional debate concerning federal assistance for current and future disasters.\nThe financial information for the 2005 and 2008 Gulf Coast storms is provided in two sections of this report:\n1. Table 1 of Section I summarizes disaster assistance supplemental appropriations enacted into public law primarily for the needs associated with the five hurricanes, with the information categorized by federal department and agency; and 2. Section II contains information on the federal assistance provided to the five Gulf Coast states through the most significant federal programs, or categories of programs.\nThe financial findings in this report include the following:\nCongress has appropriated roughly $121.7 billion in hurricane relief for the 2005 and 2008 hurricanes in 10 supplemental appropriations statutes. The appropriated funds have been distributed among 11 departments, 3 independent agencies\/entities, numerous subentities, and the federal judiciary. Congress appropriated almost half of the funds ($53.8 billion, or 44% of the total) to the Department of Homeland Security, most of which went to the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Congress targeted roughly 22% of the total appropriations (almost $27 billion) to the Department of Housing and Urban Development for community development and housing programs. Approximately 20% ($25 billion) was appropriated to Department of Defense entities: $15.6 billion for civil construction and engineering activities undertaken by the Army Corps of Engineers and $9.2 billion for military personnel, operations, and construction costs. FEMA has reported that roughly $5.9 billion has been obligated from the DRF after Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma to save lives and property through mission assignments made to over 50 federal entities and the American Red Cross (see Table 17), $160.4 million after Hurricane Gustav through 32 federal entities (see Table 18), and $441 million after Hurricane Ike through 30 federal entities (see Table 19). In total, federal agencies obligated roughly $6.5 billion for mission assignments after the five hurricanes. The Small Business Administration approved almost 177,000 applications in the region for business, home, and economic injury loans, with a total loan value of almost $12 billion (Table 28 and Table 29). The Department of Education obligated roughly $1.8 billion to the five states for elementary, secondary, and higher education assistance (Table 11).\nThis report also includes a brief summary of each hurricane and a discussion concerning federal to state cost-shares. Federal assistance to states is triggered when the President issues a major disaster declaration. In general, once declared the federal share for disaster recovery is 75% while the state pays for 25% of recovery costs. However, in some cases the federal share can be adjusted upward when a sufficient amount of damage has occurred, or when altered by Congress (or both). In addition, how much federal assistance is provided to states for major disasters is influenced not only by the declaration, but also by the percentage the federal government pays for the assistance. This report includes a cost-share discussion because some of these incidents received adjusted cost-shares in certain areas.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_31"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_32","query":"From the earliest days of the republic, the federal government has compensated members of the Armed Forces for their services. While the original pay structure was fairly simple, over time a more complex system of compensation has evolved. The current military compensation system includes cash payments such as basic pay, special and incentive pays, and various allowances. Servicemembers also receive noncash benefits such as health care and access to commissaries and recreational facilities, and may qualify for deferred compensation in the form of retired pay and other retirement benefits. This report provides an overview of military compensation generally, but focuses on cash compensation for current servicemembers.\nSince the advent of the all-volunteer force in 1973, Congress has used military compensation to improve recruiting, retention, and the overall quality of the force. Congressional interest in sustaining the all-volunteer force during a time of sustained combat operations led to substantial increases in compensation in the decade following the attacks of September 11, 2001. Subsequently, in the earlier part of the 2010s, concerns over government spending generated congressional and executive branch interest in slowing the rate of growth in military compensation. Initiatives to slow compensation growth included presidentially directed increases in basic pay below the rate of increase for the Employment Cost Index (ECI) for 2014-2016 and statutory authority for the Department of Defense (DOD) to reduce Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) payments by 1% of the national average monthly housing cost per year from 2015 to 2019 (for a maximum reduction of 5% under the national monthly average housing cost).\nSome have raised concerns about the impact of personnel costs on the overall defense budget, arguing that they decrease the amount of funds available for modernizing equipment and sustaining readiness. Others argue that robust compensation is essential to maintaining a high-quality force that is vigorous, well-trained, experienced, and able to function effectively in austere and volatile environments. The availability of funding to prosecute contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan mitigated the pressure to trade off personnel, readiness, and equipment costs, but the current budgetary environment appears to have brought these trade-offs to the fore again.\nDOD spends about $100,000-$110,000 per year to compensate the average active duty servicemember\u2014to include cash, benefits, and contributions to retirement programs\u2014although some estimates of compensation costs are substantially higher. However, gross compensation figures do not tell the full story, as military compensation relative to civilian compensation is a key factor in an individual's decision to join or stay in the military. Thus, the issue of comparability between military and civilian pay is an often-discussed topic. Some analysts and advocacy groups have argued that a substantial \"pay gap\" has existed for decades\u2014with military personnel earning less than their civilian counterparts\u2014although they generally concede that this gap is fairly small today. Others argue that the methodology behind this \"pay gap\" is flawed and does not provide a suitable estimate of pay comparability. Still others believe that military personnel, in general, are better compensated than their civilian counterparts. The Department of Defense takes a different approach to pay comparability. The 9th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC), published in 2002, argued that compensation for servicemembers should be around the 70th percentile of wages for civilian employees with similar education and experience. According to the 11th QRMC, published in 2012, regular military compensation for officers was at the 83rd percentile of wages for civilian employees with similar education and experience, and at the 90th percentile for enlisted personnel. A 2018 RAND report concluded that these overall percentiles were nearly the same in 2016.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_32"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_33","query":"The Trump Administration submitted to Congress its FY2019 budget request on February 12, 2018. The proposal included $41.86 billion for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS). Of that amount, $13.26 billion was for State Department operations, international broadcasting, and related agencies, and $28.60 billion for foreign operations. With the enactment of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA; P.L. 115-123, February 9, 2018), which raised discretionary spending limits set by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25), the Administration's FY2019 foreign affairs funding request was entirely within enduring (base) funds; no Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding was included the SFOPS request for the first time since FY2012.\nThe FY2019 request would have represented a 23.3% decrease in SFOPS funding compared with FY2018 actual funding levels. The proposed State and related agency funding would have been 18.7% below FY2018 funding and the foreign operations funding would have been reduced by 25.2%. In the State and related programs budget, cuts were proposed for several accounts, including the diplomatic security accounts, contributions to international organizations, and contributions for international peacekeeping activities. In the foreign operations budget, cuts would have been applied across all accounts, with disproportionately large cuts proposed for humanitarian assistance, multilateral assistance, and funding for bilateral development programs focused on agriculture, education, and democracy promotion.\nBoth the House and Senate appropriations committees approved FY2019 SFOPS bills that included funding at higher levels than the Administration requested and closer to FY2018 funding. H.R. 6385, approved by the House appropriations committee on June 20, 2018, would have funded SFOPS accounts at $54.177 billion. S. 3108, approved by the Senate appropriations committee on June 21, 2018, would have provided $54.602 billion for SFOPS accounts.\nFY2019 began with seven appropriations bills, including SFOPS, unfinished. Congress and the President approved continuing resolutions to fund the affected federal agencies through December 21, 2018 at the FY2018 level (P.L. 115-245, Division C and P.L. 115-298). After December 21, a partial shutdown of the government, including SFOPS funded agencies, occurred. On January 25, 2019, an agreement was reached to continue funding for SFOPS and other appropriations that had lapsed through February 15, at the FY2018 level (P.L. 116-5). On February 14, Congress passed, and the President later signed into law, a full year omnibus appropriation that included SFOPS funding (P.L. 116-6, Division F).\nP.L. 116-6 included a total of $54.377 billion for SFOPS accounts in FY2019, a 0.3% decrease from the FY2018 funding level and about 30% more than the Administration's request. Of that enacted total, $8.0 billion, or 14.7%, was designated as OCO.\nThis report provides an account-by-account comparison of the FY2019 SFOPS request, House and Senate SFOPS legislation and the final FY2019 SFOPS appropriation to FY2018 funding in Appendix A. The International Affairs (function 150) budget in Appendix B provides a similar comparison.\nThis report will not be further updated unless there is further congressional activity on FY2019 appropriations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_33"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_34","query":"NAFTA is an international trade agreement among the United States, Canada, and Mexico that became effective on January 1, 1994. The agreement includes market-opening provisions that remove tariff and nontariff barriers to trade, as well as other rules affecting trade in areas such as agriculture, customs procedures, foreign investment, government procurement, intellectual property protection, and trade in services. Congress approved and implemented NAFTA in domestic law in the NAFTA Implementation Act (P.L. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057). On May 18, 2017, U.S. Trade Representative Ambassador Robert Lighthizer notified Congress that the Administration intended to renegotiate NAFTA. More than a year later, following the conclusion of the negotiations, President Trump signed a proposed replacement for NAFTA, the United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (USMCA), along with his counterparts from Canada and Mexico. President Trump has at times suggested that he will withdraw the United States from NAFTA unilaterally if Congress does not approve the USMCA.\nThis report examines the President's authority to terminate the United States' international obligations under NAFTA without further action from Congress. It also examines whether the NAFTA Implementation Act, the primary federal statute that implements the agreement in domestic law, would remain in effect if the President successfully terminated U.S. obligations under the agreement. In analyzing these issues, the report focuses on three related questions: (1) whether, under international law, the President may terminate U.S. international obligations under NAFTA without congressional approval; (2) whether, under domestic law, the President, relying on constitutional or statutory authority, may terminate U.S. international obligations under NAFTA unilaterally; and (3) whether the NAFTA Implementation Act would remain in effect if the President successfully terminated U.S. international obligations under the agreement.\nWith regard to the first question, under international law, the President appears to be able to terminate the United States' international obligations under NAFTA without congressional approval by delivering six months' notice of withdrawal to Canada and Mexico, provided such notice later becomes effective (e.g., assuming that a court does not enjoin the Executive from issuing the notice or declare such issuance unlawful).\nThe answer to the second question is less clear, however, and would require a reviewing court to confront several complicated issues of first impression, including the scope of the President's constitutional authority and statutory authority to terminate an international agreement. Justiciability questions may prevent a court from definitively answering the constitutional questions, leaving the resolution of the President's constitutional authority to the political process. With regard to the statutory question, while legal commentators have raised various arguments with respect to the President's domestic legal authority to terminate U.S. NAFTA international obligations unilaterally, it does not appear that any statute expressly affords the President with the authority to terminate NAFTA on his own. It is unclear whether Congress's enactment of an extensive legal framework providing for legislative consideration, approval, and implementation of trade agreements indicates that Congress did not intend to authorize the President implicitly to withdraw from NAFTA without further congressional action. Nonetheless, as explained below, provisions of federal law such as Sections 125 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 may provide the Executive with broad authority to suspend individual trade concessions granted to NAFTA countries and thereby establish barriers to trade with Canada and Mexico. At the same time, the Executive's use of such authority would, however, likely be subject to review on various grounds by domestic or international tribunals.\nFinally, whether the NAFTA Implementation Act would remain in effect after termination of U.S. obligations under NAFTA would be informed by Supreme Court precedent generally requiring the repeal of statutes to conform to the same bicameral process set forth in Article I of the Constitution that is used to enact new legislation. Accordingly, as an initial matter, it would appear that the President lacks authority to terminate the domestic effect of the NAFTA Implementation Act without going through the full legislative process for repeal. Thus, the Act appears to remain in effect unless Congress has, consistent with the Constitution, delegated to the President authority to terminate its provisions or made such provisions \"self-terminating.\"","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_34"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_35","query":"The principal federal program to aid municipal wastewater treatment plant construction is authorized in the Clean Water Act (CWA). Established as a grant program in 1972, it now capitalizes state loan programs through the clean water state revolving loan fund (CWSRF) program. Since FY1972, appropriations have totaled $98 billion.\nIn 1996, Congress amended the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA, P.L. 104-182) to authorize a similar state loan program for drinking water to help systems finance projects needed to comply with drinking water regulations and to protect public health. Since FY1997, appropriations for the drinking water state revolving loan fund (DWSRF) program have totaled $23 billion.\nThe U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administers both SRF programs, which annually distribute funds to the states for implementation. Funding amounts are specified in the State and Tribal Assistance Grants (STAG) account of EPA annual appropriations acts. The combined appropriations for wastewater and drinking water infrastructure assistance have represented 25%-32% of total funds appropriated to EPA in recent years.\nPrior to CWA amendments in 1987 (P.L. 100-4), Congress provided wastewater grant funding directly to municipalities. The federal share of project costs was generally 55%; state and local governments were responsible for the remaining 45%. The 1987 amendments replaced this grant program with the SRF program. Local communities are now often responsible for 100% of project costs, rather than 45%, as they are required to repay loans to states. The greater financial burden of the act's loan program on some cities has caused some to seek continued grant funding.\nAlthough the CWSRF and DWSRF have largely functioned as loan programs, both allow the implementing state agency to provide \"additional subsidization\" under certain conditions. Since its amendments in 1996, the SDWA has authorized states to use up to 30% of their DWSRF capitalization grants to provide additional assistance, such as forgiveness of loan principal or negative interest rate loans, to help disadvantaged communities. America's Water Infrastructure Act of 2018 (AWIA; P.L. 115-270) increased this proportion to 35% while conditionally requiring states to use at least 6% of their capitalization grants for these purposes.\nCongress amended the CWA in 2014, adding similar provisions to the CWSRF program. In addition, appropriations acts in recent years have required states to use minimum percentages of their allotted SRF grants to provide additional subsidization.\nFinal full-year appropriations were enacted as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2019 (P.L. 116-6), on February 15, 2019. The act provided $1.694 billion for the CWSRF and $1.163 billion for the DWSRF program, nearly identical to the FY2018 appropriations. The FY0219 act provided $68 million for the WIFIA program, a $5 million increase from the FY2018 appropriation.\nCompared to the FY2019 appropriation levels, the Trump Administration's FY2020 budget request proposes to decrease the appropriations for the CWSRF, DWSRF, and WIFIA programs by 34%, 26%, and 63%, respectively.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_35"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_36","query":"The Senior Community Service Employment Program (SCSEP) authorizes the Department of Labor (DOL) to make grants to support part-time community service employment opportunities for eligible individuals age 55 or over. In FY2019, appropriations for SCSEP programs were $400 million and supported approximately 41,000 positions. DOL may also refer to the SCSEP program as Community Service Employment for Older Americans (CSEOA)\nSCSEP is authorized by Title V of the Older Americans Act (OAA). The Older Americans Act Reauthorization Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-144) authorized appropriations for OAA programs for FY2017 through FY2019. In FY2019, SCSEP appropriations accounted for about 20% of the funding under the OAA.\nThe bulk of SCSEP appropriations support two primary grant streams: one to national nonprofit organizations and one to state agencies. In the most recent program year, approximately 78% of formula grant funds were allocated to national grantees and about 22% were allocated to state grantees. Both the national organizations and state grantees subgrant funds to host agencies that provide the actual community service employment opportunities to participants.\nHost agencies are responsible for recruiting eligible participants. To be eligible for the program, prospective participants must be at least age 55, low-income, and unemployed. Federal law requires host agencies to give preference to prospective participants who demonstrate additional barriers to employment such as having a disability or being at risk of homelessness.\nProgram participants work part-time in community service jobs, including employment at schools, libraries, social service organizations, or senior-serving organizations. Program participants earn the higher of minimum wage or the typical wage for the job in which they are employed. An individual may typically participate in the program for a cumulative total of no more than 48 months.\nDuring orientation, participants receive an assessment of their skills, interests, capabilities, and needs. This assessment informs the development of an individual employment plan (IEP). A participant's IEP is updated throughout their participation in the program.\nGrantees are subject to a performance accountability system. Performance metrics generally relate to participants' unsubsidized employment and earnings after exiting the program. In addition to outcome-based metrics, grantees are also assessed on participants' total number of hours of service and whether the grantee served participants with barriers to employment. Grantees that do not meet negotiated levels of performance may become ineligible for subsequent grants.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_36"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_37","query":"U.S. assistance to Vietnam for the environmental and health damage attributed to a dioxin contained in Agent Orange and other herbicides sprayed over much of the southern portion of the country during the Vietnam War remains a major bilateral issue. Between fiscal years (FY) 2007 and 2019, Congress appropriated nearly $255 million to address these two issues. In addition, the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (P.L. 115-232) authorized the transfer of up to $15 million to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for the dioxin cleanup of the Bien Hoa Airbase.\nMost of the appropriated funds have been used by USAID for the environmental cleanup of Danang airport, one of the major airbases used for storing and spraying the herbicides between 1961 and 1971. A lesser amount of the appropriated funds have been used by USAID for assistance to Vietnam's persons with disabilities, generally, but not always in the vicinity of Danang or other dioxin-contaminated areas.\nCongressional interest in Agent Orange\/dioxin in Vietnam has largely been focused on two issues. The first issue is determining the appropriate amount and type of assistance to provide to address the environmental damage and the health effects of dioxin contamination in Vietnam. The second issue is oversight of how such assistance has been utilized by the State Department and USAID.\nIn November 2017, the United States and Vietnam completed the environmental remediation of approximately 90,000 cubic meters (118,000 cubic yards) of contaminated soil and 60,000 cubic meters (78,000 cubic yards) of lower risk materials at Danang airport by a process known as in-pile thermal desorption (IPTD). Restoration and project closure operations were completed in November 2018. The project took six years, with an estimated overall cost of $116 million.\nField studies have identified a number of other areas in Vietnam contaminated with the dioxin associated with Agent Orange, including the airports near Bien Hoa and Phu Cat, as well as sections of the A Luoi Valley. In January 2018, U.S. and Vietnamese governments signed a memorandum of intent (MOI) to begin the cleanup of the Bien Hoa airport. According to a USAID study, the environmental cleanup of Bien Hoa airport could cost an estimated $137 million to $794 million, depending on what form of remediation is used.\nThe provision of health-related assistance to areas contaminated with Agent Orange\/dioxin has raised questions about how USAID has utilized appropriated funds. By May 2017, USAID had obligated less than two-thirds of the appropriated funds for FY2011-FY2017. The funds have generally been used for disability assistance programs regardless of the cause of the disability, rather than for both health and disability programs targeting populations residing near Agent Orange\/dioxin \"hot spots.\"\nWhile the obligations for environmental remediation activities generally have not been a matter of congressional concern, how USAID has obligated appropriations for health and disability activities has drawn some attention.\nThe Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6) appropriated \"not less than $20 million\" for environmental remediation and \"not less than $12.5 million \u2026 for health and disability programs in areas sprayed with Agent Orange and otherwise contaminated with dioxin.\" The Victims of Agent Orange Relief Act of 2019 (H.R. 326) would require the Secretary of State to provide assistance to individuals in Vietnam with health issues related to exposure to Agent Orange, as well as \"to institutions in Vietnam that provide health care for covered individuals.\" The act would also require the Secretary of State to provide assistance \"to remediate those geographic areas of Vietnam that the Secretary determines contain high levels of Agent Orange.\"","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_37"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_38","query":"The Office of Advocacy (Advocacy) is an \"independent\" office within the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) that advances \"the views and concerns of small businesses before Congress, the White House, federal agencies, the federal courts, and state and local policymakers as appropriate.\" The Chief Counsel for Advocacy (Chief Counsel) directs the office and is appointed by the President from civilian life with the advice and consent of the Senate.\nAdvocacy is a relatively small office with a relatively large mandate\u2014to represent the interests of small business in the regulatory process, provide Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) compliance training to federal regulatory officials, produce and promote small business economic research to inform policymakers and other stakeholders concerning the impact of federal regulatory burdens on small businesses and the role of small businesses in the economy, and facilitate small business outreach across the federal government.\nThis report examines Advocacy's origins and the expansion of its responsibilities over time; describes its organizational structure, funding, functions, and current activities; and discusses recent legislative efforts to further enhance its authority. For example, during the 115th Congress, the House passed H.R. 5, the Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017 (Title III, Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act), which would have expanded Advocacy's responsibilities. It would have revised and enhanced requirements for federal agency notification of the Chief Counsel prior to the publication of any proposed rule; expanded the required use of small business advocacy review panels from three federal agencies to all federal agencies, including independent regulatory agencies; empowered the Chief Counsel to issue rules governing federal agency compliance with the RFA; specifically authorized the Chief Counsel to file comments on any notice of proposed rulemaking, not just when the RFA is concerned; and transferred size standard determinations for purposes other than the Small Business Act and the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 from the SBA's Administrator to the Chief Counsel. The House passed similar legislation during the 114th Congress (H.R. 527).\nThe analysis suggests that Advocacy faces several challenges.\nAdvocacy, generally recognized as being an independent office, is housed within the much larger SBA which, given their statutorily overlapping missions as advocates for small businesses, makes it more difficult for stakeholders to recognize Advocacy as the definitive voice for small businesses. Chief Counsels tend to have relatively short tenures, creating continuity problems for Advocacy. The RFA does not define significant economic impact or substantial number of small entities, two key terms for triggering Advocacy's role under the RFA. The lack of clarity concerning these key terms makes it difficult for Advocacy to objectively determine agency compliance with the RFA and to train federal regulatory officials in how to come into compliance with the act. Advocacy often finds itself involved in ideological and partisan disputes concerning the outcome of federal regulatory policies for which it does not have the final say. Advocacy's ability to produce and promote economic research on small businesses and to engage in outreach activities, particularly outreach activities not directly related to its RFA role, is constrained by its relatively limited budgetary resources.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_38"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_39","query":"On January 4, 2019, the House established the Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress by adopting Title II of H.Res. 6, the House rules package for the 116th Congress (2019-2020), on a 418-12 vote. The purpose of the select committee as stated in its authorizing resolution is \"to investigate, study, make findings, hold public hearings, and develop recommendations on modernizing Congress.\"\nTwelve Members, six from each party, have been selected by their leadership to serve on the select committee during its year-long investigation. The committee's authorizing resolution requires its membership to include two Members from the freshman class of the 116th Congress, two Members of the Rules Committee, and two Members of the Committee on House Administration. Funding for the select committee in the amount of $487,500 was provided through House adoption of H.Res. 245 on March 27, 2019.\nThe committee has held four hearings to date, with additional meetings likely. Committee operations are scheduled to end on February 1, 2020. Any final report of the committee will be made public. Publication of the final report will require approval from at least two-thirds of the committee. Given that both parties are equally represented on the committee, some amount of bipartisan support will be needed to approve and publish the final report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_39"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_40","query":"The United States provides foreign assistance to Latin American and Caribbean nations to support development and other U.S. objectives. U.S. policymakers have emphasized different strategic interests in the region at different times, from combating Soviet influence during the Cold War to promoting democracy and open markets since the 1990s. The Trump Administration has sought to reduce foreign aid significantly and refocus U.S. assistance efforts in the region to address U.S. domestic concerns, such as irregular migration and transnational crime.\nFY2019 Budget Request\nFor FY2019, the Trump Administration requested $1.1 billion for Latin America and the Caribbean through foreign assistance accounts managed by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). That amount would have been $581 million, or 34%, less than the estimated $1.7 billion of U.S. assistance the region received in FY2018. The proposal would have cut funding for every type of assistance and nearly every Latin American and Caribbean nation. The Trump Administration also proposed eliminating the Inter-American Foundation\u2014a small, independent U.S. foreign assistance agency that promotes grassroots development in the region\u2014and consolidating its programs into USAID.\nThe Administration's efforts to scale back U.S. assistance could have significant implications for U.S. policy in Latin America and the Caribbean. Faced with potential cuts, U.S. agencies could accelerate efforts to transition countries in the region away from traditional development assistance toward other forms of bilateral engagement. Reductions in State Department-managed security assistance could lead to the Department of Defense taking on a larger role in U.S. security cooperation. Moreover, many argue that reductions in foreign aid, combined with other policy shifts, could contribute to a relative decline in U.S. influence in the region.\nLegislative Developments\nPresident Trump signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), on February 15, 2019. Division F of the act\u2014the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2019\u2014includes funding for foreign assistance programs in Latin America and the Caribbean. The measure was preceded by three short-term continuing resolutions (P.L. 115-245, P.L. 115-298, and P.L. 116-5), which funded foreign assistance programs at the FY2018 level, and a 35-day lapse in appropriations from December 22, 2018, to January 25, 2019. Although the House and Senate Appropriations Committees had approved their FY2019 foreign assistance appropriations measures (H.R. 6385 and S. 3108, respectively) in June 2018, neither bill received floor consideration prior to the end of the 115th Congress.\nP.L. 116-6 and the accompanying joint explanatory statement do not specify appropriations levels for every Latin American and Caribbean nation. Nevertheless, the amounts designated for key U.S. initiatives in Central America, Colombia, and Mexico significantly exceed the Administration's request. The act provides\n$527.6 million to continue implementation of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, which is $92 million more than the Administration requested but $99 million less than Congress appropriated for the initiative in FY2018. at least $418.3 million to support the peace process and security and development efforts in Colombia, which is $153 million more than the Administration requested and $27 million more than Congress appropriated for Colombia in FY2018. $162.7 million to support security and rule-of-law efforts in Mexico, which is $84 million more than the Administration requested and $10 million more than Congress appropriated for Mexico in FY2018.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_40"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_41","query":"From its inception, the United States Intelligence Community (IC) has relied on close relations with foreign partners. These relationships often reflect mutual security interests and the trust each side has of the other's credibility and professionalism. They are generally strategic and cover a range of national security priorities involving national defense, emerging threats, counterterrorism, counter-proliferation, treaty compliance, cybersecurity, economic and financial security, counter-narcotics, and piracy.\nU.S. intelligence relations with foreign counterparts offer a number of benefits: indications and warning of an attack, expanded geographic coverage, corroboration of national sources, accelerated access to a contingency area, and a diplomatic backchannel. They also present risks of compromise due to poor security, espionage, geopolitical turmoil, manipulation to influence policy, incomplete vetting of foreign sources, over-reliance on a foreign partner's intelligence capabilities, and concern over a partner's potentially illegal or unethical tradecraft. Because intelligence failures involving a foreign partner sometimes become public, the risks to the IC of cooperating with a foreign intelligence service are more easily understood. Nevertheless, the persistent cultivation of intelligence relations with foreign partners suggests that the IC remains confident that the benefits outweigh the risks.\nThese benefits are not always widely recognized due to their sensitivity and the potential for compromising the scope and details of what amounts to intelligence collection. The best known of these intelligence relationships are the decades-long ties to America's closest allies, who have shared history, values, and similar perspectives on national security threats. Such ties are often one component of a broader security cooperation arrangement. Less well known are liaison relationships with U.S. adversaries over a particular issue of mutual concern, or relations with non-state foreign intelligence organizations such as Kurdish groups. Regardless of the partner, the U.S. Intelligence Community's aim is to enhance national intelligence resources and capabilities and to further U.S. national security by better understanding the threat environment and thereby enabling informed strategic planning, better policy decisions, and successful military operations. Thus, U.S. foreign intelligence relationships can be an overlooked component of public discussion of various aspects of international cooperation.\nForeign intelligence agencies with ties to U.S. intelligence have often escaped the reach of congressional oversight. Yet Congress, at various times, has been interested in both the benefits and the risks of foreign intelligence relationships to U.S. national security. While sometimes extolling the value intelligence foreign partners can provide, Congress has also been critical of occasions when the IC has become too dependent on such partners at the expense of IC investment in its own intelligence capabilities. Congress has also been concerned with the IC's ability to independently assess the credibility of foreign intelligence sources, as well as the vulnerability of a foreign intelligence partner's telecommunications infrastructure to compromise by a hostile foreign intelligence service. Of particular sensitivity to Congress has been the poor record of human rights by certain foreign intelligence agencies and the potential for foreign intelligence partners to collect and share with the United States information on U.S. persons.\nThis report uses publicly available, unclassified sources as the basis of its research, and does not reference information in the public domain that was unlawfully disclosed.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_41"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_42","query":"The nation's air, land, and marine transportation systems are designed for accessibility and efficiency, two characteristics that make them vulnerable to terrorist attack. While hardening the transportation sector is difficult, measures can be taken to deter terrorists. The enduring challenge facing Congress is how best to implement and finance a system of deterrence, protection, and response that effectively reduces the possibility and consequences of terrorist attacks without unduly interfering with travel, commerce, and civil liberties.\nTransportation security has been a major policy focus since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of those attacks, the 107th Congress moved quickly to pass the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA; P.L. 107-71), creating the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and mandating that security screeners employed by the federal government inspect airline passengers, their baggage, and air cargo. Despite the extensive focus on aviation and transportation security over the past decade, a number of challenges remain, including\ndeveloping and deploying effective biometric capabilities to verify the identities of transportation workers and travelers; developing effective risk-based approaches to vetting and screening transportation workers accessing secured areas of airports and other sensitive areas of transportation networks; developing cost-effective solutions to screen air cargo and freight without impeding the flow of commerce; and coordination among state, local, and federal homeland security and law enforcement personnel to effectively deter and respond to criminal and terrorist acts targeting public areas of transportation facilities.\nThe FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-190) and the TSA Modernization Act (P.L. 115-254, Division K) included provisions intended to improve screening technologies, streamline the passenger screening process, mandate more rigorous background checks of airport workers, strengthen airport access controls, increase passenger checkpoint efficiency and operational performance, and enhance security in public areas of airports and at foreign airports where flights depart for the United States. Oversight of TSA actions to implement these mandates may be an area of particular interest in the 116th Congress. Particular topics may include the evolution of screening technologies and assessments of emerging screening technology solutions; the expansion of canine teams for transportation security; the expansion of the PreCheck program to expedite screening of known travelers; the use of biometrics and associated data security and privacy concerns; implementing effective approaches, regulations, and international agreements to conduct risk-based screening of air cargo shipments worldwide; protecting public areas of airports; and developing effective countermeasures to protect critical infrastructure, including airports and aircraft, from attacks using drones.\nBombings of passenger trains in Europe and Asia in the past few years illustrate the vulnerability of passenger rail systems to terrorist attacks. Passenger rail systems\u2014primarily subway systems\u2014in the United States carry about five times as many passengers each day as do airlines, over many thousands of miles of track, serving stations that are designed primarily for easy access. Transit security issues of recent interest to Congress include the quality of TSA's surface transportation inspector program. The bulk of U.S. overseas trade is carried by ships, and thus the economic consequences of a maritime terrorist attack could be significant. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Coast Guard have implemented security screening procedures that effectively \"push the borders out\"\u2014that is, they begin screening vessels and cargo before they reach a U.S. port. Two aspects of maritime security that have drawn attention recently are cybersecurity and the use of drones for coastal surveillance.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_42"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_43","query":"The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, as amended, enumerates categories of foreign nationals, known as nonimmigrants, who are admitted to the United States for a temporary period of time and a specific purpose. One of these nonimmigrant visa categories\u2014known as the H-2B visa\u2014is for temporary nonagricultural workers.\nThe H-2B visa allows for the temporary admission of foreign workers to the United States to perform nonagricultural labor or services of a temporary nature if unemployed U.S. workers are not available. Common H-2B occupations include landscape laborer, housekeeper, and amusement park worker.\nThe H-2B program is administered by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the U.S. Department of Labor's (DOL's) Employment and Training Administration. DOL's Wage and Hour Division also has certain concurrent enforcement responsibilities. The H-2B program currently operates under regulations issued by DHS in 2008 on H-2B requirements, by DHS and DOL jointly in 2015 on H-2B employment, and by DHS and DOL jointly in 2015 on H-2B wages.\nBringing workers into the United States under the H-2B program is a multiagency process involving DOL, DHS, and the Department of State (DOS). A prospective H-2B employer must apply to DOL for labor certification. Approval of a labor certification application reflects a finding by DOL that there are not sufficient U.S. workers who are qualified and available to perform the work and that the employment of foreign workers will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers who are similarly employed.\nIf granted labor certification, an employer can file a petition with DHS to bring in the approved number of H-2B workers. If the petition is approved, a foreign worker overseas who the employer wants to employ can go to a U.S. embassy or consulate to apply for an H-2B nonimmigrant visa from DOS. If the visa application is approved, the worker is issued a visa that he or she can use to apply for admission to the United States at a port of entry. H-2B workers can be accompanied by eligible spouses and children.\nBy law, the H-2B visa is subject to an annual numerical cap. Under the INA, the total number of individuals who may be issued H-2B visas or otherwise provided with H-2B nonimmigrant status in any fiscal year may not exceed 66,000. USCIS is responsible for implementing the H-2B cap, which it does at the petition receipt stage. Spouses and children accompanying H-2B workers are not counted against the H-2B cap. In addition, certain categories of H-2B workers are exempt from the cap. Among these categories are current H-2B workers who are seeking an extension of stay, change of employer, or change in the terms of their employment.\nEmployer demand for H-2B workers has varied over the years. In recent years, demand has exceeded supply, and special provisions have been enacted to make additional H-2B visas available. For FY2016, a temporary statutory provision exempted certain H-2B workers from the cap. It applied to H-2B workers who had been counted against the cap in any one of the three prior fiscal years and would be returning as H-2B workers in FY2016. For FY2017, FY2018, and FY2019, a different type of H-2B cap-related provision authorized DHS to issue additional H-2B visas (above the cap) subject to specified conditions.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_43"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_44","query":"As agreed to in the House, H.Res. 6, a resolution adopting the rules of the House of Representatives, provided amendments to the rules, as well as separate orders, that affect committee procedure in the 116th Congress (2019-2020). Several of these changes apply to general committee procedure, while others concern specific committees, such as modifications to the names, jurisdiction, or procedures of certain House committees. The rules package also established, during the 116th Congress, two new select committees.\nH.Res. 6 made several changes to committee membership and organization. Most significantly, it removed the committee chair term limits that were in effect during each Congress from the 104th through the 115th Congresses (1995-2018), excluding the 111th Congress (2009-2010). H.Res. 6 added a provision to Rule XXIII that calls on any Member, Delegate, or the Resident Commissioner who has been indicted or formally charged with certain felony offenses to refrain from committee business. It clarified that Delegates and the Resident Commissioner may serve on joint committees, and it lengthened from 30 days to 60 days the period in which to adopt and publish committee rules at the start of a Congress.\nIn a separate order, the 116th Congress rules package established a requirement that certain legislative measures must be reported and be subject to a committee hearing and markup prior to their consideration on the floor. This requirement applies, with some exceptions, to measures that are raised under the terms of a special rule reported from the Rules Committee. Another separate order requires most standing committees to hold a Member Day Hearing during the first session of the 116th Congress, affording any Member the opportunity to speak on proposed legislation within the committee's jurisdiction. H.Res. 6 clarified the notification requirement for committee markup meetings. As amended, clause 2 of Rule XI provides Members at least three workdays to prepare for an upcoming markup, as opposed to the less specific requirement that markups may not occur before the \"third day\" after a chair announces the meeting.\nH.Res. 6 altered procedures concerning committee oversight. The 115th Congress House rules requirement that committees prepare and submit \"authorization and oversight plans\" was replaced with the requirement that chairs develop oversight plans in consultation with the ranking member. In addition, a separate order now allows committee counsel to take depositions without the presence of a committee member.\nAmendments to the House standing rules changed two committees' names and clarified their jurisdictions. The Committee on Education and the Workforce became the Committee on Education and Labor, a name it held in some previous Congresses. As amended, Rule X specified that the committee's jurisdiction includes the general management of the Department of Education and the Department of Labor. The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform was re-designated the Committee on Oversight and Reform. The rules changes clarified that the Committee on Oversight and Reform's existing jurisdiction over the review and study of all government activities includes \"the Executive Office of the President.\"\nA separate order directed the Committee on Ethics to empanel an investigative subcommittee to review allegations whenever a Member, Delegate, or the Resident Commissioner is indicted on a criminal charge. H.Res. 6 amended clause 3 of Rule XI to allow the Committee on Ethics, or an investigative subcommittee thereof, to consider trial evidence in ethics investigations of Members, Delegates, and the Resident Commissioner.\nAnother separate order enabled the Committee on Financial Services to establish as many as seven subcommittees, as opposed to the six subcommittees allowed under the rules, while an amendment to clause 3 of Rule XIII exempted the Rules Committee from the requirement that committee reports must include recorded votes taken in committee. The rules changes also removed membership term limits to the Committee on the Budget. However, the rules of the Democratic Caucus and Republican Conference may continue to limit the number of terms that Members may serve on the Budget Committee.\nFinally, the rules package established, for the 116th Congress, the Select Committee on the Climate Crisis and the Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress. The committees are to \"investigate, study, make findings, hold public hearings, and develop recommendations.\" By the end of the 116th Congress, they are to report their findings and policy recommendations to the relevant standing committees and publish them in a publicly available format.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_44"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_45","query":"Many observers consider sanctions to be a central element of U.S. policy to counter Russian malign behavior. Most Russia-related sanctions implemented by the United States have been levied in response to Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine. In addition, the United States has imposed sanctions on Russia in response to human rights abuses, election interference and cyberattacks, weapons proliferation, illicit trade with North Korea, support to Syria, and use of a chemical weapon. The United States also employs sanctions to deter further objectionable activities. Most Members of Congress support a robust use of sanctions amid concerns about Russia's international behavior and geostrategic intentions.\nUkraine-related sanctions are mainly based on four executive orders (EOs) the President introduced in 2014. In addition, Congress passed and the President signed into law two acts establishing sanctions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine: the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (SSIDES; P.L. 113-95\/H.R. 4152) and the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (UFSA; P.L. 113-272\/H.R. 5859).\nIn 2017, Congress passed and the President signed into law the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA; P.L. 115-44\/H.R. 3364, Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act [CAATSA], Title II). This legislation codifies Ukraine-related and cyber-related EOs, strengthens existing Russia-related sanctions authorities, and identifies several new targets for sanctions. It also establishes congressional review of any action the President takes to ease or lift a variety of sanctions.\nAdditional sanctions on Russia may be forthcoming. On August 6, 2018, the United States determined that in March 2018 the Russian government used a chemical weapon in the United Kingdom in contravention of international law. In response, the United States launched an initial round of sanctions on Russia, as required by the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act; P.L. 102-182\/H.R. 1724, Title III). The law requires a second, more severe round of sanctions in the absence of Russia's reliable commitment to no longer use such weapons.\nThe United States has imposed most Ukraine-related sanctions on Russia in coordination with the European Union (EU). Since 2017, the efforts of Congress and the Trump Administration to tighten U.S. sanctions on Russia have prompted some degree of concern in the EU about U.S. commitment to sanctions coordination and U.S.-EU cooperation on Russia and Ukraine more broadly. The EU continues to consider the possibility of imposing sanctions in response to Russia's use of a chemical weapon in the United Kingdom, human rights abuses, and cyberattacks.\nDebates about the effectiveness of U.S. and other sanctions on Russia continue in Congress, in the Administration, and among other stakeholders. Russia has not reversed its occupation and annexation of Ukraine's Crimea region, nor has it stopped fostering separatism in eastern Ukraine. On the contrary, it has extended military operations to the Black Sea and the Azov Sea bordering Ukraine and Russia. With respect to other malign activities, the relationship between sanctions and Russian behavior is difficult to determine. Nonetheless, many observers argue that sanctions help to restrain Russia or that their imposition is an appropriate foreign policy response regardless of immediate effect.\nIn the 115th Congress, several bills were introduced to increase the use of sanctions in response to Russia's malign activities. The 116th Congress may continue to debate the role of sanctions in U.S. foreign policy toward Russia.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_45"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_46","query":"Every year the President submits a series of volumes to Congress containing the President's proposed budget for the coming fiscal year. The President's submission is required on or after the first Monday in January, but no later than the first Monday in February (31 U.S.C. \u00a71105(a)). This year the President released the budget submission, in two installments, on March 11, and March 18, 2019.\nThis report provides brief descriptions of the FY2020 budget volumes and related documents, together with internet addresses, Government Publishing Office (GPO) stock numbers, and prices for obtaining print copies of these publications. It also explains how to find the locations of government depository libraries, which can provide both printed copies for reference use and internet access to the online versions. This report will be updated as events warrant.\nPlease note that neither the Congressional Research Service (CRS) nor the Library of Congress (LOC) distributes print copies of the budget documents.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_46"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_47","query":"This report provides a convenient listing of online FY2020 agency budget justification submissions for all 15 executive branch departments and 9 selected independent agencies. In most cases, budget justifications contain more detailed descriptions of the proposals and programs that are provided in the President's budget submissions.\nThis report will be updated to reflect the current budget justifications submissions for the forthcoming fiscal year.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_47"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_48","query":"Names for Navy ships traditionally have been chosen and announced by the Secretary of the Navy, under the direction of the President and in accordance with rules prescribed by Congress. Rules for giving certain types of names to certain types of Navy ships have evolved over time. There have been exceptions to the Navy's ship-naming rules, particularly for the purpose of naming a ship for a person when the rule for that type of ship would have called for it to be named for something else. Some observers have perceived a breakdown in, or corruption of, the rules for naming Navy ships. On July 13, 2012, the Navy submitted to Congress a 73-page report on the Navy's policies and practices for naming ships.\nFor ship types now being procured for the Navy, or recently procured for the Navy, naming rules can be summarized as follows:\nThe first Ohio replacement ballistic missile submarine (SSBN-826) has been named Columbia in honor of the District of Columbia, but the Navy has not stated what the naming rule for these ships will be. Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines are being named for states. Aircraft carriers are generally named for past U.S. Presidents. Of the past 14, 10 were named for past U.S. Presidents, and 2 for Members of Congress. Destroyers are being named for deceased members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, including Secretaries of the Navy. The Navy has not yet announced a naming rule for its planned new class of FFG(X) frigates, the first of which the Navy wants to procure in FY2021. Previous classes of U.S. Navy frigates, like Navy destroyers, were generally named for naval leaders and heroes. Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) are being named for regionally important U.S. cities and communities. Amphibious assault ships are being named for important battles in which U.S. Marines played a prominent part, and for famous earlier U.S. Navy ships that were not named for battles. San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships are being named for major U.S. cities and communities, and cities and communities attacked on September 11, 2001. John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers are being named for people who fought for civil rights and human rights. Expeditionary Fast Transports (EPFs) are being named for small U.S. cities. Expeditionary Transport Docks (ESDs) and Expeditionary Sea Bases (ESBs) are being named for famous names or places of historical significance to U.S. Marines. Navajo (TATS-6) class towing, salvage, and rescue ships are being named for prominent Native Americans or Native American tribes.\nSince 1974, at least 21 U.S. military ships have been named for persons who were living at the time the name was announced. The most recent instance occurred on May 6, 2019, when the Navy announced that it was naming the destroyer DDG-51 for former Senator Sam Nunn.\nMembers of the public are sometimes interested in having Navy ships named for their own states or cities, for older U.S. Navy ships (particularly those on which they or their relatives served), for battles in which they or their relatives participated, or for people they admire.\nCongress has long maintained an interest in how Navy ships are named, and has influenced the naming of certain Navy ships. The Navy suggests that congressional offices wishing to express support for proposals to name a Navy ship for a specific person, place, or thing contact the office of the Secretary of the Navy to make their support known. Congress may also pass legislation relating to ship names. Measures passed by Congress in recent years regarding Navy ship names have all been sense-of-the-Congress provisions.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_48"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_49","query":"Historically, Egypt has been an important country for U.S. national security interests based on its geography, demography, and diplomatic posture. Egypt controls the Suez Canal, which is one of the world's most well-known maritime chokepoints, linking the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Egypt, with its population of more than 100 million people, is by far the most populous Arabic-speaking country. Although it may not play the same type of leading political or military role in the Arab world as it has in the past, Egypt may retain some \"soft power\" by virtue of its history, media, and culture. Cairo plays host both to the 22-member Arab League and Al Azhar University, which claims to be the oldest continuously operating university in the world and has symbolic importance as a leading source of Islamic scholarship.\nAdditionally, Egypt's 1979 peace treaty with Israel remains one of the most significant diplomatic achievements for the promotion of Arab-Israeli peace. While people-to-people relations remain cold, the Israeli and Egyptian governments have increased their cooperation against Islamist militants and instability in the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip.\nPersonnel moves and possible amendments to the Egyptian constitution highlight apparent efforts by President Sisi to consolidate power with the help of political allies, including colleagues from Egypt's security establishment. President Sisi has come under repeated international criticism for an ongoing government crackdown against various forms of political dissent and freedom of expression. The Egyptian government has defended its human rights record, asserting that the country is under pressure from terrorist groups seeking to destabilize Arab nation-states.\nThe Trump Administration has tried to normalize ties with the Sisi government that were generally perceived as strained under President Obama. In January 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo delivered a major policy speech at the American University in Cairo, where he stated, \"And as we seek an even stronger partnership with Egypt, we encourage President Sisi to unleash the creative energy of Egypt's people, unfetter the economy, and promote a free and open exchange of ideas.\"\nThe United States has provided significant military and economic assistance to Egypt since the late 1970s. Successive U.S. Administrations have justified aid to Egypt as an investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running cooperation with the Egyptian military and on sustaining the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.\nAll U.S. foreign aid to Egypt (or any recipient) is appropriated and authorized by Congress. Since 1946, the United States has provided Egypt with over $83 billion in bilateral foreign aid (calculated in historical dollars\u2014not adjusted for inflation). Annual appropriations legislation includes several conditions governing the release of these funds. All U.S. military aid to Egypt finances the procurement of weapons systems and services from U.S. defense contractors.\nFor FY2019, Congress has appropriated $1.4 billion in total bilateral assistance for Egypt, the same amount it provided in FY2018. For FY2020, the President is requesting a total of $1.382 billion in bilateral assistance for Egypt. Nearly all of the U.S. funds for Egypt come from the FMF account (military aid). In November 2018, the U.S. Defense Department notified Congress of a major $1 billion sale of defense equipment to Egypt, consisting of 10 AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters, among other things.\nBeyond the United States, President Sisi has broadened Egypt's international base of support to include several key partners, including the Arab Gulf states, Israel, Russia, and France. In the last five years, as French-Egyptian ties have improved, Egypt has purchased major air and naval defense systems from French defense companies.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_49"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_50","query":"Sales of U.S. agricultural products to foreign markets absorb about one-fifth of U.S. agricultural production, thus contributing significantly to the health of the farm economy. Farm product exports, which totaled $143 billion in FY2018 (see chart below), make up about 9% of total U.S. exports and contribute positively to the U.S. balance of trade. The economic benefits of agricultural exports also extend across rural communities, while overseas farm sales help to buoy a wide array of industries linked to agriculture, including transportation, processing, and farm input suppliers.\nCongress has traditionally displayed a keen interest in agricultural trade issues given their importance to farmers and ranchers and to the overall economy. A major area of interest for the 116th Congress has been the loss of overseas export market shares for agricultural products due to the direction of the Trump Administration's trade policy, which places increased emphasis on reducing the overall U.S. trade deficit. In March 2018, the Trump Administration imposed Section 232 tariffs on U.S. imports of steel and aluminum from most countries and additional Section 301 tariffs on a number of imports from China. Following these actions, Canada, China, Mexico, the European Union (EU), and Turkey imposed retaliatory tariffs on more than 800 U.S. agricultural and food product exports. In response, USDA authorized $12 billion in short-term assistance to the affected agricultural producers and commodities under its Market Facilitation Program to help mitigate the economic impact on farmers.\nA number of policy developments undertaken by the Trump Administration in bilateral and regional trade agreements may affect agricultural markets as well. On the Administration's initiative, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has been renegotiated and signed as the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). This agreement is subject to legislative ratification by Canada and Mexico and approval by U.S. Congress. President Trump withdrew the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in January 2017. In March 2018, the remaining 11 countries concluded a revised version of TPP, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Signatories of CPTPP have begun to reduce tariffs and provide greater agricultural market access for imports from CPTPP signatory countries, actions that could potentially erode U.S. agricultural market shares in the region. At the bilateral level, the Trump Administration has notified Congress of its intent to begin trade negotiations with Japan (a CPTPP member), the EU, and the United Kingdom.\nAt the global level, and at the initiative of the United States, the World Trade Organization (WTO) recently ruled that China has subsidized its agricultural production beyond the level permitted under its WTO obligations and that China's administration of its agricultural market access policies are inconsistent with its WTO obligations. The United States has also filed a counter notification against India at the WTO stating that India has underreported its agricultural domestic subsidies.\nSeveral other agricultural trade issues may be of interest to Congress. For example, the proposed USMCA does not address all the issues that restrict U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico and Canada, and Southeastern U.S. produce growers have been seeking changes to trade remedy laws to address imports of seasonal produce. A key objective of U.S. trade negotiations continues to be the establishment of a common framework for approval, trade, and marketing of the products of agricultural biotechnology. U.S. farm and food interests see the potential for market expansion opportunities in Cuba, but a prohibition on private U.S. financing is generally viewed as a major obstacle to this end. Moreover, the United States has announced its intention to withdraw eligibility for the Generalized System of Preference (GSP)\u2014which provides duty-free tariff treatment for certain products from developing countries\u2014from Turkey and India. On another front, U.S. exports of beef, pork, and chicken continue to face bans and trade restrictions over disease outbreaks even though the bans are inconsistent with international trade protocols, among which are China's ongoing bans on imports of U.S. beef and poultry and restrictions imposed by several foreign markets on U.S. ractopamine-fed pork.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_50"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_51","query":"A private bill is one that provides benefits to specified individuals (including corporate bodies). Individuals sometimes request relief through private law when administrative or legal remedies are exhausted, but Congress seems more often to view private legislation as appropriate when no other remedy is available and when enactment would, in a broad sense, afford equity. From 1817 through 1971, most Congresses enacted hundreds of private laws, but since then, the number has declined significantly as Congress has expanded administrative discretion to deal with many of the situations that tended to give rise to private bills. Since 2007, four private laws have been enacted. Private provisions are also occasionally included in public legislation. The Senate considers private bills using the same procedures that are used to consider other legislation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_51"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_52","query":"The National Institutes of Health (NIH), under the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), is the primary federal agency charged with performing and supporting biomedical and behavioral research. In FY2018, NIH used its over $34 billion budget to support more than 300,000 scientists and research personnel working at over 2,500 institutions across the United States and abroad, as well as to conduct biomedical and behavioral research and research training at its own facilities. The agency consists of the Office of the Director, in charge of overall policy and program coordination, and 27 institutes and centers, each of which focuses on particular diseases or research areas in human health. A broad range of research is funded through a highly competitive system of peer-reviewed grants and contracts.\nThe Public Health Service Act (PHSA) provides the statutory basis for NIH programs, and funding levels are mostly provided through the annual appropriations process. In December 2016, Congress introduced major reforms and programs at the NIH through the 21st Century Cures Act (P.L. 114-255). Prior to 2016, the last time Congress addressed NIH with comprehensive legislation was in December 2006, when it passed the NIH Reform Act (P.L. 109-482). Congress also gives direction to NIH through appropriations report language, but usually not through budget line items or earmarks. Historically, Congress has accepted, for the most part, the scientific and public health priorities established by the agency through its planning and grant-making activities that involve members of the scientific community and the general public.\nNIH has seen periods of both low and high funding growth. From FY1998 to FY2003, Congress doubled the NIH budget from $13.7 billion to $27.1 billion. The agency then saw low funding growth or cuts from FY2004 to FY2015. Starting in FY2016, Congress provided NIH with funding increases of over 5% each year, raising the program level from $30.3 billion in FY2015 to $39.3 billion in FY2019. Under President Trump's budget request for FY2020, NIH would be provided a program level of $34.3 billion\u2014a 12.6% reduction from the FY2019 program level.\nNIH officials and scientific observers have cited funding variability and uncertainty as a challenge for the agency. Along with funding uncertainty, other challenges facing the agency and the research enterprise include\nallocating funding across disease types, areas of human health, and types of research; addressing congressional priorities and concerns, while ensuring the scientific merit and quality of NIH-funded research; helping new and early-stage scientists obtain their first independent research grants; balancing the public and private sectors' relative roles in biomedical research.\nNIH is the largest single public funder of biomedical research in the world, yet other countries\u2014particularly China\u2014have increased their funding levels for such research. Some Members of Congress have voiced concern about the position of U.S. biomedical research compared with other countries. A January 2015 study found that the total U.S. (public and private) share of global biomedical research funding declined from 57% in 2004 to 44% in 2011, while countries in Asia increased investment into biomedical research from $28 billion (2004) to $52.4 billion (2011), with especially large increases in China (analysis included Japan, China, India, Singapore and South Korea). Globally, the United States continues to be the top supporter of both public and industry medical research.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_52"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_53","query":"Although juvenile justice has always been administered by the states, the federal government has played a role in this area through the administration of grant programs. Congress has influenced juvenile justice by authorizing and funding grant programs administered by the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP).\nThe Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA; P.L. 93-415), enacted in 1974, was the first comprehensive juvenile justice legislation passed by Congress. The JJDPA authorized a series of grant programs designed to support state juvenile justice systems and prevent juvenile delinquency. Since its enactment, the JJDPA has undergone several key amendments, including a significant reorganization in 2002 (by the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act; P.L. 107-273). Its grant programs were most recently amended and reauthorized by the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-385).\nFunding for programs authorized by the JJDPA, as well as for other non-JJDPA grant programs that are administered by OJJDP, is provided through the Juvenile Justice Programs account in the annual Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies appropriations act. After the restructuring of juvenile justice grant programs in 2002, total funding for these programs began to decline. This decline generally continued through FY2007, after which funding for these programs started to increase. For FY2010, Congress provided $424 million for juvenile justice programs\u2014the largest appropriation since FY2003. Juvenile justice funding then generally declined again from FY2010 through FY2017. After appropriating a low of $247 million for juvenile justice programs in FY2017, Congress increased funding for both FY2018 and FY2019. Through the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), Congress appropriated $287 million for juvenile justice programs for FY2019\u2014the largest appropriation since the $424 million in FY2010.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_53"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_54","query":"Section 420 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288, hereinafter the Stafford Act) authorizes the President to \"declare\" a Fire Management Assistance Grant (FMAG). In the interest of saving time, the authority to make the declaration has been delegated to the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Regional Administrators. Once issued, the FMAG declaration authorizes various forms of federal fire suppression assistance such as the provision of equipment, personnel, and grants to state, local, and tribal governments for the control, management, and mitigation of any fire on certain public or private forest land or grassland that might become a major disaster. This federal assistance requires a cost-sharing component such that state, local, and tribal governments are responsible for 25% of the expenses.\nThis report answers frequently asked questions about FMAGs. This report will be updated as events warrant.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_54"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_55","query":"Congress has granted some federal land management agencies the authority to sell timber from federal lands. Two agencies, the Forest Service (FS) and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), conduct timber sales as an authorized use. Together, the FS and the BLM manage 76% of federal forest area. FS manages 144.9 million acres, while BLM manages 37.6 million acres. The other major federal land management agencies, the National Park Service (NPS) and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), rarely conduct timber sales.\nLands managed by the FS, the National Forest System (NFS), are managed under a multiple use-sustained yield model pursuant to the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 (MUSYA). This statute directs FS to balance multiple uses of their lands and ensure a sustained yield of those uses in perpetuity. Congress, through the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), has directed FS to engage in long-term land use and resource management planning. Plans set the framework for land management, uses, and protection; they are developed through an interdisciplinary process with opportunities for public participation. In the case of timber, they describe where timber harvesting may occur and include measures of sustainable timber harvest levels. FS uses these plans to guide implementation of individual sales, which generate revenue. Congress has specified various uses for this revenue.\nTimber harvest on FS lands has varied over time. FS harvest volumes in the 1940s were around 1-3 billion board feet per year. Annual harvest volumes rose from the 1950s through the 1980s, sometimes exceeding 10 billion board feet. Annual harvested volumes decreased in the early 1990s and have remained between 1.8 and 2.8 billion board feet since FY2003. The total dollar value of FS timber harvests generally rose from the early 1940s to over $3 billion in FY1979. Total value has been between $100 million and $300 million since FY2001. From FY2014 to FY2018, the greatest average annual harvest volume on FS lands was from Oregon and Washington.\nBLM lands are managed under a multiple use-sustained yield model pursuant to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). This statute directs BLM to balance multiple uses of their lands and ensure a sustained yield of those uses in perpetuity. Congress has directed BLM to engage in long-term land use and resource management planning through FLPMA. Plans set the framework for land management, uses, and protection; they are developed made through an interdisciplinary process with opportunities for public participation. In the case of timber, they describe where timber harvesting may occur and contain measures of sustainable timber harvest levels. The FS and the BLM use these plans to guide implementation of individual sales, which generate revenue. Congress has specified various uses for this revenue.\nAlthough trends in timber activities on BLM lands are challenging to infer from the available data, volumes sold in the past appear to be larger than recent volumes offered for sale. Harvested volumes for the BLM have been between 100 and 260 million board feet annually from FY1995 onward, except in FY1994 and between FY2001-FY2003. Total harvest values have declined since the mid-1990s, and have generally been between $20 million and $50 million annually since FY2011. From FY2014 to FY2018, the greatest average annual harvest volume from BLM lands was from Oregon and Washington.\nCongress has debated the appropriate balance of timber harvesting and other uses on federal lands. Determining the proportions of these uses, in whole and on individual lands, is challenging for land management agencies. Preferences for certain balances of these uses often stem from values about federal forests' purposes, such as consideration of economic, environmental, or recreational values. Debate has also centered on the relationship of timber harvesting levels to forest health, including whether changing harvest levels is a desirable forest management tool.\nCongress has granted some federal land management agencies the authority to sell timber from federal lands. Two agencies, the Forest Service (FS) and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), conduct timber sales as an authorized use. Together, the FS and the BLM manage 76% of federal forest area. FS manages 144.9 million acres, while BLM manages 37.6 million acres. The other major federal land management agencies, the National Park Service (NPS) and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), rarely conduct timber sales.\nLands managed by the FS, the National Forest System (NFS), are managed under a multiple use-sustained yield model pursuant to the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 (MUSYA). This statute directs FS to balance multiple uses of their lands and ensure a sustained yield of those uses in perpetuity. Congress, through the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), has directed FS to engage in long-term land use and resource management planning. Plans set the framework for land management, uses, and protection; they are developed through an interdisciplinary process with opportunities for public participation. In the case of timber, they describe where timber harvesting may occur and include measures of sustainable timber harvest levels. FS uses these plans to guide implementation of individual sales, which generate revenue. Congress has specified various uses for this revenue.\nTimber harvest on FS lands has varied over time. FS harvest volumes in the 1940s were around 1-3 billion board feet per year. Annual harvest volumes rose from the 1950s through the 1980s, sometimes exceeding 10 billion board feet. Annual harvested volumes decreased in the early 1990s and have remained between 1.8 and 2.8 billion board feet since FY2003. The total dollar value of FS timber harvests generally rose from the early 1940s to over $3 billion in FY1979. Total value has been between $100 million and $300 million since FY2001. From FY2014 to FY2018, the greatest average annual harvest volume on FS lands was from Oregon and Washington.\nBLM lands are managed under a multiple use-sustained yield model pursuant to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). This statute directs BLM to balance multiple uses of their lands and ensure a sustained yield of those uses in perpetuity. Congress has directed BLM to engage in long-term land use and resource management planning through FLPMA. Plans set the framework for land management, uses, and protection; they are developed made through an interdisciplinary process with opportunities for public participation. In the case of timber, they describe where timber harvesting may occur and contain measures of sustainable timber harvest levels. The FS and the BLM use these plans to guide implementation of individual sales, which generate revenue. Congress has specified various uses for this revenue.\nAlthough trends in timber activities on BLM lands are challenging to infer from the available data, volumes sold in the past appear to be larger than recent volumes offered for sale. Harvested volumes for the BLM have been between 100 and 260 million board feet annually from FY1995 onward, except in FY1994 and between FY2001-FY2003. Total harvest values have declined since the mid-1990s, and have generally been between $20 million and $50 million annually since FY2011. From FY2014 to FY2018, the greatest average annual harvest volume from BLM lands was from Oregon and Washington.\nCongress has debated the appropriate balance of timber harvesting and other uses on federal lands. Determining the proportions of these uses, in whole and on individual lands, is challenging for land management agencies. Preferences for certain balances of these uses often stem from values about federal forests' purposes, such as consideration of economic, environmental, or recreational values. Debate has also centered on the relationship of timber harvesting levels to forest health, including whether changing harvest levels is a desirable forest management tool.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_55"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_56","query":"The Clean Air Act requires that transportation fuels contain a minimum volume of renewable fuel. This renewable fuel standard (RFS) was established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct05; P.L. 109-58) and amended by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA; P.L. 110-140). The RFS includes scheduled volume mandates that grow each year (starting with 9 billion gallons in 2008 and ascending to 36 billion gallons in 2022). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which is responsible for administering the RFS, determines the annual volume after 2022. Within the overall RFS, there are submandates for advanced biofuels, including cellulosic biofuel, biomass-based diesel, and other advanced biofuels.\nEPA has the authority to waive the RFS requirements, in whole or in part, if certain conditions outlined in statute prevail. More specifically, the statute identifies a general waiver for the overall RFS and waivers for two types of advanced biofuel: cellulosic biofuel and biomass-based diesel. Statute requires EPA to announce each year's standards by November 30 of the previous year, except for biomass-based diesel, which must be announced 14 months before the year for which the applicable volume is to apply. Further, the final section of the waiver provision\u2014which some refer to as the \"reset\" section\u2014requires a permanent modification of applicable volumes of the RFS starting in 2016 and carried forward, if certain conditions are met.\nIn several instances, EPA has used, has proposed to use, or has been petitioned to use its waiver authority when implementing the RFS. In November 2018, EPA announced in its final rule for 2019 for the RFS that it was using the cellulosic biofuel waiver authority to reduce the cellulosic biofuel, advanced biofuel, and total renewable fuel volume requirements. EPA's use of the cellulosic biofuel waiver authority is not new. EPA has repeatedly issued a waiver, reducing the volume required for cellulosic biofuel. For the last few years, the use of the cellulosic biofuel waiver led EPA to also reduce the total advanced biofuel volume requirement. For various reasons (e.g., technology issues, financial support, policy uncertainty), the U.S. cellulosic biofuel industry has been unable, by a wide margin, to produce the volume amounts identified in statute.\nThe 2019 final RFS program rule issued by EPA triggers the RFS \"reset\" section of the waiver provision for total renewable fuel. The reset was triggered in previous final rules for both advanced biofuel and cellulosic biofuel. It is unclear what impact the use of the reset section will have on RFS standards in future years. EPA reports it will issue a rulemaking in early 2019 that proposes to reset the cellulosic biofuel, advanced biofuel, and total renewable fuel volume targets for the years 2020-2022.\nA possible issue for Congress is whether the waiver authority and the reset provisions are sufficient options for EPA to address the statutory advanced biofuel volume shortfalls\u2014shortfalls that may have been more than what Congress envisioned when it expanded the RFS in 2007. Another issue is how the Administration might apply the reset provision, and if it would contribute to uncertainty for industry, financiers, and other interested parties.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_56"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_57","query":"The mail and wire fraud statutes are exceptionally broad. Their scope has occasionally given the courts pause. Nevertheless, prosecutions in their name have brought to an end schemes that have bilked victims out of millions, and sometimes billions, of dollars. The statutes proscribe (1) causing the use of the mail or wire communications, including email; (2) in conjunction with a scheme to intentionally defraud another of money or property; (3) by means of a material deception. The offenses, along with attempts or conspiracies to commit them, carry a term of imprisonment of up to 30 years in some cases, followed by a term of supervised release. Offenders also face the prospect of fines, orders to make restitution, and forfeiture of their property.\nThe mail and wire fraud statutes overlap with a surprising number of other federal criminal statutes. Conduct that supports a prosecution under the mail or wire fraud statutes will often support prosecution under one or more other criminal provision(s). These companion offenses include (1) those that use mail or wire fraud as an element of a separate offense, like racketeering or money laundering; (2) those that condemn fraud on some jurisdictional basis other than use of the mail or wire communications, like those that outlaw defrauding the federal government or federally insured banks; and (3) those that proscribe other deprivations of honest services (i.e., bribery and kickbacks), like the statutes that ban bribery of federal officials or in connection with federal programs.\nAmong the crimes for which mail or wire fraud may serve as an element, RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) outlaws employing the patterned commission of predicate offenses to conduct the affairs of an enterprise that impacts commerce. Money laundering consists of transactions involving the proceeds of a predicate offense in order to launder them or to promote further predicate offenses.\nThe statutes that prohibit fraud in some form or another are the most diverse of the mail and wire fraud companions. Congress modeled some after the mail and wire fraud statutes, incorporating elements of a scheme to defraud or obtain property by false pretenses into statutes that outlaw bank fraud, health care fraud, securities fraud, and foreign labor contracting fraud. Congress designed others to protect the public fisc by proscribing false claims against the United States, conspiracies to defraud the United States by obstructing its functions, and false statements in matters within the jurisdiction of the United States and its departments and agencies.\nFederal bribery and kickback statutes populate the third class of wire and mail fraud companions. One provision bans offering or accepting a thing of value in exchange for the performance or forbearance of a federal official act. Another condemns bribery of faithless agents in connection with federally funded programs and activities. A third, the Hobbs Act, outlaws bribery as a form of extortion under the color of official right.\nThe fines, prison sentences, and other consequences that follow conviction for wire and mail fraud companions vary considerably, with fines from not more than $25,000 to not more than $2 million and prison terms from not more than five years to life.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_57"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_58","query":"The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is an independent federal agency established by the Communications Act of 1934 (1934 Act, or \"Communications Act\"). The agency is charged with regulating interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable. The mission of the FCC is to make available for all people of the United States, \"without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nationwide, and worldwide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges.\"\nThe FCC operates under a public interest mandate first laid out in the 1927 Radio Act (P.L. 632, 69th Congress), but how this mandate is applied depends on how \"the public interest\" is interpreted. Some regulators seek to protect and benefit the public at large through regulation, while others seek to achieve the same goals through the promotion of market efficiency. Additionally, Congress granted the FCC wide latitude and flexibility to revise its interpretation of the public interest standard to reflect changing circumstances and the agency has not defined it in more concrete terms. These circumstances, paired with changes in FCC leadership, have led to significant changes over time in how the FCC regulates the broadcast and telecommunications industries.\nThe FCC is directed by five commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for five-year terms. The President designates one of the commissioners as chairperson. Three commissioners may be members of the same political party of the President and none can have a financial interest in any commission-related business. The current commissioners are Ajit Pai (Chair), Michael O'Rielly, Brendan Carr, Jessica Rosenworcel, and Geoffrey Starks.\nThe day-to-day functions of the FCC are carried out by 7 bureaus and 10 offices. The current basic structure of the FCC was established in 2002 as part of the agency's effort to better reflect the industries it regulates. The seventh bureau, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, was established in 2006. The bureaus process applications for licenses and other filings, manage non-federal spectrum, analyze complaints, conduct investigations, develop and implement regulatory programs, and participate in hearings, among other things. The offices provide support services. Bureaus and offices often collaborate when addressing FCC issues.\nBeginning in the 110th Congress, the FCC has been funded through the House and Senate Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill as a single line item. Previously, it was funded through what is now the Commerce, Justice, Science appropriations bill, also as a single line item. Since 2009 the FCC's budget has been derived from regulatory fees collected by the agency rather than through a direct appropriation. The fees, often referred to as \"Section (9) fees,\" are collected from license holders and certain other entities. The FCC is authorized to review the regulatory fees each year and adjust them to reflect changes in its appropriation from year to year. Most years, appropriations language prohibits the use by the commission of any excess collections received in the current fiscal year or any prior years.\nFor FY2020, the FCC has requested $335,660,000 in budget authority from regulatory fee offsetting collections. The FCC also requested $132,538,680 in budget authority for the spectrum auctions program.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_58"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_59","query":"The mail and wire fraud statutes are exceptionally broad. Their scope has occasionally given the courts pause. Nevertheless, prosecutions in their name have brought to an end schemes that have bilked victims out of millions, and sometimes billions, of dollars. The statutes proscribe (1) causing the use of the mail or wire communications, including email; (2) in conjunction with a scheme to intentionally defraud another of money or property; (3) by means of a material deception. The offenses, along with attempts or conspiracies to commit them, carry a term of imprisonment of up to 30 years in some cases, followed by a term of supervised release. Offenders also face the prospect of fines, orders to make restitution, and forfeiture of their property.\nThe mail and wire fraud statutes overlap with a surprising number of other federal criminal statutes. Conduct that supports a prosecution under the mail or wire fraud statutes will often support prosecution under one or more other criminal provision(s). These companion offenses include (1) those that use mail or wire fraud as an element of a separate offense, like racketeering or money laundering; (2) those that condemn fraud on some jurisdictional basis other than use of the mail or wire communications, like those that outlaw defrauding the federal government or federally insured banks; and (3) those that proscribe other deprivations of honest services (i.e., bribery and kickbacks), like the statutes that ban bribery of federal officials or in connection with federal programs.\nAmong the crimes for which mail or wire fraud may serve as an element, RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) outlaws employing the patterned commission of predicate offenses to conduct the affairs of an enterprise that impacts commerce. Money laundering consists of transactions involving the proceeds of a predicate offense in order to launder them or to promote further predicate offenses.\nThe statutes that prohibit fraud in some form or another are the most diverse of the mail and wire fraud companions. Congress modeled some after the mail and wire fraud statutes, incorporating elements of a scheme to defraud or obtain property by false pretenses into statutes that outlaw bank fraud, health care fraud, securities fraud, and foreign labor contracting fraud. Congress designed others to protect the public fisc by proscribing false claims against the United States, conspiracies to defraud the United States by obstructing its functions, and false statements in matters within the jurisdiction of the United States and its departments and agencies.\nFederal bribery and kickback statutes populate the third class of wire and mail fraud companions. One provision bans offering or accepting a thing of value in exchange for the performance or forbearance of a federal official act. Another condemns bribery of faithless agents in connection with federally funded programs and activities. A third, the Hobbs Act, outlaws bribery as a form of extortion under the color of official right.\nThe fines, prison sentences, and other consequences that follow conviction for wire and mail fraud companions vary considerably, with fines from not more than $25,000 to not more than $2 million and prison terms from not more than five years to life.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_59"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_60","query":"Rwanda, a small landlocked country in central Africa's Great Lakes region, has seen rapid development and security gains since about 800,000 people\u2014mostly members of the ethnic Tutsi minority\u2014were killed in the 1994 genocide. The ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) ended the genocide by seizing power in mid-1994 and has been the dominant force in Rwandan politics ever since. The Rwandan government has won donor plaudits for its efforts to improve health, boost agricultural output, encourage foreign investment, and promote women's empowerment. Yet, analysts debate whether Rwanda's authoritarian political system\u2014and periodic support for rebel groups in neighboring countries\u2014could jeopardize the country's stability in the long-run, or undermine the case for donor support.\nPresident Paul Kagame, in office since 2000, won reelection to another seven-year term in 2017 with nearly 99% of the vote, after the adoption of a new constitution that effectively exempted him from term limits through 2034. Kagame's overwhelming margin of victory may reflect popular support for his efforts to stabilize and transform Rwandan society, as well as a political system that involves constraints on opposition activity and close government scrutiny of citizen behavior. In response to external criticism, Kagame has generally denied specific allegations of abusing human rights while asserting that restrictions on civil and political rights are necessary to prevent the return of ethnic violence.\nThe United States and Rwanda have cultivated close ties since the mid-1990s, underpinned by U.S. development aid and support for Rwanda's robust participation in international peacekeeping. Congress has helped shape U.S. engagement through its appropriation of foreign aid and other legislative initiatives, along with oversight and direct Member outreach to Rwandan officials. Over the past decade, successive Administrations and Congress have continued to support U.S. partnership with Rwanda on development and peacekeeping, while criticizing the government's human rights record and periodic role in regional conflicts. Congress has notably enacted provisions in aid appropriations legislation restricting U.S. military aid to Rwanda if it is found to be supporting rebel groups in neighboring countries. The Obama Administration temporarily applied such restrictions, along with others pursuant to separate child soldiers legislation, citing Rwandan support for rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi. There have been fewer reports of Rwandan support for rebel groups in recent years.\nAfter meeting with President Kagame in early 2018, President Trump expressed appreciation for U.S.-Rwandan economic ties, Rwanda's contributions to peacekeeping, and Kagame's pursuit of African Union institutional reforms. In line with the Administration's proposals to decrease foreign aid worldwide, its FY2020 budget request would provide $117 million in bilateral aid to Rwanda, a 28% decrease from FY2018 levels. U.S. peacekeeping-related military assistance for Rwanda has drawn on regionally- and centrally-managed funds, and is not reflected in these totals. The Administration has also suspended Rwanda's eligibility for trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, reauthorized under P.L. 114-27), in response to alleged market barriers to U.S. exports of used clothing.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_60"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_61","query":"Recent high-profile data breaches and other concerns about how third parties protect the privacy of individuals in the digital age have raised national concerns over legal protections of Americans' electronic data. Intentional intrusions into government and private computer networks and inadequate corporate privacy and cybersecurity practices have exposed the personal information of millions of Americans to unwanted recipients. At the same time, internet connectivity has increased and varied in form in recent years. Americans now transmit their personal data on the internet at an exponentially higher rate than in the past, and their data are collected, cultivated, and maintained by a growing number of both \"consumer facing\" and \"behind the scenes\" actors such as data brokers. As a consequence, the privacy, cybersecurity and protection of personal data have emerged as a major issue for congressional consideration.\nDespite the rise in interest in data protection, the legislative paradigms governing cybersecurity and data privacy are complex and technical, and lack uniformity at the federal level. The constitutional \"right to privacy\" developed over the course of the 20th century, but this right generally guards only against government intrusions and does little to shield the average internet user from private actors. At the federal statutory level, there are a number of statutes that protect individuals' personal data or concern cybersecurity, including the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, and others. And a number of different agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (CFPB), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), enforce these laws. But these statutes primarily regulate certain industries and subcategories of data. The FTC fills in some of the statutory gaps by enforcing a broad prohibition against unfair and deceptive data protection practices. But no single federal law comprehensively regulates the collection and use of consumers' personal data. Seeking a more fulsome data protection system, some governments\u2014such as California and the European Union (EU)\u2014have recently enacted privacy laws regulating nearly all forms of personal data within their jurisdictional reach. Some argue that Congress should consider creating similar protections in federal law, but others have criticized the EU and California approaches as being overly prescriptive and burdensome.\nShould the 116th Congress consider a comprehensive federal data protection law, its legislative proposals may involve numerous decision points and legal considerations. Points of consideration may include the conceptual framework of the law (i.e., whether it is prescriptive or outcome-based), the scope of the law and its definition of protected information, and the role of the FTC or other federal enforcement agency. Further, if Congress wants to allow individuals to enforce data protection laws and seek remedies for the violations of such laws in court, it must account for standing requirements in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. Federal preemption also raises complex legal questions\u2014not only of whether to preempt state law, but what form of preemption Congress should employ. Finally, from a First Amendment perspective, Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that while some privacy, cybersecurity, or data security regulations are permissible, any federal law that restricts protected speech, particularly if it targets specific speakers or content, may be subject to more stringent review by a reviewing court.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_61"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_62","query":"On September 30, 2018, the Trump Administration announced the conclusion of the renegotiations of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the proposed United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). If approved by Congress and ratified by Canada and Mexico, USMCA would modify and possibly replace NAFTA, which entered into force January 1, 1994. NAFTA provisions are structured as three separate bilateral agreements: one between Canada and the United States, a second between Mexico and the United States, and a third between Canada and Mexico.\nUnder NAFTA, bilateral agricultural trade between the United States and Mexico was liberalized over a transition period of 14 years beginning in 1994. NAFTA provisions on agricultural trade between Canada and the United States are based on commitments under the Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement (CUSTA), which granted full market access for most agricultural products with the exception of certain products. The agricultural exceptions under NAFTA include Canadian imports from the United States of dairy products, poultry, eggs, and margarine and U.S. imports from Canada of dairy products, peanuts, peanut butter, cotton, sugar, and sugar-containing products.\nThe proposed USMCA would expand market access for U.S. exports of dairy, poultry, and eggs to Canada and enhance NAFTA's Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) provisions. It would also include new provisions for trade in agricultural biotechnology products, add provisions governing Geographical Indications (GIs), add protection for proprietary food formulas, and require USMCA countries to apply the same regulatory treatment to imported alcoholic beverages and wheat as those that govern their domestic products.\nSince 2002, Canada has been the United States' top agricultural export market, and Mexico was the second-largest export market until 2010, when it became the third-largest market as China became the second-largest agricultural export market for the United States. U.S. agricultural exporters are thus keen to keep and grow the existing export market in North America. If the United States were to potentially withdraw from NAFTA, as mentioned several times by President Trump, U.S. agricultural exporters could potentially lose at least a portion of their market share in Canada and Mexico if the proposed USMCA does not enter into force. If the United States withdraws from NAFTA, U.S. agricultural exports to Canada and Mexico would likely face World Trade Organization (WTO) most-favored-nation tariffs\u2014the highest rate a country applies to WTO member countries. These tariffs are much higher than the zero tariffs that U.S. exporters currently enjoy under NAFTA for most agricultural exports to Canada and Mexico.\nThe proposed USMCA would need to be approved by the U.S. Congress and ratified by Canada and Mexico before it could enter into force. Some Members of Congress have voiced concerns about issues such as labor provisions and intellectual property rights protection of pharmaceuticals. Other Members have indicated that an anticipated assessment by the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) will be key to their decisions on whether to support the agreement. Canada, Mexico, and some Members of Congress have expressed concern about other ongoing trade issues with Canada and Mexico, such as antidumping issues related to seasonal produce imports and the recent U.S. imposition of a 25% duty on all steel imports and a 10% duty on all aluminum imports. Both the Canadian and the Mexican governments have stated that USMCA ratification hinges in large part upon the Trump Administration lifting the Section 232 tariffs on imported steel and aluminum. Similarly, some Members of Congress have stated that the Administration should lift tariffs on steel and aluminum imports in order to secure the elimination of retaliatory tariffs on agricultural products before Congress would consider legislation to implement USMCA.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_62"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_63","query":"Senators and Representatives are frequently asked to support or sponsor proposals recognizing historic events and outstanding achievements by individuals or institutions. Among the various forms of recognition that Congress bestows, the Congressional Gold Medal is often considered the most distinguished. Through this venerable tradition\u2014the occasional commissioning of individually struck gold medals in its name\u2014Congress has expressed public gratitude on behalf of the nation for distinguished contributions for more than two centuries. Since 1776, this award, which initially was bestowed on military leaders, has also been given to such diverse individuals as Sir Winston Churchill and Bob Hope, George Washington and Robert Frost, Joe Louis and Mother Teresa of Calcutta.\nCongressional gold medal legislation generally has a specific format. Once a gold medal is authorized, it follows a specific process for design, minting, and awarding. This process includes consultation and recommendations by the Citizens Coinage Advisory Commission (CCAC) and the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts (CFA), pursuant to any statutory instructions, before the Secretary of the Treasury makes the final decision on a gold medal's design. Once the medal has been struck, a ceremony will often be scheduled to formally award the medal to the recipient.\nIn recent years, the number of gold medals awarded has increased, and some have expressed interest in examining the gold medal awarding process. Should Congress want to make such changes, several individual and institutional options might be available. The individual options include decisions made by Members of Congress as to what individual or groups might be honored; potential specification of gold medal design elements; and where gold medals for groups might be housed once the award is made. The institutional options could include House, Senate, or committee rules for the consideration of gold medal legislation and whether statutory standards on the number of gold medals issued per year or per Congress might be established for gold medals.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_63"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_64","query":"Asylum is a complex area of immigration law and policy. While much of the recent debate surrounding asylum has focused on efforts by the Trump Administration to address asylum seekers arriving at the U.S. southern border, U.S. asylum policies have long been a subject of discussion.\nThe Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, as originally enacted, did not contain any language on asylum. Asylum provisions were added and then revised by a series of subsequent laws. Currently, the INA provides for the granting of asylum to an alien who applies for such relief in accordance with applicable requirements and is determined to be a refugee. The INA defines a refugee, in general, as a person who is outside his or her country of nationality and is unable or unwilling to return to that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.\nUnder current law and regulations, aliens who are in the United States or who arrive in the United States, regardless of immigration status, may apply for asylum (with exceptions). An asylum application is affirmative if an alien who is physically present in the United States (and is not in removal proceedings) submits an application to the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). An asylum application is defensive when the applicant is in standard removal proceedings with the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) and requests asylum as a defense against removal. An asylum applicant may receive employment authorization 180 days after the application filing date.\nSpecial asylum provisions apply to aliens who are subject to a streamlined removal process known as expedited removal. To be considered for asylum, these aliens must first be determined by a USCIS asylum officer to have a credible fear of persecution. Under the INA, credible fear of persecution means that \"there is a significant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of the alien's claim and such other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum.\" Individuals determined to have a credible fear may apply for asylum during standard removal proceedings.\nAsylum may be granted by USCIS or EOIR. There are no numerical limitations on asylum grants. If an alien is granted asylum, his or her spouse and children may also be granted asylum, as dependents. A grant of asylum does not expire, but it may be terminated under certain circumstances. After one year of physical presence in the United States as asylees, an alien and his or her spouse and children may be granted lawful permanent resident status, subject to certain requirements.\nThe Trump Administration has taken a variety of steps that would limit eligibility for asylum. As of the date of this report, legal challenges to these actions are ongoing. For its part, the 115th Congress considered asylum-related legislation, which generally would have tightened the asylum system. Several bills contained provisions that, among other things, would have amended INA provisions on termination of asylum, credible fear of persecution, frivolous asylum applications, and the definition of a refugee.\nKey policy considerations about asylum include the asylum application backlog, the grounds for granting asylum, the credible fear of persecution threshold, frivolous asylum applications, employment authorization, variation in immigration judges' asylum decisions, and safe third country agreements.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_64"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_65","query":"Multiyear procurement (MYP) and block buy contracting (BBC) are special contracting mechanisms that Congress permits the Department of Defense (DOD) to use for a limited number of defense acquisition programs. Compared to the standard or default approach of annual contracting, MYP and BBC have the potential for reducing weapon procurement costs by a few or several percent.\nUnder annual contracting, DOD uses one or more contracts for each year's worth of procurement of a given kind of item. Under MYP, DOD instead uses a single contract for two to five years' worth of procurement of a given kind of item without having to exercise a contract option for each year after the first year. DOD needs congressional approval for each use of MYP. There is a permanent statute governing MYP contracting\u201410 U.S.C. 2306b. Under this statute, a program must meet several criteria to qualify for MYP.\nCompared with estimated costs under annual contracting, estimated savings for programs being proposed for MYP have ranged from less than 5% to more than 15%, depending on the particulars of the program in question, with many estimates falling in the range of 5% to 10%. In practice, actual savings from using MYP rather than annual contracting can be difficult to observe or verify because of cost growth during the execution of the contract due to changes in the program independent of the use of MYP rather than annual contracting.\nBBC is similar to MYP in that it permits DOD to use a single contract for more than one year's worth of procurement of a given kind of item without having to exercise a contract option for each year after the first year. BBC is also similar to MYP in that DOD needs congressional approval for each use of BBC. BBC differs from MYP in the following ways:\nThere is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC. There is no requirement that BBC be approved in both a DOD appropriations act and an act other than a DOD appropriations act. Programs being considered for BBC do not need to meet any legal criteria to qualify for BBC, because there is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC that establishes such criteria. A BBC contract can cover more than five years of planned procurements. Economic order quantity (EOQ) authority\u2014the authority to bring forward selected key components of the items to be procured under the contract and purchase the components in batch form during the first year or two of the contract\u2014does not come automatically as part of BBC authority because there is no permanent statute governing the use of BBC that includes EOQ authority as an automatic feature. BBC contracts are less likely to include cancellation penalties.\nPotential issues for Congress concerning MYP and BBC include whether to use MYP and BBC in the future more frequently, less frequently, or about as frequently as they are currently used; whether to create a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC, analogous to the permanent statute that governs the use of MYP; and whether the Coast Guard should begin making use of MYP and BBC.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_65"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_66","query":"The U.S. tax code supports the energy sector by providing a number of targeted tax incentives, or tax incentives available only for the energy industry. Some policymakers have expressed interest in understanding how energy tax benefits are distributed across different domestic energy resources. For example, what percentage of energy-related tax benefits support fossil fuels (or support renewables)? How much domestic energy is produced using fossil fuels (or produced using renewables)? And how do these figures compare?\nIn 2017, the value of federal tax-related support for the energy sector was estimated to be $17.8 billion. Of this, $4.6 billion (25.8%) can be attributed to tax incentives supporting fossil fuels. Tax-related support for renewables was an estimated $11.6 billion in 2017 (or 65.2% of total tax-related support for energy). The remaining tax-related support went toward nuclear energy, efficiency measures, and alternative technology vehicles.\nWhile the cost of tax incentives for renewables has exceeded the cost of incentives for fossil fuels in recent years, the majority of energy produced in the United States continues to be derived from fossil fuels. In 2017, fossil fuels accounted for 77.7% of U.S. primary energy production. The remaining primary energy production is attributable to renewable energy and nuclear electric resources, with shares of 12.8% and 9.5%, respectively.\nThe balance of energy-related tax incentives has changed over time, and it is projected to continue to change, under current law, in coming years. Factors that have contributed to recent changes in the balance of energy-related tax incentives include the following:\nIncreased tax expenditures for solar and wind. Tax expenditures associated with the energy credit for solar and the production tax credit for wind have increased substantially in recent years. Following the long-term extensions of these temporary tax benefits provided in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), tax expenditures for the solar energy credit are projected to remain stable for several years, before decreasing in the longer term. The expiration of tax-related support for renewable fuels. Tax-related support for renewable fuels declined substantially after the tax credits for alcohol fuels were allowed to expire at the end of 2011. Other fuels-related incentives also expired at the end of 2017 (although these may be extended as part of the \"tax extenders\"). Decline then increase in tax expenditures for fossil fuels. Tax expenditures for fossil fuels declined between 2017 and 2018, an indirect effect of the 2017 tax act (P.L. 115-97). Over time, however, the tax expenditures associated with permanent fossil fuels tax incentives are estimated to increase.\nOne starting point for evaluating energy tax policy may be a calculation of subsidy relative to production level. However, a complete policy analysis might consider why the level of federal financial support differs across various energy technologies. Tax incentives for energy may support various environmental or economic objectives. For example, tax incentives designed to reduce reliance on imported petroleum may be consistent with energy security goals. Tax incentives that promote renewable energy resources may be consistent with certain environmental objectives.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_66"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_67","query":"This report discusses and assesses the War Powers Resolution and its application since enactment in 1973, providing detailed background on various cases in which it was used, as well as cases in which issues of its applicability were raised.\nIn the post-Cold War world, Presidents have continued to commit U.S. Armed Forces into potential hostilities, sometimes without a specific authorization from Congress. Thus the War Powers Resolution and its purposes continue to be a potential subject of controversy. On June 7, 1995, the House defeated, by a vote of 217-201, an amendment to repeal the central features of the War Powers Resolution that have been deemed unconstitutional by every President since the law's enactment in 1973. In 1999, after the President committed U.S. military forces to action in Yugoslavia without congressional authorization, Representative Tom Campbell used expedited procedures under the Resolution to force a debate and votes on U.S. military action in Yugoslavia, and later sought, unsuccessfully, through a federal court suit to enforce presidential compliance with the terms of the War Powers Resolution.\nThe War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148) was enacted over the veto of President Nixon on November 7, 1973, to provide procedures for Congress and the President to participate in decisions to send U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities. Section 4(a)(1) requires the President to report to Congress any introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities. When such a report is submitted, or is required to be submitted, Section 5(b) requires that the use of forces must be terminated within 60 to 90 days unless Congress authorizes such use or extends the time period. Section 3 requires that the \"President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing\" U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities.\nFrom 1975 through March 2017, Presidents have submitted 168 reports as the result of the War Powers Resolution, but only one, the 1975 Mayaguez seizure, cited Section 4(a)(1), which triggers the 60-day withdrawal requirement, and in this case the military action was completed and U.S. Armed Forces had disengaged from the area of conflict when the report was made. The reports submitted by the President since enactment of the War Powers Resolution cover a range of military activities, from embassy evacuations to full-scale combat military operations, such as the Persian Gulf conflict, and the 2003 war with Iraq, the intervention in Kosovo, and the anti-terrorism actions in Afghanistan. In some instances, U.S. Armed Forces have been used in hostile situations without formal reports to Congress under the War Powers Resolution. On one occasion, Congress exercised its authority to determine that the requirements of Section 4(a)(1) became operative on August 29, 1983, through passage of the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution (P.L. 98-119). In 1991 and 2002, Congress authorized, by law, the use of military force against Iraq. In several instances none of the President, Congress, or the courts has been willing to initiate the procedures of or enforce the directives in the War Powers Resolution.\nIn the 115th Congress, U.S. military operations related to the joint counter-Houthi campaign conducted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in Yemen spurred congressional legislative action in both houses of Congress. The Senate on December 13, 2018, voted to adopt S.J.Res. 54, a joint resolution to \"direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress,\" marking the first instance that such a joint resolution received consideration and passed the full Senate under the expedited consideration provisions of Section 1013 of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 (P.L. 98-164; 50 U.S.C. \u00a71546a). In the 116th Congress, the House of Representatives on February 13, 2019, voted to adopt a similar joint resolution on U.S. military involvement in Yemen, H.J.Res. 37, and the Senate is expected to take up a companion measure, S.J.Res. 7, in March 2019.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_67"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_68","query":"The farm commodity program provisions in Title I of the Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-334; the 2018 farm bill) include revenue support programs for major program crops and permanent agricultural disaster assistance programs for producers of most tree crops and livestock. Aside from dairy and sugar, which have their own specific programs, most grain and oilseed crops produced in the United States are eligible for two tiers of revenue support under Title I of the 2018 farm bill\u2014specialty crops such as fruits, vegetables, and tree nuts are not covered. The first tier of support is provided by the Marketing Assistance Loan (MAL) program, which offers interim financing for production of \"loan\" commodities in the form of a nine-month nonrecourse loan at statutorily set prices. A producer must have a harvested crop to offer as collateral for the MAL loan. Nonrecourse means that, if forfeited, USDA must accept the crop pledged as collateral as full payment of an outstanding loan. Thus, the statutory loan rates serve as minimum price guarantees for eligible commodities.\nThe MAL program may be supplemented by a higher, second tier of revenue support comprised of (1) the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) program, which provides price protection at the national level via statutory fixed \"reference\" prices for eligible crops, or (2) the Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) program, which provides revenue protection via historical moving average revenue guarantees based on the five most recent years of national crop prices and county or farm average yields. Participation is free for both ARC and PLC. However, a producer must own or rent historical \"base\" acres of \"covered\" commodities. In addition, producers must sign up and elect either PLC or a county-coverage ARC program (ARC-CO) on a crop-by-crop basis or enroll all covered commodities together in a whole-farm revenue guarantee under an individual-coverage ARC program (ARC-IC).\nThe dairy and sugar sectors are supported by separate federal farm programs that are tailored more specifically to the physical differences associated with each of their products\u2014liquid fresh milk and refined sugar\u2014and their respective markets. For dairy, the Dairy Margin Coverage (DMC) program offers producers milk margin protection for a range of margin thresholds\u2014the milk margin equals the difference between the all-milk farm price and the price of a formula-based feed ration\u2014and for a producer-selected portion (ranging from 5% to 95%) of historical milk production. Milk producers must sign up, select both margin and milk production coverage levels, and pay a premium that varies with coverage levels. The U.S. dairy sector also benefits from tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) on selected dairy products. The sugar program provides revenue support through a combination of limits on domestic output sales (marketing allotments), nonrecourse MAL loans for domestic sugar production (but at the processor level), a sugar-to-ethanol backstop program (Feedstock Flexibility Program), and quotas that limit imports. The import quotas for dairy and sugar are authorized outside of the omnibus farm bill.\nDisaster assistance is available for producers of most tree crops and livestock. The Noninsured Crop Assistance Program (NAP) is available for all agricultural production that is not covered by a federal crop insurance policy. All of these programs have permanent authority. However, the 2018 farm bill amends most of them.\nThe enacted 2018 farm bill continues a $125,000 per-person cap on combined PLC and ARC payments but excludes MAL program benefits from the limit. The limit applies to the total from all covered commodities except peanuts, which has a separate $125,000 limit. To be eligible for payments, persons must be actively engaged in farming (AEF). Payment limits are doubled if the farm operator has a spouse. On family farming operations, all family members 18 years or older are deemed AEF and eligible for payments, including cousins, nephews, and nieces. The 2018 farm bill retains the adjusted gross income (AGI) limit for payment eligibility of $900,000.\nThe Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects outlays for Title I provisions of the 2018 farm bill for the five-year period (FY2019-FY2023) to average $6.3 billion compared with an estimated $7.2 billion in annual outlays under the 2014 farm bill. Based on projected market-price-to-PLC-reference price ratios, producers are expected to shift their preference toward PLC over ARC under the 2018 farm bill, resulting in a shift in program outlays concentrated more on PLC than ARC.\nThe farm commodity program provisions in Title I of the Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-334; the 2018 farm bill) include revenue support programs for major program crops and permanent agricultural disaster assistance programs for producers of most tree crops and livestock. Aside from dairy and sugar, which have their own specific programs, most grain and oilseed crops produced in the United States are eligible for two tiers of revenue support under Title I of the 2018 farm bill\u2014specialty crops such as fruits, vegetables, and tree nuts are not covered. The first tier of support is provided by the Marketing Assistance Loan (MAL) program, which offers interim financing for production of \"loan\" commodities in the form of a nine-month nonrecourse loan at statutorily set prices. A producer must have a harvested crop to offer as collateral for the MAL loan. Nonrecourse means that, if forfeited, USDA must accept the crop pledged as collateral as full payment of an outstanding loan. Thus, the statutory loan rates serve as minimum price guarantees for eligible commodities.\nThe MAL program may be supplemented by a higher, second tier of revenue support comprised of (1) the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) program, which provides price protection at the national level via statutory fixed \"reference\" prices for eligible crops, or (2) the Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) program, which provides revenue protection via historical moving average revenue guarantees based on the five most recent years of national crop prices and county or farm average yields. Participation is free for both ARC and PLC. However, a producer must own or rent historical \"base\" acres of \"covered\" commodities. In addition, producers must sign up and elect either PLC or a county-coverage ARC program (ARC-CO) on a crop-by-crop basis or enroll all covered commodities together in a whole-farm revenue guarantee under an individual-coverage ARC program (ARC-IC).\nThe dairy and sugar sectors are supported by separate federal farm programs that are tailored more specifically to the physical differences associated with each of their products\u2014liquid fresh milk and refined sugar\u2014and their respective markets. For dairy, the Dairy Margin Coverage (DMC) program offers producers milk margin protection for a range of margin thresholds\u2014the milk margin equals the difference between the all-milk farm price and the price of a formula-based feed ration\u2014and for a producer-selected portion (ranging from 5% to 95%) of historical milk production. Milk producers must sign up, select both margin and milk production coverage levels, and pay a premium that varies with coverage levels. The U.S. dairy sector also benefits from tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) on selected dairy products. The sugar program provides revenue support through a combination of limits on domestic output sales (marketing allotments), nonrecourse MAL loans for domestic sugar production (but at the processor level), a sugar-to-ethanol backstop program (Feedstock Flexibility Program), and quotas that limit imports. The import quotas for dairy and sugar are authorized outside of the omnibus farm bill.\nDisaster assistance is available for producers of most tree crops and livestock. The Noninsured Crop Assistance Program (NAP) is available for all agricultural production that is not covered by a federal crop insurance policy. All of these programs have permanent authority. However, the 2018 farm bill amends most of them.\nThe enacted 2018 farm bill continues a $125,000 per-person cap on combined PLC and ARC payments but excludes MAL program benefits from the limit. The limit applies to the total from all covered commodities except peanuts, which has a separate $125,000 limit. To be eligible for payments, persons must be actively engaged in farming (AEF). Payment limits are doubled if the farm operator has a spouse. On family farming operations, all family members 18 years or older are deemed AEF and eligible for payments, including cousins, nephews, and nieces. The 2018 farm bill retains the adjusted gross income (AGI) limit for payment eligibility of $900,000.\nThe Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects outlays for Title I provisions of the 2018 farm bill for the five-year period (FY2019-FY2023) to average $6.3 billion compared with an estimated $7.2 billion in annual outlays under the 2014 farm bill. Based on projected market-price-to-PLC-reference price ratios, producers are expected to shift their preference toward PLC over ARC under the 2018 farm bill, resulting in a shift in program outlays concentrated more on PLC than ARC.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_68"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_69","query":"House rules govern the length of time legislative measures must be available to Members before being considered on the floor. For measures reported from committee, a draft of the committee report must have been available for 72 hours. Conference reports must also have been available for 72 hours and special rules for considering measures for one legislative day. Bills and joint resolutions that have not been reported by committee, and therefore are not accompanied by a written report, may also not be considered on the House floor unless the measure has been available for 72 hours. Proposed committee reports, unreported bills and joint resolutions, conference reports, and joint explanatory statements are considered available under these rules if they are publicly available in electronic form on a website designated by the Committee on House Administration for this purpose, http:\/\/docs.house.gov.\nThe House has several means by which it can choose to waive these availability requirements and call up, debate, and vote on a measure in a single calendar day even if the text of the measure was not made available prior to consideration. These include (1) considering a measure under the suspension of the rules procedure or by unanimous consent, (2) adopting a special rule that waives the 72-hour requirement, (3) adopting a special rule that waives the one-day requirement for another special rule, and (4) convening a second legislative day on the same calendar day. Waiving availability requirements allows the House to act quickly when necessary, such as near the end of a session.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_69"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_70","query":"Although states have a great deal of autonomy in how they establish and run their unemployment insurance programs, federal law requires states to pay Unemployment Compensation (UC) benefits promptly as provided under state law. During some recessions, current taxes and reserve balances may be insufficient to cover state obligations for UC benefits. States may borrow funds from the federal loan account within the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) to meet UC benefit obligations.\nThis report summarizes how insolvent states may borrow funds from the UTF loan account to meet their UC benefit obligations. It includes the manner in which states must repay federal UTF loans. It also provides details on how the UTF loans may trigger potential interest accrual and explains the timetable for increased net Federal Unemployment Taxes Act (FUTA) taxes if the funds are not repaid promptly.\nOutstanding loans listed by state may be found at the Department of Labor's (DOL's) website, https:\/\/oui.doleta.gov\/unemploy\/budget.asp.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_70"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_71","query":"This product provides an overview of the role Congress has played in shaping U.S. policy toward the conflict in Yemen. Summary tables provide information on legislative proposals considered in the 115th and 116th Congresses. Various legislative proposals have reflected a range of congressional perspectives and priorities, including with regard to\nthe authorization of the activities of the U.S. Armed Forces related to the conflict; the extent of U.S. logistical, material, advisory, and intelligence support for the coalition led by Saudi Arabia; the approval, disapproval, or conditioning of U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia; the appropriation of funds for U.S. operations in support of the Saudi-led coalition; the conduct of the Saudi-led coalition's air campaign and its adherence to international humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict; the demand for greater humanitarian access to Yemen; the call for a wider government assessment of U.S. policy toward Yemen and U.S. support to parties to the conflict; the nature and extent of U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism and border security cooperation; and the role of Iran in supplying missile technology and other weapons to the forces of the Houthi movement.\nThe 116th Congress may continue to debate U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi Arabia's conduct of the war in Yemen, where fighting has continued since March 2015. The war has exacerbated a humanitarian crisis in Yemen that began in 2011; presently, the World Food Program reports that 20 million Yemenis face hunger in the absence of sustained food assistance. The difficulty of accessing certain areas of Yemen has made it hard for governments and aid agencies to count the war's casualties. Data collected by the U.S. and European-funded Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) suggest that 60,000 Yemenis have been killed since January 2016.\nThe Trump Administration has opposed various congressional proposals, including initiatives to reject or condition proposed U.S. arms sales or to require an end to U.S. military support to Saudi-led coalition operations in Yemen. Many in Congress have condemned the October 2018 murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi government personnel, and in general, the incident appears to have exacerbated existing congressional concerns about Saudi leaders and the pace, scope, and direction of change in the kingdom's policies.\nThis product includes legislative proposals considered during the 115th and 116th Congresses. It does not include references to Yemen in Iran sanctions legislation, which are covered in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions. For additional information on the war in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, please see the following CRS products.\nCRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention.\nCRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations.\nCRS Insight IN10729, Yemen: Cholera Outbreak.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_71"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_72","query":"The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant was created in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193). It was born out of the welfare reform debates that spanned four decades, from the 1960s through the 1990s. These debates focused on the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, which provided federal funding for state-run programs delivering assistance to needy families with children, with most families receiving assistance historically being headed by single mothers who were not working. The welfare reform debates focused on whether and how much single mothers should be expected to work, and whether the program itself contributed to dependency by providing disincentives to work and raise children in two-parent families.\nIn 1992, then-candidate Bill Clinton promised to \"end welfare as we know it.\" President Clinton submitted his welfare reform proposal to Congress in June 1994, but Congress did not take any action on it. A welfare reform proposal was included in the House Republican \"Contract with America\" document during the 1994 congressional campaign. This proposal would have altered, but not replaced, AFDC. Immediately after the 1994 congressional campaign, with Republicans taking control of both the House and the Senate, the new House leadership and Republican governors crafted a proposal to end AFDC and replace it with the TANF block grant. This proposal passed Congress as part of two separate pieces of legislation in 1995, but President Clinton vetoed both.\nIn 1996, a revised proposal was offered and passed Congress. On August 22, 1996, President Clinton signed the 1996 welfare reform bill that ended AFDC and replaced it with TANF, a broad-purpose block grant to the states that helps fund a wide range of benefits, services, and activities to address the effects of, and root causes of, child poverty and economic disadvantage. Reflecting its origins in the welfare reform debates, most TANF policy revolves around the state programs of cash assistance and work programs that the block grant helps fund.\nMost TANF policies in effect in 2019 date back to the 1996 welfare reform law. The original funding provided in that law for TANF expired at the end of FY2002 (September 30, 2002), and most of the legislative activity since then has been to continue funding on a short-term basis. From FY2002 to FY2006, TANF was funded by a series of short-term extensions. There was one long-term extension of TANF funding\u2014The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA, P.L. 109-171)\u2014which extended it from FY2006 through the end of FY2010. The DRA also made some changes to TANF work rules and established a program of competitive grants mostly to community-based organizations for healthy marriage and responsible fatherhood initiatives. Since the end of FY2010, TANF has again been funded by a series of short-term extensions. Most recently, it was extended through June 30, 2019, by the TANF Extension Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-4).","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_72"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_73","query":"The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), an agency of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), was created by the National Housing Act of 1934. FHA insures private lenders against the possibility of borrowers defaulting on mortgages that meet certain criteria, thereby expanding the availability of mortgage credit beyond what may be available otherwise. If the borrower defaults on the mortgage, FHA is to repay the lender the remaining amount owed.\nA household that obtains an FHA-insured mortgage must meet FHA's eligibility and underwriting standards, including showing that it has sufficient income to repay a mortgage. FHA requires a minimum down payment of 3.5% from most borrowers, which is lower than the down payment required for many other types of mortgages. FHA-insured mortgages cannot exceed a statutory maximum mortgage amount, which varies by area and is based on area median house prices but cannot exceed a specified ceiling in high-cost areas. (The ceiling is set at $726,525 in high-cost areas in calendar year 2019.) Borrowers are charged fees, called mortgage insurance premiums, in exchange for the insurance.\nIn FY2018, FHA insured over 1 million new mortgages (including both home purchase and refinance mortgages) with a combined principal balance of $209 billion.\nFHA's share of the mortgage market tends to vary with economic conditions and other factors. In the aftermath of the housing market turmoil that began around 2007 and a related contraction of mortgage lending, FHA insured a larger share of mortgages than it had in the preceding years. Its overall share of the mortgage market increased from about 3% in calendar year 2005 to a peak of 21% in 2009. Since that time, FHA's share of the mortgage market has decreased somewhat, though it remains higher than it was in the early 2000s. In calendar year 2017, FHA's overall share of the mortgage market was about 17%.\nFHA-insured mortgages, like all mortgages, experienced increased default rates during the housing downturn that began around 2007, leading to concerns about the stability of the FHA insurance fund for single-family mortgages, the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMI Fund). In response to these concerns, FHA adopted a number of policy changes in an attempt to limit risk to the MMI Fund. These changes have included raising the fees that it charges and making changes to certain eligibility criteria for FHA-insured loans.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_73"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_74","query":"The President and Vice President's terms of office are prescribed by the Constitution and four of its amendments.\nArticle II, Section 1, of the Constitution, which came into effect with the convening of the First Congress and inauguration of the first President and Vice President in 1789, sets the terms of these two officers at four years, and does not prohibit their reelection. Four amendments to the Constitution, ratified between 1804 and 1967, have added further conditions to presidential terms and tenure.\nThe Twelfth Amendment, ratified in 1804, extended the qualifications for Presidents to the vice presidency.\nSection 1 of the Twentieth Amendment, ratified in 1933, sets the expiration date for these terms at noon on January 20 of each year following a presidential election.\nThe Twenty-Second Amendment, ratified in 1951, limits presidential tenure: no person may be elected President more than twice. It also specifies that Vice Presidents who succeed to the office may be elected to two full terms if they served less than two years of the term of the President they succeeded. If they served more than two years of the predecessor's term, they are eligible for election to only one additional term.\nThe Twenty-Fifth Amendment, ratified in 1967, does not directly affect terms and tenure of the President and Vice President, but provides in Section 1 that the Vice President \"shall become President\" on the death, resignation, or removal from office of the President. This section clarifies original constitutional language on the status of a Vice President who succeeds to the presidency. Section 2 authorizes the President to make nominations to fill vacancies in the office of Vice President, subject to approval by a majority vote of both houses of Congress, a contingency not covered in the original language of the Constitution.\nThe length of the President's term and the question of whether Presidents should be eligible for reelection were extensively debated in 1787 at the Constitutional Convention. Late in the proceedings, the delegates settled on a four-year term for both President and Vice President but did not place a limit on the number of terms a President could serve. Following a precedent set by President George Washington (1789-1797), and reinforced by Thomas Jefferson (1801-1809), however, U.S. Presidents adhered to a self-imposed limit of two terms, a precedent that was observed for over 140 years. Although several Presidents during this period who had served two terms considered running for a third, Franklin Roosevelt (1933-1945) was the first to seek and be elected to both a third term, in 1940, and a fourth, in 1944.\nFollowing ratification of the four amendments cited above, additional amendment proposals to change the conditions of presidential terms and tenure were regularly introduced during the second half of the 20th century, but much less frequently to date in the 21st. Two categories of amendment predominated during this period: one variant proposed repeal of the Twenty-Second Amendment, thus permitting Presidents to be elected an unlimited number of times. Another category of proposed amendment would have extended the presidential and vice-presidential terms to six years, often in combination with a requirement limiting Presidents to one term.\nNo measure to repeal the Twenty-Second Amendment or otherwise change the presidential term of office has been introduced to date in the 116th Congress. This report will be updated if events warrant.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_74"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_75","query":"Authoring and introducing legislation is fundamental to the task of representing voters as a Member of Congress. In fact, part of what makes the American political process unique is that it affords all Members an ability to propose their own ideas for chamber consideration. By comparison, most other democratic governments around the world rely on an executive official, often called a premier, chancellor, or prime minister, to originate and submit policy proposals for discussion and enactment by the legislature. Legislators serving in other countries generally lack the power to initiate legislative proposals of their own.\nIn the American political system, ideas and recommendations for legislation come from a wide variety of sources. Any number of individuals, groups, or entities may participate in drafting bills and resolutions, but only Members of Congress may formally introduce legislation, and they may do so for any reason.\nWhen a Representative has determined that a bill or resolution is ready for introduction, it is placed in the box, or \"hopper,\" at the bill clerk's desk on the chamber floor when the House is in session. The sponsor must sign the measure and attach the names of any original cosponsors on a form provided by the Clerk's office. Cosponsors do not sign the bill, but sponsors are \"encouraged\" by the Speaker to obtain original signatures from cosponsors prior to submitting the cosponsorship form. Since the 112th Congress, House rules have required Members to provide at the time of introduction a statement of constitutional authority indicating why Congress has the authority to enact the proposed bill or joint resolution. There is no House rule that introduced bills and resolutions must be prepared by the House Office of the Legislative Counsel, but that office plays an important role by providing Members and staff, at their request, with drafts of legislation. Use of the office by Members and staff is nearly universal.\nOnce introduced, the Speaker refers legislation to one or more committees based primarily on how its contents align with the subject matter jurisdictions of committees established in clause 1 of House Rule X. In practice, the Office of the Parliamentarian advises the Speaker in these referral decisions, and the Parliamentarian's recommendations are followed in virtually every case.\nThis report is intended to assist Members and staff in preparing legislation for introduction. Its contents address essential elements of the process, including bill drafting, the mechanics of introduction, and the roles played by key House offices involved in the drafting, submission, and referral of legislation. Statistics on introduced measures are presented in the final section, and a brief explanation of patterns of introduction over time is also provided.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_75"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_76","query":"The Military Selective Service Act (MSSA), first enacted as the Selective Service Act of 1948, provides the statutory authority for the federal government to maintain a Selective Service System (SSS) as an independent federal agency responsible for delivering appropriately qualified civilian men for induction into the Armed Forces of the United States as authorized by Congress. The annual budget for the agency is just under $23 million. One of the SSS's main functions is to maintain a database of registrants in case of a draft. The agency stores approximately 78 million records in order to verify registration status and eligibility for certain benefits that require certification of registration for eligibility. The SSS has a staff of about 124 full-time employees, complemented by a corps of volunteers and military reservists.\nThe MSSA requires most males between the ages of 18 and 26 who are citizens or residents of the United States to register with Selective Service. Women in the United States have never been required to register for the draft. Men who fail to register may be subject to criminal penalties, loss of eligibility for certain federal or state employment opportunities and education benefits, and denial of security clearances. Documented or undocumented immigrants who fail to register may not be able to obtain United States citizenship. Registration compliance rates were 92% in calendar year 2016. While individuals may still register at U.S. post offices, the SSS attributes high compliance rates to a system of automatic electronic registration supported by state legislation and interagency cooperation.\nThe MSSA does not currently authorize the use of a draft for induction into the Armed Forces. When the draft has been implemented, it has met some public resistance. Such resistance to the draft drives much of the opposition toward maintaining the SSS and the registration requirement. Even some who are not opposed to the government's use of conscription in a time of national need are opposed to maintaining the current SSS agency infrastructure. They argue that a stand-alone agency is unnecessary and expensive and that there are a number of alternatives that could more effectively and efficiently enable the country to reestablish conscription, if necessary. Others counter that, at the cost of $23 million annually, maintaining the SSS is a relatively inexpensive insurance policy should the draft need to be quickly reinstated. They also argue that maintaining the SSS sends a signal to potential adversaries that the United States is willing to draw on its full national resources for armed conflict if necessary.\nSome are concerned that the registration requirements are inequitable, arguing that it is unfair to men that women can voluntarily serve in all military occupations but are exempt from the registration requirement and the prospect of being drafted. In addition, some have raised concerns about the statutory penalties for failing to register and whether these penalties are more likely to be levied on vulnerable groups. Some contend that Congress should amend MSSA and associated statute to remove penalties for failing to register. Others argue that weakening or removing penalties would cause registration compliance rates to fall to unacceptably low levels. In response to these issues, Congress has established a National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service to provide research support and recommendations on the future of the SSS.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_76"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_77","query":"The Columbia (SSBN-826) class program is a program to design and build a class of 12 new ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to replace the Navy's current force of 14 aging Ohio-class SSBNs. The Navy has identified the Columbia-class program as the Navy's top priority program. The Navy wants to procure the first Columbia-class boat in FY2021. Research and development work on the program has been underway for several years, and advance procurement (AP) funding for the program began in FY2017. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests $1,698.9 million in advance procurement (AP) funding and $533.1 million in research and development funding for the program.\nThe Navy's FY2020 budget submission estimates the total procurement cost of the 12-ship class at $109.0 billion in then-year dollars. An April 2018 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report assessing selected major DOD weapon acquisition programs stated that the estimated total acquisition cost of the Columbia-class program is $102,075.3 million (about $102.1 billion) in constant FY2018 dollars, including $12,901.0 million (about $12.9 billion) in research and development costs and $89,174.3 million (about $89.2 billion) in procurement costs.\nIssues for Congress for the Columbia-class program include the following:\nwhether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 funding requests for the program; the risk of cost growth in the program; the risk of technical challenges or funding-related issues that could lead to delays in designing and building the lead boat in the program and having it ready for its scheduled initial deterrent patrol in 2031; the potential impact of the Columbia-class program on funding that will be available for other Navy programs, including other shipbuilding programs; and potential industrial-base challenges of building both Columbia-class boats and Virginia-class attack submarines (SSNs) at the same time.\nThis report focuses on the Columbia-class program as a Navy shipbuilding program. CRS Report RL33640, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf, discusses the Columbia class as an element of future U.S. strategic nuclear forces in the context of strategic nuclear arms control agreements.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_77"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_78","query":"The programs and activities of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) are designed primarily to address housing problems faced by households with very low incomes or other special housing needs and to expand access to homeownership. Nearly all of the department's budget comes from discretionary appropriations provided each year in the annual appropriations acts, typically as a part of the Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies appropriations bill (THUD).\nOn February 12, 2018, the Trump Administration submitted its FY2019 budget request to Congress, including $41.4 billion in gross new budget authority for HUD (not accounting for savings from offsets or rescissions). That is about $11.3 billion (21.5%) less than was provided in FY2018. Most of that reduction ($7.7 billion) is attributable to proposed program eliminations, including Community Development Block Grants (CDBG), the HOME Investment Partnerships grant program, Public Housing Capital Funding, Choice Neighborhoods grants, and the programs funded in the Self-Help Homeownership Opportunity Program (SHOP) account.\nOn May 23, 2018, the House Appropriations Committee approved its version of a FY2019 THUD appropriations bill ( H.R. 6072 ; H.Rept. 115-750 ), which proposed $53.2 billion in gross funding for HUD. This was about 29% more in gross funding than was requested by the President and slightly more (1%) than was provided in FY2018. The bill did not include the program eliminations proposed by the President, and instead proposed to fund CDBG and the Public Housing Capital Fund at FY2018 levels while reducing funding for the HOME and SHOP accounts (-12% and -7%, respectively).\nOn August 1, 2018, the Senate approved H.R. 6147 , the Financial Services Appropriations bill, which had been amended to include the Senate Appropriations Committee-approved version of a FY2019 THUD appropriations bill ( S. 3023 , incorporated as Division D), along with three other appropriations bills. It included more than $54 billion in gross funding for HUD. This is 30% more in gross funding than was requested by the President, and about 2.5% more than was provided in FY2018. Like H.R. 6072 , the Senate-passed bill did not include the President's proposed program eliminations, and instead proposed to fund those programs at their prior-year levels.\nFinal FY2019 appropriations were not completed before the start of the fiscal year. Funding for HUD and most other federal agencies was continued under a series of continuing resolutions until December 21, 2018, at which point funding lapsed and a partial government shutdown commenced. It continued until January 25, 2019, when another short-term continuing resolution was enacted. Final FY2019 HUD appropriations were enacted on February 15, 2019 as a part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 ( P.L. 116-6 ).\nAppropriations for Selected HUD Accounts, FY2018-FY2019 (dollars in millions)","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_78"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_79","query":"News reports in the late 1990s and early 2000s drew attention to a phenomenon sometimes called corporate \"inversions\" or \"expatriations\": instances where U.S. firms reorganize their structure so that the \"parent\" element of the group is a foreign corporation rather than a corporation chartered in the United States. The main objective of these transactions was tax savings, and they involved little to no shift in actual economic activity. Bermuda and the Cayman Islands (countries with no corporate income tax) were the locations of many of the newly created parent corporations.\nThese types of inversions largely ended with the enactment of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (JOBS Act; P.L. 108-357), which denied the tax benefits of an inversion if the original U.S. stockholders owned 80% or more of the new firm. The act effectively ended shifts to tax havens where no real business activity took place.\nHowever, two avenues for inverting remained. The act allowed a firm to invert if it has substantial business operations in the country where the new parent was to be located; the regulations at one point set a 10% level of these business operations. Several inversions using the business activity test resulted in Treasury regulations in 2012 that increased the activity requirement to 25%, effectively closing off this method. Firms could also invert by merging with a foreign company if the original U.S. stockholders owned less than 80% of the new firm. If the original U.S. shareholders owned less than 60%, the firm was not considered as inverting.\nTwo features made a country an attractive destination: a low corporate tax rate and a territorial tax system that did not tax foreign source income. The U.K. joined countries such as Ireland, Switzerland, and Canada as targets for inverting when it adopted a territorial tax in 2009. At the same time, the U.K. also lowered its rate (from 25% to 20% by 2015). Inverted firms could reduce worldwide taxes by stripping taxable earnings out of the new U.S. subsidiary, largely through allocating debt to that subsidiary.\nSoon after, several high-profile companies indicated an interest in merging with a non-U.S. headquartered company, including Pfizer, Chiquita, AbbVie, and Burger King. This \"second wave\" of inversions again raised concerns about an erosion of the U.S. tax base. Chiquita and AbbVie canceled their plans in the wake of 2014 Treasury regulations, but Burger King and other firms completed merger plans. Pfizer subsequently terminated its planned merger with Allergan after Treasury regulations issued in 2016. Evidence suggests that these Treasury regulations have been an important factor in subsequently decreasing these merger-related inversions.\nTwo policy options had been discussed in response: a general reform of the U.S. corporate tax and specific provisions to deal with tax-motivated international mergers. In December 2017, P.L. 115-97 (popularly known as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act) lowered the corporate tax rate as part of broader tax reform which some argued would slow the rate of inversions. Other tax reform proposals suggested that if the United States moved to a territorial tax, the incentive to invert would be eliminated. There were concerns that a territorial tax could worsen the profit-shifting that already exists among multinational firms. P.L. 115-97, while moving in some ways to a territorial tax, also instituted a number of measures aimed at combatting profit shifting, including a global minimum tax on intangible income that limited the tax benefits of a territorial tax.\nThe second option is to directly target inversions. The 2017 act included several provisions that discouraged inversions. In addition, further anti-inversion provisions have been introduced, most recently H.R. 5108 and S. 2459 in the 115th Congress, to treat all firms in which former U.S. shareholders have more than 50% ownership (or in which management and control is in the United States) as U.S. firms. These bills also provided that debt could also be allocated to the U.S. member of a worldwide operation in proportion to the U.S. ownership of assets.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_79"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_80","query":"The Small Business Administration (SBA) administers several programs to support small businesses, including loan guaranty programs designed to encourage lenders to provide loans to small businesses \"that might not otherwise obtain financing on reasonable terms and conditions.\" The SBA's 7(a) loan guaranty program is considered the agency's flagship loan program. Its name is derived from Section 7(a) of the Small Business Act of 1953 (P.L. 83-163, as amended), which authorizes the SBA to provide business loans and loan guaranties to American small businesses.\nIn FY2018, the SBA approved 60,353 7(a) loans totaling nearly $25.4 billion. The average approved 7(a) loan amount was $420,401. Proceeds from 7(a) loans may be used to establish a new business or to assist in the operation, acquisition, or expansion of an existing business.\nThis report discusses the rationale provided for the 7(a) program; the program's borrower and lender eligibility standards and program requirements; and program statistics, including loan volume, loss rates, use of proceeds, borrower satisfaction, and borrower demographics. It also examines issues raised concerning the SBA's administration of the 7(a) program, including the oversight of 7(a) lenders and the program's lack of outcome-based performance measures.\nThe report also surveys congressional and presidential actions taken in recent years to enhance small businesses' access to capital. For example,\nCongress approved legislation during the 111th Congress to provide more than $1.1 billion to temporarily subsidize the 7(a) and 504\/Certified Development Companies (504\/CDC) loan guaranty programs' fees and temporarily increase the 7(a) program's maximum loan guaranty percentage to 90% (funding was exhausted on January 3, 2011); raise the 7(a) program's gross loan limit from $2 million to $5 million; and establish an alternative size standard for the 7(a) and 504\/CDC loan programs. The SBA waived the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee for smaller 7(a) loans from FY2014 through FY2018; and is waiving the annual service fee for 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less made to small businesses located in a rural area or a HUBZone and reducing the up-front one-time guaranty fee for these loans from 2.0% to 0.6667% of the guaranteed portion of the loan in FY2019. The SBA has also waived the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee for veteran loans under the SBAExpress program (up to $350,000) since January 1, 2014; and reduced the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee on non-SBAExpress 7(a) loans to veterans from FY2015 through FY2018. P.L. 114-38, the Veterans Entrepreneurship Act of 2015, provided statutory authorization and made permanent the veteran's fee waiver under the SBAExpress program, except during any upcoming fiscal year for which the President's budget, submitted to Congress, includes a cost for the 7(a) program, in its entirety, that is above zero. Congress also approved legislation that increased the 7(a) program's authorization limit from $18.75 billion (on disbursements) in FY2014 to $23.5 billion in FY2015, $26.5 billion in FY2016, $27.5 billion in FY2017, $29.0 billion in FY2018, and $30 billion in FY2019. P.L. 115-189, the Small Business 7(a) Lending Oversight Reform Act of 2018, among other provisions, codified the SBA's Office of Credit Risk Management; required that office to annually undertake and report the findings of a risk analysis of the 7(a) program's loan portfolio; created a lender oversight committee within the SBA; authorized the Director of the Office of Credit Risk Management to undertake informal and formal enforcement actions against 7(a) lenders under specified conditions; redefined the credit elsewhere requirement; and authorized the SBA Administrator, starting in FY2019 and after providing at least 30 days' notice to specified congressional committees, to increase the amount of 7(a) loans not more than once during any fiscal year to not more than 115% of the 7(a) program's authorization limit.\nThe Appendix provides a brief description of the 7(a) program's SBAExpress, Export Express, and Community Advantage programs.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_80"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_81","query":"In the second half of the 19th century, the federal government pursued a policy of confining Indian tribes to reservations. These reservations were either a portion of a tribe's aboriginal land or an area of land taken out of the public domain and set aside for a tribe. The federal statutes and treaties reserving such land for Indian reservations typically did not address the water needs of these reservations, a fact that has given rise to questions and disputes regarding Indian reserved water rights. Dating to a 1908 Supreme Court ruling, courts generally have held that many tribes have a reserved right to water sufficient to fulfill the purpose of their reservations and that this right took effect on the date the reservations were established. This means that, in the context of a state water law system of prior appropriations, which is common in many U.S. western states, many tribes have water rights senior to those of non-Indian users with water rights and access established subsequent to the Indian reservations' creation. Although many Indian tribes hold senior water rights through their reservations, the quantification of these rights is undetermined in many cases.\nTribes have pursued quantification of their water rights through both litigation and negotiated settlements. The settlements involve negotiation between tribes, the federal government, states, water districts, and private water users, among others. They aim to resolve conflict between rights holders and allow the parties to determine specific terms of water allocation and use with certainty. Over the last 50 years, negotiated settlements have been the preferred course for most tribes because they are often less lengthy and costly than litigation. Additionally, many stakeholders have noted that these negotiated agreements are more likely to allow tribes not only to quantify their water rights on paper but also to procure access to these resources in the form of infrastructure and other related expenses, at least in some cases.\nAfter being negotiated, approval and implementation of Indian water rights settlements require federal action. As of 2019, 36 Indian water rights settlements had been federally approved, with total costs in excess of $5.8 billion. Of these, 32 settlements were approved and enacted by Congress and 4 were administratively approved by the U.S. Departments of Justice and the Interior. After being congressionally authorized, federal projects associated with approved Indian water rights settlements generally have been implemented by the Bureau of Reclamation or the Bureau of Indian Affairs (both within the Department of the Interior), pursuant to congressional directions. Congress has appropriated discretionary and mandatory funding (and, in some cases, both) for these activities, including in recent appropriations bills. In the 116th Congress, H.R. 1904 proposes to extend certain mandatory funds for these settlements in perpetuity (the funding currently expires in FY2029).\nSeveral individual Indian water rights settlements recently have been considered and enacted, including three that were enacted during the 114th Congress. A primary challenge facing new settlements is the availability of federal funds to implement ongoing and future agreements. Indian water rights settlements often involve the construction of major new water infrastructure to allow tribal communities to access water they hold rights to, and obtaining federal funding for these projects can be difficult. As a result, some settlements have been renegotiated to reduce their federal costs.\nAt issue is under what circumstances (if any) Congress should approve new Indian water rights settlements and whether Congress should fund (and in some cases amend) existing settlements. Some argue that resolution of Indian water rights settlements is a mutually beneficial means to resolve long-standing legal issues, provide certainty of water deliveries, and reduce the federal government's liability. Others argue against authorization and funding of new settlements, either on general principle or with regard to specific individual settlements and activities.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_81"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_82","query":"Social Security provides monthly cash benefits to retired or disabled workers and their family members, and to the family members of deceased workers. Among the beneficiary population, 83% are retired or disabled workers; family members of retired, disabled, or deceased workers make up the remainder. In March 2019, approximately 63.3 million beneficiaries received a total of $85.3 billion in benefit payments for the month; the average monthly benefit was $1,347.\nWorkers become eligible for Social Security benefits for themselves and their family members by working in Social Security-covered employment. An estimated 93% of workers in paid employment or self-employment are covered, and their earnings are subject to the Social Security payroll tax. Employers and employees each pay 6.2% of covered earnings, up to an annual limit on taxable earnings ($132,900 in 2019).\nAmong other requirements, a worker generally needs 40 earnings credits (10 years of covered employment) to be eligible for a Social Security retired-worker benefit. Fewer earnings credits are needed to qualify for a disabled-worker benefit; the number needed varies depending on the age of the worker when he or she became disabled. A worker's initial monthly benefit is based on his or her career-average earnings in covered employment. Social Security retired-worker benefits are first payable at the age of 62, subject to a permanent reduction for early retirement. Full (unreduced) retirement benefits are first payable at the full retirement age (FRA), which is increasing gradually from 65 to 67 under a law enacted by Congress in 1983. The FRA will reach 67 for persons born in 1960 or later (i.e., persons who become eligible for retirement benefits at the age of 62 in 2022 or later).\nIn addition to payroll taxes, Social Security is financed by federal income taxes that some beneficiaries pay on a portion of their benefits and by interest income that is earned on the Treasury securities held by the Social Security trust funds. In 2018, the Social Security trust funds had receipts totaling $1,003 billion, expenditures totaling $1,000 billion, and accumulated assets (U.S. Treasury securities) totaling $2.9 trillion. The Social Security Board of Trustees (the trustees) notes, \"Over the program's 84-year history, it has collected roughly $21.9 trillion and paid out $19.0 trillion, leaving asset reserves of $2.9 trillion at the end of 2018 in its two trust funds.\" Projections by the trustees show that, based on the program's current financing and benefit structure, benefits scheduled under current law can be paid in full and on time until 2035 (under the intermediate set of assumptions). Projections also show that Social Security expenditures are estimated to exceed income by at least 20% over the next 75 years. Restoring long-range trust fund solvency and other policy objectives (such as increasing benefits for certain beneficiaries) have made Social Security reform an issue of ongoing congressional interest.\nThis report provides an overview of Social Security financing and benefits under current law. Specifically, the report covers the origins and a brief history of the program; Social Security financing and the status of the trust funds; how Social Security benefits are computed; the types of Social Security benefits available to workers and their family members; the basic eligibility requirements for each type of benefit; the scheduled increase in the Social Security retirement age; and the federal income taxation of Social Security benefits.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_82"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_83","query":"Summary\nThe Antiquities Act authorizes the President to declare, by public proclamation, historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest situated on federal lands as national monuments. The act also authorizes the President to reserve parcels of land surrounding the objects of historic or scientific interest, but requires that the amount of land reserved be confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected. Since its enactment in 1906, Presidents have used the Antiquities Act to establish 158 monuments, reserving millions of acres of land in the process. Presidents have also modified existing monuments, whether by increasing or decreasing their size (or both), on more than 90 occasions.\nThough most monument proclamations have been uncontroversial, some have spurred corrective legislative action and litigation. Congress has twice imposed geographic limitations on the President's authority under the Antiquities Act in response to proclamations reserving millions of acres of land in Wyoming and Alaska. Litigants have also challenged the President's authority to establish certain monuments, disputing whether the historic or scientific objects selected for preservation were encompassed by the act, as well as whether the amount of land reserved exceeded the smallest area necessary for the objects' preservation. Courts, however, have uniformly rejected these challenges and adopted a broad interpretation of the President's authority under the Antiquities Act.\nNo President has purported to revoke a national monument, but past Presidents have reduced the size of existing monuments on 18 occasions. In 2017, President Trump issued proclamations reducing the size of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument and the Bears Ears National Monument. Various groups have sued to block these proclamations, arguing that the President exceeded his authority under the Antiquities Act. Because none of the prior proclamations diminishing monuments was challenged in court, these lawsuits offer the first opportunity for a court to decide whether the act empowers the President to diminish a national monument.\nThose challenging President Trump's proclamations argue that the Antiquities Act's authorization for the President to \"declare\" national monuments and \"reserve\" surrounding lands does not include the distinct power to revoke or diminish an existing monument. They underscore this point by noting that, unlike the Antiquities Act, several contemporaneous public land laws expressly authorized the President to undo a prior reservation of land. The plaintiffs also highlight a number of 19th and early 20th century legal opinions from the executive branch concluding that the President lacks authority to undo a reservation of land absent express statutory authorization. Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA)\u2014which prohibited the Secretary of the Interior from modifying or revoking a national monument established under the Antiquities Act\u2014demonstrates Congress's intent to consolidate modification power in the legislature.\nBy contrast, the United States argues that the requirement that reserved land be \"the smallest area compatible\" with the preservation of the designated objects empowers the President to reduce the size of a monument when he determines that more land was reserved than necessary. The United States also contends that the Executive has implied authority to revisit prior discretionary decisions. Further, the United States argues that the President's authority to diminish monuments is confirmed by the 18 times past Presidents have done so and by several executive branch legal opinions that support this conclusion. Finally, the United States argues that FLPMA is irrelevant because that law prohibits the Secretary of the Interior, not the President, from diminishing monuments.\nWhile the President's authority to diminish a national monument has been questioned, there appears to be no dispute that Congress has authority to do so, a power it has exercised before. Several Members of Congress have introduced legislation either codifying or reversing President Trump's proclamations or placing limits on the President's authority under the Antiquities Act going forward.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_83"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_84","query":"The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a \"dual-track\" decision taken by NATO in 1979 in response to concerns about the Soviet Union's deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles. NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles.\nThe U.S. State Department, in the 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 editions of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, stated that the United States has determined that \"the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.\" In the 2016 report, it noted that \"the cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km.\" In late 2017, the United States released the Russian designator for the missile\u20149M729. The United States has also noted that Russia has deployed several battalions with the missile. In late 2018, the Office of the Director for National Intelligence provided further details on the violation.\nThe Obama Administration raised its concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty in a number of meetings since 2013. Russia repeatedly denied that it had violated the treaty. In October 2016, the United States called a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the INF Treaty to address compliance concerns. During this meeting, in mid-November, both sides raised their concerns, but they failed to make any progress in resolving them. A second SVC meeting was held in December 2017. The United States has also begun to consider a number of military responses, which might include new land-based INF-range systems or new sea-launched cruise missiles, both to provide Russia with an incentive to reach a resolution and to provide the United States with options for future programs if Russia eventually deploys new missiles and the treaty regime collapses. It might also suspend or withdraw from arms control agreements, although several analysts have noted that this might harm U.S. security interests, as it would remove all constraints on Russia's nuclear forces.\nThe Trump Administration conducted an extensive review of the INF Treaty during 2017 to assess the potential security implications of Russia's violation and to determine how the United States would respond going forward. On December 8, 2017\u2014the 30th anniversary of the date when the treaty was signed\u2014the Administration announced that the United States would implement an integrated response that included diplomatic, military, and economic measures. On October 20, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from INF, citing Russia's noncompliance as a key factor in that decision. The United States suspended its participation in the treaty and submitted its official notice of withdrawal February 2, 2019. Russia responded by suspending its participation on February 2, 2019, as well.\nCongress is likely to continue to conduct oversight hearings on this issue, and to receive briefings on the status of Russia's cruise missile program. It may also consider legislation authorizing U.S. military responses and supporting alternative diplomatic approaches. This report will be updated as needed.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_84"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_85","query":"The Colorado River Basin covers more than 246,000 square miles in seven U.S. states (Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and California) and Mexico. Pursuant to federal law, the Bureau of Reclamation (part of the Department of the Interior) manages much of the basin's water supplies. Colorado River water is used primarily for agricultural irrigation and municipal and industrial (M&I) uses, but it also is important for power production, fish and wildlife, and recreational uses.\nIn recent years, consumptive uses of Colorado River water have exceeded natural flows. This causes an imbalance in the basin's available supplies and competing demands. A drought in the basin dating to 2000 has raised the prospect of water delivery curtailments and decreased hydropower production, among other things. In the future, observers expect that increasing demand for supplies, coupled with the effects of climate change, will further increase the strain on the basin's limited water supplies.\nRiver Management\nThe Law of the River is the commonly used shorthand for the multiple laws, court decisions, and other documents governing Colorado River operations. The foundational document of the Law of the River is the Colorado River Compact of 1922. Pursuant to the compact, the basin states established a framework to apportion the water supplies between the Upper and Lower Basins of the Colorado River, with the dividing line between the two basins at Lee Ferry, AZ (near the Utah border). The Upper and Lower Basins each were allocated 7.5 million acre-feet (MAF) annually under the Colorado River Compact; an additional 1.5 MAF in annual flows was made available to Mexico under a 1944 treaty. Future agreements and court decisions addressed numerous other issues (including intrastate allocations of flows), and subsequent federal legislation provided authority and funding for federal facilities that allowed users to develop their allocations. A Supreme Court ruling also confirmed that Congress designated the Secretary of the Interior as the water master for the Lower Basin, a role in which the federal government manages the delivery of all water below Hoover Dam.\nReclamation and basin stakeholders closely track the status of two large reservoirs\u2014Lake Powell in the Upper Basin and Lake Mead in the Lower Basin\u2014as an indicator of basin storage conditions. Under recent guidelines, dam releases from these facilities are tied to specific water storage levels. For Lake Mead, the first tier of \"shortage,\" under which Arizona's and Nevada's allocations would be decreased, would be triggered if Lake Mead's January 1 elevation is expected to fall below 1,075 feet above mean sea level. As of early 2019, Reclamation projected that there was a 69% chance of a shortage condition at Lake Mead in 2020; there was also a lesser chance of Lake Powell reaching critically low levels. Improved hydrology in early 2019 may decrease the chances of shortage in the immediate future.\nDrought Contingency Plans\nDespite previous efforts to alleviate future shortages, the basin's hydrological outlook has generally worsened in recent years. After several years of negotiations, in early 2019 Reclamation and the basin states transmitted to Congress additional plans to alleviate stress on basin water supplies. These plans, known as the drought contingency plans (DCPs) for the Upper and Lower Basins, were authorized by Congress in April 2019 in the Colorado River Drought Contingency Plan Authorization Act (P.L. 116-14). The DCPs among other things obligate Lower Basin states to additional water supply cutbacks at specified storage levels (i.e., cutbacks beyond previous curtailment plans), commit Reclamation to additional water conservation efforts, and coordinate Upper Basin operations to protect Lake Powell storage levels and hydropower generation.\nCongressional Role\nCongress plays a multifaceted role in federal management of the Colorado River basin. Congress funds and oversees management of basin facilities, including operations and programs to protect and restore endangered species. It has also enacted and continues to consider Indian water rights settlements involving Colorado River waters and development of new water storage facilities in the basin. In addition, Congress has approved funding to mitigate water shortages and conserve basin water supplies and has enacted new authorities to combat drought and its effects on basin water users (i.e., the DCPs and other related efforts).","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_85"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_86","query":"Each of the four major federal land management agencies maintains tens of thousands of diverse assets, including roads, bridges, buildings, and water management structures. These agencies are the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), National Park Service (NPS), and Forest Service (FS). Congress and the Administration continue to focus on the agencies' deferred maintenance and repair of these assets\u2014in essence, the cost of any maintenance or repair that was not done when it should have been or was scheduled to be done. Deferred maintenance and repair is often called the maintenance backlog.\nIn FY2018, the most recent year for which these estimates are available, the four agencies had combined deferred maintenance estimated at $19.38 billion. This figure includes $11.92 billion (62%) in deferred maintenance for NPS, $5.20 billion (27%) for FS, $1.30 billion (7%) for FWS, and $0.96 billion (5%) for BLM. The estimates reflect project costs.\nOver the past decade (FY2009-FY2018), the total deferred maintenance for the four agencies fluctuated, peaking in FY2012 and ending the decade relatively flat in current dollars. It increased overall by $0.36 billion, from $19.02 billion to $19.38 billion, or 2%. Both the BLM and NPS estimates increased, whereas the FWS and FS estimates decreased. By contrast, in constant dollars, the total deferred maintenance estimate for the four agencies decreased from FY2009 to FY2018 by $3.61 billion, from $22.99 billion to $19.38 billion, or 16%. The BLM estimate increased, whereas estimates for the other three agencies decreased.\nIn each fiscal year, NPS had the largest portion of the total deferred maintenance, considerably more than any of the other three agencies. FS consistently had the second-largest share, followed by FWS and then BLM. Throughout the past decade, the asset class that included roads comprised the largest portion of the four-agency combined deferred maintenance.\nCongressional debate has focused on varied issues, including the level and sources of funds needed to reduce deferred maintenance, whether agencies are using existing funding efficiently, how to balance the maintenance of existing infrastructure with the acquisition of new assets, whether disposal of assets is desirable given limited funding, and the priority of maintaining infrastructure relative to other government functions.\nSome question why deferred maintenance estimates have fluctuated over time. These fluctuations are likely the result of many factors, among them the following:\nAgencies have refined methods of defining and quantifying the maintenance needs of their assets. Levels of funding for maintenance, including funding to address the maintenance backlog, vary from year to year. Economic conditions, including costs of services and products, also fluctuate. The asset portfolios of the agencies change, with acquisitions and disposals affecting the number, type, size, age, and location of agency assets.\nThe extent to which these and other factors affected changes in each agency's maintenance backlog over the past decade is not entirely clear. In some cases, comprehensive information is not readily available or has not been examined.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_86"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_87","query":"The economic and trade relationship with Mexico is of interest to U.S. policymakers because of Mexico's proximity to the United States, the extensive trade and investment relationship under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the conclusion of the NAFTA renegotiations and the proposed U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), and the strong cultural and economic ties that connect the two countries. Also, it is of national interest for the United States to have a prosperous and democratic Mexico as a neighboring country. Mexico is the United States' third-largest trading partner, while the United States is, by far, Mexico's largest trading partner. Mexico ranks third as a source of U.S. imports, after China and Canada, and second, after Canada, as an export market for U.S. goods and services. The United States is the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mexico.\nMost studies show that the net economic effects of NAFTA, which entered into force in 1994, on both the United States and Mexico have been small but positive, though there have been adjustment costs to some sectors within both countries. Much of the bilateral trade between the United States and Mexico occurs in the context of supply chains as manufacturers in each country work together to create goods. The expansion of trade since NAFTA has resulted in the creation of vertical supply relationships, especially along the U.S.-Mexico border. The flow of intermediate inputs produced in the United States and exported to Mexico and the return flow of finished products greatly increased the importance of the U.S.-Mexico border region as a production site. U.S. manufacturing industries, including automotive, electronics, appliances, and machinery, all rely on the assistance of Mexican manufacturers.\nCongress faces numerous issues related to U.S.-Mexico trade and investment relations. The United States, Mexico, and Canada signed the proposed USMCA on November 30, 2018, which would have to be approved by Congress and ratified by Mexico and Canada before entering into force. A few days after signing the agreement, President Donald J. Trump stated to reporters that he intends to notify Mexico and Canada of his intention to withdraw from NAFTA with a six-month notice. Congress may consider policy issues and economic effects of the proposed USMCA, economic and political ramifications of possibly withdrawing from NAFTA, and the potential strategic implications of Mexico's new President Andr\u00e9s Manuel L\u00f3pez Obrador, who entered into office on December 1, 2018. Congress may also examine the congressional role in a possible withdrawal from NAFTA; evaluate the effects of U.S. tariffs on aluminum and steel imports from Mexico and Mexico's retaliatory tariffs on certain U.S. exports; and address issues related to the U.S. withdrawal from the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement among the United States, Canada, Mexico, and nine other countries, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which will enact much of the proposed TPP without the participation of the United States. The CPTPP is set to take effect for Mexico and five other countries on December 30, 2018. Some observers contend that the withdrawal from TPP could damage U.S. competitiveness and economic leadership in the region, while others see the withdrawal as a way to prevent lower-cost imports and potential job losses.\nCongress also may maintain an active interest in ongoing bilateral efforts to promote economic competitiveness, increase regulatory cooperation, and pursue energy integration. Under the U.S.-Mexico High Level Economic Dialogue (HLED), which was first launched in September 2013, the United States and Mexico are striving to advance economic and commercial priorities through annual meetings at the Cabinet level that also include leaders from the public and private sectors. Two other initiatives that may be of interest to policymakers are the High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Council (HLRCC) and the bilateral border management initiative under the Declaration Concerning 21st Center Border Management.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_87"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_88","query":"Congress plays a major role in U.S. trade policy through its legislative and oversight authority. Since the end of World War II, U.S. trade policy has focused on fostering an open, rules-based global trading system, liberalizing markets by reducing trade and investment barriers through negotiations and agreements, and enforcing trade commitments and related laws. International trade and investment issues can affect the overall health of the U.S. economy and specific sectors, the success of U.S. businesses, U.S. employment opportunities, and the overall standard of living of Americans. The benefits and costs of international trade and the future direction of trade policy are active areas of interest for many in Congress.\nThis report addresses frequently asked questions regarding U.S. trade policy and is intended to assist Members and staff who may be new to trade issues. The report provides context for basic trade concepts and data on key U.S. trade and investment trends. It also addresses how U.S. trade policy is formulated and describes the trade and investment policy tools used to advance U.S. objectives. The report is divided into five sections:\nThe Basics of Trade explains key economic concepts, including why countries trade, the benefits and costs of trade expansion, and the role of global value chains in international trade. The section also highlights common trade terms and principles.\nU.S. Trade Trends provides data on key U.S. trade relationships, the U.S. trade deficit, and sector-specific issues related to manufacturing, agriculture, services, and digital trade.\nFormulation of U.S. Trade Policy describes key objectives and functions of trade policy. The section outlines the roles of Congress, the executive branch, private stakeholders, and the judiciary in the formulation and implementation of U.S. trade policy.\nU.S. Trade Policy Tools explains some of the key vehicles for advancing U.S. trade policy objectives, including trade negotiations and agreements, special trade programs, tariff policy and trade remedies, trade adjustment assistance, and export promotion programs and controls.\nLink Between International Investment and Trade explains the motivations of foreign direct investment (FDI) and its relationship to trade. The section provides data on top sources of FDI in the United States as well as destinations of U.S. FDI abroad, and explains the role of investment agreements and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).\nThis report is intended as an introduction to U.S. trade policy and does not provide in-depth coverage of all trade and investment issues. For more detail on U.S. trade policy issues, refer to the following CRS products:\nCRS Report R45474, International Trade and Finance: Overview and Issues for the 116th Congress, coordinated by Rebecca M. Nelson and Andres B. Schwarzenberg. CRS Report R45420, U.S. Trade Trends and Developments, by Andres B. Schwarzenberg. CRS Report R44546, The Economic Effects of Trade: Overview and Policy Challenges, by James K. Jackson. CRS Report R45243, Trade Deficits and U.S. Trade Policy, by James K. Jackson. CRS In Focus IF10156, U.S. Trade Policy: Background and Current Issues, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar, Ian F. Fergusson, and Brock R. Williams. CRS In Focus IF11016, U.S. Trade Policy Functions: Who Does What?, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_88"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_89","query":"All nuclear power in the United States is generated by light water reactors (LWRs), which were commercialized in the 1950s and early 1960s and are now used throughout most of the world. LWRs are cooled by ordinary (\"light\") water, which also slows (\"moderates\") the neutrons that maintain the nuclear fission chain reaction. High construction costs of large conventional LWRs, concerns about safety raised by the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan, and other issues have led to increased interest in unconventional, or \"advanced,\" nuclear technologies that could be less expensive and safer than existing LWRs.\nAn \"advanced nuclear reactor\" is defined in legislation enacted in 2018 as \"a nuclear fission reactor with significant improvements over the most recent generation of nuclear fission reactors\" or a reactor using nuclear fusion (P.L. 115-248). Such reactors include LWR designs that are far smaller than existing reactors, as well as concepts that would use different moderators, coolants, and types of fuel. Many of these advanced designs are considered to be small modular reactors (SMRs), which the Department of Energy (DOE) defines as reactors with electric generating capacity of 300 megawatts and below, in contrast to an average of about 1,000 megawatts for existing commercial reactors.\nAdvanced reactors are often referred to as \"Generation IV\" nuclear technologies, with existing commercial reactors constituting \"Generation III\" or, for the most recently constructed reactors, \"Generation III+.\" Major categories of advanced reactors include advanced water-cooled reactors, which would make safety, efficiency, and other improvements over existing commercial reactors; gas-cooled reactors, which could use graphite as a neutron moderator or have no moderator; liquid-metal-cooled reactors, which would be cooled by liquid sodium or other metals and have no moderator; molten salt reactors, which would use liquid fuel; and fusion reactors, which would release energy through the combination of light atomic nuclei rather than the splitting (fission) of heavy nuclei such as uranium. Most of these concepts have been studied since the dawn of the nuclear age, but relatively few, such as sodium-cooled reactors, have advanced to commercial scale demonstration, and such demonstrations in the United States took place decades ago.\nThe 115th Congress enacted two bills to promote the development of advanced nuclear reactors. The first, the Nuclear Energy Innovation Capabilities Act of 2017 (NEICA), was signed into law in September 2018 (P.L. 115-248). It requires DOE to develop a versatile fast neutron test reactor that could help develop fuels and materials for advanced reactors and authorizes DOE national laboratories and other sites to host reactor testing and demonstration projects \"to be proposed and funded, in whole or in part, by the private sector.\" The second, the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (NEIMA, P.L. 115-439), signed in January 2019, would require the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to develop an optional regulatory framework suitable for advanced nuclear technologies. The 115th Congress also appropriated $65 million for R&D to support development of the versatile test reactor in the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, FY2019, along with funding for ongoing advanced nuclear research and development programs (Division A of P.L. 115-244).\nContinued debate over advanced reactor issues is anticipated in the 116th Congress. A fundamental question may be the role of the federal government in advanced nuclear power development. DOE's budget request for FY2020 focuses the federal role on \"early stage research\" rather than the more expensive stages of demonstration and commercialization. Controversy is also likely to continue over the need for advanced nuclear power. Supporters contend that such technology will be crucial in reducing emissions of greenhouse gases and bringing carbon-free power to the majority of the world that currently has little access to electricity. However, some observers and interest groups have cast doubt on the potential safety, affordability, and sustainability of advanced reactors. Because many of these technologies are in the conceptual or design phases, the potential advantages of these systems have not yet been established on a commercial scale. Concern has also been raised about the weapons-proliferation risks posed by the potential use of plutonium-based fuel by some advanced reactor technologies.\nOther current issues related to advanced reactors include criteria for hosting private-sector demonstration reactors at DOE sites, the licensing framework for non-LWR reactors, longer time periods for federal agreements to purchase power from advanced reactors, and the supply of the high-assay low enriched uranium fuel that would be needed for some advanced reactor designs. There also may be congressional interest about potential federal assistance for demonstration reactors, which are expected to cost billions of dollars apiece. Major options for such assistance include federal cost sharing, loan guarantees, power purchase agreements, purchase of reactor capacity for research uses, and tax credits.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_89"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_90","query":"Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter, \"Bosnia\") drew heavily on U.S. support after gaining independence from Yugoslavia in 1992. The United States helped end the Bosnian war (1992-1995), one of the most lethal conflicts in Europe since the Second World War, by leading NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serb forces, brokering the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, and deploying 20,000 U.S. troops. Some Members of Congress became involved in policy debates over these measures, and Congress monitored and at times challenged the Bush and Clinton Administrations' response through numerous hearings, resolutions, and legislative proposals. Since 1995, the United States has been a major source of aid to Bosnia and firmly supports its territorial integrity. The United States also supports Bosnia's aspirations for NATO and European Union (EU) membership.\nToday, Bosnia faces serious challenges. Nearly 25 years after the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia continues to use part of the Agreement as its constitution, which divides the country into two ethnoterritorial entities. Critics charge that Bosnia's political system is too decentralized to enact the reforms required for NATO and EU membership. They also contend that the ethnic power-sharing arrangements and veto points embedded in numerous government bodies are sources of gridlock. Domestic and international courts have ruled against several aspects of Bosnia's constitution, yet the Bosnian government thus far has failed to implement these rulings.\nSince Bosnia's independence, its politics has been dominated by ethnic parties representing the country's three main groups: Bosniaks (Slavic Muslims), Croats, and Serbs. These parties have prospered under a system that critics charge lacks transparency and accountability. Critics also maintain that ethnic party leaders use divisive nationalist rhetoric to distract from serious issues affecting the country as a whole, including poverty, unemployment, and stalled political reforms. The Bosnian population exhibits low trust in political parties and the government, and disaffection toward the country's elite.\nU.S. and EU officials brokered several ultimately unsuccessful rounds of constitutional reform negotiations, and continue to call on Bosnia's leaders to implement reforms to make governance more efficient and effective, dismantle patronage networks, and bring Bosnia closer to EU and NATO membership. However, there is little consensus among the country's leaders on how the country should be reformed. Bosnian Serb leaders from the Serb-majority entity (Republika Srpska) have called for greater autonomy and even secession from Bosnia. Some Bosnian Croat leaders have called for partitioning Bosnia's other entity, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to create a separate Croat-majority entity. Bosniak leaders, by contrast, generally prefer a more centralized state. Many analysts caution that any move to partition the country could lead to renewed violence, while greater decentralization could make Bosnia's government less functional. U.S. policy has long been oriented toward preserving Bosnia's statehood. Bosnia's 2018 general elections largely returned to power the same entrenched ethnic parties. Of particular concern is the election of Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik to Bosnia's collective presidency. Dodik, a sharp critic of the United States and NATO, has periodically called for a referendum on Republika Srpska's secession. He is under U.S. sanctions for obstructing the Dayton Agreement.\nIn addition to these internal challenges, U.S. and EU officials have expressed concern over external influence in the region. Russia reportedly relies on soft power, energy leverage, and \"spoiler\" tactics to influence Bosnia, particularly in the Serb-majority entity. Turkish soft power draws on Bosnia's Ottoman-era heritage and Turkey's shared religious tradition with Bosniaks. China is a more recent presence in the region, but its heavy investments and lending have prompted concern on both sides of the Atlantic. Policymakers have also expressed concern at the challenges posed by the return of Bosnians who fought with the Islamic State and Nusra Front in Syria and Iraq.\nMany observers contend that the United States remains a stakeholder in Bosnia's future because of its central role in resolving the conflict and shaping the postwar Bosnian state. Given the history of U.S. involvement in Bosnia, Bosnia's importance to regional stability in the Balkans, and concerns over Russian and Chinese influence in Bosnia, Members of Congress may be interested in monitoring how the country navigates its internal and external challenges. Congress may also consider future U.S. aid levels to Bosnia and the degree to which such assistance supports the long-standing U.S. policy objectives for Bosnia of territorial integrity, NATO and EU integration, energy security, and resilience against malign influence.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_90"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_91","query":"Congressional interest in small business access to capital has increased in recent years because of concerns that small businesses might be prevented from accessing sufficient capital to enable them to start, continue, or expand operations and create jobs. Some have argued that the federal government should provide additional resources to assist small businesses. Others worry about the long-term adverse economic effects of spending programs that increase the federal deficit. They advocate business tax reduction, reform of financial credit market regulation, and federal fiscal restraint as the best means to assist small businesses and create jobs.\nSeveral laws were enacted during the 111th Congress to enhance small business access to capital. For example,\nP.L. 111-5, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), provided the Small Business Administration (SBA) an additional $730 million, including funding to temporarily subsidize SBA fees and increase the 7(a) loan guaranty program's maximum loan guaranty percentage to 90%. P.L. 111-240, the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish a $30 billion Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF), in which $4.0 billion was issued, to encourage community banks with less than $10 billion in assets to increase their lending to small businesses. It also authorized a $1.5 billion State Small Business Credit Initiative to provide funding to participating states with small business capital access programs, numerous changes to the SBA's loan guaranty and contracting programs, funding to continue the SBA's fee subsidies and the 7(a) program's 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage through December 31, 2010, and about $12 billion in tax relief for small businesses. P.L. 111-322, the Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extensions Act, 2011, authorized the SBA to continue its fee subsidies and the 7(a) program's 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage through March 4, 2011, or until available funding was exhausted, which occurred on January 3, 2011.\nThis report focuses on the SBLF. It opens with a discussion of the supply and demand for small business loans. The SBLF's advocates claimed the SBLF was needed to enhance the supply of small business loans. The report then examines other arguments presented both for and against the program. Advocates argued that the SBLF would increase lending to small businesses and, in turn, create jobs. Opponents contended that the SBLF could lose money, lacked sufficient oversight provisions, did not require lenders to increase their lending to small businesses, could serve as a vehicle for Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) recipients to effectively refinance their TARP loans on more favorable terms with little or no resulting benefit for small businesses, and could encourage a failing lender to make even riskier loans to avoid higher dividend payments.\nThe report concludes with an examination of the program's implementation and a discussion of bills introduced to amend the SBLF. For example, during the 112th Congress, S. 681, the Greater Accountability in the Lending Fund Act of 2011, would have limited the program's authority to 15 years from enactment and prohibited TARP recipients from participating in the program. H.R. 2807, the Small Business Leg-Up Act of 2011, would have transferred any unobligated and repaid funds from the SBLF to the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund \"to increase the availability of credit for small businesses.\" H.R. 3147, the Small Business Lending Extension Act, would have extended the Department of the Treasury's investment authority from one year to two years. During the 113th Congress, H.R. 2474, the Community Lending and Small Business Jobs Act of 2013, would have transferred any unobligated and repaid funds from the SBLF to the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_91"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_92","query":"A plaintiff injured by a defendant's wrongful act may file a tort lawsuit to recover money from that defendant. To name a particularly familiar example, a person who negligently causes a vehicular collision may be liable to the victim of that crash. By forcing people who wrongfully injure others to pay money to their victims, the tort system serves at least two functions: (1) deterring people from injuring others and (2) compensating those who are injured.\nEmployees and officers of the federal government occasionally commit torts just like other members of the general public. For a substantial portion of this nation's history, however, plaintiffs injured by the tortious acts of a federal officer or employee were barred from filing lawsuits against the United States by \"sovereign immunity\"\u2014a legal doctrine that ordinarily prohibits private citizens from haling a sovereign state into court without its consent. Until the mid-20th century, a tort victim could obtain compensation from the United States only by persuading Congress to pass a private bill compensating him for his loss.\nCongress, deeming this state of affairs unacceptable, enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which authorizes plaintiffs to obtain compensation from the United States for the torts of its employees. However, subjecting the federal government to tort liability not only creates a financial cost to the United States, it also creates a risk that government officials may inappropriately base their decisions not on socially desirable policy objectives, but rather on the desire to reduce the government's exposure to monetary damages. In an attempt to mitigate these potential negative effects of abrogating the government's immunity from liability and litigation, the FTCA limits the circumstances in which a plaintiff may pursue a tort lawsuit against the United States. For example, the FTCA contains several exceptions that categorically bar plaintiffs from recovering tort damages in certain categories of cases. Federal law also restricts the types and amount of damages a victorious plaintiff may recover in an FTCA suit. Additionally, a plaintiff may not initiate an FTCA lawsuit unless he has timely complied with a series of procedural requirements, such as providing the government an initial opportunity to evaluate the plaintiff's claim and decide whether to settle it before the case proceeds to federal court.\nSince Congress first enacted the FTCA, the federal courts have developed a robust body of judicial precedent interpreting the statute's contours. In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has expressed reluctance to reconsider its long-standing FTCA precedents, thereby leaving the task of further developing the FTCA to Congress. Some Members of Congress have accordingly proposed legislation to modify the FTCA in various respects, such as by broadening the circumstances in which a plaintiff may hold the United States liable for torts committed by government employees.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_92"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_93","query":"The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insures private lenders against losses on home mortgages that meet certain eligibility criteria. If the mortgage borrower defaults (that is, does not repay the mortgage as promised) and the home goes to foreclosure, FHA pays the lender the remaining principal amount owed. By insuring lenders against the possibility of borrower default, FHA is intended to expand access to mortgage credit to some households who might not otherwise be able to obtain affordable mortgages, such as those with small down payments.\nWhen an FHA-insured mortgage goes to foreclosure, the lender files a claim with FHA for the remaining amount owed on the mortgage. Claims on FHA-insured home mortgages are paid out of the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMI Fund), which is funded through fees paid by borrowers (called premiums), rather than through appropriations. However, like all federal credit programs covered by the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, FHA can draw on permanent and indefinite budget authority with the U.S. Treasury to cover unanticipated increases in the cost of the loans that it insures, if necessary, without additional congressional action.\nEach year, as part of the annual budget process, the expected costs of mortgages insured in past years are re-estimated to take into account updated information on loan performance and economic assumptions. If the anticipated costs of insured mortgages have increased, then FHA must transfer funds from a secondary reserve account into its primary reserve account to cover the amount of the increase in the anticipated cost of insured loans. If there are not enough funds in the secondary reserve account, then the MMI Fund is required to take funds from Treasury using its permanent and indefinite budget authority in order to make the required transfer.\nSeparately from the budget re-estimates, FHA is required by law to obtain an independent actuarial review of the MMI Fund each year. This review provides a view of the MMI Fund's financial status by estimating the MMI Fund's economic value\u2014that is, the amount of funds that the MMI Fund currently has on hand plus the net present value of all of the expected future cash flows on the mortgages that are currently insured under the MMI Fund. The actuarial review is used to determine whether the MMI Fund is in compliance with a statutory requirement to maintain a capital ratio of at least 2%. The capital ratio is the economic value of the MMI Fund divided by the total dollar amount of mortgages insured under the MMI Fund.\nIn the years following the housing and mortgage market turmoil that began around 2007, increased foreclosure rates, as well as economic factors such as falling house prices, contributed to increases in expected losses on FHA-insured loans. This put pressure on the MMI Fund and reduced the amount of resources that FHA had available to pay for additional, unexpected future losses. The capital ratio fell below 2% in FY2009 and remained below 2% for several years thereafter, turning negative in FY2012 and FY2013. Concerns about FHA's finances culminated at the end of FY2013, when FHA announced that it would need $1.7 billion from Treasury to cover an increase in anticipated costs of insured loans. This marked the first time that FHA needed funds from Treasury to make the required transfer of funds between the primary and secondary reserve accounts.\nMore recently, the financial position of the MMI Fund has improved. The capital ratio again exceeded the 2% threshold in FY2015 and has remained above 2% in the years since. The FY2018 actuarial review of the MMI Fund estimated the economic value of the MMI Fund to be positive $34.9 billion and the capital ratio to be 2.76%. This suggests that the MMI Fund would have about $34.9 billion remaining after realizing all of its expected future cash flows on currently insured mortgages. The FY2018 results represent an increase from FY2017, when the capital ratio was estimated to be 2.18% and the economic value was estimated to be $26.7 billion.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_93"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_94","query":"More than 90% of federal highway assistance is distributed to the states by formula. Between 1916, when Congress created the first ongoing program to fund road construction, and 2012, various formula factors specified in law were used to apportion highway funds among the states. After 1982, these factors were partially overridden by provisions to guarantee that each state received federal funding at least equal to a specific percentage of the federal highway taxes its residents paid.\nSince enactment of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141) in 2012, formula factors such as population and highway lane mileage have ceased to have a significant role in determining the distribution of funds. The apportionment among the states under the current surface transportation law, the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94), passed in 2015, is not based on any particular policy objectives other than ensuring the stability of states' shares of total funding based on their shares in the last year of MAP-21, In addition, each state is guaranteed an amount at least equal to 95 cents on the dollar of the taxes paid by its residents into the highway account of the Highway Trust Fund.\nSome policy-related factors used to distribute highway funds in the past are no longer in use, while other possible factors sometimes mentioned in policy discussions, such as states' rates of population growth and projected increases in truck traffic, have never been used as formula factors. This report describes mechanism by which Federal-Aid Highway Program funds are distributed today, and includes tables comparing individual states' shares of the FY2018 apportionment with their shares of some factors relevant to highway needs. Table 5 ranks states' apportionments based on the apportionment amount per resident, per square mile of land area, per federal-aid highway lane mile, and per million vehicle miles traveled on federal-aid highways.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_94"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_95","query":"The Historically Underutilized Business Zone Empowerment Contracting (HUBZone) program provides participating small businesses located in areas with low income, high poverty, or high unemployment with contracting opportunities in the form of set-asides, sole-source awards, and price-evaluation preferences. Its primary objectives are job creation and increased capital investment in distressed communities. Firms must be certified by the SBA to participate in the program. As of April 3, 2019, the SBA's Dynamic Small Business Search database included 6,769 firms with active HUBZone certifications.\nIn FY2017, the federal government awarded 81,082 contracts valued at $7.53 billion to HUBZone-certified businesses. About $1.90 billion of that amount was awarded with a HUBZone preference ($1.49 billion through a HUBZone set-aside, $65.3 million through a HUBZone sole-source award, and $346.9 million through a HUBZone price-evaluation preference). About $1.53 billion of that amount was awarded to HUBZone-certified businesses in open competition with other firms. The remaining $4.10 billion was awarded with another small business preference (e.g., set aside and sole source awards for small business generally and for 8(a), women-owned, and service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses).\nThe HUBZone program's administrative cost is about $8.4 million annually. It received an appropriation of $3.0 million for FY2019, with the additional cost of administering the program provided by the SBA's appropriation for salaries and general administrative expenses.\nCongressional interest in the HUBZone program has increased in recent years, primarily due to GAO reports of fraud in the program and efforts by small businesses to ease HUBZone eligibility requirements.\nThis report examines arguments both for and against targeting assistance to geographic areas with specified characteristics as opposed to providing assistance to people or businesses with specified characteristics. It then assesses the arguments both for and against the continuation of the HUBZone program.\nThe report also discusses the HUBZone program's structure and operation, focusing on the definition of HUBZone areas and HUBZone small businesses and the program's performance relative to federal contracting goals. It includes an analysis of the SBA's administration of the program and the SBA's performance measures.\nThis report also examines HUBZone-related legislation, including\nP.L. 114-92, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, which, among other provisions, expanded the definition of a Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC) military base closure area to make it easier for businesses located in those areas to meet the HUBZone program's requirement that at least 35% of its employees reside in a HUBZone area. It also extended BRAC base closure area HUBZone eligibility from five years to not less than eight years, provided HUBZone eligibility to qualified disaster areas, and added Native Hawaiian Organizations to the list of HUBZone eligible small business concerns. P.L. 115-91, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, which, among other provisions, allows small businesses that have HUBZone status on or before December 31, 2019, to retain that status from January 1, 2020, until the SBA prepares an updated online tool depicting HUBZone qualified areas (anticipated by the SBA to take place in December 2021). Once the new online tool (currently called the HUBZone map) is operational, the SBA must update it every five years for qualified census tracts and nonmetropolitan counties and when a change in status takes place for other HUBZone types (e.g., when an area becomes or ceases to be a redesignated area). The act also allows governors, starting on January 1, 2020, to petition the SBA each year to designate areas located in nonurban areas, with a population of 50,000 or fewer, and an average unemployment rate at least 120% of the national or state average, whichever is lower, as HUBZones; requires the SBA to process HUBZone certification applications with sufficient and complete documentation within 60 days of receipt; ensures that HUBZone-eligible BRAC areas receive HUBZone eligibility for a full eight years, beginning on the date they are designated a BRAC; and requires the SBA, not later than one year after enactment, to publish performance metrics measuring the HUBZone program's success in promoting economic development in economically distressed areas.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_95"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_96","query":"The Navy has been procuring Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) since FY1998. The three Virginia-class boats that the Navy has requested for procurement in FY2020 would be the 31st, 32nd, and 33rd boats in the class. Virginia-class submarines are being procured under a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract covering at least 10 boats to be procured in FY2019-FY2023.\nNavy plans previously called for procuring two Virginia-class boats in FY2020. The third boat requested for FY2020 was added to the budget request as part of the FY2020 budget-planning cycle. The Navy states that since this third boat has not received any prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding, it would execute (i.e., be constructed) on a schedule similar to that of a boat procured in FY2023.\nThe Navy plans to build the second of the two boats procured in FY2019, the second and third boats requested for procurement in FY2020, the second of the two boats planned for procurement in FY2021, and all subsequent Virginia-class boats with the Virginia Payload Module (VPM), an additional, 84-foot-long, mid-body section equipped with four large-diameter, vertical launch tubes for storing and launching additional Tomahawk missiles or other payloads. The Navy's FY2020 budget submission shows that Virginia-class boats with and without the VPM have estimated recurring unit procurement costs of roughly $3.2 billion and $2.8 billion, respectively.\nThe Navy estimates the combined procurement cost of the three Virginia-class boats requested for procurement in FY2020 at $9.274.4 (i.e., about $9.3 billion). The boats have received $1,756.9 million in prior-year \"regular\" advance procurement (AP) funding and $361.6 million in additional Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) AP funding for components of boats being procured under the FY2019-FY2023 MYP contract. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests the remaining $7,155.9 million in procurement funding needed to complete the boats' estimated combined procurement cost, as well as $1,887.6 million in \"regular\" AP funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured in future fiscal years and $882.0 million in additional EOQ AP funding for components of boats to be procured under the FY2019-FY2023 MYP contract, bringing the total amount of procurement and AP funding requested for the program in FY2020 to $9,925.5 million (i.e., about $9.9 billion), excluding outfitting and post-delivery costs.\nThe Navy's SSN force included 51 boats at the end of FY2018. The Navy's force-level goal for SSNs is to achieve and maintain a force of 66 boats. From the mid-2020s through the early 2030s, the number of SSNs is projected to experience a valley or trough, reaching a minimum of 42 boats in FY2027-FY2028. Some observers are concerned that this projected valley\u2014a consequence of having procured a relatively small number of SSNs during the 1990s, in the early years of the post-Cold War era\u2014could lead to a period of heightened operational strain for the SSN force, and perhaps a period of weakened conventional deterrence against potential adversaries such as China. The projected SSN valley was first identified by CRS in 1995 and has been discussed in CRS reports and testimony every year since then. The Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan projects that, after reaching its projected 42-boat minimum, the SSN force will increase to 66 boats by FY2048.\nIssues for Congress regarding the Virginia-class program include whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 procurement and advance procurement (AP) funding requests for the Virginia-class program; the funding profile for the third Virginia-class boat requested for procurement in FY2020; the potential industrial-base challenges of building both Columbia-class boats and Virginia-class attack submarines (SSNs) at the same time; and technical risk in the design for the Block V version of the Virginia-class program.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_96"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_97","query":"Written for congressional staff, this report identifies and provides details on how to obtain information on legislative procedures and process in the House and Senate. It provides references to selected CRS products and offers information on the CRS legislative institutes. A listing of selected supplementary materials is also provided.\nThis report will be updated as new information is available.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_97"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_98","query":"Since the 1950s and the creation of the first federal student aid programs, one aim of federal higher education policy has been to promote access to postsecondary education, particularly for students with financial need. In recent years, the federal government has annually made available more than $100 billion in federal grants, loans, and work-study funds to millions of students to help cover the cost of higher education. As Congress continues to focus on expanding access to postsecondary education through federal student aid policies, understanding various characteristics of the population enrolling in postsecondary education may be useful for policy deliberations.\nThis report focuses on the income of the undergraduate student population. It analyzes (1) how the income distribution of the undergraduate population has changed over time; (2) the relationship between student income and certain student demographics, such as race and dependency status; and (3) how the income distribution of the undergraduate population compares with that of the population of persons who do not have a postsecondary degree. Major findings presented in this report include the following:\nThe number and proportion of low-income students has increased in more recent years, even as total enrollment has decreased. Low-income student enrollment has increased at a faster pace than the nation's population of low-income persons. The majority of students enrolling in postsecondary education have incomes below 200% of the poverty guidelines. Independent undergraduate students who have sometimes been labeled as \"non-traditional\" constitute a large portion of enrolled postsecondary students and tend to have lower income than more \"traditional\" students. Nonwhite students account for nearly 50% of the undergraduate student population, and they tend to have lower income than white students. The majority of low-income students attend community colleges and a disproportionately high share attend private for-profit institutions.\nThe changing composition of the student population could have implications for federal policies designed to promote access to postsecondary education. In particular, policymakers face consideration of whether federal policies could play a role in encouraging students at various income levels to enroll at the highest performing types of schools. Policymakers also face consideration of the extent to which Higher Education Act programs are designed to support the success of non-traditional and minority students.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_98"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_99","query":"\"Cross-border data flows\" refers to the movement or transfer of information between computer servers across national borders. Such data flows enable people to transmit information for online communication, track global supply chains, share research, provide cross-border services, and support technological innovation.\nEnsuring open cross-border data flows has been an objective of Congress in recent trade agreements and in broader U.S. international trade policy. The free flow of personal data, however, has raised security and privacy concerns. U.S. trade policy has traditionally sought to balance the need for cross-border data flows, which often include personal data, with online privacy and security. Some stakeholders, including some Members of Congress, believe that U.S. policy should better protect personal data privacy and security, and have introduced legislation to set a national policy. Other policymakers and analysts are concerned about increasing foreign barriers to U.S. digital trade, including data flows.\nRecent incidents of private information being shared or exposed have heightened public awareness of the risks posed to personal data stored online. Consumers' personal online data is valued by organizations for a variety of reasons, such as analyzing marketing information and easing the efficiency of transactions. Concerns are likely to grow as the amount of online data organizations collect and the level of global data flows expand. As Congress assesses policy options, it may further explore the link between cross-border data flows, online privacy, and trade policy; the trade implications of a comprehensive data privacy policy; and the U.S. role in establishing best practices and binding trade rules that seek to balance public policy priorities.\nThere is no globally accepted standard or definition of data privacy in the online world, and there are no comprehensive binding multilateral rules specifically about cross-border data flows and privacy. Several international organizations, including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), G-20, and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, have sought to develop best practice guidelines or principles related to privacy and cross-border data flows, although none are legally binding. U.S. and other recent trade agreements are establishing new enforceable trade rules and disciplines.\nCountries vary in their data policies and laws; some focus on limiting access to online information by restricting the flow of data beyond a country's borders, aiming to protect domestic interests (e.g., constituents' privacy). However, these policies can also act as protectionist measures. The EU and China, two top U.S. trading partners, have established prescriptive rules on cross-border data flows and personal data from different perspectives. The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is driven by privacy concerns; China is focused on security. Their policies affect U.S. firms seeking to do business in those regions, as well as in other markets that emulate the EU and Chinese approaches. Unlike the EU or China, the United States does not broadly restrict cross-border data flows and has traditionally regulated privacy at a sectoral level to cover data, such as health records.\nU.S. trade policy has sought to balance the goals of consumer privacy, security, and open commerce. The proposed United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) represents the Trump Administration's first attempt to include negotiated trade rules and disciplines on privacy, cross-border data flows, and security in a trade agreement. While the United States and other countries work to define their respective national privacy strategies, many stakeholders seek a more global approach that would allow interoperability between differing national regimes to facilitate and remove discriminatory trade barriers to cross-border data flows; this could offer an opportunity for the United States to lead the global conversation.\nAlthough Congress has examined issues surrounding online privacy and has considered multiple bills, there is not yet consensus on a comprehensive U.S. online data privacy policy. Congress may weigh in as the Administration seeks to define U.S. policy on data privacy and engages in international negotiations on cross-border data flows.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_99"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_100","query":"Geographic proximity has ensured strong linkages between the United States and Latin America and the Caribbean, based on diverse U.S. interests, including economic, political, and security concerns. The United States is a major trading partner and the largest source of foreign investment for many countries in the region, with free-trade agreements enhancing economic linkages with 11 countries. The region is a large source of U.S. immigration, both legal and illegal; proximity and economic and security conditions are major factors driving migration. Curbing the flow of illicit drugs has been a key component of U.S. relations with the region for more than three decades and currently involves close security cooperation with Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. U.S. support for democracy and human rights in the region has been long-standing, with particular current focus on Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.\nUnder the Trump Administration, the outlook for U.S. relations with the region has changed. The Administration proposed deep cuts in FY2018 and FY2019 assistance to the region compared with FY2017. On trade, President Trump ordered U.S. withdrawal from the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, which would have increased U.S. economic linkages with Mexico, Chile, and Peru. President Trump criticized the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada as unfair, warned that the United States might withdraw, and initiated renegotiations; ultimately, the three countries agreed to a United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement in late September 2018. The proposed agreement, which requires congressional approval, largely leaves NAFTA intact but includes some updates and changes, especially to the dairy and auto industries. Administration actions on immigration have caused concern in the region, including efforts to end the deportation relief program known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designations for Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, and Honduras. President Trump unveiled a new policy in 2017 toward Cuba partially rolling back U.S. efforts to normalize relations and imposing new sanctions.\nCongressional Action in the 115th Congress\nCongress traditionally has played an active role in policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of both legislation and oversight. Congress rejected the Trump Administration's proposed FY2018 cuts in foreign assistance to the region when it enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141). Although the 115th Congress did not complete action on FY2019 appropriations funding foreign aid, both House and Senate Appropriations Committees' bills, H.R. 6385 and S. 3108, would have funded key countries and initiatives approaching FY2017 amounts.\nIn other action, Congress enacted the Nicaragua Human Rights and Anticorruption Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-335, H.R. 1918) in December 2018. The measure requires the United States to vote against loans from the international financial institutions to Nicaragua, except to address basic human needs or promote democracy, and authorizes the President to impose sanctions on persons responsible for human rights violations or acts of corruption. In August 2018, Congress enacted the FY2019 defense authorization measure, P.L. 115-232 (H.R. 5515), with several Latin America provisions, including required reports on narcotics trafficking corruption and illicit campaign financing in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras and on security cooperation between Russia and Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. The House also approved H.R. 2658 on Venezuela in December 2017, which, among its provisions, would have authorized humanitarian assistance for Venezuela; similar bills were introduced in the Senate but were not considered.\nBoth houses approved several resolutions indicating policy preferences on a range of issues and countries: S.Res. 35 and H.Res. 259 on Venezuela, S.Res. 83 and H.Res. 336 on Mexico, H.Res. 54 on Argentina, H.Res. 145 on Central America, S.Res. 224 on Cuba, and H.Res. 981 on Nicaragua.\nLooking ahead to the 116th Congress, in addition to completing action on FY2019 foreign aid appropriations, many of the U.S. economic, political, and security concerns discussed in this report likely will sustain congressional interest in Latin America and the Caribbean (see \"Outlook for the 116th Congress,\" below.)\nThis report, which will not be updated, tracks legislative action on Latin America and the Caribbean in the 115th Congress in 2017 and 2018.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_100"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_101","query":"Money-bail systems allow criminal defendants to avoid prison while awaiting trial by posting a bond set by a fee schedule. The impact of money-bail systems on indigent criminal defendants, however, has prompted legislative interest in and legal challenges to such systems, particularly when the bail does not reflect an individual's specific circumstances, such as potential flight risk or public safety. Critics of money-bail systems assert that fee schedules unduly burden indigent defendants, while supporters argue that fee schedules provide uniformity and ensure that defendants appear at trial.\nSeveral states and municipalities have reformed their bail systems. Voters in New Mexico approved a constitutional amendment that allows judges to deny bail to defendants considered exceptionally dangerous, but otherwise permits pretrial release of nondangerous indigent offenders who cannot make bail. Other jurisdictions have altered or eliminated their money-bail systems in recent years, including cities in Alabama, Georgia, and Maryland.\nCourts have heard legal challenges regarding whether state or local money-bail systems comport with the Constitution's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The Supreme Court has established that the Constitution provides certain protections to indigents during sentencing and postconviction, including ensuring that an indigent's failure to pay a fine cannot result in an automatic revocation of probation or imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum term. The Court, however, has not addressed these rights in the bail context. Applying the rational basis standard, some courts have found money-bail systems that reasonably ensure a defendant's subsequent court appearance to be constitutional. Other courts have indicated that bail systems that detain indigent criminal defendants pretrial, without considering their ability to pay, may be unconstitutional.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_101"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_102","query":"On January 5, 2011, the House of Representatives adopted an amendment to House Rule XII to require that Members state the constitutional basis for Congress's power to enact the proposed legislation when introducing a bill or joint resolution. (The amendment does not pertain to concurrent or simple resolutions). This Constitutional Authority Statement (CAS) rule, found at House Rule XII, clause 7(c), was subsequently adopted by every subsequent Congress.\nUnderstanding the CAS rule first requires an understanding of both the powers provided to the Congress under the Constitution and Congress's role in interpreting the founding document. Article I's Vesting Clause creates a Congress of specified or \"enumerated\" powers, and every law Congress enacts must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution. The Constitution creates two central types of limitations on Congress's powers: (1) internal limits and (2) external limits. Internal limits are the restrictions inherent in the constitutional grants of power themselves, such as the limits on the scope of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause. External limits, on the other hand, are the constraints contained in affirmative prohibitions found elsewhere in the text or structure of the document, such as the First Amendment's prohibition on Congress abridging the freedom of speech. While the Court's 1803 decision in Marbury v. Madison firmly cemented the judicial branch's role in interpreting the Constitution by recognizing the power of the Court to strike down legislation as unconstitutional, the early history of the nation is replete with examples of all three government branches playing a substantial role in constitutional interpretation. By the mid-20th century, however, the Supreme Court began articulating a theory of judicial supremacy that became widely accepted, wherein the federal judiciary is the final and exclusive arbiter of the Constitution's meaning. Nonetheless, in recent decades, a number of legal scholars and government officials have criticized this theory, instead promoting the view that the political branches of government possess the independent and coordinate authority to interpret the Constitution. In support of this view, some point to (1) the Constitution itself requiring all Members of Congress to be bound by an oath to support the Constitution; (2) the presumption of constitutionality that courts afford legislation enacted by Congress; and (3) the wide range of questions the Constitution requires Congress to resolve.\nA CAS is fundamentally a congressional interpretation of the Constitution, in that House Rule XII requires each Member introducing a piece of legislation to attach a statement that cites the power(s) that allows Congress to enact the legislation. The submitted CAS appears in the Congressional Record and is published on Congress.gov. The House Rules Committee has indicated that Members have significant discretion in determining whether particular CASs comply with the rule. The CAS rule is enforced only insofar as \"the House clerk ... acts to verify that each bill has a justification\" and \"not [in judging] the adequacy of the justification itself.\" The most common means of complying with the rule is to cite to a specific clause in Article I, Section 8, such as the Taxing and Spending Clause. The CAS rule has itself been subject to much debate, with proponents arguing that the rule promotes constitutional dialogue in the House, while critics contend that the rule provides minimal benefits and is administratively costly.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_102"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_103","query":"Since 1977, statutory thresholds have effectively constrained the President's ability to close or realign major military installations in the United States. Congress has instead periodically granted temporary authorities\u2014known as a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)\u2014that have established independent commissions for the review and approval of basing changes submitted by the Secretary of Defense. These unique and transient authorities last expired on April 16, 2006. There have been five rounds of base closures: 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005.\nThough Congress has periodically adjusted the BRAC process to account for lessons learned, the modern framework has remained generally consistent with earlier rounds, and includes\nestablishment of an independent commission; reliance on objective and uniform criteria; Government Accountability Office (GAO) review and certification of Department of Defense (DOD) data; deliberations designed to be transparent that include open hearings, solicitation of feedback, installation visits, and data available for public review; and requirement that the final list of closure and realignment recommendations be accepted or rejected in their entirety.\nCongress has defined BRAC selection criteria in statute, thus requiring the Secretary to prioritize military value over cost savings. Additionally, Congress has required the Secretary to align the Department's recommendations with a comprehensive 20-year force structure plan. The commission may modify, reject, or add recommendations during its review before forwarding a final list to the President.\nAfter receiving the Commission's list of recommendations, the President may either accept the report in its entirety or seek to modify it by indicating disapproval and returning it to the commission for further evaluation. If the President accepts the commission's recommendations, they are forwarded to Congress. BRAC implementation begins by default unless Congress rejects the recommendations in their entirety within 45 days by enacting a joint resolution. During the implementation phase, DOD is required to initiate closures and realignments within two years and complete all actions within six years.\nThe BRAC process represents a legislative compromise between the executive and legislative branches wherein each shares power in managing the closure and realignment of military bases. The imposition of an independent, third-party mediator was intended to insulate base closings from political considerations by both branches that had complicated similar actions in the past.\nThis report provides background on the development of BRAC, describes its major elements and milestones, and outlines issues frequently cited in the context of new rounds, such as potential savings.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_103"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_104","query":"The Property Clause in the U.S. Constitution (Article IV, \u00a73, clause 2) grants Congress the authority to acquire, dispose of, and manage federal property. The 116th Congress faces multiple policy issues related to federal lands and natural resources. These issues include how much and which land the government should own and how lands and resources should be used and managed. These issues affect local communities, industries, ecosystems, and the nation.\nThere are approximately 640 million surface acres of federally owned land in the United States. Four agencies (referred to in this report as the federal land management agencies, or FLMAs) administer approximately 608 million surface acres (~95%) of federal lands: the Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and National Park Service (NPS), all in the Department of the Interior (DOI). The federal estate also extends to energy and mineral resources located below ground and offshore. BLM manages the onshore subsurface mineral estate and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, also in DOI, manages access to approximately 1.7 billion offshore acres in federal waters on the U.S. outer continental shelf. However, not all of these onshore or offshore acres can be expected to contain extractable mineral and energy resources.\nThis report introduces some of the broad themes and issues Congress has considered when addressing federal land policy and resource management. These include questions about the extent and location of the federal estate. For example, typically Congress considers both measures to authorize and fund the acquisition of additional lands and measures to convey some land out of federal ownership or management. Other issues for Congress include whether certain lands or resources should have additional protections, for example, through designation as wilderness or national monuments, or protection of endangered species and their habitat.\nOther policy questions involve how federal land should be used. Certain federal lands are considered primary- or dominant-use lands as specified in statute by Congress. For example, the dominant-use mission of the National Wildlife Refuge System is the conservation of fish, wildlife, and plant resources and associated habitats for the benefit of current and future Americans, and the dual-use mission of the National Park System is to conserve unique resources and provide for their use and enjoyment by the public. BLM and FS lands, however, have a statutory mission to balance multiple uses: recreation, grazing, timber, habitat and watershed protection, and energy production, among others. Conflicts arise as users and land managers attempt to balance these uses. Congress often addresses bills to clarify, prioritize, and alter land uses, including timber harvesting, livestock grazing, and recreation (motorized and nonmotorized). With respect to energy uses, in addition to questions about balancing energy production against other uses, other questions include how to balance traditional and alternative energy production on federal lands.\nAdditional issues of debate include whether or how to charge for access and use of federal resources and lands, how to use any funds collected, and whether or how to compensate local governments for the presence of untaxed federal lands within their borders. Congress also faces questions about wildfire management on both federal and nonfederal lands, including questions of risk management and funding suppression efforts.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_104"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_105","query":"This report describes actions taken by the Trump Administration and Congress to provide FY2019 funding for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) accounts. It also provides an overview of enacted FY2018 funding for agencies and bureaus funded as part of annual CJS appropriations acts.\nThe Administration requested $66.555 billion for CJS for FY2019. The request included $9.797 billion for the Department of Commerce, $28.835 billion for the Department of Justice (DOJ), $27.372 billion for the science agencies, and $551 million for the related agencies. The Administration's budget proposed eliminating funding for several CJS agencies and accounts. The Administration proposed moving funding for the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas program from the Office of National Drug Control Policy to the Drug Enforcement Administration, closing the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Office and moving its responsibilities to the Office of Justice Programs (OJP), and a new account structure for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).\nThe bill reported by the House Committee on Appropriations (H.R. 5952) would have provided a total of $73.923 billion for CJS for FY2019. The bill would have provided $12.106 billion for the Department of Commerce, $31.113 billion for DOJ, $29.728 billion for the science agencies, and $976 million for the related agencies. The committee largely declined to adopt many of the Administration's proposals to eliminate funding for several CJS agencies and accounts, though the committee-reported bill would have moved funding for the COPS program to OJP and it included the Administration's proposed account structure for NASA.\nThe bill reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations (S. 3072) would have provided a total of $72.648 billion for CJS for FY2019. The bill would have provided $11.572 billion for the Department of Commerce, $30.699 billion for DOJ, $29.400 billion for the science agencies, and $977 million for the related agencies. The Senate Committee on Appropriations largely declined to adopt many of the proposals put forth by the Administration in its FY2019 budget. Unlike the Administration's request and the House committee-reported bill, S. 3072 would have funded the COPS program through its own account and the committee did not include the Administration's new account structure for NASA.\nFY2019 enacted funding for CJS is $72.908 billion. This amount includes $11.414 billion for the Department of Commerce, $30.934 billion for DOJ, $29.583 billion for the science agencies, and $977 million for the related agencies. In general, FY2019 funding for CJS is in-line with FY2018 enacted funding, with a few notable exceptions. These include increased funding for the Census Bureau to help ramp up operations for the 2020 decennial census, increased funding for DOJ's law enforcement agencies and the federal prisons system, and increased funding for several NASA accounts.\nFor FY2018, Congress and the President provided a total of $72.119 billion in funding for CJS. This included $70.921 billion in regular funding provided in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141) and $1.198 billion in emergency-designated funding provided in the Further Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Requirements Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-123).","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_105"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_106","query":"The State of Qatar has employed its ample financial resources to exert regional influence separate from and independent of Saudi Arabia, the de facto leader of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman), an alliance of six Gulf monarchies. Qatar has intervened in several regional conflicts, including in Syria and Libya, and has engaged both Sunni Islamist and Iran-backed Shiite groups in Lebanon, Sudan, the Gaza Strip, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Qatar has maintained consistent dialogue with Iran while also supporting U.S. and GCC efforts to limit Iran's regional influence.\nQatar's independent policies, which include supporting regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations and hosting a global media network often critical of Arab leaders called Al Jazeera, have caused a backlash against Qatar by Saudi Arabia and some other GCC members. A rift within the GCC opened on June 5, 2017, when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other governments, severed relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The Trump Administration has sought, unsuccessfully to date, to mediate a resolution of the dispute. The rift has hindered U.S. efforts to hold another U.S.-GCC summit that would formalize a new \"Middle East Strategic Alliance\" of the United States, the GCC, and other Sunni-led countries in the region to counter Iran and other regional threats. Qatar has countered the Saudi-led pressure with new arms buys and deepening relations with Turkey and Iran.\nAs do the other GCC leaders, Qatar's leaders have looked to the United States to guarantee their external security since the 1980s. Since 1992, the United States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that reportedly addresses a U.S. troop presence in Qatar, consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. Under the DCA, Qatar hosts about 13,000 U.S. forces and the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) at various military facilities, including the large Al Udeid Air Base. U.S. forces in Qatar participate in all U.S. operations in the region. Qatar is a significant buyer of U.S.-made weaponry, including combat aircraft. In January 2018, Qatar and the United States inaugurated a \"Strategic Dialogue\" to strengthen the U.S.-Qatar defense partnership, which Qatar says might include permanent U.S. basing there. The second iteration of the dialogue, in January 2019, resulted in a U.S.-Qatar memorandum of understanding to expand Al Udeid Air Base to improve and expand accommodation for U.S. military personnel. Qatar signed a broad memorandum of understanding with the United States in 2017 to cooperate against international terrorism. That MOU appeared intended to counter assertions that Qatar's ties to regional Islamist movements support terrorism.\nThe voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar's former Amir (ruler), Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, departed from GCC patterns of governance in which leaders generally remain in power for life. However, Qatar is the only one of the smaller GCC states that has not yet held elections for a legislative body. U.S. and international reports criticize Qatar for failing to adhere to international standards of labor rights practices, but credit it for taking steps in 2018 to improve the conditions for expatriate workers.\nAs are the other GCC states, Qatar is wrestling with the fluctuations in global hydrocarbons prices since 2014, now compounded by the Saudi-led embargo. Qatar is positioned to weather these headwinds because of its small population and substantial financial reserves. But, Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products. On December 3, 2018, Qatar announced it would withdraw from the OPEC oil cartel in order to focus on its natural gas export sector.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_106"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_107","query":"Electronic forms of payment have become increasingly available, convenient, and cost efficient due to technological advances in digitization and data processing. Anecdotal reporting and certain analyses suggest that businesses and consumers are increasingly eschewing cash payments in favor of electronic payment methods. Such trends have led analysts and policymakers to examine the possibility that the use and acceptance of cash will significantly decline in coming years and to consider the effects of such an evolution.\nCash is still a common and widely accepted payment system in the United States. Cash's advantages include its simplicity and robustness as a payment system that requires no ancillary technologies. In addition, it provides privacy in transactions and protection from cyber threats or financial institution failures. However, using cash involves costs to businesses and consumers who pay fees to obtain, manage, and protect cash and exposes its users to loss through misplacement, theft, or accidental destruction of physical currency. Cash also concurrently generates government revenues through \"profits\" earned by producing it and by acting as interest-free liabilities to the Federal Reserve (in contrast to reserve balances on which the Federal Reserve pays interest), while reducing government revenues by facilitating some tax avoidance.\nThe relative advantages and costs of various payment methods will largely determine whether and to what degree electronic payment systems will displace cash. Traditional noncash payment systems (such as credit and debit cards and interbank clearing systems) involving intermediaries such as banks and central banks address some of the shortcomings of cash payments. These systems can execute payments over physical distance, allow businesses and consumers to avoid some of the costs and risks of using cash, and are run by generally trusted and closely regulated intermediaries. However, the maintenance and operation of legacy noncash systems involve their own costs, and the intermediaries charge fees to recoup those costs and earn profits. The time it takes to finalize certain transactions\u2014including crediting customer accounts for check or electronic deposits\u2014can lead to consumers incurring additional costs. In addition, these systems involve cybersecurity risks and generally require customers to divulge their private personal information to gain system access, which raises privacy concerns.\nTo date, the migration away from cash has largely been in favor of traditional noncash payment systems; however, some observers predict new alternative systems will play a larger role in the future. Such alternative systems aim to address some of the inefficiencies and risks of traditional noncash systems, but face obstacles to achieving that aim and involve costs of their own. Private systems using distributed ledger technology, such as cryptocurrencies, may not serve the main functions of money well and face challenges to widespread acceptance and technological scalability. These systems also raise concerns among certain observers related to whether these systems could facilitate crime, provide inadequate protections to consumers, and may adversely affect governments' ability to implement or transmit monetary policy. The potential for increased payment efficiency from these systems is promising enough that certain central banks have investigated the possibility of issuing government-backed, electronic-only currencies\u2014called central bank digital currencies (CBDCs)\u2014in such a way that the benefits of certain alternative payment systems could be realized with appropriately mitigated risk. How CBDCs would be created and function are still matters of speculation at this time, and the possibility of their introduction raises questions about the appropriate role of a central bank in the financial system and the economy.\nIf the relative benefits and costs of cash and the various other payment methods evolve in such a way that cash is significantly displaced as a commonly accepted form of payment, that evolution could have a number of effects, both positive and negative, on the economy and society. Proponents of reducing cash usage (or even eliminating it all together and becoming a cashless society) argue that doing so will generate important benefits, including potentially improved efficiency of the payment system, a reduction of crime, and less constrained monetary policy. Proponents of maintaining cash as a payment option argue that significant reductions in cash usage and acceptance would further marginalize people with limited access to the financial system, increase the financial system's vulnerability to cyberattack, and reduce personal privacy. Based on their assessment of the magnitude of these benefits and costs and the likelihood that market forces will displace cash as a payment system, policymakers may choose to encourage or discourage this trend.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_107"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_108","query":"Over the last decade, migration to the United States from Central America\u2014in particular from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (known collectively as the Northern Triangle)\u2014has increased considerably. Families migrating from this region, many seeking asylum, have made up an increasing share of the migrants seeking admission to the United States at the U.S.-Mexico border. In the past year, news reports of migrant \"caravans\" from the Northern Triangle traveling toward the United States have sparked intense interest and questions from Congress.\nMany factors, both in their countries of origin and elsewhere, contribute to people's decisions to emigrate from the Northern Triangle. Weak institutions and corrupt government officials, chronic poverty, rising levels of crime, and demand for illicit drugs result in insecurity and citizens' low levels of confidence in government institutions. These \"push\" factors intersect with \"pull\" factors attracting migrants to the United States, including economic and educational opportunities and a desire to reunify with family members.\nAddressing these factors is complex. Under the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, the United States is working with Central American governments to promote economic prosperity, improve security, and strengthen governance in the region. Since 2014, Mexico has helped the United States manage flows of Central American migrants, including a recent decision to allow certain U.S.-bound asylum seekers to remain in Mexico while awaiting U.S. immigration proceedings. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)\u2014in collaboration with local and federal governments and civil society\u2014is providing immediate and longer-term support for Mexico's refugee agency and migrants in transit.\nCentral Americans who wish to request asylum in the United States may do so at a U.S. port of entry before a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer or upon apprehension by a CBP officer between U.S. ports of entry. Those requesting asylum at the border undergo screening to determine whether they can pursue an asylum claim. To receive asylum, a foreign national must establish, among other requirements, that he or she is unable or unwilling to return to his or her home country because of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution based on one of five protected grounds (race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion). In 2018, President Trump, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) took various actions to tighten the U.S. asylum system. These actions have been met with legal challenges. For example, on November 9, 2018, the President issued a presidential proclamation to suspend immediately the entry into the United States of aliens who cross the Southwest border between ports of entry. This proclamation and a related DHS-DOJ rule are being challenged in federal court.\nChapter 15, Title 10 of the U.S. Code provides general legislative authority for the Armed Forces to provide certain types of support to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. In October 2018, active-duty personnel were deployed to the Southwest border to provide assistance in air and ground transportation, logistics support, engineering capabilities and equipment, medical support, housing, and planning support. The Posse Comitatus Act constrains the manner in which military personnel may be used in a law enforcement capacity at the border. President Trump has contemplated proclaiming a national emergency pursuant to the National Emergencies Act (NEA) in order to fund a physical barrier at the southern border with Mexico using DOD funds.\nCongress provided the President with significant discretion to reduce foreign assistance to Central America in FY2018, dependent on the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras addressing a variety of congressional concerns, including improving border security, combating corruption, and protecting human rights. The President's ability to modify assistance to the Northern Triangle for the remainder of FY2019 will depend on provisions Congress may include in future appropriations legislation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_108"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_109","query":"According to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the federal workforce consists of an estimated two million civilian employees. Federal law categorizes these employees into three types of service\u2014the competitive service, the excepted service, and the Senior Executive Service (SES)\u2014that may be distinguished by different selection, compensation, and other standards. Title 5 of the U.S. Code (Title 5) contains most of the standards governing federal employment, and OPM is generally responsible for implementing these requirements.\nThe competitive service largely consists of all civil service positions in the executive branch, other than (1) positions excepted from the competitive service by statute; (2) positions appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate; and (3) the SES. Traditionally, OPM has administered examinations for entrance into the competitive service. These examinations are meant to be \"practical in character\" and relate to \"matters that fairly test the relative capacity and fitness of the applicants for the appointment sought.\" Title 5 also authorizes OPM to prescribe rules allowing agencies to hire candidates directly under specified circumstances.\nThe excepted service includes designated civil service positions that are not in the competitive service or the SES and are not subject to competitive examination. OPM maintains authority to exempt a position from the competitive service when it determines that an appointment through competitive examination is not practicable, or the recruitment of students or recent graduates would be better achieved through alternate recruitment and assessment processes.\nThe pay structure for the competitive service and the excepted service is similar. Both services are typically paid in accordance with the General Schedule, a schedule of annual basic pay rates that consists of 15 grades, designated \"GS-1\" through \"GS-15.\" This fixed pay scale is generally designed to reflect, among other things, equal pay for substantially equal work within a local pay area. Additionally, the competitive service and the excepted service generally have similar notice and appeal rights for adverse personnel actions. For example, before a removal, a suspension for more than 14 days, a reduction in grade or pay, or a furlough of 30 days or less, the agency must provide at least 30 days' advance written notice to the affected employee. The employee must also be given a reasonable time to respond to the notice and provide affidavits and other evidence to support the answer. Some adverse actions may also be appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB or Board), an independent, quasi-judicial agency that reviews and adjudicates specified personnel actions taken against qualifying federal employees.\nThe SES is a corps of some 7,000 high-level government administrators who manage major programs and projects within most federal agencies. In these leadership roles, SES members may serve as a link between top-level political appointees of an agency and career civil servants within the agency. The SES is governed by a regulatory structure separate from the competitive and excepted services. While SES members are primarily career appointees chosen through a merit-based competitive hiring process, others are noncareer, limited term or limited emergency appointees (commonly political appointees) selected by agency leadership. To shield certain SES roles from political influence, some SES positions (career reserved positions) must be filled with career appointees, and Title 5 limits the number of noncareer and limited term appointees that may serve in SES positions.\nThe SES pay structure is distinct from the rest of the civil service. Title 5 specifies that SES members are paid within a particular range based on an executive's individual performance or contribution to agency performance (or both), as measured under a performance appraisal system. In addition, Title 5 articulates special conditions and procedures for removing, suspending, or taking other adverse actions against a member of the SES. For example, career SES appointees who have successfully completed a one-year probationary period may be removed or subject to adverse action only for specified reasons, including misconduct and substandard performance. Career appointees must receive advance written notice of these actions, and an opportunity to appeal the action. In comparison, noncareer, limited term, and limited emergency appointees are generally not subject to the same protections and may be removed from the SES at any time.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_109"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_110","query":"Political and economic developments in Cuba, a one-party authoritarian state with a poor human rights record, frequently have been the subject of intense congressional concern since the Cuban revolution in 1959. Current Cuban President Miguel D\u00edaz-Canel succeeded Ra\u00fal Castro in April 2018, but Castro continues to head Cuba's Communist Party. Over the past decade, Cuba has implemented gradual market-oriented economic policy changes, although it has not taken enough action to foster sustainable economic growth. Most observers do not anticipate major policy changes under D\u00edaz-Canel, at least in the short term; the president faces the enormous challenges of reforming the economy and responding to citizens' desires for greater freedom.\nU.S. Policy\nSince the early 1960s, the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at isolating the Cuban government. Congress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of legislation strengthening, and at times easing, U.S. economic sanctions. In 2014, however, the Obama Administration initiated a policy shift moving away from sanctions toward a policy of engagement. This included the restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015), the rescission of Cuba's designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015), and an increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba implemented through regulatory changes.\nPresident Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in 2017 that increased sanctions and partially rolled back some of the Obama Administration's efforts to normalize relations. In 2017, the State Department reduced the staff of the U.S. Embassy by about two-thirds in response to unexplained injuries of members of the U.S. diplomatic community in Havana; 26 individuals have been affected. The reduction has affected embassy operations, especially visa processing, and has made bilateral engagement more difficult. The most significant Trump Administration policy changes include restrictions on transactions with over 200 entities controlled by the Cuban military, intelligence, and security services (on a \"restricted list\" maintained by the State Department) and the elimination of people-to-people educational travel for individuals (such travel with a group specializing in educational tours is still permitted). In March 2019, the Administration ratcheted up economic pressure on Cuba by allowing certain lawsuits to go forward against those entities on the \"restricted list\" for trafficking in confiscated property in Cuba. In light of increased U.S. sanctions against the regime of Nicol\u00e1s Maduro in Venezuela, the Administration has increased its criticism of Cuba's military and intelligence support for the regime in Caracas.\nLegislative Activity in the 116th Congress\nIn the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6, H.J.Res. 31) enacted in February 2019, Congress provided $20 million in Cuba democracy assistance ($10 million more than requested) and $29.1 million for Cuba broadcasting ($15.4 million more than requested).\nSeveral legislative initiatives on Cuba have been introduced in the 116th Congress: H.R. 213 would waive certain prohibitions to allows nationals of Cuba to come to the United States to play organized professional baseball; S. 428 would repeal or amend many provisions of law restricting trade and other relations with Cuba; and H.R. 1898 would authorize private financing for U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba. S.Res. 14 and H.Res. 136 would express the sense of the Senate and House, respectively, that Cuba's foreign medical missions constitute human trafficking; and H.Res. 92 would call for the extradition or rendering to the United States all fugitives from U.S. justice receiving safe harbor in Cuba. For more on legislative initiatives in the 116th Congress, see Appendix A.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_110"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_111","query":"This report focuses on previous activity in Congress regarding high profile incidents of sexual assault in the military during the summer 2013 through 2016. Included are separate sections on the official responses related to these incidents by the Department of Defense (DOD), the Obama Administration, and Congress including legislation during the 113th (2013-2014) Congress and 114th Congress (2015-2016). The last section is a resource guide for sources in this report and related materials on sexual assault and prevention during this period. This report will not be updated and supersedes CRS Report R43168, Military Sexual Assault: Chronology of Activity in Congress and Related Resources.\nFor current information regarding Congress and issues on sexual assault in the military, see CRS Report R44944, Military Sexual Assault: A Framework for Congressional Oversight, by Kristy N. Kamarck and Barbara Salazar Torreon. For legislative initiatives in the 115th Congress, see CRS Report R44923, FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues, by Kristy N. Kamarck, Lawrence Kapp, and Barbara Salazar Torreon and CRS Report R45343, FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues, by Bryce H. P. Mendez et al.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_111"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_112","query":"At least 17 different reports by United Nations (U.N.) entities and independent human rights organizations have been released containing allegations that certain Burmese security force officers and units committed serious human rights violations dating back to 2011. These reports name nearly 40 individuals and over 100 security units as responsible for such gross human rights violations as murder, torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence, and forced labor. Some of these individuals, including Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, were identified in four or more of the reports. Similarly, some of the security units, in particular Infantry Division 33 and Infantry Division 99, were cited by six or more of the reports. The reports suggest that the commission of human rights abuses by Burma's security forces is pervasive, systematic, and endemic. CRS did not independently verify the credibility of these reports.\nThe Trump Administration has labeled the alleged human rights violations as \"ethnic cleansing\" and has imposed \"limited targeted sanctions\" on five Burmese military officers and two military units it considers responsible for serious human rights violations against the Rohingya in Burma's Rakhine State. In August 2018, the State Department released a report summarizing the results of a survey of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh that concluded that \"the vast majority of Rohingya refugees experienced or directly witnessed extreme violence and the destruction of their homes.\" The report also stated \"that the recent violence in northern Rakhine State was extreme, large-scale, widespread, and seemingly geared toward both terrorizing the population and driving out the Rohingya residents.\" The report, however, did not indicate if the violence constituted genocide, crimes against humanity, and\/or war crimes.\nSome Members of Congress and other observers view this response as too limited, and have called on the Trump Administration to take stronger action given the severity of the human rights abuses. The 116th Congress appropriated $3.75 million in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6) for the documentation of human rights violations against Rohingya and others in Burma. Congress has also placed restrictions and requirements on relations with Burma in previous appropriations legislation to address human rights issues.\nMany of the reports advocate for some form of accountability for the reported human rights violations, including by calling for the U.N. Security Council to refer the alleged human rights violations in Burma to the International Criminal Court (ICC) or an ad hoc international criminal tribunal for investigation and possible prosecution. China and possibly Russia are likely to oppose an ICC referral, and recent statements by President Trump and National Security Advisor John Bolton suggest the United States may also oppose such a referral. The ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber had previously ruled that the ICC's Prosecutor can begin a preliminary investigation of the war crime of forced deportation of the country's Rohingya ethnic minority into neighboring Bangladesh.\nIn the interim, the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (UNFFM) has recommended that an independent international mechanism (IIM) be established to collect and preserve evidence of alleged acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed in Burma since 2011. The U.N. Human Rights Council has approved the formation of an IIM, and has urged U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to appoint \"the staff of the mechanism as expeditiously as possible.\"\nIn addition to these measures to support some form of future criminal action against the alleged perpetrators, the UNFFM and others have expressed support for U.N. sanctions against the Burmese military and others considered responsible for the abuses. Some of the reports also call on individual nations to impose sanctions on Burma's military and its government.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_112"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_113","query":"The Congressional Review Act (CRA) allows Congress to review certain types of federal agency actions that fall under the statutory category of \"rules.\" The CRA requires that agencies report their rules to Congress and provides special procedures under which Congress can consider legislation to overturn those rules. A joint resolution of disapproval will become effective once both houses of Congress pass a joint resolution and it is signed by the President, or if Congress overrides the President's veto.\nThe CRA generally adopts a broad definition of the word \"rule\" from the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), defining a rule as \"the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency.\"\nThe CRA, however, provides three exceptions to this broad definition:\nany rule of particular applicability, including a rule that approves or prescribes for the future rates, wages, prices, services, or allowances therefor, corporate or financial structures, reorganizations, mergers, or acquisitions thereof, or accounting practices or disclosures bearing on any of the foregoing; any rule relating to agency management or personnel; or any rule of agency organization, procedure, or practice that does not substantially affect the rights or obligations of non-agency parties.\nThe class of rules the CRA covers is broader than the category of rules that are subject to the APA's notice-and-comment requirements. As such, some agency actions, such as guidance documents, that are not subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures may still be considered rules under the CRA and thus could be overturned using the CRA's procedures. The effect of Congress disapproving a rule that is not subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking may be subject to debate, given that such rules are generally viewed to lack any legal effect in the first place. Nonetheless, the CRA does encompass some such rules, as highlighted by the recent enactment of a CRA resolution overturning a bulletin from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that was not subject to the notice-and-comment procedures.\nEven if an agency action falls under the CRA's definition of \"rule,\" however, the expedited procedures for considering legislation to overturn the rule only become available when the agency submits the rule to Congress. In many cases in which agencies take actions that fall under the scope of a \"rule\" but have not gone through notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, agencies fail to submit those rules. Thus, questions have arisen as to how Members can avail themselves of the CRA's special fast-track procedures if the agency has not submitted the action to Congress.\nTo protect its prerogative to review agency rules under the CRA, Congress and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have developed an ad hoc process in which Members can request that GAO provide a formal legal opinion on whether a particular agency action qualifies as a rule under the CRA. If GAO concludes that the action in question falls within the CRA's definition of \"rule,\" Congress has treated the publication of the GAO opinion in the Congressional Record as constructive submission of the rule. In other words, an affirmative opinion from GAO can allow Congress to use the CRA procedures to consider legislation overturning an agency action despite the agency not submitting that action to Congress.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_113"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_114","query":"As the trials of Sheldon Silver and Dean Skelos illustrate, corruption among high-profile public officials continues to be a concern in the United States. Likewise, recent examples abound of powerful executives in the private sector abusing positions of trust for personal gain. Faced with this reality, Congress has shown consistent interest in policing public- and private-sector corruption, enacting a number of criminal provisions aimed at holding corrupt officials accountable for their actions under federal law. However, one of federal prosecutors' most potent existing tools for combating such corruption\u201418 U.S.C. \u00a7 1346, which defines the crimes of mail and wire fraud as including so-called \"honest services\" fraud\u2014has been a source of contention between the courts and Congress for years.\n18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1346 defines the term \"scheme or artifice to defraud,\" as used in the general statutes prohibiting use of the mails or wires to commit fraud, to include a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services. Congress enacted this provision in the late 1980s in response to the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in McNally v. United States that the mail fraud statute was limited in scope to only the protection of tangible property rights. The McNally decision was grounded in concerns that a broader construction of the statute could leave its outer boundaries ambiguous and unjustifiably involve the federal government in setting standards for good government at the local level. Nevertheless, Section 1346 abrogates McNally's holding, codifying the understanding of some of the lower federal courts that the mail and wire fraud statutes extend to conduct that deprives a person or group of the right to have another act in accordance with some externally imposed duty or obligation, regardless of whether the victim so deprived has suffered or would suffer a pecuniary harm.\nRecognizing that this lower court understanding in fact evinced considerable disarray as to the kinds of schemes that would qualify as honest services fraud, however, the Supreme Court subsequently read a limiting principle into Section 1346 in Skilling v. United States in order to avoid invalidating the statute as unconstitutionally vague. After Skilling, mail and wire fraud prosecutions under an honest services theory may extend only to those who, in violation of a fiduciary duty, participate in bribery or kickback schemes. Notably, the Skilling decision withdrew from the reach of Section 1346 a significant category of cases that had been prosecuted as honest services fraud up to that point: cases involving more general financial self-dealing or conflicts of interest, where no bribes or kickbacks are given. Congress has considered legislation on more than one occasion that would reinstate the self-dealing category of honest services fraud rejected in Skilling, though the law remains unchanged as of this writing.\nThe conversation between the Court and Congress regarding the scope of honest services fraud and its culmination in Skilling have presented more questions that lower courts have been tasked with answering, including the source of the requisite fiduciary duty and the conduct that qualifies as bribery or kickbacks. Courts have looked to a variety of sources to give content to the fiduciary duty requirement, including federal, state, and common law. Likewise, in fleshing out the contours of the bribery or kickbacks called for in Skilling, lower courts have relied on anti-bribery and anti-kickback provisions found in federal statutes. In the recent case of McDonnell v. United States, the Supreme Court limited the reach of one of those statutes\u201418 U.S.C. \u00a7 201, which makes it a crime to offer or solicit anything of value to influence an \"official act\"\u2014by construing the term \"official act\" narrowly. Nevertheless, alternate routes appear to be available to prosecute bribery schemes involving conduct that may be beyond the scope of McDonnell.\nShould Congress seek to alter the scope of honest services fraud, it will likely need to be attuned to the concerns that federal courts interpreting 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1346 have voiced over the years. Chief among these have been the concerns that\u2014as written\u2014the statute has the potential to sweep too broadly and regulate ethically dubious conduct of state and local officials in a way that conflicts with the Constitution.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_114"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_115","query":"Whistleblowing is \"the act of reporting waste, fraud, abuse and corruption in a lawful manner to those who can correct the wrongdoing.\" Intelligence community (IC) whistleblowers are those employees or contractors working in any of the 17 elements of the IC who reasonably believe there has been a violation of law, rule, or regulation; gross mismanagement; waste of resources; abuse of authority; or a substantial danger to public health and safety. The IC has publicly recognized the importance of whistleblowing, and supports protections for whistleblowers who conform to guidelines to protect classified information. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) whistleblowing policy and guidance is publicly available and specifically addresses the process for making protected disclosures and whistleblower protections for IC contractors, members of the Armed Forces, and federal employees. There are differing opinions, however, on whether the IC's internal processes have the transparency necessary to ensure adequate protections against reprisal, and whether protections for IC contractors are sufficient.\nIC whistleblower protections have evolved in response to perceptions of gaps that many believed left whistleblowers vulnerable to reprisal. The first whistleblower legislation specific to the IC was limited to specifying a process for IC whistleblowers to make a complaint but offered no specific protections. Subsequent legislation included only general provisions for protecting IC whistleblowers with no additional guidance on standards for implementation. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-19, signed in 2012, provided the first specific protections against reprisal actions for making a complaint. The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 codified these provisions, which were further supported with IC implementation policy. Separate legislation under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, along with DOD implementing guidance, provides protections for members of the Armed Forces, including those assigned to elements of the IC. In early 2018, Congress passed legislation to address perceived gaps in protections for IC contractors.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_115"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_116","query":"A wide array of federal incentives supports the development and deployment of alternatives to conventional fuels and engines in transportation. These incentives include tax deductions and credits for vehicle purchases and the installation of refueling systems, federal grants for conversion of older vehicles to newer technologies, mandates for the use of biofuels, and incentives for manufacturers to produce alternative fuel vehicles. The current array of incentives for alternative fuels and related technologies does not reflect a single, comprehensive strategy, but rather an aggregative approach to a range of discrete public policy issues, including goals of reducing petroleum consumption and import dependence, improving environmental quality, expanding domestic manufacturing, and promoting agriculture and rural development.\nCurrent federal programs are administered by five key agencies: Department of the Treasury (Treasury), Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Transportation (DOT), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The incentives and programs described in this report are organized by the responsible agency.\nTreasury (through the Internal Revenue Service, IRS) administers tax credits and deductions for alternative fuel and advanced technology vehicle purchases, expansion of alternative fuel refueling infrastructure, and incentives for the production and\/or distribution of alternative fuels. Many of these incentives have expired in recent years. DOE (mainly through the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, EERE) administers research and development (R&D) programs for advanced fuels and transportation technology, grant programs to deploy alternative fuels and vehicles, and a loan program to promote domestic manufacturing of high-efficiency vehicles. DOT (mainly through the Federal Highway Administration, FHWA, and Federal Transit Administration, FTA) administers grant programs to deploy \"clean fuel\" buses and other alternative fuel vehicles. DOT (through the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, NHTSA) also administers federal Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, which include incentives for production of alternative fuel vehicles. EPA (mainly through the Office of Transportation and Air Quality, OTAQ) administers the Renewable Fuel Standard, which mandates the use of biofuels in transportation. EPA also administers grant programs to replace older diesel engines with newer technology. USDA (mainly through the Rural Business-Cooperative Service, RBS) administers grant, loan, and loan guarantee programs to expand agricultural production of biofuel feedstocks, conduct R&D on biofuels and bioenergy, and establish and expand facilities to produce biofuels, bioenergy, and bioproducts.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_116"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_117","query":"President Trump's budget request for FY2020 includes approximately $134.1 billion for research and development (R&D). Several FY2019 appropriations bills had not been enacted at the time the President's FY2020 budget was prepared; therefore, the President's budget included the FY2018 actual funding levels, 2019 annualized continuing resolution (CR) levels, and the FY2020 request levels. On February 15, 2019, Congress enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6). This act included each of the remaining appropriations acts, completing the FY2019 appropriations process. The act also rendered the CR levels identified in the budget no longer relevant, though for some agencies the exact amount of R&D funding in the act remained uncertain. The analysis of government-wide R&D funding in this report compares the President's request for FY2020 to the FY2018 level. For agencies for which the FY2019 R&D funding levels are known, individual agency analyses in this report compare the FY2020 request to FY2019 enacted levels. For agencies for which the FY2019 R&D funding levels remain unknown, individual agency analyses in this report compare the FY2020 request to FY2018 actual levels; when the FY2019 levels become available, these sections will be updated to compare the FY2020 request to FY2019 enacted amounts. As of the date of this report, the House had not completed action on any of the 12 regular appropriations bills for FY2020; nor had the Senate.\nIn FY2018, OMB adopted a change to the definition of development, applying a more narrow treatment it describes as \"experimental development.\" This change was intended to harmonize the reporting of U.S. R&D funding data with the approach used by other nations. The new definition is used in this report. Under the new definition of R&D (applied to both FY2018 and FY2020 figures), President Trump is requesting approximately $134.1 billion for R&D for FY2020, a decrease of $1.7 billion (1.2%) from the FY2018 level. Adjusted for inflation, the President's FY2020 R&D request represents a decrease of 5.1% below the FY2018 level.\nFunding for R&D is concentrated in a few departments and agencies. In FY2018, eight federal agencies received 96.3% of total federal R&D funding, with the Department of Defense (DOD, 38.6%) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS, 27.2%) combined accounting for nearly two-thirds of all federal R&D funding. The same eight agencies account for 97.2% of the FY2020 request, with DOD accounting for 44.3% and HHS for 25.1%\nUnder the President's FY2020 budget request, most federal agencies would see their R&D funding decline. The primary exception is the Department of Defense. DOD's requested R&D funding for FY2020 is $7.1 billion (13.5%) above the FY2018 level. The Departments of Transportation and Veterans Affairs would see small increases in R&D funding. Among the agencies with the largest proposed reductions in R&D funding in the FY2020 budget compared to the FY2018 actual levels are the Department of Energy ($2.8 billion, 15.8%), the National Science Foundation ($567 million, 9.0%), and National Aeronautics and Space Administration ($475 million, 4.0%).\nThe President's FY2020 budget request would reduce funding for basic research by $1.5 billion (4.0%), applied research by $4.3 billion (10.5%), and facilities and equipment by $0.5 billion (12.8%), while increasing funding for development by $4.5 billion (8.3%).\nPresident Trump's FY2020 budget is largely silent on funding levels for multiagency R&D initiatives. However, some activities supporting these initiatives are discussed in agency budget justifications and are reported in the agency analyses in this report.\nThe request represents the President's R&D priorities. Congress may opt to agree with none, part, or all of the request, and it may express different priorities through the appropriations process. In recent years, Congress has completed the annual appropriations process after the start of the fiscal year. Completing the process after the start of the fiscal year and the accompanying use of continuing resolutions can affect agencies' execution of their R&D budgets, including the delay or cancellation of planned R&D activities and the acquisition of R&D-related equipment.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_117"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_118","query":"The Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President (EOP), the judiciary, the District of Columbia, and more than two dozen independent agencies. The House and Senate FSGG bills fund the same agencies, with one exception. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is usually funded through the Agriculture appropriations bill in the House and the FSGG bill in the Senate.\nPresident Trump submitted his FY2019 budget request on February 12, 2018. The request included a total of $49.1 billion for agencies funded through the FSGG appropriations bill, including $282 million for the CFTC. The $49.1 billion figure includes $3 billion for a legislative provision on government-wide transfers (Section 737).\nThe 115th Congress House and Senate Committees on Appropriations reported FSGG appropriations bills (H.R. 6258, H.Rept. 115-792 and S. 3107, S.Rept. 115-281) and both houses passed different versions of a broader bill (H.R. 6147) that would have provided FY2019 appropriations. The House-passed H.R. 6147 would have provided a combined total of $45.9 billion for the FSGG agencies, while the Senate-passed H.R. 6147 would have provided $45.7 billion. In both cases, the largest differences compared to the President's request were in the funding for the General Services Administration (GSA), the funding for the Executive Office of the President, and the absence of the Section 737 provision on government-wide transfers in both bills. No full-year FY2019 FSGG bill was enacted prior to the end of FY2018. The FSGG agencies were provided continuing appropriations until December 7, 2018, in P.L. 115-245 and until December 21, 2018, in P.L. 115-298. No final bill was enacted, and funding for FSGG agencies, along with much of the rest of the government, lapsed on December 22, 2018. No further appropriations occurred prior to the 116th Congress.\nIn the 116th Congress, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 21, which contained six full FY2019 appropriations bills, including FSGG provisions nearly identical to those passed by the Senate in the 115th Congress on January 3, 2019. On January 23, 2019, the House passed H.R. 648, also containing six appropriations bills, which was reportedly based on a potential conference report from the 115th Congress and would have provided $46.0 billion for FSGG appropriations. (Neither of these bills provided full-year funding for the Department of Homeland Security.) The Senate did not act on either of these bills.\nOn February 14, 2019, both the House and the Senate passed a conference report (H.Rept. 116-9) for H.J.Res. 31, containing seven appropriations bills providing full FY2019 funding for the government's operations that had not been previously funded, including FSGG provisions nearly identical to H.R. 648. The President signed the resolution on February 15, 2019, enacting it into law as P.L. 116-6. The law provides $45.7 billion in the FSGG appropriations portion (Division D), which includes the funding for the CFTC. This is $3.4 billion less than the President's request, with the bulk of this due to the absence of the Section 737 transfer authority in P.L. 116-6. Other notable differences include the funding for GSA and the Executive Office of the President.\nAlthough financial services are a major focus of the FSGG appropriations bills, these bills do not include funding for many financial regulatory agencies, which are funded outside of the appropriations process. The FSGG bills have, however, often contained additional legislative provisions relating to such agencies, as is the case with H.R. 6258\/H.R. 6147 in the 115th Congress, whose Title IX contained language from a number of different bills relating to financial regulation. P.L. 116-6 did not contain this language.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_118"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_119","query":"The 116th Congress may conduct oversight and deliberate on authorization and funding of water resource development, management, and protection. Congress engages in authorization and appropriations for water resource projects and activities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation). USACE constructs projects nationwide, primarily to improve navigation, reduce flood damage, and restore aquatic ecosystems. Reclamation constructs projects in the 17 arid states west of the Mississippi River; these projects primarily provide water supply benefits, often to agricultural irrigation users. The 116th Congress, like earlier Congresses, also may consider Indian water rights settlements and may evaluate the focus of and funding for the water resource science activities of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS).\nDevelopment pressures, droughts and floods, and concerns about changing hydrology from land-use change and climate change have engendered nonfederal interest in federal financial and technical assistance for water resource science and projects. Stakeholders are interested in a range of water resource issues, including\nnew water resource infrastructure (e.g., storm surge gates, water storage) and new kinds of projects (e.g., groundwater recharge, nature-based flood risk reduction); reinvestment in aging water resource infrastructure and use of water science and real-time monitoring and forecasting to improve infrastructure operations; funding and financing of projects, and whether and how to shift from federally led projects to federal partnerships with state and\/or local entities; and activities to protect and restore aquatic ecosystems and enhance flood resilience (including the use of nature-based approaches).\nSome topics arise within the context of specific agencies. USACE-related topics for the 116th Congress may include funding and financing issues, such as use of the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund; the status of investments in projects to deepen coastal harbors; USACE budgeting priorities; and oversight of USACE efforts to implement public-private partnerships and develop alternative financing opportunities. Some Reclamation-related water project and management issues during the 116th Congress may include the status of proposed new and augmented water storage projects, as well as efforts to address the agency's aging infrastructure and transition certain qualifying projects to nonfederal ownership. Congress also may address Reclamation drought mitigation activities in the Colorado River basin and other areas. In addition, Congress may explore ongoing issues associated with Reclamation's project operations in California and other areas. It may address how these issues affect water deliveries to irrigation districts and municipalities and threatened and endangered species, among others.\nSome topics are international in character. Regarding freshwater bodies shared with Canada, potential topics for the 116th Congress include federal funding for activities supporting Great Lakes restoration and negotiations (and any resulting agreements) with Canada to modify the Columbia River Treaty. Potential topics related to Mexico include oversight of a binational agreement on water sharing during dry conditions in the Colorado River basin and Mexico's deliveries to the United States in the Rio Grande basin.\nCrosscutting topics (i.e., topics relevant to multiple agencies and programs) also are part of congressional water resource deliberations. For example, the 116th Congress may consider the status and priority of new and ongoing federal efforts to restore large-scale aquatic ecosystems that have been altered or impaired by changes to their natural conditions (e.g., Florida Everglades, Chesapeake Bay). Congress may explore the funding and performance of existing restoration efforts, including what changes (if any) may be necessary to improve project delivery and evaluation. The 116th Congress may consider its guidance to multiple federal agencies on how to respond to flood hazards, including efforts related to enhancing the resilience of infrastructure and communities to flooding. There is interest in developing and evaluating approaches that protect natural elements that reduce flood risk (e.g., natural dunes) or are \"nature-based\" in comprehensive flood risk management (e.g., constructed dunes). Congress also may consider legislation and oversight on USACE supplemental appropriations for response to and recovery from floods.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_119"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_120","query":"On April 4, 2019, foreign ministers from the 29 member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are to gather in Washington, DC, to mark the 70th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty (also known as the Washington Treaty). NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg is to address a joint session of Congress on April 3, 2019, the first ever to do so. Congress was instrumental in creating NATO in 1949 and has played a critical role in shaping U.S. policy toward the alliance ever since.\nA key goal of the 70th anniversary meeting will be to highlight NATO's past successes and present a unified vision for its future. The United States was the driving proponent of NATO's creation and has been the unquestioned leader of the alliance as it has evolved from a collective defense organization of 12 members focused on deterring the Soviet Union to a globally engaged security organization of 29 members. Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed U.S. leadership of NATO as a cornerstone of U.S. national security strategy. Proponents of NATO cite numerous benefits to the United States, including\npeace, stability, conflict prevention, and deterrence in Europe; treaty-based defense and security support from 28 allies, including many of the world's most advanced militaries; an unrivaled platform for constructing and operating international military coalitions; U.S. military bases in strategically important locations; and economic stability in the world's largest trade and investment marketplace.\nOn the other hand, NATO's critics argue that European reliance on U.S. security guarantees have fostered an imbalanced and unsustainable \"burdensharing\" arrangement by which the United States carries an unfair share of the responsibility for ensuring European security. Critics cite the following costs to the United States of its leadership of NATO:\nloss of autonomy; heightened risks to U.S. forces; continued European military dependence on the United States; provoking Russia; and a negative budgetary impact.\nThe anniversary meeting comes at a tense time for NATO, as the allies have struggled to present a unified response to vocal criticism from U.S. President Donald Trump. President Trump has admonished European allies for failing to meet agreed NATO defense spending targets and has repeatedly questioned NATO's value to the United States. Although he is not the first U.S. president to press the allies to increase defense spending, none has done so as stridently and none has called into question the U.S. commitment to NATO as openly or to the same extent as Trump. The President's criticisms have provoked mixed reactions in the United States, with NATO supporters, including many Members of Congress, reaffirming the U.S. commitment to NATO, and others reevaluating the costs and benefits of long-standing U.S. leadership of the alliance.\nTrump Administration officials stress that they remain committed to NATO and to upholding European security. They underscore that Congress has supported the Administration's requests to increase funding for U.S. defense activities in Europe such as the European Deterrence Initiative. President Trump's supporters also argue that his forceful statements have succeeded in securing defense spending increases by European allies that were not forthcoming under his predecessors.\nWhile many Members of Congress have criticized specific developments within NATO\u2014regarding burdensharing, for example\u2014Congress as a whole has demonstrated consistent bipartisan support for NATO. During the Trump Administration, congressional support has at times been viewed as an effort to reassure allies troubled by President Trump's criticisms of the alliance. During the Trump Administration, both chambers of Congress have passed legislation expressly reaffirming U.S. support (H.Res. 397; H.R. 5515\/P.L. 115-232; H.Res. 256), including legislation passed by the House in January 2019 (H.R. 676) seeking to limit the president's ability to withdraw from NATO unilaterally (similar legislation, S.J.Res. 4, has been introduced in the Senate). Some analysts portrayed the bipartisan House-Senate invitation to Secretary General Stoltenberg to address a joint session as an additional demonstration of NATO's importance to the Congress.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_120"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_121","query":"Congressional interest in Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) funding has continued as Members debate ways of funding priorities without breaching discretionary spending limits set in law.\nSince the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress has appropriated approximately $2 trillion in discretionary budget authority designated as emergency requirements or for Overseas Contingency Operations\/Global War on Terrorism (OCO\/GWOT) in support of the broad U.S. government response to the 9\/11 attacks and for other related international affairs activities. This figure amounts to approximately 9.4% of total discretionary spending during this period.\nCongress has used supplemental appropriation acts or designated funding for emergency requirements or OCO\/GWOT\u2014or both\u2014in statute. These funds are not subject to limits on discretionary spending in congressional budget resolutions or to the statutory discretionary spending limits established by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-125). The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA; P.L. 99-177) allows emergency funding to be excluded from budget control limits. The BCA added the OCO\/GWOT designation to the BBEDCA exemption, thereby providing Congress and the President with an alternate way to exclude funding from the BCA spending limits.\nWhile there is no overall statutory limit on the amount of emergency or OCO\/GWOT spending, both Congress and the President have fundamental roles in determining how much of the spending to provide each fiscal year. Congress must designate any such funding in statute on an account-by-account basis. The President is also required to designate it as such after it is appropriated to be available for expenditure. Debate over what should constitute OCO\/GWOT or emergency activities and expenses has shifted over time, reflecting differing viewpoints about the extent, nature, and duration of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. Funding designated for OCO\/GWOT has also been used to fund base-budget requirements of the DOD and State Department and to prevent or respond to crises abroad, including armed conflict, as well as human-caused and natural disasters.\nSome defense officials and policymakers argue OCO funding allows for flexible response to contingencies, and provides a \"safety valve\" to the spending caps and threat of sequestration\u2014the automatic cancellation of budget authority largely through across-the-board reductions of nonexempt programs and activities\u2014under the BCA. Critics, however, have described OCO\/GWOT as a loophole or \"gimmick\"\u2014morphing from an account for replacing combat losses of equipment, resupplying expended munitions, and transporting troops through war zones, to a \"slush fund\" for activities unrelated to contingency operations.\nCongress appropriated approximately $103 billion for OCO in FY2017 (8.5% of all discretionary appropriations), $78 billion for OCO in FY2018 (5.5% of all discretionary appropriations), and $68.8 billion for OCO so far in FY2019. Discretionary appropriations for FY2019 are not yet final; a continuing resolution expired December 21, 2018.\nFollowing passage of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), which raised discretionary budget caps for defense and foreign affairs agencies in FY2018 and FY2019, the Administration proposed shifting some OCO funding into the base, or regular, budget. Although Congress has generally not followed Administration requests for reduced funding for foreign affairs and domestic activities and has increased funding for defense, the President has asked cabinet secretaries to propose spending cuts of 5% in FY2020. Such proposals, if requested in a budget submission, may create difficult choices for Congress in FY2020 and FY2021\u2014the final two years of the BCA discretionary spending limits. Congress's decisions on OCO\/GWOT designations will affect how much agency funding is available for military operations and foreign affairs activities overseas, how much is subject to the BCA caps, and how much is incorporated into regular budgets and long-term budget projections.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_121"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_122","query":"The Navy began procuring John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers in FY2016, and a total of four have been procured through FY2019, including two in FY2019. The first six ships are being procured under a block buy contract that was authorized by Section 127 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1356\/P.L. 114-92 of November 25, 2015). The Navy wants to procure a total of 20 TAO-205s.\nThe Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests the procurement of the fifth and sixth ships in the program. The Navy estimates the combined procurement cost of the two ships at $1,056.3 million, or an average of $528.1 million each. The two ships have received $75.0 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding, and the Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests the remaining $981.2 million in procurement funding needed to complete the two ships' estimated combined procurement cost. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget also requests $73.0 million in AP funding for TAO-205s to be procured in future fiscal years, and $3.7 million in cost-to-complete procurement funding to cover cost growth on TAO-205s procured in prior fiscal years, bringing the total FY2020 procurement funding request for the TAO-205 program (aside from outfitting and post-delivery costs) to $1,057.9 million.\nIssues for Congress include the following:\nwhether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 procurement funding request for the TAO-205 program; the number of oilers the Navy will require in coming years to support its operations; and whether to encourage or direct the Navy to build TAO-205s with more ship self-defense equipment than currently planned by the Navy.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_122"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_123","query":"The Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program, administered by the Department of Transportation's Build America Bureau, provides long-term, low-interest loans and other types of credit assistance for the construction of surface transportation projects (23 U.S.C. \u00a7601 et seq.). The TIFIA program was reauthorized from FY2016 through FY2020 in the Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act (P.L. 114-94). Direct funding for the TIFIA program is authorized at $300 million for each of FY2019 and FY2020. Additionally, state departments of transportation can use other federal-aid highway grant money, both formula and discretionary, to subsidize much larger loans. To date, states have not had to use other grant funding to subsidize credit assistance because the TIFIA program has a relatively large unexpended funding balance.\nThe primary goal of the TIFIA program, historically, has been to enable the construction of large-scale surface transportation projects by providing financing to complement state, local, and private investment. The TIFIA program has been one of the main ways in which the federal government has encouraged the development of public-private partnerships (P3s) and private financing in surface transportation often backed by new, but sometimes uncertain, revenue sources such as highway tolls, other types of user charges, and incremental real estate taxes. To be eligible for TIFIA assistance, a project sponsor must be deemed creditworthy, that is, a good risk for repaying its debts, and must have a dedicated source of revenue for repayment. Project sponsors, therefore, are required to develop a funding mechanism, whether this is a new user fee or tax or the repurposing of existing fees and taxes. Changes to the TIFIA program have sought to make TIFIA assistance more accessible to less costly projects, but so far every TIFIA-supported project has cost $175 million or more.\nFinancing projects instead of relying on pay-as-you go funding from taxes and other existing revenues can mean such projects can be constructed years earlier. TIFIA, therefore, is a means to accelerate project delivery and the benefits that flow from new infrastructure. The TIFIA program is also a relatively low-cost way for the federal government to support surface transportation projects because it relies on loans, not grants, and the TIFIA assistance is typically one-third or less of project costs. Another advantage from the federal point of view is that a relatively small amount of budget authority can be leveraged into a large amount of loan capacity. Because the government expects its loans to be repaid, an appropriation need only cover administrative costs and the subsidy cost of credit assistance. Program funding of $300 million can support approximately $4 billion in TIFIA loans.\nSince its enactment in 1998, the TIFIA program has provided assistance of $32 billion to 74 projects with a total cost of about $117 billion (in FY2018 inflation-adjusted dollars). All but one TIFIA credit agreement has been a loan; the exception is a loan guarantee. The average TIFIA-supported project cost is $1.5 billion, and the average TIFIA loan is $430 million (both in FY2018 dollars). About two-thirds of TIFIA loans have gone to highway and highway bridge projects, and another quarter to public transportation. TIFIA has supported at least one project in 21 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, but the top 10 states account for about 80% of the 74 projects supported.\nThe TIFIA program is likely to be considered in the 116th Congress during the reauthorization of the surface transportation programs. Program funding is one issue that may be discussed, because some stakeholders would like more budget authority despite a relatively large unexpended balance and the existing authority of states to use grant funding to pay the subsidy cost of credit assistance. Criticisms of the program and its implementation include the often slow decisionmaking process, the program's increasing risk aversion, and the limitation of the federal share of project costs to 33%, despite a statutory limit of 49%. Because of the relatively large unexpended balance, Congress might considered broadening the use of TIFIA assistance to nonsurface transportation and nontransportation infrastructure. Another option might be to create a national infrastructure bank, a federal infrastructure financing entity largely independent of other executive branch agencies, to take the place of TIFIA and other federal infrastructure credit assistance programs.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_123"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_124","query":"The Second Amendment states that \"[a] well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.\" Before the Supreme Court's 2008 opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Second Amendment had received little Supreme Court attention and had been largely interpreted, at least by the lower federal courts, to be intertwined with military or militia use. Still, there had been ample debate in the lower federal courts and political discussion over whether the Second Amendment provides an individual right to keep and bear arms, versus a collective right belonging to the states to maintain militias. Pre-Heller, the vast majority of lower federal courts had embraced the collective right theory.\nIn Heller, though, the Supreme Court adopted the individual right theory, holding that the Second Amendment protects an individual right for law-abiding citizens to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes including, most notably, self-defense in the home. Two years later in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court held that the Second Amendment applies to the states via selective incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment.\nAfter Heller and McDonald, numerous challenges were brought on Second Amendment grounds to various federal, state, and local firearm laws and regulations. Because Heller neither purported to define the full scope of the Second Amendment, nor suggested a standard of review for evaluating Second Amendment claims, the lower federal courts have been tasked with doing so in the Second Amendment challenges brought before them. These challenges include allegations that provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968, as amended, as well as various state and local firearm laws (e.g., \"assault weapon\" bans, concealed carry regulations, firearm licensing schemes) are unconstitutional. The analyses in these cases may provide useful guideposts for Congress should it seek to enact further firearm regulations.\nGenerally, the courts have adopted a two-step framework for evaluating Second Amendment challenges. First, courts ask whether the regulated person, firearm, or place comes within the scope of the Second Amendment's protections. If not, the law does not implicate the Second Amendment. But if so, the court next employs the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny\u2014rational basis, intermediate, or strict scrutiny\u2014to assess whether the law passes constitutional muster. In deciding what level of scrutiny is warranted, courts generally ask whether the challenged law burdens core Second Amendment conduct, like the ability to use a firearm for self-defense in the home. If a law substantially burdens core Second Amendment activity, courts typically will apply strict scrutiny. Otherwise, courts generally will apply intermediate scrutiny. Most challenged laws have been reviewed for intermediate scrutiny, where a court asks whether a law is substantially related to an important governmental interest. And typically, the viability of a firearm restriction will depend on what evidence the government puts forth to justify the law. Yet sometimes courts take a different or modified approach from that described above and ask whether a challenged regulation falls within a category deemed \"presumptively lawful\" by Heller. If the law falls within such a category, a court does not need to apply a particular level of scrutiny in reviewing the restriction because the law does not facially violate the Second Amendment.\nIn early 2019, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of New York. The Court is set to review a portion of New York City's firearm licensing scheme that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld as valid. In doing so, the Court may clarify the scope of the right protected in the Second Amendment. Importantly, to make this substantive ruling, the Court likely will have to answer a question that it has eluded since Heller: Under what framework should Second Amendment challenges be evaluated?","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_124"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_125","query":"On January 3, 2019, the House adopted Title I of H.Res. 6 , the standing rules for the House of Representatives for the 116 th Congress. In addition to the standing rules, H.Res. 6 included a separate order related to the consideration of appropriations bills. This report provides information on changes to both the standing rules and separate orders that might affect the consideration of budgetary legislation in the House of Representatives. These include the following:\nDeleting language in Rule X added in the 115 th Congress providing for committees to include a review of authorizations for programs or agencies within their jurisdiction in their oversight plans. Deleting language in Rule XIII, previously adopted in the 114 th and 115 th Congresses, requiring that any budgetary estimates provided by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) include, to the extent practicable, a macroeconomic impact analysis (often referred to as \"dynamic scoring\") as well as a requirement that any estimate provided to CBO by the Joint Committee on Taxation also include a macroeconomic impact analysis. Deleting language added to Rule XXI in the 104 th Congress requiring the vote of a three-fifths majority to approve a federal income tax rate increase as well as a requirement in Rule XX to automatically order the yeas and nays for a vote of the House on such measures. Establishing new language as Rule XXVIII providing for certain measures concerning the debt limit to automatically be engrossed and deemed to have been passed by the House. This measure would suspend the debt limit through the end of the budget year in the concurrent resolution on the budget (but not through the period covered by any outyears beyond the budget year). The engrossed measure would then be transmitted to the Senate for further action. This rule is similar to language that was previously part of House rules from the 96 th -107 th Congresses (known as the \"Gephardt Rule\"). Reestablishing a PAYGO requirement in the House, which had previously been in effect during the 110 th and 111 th Congresses. This PAYGO rule (Rule XXI, clause 10) replaces the CUTGO rule that was a part of Rule XXI between the 112 th and 115 th Congresses. The new rule prohibits the consideration of direct spending or revenue legislation that is projected to increase or cause a deficit in either of two time periods: (1) the period consisting of the current fiscal year, the budget year, and the four ensuing fiscal years following the budget year or (2) the 11-year period consisting of the current year, the budget year, and the ensuing nine fiscal years following the budget year. The rule applies to any bill, joint resolution, amendment, motion, or conference report that affects direct spending or revenues.\nH.Res. 6 also included a separate order establishing a limit on advance appropriations, defined as applying to funding provided in FY2019 appropriations acts that are to become available in any fiscal year following FY2019.\nIn addition, several separate orders from previous congresses are not included in H.Res. 6 for the 116 th Congress. These include\nlanguage prohibiting House consideration of measures estimated by CBO as causing a net increase in spending in excess of $5 billion in any of the four 10-year periods beginning with the fiscal year 10 years after the current fiscal year, two points of order that previously supplemented the point of order in Section 302(f) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 as a means for enforcing 302(b) suballocations, language requiring that appropriations bills include a spending reduction account, and language allowing certain legislative amendments in appropriations bills (known as the \"Holman Rule\").","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_125"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_126","query":"Congress has maintained significant interest in Mexico, an ally and top trade partner. In recent decades, U.S.-Mexican relations have grown closer through cooperative management of the 2,000-mile border, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and security and rule of law cooperation under the M\u00e9rida Initiative. Relations have been tested, however, by President Donald J. Trump's shifts in U.S. immigration and trade policies.\nOn December 1, 2018, Andr\u00e9s Manuel L\u00f3pez Obrador, the leftist populist leader of the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) party, which he created in 2014, took office for a six-year term after winning 53% of votes in the July 1, 2018, presidential election. Elected on an anticorruption platform, L\u00f3pez Obrador is the first Mexican president in over two decades to enjoy majorities in both chambers of Congress. L\u00f3pez Obrador succeeded Enrique Pe\u00f1a Nieto of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). From 2013-2014, Pe\u00f1a Nieto shepherded reforms through the Mexican Congress, including one that opened Mexico's energy sector to foreign investment. He struggled, however, to address human rights abuses, insecurity, and corruption.\nPresident L\u00f3pez Obrador has pledged to make Mexico a more just and peaceful society, but also to govern with austerity. Given fiscal constraints and rising insecurity, observers question whether his goals are attainable. L\u00f3pez Obrador aims to build infrastructure in southern Mexico, revive the state oil company, promote social programs, and maintain a noninterventionist position in foreign affairs, including the crisis in Venezuela. His power is constrained, however, by MORENA's lack of a two-thirds majority in Congress, which he would need to enact constitutional reforms or to roll back reforms. Non-MORENA governors have also opposed some of his policies. Still, as of April 2019, L\u00f3pez Obrador had an approval rating of78%.\nU.S. Policy\nDespite predictions to the contrary, U.S.-Mexico relations under the L\u00f3pez Obrador government have thus far remained friendly. Nevertheless, tensions have emerged over several key issues, including trade disputes and tariffs, immigration and border security issues, and Mexico's decision to remain neutral in the crisis in Venezuela. The new government has accommodated U.S. migration and border security policies, despite the domestic criticism it has received for agreeing to allow Central American asylum seekers to await U.S. immigration proceedings in Mexico and for rapidly increasing deportations. The Trump Administration requested $76.3 million for the M\u00e9rida Initiative for FY2020 (a 35% decline from the FY2018-enacted level).\nIn November 2018, Mexico, the United States, and Canada signed a proposed U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) free trade agreement that, if approved by Congress and ratified by Mexico and Canada, would replace NAFTA. Mexico has applied retaliatory tariffs in response to U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum imports imposed in 2018.\nLegislative Action\nThe 116th Congress may consider approval of the USMCA. Congressional concerns regarding the USMCA include possible effect on the U.S. economy, working conditions in Mexico and the protection of worker rights, enforceability of USMCA labor provisions, U.S.-Mexican economic relations, and other issues. It is not known whether or when Congress will consider implementing legislation for USMCA. In January 2019, Congress provided $145 million for the M\u00e9rida Initiative ($68 million above the budget request) in the FY2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-6) and asked for reports on how bilateral efforts are combating flows of opioids, methamphetamine, and cocaine. The House also passed H.R. 133 (Cuellar), a bill that would promote economic partnership between the United States and Mexico, as well as educational and professional exchanges. A related bill, S. 587 (Cornyn), has been introduced in the Senate.\nFurther Reading\nCRS In Focus IF10578, Mexico: Evolution of the M\u00e9rida Initiative, 2007-2019.\nCRS In Focus IF10400, Transnational Crime Issues: Heroin Production, Fentanyl Trafficking, and U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation.\nCRS In Focus IF10215, Mexico's Immigration Control Efforts.\nCRS Report R45489, Recent Migration to the United States from Central America: Frequently Asked Questions.\nCRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications.\nCRS Report R44981, NAFTA Renegotiation and the Proposed United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)\nCRS Report R45430, Sharing the Colorado River and the Rio Grande: Cooperation and Conflict with Mexico","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_126"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_127","query":"The federal government, through the Department of Energy, operates four regional power marketing administrations (PMAs), created by statute: the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), the Southeastern Power Administration (SEPA), the Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA), and the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). Each PMA operates in a distinct geographic area. Congressional interest in the PMAs has included diverse issues such as rate setting, cost and compliance associated with the Endangered Species Act (ESA; P.L. 93-205; 16 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a71531 et seq.), and questions of privatization of these federal agencies.\nIn general, the PMAs came into being because of the government's need to dispose of electric power produced by dams constructed largely for irrigation, flood control, or other purposes, and to achieve small community and farm electrification\u2014that is, providing service to customers whom it would not have been profitable for a private utility to serve. With minor exceptions, these agencies market the electric power produced by federal dams constructed, owned, and operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR). By statute, PMAs must give preference to public utility districts and cooperatives (e.g., \"preference customers\"), and sell their power at cost-based rates set at the lowest possible rate consistent with sound business principles. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regulates PMA rates to ensure that they are set high enough to repay the U.S. Treasury for the portion of federal facility costs allocated to hydropower beneficiaries.\nWith energy and capacity markets changing in the western United States (especially with the growing need to integrate increasing amounts of variable renewable sources), and the development of the Energy Imbalance Market in the West, BPA and WAPA may have to adapt their plans with regard to generation needs and how transmission systems are developed.\nIn 2018, the Trump Administration proposed to sell the transmission assets (lines, towers, substations, and\/or rights of way) owned and operated by the federal Power Marketing Administrations. The proposal suggested that \"eliminating or reducing\" the federal government's role in owning and operating transmission assets, and increasing the private sector's role, would \"encourage a more efficient allocation of economic resources and mitigate unnecessary risk to taxpayers.\" The resulting PMA entities would then contract with other utilities to provide transmission services for the delivery of federal power, similar to what SEPA does currently. Reportedly, the proposed sale of PMA assets was dropped after opposition to the plan emerged from stakeholders. Under Section 208 of the Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1986 (P.L. 99-349), the executive branch is prohibited from spending funds to study or draft proposals to transfer from federal control any portion of the assets of the PMAs unless specifically authorized by Congress.\nEnvironmental, fishing, and tribal advocates have sued the federal government over concerns that operating rules for hydropower dams on the Columbia and Snake Rivers (i.e., the National Marine Fisheries Service Biological Opinion) are inadequate to ensure survival of species threatened or endangered under the ESA. In 2016, a federal judge overturned a previous management plan for the dams, finding that it would not be sufficient to protect salmon runs, and ordered a new management plan that could include removing the dams. However, in 2018, President Trump issued a Presidential Memorandum accelerating the process for a new management plan, requiring the biological opinion to be ready by 2020.\nSince FY2011, power revenues associated with the PMAs have been classified as discretionary offsetting receipts (i.e., receipts that are available for spending by the PMAs), thus the agencies are sometimes noted as having a \"net-zero\" spending authority. Only the capital expenses of WAPA and SWPA require appropriations from Congress.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_127"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_128","query":"The federal government has been involved in providing housing assistance to lower-income households since the 1930s. In the beginning, the federal government played a role in supporting the mortgage market (through establishment of the Federal Housing Administration [FHA] and the government-sponsored enterprises) and in promoting construction of low-rent public housing for lower-income families through local public housing authorities (PHAs). Over time, the federal government has shifted away from providing construction-based subsidies toward providing rental subsidies, and private developers and property owners have been playing a larger role.\nToday's federal housing assistance programs fall into three main categories: rental housing assistance, assistance to state and local governments, and assistance for homeowners. Most of these programs are administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Current housing assistance programs include Section 8 vouchers and project-based rental assistance, public housing, housing for the elderly (Section 202), housing for persons with disabilities (Section 811), rural rental assistance (the United States Department of Agriculture's Section 521 program), Community Development Block Grants (CDBG), HOME Investment Partnerships Block Grants, Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC), homeless assistance programs, Federal Housing Authority (FHA) and Department of Veterans Affairs mortgage insurance, and the mortgage interest deduction in the tax code.\nMost federal housing assistance programs are aimed at making housing affordable for low-income families. Affordability\u2014defined as housing that costs no more than 30% of a family's income\u2014is considered to be the largest housing problem today. Rental assistance programs, which are the largest source of direct housing assistance for low-income families, all allow families to pay affordable, income-based rents; however, different forms of assistance target different types of households, including the elderly, persons with disabilities, and families with children. Several trends in federal housing policy have emerged in recent decades. As the focus of federal housing assistance has shifted away from construction-based subsidies to rental assistance, block grants, and LIHTC, state and local governments have had greater access to federal resources to fund local housing and community development priorities. This shift in federal funding has also led affordable housing developers to pursue mixed financing: the use of multiple streams of federal, state, and local funding, or private financing. In the past, lagging homeownership rates among low-income and minority households have prompted several Presidents to promote homeownership-based housing policies. However, given the severe downturn in U.S. housing markets that began in 2007 and the resulting high foreclosure rate, it is unclear to what degree federal policy will continue to focus on increasing access to homeownership.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_128"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_129","query":"The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) is a federal workers' compensation program that covers certain private-sector maritime workers. Firms that employ these workers are required to purchase workers' compensation or self-insure and are responsible for providing medical and disability benefits to covered workers who are injured or become ill on the job and survivors benefits to the families of covered workers who die on the job. The LHWCA is administered by the Department of Labor (DOL), and all benefit costs are paid by employers and their insurance carriers. In 2016, more than $1.4 billion in LHWCA benefits were paid to beneficiaries.\nCongress has extended the LHWCA provisions to cover workers outside of the maritime industry, such as overseas government contractors and civilian employees of military post exchanges. As part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), persons who repair recreational vessels of any size were added to the LHWCA exemption list. In 2011, the DOL implemented this provision; since then, those regulations have proven controversial and numerous bills have been introduced to modify the regulatory definition to increase the number of workers exempted from the LHWCA.\nThe LHWCA pays for all medical care associated with a covered injury or illness. Disability benefits are based on a worker's pre-injury wage, and, unlike comparable state workers' compensation benefits, are adjusted annually to reflect national wage growth.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_129"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_130","query":"The U.S. Fourth National Climate Assessment, released in 2018, concluded that \"the impacts of global climate change are already being felt in the United States and are projected to intensify in the future\u2014but the severity of future impacts will depend largely on actions taken to reduce greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions and to adapt to the changes that will occur.\" Members of Congress and stakeholders articulate a wide range of perspectives over what to do, if anything, about GHG emissions, future climate change, and related impacts. If Congress were to consider establishing a program to reduce GHG emissions, one option would be to attach a price to GHG emissions with a carbon tax or GHG emissions fee. In the 115th Congress, Members introduced nine bills to establish a carbon tax or emissions fee program. However, many Members have expressed their opposition to such an approach. In particular, in the 115th Congress, the House passed a resolution \"expressing the sense of Congress that a carbon tax would be detrimental to the United States economy.\"\nMultiple economic studies have estimated the emission reductions that particular carbon tax would achieve. For example, a 2018 study analyzed various impacts of four carbon tax rate scenarios: a $25\/metric ton of CO2 and $50\/metric ton of CO2 carbon tax, increasing annually by 1% and 5%. The study concluded that each of the scenarios would likely achieve the U.S. GHG emission reduction target pledged under the international Paris Agreement (at least in terms of CO2 emissions).\nA carbon tax system would generate a new revenue stream, the magnitude of which would depend on the scope and rate of the tax, among other factors. In 2018, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that a $25\/metric ton carbon tax would yield approximately $100 billion in its first year. CBO projected that federal revenue would total $3.5 trillion in FY2019.\nPolicymakers would face challenging decisions regarding the distribution of the new carbon tax revenues. Congress could apply revenues to support a range of policy objectives but would encounter trade-offs among the objectives. The central trade-offs involve minimizing economy-wide costs, lessening the costs borne by specific groups\u2014particularly low-income households and displaced workers in certain industries (e.g., coal mining)\u2014and supporting other policy objectives.\nA primary argument against a carbon tax regards it potential economy-wide impacts, often measured as impacts to the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). Some may argue that projected impacts should be compared with the climate benefits achieved from the program as well as the estimated costs of taking no action. The potential impacts would depend on a number of factors, including the program's magnitude and design and, most importantly, the use of carbon tax revenues.\nIn general, economic literature finds that some of the revenue applications would reduce the economy-wide costs from a carbon tax but may not eliminate them entirely. In addition, some studies cite particular economic modeling scenarios in which certain carbon tax revenue applications produce a net increase in GDP compared to a baseline scenario. These scenarios involve using carbon tax revenues to offset reductions in other tax rates (e.g., corporate income or payroll taxes). Although economic models generally indicate that these particular revenue applications would yield the greatest benefit to the economy overall, the models also find that lower-income households would likely face a disproportionate impact under such an approach. As lower-income households spend a greater proportion of their income on energy needs (electricity, gasoline), these households are expected to experience disproportionate impacts from a carbon tax if revenues were not recycled back to them in some fashion (e.g., lump-sum distribution).\nA price on GHG emissions could create a competitive disadvantage for some industries, particularly \"emission-intensive, trade-exposed industries.\" Policymakers have several options to address this concern, including establishing a \"border carbon adjustment\" program, which would levy a fee on imports from countries without comparable GHG reduction programs. Alternatively, policymakers could allocate (indefinitely or for a period of time) some of the carbon tax revenues to selected industry sectors or businesses. Relatedly, a carbon tax system is projected to disproportionately impact fossil fuel industries, particularly coal, and the communities that rely on their employment. To alleviate these impacts, policymakers may consider using some of the revenue to provide transition assistance to employees or affected communities.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_130"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_131","query":"The U.S. energy pipeline network is composed of approximately 3 million miles of pipeline transporting natural gas, oil, and other hazardous liquids. Recent incidents in California, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and other states have drawn criticism from stakeholders and have raised concerns in Congress about pipeline safety. The Department of Energy's (DOE's) 2015 Quadrennial Energy Review also highlighted pipeline safety as an issue for the nation's energy infrastructure. Recent incident statistics suggest there is opportunity for safety improvement.\nThe federal pipeline safety program is administered by the Department of Transportation's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), which relies heavily on state partnerships for inspection and enforcement of its regulations. PHMSA's pipeline safety program is authorized through FY2019. For FY2019, PHMSA's estimated budget authority is approximately $164 million\u2014more than double the agency's budget authority in FY2008 (not adjusted for inflation). Much of PHMSA's funding is for inspectors. However, due to private sector competition, the agency faces persistent challenges recruiting and retaining the staff for which it is funded. The Trump Administration's requested budget authority for PHMSA is approximately $151 million for FY2020, roughly 8% less than the FY2019 amount. The request would only slightly reduce PHMSA staffing but proposes cuts in state grants that could impact staffing at state pipeline safety agencies. In the wake of major incidents involving facilities under state jurisdiction, some state programs have come under scrutiny regarding their effectiveness and oversight by PHMSA.\nCongress has used past reauthorizations to impose various mandates on PHMSA regarding standards, studies, and other elements of pipeline safety regulation. The Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-90) and the PIPES Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-183) together included 61 such mandates. As of March 5, 2019, according to PHMSA, the agency had completed 34 of 42 mandates under P.L. 112-90 and 16 of 19 mandates under P.L. 114-183. PHMSA also has not satisfied a number of safety recommendations from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). Some in Congress are concerned that major mandates and NTSB recommendations remain unfulfilled.\nThe NTSB highlighted aging pipelines as a particular concern in its 2019-2020 Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements. Likewise, Congress has ongoing interest in the safety of older transmission pipelines and in the replacement of leaky and deteriorating cast iron pipe in natural gas distribution systems. Recent accidents involving older pipelines and related infrastructure may refocus attention on PHMSA's regulation of pipe replacement (currently voluntary), pipeline modernization projects and work packages, older pipeline records, safety management systems, and other issues related to aging pipelines.\nOngoing physical and cyber threats against the nation's pipelines since passage of the PIPES Act have heightened concerns about pipeline security risks. Although the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has the primary statutory authority over pipeline security, pipeline safety and security are intertwined\u2014and PHMSA is involved in both. Under the terms of a 2006 agreement, PHMSA and TSA are directed to work together \"to delineate clear lines of authority \u2026 in the area of transportation security.\" While PHMSA reports ongoing cooperation with TSA, questions remain about what this cooperation entails and the ongoing roles of the two agencies.\nIn addition to these specific issues, Congress may assess how the various elements of U.S. pipeline safety and security fit together in the nation's overall approach to protect the public and the environment. This approach involves federal and state agencies, pipeline associations, large and small pipeline operators, and local communities. Reviewing how these various groups work together to achieve common goals could be an overarching consideration for Congress.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_131"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_132","query":"The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA; Title IV of P.L. 103-322) was originally enacted in 1994. It addressed congressional concerns about violent crime, and violence against women in particular, in several ways. It allowed for enhanced sentencing of repeat federal sex offenders; mandated restitution to victims of specified federal sex offenses; and authorized grants to state, local, and tribal law enforcement entities to investigate and prosecute violent crimes against women, among other things. VAWA has been reauthorized three times since its original enactment. Most recently, Congress passed and President Obama signed the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-4), which reauthorized most VAWA programs through FY2018, among other things.\nThe fundamental goals of VAWA are to prevent violent crime; respond to the needs of crime victims; learn more about crime; and change public attitudes through a collaborative effort by the criminal justice system, social service agencies, research organizations, schools, public health organizations, and private organizations. The federal government tries to achieve these goals primarily through federal grant programs that provide funding to state, tribal, territorial, and local governments; nonprofit organizations; and universities.\nVAWA programs generally address domestic violence, sexual assault, dating violence, and stalking\u2014crimes for which the risk of victimization is highest for women\u2014although some VAWA programs address additional crimes. VAWA grant programs largely address the criminal justice system and community response to these crimes, but certain programs address prevention as well.\nThe Office on Violence Against Women (OVW) administers the majority of VAWA-authorized programs, while other federal agencies, including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Office of Justice Programs (OJP), also manage VAWA programs. Since its creation in 1995 through FY2018, OVW has awarded more than $8 billion in grants and cooperative agreements to state, tribal, and local governments, nonprofit organizations, and universities. In FY2019, approximately $559 million was appropriated for VAWA-authorized programs administered by OVW, OJP, and CDC. While several extensions of authorization for VAWA were provided through FY2019 continuing appropriations, authorizations for appropriations for all VAWA programs have since expired. However, all VAWA programs funded in FY2018 have been funded in FY2019 (select programs at slightly higher levels), and thus far it appears that the expiration of authorizations has not impacted the continuing operation of VAWA programs. The Administration has requested FY2020 funding for all VAWA-authorized programs funded in FY2019.\nThere are several issues that Congress may consider in efforts to reauthorize VAWA. These include, but are not limited to, improvements to data collection on domestic violence and stalking or the rape kit backlog; assessing the implementation and future direction of tribal jurisdiction over non-tribal members, including potentially adding new crimes under VAWA; new approaches for law enforcement in assisting victims; and enforcement of the federal prohibition on firearms for those convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence and those who are subject to a domestic violence protective order. Congress may also consider further changes to VAWA programs.\nIn the 116th Congress, the House passed the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2019 (H.R. 1585). Among other things, it would reauthorize funding for VAWA programs and authorize new programs; amend and add definitions used for VAWA programs; amend federal criminal law relating to firearms, custodial rape, and stalking; and expand tribal jurisdiction over certain crimes committed on tribal lands.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_132"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_133","query":"The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), enacted in 1938, is the main federal law that establishes general wage and hour standards for most, but not all, private and public sector employees. Among other protections, the FLSA establishes that covered nonexempt employees must be compensated at one-and-a-half times their regular rate of pay for each hour worked over 40 hours in a workweek.\nThe FLSA also establishes certain exemptions from its general labor market standards. One of the major exemptions to the overtime provisions in the FLSA is for bona fide \"executive, administrative, and professional\" employees (the \"EAP\" or \"white collar\" exemptions). The FLSA grants authority to the Secretary of Labor to define and delimit the EAP exemption \"from time to time.\" To qualify for this exemption from the FLSA's overtime pay requirement, an employee must be salaried (the \"salary basis\" test); perform specified executive, administrative, or professional duties (the \"duties\" test); and earn above an established salary level threshold (the \"salary level\" test).\nIn March 2019, the Secretary of Labor published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to make changes to the EAP exemptions. The 2019 proposed rule would become effective around January 2020. The major changes in the 2019 proposed rule include increasing the standard salary level threshold from the previous level of $455 per week to $679 per week and committing the Department of Labor (DOL) to updating the EAP exemptions every four years through the rulemaking process. The 2019 proposed rule does not change the duties and responsibilities that employees must perform to be exempt. Thus, the 2019 proposed rule would affect EAP employees at salary levels between $455 and $679 per week in 2020. DOL estimates that about 4.9 million workers would be affected in the first year, including about 1.3 million EAP employees who would become newly entitled to overtime pay and an additional 3.6 million workers who would have overtime protection clarified and thereby strengthened.\nThis report answers frequently asked questions about the overtime provisions of the FLSA, the EAP exemptions, and the 2019 proposed rule that would define and delimit the EAP exemptions.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_133"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_134","query":"The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a significant U.S. partner in Gulf security, helping to address multiple regional threats by hosting about 5,000 U.S. military personnel at UAE military facilities under a bilateral defense cooperation agreement (DCA). The UAE is a significant buyer of U.S. military equipment, including sophisticated missile defenses, and it reportedly wants to buy the F-35 combat aircraft. The alliance is expected to continue after UAE President Shaykh Khalifa bin Zayid Al Nuhayyan, who suffered an incapacitating stroke in January 2014, is succeeded by his younger brother and de-facto UAE leader Shaykh Muhammad bin Zayid Al Nuhayyan.\nAdvised and armed by the United States, the UAE military has become sufficiently capable that the country is able to, and is, asserting itself in the region, including militarily. The UAE is part of a Saudi-led military effort to pressure the Iran-backed Zaidi Shia Houthi rebels in Yemen, an effort to which the United States provides logistical support but which has produced criticism over the effects of the war on Yemen's civilians. UAE forces, alongside U.S. special operations forces, also are combatting Al Qaeda's affiliate in that country. UAE forces have built up several bases in East African countries to train allied forces and facilitate UAE operations in Yemen. The UAE is supporting an anti-Islamist commander based in eastern Libya, Khalifa Hafter, who in April 2019 launched an assault to capture Tripoli from a U.N.-backed government based there. The UAE has sought to counteract criticism by expanding its long-standing donations of assistance to regional and international organizations and economically strapped countries.\nThe UAE's opposition to Muslim Brotherhood-linked regional organizations as regional and domestic threats has driven UAE policy toward Egypt, Syria, the Palestinian territories, and other countries. The UAE's stance has contributed to a major rift with Qatar, another member of the Gulf Cooperation Council alliance (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman), but which supports Brotherhood-related groups as Islamists willing to work within established political processes. In June 2017, the UAE joined Saudi Arabia in isolating Qatar until it adopts policies closer to those of the three GCC states on the Brotherhood and other issues, including on Iran, where the UAE and the Trump Administration share a policy of strongly pressuring Iran economically and politically. U.S. mediation efforts have failed to resolve the intra-GCC rift, to date. The October 2018 killing by Saudi agents of a U.S.-based Saudi journalist at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul has added to criticism of UAE leaders for their close strategic alliance with Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud.\nThe UAE's relatively open borders and economy have won praise from advocates of expanded freedoms in the Middle East. The UAE is considered among the wealthiest countries in the world, in part because of the small population that requires services, and the wealth has helped the government maintain popular support. In 2006, the government established a limited voting process for half of the 40 seats in its quasi-legislative body, the Federal National Council (FNC). The most recent such vote was held in October 2015, and resulted in the selection of a woman as speaker of the FNC. However, the country remains under the control of a small circle of leaders. And, since the Arab Spring uprisings, the government has become more wary of the potential for regional conflicts to affect domestic stability and has suppressed domestic opponents. The country sought to showcase its continued commitment to pluralism by hosting a visit by Pope Francis in February 2019.\nIn part to cope with the effects of reduced prices for crude oil during 2014-2018, the government has created new ministries tasked with formulating economic and social strategies that, among other objectives, can attract the support of the country's youth. Any U.S. assistance to the UAE has been very small in dollar amounts and intended mainly to qualify the UAE for inclusion in training and other programs that benefit UAE security.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_134"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_135","query":"The United States Fire Administration (USFA)\u2014which includes the National Fire Academy (NFA)\u2014is currently housed within the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The objective of the USFA is to significantly reduce the nation's loss of life from fire, while also achieving a reduction in property loss and nonfatal injury due to fire.\nThe Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6) provided $45.679 million for USFA, including $1.5 million in the FEMA Procurement, Construction, and Improvements account for the National Emergency Training Center. For FY2020, the Administration requested $46.605 million, which includes $1.5 million transferred from the Procurement, Construction, and Improvements account for NETC campus renovations. The budget proposal would be a $1 million increase over the FY2019 level; the increase would fund further improvements to NETC facilities. The budget proposal does not include funding for State Fire Training Assistance.\nOn January 3, 2018, the President signed the United States Fire Administration, AFG, and SAFER Program Reauthorization Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-98). P.L. 115-98 extends the USFA authorization through FY2023. The authorization levels are the same as in the previous authorization: $76,490,890 each year for FY2017 through FY2023.\nMeanwhile, concerns over the federal budget deficit could impact future funding levels for the USFA. Debate over the USFA budget has focused on whether the USFA is receiving an appropriate level of funding to accomplish its mission, given that appropriations for USFA have consistently been well below the agency's authorized level. Additionally, an ongoing issue is the viability and status of the USFA and the National Fire Academy within the Department of Homeland Security.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_135"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_136","query":"The 116th Congress faces policy issues related to the Trump Administration's renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the proposed United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). On May 18, 2017, the Trump Administration sent a 90-day notification to Congress of its intent to begin talks with Canada and Mexico to renegotiate and modernize NAFTA, as required by the 2015 Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). Talks officially began on August 16, 2017. Negotiations were concluded on September 30, 2018. The proposed USMCA was signed on November 30, 2018. The agreement must be approved by Congress and ratified by the governments of Mexico and Canada before it can enter into force.\nThe first NAFTA negotiations were launched in 1992 under President George H.W. Bush and continued under President William J. Clinton, who signed the implementing legislation on December 8, 1991 (P.L. 103-182). NAFTA entered into force on January 1, 1994. It is particularly significant because it was the most comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) negotiated at the time, contained several groundbreaking provisions, and was the first of a new generation of U.S. FTAs later negotiated. Congress played a major role during its consideration and, after contentious and comprehensive debate, ultimately approved legislation to implement the agreement.\nNAFTA established trade liberalization commitments and set new rules and disciplines for future FTAs on issues important to the United States, including intellectual property rights protection, services trade, dispute settlement procedures, investment, labor, and environment. NAFTA's market-opening provisions gradually eliminated nearly all tariff and most nontariff barriers on merchandise trade. At the time of NAFTA negotiations, average applied U.S. duties on imports from Mexico were 2.07%, while U.S. businesses faced average tariffs of 10%, in addition to nontariff and investment barriers, in Mexico. The U.S.-Canada FTA had been in effect since 1989.\nThe proposed USMCA, comprising 34 chapters and 12 side letters, retains most of NAFTA's market opening measures and most of its chapters, while making notable changes to auto rules of origin, dispute settlement provisions, government procurement, investment, and intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. It also modernizes provisions in services, labor, and the environment. New trade issues, such as digital trade, state-owned enterprises, anticorruption, and currency misalignment, are also addressed. Key issues for Congress in regard to the proposed USMCA include the constitutional authority of Congress over international trade, its role in revising, approving, or withdrawing from the agreement, U.S. negotiating objectives and the extent to which the proposed agreement makes progress in meeting them as required under TPA. Congress may also consider the agreement's impact on U.S. industries, the U.S. economy, and broader U.S. trade relations with Canada and Mexico.\nThe timing for congressional consideration of the proposed USMCA is unclear in part because of the TPA timeline and also because of issues of interest and concern voiced by Congress, including the level of enforceable labor provisions, auto rules of origin, and investor-state dispute settlement. Some policymakers have stated that the path forward to passage of the USMCA by Congress is uncertain partially because the three countries have yet to resolve disputes over U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs imposed by the Trump Administration. The United States, Canada, and Mexico are currently in a trade dispute over U.S. actions under Section 232 of the Trade Act of 1962 to impose tariffs on such imports due to national security concerns. In response to the U.S. action, Mexico and Canada initiated World Trade Organization dispute settlement proceedings and retaliated against certain U.S. exports. The conclusion of the proposed USMCA did not resolve the Section 232 tariff dispute. The U.S. business community, industry groups, and some congressional leaders have publicly stated that the tariff issue must be resolved before the USMCA could enter into force.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_136"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_137","query":"The U.S. Constitution provides each House of Congress with the sole authority to establish rules and punish and expel Members. From 1789 to 1964, the Senate dealt individually with cases of disciplinary action against Members, often forming ad hoc committees to investigate and make recommendations when acts of wrongdoing were brought to the chamber's attention. Events of the 1960s, including the investigation of Secretary to the Majority Robert G. \"Bobby\" Baker, for alleged corruption and influence peddling, prompted the creation of a permanent ethics committee and the writing of a Code of Conduct for Members, officers, and staff of the Senate.\nThe Senate Select Committee on Ethics was first established in 1964. This bipartisan, six-member committee investigates alleged violations of the rules of the Senate and recommends disciplinary actions. In the 95th Congress (1977-1978), the Senate expanded the committee's jurisdiction and altered its procedures to implement revisions to the Senate Code of Official Conduct. Also, to reflect these changes the committee was renamed the Select Committee on Ethics.\nThis report briefly outlines the background of ethics enforcement in the Senate, including the creation of the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct and the subsequent renaming of the committee as the Select Committee on Ethics. The report also provides a brief overview of the Senate Code of Conduct and on the Select Committee's current jurisdiction and procedures.\nFor additional information on ethics in the Senate, please see CRS Report RL30764, Enforcement of Congressional Rules of Conduct: A Historical Overview, by Jacob R. Straus.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_137"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_138","query":"Congress has long deliberated on the condition of drinking water infrastructure and drinking water quality as well as the financial and technical challenges some public water systems face in ensuring the delivery of safe and adequate water supplies. Several events and circumstances\u2014including source water contamination incidents; water infrastructure damage from natural disasters, such as hurricanes; detection of elevated lead levels in tap water in various cities and schools; and the nationwide need to repair or replace aging drinking water infrastructure\u2014have increased national attention to these issues. America's Water Infrastructure Act of 2018 (AWIA; P.L. 115-270), enacted on October 23, 2018, contains provisions that seek to address these and other water infrastructure concerns.\nOverall, AWIA authorizes various water infrastructure projects and activities for several federal agencies. Title I of AWIA, \"Water Resources Development Act of 2018,\" authorizes water resource development activities for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). Title II of AWIA constitutes the most comprehensive amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) since 1996. Title III primarily includes provisions that address hydropower-related activities of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Among its provisions, Title IV amends U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)-administered water infrastructure programs and several Clean Water Act authorities.\nThis report focuses on the drinking water provisions of Title II and Title IV of AWIA, which authorize appropriations for several drinking water and wastewater infrastructure programs for projects that promote compliance, address aging drinking water infrastructure and lead in school drinking water, and increase drinking water infrastructure resilience to natural hazards.\nTitle II amends SDWA to help communities achieve SDWA compliance, revise the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund (DWSRF) program, reauthorize appropriations for the DWSRF program, and increase emphasis on assisting disadvantaged communities. Provisions in Title II also revise emergency notification and planning requirements; authorize the use of DWSRF funds for the assessment and protection of drinking water sources; identify options intended to develop public water systems' technical, managerial, and financial capacity; and improve consumer confidence in public drinking water supplies. Title II authorizes a supplemental DWSRF appropriation for disaster assistance for public water systems in certain areas under certain conditions. Other provisions authorize new grant programs to reduce lead contamination in school drinking water, improve drinking water infrastructure for specified Indian tribes, respond to contamination of small and disadvantaged communities' drinking water sources, and improve the sustainability and resilience of small and disadvantaged communities' drinking water systems.\nTitle IV addresses several other water quality and infrastructure issues by authorizing and revising activities and programs for the EPA and other federal agencies. Title IV extends, authorizes, and amends drinking-water-related activities and programs administered by EPA. Specifically, these provisions authorize WaterSense, an EPA-initiated voluntary water efficiency labeling program, and revise the Water Instructure Finance and Innovation Act (WIFIA) financial assistance program. The WIFIA program provides credit assistance for water infrastructure projects. Other provisions authorize grant programs for innovative water technology and for water sector workforce development. Title IV also amends the Clean Water Act to expand a municipal sewer overflow grant program to include stormwater management projects, reauthorize appropriations for that program, and direct EPA to establish a task force for stormwater management.\nWith AWIA, the 115th Congress passed an omnibus water infrastructure and project authorization bill that affects several federal agencies. The act includes several provisions related to drinking water, with overarching themes involving drinking water infrastructure affordability and water system compliance capacity and sustainability.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_138"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_139","query":"Several U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010 required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On the JCPOA's Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous resolutions' requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, compose the current legal framework governing Iran's nuclear program. Iran has complied with the JCPOA and resolution.\nIran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. The IAEA had essentially resolved most of these issues, but for several years the agency still had questions concerning \"possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.\" A December 2, 2015, report to the IAEA Board of Governors from agency Director General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA's \"final assessment on the resolution\" of the outstanding issues.\nThis report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_139"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_140","query":"The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB or Board) is a quasi-judicial independent agency in the executive branch charged with protecting federal employees against improper employment-related actions. The Board works to ensure, for example, that federal agencies avoid taking arbitrary action against employees, exhibiting favoritism, or engaging in reprisals against whistleblowers. The MSPB also aims to promote an effective federal workforce free of certain types of discrimination and other prohibited personnel practices. While the Board mainly carries out its mission through adjudication of federal employment-related disputes, it also performs specified oversight functions related to federal employment, including conducting special studies of the civil service and other executive branch merit systems.\nEstablished by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, the MSPB consists of three Board members, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Not more than two Board members may be adherents of the same political party. The term of office of each Board member is seven years, and terms are nonrenewable. Board members may be removed by the President only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. The Board operates concurrently with the Office of Special Counsel, an independent, prosecutorial federal agency. The Special Counsel receives and investigates complaints related to certain kinds of federal agency misconduct and may petition the Board for corrective action.\nThe MSPB operates like a tribunal and maintains procedures for conducting hearings, examining evidence, and rendering decisions. Most cases the Board reviews are federal employee appeals of adverse actions, including those related to removal or suspension of employment. When the MSPB determines that a federal employee has been subject to an improper adverse action, the Board can issue orders that compel agencies to reverse these actions and, depending upon the particular agency action in question, may order relief, including reinstatement, backpay, and attorney's fees.\nThe Board also maintains original jurisdiction over certain types of cases in which it hears and decides the case initially rather than reviews an agency decision. For example, the MSPB may adjudicate cases brought by the Office of Special Counsel related to a prohibited personnel practice. The Special Counsel may, among other things, petition the Board for a stay of an adverse employment action in relation to this practice. Some of the Board's adjudicatory functions, including appeals of adverse action decisions, typically are carried out by \"administrative judges\" employed by the Board, while administrative law judges (ALJs) may examine matters coming under the Board's original jurisdiction.\nFederal employees or applicants for employment who are adversely affected by a final order or decision of the MSPB may obtain judicial review. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) is generally the proper judicial forum for these cases. Federal law compels the Federal Circuit to examine these cases under a standard of review that is deferential to the MSPB's determination. Consequently, the Federal Circuit typically upholds Board decisions. But a special jurisdictional rule exists for so-called \"mixed cases\" involving an alleged violation of federal antidiscrimination laws in connection with an improper adverse personnel action. Following the MSPB's decision in a mixed case, affected employees may seek judicial review in federal district court rather than the Federal Circuit. District court review is generally preferable for the petitioning federal employee, as district courts typically review these discrimination-related claims under a de novo standard (i.e., affording no deference to the determination of the MSPB).\nSince March 2019, the Board has lacked sitting members. Lack of a quorum prevents the Board from performing some of its review functions, including issuing final decisions in cases when an initial decision issued by an administrative judge has been appealed to the full Board. As a result, a significant case backlog has developed. President Trump has submitted nominees to the Senate to fill vacancies on the Board.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_140"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_141","query":"Congress is required by Article I, Section 6, of the Constitution to determine its own pay. In the past, Congress periodically enacted specific legislation to alter its pay; the last time this occurred affected pay in 1991. More recently, pay has been determined pursuant to laws establishing formulas for automatic adjustments.\nThe Ethics Reform Act of 1989 established the current automatic annual adjustment formula, which is based on changes in private sector wages as measured by the Employment Cost Index (ECI). The adjustment is automatic unless denied statutorily, although the percentage may not exceed the percentage base pay increase for General Schedule (GS) employees. Member pay has since been frozen in two ways: (1) directly, through legislation that freezes salaries for Members but not for other federal employees, and (2) indirectly, through broader pay freeze legislation that covers Members and other specified categories of federal employees.\nMembers of Congress last received a pay adjustment in January 2009. At that time, their salary was increased 2.8%, to $174,000. A provision in P.L. 111-8 prohibited any pay adjustment for 2010. Under the pay adjustment formula, Members were originally scheduled to receive an adjustment in January 2010 of 2.1%, although this would have been revised downward automatically to 1.5% to match the GS base pay adjustment. Members next were scheduled to receive a 0.9% pay adjustment in 2011. The pay adjustment was prohibited by P.L. 111-165. Additionally, P.L. 111-322 prevented any adjustment in GS base pay before December 31, 2012. Since the percentage adjustment in Member pay may not exceed the percentage adjustment in the base pay of GS employees, Member pay was also frozen during this period. If not limited by GS pay, Member pay could have been adjusted by 1.3% in 2012. The ECI formula established a maximum potential pay adjustment in January 2013 of 1.1%. P.L. 112-175 extended the freeze on GS pay rates for the duration of this continuing resolution, which also extended the Member freeze since the percentage adjustment in Member pay may not exceed the percentage adjustment in GS base pay. Subsequently, Member pay for 2013 was further frozen in P.L. 112-240. The maximum potential 2014 pay adjustment of 1.2%, or $2,100, was denied by P.L. 113-46. The maximum potential January 2015 Member pay adjustment was 1.6%, or $2,800. President Obama proposed a 1.0% increase in the base pay of GS employees, which would automatically have limited any Member pay adjustment to 1.0%. P.L. 113-235 contained a provision prohibiting any Member pay adjustment. The maximum potential January 2016 pay adjustment of 1.7%, or $3,000, would have been limited to 1.0%, or $1,700, due to the GS base pay increase. Member pay for 2016 was frozen by P.L. 114-113. The maximum potential January 2017 pay adjustment of 1.6%, or $2,800, would have been limited to 1.0%, or $1,700, due to the GS base pay increase. Member pay for 2017 was frozen by P.L. 114-254. The maximum potential January 2018 pay adjustment of 1.8%, or $3,100, was automatically limited to 1.4%, or $2,400, before being frozen by P.L. 115-141. The maximum potential January 2019 pay adjustment of 2.3%, or $4,000, was automatically limited to 1.4%, or $2,400, before being frozen at the 2009 level by P.L. 115-244. The maximum potential January 2020 pay adjustment is 2.6%, or $4,500.\nIf Members of Congress had received every adjustment prescribed by the ECI formula since 1992, and the 2 U.S.C. \u00a74501 limitation regarding the percentage base pay increase for GS employees remained unchanged, the 2019 salary would be $210,900. When adjusted for inflation, Member salaries have decreased 15% since the last pay adjustment in 2009.\nBoth the automatic annual adjustments and funding for Members' salaries are provided pursuant to other laws (2 U.S.C. \u00a74501)\u2014not the annual appropriations bills\u2014and a provision prohibiting a scheduled adjustment could be included in any bill, or introduced as a separate bill.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_141"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_142","query":"The FY2019 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, enacted as Division A of P.L. 115-245 , provides $667.3 billion in new budget authority to fund all activities of the Department of Defense (DOD) except for the construction of military facilities and the operation of military family housing complexes.\nWhile the total amount appropriated for DOD for FY2019 was nearly equal to the Administration's request, the act provides more funding than requested for dozens of weapons acquisition programs, with the gross increase exceeding $10 billion. Those additions are offset by hundreds of reductions made elsewhere within the budget request.\nIn effect, these reductions allowed Congress to add billions of dollars to the Administration's DOD budget request without exceeding the cap on defense spending that arose from the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ). That cap applies to discretionary appropriations for DOD's base budget \u2014that is, appropriations designated by Congress and the President as funding for emergencies or for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). OCO activities include current operations in Afghanistan and Syria, and any other operations which are so designated by Congress and the President.\nA House-Senate conference committee reported a version of the bill on September 13, 2018. The Senate approved the conference report on September 18 by a vote of 93-7 and the House did likewise on September 26 by a vote of 361-61. President Donald J. Trump signed the bill into law ( P.L. 115-245 ) on September 28, 2018.\nAs enacted, H.R. 6157 funds the Administration's major defense initiatives, including an increase of 16,500 active-duty military personnel. Among the weapons procurement programs for which the bill provides substantial additions add to the amounts requested are the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter used by the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps (77 aircraft requested and 93 funded) and the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (one requested and three funded).","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_142"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_143","query":"The Department of Defense (DOD) obligates more than $300 billion annually to buy goods and services, and to support research and development. Most of these acquisitions are governed by procurement statutes and regulations found in Title 10 (and parts of other select titles) of the United States Code, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement.\nUnder certain circumstances, DOD can enter into an other transaction (OT) agreement instead of a traditional contract. OT agreements are generally exempt from federal procurement laws and regulations. These exemptions grant government officials the flexibility to include, amend, or exclude contract clauses and requirements that are mandatory in traditional procurements (e.g., termination clauses, cost accounting standards, payments, audit requirements, intellectual property, and contract disputes). OT authorities also grant more flexibility to structure agreements in numerous ways, including joint ventures; partnerships; consortia; or multiple agencies joining together to fund an agreement encompassing multiple providers.\nOther transaction agreements are legally binding contracts; they are referred to as agreements to distinguish them from the traditional procurement contracts governed by the FAR and procurements laws. Other transaction authorities are set forth in two sections of law:\n10 U.S.C. 2371\u2014granting authority to use OTs for basic, applied, and advanced research projects. 10 U.S.C. 2371b\u2014granting authority to use OTs for prototype projects and follow-on production. Under this authority, a prototype project can only be conducted if at least one nontraditional defense contractor significantly participates in the project; all significant participants are small businesses or nontraditional defense contractors; at least one-third of the total cost of the prototype project is provided by nongovernment participants; or the senior procurement acquisition official provides a written justification for using an OT. Follow-on production can only be conducted when the underlying prototype OT was competitively awarded, and the prototype project was successfully completed.\nOTs have the potential to provide significant benefits to DOD, including\nattracting nontraditional contractors with promising technological capabilities to work with DOD, establishing a mechanism to pool resources with other entities to facilitate development of, and obtain, state-of-the-art dual-use technologies, and offering a unique mechanism for DOD to invest in, and influence the direction of, technology development.\nA number of analysts warn that along with the potential benefits come significant risks, including potentially diminished oversight and exemption from laws and regulations designed to protect government and taxpayer interests.\nIn FY2017, DOD obligated $2.1 billion on prototype OT agreements, representing less than 1% of contract obligations for the year. However, the use of OTs is expected to grow at a rapid pace, due in part to recent statutory changes expanding other transaction authorities.\nA number of analysts and officials have raised concerns that if DOD uses OTs in ways not intended by Congress\u2014or is perceived to abuse the authority\u2014Congress could clamp down on the authority. Generally, DOD lacks authoritative data that can be used to measure and evaluate the use of other transaction authorities.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_143"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_144","query":"Given the large potential impact broadband access may have on the economic development of rural America, concern has been raised over a \"digital divide\" between rural and urban or suburban areas with respect to broadband deployment. While there are many examples of rural communities with state-of-the-art telecommunications facilities, recent surveys and studies have indicated that, in general, rural areas tend to lag behind urban and suburban areas in broadband deployment.\nAccording to the Federal Communications Commission's Communications Marketplace Report, as of 2017, 24% of Americans in rural areas lacked coverage from fixed terrestrial 25 Mbps\/3 Mbps broadband, as compared to only 1.5% of Americans in urban areas. The comparatively lower population density of rural areas is likely a major reason why broadband is less deployed than in more highly populated suburban and urban areas. Particularly for wireline broadband technologies\u2014such as cable modem and fiber\u2014the greater the geographical distances among customers, the larger the cost to serve those customers.\nThe Rural Utilities Service (RUS) at the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) houses three ongoing assistance programs exclusively created and dedicated to financing broadband deployment: the Rural Broadband Access Loan and Loan Guarantee Program, the Community Connect Grant Program, and the ReConnect Program. Additionally, the Telecommunications Infrastructure Loan and Loan Guarantee Program (previously the Telephone Loan Program) funds broadband deployment in rural areas. Distance Learning and Telemedicine (DLT) grants\u2014while not principally supporting connectivity\u2014fund equipment and software that operate via telecommunications to rural end-users of telemedicine and distance learning applications.\nThe Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6) provided $5.83 million to subsidize a rural broadband loan level of $29.851 million, $30 million to Community Connect broadband grants, $47 million for DLT grants, and $1.725 million in loan subsidies for a total loan level of $690 million for the Telecommunications Infrastructure Loan and Loan Guarantee Program. P.L. 116-6 also provided $550 million for the ReConnect Program, which is in addition to the $600 million provided in the 2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act.\nThe Administration's FY2020 budget proposal requested zero funding for Rural Broadband Access Loans, $200 million for the ReConnect Program, $1.933 million in budget authority to subsidize a loan level of $690 million for Telecommunications Infrastructure Loans and Loan Guarantees, $30 million for Community Connect Grants, and $43.6 million for Distance Learning and Telemedicine Grants.\nOn December 20, 2018, the President signed the 2018 farm bill (P.L. 115-334, Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018). Regarding the RUS broadband programs, the act includes provisions authorizing a grant component in combination with the broadband loan program; increasing the annual authorization level from $25 million to $350 million; raising the proposed service area eligibility threshold of unserved households from 15% to 50% for broadband loans; authorizing grants, loans, and loan guarantees for middle mile infrastructure; directing improved federal agency broadband program coordination; and providing eligible applicants with technical assistance and training to prepare applications. In the 116th Congress, appropriations will determine the extent to which these programs will be funded.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_144"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_145","query":"The leaders of the legislative branch agencies and entities\u2014the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Library of Congress (LOC), the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the Government Publishing Office (GPO, formerly Government Printing Office), the Office of the Architect of the Capitol (AOC), the U.S. Capitol Police (USCP), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the Office of Compliance\u2014are appointed in a variety of manners.\nFour agencies are led by a person appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate; two are appointed by Congress; one is appointed by the Librarian of Congress; and one is appointed by a board of directors.\nCongress has periodically examined the procedures used to appoint these officers with the aim of protecting the prerogatives of, and ensuring accountability to, Congress within the framework of the advice and consent appointment process established in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution.\nThis report contains information on the legislative branch agency heads' appointment processes, length of tenures (if terms are set), reappointment or removal provisions (if any), salaries and benefits, and most recent appointments.\nThis report also briefly addresses legislation considered, but not enacted, in the 115th Congress to change the appointment process for the Register of Copyrights.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_145"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_146","query":"On January 6, 2011, after spending approximately $3 billion in developmental funding, the Marine Corps cancelled the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program due to poor reliability demonstrated during operational testing and excessive cost growth. Because the EFV was intended to replace the 40-year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), the Pentagon pledged to move quickly to develop a \"more affordable and sustainable\" vehicle to replace the EFV. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is intended to replace the AAV, incorporating some EFV capabilities but in a more practical and cost-efficient manner. In concert with the ACV, the Marines were developing the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) to serve as a survivable and mobile platform to transport Marines when ashore. The MPC was not intended to be amphibious like an AAV, EFV, or the ACV but instead would be required to have a swim capability for inland waterways such as rivers, lakes, and other water obstacles such as shore-to-shore operations in the littorals. Both vehicles were intended to play central roles in future Marine amphibious operations. On June 14, 2013, Marine leadership put the MPC program \"on ice\" due to budgetary pressures but suggested the program might be resurrected some 10 years down the road when budgetary resources might be more favorable.\nIn what was described as a \"drastic shift,\" the Marines decided to \"resurrect\" the MPC in March 2014. The Marines designated the MPC as ACV Increment 1.1 and planned to acquire about 200 vehicles. The Marines also plan to develop ACV Increment 1.2, a tracked, fully amphibious version, and at the time planned to acquire about 470 vehicles and fund an ongoing high water speed study. Although ACV Increment 1.1 is to have a swim capability, another mode of transport (ship or aircraft) would be required to get the vehicles from ship to shore. The Marines are reportedly exploring the possibility of developing a high water speed ACV 2.0, which could accompany tanks and light armored vehicles into combat.\nOn November 5, 2014, the Marines released a draft Request for Proposal (RFP) for ACV Increment 1.1. On November 24, 2015, the Marine Corps awarded BAE Systems and SAIC contracts to develop ACV 1.1 prototypes for evaluation. BAE's contract was for $103.8 million and SAIC's for $121.5 million, and each company was to build 16 prototypes to be tested over the next two years. Both BAE and SAIC delivered their prototypes early, and Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) testing began mid-March 2017. In early December 2017, the Marines reportedly sent the ACV 1.1 down select request for proposals to BAE and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC).\nOn June 19, 2018, the Marine Corps selected BAE Systems to produce the ACV. The initial contract\u2014valued at $198 million\u2014was for low-rate production of 30 vehicles to be delivered by the autumn of 2019. On April 10, 2019, during testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Navy and Marine Corps leadership announced that during the fall of 2018, ACV 1.1 prototypes demonstrated satisfactory water mobility performance in high surf conditions and, in doing so, met the full water mobility transition requirement for ACV 1.2 capability. As a result, ACV 1.1 and ACV 1.2 were to be consolidated into a single variant\u2014the ACV\u2014which is intended to replace all AAVs.\nPotential issues for Congress include the potential ramifications of the consolidation of the ACV 1.1 and ACV 1.2 programs and how the possible adoption of the Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) operational concept could affect the ACV program.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_146"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_147","query":"Congress currently appropriates most foreign affairs funding through annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations. Prior to FY2008, however, Congress provided funding for the Department of State, international broadcasting, and related programs within the Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies appropriations. In those years, Congress separately appropriated funding for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and foreign aid within the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs appropriations. The 110th Congress aligned the two foreign affairs appropriations into the SFOPS legislation.\nSFOPS appropriations since FY2001 have included enduring appropriations (ongoing or base funding), emergency supplemental appropriations, and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) appropriations. Total SFOPS funding levels in both current and constant dollars show a general upward trend, with FY2004 as the peak largely as a result of emergency supplemental appropriations for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds. When adjusted for inflation, annual foreign affairs appropriations have yet to surpass the FY2004 peak. The Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 and the Bipartisan Budget Acts (BBA) of 2015 and 2018 appear to have had an impact on both enduring and OCO funding levels.\nThe legislative history of SFOPS appropriations shows that nearly all foreign affairs appropriations measures within the past 25 years were passed within omnibus, consolidated, or full-year continuing resolutions, rather than in stand-alone bills. Moreover, many appropriations were passed after the start of the new fiscal year, at times more than half way into the new fiscal year. In many fiscal years, SFOPS appropriations included emergency supplemental funding or, since FY2012, OCO funding.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_147"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_148","query":"Dining facilities in the Capitol and in House and Senate office buildings provide an essential convenience for Members of Congress and congressional staff, enabling them to easily obtain meals, beverages, and snacks, and quickly return to work. By providing an efficient way to meet congressional dining needs during unpredictable workdays, the restaurant systems help facilitate the legislative and representational work of Congress. These restaurants also provide spaces for constituents and other visitors to meet with staff and Members of Congress, or to purchase refreshments. House and Senate restaurant services are also available to provide catering to Members of Congress when they host events on Capitol grounds. The restaurants remain a subject of ongoing congressional interest, as many Members and staff visit them on a daily basis.\nThose involved with restaurant administration in the House and Senate have often considered how management choices affect operating costs, services available, oversight, and other elements of the restaurant systems. For much of their histories, the House and Senate operated their own restaurants, but since 1994 in the House and since 2008 in the Senate, private vendors have run the restaurants. In August 2015, the House entered an agreement with Sodexo to operate the 17 facilities in the House restaurant system, subject to direction from the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) and the Committee on House Administration. In December 2015, the Senate entered a new contract with Restaurant Associates to operate the 12 facilities in the Senate restaurant system, subject to direction from the Architect of the Capitol (AOC) and the Committee on Rules and Administration.\nMany argue that this professional restaurant management experience is necessary to meet the variety of customer needs in the House and Senate restaurants in a cost-effective manner. Numerous nearby eateries compete with the congressional restaurants for customers. Often, an advantage the House and Senate restaurants are able to provide is convenience for Members, staff, and visitors. This advantage, however, may be undermined if the restaurants are not responsive to customer input and are unable to provide consistent food quality, sufficient variety, or reasonably priced service, relative to their competitors.\nFood and price issues, along with other day-to-day operational issues, including personnel matters, are largely the responsibility of the restaurant contractors. Some Members and observers have raised concerns about the degree of accountability for the House and Senate restaurant contractors, believing that the restaurants' administration reflects upon Congress and that the restaurants should set an example for other businesses to follow. Although the House and Senate are responsible for restaurant oversight, the delegation of restaurant operations to private contractors means the chambers have less control over employee wages and benefits, procurement, or other business decisions that affect the restaurant systems.\nThe combination of entities involved in House and Senate dining operations creates a unique organizational arrangement, unlike other institutional dining systems. Other features of Congress also distinguish the House and Senate restaurants from similar-seeming restaurant operations. The restaurants' business volume, for example, is highly contingent on the congressional calendar, consisting of a fairly constant weekday breakfast and lunch business, but experiencing substantial, and sometimes unexpected, decreases if Congress adjourns for a recess. Information specific to the House and Senate restaurant systems may therefore be of particular interest to those concerned with their operations. Additional background and context on House and Senate restaurant operations is found in CRS Report R44600, History of House and Senate Restaurants: Context for Current Operations and Issues, by Sarah J. Eckman.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_148"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_149","query":"The low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC) program is one of the federal government's primary policy tools for encouraging the development and rehabilitation of affordable rental housing. These nonrefundable federal housing tax credits are awarded to developers of qualified rental projects via a competitive application process administered by state housing finance authorities. Developers typically sell their tax credits to outside investors in exchange for equity in the project. Selling the tax credits reduces the debt developers would otherwise have to incur and the equity they would otherwise have to contribute. With lower financing costs, tax credit properties can potentially offer lower, more affordable rents. The LIHTC is estimated to cost the government an average of approximately $9.9 billion annually.\nIn late 2017, there was a revision to the Internal Revenue Code (P.L. 115-97) that substantially changed the federal tax system. The revision did not directly alter the LIHTC program; however, there had been early reports of downward pressure on tax credit demand stemming from the 2017 tax revision.\nMost recently, the 2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 115-141) made two changes to the LIHTC program. First, the act modified the so-called \"income test,\" which determines the maximum income an LIHTC tenant may have. Previously, each individual tenant was required to have an income below one of two threshold options (either 50% or 60% of area median gross income, depending on an election made by the property owner). With the modification, property owners may use a third income test option that allows them to average the income of tenants when determining whether the income restriction is satisfied. Second, the act also increased the amount of credits available to states each year by 12.5% for years 2018 through 2021.\nThis report will be updated as warranted by legislative changes.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_149"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_150","query":"Federal law requires a sentencing judge to impose a minimum sentence of imprisonment following conviction for any of a number of federal offenses. Congress has created three exceptions. Two are available in any case where the prosecutor asserts that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the criminal investigation or prosecution of another. The other, commonly referred to as the safety valve, is available, without the government's approval, for a handful of the more commonly prosecuted drug trafficking and unlawful possession offenses that carry minimum sentences.\nQualification for the substantial assistance exceptions is ordinarily only possible upon the motion of the government. In rare cases, the court may compel the government to file such a motion when the defendant can establish that the refusal to do so was based on constitutionally invalid considerations, or was in derogation of a plea bargain obligation or was the product of bad faith.\nQualification for the safety valve exception requires a defendant to satisfy five criteria. His past criminal record must be minimal; he must not have been a leader, organizer, or supervisor in the commission of the offense; he must not have used violence in the commission of the offense, and the offense must not have resulted in serious injury; and prior to sentencing, he must tell the government all that he knows of the offense and any related misconduct.\nIn response to a congressional request, the U.S. Sentencing Commission recommended expansion of the safety valve. The First Step Act, P.L. 115-391, broadened the safety valve for the benefit of (1) defendants with slightly more serious criminal records and (2) defendants convicted under the Maritime Drug Enforcement Act.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_150"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_151","query":"The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is being developed by the Army and the Marine Corps as a successor to the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), which has been in service since 1985. On October 28, 2008, awards were made for the JLTV Technology Development (TD) Phase to three industry teams: (1) BAE Systems, (2) the team of Lockheed Martin and General Tactical Vehicle, and (3) AM General and General Dynamics Land Systems.\nOn January 26, 2012, the Army issued the Request for Proposal (RFP) for the JLTV's Engineering Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase. Up to three EMD contracts scheduled for June could have been awarded. The period of performance for EMD contracts was 27 months, and the overall EMD phase was scheduled to last 33 months. Vendors were required to provide 22 JLTV prototypes for testing 12 months after contract award. The target cost for the base vehicle was $250,000, excluding add-on armor and other kits.\nOn August 22, 2012, the Army announced the award of three firm-fixed price JLTV EMD contracts totaling approximately $185 million. The three companies awarded the EMD contracts were AM General, LLC (South Bend, IN); Lockheed Martin Corporation (Grand Prairie, TX); and Oshkosh Corporation (Oshkosh, WI).\nOn September 3, 2013, the Army began JLTV testing at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; Yuma, AZ; and Redstone Arsenal, AL. The Army planned to select a single vendor by 2015, with the first Army brigade being equipped with JLTVs by 2018. FY2015 program plans anticipated a Milestone C (Production and Deployment Phase Approval) decision in the fourth quarter of FY2015, followed by Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP).\nOn August 25, 2015, it was announced the Army had awarded Oshkosh a $6.7 billion low rate initial production (LRIP) contract with eight options to procure the initial 16,901 vehicles for the Army and Marines. The JLTV is being produced in Oshkosh, WI.\nIt is also reported the Army plans to use the JLTV as the interim platform for its upcoming Light Reconnaissance Vehicle (LRV) program instead of procuring a new system. The British Army is reportedly trying to acquire 2,747 JLTVs through Foreign Military Sales (FMS). The Marines have also reportedly increased their JLTV requirement for a total of 9,091 JLTVs. The Air Force and Navy are also procuring a limited number of JLTVs for use.\nA redacted May 2, 2018, DOD Inspector General (IG) report noted the services have not demonstrated effective test results to prepare the JLTV program for full rate production, but the JLTV Program Office has plans to address this concern. The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) FY2018 Annual Report notes among other findings that JLTVs are not operationally suitable because of deficiencies in reliability, maintainability, training, manuals, crew situational awareness, and safety. Reportedly, the Army has decided to delay JLTV full-rate production, previously scheduled for December 2018, until the early summer of 2019 in order to assess options for vehicle design changes. On March 14, 2019, Army leadership reportedly announced the Army was lowering its overall requirement for JLTVs by 1,900 vehicles in order to free up funding for modernization.\nThe FY2020 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) and Procurement JLTV budget request for all four services is $1.641 billion for 4,090 vehicles. Potential issues for Congress include (1) the possible examination of the DOD Inspector General's Report and DOT&E's FY2018 Annual Report findings and full-rate JLTV production, (2) the potential consequences of a delayed full-rate JLTV production decision, and (3) implications of the Army's new top-line JLTV requirement.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_151"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_152","query":"The size of the U.S. bilateral trade deficit with China has been and continues to be an important issue in bilateral trade relations. President Trump and some Members of Congress view the deficit as a sign of unfair economic policies in China. The Trump Administration has reportedly asked China to develop a plan to reduce the bilateral trade deficit by $100 billion. In the 116th Congress, the Fair Trade with China Enforcement Act (H.R. 704 and S. 2) and the United States Reciprocal Trade Act (H.R. 764) mention U.S. trade deficits as a reason for the proposed legislation.\nThere is a large and growing difference between the official trade statistics released by the United States and the People's Republic of China. According to the United States, the 2018 bilateral merchandise trade deficit with China was $419.2 billion. According to China, its trade surplus with the United States was $323.3 billion\u2014a $95.9 billion difference.\nThis report examines the differences in the trade data from the two nations in two ways. First, it compares the trade figures using the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (Harmonized System) to discern any patterns in the discrepancies between the U.S. and Chinese data. This comparison reveals that more than 94% of the difference in the value of China's exports to the United States in 2018 was attributable to five types of goods. Those five types of goods, in order of the size of the discrepancy, were electrical machinery, machinery, toys and sporting goods, optical and medical equipment, and footwear.\nThe second approach to examining the differing trade data involves a review of the existing literature on the technical and non-technical sources of the trade data discrepancies. The literature reveals that the leading sources of the discrepancies are differences in the list value of shipments when they leave China and when they enter the United States, and differing attributions of origin and destination of Chinese exports that are transshipped through a third location (such as Hong Kong) before arriving in the United States.\nIn light of the differences in the official bilateral merchandise trade data, the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) established a statistical working group in 2004. The working group has released two reconciliation studies (in 2009 and 2012) to identify the causes of the statistical discrepancies. The Working Group stated that the adjustments contained in the two studies are not meant to imply errors in the official statistics of either country.\nThis report is updated annually, after the release of official trade data by China and the United States.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_152"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_153","query":"Charging fees for grazing private livestock on federal lands is a long-standing but contentious practice. Generally, livestock producers who use federal lands want to keep fees low, whereas conservation groups believe fees should be increased. The current formula for determining the grazing fee for lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest Service (FS) was established in the Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978 (PRIA) and continued by a 1986 executive order issued by President Reagan. The fee is based on grazing of a specified number of animals for one month, known as an animal unit month (AUM). The fee is set annually under a formula that uses a base value per AUM. The base value is adjusted by three factors\u2014the lease rates for grazing on private lands, beef cattle prices, and the cost of livestock production.\nFor 2019, BLM and FS are charging a grazing fee of $1.35 per AUM. This fee is in effect from March 1, 2019, through February 29, 2020, and is the minimum allowed. Since 1981, when BLM and FS began charging the same grazing fee, the fee has ranged from $1.35 per AUM (for about half the years) to $2.31 per AUM (for 1981). The average fee during the period was $1.55 per AUM. In recent decades, grazing fee reform has occasionally been considered by Congress or proposed by the President, but no fee changes have been adopted.\nThe grazing fees collected by each agency essentially are divided between the agency, Treasury, and states\/localities. The agency portion is deposited in a range betterment fund in the Treasury and is subject to appropriation by Congress. The agencies use these funds for on-the-ground activities, such as range rehabilitation and fence construction. Under law, BLM and FS allocate the remaining collections differently between the Treasury and states\/localities.\nIssues for Congress include whether to retain the current grazing fee or alter the charges for grazing on federal lands. The current BLM and FS grazing fee is generally lower than fees charged for grazing on state and private lands. Comparing the BLM and FS fee with state and private fees is complicated, due to factors including the purposes for which fees are charged, the quality of the resources on the lands being grazed, and whether the federal grazing fee alone or other nonfee costs are considered.\nUnauthorized grazing occurs on BLM and FS lands in a variety of ways, including when cattle graze outside the allowed areas or seasons or in larger numbers than allowed under permit. In some cases, livestock owners have intentionally grazed cattle on federal land without getting a permit or paying the required fee. The agencies have responded at times by fining the owners, as well as by impounding and selling the trespassing cattle. BLM continues to seek a judicial resolution to a long-standing controversy involving cattle grazed by Cliven Bundy on lands in Nevada.\nThere have been efforts to end livestock grazing in specific areas through voluntary retirement of permits and leases and subsequent closure of the allotments to grazing. Congress has enacted some such proposals. Congress also has considered measures to reduce or end grazing in specified states or to allow a maximum number of permits to be waived yearly. Among other reasons, such measures have been supported to protect range resources but opposed as diminishing ranching operations.\nAnother issue involves expiring grazing permits. Both BLM and FS have a backlog of permits needing evaluation for renewal. To allow for continuity in grazing operations, P.L. 113-291 made permanent the automatic renewal (until the evaluation process is complete) of permits and leases that expire or are transferred. The law provided that the issuance of a grazing permit \"may\" be categorically excluded from environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) under certain conditions. NEPA categorical exclusions have been controversial.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_153"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_154","query":"This report presents a profile of the membership of the 116th Congress (2019-2020) as of March 7, 2019. Statistical information is included on selected characteristics of Members, including data on party affiliation, average age, occupation, education, length of congressional service, religious affiliation, gender, ethnicity, foreign birth, and military service.\nIn the House of Representatives, there are 239 Democrats (including 4 Delegates), 199 Republicans (including 1 Delegate and the Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico), and 3 vacant seats. The Senate has 53 Republicans, 45 Democrats, and 2 Independents, who both caucus with the Democrats. Additionally\nThe average age of Members of the House at the beginning of the 116th Congress was 57.6 years; of Senators, 62.9 years. The overwhelming majority, 96%, of Members of Congress have a college education. The dominant professions of Members are public service\/politics, business, and law. Most Members identify as Christians, and the collective majority of these affiliate with a Protestant denomination. Roman Catholics account for the largest single religious denomination, and numerous other affiliations are represented, including Jewish, Mormon, Buddhist, Muslim, Hindu, Greek Orthodox, Pentecostal Christian, Unitarian Universalist, and Adventist. The average length of service for Representatives at the beginning of the 116th Congress was 8.6 years (4.3 House terms); for Senators, 10.1 years (1.7 Senate terms). A record 131 women serve in the 116th Congress: 106 in the House, including 3 Delegates and the Resident Commissioner, and 25 in the Senate. There are 55 African American Members of the House and 3 in the Senate. This House number includes two Delegates. There are 50 Hispanic or Latino Members (a record number) serving: 45 in the House, including 2 Delegates and the Resident Commissioner, and 5 in the Senate. There are 20 Members (14 Representatives, 3 Delegates, and 3 Senators) who are Asian Americans, Indian Americans, or Pacific Islander Americans. This is also a record number. A record four American Indians (Native Americans) serve in the House.\nThe portions of this report covering political party affiliation, gender, ethnicity, and vacant seats may be updated as events warrant. The remainder of the report will not be updated.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_154"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_155","query":"The Constitution grants Congress the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States\u2014one part of its power of the purse\u2014and thus mandates that Congress exercise control over federal debt. Control of debt policy has at times provided Congress with a means of raising concerns regarding fiscal policies. Debates over federal fiscal policy have been especially animated in the past decade, in part because of the accumulation of federal debt in the wake of the 2007-2008 financial crisis and subsequent recession. Rising debt levels, along with continued differences in views of fiscal policy, led to a series of contentious debt limit episodes in recent years.\nThe most recent suspension of the debt limit lapsed after March 1, 2019. The limit was then reset at $21.988 trillion, a level that accommodates federal obligations incurred during the suspension period. U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin invoked extraordinary authorities on March 4, 2019. CBO estimates that Treasury could meet federal obligations until just before or just after October 1, 2019. One private estimate suggests Treasury could cover federal payments until mid-August, if not later. Such estimates are subject to considerable uncertainty.\nThe 2011 debt limit episode was resolved on August 2, 2011, when President Obama signed the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; S. 365; P.L. 112-25). The BCA included provisions aimed at deficit reduction and allowing the debt limit to rise in three stages, the latter two subject to congressional disapproval. Once the BCA was enacted, a presidential certification triggered a $400 billion increase. A second certification led to a $500 billion increase on September 22, 2011, and a third, $1,200 billion increase took place on January 28, 2012.\nFederal debt again reached its limit on December 31, 2012. Extraordinary measures were again used to allow payment of government obligations until February 4, 2013, when H.R. 325, which suspended the debt limit until May 19, 2013, was signed into law (P.L. 113-3), which reset extraordinary measures. On October 16, 2013, enactment of a continuing resolution (H.R. 2775; P.L. 113-46) resolved a funding lapse and suspended the debt limit through February 7, 2014. On February 15, 2014, a measure to suspend the debt limit (S. 540; P.L. 113-83) through March 15, 2015, was enacted. On November 2, 2015, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA2015; H.R. 1314; P.L. 114-74) was enacted, which suspended the debt limit through March 15, 2017, and relaxed some discretionary spending limits.\nOn March 16, 2017, the debt limit was reset at $19,809 billion, and Treasury Secretary Mnuchin notified Congress that he had invoked authorities to use extraordinary measures. On September 6, 2017, an agreement on the debt limit and a continuing resolution was announced between President Trump and congressional leaders. Two days later a measure (P.L. 115-56) was enacted to implement that agreement, which included a suspension of the debt limit through December 8, 2017. Once that suspension lapsed\u2014with a new debt limit set at $20,456 billion\u2014Treasury Secretary Mnuchin invoked authorities to employ extraordinary measures, which estimates had suggested would last until early March. The debt limit issue was addressed when the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. 115-123) was enacted on February 9, 2018. Section 30301 of the BBA 2018 suspended the debt limit through March 1, 2019.\nTotal federal debt increases when the government sells debt to the public to finance budget deficits, which adds to debt held by the public, or when the federal government issues debt to certain government accounts, such as the Social Security, Medicare, and Transportation trust funds, in exchange for their reported surpluses\u2014which adds to debt held by government accounts; or when new federal loans outpace loan repayments. The sum of debt held by the public and debt held by government accounts is the total federal debt. Surpluses reduce debt held by the public, while deficits raise it.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_155"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_156","query":"The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act) authorizes the President to issue two types of declarations that could potentially provide federal assistance to states and localities in response to a terrorist attack: a \"major disaster declaration\" or an \"emergency declaration.\" Major disaster declarations authorize a wide range of federal assistance to states, local governments, tribal nations, individuals and households, and certain nonprofit organizations to recover from a catastrophic event. Major disaster declarations also make Small Business Administration (SBA) disaster loans available to eligible businesses and households. Emergency declarations authorize a more limited range of federal assistance to protect property and public health and safety, and to lessen or avert the threat of a major disaster. Only private nonprofit organizations are eligible for disaster loans under an emergency declaration.\nThe Stafford Act has been used to provide assistance in response to terrorist attacks in the past including the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City, the September 11, 2001, attacks, and the 2013 Boston Marathon attack. Nevertheless, the tactics used in recent incidents such as the 2015 San Bernardino, CA, and the 2016 Orlando, FL, mass shootings, and the 2016 Ohio State University vehicular and knife attack, have brought to light two main challenges that might prevent certain types of terrorist incidents from receiving the wider assistance provided under a major disaster declaration:\nthe major disaster definition lists specific incident types that are eligible for federal assistance. Past terrorist incidents were considered major disasters, in part, because they resulted in fires and explosions. Incidents without a fire or an explosion may not meet the definition of a major disaster; and the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) recommendation to the President to issue a major disaster declaration is mainly based on damage amounts to public infrastructure compared to the state's population. Terrorist incidents with a large loss of life but limited damage to public infrastructure may not meet this criterion.\nSome may argue that terrorist incidents warrant the wider range of assistance provided by a major disaster declaration, and advocate for changes to the Stafford Act and FEMA policies to make all acts of terrorism eligible for major disaster assistance. Others may disagree and argue that Stafford Act should not be altered for the following reasons:\nregardless of cause, state and local governments should be the main source of assistance if damages are limited; if the incident does not qualify for major disaster assistance, it could still be eligible for limited assistance under an emergency declaration.\nAdvocates of changing the Stafford Act may argue that emergency declaration assistance is too limited. For example, parts of FEMA's Individual Assistance (IA) program, which provides various forms of help for families and individuals, are not available without a major disaster declaration. Another concern is the limited availability of SBA disaster loans under an emergency declaration. Advocates might therefore argue that changes to the Stafford Act are needed to make it easier for certain terror attacks to qualify for major disaster assistance. These include\nexpanding the major disaster definition to include terror incidents that do not involve fires and explosions; requiring FEMA to use additional metrics when making major disaster recommendations; and\/or extending the availability of certain IA programs and SBA disaster loans under an emergency declaration.\nThis report provides an overview of emergency and major disaster declarations and explains how they might be used in the aftermath of a terrorist incident that does not involve a fire or an explosion, such as high casualty mass shootings or chemical gas attacks. This report also provides an overview of Stafford Act assistance provided for past terrorist incidents.\nThis report will be updated as events warrant.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_156"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_157","query":"A key U.S. ally in the Latin American region, Colombia endured an internal armed conflict for half a century. Drug trafficking fueled the violence by funding both left-wing and right-wing armed groups. Some analysts feared Colombia would become a failed state in the late 1990s, but the Colombian government devised a new security strategy, known as Plan Colombia, to counter the insurgencies. Originally designed as a 6-year program, Plan Colombia ultimately became a 17-year U.S.-Colombian bilateral effort. The partnership focused initially on counternarcotics and later on counterterrorism; it then broadened to include sustainable development, human rights, trade, regional security, and many other areas of cooperation. Between FY2000 and FY2016, the U.S. Congress appropriated more than $10 billion to help fund Plan Colombia and its follow-on programs. For FY2018, Congress appropriated $391.3 million in foreign aid for Colombia, including assistance to promote peace and end the conflict.\nPresident Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) made concluding a peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)\u2014the country's largest leftist guerrilla organization\u2014his government's primary focus. Following four years of formal peace negotiations, Colombia's Congress ratified the FARC-government peace accord in November 2016. During a U.N.-monitored demobilization effort in 2017, approximately 11,000 FARC disarmed and demobilized. This figure included FARC who had been held in prison for crimes of rebellion and those making up FARC militias, who were accredited by the Colombian government as eligible to demobilize.\nOn August 7, 2018, Iv\u00e1n Duque, a senator from the conservative Democratic Center party, was inaugurated to a four-year presidential term. Duque, who also worked at the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington, DC, and is Colombia's youngest president in a century, campaigned as a critic of the peace accord with the FARC. His party objected to specific measures concerning justice and political representation. Some observers maintain that his election has generated uncertainty for implementation of the accord. Shortly after taking office, Duque suspended peace talks with the National Liberation Army (ELN), the country's second-largest rebel group, which had begun under President Santos.\nSince the ratification of the peace accord, Colombia's long-term strategy has evolved from defeating insurgents to post-conflict stabilization. Many considered Plan Colombia and its successor strategies a remarkable advance, given the country's improvements in security and economic stability. Nevertheless, recent developments have called into question Colombia's progress. The FARC's demobilization has triggered open conflict among armed actors (including FARC dissidents and transnational criminal groups), which seek to control drug cultivation and trafficking, illegal mining, and other illicit businesses that the demobilized FARC abandoned. The ongoing lack of governance in remote rural areas recalls the conditions that originally gave rise to the FARC and other armed groups.\nMany observers continue to raise concerns about the country's human-rights conditions, sharp increases in coca cultivation and cocaine production, and problems stemming from the failing authoritarian government of neighboring Venezuela, which shares a nearly 1,400-mile border with Colombia. Venezuela's humanitarian crisis has set in motion an exodus of migrants, many of whom have sought temporary residence (or extended stays) in Colombia. Political upheaval has added yet more uncertainty after the United States and many other Western Hemisphere and European nations, including Colombia, called for a democratic transition in Venezuela and recognized the president of the Venezuelan National Assembly, Juan Guaid\u00f3, as the country's interim president in January 2019.\nThe U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement went into force in May 2012. The United States remains Colombia's top trade partner. After several years of annual growth exceeding 4%, one of the steadiest expansion rates in the region, Colombia grew by an estimated 2.7% in 2018. The FARC-government peace accord is projected to cost more than $40 billion to implement over 15 years, adding to the polarization over the controversial peace process.\nFor additional background, see CRS In Focus IF10817, Colombia's 2018 Elections, CRS Report R44779, Colombia's Changing Approach to Drug Policy, CRS Report R42982, Colombia's Peace Process Through 2016, and CRS Report RL34470, The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Background and Issues.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_157"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_158","query":"CVN-78, CVN-79, CVN-80, and CVN-81 are the first four ships in the Navy's new Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs).\nCVN-78 (Gerald R. Ford) was procured in FY2008. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget estimates the ship's procurement cost at $13,084.0 million (i.e., about $13.1 billion) in then-year dollars. The ship received advance procurement (AP) funding in FY2001-FY2007 and was fully funded in FY2008-FY2011 using congressionally authorized four-year incremental funding. To help cover cost growth on the ship, the ship received an additional $1,394.9 million in FY2014-FY2016 and FY2018 cost-to-complete procurement funding. The ship was delivered to the Navy on May 31, 2017, and was commissioned into service on July 22, 2017. The Navy is currently working to complete construction, testing, and certification of the ship's 11 weapons elevators.\nCVN-79 (John F. Kennedy) was procured in FY2013. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget estimates the ship's procurement cost at $11,327.4 million (i.e., about $11.3 billion) in then-year dollars. The ship received AP funding in FY2007-FY2012, and was fully funded in FY2013-FY2018 using congressionally authorized six-year incremental funding. The ship is scheduled for delivery to the Navy in September 2024.\nCVN-80 (Enterprise) and CVN-81 (not yet named) are being procured under a two-ship block buy contract that was authorized by Section 121(a)(2) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (H.R. 5515\/P.L. 115-232 of August 13, 2018). The provision permitted the Navy to add CVN-81 to the existing contract for building CVN-80 after the Department of Defense (DOD) made certain certifications to Congress. DOD made the certifications on December 31, 2018, and the Navy announced the award of the contract on January 31, 2019. Compared to the estimated procurement costs for CVN-80 and CVN-81 in the Navy's FY2019 budget submission, the Navy estimates under its FY2020 budget submission that the two-ship block buy contract will reduce the cost of CVN-80 by $246.6 million and the cost of CVN-81 by $2,637.3 million, for a combined reduction of $2,883.9 million (i.e., about $2.9 billion). Using higher estimated baseline costs for CVN-80 and CVN-81 taken from a December 2017 Navy business case analysis, the Navy estimates under its FY2020 budget submission that the two-ship contract will reduce the cost of CVN-80 by $770.9 million and the cost of CVN-81 by $3,086.3 million, for a combined reduction of $3,857.2 million (i.e., about $3.9 billion).\nCVN-80 was procured in FY2018. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget estimates the ship's procurement cost at $12,335.1 million (i.e., about $12.3 billion) in then-year dollars. The ship received AP funding in FY2016 and FY2017, and the Navy plans to fully fund the ship in FY2018-FY2025 using incremental funding authorized by Section 121(c) of P.L. 115-232. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests $1,062.0 million in procurement funding for the ship. The ship is scheduled for delivery to the Navy in March 2028.\nPrior to the awarding of the two-ship block buy contract, CVN-81 was scheduled to be procured in FY2023. Following the awarding of the two-ship block buy contract, the Navy has chosen to show CVN-81 in its FY2020 budget submission as a ship to be procured in FY2020 (as opposed to a ship that was procured in FY2019). The Navy's FY2020 budget submission estimates the ship's procurement cost at $12,450.7 million (i.e., about $12.5 billion) in then-year dollars. The Navy plans to fully fund the ship beginning in FY2019 and extending beyond FY2026 using incremental funding authorized by Section 121(c) of P.L. 115-232. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests $1,285.0 million in procurement funding for the ship. The ship is scheduled for delivery to the Navy in February 2032.\nThe Navy's FY2020 budget submission proposed to not fund the mid-life nuclear refueling overhaul (called a Refueling Complex Overhaul, or RCOH) for the aircraft carrier CVN-75 (Harry S. Truman), and to instead retire the ship around FY2024 and also deactivate one of the Navy's carrier air wings at about the same time. On April 30, 2019, however, the Administration announced that it was effectively withdrawing this proposal from the Navy's FY2020 budget submission. The Administration now supports funding the CVN-75 RCOH and keeping CVN-75 (and by implication its associated air wing) in service past FY2024.\nOversight issues for Congress for the CVN-78 program include the following:\nDOD's decision to show CVN-81 in its FY2020 budget submission as a ship to be procured in FY2020, instead of a ship that was procured in FY2019; the Navy's decision, as part of its FY2020 budget submission, to not accelerate the scheduled procurement of CVN-82 from FY2028 to an earlier fiscal year; whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 procurement funding request for the CVN-78 program; the date for achieving the Navy's 12-ship force-level goal for aircraft carriers; cost growth in the CVN-78 program, Navy efforts to stem that growth, and Navy efforts to manage costs so as to stay within the program's cost caps; Navy efforts to complete the construction, testing, and certification of the weapons elevators on CVN-78; additional CVN-78 program issues that were raised in a December 2018 report from the Department of Defense's (DOD's) Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E); additional CVN-78 program issues that were raised in a May 2019 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on DOD weapon systems; whether the Navy should shift at some point from procuring large-deck, nuclear-powered carriers like the CVN-78 class to procuring smaller aircraft carriers.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_158"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_159","query":"For the last several years, Central American migrant families have arrived at the U.S.-Mexico border in relatively large numbers, many seeking asylum. While some request asylum at U.S. ports of entry, others do so after entering the United States \"without inspection\" (i.e., illegally) between U.S. ports of entry. On May 7, 2018, the Department of Justice (DOJ) implemented a \"zero tolerance\" policy toward illegal border crossing both to discourage illegal migration into the United States and to reduce the burden of processing asylum claims that Administration officials contend are often fraudulent.\nUnder the zero tolerance policy, DOJ prosecuted all adult aliens apprehended crossing the border illegally, with no exception for asylum seekers or those with minor children. DOJ's policy represented a change in the level of enforcement of an existing statute rather than a change in statute or regulation. Prior Administrations prosecuted illegal border crossings relatively infrequently.\nCriminally prosecuting adults for illegal border crossing requires detaining them in federal criminal facilities where children are not permitted. While DOJ and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have broad statutory authority to detain adult aliens, children must be detained according to guidelines established in the Flores Settlement Agreement (FSA), the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008. A 2015 judicial ruling held that children remain in family immigration detention for no more than 20 days. If parents cannot be released with them, children are treated as unaccompanied alien children and transferred to the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS's) Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) for care and custody.\nThe widely publicized family separations were a consequence of the Trump Administration's zero tolerance policy, not the result of an explicit family separation policy. Since the zero tolerance policy was implemented, up to 3,000 children may have been separated from their parents. In addition, thousands more were separated prior to the public announcement of the policy change.\nFollowing mostly critical public reaction, President Trump issued an executive order on June 20, 2018, mandating that DHS maintain custody of alien families during the pendency of any criminal trial or immigration proceedings. DHS Customs and Border Protection (CBP) subsequently stopped referring most illegal border crossers to DOJ for criminal prosecution. A federal judge then mandated that all separated children be promptly reunited with their families. Another rejected DOJ's request to modify the FSA to extend the 20-day child detention guideline. DHS has since reverted to some prior immigration enforcement policies, and family separations continue to occur based upon DHS enforcement protocols in place prior to the 2018 zero tolerance policy.\nAdministration officials and immigration enforcement advocates argue that measures like the zero tolerance policy are necessary to discourage migrants from coming to the United States and submitting fraudulent asylum requests. They maintain that alien family separation resulting from the prosecution of illegal border crossers mirrors that which occurs regularly under the U.S. criminal justice system policy where adults with custody of minor children are charged with a crime and may be held in jail, effectively separating them from their children.\nImmigrant advocates contend that migrant families are fleeing legitimate threats from countries with exceptionally high rates of gang violence, and that family separations resulting from the zero tolerance policy are cruel and violate fundamental human rights\u2014such as the ability to request asylum. They maintain that the zero tolerance policy was hastily implemented and lacked planning for family reunification following criminal prosecutions. Some observers question the Trump Administration's capacity to marshal sufficient resources to prosecute all illegal border crossers without additional resources. Others criticize the family separation policy in light of less expensive alternatives to detention.\nIn prior years, most individuals apprehended were single adult males. Family unit apprehensions, which increased from just over 11,000 in FY2012 to 99,901 in the first four months of FY2019, and apprehensions of unaccompanied alien children are occurring within the context of otherwise relatively low historical levels of total alien apprehensions. In addition, the national origin of recently apprehended family units and unaccompanied children has shifted to mostly Central American from long-term trends of mostly Mexican.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_159"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_160","query":"The House Office of Congressional Ethics (OCE) was established on March 11, 2008, with the passage of H.Res. 895. It was most recently reauthorized by the House as part of the rules package (H.Res. 6) adopted by the 116th Congress on January 3, 2019.\nThe office's establishment followed years of efforts by groups within and outside Congress to create an independent entity to investigate allegations of misconduct by Members, officers, and employees of Congress. During the 110th Congress (2007-2008), Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and Minority Leader John Boehner created the bipartisan Special Task Force on Ethics Enforcement, chaired by Representative Michael Capuano, to consider whether the House should create an \"outside\" ethics-enforcement entity. The task force worked for nearly a year before issuing its recommendations for the creation of the OCE.\nThe mandate of the OCE, which has jurisdiction only in the House, is to review information, and when appropriate, refer findings of fact to the House Committee on Ethics. Only this committee, pursuant to House rules, has the authority to recommend House discipline of Members and staff. Information of alleged wrongdoing by Members, officers, and employees of the House may be accepted by the OCE from the general public, but only the OCE board can initiate a review.\nThe OCE is composed of six board members, and at least two alternates, each of whom serves a four-year term. The Speaker and the minority leader are each responsible for the appointment of three board members and one alternate. The chair is selected by the Speaker and a co-chair is selected by the minority leader. Current Members of the House, federal employees, and lobbyists are not eligible to serve on the board.\nOCE rules for the conduct of investigations and code of conduct can be found at their website, https:\/\/oce.house.gov.\nThis report describes the history and rationale behind the creation of the OCE, its operations, its relationship with the House Committee on Ethics, and options potentially available for Congress if further amendments to the House ethics process are desired.\nFor additional information, please refer to CRS Report RL30764, Enforcement of Congressional Rules of Conduct: A Historical Overview, by Jacob R. Straus; CRS Report RL30650, Senate Select Committee on Ethics: A Brief History of Its Evolution and Jurisdiction, by Jacob R. Straus; and CRS Report 98-15, House Committee on Ethics: A Brief History of Its Evolution and Jurisdiction, by Jacob R. Straus.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_160"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_161","query":"The Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program is a program to acquire three new heavy polar icebreakers, to be followed years from now by the acquisition of up to three new medium polar icebreakers. On April 23, 2019, the Coast Guard-Navy Integrated Program Office for the PSC program awarded a $745.9 million fixed-price, incentive-firm contract for the detail design and construction (DD&C) of the first PSC to VT Halter Marine of Pascagoula, MS, a shipyard owned by Singapore Technologies (ST) Engineering. VT Halter was the leader of one of three industry teams that competed for the DD&C contract. The first PSC is scheduled to begin construction in 2021 and be delivered in 2024, though the DD&C contract includes financial incentives for earlier delivery.\nThe DD&C contract includes options for building the second and third PSCs. If these options are exercised, the total value of the contract would increase to $1,942.8 million (i.e., about $1.9 billion). The figures of $745.9 million and $1,942.8 million cover only the shipbuilder's costs; they do not include the cost of government-furnished equipment (GFE), which is equipment for the ships that the government purchases and then provides to the shipbuilder for incorporation into the ship, or government program-management costs. When GFE and government program-management costs are included, the total estimated procurement cost of the first PSC is between $925 million and $940 million, and the total estimated procurement cost of the three-ship PSC program is about $2.95 billion.\nThe PSC program has received a total of $1,034.6 million (i.e., about $1.0 billion) in procurement funding through FY2019, including $300 million provided through the Navy's shipbuilding account in FY2017 and FY2018. The Coast Guard's proposed FY2020 budget requests $35 million in procurement funding for the PSC program, which is enough to cover the PSC program's FY2020 government program-management costs. The Coast Guard's FY2019 budget submission had projected that a total of $125 million in procurement funding would be requested for the PSC program in FY2020.\nThe operational U.S. polar icebreaking fleet currently consists of one heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Star, and one medium polar icebreaker, Healy. In addition to Polar Star, the Coast Guard has a second heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Sea. Polar Sea, however, suffered an engine casualty in June 2010 and has been nonoperational since then. Polar Star and Polar Sea entered service in 1976 and 1978, respectively, and are now well beyond their originally intended 30-year service lives. The Coast Guard is using Polar Sea as a source of spare parts for keeping Polar Star operational.\nIssues for Congress for the PSC program include, inter alia, whether to approve, reject, or modify the Coast Guard's FY2020 procurement funding request for the program; whether to use a contract with options or a block buy contract to procure the ships; whether to continue providing at least some of the procurement funding for the PSC program through the Navy's shipbuilding account; technical, schedule, and cost risk in the PSC program; and whether to procure heavy and medium polar icebreakers to a common basic design.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_161"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_162","query":"Exposure to ozone, a common air pollutant, has been linked to early death, plant and crop damage, and damage to property. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for ground-level ozone to protect human health and welfare with, by law, a \"margin of safety.\" States that contain areas with ozone concentrations above these standards must develop plans to reduce emissions and improve air quality. However, states have direct control only over emission sources located within their borders.\nThe Clean Air Act (CAA) requires EPA to re-evaluate the NAAQS every five years to include the latest science and technological advancements. Studies reporting the human health impacts of ozone increasingly suggest that ozone exposure may not be completely safe at any level. With the potential for a NAAQS re-evaluation leading to science-based recommendations for a tighter standard, some stakeholders have expressed increasing concern that future\u2014and even current\u2014ozone standards could be difficult to meet due to the contribution of \"background ozone,\" which arises from a variety of sources described in this report. In some areas of the United States, background ozone may be approaching 70 parts per billion (ppb) on some days, the current level of the NAAQS.\nSome Members of Congress have expressed interest in adverse health effects that occur at or below the current standard, challenges some nonattainment areas may have in meeting current standards, and particularly the responsibilities for meeting the health standard, given interstate and international transport. EPA's review of the ozone NAAQS is underway and set to be completed in 2020, with background ozone contributions suggested as a topic to be addressed. Congress may have an interest in better understanding scientific capabilities, needs, and efforts to improve understanding of contributions from background sources, as well as options for regulatory responses.\nDefining Background Ozone\nThree terms are used for different types of background ozone, and distinguishing among them can be important for regulatory purposes.\n1. Natural background. Ozone concentrations that would be present without any human influence or contribution from anywhere on the globe. Natural background includes contributions from wildfires, vegetation, lightning, ozone in the stratosphere, and global methane concentrations. Contributions to background ozone from wildfires and methane have been increasing over the past several decades. 2. North American background. Ozone concentrations absent human-caused emissions from North America. North American background includes all sources in natural background plus ozone from international sources outside North America. Studies suggest that Asian emissions may be contributing to ozone in the United States, especially in Western states, but that those contributions may be beginning to decrease. 3. United States background. Ozone concentrations absent human-caused emissions from the United States. U.S. background includes all sources in North American background plus ozone formed from emission sources in Mexico and Canada.\nChallenges in Estimating Background Ozone\nThe CAA provides alternative regulatory options for areas that successfully demonstrate significant influence from some specific sources of natural background ozone on ozone exceedences. However, such demonstrations may be difficult to conduct and reliably assess, given data and analytical challenges:\nEmissions inventories. Current understanding of the amount, location, and type of pollutant emissions from many types of sources is insufficient. Therefore inventories typically provide estimations, which may not be precise enough for apportioning contributions. Weather data. Meteorological data (i.e., wind speed, wind direction, temperature, cloud cover, humidity, etc.) are not currently measured at a fine enough spatial scale to adequately represent relevant weather processes. Ambient air quality measurements. Data on pollutant concentrations are limited, which increases the challenge of understanding ozone formation and movement. Fine spatial and temporal measurements are needed both horizontally across the surface and vertically to higher levels of the atmosphere. Source contribution variability. Background ozone source contributions change by year, season, day, and hour and from location to location. This makes it difficult to project future contributions, including when contributions will be relevant to attainment status.\nThis report provides information on sources of background ozone, presents key challenges in addressing these sources, and discusses potential options to overcome these challenges.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_162"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_163","query":"The Navy wants to procure a total of 13 LPD-17 Flight II amphibious ships. LPD-17 Flight II ships cost roughly $1.8 billion each to procure. The first LPD-17 Flight II ship, LPD-30, was procured in FY2018. As part of its action on the Navy's proposed FY2019 budget, Congress provided $350 million in unrequested advance procurement (AP) funding for a second LPD-17 Flight II ship, LPD-31, to be procured in FY2020. This was consistent with the Navy's FY2019 budget submission, under which LPD-31 was planned for procurement in FY2020 and the remainder of its procurement cost was to be requested in FY2020. The Navy's FY2020 budget submission, however, proposes deferring the procurement of LPD-31 by one year, to FY2021, and the Navy's proposed FY2020 budget, rather than requesting the remainder of LPD-31's procurement cost, instead requests $247.1 million in AP funding for the ship.\nNavy officials state that if no LPD-17 Flight II ship is procured in FY2020, the $350 million in FY2019 AP funding that Congress provided for the LPD-17 program would become unexecutable, because that funding was provided specifically for use in building an LPD-17 Flight II ship procured in FY2020, not an LPD-17 Flight II ship procured in FY2021. The $350 million in FY2019 AP funding can be made executable by procuring LPD-31 in FY2020 or by passing legislation permitting the FY2019 AP funding to be used for an LPD-17 Flight II ship procured in FY2021. One alternative for procuring LPD-31 in FY2020 would be to do so with full funding (i.e., with the remainder of the ship's procurement cost provided in FY2020). Another alternative would be to pass legislation giving the Navy the authority to procure LPD-31 in FY2020 using incremental funding. Navy officials state that under the latter alternative, the amount of procurement funding needed for LPD-31 in FY2020 would be, at a minimum, roughly $200 million, and not more than the requested amount of $247.1 million.\nAs part of its action on the Navy's proposed FY2019 budget, Congress also provided $350 million in unrequested AP funding for a different kind of amphibious ship\u2014an amphibious assault ship called LHA-9. This ship is considerably larger and more expensive than an LPD-17 Flight II ship. The Navy's FY2020 budget submission estimates LHA-9's procurement cost at $4,076.4 million (i.e., about $4.1 billion). Under the Navy's FY2019 budget submission, LHA-9 was planned for procurement in FY2024. The $350 million in FY2019 AP funding that Congress provided was intended to encourage the Navy to accelerate the procurement of LHA-9 from FY2024 to an earlier fiscal year, such as FY2020 or FY2021. Under the Navy's FY2020 budget submission, the Navy continues to show LHA-9 as a ship planned for procurement in FY2024, and the Navy's proposed FY2020 budget does not request any additional procurement or AP funding for the ship.\nIssues for Congress include whether to procure LPD-31 in FY2020 or FY2021; whether to procure LPD-31 (if it is procured in FY2020) with full funding or incremental funding; the amount of procurement or AP funding to provide for LPD-31 and LHA-9 in FY2020; more generally whether the Navy is placing too much, too little, or about the right amount of emphasis on amphibious ships in its FY2020 budget submission, particularly compared to other Navy shipbuilding programs; and technical risk in the LPD-17 Flight II and LHA programs.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_163"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_164","query":"The federal government pays benefits to coal miners affected by coal workers' pneumoconiosis (CWP, commonly referred to as black lung disease) and other lung diseases linked to coal mining in cases where responsible mine operators are not able to pay. In 2019, the monthly benefit for a miner with no dependents is $660.10. Benefits can be as much as $1,320.10 per month for miners with three or more dependents. Medical benefits are provided separately from disability benefits. Benefit payments and related administrative expenses in cases in which the responsible operators do not pay are paid out of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund. The primary source of revenue for the trust fund is an excise tax on coal produced and sold domestically. If excise tax revenue is not sufficient to finance Black Lung Program benefits, the trust fund may borrow from the general fund of the Treasury.\nFor 2018, the tax rates on coal were $1.10 per ton of underground-mined coal or $0.55 per ton of surface-mined coal, limited to 4.4% of the sales price. These rates were established in 1986. Starting in 2019, under current law, these tax rates are $0.50 per ton of underground-mined coal or $0.25 per ton of surface-mined coal, limited to 2% of the sales price. These are the rates that were set when the trust fund was established in 1977.\nThe decline in the excise tax rates will likely put additional financial strain on a trust fund that already borrows from the general fund to meet obligations. The decline in domestic coal production, recent increases in the rate of CWP, and bankruptcies in the coal sector also contribute to the financial strain on the trust fund.\nThe Black Lung Disability Trust Fund and associated excise tax on coal were established so that the coal industry, as opposed to taxpayers in general, would bear the burden associated with providing black lung benefits. Throughout its history, the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund has not raised revenues sufficient to meet obligations. As a result, at various points in time, Congress and the President have acted to increase the excise tax on coal, forgive or refinance trust fund debt, and modify black lung benefits eligibility. With the rate of the excise tax on coal reduced in 2019, the 116th Congress may again evaluate options for improving the fiscal condition of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund, or other issues related to providing federal benefits to miners with black lung disease.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_164"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_165","query":"This report examines the Small Business Administration's (SBA's) appropriations (new budget authority, minus rescissions and sequestration) over time, focusing on developments and trends since FY2000. It also provides total available funding (which includes carryover from the prior fiscal year, carryover into the next fiscal year, account transfers, rescissions, and sequestration) and, for entrepreneurial development noncredit programs, actual and anticipated expenditures for comparative purposes.\nSBA appropriations, as a whole, have varied significantly from year to year since FY2000 and across all three of the agency's major spending categories: disaster assistance, business loan credit subsidies, and \"other programs,\" a category that includes salaries and expenses, business loan administration, the Office of Inspector General, the Office of Advocacy, and entrepreneurial development programs. Overall, the SBA's appropriations have ranged from a high of $2.359 billion in FY2018 to a low of $571.8 million in FY2007. Much of this volatility is due to significant variation in appropriations for disaster assistance, which ranged from a high of $1.7 billion in FY2006 to a low of $0 in FY2009. This variation can be attributed primarily to supplemental appropriations provided to address disaster needs arising from the impact of major hurricanes, such as Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, and more recently, Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria.\nThe SBA's appropriations for business loan credit subsidies have also varied since FY2000, ranging from a high of $319.7 million in FY2013 ($337.3 million before sequestration and rescission) to a low of $1.3 million in FY2006 and FY2007. This variation is due to the impact of changing economic conditions on the SBA's guaranteed loan portfolios. During good economic times, revenue from SBA fees and collateral liquidation is typically sufficient to cover the costs of purchasing guaranteed loans that have defaulted. During and immediately following recessions, however, that revenue is typically insufficient to cover the costs of purchasing guaranteed loans that have defaulted.\nThe SBA's appropriations for other programs, as a collective, have also varied since FY2000, ranging from a high of $1.6253 billion in FY2010 to a low of $455.6 million in FY2007. This variation is primarily due to congressional response to changing economic conditions. For example, Congress approved significant, temporary increases in appropriations for the SBA's other programs spending category in FY2009 and FY2010. Overall, since FY2000, appropriations for other programs have increased at a pace that exceeds inflation. This report provides appropriations for all five major components of the other programs spending category, including the SBA's entrepreneurial development programs.\nThe SBA's appropriations for FY1954 through FY1999 are provided in the Appendix.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_165"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_166","query":"Corruption of public officials in Latin America continues to be a prominent political concern. In the past few years, 11 presidents and former presidents in Latin America have been forced from office, jailed, or are under investigation for corruption. As in previous years, Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index covering 2018 found that the majority of respondents in several Latin American nations believed that corruption was increasing. Several analysts have suggested that heightened awareness of corruption in Latin America may be due to several possible factors: the growing use of social media to reveal violations and mobilize citizens, greater media and investor scrutiny, or, in some cases, judicial and legislative investigations. Moreover, as expectations for good government tend to rise with greater affluence, the expanding middle class in Latin America has sought more integrity from its politicians. U.S. congressional interest in addressing corruption comes at a time of this heightened rejection of corruption in public office across several Latin American and Caribbean countries.\nWhether or not the perception that corruption is increasing is accurate, it is nevertheless fueling civil society efforts to combat corrupt behavior and demand greater accountability. Voter discontent and outright indignation has focused on bribery and the economic consequences of official corruption, diminished public services, and the link of public corruption to organized crime and criminal impunity. In some countries, rejection of tainted political parties and leaders from across the spectrum has challenged public confidence in governmental legitimacy. In some cases, condemnation of corruption has helped to usher in populist presidents. For example, a populist of the left won Mexico's election and of the right Brazil's in 2018, as winning candidates appealed to end corruption and overcome political paralysis.\nThe 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy characterizes corruption as a threat to the United States because criminals and terrorists may thrive under governments with rampant corruption. Studies indicate that corruption lowers productivity and mars competitiveness in developing economies. When it is systemic, it can spur migration and reduce GDP measurably.\nThe U.S. government has used several policy tools to combat corruption. Among them are sanctions (asset blocking and visa restrictions) against leaders and other public officials to punish and deter corrupt practices, and programming and incentives to adopt anti-corruption best practices. The United States has also provided foreign assistance to some countries to promote clean or \"good\" government goals. U.S. efforts include assistance to strengthen the rule of law and judicial independence, law enforcement training, programs to institutionalize open and transparent public sector procurement and other clean government practices, and efforts to tap private-sector knowledge to combat corruption.\nThis report examines U.S. strategies to help allies achieve anti-corruption goals, which were once again affirmed at the Summit of the Americas held in Peru in April 2018, with the theme of \"Democratic Governance against Corruption.\" The case studies in the report explore:\nBrazil's collaboration with the U.S. Department of Justice and other international partners to expand investigations and use tools such as plea bargaining to secure convictions; Mexico's efforts to strengthen protections for journalists and to protect investigative journalism generally, and mixed efforts to implement comprehensive reforms approved by Mexico's legislature; and the experiences of Honduras and Guatemala with multilateral anti-corruption bodies to bolster weak domestic institutions, although leaders investigated by these bodies have tried to shutter them.\nSome analysts maintain that U.S. funding for \"anti-corruption\" programming has been too limited, noting that by some definitions, worldwide spending in recent years has not exceeded $115 million annually. Recent congressional support for anti-corruption efforts includes: training of police and justice personnel, backing for the Trump Administration's use of targeted sanctions, and other efforts to condition assistance. Policy debates have also highlighted the importance of combating corruption related to trade and investment. The 116th Congress may consider the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which would revise the NAFTA trade agreement, and contains a new chapter on anti-corruption measures.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_166"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_167","query":"USAspending.gov, available at http:\/\/www.USAspending.gov, is a government source for data on federal awards by state, congressional district (CD), county, and zip code. The awards data in USAspending.gov are provided by federal agencies and represent contracts, grants, loans, and other forms of financial assistance. USAspending.gov also provides tools for examining the broader picture of federal spending obligations by categories, such as budget function, agency, and object class.\nUsing USAspending.gov to locate and compile accurate data on federal awards can be challenging due, in part, to continuing data quality issues that have been identified by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). Users of USAspending.gov need to be aware that while search results may be useful for informing consideration of certain questions, these results may be incomplete or contain inaccuracies.\nUSAspending.gov was created under P.L. 109-282, the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 (FFATA), and is being enhanced under requirements in P.L. 113-101, the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act).\nOther federal awards data sources reviewed in this report include the following:\nFederal Procurement Data System (FPDS); Census Federal Audit Clearinghouse; U.S. Budget: Aid to State and Local Governments; Census Federal Aid to States (FAS) and Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR); and Additional federal grant awards databases, including sources tracking medical, scientific, and technical research.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_167"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_168","query":"Several federal agencies, including the Small Business Administration (SBA), provide training and other assistance to veterans seeking civilian employment. For example, the Department of Defense (DOD), in cooperation with the SBA, Department of Labor, Department of Veterans Affairs, and several other federal agencies, operates the Transition Goals Plans Success program (Transition GPS), which provides employment information and entrepreneurship training to exiting military servicemembers to assist them in transitioning from the military to the civilian labor force.\nIn recent years, the unemployment rate among veterans as a whole has generally been similar to or lower than the unemployment rate for nonveterans 18 years and older. However, veterans who have left the military since September 2001 have experienced higher unemployment than other veterans and, in some years, higher unemployment than nonveterans. As a result, Congress has focused much of its attention on finding ways to assist veterans who have left the military since September 2001.\nThe SBA provides management and technical assistance services to more than 100,000 veterans each year through its various management and technical assistance training partners (e.g., Small Business Development Centers, Women's Business Centers [WBCs], Service Corps of Retired Executives [SCORE], and Veterans Business Outreach Centers [VBOCs]). The SBA's Office of Veterans Business Development (OVBD) also administers several programs to assist veterans, including the Operation Boots to Business: From Service to Startup initiative, which is part of DOD's Transition GPS program.\nThe expansion of federal employment training programs targeted at specific populations, such as women and veterans, has led some Members and organizations to ask if these programs should be consolidated. In their view, eliminating program duplication among federal business assistance programs across federal agencies, and within the SBA, would result in lower costs and improved services. Others argue that keeping these business assistance programs separate enables them to offer services that match the unique needs of various underserved populations, such as veterans. In their view, instead of considering program consolidation as a policy option, the focus should be on improving communication and cooperation among the federal agencies providing assistance to entrepreneurs.\nThis report opens with an examination of the economic circumstances of veteran-owned businesses drawn from the Bureau of the Census's 2012 Survey of Business Owners (SBO). It then provides a brief overview of veterans' employment experiences, comparing unemployment and labor force participation rates for veterans, veterans who have left the military since September 2001, and nonveterans. The report also describes employment assistance programs offered by several federal agencies to assist veterans in their transition from the military to the civilian labor force and examines, in greater detail, the SBA's veteran business development programs, the SBA's efforts to assist veterans' access to capital, and the SBA's veteran contracting programs. It also discusses the SBA's Military Reservist Economic Injury Disaster Loan program and P.L. 114-38, the Veterans Entrepreneurship Act of 2015, which authorized and made permanent the SBA's recent practice of waiving the SBAExpress loan program's one time, up-front loan guarantee fee for veterans (and their spouse).","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_168"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_169","query":"The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) administers several programs to support small businesses, including loan guaranty and venture capital programs to enhance small business access to capital; contracting programs to increase small business opportunities in federal contracting; direct loan programs for businesses, homeowners, and renters to assist their recovery from natural disasters; and small business management and technical assistance training programs to assist business formation and expansion. Congressional interest in these programs has increased in recent years, primarily because assisting small business is viewed as a means to enhance economic growth.\nSome have argued that the SBA should be provided additional resources to assist small businesses in acquiring capital necessary to start, continue, or expand operations and create jobs. Others worry about the long-term adverse economic effects of spending programs that increase the federal deficit. They advocate business tax reduction, reform of financial credit market regulation, and federal fiscal restraint as the best means to assist small business economic growth and job creation.\nOver the past several Congresses, several laws were enacted to assist small businesses, including\nP.L. 111-5, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), provided the SBA an additional $730 million, including $375 million to temporarily subsidize SBA fees and increase the 7(a) loan guaranty program's maximum loan guaranty percentage to 90%. P.L. 111-240, the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, authorized numerous changes to the SBA's loan guaranty and contracting programs; provided $510 million to continue the SBA's fee subsidies and 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage through December 31, 2010; and provided about $12 billion in tax relief for small businesses. P.L. 111-322, the Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extensions Act, 2011, continued the SBA's fee subsidies and the 7(a) program's 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage through March 4, 2011, or until available funding was exhausted, which occurred on January 3, 2011. P.L. 112-106, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, established a regulatory structure for startups and small businesses to raise capital through securities offerings using the Internet through crowdfunding. P.L. 113-76, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, increased the annual authorization amount for the SBA's Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) venture capital program to $4 billion from $3 billion. P.L. 114-38, the Veterans Entrepreneurship Act of 2015, authorized and made permanent the SBA's practice of waiving the SBAExpress loan program's one-time, up-front loan guaranty fee for veterans and increased the 7(a) loan program's FY2015 authorization limit from $18.75 billion to $23.5 billion. P.L. 114-113, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, expanded the projects eligible for refinancing under the 504\/CDC loan guaranty program in any fiscal year in which the refinancing program and the 504\/CDC program as a whole do not have credit subsidy costs, increased the SBIC program's family of funds limit (the amount of outstanding leverage allowed for two or more SBIC licenses under common control) to $350 million from $225 million, and increased the 7(a) loan program's authorization limit to $26.5 billion for FY2016. P.L. 115-31, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, increased the 7(a) program's authorization limit to $27.5 billion for FY2017. P.L. 115-141, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, increased the 7(a) program's authorization limit to $29.0 billion for FY2018.\nThis report addresses a core issue facing the 116th Congress: What, if any, additional action should the federal government take to enhance small business access to capital? It discusses the role of small business in job creation and retention, then provides an assessment of the supply and demand for small business loans and recently enacted laws designed to enhance small business access to capital by increasing either the supply of small business loans or the demand for small business loans, or both. It also examines recent actions concerning the SBA's budget and concludes with a brief overview of three legislative options available to address small business access to capital issues during the 116th Congress: wait-and-see, enact additional programs, or reduce and consolidate existing programs.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_169"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_170","query":"The Agriculture appropriations bill funds the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) except for the Forest Service. The FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 115-141, Division A), and the FY2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-6, Division B) include funding for conservation programs and activities at USDA.\nCongress passed the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act on March 23, 2018. FY2019 began with seven appropriations bills, including USDA, unfinished. The House and Senate Appropriations Committees reported Agriculture appropriations bills for FY2019 (H.R. 5961, S. 2976), with the Senate having amended and passed its version as Division C of a four-bill minibus (H.R. 6147). Congress and the President approved continuing resolutions to fund the affected federal agencies through December 21, 2018, at the FY2018 level (P.L. 115-245). After December 21, 2018, a partial shutdown of the government, including many agencies within USDA, occurred. One of the few exceptions was the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), which was able to operate on mandatory and carryover funds during the majority of the shutdown. On January 25, 2019, an agreement was reached to continue funding for USDA and other appropriations that had lapsed through February 15, at the FY2018 level (P.L. 116-5). The FY2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act was signed into law on February 15, 2019, funding USDA through the end of the fiscal year (Division B, P.L. 116-6).\nAgricultural conservation programs include both mandatory and discretionary spending. Most conservation program funding is mandatory and is authorized in omnibus farm bills. Other conservation programs\u2014mostly technical assistance\u2014are discretionary and are funded through annual appropriations.\nThe largest discretionary program is the Conservation Operations (CO) account, which funds conservation planning and implementation assistance on private agricultural lands across the country. The enacted FY2018 appropriation provided $874 million for CO, an increase from the FY2017 enacted amount ($864 million). The enacted FY2019 appropriation decreases funding for CO below FY2018 levels to $819 million and redirects funding to the new Farm Production and Conservation Business Center. Other discretionary spending is primarily for watershed programs. The largest\u2014Watershed and Flood Prevention Operations (WFPO)\u2014was funded at $150 million annually in FY2018 and FY2019.\nMost mandatory conservation programs are authorized in omnibus farm bills and do not require an annual appropriation. However, Congress has reduced mandatory conservation programs through changes in mandatory program spending (CHIMPS) in the annual agricultural appropriations law every year since FY2003. The enacted FY2018 omnibus marks the first appropriation since FY2002 that did not include CHIMPS to mandatory conservation programs. The enacted FY2019 appropriation also does not include reductions to mandatory conservation programs, as most programs' authorizations expired on September 30, 2018, making these programs ineligible for reduction. The 2018 farm bill (Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018, P.L. 115-334) reauthorized and amended funding for many of the mandatory conservation programs.\nWhile this is infrequent, the Agriculture appropriations bill may also serve as a vehicle for amendments to authorized programs that permanently alter or create programs. The FY2018 Agriculture appropriations act included two such amendments\u2014one to WFPO and one to farm bill conservation program reporting requirements. The WFPO amendment increased the size threshold required for congressional approval. Under the amended language, the Senate and House Agriculture Committees must approve WFPO projects that include an estimated federal contribution of more than $25 million for construction, an increase from the previous $5 million threshold. Additionally, the FY2018 appropriations act exempted farm bill conservation programs from select federal reporting requirements, including obtaining a Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) number and System for Award Management (SAM) registration.\nAgriculture appropriations bills may also include policy-related provisions that direct how the executive branch should carry out the appropriation. The FY2018 and FY2019 appropriations acts both include policy provisions for conservation programs that range from reports to Congress to suggested natural resource priorities.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_170"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_171","query":"The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), was signed into law on February 15, 2019. The act included a total of $647.0 million in funding for three trade-related agencies under the Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies (CJS) account\u2014the International Trade Administration (ITA), the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), and the office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). This represents a 0.2% decrease from FY2018 appropriations. For FY2019, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, included $484.0 million in direct appropriations for ITA (a 0.4% increase from the FY2018 appropriation), $95.0 million in funding for USITC (a 1.4% increase), and a total of $68.0 million for USTR (a 0.2% decrease).\nThe Administration's Request\nOn February 12, 2018, the Trump Administration submitted its FY2019 budget request to Congress. The FY2019 proposal included a total of $590.8 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies, an 8.9% decrease from FY2018 total appropriated amounts for these agencies. The Administration requested reducing funding for all three trade-related agencies. For FY2019, the request included $440.1 million in direct funding for ITA (an 8.7% decrease from the FY2018 appropriation), $87.6 million for USITC (a 6.5% decrease), and $63.0 million for USTR (a 13.2% decrease).\nCongressional Actions\nIn the spring of 2018, the House and Senate reported FY2019 CJS appropriations bills, which included proposed funding for ITA, USITC, and USTR. The reported bills did not adopt many of the Administration's budget reductions, and instead proposed funding levels that were more similar to the FY2018-enacted amounts.\nThe House Committee on Appropriations reported H.R. 5952 on May 17, 2018. The House proposal recommended a total of $647.6 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies. This proposal was $56.8 million more (9.6%) than the Administration's request, and $0.7 million less (-0.1%) than the FY2018-enacted legislation. The House committee proposed $480.0 million in direct funding for ITA, $95.0 million for USTIC, and a total of $72.6 million for USTR, comprised of $57.6 million for salaries and expenses and an additional $15.0 million from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund for trade enforcement activities as authorized by the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-125).\nThe Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 3072 on June 14, 2018. The Senate committee-reported proposal recommended a total of $655.6 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies. This is $64.8 million (11.0%) more than the Administration's request and $7.3 million (1.1%) more than the FY2018-enacted appropriations. The Senate committee proposed $488.0 million in direct funding for ITA, $95 million for USITC, and a total of $72.6 million for USTR, comprised of $57.6 million for salaries and expenses and an additional $15.0 million from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund for trade enforcement activities.\nAfter three continuing resolutions and a three-week lapse in funding, Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act. 2019 (P.L. 116-6), which was signed into law on February 15, 2019. The act included a total of $647.0 million in funding for the three trade-related agencies, which represented a 0.2% decrease from FY2018 funding levels.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_171"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_172","query":"Congress may review existing U.S. policies and programs in sub-Saharan Africa (henceforth, \"Africa\") as it establishes its budgetary and policy priorities and responds to developments in the region. Key enduring issues for Congress include the authorization and appropriation of funding for U.S. foreign aid programs and U.S. military activities in the region, and oversight of U.S. programs and policies.\nEconomic and Development Issues. Much of Africa experienced rapid economic growth starting in the early 2000s, reducing poverty and expanding the middle class in some countries. Since 2014, however, growth has slowed in many countries\u2014and almost all continue to face high poverty rates and long-standing development challenges such as food insecurity and malnutrition, ineffective health and education institutions, and infrastructure deficiencies. Other factors hindering socioeconomic development in Africa include low domestic buying power, a shortage of skilled labor, limited access to capital and other inputs, poor governance, and political instability and insecurity.\nGovernance, Democracy, and Human Rights. Since the early 1990s, nearly all African countries have transitioned from military or single-party rule to at least nominally multiparty political systems in which elections are held regularly. Nonetheless, the development of accountable, functional democratic institutions remains limited in many countries. Corruption and mismanagement are pervasive across much of the region, and state services are limited. Authoritarian governments and armed belligerents in Africa commit serious human rights violations.\nPeace and Security. Civil wars and crises have broken out in multiple African countries since 2010, reversing the previous decade's trend of stabilization. Newer crises have unfolded in the Lake Chad Basin, the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Burundi, and South Sudan, while long-running conflicts continue to affect the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, and Somalia. Porous borders, weak institutions, and corruption have created permissive environments for transnational threats such as terrorism, trafficking, and maritime piracy. Two conflict-affected African countries, South Sudan and Nigeria, face a credible risk of famine in early 2019; in both, insecurity has hindered aid access to affected zones.\nU.S.-Africa Policy under the Trump Administration. The Trump Administration has maintained several Africa-focused initiatives launched by its predecessors, but it also has proposed changes to U.S. trade policy and foreign assistance, including aid cuts, that could significantly affect U.S. engagement with Africa if implemented. The Administration's policy approach toward Africa, unveiled in late 2018, identifies three broad U.S. interests in the region: expanding U.S. trade and commercial ties with African countries, countering Islamist extremism and other forms of violent conflict, and imposing more stringent conditions on U.S. aid and U.N. peacekeeping missions in the region. Administration officials also have placed a high priority on countering Chinese and Russian influence in Africa, with the Department of Defense announcing in late 2018 that it would reorient its personnel and footprint in parts of Africa to align with that objective in the coming years. Country-specific goals identified in other Trump Administration statements and policy documents include the continued normalization of U.S. relations with Sudan, conflict resolution in South Sudan, an electoral transition in DRC, and democratic reforms in Ethiopia. The Administration also has signaled greater focus on reciprocity in trade relations, imposed tariffs affecting trade with some African countries, pressed African states to join efforts to put pressure on North Korea, and enacted immigration policies that have affected U.S.-Africa policy, among other initiatives.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_172"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_173","query":"The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), enacted in 1938, is the federal legislation that establishes the general minimum wage that must be paid to all covered workers. While the FLSA mandates broad minimum wage coverage, states have the option of establishing minimum wage rates that are different from those set in it. Under the provisions of the FLSA, an individual is generally covered by the higher of the state or federal minimum wage.\nAs of 2019, minimum wage rates are above the federal rate of $7.25 per hour in 29 states and the District of Columbia, ranging from $0.25 to $6.75 above the federal rate. Another 14 states have minimum wage rates equal to the federal rate. The remaining 7 states have minimum wage rates below the federal rate or do not have a state minimum wage requirement. In the states with no minimum wage requirements or wages lower than the federal minimum wage, only individuals who are not covered by the FLSA are subject to those lower rates.\nIn any given year, the exact number of states with a minimum wage rate above the federal rate may vary, depending on the interaction between the federal rate and the mechanisms in place to adjust the state minimum wage. Adjusting minimum wage rates is typically done in one of two ways: (1) legislatively scheduled rate increases that may include one or several increments; (2) a measure of inflation to index the value of the minimum wage to the general change in prices.\nOf the 29 states and the District of Columbia with minimum wage rates above the federal rate, 9 currently have no scheduled increases beyond 2019, 3 states have legislatively scheduled rate increases after 2019, and 17 states and the District of Columbia have scheduled increases through a combination of planned increases and current- or future-year indexation of state minimum wage rates to a measure of inflation.\nBecause the federal and state minimum wage rates change at various times and in various increments, the share of the labor force for which the federal rate is the binding wage floor has changed over time. Since 1981, there have been three series of increases in the federal minimum wage rate\u20141990-1991, 1996-1997, and 2007-2009. During that same period, there have been numerous changes in state minimum wage policies. As a result of those interactions, the share of the U.S. civilian labor force living in states in which the federal minimum wage is the floor has fluctuated but generally declined, and is about 39% as of 2018.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_173"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_174","query":"This report discusses runaway and homeless youth, and the federal response to support this population. There is no single definition of the terms \"runaway youth\" or \"homeless youth.\" However, both groups of youth share the risk of not having adequate shelter and other provisions, and may engage in harmful behaviors while away from a permanent home.\nYouth most often cite family conflict as the major reason for their homelessness or episodes of running away. A youth's sexual orientation, sexual activity, school problems, and substance abuse are associated with family discord. The precise number of homeless and runaway youth is unknown due to their residential mobility and overlap among the populations. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is supporting data collection efforts, known as Voices of Youth Count, to better determine the number of homeless youth. The 2017 study found that approximately 700,000 youth ages 13 to 17 and 3.5 million young adults ages 18 to 25 experienced homelessness within a 12-month period because they were sleeping in places not meant for habitation, in shelters, or with others while lacking alternative living arrangements.\nFrom the early 20th century through the 1960s, the needs of runaway and homeless youth were handled locally through the child welfare agency, juvenile justice courts, or both. The 1970s marked a shift toward federal oversight of programs that help youth who had run afoul of the law, including those who committed status offenses (i.e., a noncriminal act that is considered a violation of the law because of the youth's age). The Runaway Youth Act of 1974 was enacted as Title III of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (P.L. 93-415) to assist runaways through services specifically for this population. The act was amended over time to include homeless youth. It authorizes funding for services carried out under the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program (RHYP), which is administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The program was most recently authorized through FY2020 by the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-385). This law did not make other changes to the RHYP statute. Funding is discretionary, meaning provided through the appropriations process. FY2019 appropriations are $127.4 million.\nThe RHYP program is made up of three components: the Basic Center Program (BCP), Transitional Living Program (TLP), and Street Outreach Program (SOP). The BCP provides temporary shelter, counseling, and after care services to runaway and homeless youth under age 18 and their families. In FY2017, the program served 23,288 youth, and in FY2018 it funded 280 BCP shelters (most recent figures available). The TLP is targeted to older youth ages 16 through 22 (and sometimes an older age). In FY2017, the TLP program served 3,517 youth, and in FY2018 it funded 299 grantees (most recent figures available). Youth who use the TLP receive longer-term housing with supportive services. The SOP provides education, treatment, counseling, and referrals for runaway, homeless, and street youth who have been subjected to, or are at risk of being subjected to, sexual abuse, sex exploitation, and trafficking. In FY2017, the SOP grantees made contact with 24,366 youth.\nThe RHYP is a part of larger federal efforts to end youth homelessness through the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH). The USICH is a coordinating body made up of multiple federal agencies committed to addressing homelessness. The USICH's Opening Doors plan to end homelessness includes strategies for ending youth homelessness by 2020, including through collecting better data and supporting evidence-based practices to improve youth outcomes. Voices of Youth Count is continuing to report on characteristics of homeless youth. In addition to the RHYP, there are other federal supports to address youth homelessness. HUD's Youth Homelessness Demonstration Program is funding a range of housing options for youth, in selected urban and rural communities. Other federal programs have enabled homeless youth to access services, including those related to education and family violence.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_174"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_175","query":"In 1987, Congress enacted what is commonly known as the Farm Program Payments Integrity Act (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, P.L. 100-203, \u00a7\u00a71301-1307), which requires that an individual or legal entity be \"actively engaged in farming\" (AEF) to be eligible for federal commodity revenue support programs. AEF requirements apply equally to U.S. citizens, resident aliens, and foreign entities. Designing a transparent and comprehensive AEF definition has proven difficult and has evolved over the years. The current set of laws and rules governing farm program eligibility\u2014for both family and nonfamily members on farm operations\u2014remain subject to considerable scrutiny and criticism from both rural and farm advocacy groups as well as certain Members of Congress. In particular, critics contend that current U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) eligibility criteria\u2014especially for providing active personal management\u2014remain broad and subjective and may represent a low threshold to qualify for payments, thus facilitating the creation of new farm operation members simply to expand an operation's farm payment receipts.\nThree major categories of legal entities are subject to AEF requirement for program payment eligibility: an individual, a partnership, and a corporation.\nAn individual must meet three specific AEF criteria. First, independently and separately from other individuals with an interest in the farm business, the person makes a significant contribution to the operation of: (a) capital, equipment, or land; and (b) active personal labor and\/or active personal management. Second, the person's share of profits or losses is commensurate with his\/her contribution to the farming operation. Third, the person shares in the risk of loss from the farming operation.\nAn individual that meets the AEF criteria is eligible for farm program payments but subject to annual payment limits. If a married person meets the AEF requirements, any spouse will also be considered to have met the AEF requirements, thus effectively doubling the individual payment limit. Also, every family member 18 years or older who receives income based on the farm's operating results is deemed to meet the AEF requirements and is eligible for a separate payment limit. Another exception to AEF requirements is made for landowners provided they receive income based on the farm's operating results.\nA general partnership is an association of multiple persons whereby each member is treated separately and individually for purposes of determining eligibility and payment limits. A partnership's potential payment limit is equal to the limit for a single person times the number of persons or legal entities that comprise the operation's ownership and meet the AEF requirements. Thus, adding a new member can potentially provide an additional payment limit. A corporation is an association of joint owners that is treated as a single person for purposes of determining eligibility and payment limits, provided that the entity meets the AEF and other eligibility criteria. Adding a new member generally does not affect a corporation's payment limit but only increases the number of members that can share a single payment limit.\nIn accordance with a provision in the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79; \u00a71604), USDA added more specificity to the role that a nonfamily member of a partnership or joint venture must play to qualify for farm program benefits. However, considerable issues remain that may be of interest to Congress. Long-standing concerns remain that some farm operations are organized to overcome program payment limits and maximize the amount of their farm program payments. In particular, some advocacy groups suggest that USDA's new rule did not go far enough in tightening AEF criteria and that it continues to allow for a high number of farm managers and associated payment limits for both family and nonfamily farm operations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_175"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_176","query":"The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), signed into law on February 9, 2018, created a joint select committee of the House and Senate. The Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform was to be made up of 16 Members from the House and Senate\u20144 chosen by each of the chambers' party leaders. The act charged the joint select committee with formulating recommendations and legislative language to \"significantly reform the budget and appropriations process.\" The law directed the committee to make a report no later than November 30, 2018, to be submitted, along with legislative language, to the President, the Speaker of the House, and the majority and minority leaders of the House and Senate.\nThe act included procedures intended to allow the Senate to reach a timely vote on the question of whether or not to consider any legislation embodying the recommendations of the joint select committee. Under the terms of the act, the Senate would be able to vote on a motion to proceed to consider any reported joint committee bill before the conclusion of the 115th Congress (2017-2018). Consideration of the motion to proceed (and all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith) was to be limited to 10 hours, equally divided and controlled by the majority and minority leaders (or their designees) with support of at least three-fifths of the Senate (60 votes if there is no more than one vacancy) necessary to approve the motion. The act did not specify any procedures governing consideration of the bill once the Senate had agreed to take it up. There were also no provisions in the act concerning the consideration of the recommendations of the joint select committee in the House nor any provisions concerning resolving any differences between the House and Senate. Such actions would have occurred under the regular procedures of each chamber.\nDuring its lifespan, the joint select committee held five days of hearings, taking testimony from 12 outside witnesses and 27 Members, including then-Speaker of the House Paul Ryan and then-House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi.\nFormal and informal discussions among committee members resulted in draft legislation to be considered in a markup that concluded on November 29, 2018. The chief recommendation in the draft provided for the budget resolution to be adopted for a two-year cycle rather than the current annual cycle. By unanimous consent, the committee members applied a voting rule for the adoption of amendments consistent with the rule required by the act for final adoption of any recommendations requiring separate majorities of the appointees from each party. The final vote on reporting the bill as amended was not agreed to by a roll-call vote of one aye and seven noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate majority leader and seven ayes and zero noes of the Members appointed by the House minority leader and the Senate minority leader.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_176"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_177","query":"The 2007-2009 financial crisis highlighted the problem of \"too big to fail\" financial institutions\u2014the concept that the failure of large financial firms could trigger financial instability, which in several cases prompted extraordinary federal assistance to prevent their failure. One pillar of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act's (P.L. 111-203) response to addressing financial stability and ending too big to fail is a new enhanced prudential regulatory (EPR) regime that applies to large banks and to nonbank financial institutions designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). Previously, FSOC had designated four nonbank SIFIs for enhanced prudential regulation, but all four have since been de-designated.\nUnder this regime, the Federal Reserve (Fed) is required to apply a number of safety and soundness requirements to large banks that are more stringent than those applied to smaller banks. These requirements are intended to mitigate systemic risk posed by large banks\nStress tests and capital planning ensure banks hold enough capital to survive a crisis. Living wills provide a plan to safely wind down a failing bank. Liquidity requirements ensure that banks are sufficiently liquid if they lose access to funding markets. Counterparty limits restrict the bank's exposure to counterparty default. Risk management requires publicly traded companies to have risk committees on their boards and banks to have chief risk officers. Financial stability requirements provide for regulatory interventions that can be taken only if a bank poses a threat to financial stability. Capital requirements under Basel III, an international agreement, require large banks hold more capital than other banks to potentially absorb unforeseen losses.\nThe Dodd-Frank Act automatically subjected all bank holding companies and foreign banks with more than $50 billion in assets to enhanced prudential regulation. In 2017, the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 115-174) created a more \"tiered\" and \"tailored\" EPR regime for banks. It automatically exempted domestic banks with assets between $50 billion and $100 billion (five at present) from enhanced regulation. The Fed has discretion to apply most individual enhanced prudential provisions to the 11 domestic banks with between $100 billion and $250 billion in assets on a case-by-case basis if it would promote financial stability or the institutions' safety and soundness, and has proposed exempting them from several EPR requirements. The eight domestic banks that have been designated as Global-Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) and the five banks with more than $250 billion in assets or $75 billion in cross-jurisdictional activity remain subject to all Dodd-Frank EPR requirements. In addition, the Fed has proposed applying some EPR requirements on a progressively tiered basis to the 23 foreign banks with over $50 billion in U.S. assets and $250 billion in global assets.\nP.L. 115-174 also reduced the amount of capital that custody banks are required to hold against one of the EPR capital requirements, the supplementary leverage ratio (SLR). In addition, the Fed has issued a proposed rule that would reduce the amount of capital that G-SIBs are required to hold against the SLR. Finally, the Fed has proposed another rule that would combine capital planning under the stress tests with overall capital requirements for large banks.\nCollectively, these proposed changes would reduce, to varying degrees, capital and other advanced EPR requirements for banks with more than $50 billion in assets. In the view of the banking regulators and the supporters of P.L. 115-174, these changes better tailor EPR to match the risks posed by large banks. Opponents are concerned that the additional systemic and prudential risks posed by these changes outweigh the benefits to society of reduced regulatory burden, believing that the benefits will mainly accrue to the affected banks.\nThe 2007-2009 financial crisis highlighted the problem of \"too big to fail\" financial institutions\u2014the concept that the failure of large financial firms could trigger financial instability, which in several cases prompted extraordinary federal assistance to prevent their failure. One pillar of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act's (P.L. 111-203) response to addressing financial stability and ending too big to fail is a new enhanced prudential regulatory (EPR) regime that applies to large banks and to nonbank financial institutions designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). Previously, FSOC had designated four nonbank SIFIs for enhanced prudential regulation, but all four have since been de-designated.\nUnder this regime, the Federal Reserve (Fed) is required to apply a number of safety and soundness requirements to large banks that are more stringent than those applied to smaller banks. These requirements are intended to mitigate systemic risk posed by large banks\nStress tests and capital planning ensure banks hold enough capital to survive a crisis. Living wills provide a plan to safely wind down a failing bank. Liquidity requirements ensure that banks are sufficiently liquid if they lose access to funding markets. Counterparty limits restrict the bank's exposure to counterparty default. Risk management requires publicly traded companies to have risk committees on their boards and banks to have chief risk officers. Financial stability requirements provide for regulatory interventions that can be taken only if a bank poses a threat to financial stability. Capital requirements under Basel III, an international agreement, require large banks hold more capital than other banks to potentially absorb unforeseen losses.\nThe Dodd-Frank Act automatically subjected all bank holding companies and foreign banks with more than $50 billion in assets to enhanced prudential regulation. In 2017, the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 115-174) created a more \"tiered\" and \"tailored\" EPR regime for banks. It automatically exempted domestic banks with assets between $50 billion and $100 billion (five at present) from enhanced regulation. The Fed has discretion to apply most individual enhanced prudential provisions to the 11 domestic banks with between $100 billion and $250 billion in assets on a case-by-case basis if it would promote financial stability or the institutions' safety and soundness, and has proposed exempting them from several EPR requirements. The eight domestic banks that have been designated as Global-Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) and the five banks with more than $250 billion in assets or $75 billion in cross-jurisdictional activity remain subject to all Dodd-Frank EPR requirements. In addition, the Fed has proposed applying some EPR requirements on a progressively tiered basis to the 23 foreign banks with over $50 billion in U.S. assets and $250 billion in global assets.\nP.L. 115-174 also reduced the amount of capital that custody banks are required to hold against one of the EPR capital requirements, the supplementary leverage ratio (SLR). In addition, the Fed has issued a proposed rule that would reduce the amount of capital that G-SIBs are required to hold against the SLR. Finally, the Fed has proposed another rule that would combine capital planning under the stress tests with overall capital requirements for large banks.\nCollectively, these proposed changes would reduce, to varying degrees, capital and other advanced EPR requirements for banks with more than $50 billion in assets. In the view of the banking regulators and the supporters of P.L. 115-174, these changes better tailor EPR to match the risks posed by large banks. Opponents are concerned that the additional systemic and prudential risks posed by these changes outweigh the benefits to society of reduced regulatory burden, believing that the benefits will mainly accrue to the affected banks.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_177"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_178","query":"Fiscal policy is the means by which the government adjusts its spending and revenue to influence the broader economy. By adjusting its level of spending and tax revenue, the government can affect the economy by either increasing or decreasing economic activity in the short term. For example, when the government runs a budget deficit, it is said to be engaging in fiscal stimulus, spurring economic activity, and when the government runs a budget surplus, it is said to be engaging in a fiscal contraction, slowing economic activity.\nThe government can use fiscal stimulus to spur economic activity by increasing government spending, decreasing tax revenue, or a combination of the two. Increasing government spending tends to encourage economic activity either directly through purchasing additional goods and services from the private sector or indirectly by transferring funds to individuals who may then spend that money. Decreasing tax revenue tends to encourage economic activity indirectly by increasing individuals' disposable income, which tends to lead to those individuals consuming more goods and services. This sort of expansionary fiscal policy can be beneficial when the economy is in recession, as it lessens the negative impacts of a recession, such as elevated unemployment and stagnant wages. However, expansionary fiscal policy can result in rising interest rates, growing trade deficits, and accelerating inflation, particularly if applied during healthy economic expansions. These side effects from expansionary fiscal policy tend to partly offset its stimulative effects.\nThe government can use contractionary fiscal policy to slow economic activity by decreasing government spending, increasing tax revenue, or a combination of the two. Decreasing government spending tends to slow economic activity as the government purchases fewer goods and services from the private sector. Increasing tax revenue tends to slow economic activity by decreasing individuals' disposable income, likely causing them to decrease spending on goods and services. As the economy exits a recession and begins to grow at a healthy pace, policymakers may choose to reduce fiscal stimulus to avoid some of the negative consequences of expansionary fiscal policy, such as rising interest rates, growing trade deficits, and accelerating inflation, or to manage the level of public debt.\nIn recent history, the federal government has generally followed a pattern of increasing fiscal stimulus during a recession, then decreasing fiscal stimulus during the economic recovery. Prior to the \"Great Recession\" of 2007-2009 the federal budget deficit was about 1% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2007. During the recession, the budget deficit grew to nearly 10% of GDP in part due to additional fiscal stimulus applied to the economy. The budget deficit began shrinking in 2010, falling to about 2% of GDP by 2015. In contrast to the typical pattern of fiscal policy, the budget deficit began growing again in 2016, rising to nearly 4% of GDP in 2018 despite relatively strong economic conditions. This change in fiscal policy is notable, as expanding fiscal stimulus when the economy is not depressed can result in rising interest rates, a growing trade deficit, and accelerating inflation. As of publication of this report, interest rates have not risen discernibly and are still near historic lows, and inflation rates show no sign of acceleration. The trade deficit has been growing in recent years; however, it is not clear that this growth in the trade deficit is a result of increased fiscal stimulus.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_178"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_179","query":"Strong relations between the United States and Israel have led to bilateral cooperation in many areas. Matters of particular significance to U.S.-Israel relations include\nIsrael's ability to address the threats it faces in its region. Shared U.S.-Israel concerns about Iran and its allies on the nuclear issue and in Syria and Lebanon. Israeli-Palestinian issues. Israeli domestic political issues, including elections scheduled for 2019.\nIsrael relies on a number of strengths to manage potential threats to its security and existence. It maintains conventional military superiority relative to neighboring states and the Palestinians. It also takes measures to deter attack and defend its population and borders from evolving asymmetric threats such as rockets and missiles, cross-border tunneling, drones, and cyberattacks. Additionally, Israel has an undeclared but presumed nuclear weapons capability.\nAgainst a backdrop of strong bilateral cooperation, Israel's leaders and supporters routinely make the case that Israel's security and the broader stability of the region remain critically important for U.S. interests. A 10-year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)\u2014signed in 2016\u2014commits the United States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing annually from FY2019 to FY2028, along with additional amounts from Defense Department accounts for missile defense. All of these amounts remain subject to congressional appropriations.\nIsraeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu released new Israeli intelligence on Iran's nuclear program in April 2018, days before President Trump announced the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 international agreement that constrains Iran's nuclear activities. It is unclear whether Israel might take future military action in Iran if Iranian nuclear activities resume. Since 2018, Israel has conducted a number of military operations in Syria against Iran and its allies, including Lebanese Hezbollah. Israel and Iran also appear to be competing for military advantage over each other at the Israel-Lebanon border. Amid uncertainty in the area, in March 2019 President Trump recognized Israel's claim to sovereignty over the Golan Heights, changing long-standing U.S. policy that held\u2014in line with U.N. Security Council Resolution 497 from 1981\u2014the Golan was occupied Syrian territory whose final status was subject to Israel-Syria negotiation.\nThe prospects for an Israeli-Palestinian peace process are complicated by many factors. Palestinian leaders cut off high-level political contacts with the Trump Administration after it recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital in December 2017. U.S.-Palestinian tensions have since worsened amid U.S. cutoffs of funding to the Palestinians and diplomatic moves\u2014including the May 2018 opening of the U.S. embassy to Israel in Jerusalem. Palestinian leaders interpreted these actions as prejudicing their claims to a capital in Jerusalem and to a just resolution of Palestinian refugee claims. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has welcomed these U.S. actions. The Trump Administration has suggested that it will release a proposed peace plan after Israeli elections, which are scheduled for April 9, 2019. Speculation continues about how warming ties between Israel and Arab Gulf states may affect Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, though Saudi Arabia said that the U.S. policy change on the Golan Heights would negatively affect the peace process. Bouts of tension and violence between Israel and Hamas in Gaza have continued\u2014reportedly accompanied by indirect talks between the two parties that are being brokered by Egypt and aim for a long-term cease-fire.\nDomestically, Israel is preparing for the April 9 elections, which are closely contested. Former top general Benny Gantz is combining with former Finance Minister Yair Lapid to challenge Netanyahu, whom the attorney general has recommended be indicted for corruption in three separate cases. The elections and subsequent government formation process will have significant implications for Israel's future leadership and policies.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_179"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_180","query":"Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) constitute the Army's \"light\" ground forces and are an important part of the nation's ability to project forces overseas. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as current thinking by Army leadership as to where and how future conflicts would be fought, suggest IBCTs are limited operationally by their lack of assigned transport and reconnaissance vehicles as well as firepower against hardened targets and armored vehicles.\nThere are three types of IBCTs: Light, Airborne, and Air Assault. Light IBCTs are primarily foot-mobile forces. Light IBCTs can move by foot, by vehicle, or by air (either air landed or by helicopter). Airborne IBCTs are specially trained and equipped to conduct parachute assaults. Air Assault IBCTs are specially trained and equipped to conduct helicopter assaults.\nCurrently, the Army contends IBCTs face a number of limitations\nThe IBCT lacks the ability to decisively close with and destroy the enemy under restricted terrains such as mountains, littorals, jungles, subterranean areas, and urban areas to minimize excessive physical burdens imposed by organic material systems. The IBCT lacks the ability to maneuver and survive in close combat against hardened enemy fortifications, light armored vehicles, and dismounted personnel. IBCTs lack the support of a mobile protected firepower capability to apply immediate, lethal, long-range direct fires in the engagement of hardened enemy bunkers, light armored vehicles, and dismounted personnel in machine gun and sniper positions; with all-terrain mobility and scalable armor protection; capable of conducting operations in all environments.\nTo address these limitations, the Army is undertaking three programs: the Ground Mobility Vehicle (GMV)\/Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV), formerly known as the Ultra-Light Combat Vehicle (ULCV); the Light Reconnaissance Vehicle (LRV); and the Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF) programs. These programs would be based on vehicles that are commercially available. This approach serves to reduce costs and the time it takes to field combat vehicles.\nThe GMV\/ISV is intended to provide mobility to the rifle squad and company. The LRV would provide protection to the moving force by means of scouts, sensors, and a variety of medium-caliber weapons, and the MPF would offer the IBCT the capability to engage and destroy fortifications, bunkers, buildings, and light-to-medium armored vehicles more effectively.\nThe FY2020 Army GMV budget request for $37 million in procurement funding supports the procurement of 69 GMVs for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and 15 ISVs for the Army. The FY2020 GMV Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) request is for $3 million to support operational testing. The Army did not submit a FY2020 budget request for the LRV program. The FY2020 Army MPF budget request for $310.152 million in RDT&E funding supports the continuation of rapid prototyping efforts and the completion of 24 prototypes.\nPotential issues for Congress include the future of the LRV effort; Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) and GMV\/ISV, LRV, and MPF requirements; and GMV\/ISV, LRV, and MPF fielding plans.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_180"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_181","query":"The growth of the international insurance market and trade in insurance products and services has created opportunities and new policy issues for U.S. insurers, Congress, and the U.S. financial system. Insurance regulation is centered on the states, with the federal government having a limited role. Although the risks of loss and the regulation may be local, the business of insurance, as with many financial services, has an increasingly substantial international component as companies and investors look to grow and diversify.\nThe 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act\nThe 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank; P.L. 111-203) enhanced the federal role in insurance markets through several provisions, including the Financial Stability Oversight Council's (FSOC's) ability to designate insurers as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs); Federal Reserve oversight of SIFIs and insurers with depository affiliates; and the creation of a Federal Insurance Office (FIO) inside the Department of the Treasury. Alongside FIO, Dodd-Frank defined a new class of international insurance agreements called covered agreements for recognition of prudential measures which the FIO and the United States Trade Representative (USTR) may negotiate with foreign entities. Although not a regulator, FIO has the authority to monitor the insurance industry and limited power to preempt state laws in conjunction with covered agreements. Dodd-Frank requires congressional consultations and a 90-day layover period for covered agreements, but such agreements do not require congressional approval.\nInternational Insurance Stakeholders and Concerns\nThe international response to the financial crisis included the creation of a Financial Stability Board (FSB), largely made up of various countries' financial regulators, and increasing the focus of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) on creating regulatory standards, especially relating to insurer capital levels. The Federal Reserve and the FIO have assumed roles in the IAIS, whereas previously the individual states and the U.S. National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) had been the only U.S. members. Any agreements reached under the FSB or IAIS would have no legal impact in the United States until adopted in regulation by federal or state regulators or enacted into federal or state statute. Congress has little direct role in international regulatory cooperation agreements such as those reached at the FSB or IAIS, but past hearings and proposed legislation has addressed these issues.\nThe federal involvement in insurance issues has created frictions both among the federal entities and between the states and the federal entities, and it has been a subject of congressional hearings and legislation. The first covered agreement, between the United States and the European Union (EU), went into effect on September 22, 2017. The agreement was largely rejected by the states and the NAIC, with the insurance industry split in its support, or lack thereof, for the agreement. Treasury and USTR announced a second covered agreement, with the United Kingdom (UK), on December 11, 2018.\nCongressional Outlook\nThe recently negotiated U.S.-UK covered agreement is currently in the 90-day layover period giving the 116th Congress the opportunity to conduct oversight or pass legislation affecting the agreement. Past Congresses have been interested in revisiting the Dodd-Frank authorities that created covered agreements and the current Congress may consider similar legislation. The potential impact of international organizations and standards on the U.S. insurance markets and the potential for new trade agreements may also be of congressional concern.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_181"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_182","query":"The Social Security program, enacted in 1935, has been amended numerous times. Lists and summaries of individual major Social Security amendments may illuminate the tone and context of the debate of the program in the House and Senate. Major statutory decisions made by Congress on the Social Security program, vote information, summaries of major legislative actions, and descriptions of floor amendments and congressional debate may be informative to current discussions of the Social Security program.\nDuring the 115th Congress, lawmakers enacted several pieces of Social Security legislation that included the following:\nP.L. 115-59, the Social Security Number Fraud Prevention Act of 2017, which restricted federal agencies from including any individual's Social Security number (SSN) on documents sent by mail; P.L. 115-165, the Strengthening Protections for Social Security Beneficiaries Act of 2018, which made a variety of changes to the Social Security Administration's (SSA's) representative payee program; P.L. 115-243, the Tribal Social Security Fairness Act of 2018, which allowed federally recognized Indian tribes to enter into voluntary agreements with SSA to extend Social Security coverage to tribal council members; and P.L. 115-174, the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and Consumer Protection Act, which required SSA to accept electronic signatures of individuals who consent to allow a financial institution to verify their name, SSN, and date of birth with the information contained in SSA's records.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_182"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_183","query":"The Older Americans Act (OAA) is the major vehicle for the delivery of social and nutrition services for older persons. The act's statutory funding formulas determine allotments to states and other entities under the following OAA Titles: Title III, Grants for State and Community Programs; Title V, the Community Service Senior Opportunities Act; Title VI, Grants for Older Native Americans; and Title VII, Vulnerable Elder Rights Protection Activities. This report describes the OAA statutory provisions that allocate funds to states and other entities under various titles of the act.\nTitle III accounts for 73% of the act's total FY2019 discretionary appropriations ($1.498 billion out of $2.055 billion). States receive separate allotments of funds for the following six programs authorized under Title III: (1) supportive services and senior centers, (2) congregate nutrition services, (3) home-delivered nutrition services, (4) the Nutrition Services Incentive Program (NSIP), (5) disease prevention and health promotion services, and (6) the National Family Caregiver Support Program (NFCSP). Formula grants are allotted from the Administration on Aging (AOA), within the Administration for Community Living (ACL) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), to State Units on Aging (SUAs) in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. territories. The states, in turn, award funds to approximately 629 Area Agencies on Aging (AAAs).\nTitle V authorizes the Community Service Employment for Older Americans Program (CSEOA). Administered by the Department of Labor (DOL), Title V is OAA's second-largest program and is the only federally subsidized employment program for low-income older persons. Its FY2019 funding of $400 million represents 20% of the act's total discretionary funding. DOL allocates Title V funds for grants to state agencies in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. territories, and to national grantees who are typically nonprofit organizations that operate in more than one state. The total Title V state allotment is the sum of its respective state agency grantee allotment and national grantee allotment.\nTitle VI authorizes funds for supportive and nutrition services to older Native Americans to promote the delivery of home and community-based supportive services, nutrition services, and family caregiver support. Funds are awarded directly to Indian tribal organizations, Alaskan Native organizations, and nonprofit groups representing Native Hawaiians.\nTitle VII authorizes the Long-Term Care (LTC) Ombudsman Program and elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation prevention programs. Most Title VII funding is directed at the LTC Ombudsman Program, the purpose of which is to investigate and resolve complaints of residents of nursing facilities and other long-term care facilities. Funds for LTC ombudsman and elder abuse prevention activities are allotted to all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. territories.\nThe Older Americans Act Reauthorization Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-144) authorizes appropriations for most OAA programs through FY2019. P.L. 114-144 also made changes to the statutory funding formulas for several programs under Title III of the act. Appendix A of the report provides a detailed legislative history of the Title III funding formula changes, including changes under P.L. 114-144, as well as the OAA reauthorizations of 2000 and 2006. Appendix B provides an analysis of the state-based population data for the U.S. population age 60 and older. Appendix C compares FY2016 allotment amounts for states and other entities with actual allotment amounts under the statutory funding formula change in P.L. 114-144 for FY2017 to FY2019 for Title III Parts B, C, and D programs.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_183"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_184","query":"Cluster munitions are air-dropped or ground-launched weapons that release a number of smaller submunitions intended to kill enemy personnel or destroy vehicles. Cluster munitions were developed in World War II and are part of many nations' weapons stockpiles. Cluster munitions have been used frequently in combat, including the early phases of the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cluster munitions have been highly criticized internationally for causing a significant number of civilian deaths, and efforts have been undertaken to ban and regulate their use. The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to view cluster munitions as a military necessity but in 2008 instituted a policy to reduce the failure rate of cluster munitions to 1% or less after 2018.\nIn November 2017, a new DOD policy was issued that essentially reversed the 2008 policy. Under the new policy, combatant commanders can use cluster munitions that do not meet the 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard in extreme situations to meet immediate warfighting demands. In addition, the new policy does not establish a deadline to replace cluster munitions exceeding the 1% rate and states that DOD \"will retain cluster munitions currently in active inventories until the capabilities they provide are replaced with enhanced and more reliable munitions.\"\nPotential issues for Congress include cluster munitions in an era of precision weapons, other weapons in lieu of cluster munitions, and the potential impact of DOD's 2017 revised cluster munitions policy.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_184"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_185","query":"Some observers perceive that after remaining generally stable for a period of about 70 years, the U.S. role in the world\u2014meaning the overall character, purpose, or direction of U.S. participation in international affairs and the country's overall relationship to the rest of the world\u2014is undergoing a potentially historic change. A change in the U.S. role in the world could have significant and even profound effects on U.S. security, freedom, and prosperity. It could significantly affect U.S. policy in areas such as relations with allies and other countries, defense plans and programs, trade and international finance, foreign assistance, and human rights.\nThe U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II in 1945 (i.e., over the past 70 years or so) is generally described as one of global leadership and significant engagement in international affairs. A key element of that role has been to defend and promote the liberal international order that the United States, with the support of its allies, created in the years after World War II. Other key elements have been to defend and promote freedom, democracy, and human rights as universal values, while criticizing and resisting authoritarian and illiberal forms of government where possible; and to oppose the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia or a spheres-of-influence world.\nThe fact that the U.S. role in the world has been generally stable over the past 70 years does not necessarily mean that this role was the right one for the United States, or that it would be the right one in the future. Although the role the United States has played in the world since the end of World War II has many defenders, it also has critics, and the merits of that role have been a matter of long-standing debate among foreign policy specialists, strategists, policymakers, and the public, with critics offering potential alternative concepts for the U.S. role in the world. One major dimension of the debate is whether the United States should attempt to continue playing the active internationalist role that it has played for the past 70 years, or instead adopt a more-restrained role that reduces U.S. involvement in world affairs. A number of critics of the U.S. role in the world over the past 70 years have offered multiple variations on the idea of a more-restrained U.S. role.\nThe overall issue for Congress is how to respond to recent developments regarding the U.S. role in the world. Potential key issues for Congress include but are not necessarily limited to the following:\nIs the U.S. role changing, and if so, in what ways? Should the U.S. role change? Is a change of some kind in the U.S. role unavoidable? How are other countries responding to a possibly changed U.S. role? Is a changed U.S. role affecting world order? What implications might a changed U.S. role in the world have for Congress's role relative to that of the executive branch in U.S. foreign policymaking? How might the operation of democracy in the United States affect the U.S. role in the world, particularly in terms of defending and promoting democracy and criticizing and resisting authoritarian and illiberal forms of government? Would a change in the U.S. role be reversible, and if so, to what degree?\nCongress's decisions on this issue could have significant implications for numerous policies, plans, programs, and budgets, and for the role of Congress relative to that of the executive branch in U.S. foreign policymaking.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_185"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_186","query":"The term child nutrition programs refers to several U.S. Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service (USDA-FNS) programs that provide food for children in institutional settings. These include the school meals programs\u2014the National School Lunch Program and School Breakfast Program\u2014as well as the Child and Adult Care Food Program, Summer Food Service Program, Special Milk Program, and Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program.\nThe most recent child nutrition reauthorization, the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (HHFKA; P.L. 111-296), made a number of changes to the child nutrition programs. In some cases, these changes spurred debate during the law's implementation, particularly in regard to updated nutrition standards for school meals and snacks. On September 30, 2015, some of the authorities created by the HHFKA expired. Efforts to reauthorize the child nutrition programs in the 114th Congress, while not completed, considered several related issues and prompted further discussion about the programs. There were no substantial reauthorization attempts in the 115th Congress.\nCurrent issues discussed in this report include the following:\nNutrition standards for school meals and snacks. The HHFKA required USDA to update the nutrition standards for school meals and other foods sold in schools. USDA issued final rules on these standards in 2012 and 2016, respectively. Some schools had difficulty implementing the nutrition standards, and USDA and Congress have taken actions to change certain parts of the standards related to whole grains, sodium, and milk.\nOfferings in the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program (FFVP). There have been debates recently over whether the FFVP should include processed and preserved fruits and vegetables, including canned, dried, and frozen items. Currently, statute permits only fresh offerings.\n\"Buy American\" requirements for school meals. The school meals programs' authorizing laws require schools to source foods domestically, with some exceptions, under Buy American requirements. Efforts both to tighten and loosen these requirements have been made in recent years. The enacted 2018 farm bill (P.L. 115-334) instructed USDA to \"enforce full compliance\" with the Buy American requirements and report to Congress within 180 days of enactment.\nCongregate feeding in summer meals. Under current law, children must consume summer meals on-site. This is known as the \"congregate feeding\" requirement. Starting in 2010, Congress funded demonstration projects, including the Summer Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) demonstration, to test alternatives to congregate feeding in summer meals. Congress has increased funding for Summer EBT in recent appropriations cycles and there have been discussions about whether to continue or expand the program.\nImplementation of the Community Eligibility Provision (CEP). The HHFKA created CEP, an option for qualifying schools, groups of schools, and school districts to offer free meals to all students. Because income-based applications for school meals are no longer required in schools adopting CEP, its implementation has created data issues for federal and state programs relying on free and reduced-price lunch eligibility data.\nUnpaid meal costs and \"lunch shaming.\" The issue of students not paying for meals and schools' handling of these situations has received increasing attention. Some schools have adopted what some term as \"lunch shaming\" practices, including throwing away a student's selected hot meal and providing a cold meal alternative when a student does not pay. Congress and USDA have taken actions recently to reduce instances of student nonpayment and stigmatization.\nPaid lunch pricing. One result of new requirements in the HHFKA was price increases for paid (full price) lunches in many schools. Attempts have been made\u2014some successfully\u2014to loosen these \"paid lunch equity\" requirements in recent years.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_186"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_187","query":"The National Popular Vote (NPV) initiative proposes an agreement among the states, an interstate compact that would effectively achieve direct popular election of the President and Vice President without a constitutional amendment. It relies on the Constitution's grant of authority to the states in Article II, Section 1 to appoint presidential electors \"in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.... \" Any state that joins the NPV compact pledges that if the compact comes into effect, its legislature will award all the state's electoral votes to the presidential ticket that wins the most popular votes nationwide, regardless of who wins in that particular state. The compact would, however, come into effect only if its success has been assured; that is, only if states controlling a majority of electoral votes (270 or more) join the compact.\nBy early May 2019, 14 states and the District of Columbia had joined the compact. After early momentum\u2014eight states and the District of Columbia joined the NPV Compact between 2007 and 2011\u2014the pace of state accessions slowed through 2018. Since then, four additional states joined, bringing the total number of electoral votes controlled by NPV member states to 189. During the same period, legislation to join the compact had been introduced during the current session in at least one chamber of the legislature in 14 additional states that control an additional 150 electors.\nThe NPV initiative emerged following the presidential election of 2000, in which one ticket gained an electoral vote majority, winning the presidency, but received fewer popular votes than its opponents. NPV grew out of subsequent discussions among scholars and activists about how to avoid similar outcomes in the future and to achieve direct popular election.\nProponents of NPV assert that it would guarantee the presidential candidates who win the most popular votes nationwide will always win the presidency; that it would end the inequities of the general ticket\/winner-take-all system of awarding electoral votes; and that candidates would extend their focus beyond winning the \"battleground states,\" campaigning more widely and devoting greater attention to issues of concern to other parts of the country. They further assert that NPV would accomplish this while avoiding the exacting standards set for the proposal and ratification of constitutional amendments. Opponents argue that NPV would undermine the authority of states under the Constitution and the Founders' intention that presidential elections should be both national and federal contests; that it is an admitted \"end run\" around the Constitution that would circumvent the amendment process; and that it might actually lead to more disputed presidential elections characterized by politically contentious state recounts.\nThe NPV has also been debated on legal grounds. Some observers maintain that it must be approved by Congress, because it is an interstate compact that would affect key provisions of constitutional presidential election procedures. NPV Inc., the organization managing the initiative's advocacy campaign, responds that congressional approval is not necessary because NPV concerns the appointment of electors, a subject that falls within state constitutional authority, and that the Supreme Court has previously rejected arguments that similar compacts would impair the rights of nonmember states. Other critics claim that NPV might violate the Voting Rights Act by diluting minority voter influence and avoiding the recently invalidated preclearance requirement for election procedure changes in covered jurisdictions. In response, NPV Inc. has asserted that the compact is \"entirely consistent with the goal of the Voting Rights Act.\"\nThis report monitors the NPV's progress in the states and will identify and analyze further developments as warranted.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_187"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_188","query":"The Railroad Retirement Board (RRB), an independent federal agency, administers retirement, survivor, disability, unemployment, and sickness insurance for railroad workers and their families. During FY2017, the RRB paid nearly $12.5 billion in retirement, disability, and survivor benefits to approximately 548,000 beneficiaries and paid $105.4 million in unemployment and sickness benefits to approximately 28,000 claimants. Of the total $12.5 billion benefit payments in the same fiscal year, 60.0% was paid to retired workers, 8.0% to disabled workers, 14.4% to spouses, and 16.8% to survivors.\nThe Railroad Retirement Act (RRA) authorizes retirement, disability, and survivor benefits for railroad workers and their families. RRA is financed primarily by payroll taxes, financial interchanges from Social Security, and transfers from the National Railroad Retirement Investment Trust (NRRIT). Railroad retirement payroll taxes have two tiers: the Tier I tax is essentially the same as the Social Security payroll tax and the Tier II tax is set each year based on the railroad retirement system's asset balances, benefit payments, and administrative costs. In FY2017, the gross RRA funding was about $12.7 billion.\nRailroad retirement annuities are also divided into two tiers. Tier I annuities are designed to be nearly equivalent to Social Security benefits and are based on both railroad retirement and Social Security-covered employment. However, Tier I annuities are more generous than Social Security benefits in certain situations. For example, at the age of 60, railroad workers with at least 30 years of covered railroad work may receive unreduced retirement annuities. Tier II annuities are similar to private pensions and based solely on covered railroad service. Tier II annuities are paid in addition to Tier I annuities.\nRailroad disability annuities may be payable to totally disabled railroad workers who are permanently disabled from all work and occupational disabled workers who are found to be permanently disabled from their regular railroad occupations. Eligible spouses and survivors of railroad workers may receive a certain portion of Tier I and Tier II benefits, but divorced spouses and surviving divorced spouses are eligible for only a certain portion of Tier I benefits.\nThe Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act (RUIA) authorizes unemployment and sickness benefits for railroad workers. RUIA is financed solely by railroad employers, whose contributions are based on the taxable earnings of their employees. Eligibility for railroad unemployment and sickness benefits is based on recent railroad service and earnings. The maximum daily unemployment and sickness benefit payable in the benefit year that began July 1, 2018, is $77, and the maximum benefit for a biweekly claim is $770. Normal benefits are paid for up to 26 weeks in a benefit year. The railroad unemployment and sickness system remains affected by sequestration, as unemployment benefits will continue to be reduced through at least September 30, 2019.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_188"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_189","query":"The Navy began procuring a small surface combatant called the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) in FY2005, and a total of 35 LCSs have been procured through FY2019, including three in FY2019. The total of 35 LCSs is three more than the 32 the Navy says are required under its 355-ship force-level goal. The Navy wants FY2019 to be the final year of LCS procurement, and it has not requested the procurement of any additional LCSs in its FY2020 budget submission.\nThe Navy wants to shift procurement of small surface combatants in FY2020 to a new frigate called the FFG(X). The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests funding for the procurement of the first FFG(X). Five industry teams are currently competing for the FFG(X) program. Two of these teams are offering designs for the FFG(X) that are modified versions of the two LCS designs that the Navy has procured in prior years. The other three industry teams are offering designs for the FFG(X) that are based on other existing ship designs. One of these three other industry teams is proposing to build its design at one of the LCS shipyards. The Navy plans to announce the outcome of the FFG(X) competition in the fourth quarter of FY2020. The FFG(X) program is covered in detail in another CRS report.\nThe Navy's 355-ship force-level goal is the result of a Force Structure Analysis (FSA) that the Navy conducted in 2016. The 2016 FSA established a force-level goal for a 355-ship Navy with 52 small surface combatants, including 32 LCSs and 20 frigates. The Navy conducts a new or updated FSA every few years, and is currently conducting a new FSA that is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2019. Navy officials have stated that this new FSA will likely not reduce the required number of small surface combatants, and might increase it. Navy officials have also suggested that the Navy in coming years may shift to a new fleet architecture that will include, among other thing, a larger proportion of small surface combatants.\nThe LCS is a relatively inexpensive surface combatant equipped with modular mission packages. The LCS program includes two very different LCS designs. One, called the LCS-1 or Freedom-class design, was developed by an industry team led by Lockheed. The other, called the LCS-2 or Independence-class design, was developed by an industry team that was then led by General Dynamics. LCS procurement has been divided more or less evenly between the two designs. The LCS-1 design is built at the Marinette Marine shipyard at Marinette, WI, with Lockheed as the prime contractor. The LCS-2 design is built at the Austal USA shipyard at Mobile, AL, with Austal USA as the prime contractor.\nThe LCS program has been controversial over the years due to past cost growth, design and construction issues with the first LCSs, concerns over the survivability of LCSs (i.e., their ability to withstand battle damage), concerns over whether LCSs are sufficiently armed and would be able to perform their stated missions effectively, and concerns over the development and testing of the modular mission packages for LCSs. The Navy's execution of the program has been a matter of congressional oversight attention for several years.\nA current issue for Congress is whether to procure any LCSs in FY2020, and if so, how many. Opponents could argue that the total number of LCSs procured in prior years exceeds the Navy's stated requirement, and that adding funding to the Navy's FY2020 shipbuilding account for procuring one or more additional LCSs could reduce FY2020 funding for other Navy programs. Supporters could argue that procuring additional LCSs in FY2020 could provide a hedge against delays in the FFG(X) program and help the Navy achieve its small surface combatant force-level goal more quickly. Another issue for Congress concerns future workloads and employment levels at the two LCS shipyards if one or both of these yards are not involved in building FFG(X)s.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_189"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_190","query":"Review and rollback of Clean Air Act rules to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from power plants, cars and trucks, and the oil and gas sector has been a major focus of the Trump Administration since it took office in 2017. On March 28, 2017, President Trump signed Executive Order 13783, to require the review of regulations and policies that \"burden the development or use of domestically produced energy resources.\" The E.O. directed the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to review the Clean Power Plan (CPP), which set limits on GHG emissions from existing power plants, and several other regulations for consistency with policies that the E.O. enumerates, and as soon as practicable, to \"suspend, revise, or rescind the guidance, or publish for notice and comment proposed rules suspending, revising, or rescinding those rules.\" GHG rules for new power plants, for cars and trucks, and for methane emissions from the oil and gas industry, in addition to the CPP, are subject to the executive order and are under review at EPA, as well as being challenged in the courts.\nThe CPP, which was promulgated by the Obama Administration's EPA in 2015 and would limit GHG emissions from existing fossil-fueled power plants, has been one focus of debate. The Trump Administration's EPA has proposed to repeal the CPP and replace it with the Affordable Clean Energy rule (ACE), a rule that defines the \"best system of emission reduction\" for coal-fired power plant GHGs as efficiency improvement technologies. As proposed, the CPP repeal and ACE rules would remove federal numerical carbon dioxide (CO2) emission limits for existing coal- and natural gas-fired power plants, eliminating one backstop on power plant GHG emissions. Final agency action on ACE is expected later this year. Some Members of Congress have submitted comments to EPA on the ACE proposal. Congress may be interested in conducting oversight of the ACE rule.\nClean Air Act GHG standards for cars and light trucks are the subject of another EPA review. An August 2018 proposal would freeze EPA's GHG standards for new cars and light trucks at the level required in model year (MY) 2020. Current regulations, promulgated in 2012 and reaffirmed in January 2017, set increasingly stringent emission standards through MY2025. The EPA proposal would cause a projected increase in vehicle fuel consumption of about a half million barrels of gasoline per day (equivalent to about 186,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide per day) when fully implemented, according to EPA and the Department of Transportation. The proposal would also withdraw California's Clean Air Act waiver for new vehicle GHG standards applicable to MY2021-MY2025. The California standards have been adopted by 12 other states and cover about 35% of the new vehicle market.\nFollowing promulgation of these or other Clean Air Act regulations, Congress could address the issues through legislation affirming, modifying, or overturning them. The threat of a filibuster, requiring 60 votes to proceed, however, has generally prevented Senate action. In the 116th Congress, the new majority in the House has indicated a greater interest in addressing climate change issues rather than rolling back regulations. One result may be a new focus on oversight of agency actions to address climate change and its impacts.\nThe 116th Congress may also be interested in issues related to EPA air quality standards for what are called \"conventional\" or \"criteria\" pollutants. EPA faces statutory deadlines to complete reviews of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for the two most widespread of this group: ozone and particulate matter (PM). The agency has proposed to speed up the review process, while simultaneously eliminating the scientific review panels that have historically assisted agency staff in conducting the reviews. The Clean Air Act has minimal requirements for how the agency is to conduct NAAQS reviews, leaving the details to the EPA Administrator. Nevertheless, congressional oversight is considered possible as EPA moves forward with the ozone and PM reviews.\nOther issues Congress might consider include air toxics regulations (e.g., the Mercury and Air Toxics rule for power plants), standards for new residential wood heaters, and the Renewable Fuel Standard.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_190"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_191","query":"China's actions in recent years in the South China Sea (SCS)\u2014particularly its island-building and base-construction activities at sites that it occupies in the Spratly Islands\u2014have heightened concerns among U.S. observers that China is rapidly gaining effective control of the SCS, an area of strategic, political, and economic importance to the United States and its allies and partners, particularly those in the Indo-Pacific region. U.S. Navy Admiral Philip Davidson, in his responses to advance policy questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee for an April 17, 2018, hearing to consider his nomination to become Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), stated that \"China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States.\" Chinese control of the SCS\u2014and, more generally, Chinese domination of China's near-seas region, meaning the SCS, the East China Sea (ECS), and the Yellow Sea\u2014could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere.\nChina is a party to multiple territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS, including, in particular, disputes with multiple neighboring countries over the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, and Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, and with Japan over the Senkaku Islands in the ECS. Up through 2014, U.S. concern over these disputes centered more on their potential for causing tension, incidents, and a risk of conflict between China and its neighbors in the region, including U.S. allies Japan and the Philippines and emerging partner states such as Vietnam. While that concern remains, particularly regarding the potential for a conflict between China and Japan involving the Senkaku Islands, U.S. concern since 2014 (i.e., since China's island-building activities in the Spratly Islands were first publicly reported) has shifted increasingly to how China's strengthening position in the SCS may be affecting the risk of a U.S.-China crisis or conflict in the SCS and the broader U.S.-Chinese strategic competition.\nIn addition to territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS, China is involved in a dispute, particularly with the United States, over whether China has a right under international law to regulate the activities of foreign military forces operating within China's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The position of the United States and most other countries is that while international law gives coastal states the right to regulate economic activities (such as fishing and oil exploration) within their EEZs, it does not give coastal states the right to regulate foreign military activities in the parts of their EEZs beyond their 12-nautical-mile territorial waters. The position of China and some other countries (i.e., a minority group among the world's nations) is that UNCLOS gives coastal states the right to regulate not only economic activities, but also foreign military activities, in their EEZs. The dispute appears to be at the heart of multiple incidents between Chinese and U.S. ships and aircraft in international waters and airspace since 2001, and has potential implications not only for China's EEZs, but for U.S. naval operations in EEZs globally, and for international law of the sea.\nA key issue for Congress is how the United States should respond to China's actions in the SCS and ECS\u2014particularly its island-building and base-construction activities in the Spratly Islands\u2014and to China's strengthening position in the SCS. A key oversight question for Congress is whether the Trump Administration has an appropriate strategy\u2014and an appropriate amount of resources for implementing that strategy\u2014for countering China's \"salami-slicing\" strategy or gray zone operations for gradually strengthening its position in the SCS, for imposing costs on China for its actions in the SCS and ECS, and for defending and promoting U.S. interests in the region.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_191"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_192","query":"On January 7, 2018, World Bank President Jim Yong Kim announced that he would resign by February 1, three years before the expiration of his second five-year term in 2022. Following his resignation, Dr. Kim is to join Global Infrastructure Partners (GIP), a private equity fund that invests in projects in advanced and developing countries. Prior to his nomination to the World Bank by President Barack Obama in 2012, Dr. Kim served as the president of Dartmouth College.\nThe nomination period for the next president ends on March 14, after which the Executive Board is to select three candidates for interviews. To date, the only candidate is David Malpass, the Treasury Department's Under Secretary for International Affairs, nominated by President Trump on February 6, 2019. Following the interviews, the Executive Board is to select the next president, something which it aims to do before the spring meetings in April 2019.\nSince its founding after World War II, the presidency of the World Bank has been held by a citizen of the United States, the Bank's largest shareholder. According to an informal agreement among World Bank member countries, a U.S. candidate is chosen as the president of the World Bank and a European candidate (typically French or German) is appointed as the managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).\nThe formal requirement for the selection of the World Bank president is that the executive directors appoint, by at least a 50% majority, an individual who is neither a member of the Board of Governors nor Board of Executive Directors. There are no requirements on how individuals are selected, on what criteria, or by what process they are vetted. Although the executive directors may select the IMF managing director by a simple majority vote, they historically aim to reach agreement by consensus. With these factors combined, the custom guaranteeing European leadership at the IMF and American leadership at the World Bank has remained in place.\nThis custom has been subject to increasing criticism during the past two decades. The first line of criticism is directed at the current distribution of voting power, which critics contend does not account for the increasing integration of developing countries into the global economy. A second line of criticism is directed at the method of selecting World Bank and IMF leadership, which critics argue elevates nationality above merit and undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of the institutions. Calls for a more open, transparent, and merit-based leadership selection process have been made consistently in the past, and at times have been incorporated into communiqu\u00e9s of various summits, but have yet to change the leadership selection process at either institution.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_192"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_193","query":"Kuwait has been pivotal to the decades-long U.S. effort to secure the Persian Gulf region because of its consistent cooperation with U.S. military operations in the region and its key location in the northern Gulf. Kuwait and the United States have a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), under which the United States maintains over 13,000 military personnel in country and prepositioned military equipment in Kuwait to project power in the region. Only Germany, Japan, and South Korea host more U.S. troops than does Kuwait, which hosts the operational command center for U.S.-led Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) that has combatted the Islamic State.\nKuwait usually acts in concert not only with the United States but also with allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman). Kuwait is participating militarily in the Saudi-led coalition that is trying to defeat the Shia \"Houthi\" rebel movement in Yemen, but Kuwait tends to favor mediation of regional issues over the use of military force. Kuwait is trying to mediate a resolution of the intra-GCC rift that erupted in June 2017 when Saudi Arabia and the UAE moved to isolate Qatar. Kuwait has refrained from intervening in Syria's civil war, instead hosting donor conferences for victims of the Syrian civil conflict, Iraq's recovery from the Islamic State challenge, and the effects of regional conflict on Jordan's economy. Kuwait generally supports U.S. efforts to counter Iran and has periodically arrested Kuwaiti Shias that the government says are spying for Iran, but it also engages Iran at high levels. U.S. government reports have praised recent steps by Kuwait to counter the financing of terrorism, but reports persist that wealthy Kuwaitis are still able to donate to extreme Islamist factions in the region. Kuwait has consistently engaged the post-Saddam governments in Baghdad in part to prevent any repeat of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.\nExperts have long assessed Kuwait's political system as a potential regional model for its successful incorporation of secular and Islamist political factions, both Shia and Sunni. However, this assessment has evolved since 2011 because Kuwait has followed other GCC states in incarcerating and revoking the citizenship of social media and other critics. Kuwait's political stability has not been in question but long-standing parliamentary opposition to the ruling Sabah family's political dominance has broadened in recent years to visible public pressure for political and economic reform. Parliamentary elections in July 2013 produced a National Assembly amenable to working with the ruling family, but the subsequent elections held in November 2016 returned to the body Islamist and liberal opponents of the Sabah family who held sway in earlier assemblies. Assembly oppositionist challenges to government policy led to a cabinet resignation in early November 2017, although the current cabinet does not differ much from the previous cabinet on key policy questions. Kuwait has increased its efforts to curb trafficking in persons over the past few years.\nYears of political paralysis contributed to economic stagnation relative to Kuwait's more economically vibrant Gulf neighbors such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Like the other GCC states, Kuwait has struggled with reduced income from oil exports during 2014-2018. Kuwait receives negligible amounts of U.S. foreign assistance, and has offset some of the costs of U.S. operations in the region since Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_193"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_194","query":"Georgia is one of the United States' closest partners among the states that gained their independence after the USSR collapsed in 1991. With a history of strong economic aid and security cooperation, the United States has deepened its strategic partnership with Georgia since Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia and 2014 invasion of Ukraine. U.S. policy expressly supports Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, and Georgia is a leading recipient of U.S. aid to Europe and Eurasia.\nMany observers consider Georgia to be one of the most democratic states in the post-Soviet region, even as the country faces ongoing governance challenges. The center-left Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia party (GD) has close to a three-fourths supermajority in parliament and governs with limited checks and balances. Although Georgia faces high rates of poverty and underemployment, its economy in 2017 and 2018 appeared to show stronger growth than it had in the previous four years.\nThe GD led a coalition to victory in parliamentary elections in 2012 amid growing dissatisfaction with the former ruling party, Mikheil Saakashvili's center-right United National Movement, which came to power as a result of Georgia's 2003 Rose Revolution. In August 2008, Russia went to war with Georgia to prevent Saakashvili's government from reestablishing control over the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which broke away from Georgia in the early 1990s and became informal Russian protectorates.\nCongress has expressed firm support for Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-44, Title II, \u00a7253) states that the United States \"does not recognize territorial changes effected by force, including the illegal invasions and occupations\" of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and other territories occupied by Russia. In September 2016, the House of Representatives passed H.Res. 660, which condemns Russia's military intervention and occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In February 2019, the Georgia Support Act (H.R. 598), which originally passed the House by unanimous consent in the 115th Congress (H.R. 6219), was reintroduced in the 116th Congress. The act would express support for Georgia's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, as well as for its democratic development, Euro-Atlantic integration, and peaceful conflict resolution in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.\nThe United States provides substantial foreign and military aid to Georgia each year. Since 2010, U.S. nonmilitary aid to Georgia has totaled around $64 million a year on average, in addition to a five-year Millennium Challenge Corporation grant of $140 million to support education. In FY2019, Congress appropriated almost $90 million in nonmilitary aid to Georgia. Since 2010, U.S. military aid to Georgia has been estimated at around $68 million a year on average. In FY2019, Congress appropriated $35 million in Foreign Military Financing and $2 million in International Military Education and Training funds. Defense assistance also includes a three-year, $35 million training initiative, the Georgia Defense Readiness Program.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_194"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_195","query":"Over the years, many Members of Congress have demonstrated an ongoing interest in the role and effectiveness of the United Nations (U.N.) Human Rights Council (the Council). The Council is the primary intergovernmental body mandated with addressing human rights on a global level. During the Obama Administration and the first part of the Trump Administration, the United States served three terms as a Council member. In June 2018, Trump Administration officials announced U.S. withdrawal from the Council, noting concerns with the Council's focus on Israel, overall ineffectiveness in addressing human rights issues, and lack of comprehensive reform.\nBackground\nThe U.N. General Assembly established the Human Rights Council in 2006 to replace the Commission on Human Rights, which was criticized for its apparent ineffectiveness in addressing human rights abuses and for the number of widely perceived human rights abusers that served as its members. Since 2006, many governments and observers have expressed serious concerns with the Council's disproportionate attention to Israel and apparent lack of attention to other pressing human rights situations. In particular, some criticize the inclusion of the \"human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories\" (Israel) as a permanent item on the Council's agenda. No other country-specific human rights situation is singled out in this manner. Some are also concerned that countries widely perceived as human rights abusers, such as Saudi Arabia, China, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, serve as Council members. On the other hand, supporters argue that the Council is an improvement over the previous commission. They contend that the Council's Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process, which aims to evaluate each member state's fulfillment of its human rights obligations, is an effective means for addressing human rights issues in various countries. Many proponents of the Council are encouraged by its increased attention to human rights situations in countries such as Iran, North Korea, and Syria.\nU.S. Policy\nOver the years, U.S. policymakers have debated U.S. participation in and funding of the Human Rights Council. The George W. Bush Administration voted against the General Assembly resolution creating the Council and did not run for membership; it also decided to withhold U.S. funding to the organization in FY2008 under a provision enacted by Congress. Conversely, the Obama Administration supported the overall purpose of the Council and decided that it was better to work from within as a Council member to improve its effectiveness. The Obama Administration was also critical of the Council's focus on Israel, sometimes boycotting debates on the issue. The United States was elected to the Council in 2009 and in 2012. In October 2016, it was elected for a third term, which began in January 2017. The United States remained a member during the Trump Administration until mid-2018, when it announced its withdrawal. The Administration also withheld Council funding in FY2017 and FY2018.\nSome Members of Congress maintain an ongoing interest in the credibility and effectiveness of the Council. Members have been particularly critical of both the Council's focus on Israel and lack of competitive Council elections. Some Members have proposed or enacted legislation calling for U.S. withdrawal; at the same time, others have introduced legislation urging the Council to address specific human rights situations. Most recently, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6 ), prohibits Council funding unless the Secretary of State determines that U.S. participation is important to the national interest of the United States, and that the Council is taking steps to remove Israel as a permanent agenda item and ensure the integrity of Council elections.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_195"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_196","query":"The Constitution grants Congress the sole authority over the regulation of foreign commerce. Over the past several decades, Congress has authorized the President to adjust tariffs and other trade restrictions in certain circumstances through specific trade laws. Using these delegated authorities under three trade laws, President Trump has imposed increased tariffs, largely in the range of 10% - 25%, on a variety of U.S. imports to address concerns related to national security, injury to competing industries, and China's trade practices on forced technology transfer and intellectual property rights, among other issues. Several U.S. trade partners argue that these tariff actions violate existing U.S. commitments under multilateral and bilateral or regional trade agreements and have imposed tariffs on U.S. exports in retaliation. Congress continues to actively examine and debate these tariffs, and several bills have been introduced either to expand, limit, or revise existing authorities.\nU.S. Trade Laws Authorizing the President's Tariff Actions\nThe President's recent tariff actions raise a number of significant issues for Congress. These issues include the economic effects of tariffs on firms, farmers, and workers, and the overall U.S. economy, the appropriate use of delegated authorities in line with congressional intent, and the potential implications and impact of these measures for broader U.S. trade policy, particularly with respect to the U.S. role in the global trading system.\nThe products affected by the tariff increases include washing machines, solar products, steel, aluminum, and numerous imports from China. Retaliatory tariffs are affecting several U.S. exports, including agricultural products such as soybeans and pork, motor vehicles, steel, and aluminum. Using 2017 values, U.S. imports subject to the increased tariffs accounted for 12% of annual U.S. imports, while exports subject to retaliatory tariffs accounted for 8% of annual U.S. exports. A pending Section 232 investigation on motor vehicle and parts imports could result in increased tariffs on more than $360 billion of imports, and the President has stated that additional tariffs could be imposed on imports from China absent a negotiated agreement to address certain Chinese trade practices of longstanding concern to the United States.\nAlthough the consensus among most economists is that the tariffs are likely to have a negative effect on the U.S. economy overall, they may have both costs and benefits across different market sectors and actors. Import tariffs are effectively a tax on domestic consumption and thus increase costs for U.S. consumers and downstream industries that use products subject to tariffs. Retaliatory tariffs create disadvantages for U.S. exports in foreign markets, and can lead to fewer sales of U.S. products abroad and depressed prices. However, domestic producers who compete with affected imports can benefit by being able to charge higher prices for their goods. The Administration also argues the tariffs may have an indirect benefit if they result in tariff reductions by U.S. trading partners and lead to resolution of U.S. trade concerns affecting key sectors of the U.S. economy. Economic analyses of the tariff actions estimate a range of potential effects, but generally suggest a 0.1%-0.2% reduction in U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) growth annually owing to the actions to date. The economic effects of the President's actions are likely to be central to ongoing congressional debate on legislation to alter the President's tariff authority.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_196"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_197","query":"This report provides information on the ongoing crisis in Yemen. Now in its fifth year, the war in Yemen shows no signs of abating. The war has killed thousands of Yemenis, including combatants as well as civilians, and has significantly damaged the country's infrastructure. The difficulty of accessing certain areas of Yemen has made it problematic for governments and aid agencies to count the war's casualties. One U.S. and European-funded organization, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), estimates that 60,000 Yemenis have been killed since January 2016.\nThough fighting continues along several fronts, on December 13, 2018, Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Yemen Martin Griffiths brokered a cease-fire centered on the besieged Red Sea port city of Hudaydah, Yemen's largest port. As part of the deal, the coalition and the Houthis agreed to redeploy their forces outside Hudaydah city and port. The United Nations agreed to chair a Redeployment Coordination Committee (RCC) to monitor the cease-fire and redeployment. On January 16, the United Nations Security Council (UNSCR) passed UNSCR 2452, which authorized (for a six-month period) the creation of the United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA), of which the RCC is a significant component. As of late March 2019, the Stockholm Agreement remains unfulfilled, although U.N. officials claim that the parties have made \"significant progress towards an agreement to implement phase one of the redeployments of the Hudayda agreement.\"\nAlthough both the Obama and Trump Administrations have called for a political solution to the conflict, the two sides in Yemen appear to fundamentally disagree over the framework for a potential political solution. The Saudi-led coalition demands that the Houthi militia disarm, relinquish its heavy weaponry (ballistic missiles and rockets), and return control of the capital, Sanaa, to the internationally recognized government of President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who is in exile in Saudi Arabia. The coalition asserts that there remains international consensus for these demands, insisting that the conditions laid out in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2216 (April 2015) should form the basis for a solution to the conflict. The Houthis reject UNSCR 2216 and seem determined to outlast their opponents while consolidating their control over northern Yemen. Since the December 2017 Houthi killing of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, a former Houthi ally, there is no apparent single Yemeni rival to challenge Houthi rule in northern Yemen. Armed groups, including Islamist extremists, operate in other parts of the country, and rival political movements and trends advance competing visions for the long-term reestablishment of national governance in the country. The reconciliation of Yemeni factions and the redefinition of the country's political system, security sector, and social contract will likely require years of additional diplomatic engagement.\nAccording to the United Nations, Yemen's humanitarian crisis is the worst in the world, with close to 80% of Yemen's population of nearly 30 million needing some form of assistance. Two-thirds of the population is considered food insecure; one-third is suffering from extreme levels of hunger; and the United Nations estimates that 230 out of Yemen's 333 districts are at risk of famine. In sum, the United Nations notes that humanitarian assistance is \"increasingly becoming the only lifeline for millions of Yemenis.\"\nFor additional information on Yemen, including a summary of relevant legislation, please see CRS Report R45046, Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2019, by Jeremy M. Sharp and Christopher M. Blanchard.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_197"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_198","query":"Difficulty with striking an appropriate balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the Export Controls Act of 2018 (ECA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense articles; dual-use goods and technology; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. The ECA legislates dual-use controls.\nThe U.S. export control system is diffused among several different licensing and enforcement agencies. Exports of dual-use goods and technologies\u2014as well as some military items\u2014are licensed by the Department of Commerce, munitions are licensed by the Department of State, and restrictions on exports based on U.S. sanctions are administered by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Administrative enforcement of export controls is conducted by these agencies, while criminal penalties are issued by units of the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice.\nAspects of the U.S. export control system have long been criticized by exporters, nonproliferation advocates, allies, and other stakeholders as being too rigorous, insufficiently rigorous, cumbersome, obsolete, inefficient, or combinations of these descriptions. In August 2009, the Barack Obama Administration launched a comprehensive review of the U.S. export control system. In April 2010, then-Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates proposed an outline of a new system based on four singularities\na single export control licensing agency for dual-use, munitions exports, and Treasury-administered embargoes, a unified control list, a single primary enforcement coordination agency, and a single integrated information technology (IT) system.\nThe rationalization of the two control lists was the Obama Administration's focus. The Administration made no specific proposals concerning the single licensing agency, although the Administration implemented some elements of a future single system, such as a consolidated screening list and harmonization of certain licensing policies.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_198"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_199","query":"In early 2018, the Trump Administration\u2014citing concerns over national security and unfair trade practices\u2014imposed increased tariffs on certain imported products in general and on U.S. imports from China in particular. Several of the affected foreign trading partners (including China) responded to the U.S. tariffs with their own retaliatory tariffs targeting various U.S. products, especially agricultural commodities.\nOn July 24, 2018, Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue announced that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) would be taking several temporary actions to assist farmers in response to trade damage from what the Administration has characterized as \"unjustified retaliation.\" Specifically, the Secretary said that USDA would authorize up to $12 billion in financial assistance\u2014referred to as a trade aid package\u2014for certain agricultural commodities using Section 5 of the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) Charter Act (15 U.S.C. 714c). USDA intends for the trade aid package to provide short-term assistance in response to the ongoing trade disputes. However, the Secretary stated that there would not be further trade-related financial assistance beyond this $12 billion package. The aid package includes (1) a Market Facilitation Program (MFP) of direct payments (valued at up to $10 billion) to producers of soybeans, corn, cotton, sorghum, wheat, hogs, and dairy who are most affected by the trade retaliation (sweet cherries and almonds were added to this list in September); (2) a Food Purchase and Distribution Program to partially offset lost export sales of affected commodities ($1.2 billion); and (3) an Agricultural Trade Promotion (ATP) Program to expand foreign markets ($200 million).\nUSDA's Farm Service Agency will administer the MFP by providing payments in two potential tranches: a first round announced on August 27, 2018, initially valued at $4.7 billion; and an equivalent-valued second round announced on December 17, 2018. However, producers need only sign up once for the MFP to be eligible for first and second payments. The sign-up period for soybeans, corn, cotton, sorghum, wheat, hogs, and dairy started September 4, 2018. The sign-up period for fresh sweet cherries and shelled almonds started on September 24. To be eligible, a producer must have an ownership share in the commodity, be actively engaged in farming, and be in compliance with adjusted gross income restrictions and conservation provisions. Eligible producers should apply after their harvest is complete. Initially, producers were given a deadline of January 15, 2019, to complete an application. However, USDA extended the deadline until February 14, 2018, due to the government shutdown.\nUSDA used 2017 production data to estimate that approximately $9.6 billion would be distributed in MFP payments for corn, cotton, sorghum, soybeans, wheat, dairy, hogs, fresh sweet cherries, and shelled almonds, with over three-fourths ($7.3 billion) of MFP payments provided to soybean producers. MFP payments are capped on a per-person or per-legal-entity basis at a combined $125,000 for eligible crop commodities, a combined $125,000 for dairy production and hogs, and, separately, a combined $125,000 for fresh sweet cherries and shelled almonds.\nIn addition to the MFP payments, the Administration announced a Food Purchase and Distribution Program that is to undertake $1.2 billion in government purchases of excess food supplies. USDA has targeted an initial 29 commodities for purchases and distribution through domestic nutrition assistance programs. Purchasing orders and distribution activities are to be adjusted based on the demand by the recipient food assistance programs geographically.\nThe smallest piece of the trade aid package is an allocation of $200 million to the ATP to boost the trade promotion efforts at USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service, including foreign market development for affected agricultural products. On January 31, 2019, USDA awarded $200 million to 57 organizations through ATP.\nUSDA's use of its discretionary authority under the CCC Charter Act to make direct payments without further congressional action has historically been somewhat intermittent and limited in its scale. While the use of this authority is not without precedent, the scope and scale of this trade aid package has increased congressional and public interest. Furthermore, the significant variation in the announced MFP payment rates for affected commodities has elicited questions about equitable treatment among affected commodities. On September 13, USDA released a description of its MFP payment methodology, which is based strictly on the estimated direct trade \"damage\"\u2014that is, export losses resulting from retaliatory tariffs. Indirect effects\u2014such as the decline in market prices and resultant \"lost value\" for many of the affected commodities\u2014were not included in the payment calculation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_199"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_200","query":"The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is the U.S. government authority tasked with regulating the import, transit, and release of regulated animals, animal products, veterinary biologics, plants, plant products, pests, organisms, soil, and genetically engineered organisms. APHIS provides scientific authorities in trade partner countries and U.S. importers with animal and plant health import regulations.\nAPHIS requires U.S. importers to obtain animal or plant health import permits, which verify that the items being imported meet U.S. import standards. Animal and plant health import permits certify that imports follow U.S. regulations, World Trade Organization (WTO) guidelines, and\/or trading partner specific requirements. These import permits are a part of broader agreements between the United States and its trading partners within the WTO on established sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. These measures aim to protect against diseases, pests, toxins, and other contaminants. The House and Senate Agricultural Appropriations Committees appropriate funds that allow APHIS to carry out a range of activities, including those involved in issuing import permits. From FY2014 to FY2018, discretionary appropriations for APHIS have averaged nearly $900 million. About 85% of the APHIS budget is allocated to the \"Safeguarding and Emergency Preparedness\/Response\" mission area, which includes the administration of health import permits and other efforts to prevent imports of pests and diseases into the United States.\nAPHIS's authority over agricultural imports is largely provided by the Animal Health Protection Act (7 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a78301 et seq.), the Plant Protection Act (7 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a77701 et seq.), and the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (7 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a78401). These laws authorize APHIS to administer animal and plant health import permits and conduct agricultural import inspections. APHIS works with other federal agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection (CBP), to conduct animal and plant health monitoring programs and to determine if new pest or disease management programs are needed. In addition, Congress directs the Food and Drug Administration, the Food Safety and Inspection Service, and state-level Departments of Agriculture to participate in inspecting many products regulated by APHIS.\nAPHIS and CBP personnel inspect shipments of imported agricultural products and certify that the required import health permits and SPS certificates accompany each shipment. One of the major flagship programs that APHIS and CBP administer together is the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program, in which APHIS and CBP technical staff work to ensure that the required animal or plant health permits, sanitary certificates (for animal products), and phytosanitary certificates (for plant products) accompany each shipment. APHIS transfers funds to CBP to conduct AQI activities.\nThe ongoing congressional commitment to preventing plant and animal disease and pests from entering the United States through agricultural imports is evident in annual appropriations Congress provides for APHIS. Congress has directed APHIS to monitor pests and diseases and has assigned APHIS to oversee SPS activities in some free trade agreements. Moreover, legislation introduced in the 115th Congress sought to address invasive species (e.g., Areawide Integrated Pest Management, H.R. 5411) and would have directed CBP to enforce APHIS regulations to deter smuggling of plants and animals into the United States.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_200"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_201","query":"The District of Columbia Opportunity Scholarship Program (DC OSP) is the only federally funded voucher program for elementary and secondary education. It operates exclusively in the District of Columbia. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-199), which included the FY2004 District of Columbia Appropriations Act, also included the now-repealed DC School Choice Incentive Act of 2003. The DC School Choice Incentive Act initially authorized the DC OSP. Appropriations were authorized for FY2004 through FY2008. The DC OSP provides scholarships to eligible students to attend participating private elementary or secondary schools, and is administered by the U.S. Department of Education (ED).\nThe FY2004 appropriations act provided funding for the DC OSP for the first time and also, for the first time, provided funding for District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) for the improvement of public education, and funding for the District of Columbia State Education Office for public charter schools. Funding for DCPS and public charter schools was not addressed in the DC School Choice Incentive Act of 2003. However, for every year that Congress has provided funding for the DC OSP, it has also provided funding for the DC public schools and DC public charter schools. The provision of federal funds for the DC OSP, DC public schools, and public charter schools is commonly referred to as the \"three-pronged approach\" to supporting elementary and secondary education in the District of Columbia.\nReauthorization\nThe DC OSP has been reauthorized twice. It was reauthorized by the Scholarships for Opportunity and Results (SOAR) Act (P.L. 112-10) in 2011, which also repealed the DC School Choice Incentive Act of 2003. The SOAR Act authorized appropriations from FY2012 through FY2016 for the DC OSP, DC public schools, and DC public charter schools. The DC OSP was subsequently reauthorized by the SOAR Reauthorization Act (P.L. 115-31), which amended the SOAR Act and extended the authorization of appropriations for the DC OSP, DC public schools, and DC public charter schools through FY2019. Changes to the DC OSP have also been made primarily through appropriations acts in the intervening fiscal years. For FY2019, $52.5 million was appropriated for the SOAR Act, with $17.5 million each provided to the DC OSP, DCPS, and the DC State Education Office.\nParticipation\nBased on data available from Serving Our Children, the current local DC OSP administrator, since the program's inception in the 2004-2005 school year, over 21,057 applications have been submitted, and over 8,400 scholarships have been awarded. For the 2017-2018 school year, over 3,900 applications for scholarships were received from new applicants and returning students. Over 1,650 students received and used a scholarship at 44 of 48 participating private schools that school year. While the value of the scholarship has changed over time, for the 2018-2019 school year students may receive up to $8,857 to attend a participating private elementary or middle school and up to $13,287 to attend a participating private high school.\nEvaluation\nThe DC OSP has been evaluated by two federal agencies: the Department of Education (ED) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). The evaluations conducted by these two agencies differed considerably in terms of purpose and scope. ED evaluated the participation of schools, parents, and students in the DC OSP, as well as the effectiveness of the program on student achievement and other outcome measures. GAO evaluated certain accountability mechanisms and whether they were operating as intended, such as the program's use of funds and general adherence to statutory requirements. GAO also evaluated how ED and the District of Columbia fulfilled their roles and responsibilities for the DC OSP. The impact evaluations conducted by ED found mixed results. These evaluations focused on four outcome measures: (1) reading and mathematics achievement, (2) parent and student satisfaction, (3) parent and student perceptions of school safety, and (4) parental involvement. The GAO evaluations revealed issues with the way the DC OSP was being administered by the first two local program administrators, as well as concerns about ED's oversight of the program.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_201"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_202","query":"Recent acts of terrorism and hate crimes have prompted a renewed focus on the possible links between internet content and offline violence. While some have focused on the role that social media companies play in moderating user-generated content, others have called for Congress to pass laws regulating online content promoting terrorism or violence. Proposals related to government action of this nature raise significant free speech questions, including (1) the reach of the First Amendment's protections when it comes to foreign nationals posting online content from abroad; (2) the scope of so-called \"unprotected\" categories of speech developed long before the advent of the internet; and (3) the judicial standards that limit how the government can craft or enforce laws to preserve national security and prevent violence.\nAt the outset, it is not clear that a foreign national (i.e., a non-U.S. citizen or resident) could invoke the protections of the First Amendment in a specific U.S. prosecution or litigation involving online speech that the foreign national posted from abroad. The Supreme Court has never directly opined on this question. However, its decisions regarding the extraterritorial application of other constitutional protections to foreign nationals and lower court decisions involving speech made by foreign nationals while outside of the United States suggest that the First Amendment may not apply in that scenario. In contrast, free speech considerations are likely to be highly relevant in evaluating the legality of (1) proposals for the U.S. government to regulate what internet users in the United States can post, or (2) the enforcement of existing U.S. laws where the government seeks to hold U.S. persons liable for their online speech.\nAlthough the government typically can regulate conduct without running afoul of the First Amendment, regulations that restrict or burden expression often do implicate free speech protections. In such circumstances, courts generally distinguish between laws that regulate speech on the basis of its content (i.e., the topic discussed or the message expressed) and those that do not, subjecting the former to more stringent review. A law that expressly restricts online communications or media promoting violence or terrorism is likely to be deemed a content-based restriction on speech; whereas a law that primarily regulates conduct could be subject to a less stringent standard of review, unless its application to speech turns on the message expressed. Whether such laws would survive First Amendment scrutiny depends on a number of factors.\nOver the past 50 years, the Supreme Court has generally extended the First Amendment's free speech protections to speech that advocates violence in the abstract while allowing the government to restrict or punish speech that threatens or facilitates violence in a more specific or immediate way. The subtle distinctions that have developed over time are reflected in the categories of speech that the court has deemed unprotected, meaning that the government generally can prohibit speech in these areas because of its content. These include incitement to imminent lawless action, true threats, and speech integral to criminal conduct. Although judicial decisions have helped to define the scope of some of these categories, open questions remain as to how they apply in the context of online speech. For instance, legal scholars have questioned what it means for speech to incite \"imminent\" violence when posted to social media. They have also asked how threats should be perceived when made in the context of online forums where hyperbolic speech about violence is common.\nThe extent to which the government can regulate speech promoting violence or terrorism also depends on whether its law or action satisfies the applicable level of scrutiny that the Court has developed to evaluate measures that restrict or burden speech. In general, laws that regulate protected speech on political or ideological matters are subject to strict scrutiny, a test that requires the government to demonstrate that its law is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. Nevertheless, in some cases, courts have concluded that the government's national security interests justify restrictions on protected speech, such as in 2010 when the Supreme Court upheld certain applications of a federal statute prohibiting providing material support to U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_202"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_203","query":"The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), most recently comprehensively amended by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95), is the primary source of federal aid to K-12 education. The Title I-A program is the largest grant program authorized under the ESEA and was funded at $15.8 billion for FY2018. It is designed to provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending elementary and secondary schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families.\nUnder current law, the U.S. Department of Education (ED) determines Title I-A grants to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). The four Title I-A formulas have somewhat distinct allocation patterns, providing varying shares of allocated funds to different types of states. Thus, for some states, certain formulas are more favorable than others.\nThis report provides FY2018 state grant amounts under each of the four formulas used to determine Title I-A grants. Overall, California received the largest FY2018 Title I-A grant amount ($2.0 billion, or 12.76% of total Title I-A grants). Wyoming received the smallest FY2018 Title I-A grant amount ($35.9 million, or 0.23% of total Title I-A grants).","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_203"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_204","query":"This report examines the historical development and contemporary role of Congressional Member Organizations (CMOs) in the House, as well as informal Member groups in the House, Senate, and across the chambers. Commonly, these groups are referred to as caucuses, but they will be referred to collectively as informal Member organizations in this report to avoid confusion with official party caucuses. Some examples of groups that modern observers would consider informal Member organizations date back as far as the early 1800s, but the number of groups has grown substantially since the 1990s.\nMembers of the House and Senate may form these groups and participate in their activities for a variety of reasons. Often the objectives of these groups coincide with Members' policy objectives or representational considerations. These groups enable Members to exchange information and ideas with colleagues, and can facilitate interactions among Members who might not otherwise have opportunities to work with one another.\nSome groups may be eligible to register with the Committee on House Administration as a Congressional Member Organization (CMO), which enables House Members to utilize some personal office resources in support of CMO legislative activities. CMOs may include Senators among their members, but the Senate has no registration process for Member groups. Informal Member organizations that are not registered with the Committee on House Administration (including those in the Senate) are called informal Member groups. The term informal Member organization is used when referring to both CMOs and informal Member groups.\nSince the 1970s, the House has issued various regulations governing informal Member organizations. This history provides some additional background on existing CMO regulations and can provide further insights about some of the perceived benefits and shortcomings of these groups. To increase accountability and transparency in an era when Member groups had greater access to institutional resources, the House created its first regulations in 1979 for Member groups registered with the Committee on House Administration as Legislative Service Organizations (LSOs). In 1995, LSOs were abolished and CMOs were created, with limited abilities to use official resources in support of Member groups. Beginning in 2015, the Committee on House Administration created a designation of Eligible Congressional Member Organizations (ECMOs) for certain CMOs, which enables Members to assign personal office staff to work on behalf of an ECMO; four CMOs in the 115th Congress were designated as ECMOs.\nIn recent years, the number of CMOs and informal Member groups has increased, more than doubling from the 108th Congress (350) to the 115th Congress (854). This increase has taken place even though (with limited exceptions in certain specific circumstances) House Members can no longer use their Members' Representational Allowance (MRA) to directly support a CMO or informal Member group as an independent entity; provide congressional office space for these organizations; use the congressional frank to support their activities; or accept goods, funds, or services from private organizations or individuals to support their activities. Despite these limits imposed on the options available to House Members to support informal Member organizations, CMOs and other informal Member organizations have retained an ongoing role in the congressional policymaking process. Their influence has endured largely because many Members continue to consider their participation in informal Member groups and CMOs as advantageous in achieving their legislative and representational goals.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_204"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_205","query":"Small business size standards are of congressional interest because they have a pivotal role in determining eligibility for Small Business Administration (SBA) assistance as well as federal contracting and, in some instances, tax preferences. Although there is bipartisan agreement that the nation's small businesses play an important role in the American economy, there are differences of opinion concerning how to define them. The Small Business Act of 1953 (P.L. 83-163, as amended) authorized the SBA to establish size standards to ensure that only small businesses receive SBA assistance. The SBA currently uses two types of size standards to determine SBA program eligibility: industry-specific size standards and alternative size standards based on the applicant's maximum tangible net worth and average net income after federal taxes.\nThe SBA's industry-specific size standards determine program eligibility for firms in 1,036 industrial classifications in 23 sub-industry activities described in the 2017 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). The size standards are based on one of four measures: (1) number of employees, (2) average annual receipts in the previous three (may soon be the previous five) years, (3) average asset size as reported in the firm's four quarterly financial statements for the preceding year, or (4) a combination of number of employees and barrel per day refining capacity. Overall, about 97% of all employer firms qualify as small under the SBA's size standards. These firms represent about 30% of industry receipts.\nThe SBA conducts an analysis of various economic factors, such as each industry's overall competitiveness and the competitiveness of firms within each industry, to determine its size standards. However, in the absence of precise statutory guidance and consensus on how to define small, the SBA's size standards have often been challenged, typically by industry representatives seeking to increase the number of firms eligible for assistance and by Members concerned that the size standards may not adequately target assistance to firms that they consider to be truly small.\nThis report provides a historical examination of the SBA's size standards and assesses competing views concerning how to define a small business. It also discusses\nP.L. 111-240, the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which authorized the SBA to establish an alternative size standard using maximum tangible net worth and average net income after federal taxes for both the 7(a) and 504\/CDC loan guaranty programs; established, until the SBA acted, an interim alternative size standard for the 7(a) and 504\/CDC programs of not more than $15 million in tangible net worth and not more than $5 million in average net income after federal taxes (excluding any carry-over losses) for the two full fiscal years before the date of the application; and required the SBA to conduct a detailed review of not less than one-third of the SBA's industry size standards every 18 months beginning on the new law's date of enactment (September 27, 2010) and ensure that each size standard is reviewed at least once every five years. P.L. 112-239, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, which directed the SBA not to limit the number of size standards and to assign the appropriate size standard to each NAICS industrial classification. This provision addressed the SBA's practice of limiting the number of size standards it used and combining size standards within industrial groups as a means to reduce the complexity of its size standards and to provide greater consistency for industrial classifications that have similar economic characteristics. P.L. 114-328, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, which authorizes the SBA to establish different size standards for agricultural enterprises using existing methods and appeal processes. Previously, the small business size standard for agricultural enterprises was set in statute as having annual receipts not in excess of $750,000. P.L. 115-324, the Small Business Runway Extension Act of 2018, which directs federal agencies proposing a size standard (and, based on report language accompanying the act, presumably the SBA as well) to use the average annual gross receipts from at least the previous five years, instead of the previous three years, when seeking SBA approval to establish a size standard based on annual gross receipts. Legislation introduced during recent Congresses (including H.R. 33, the Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act of 2017, and its Senate companion bill, S. 584, during the 115th Congress) to authorize the SBA's Office of Chief Counsel for Advocacy to approve or disapprove a size standard requested by a federal agency for purposes other than the Small Business Act or the Small Business Investment Act of 1958. The SBA's Administrator currently has that authority.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_205"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_206","query":"The Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) provides funds to states, the District of Columbia, U.S. territories and commonwealths, and Indian tribal organizations (collectively referred to as grantees) primarily to help low-income households pay home energy expenses. The LIHEAP statute provides for two types of funding: regular funds (sometimes referred to as block grant funds) and emergency contingency funds. Regular funds are allocated to grantees based on a formula, while emergency contingency funds may be released to one or more grantees at the discretion of the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) based on emergency need. This report focuses on the way in which regular funds are distributed.\nRegular LIHEAP funds are allocated to the states according to a formula that has a long and complicated history. (Tribes receive a share of state funding, while a percentage of regular funds is set aside for territories.) Prior to enactment of LIHEAP, in 1981, a series of predecessor energy assistance programs focused on the heating needs of cold weather states. This focus was in part the result of high heating oil prices throughout the 1970s. When LIHEAP was enacted, it adopted the formula of its immediate predecessor program, the Low Income Energy Assistance Program (LIEAP). Funds under LIEAP were distributed according to a multi-step formula that was more favorable to colder-weather states. The LIHEAP statute specified that states would continue to receive the same percentage of regular funds that they did under the LIEAP formula. This is sometimes referred to as the \"old\" LIHEAP formula.\nAfter several years, when Congress reauthorized LIHEAP in 1984 it changed the program's formula by requiring the use of more recent population and energy data (data were not updated under the \"old\" formula) and reducing the emphasis on heating needs. The effect of these changes meant that, in general, some funding would be shifted from colder-weather states to warmer-weather states. (Using FY2019 formula data, the figure below shows which states receive a greater share of funds under the \"new\" and \"old\" formulas.) To prevent a dramatic shift of funds, Congress added two \"hold-harmless\" provisions to the formula. The percentage of funds that states receive under the formula enacted in 1984 is sometimes referred to as the \"new\" formula.\nNew formula data is used to calculate state allotments when appropriations for LIHEAP regular funds exceed approximately $2 billion. In the years following the enactment of the \"new\" LIHEAP formula, appropriations did not reach this level, so until the mid-2000s funds were largely distributed according to the \"old\" formula percentages. However, in FY2006, and in FY2009 through FY2019, regular fund appropriations have ranged from $2.5 billion to $4.5 billion, and the \"new\" formula has been incorporated into the way in which funds are distributed to the states. Notably, however, since FY2009 Congress has limited the operation of the \"new\" formula by requiring that the majority of regular funds be distributed using \"old\" formula percentages. For distributions to the states from FY2009-FY2019, see Table C-1.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_206"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_207","query":"The Assistance to Firefighters Grant (AFG) Program, also known as fire grants or the FIRE Act grant program, was established by Title XVII of the FY2001 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 106-398). Currently administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the program provides federal grants directly to local fire departments and unaffiliated Emergency Medical Services (EMS) organizations to help address a variety of equipment, training, and other firefighter-related and EMS needs. AFG also supports fire prevention projects and firefighter health and safety research and development through the Firefighter Prevention and Safety (FP&S) grant program. A related program is the Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response Firefighters (SAFER) program, which provides grants for hiring, recruiting, and retaining firefighters.\nThe fire grant program is now in its 19th year. AFG assistance is distributed to career, volunteer, combination, and paid-on-call fire departments serving urban, suburban, and rural areas. There is no set geographical formula for the distribution of fire grants\u2014fire departments throughout the nation apply, and award decisions are made by a peer panel based on the merits of the application and the needs of the community.\nOn January 3, 2018, the President signed the United States Fire Administration, AFG, and SAFER Program Reauthorization Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-98). P.L. 115-98 extends the AFG and SAFER authorizations through FY2023; extends the sunset provisions for AFG and SAFER through September 30, 2024; provides that the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) may develop and make widely available an online training course on AFG and SAFER grant administration; expands SAFER hiring grant eligibility to cover the conversion of part-time or paid-on-call firefighters to full-time firefighters; directs FEMA, acting through the Administrator of USFA, to develop and implement a grant monitoring and oversight framework to mitigate and minimize risks of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement related to the AFG and SAFER grant programs; and makes various technical corrections to the AFG and SAFER statute.\nThe Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6) provided $700 million for firefighter assistance in FY2019, including $350 million for AFG and $350 million for SAFER. For FY2020, the Administration requested $688.688 million for firefighter assistance, including $344.344 million for AFG and $344.344 million for SAFER. This is the same amount the Administration requested in its FY2019 budget proposal and a 1.6% reduction from the FY2019 appropriation.\nA continuing issue for the 116th Congress is how equitably and effectively grants are being distributed and used to protect the health and safety of the public and firefighting personnel against fire and fire-related hazards. Another continuing issue is budget appropriations for AFG and SAFER. As is the case with many federal programs, concerns over the federal budget deficit could impact budget levels for AFG and SAFER. At the same time, firefighter assistance budgets will likely receive heightened scrutiny from the fire service community, given the local budgetary shortfalls that many fire departments may face.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_207"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_208","query":"Although congressional rules establish a general division of responsibility under which questions of policy are kept separate from questions of funding, House rules provide for exceptions in certain circumstances. One such circumstance allows for the inclusion of legislative language in general appropriations bills or amendments thereto for \"germane provisions that retrench expenditures by the reduction of amounts of money covered by the bill.\" This exception appears in clause 2(b) of House Rule XXI and is known as the Holman rule, after Representative William Holman of Indiana, who first proposed the exception in 1876.\nSince the period immediately after its initial adoption, the House has interpreted the Holman rule through precedents that have tended to incrementally narrow its application. Under current precedents, for a legislative provision or amendment to be in order, the legislative language in question must be both germane to other provisions in the measure and must produce a clear reduction of appropriations in that bill.\nIn addition, the House adopted a separate order during the 115th Congress that provided for retrenchments of expenditures by a reduction of amounts of money covered by the bill to be construed as applying to:\nany provision or amendment that retrenches expenditures by\u2014\n(1) the reduction of amounts of money in the bill;\n(2) the reduction of the number and salary of the officers of the United States; or\n(3) the reduction of the compensation of any person paid out of the Treasury of the United States.\nThis separate order was not readopted for the 116th Congress.\nThis report provides a history of this provision in House rules and an analysis of precedents that are illustrative of its possible application.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_208"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_209","query":"The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic ally of the United States since 1980, when it became the first Persian Gulf state to sign a formal accord permitting the U.S. military to use its facilities. Oman has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in the region since then, and it is a partner in U.S. efforts to counter regional terrorism and related threats. Oman's ties to the United States are unlikely to loosen even after its ailing leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id Al Said, leaves the scene. Qaboos underwent cancer treatment abroad during 2014-2015, and his frail appearance in public appearance fuels speculation about succession. He does continue to meet with visiting leaders, including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on October 25, 2018, the first such visit by Israeli leadership to Oman in more than 20 years.\nOman has tended to position itself as a mediator of regional conflicts, and generally avoids joining its Gulf allies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) in regional military interventions such as that in Yemen. Oman joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization, but it did not send forces to that effort, nor did it support groups fighting Syrian President Bashar Al Asad's regime. It refrained from joining a Saudi-led regional counterterrorism alliance until a year after that group was formed in December 2015, and Oman opposed the June 2017 Saudi\/UAE isolation of Qatar.\nOman also has historically asserted that engaging Iran is the optimal strategy to reduce the potential threat from that country. It was the only GCC state not to downgrade its relations with Iran in connection with a January 2016 Saudi-Iran dispute. Oman's ties to Iran have enabled it to broker agreements between the United States and Iran, including the release of U.S. citizens held by Iran as well as U.S.-Iran direct talks that later produced the July 14, 2015, nuclear agreement between Iran and the international community (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA). Yet, U.S. officials credit Oman with enforcing re-imposed U.S. sanctions and with taking steps to block Iran's efforts to ship weapons across Oman's borders to Houthi rebels in Yemen.\nPrior to the 2011 wave of Middle East unrest, the United States consistently praised Sultan Qaboos for gradually opening the political process even in the absence of evident public pressure to do so. The liberalization allows Omanis a measure of representation through elections for the lower house of a legislative body, but does not significantly limit Qaboos's role as paramount decisionmaker. The public support for additional political reform, and resentment of inadequate employment opportunities produced protests in several Omani cities for much of 2011, and for two weeks in January 2018, but government commitments to create jobs helped calm the unrest. Oman has followed policies similar to the other GCC states since 2011 by increasing press censorship and arresting critics of the government who use social media.\nThe periodic economy-driven unrest demonstrates that Oman is having difficulty coping with the decline in the price of crude oil since mid-2014. Oman's economy and workforce has always been somewhat more diversified than some of the other GCC states, but Oman has only a modest financial cushion to invest in projects that can further diversify its revenue sources. The U.S.-Oman free trade agreement (FTA) was intended to facilitate Oman's access to the large U.S. economy and accelerate Oman's efforts to diversify. Oman receives small amounts of U.S. security assistance, and no economic aid.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_209"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_210","query":"Iran's nuclear program began during the 1950s. The United States has expressed concern since the mid-1970s that Tehran might develop nuclear weapons. Iran's construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons.\nIs Iran Capable of Building Nuclear Weapons?\nThe United States has assessed that Tehran possesses the technological and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons. But Iran has not yet mastered all of the necessary technologies for building such weapons. Whether Iran has a viable design for a nuclear weapon is unclear. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in 2007 assessed that Tehran \"halted its nuclear weapons program\" in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is \"keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons\" and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is \"inherently reversible.\" U.S. intelligence officials have reaffirmed this judgment on several occasions.\nObtaining fissile material is widely regarded as the most difficult task in building nuclear weapons. As of January 2014, Iran had produced an amount of LEU containing up to 5% uranium-235, which, if further enriched, could theoretically have produced enough HEU for as many as eight nuclear weapons. Iran had also produced LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235; the total amount of this LEU, if it had been in the form of uranium hexafluoride and further enriched, would have been sufficient for a nuclear weapon.. After the Joint Plan of Action, which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the \"P5+1\"), went into effect in January 2014, Iran either converted much of its LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235 for use as fuel in a research reactor located in Tehran, or prepared it for that purpose. Iran has diluted the rest of that stockpile so that it contained no more than 5% uranium-235. In addition, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with the P5+1.\nAlthough Iran claims that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, the program has generated considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The U.N. Security Council responded to Iran's refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment program by adopting several resolutions that imposed sanctions on Tehran. Despite evidence that sanctions and other forms of pressure have slowed the program, Iran continued to enrich uranium, install additional centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges. Tehran has also worked on a heavy-water reactor, which was a proliferation concern because its spent fuel would have contained plutonium\u2014the other type of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. However, plutonium must be separated from spent fuel\u2014a procedure called \"reprocessing.\" Iran has said that it will not engage in reprocessing.\nWho Is Monitoring Iran's Nuclear Program?\nThe International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors Iran's nuclear facilities and has verified that Tehran's declared nuclear facilities and materials have not been diverted for military purposes. The agency has also verified that Iran's compliance with the JCPOA. On the JCPOA's Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous Security Council resolutions' requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the council adopted on July 20, 2015, compose the current legal framework governing Iran's nuclear program. Iran has continued to comply with the JCPOA and Resolution 2231. Iran and the IAEA agreed in 2007 on a work plan to clarify outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program, most of which concerned possible Iranian procurement activities and research directly applicable to nuclear weapons development. A December 2015 report to the IAEA Board of Governors from agency Director-General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA's \"final assessment on the resolution\" of these outstanding issues.\nHow Soon Could Iran Produce a Nuclear Weapon?\nThen-Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman explained during an October 2013 hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that Iran would need as much as one year to produce a nuclear weapon if the government decided to do so. At the time, Tehran would have needed two to three months to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for a nuclear weapon. Iran's compliance with the JCPOA has increased that time frame to one year, according to U.S. officials. These estimates apparently assume that Iran would use its declared nuclear facilities to produce fissile material for a weapon. However, Tehran would probably use covert facilities for this purpose; Iranian efforts to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons by using its known nuclear facilities would almost certainly be detected by the IAEA.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_210"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_211","query":"When federal government agencies and programs lack budget authority after the expiration of either full-year or interim appropriations, they experience a \"funding gap.\" Under the Antideficiency Act (31 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a71341 et seq.), they must cease operations, except in certain circumstances when continued activities are authorized by law. When there is a funding gap that affects many federal entities, the situation is often referred to as a government shutdown. In the past, there have occasionally been funding gaps that led to government shutdowns, one of which lasted 21 days, from December 16, 1995, to January 6, 1996. A shutdown occurred at the beginning of FY2014 (October 1, 2013) and lasted for a total of 16 days. Subsequently, two comparatively brief shutdowns occurred during FY2018, in January and February 2018, respectively. The longest shutdown occurred in FY2019\u2014beginning at the end of the day on December 21, 2018, and lasting 35 days.\nThe relevant laws that govern shutdowns have remained relatively constant in recent decades. However, agencies and officials may exercise some discretion in how they interpret the laws, and circumstances that confront agencies and officials may differ over time. Consequently, it is difficult to predict what might happen in the event of a future shutdown. Still, information about past events may offer some insight into possible outcomes and help inform future deliberations.\nThis report provides an annotated list of historical documents and other resources related to several past government shutdowns. Sources for these documents and resources include the Congressional Research Service (CRS), Government Accountability Office (GAO), House and Senate Committees, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and Executive Office of the President. When possible, the report includes links to full-text documents.\nFor more information about federal government shutdowns and funding gaps, see CRS Report RL34680, Shutdown of the Federal Government: Causes, Processes, and Effects, coordinated by Clinton T. Brass. For more information about funding gaps, see CRS Report RS20348, Federal Funding Gaps: A Brief Overview, by James V. Saturno.\nThis report will be updated as additional resources are identified.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_211"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_212","query":"The federal government owns roughly 640 million acres, heavily concentrated in 12 western states. Four agencies\u2014the National Park Service (NPS), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the Department of the Interior, and the U.S. Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture\u2014administer about 95% of those lands.\nThe extent to which each of these four federal agencies have authority to acquire and dispose of land varies considerably. The BLM has relatively broad authority for both acquisitions and disposals under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). The agency also has other authorities for disposing of land, including two laws that allow the agency to retain the proceeds for subsequent land acquisition, among other purposes, and a law that allows transfers to governmental units and other entities for public purposes. By contrast, the NPS has no general authority to acquire land to create new park units or to dispose of park lands. The FS authority to acquire lands is mostly limited to lands within or contiguous to the boundaries of a national forest. The agency has various authorities to dispose of land, but they are relatively constrained and infrequently used. The FWS has various authorities to acquire lands but no general authority to dispose of its lands. The agency frequently uses acquisition authority under the Migratory Bird Conservation Act of 1929 because of the availability of funding through the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund.\nThe nature of the acquisition and disposal authorities of the four federal agencies also varies. In general, the acquisition authorities are designed to allow the four agencies to bring into federal ownership lands that many contend could benefit from federal management. Disposal authorities generally are designed to allow agencies to convey land that is no longer needed for a federal purpose or that might be chiefly valuable for another purpose. Some of the authorities specify particular circumstances where they can be used, such as the conveyance of FS land for educational purposes and the disposal of BLM land for recreation and public purposes.\nCongress often faces questions on the adequacy of existing acquisition and disposal authorities; the nature, extent, and location of their use; and the extent of federal land ownership overall. The current acquisition and disposal authorities form the backdrop for consideration of measures to establish, modify, or eliminate authorities, or to provide for the acquisition or disposal of particular lands. In some cases, Congress enacts bills to provide authority to acquire or dispose of particular parcels where no standing authority exists and, in other cases, to direct or facilitate land transactions. Congress also addresses acquisition and disposal policy in the context of debates on the role and goals of the federal government in owning and managing land generally, and it has considered broader measures to dispose of lands or to promote acquisition.\nOther issues for Congress pertain to the sources and levels of funds for land acquisition. The Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) is the primary source of funding for land acquisition. Congress has considered diverse measures related to the LWCF, such as legislation to make LWCF funding permanent and bills to direct LWCF monies to additional, nonacquisition purposes. Additionally, the FWS has the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund, an account with mandatory spending authority supported by revenue from three sources. The BLM also has mandatory spending authorities that allow the proceeds from land sales to be used for land acquisition, among other purposes.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_212"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_213","query":"Iraq's government declared military victory against the Islamic State organization (IS, also ISIS\/ISIL) in December 2017, but insurgent attacks by remaining IS fighters continue to threaten Iraqis as they shift their attention toward recovery and the country's political future. Approximately 5,000 U.S. troops remain in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government and provide advisory and training support to Iraqi security forces. However, some Iraqi political groups are calling for U.S. and other foreign troops to depart, and they may seek to force Iraqi government action on this question during 2019.\nElections and Politics. Iraqis held national elections in May 2018, electing members to Iraq's unicameral legislature, the 329-seat Council of Representatives (COR). Political factions spent months negotiating in a bid to identify a majority bloc of legislators to form the next government, but the distribution of seats and alignment of actors precluded the emergence of a dominant coalition. Meanwhile, protests and violence in southern Iraq highlighted some citizens' outrage with poor service delivery, lack of economic opportunity, and corruption. In October, the COR chose former Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister and former Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih as Iraq's President. Salih, in turn, named former Oil Minister Adel Abd al Mahdi as Prime Minister-designate and directed him to assemble a slate of cabinet officials for COR approval. Abd al Mahdi is a consensus figure acceptable to rival factions, but he does not lead a party or parliamentary group of his own. COR members have confirmed most of Abd al Mahdi's cabinet nominees, but key political groups are at an impasse over certain ministries, including the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense.\nIraqi politicians have increasingly reached across sectarian political and economic lines in recent years in an attempt to appeal to disaffected citizens, but ethnic and religious politics remain relevant and Iraqi citizens remain frustrated with government performance. Iraq's neighbors and other outsiders, including the United States, are pursuing their respective interests in Iraq, and their competition creates additional challenges for Iraqi leaders. Paramilitary forces have grown stronger and more numerous in Iraq since 2014, and have yet to be fully integrated into national security institutions. Some figures associated with the volunteer Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) that were organized to fight the Islamic State participated in the 2018 election and won COR seats, including critics of U.S. policy who have ties to Iran and are demanding the United States withdraw its military forces.\nThe Kurdistan Region. The Kurdistan Region of northern Iraq (KRI) enjoys considerable administrative autonomy under the terms of Iraq's 2005 constitution, and the KRG held legislative elections on September 30, 2018. The KRG had held a controversial advisory referendum on independence in September 2017, amplifying political tensions with the national government, which then moved to reassert security control of disputed areas that had been secured by Kurdish forces after the Islamic State's mid-2014 advance. National government security forces and Kurdish peshmerga are deployed along contested lines of control, as leaders negotiate a host of sensitive issues.\nStabilization and Reconstruction. Daunting resettlement, stabilization, and reconstruction needs face Iraqi citizens and leaders as they look to the future. More than 4 million Iraqis uprooted during the war with the Islamic State group have returned to their home communities, but many of the estimated 1.7 million Iraqis who remain internally displaced face significant political, economic, and security barriers to safe and voluntary return. Stabilization efforts in areas recaptured from the Islamic State are underway with United Nations and other international support, but many immediate post-IS stabilization priorities and projects are underfunded. Iraqi authorities have identified $88 billion in broader reconstruction needs to be met over the next decade.\nU.S. Policy and Issues for Congress. In general, U.S. engagement in Iraq since 2011 has sought to reinforce unifying trends and avoid divisive outcomes. The Trump Administration seeks to continue to train and support Iraqi security forces, while hoping to limit negative Iranian influence. The 116th Congress is considering Administration requests for funding to provide security assistance, humanitarian relief, and foreign aid in Iraq and may debate authorities for and provide oversight of the U.S. military presence in Iraq and security cooperation and aid programs. For background, see CRS Report R45025, Iraq: Background and U.S. Policy.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_213"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_214","query":"The Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (2018 farm bill, P.L. 115-334, Title II) included a number of changes to agricultural conservation programs, including reauthorizing and amending existing programs, directing existing program activities to specific resource concerns, shifting funds within the title, and authorizing a budget-neutral level of funding.\nDebate over the conservation title in the 2018 farm bill focused on a number of issues in the different versions in the House- and Senate-passed bills (H.R. 2). These differences were resolved in a House-Senate conference to create the enacted bill, which is a mix of both versions that were passed by both chambers. The enacted bill reauthorizes and amends portions of most all conservation programs; however, the general focus is on the larger programs, namely the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), and Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP).\nMost farm bill conservation programs are authorized to receive mandatory funding and are not subject to appropriation. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the conservation title of the 2018 farm bill makes up 7% of the bill's total projected mandatory spending over 10 years, which is $60 billion of the total $867 billion. The conservation title is budget neutral over the 10-year baseline; however, the 2018 farm bill is projected to increase funding in the first five years (+$555 million over FY2019-FY2023) and decrease funding in the last five years (-$561 million over FY2024-FY2028). Generally, the 2018 farm bill reallocates mandatory funding within the conservation title among the larger programs.\nThe two largest working lands programs\u2014EQIP and CSP\u2014were reauthorized and amended under the enacted bill, but in different ways. The House-passed bill would have repealed CSP and created a stewardship contract within EQIP, whereas the Senate-passed bill would have reauthorized CSP and reduced program enrollment. The enacted bill creates a mix of both the House- and Senate-passed bills by reauthorizing CSP and reducing program enrollment, as well as creating a new incentive contract within EQIP. Funding for CSP is shifted away from an acreage limitation under prior law to limits based on funding. EQIP is expanded and reauthorized with increased funding levels.\nThe largest land retirement program\u2014CRP\u2014is reauthorized and expanded by increasing the CRP enrollment limit in annual increments from 24 million acres in FY2019 to 27 million by FY2023. To offset this increased enrollment level, the enacted bill reduces payments to participants, including cost-share payments, annual rental payments, and incentive payments. The 2018 farm bill also reauthorized and amended the Agricultural Conservation Easement Program (ACEP). Most of the changes to ACEP focus on the agricultural land easements by providing additional flexibilities to ACEP-eligible entities and authorize an increase in overall funding.\nThe Regional Conservation Partnership Program (RCPP) is reauthorized and amended by shifting the program away from enrolling land through existing conservation programs to a standalone program with separate contracts and agreements. Under the revised program, USDA is to continue to enter into agreements with eligible partners, and these partners are to continue to define the scope and location of a project, provide a portion of the project cost, and work with eligible landowners to enroll in RCPP contracts.\nWhile the 2018 farm bill does not create new conservation programs, it does require that a number of existing programs direct a dollar amount or percentage of a program's funding to a resource-specific issue, initiative, or subprogram. Through these directed policies Congress has established a level of support, or required investment, to be carried out through implementation to target specific issues such as nutrient runoff or groundwater protection. The directed policy may also reduce the implementing agency's flexibility to allocate funding based on need, as well as reducing the amount available for activities under the larger program that may not meet a resource-specific provision.\nHigh commodity prices in years past, changing land rental rates, and new conservation technologies have led over time to a shift in farm bill conservation policy away from programs that retire land from production (CRP) toward programs that provide assistance to lands still in production (EQIP and CSP). Much of this shift occurred following the 2008 farm bill (FY2009-FY2013) and continued under the 2014 farm bill (FY2014-FY2018) as the level of total mandatory program funding for CRP was reduced relative to EQIP and CSP. Funding for easement programs (ACEP) also declined somewhat under the 2014 farm bill, but is projected to level off under the 2018 farm bill. Partnership program (RCPP) funding has also increased in recent farm bills, but remains relatively small compared to the other categories of programs.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_214"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_215","query":"Congress sets national food and agriculture policy through periodic omnibus farm bills that address a broad range of farm and food programs and policies. The 115th Congress established the direction of farm and food policy for five years through 2023 by enacting the Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018, which the President signed into law on December 20, 2018, as P.L. 115-334.\nThe Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has scored the cost of programs with mandatory spending\u2014such as nutrition programs, commodity support programs, major conservation programs, and crop insurance\u2014in the enacted 2018 farm bill at $867 billion over a 10-year budget window of FY2019-FY2028. This amount is budget neutral compared with CBO's baseline scenario of an extension of 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79) programs with no changes. CBO estimates that over the five-year life of the law (FY2019-FY2023), outlays will amount to $428 billion, or $1.8 billion above the baseline scenario. In general, the new law largely extends many major programs through FY2023, thereby providing an overlay of continuity with the existing framework of agriculture and nutrition programs even as it modifies numerous programs, alters the amount and type of program funding that certain programs receive, and exercises discretion not to reauthorize some others.\nThe enacted 2018 farm bill extends agricultural commodity support programs largely along existing lines while modifying them in various ways. For instance, producers acquire greater flexibility, compared with prior law, to switch between the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) revenue support programs. Producers may update program yields that factor into payments under PLC, while a newly added escalator could raise a commodity's reference price under the program. The law also makes several modifications to ARC, including introducing a trend-adjusted yield that has the potential to raise ARC revenue guarantees for producers. Other changes include an increase in marketing assistance loan rates for a number of crops and revising the definition of family farm to include nephews, nieces, and cousins, making these individuals eligible for farm program payments. The law modifies dairy programs, including renaming the Margin Protection Program as Dairy Margin Coverage (DMC) and revising it to expand the margin protection between milk prices and feed costs that milk producers may purchase, as well as lowering the cost of this coverage for the first 5 million pounds of milk produced. Loan rates under the sugar program are increased.\nThe Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), the largest domestic nutrition assistance program, is reauthorized through FY2023. The law amends SNAP in a number of ways, including making changes to policies intended to reduced errors and fraud in SNAP, limiting fees that electronic benefit transfer processors may charge, and requiring nationwide online acceptance of SNAP benefits. Not included in the enacted bill are provisions in the House-passed bill that would have expanded work requirements and SNAP employment and training programs. The enacted bill does make certain modifications to these elements of the program, such as expanding the employment and training activities that a state may provide. Beyond SNAP, the law amends programs that distribute U.S. Department of Agriculture foods to low-income households, and it increases funding for The Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP).\nThe enacted farm bill addresses agricultural conservation on several fronts. For one, it reauthorizes the two largest working lands programs\u2014the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) and the Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP)\u2014while reducing the overall funding allocated for these two programs. It also reauthorizes the primary land retirement program, the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), allowing it to expand from a maximum of 24 million acres in FY2019 to 27 million acres in FY2023 while offsetting the added cost of any enrollment increase through lower payments to participants. The law also expands grazing and commercial uses on CRP acres and provides options for new and limited resource producers for transitioning CRP land.\nThe enacted 2018 farm bill addresses a range of issues of importance to rural America, including combatting substance abuse by prioritizing assistance under certain programs, by expanding broadband access and providing additional authorized appropriations to that end and by amending the definition of rural by excluding certain groups of individuals from population-based criteria. The credit title increases the maximum loan amount for guaranteed loans, and these amounts are adjusted for inflation thereafter. The ceiling for direct loans is also raised, among other changes.\nAmong the broad and diverse array of other provisions in the law are provisions intended to facilitate the commercial cultivation, processing, and marketing of hemp. Among these, hemp with low levels of the psychoactive ingredient in marijuana is excluded from the statutory definition of marijuana. The law creates a new hemp program under USDA oversight and makes hemp an eligible crop under the federal crop insurance program. The enacted 2018 farm bill also strengthens the National Organic Program and increases funding for organic agricultural research.\nWithin the Miscellaneous title, the livestock industry is the object of several initiatives to guard against disease outbreaks and strengthen the response to such events. These include the establishment of the National Animal Disease Preparedness Response Program and the National Animal Vaccine and Veterinary Countermeasures Bank. The law also addresses USDA organizational changes in recent years, requiring USDA to reestablish the position of Under Secretary for Rural Development and creating a Rural Health Liaison, among other changes. Among its provisions, the Forestry title addresses the accumulation of biomass in many forests and the consequent risk of wildfires by establishing, reauthorizing, and modifying various assistance programs to promote wood use and biomass removal.\nWith these programs, policies, and initiatives codified into law, the job that remains is for USDA, other federal agencies, and entities designated by the enacted farm law to implement the will of Congress through regulatory actions and other administrative measures. As implementation of the farm law proceeds, Congress may find it prudent to monitor this process and to provide direction and feedback through the exercise of its oversight responsibilities.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_215"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_216","query":"One of the most common methods for changing spending priorities in appropriations bills on the House floor is through offset amendments. House offset amendments may generally change spending priorities in a pending appropriations measure by increasing spending for certain activities (or creating spending for new activities not previously included in the bill) and offsetting the increase with funding decreases in other activities in the bill. Offset amendments are needed to avoid points of order under Sections 302(f) and 311(a) of the Congressional Budget Act, enforcing certain spending ceilings affecting regular appropriations bills, continuing resolutions (CRs), and supplemental appropriations measures (supplementals). In addition, amendments to general appropriations bills that would increase total spending provided in the bill must be entirely offset.\nTwo types of House offset amendments are considered in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union (Committee of the Whole): clause 2(f) and reachback (or fetchback) amendments. As provided under House Rule XXI, clause 2(f) offset amendments consist of two or more amendments considered together (or en bloc) that would change amounts by directly adding text or changing text in the body of the bill. Taken as a whole, the amendment does not increase the amount of funding in the pending bill. Such amendments (1) must provide offsets in both new budget authority and outlays, (2) can only include language transferring appropriations in the bill, and (3) may contain certain unauthorized appropriations.\nReachback offset amendments are generally offered at the end of the bill and change funding amounts in the pending bill by reference. These amendments (1) must provide offsets in new budget authority, but not necessarily outlays; (2) may add new appropriations (and spending set-asides within certain restrictions); (3) cannot include unauthorized appropriations; and (4) may provide across-the-board spending reductions as offsets.\nParliamentary rules governing consideration of offset amendments may be suspended or waived, typically by House adoption of a special rule but also by unanimous consent.\nThe advantages of clause 2(f) amendments over reachback amendments are that clause 2(f) amendments may contain certain unauthorized appropriations and are typically considered before reachback amendments, sometimes limiting offset opportunities for reachback amendments. The main advantages of reachback amendments are that they may not have to offset outlays, may add new appropriations, and may include across-the-board spending reductions.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_216"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_217","query":"The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is an independent federal agency established by the Communications Act of 1934 (1934 Act, or \"Communications Act\"). The agency is charged with regulating interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable. The mission of the FCC is to make available for all people of the United States, \"without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nationwide, and worldwide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges.\"\nThe FCC operates under a public interest mandate first laid out in the 1927 Radio Act (P.L. 632, 69th Congress), but how this mandate is applied depends on how \"the public interest\" is interpreted. Some regulators seek to protect and benefit the public at large through regulation, while others seek to achieve the same goals through the promotion of market efficiency. Additionally, Congress granted the FCC wide latitude and flexibility to revise its interpretation of the public interest standard to reflect changing circumstances and the agency has not defined it in more concrete terms. These circumstances, paired with changes in FCC leadership, have led to significant changes over time in how the FCC regulates the broadcast and telecommunications industries.\nThe FCC is directed by five commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for five-year terms. The President designates one of the commissioners as chairperson. Three commissioners may be members of the same political party of the President and none can have a financial interest in any commission-related business. The current commissioners are Ajit Pai (Chair), Michael O'Rielly, Brendan Carr, Jessica Rosenworcel, and Geoffrey Starks.\nThe day-to-day functions of the FCC are carried out by 7 bureaus and 10 offices. The current basic structure of the FCC was established in 2002 as part of the agency's effort to better reflect the industries it regulates. The seventh bureau, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, was established in 2006. The bureaus process applications for licenses and other filings, manage non-federal spectrum, analyze complaints, conduct investigations, develop and implement regulatory programs, and participate in hearings, among other things. The offices provide support services. Bureaus and offices often collaborate when addressing FCC issues.\nBeginning in the 110th Congress, the FCC has been funded through the House and Senate Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill as a single line item. Previously, it was funded through what is now the Commerce, Justice, Science appropriations bill, also as a single line item. Since 2009 the FCC's budget has been derived from regulatory fees collected by the agency rather than through a direct appropriation. The fees, often referred to as \"Section (9) fees,\" are collected from license holders and certain other entities. The FCC is authorized to review the regulatory fees each year and adjust them to reflect changes in its appropriation from year to year. Most years, appropriations language prohibits the use by the commission of any excess collections received in the current fiscal year or any prior years.\nFor FY2020, the FCC has requested $335,660,000 in budget authority from regulatory fee offsetting collections. The FCC also requested $132,538,680 in budget authority for the spectrum auctions program.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_217"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_218","query":"Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution provides that the President shall appoint officers of the United States \"by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.\" This report describes the process by which the Senate provides advice and consent on presidential nominations, including receipt and referral of nominations, committee practices, and floor procedure.\nCommittees play the central role in the process through investigations and hearings. Senate Rule XXXI provides that nominations shall be referred to appropriate committees \"unless otherwise ordered.\" Most nominations are referred, although a Senate standing order provides that some \"privileged\" nominations to specified positions will not be referred unless requested by a Senator. The Senate rule concerning committee jurisdictions (Rule XXV) broadly defines issue areas for committees, and the same jurisdictional statements generally apply to nominations as well as legislation. A committee often gathers information about a nominee either before or instead of a formal hearing. A committee considering a nomination has four options. It can report the nomination to the Senate favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation, or it can choose to take no action. It is more common for a committee to take no action on a nomination than to reject a nominee outright.\nThe Senate handles executive business, which includes both nominations and treaties, separately from its legislative business. All nominations reported from committee are listed on the Executive Calendar, a separate document from the Calendar of Business, which lists pending bills and resolutions. Generally speaking, the majority leader schedules floor consideration of nominations on the Calendar. Nominations are considered in \"executive session,\" a parliamentary form of the Senate in session that has its own journal and, to some extent, its own rules of procedure.\nThe Senate can call up a nomination expeditiously, because a motion to enter executive session to consider a specific nomination on the Calendar is not debatable. This motion requires a majority of Senators present and voting, a quorum being present, for approval.\nAfter a nomination has been called up, the question before the Senate is \"will the Senate advise and consent to this nomination?\" A majority of Senators voting is required to approve a nomination. However, Senate rules place no limit on how long a nomination may be debated, and ending consideration could require invoking cloture. On April 6, 2017, the Senate reinterpreted Rule XXII in order to allow cloture to be invoked on nominations to the Supreme Court by a majority of Senators voting. This expanded the results of similar actions taken by the Senate in November 2013, which changed the cloture vote requirement to a majority for nominations other than to the Supreme Court. After the 2013 decision, the number of nominations subjected to a cloture process increased.\nOn April 3, 2019, the Senate reinterpreted Rule XXII again. The Senate reduced, from 30 hours to 2 hours, the maximum time nominations can be considered after cloture has been invoked. This change applied to all executive branch nominations except to high-level positions such as heads of departments, and it applied to all judicial nominations except to the Supreme Court and the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. The full impact of this change is difficult to assess at this time, but it is likely to shorten the time between a cloture vote and a vote on the nomination. If Senators respond as they did to the last reinterpretation of the cloture rule, it might also increase the number of nominations subjected to a cloture process.\nNominations that are pending when the Senate adjourns sine die at the end of a session or recesses for more than 30 days are returned to the President unless the Senate, by unanimous consent, waives the rule requiring their return (Senate Rule XXXI, clause 6). If a nomination is returned, and the President still desires Senate consideration, he must submit a new nomination.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_218"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_219","query":"Congress gathers much of the information necessary to oversee the implementation of existing laws or to evaluate whether new laws are necessary from the executive branch. While executive branch officials comply with most congressional requests for information, there are times when the executive branch chooses to resist disclosure.\nWhen Congress finds an inquiry blocked by the withholding of information by the executive branch, or where the traditional process of negotiation and accommodation is inappropriate or unavailing, a subpoena\u2014either for testimony or documents\u2014may be used to compel compliance with congressional demands. The recipient of a duly issued and valid congressional subpoena has a legal obligation to comply, absent a valid and overriding privilege or other legal justification. But the subpoena is only as effective as the means by which it may be enforced. Without a process by which Congress can coerce compliance or deter non-compliance, the subpoena would be reduced to a formalized request rather than a constitutionally based demand for information.\nCongress currently employs an ad hoc combination of methods to combat non-compliance with subpoenas. The two predominant methods rely on the authority and participation of another branch of government. First, the criminal contempt statute permits a single house of Congress to certify a contempt citation to the executive branch for the criminal prosecution of an individual who has willfully refused to comply with a committee subpoena. Once the contempt citation is received, any prosecution lies within the control of the executive branch. Second, Congress may try to enforce a subpoena by seeking a civil judgment declaring that the recipient is legally obligated to comply. This process of civil enforcement relies on the help of the courts to enforce congressional demands.\nBut these mechanisms do not always ensure congressional access to requested information. Recent controversies could be interpreted to suggest that the existing mechanisms are at times inadequate\u2014particularly in the instance that enforcement is necessary to respond to a current or former executive branch official who has refused to comply with a subpoena. There would appear to be several ways in which Congress could alter its approach to enforcing committee subpoenas issued to executive branch officials. These alternatives include the enactment of laws that would expedite judicial consideration of subpoena-enforcement lawsuits filed by either house of Congress; the establishment of an independent office charged with enforcing the criminal contempt of Congress statute; or the creation of an automatic consequence, such as a withholding of appropriated funds, triggered by the approval of a contempt citation. In addition, either the House or Senate could consider acting on internal rules of procedure to revive the long-dormant inherent contempt power as a way to enforce subpoenas issued to executive branch officials. Yet, because of the institutional prerogatives that are often implicated in inter-branch oversight disputes, some of these proposals may raise constitutional concerns.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_219"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_220","query":"The windfall elimination provision (WEP) is a modified benefit formula that reduces the Social Security benefits of certain retired or disabled workers who are also entitled to pension benefits based on earnings from jobs that were not covered by Social Security and thus not subject to the Social Security payroll tax. Its purpose is to remove an unintended advantage or \"windfall\" that these workers would otherwise receive as a result of the interaction between the regular Social Security benefit formula and the workers' relatively short careers in Social Security-covered employment. In December 2018, nearly 1.9 million people (or about 3% of all Social Security beneficiaries) were affected by the WEP.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_220"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_221","query":"A variety of housing-related issues were active during the 115th Congress. These issues included topics related to housing finance, tax provisions related to housing, housing assistance and grant programs administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and regulatory review efforts underway at HUD. In some cases, the 115th Congress considered or passed legislation related to certain housing issues, such as mortgage-related provisions enacted as part of broader financial \"regulatory relief\" legislation and particular housing-related tax provisions. In other cases, Congress conducted oversight or otherwise expressed interest in actions taken by HUD or other entities involved in housing, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.\nMany of the housing-related topics that were of interest during the 115th Congress are ongoing issues, though some involved particular actions that took place during the 115th Congress. Issues of interest during the Congress included the following:\nHousing finance issues included changes to certain mortgage-related requirements and other housing provisions included in broader financial legislation that became law in May 2018. Congress also expressed ongoing interest in certain issues related to the Federal Housing Administration (FHA): (1) a forthcoming final rule on FHA's requirements for insuring mortgages on condominiums and (2) the level of the mortgage insurance premiums charged by FHA. Comprehensive housing finance reform that would address the status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is also an ongoing topic of interest, although the 115th Congress did not actively consider comprehensive housing finance reform legislation. Tax issues included changes to housing-related tax provisions in the tax revision law enacted at the end of 2017 (P.L. 115-97); extensions of other, temporary housing-related tax provisions through 2017 by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123); and changes to the low-income housing tax credit in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141). Housing assistance issues included considerations related to HUD appropriations, ongoing initiatives or proposed changes to HUD rental assistance programs, committee consideration of legislation to reauthorize the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act (NAHASDA), issues related to the housing response to presidentially declared major disasters, and a variety of introduced bills that were meant to address housing affordability issues in various ways. HUD began a variety of regulatory review efforts in keeping with Executive Order 13777, which directed federal agencies to evaluate existing regulations and identify opportunities for reform. Specific HUD actions included suspending a rule related to small-area fair market rents (the suspension has since been voided by a preliminary court injunction); initiating a broad review of manufactured housing regulations; suspending certain regulations governing how HUD funding recipients must comply with the requirement to affirmatively further fair housing; and publishing an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeking public comment on whether its regulations related to disparate impact and the Fair Housing Act should be amended.\nHousing and mortgage market conditions provide important context for these issues, although housing markets are generally local in nature and national housing market indicators do not necessarily accurately reflect conditions in specific communities. Generally speaking, owner-occupied housing markets in recent years have been characterized by rising house prices, relatively low levels of housing starts and housing inventory, and relatively strong home sales. Rising house prices combined with rising mortgage interest rates have raised concerns about the affordability of buying a home, although interest rates remain low by historical standards. Rental housing markets have also raised affordability concerns. Nearly 21 million renter households are considered to be cost burdened, meaning they spend more than 30% of their incomes on rent. The share of households who rent, rather than own, their homes has increased in the years since the housing market turmoil that began around 2007, contributing to lower rental vacancy rates and increasing rents. Increases in household income in recent years have generally not kept pace with increases in house prices or rents, contributing to affordability concerns.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_221"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_222","query":"Regulation of the banking industry has undergone substantial changes over the past decade. In response to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, many new bank regulations were implemented pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203) or under the existing authorities of bank regulators to address apparent weaknesses in the regulatory regime. While some observers view those changes as necessary and effective, others argued that certain regulations were unjustifiably burdensome. To address those concerns, the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-174) relaxed certain regulations. Opponents of that legislation argue it unnecessarily pared back important safeguards, but proponents of deregulation argue additional pare backs are needed. Meanwhile, a variety of economic and technological trends continue to affect banks. As a result, the 116th Congress faces many issues related to banking, including the following:\nSafety and Soundness. Banks are subject to regulations designed to reduce the likelihood of bank failures. Examples include requirements to hold a certain amount of capital (which enables a bank to absorb losses without failing) and the so-called Volcker Rule (a ban on banks' proprietary trading). In addition, anti-money laundering requirements aim to reduce the likelihood banks will execute transactions involving criminal proceeds. Banks are also required to take steps to avoid becoming victims of cyberattacks. The extent to which these regulations (i) are effective, and (ii) appropriately balance benefits and costs is a matter of debate.\nConsumer Protection, Fair Lending, and Access to Banking. Certain laws are designed to protect consumers and ensure that lenders use fair lending practices. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has authorities to regulate for consumer protection. No consensus exists on whether current regulations strike an appropriate balance between protecting consumers while ensuring access to credit and justifiable compliance costs. In addition, whether Community Reinvestment Act regulations as currently implemented effectively and efficiently encourage banks to provide services in their areas of operation is an open question.\nLarge Banks and \"Too Big To Fail.\" Regulators also regulate for systemic risks, such as those associated with very large and complex financial institutions that may contribute to systemic instability. Dodd-Frank Act provisions include enhanced prudential regulation for certain large banks and changes to resolution processes in the event one fails. In addition, bank regulators imposed additional capital requirements on certain large, complex banks. Subsequently, some argued that certain of these additional regulations were too broadly applied and overly stringent. In response, Congress reduced the applicability of the Dodd-Frank measures and regulators have proposed changes to the capital rules. Whether relaxing these rules will provide needed relief to these banks or unnecessarily pare back important safeguards is a debated issue.\nCommunity Banks. The number of small or \"community\" banks has declined substantially in recent decades. No consensus exists on the degree to which regulatory burden, market forces, and the removal of regulatory barriers to interstate branching and banking are causing the decline.\nWhat Companies Should Be Eligible for Bank Charters. To operate legally as a bank, an institution must hold a charter granted by a state or federal government. Traditionally, these are held by companies generally focused on and led by people with experience in finance. However, recently companies with a focus on technology are interested in having legal status as a bank, either through a charter from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency or a state-level industrial loan company charter. Policymakers disagree over whether allowing these companies to operate as banks would create appropriately regulated providers of financial services or inappropriately extend government-backed bank safety nets and disadvantage existing banks.\nRecent Market and Economic Trends. Changing economic forces also pose issues for the banking industry. Some observers argue that increases in regulation could drive certain financial activities into a relatively lightly regulated \"shadow banking\" sector. Innovative financial technology may alter the way certain financial services are delivered. If interest rates rise, it could create opportunities and risks. Such trends could have implications for how the financial system performs and influence debates over appropriate banking regulations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_222"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_223","query":"The federal government incurs a budget deficit when its total outgoing payments (outlays) exceed the total money it collects (revenues). If instead federal revenues are greater than outlays, then the federal government generates a surplus. Deficits are measured over the course of a defined period of time\u2014in the case of the federal government, a fiscal year.\nDebt measurements may be taken at any point in time, and represent the accumulation of all previous government borrowing activity from private citizens, institutions, foreign governments, and other parts of the federal government. Federal debt increases when there are net budget deficits and outflows made for federal credit programs, which combine to represent debt held by the public. Federal debt also rises through increases in intragovernmental debt, which is generated by trust fund surpluses that are used to finance other government activity. Federal debt declines when there are budget surpluses, a reduction in the federal credit portfolio, or decreases in intragovernmental borrowing.\nFederal deficit and debt outcomes are interdependent: budget deficits increase federal debt levels, which in turn increase future net deficits. The nature of the relationship between deficits and debt varies depending on the type of debt considered. Budget deficits are the principal contributor to debt held by the public. The effect of deficits on intragovernmental debt is less certain than their contribution to debt held by the public. All else equal, increases in net trust fund deficits will lead to increases in total budget deficits but decreases in intragovernmental debt.\nInterest payments made on publicly held debt instruments contribute directly to federal deficits. Holders of federal debt are compensated by receiving interest payments from Treasury. Intragovernmental debt does not contribute to future deficits.\nPersistent budget deficits and a large and increasing federal debt have generated discussions over the long-term sustainability of current budget projections. Federal budget deficits declined from 9.8% of gross domestic product (GDP) in FY2009 to 2.4% of GDP in FY2015, and subsequently increased to 3.8% of GDP in FY2018. Recent estimates forecast that the government will run deficits in every year through FY2029.\nFederal debt totaled $21.516 trillion at the end of FY2018, which as a percentage of GDP (106.0%) was its highest value since FY1947; of that debt, $15.761 trillion (or 77.8% of GDP) was held by the public.\nOver time, persistent budget deficits can hamper economic growth. Deficits represent an intertemporal transfer from later generations to the current one, as money borrowed now will eventually require repayment with interest. The effect of deficit financing on economic output depends on the nature of the government activity being financed and the private activity that would have otherwise taken place.\nFederal debt is constrained by the willingness of investors to finance borrowing. While the amount of federal borrowing investors will finance may be affected by economic growth and other factors, real federal debt cannot increase indefinitely. There are no signs that federal borrowing capacity will be exhausted in the short term. However, the consequences of exhausted fiscal space may be worth considering when examining the medium- and long-term trajectory of the federal budget.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_223"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_224","query":"The program activities of most federal agencies are generally funded on an annual basis through the enactment of regular appropriations acts. When those annual appropriations acts are not enacted by the beginning of the fiscal year (i.e., by October 1), one or more continuing appropriations acts (commonly known as continuing resolutions or CRs) may be enacted to provide temporary funding to continue certain programs and activities until action on the regular appropriations acts is completed.\nCongress has included six main components in CRs. First, CRs have provided funding for certain activities (coverage), which are typically specified with reference to the prior fiscal year's appropriations acts. Second, CRs have provided budget authority for a specified duration of time. This duration may be as short as a single day or as long as the remainder of the fiscal year. Third, CRs have provided funds based on an overall funding rate. Fourth, the use of budget authority provided in the CR has been prohibited for new activities not funded in the previous fiscal year. Fifth, the duration and amount of funds in the CR, and purposes for which they may be used for specified activities, may be adjusted through anomalies. Sixth, legislative provisions\u2014which create, amend, or extend other laws\u2014have been included in some instances.\nThis report provides detailed information on CRs beginning with FY1977, which was the first fiscal year that began on October 1. Congress has enacted one or more CRs in all but three of the last 43 fiscal years (FY1977-FY2019). In addition, in 10 of the last 18 fiscal years, the initial CR\u2014and in some years subsequent CRs\u2014provided continuing appropriations for all the regular appropriations acts.\nAfter FY1997\u2014the most recent fiscal year that all regular appropriations bills were enacted before the start of the new fiscal year\u2014an average of at least five CRs were signed into law for each fiscal year before the appropriations process was completed for that year. During this period, CRs provided funding for an average of almost five months each fiscal year.\nFor some fiscal years, a CR has provided continuing appropriations (i.e., at a rate of operations) through the end of that year (often referred to as a full-year CR). Most recently, a full-year CR was enacted for most of the regular appropriations acts for FY2007, FY2011, and FY2013. In the 1980s, in contrast, some \"full-year CRs\" actually included the full text of certain regular appropriations acts (i.e., in the form of an omnibus appropriations act rather than a typical CR).","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_224"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_225","query":"The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA; P.L. 95-128, 12 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a72901-2908) addresses how banking institutions meet the credit needs of the areas they serve, particularly in low- and moderate-income (LMI) neighborhoods. The federal banking regulatory agencies\u2014the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)\u2014currently implement the CRA. The regulators issue CRA credits, or points, where banks engage in qualifying activities\u2014such as mortgage, consumer, and business lending; community investments; and low-cost services that would benefit LMI areas and entities\u2014that occur with a designated assessment area. These credits are then used to issue each bank a performance rating. The CRA requires these ratings be taken into account when banks apply for charters, branches, mergers, and acquisitions among other things.\nThe CRA, which was enacted in 1977, was subsequently revised in 1989 to require public disclosure of bank CRA ratings to establish a four-tiered system of descriptive performance levels (i.e., Outstanding, Satisfactory, Needs to Improve, or Substantial Noncompliance). In 1995, the CRA examination was customized to account for differences in bank sizes and business models. In 2005, the bank size definitions were revised and indexed to the Consumer Price Index. The 2005 amendments also expanded opportunities for banks to earn CRA credit for public welfare investments (such as providing housing, services, or jobs that primarily benefit LMI individuals). Qualifying activities under the CRA have evolved to include consumer and business lending, community investments, and low-cost services that would benefit LMI areas and entities.\nCongressional interest in the CRA stems from various perceptions of its effectiveness. Some have argued that, by encouraging lending in LMI neighborhoods, the CRA may also encourage the issuance of higher-risk loans to borrowers likely to have repayment problems (under the presumption that low-income is correlated with lower creditworthiness), which can translate into losses for lenders. Others are concerned that the CRA is not generating sufficient incentives to increase credit availability to qualified LMI borrowers, which may impede economic recovery for some, particularly following the 2007-2009 recession.\nThis report informs the congressional debate concerning the CRA's effectiveness in incentivizing bank lending and investment activity to LMI borrowers. After a discussion of the CRA's origins, it presents the CRA's examination process and bank activities that are eligible for consideration of CRA credits. Next, it discusses the difficulty of determining the CRA's influence on bank behavior. For example, the CRA does not specify the quality and quantity of CRA-qualifying activities, meaning that compliance with the CRA does not require adherence to lending quotas or benchmarks. In the absence of benchmarks, determining the extent to which CRA incentives have influenced LMI credit availability relative to other factors is not straightforward. Banks also face a variety of financial incentives\u2014for example, capital requirements, the prevailing interest rate environment, changes in tax laws, and technological innovations\u2014that influence how much (or how little) they lend to LMI borrowers. Because multiple financial profit incentives and CRA incentives tend to exist simultaneously, it is difficult to determine the extent to which CRA incentives have influenced LMI credit availability relative to other factors.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_225"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_226","query":"Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits federally funded programs, activities, and institutions from discriminating based on race, color, or national origin. In its current form, largely unchanged since its adoption, Title VI incorporates a number of unique features. Besides barring federally funded programs from discriminating based on race, Title VI also authorizes and directs all federal funding agencies to promulgate rules effectuating that nondiscrimination mandate. Those rules were also made subject to presidential approval, an authority since delegated to the Attorney General by executive order. To enforce Title VI, agencies also have at their disposal a uniquely powerful tool: the termination or refusal to provide federal financial support to an institution or program seeking it. Although this power to withdraw federal funds was envisioned as the primary mechanism for enforcing Title VI, that authority was also hedged with a range of procedural requirements designed to spur agencies to resolve complaints against recipients through voluntary agreements.\nIn the 50 years since Title VI became law much of the debate over the statute has centered on how the courts have read its two central provisions\u2014Sections 601 and 602\u2014and how federal agencies have gone about enforcing them. In the courts those debates have especially focused on what counts as unlawful \"discrimination\" under Section 601. The courts have long agreed that Title VI bars federally funded programs from intentionally singling out individuals by race for adverse treatment. In its first case involving Title VI the Supreme Court suggested that Section 601 might also reach beyond intentional discrimination to bar the use of policies with a disparate impact\u2014policies that, irrespective of the intent, impose a discriminatory effect on different racial groups. With its 2001 ruling in Alexander v Sandoval, the Court appeared to put that interpretive question to rest: Title VI directly prohibits only intentional discrimination.\nFor the agencies charged with enforcing Title VI, the primary concerns have tended to be more operational and programmatic\u2014how to go about the business of reviewing and assessing particular practices under Section 602 of the statute. Section 602 authorizes and directs agencies to issue regulations \"effectuat[ing]\" Section 601. The breadth of that authority has produced a further point of uncertainty about the statute: what limits are there to funding agencies' rulemaking authority under Title VI? So far, two divergent views have emerged from the Court's decisions: (1) a largely deferential view that would give agencies leeway to issue prophylactic rules reaching conduct beyond intentional discrimination, and (2) a more exacting view under which agencies may redress only provable cases of intentional discrimination.\nAlthough Title VI's nondiscrimination prohibition accompanies nearly all awards of federal financial support, much of the statute's doctrine has been shaped by its use in the public schools. That doctrinal history has centered on one agency in particular: the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) in the U.S. Department of Education (ED). Title VI continues to play a central part in OCR's mission of protecting civil rights on campuses at all educational levels, and in institutions both public and private. OCR handles a large volume and variety of claims alleging race and national origin discrimination, which it administratively resolves through a series of investigative procedures laid out in its Case Processing Manual. Although the types of allegations OCR investigates vary, three major categories of complaint occupy much of its docket: disparate treatment, retaliation, and racial harassment.\nCongress has the ultimate say over how Title VI works\u2014rooted not only in its legislative power but in its authority to oversee the statute's enforcement. In recent years two questions surrounding Title VI have drawn particular congressional interest: the viability of disparate impact regulations under Section 602 and the possible inclusion of new protected classes in Section 601. No matter how Congress may choose to address those subjects, however, they are likely only to raise further questions about the future of this landmark civil rights law.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_226"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_227","query":"This report provides an introduction to the general tax equity financing mechanism. The term tax equity investment describes transactions that pair the tax credits or other tax benefits generated by a qualifying physical investment with the capital financing associated with that investment. These transactions involve one party agreeing to assign the rights to claim the tax credits to another party in exchange for an equity investment (i.e., cash financing). The exchange is sometimes referred to as \"monetizing,\" \"selling,\" or \"trading\" the tax credits. Importantly, however, the \"sale\" of federal tax credits usually occurs within a partnership or contractual agreement that legally binds the two parties.\nThree categories of tax credits that either currently use or have recently used this mechanism are presented in this report to help explain the structure and function of tax equity arrangements. These include the low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC); the new markets tax credit (NMTC); and two energy-related tax credits\u2014the renewable electricity production tax credit (PTC) and energy investment tax credit (ITC). While these credits all use the tax equity financing mechanism, no two credits do so in the same manner. The economic rationale for subsidizing the activities targeted by these tax credits is not evaluated. Instead, this report focuses on explaining the structure and functioning of tax equity arrangements, analyzing the delivery of federal financial support using this mechanism, and discussing various policy options related to tax credits that rely on tax equity.\nFour policy options are presented to help Congress should it consider modifications to an existing tax equity program, or create a new one. The options are with respect to the general tax equity approach and include making the credits refundable, converting the credits to grants, allowing for the direct transfer of credits, and accelerating the credit claim periods. This list of options is not exhaustive. Due to important differences in the underlying structure of various current or future credits, some options may be better suited for particular credits than others. Careful consideration on a case-by-case basis is part of evaluating the appropriateness of each option.\nConsideration of various options might ask whether the use of tax equity markets is an efficient and effective means of delivering federal financial support. At first glance, it may appear that the government would get more \"bang for its buck\" by delivering subsidies more directly, without a role for tax equity markets. However, such a conclusion overlooks one role that tax equity investors play in some industries in addition to providing financing: they evaluate the quality of projects before investing, as well as provide continuing oversight and compliance monitoring. Effectively, the tax equity mechanism outsources a portion of the oversight and compliance monitoring to investors in exchange for a financial return. On the one hand, there may be value to the federal government in being able to rely on outside investors to provide oversight and monitoring. On the other hand, for some tax equity programs that have a government entity overseeing participant compliance, the monitor role of investors may be redundant. There also may be ways to improve the current delivery approach.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_227"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_228","query":"Antipoverty interventions that provide resources to local communities, based on the characteristics of those communities, have been of interest to Congress. One such policy, dubbed the \"10-20-30 provision,\" was implemented in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5). Title I, Section 105 of ARRA required the Secretary of Agriculture to allocate at least 10% of funds from three rural development program accounts to persistent poverty counties; that is, to counties that have had poverty rates of 20% or more for the past 30 years, as measured by the 1980, 1990, and 2000 decennial censuses. One notable characteristic of this provision is that it did not increase spending for the rural development programs addressed in ARRA, but rather targeted existing funds differently.\nResearch has suggested that areas for which the poverty rate (the percentage of the population that is below poverty) reaches 20% experience systemic problems that are more acute than in lower-poverty areas. Therefore, policy interventions at the community level (such as applying the 10-20-30 provision to other programs besides those cited in ARRA), and not only at the individual or family level, could continue to be of interest to Congress.\nPoverty rates are computed using data from household surveys. The list of counties identified to be persistently poor may differ by roughly 70 to 100 counties in a particular year, depending on the surveys selected to compile the list and the rounding method used for the poverty rate estimates. Before the mid-1990s, the decennial census was the only source of county poverty estimates. However, currently, the only data sources that provide poverty estimates for all U.S. counties are the American Community Survey (ACS) and the Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates program (SAIPE). Therefore, to determine whether an area is \"persistently\" poor in a time span that ends after the year 2000, it must first be decided whether ACS or SAIPE poverty estimates will be used for the later part of that time span.\nWhen determining the rounding method and data source to be used to compile a list of persistent poverty counties, the following may be relevant to consider:\nCharacteristics of interest: SAIPE is suited for poverty or median income alone; ACS for other topics in addition to poverty and income. Geographic areas of interest: SAIPE is recommended for counties and school districts only; ACS produces estimates for other small geographic areas as well. Reference period of estimate: SAIPE for one year; ACS for a five-year span. Rounding method for poverty rates: rounding to 20.0% (one decimal place) yields a shorter list than rounding to 20% (whole number).\nPoverty status is not defined for all persons: foster children (unrelated individuals under age 15), institutionalized persons, and residents of college dormitories are excluded; the homeless are not targeted by household surveys; and areas with large numbers of students living off-campus may have high poverty rates.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_228"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_229","query":"The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD operations. Under the FY2020 budget submission, the number of BMD-capable Navy Aegis ships is projected to increase from 38 at the end of FY2018 to 59 at the end of FY2024. BMD-capable Aegis ships operate in European waters to defend Europe from potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran, and in in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional defense against potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran.\nThe Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA's budget. The Navy's budget provides additional funding for BMD-related efforts. MDA's proposed FY2020 budget requests a total of $1,784.2 million (i.e., about $1.8 billion) in procurement and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts, including funding for two Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania. MDA's budget also includes operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon) funding for the Aegis BMD program.\nIssues for Congress regarding the Aegis BMD program include the following:\nwhether to approve, reject, or modify MDA's FY2020 funding procurement and research and development funding requests for the program; required numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships versus available numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships; the burden that BMD operations may be placing on the Navy's fleet of Aegis ships, and whether there are alternative ways to perform BMD missions now performed by U.S. Navy Aegis ships, such as establishing more Aegis Ashore sites; burden sharing\u2014how allied contributions to regional BMD capabilities and operations compare to U.S. naval contributions to overseas regional BMD capabilities and operations; whether to convert the Aegis test facility in Hawaii into an operational land-based Aegis BMD site; the potential for ship-based lasers, electromagnetic railguns (EMRGs), and hypervelocity projectiles (HVPs) to contribute in coming years to Navy terminal-phase BMD operations and the impact this might eventually have on required numbers of ship-based BMD interceptor missiles; and technical risk and test and evaluation issues in the Aegis BMD program.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_229"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_230","query":"Three new ship-based weapons being developed by the Navy\u2014solid state lasers (SSLs), the electromagnetic railgun (EMRG), and the gun-launched guided projectile (GLGP), also known as the hypervelocity projectile (HVP)\u2014could substantially improve the ability of Navy surface ships to defend themselves against surface craft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and eventually anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs).\nThe Navy has been developing SSLs for several years, and in 2014 installed on a Navy ship a prototype SSL called the Laser Weapon System (LaWS) that was capable of countering surface craft and UAVs. The Navy is now developing SSLs with improved capability for countering surface craft and UAVs, and eventually a capability for countering ASCMs. Navy efforts to develop these more capable lasers include\nthe Solid State Laser Technology Maturation (SSL-TM) effort; the Ruggedized High Energy Laser (RHEL); the Optical Dazzling Interdictor, Navy (ODIN); the Surface Navy Laser Weapon System (SNLWS) Increment 1, also known as the high-energy laser with integrated optical dazzler and surveillance (HELIOS); and the High Energy Laser Counter-ASCM Program (HELCAP).\nThe Navy refers to the first four efforts above collectively as the Navy Laser Family of Systems (NFLoS). Under the Navy's laser development approach, NFLOS and HELCAP, along with technologies developed by other parts of DOD, are to support the development of future, more capable shipboard lasers.\nThe Navy has been developing EMRG for several years. It was originally conceived as a naval surface fire support (NSFS) weapon for supporting Marines and other friendly forces ashore. Subsequently, it was determined that ERGM could also be used for air and missile defense, which strengthened interest in ERGM development. More recently, it was determined that the projectile to be fired by ERGM could also be fired by existing powder-propellant guns, including 5-inch and 155 mm guns on Navy cruisers and destroyers, and 155 mm artillery guns operated by the Army and Marine Corps. When fired from power guns, the projectile does not fly as quickly as it does when fired from an ERGM, but it still flies quickly enough to be of use as an air-defense weapon. The concept of firing the projectile from powder guns is referred to as GLGP and HVP. One potential advantage of HVP\/GLGP is that, once developed, it can be rapidly deployed on Navy cruisers and destroyers and in Army and Marine Corps artillery units, because the powder guns in question already exist.\nIn addition to the question of whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 funding requests for SSLs, ERGM, and HVP\/GLGP, issues for Congress include the following:\nwhether the Navy is moving too quickly, too slowly, or at about the right speed in its efforts to develop these weapons; the Navy's plans for transitioning these weapons from development to procurement and fielding aboard Navy ships; and whether Navy the Navy's shipbuilding plans include ships with appropriate amounts of space, weight, electrical power, and cooling capacity to accommodate these weapons.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_230"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_231","query":"For more than forty-five years, all three branches of government have struggled with how to interpret the meaning of \"waters of the United States\" in the Clean Water Act. In a shift from early water pollution legislation, the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which came to be known as the Clean Water Act, eliminated the requirement that federally regulated waters must be capable of being used by vessels in interstate commerce. Rather than use traditional navigability tests, the 1972 amendments redefined \"navigable waters\" for purposes of the Clean Water Act's jurisdiction to include \"the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.\" Disputes over the proper meaning of that phrase have been ongoing since that change.\nFederal authority to regulate waters within the United States primarily derives from the Commerce Clause, and accordingly, federal laws and regulations concerning waters of the United States cannot cover matters which exceed that constitutional source of authority. During the first two decades after the passage of the Clean Water Act, courts generally interpreted the act as having a wide jurisdictional reach. In recent decades, however, the Supreme Court has emphasized that \"the grant of authority to Congress under the Commerce Clause, though broad, is not unlimited.\" This modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence has informed federal courts' approach to interpreting which \"waters\" are subject to the Clean Water Act. At the same time, the Supreme Court has not always provided clear rules for determining whether a particular waterbody is a water of the United States. In its most recent case on the issue, Rapanos v. United States, the High Court issued a fractured 4-1-4 decision with no majority opinion providing a rationale for how to evaluate jurisdictional disputes.\nSome courts and commentators disagree on how the scope of federal jurisdictional waters changed over time as a result of interpretative approaches taken by the agencies responsible for administering the Clean Water Act\u2014the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). This debate resurfaced during the Obama Administration when the Corps and EPA issued a rule, known as the Clean Water Rule, which substantially redefined \"waters of the United States\" in the agencies' regulations for the first time in more than two decades. While some argued that the Clean Water Rule constituted a large-scale expansion of federal jurisdiction, others asserted that the agencies construed the term in a narrower fashion than in prior regulations.\nA vocal critic of the Clean Water Rule, President Trump shifted the executive branch's policy toward the meaning of \"waters of the United States.\" In February 2017, President Trump issued an executive order directing EPA and the Corps to review and revise or rescind the Clean Water Rule. The agencies currently are in the process of carrying out the executive order, and they unveiled proposed regulations redefining \"waters of the United States\" in December 2018. As in nearly all prior attempts to define this phrase, observers disagree on whether the latest proposed definition correctly calibrates the scope of federal jurisdiction to regulate water pollution.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_231"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_232","query":"Iran's national security policy is the product of many overlapping and sometimes competing factors such as the ideology of Iran's Islamic revolution, perception of threats to the regime and to the country, long-standing national interests, and the interaction of the Iranian regime's factions and constituencies. Iran's leadership:\nSeeks to deter or thwart U.S. or other efforts to invade or intimidate Iran or to bring about a change of regime. Has sought to take advantage of opportunities of regional conflicts to overturn a power structure in the Middle East that it asserts favors the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Sunni Muslim Arab regimes. Seeks to enhance its international prestige and restore a sense of \"greatness\" reminiscent of ancient Persian empires. Advances its foreign policy goals, in part by providing material support to regional allied governments and armed factions. Iranian officials characterize the support as helping the region's \"oppressed\" and assert that Saudi Arabia, in particular, is instigating sectarian tensions and trying to exclude Iran from regional affairs. Sometimes disagrees on tactics and strategies. Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'i and key hardline institutions, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), oppose any compromises of Iran's national security core goals. Iran's elected president, Hassan Rouhani, and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif support Iran's integration into regional and international diplomacy. Supports acts of international terrorism, as the \"leading\" or \"most active\" state sponsor of terrorism, according to each annual State Department report on international terrorism since the early 1990s.\nThe Administration insists that an end to Iran's malign activities is a requirement of any revised JCPOA and normalization of relations with the United States. The Trump Administration has articulated a strategy to counter Iran's \"malign activities\" based on:\nApplying \"maximum pressure\" on Iran's economy and regime through sanctions. President Trump withdrew the United States from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, and reimposed all U.S. sanctions as of November 5, 2018. Attempting to diplomatically, politically, and economically isolate Iran. Training, arming, and providing counterterrorism assistance to partner governments and some allied substate actors in the region. Deploying U.S. forces to deter Iran and interdict its arms shipments to its allies and proxies. Indirectly threatening military action against Iranian actions that pose an immediate threat to U.S. regional interests or allies.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_232"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_233","query":"The United States and other donors have focused substantial resources on stabilizing the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since the early 2000s, when \"Africa's World War\"\u2014a conflict that drew in multiple neighboring countries and reportedly caused millions of deaths\u2014drew to a close. DRC hosts the world's largest U.N. peacekeeping operation and is a major recipient of donor aid. Conflict has nonetheless persisted in eastern DRC, prolonging instability and an enduring humanitarian crisis in Africa's Great Lakes region. New unrest erupted as elections were repeatedly delayed past 2016, their scheduled date, leaving widely unpopular President Joseph Kabila in office. Security forces brutally cracked down on protests, while new conflicts emerged in previously stable regions, possibly fueled by political interference. An ongoing Ebola outbreak in the east has added to DRC's challenges. In April 2019, the Islamic State organization claimed responsibility for an attack on local soldiers in the Ebola-affected area, an apparent effort to rebrand a local armed group known as the Allied Democratic Forces.\nNational elections were ultimately held on December 30, 2018, following intense domestic and regional pressure. Opposition figure Felix Tshisekedi unexpectedly won the presidential contest, though his ability to assert a popular mandate may be undermined by allegations that the official results were rigged to deny victory to a more hardline opposition rival. Many Congolese nonetheless reacted to the outcome with relief and\/or enthusiasm, noting that Kabila would step down and that voters had soundly defeated his stated choice of successor, a former Interior Minister. Kabila's coalition nonetheless won sweeping majorities in simultaneous legislative and provincial-level elections, ensuring enduring influence for the former president and his supporters. Whether President Tshisekedi will make durable progress toward spurring inclusive economic growth, reforming state institutions, or ending security force abuses remains to be seen.\nThe Trump and Obama Administrations expended significant efforts to encourage an electoral transfer of power in DRC, that is, \"credible\" elections in which Kabila was not a candidate. U.S. officials have welcomed Tshisekedi's election and pledged to work with him, but they also imposed sanctions against top election officials in the aftermath of the polls, citing corruption in the electoral process. The Trump Administration has more broadly maintained a high-level focus on human rights and governance in DRC, expanding a U.S. unilateral sanctions regime targeting high-level security commanders and appointing regional specialist J. Peter Pham as Special Envoy in 2018. U.S. diplomats have also called on DRC authorities to credibly prosecute the murder in 2017 of two U.N. sanctions investigators, one of whom was a U.S. citizen. The United States remains the largest humanitarian donor in DRC and the largest financial contributor to the U.N. peacekeeping operation, MONUSCO, though the Administration has advocated broad cuts to U.S. peacekeeping funding and secured a decrease in MONUSCO's troop level in 2017. U.S. bilateral aid to DRC totaled $375 million in FY2018, higher than in previous years.\nCongress has shaped U.S. policy toward DRC, often focusing on human rights and democracy. Recent foreign aid appropriations measures have directed bilateral economic assistance for DRC. In the 115th Congress, the House passed H.R. 6207, which would have codified Executive Orders authorizing U.S. targeted sanctions, while the Senate agreed to S.Res. 386, urging the U.S. President to \"deter further electoral calendar slippage and abuses against the people of Congo.\" For more than a decade, Congress has also sought to deter Rwandan and Ugandan proxy involvement in DRC, including via provisions in aid appropriations legislation. Laws restricting U.S. aid to countries that, like DRC, have poor records on curtailing the use of child soldiers or human trafficking have also shaped U.S. engagement and aid. See also CRS In Focus IF11100, Ebola Outbreak: Democratic Republic of Congo; CRS Report R44402, Rwanda: In Brief; and CRS Report R42618, Conflict Minerals in Central Africa: U.S. and International Responses.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_233"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_234","query":"Congress has enacted a series of legislative provisions since 2006 to enable certain Iraqi and Afghan nationals to become U.S. lawful permanent residents (LPRs). These provisions make certain Iraqis and Afghans who worked as translators or interpreters, or who were employed by, or on behalf of, the U.S. government in Iraq or Afghanistan, eligible for special immigrant visas (SIVs). Special immigrants comprise a category of permanent employment-based admissions under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). While the special immigrant category is unique, it does bear some similarities to other admission categories that are authorized by other sections of the INA, including refugees and Amerasian children.\nTo apply under the SIV programs for Iraqis or Afghans, a prospective special immigrant must submit a petition to the Department of Homeland Security; be otherwise eligible for an immigrant visa; and be otherwise admissible to the United States. An Iraqi or Afghan SIV applicant whose petition is approved and who is abroad is required to have an in-person visa interview at a U.S. embassy or consulate abroad to determine visa eligibility. Upon admission to the United States, SIV recipients are granted LPR status. Iraqi and Afghan special immigrants are eligible for the same resettlement assistance and federal public benefits as refugees.\nThere are three SIV programs for Iraqi and Afghan nationals. One is a permanent program for certain Iraqis and Afghans who have worked directly with U.S. Armed Forces, or under Chief of Mission authority, as translators or interpreters. This program is currently capped at 50 principal aliens (excluding spouses and children) per year.\nThe other two SIV programs for Iraqis and Afghans are temporary. One program is for certain Iraqis who were employed in Iraq by, or on behalf of, the U.S. government during a specified period. It was capped at 5,000 principal aliens annually for FY2008 through FY2012 and included a provision to carry forward any unused numbers from one fiscal year to the next. It expired at the end of FY2013, but was subsequently revived. Current statutory authority provides for the issuance of no more than 2,500 visas to principal applicants after January 1, 2014. Applications are no longer being accepted for this program because the application deadline has passed.\nThere is a similar SIV program for certain Afghans who were employed in Afghanistan by, or on behalf of, the U.S. government or by the International Security Assistance Force during a specified period. The program was capped at 1,500 principal aliens annually for FY2009 through FY2013, with a provision to carry forward any unused numbers from one fiscal year to the next. Current statutory authority provides for the issuance of no more than 18,500 visas to principal applicants after December 19, 2014. The application period for this program remains open.\nThrough the end of FY2018, more than 79,000 individuals were granted special immigrant status under the three SIV programs for Iraqi and Afghan nationals. Principal applicants accounted for about 26,000 of the total, and dependent spouses and children accounted for the remaining 53,000.\nThe Iraqi and Afghan SIV programs have faced challenges with respect to application processing, security screening, and visa availability. The structure of the SIV programs themselves, with statutory timeframes and numerical limitations, introduces additional complication.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_234"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_235","query":"The Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (WIFIA) program provides financial assistance for water infrastructure projects, including projects to build and upgrade wastewater and drinking water treatment systems. Congress established the WIFIA program in the Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 (WRRDA 2014, P.L. 113-121).\nThe WIFIA concept is modeled after a similar program that finances transportation projects, the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program. Proponents of the WIFIA approach, including water utility organizations, cite several potential benefits:\nWIFIA provides credit assistance to large water infrastructure projects that may otherwise have difficulty obtaining financing. WIFIA provides credit assistance, namely direct loans, at U.S. Treasury rates, potentially lowering the cost of capital for borrowers. WIFIA assistance has less of a federal budgetary effect than conventional project grants that are not repaid, because only the subsidy cost of a loan (representing the presumed default rate on loans) is required to be appropriated. WIFIA support limits the federal government's exposure to default, because projects must be found creditworthy with a revenue stream for repayment to be eligible for assistance.\nOn the other hand, opponents of the WIFIA approach, including organizations that represent state environmental agency officials, have cited several concerns:\nFederal funding for a WIFIA program could have a detrimental effect on federal support for established State Revolving Fund (SRF) programs that provide the largest source of water infrastructure assistance today. If WIFIA funding resulted in a decrease in SRF assistance, smaller projects may face financing challenges. The Congressional Budget Office has warned that the future costs of a WIFIA program to the federal budget may be underestimated.\nAmerica's Water Infrastructure Act of 2018 (AWIA; P.L. 115-270), enacted on October 23, 2018, removed the pilot designation from the WIFIA program, reauthorized appropriations, and revised provisions related to program administration.\nAppropriations for the WIFIA program have increased since its inception, allowing EPA to provide increasing amounts of credit assistance each year:\nFY2017 appropriations totaled $30 million. FY2018 appropriations totaled $63 million. FY2019 appropriations totaled $68 million.\nOn April 5, 2019, EPA announced a third round of WIFIA funding, inviting prospective borrowers to submit letters of interest to EPA. From these submittals, the agency will select projects for funding. EPA estimated that its budget authority would provide approximately $6 billion in credit assistance.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_235"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_236","query":"Economic growth and expanded global trade have led to substantial increases in goods movement over the past few decades. The growth in freight transportation demand, along with growing passenger demand, has caused congestion in many parts of the transportation system, making freight movements slower and less reliable. Because the condition and performance of freight infrastructure play a considerable role in the efficiency of the freight system, federal support of freight infrastructure investment is likely to be of significant congressional concern in the reauthorization of the surface transportation program. The program is currently authorized by the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94), which is scheduled to expire on September 30, 2020.\nUntil recently, the federal surface transportation program did not pay specific attention to freight movement. However, the two most recent surface transportation acts, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141), approved in 2012, and the FAST Act, passed in 2015, encouraged federal and state planning for freight transportation from a multimodal perspective. The FAST Act also directed a portion of federal funds toward highway segments and other projects deemed most critical to freight movement. It did this by creating two new programs: a discretionary grant program administered by the Secretary of Transportation and a formula program for distributing federal funds to states.\nTrucks continue to move the bulk of freight in the United States. Freight tonnage is projected to increase by an average of 1.4% per year through 2045, according to the Department of Transportation (DOT), and trucks are projected to carry the largest share of the additional freight traffic. Much of the growth in truck traffic has occurred in urban areas, and this trend is expected to continue. Consequently, most truck congestion occurs in urban areas, and comparatively few highway miles are responsible for a disproportionately large share of congestion costs. Highway infrastructure decisions are mainly made by the states, but federal fuel tax revenue is an important source of funds for the projects states pursue. With fuel taxes no longer able to fully cover the cost of existing highway infrastructure programs, Congress has considered strategies to raise new revenue and to make more effective use of federal dollars to facilitate the movement of freight. The trucking industry has favored raising additional revenue by increasing fuel taxes and has generally opposed greater use of highway tolls out of concern that these may disproportionately affect truckers. DOT studies have shown that the structure of motor fuel taxes provides a subsidy to heavily loaded trucks at the expense of passenger vehicles.\nOne significant question is whether additional funding for freight-related infrastructure should be distributed to the states by formula or on a discretionary basis. Federal projections indicate that a relatively small number of Interstate Highway segments and interchanges are likely to face large increases in truck traffic by 2045. However, individual states may have limited incentives to use their federal formula funds to alleviate increasing congestion in those locations, as many of the trucks affected may be passing through rather than serving local businesses. Discretionary grants may be more effective in providing large amounts of federal funding for very costly freight-related projects, particularly those requiring interstate cooperation, but could also lead to fewer projects receiving federal funds.\nBesides appropriating funds for freight infrastructure, Congress has created programs to support research and development of new transportation technologies. Autonomous and connected vehicle technologies have potential applications in the freight sector, but many federal regulations are written assuming that a single person is in full control of a vehicle at all times. Congress has considered, but not advanced, proposals to update such regulations. Industry is eager to explore the cost-saving potential of new technology, so it will likely remain an issue for Congress.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_236"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_237","query":"There is no official or agreed-upon definition of what constitutes a \"sanctuary\" jurisdiction, and there has been debate as to whether the term applies to particular states and localities. Moreover, state and local jurisdictions have varied reasons for opting not to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement efforts, including reasons not necessarily motivated by disagreement with federal policies, such as concern about potential civil liability or the costs associated with assisting federal efforts. But traditional sanctuary policies are often described as falling under one of three categories. First, so-called \"don't enforce\" policies generally bar state or local police from assisting federal immigration authorities. Second, \"don't ask\" policies generally bar certain state or local officials from inquiring into a person's immigration status. Third, \"don't tell\" policies typically restrict information sharing between state or local law enforcement and federal immigration authorities.\nOne legal question relevant to sanctuary policies is the extent to which states, as sovereign entities, may decline to assist in federal immigration enforcement, and the degree to which the federal government can stop state measures that undermine federal objectives. The Tenth Amendment preserves the states' broad police powers, and states have frequently enacted measures that, directly or indirectly, address aliens residing in their communities. Under the doctrine of preemption\u2014derived from the Supremacy Clause\u2014Congress may displace many state or local laws pertaining to immigration. But not every state or local law touching on immigration matters is necessarily preempted; the measure must interfere with, or be contrary to, federal law to be rendered unenforceable. Further, the anti-commandeering doctrine, rooted in the Constitution's allocation of powers between the federal government and the states, prohibits Congress from forcing state entities to perform regulatory functions on the federal government's behalf, including in the context of immigration. A series of Supreme Court cases inform the boundaries of preemption and the anti-commandeering doctrine, with the Court most recently opining on the issue in Murphy v. NCAA.\nThese dueling federal and state interests are front and center in numerous lawsuits challenging actions taken by the Trump Administration to curb states and localities from implementing sanctuary-type policies. Notably, Section 9(a) of Executive Order 13768, \"Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States,\" directs the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General to withhold federal grants from jurisdictions that willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1373\u2014a statute that bars states and localities from prohibiting their employees from sharing with federal immigration authorities certain immigration-related information. The executive order further directs the Attorney General to take \"appropriate enforcement action\" against jurisdictions that violate Section 1373 or have policies that \"prevent or hinder the enforcement of federal law.\" To implement the executive order, the Department of Justice added new eligibility conditions to the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (Byrne JAG) Program and grants administered by the Justice Department's Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS). These conditions tied eligibility to compliance with Section 1373 and other federal immigration priorities, like granting federal authorities access to state and local detention facilities housing aliens and giving immigration authorities notice before releasing from custody an alien wanted for removal.\nSeveral lawsuits were filed challenging the constitutionality of the executive order and new grant conditions. So far the courts that have reviewed these challenges\u2014principally contending that the executive order and grant conditions violate the separation of powers and anti-commandeering principles\u2014generally agree that the Trump Administration acted unconstitutionally. For instance, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a permanent injunction blocking enforcement of Section 9(a) against California. Additionally, two separate district courts permanently enjoined the Byrne JAG conditions as applied to Chicago and Philadelphia. In doing so, these courts concluded that the Supreme Court's most recent formulation of the anti-commandeering doctrine in Murphy requires holding Section 1373 unconstitutional. These lawsuits notwithstanding, the courts still recognize the federal government's pervasive, nearly exclusive role in immigration enforcement. This can be seen in the federal government's lawsuit challenging three California measures governing the state's regulation of private and public actors' involvement in immigration enforcement within its border. Although a district court opined that several measures likely were lawful exercises of the state's police powers, it also concluded that two provisions regulating private employers are likely unlawful under the Supremacy Clause. This ruling was mostly upheld on appeal, in which the Ninth Circuit additionally opined that a provision requiring the California attorney general to review the circumstances surrounding detained aliens' apprehension and transfer to detention facilities within the state also violates the Supremacy Clause.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_237"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_238","query":"The federal crop insurance program offers subsidized crop insurance policies to farmers. Farmers can purchase policies that pay indemnities when their yields or revenues fall below guaranteed levels. While the majority of federal crop insurance policies cover yield or revenue losses, the program also offers policies with other types of guarantees, such as index policies that trigger an indemnity payment based on weather conditions. The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC), a government corporation within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), pays part of the premium\u2014about 63%, on average\u2014across the federal crop insurance portfolio during crop year 2017, while policy holders\u2014farmers and ranchers\u2014pay the balance. Private insurance companies, known as Approved Insurance Providers (AIPs), deliver the policies in return for administrative and operating subsidies from FCIC. AIPs also share underwriting risk with FCIC through a mutually negotiated Standard Reinsurance Agreement. The USDA Risk Management Agency (RMA) administers the federal crop insurance program.\nThe federal crop insurance program primarily covers traditional field crops (such as wheat, corn, and soybeans) that are supported by USDA's revenue-support programs. Unlike these traditional crops, specialty crops\u2014defined in statute as \"fruits and vegetables, tree nuts, dried fruits, and horticulture and nursery crops (including floriculture)\" (7 U.S.C. \u00a71621 note)\u2014have not been a major part of federal crop insurance support. Specialty crops are also generally not eligible for USDA's revenue-support programs. USDA estimates that the statutory definition of specialty crops covers more than 300 agricultural commodities, including fresh and processed fruits and vegetables, tree nuts, nursery plants (trees, shrubs, and flowering plants), herbs, spices, coffee, tea, honey, and maple syrup.\nLegislative changes, coupled with ongoing administrative efforts by USDA, have expanded federal crop insurance coverage for specialty crops, and they now account for a small but growing number of federal crop insurance policies bought by farmers. Among the issues Congress may consider if it seeks to further expand coverage for specialty crops are data collection and price discovery for commodities not sold on exchanges (such as most fruits and vegetables), coverage of quality losses, and the effect of ad hoc payments on the demand for crop insurance.\nFederal crop insurance policies currently cover around 38 specialty crop categories, which include roughly 80 types of fruits, vegetables, tree nuts, and nursery crops. Over the past few decades, total specialty crop insured liabilities rose from nearly $1 billion in 1989 to nearly $18.5 billion in 2017. In 2017, federal crop insurance policies covered about 9 million acres of specialty crops, around 800,000 bee colonies, about 100,000 tons of raisins, and roughly 60,000 fruit and coffee trees. Across all specialty crops, coverage and the premium subsidy paid by the federal government may vary depending on the crop. Moreover, for many specialty crops, crop-specific insurance policies are not available. Currently, about one-half of all U.S. specialty crop acres are covered by federal crop insurance policies. Some specialty crops may be covered under a Whole Farm Revenue Protection (WFRP) insurance policy. WFRP is designed to fill in coverage gaps for producers of uninsured crops that lack individual policy coverage and for producers marketing to local, farm-identity preserved, or direct markets. The average premium subsidy rate for WRFP was about 70% in 2017. Federal crop insurance for specialty crops and WFRP together accounted for about 17% of the entire federal crop insurance portfolio, as measured by liability, during crop year 2017.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_238"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_239","query":"As congressional policymakers continue to debate telecommunications reform, a major discussion point revolves around what approach should be taken to ensure unfettered access to the internet. The move to place restrictions on the owners of the networks that compose and provide access to the internet, to ensure equal access and nondiscriminatory treatment, is referred to as \"net neutrality.\" There is no single accepted definition of \"net neutrality,\" but most agree that any such definition should include the general principles that owners of the networks that compose and provide access to the internet should not control how consumers lawfully use that network, and they should not be able to discriminate against content provider access to that network.\nThe Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in its February 26, 2015, open meeting voted 3-2, along party lines, to adopt open internet rules and released these rules on March 12, 2015. One of the most controversial aspects of the rules was the decision to reclassify broadband internet access service (BIAS) as telecommunications service under Title II, thereby subjecting internet service providers to a more stringent regulatory framework. With limited exceptions, the rules went into effect June 12, 2015. Various parties challenged the legality of the FCC's 2015 Open Internet Order, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, in a June 14, 2016, ruling, voted (2-1) to uphold the legality of all aspects of the 2015 FCC Order. A petition for full U.S. Appeals Court review was denied and a subsequent petition for U.S. Supreme Court review was declined.\nThe FCC on December 14, 2017, adopted (3-2) an Order that largely reverses the 2015 regulatory framework. The 2017 Order, among other things, reverses the 2015 classification of BIAS as a telecommunications service under Title II of the Communications Act, shifts much of the oversight from the FCC to the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice, and provides for a less regulatory approach. This action has once again opened up the debate over what the appropriate framework is to ensure an open internet. Reaction to the 2017 Order has been mixed. Some see the 2015 FCC rules as regulatory overreach and welcome a more \"light-touch\" approach, which they feel will stimulate broadband investment, deployment, and innovation. Others support the 2015 regulations and feel that their reversal will result in a concentration of power to the detriment of content, services, and applications providers, as well as consumers, and refute the claim that these regulations have had a negative impact on broadband investment, expansion, or innovation. The 2017 Order was published in the Federal Register on February 22, 2018, and went into effect on June 11, 2018. Federal Register publication triggered timelines for both court challenges and Congressional Review Act (CRA) consideration. Petitions for review have been consolidated in the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit. CRA resolutions (S.J.Res. 52, H.J.Res. 129) to overturn the 2017 Order were introduced in the 115th Congress. S.J.Res. 52 passed (52-47) the Senate, but H.J.Res. 129 was not considered in the House. Additional bills to provide a regulatory framework to outline FCC authority over broadband internet access services were introduced, but not acted on, in the 115th Congress.\nDebate over what the appropriate regulatory framework should be for broadband access has continued in the 116th Congress. Two bills (H.R. 1644, S. 682) add a new title to the Communications Act that overturns the 2017 Order and restores the 2015 Order. An amended version of H.R. 1644 passed (232-190) the House on April 10, 2019. Additional bills (H.R. 1006, H.R. 1096, H.R. 1101, and H.R. 1860) that address the net neutrality debate have also been introduced.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_239"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_240","query":"Successive Administrations have described the U.S. relationship with Nigeria, Africa's largest producer of oil and its largest economy, to be among the most important on the continent. The country is Africa's most populous, with more than 200 million people, roughly evenly divided between Muslims and Christians. Nigeria, which transitioned from military to civilian rule in 1999, ranked for years among the top suppliers of U.S. oil imports, and it is a major recipient of U.S. foreign aid. The country is the United States' second-largest trading partner in Africa and the third-largest beneficiary of U.S. foreign direct investment on the continent. Nigerians comprise the largest African diaspora group in the United States.\nNigeria is a country of significant promise, but it also faces serious social, economic, and security challenges, some of which pose threats to state and regional stability. The country has faced intermittent political turmoil and economic crises since gaining independence in 1960 from the United Kingdom. Political life has been scarred by conflict along ethnic, geographic, and religious lines, and corruption and misrule have undermined the state's authority and legitimacy. Despite extensive petroleum resources, its human development indicators are among the world's lowest, and a majority of the population faces extreme poverty. In the south, social unrest, criminality, and corruption in the oil-producing Niger Delta have hindered oil production and contributed to piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Perceived government neglect and economic marginalization have also fueled resentment in the predominately Muslim north, while communal grievances and competition over land and other resources\u2014sometimes subject to political manipulation\u2014drive conflict in the Middle Belt.\nThe rise of Boko Haram has heightened concerns about extremist recruitment in Nigeria, which has one of the world's largest Muslim populations. Boko Haram has focused on a range of targets, but civilians in the impoverished, predominately Muslim northeast have borne the brunt of the violence. The group became notorious for its 2014 kidnapping of over 270 schoolgirls and its use of women and children as suicide bombers. It has staged attacks in neighboring countries and poses a threat to international targets in the region. Boko Haram appears primarily focused on the Lake Chad Basin region. Its 2015 pledge to the Islamic State and the emergence of a splinter faction, Islamic State-West Africa (IS-WA), have raised concerns from U.S. policymakers, though the extent of intergroup linkages is unclear. IS-WA is credited with a number of devastating attacks in 2018 against Nigerian military bases; the army has struggled to defend them.\nDomestic criticism of the government's response to corruption, economic pressures, and Boko Haram contributed to the election in 2015 of former military ruler Muhammadu Buhari. In what was widely hailed as a historic transition, the ruling People's Democratic Party and President Goodluck Jonathan lost power to Buhari and his All Progressives Congress, marking Nigeria's first democratic transfer of power. Buhari has since struggled to enact promised reforms amid persistent security challenges and a struggling economy. He faces a challenge from former vice president Atiku Abubakar in elections scheduled for February 2019; it is forecast to be a close race. As in previous elections, there are concerns about violence around the polls, and intense, high-stakes contests over a number of legislative and gubernatorial posts increase the risk of conflicts. U.S. officials and Members of Congress have called for credible, transparent, and peaceful elections.\nU.S.-Nigeria relations under the Trump Administration appear generally consistent with U.S. policy under the Obama Administration. Both Administrations have supported reform initiatives in Nigeria, including anticorruption efforts, economic and electoral reforms, energy sector privatization, and programs to promote peace and development. Congress oversees more than $500 million in U.S. foreign aid programs in Nigeria and regularly monitors political developments; some Members have expressed concern with corruption, human rights abuses, and violent extremism in Nigeria.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_240"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_241","query":"Over the past several decades, Congress, by statute, has established a wide array of commissions, boards, and advisory bodies to provide it with assistance in meeting various legislative, investigative, and administrative responsibilities. Some of these entities are temporary and created to serve specific functions, such as studying a discrete policy area or performing one-time tasks. Others are permanent, serving an ongoing purpose, such as overseeing an institution or performing a regular administrative function.\nThe majority of these congressional bodies provide that Members of Congress, particularly the leadership, be intimately involved in the appointment process, either through direct service on a commission, or by appointing or recommending candidates for membership.\nThe choice of a particular mechanism for membership appointment may have implications for the ability of these entities to fulfill their congressional mandates. Examination of the statutory language creating these bodies reveals several common approaches to membership selection. Each alternative schema has its advantages.\nFor example, a commission or board composed entirely of Members permits a high degree of congressional control over the entity's operations. Bodies composed mainly of qualified private citizens or executive branch appointees may provide a broader expertise than Member-only bodies. Assemblages of mixed membership provide some of the advantages of both Member and citizen-only appointment schemes.\nThis report contains a compilation of existing commissions and boards that demonstrates the range of alternative membership-appointment structures. It includes any statutorily created advisory entity (e.g., boards, advisory panels, task forces) whose membership scheme mandates the participation of Members of Congress either as potential members or as participants in the process of appointing the membership. For each entity, information on the purpose, duration, appointment structure, and term of appointment is provided. Finally, information on the involvement of Members of Congress in the appointment process is presented in a series of tables.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_241"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_242","query":"The Small Business Administration's (SBA's) Surety Bond Guarantee Program is designed to increase small businesses' access to federal, state, and local government contracting, as well as private-sector contracts, by guaranteeing bid, performance, and payment bonds for small businesses that cannot obtain surety bonds through regular commercial channels. The program guarantees individual contracts of up to $6.5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary. The SBA's guarantee currently ranges from 80% to 90% of the surety's loss if a default occurs. In FY2018, the SBA guaranteed 10,800 bid and final surety bonds with a total contract value of nearly $6.5 billion.\nA surety bond is a three-party instrument between a surety (who agrees to be responsible for the debt or obligation of another), a contractor, and a project owner. The agreement binds the contractor to comply with the contract's terms and conditions. If the contractor is unable to successfully perform the contract, the surety assumes the contractor's responsibilities and ensures that the project is completed. Surety bonds encourage project owners to contract with small businesses that may not have the credit history or prior experience of larger businesses and may be at greater risk of failing to comply with the contract's terms and conditions.\nSurety bonds are important to small businesses interested in competing for federal contracts because the federal government requires prime contractors\u2014prior to the award of a federal contract exceeding $150,000 for the construction, alteration, or repair of any building or public work of the United States\u2014to furnish a performance bond issued by a surety satisfactory to the contracting officer in an amount that the officer considers adequate to protect the government.\nP.L. 112-239, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, increased the program's bond limit to $6.5 million, or up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary. The limit had been $2 million since 2000, with a temporary increase from February 17, 2009, through September 30, 2010, to $5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certified in writing that such a guarantee was necessary. Advocates of raising the program's bond limit argued that doing so would increase contracting opportunities for small businesses and bring the limit more in line with limits of other small business programs, such as the 8(a) Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program and the Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) Program. Opponents argued that raising the limit could lead to higher amounts being guaranteed by the SBA and, as a result, increase the risk of program losses.\nThis report examines the program's origin and development, including (1) the decision to supplement the original Prior Approval Program with the Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program that initially provided a lower guarantee rate (not to exceed 70%) than the Prior Approval Program (not to exceed 80% or 90%, depending on the size of the contract and the type of small business) in exchange for allowing preferred sureties to issue SBA-guaranteed surety bonds without the SBA's prior approval; (2) P.L. 114-92, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, which increased the Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program's guarantee rate from not to exceed 70% to not to exceed 90% of losses; and (3) the decision to increase the program's bond limit.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_242"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_243","query":"Since the first mobile phones were made available in the 1980s, telecommunication providers have been investing in mobile networks to expand coverage, improve services, and attract more users. First-generation networks supported mobile voice calls but were limited in coverage and capacity. To address those limitations, providers developed and deployed second-generation (2G) mobile networks, then third-generation (3G), and fourth-generation (4G) networks. Each generation offered improved speeds, greater capacity, and new features and services.\nIn 2018, telecommunication providers began deploying fifth-generation (5G) networks to meet growing demands for data from consumer and industrial users. 5G networks are expected to enable providers to expand consumer services (e.g., video streaming, virtual reality applications), support the growing number of connected devices (e.g., medical devices, smart homes, Internet of Things), support new industrial uses (e.g., industrial sensors, industrial monitoring systems), perform advanced data analytics, and enable the use of advanced technologies (e.g., smart city applications, autonomous vehicles).\n5G is expected to yield significant economic benefits. Market analysts estimate that in the United States, 5G could create up to 3 million new jobs and add $500 billion to the nation's gross domestic product (GDP). Globally, analysts estimate that 5G technologies could generate $12.3 trillion in sales activity across multiple industries and support 22 million jobs by 2035. Experience has shown that companies first to market with new products can capture the bulk of the revenues, yielding long-term benefits for those companies and significant economic gains for the countries where those companies are located. Hence, technology companies around the world are racing to develop 5G products, and some countries (i.e., central governments) are acting in support of 5G deployment. This competition to develop 5G products and capture the global 5G market is often called the \"race to 5G.\"\nIn the race to 5G, the United States is one of the leaders, along with China and South Korea. Each country has adopted a different strategy to lead in 5G technology development and deployment. China's central government is supporting the deployment of 5G infrastructure in China. China has a national plan to deploy 5G domestically, capture the revenues from its domestic market, improve its industrial systems, and become a leading supplier of telecommunications equipment to the world. In South Korea, the central government is working with telecommunications providers to deploy 5G. South Korea plans to be the first country to deploy 5G nationwide, and to use the technology to improve its industrial systems. In the United States, private industry is leading 5G deployment. U.S. providers, competing against each other, have conducted 5G trials in several cities and were the first in the world to offer 5G services commercially. The U.S. government has supported 5G deployment, making spectrum available for 5G use and streamlining processes related to the siting of 5G equipment (e.g., small cells).\nWhile each country has taken a different approach to capturing the 5G market, there are factors that drive the timeline for all deployments, including international decisions on standards and spectrum. In the United States, 5G deployment may also be affected by the lengthy spectrum allocation process, resistance from local governments to federal small cell siting rules, and limitations on trade that may affect availability of equipment.\nThe 116th Congress may monitor the progress of 5G deployment in the United States and the U.S. position in the race to 5G. Congress may consider policies that may affect 5G deployment, including policies related to spectrum allocation, trade restrictions, and local concerns with 5G deployment. Policies that support 5G deployment while also protecting national and local interests could provide significant consumer benefits, help to modernize industries, give U.S. companies an advantage in the global economy, and yield long-term economic gains for the United States. In developing policies, Members may consider the economic and consumer benefits of 5G technologies, as well as other interests, such as the need to preserve spectrum for other users and uses, the protection of national security and intellectual property when trading, the privacy and security of 5G devices and systems, and the respect of local authorities and concerns during 5G deployment.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_243"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_244","query":"Law enforcement officials have described money laundering\u2014the process of making illegally obtained proceeds appear legitimate\u2014as the \"lifeblood\" of organized crime. Recently, money launderers have increasingly turned to a new technology to conceal the origins of illegally obtained proceeds: virtual currency. Virtual currencies like Bitcoin, Ether, and Ripple are digital representations of value that, like ordinary currency, function as media of exchange, units of account, and stores of value. However, unlike ordinary currencies, virtual currencies are not legal tender, meaning they cannot be used to pay taxes and creditors need not accept them as payments for debt. While virtual currency enthusiasts tout their technological promise, a number of commentators have contended that the anonymity offered by these new financial instruments makes them an attractive vehicle for money laundering. Law enforcement officials, regulators, and courts have accordingly grappled with how virtual currencies fit into a federal anti-money laundering (AML) regime designed principally for traditional financial institutions.\nThe federal AML regime consists of two general categories of laws and regulations. First, federal law requires a range of \"financial institutions\" to abide by a variety of AML program, reporting, and recordkeeping requirements. Second, federal law criminalizes money laundering and various forms of related conduct.\nOver the past decade, federal prosecutors and regulators have pursued a number of cases involving the application of these laws to virtual currencies. Specifically, federal prosecutors have brought money laundering charges against the creators of online marketplaces that allowed their users to exchange virtual currency for illicit goods and services. In one of these prosecutions, a federal district court held that transactions involving Bitcoin can serve as the predicate for money laundering charges. Federal prosecutors have also pursued charges against the developers of certain virtual currency payment systems allegedly designed to facilitate illicit transactions and launder the proceeds of criminal activity. Specifically, prosecutors charged these developers with conspiring to commit money laundering and operating unlicensed money transmitting businesses. In adjudicating the second category of charges, courts have concluded that the relevant virtual currency payment systems were \"unlicensed money transmitting businesses,\" rejecting the argument that the relevant criminal prohibition applies only to money transmitters that facilitate cash transactions. Finally, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)\u2014the bureau within the Treasury Department responsible for administering the principal federal AML statute\u2014has pursued a number of administrative enforcement actions against virtual currency exchangers, assessing civil penalties for failure to implement sufficient AML programs and report suspicious transactions.\nAs these prosecutions and enforcement actions demonstrate, virtual currencies have a number of features that make them attractive to criminals. Specifically, commentators have noted that money launderers are attracted to the anonymity, ease of cross-border transfer, lack of clear regulations, and settlement finality that accompanies virtual currency transactions. Several bills introduced in the 116th Congress are aimed at addressing these challenges. These bills would, among other things, commission agency analyses of the use of virtual currencies for illicit activities and clarify FinCEN's statutory powers and duties. Commentators have also identified legal uncertainty as an additional challenge facing prosecutors, regulators, and participants in virtual currency transactions. Moreover, a number of observers have argued that existing AML regulations are likely to stifle innovation by virtual currency developers. In response to these concerns about legal clarity and burdensome regulation, at least one legislative proposal contemplates exempting certain blockchain developers from various AML requirements.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_244"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_245","query":"The combination of growing liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies and new requirements for less polluting fuels in the maritime shipping industry has heightened interest in LNG as a maritime fuel. The use of LNG as an engine (\"bunker\") fuel in shipping is also drawing attention from federal agencies and is beginning to emerge as an issue of interest in Congress.\nIn 2008, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) announced a timeline to reduce the maximum sulfur content in vessel fuels to 0.5% by January 1, 2020. Annex VI of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships requires vessels to either use fuels containing less than 0.5% sulfur or install exhaust-cleaning systems (\"scrubbers\") to limit a vessel's airborne emissions of sulfur oxides to an equivalent level. An option for vessel operators to meet the IMO 2020 standards is to install LNG-fueled engines, which emit only trace amounts of sulfur. Adopting LNG engines requires more investment than installing scrubbers, but LNG-fueled engines may offset their capital costs with operating cost advantages over conventional fuels. Savings would depend on the price spread between LNG and fuel oil. Recent trends suggest that LNG may be cheaper in the long run than conventional fuels.\nLNG bunkering requires specialized infrastructure for supply, storage, and delivery to vessels. To date, the number of ports worldwide that have developed such infrastructure is limited, although growth in this area has accelerated. Early adoption of LNG bunkering is occurring in Europe where the European Union requires a core network of ports to provide LNG bunkering by 2030. LNG bunkering is also advancing in Asia, led by Singapore, the world's largest bunkering port. Asian countries, together with Australia and the United Arab Emirates, have about 10 coastal ports offering LNG bunkering, with another 15 projects in development.\nLNG bunkering in the United States currently takes place in Jacksonville, FL, and Port Fourchon, LA\u2014with a third facility under development in Tacoma, WA. Bunkering of LNG-fueled cruise ships using barges also is planned for Port Canaveral, FL. The relative locations of other U.S. ports and operating LNG terminals suggest that LNG bunkering could be within reach of every port along the Eastern Seaboard and in the Gulf of Mexico. On the West Coast, the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, CA, are near the Costa Azul LNG terminal in Ensenada, MX. Seattle and Tacoma are adjacent to the proposed Tacoma LNG project. Since 2015, Jones Act coastal ship operators have taken steps to transition their fleets to use cleaner burning fuels, including LNG. Shippers of dry goods to Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico have taken delivery or have ordered LNG-fueled and LNG-capable vessels from U.S. shipyards in Philadelphia, PA, and Brownsville, TX. Another company operates five LNG-powered offshore supply vessels built in Gulfport, MS.\nDepending upon LNG conversions, the global LNG bunker fuel market could grow to several billion dollars by 2030. If U.S. LNG producers were to supply a significant share of this market\u2014on the strength of comparatively low LNG production costs\u2014LNG bunkering could increase demand for U.S. natural gas production, transportation, and liquefaction. Opportunities in LNG-related shipbuilding might be more limited, as most shipbuilding occurs overseas, although domestically-constructed LNG bunkering barges could be one area of economic growth. Finally, engineering and construction firms could benefit from new opportunities to develop port infrastructure for LNG storage and transfer. However, while vessel conversion to LNG fuel may increase demand for U.S.-produced natural gas, it partially could be offset by reduced demand for U.S.-produced crude oil or refined products. Furthermore, while LNG can reduce direct emissions from vessels, fugitive emissions and environmental impacts from natural gas production and transportation could reduce overall emissions benefits. While the LNG industry has experienced few accidents, the Coast Guard has been developing new standards to address unique safety and security risks associated with LNG in vessel operations.\nThe overarching consideration about LNG bunkering in the United States is uncertainty about how the global shipping fleet will adapt to the IMO sulfur standards over time. This uncertainty complicates decisions related to both private investment and public policy. Although Congress has limited ability to influence global shipping, it could influence the growth of LNG bunkering through the tax code and regulation, or through policies affecting the LNG industry or domestic shipping industry as a whole. Evaluating the potential implications of LNG bunkering within the context of broader energy and environmental policies may become an additional consideration for Congress. If LNG bunkering expands significantly, Congress also may examine the adequacy of existing measures to ensure the safety and security of LNG vessels, storage, and related facilities.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_245"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_246","query":"Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, coverage for losses from such attacks was normally included in general insurance policies without additional cost to the policyholders. Following the attacks, such coverage became expensive, if offered at all. Moreover, some observers feared that the absence of insurance against terrorism loss would have a wider economic impact, because insurance is required to consummate a variety of transactions (e.g., real estate). For example, if real estate deals were not completed due to lack of insurance, this could have ripple effects\u2014such as job loss\u2014on related industries like the construction industry. Terrorism insurance was largely unavailable for most of 2002, and some have argued that this adversely affected parts of the economy, while others suggest the evidence is inconclusive.\nCongress responded to the disruption in the insurance market by passing the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA; P.L. 107-297), which created a temporary three-year Terrorism Insurance Program. Under TRIA, the government would share the losses on commercial property and casualty insurance should a foreign terrorist attack occur, with potential recoupment of this loss sharing after the fact. In addition, TRIA requires insurers to make terrorism coverage available to commercial policyholders, but does not require policyholders to purchase the coverage. The program expiration date was extended in 2005 (P.L. 109-144), 2007 (P.L. 110-160), and 2015 (P.L. 114-1). Over the course of such reauthorizations, the prospective government share of losses has been reduced and the recoupment amount increased, although the 2007 reauthorization also expanded the program to cover losses from acts of domestic terrorism. The TRIA program is currently slated to expire at the end of 2020.\nIn general terms, if a terrorist attack occurs under TRIA, the insurance industry covers the entire amount for relatively small losses. For a medium-sized loss, the government assists insurers initially but is then required to recoup the payments it made to insurers through a broad levy on insurance policies afterwards\u2014the federal role is to spread the losses over time and over the entire insurance industry and insurance policyholders. As the size of losses grows larger, the federal government covers more of the losses without this mandatory recoupment. Ultimately, for the largest losses, the government is not required to recoup the payments it has made, although discretionary recoupment remains possible. The precise dollar values where losses cross these small, medium, and large thresholds are uncertain and will depend on how the losses are distributed among insurers.\nThe specifics of the current program are as follows: (1) a terrorist act must cause $5 million in insured losses to be certified for TRIA coverage; (2) the aggregate insured losses from certified acts of terrorism must be $180 million in a year for the government coverage to begin (this amount increases to $200 million in 2020); and (3) an individual insurer must meet a deductible of 20% of its annual premiums for the government coverage to begin. Once these thresholds are met, the government covers 81% of insured losses due to terrorism (this amount decreases to 80% in 2020). If the insured losses are less than $37.5 billion, the Secretary of the Treasury is required to recoup 140% of government outlays through surcharges on TRIA-eligible property and casualty insurance policies. As insured losses rise above $37.5 billion, the Secretary is required to recoup a progressively reduced amount of the outlays. At some high insured loss level, which will depend on the exact distribution of losses, the Secretary would no longer be required to recoup outlays.\nSince TRIA's passage, the private industry's willingness and ability to cover terrorism risk have increased. According to data collected by the Treasury, in 2017, approximately 78% of insureds purchased the optional terrorism coverage, paying $3.65 billion in premiums. Over the life of the program, premiums earned by unrelated insurers have totaled $38 billion. This relative market calm has been under the umbrella of TRIA coverage and in a period in which no terrorist attacks have occurred that resulted in government payments under TRIA. It is unclear how the insurance market would react to the expiration of the federal program, although at least some instability might be expected were this to occur. With the upcoming 2020 expiration of the program, the 116th Congress may consider legislation to extend TRIA; to date, no such legislation has been introduced.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_246"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_247","query":"Intellectual property (IP) rights play an important role in the development and pricing of pharmaceutical products such as prescription drugs and biologics. In order to encourage innovation, IP law grants the rights holder a temporary monopoly on a particular invention or product, potentially enabling him to charge higher-than-competitive prices. IP rights, if sufficiently limited, are typically justified as necessary to allow pharmaceutical manufacturers the ability to recoup substantial costs in research and development, including clinical trials and other tests necessary to obtain regulatory approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). However, because they may operate to deter or delay competition from generic drug and biosimilar manufacturers, IP rights have been criticized as contributing to high prices for pharmaceutical products in the United States.\nTwo main types of IP may protect pharmaceutical products: patents and regulatory exclusivities. Patents, which are available to a wide range of technologies besides pharmaceuticals, are granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to new and useful inventions. Pharmaceutical patents may claim chemical compounds in the pharmaceutical product, a method of using the product, a method of making the product, or a variety of other patentable inventions relating to a drug or biologic. The holder of a valid patent generally has the exclusive right to make, use, sell, and import the invention for a term lasting approximately 20 years. If a court concludes that a competitor's generic or biosimilar version infringes a valid patent, the court may issue an injunction precluding the competitor from making, using, selling, and importing that competing product until the patent expires.\nIn some circumstances, FDA grants regulatory exclusivities to a pharmaceutical manufacturer upon the completion of the process required to market pharmaceutical products. Before a new drug or biologic can be sold in the United States, companies must apply for regulatory approval or licensure from FDA, which determines if the pharmaceutical is safe and effective. For certain pharmaceuticals, such as innovative products or those that serve particular needs, FDA provides a term of marketing exclusivity upon the successful completion of the regulatory process. If a product is covered by an unexpired regulatory exclusivity, FDA generally may not accept and\/or approve an application seeking FDA approval of a follow-on product (i.e., a generic drug or biosimilar). Regulatory exclusivities vary in length from as little as six months to as much as 12 years depending on the specific type of drug or biologic at issue and other factors.\nLike regulatory exclusivities, patent rights can affect when generic and biosimilar manufacturers can market their follow-on products. Pharmaceutical patent disputes are subject to certain specialized procedures under the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA). Under Hatch-Waxman, applicants seeking approval of a generic version of an existing FDA-approved drug must make a certification with respect to each patent that the brand-name drug manufacturer lists as covering the product. If the generic manufacturer challenges those patents, FDA generally cannot approve the generic drug application for 30 months while the patent dispute is litigated. For biologics, applicants seeking approval of a biosimilar version of an existing biological product may choose to engage in the BPCIA's \"patent dance,\" a complex scheme of private information exchanges made in preparation for formal patent disputes between brand-name biologic and biosimilar manufacturers. The patent dance does not affect FDA's ability to approve a biosimilar application.\nSome pharmaceutical companies have been criticized for charging high prices and engaging in practices that are perceived by some to exploit the existing legal system governing IP rights on pharmaceutical products. For example, some generic manufacturers have claimed that brand-name drug manufacturers have unreasonably refused to sell them samples of brand-name drugs in order to impede their ability to obtain FDA approval and delay market entry of generic competition. Other commentators have criticized the practice of \"pay-for-delay\" settlements, through which brand-name drug companies settle patent litigation with generic or biosimilar manufacturers by paying them to delay their entry into the market. Still others criticize so-called patent \"evergreening,\" in which pharmaceutical companies are alleged to serially patent minor improvements or ancillary features of their products in order to extend the effective term of patent protection.\nIn recent years, a number of congressional proposals have been introduced that seek to address these and other issues in IP law that are perceived by some to contribute to high prices for pharmaceutical products. These proposed reforms range from relatively modest changes, such as increasing patent transparency, to more sweeping reforms such as pricing controls and government compulsory licensing provisions.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_247"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_248","query":"Under the Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-334; 2018 farm bill), U.S. farm program participants\u2014whether individuals or multiperson legal entities\u2014must meet specific eligibility requirements to receive benefits under certain farm programs. Some requirements are common across most programs, while others are specific to individual programs. In addition, program participants are subject to annual payment limits that vary across different combinations of farm programs. Federal farm support programs and risk management programs, along with their current eligibility requirements and payment limits, are listed in Table 1. Terms for most of these programs are applicable for the 2019-2023 crop years.\nSince 1970, Congress has used various policies to address the issue of who should be eligible for farm payments and how much an individual recipient should be permitted to receive in a single year. In recent years, congressional policy has focused on tracking payments through multiperson entities to individual recipients (referred to as direct attribution), ensuring that payments go to persons or entities actively engaged in farming, capping the amount of payments that a qualifying recipient may receive in any one year, and excluding farmers or farming entities with large average incomes from payment eligibility.\nCurrent eligibility requirements that affect multiple programs include identification of every participating person or legal entity\u2014both U.S. and non-U.S. citizens\u2014the nature and extent of an individual's participation (i.e., actively engaged in farming criteria), including ownership interests in multiperson entities and personal time commitments (whether as labor or management) and means testing (persons with combined farm and nonfarm adjusted gross income in excess of $900,000 are ineligible for most program benefits); and conservation compliance requirements.\nIn general, if foreign persons or legal entities meet a program's eligibility requirements, then they are eligible to participate. One exception is the four permanent disaster assistance programs created under the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79) and the noninsured crop disaster assistance program (NAP) in which nonresident aliens are excluded.\nCurrent law requires direct attribution through four levels of ownership in multiperson legal entities. Current payment limits include a cumulative limit of $125,000 for all covered commodities under the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and Agricultural Revenue Coverage (ARC) support programs, with the exception of peanuts, which has its own $125,000 limit. Only one permanent disaster assistance program\u2014the Livestock Forage Disaster Program (LFP)\u2014is subject to a payment limit ($125,000 per crop year). NAP is also subject to a $125,000 per crop year limit per person for catastrophic coverage.\nSupporters of payment limits contend that large payments facilitate consolidation of farms into larger units, raise the price of land, and put smaller family-sized farming operations and beginning farmers at a disadvantage. In addition, they argue that large payments undermine public support for farm subsidies and are costly. Critics of payment limits counter that all farms need support, especially when market prices decline, and that larger farms should not be penalized for the economies of size and efficiencies they have achieved. Further, critics argue that farm payments help U.S. agriculture compete in global markets and that income testing is at odds with federal farm policies directed toward improving U.S. agriculture and its competitiveness.\nCongress may continue to address these issues, as well as related questions, such as: How does the current policy design of payment limits relate to their distributional impact on crops, regions, and farm size? Is there an optimal aggregation of payment limits across commodities or programs? Do unlimited benefits under the marketing assistance loan program reduce the effectiveness of overall payment limits?","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_248"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_249","query":"This report describes actions taken by the Trump Administration and Congress to provide FY2020 appropriations for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) accounts. The annual CJS appropriations act provides funding for the Department of Commerce, which includes agencies such as the Census Bureau, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST); the Department of Justice (DOJ), which includes agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), the U.S. Marshals, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the U.S. Attorneys; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); the National Science Foundation (NSF); and several related agencies such as the Legal Services Corporation and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.\nThe Administration requests $71.388 billion for CJS for FY2020, which is $1.520 billion (-2.1%) less than the $72.908 billion appropriated for CJS for FY2019. The Administration's request includes $12.214 billion for the Department of Commerce, $30.529 billion for the Department of Justice, $28.092 billion for the science agencies, and $552 million for the related agencies. The Administration's FY2020 budget proposes eliminating several CJS agencies and programs, including the Economic Development Administration, the Community Oriented Policing Services Office, NASA's STEM Engagement Office (formerly the Office of Education), and the Legal Services Corporation. The Administration proposes reducing funding for many accounts in CJS, though there are a few exceptions\u2014the most notable of which is the proposed $2.334 billion increase for the Census Bureau's Periodic Censuses and Programs account. The increased funding is requested to help the Census Bureau conduct the decennial 2020 Census.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_249"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_250","query":"Commemorative coins are produced by the U.S. Mint pursuant to an act of Congress and are often proposed by Members of Congress as part of their representational duties. These coins are legal tender that celebrate and honor American people, places, events, and institutions. Overall, 152 commemorative coins have been authorized since 1892. Since 1982, when Congress reinstituted the commemorative program, 91 commemorative coins have been authorized. Since 1998, only two coins may be authorized for any given year. To date, Congress has authorized commemorative coins to be issued through 2020.\nThe issuance of commemorative coins can be broadly divided into two eras: historical coins and modern coins. Historical commemorative coins were those authorized between 1892 and 1954 and generally celebrated anniversaries, public events, or the construction of new memorials. These coins were sold by the government to the sponsor organization, which then resold the coins to the public at a higher price to earn money to support their mission.\nIn 1939, Congress stopped authorizing new coins because a glut of commemorative coins on the market had caused their value to decline, and the U.S. Treasury became concerned that so many coins might facilitate counterfeiting. These sentiments were echoed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who in 1954 vetoed legislation for a half-dollar honoring the tercentennial of New York City and remarked that \"large quantities [of coins] have remained unsold and have been returned to the mints for melting.\" The historical era concluded with the minting of George Washington Carver and Booker T. Washington half-dollars between 1951 and 1954.\nThe modern commemorative coin era began in 1982, when Congress authorized coins to celebrate the 250th anniversary of George Washington's birth. Between 1982 and 1997, prior to the Commemorative Coin Reform Act (CCRA) of 1996's statutory limitation of two commemorative coins issued per year, 47 commemorative coins were authorized and minted. Between 1998 and 2018, an additional 41 coins were authorized and minted. Three additional coins have been authorized, two in 2019 and one in 2020 (to date).\nCommemorative coin legislation generally has a specific format. Once a coin is authorized, it follows a specific process for design and minting. This process includes consultation and recommendations by the Citizens Coin Advisory Commission (CCAC) and the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts (CFA), pursuant to any statutory instructions, before the Secretary of the Treasury makes the final decision on a coin's design. Following the conclusion of a coin program, designated recipient organizations may receive surcharge payments, once the U.S. Mint has recouped all costs associated with producing the coin.\nShould Congress want to make changes to the commemorative coin process, several individual and institutional options might be available. The individual options include decisions made by Members of Congress as to which people, places, events, or institutions should be celebrated; which groups should receive potential surcharge payments; and any specific design requirements Congress might want to request or require. The institutional options could include House, Senate, or committee rules for the consideration of commemorative coin legislation and whether the statutory maximum of two coins minted per year is too many or too few.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_250"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_251","query":"Essentially all of the outstanding debt of the federal government is subject to a statutory limit, which is set forth as a dollar limitation in 31 U.S.C. 3101(b). From time to time, Congress considers and passes legislation to adjust or suspend this limit.\nAt the beginning of the 116th Congress, the House adopted a standing rule that would provide for legislation suspending the statutory debt limit to be considered as passed by the House, without a separate vote, when the House adopts the budget resolution for a fiscal year. This House rule is similar to a previous one related to the debt limit (commonly referred to as the \"Gephardt rule,\" named after its original sponsor, former Representative Richard Gephardt), which was first adopted in 1979 but was repealed at the beginning of the 112th Congress in 2011.\nThe House may also consider debt limit legislation without resorting to the new debt limit rule (and also did so under the former Gephardt rule) either as freestanding legislation, as part of another measure, or as part of a budget reconciliation bill. The Senate does not have (and has never had) a comparable procedure. If it chooses under the new rule to consider such debt-limit legislation, it would do so under its regular legislative process.\nThis report first explains the current House debt limit rule, particularly in relation to the former Gephardt rule. Then, it describes the legislative history of the former rule and reviews how the former rule operated before it was repealed at the beginning of the 112th Congress.\nUnder the former Gephardt rule, in 11 of the 31 years between 1980 and 2010, the rule was either suspended (1988, 1990-1991, 1994-1997, and 1999-2000) or repealed (2001-2002) by the House. In most years in which the rule was suspended, legislation changing the statutory limit was not necessary\u2014that is, at the time, the existing public debt limit was expected to be sufficient.\nDuring the years in which the rule applied (i.e., in the remaining 20 of the 31 years between 1980 and 2010), the rule led to the automatic engrossment of 20 House joint resolutions increasing the statutory limit on the public debt. In effect, under the rule, in these cases, the House was able to initiate legislation increasing the level of the public debt limit without a separate, direct vote on the legislation. Of these 20 joint resolutions, 15 became law. In 10 of these 15 cases, the Senate passed the measure without change, allowing it to be sent to the President for his signature without any further action by the House. In the remaining 5 cases, the Senate amended the rule-initiated legislation, requiring the House to vote on the amended legislation before it could be sent to the President.\nDuring this period, the House also originated and considered debt limit legislation without resorting to the Gephardt rule either as freestanding legislation, as part of another measure, or as part of a budget reconciliation bill. Of the 47 public debt limit changes enacted into law during the period 1980-2010, 32 were enacted without resorting to the Gephardt rule, each requiring the House to vote on such legislation.\nIn total, between 1980 and 2010, the rule effectively allowed the House to avoid a separate, direct vote on 10 of the 47 measures changing the debt limit that were ultimately enacted into law.\nThis report updates the previous one (dated July 27, 2015) with a description of the changes to the former rule.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_251"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_252","query":"The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that \"[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.\" This provision requires that a federal prosecutor, in order to charge a suspect with a serious federal crime, secure the assent of an independent investigative and deliberative body comprising citizens drawn from the jurisdiction in which the crime would be tried. Federal grand juries serve two primary functions: (1) they aid federal prosecutors in investigating possible crimes by issuing subpoenas for documents, physical evidence, and witness testimony; and (2) they determine whether there is sufficient evidence to charge a criminal suspect with the crime or crimes under investigation.\nTraditionally, the grand jury has conducted its work in secret. Secrecy prevents those under scrutiny from fleeing or importuning the grand jurors, encourages full disclosure by witnesses, and protects the innocent from unwarranted prosecution, among other things. The long-established rule of grand jury secrecy is enshrined in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which provides that government attorneys and the jurors themselves, among others, \"must not disclose a matter occurring before the grand jury.\" Accordingly, as a general matter, persons and entities external to the grand jury process are precluded from obtaining transcripts of grand jury testimony or other documents or information that would reveal what took place in the proceedings, even if the grand jury has concluded its work and even if the information is sought pursuant to otherwise-valid legal processes.\nAt times, the rule of grand jury secrecy has come into tension with Congress's power of inquiry when an arm of the legislative branch has sought protected materials pursuant to its oversight function. For instance, some courts have determined that the information barrier established in Rule 6(e) extends to congressional inquiries, observing that the Rule contains no reservations for congressional access to grand jury materials that would otherwise remain secret. Nevertheless, the rule of grand jury secrecy is subject to a number of exceptions, both codified and judicially crafted, that permit grand jury information to be disclosed in certain circumstances (usually only with prior judicial authorization). Perhaps the most significant of these for congressional purposes are (1) the exception that allows a court to authorize disclosure of grand jury matters \"preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding,\" and (2) the exception, recognized by a few courts, that allows a court to authorize disclosure of grand jury matters in special or exceptional circumstances. In turn, some courts have determined that one or both of these exceptions applies to congressional requests for grand jury materials in the context of impeachment proceedings, though there is authority to the contrary.\nAdditionally, because Rule 6(e) covers only \"matters occurring before the grand jury,\" courts have recognized that documents and information are not independently insulated from disclosure merely because they happen to have been presented to, or considered by, a grand jury. As such, even if Rule 6(e) generally limits congressional access to grand jury information, Congress has a number of tools at its disposal to seek materials connected to a grand jury investigation.\nPrior Congresses have considered legislation that would have expressly permitted a court to authorize disclosure of grand jury matters to congressional committees on a showing of substantial need. However, in response to such proposals, the executive branch has voiced concerns that the legislation would raise due-process and separation-of-powers issues and potentially undermine the proper functioning of federal grand juries. These concerns may have resulted in Congress declining to alter Rule 6(e). As a result, to the extent Rule 6(e) constrains Congress's ability to conduct oversight, legislation seeking to amend the rules governing grand jury secrecy in a way that would give Congress independent access to grand jury materials may raise additional legal and pragmatic issues for the legislative branch to consider.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_252"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_253","query":"The U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) is a federal executive department responsible for the conservation and administration of the public lands and mineral estate of the United States. DOI describes its mission as protecting and managing the nation's natural resources and cultural heritage for the benefit of the American people; providing scientific and scholarly information about those resources and natural hazards; and exercising the nation's trust responsibilities and special commitments to American Indians, Alaska Natives, and island territories under U.S. administration.\nAs part of its responsibilities, DOI oversees and fosters the use of more than 480 million acres of public lands, 700 million acres of subsurface minerals, and 1.7 billion acres of the outer continental shelf. Each year, Congress deliberates legislation that could affect DOI's management of this vast federal estate. As a result, understanding the roles and responsibilities of DOI's various components and offices is valuable when crafting legislation that affects the department's operations and ability to fulfill its mission.\nDOI primarily implements its responsibilities and mission through nine technical bureaus that make up more than 80% of the agency's workforce. These technical bureaus are the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), National Park Service (NPS), Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Each of these bureaus has a unique mission and set of responsibilities, as well as a distinct organizational structure that serves to meet its functional duties. In addition to these technical bureaus, DOI has multiple departmental offices, which provide leadership, coordination, and services to DOI's various bureaus and programs.\nAs of June 2018, DOI employed a staff of 69,563 nationwide across its bureaus and offices. However, total DOI employment figures fluctuate throughout the year, as some bureaus rely on seasonal and part-time staff, increasing staff totals during the summer months. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) reports the average total DOI employment as 65,350 for the four reporting periods from September 2017 to June 2018. The largest bureau within DOI based on number of staff is NPS, which averaged close to 20,000 staff over the same time period\u2014more than twice the size of the second-largest bureau, BLM. The smallest technical bureau by employment is OSMRE, which averaged just over 400 employees. Approximately 10% of all DOI staff are within the District of Columbia core-based statistical area (CBSA), which includes the District of Columbia and selected counties in Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia.\nCongress provides discretionary appropriations for DOI through two annual appropriations bills: the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies bill and the Energy and Water appropriations bill. Enacted discretionary appropriations for FY2018 totaled $14.6 billion. DOI also received $566 million in supplemental emergency appropriations in FY2018, for a total of $15.2 billion in discretionary appropriations for FY2018.\nThe organizational structure of DOI is subject to continual congressional oversight and executive branch examination. In 2017 and 2018, President Trump and then-Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke submitted reorganization plans for the department and its bureaus. These plans put forth several recommendations, including the consolidation and transfer of most functions of the Army Corps of Engineers Civil Works Division to DOI, the merger of the Department of Commerce's National Marine Fisheries Service with FWS, and the creation of 12 \"Unified Regional Boundaries\" across DOI's various bureaus.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_253"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_254","query":"Social Security auxiliary benefits are paid to the spouse, former spouse, survivor, child, or parent of a Social Security-covered worker and are equal to a specified percentage of the worker's basic monthly benefit amount (subject to a maximum family benefit amount). For example, the spouse of a retired worker may receive up to 50% of the retired worker's basic benefit and the widow(er) of a retired worker may receive up to 100% of the retired worker's basic benefit.\nWhen auxiliary benefits were first established, most households consisted of a single earner\u2014usually the husband\u2014and a wife who cared for children and remained out of the paid workforce. As a result, benefits for nonworking spouses were structured to be relatively generous. A woman who was never employed but is married to a man with high Social Security-covered wages may receive a Social Security spousal benefit that is higher than the retirement benefit received by a single woman, or a divorced woman who was married less than 10 years, who worked a full career in a low-wage job.\nIn recent decades, this household structure has changed in part because women have entered the workforce in increasing numbers. The labor force participation rate of women with children under the age of 18 increased from 47% in 1975 to 70.8% in March 2016. As a result, many women now qualify for Social Security benefits based on their own work records. Women are, however, more likely than men to take breaks in employment to care for family members, which can result in fewer years of contributions to Social Security and employer-sponsored pension plans.\nBeneficiaries who qualify for multiple benefits do not receive both benefits in full, however. For example, for a beneficiary eligible for his or her own retired-worker benefits as well as spousal benefits, the spousal benefit is reduced by the amount of the retired-worker benefit. The beneficiary receives a reduced spousal benefit (if not reduced to zero) in addition to his or her retired-worker benefit. This effectively means the beneficiary receives the higher of the two benefit amounts. Because of this, a two-earner household may receive lower total Social Security benefits than a single-earner household with identical total Social Security-covered earnings.\nAnother change since 1939 has been an increase in the number of men and women who remain single or who have divorced. Persons who have never been married, or divorced before 10 years of marriage, do not qualify for Social Security spousal or survivors benefits under current law.\nProposals to modify the Social Security auxiliary benefit structure are often motivated by desire to improve adequacy for certain beneficiaries, or equity between a two-earner household and a one-earner household with similar earning profiles. For example, some proposals address the adequacy of benefits for certain groups of beneficiaries, such as elderly and widowed women. Although Social Security plays an important role in the retirement security of aged women, about 13.9% of widowed women aged 65 or older, 15.8% of divorced elderly women, and 21.5% of never-married elderly women have family incomes below the official poverty line in 2017.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_254"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_255","query":"The consumer data industry\u2014generally referred to as credit reporting agencies or credit bureaus\u2014collects and subsequently provides information to firms about the behavior of consumers when they participate in various financial transactions. Firms use consumer information to screen for the risk that consumers will engage in behaviors that are costly for businesses. For example, lenders rely upon credit reports and scores to determine the likelihood that prospective borrowers will repay their loans. Insured depository institutions (i.e., banks and credit unions) rely on consumer data service providers to determine whether to make available checking accounts or loans to individuals. Some insurance companies use consumer data to determine what insurance products to make available and to set policy premiums. Some payday lenders use data regarding the management of checking accounts and payment of telecommunications and utility bills to determine the likelihood of failure to repay small-dollar cash advances. Merchants rely on the consumer data industry to determine whether to approve payment by check or electronic payment card. Employers may use consumer data information to screen prospective employees to determine the likelihood of fraudulent behavior. In short, numerous firms rely upon consumer data to identify and evaluate potential risks a consumer may pose before entering into a financial relationship with that consumer.\nGreater reliance by firms on consumer data significantly affects\u2014and potentially limits\u2014consumer access to financial products or opportunities. Specifically, negative or derogatory information, such as late payments, loan defaults, and multiple overdrafts, may stay on consumer reports for several years and lead firms to deny a consumer access to credit, a financial product, or a job opportunity. Having a nonexistent, insufficient, or a stale credit history may also prevent credit access.\nAccordingly, various policy issues have been raised about the consumer data industry, most notably including the following:\nHow to address inaccurate or disputed consumer data provided in consumer data reports; How long negative or derogatory information should remain in consumer data reports; How to address differences in billing and collection practices that can adversely affect consumer data reports, an issue of particular concern with medical billing practices; How to ensure that consumers are aware of their rights and how to exercise them in the event of a consumer data dispute; Whether uses of consumer data reports outside of the financial services, such as for employment decisions, adversely affect consumers and should be limited; Whether the use of alternative consumer data or newer versions of credit scores may increase accuracy and credit access; and How to address data protection and security issues in consumer data reporting.\nCongress has shown continuing interest in these and other policy questions surrounding the consumer data industry, particularly in its regulation and whether such regulation currently provides sufficient protection to consumers. In the 116th Congress, legislation has been introduced to address many of these concerns. The Comprehensive Credit Reporting Reform Act of 2019 (CCRRA) and the Protecting Innocent Consumers Affected by a Shutdown Act, both released as drafts by Chairwoman Maxine Waters, would amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and create additional laws to address these concerns. Other relevant bills introduced in the 116th Congress address topics such as credit reporting and cybersecurity (H.R. 331 and H.R. 1282); credit information used for auto insurance (H.R. 1756); and federal employees affected by the shutdown (H.R. 935, H.R. 799, H.R. 1286, and S. 535).","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_255"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_256","query":"Congress enacted the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA; P.L. 92-583, 16 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a71451-1466) in 1972 and has amended the act 11 times, most recently in 2009. CZMA sets up a national framework for states and territories to consider and manage coastal resources. If a state or territory chooses to develop a coastal zone management program and the program is approved, the state or territory (1) becomes eligible for several federal grants and (2) can perform reviews of federal agency actions in coastal areas (known as federal consistency determination reviews).\nEach level of government plays a role in coastal management under CZMA. At the federal level, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA's) Office for Coastal Management (OCM) in the Department of Commerce implements CZMA's national policies and provisions. OCM administers CZMA under several national programs; the National Coastal Zone Management Program (NCZMP) is the focus of this report. To participate in the NCZMP, states and territories (hereinafter referred to as states) must adhere to guidelines set out in CZMA and related regulations. States determine the details of their coastal management programs (CMPs), including the boundaries of their coastal zones, issues of most interest to the state, and policies to address these issues, among other factors. Local governments then implement the approved CMPs, often through land use regulations.\nThe Secretary of Commerce must approve state CMPs. Once the Secretary approves a state's CMP, the state is eligible to receive the NCZMP's benefits and is referred to as a participant in the program (16 U.S.C. \u00a71455). Participation in the NCZMP provides several advantages to participants, including eligibility for federal grant programs and the right to review federal actions for consistency with state coastal policies. Thirty-five states and territories (including states surrounding the Great Lakes, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands) are eligible to participate. Although all 35 eligible states have at some point chosen to participate, 34 are currently part of the NCZMP.\nSince 1972, NOAA has allocated over $2 billion in coastal zone management-related grants to eligible coastal states. States have received amounts ranging from $13 million to over $106 million in grant funding, depending on factors such as how long the state has been a part of the NCZMP, the state's size and population, and extent of the state's applications to grant programs.\nCZMA consistency provisions (Section 307) require federal actions that have reasonably foreseeable effects on coastal uses or resources to be consistent with the enforceable policies of a participant's approved CMP. These actions may occur in the state's approved coastal zone or in federal or out-of-state waters (which may cause interstate coastal effects). Federal agencies or applicants proposing to perform these federal actions must submit a consistency determination to the potentially affected participant, certifying that the actions are consistent with state coastal policies and providing participants the opportunity to review their determinations (16 U.S.C. \u00a71456).\nThe 116th Congress may consider changes to CZMA. These changes may address issues such as growing population and infrastructure needs and changing environmental conditions along the coast, questions about the effectiveness of CZMA implementation, and expired authorization of appropriations for CZMA grant programs. Some of these concerns were addressed in proposed legislation in the 115th Congress, such as legislation to expand grant programs to cover more topics and affected groups, and may be addressed in the 116th Congress.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_256"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_257","query":"Suspension of the rules is the most commonly used procedure to call up measures on the floor of the House of Representatives. As the name suggests, the procedure allows the House to suspend its standing and statutory rules in order to consider broadly supported legislation in an expedited manner. More specifically, the House temporarily sets aside its rules that govern the raising and consideration of measures and assumes a new set of constraints particular to the suspension procedure.\nThe suspension of the rules procedure has several parliamentary advantages: (1) it allows nonprivileged measures to be raised on the House floor without the need for a special rule, (2) it enables the consideration of measures that would otherwise be subject to a point of order, and (3) it streamlines floor action by limiting debate and prohibiting floor amendments. Given these features, as well as the required two-thirds supermajority vote for passage, suspension motions are generally used to process less controversial legislation.\nIn the 114th Congress (2015-2016), measures considered under suspension made up 62% of the bills and resolutions that received floor action in the House (743 out of 1,200 measures). The majority of suspension measures were House bills (83%), followed by Senate bills (11%) and House resolutions (4%). The measures covered a variety of policy areas but most often addressed government operations, such as the designation of federal facilities or amending administrative policies.\nMost measures that are considered in the House under the suspension procedure are sponsored by a House or Senate majority party member. However, suspension is the most common House procedure used to consider minority-party-sponsored legislation regardless of whether the legislation originated in the House or Senate. In 2015 and 2016, minority-party members sponsored 31% of suspension measures, compared to 9% of legislation subject to different procedures, including privileged business (17 measures), unanimous consent (21 measures), and under the terms of a special rule (one Senate bill).\nMost suspension measures are referred to at least one House committee before their consideration on the floor. The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (now called the Committee on Oversight and Reform) was the committee of primary jurisdiction for the plurality of suspension measures considered in the 114th Congress. Additional committees\u2014such as Energy and Commerce, Homeland Security, Natural Resources, Foreign Affairs, and Veterans' Affairs\u2014also served as the primary committee for a large number of suspension measures.\nSuspension motions are debatable for up to 40 minutes. In most cases, only a fraction of that debate time is actually used. In the 114th Congress, the average amount of time spent considering a motion to suspend the rules was 13 minutes and 10 seconds.\nThe House adopted nearly every suspension motion considered in 2015 and 2016. Approval by the House, however, did not guarantee final approval in the 114th Congress. The Senate passed or agreed to 40% of the bills, joint resolutions, and concurrent resolutions initially considered in the House under suspension of the rules, and 276 measures were signed into law.\nThis report briefly describes the suspension of the rules procedure, which is defined in House Rule XV, and provides an analysis of measures considered under this procedure during the 114th Congress. Figures and one table display statistics on the use of the procedure, including the prevalence and form of suspension measures, sponsorship of measures by party, committee consideration, length of debate, voting, resolution of differences between the chambers, and the final status of legislation. In addition, an Appendix illustrates trends in the use of the suspension procedure from the 110th to the 114th Congress (2007-2016).","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_257"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_258","query":"U.S. airborne electronic warfare (EW) programs involve developing and procuring EW aircraft and EW systems that are mounted on U.S. aircraft. The President's FY2020 budget request for the Department of Defense (DOD) proposes funding for a number of airborne EW programs.\nThe Role of Airborne EW in Modern Warfare\nEW is a component of modern warfare, particularly in response to threats posed by potential adversaries such as Russia or China. EW refers to operations that use the electromagnetic spectrum (i.e., the \"airwaves\") to detect, listen to, jam, and deceive (or \"spoof\") enemy radars, radio communication systems, data links, and other electronic systems. EW also refers to operations that defend against enemy attempts to do the same.\nThe shift in the international security environment from the post-Cold War era to an era of renewed great power competition has led to an increased focus on EW in U.S. defense planning and programming, particularly aspects of EW related to high-end warfare.\nU.S. Airborne Electronic Attack Capabilities\nAirborne EW capabilities are a component of U.S. military airpower. Although dedicated U.S. EW aircraft are relatively few in number compared with U.S. fighters, strike fighters, and attack aircraft, they play a role in helping to ensure the combat survivability and effectiveness of other aircraft and friendly forces on the ground.\nDOD's three primary manned EW electronic attack aircraft are the Navy EA-18G Growler, the Air Force EC-130H Compass Call, and the Air Force EC-37B Compass Call Re-Host. A fourth manned aircraft\u2014the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter\u2014has extensive, integrated EW capabilities. DOD's primary airborne electronic attack payloads include the AN\/ALQ-99 electronic attack suite, the Next Generation Jammer, and the Miniature Air Launched Decoy-Jammer.\nEW Oversight Issues for Congress\nCongress has continually shown interest in EW, and the decisions it makes regarding EW could affect future U.S. military capabilities and funding requirements. In particular, EW programs pose several potential oversight issues for Congress\nWhether DOD is prioritizing appropriately airborne EW programs in its planning and budgeting relative to other U.S. military EW programs (such as those for U.S. ground forces or Navy surface ships) and to other DOD non-EW priorities. Whether DOD's proposed mix of airborne EW capabilities and investments is appropriate. The evolution of technology and how new technologies can be employed for EW operations. The Air Force's planned rate for procuring EC-37Bs and replacing EC-130Hs.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_258"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_259","query":"U.S. relations with the Kingdom of Cambodia have become increasingly strained in recent years in light of Prime Minister Hun Sen's suppression of the political opposition and his growing embrace of the People's Republic of China (PRC). During the previous decade, U.S. engagement with the Kingdom slowly strengthened as Western countries continued to pressure Hun Sen to abide by democratic norms and institutions and as the U.S. government attempted to prevent Cambodia from falling too heavily under China's influence. Following strong performances by the opposition in the 2013 and 2017 elections, the Cambodian government banned the largest opposition party, the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), in 2017. As a result, the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) ran virtually unopposed in the 2018 National Assembly election. The Trump Administration and Congress have imposed sanctions in order to pressure Hun Sen into restoring democratic rights and dropping criminal charges against opposition leaders.\nWhile the U.S. government has criticized Hun Sen's backtracking on democracy, it also has sought to remain engaged with Cambodia. During the past decade, U.S. interests and foreign assistance efforts in Cambodia have included strengthening democratic institutions and norms, promoting the rule of law, increasing bilateral trade and investment, supporting economic growth, reducing poverty, and improving public health. The U.S. government has supported demining and related activities in Cambodia, which is among the countries most heavily affected by unexploded ordnance (UXO). Military engagement has included U.S. naval port visits, U.S. military assistance and training, and joint exercises.\nThe United States and other countries have provided funding for the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), also known as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, established through a 2003 agreement between the government of Cambodia and the United Nations. Since the court commenced proceedings in 2006, it has convicted and sentenced three former Khmer Rouge leaders for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed during the period of Khmer Rouge rule (1975-1978). Following the conclusion of two trials in November 2018, the Cambodian government announced that the ECCC's work was concluded, despite calls by some Cambodians and international human rights groups to prosecute additional Khmer Rouge officials.\nIn recent years, PRC assistance to Cambodia, by some measures, has begun to match total annual foreign aid flows from traditional major providers of official development assistance to Cambodia. China's economic support has given Hun Sen greater political room to maneuver, according to some analysts. In return, Cambodia has appeared increasingly willing to accommodate or support Beijing's positions on various regional issues, including territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Japan is the largest provider of Official Development Assistance and second-largest source of foreign direct investment in Cambodia.\nOne of the poorest countries in Asia, Cambodia has performed well on some socioeconomic indicators since the United Nations brokered a peace settlement in 1991 and restored a constitutional monarchy in 1993. The Kingdom's economy has achieved an average annual growth rate of 7.7% since 1995, driven by growth in the agricultural, construction, garment, real estate, and tourism sectors. China, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asian countries are the main sources of foreign investment. The United States is the single largest overseas market for Cambodian merchandise exports, which consist mostly of garments and footwear.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_259"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_260","query":"The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is a federal agency established by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA; P.L. 93-406). It was created to protect the pensions of participants and beneficiaries covered by private sector defined benefit (DB) plans. These pension plans provide a specified monthly benefit at retirement, usually either a percentage of salary or a flat dollar amount multiplied by years of service. Defined contribution (DC) plans, such as 401(k) plans, are not insured. PBGC is chaired by the Secretary of Labor, with the Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce serving as board members.\nPBGC runs two distinct insurance programs: one for single-employer pensions and a second for multiemployer plans. Single-employer pension plans are sponsored by one employer and cover eligible workers employed by the plan sponsor. Multiemployer plans are collectively bargained plans to which more than one company makes contributions. PBGC maintains separate reserve funds for each program.\nA firm must be in financial distress to end an underfunded single-employer plan and for PBGC to become the trustee of the plan. Multiemployer plans do not terminate. When a multiemployer plan becomes insolvent and is not able to pay promised benefits, PBGC provides financial assistance to the plan in the form of loans, although PBGC does not expect the loans to be repaid.\nIn FY2018, PBGC insured about 25,000 DB pension plans covering approximately 37 million people. PBGC became the trustee of 58 newly terminated single-employer pension plans and began providing financial assistance to an additional 6 multiemployer pension plans. PBGC paid benefits to 861,371 participants in 4,919 single-employer pension plans and 62,300 participants in 78 multiemployer plans.\nThere is a statutory maximum benefit that PBGC can pay. Participants receive the lower of their benefit as calculated under the plan or the statutory maximum benefit. If a participant's benefit is higher than the statutory maximum benefit, the participant's benefit is reduced. Participants in single-employer plans that terminate in 2019 and are trusteed by PBGC may receive up to $67,295 per year if they begin taking their pension at the age of 65. The single-employer maximum benefit is adjusted depending on the age at which the participant begins taking the benefit and on the form of the benefit (e.g., the maximum benefit is lower for a joint-and-survivor annuity). The maximum benefit for participants in multiemployer plans that receive financial assistance depends on the number of years of service in the plan. For example, a participant with 30 years of service may receive up to $12,870 per year. Currently, most workers in single-employer plans taken over by PBGC and multiemployer plans that receive financial assistance from PBGC receive the full pension benefit that they earned. However, among participants in multiemployer plans that were terminated and likely to need financial assistance in the future, 49% have a benefit below the PBGC maximum guarantee and 51% have a benefit larger than the PBGC maximum guarantee.\nAt the end of FY2018, PBGC had a total deficit of $51.4 billion, which consisted of a $2.4 billion surplus from the single-employer program and a $53.9 billion deficit from the multiemployer program. PBGC's single-employer program has been on the Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) list of high-risk government programs since 2003. PBGC's multiemployer program was added in 2009. PBGC projects the financial position of the single-employer program to improve slightly, but the financial position of the multiemployer program is expected to worsen considerably over the next 10 years.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_260"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_261","query":"Medicare is a federal insurance program that pays for covered health care services of most individuals aged 65 and older and certain disabled persons. In calendar year 2019, the program is expected to cover about 61 million persons (52 million aged and 9 million disabled) at a total cost of $798 billion. Most individuals (or their spouses) aged 65 and older who have worked in covered employment and paid Medicare payroll taxes for 40 quarters receive premium-free Medicare Part A (Hospital Insurance). Those entitled to Medicare Part A (regardless of whether they are eligible for premium-free Part A) have the option of enrolling in Part B, which covers such things as physician and outpatient services and medical equipment.\nBeneficiaries have a seven-month initial enrollment period, and those who enroll in Part B after this initial enrollment period and\/or reenroll after a termination of coverage may be subject to a late-enrollment penalty. This penalty is equal to a 10% surcharge for each 12 months of delay in enrollment and\/or reenrollment. Under certain conditions, some beneficiaries are exempt from the late-enrollment penalty; these exempt beneficiaries include working individuals (and their spouses) with group coverage through their current employment, some international volunteers, and those granted \"equitable relief.\"\nWhereas Part A is financed primarily by payroll taxes paid by current workers, Part B is financed through a combination of beneficiary premiums and federal general revenues. The standard Part B premiums are set to cover 25% of projected average per capita Part B program costs for the aged, with federal general revenues accounting for the remaining amount. In general, if projected Part B costs increase or decrease, the premium rises or falls proportionately. However, some Part B enrollees are protected by a provision in the Social Security Act (the hold-harmless provision) that prevents their Medicare Part B premiums from increasing more than the annual increase in their Social Security benefit payments. This protection does not apply to four main groups of beneficiaries: low-income beneficiaries whose Part B premiums are paid by the Medicaid program; high-income beneficiaries who are subject to income-related Part B premiums; those whose Medicare premiums are not deducted from Social Security benefits; and new Medicare and Social Security enrollees.\nMost Part B participants must pay monthly premiums, which do not vary with a beneficiary's age, health status, or place of residence. However, since 2007, higher-income enrollees pay higher premiums to cover a higher percentage of Part B costs. Additionally, certain low-income beneficiaries may qualify for Medicare cost-sharing and\/or premium assistance from Medicaid through a Medicare Savings Program. The premiums of those receiving benefits through Social Security are deducted from their monthly payments.\nEach year, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) determines the Medicare Part B premiums for the following year. The standard monthly Part B premium for 2019 is $135.50. However, in 2019, the hold-harmless provision applies to about 3.5% of Part B enrollees, and these individuals pay lower premiums. (The premiums of those held harmless vary depending on the dollar amount of the increase in their Social Security benefits.) Higher-income beneficiaries, currently defined as individuals with incomes over $85,000 per year or couples with incomes over $170,000 per year, pay $189.60, $270.90, $352.20, $433.40, or $460.50 per month, depending on their income levels.\nStarting in 2018, the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA; P.L. 114-10) reduced the income thresholds in the highest two income tiers so that more enrollees will pay higher premiums. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 18; P.L. 115-123) added an additional income tier beginning in 2019 for individuals with annual incomes of $500,000 or more or couples filing jointly with incomes of $750,000 or more.\nCurrent issues related to the Part B premium that may come before Congress include the amount of the premium and its rate of increase (and the potential net impact on Social Security benefits), the impact of the hold-harmless provision on those not held harmless, modifications to the late-enrollment penalty, and possible increases in Medicare premiums as a means to reduce federal spending and deficits.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_261"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_262","query":"The Capitol Rotunda and the Capitol Grounds have been used as the setting for a variety of events, ranging from memorial ceremonies and the reception of foreign dignitaries to the presentation of awards and the hosting of public competitions. This report identifies and categorizes uses of the Capitol Rotunda and Capitol Grounds authorized by concurrent resolutions since the 101st Congress.\nIn most cases, use of the Capitol Rotunda requires a concurrent resolution agreed to by both the House and Senate. A concurrent resolution for the use of the Rotunda typically identifies the event and date for which use is authorized. Often, the resolution also directs physical preparations to be carried out under the supervision of the Architect of the Capitol.\nNinety-nine concurrent resolutions were agreed to by the House and the Senate authorizing the use of the Rotunda between the 101st and the 115th Congresses. These resolutions can be divided into seven categories: (1) commemoration ceremonies; (2) Congressional Gold Medal ceremonies; (3) artwork unveilings; (4) presidential inauguration activities; (5) receptions or ceremonies honoring living people; (6) persons lying in state or honor; and (7) prayer vigils.\nUse of the Capitol Grounds can be authorized either by the passage of a concurrent resolution or through an application process with the Capitol Police. A concurrent resolution is typically needed for events longer than 24 hours in duration, for events that require vehicles on the Capitol Grounds for setup, for events requiring electronics on the Lower West Terrace of the Capitol, and for events where a large number of Members will be in attendance. The Capitol Police's special events office handles permits and approval for all other events.\nOne hundred twelve concurrent resolutions were agreed to by the House and the Senate authorizing the use of the Capitol Grounds between the 101st and the 115th Congresses. These resolutions can be divided into four categories: (1) events sponsored by nonfederal-government groups; (2) memorial services; (3) events sponsored by the federal government; and (4) award and dedication ceremonies.\nUpon the completion and opening of the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) during the 110th Congress, Emancipation Hall of the CVC became available for use in the same manner as the Rotunda and Capitol Grounds. Use of Emancipation Hall requires the passage of a resolution agreed to by both houses of Congress authorizing its use. These resolutions can be divided into four categories: (1) commemoration ceremonies, (2) congressional gold medal ceremonies, (3) artwork unveilings, and (4) presidential inauguration activities. As of the date of this report, 43 concurrent resolutions authorizing the use of Emancipation Hall have been agreed to.\nThis report will be updated at the end of each session of Congress.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_262"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_263","query":"Statuary Hall has been used as the setting for a variety of events, including memorial ceremonies and receptions for new Members of Congress, award presentations, and as media space after presidential addresses. This report identifies and categorizes uses of Statuary Hall since 2005.\nUse of Statuary Hall is at the discretion of the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Under House Rule I, clause 3, the Speaker has the authority to assign unappropriated rooms on the House of Representatives side of the Capitol, including Statuary Hall. Use of Statuary Hall could also be authorized by House resolution, but no events since 2005 have been held in Statuary Hall on such authority.\nSince 2005, 170 events have been held in Statuary Hall. Events held in Statuary Hall can be divided into four categories: (1) receptions and dinners, (2) ceremonies, (3) media events, and (4) memorial services. The report provides a brief explanation of each category and examples of activities in each category.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_263"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_264","query":"Guatemala, the most populous Central American country, with a population of 16.3 million, has been consolidating its transition to democracy since the 1980s. Guatemala has a long history of internal conflict, including a 36-year civil war (1960-1996) during which the Guatemalan military held power and over 200,000 people were killed or disappeared. A democratic constitution was adopted in 1985, and a democratically elected government was inaugurated in 1986.\nPresident Jimmy Morales is being investigated for corruption and has survived three efforts to remove his immunity from prosecution. Morales took office in January 2016, having campaigned on an anticorruption platform. The previous president and vice president had resigned and been arrested after being implicated in a large-scale corruption scandal.\nIn what many observers see as a step forward in Guatemala's democratic development, the Public Ministry's corruption and human rights abuse investigations in recent years have led to the arrest and trial of high-level government, judicial, and military officials. The Public Ministry is responsible for public prosecution and law enforcement, and works in conjunction with the United Nations-backed International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) to strengthen rule of law in Guatemala. As their anticorruption efforts prove effective, the circle of those feeling threatened by investigations broadens, and attacks against CICIG and the judicial system it supports broaden and intensify as well.\nSince Morales and some of his inner circle became the targets of investigations, he has ended CICIG's mandate, tried to terminate it early, and fired some of his more reformist officials. The Guatemalan Congress is moving legislation forward that would give amnesty to perpetrators of crimes against humanity, free some high-profile prisoners held for corruption, and limit the work of nongovernment organizations. Observers within Guatemala and abroad worry that Morales and the Congress are trying to protect themselves and others from corruption and other charges, and threatening the rule of law in doing so.\nGuatemala continues to face many other challenges, including insecurity, high rates of violence, and increasing rates of poverty and malnourishment. Guatemala remains a major transit country for cocaine and heroin trafficked from South America to the United States. Although Guatemala recorded record drug seizures in 2017, the lack of law enforcement and the collusion between corrupt officials and organized crime in many areas enable trafficking of illicit drugs, precursor chemicals, weapons, people, and other contraband. During Morales's first year, his administration improved tax collection, and the interior ministry reported a 5% drop in homicide rates. Morales has since fired many of the officials responsible for those advances and other reforms.\nGuatemala has the largest economy in Central America and in recent decades has had relatively stable economic growth. Despite that economic growth, Guatemala's economic inequality and poverty have increased, especially among the rural indigenous population. The Economist Intelligence Unit projects that the country's economic growth rate will likely peak in 2018-2019 at 3.2%, followed by a decrease until 2022. The World Bank calls for rapid economic growth coupled with increased public investment and pro-poor policies to improve social conditions.\nTraditionally, the United States and Guatemala have had close relations, with friction at times over human rights and civil\/military issues. Guatemala and the United States have significant trade and are part of the U.S.-Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). Top priorities for U.S. bilateral assistance to Guatemala include improving security, governance, and justice for citizens; improving economic growth and food security; providing access to health services; promoting better educational outcomes; and providing opportunities for out-of-school youth to reduce their desire to migrate. The U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America is meant to spur development and reduce illegal emigration to the United States. The Trump Administration has proposed substantially cutting funds for Guatemala, and eliminating traditional food aid and the Inter-American Foundation in its FY2018-FY2020 budget requests. Congress rejected much of those cuts in the reports to and language in the Consolidated Appropriations Acts of 2018 (P.L. 115-141), and 2019 (P.L. 116-6). Tensions between Guatemala and much of the international community have arisen over Guatemalan efforts to oust CICIG and to grant amnesty for human rights violations. The Trump Administration suspended military aid to Guatemala in March 2019 over its misuse of armored vehicles provided by the Department of Defense to combat drug trafficking.\nBills introduced in the 116th Congress regarding Guatemala address immigration, order security, corruption and other governance issues, and include H.Res. 18, H.R. 1630, and S. 716.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_264"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_265","query":"The Antideficiency Act (31 U.S.C. 1341-1342, 1511-1519) generally bars the obligation of funds in the absence of appropriations. Exceptions are made under the act, including for activities involving \"the safety of human life or the protection of property.\" The interval during the fiscal year when appropriations for a particular project or activity are not enacted into law, either in the form of a regular appropriations act or a continuing resolution (CR), is referred to as a funding gap or funding lapse. Although funding gaps may occur at the start of the fiscal year, they may also occur any time a CR expires and another CR (or the regular appropriations bill) is not enacted immediately thereafter. Multiple funding gaps may occur within a fiscal year.\nWhen a funding gap occurs, federal agencies are generally required to begin a shutdown of the affected projects and activities, which includes the prompt furlough of non-excepted personnel. The general practice of the federal government after the shutdown has ended has been to retroactively pay furloughed employees for the time they missed, as well as employees who were required to come to work.\nAlthough a shutdown may be the result of a funding gap, the two events should be distinguished. This is because a funding gap may result in a total shutdown of all affected projects or activities in some instances but not others. For example, when funding gaps are of a short duration, agencies may not have enough time to complete a shutdown of affected projects and activities before funding is restored. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget has previously indicated that a shutdown of agency operations within the first day of the funding gap may be postponed if a resolution appears to be imminent.\nSince FY1977, 20 funding gaps occurred, ranging in duration from 1 day to 34 full days. These funding gaps are listed in Table 1. About half of these funding gaps were brief (i.e., three days or less in duration). Notably, many of the funding gaps do not appear to have resulted in a \"shutdown.\" Prior to the issuance of the opinions in 1980 and early 1981 by then-Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti, while agencies tended to curtail some operations in response to a funding gap, they often \"continued to operate during periods of expired funding.\" In addition, some of the funding gaps after the Civiletti opinions did not result in a completion of shutdown operations due to both the funding gap's short duration and an expectation that appropriations would soon be enacted. Some of the funding gaps during this period, however, did have a broader impact on affected government operations, even if only for a matter of hours.\nTwo funding gaps occurred in FY1996, amounting to 5 days and 21 days. The chronology of regular and continuing appropriations enacted during FY1996 is illustrated in Figure 1.\nAt the beginning of FY2014 (October 1, 2013), none of the regular appropriations bills had been enacted, so a government-wide funding gap occurred. It concluded on October 17, 2013, after lasting 16 full days.\nDuring FY2018, there was a funding gap when a CR covering all of the regular appropriations bills expired on January 19, 2018. It concluded on January 22, 2018, after lasting two full days.\nThe most recent funding gap occurred during FY2019, when a CR covering federal agencies and activities funded in 7 of the 12 regular appropriations bills expired on December 21, 2018. It concluded on January 25, 2019, after lasting 34 full days.\nFor a general discussion of federal government shutdowns, see CRS Report RL34680, Shutdown of the Federal Government: Causes, Processes, and Effects, coordinated by Clinton T. Brass.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_265"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_266","query":"Most major cybersecurity legislative provisions were enacted prior to 2002, despite many recommendations having been made over the past decade. More recently, in the 115th and 116th Congresses, cybersecurity legislation has received either committee or floor action or final passage, and both chambers have held multiple hearings.\nIn the 116th Congress, a number of House and Senate bills have received consideration, and hearings have been held by committees in each chamber.\nIn the 115th Congress, 31 bills received some type of action (committee consideration or passage by one or both chambers). Five bills became public law. The House held 54 hearings on cybersecurity issues and the Senate held 40 hearings.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_266"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_267","query":"This report is designed to assist Members of Congress and their staff as they address the needs of their states, communities, and constituents after a disaster. It includes a summary of federal programs that provide federal disaster assistance to individual survivors, states, territories, local governments, and nongovernmental entities following a natural or man-made disaster. A number of federal agencies provide financial assistance through grants, loans, and loan guarantees to assist in the provision of critical services, such as temporary housing, counseling, and infrastructure repair.\nThe programs summarized in this report fall into two broad categories. First, there are programs specifically authorized for use during situations occurring because of a disaster. Most of these programs are administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Second are general assistance programs that in some instances may be used either in disaster situations or to meet other needs unrelated to a disaster. Many federal agencies, including the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Housing and Urban Development (HUD), administer programs that may be included in the second category.\nThe programs in the report are primarily organized by recipient: individuals, state and local governments, nongovernmental entities, or businesses. These programs address a variety of short-term needs, such as food and shelter, and long-term needs, such as the repair of public utilities and public infrastructure.\nThe report also includes a list of Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports on disaster assistance as well as relevant federal agency websites that provide information on disaster responses, updates on recovery efforts, and resources on federal assistance programs.\nThis report will be updated as significant legislative or administrative changes occur.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_267"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_268","query":"Historically, the United States' leadership of the global trading system has ensured the United States a seat at the table to shape the international trade agenda in ways that both advance and defend U.S. interests. The evolution of U.S. leadership and the global trade agenda remain of interest to Congress, which holds constitutional authority over foreign commerce and establishes trade negotiating objectives and principles through legislation. Congress has recognized the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the \"foundation of the global trading system\" within trade promotion authority (TPA) and plays a direct legislative and oversight role over WTO agreements. The statutory basis for U.S. WTO membership is the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (P.L. 103-465), and U.S. priorities and objectives for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)\/WTO have been reflected in various TPA legislation since 1974. Congress also has oversight of the U.S. Trade Representative and other agencies that participate in WTO meetings and enforce WTO commitments.\nThe WTO is a 164-member international organization that was created to oversee and administer multilateral trade rules, serve as a forum for trade liberalization negotiations, and resolve trade disputes. The United States was a major force behind the establishment of the WTO in 1995, and the rules and agreements resulting from multilateral trade negotiations. The WTO encompassed and succeeded the GATT, established in 1947 among the United States and 22 other countries. Through the GATT and WTO, the United States, with other countries, sought to establish a more open, rules-based trading system in the postwar era, with the goal of fostering international economic cooperation and raising economic prosperity worldwide. Today, 98% of global trade is among WTO members.\nThe WTO is a consensus and member-driven organization. Its core principles include nondiscrimination (most favored nation treatment and national treatment), freer trade, fair competition, transparency, and encouraging development. These are enshrined in a series of WTO trade agreements covering goods, agriculture, services, intellectual property rights, and trade facilitation, among other issues. Some countries, including China, have been motivated to join the WTO not just to expand access to foreign markets but to spur domestic economic reforms, help transition to market economies, and promote the rule of law.\nThe WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) provides an enforceable means for members to resolve disputes over WTO commitments and obligations. The WTO has processed more than 500 disputes, and the United States has been an active user of the dispute settlement system. Supporters of the multilateral trading system consider the dispute settlement mechanism an important success of the system. At the same time, some members, including the United States, contend it has procedural shortcomings and has exceeded its mandate in deciding cases.\nMany observers are concerned that the effectiveness of the WTO has diminished since the collapse of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, which began in 2001, and believe the WTO needs to adopt reforms to continue its role as the foundation of the global trading system. To date, WTO members have been unable to reach consensus for a new comprehensive multilateral agreement on trade liberalization and rules. While global supply chains and technology have transformed international trade and investment, global trade rules have not kept up with the pace of change. Many countries have turned to negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs) outside the WTO as well as plurilateral agreements involving subsets of WTO members rather than all members.\nAt the latest WTO Ministerial conference in December 2017, no major deliverables were announced. Several members committed to make progress on ongoing talks, such as fisheries subsidies and e-commerce, while other areas remain stalled. While many were disappointed by the limited progress, in the U.S. view, the outcome signaled that \"the impasse at the WTO was broken,\" paving the way for groups of like-minded countries to pursue new work in other key areas.\nCertain WTO members have begun to explore aspects of reform and future negotiations. Potential reforms concern the administration of the organization, its procedures and practices, and attempts to address the inability of WTO members to conclude new agreements. Proposed DS reforms also attempt to improve the working of the dispute settlement system, particularly the Appellate Body\u2014the seven-member body that reviews appeals by WTO members of a panel's findings in a dispute case.\nSome U.S. frustrations with the WTO are not new and many are shared by other trading partners, such as the European Union. At the same time, the Administration's overall approach has spurred new questions regarding the future of U.S. leadership and U.S. priorities for improving the multilateral trading system. Concerns have emphasized that the Administration's recent actions to unilaterally raise tariffs under U.S. trade laws and to possibly impede the functioning of the dispute settlement system might undermine the credibility of the WTO system. A growing question of some observers is whether the WTO would flounder for lack of U.S. leadership, or whether other WTO members like the EU and China taking on larger roles would continue to make it a meaningful actor in the global trade environment.\nThe growing debate over the role and future direction of the WTO may be of interest to Congress. Important issues it may address include how current and future WTO agreements affect the U.S. economy, the value of U.S. membership and leadership in the WTO, whether new U.S. negotiating objectives or oversight hearings are needed to address prospects for new WTO reforms and rulemaking, and the relevant authorities and impact of potential U.S. withdrawal from the WTO on U.S. economic and foreign policy interests.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_268"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_269","query":"The daily order of business on the floor of the House of Representatives is governed by standing rules that make certain matters and actions privileged for consideration. On a day-to-day basis, however, the House can also decide to grant individual bills privileged access to the floor, using one of several parliamentary mechanisms.\nThe standing rules of the House include several different parliamentary mechanisms that the body may use to act on bills and resolutions. Which of these will be employed in a given instance usually depends on the extent to which Members want to debate and amend the legislation. In general, all of the procedures of the House permit a majority of Members to work their will without excessive delay.\nThe House considers most legislation by motions to suspend the rules, with limited debate and no floor amendments, with the support of at least two-thirds of the Members voting. Occasionally, the House will choose to consider a measure on the floor by the unanimous consent of Members. The Rules Committee is instrumental in recommending procedures for considering major bills and may propose restrictions on the floor amendments that Members can offer or bar them altogether. Many major bills are first considered in Committee of the Whole before being passed by a simple majority vote of the House. The Committee of the Whole is governed by more flexible procedures than the basic rules of the House, under which a majority can vote to pass a bill after only one hour of debate and with no floor amendments.\nAlthough a quorum is supposed to be present on the floor when the House is conducting business, the House assumes a quorum is present unless a quorum call or electronically recorded vote demonstrates that it is not. However, the standing rules preclude quorum calls at most times other than when the House is voting. Questions are first decided by voice vote, although any Member may then demand a division vote. Before the final result of a voice or division vote is announced, Members can secure an electronically recorded vote instead if enough Members desire it or if a quorum is not present in the House.\nThe constitutional requirements for making law mean that each chamber must pass the same measure with the identical text before transmitting it to the President for his consideration. When the second chamber of Congress amends a measure sent to it by the first chamber, the two chambers must resolve legislative differences to meet this requirement. This can be accomplished by shuttling the bill back and forth between the House and Senate, with each chamber proposing amendments to the position of the other, or by establishing a conference committee to try to negotiate a compromise version of the legislation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_269"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_270","query":"The Office of the National Ombudsman was created in 1996 as part of P.L. 104-121, the Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996 (Title II, the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 [SBREFA]). Housed within the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA), the office's primary purpose is to provide small businesses, small government entities (those serving populations of less than 50,000), and small nonprofit organizations that believe they have experienced unfair or excessive regulatory compliance or enforcement actions (such as repetitive audits or investigations, excessive fines, and retaliation by federal agencies) a means to comment about such actions.\nThe Office of the National Ombudsman is an impartial liaison that reports small business regulatory fairness matters to the appropriate federal agency for review and works across government to address those concerns and reduce regulatory burdens on small businesses.\nSBREFA also created 10 Small Business Regulatory Fairness Boards, one in each of the SBA's 10 regions, to advise the National Ombudsman on matters related to federal regulatory enforcement activities affecting small businesses.\nSpecifically, the National Ombudsman\nworks with each federal agency with regulatory authority over small businesses to ensure that small businesses are provided a means to comment on the federal agency's regulatory compliance and enforcement activities; receives comments from small businesses regarding actions by federal agency employees conducting small business regulatory compliance or enforcement activities; refers comments to the affected federal agency's inspector general in appropriate circumstances while maintaining the confidentiality of the person or small business making these comments; issues an annual report to Congress and affected federal agencies evaluating the agency's compliance and enforcement activities, including a rating of their responsiveness to small businesses; provides the affected federal agency with an opportunity to comment on the annual report prior to publication and includes in the report a section in which the affected federal agency may comment on issues that are not addressed by the National Ombudsman in revisions to the draft; and coordinates and reports annually on the Small Business Regulatory Fairness Boards' activities, findings, and recommendations to the SBA Administrator and the heads of affected federal agencies.\nThis report examines the Office of the National Ombudsman's origin and history; describes its organizational structure, funding, functions, and current activities; and discusses a recent legislative effort to enhance its authority. During the 115th Congress, S. 1146, the Small Business Regulatory Relief Act of 2017, would have, among other provisions,\nexpanded the National Ombudsman's authority to work with federal agencies on the development of best practices for educating, training, and assisting small entities in understanding and complying with federal regulations; and authorized the National Ombudsman to evaluate federal agency regulatory compliance guides, ensure that those guides are available to small business development centers and other SBA management and training resource partners, conduct small business customer service surveys on an ongoing basis to assess the timeliness and quality of federal agency regulatory activities, and develop an outreach program to promote awareness of the National Ombudsman's activities.\nThis report also discusses some challenges facing the Office of the National Ombudsman\nalthough it is generally recognized as an independent, impartial office, it is housed within the much larger SBA and remains subject to its influence; the National Ombudsman has often stayed in the position for a relatively short time. Frequent turnover can lead to continuity problems for the office; it does not have the authority to compel federal agencies to undertake specific actions to resolve disputes. As a result, although its annual rating of federal agency responsiveness to small business concerns does provide it a means to exert some influence on federal agency actions, its role in resolving disputes is somewhat constrained; and its relatively limited budget and staffing level restrict its ability to engage in outreach activities that could increase small business awareness of its existence and services.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_270"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_271","query":"Many interns serve Congress, assisting individual Members, committees, and other offices or support services. Interns serve the House or Senate in a temporary capacity, primarily for an educational benefit, although some interns may receive pay for their service. Like many aspects of congressional operations, individual House or Senate offices can make many of their own rules and guidelines for interns, if they choose to operate an internship program. Additional institutional rules, however, may also apply. In the House, policies set by the Committee on Ethics or the Committee on House Administration may also affect congressional offices and interns, and in the Senate, additional relevant policies may be set by the Senate Select Committee on Ethics or the Committee on Rules and Administration.\nThis report addresses frequently asked questions (FAQs) about congressional interns and internships. It is intended to provide information to congressional offices about the role of interns and to provide a summary of some of the policies and guidance provided by the House and the Senate related to internships. It addresses the House and Senate rules that apply to congressional internships, factors that may affect an office's selection process and an individual's eligibility to serve in an internship, and some of the congressional resources and training opportunities available for interns. For additional information about internship opportunities, refer to CRS Report 98-654, Internships, Fellowships, and Other Work Experience Opportunities in the Federal Government .","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_271"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_272","query":"The Small Business Administration's (SBA's) Microloan program provides direct loans to qualified nonprofit intermediary lenders who, in turn, provide \"microloans\" of up to $50,000 to small businesses and nonprofit child care centers. It also provides marketing, management, and technical assistance to microloan borrowers and potential borrowers. Authorized in 1991 as a five-year demonstration project, it became operational in 1992, and was made permanent, subject to reauthorization, in 1997.\nThe Microloan program is designed to assist women, low-income, veteran, and minority entrepreneurs and small business owners by providing them small-scale loans for working capital or the acquisition of materials, supplies, or equipment. In FY2018, Microloan intermediaries provided 5,459 microloans totaling $76.8 million. The average Microloan was $14,071 and had a 7.6% interest rate.\nCritics of the SBA's Microloan program argue that it is expensive relative to alternative programs, duplicative of the SBA's 7(a) loan guaranty program, and subject to administrative shortfalls. The program's advocates argue that it assists many who otherwise would not be served by the private sector and is an important source of capital and training assistance for low-income, women, and minority business owners.\nCongressional interest in the Microloan program has increased in recent years, primarily because microloans are viewed as a means to assist very small businesses, especially women- and minority-owned startups, to get loans that enable them to create and retain jobs. Job creation, always a congressional interest, has taken on increased importance given continuing concerns about job growth during the current economic recovery.\nThis report opens with a discussion of the rationale provided for having a Microloan program, describes the program's eligibility standards and operating requirements for lenders and borrowers, and examines the arguments presented by the program's critics and advocates. It then discusses P.L. 111-240, the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which increased the Microloan program's loan limit for borrowers from $35,000 to $50,000, and the aggregate loan limit for intermediaries after their first year of participation in the program from $3.5 million to $5 million.\nIt also discusses P.L. 115-141, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, which, among other provisions, relaxed requirements on Microloan intermediaries that prohibited them from spending more than 25% of their technical assistance grant funds on prospective borrowers and more than 25% of those grant funds on contracts with third parties to provide that technical assistance. The act increased those percentages to 50% (originally in H.R. 2056, the Microloan Modernization Act of 2017, and S. 526, its companion bill in the Senate). In addition, P.L. 115-232, the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, among other provisions, increased the Microloan program's aggregate loan limit for intermediaries after their first year of participation in the program from $5 million to $6 million.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_272"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_273","query":"The Agriculture appropriations bill\u2014formally known as the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act\u2014funds the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) except for the Forest Service. This includes funding for certain U.S. international food aid programs.\nIn March 2018, President Trump signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141), an omnibus appropriations act for FY2018, into law. In February 2019, President Trump signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), an omnibus appropriations act for FY2019, into law. The FY2018 and FY2019 Agriculture Appropriations Acts\u2014Division A of P.L. 115-141 and Division B of P.L. 116-6, respectively\u2014include funding for certain U.S. international food aid programs, such as the Food for Peace (FFP) Title II Program and the McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program. Other international food aid programs receive mandatory funding and do not rely on discretionary funding provided through annual appropriations. Congress authorizes discretionary and mandatory funding levels for international food aid programs in periodic farm bills, most recently the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-334).\nThis analysis covers appropriations for U.S. international food aid programs that Congress funds through agriculture appropriations bills. It does not cover appropriations for international food assistance or agricultural development programs that Congress funds in State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations bills, such as the Emergency Food Security Program (EFSP) or the Feed the Future Program.\nIn FY2018, Congress provided a total of $1.924 billion in funding for U.S. international food aid programs, a 7% increase from the $1.802 billion provided in FY2017. In FY2019, Congress provided $1.942 billion in funding for U.S. international food aid programs, a 1% increase from FY2018 enacted levels.\nIn addition to providing funding for U.S. international food aid programs, agriculture appropriations bills may also include policy-related provisions that direct how the executive branch should carry out certain appropriations. The FY2018 and FY2019 Agriculture Appropriations Acts, as well as House and Senate Agriculture appropriations bills for those fiscal years, include policy provisions related to international food aid programs. For example, one provision directs that a certain amount of the funds appropriated for the McGovern-Dole Program be used to provide locally and regionally procured food assistance\u2014food assistance purchased in the country or region where it is to be distributed rather than in the United States.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_273"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_274","query":"The Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill contains funding for more than 30 agencies and entities. They include most of the Department of the Interior (DOI) as well as agencies within other departments, such as the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Indian Health Service within the Department of Health and Human Services. The bill also provides funding for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), arts and cultural agencies, and other organizations and entities. Issues for Congress included determining the amount, terms, and conditions of funding for agencies and programs.\nFor FY2019, the enacted appropriation for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies was $35.61 billion. This total was composed of $13.02 billion for DOI agencies in Title I, $8.06 billion for EPA in Title II, $13.74 billion for the 23 \"related agencies\" in Title III, and $791.0 million in Title IV for certain EPA activities.\nThe FY2019 appropriation was $300.0 million (0.8%) more than the FY2018 regular appropriation of $35.31 billion (in P.L. 115-141), but $975.4 million (2.7%) less than the FY2018 total appropriation of $36.59 billion, including $1.28 billion in emergency supplemental appropriations for disaster relief (in P.L. 115-72 and P.L. 115-123). The FY2019 appropriation was $7.28 billion (25.7%) more than the President's request ($28.34 billion), $305.5 million (0.9%) more than the House-passed level ($35.31 billion), and $301.0 million (0.8%) less than the Senate-passed amount ($35.91 billion).\nBecause the FY2019 appropriation was not enacted until February 15, 2019, agencies received continuing appropriations for certain periods before that date. Specifically, from October 1, 2018, through December 21, 2018, and again from January 25, 2019, through February 15, 2019, appropriations were provided under a continuing resolution (CR) at the FY2018 level (in Division G of P.L. 115-141). Due to a lapse in funds after December 21, 2018, until January 25, 2019, a partial government shutdown went into effect. Agencies in the Interior bill generally operated under \"contingency\" plans that summarize activities that would cease and activities that would continue during a lapse in appropriations.\nIn earlier action, President Trump's request of $28.34 billion for FY2019 for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies included $10.59 billion for DOI agencies, $6.19 billion for EPA, and $11.56 billion for related agencies. The versions of H.R. 6147 (115th Congress) passed by the House on July 19, 2018, and by the Senate on August 1, 2018, contained higher FY2019 appropriations overall, and for each title of the bill, than requested. The President's request also contained a legislative proposal for a $1.52 billion cap adjustment to the discretionary spending limits in law for certain wildland fire suppression activities. This cap adjustment was not approved by the chambers or enacted for FY2019. However, Congress enacted a similar proposal (in P.L. 115-141), under which the adjustment becomes available in FY2020.\nThe President, House, and Senate each proposed less funding for FY2019 relative to the FY2018 total of $36.59 billion (including emergency supplemental appropriations), proposing 22.5%, 3.5%, and 1.8% less, respectively. In contrast, relative to the regular FY2018 appropriation of $35.31 billion, the President would have reduced funding (19.8%), the House would have provided nearly level appropriations (<0.1% decrease), and the Senate would have increased funding (1.7%) for FY2019.\nFor individual agencies and programs in the bill, there are many differences among the funding levels enacted for FY2019 and those supported by the President, House, and Senate for FY2019 and enacted for FY2018. This report highlights funding for selected agencies and programs that have been among the many of interest to Congress, stakeholders, and the public.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_274"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_275","query":"The Agriculture appropriations bill funds the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) except for the Forest Service. It also funds the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and\u2014in even-numbered fiscal years\u2014the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).\nAgriculture appropriations include both mandatory and discretionary spending. Discretionary amounts, though, are the primary focus during the bill's development. The largest discretionary spending items are the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); agricultural research; rural development; FDA; foreign food aid and trade; farm assistance program salaries and loans; food safety inspection; animal and plant health programs; and salaries and expenses for administering conservation programs.\nOn February 15, 2019, Congress passed and the President signed the FY2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-6, H.Rept. 116-9). This action, more than four months into the fiscal year, followed three continuing resolutions and a 34-day partial government shutdown.\nThe official discretionary total of the enacted FY2019 Agriculture appropriation is $23.03 billion, which is $35 million more than enacted in FY2018 (+0.2%) on a comparable basis that excludes the CFTC. The enacted total is $6.3 billion more than the Administration requested (+38%), $55 million more than was proposed in the House-reported bill (+0.2%), but $194 million less than in the Senate-passed bill (-0.8%).\nAmong the primary differences that account for the overall $35 million discretionary increase for FY2019 over FY2018 are an increase in agricultural research (mostly for construction) by $387 million (+13%) to $3.4 billion, an increase in FDA appropriations by $269 million (+10%) to $3.1 billion, an increase in WIC funding by a net $200 million (accounting for changes in the amount of carryover balances rescinded and in the base appropriation), an increase in five other program areas by a combined $78 million, and a decrease in rural development by reducing extra appropriations that were made in FY2018 for water and wastewater programs (-$425 million) and rural broadband (-$475 million).\nThe appropriation also carries $129 billion of mandatory spending that is largely determined in separate authorizing laws. The mandatory spending increased by $6 billion not because of congressional action this year but because of changing economic and program conditions. The annual change was mostly due to higher costs for crop insurance (+$6.5 billion), greater reimbursement for the Commodity Credit Corporation (+1.1 billion), and lower outlays for child nutrition (-$1.1 billion) and SNAP (-$0.5 billion). With mandatory and discretionary spending appropriations combined, the FY2019 agriculture total is nearly $152 billion.\nThe Consolidated Appropriations Act and its underlying bills also contain policy provisions that affect how the appropriation is delivered. These provisions affect disaster programs, rural definitions, industrial hemp, animal regulations, nutrition programs, dietary guidelines, CFTC, and tobacco products.\nSequestration on mandatory accounts\u2014a process that reduces federal spending through automatic across-the-board reductions\u2014also continues to affect agriculture spending.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_275"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_276","query":"The U.S. Constitution grants authority to Congress to lay and collect duties and regulate foreign commerce. Congress exercises this authority in numerous ways, including through oversight of trade policy and consideration of legislation to implement trade agreements and authorize trade programs. Policy issues cover areas such as U.S. trade negotiations, U.S. trade and economic relations with specific regions and countries, international institutions focused on trade, tariff and nontariff barriers, worker dislocation due to trade liberalization, enforcement of trade laws and trade agreement commitments, import and export policies, international investment, economic sanctions, and other trade-related functions of the federal government. Congress also has authority over U.S. financial commitments to international financial institutions and oversight responsibilities for trade- and finance-related agencies of the U.S. government.\nIssues in the 116th Congress\nDuring his first two years in office, President Trump has focused on reevaluating many U.S. international trade and economic policies and relationships. The President's focus on these issues could continue over the next two years. Broad policy debates during the 116th Congress may include the impact of trade and trade agreements on the U.S. economy, including U.S. jobs; the causes and consequences of the U.S. trade deficit; the implications of technological developments for U.S. trade policy; and the intersection of economics and national security. Among many others, the potentially more prominent issues in this area that the 116th Congress may consider are\nthe use and impact of unilateral tariffs imposed by the Trump Administration under various U.S. trade laws, as well as potential legislation that alters the authority granted by Congress to the President to do so; legislation to implement the proposed United States-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA), which would revise and modernize the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); the Administration's launch of bilateral trade negotiations with the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom, as well as key provisions in trade agreements, including on intellectual property rights, labor, the environment, and dispute settlement; U.S. engagement with the World Trade Organization (WTO), proposals for WTO reform, and the future direction of the multilateral trading system; U.S.-China trade relations, including investment issues, intellectual property rights protection, forced technology transfer, currency issues, and market access liberalization; the future of U.S.-Asia trade and economic relations, given President Trump's withdrawal of the United States from the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and China's expanding Belt and Road Initiative; the Administration's use of quotas to achieve some of its trade objectives, and whether these actions represent a shift in U.S. policy towards \"managed trade\"; monitoring the implementation of legislation passed by the 115th Congress, including changes to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CIFUS) and export controls, as well as the creation of a new U.S. International Development Finance Corporation; re-authorization of the Export-Import Bank, the U.S. export credit agency that helps finance U.S. exports; oversight of international trade and finance policies to support foreign policy goals, including sanctions on Iran, North Korea, Russia, and other countries; shifts in U.S. leadership of international economic policy coordination at the Group of 7 (G-7) and the Group of 20 (G-20) under the Trump Administration; legislation to fund the Administration's commitment to increase U.S. contributions to the World Bank, as well as potential U.S.-led reforms to the institution; and major developments in financial markets, including the impact of other countries' exchange rate polices on the U.S. economy, high levels of debt in emerging markets, potential economic crises, and the role of the U.S. dollar in the global economy.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_276"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_277","query":"Banks play a critical role in the United States economy, channeling money from savers to borrowers and facilitating productive investment. While the nature of lawmakers' interest in bank regulation has shifted over time, most bank regulations fall into one of three general categories. First, banks must abide by a variety of safety-and-soundness requirements designed to minimize the risk of their failure and maintain macroeconomic stability. Second, banks must comply with consumer protection rules intended to deter abusive practices and provide consumers with complete information about financial products and services. Third, banks are subject to various reporting, recordkeeping, and anti-money laundering requirements designed to assist law enforcement in investigating criminal activity.\nThe substantive content of these requirements remains the subject of intense debate. However, the division of regulatory authority over banks between the federal government and the states plays a key role in shaping that content. In some cases, federal law displaces (or \"preempts\") state bank regulations. In other cases, states are permitted to supplement federal regulations with different, sometimes stricter requirements. Because of its substantive implications, federal preemption has recently become a flashpoint in debates surrounding bank regulation.\nIn the American \"dual banking system,\" banks can apply for a national charter from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) or a state charter from a state's banking authority. A bank's choice of chartering authority is also a choice of primary regulator, as the OCC serves as the primary regulator of national banks and state regulatory agencies serve as the primary regulators of state-chartered banks. However, the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) also play an important role in bank regulation. The Federal Reserve supervises all national banks and state-chartered banks that become members of the Federal Reserve System (FRS), while the FDIC supervises all state banks that do not become members of the FRS. This complex regulatory architecture has resulted in a \"symbiotic system\" with both federal regulation of state banks and state regulation of national banks. In the modern dual banking system, national banks are often subject to generally applicable state laws, and state banks are subject to both generally applicable federal laws and regulations imposed by their federal regulators. The evolution of this system during the 20th century caused the regulation of national banks and state banks to converge in a number of important ways.\nHowever, despite this convergence, federal preemption provides national banks with certain unique advantages. In Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, the Supreme Court held that the National Bank Act (NBA) preempts state laws that \"significantly interfere\" with the powers of national banks. The Court has also issued two decisions on the preemptive scope of a provision of the NBA limiting states' \"visitorial powers\" over national banks. Finally, OCC rules have taken a broad view of the preemptive effects of the NBA, limiting the ways in which states can regulate national banks.\nCourts, regulators, and legislators have recently confronted a number of issues involving banking preemption and related federalism questions. Specifically, Congress has considered legislation that would overturn a line of judicial decisions concerning the circumstances in which non-banks can benefit from federal preemption of state usury laws. The OCC has also announced its intention to grant national bank charters to certain financial technology (FinTech) companies\u2014a decision that is currently being litigated. Finally, Congress has recently turned its attention to the banking industry's response to state efforts to legalize and regulate marijuana.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_277"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_278","query":"The United States Constitution (Article 1, Section 5, clause 1) provides each House of Congress with the sole authority to establish rules, judge membership requirements, and punish and expel Members. From 1789 to 1967, the House of Representatives dealt with disciplinary action against Members on a case-by-case basis, often forming ad-hoc committees to investigate and make recommendations when acts of wrongdoing were brought to the chamber's attention. Events of the 1960s, including the investigation of Representative Adam Clayton Powell for alleged misuse of Education and Labor Committee funds, prompted the creation of a permanent ethics committee and the writing of a Code of Conduct for Members, officers, and staff of the House.\nBegun as a select committee in the 89th Congress (1965-1966), the House created a 12-member panel to \"recommend to the House \u2026 such \u2026 rules or regulations \u2026 necessary or desirable to insure proper standards of conduct by Members of the House and by officers and employees of the House, in the performance of their duties and the discharge of their responsibilities.\" Acting on the select committee's recommendations, the House created a permanent Committee on Standards of Official Conduct in the 90th Congress (1967-1968). In the 112th Congress (2011-2012), the committee was renamed the Committee on Ethics.\nThis report briefly outlines the background of ethics enforcement in the House of Representatives, including the creation of both the Select Committee on Ethics and the Committee on Ethics. The report also focuses on various jurisdictional and procedural changes that the committee has experienced since 1967 and discusses the committee's current jurisdiction and procedures.\nFor additional information on ethics in the House of Representatives, please refer to CRS Report R40760, House Office of Congressional Ethics: History, Authority, and Procedures, by Jacob R. Straus; CRS Report RL30764, Enforcement of Congressional Rules of Conduct: A Historical Overview, by Jacob R. Straus; and CRS Report R44213, Altering House Ethics Committee Sanction Recommendations on the Floor: Past Precedent and Options for Action, by Jacob R. Straus and James V. Saturno.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_278"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_279","query":"The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has heightened interest in, and concerns about, the region's future. The United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial interests in the region.\nRecord low extents of Arctic sea ice over the past decade have focused scientific and policy attention on links to global climate change and projected ice-free seasons in the Arctic within decades. These changes have potential consequences for weather in the United States, access to mineral and biological resources in the Arctic, the economies and cultures of peoples in the region, and national security.\nThe five Arctic coastal states\u2014the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark (of which Greenland is a territory)\u2014have made or are in the process of preparing submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf regarding the outer limits of their extended continental shelves. The Russian submission includes the underwater Lomonosov Ridge, a feature that spans a considerable distance across the center of the Arctic Ocean.\nThe diminishment of Arctic ice could lead in coming years to increased commercial shipping on two trans-Arctic sea routes\u2014the Northern Sea Route close to Russia, and the Northwest Passage\u2014though the rate of increase in the use of these routes might not be as great as sometimes anticipated in press accounts. International guidelines for ships operating in Arctic waters have been recently updated.\nChanges to the Arctic brought about by warming temperatures will likely allow more exploration for oil, gas, and minerals. Warming that causes permafrost to melt could pose challenges to onshore exploration activities. Increased oil and gas exploration and tourism (cruise ships) in the Arctic increase the risk of pollution in the region. Cleaning up oil spills in ice-covered waters will be more difficult than in other areas, primarily because effective strategies for cleaning up oil spills in ice-covered waters have yet to be developed.\nLarge commercial fisheries exist in the Arctic. The United States is currently meeting with other countries regarding the management of Arctic fish stocks. Changes in the Arctic could affect threatened and endangered species, and could result in migration of fish stocks to new waters. Under the Endangered Species Act, the polar bear was listed as threatened on May 15, 2008. Arctic climate change is also expected to affect the economies, health, and cultures of Arctic indigenous peoples.\nTwo of the Coast Guard's three polar icebreakers\u2014Polar Star and Polar Sea\u2014have exceeded their intended 30-year service lives, and Polar Sea is not operational. The Coast Guard has initiated a project to build up to three new heavy polar icebreakers. On May 12, 2011, representatives from the member states of the Arctic Council signed an agreement on cooperation on search and rescue in the Arctic.\nAlthough there is significant international cooperation on Arctic issues, the Arctic is increasingly being viewed by some observers as a potential emerging security issue. Some of the Arctic coastal states, particularly Russia, have announced an intention or taken actions to enhance their military presences in the high north. U.S. military forces, particularly the Navy and Coast Guard, have begun to pay more attention to the region in their planning and operations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_279"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_280","query":"Legislation to reauthorize Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)\u2014sometimes called \"fast track\"\u2014the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 (TPA-2015), was signed into law by former President Obama on June 29, 2015 (P.L. 114-26). If the President negotiates an international trade agreement that would reduce tariff or nontariff barriers to trade in ways that require changes in U.S. law, the United States can implement the agreement only through the enactment of legislation. If the trade agreement and the process of negotiating it meet certain requirements, TPA allows Congress to consider the required implementing bill under expedited procedures, pursuant to which the bill may come to the floor without action by the leadership, and can receive a guaranteed up-or-down vote with no amendments.\nUnder TPA, an implementing bill may be eligible for expedited consideration if (1) the trade agreement was negotiated during the limited time period for which TPA is in effect; (2) the agreement advances a series of U.S. trade negotiating objectives specified in the TPA statute; (3) the negotiations were conducted in compliance with an extensive array of notification and consultation with Congress and other stakeholders; and (4) the President submits to Congress a draft implementing bill, which must meet specific content requirements, and a range of required supporting information. If, in any given case, Congress judges that these requirements have not been met, TPA provides mechanisms through which the eligibility of the implementing bill for expedited consideration may be withdrawn in one or both chambers.\nTPA is authorized through July 1, 2021. The United States has now renegotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), now known as the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) for which TPA could be used to consider implementing legislation. The issue of TPA reauthorization raises a number of questions regarding TPA, and this report addresses a number of those questions that are frequently asked, including the following:\nWhat is trade promotion authority? Is TPA necessary? What are trade negotiating objectives and how are they reflected in TPA statutes? What requirements does Congress impose on the President under TPA? Does TPA affect congressional authority on trade policy?\nFor more information on TPA, see CRS Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy, by Ian F. Fergusson and CRS In Focus IF10038, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), by Ian F. Fergusson.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_280"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_281","query":"The Jones Act, which refers to Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (P.L. 66-261), requires that vessels transporting cargo from one U.S. point to another U.S. point be U.S.-built, and owned and crewed by U.S. citizens. The act provides a significant degree of protection for U.S. shipyards, domestic carriers, and American merchant sailors. It is a subject of debate because some experts point out that it leads to high domestic ocean shipping costs and constrains the availability of ships for domestic use. The Jones Act has come into prominence amid debates over Puerto Rico's economic challenges and recovery from Hurricane Maria in 2017; in the investigation into the sinking of the ship El Faro with 33 fatalities during a hurricane in 2015; and in discussions about domestic transportation of oil and natural gas. The law's effectiveness in achieving national security goals has also been the subject of attention in conjunction with a congressional directive that the Administration develop a national maritime strategy, including strategies to increase the use of short sea shipping and enhance U.S. shipbuilding capability.\nThe Jones Act of 1920 was not the first law requiring that vessels transporting cargo domestically be U.S.-built, owned, and crewed. It restated a long-standing restriction that was temporarily suspended during World War I. Since 1920, Congress has enacted provisions that could be said to tighten Jones Act requirements as well as provisions that exempt certain maritime activity from the requirements. In 1935, Congress forbade Jones Act-qualified vessels that were sold to foreign owners or registered under a foreign flag to subsequently requalify as Jones Act-eligible (P.L. 74-191). This provides additional protection from competition for Jones Act carriers if coastal shipping demand increases, because it can take around two years to construct a new ship. In 1940, Congress expanded the Jones Act to include towing and salvage vessels (P.L. 76-599). In 1988, Congress specified that waterborne transport of valueless material required use of a Jones Act-qualified vessel, such that transport of dredge spoil or municipal waste would fall under the law (P.L. 100-329). Generally, dredging and towing vessels, as well as Great Lakes ships, have occasioned less debate about the Jones Act than oceangoing ships and offshore supply vessels.\nCongress has enacted numerous exemptions or exceptions to the Jones Act. In some cases, Congress has enacted an exemption if there are no Jones Act-qualified carriers interested in providing service in a particular market (for example, passenger travel to and from Puerto Rico). Congress has allowed waivers of the Jones Act for national defense reasons, which most often have been executed to speed fuel deliveries to a region after a natural disaster disrupted normal supply lines.\nRegulatory interpretations of the Jones Act have been significant in defining what constitutes a \"U.S.-built\" vessel, what constitutes \"transportation\" between two U.S. points, and what are \"U.S. points.\" The Coast Guard has determined that a U.S.-built vessel can be assembled with major foreign components such as engines, propellers, and stern and bow sections. This interpretation has been consistent from the late 1800s. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has determined that cruise ship voyages that involve visits to foreign ports in addition to a domestic port are not domestic transportation and therefore not subject to the Jones Act. This interpretation also dates to the late 1800s. CBP's interpretations of what constitutes domestic transportation and U.S. points are significant to the offshore oil industry, as some of the vessels supporting that industry must be Jones Act-compliant while others need not be.\nBy long-standing agreement, the military is to utilize U.S.-flag commercial ships for sealift before it utilizes government-owned vessels in its reserve fleet. Jones Act mariners are expected to crew sealift ships when needed, and thus the decades-long shrinkage of the oceangoing Jones Act fleet and mariner pool has been raised as a concern. The Department of Defense is planning to buy more used foreign-built ships for sealift rather than building them in the United States for cost reasons. It also has found that repairing its current fleet in U.S. shipyards is three times more expensive and has taken twice as long as estimated.\nMuch of the commercial fleet is relatively old, raising safety concerns. Some useful types of ships are missing from the Jones Act-qualified fleet, such as heavy-lift vessels, liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers, and deepwater offshore construction vessels. Both situations appear to some observers to be contrary to the policy goal of the Jones Act, which is to \"have a merchant marine of the best equipped and most suitable types of vessels sufficient to carry the greater portion of its commerce and serve as a naval or military auxiliary in times of war or national emergency.\"","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_281"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_282","query":"In order for the United States to engage in significant civilian nuclear cooperation with other states, it must conclude a framework agreement that meets specific requirements under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). Significant nuclear cooperation includes the export of reactors, critical parts of reactors, and reactor fuel. The AEA also provides for export control licensing procedures and criteria for terminating cooperation. Congressional review is required for Section 123 agreements; the AEA establishes special parliamentary procedures by which Congress may act on a proposed agreement.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_282"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_283","query":"The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) each play a significant part in federal efforts to support the education of individuals with disabilities. These statutory frameworks, while overlapping, differ in scope and in their application to students with disabilities. As a result, when students with disabilities transition between levels of schooling, the accommodations and services they must be provided under federal law may change. For example, while the IDEA, the ADA, and Section 504 potentially apply to children with disabilities from preschool through 12th grade (P-12), only the ADA and Section 504 apply to students in an institution of higher education. More generally, application of the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA to students with disabilities is determined by (1) the definition of \"disability\" employed by each framework; (2) the mechanisms employed under each law to determine whether a student has a qualifying disability; and (3) the adaptations, accommodations, and services that must be provided to students with disabilities under each law.\nIndividuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)\nThe IDEA, as amended, authorizes federal grants to states to support the education of children with disabilities. The act requires that states, as a condition for receiving funds, provide students with disabilities a range of substantive and procedural protections. For example, states and local education agencies (LEAs) must (1) identify, locate, and evaluate all children with disabilities residing in the state, regardless of the severity of their disability, to determine which children are eligible for special education and related services; (2) convene a team, which includes the parents of each eligible child with a disability, to develop an individual education program (IEP) spelling out the specific special education and related services to be provided to that child to ensure a \"free appropriate public education\" (FAPE); and (3) provide procedural safeguards to children with disabilities and their parents, including a right to an administrative hearing to challenge determinations and placements, with the ability to appeal the ruling to federal district court. Of the three legal frameworks discussed in this report, only the IDEA is focused squarely on educational matters, and its statutory provisions and implementing regulations specifically detail the rights of children with disabilities and their families in U.S. public schools. Of the three laws examined here, the IDEA is also the only one that fixes an age limit, with its substantive and procedural guarantees applying to persons with disabilities from birth until they reach 21 years or exit high school, if earlier.\nSection 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973\nSection 504 is an antidiscrimination provision within a broader federal law providing rehabilitation services to people with disabilities. Section 504 protects individuals from disability discrimination in programs and activities that receive federal financial assistance, including elementary and secondary schools, as well as many colleges and universities. While Section 504 is terse in describing covered entities' obligations, the statute's implementing regulations, including those promulgated by the U.S. Department of Education (ED) applicable in the educational context, are extensive. For example, Section 504 and its implementing regulations require all schools receiving federal funds to make their application forms and course materials accessible to people with disabilities.\nAmericans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)\nEnacted in 1990, the ADA provides broad nondiscrimination protection for individuals with disabilities across a range of institutional contexts, both public and private, including employment, public services, transportation, telecommunications, public accommodations, and services operated by private entities. In an educational context, the ADA and implementing regulations effectively require both public schools and many P-12 private schools to ensure that students with disabilities are not excluded, denied services, segregated, or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of their disability, unless the school can demonstrate that taking those steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the school's program or cause an undue financial burden. The ADA's statutory provisions and implementing regulations outline the types of modifications that must be made for individuals with disabilities, including the removal of barriers, alterations to new and existing buildings, accessible seating in assembly areas, and accessible examinations and course materials.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_283"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_284","query":"A growing number of Americans report that they use marijuana. Most states now allow the use of marijuana for treatment of medical conditions. Ten states and the District of Columbia, representing a quarter of the U.S. population, have decriminalized the recreational use of marijuana, and other states are considering following suit.\nAs the opportunity for legal use of marijuana grows, there is concern about the impact of marijuana usage on highway safety. In a 2018 survey, the majority of state highway safety officers considered drugged driving an issue at least as important as driving while impaired by alcohol (which is associated with over 10,000 highway deaths each year). As of May 2019, 18 states have enacted laws declaring that a specified concentration of THC in a driver's body constitutes evidence of impairment and is inherently illegal (referred to as per se laws), similar to the .08% blood alcohol content (BAC) standard of alcohol impairment.\nAdvocates of loosening restrictions on marijuana often compare marijuana usage to drinking alcohol, which may contribute to some stakeholders viewing marijuana use and driving as similar to alcohol's impairment of driving. Research studies indicate that marijuana's effects on drivers' performance may vary from the effects of alcohol, in ways that challenge dealing with marijuana impairment and driving similarly to alcohol-impaired driving.\nAlcohol is a nervous system depressant that is absorbed into the blood and metabolized by the body fairly quickly, such that there is little trace of alcohol after 24 hours. Its impairing effects have been extensively studied over many decades, and the association between levels of alcohol consumption and degrees of impairment is well-established. By contrast, marijuana is a nervous system stimulant. It contains over 500 chemical compounds, only one of which, tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), is significantly psychoactive. Its effects are felt quickly after smoking, but more slowly when consumed in other forms (e.g., in food). It is metabolized quickly, but the body can store THC in fat cells, so that traces of THC can be found up to several weeks after consumption. Its impairing effects have been the subject of limited study, due in part to its status as a controlled substance under federal law.\nAlthough laboratory studies have shown that marijuana consumption can affect a person's response times and motor performance, studies of the impact of marijuana consumption on a driver's risk of being involved in a crash have produced conflicting results, with some studies finding little or no increased risk of a crash from marijuana usage. Levels of impairment that can be identified in laboratory settings may not have a significant impact in real world settings, where many variables affect the likelihood of a crash occurring. Research studies have been unable to consistently correlate levels of marijuana consumption, or THC in a person's body, and levels of impairment. Thus some researchers, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, have observed that using a measure of THC as evidence of a driver's impairment is not supported by scientific evidence to date.\nCongress, state legislatures, and other decisionmakers may address the topic of marijuana use and driver impairment through various policy options, including whether or not to support additional research on the impact of marijuana on driver performance and on measurement techniques for marijuana impairment, as well as training for law enforcement on identifying marijuana impairment. Other deliberations may address federal regulations on marijuana use and testing for transportation safety-sensitive employees.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_284"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_285","query":"At the direction of Congress, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) in the Department of Defense (DOD) undertakes water resource development activities. USACE develops civil works projects principally to improve navigable channels, reduce flood and storm damage, and restore aquatic ecosystems. Congress directs USACE through authorizations and appropriations legislation. Congress often considers USACE authorization legislation biennially and appropriations annually. USACE attracts congressional attention because its projects can have significant local and regional economic benefits and environmental effects. This report summarizes authorization legislation, project delivery, authorities for alternative project delivery, and other USACE authorities.\nAuthorization Legislation. For USACE studies and projects, congressional study and project authorization generally is required prior to being eligible for federal appropriations. Congress generally considers an omnibus USACE authorization bill biennially. The bill is typically titled a Water Resources Development Act (WRDA). Agency action on an authorization typically requires funding; that is, both an authorization and an appropriation would be needed to proceed. Most water resource project authorizations in WRDAs fall into three general categories: project studies, construction projects, and modifications to existing projects. A few provisions in WRDA bills have time-limited authorizations; therefore, some WRDA provisions may reauthorize expired or expiring authorities. Recent authorization bills include:\nAmerica's Water Infrastructure Act of 2018 (AWIA 2018; P.L. 115-270), which included Title I, Water Resources Development Act of 2018 (WRDA 2018) which focused on USACE civil works; Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN; P.L. 114-322), which included Title I ,Water Resources Development Act of 2016 (WRDA 2016) which focused on USACE civil works; and Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 (WRRDA 2014; P.L. 113-121), which was largely, but not wholly, focused on USACE civil works.\nIn WRRDA 2014, Congress developed processes for identifying site-specific studies and projects for authorization to overcome concerns related to congressionally directed spending (known as earmarks). Congress also used these processes for WRDA 2016 and WRDA 2018.\nStandard and Alternative Project Delivery. The standard process for a USACE project requires two separate congressional authorizations\u2014one for studying feasibility, and a subsequent one for construction\u2014as well as appropriations for both. In recent years, congressional authorization for project construction has been based on a favorable report by the Chief of Engineers (a Chief's report) and an accompanying feasibility report. For most activities, Congress requires a nonfederal sponsor to share some portion of study and construction costs. For some project types (e.g., local flood control), nonfederal sponsors are responsible for operation and maintenance.\nWRRDA 2014, WRDA 2016, and WRDA 2018 expanded the opportunities for interested nonfederal entities, including private entities, to have greater roles in project development, construction, and financing. WRRDA 2014 also authorized, through the Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (WIFIA), a program to provide direct loans and loan guarantees for water projects. Although the WIFIA program administered by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is operational, the USACE WIFIA program for navigation, flood risk reduction, and ecosystem restoration projects has not been implemented.\nOther USACE Activities and Authorities. Congress has granted USACE general authorities to undertake some activities without requiring additional congressional authorization, including emergency actions related to flooding and limited actions in response to drought. Additionally, under the National Response Framework, USACE may be tasked with performing activities in response to an emergency or disaster, principally associated with public works and engineering such as providing temporary roofing and emergency power restoration. In addition to its work for the Department of the Army under USACE's military program, USACE under various authorities also may perform work on a reimbursable basis for other DOD entities, federal agencies, state and local governments, and foreign governments (e.g., USACE manages the construction of multiple border barrier projects on a reimbursable basis for Customs and Border Protection).","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_285"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_286","query":"This report provides a brief list of key House, Senate, legislative support agencies, and executive branch offices, as well as links to online resources of use to new congressional staff who work with legislative procedures and conduct legislative research. Some of the websites listed are available only to congressional offices; other sites are restricted by chamber and are only available to those staff working in either House or Senate offices. This report is intended for congressional use only and will be updated annually.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_286"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_287","query":"When civil unrest, violence, or natural disasters erupt in countries around the world, concerns arise over the ability of foreign nationals in the United States from those countries to safely return. Provisions exist in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to offer temporary protected status (TPS) and other forms of relief from removal under specified circumstances. The Secretary of Homeland Security has the discretion to designate a country for TPS for periods of 6 to 18 months and can extend these periods if the country continues to meet the conditions for designation. Congress has also provided TPS legislatively. A foreign national who is granted TPS receives a registration document and employment authorization for the duration of a given TPS designation.\nThe United States currently provides TPS to approximately 417,000 foreign nationals from 10 countries: El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Certain Liberians maintain relief under a similar administrative mechanism known as Deferred Enforced Departure (DED). Since September 2017, the Secretary of Homeland Security has announced plans to terminate TPS for six countries\u2014El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua, and Sudan\u2014and extend TPS for Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. In March 2018, President Trump announced an end to DED for Liberia. Several lawsuits have been filed challenging the TPS and DED termination decisions.\nThere is ongoing debate about whether foreign nationals who have been living in the United States for long periods of time with TPS or DED should receive a pathway to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status. Various proposals related to TPS have been introduced in the 115th and 116th Congresses, including to expand the program to additional countries (e.g., Venezuela), provide a pathway to LPR status, prohibit gang members or those without lawful status from receiving TPS, and phase out the program.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_287"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_288","query":"Congress has delegated responsibility for monetary policy to the Federal Reserve (the Fed), the nation's central bank, but retains oversight responsibilities for ensuring that the Fed is adhering to its statutory mandate of \"maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.\" To meet its price stability mandate, the Fed has set a longer-run goal of 2% inflation.\nThe Fed's control over monetary policy stems from its exclusive ability to alter the money supply and credit conditions more broadly. Normally, the Fed conducts monetary policy by setting a target for the federal funds rate, the rate at which banks borrow and lend reserves on an overnight basis. It meets its target through open market operations, financial transactions traditionally involving U.S. Treasury securities. Beginning in 2007, the federal funds target was reduced from 5.25% to a range of 0% to 0.25% in December 2008, which economists call the zero lower bound. By historical standards, rates were kept unusually low for an unusually long time to mitigate the effects of the financial crisis and its aftermath. Starting in December 2015, the Fed has been raising interest rates and expects to gradually raise rates further. The Fed raised rates once in 2016, three times in 2017, and four times in 2018, by 0.25 percentage points each time. In light of increased economic uncertainty and financial volatility, the Fed announced in January 2019 that it would be \"patient\" before raising rates again.\nThe Fed influences interest rates to affect interest-sensitive spending, such as business capital spending on plant and equipment, household spending on consumer durables, and residential investment. In addition, when interest rates diverge between countries, it causes capital flows that affect the exchange rate between foreign currencies and the dollar, which in turn affects spending on exports and imports. Through these channels, monetary policy can be used to stimulate or slow aggregate spending in the short run. In the long run, monetary policy mainly affects inflation. A low and stable rate of inflation promotes price transparency and, thereby, sounder economic decisions.\nThe Fed's relative independence from Congress and the Administration has been justified by many economists on the grounds that it reduces political pressure to make monetary policy decisions that are inconsistent with a long-term focus on stable inflation. But independence reduces accountability to Congress and the Administration, and recent legislation and criticism of the Fed by the President has raised the question about the proper balance between the two.\nWhile the federal funds target was at the zero lower bound, the Fed attempted to provide additional stimulus through unsterilized purchases of Treasury and mortgage-backed securities (MBS), a practice popularly referred to as quantitative easing (QE). Between 2009 and 2014, the Fed undertook three rounds of QE. The third round was completed in October 2014, at which point the Fed's balance sheet was $4.5 trillion\u2014five times its precrisis size. After QE ended, the Fed maintained the balance sheet at the same level until September 2017, when it began to very gradually reduce it to a more normal size. The Fed has raised interest rates in the presence of a large balance sheet through the use of two new tools\u2014by paying banks interest on reserves held at the Fed and by engaging in reverse repurchase agreements (reverse repos) through a new overnight facility. In January 2019, the Fed announced that it would continue using these tools to set interest rates permanently, in which case the balance sheet may not get much smaller than its current size of $4 trillion.\nWith regard to its mandate, the Fed believes that unemployment is currently lower than the rate that it considers consistent with maximum employment, and inflation is close to the Fed's 2% goal by the Fed's preferred measure. Even after recent rate increases, monetary policy is still considered expansionary. This monetary policy stance is unusually stimulative compared with policy in this stage of previous expansions, and is being coupled with a stimulative fiscal policy (larger structural budget deficit). Debate is currently focused on how quickly the Fed should raise rates. Some contend the greater risk is that raising rates too slowly at full employment will cause inflation to become too high or cause financial instability, whereas others contend that raising rates too quickly will cause inflation to remain too low and choke off the expansion.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_288"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_289","query":"In 2001, in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, \"homeland security\" went from being a concept discussed among a relatively small cadre of policymakers and strategic thinkers to one broadly discussed among policymakers, including a broad swath of those in Congress. Debates over how to implement coordinated homeland security policy led to the passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and extensive legislative activity in the ensuing years.\nInitially, homeland security was largely seen as counterterrorism activities. Today, homeland security is a broad and complex network of interrelated issues, in policymaking terms. For example, in its executive summary, the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review issued in 2014 delineated the missions of the homeland security enterprise as follows: prevent terrorism and enhance security; secure and manage the borders; enforce and administer immigration laws; safeguard and secure cyberspace; and strengthen national preparedness and resilience.\nThis report compiles a series of Insights by CRS experts across an array of homeland security issues that may come before the 116th Congress. Several homeland security topics are also covered in CRS Report R45500, Transportation Security: Issues for the 116th Congress.\nThe information contained in the Insights only scratches the surface of these selected issues. Congressional clients may obtain more detailed information on these topic and others by contacting the relevant CRS expert listed in CRS Report R45684, Selected Homeland Security Issues in the 116th Congress: CRS Experts.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_289"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_290","query":"As the Supreme Court has recognized, social media sites like Facebook and Twitter have become important venues for users to exercise free speech rights protected under the First Amendment. Commentators and legislators, however, have questioned whether these social media platforms are living up to their reputation as digital public forums. Some have expressed concern that these sites are not doing enough to counter violent or false speech. At the same time, many argue that the platforms are unfairly banning and restricting access to potentially valuable speech.\nCurrently, federal law does not offer much recourse for social media users who seek to challenge a social media provider's decision about whether and how to present a user's content. Lawsuits predicated on these sites' decisions to host or remove content have been largely unsuccessful, facing at least two significant barriers under existing federal law. First, while individuals have sometimes alleged that these companies violated their free speech rights by discriminating against users' content, courts have held that the First Amendment, which provides protection against state action, is not implicated by the actions of these private companies. Second, courts have concluded that many non-constitutional claims are barred by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 230, which provides immunity to providers of interactive computer services, including social media providers, both for certain decisions to host content created by others and for actions taken \"voluntarily\" and \"in good faith\" to restrict access to \"objectionable\" material.\nSome have argued that Congress should step in to regulate social media sites. Government action regulating internet content would constitute state action that may implicate the First Amendment. In particular, social media providers may argue that government regulations impermissibly infringe on the providers' own constitutional free speech rights. Legal commentators have argued that when social media platforms decide whether and how to post users' content, these publication decisions are themselves protected under the First Amendment. There are few court decisions evaluating whether a social media site, by virtue of publishing, organizing, or even editing protected speech, is itself exercising free speech rights. Consequently, commentators have largely analyzed the question of whether the First Amendment protects a social media site's publication decisions by analogy to other types of First Amendment cases. There are at least three possible frameworks for analyzing governmental restrictions on social media sites' ability to moderate user content.\nFirst, using the analogue of the company town, social media sites could be treated as state actors who are themselves bound to follow the First Amendment when they regulate protected speech. If social media sites were treated as state actors under the First Amendment, then the Constitution itself would constrain their conduct, even absent legislative regulation. The second possible framework would view social media sites as analogous to special industries like common carriers or broadcast media. The Court has historically allowed greater regulation of these industries' speech, given the need to protect public access for users of their services. Under the second framework, if special aspects of social media sites threaten the use of the medium for communicative or expressive purposes, courts might approve of content-neutral regulations intended to solve those problems. The third analogy would treat social media sites like news editors, who generally receive the full protections of the First Amendment when making editorial decisions. If social media sites were considered to be equivalent to newspaper editors when they make decisions about whether and how to present users' content, then those editorial decisions would receive the broadest protections under the First Amendment. Any government regulations that alter the editorial choices of social media sites by forcing them to host content that they would not otherwise transmit, or requiring them to take down content they would like to host, could be subject to strict scrutiny. A number of federal trial courts have held that search engines exercise editorial judgment protected by the First Amendment when they make decisions about whether and how to present specific websites or advertisements in search results, seemingly adopting this last framework.\nWhich of these three frameworks applies will depend largely on the particular action being regulated. Under existing law, social media platforms may be more likely to receive First Amendment protection when they exercise more editorial discretion in presenting user-generated content, rather than if they neutrally transmit all such content. In addition, certain types of speech receive less protection under the First Amendment. Courts may be more likely to uphold regulations targeting certain disfavored categories of speech such as obscenity or speech inciting violence. Finally, if a law targets a social media site's conduct rather than speech, it may not trigger the protections of the First Amendment at all.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_290"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_291","query":"When federal courts have analyzed and addressed \"affirmative action\" in higher education, they have done so in two distinct but related senses, both under the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of \"equal protection.\"\nThe first has its roots in the original sense of \"affirmative action:\" the mandatory use of race by public education systems to eliminate the remnants of state-imposed racial segregation. Because state-sanctioned race segregation in public education violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, in certain cases involving a state's formerly de jure segregated public university system, a state's consideration of race in its higher education policies and practices may be an affirmative obligation. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in its consequential 1992 decision United States v. Fordice, equal protection may require states that formerly maintained de jure segregated university systems to consider race for the purpose of eliminating all vestiges of their prior \"dual\" systems. Drawing upon its precedent addressing racially segregated public schools in the K-12 context, the Court established a three-part legal standard in Fordice for evaluating the sufficiency and effectiveness of a state's efforts in \"dismantl[ing]\" its formerly de jure segregated public university system. To that remedial end, mandatory race-conscious measures\u2014in this de jure context\u2014are not limited to admissions. Instead, remedies may also address policies and practices relating to academic programs, institutional missions, funding, and other aspects of public university operations.\nOutside this de jure context, \"affirmative action\" has come to refer to a different category of race-conscious policies. These involve what the Court at one time called the \"benign\" use of racial classifications\u2014voluntary measures designed not to remedy past de jure discrimination, but to help racial minorities overcome the effects of their earlier exclusion. And for institutions of higher education, the Court has addressed one type of affirmative action policy in particular: the use of race as a factor in admissions decisions, a practice now widely observed by both public and private colleges and universities.\nThe federal courts have come to subject these voluntary race-conscious policies\u2014\"affirmative action\" in its perhaps more familiar sense\u2014to a particularly searching form of review known as strict scrutiny. And even though this heightened judicial scrutiny has long been regarded as strict in theory but fatal in fact, the Court's review of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education has proved a notable exception, with the Court having twice upheld universities' use of race as one of many factors considered when assembling their incoming classes. The Court has long grappled with this seeming tension\u2014between the strictness of its scrutiny and its approval of race-conscious admissions policies\u2014beginning with its landmark 1978 decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke through its 2016 decision in Fisher v. University of Texas.\nThough the Equal Protection Clause generally concerns public universities and their constitutional obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment, federal statutory law also plays a role in ensuring equal protection in higher education. To that end, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits recipients of federal funding\u2014including private colleges and universities\u2014from, at a minimum, discriminating against students and applicants in a manner that would violate the Equal Protection Clause. Federal agencies, including the Departments of Justice and Education, investigate and administratively enforce institutions' compliance with Title VI.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_291"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_292","query":"The Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) Act of 1965 (P.L. 88-578) created the LWCF in the Treasury as a funding source to implement the outdoor recreation goals set out by the act. The LWCF Act authorizes the fund to receive $900 million annually, with the monies available only if appropriated by Congress (i.e., discretionary appropriations). The fund also receives mandatory appropriations under the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006 (GOMESA). The level of annual appropriations for the LWCF has varied since the origin of the fund in FY1965.\nThe LWCF Act outlines uses of the fund for federal and state purposes. Of the total made available through appropriations or deposits under GOMESA, not less than 40% is to be used for \"federal purposes\" and not less than 40% is to be used to provide \"financial assistance to states.\" The act lists the federal purposes for which the President is to allot LWCF funds \"unless otherwise allotted in the appropriation Act making them available.\" These purposes primarily relate to acquisition of lands and waters (and interests therein) by the federal government. With regard to state purposes, the act authorizes a matching grant program to states for outdoor recreation purposes. Throughout the LWCF's history, appropriations acts typically have provided funds for land acquisition and outdoor recreational grants to states.\nBeginning in FY1998, appropriations also have been provided each year (except FY1999) to fund other purposes related to natural resources. The extent to which the LWCF should be used for purposes other than federal land acquisition and outdoor recreation grants to states, and which other purposes should be funded from the LWCF, continue to be the subject of legislation and debate in Congress. In the past few decades, Presidents have sought LWCF funds for a variety of other purposes. Congress chooses which if any of these requests to fund, and has chosen programs not sought by the President for a particular year. Among other programs, appropriations have been provided for facility maintenance of the land management agencies, ecosystem restoration, the Historic Preservation Fund, the Payments in Lieu of Taxes program, the Forest Legacy Program, State and Tribal Wildlife Grants (under the Fish and Wildlife Service), the Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation Fund, U.S. Geological Survey science and cooperative programs, and Bureau of Indian Affairs Indian Land and Water Claim Settlements.\nSince FY1998, a total of $2.7 billion has been appropriated for other purposes, of a total LWCF appropriation of $18.9 billion over the history of the fund. The Fish and Wildlife Service and the Forest Service have received the largest shares of the total appropriations for other purposes, about $1.4 billion (53%) and $1.0.billion (38%), respectively, from FY1998 to FY2019. Several agencies shared the remaining $0.2 billion (9%) of the appropriations.\nBoth the dollar amounts and the percentages of annual LWCF appropriations for other purposes have varied widely since FY1998. The dollar amounts have ranged from $0 in FY1999 to $456.0 million in FY2001. The percentage of annual funds provided for other purposes ranged from 0% in FY1999 to a high of 59% in both FY2006 and FY2007. In some years, the appropriation for other purposes was significantly less than the Administration requested. For instance, for FY2008, the George W. Bush Administration sought $313.1 million; the appropriation was $101.3 million. The appropriation for other purposes last exceeded $100.0 million in FY2010, and most recently was $93.3 million, in FY2019.\nPrior to FY2008, several other purposes typically were funded each year from LWCF. Since FY2008, funds have been appropriated annually only for grants under two programs: Forest Legacy and Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation Fund. These two programs and a third grant program\u2014State and Tribal Wildlife Grants\u2014have received more than three-quarters ($2.1 billion, 79%) of the total appropriation for other purposes since FY1998.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_292"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_293","query":"Federal law contains a wide variety of disclosure requirements, including food labels, securities registrations, and disclosures about prescription drugs in direct-to-consumer advertising. These disclosure provisions require commercial actors to make statements that they otherwise might not, compelling speech and implicating the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Nonetheless, while commercial disclosure requirements may regulate protected speech, that fact in and of itself does not render such provisions unconstitutional.\nThe Supreme Court has historically allowed greater regulation of commercial speech than of other types of speech. Since at least the mid-1970s, however, the Supreme Court has been increasingly protective of commercial speech. This trend, along with other developments in First Amendment law, has led some commentators to question whether the Supreme Court might apply a stricter test in assessing commercial disclosure requirements in the near future. Nonetheless, governing Supreme Court precedent provides that disclosure requirements generally receive lesser judicial scrutiny when they compel only commercial speech, as opposed to noncommercial speech. In National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, a decision released in June 2018, the Supreme Court explained that it has applied a lower level of scrutiny to compelled disclosures under two circumstances.\nFirst, the Supreme Court has sometimes upheld laws that regulate commercial speech if the speech regulation is part of a larger regulatory scheme that is focused on conduct and only incidentally burdens speech. If a law is properly characterized as a regulation of conduct, rather than speech, then it may be subject to rational basis review, a deferential standard that asks only whether the regulation is a rational way to address the problem. However, it can be difficult to distinguish speech from conduct, and the Supreme Court has not frequently invoked this doctrine to uphold laws against First Amendment challenges.\nSecond, the Supreme Court has sometimes applied a lower level of scrutiny to certain commercial disclosure requirements under the authority of a 1985 case, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel. In Zauderer, the Court upheld a disclosure requirement after noting that the challenged provision compelled only \"factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which . . . services will be available.\" The Court said that under the circumstances, the service provider's First Amendment rights were sufficiently protected because the disclosure requirement was \"reasonably related\" to the government's interest \"in preventing deception of consumers.\" Lower courts have generally interpreted Zauderer to mean that if a commercial disclosure provision requires only \"factual and uncontroversial information\" about the goods or services being offered, it should be analyzed under rational basis review. If a commercial disclosure requirement does not qualify for review under Zauderer, then it will most likely be analyzed under the intermediate standard that generally applies to government actions that regulate commercial speech.\nSome legal scholars have argued that recent Supreme Court case law suggests the Court may subject commercial disclosure provisions to stricter scrutiny in the future, either by limiting the factual circumstances under which these two doctrines apply or by creating express exceptions to these doctrines. If a court applies a heightened level of scrutiny, it may require the government to present more evidence of the problem it is seeking to remedy and stronger justifications for choosing a disclosure requirement to achieve its purposes.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_293"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_294","query":"In June 2018, in part due to congressional concerns, the Army announced a new modernization strategy and designated the Next Generation Combat Vehicle (NGCV) as the program to replace the M-2 Bradley. In October 2018, Army leadership decided to redesignate the NGCV as the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) and to add additional vehicle programs to what would be called the NGCV Program.\nThe M-2 Bradley, which has been in service since 1981, is an Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) used to transport infantry on the battlefield and provide fire support to dismounted troops and suppress or destroy enemy fighting vehicles. Updated numerous times since its introduction, the M-2 Bradley is widely considered to have reached the technological limits of its capacity to accommodate new electronics, armor, and defense systems. Two past efforts to replace the M-2 Bradley\u2014the Future Combat System (FCS) Program and the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program\u2014were cancelled for programmatic and cost-associated reasons.\nIn late 2018, the Army established Army Futures Command (AFC), intended to establish unity of command and effort while consolidating the Army's modernization process under one roof. AFC is intended to play a significant role in OMFV development and acquisition. Hoping to field the OMFV in FY2026, the Army plans to employ Section 804 Middle Tier Acquisition Authority for rapid prototyping. The Army plans to develop, in parallel, three complementary classes of Robotic Combat Vehicles (RCVs) intended to accompany the OMFV into combat both to protect the OMFV and provide additional fire support. For RCVs to be successfully developed, problems with autonomous ground navigation will need to be resolved and artificial intelligence must evolve to permit the RCVs to function as intended. The Army has stated that a new congressionally-granted acquisition authority\u2014referred to as Section 804 authority\u2014might also be used in RCV development.\nThe Army requested $378 million in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding for the OMFV program and $109 million in RDT&E funding for the RCV in its FY2020 budget request.\nPotential issues for Congress include the following:\nHow will the OMFV program avoid the same fate as the cancelled FCS and GCV programs? What is the Army Futures Command's (AFC's) role in program management? What is the relationship between the OMFV and RCVs? What are some of the benefits and concerns regarding Section 804 authority and the OMFV?","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_294"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_295","query":"This report uses the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) farm income projections (as of March 6, 2019) and agricultural trade outlook update (as of February 21, 2019) to describe the U.S. farm economic outlook. According to USDA's Economic Research Service (ERS), national net farm income\u2014a key indicator of U.S. farm well-being\u2014is forecast at $69.4 billion in 2019, up $6.3 billion (+10%) from last year. The forecast rise in 2019 net farm income is the result of an increase in gross returns (up $8.5 billion or +2%)\u2014including continued payments under the trade aid package announced by USDA in July 2018\u2014partially offset by slightly higher production expenses (up $2.2 billion or +0.6%). Net farm income is calculated on an accrual basis. Net cash income (calculated on a cash-flow basis) is also projected higher in 2019 (+4.7%) to $95.7 billion.\nThe 2019 net farm income forecast is substantially below (-18%) the 10-year average of $84.8 billion (in nominal dollars)\u2014primarily the result of the outlook for continued weak prices for most major crops. Commodity prices are under pressure from a record soybean and near-record corn harvest in 2018, diminished export prospects due to an ongoing trade dispute with China, and burdensome stocks.\nGovernment payments are projected down nearly 17% from 2018 at $11.5 billion\u2014due largely to lower market facilitation payments by USDA. Market facilitation payments to qualifying agricultural producers\u2014in response to the U.S.-China trade dispute\u2014were an estimated $5.2 billion in 2018 and are projected at $3.5 billion in 2019. Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) payments are also projected lower in 2019 ($1.7 billion) versus 2018 ($3.0 billion). Payments to dairy producers under the new Dairy Margin Coverage (DMC) program are projected up over 200% at $600 million, while payments under conservation and disaster assistance are projected up in 2019 at $4.3 billion (+8.6%) and $1.4 billion (+20%).\nSince 2008, U.S. agricultural exports have accounted for a 20% share of U.S. farm and manufactured or processed agricultural sales. In 2018 total agricultural exports were estimated up 2% at $143.4 billion. However, abundant supplies in international markets, strong competition from major foreign competitors, and the ongoing U.S.-China trade dispute are expected to shift trade patterns and lower U.S. export prospects slightly (-1%) in 2019.\nIn addition to the outlook for slightly higher farm income, farm asset value is also projected up 1.5% from 2018 to $3.1 trillion. However, aggregate farm debt is projected record large at $426.7 billion\u2014up 3.9% from 2018. Farm asset values reflect farm investors' and lenders' expectations about long-term profitability of farm sector investments. USDA farmland values are projected to rise 1.8% in 2019, similar to the increases of 1.9% in 2018 and 2.3% in 2017. Because they comprise such a significant portion of the U.S. farm sector's asset base (83%), change in farmland values is a critical barometer of the farm sector's financial performance. At the farm household level, average farm household incomes have been well above average U.S. household incomes since the late 1990s. However, that advantage has narrowed in recent years. In 2014, the average farm household income (including off-farm income sources) was about 77% higher than the average U.S. household income. In 2017 (the last year with comparable data), that advantage is expected to decline to 32%.\nThe outlook for below average net farm income and relatively weak prices for most major program crops signals the likelihood of continued relatively lean times ahead. The U.S. agricultural sector's well-being remains dependent on continued growth in domestic and foreign demand to sustain prices at current modest levels. In addition to commodity prices, the financial picture for the agricultural sector as a whole heading into 2019 will hinge on both domestic and international macroeconomic factors, including interest rates, economic growth, and consumer demand.\nThis report uses the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) farm income projections (as of March 6, 2019) and agricultural trade outlook update (as of February 21, 2019) to describe the U.S. farm economic outlook. According to USDA's Economic Research Service (ERS), national net farm income\u2014a key indicator of U.S. farm well-being\u2014is forecast at $69.4 billion in 2019, up $6.3 billion (+10%) from last year. The forecast rise in 2019 net farm income is the result of an increase in gross returns (up $8.5 billion or +2%)\u2014including continued payments under the trade aid package announced by USDA in July 2018\u2014partially offset by slightly higher production expenses (up $2.2 billion or +0.6%). Net farm income is calculated on an accrual basis. Net cash income (calculated on a cash-flow basis) is also projected higher in 2019 (+4.7%) to $95.7 billion.\nThe 2019 net farm income forecast is substantially below (-18%) the 10-year average of $84.8 billion (in nominal dollars)\u2014primarily the result of the outlook for continued weak prices for most major crops. Commodity prices are under pressure from a record soybean and near-record corn harvest in 2018, diminished export prospects due to an ongoing trade dispute with China, and burdensome stocks.\nGovernment payments are projected down nearly 17% from 2018 at $11.5 billion\u2014due largely to lower market facilitation payments by USDA. Market facilitation payments to qualifying agricultural producers\u2014in response to the U.S.-China trade dispute\u2014were an estimated $5.2 billion in 2018 and are projected at $3.5 billion in 2019. Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) payments are also projected lower in 2019 ($1.7 billion) versus 2018 ($3.0 billion). Payments to dairy producers under the new Dairy Margin Coverage (DMC) program are projected up over 200% at $600 million, while payments under conservation and disaster assistance are projected up in 2019 at $4.3 billion (+8.6%) and $1.4 billion (+20%).\nSince 2008, U.S. agricultural exports have accounted for a 20% share of U.S. farm and manufactured or processed agricultural sales. In 2018 total agricultural exports were estimated up 2% at $143.4 billion. However, abundant supplies in international markets, strong competition from major foreign competitors, and the ongoing U.S.-China trade dispute are expected to shift trade patterns and lower U.S. export prospects slightly (-1%) in 2019.\nIn addition to the outlook for slightly higher farm income, farm asset value is also projected up 1.5% from 2018 to $3.1 trillion. However, aggregate farm debt is projected record large at $426.7 billion\u2014up 3.9% from 2018. Farm asset values reflect farm investors' and lenders' expectations about long-term profitability of farm sector investments. USDA farmland values are projected to rise 1.8% in 2019, similar to the increases of 1.9% in 2018 and 2.3% in 2017. Because they comprise such a significant portion of the U.S. farm sector's asset base (83%), change in farmland values is a critical barometer of the farm sector's financial performance. At the farm household level, average farm household incomes have been well above average U.S. household incomes since the late 1990s. However, that advantage has narrowed in recent years. In 2014, the average farm household income (including off-farm income sources) was about 77% higher than the average U.S. household income. In 2017 (the last year with comparable data), that advantage is expected to decline to 32%.\nThe outlook for below average net farm income and relatively weak prices for most major program crops signals the likelihood of continued relatively lean times ahead. The U.S. agricultural sector's well-being remains dependent on continued growth in domestic and foreign demand to sustain prices at current modest levels. In addition to commodity prices, the financial picture for the agricultural sector as a whole heading into 2019 will hinge on both domestic and international macroeconomic factors, including interest rates, economic growth, and consumer demand.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_295"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_296","query":"The administration of elections in the United States is highly decentralized. Elections are primarily administered by thousands of state and local systems rather than a single, unified national system.\nStates and localities share responsibility for most election administration duties. Exactly how responsibilities are assigned at the state and local levels varies both between and within states, but there are some general patterns in the distribution of duties. States typically have primary responsibility for making decisions about the rules of elections (policymaking). Localities typically have primary responsibility for conducting elections in accordance with those rules (implementation). Localities, with varying contributions from states, typically also have primary responsibility for paying for the activities and resources required to conduct elections (funding).\nThe structures of the state and local systems that conduct elections also vary between and within states. Common variations include differences related to the leadership of the system, the relationship between local election officials and the state, and the population size and density of the jurisdiction the system serves. The leadership of a state or local election system may be elected or appointed, and both the leaders and the methods used to select them may be partisan, bipartisan, or nonpartisan. State officials may have more or less direct influence over local election officials, and the extent of their influence may be affected by other structural features of the state's election systems, such as the methods used to select local officials. Finally, larger election jurisdictions have different administrative advantages and challenges than smaller ones, and more urban jurisdictions have different advantages and challenges than more rural ones. These differences between jurisdictions may be reflected in structural features of the election systems that serve them, such as how the systems allocate resources and where they find specialized expertise.\nUnderstanding the duties and structures of state and local election systems may be relevant to Congress for at least two reasons. First, the way state and local election systems work can affect how well federal action on election administration serves its intended purposes. The effectiveness of federal action depends in part on how it is implemented. How it is implemented can depend, in turn, on how the state and local election systems that implement it work. Second, Congress can make or incentivize changes to the way state and local election systems work. Congress has a number of policy tools it can use to affect the administration of federal elections. The use of these tools can\u2014either intentionally or unintentionally\u2014affect the state and local election systems that administer federal elections.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_296"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_297","query":"The 116th Congress has begun to consider several issues related to two programs in the unemployment insurance (UI) system: Unemployment Compensation (UC) and Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE). The lapse in federal appropriations that occurred from December 22, 2018, to January 25, 2019, created a partial government shutdown. As a result, agencies without funding furloughed many federal employees, and many federal employees excepted from furlough were working without pay during the lapse in appropriations. Furloughed federal employees may be eligible for UCFE benefits. Private-sector workers who are furloughed or laid off due to the partial government shutdown because they were employed by government contractors may be eligible for regular UC benefits. But, according to guidance from the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), excepted federal employees who are performing services (without pay) would generally be ineligible for UCFE benefits based on states' definitions of \"unemployment.\" In this climate, there has been congressional interest in assisting furloughed and excepted federal employees through the UI system.\nUI legislative issues currently facing the 116th Congress include the following:\nthe effects of the FY2019 sequester order on UI programs and benefits, the role of UI in providing temporary income replacement during a government shutdown, state fiscal concerns related to financing UC benefits, reemployment services and eligibility assessments (RESEA), potential consideration of the UI proposals included in the President's FY2020 budget, and congressional oversight related to a proposed UC drug testing rule reissued by DOL after previously being disapproved using the Congressional Review Act.\nIn the 116th Congress, policymakers have introduced legislation related to UCFE benefits in response to the recent partial government shutdown (S. 165, H.R. 720, H.R. 725, and H.R. 1117), legislation to provide self-employment and relocation assistance benefits (S. 136 and H.R. 556), legislation to require that states consider an individual who quit employment because of sexual harassment, domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking to be eligible for UC benefits (H.R. 1585), and legislation to amend Title III of the Social Security Act to extend RESEA to all UC claimants (H.R. 1759).\nFor a brief overview of UC, see CRS In Focus IF10336, The Fundamentals of Unemployment Compensation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_297"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_298","query":"The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) is the Army's proposed replacement for the Vietnam-era M-113 personnel carriers, which are still in service in a variety of support capacities in Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs). While M-113s no longer serve as infantry fighting vehicles, five variants of the M-113 are used as command and control vehicles, general purpose vehicles, mortar carriers, and medical treatment and evacuation vehicles.\nThe AMPV is intended to be a nondevelopmental program (candidate vehicles will be either existing vehicles or modified existing vehicles\u2014not vehicles that are specially designed and not currently in service). Some suggest a nondevelopmental vehicle might make it easier for the Army to eventually field this system to the force, as most of the Army's past developmental programs, such as the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV), the Future Combat System (FCS), the Crusader self-propelled artillery system, and the Comanche helicopter, were cancelled before they could be fully developed and fielded.\nOn November 26, 2013, the Army issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the AMPV. This RFP stipulated the Army planned to award a five-year Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) contract in May 2014 worth $458 million to a single contractor for 29 prototypes. While the March 2013 RFP established an Average Unit Manufacturing Cost Ceiling for each AMPV at $1.8 million, this was rescinded to permit vendors greater flexibility. The EMD phase was scheduled to run between FY2015 and FY2019, followed by three years of low-rate initial production (LRIP) starting in 2020. As of 2018, the Army planned to procure 2,936 AMPVs to replace M-113s in ABCTs. The Army also has plans to replace 1,922 M-113s at Echelons Above Brigade (EAB), and the Department of Defense (DOD) estimates that if the M-113s are replaced by AMPVs at EAB, total program costs could be increased by an additional $6.5 billion. While the Army would like a pure fleet of AMPVs, budgetary constraints could preclude this.\nOn December 23, 2014, the Army announced it had selected BAE Systems Land and Armaments L.P. as the winner of the EMD contract. The initial award was for 52 months, valued at about $382 million. In addition, the award provided for an optional low-rate initial production (LRIP) phase. The EMD contract did not include EAB AMPV variants. The AMPV reportedly successfully completed its Critical Design Review (CDR) on June 23, 2016. On December 15, 2016, BAE delivered the first general purpose AMPV to the Army for testing. In September 2017, the Army began AMPV reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) testing. Also in 2017, based on budgetary constraints, the Army decided it would upgrade a number of EAB M-113s instead of replacing them with AMPVs. In May 2018, the Army decided to put the EAB M-113 upgrade effort on hold. On March 13, 2019, Army leadership reportedly announced the Army had decided to cut funding over the next five years for 93 programs\u2014including the AMPV\u2014to increase available funding for its new modernization strategy. This cut is not expected to affect the overall AMPV requirement but could slow the AMPV production rate.\nOther program issues include DOD Inspector General (IG) concerns regarding performance and design concerns, as well as inaccurate procurement quantities, which could result in inaccurate program costs. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2018 expressed concerns regarding cost growth, difficulties meeting a variety of developmental requirements, and dependencies on other programs that are experiencing developmental challenges.\nPotential issues for Congress include a \"way ahead\" for upgraded M-113s at EAB, DOD Inspector General (IG) and GAO concerns, and the potential revised AMPV procurement rate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_298"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_299","query":"In 1994, Congress passed and President Clinton signed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-322), which, among other things, made prisoners ineligible for Pell Grants. However, concerns about the financial and social costs of the growing prison population combined with concerns about the recidivism rate of released prisoners have led some policymakers to reconsider whether prisoners should be allowed to use Pell Grants to help cover the cost of postsecondary coursework. Pell Grants are intended to assist in making the benefits of postsecondary education available to eligible students who demonstrate financial need.\nUnder Department of Education (ED) regulations, any student who is \"serving a criminal sentence in a federal or state penitentiary, prison, jail, reformatory, work farm, or other similar correctional institution\" is not eligible to receive a Pell Grant. However, in 2015 ED used its authority under the Higher Education Act (HEA) to create the Second Chance Pell Experiment to determine if access to Pell Grants would increase the enrollment of incarcerated individuals in high-quality postsecondary correctional education programs. Under the experiment, participating institutions of higher education, in partnership with federal and\/or state correctional institutions, award Pell Grants to students who are otherwise Pell-eligible except for being incarcerated in a federal or state institution. The experiment is expected to conclude in 2020.\nThere are several issues policymakers might consider if Congress chooses to take up legislation to reinstate prisoners' eligibility for Pell Grants, including the following:\nThe Pell Grant program is a need based program that provides funds to all that qualify. Thus, restoring Pell Grant eligibility to all federal and state prisoners will increase Pell Grant program costs. Should tax dollars be used to educate convicted offenders before they are released from prison? There are some prisoners who have been sentenced to death, whose sentences exceed their life expectancy, or who might be civilly committed indefinitely under sexually dangerous persons statutes after they have served their prison sentences. Should these prisoners be eligible to receive Pell Grants? Educational attainment is lower among incarcerated adults than non-incarcerated adults and even prisoners with high school diplomas or general education development (GED) certificates might need additional assistance to help them prepare for the rigors of postsecondary education. Is there a need for additional investment in remedial education or adult basic education for prisoners to help them prepare for postsecondary education classes? Under current law and regulation, to be eligible for a Pell Grant males who are subject to registration with the Selective Service System (SSS) must register or prove they were either not required by SSS to register or failed to register for an ED-qualifying reason. There is a higher incidence of not registering among men who have been incarcerated during some or all of the period between ages 18 to 25. Should this requirement be retained for incarcerated men, or should the process for proving exceptions be modified to facilitate Pell Grant eligibility for incarcerated men? There is a lack of rigorous evaluations that have isolated the effects postsecondary education has on recidivism, and little research on the best way to deliver postsecondary education in prisons. Should Congress take steps to promote data collection on the availability of, and participation in, postsecondary education to advance research on the effects of postsecondary education on recidivism? There can be barriers to providing educational programming in a correctional environment (e.g., lack of classroom space and trained instructors, limitations on internet access) regardless of Pell Grant receipt. Are there steps Congress could take to mitigate these barriers? A criminal history can be a barrier to securing employment in a variety of fields, either because some convicted offenders are prohibited from working in certain jobs due to a provision in law or regulation, or because employers are wary of hiring someone with a criminal history. Is there interest in undertaking any efforts to reduce the collateral consequences of a criminal history on post-release employment to allow the incarcerated student to fully realize the benefits of postsecondary education?","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_299"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_300","query":"Recent debates about U.S. nuclear weapons have questioned what role weapons with shorter ranges and lower yields can play in addressing emerging threats in Europe and Asia. These weapons, often referred to as nonstrategic nuclear weapons, have not been limited by past U.S.-Russian arms control agreements, although some analysts argue such limits would be of value, particularly in addressing Russia's greater numbers of these types of weapons. Others have argued that the United States should expand its deployments of these weapons, in both Europe and Asia, to address new risks of war conducted under a nuclear shadow. The Trump Administration addressed these questions in the Nuclear Posture Review released in February 2018, and determined that the United States should acquire two new types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons: a new low-yield warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles and a new sea-launched cruise missile.\nDuring the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union both deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons for use in the field during a conflict. While there are several ways to distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons, most analysts consider nonstrategic weapons to be shorter-range delivery systems with lower-yield warheads that might be used to attack troops or facilities on the battlefield. They have included nuclear mines; artillery; short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and gravity bombs. In contrast with the longer-range \"strategic\" nuclear weapons, these weapons had a lower profile in policy debates and arms control negotiations, possibly because they did not pose a direct threat to the continental United States. At the end of the 1980s, each nation still had thousands of these weapons deployed with their troops in the field, aboard naval vessels, and on aircraft.\nIn 1991, the United States and Soviet Union both withdrew from deployment most and eliminated from their arsenals many of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The United States now has approximately 500 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, with around 200 deployed with aircraft in Europe and the remaining stored in the United States. Estimates vary, but experts believe Russia still has between 1,000 and 6,000 warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons in its arsenal. The Bush Administration quietly redeployed some U.S. weapons deployed in Europe, while the Obama Administration retired older sea-launched cruise missiles. Russia, however seems to have increased its reliance on nuclear weapons in its national security concept.\nAnalysts have identified a number of issues with the continued deployment of U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. These include questions about the safety and security of Russia's weapons and the possibility that some might be lost, stolen, or sold to another nation or group; questions about the role of these weapons in U.S. and Russian security policy; questions about the role that these weapons play in NATO policy and whether there is a continuing need for the United States to deploy them at bases overseas; questions about the implications of the disparity in numbers between U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons; and questions about the relationship between nonstrategic nuclear weapons and U.S. nonproliferation policy.\nSome argue that these weapons do not create any problems and the United States should not alter its policy. Others argue that the United States should expand its deployments of these weapons in response to challenges from Russia, China, and North Korea. Some believe the United States should reduce its reliance on these weapons and encourage Russia to do the same. Many have suggested that the United States and Russia expand efforts to cooperate on ensuring the safe and secure storage and elimination of these weapons; others have suggested that they negotiate an arms control treaty that would limit these weapons and allow for increased transparency in monitoring their deployment and elimination. The 115th Congress may review some of these proposals.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_300"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_301","query":"The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), administered by the Department of Energy (DOE), has played a role in U.S. energy policy for over 40 years. Over that time, its primary focus has changed from its original intent as world oil market conditions have changed. Originally intended to offset the market power of cartels and prevent economic damage from oil supply disruption, it has become primarily a tool for combatting the fuel market effects of domestic natural disasters like hurricanes. Most recently, U.S. net imports of oil and petroleum products have decreased as a result of the increase in domestic oil production. Because of lower reliance on imports, some stakeholders see less need for an oil stockpile, and view the SPR more as a mechanism for providing funding for a wide variety of legislative purposes, ranging from health care, to highways, and general purpose revenues. Over this period, the SPR has expanded its potential usefulness to cover all of these purposes.\nAs a member of the International Energy Agency (IEA) and a participant in the International Energy Program established by the IEA, the United States, as are all net-importer nations in the IEA, is required to hold the equivalent of 90 days of its net imports of oil and petroleum products as a reserve stock. As a result of relatively stable U.S. oil consumption and rapidly increasing production, and declining net imports, available oil stocks held in the SPR now are almost double the 90-day requirement.\nWhile the SPR has recently seen relatively little use in combatting oil supply disruptions caused by political and military instability, or even natural disasters, it has provided a source of funding for a variety of legislative initiatives. These mandated sales from the SPR have committed almost 260 million barrels of oil for sale by FY2027, leaving less than 400 million barrels of uncommitted oil reserves. Determining whether further reductions can be made from the reserve while maintaining its ability to carry out its designed purpose is a key energy policy question. The extreme variant of this question is whether a reserve is required at all, or whether privately held stocks, as practiced by most European countries, are adequate to meet international commitments.\nLegislation in the 115th Congress, H.R. 6511, sought to maintain the SPR facility and infrastructure, while reducing operating and maintenance costs, by renting unused storage capacity in the reserve to private companies and foreign nations. As of this writing, no bills have been introduced in the 116th Congress modifying the SPR.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_301"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_302","query":"Statutory individual income tax rates are the tax rates that apply by law to various amounts of taxable income. Statutory rates form the basis of marginal effective and average effective tax rates, which most economists believe have a greater impact on the economic behavior of companies and individuals than do statutory rates. Marginal effective rates capture the net effect of special tax provisions on statutory rates. They differ from average effective rates, which measure someone's overall income tax burden.\nCurrent statutory and effective individual tax rates are the result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86; P.L. 99-514) and several tax laws that have been enacted since then. Of particular importance among the latter are the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA90; P.L. 101-508), the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA93; P.L. 103-66), the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA; P.L. 107-16), the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (TRUC; P.L. 111-312), the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA, P.L. 112-240), and the tax rate changes contained in the 2017 tax revision (P.L. 115-97). TRA86 altered the income tax rate structure. EGTRRA established what are referred to as the Bush-era tax cuts for individuals. TRUC extended those cuts for another two years, through 2012. ATRA permanently extended the Bush-era tax rates for taxpayers with taxable incomes below $400,000 for single filers and $450,000 for joint filers but reinstated the 39.6% top rate established by OBRA93 for taxpayers with taxable incomes equal to or above those amounts. And P.L. 115-97 lowered individual tax rates for all income groups except those subject to the 10% and 35% brackets under previous law.\nOrdinary income is taxed at seven statutory individual income tax rates, from 2018 to 2026: 10%, 12%, 22%, 24%, 32%, 35%, and 37%. (Starting in 2026, these rates will revert to their levels in 2017.) Income from long-term capital gains and dividends is taxed at 0% for single filers with capital gains below $39,375 (below $78,750 for joint filers), 15% for single filers with capital gains between $39,375 and $434,550 (between $78,750 and $488,850 for joint filers), and 20% for single filers with capital gains above $434,550 (above $488,850 for joint filers). Since 2013, a 3.8% tax has been imposed on the lesser of net investment income received by individuals, estates, or trusts, or the amount of their modified adjusted gross incomes above $250,000 for joint filers and $125,000 for single filers. In addition, the individual alternative minimum tax (AMT), which functions like a separate income tax in that its rate structure is narrower and tax base broader than those of the regular income tax, applies to income above exemption amounts in 2019 of $111,700 for joint filers and $71,700 for single filers; the AMT taxes income at two rates: 26% and 28%.\nTax rates and the income brackets to which they apply are not the only elements of the individual income tax that determine the tax liabilities of taxpayers. Personal exemptions, exclusions, deductions, credits, and certain other elements have an effect as well. Some of these elements are indexed for inflation. Congress added annual indexation to the individual income tax in 1981, using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers. Such a mechanism helps prevent tax increases and unintended shifts in the distribution of the tax burden that are driven by inflation alone. The indexed elements are tax rate brackets, personal exemptions and their phaseout threshold, standard deductions, the itemized deduction limitation threshold, and the exemption amounts for the AMT. Starting in 2018, these items are indexed for inflation with the Chained Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers.\nThis report summarizes the tax brackets and other key elements of the individual income tax that help determine taxpayers' marginal and average effective tax rates going back to 1988. It will be updated to reflect indexation adjustments and changes in the taxation of individual income.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_302"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_303","query":"The Small Business Administration's (SBA's) Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) program is designed to enhance small business access to venture capital by stimulating and supplementing \"the flow of private equity capital and long-term loan funds which small-business concerns need for the sound financing of their business operations and for their growth, expansion, and modernization, and which are not available in adequate supply.\" Facilitating the flow of capital to small businesses to stimulate the national economy was, and remains, the SBIC program's primary objective.\nAs of December 31, 2018, there were 305 privately owned and managed SBA-licensed SBICs providing small businesses private capital the SBIC has raised (called regulatory capital) and funds the SBIC borrows at favorable rates (called leverage) because the SBA guarantees the debenture (loan obligation). SBICs pursue investments in a broad range of industries, geographic areas, and stages of investment. Some SBICs specialize in a particular field or industry, and others invest more generally. Most SBICs concentrate on a particular stage of investment (i.e., startup, expansion, or turnaround) and geographic area.\nThe SBIC program currently has invested or committed about $30.3 billion in small businesses, with the SBA's share of capital at risk about $14.5 billion. In FY2018, the SBA committed to guarantee $2.52 billion in SBIC small business investments. SBICs invested another $2.98 billion from private capital for a total of $5.50 billion in financing for 1,151 small businesses.\nIn recent years, some Members of Congress have argued that the program should be expanded as a means to stimulate economic activity and create jobs. For example, P.L. 113-76, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, increased the annual amount of leverage the SBA is authorized to provide to SBICs to $4 billion from $3 billion. P.L. 114-113, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, increased the amount of outstanding leverage allowed for two or more SBIC licenses under common control (the multiple licenses\/family of funds limit) to $350 million from $225 million. P.L. 115-187, the Small Business Investment Opportunity Act of 2017, increased the amount of outstanding leverage allowed for individual SBICs to $175 million from $150 million. Others worry that an expanded SBIC program could result in losses and increase the federal deficit. In their view, the best means to assist small business, promote economic growth, and create jobs is to reduce business taxes and exercise federal fiscal restraint.\nSome Members have also proposed that the program target additional assistance to startup and early stage small businesses, which are generally viewed as relatively risky investments but also as having a relatively high potential for job creation. During the Obama Administration, the SBA established a five-year, early stage SBIC initiative. Early stage SBICs are required to invest at least 50% of their investments in early stage small businesses, defined as small businesses that have never achieved positive cash flow from operations in any fiscal year. The SBA stopped accepting new applicants for the early stage SBIC initiative in 2017.\nThis report describes the SBIC program's structure and operations, focusing on SBIC eligibility requirements, investment activity, and program statistics. It also includes information concerning the SBIC program's debenture SBIC program, participating securities SBIC program, impact investment SBIC program (targeting underserved markets and communities facing barriers to access to credit and capital), and early stage SBIC initiative.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_303"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_304","query":"The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for civil works projects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE); the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and Central Utah Project (CUP); the Department of Energy (DOE); the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); and several other independent agencies. DOE typically accounts for about 80% of the bill's funding.\nPresident Trump submitted his FY2020 detailed budget proposal to Congress on March 18, 2019 (after submitting a general budget overview on March 11). The budget requests for agencies included in the Energy and Water Development appropriations bill total $38.02 billion\u2014$6.64 billion (15%) below the FY2019 appropriation. The largest exception to the overall decrease proposed for energy and water programs is a $1.309 billion increase (12%) for DOE nuclear weapons activities.\nFor FY2019, the conference agreement on H.R. 5895 (H.Rept. 115-929) provided total Energy and Water Development appropriations of $44.66 billion\u20143% above the FY2018 level, excluding supplemental funding, and 23% above the FY2019 request. It was signed by the President on September 21, 2018 (P.L. 115-244). Emergency supplemental appropriations totaling $17.419 billion were provided to USACE and DOE for hurricane response by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), signed February 9, 2018.\nMajor Energy and Water Development funding issues for FY2020 are listed below. They were selected based on the total funding involved, the percentage of proposed increases or decreases, and potential impact on broader public policy considerations.\nWater Agency Funding Reductions. The Trump Administration requested reductions of 31% for USACE and 29% for Reclamation for FY2020 from the FY2019 enacted levels. The largest reductions would be from USACE Operation and Maintenance (-48%) and Reclamation's Water and Related Resources account (-31%). Similar reductions proposed by the Administration for FY2019 were not enacted. Power Marketing Administration (PMA) Reforms. DOE's FY2020 budget request includes mandatory proposals to sell PMA electricity transmission lines and other assets, repeal certain PMA borrowing authority, and eliminate cost-based limits on the electricity rates charged by the PMAs. The proposals would need to be enacted in authorizing legislation. Termination of Energy Efficiency Grants. DOE's Weatherization Assistance Program and State Energy Program would be terminated under the FY2020 budget request. The Administration had proposed to eliminate the grants in FY2018 and FY2019, but Congress continued funding. Reductions in Energy Research and Development. Under the FY2020 budget request, DOE research and development appropriations would be reduced for energy efficiency and renewable energy (EERE) by 83%, nuclear energy by 38%, and fossil energy by 24%. Similar reductions proposed by the Administration for FY2019 were not enacted. Nuclear Waste Repository. The Administration's budget request would provide new funding for the first time since FY2010 for a proposed nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV. DOE would receive $116 million to seek an NRC license for the repository and develop interim waste storage capacity. NRC would receive $38.5 million to consider DOE's repository license application. Similar Administration funding requests for FY2018 and FY2019 were not enacted. Elimination of Advanced Research Projects Agency\u2014Energy (ARPA-E). The Trump Administration proposes no new appropriations for ARPA-E in FY2020 and to cancel $287 million in unobligated balances from previous appropriations. Similar proposals to terminate ARPA-E in FY2018 and FY2019 were not enacted. Loan Programs Termination. The FY2020 budget request would terminate DOE's Title 17 Innovative Technology Loan Guarantee Program, the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Loan Program, and the Tribal Energy Loan Guarantee Program. Administration proposals to eliminate the programs were not included in the enacted appropriations measures for FY2018 and FY2019. Weapons Activities. The FY2020 budget request for DOE Weapons Activities is 12% greater than it was in FY2019 ($12.4 billion vs. $11.1 billion), in contrast to a proposed 10% reduction in DOE's total funding. Notable proposed increases would be used for warhead life extension programs and preparations for increase production of plutonium pits (warhead cores).","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_304"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_305","query":"The Public Safety Officers' Benefits (PSOB) program provides cash benefits to federal, state, and local law enforcement officers; firefighters; employees of emergency management agencies; and members of emergency medical services agencies who are killed or permanently and totally disabled as the result of personal injuries sustained in the line of duty. The Public Safety Officers' Educational Assistance (PSOEA) program, a component of the PSOB program, provides higher-education assistance to the children and spouses of public safety officers killed or permanently disabled in the line of duty.\nThe PSOB and PSOEA programs are administered by the Department of Justice (DOJ), Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). However, claimants dissatisfied with denials of benefits may pursue administrative appeals within DOJ and may seek judicial review before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.\nEach year, Congress appropriates funding for PSOB death benefits, which is considered mandatory spending, and for PSOB disability benefits and PSOEA benefits, which is subject to annual appropriations.\nFor FY2019, the one-time lump-sum PSOB death and disability benefit is $359,316 and the PSOEA monthly benefit for a student attending an educational institution full-time is $1,224.\nIn FY2017, the DOJ approved 399 claims for PSOB death benefits, 82 claims for PSOB disability benefits, and 601 claims for PSOEA benefits.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_305"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_306","query":"Throughout its history, the Department of Defense (DOD) has relied on contractors to support a wide range of military operations. Operations over the last thirty years have highlighted the critical role that contractors play in supporting U.S. troops\u2014both in terms of the number of contractors and the type of work being performed. During recent U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, contractors often accounted for 50% or more of the total DOD presence in-country.\nFor the fourth quarter of fiscal year (FY) 2018, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) reported 49,451 contractor personnel working for DOD within its area of responsibility, which included 28,189 individuals located in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. From FY2009 to FY2018, obligations for all DOD-funded contracts performed within the Iraq and Afghanistan areas of operation totaled approximately $208 billion in FY2019 dollars.\nIn late 2017, the DOD stopped reporting the number of U.S. military personnel deployed in support of operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria as part of its quarterly manpower reports and in other official releases. These data remain withheld.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_306"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_307","query":"The Social Security program pays monthly cash benefits to retired or disabled workers and their family members and to the family members of deceased workers. Program income and outgo are accounted for in two separate trust funds authorized under Title II of the Social Security Act: the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund and the Federal Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund. Projections show that the OASI fund will remain solvent until 2034, whereas the DI fund will remain solvent until 2052, meaning that each trust fund is projected to be able to pay benefits scheduled under current law in full and on time up to that point. Following the depletion of trust fund reserves (2052 for DI and 2034 for OASI), continuing income to each fund is projected to cover 91% of DI scheduled benefits and 77% of OASI scheduled benefits. The two trust funds are legally distinct and do not have authority to borrow from each other. However, Congress has authorized the shifting of funds between OASI and DI in the past to address shortfalls in a particular fund. Therefore, this CRS report discusses the operations of the OASI and DI trust funds on a combined basis, referring to them collectively as the Social Security trust funds. On a combined basis, the trust funds are projected to remain solvent until 2035. Following depletion of combined trust fund reserves at that point, continuing income is projected to cover 80% of scheduled benefits.\nSocial Security is financed by payroll taxes paid by covered workers and their employers, federal income taxes paid by some beneficiaries on a portion of their benefits, and interest income from the Social Security trust fund investments. Social Security tax revenues are invested in U.S. government securities (special issues) held by the trust funds, and these securities earn interest. The tax revenues exchanged for the U.S. government securities are deposited into the General Fund of the Treasury and are indistinguishable from revenues in the General Fund that come from other sources. Because the assets held by the trust funds are U.S. government securities, the trust fund balance represents the amount of money owed to the Social Security trust funds by the General Fund of the Treasury. Funds needed to pay Social Security benefits and administrative expenses come from the redemption or sale of U.S. government securities held by the trust funds.\nThe Social Security trust funds represent funds dedicated to pay current and future Social Security benefits. However, it is useful to view the trust funds in two ways: (1) as an internal federal accounting concept and (2) as the accumulated holdings of the Social Security program.\nBy law, Social Security tax revenues must be invested in U.S. government obligations (debt instruments of the U.S. government). The accumulated holdings of U.S. government obligations are often viewed as being similar to assets held by any other trust on behalf of the beneficiaries. However, the holdings of the Social Security trust funds differ from those of private trusts because (1) the types of investments the trust funds may hold are limited and (2) the U.S. government is both the buyer and seller of the investments.\nThis report covers how the Social Security program is financed and how the Social Security trust funds work.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_307"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_308","query":"The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) offers several programs to help farmers recover financially from natural disasters, including drought and floods. All the programs have permanent authorization, and one requires a federal disaster designation (the emergency loan program). Most programs receive mandatory funding amounts that are \"such sums as necessary\" and are not subject to annual discretionary appropriations.\nThe federal crop insurance program offers subsidized policies designed to protect crop producers from risks associated with adverse weather, as well as weather-related plant diseases and insect infestations and declines in commodity prices. Policies must be purchased prior to the planting season. Eligible commodities include most major crops and many specialty crops (including fruit, tree nut, vegetable, and nursery crops), as well as forage and pastureland for livestock producers. Producers who grow a crop that is currently ineligible for crop insurance may apply for the Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program (NAP). NAP provides a catastrophic level of coverage, as well as options to purchase additional coverage. Similar to crop insurance, policies must be purchased prior to the planting season.\nThere are four permanently reauthorized disaster programs for livestock and trees. Producers do not pay a fee to participate, and advanced sign-up is not required. The programs are:\n1. the Livestock Indemnity Program (LIP), which provides payments to eligible livestock owners and contract growers at a rate of 75% of market value for livestock deaths in excess of normal mortality or sold at a reduced sale price caused by adverse weather, attacks by reintroduced wild animals, and disease; 2. the Livestock Forage Disaster Program (LFP), which makes payments to eligible livestock producers who have suffered grazing losses on drought-affected pasture or grazing land or on rangeland managed by a federal agency due to a qualifying fire; 3. the Emergency Assistance for Livestock, Honey Bees, and Farm-Raised Fish Program (ELAP), which provides payments to producers of livestock, honey bees, and farm-raised fish as compensation for losses due to disease, adverse weather, and feed or water shortages; and 4. the Tree Assistance Program (TAP), which makes payments to orchardists\/nursery tree growers for losses in excess of 15% to replant trees, bushes, and vines damaged by natural disasters.\nSeparately, for all types of farms and ranches, when a county has been declared a disaster area by either the President or the Secretary of Agriculture, producers in that county may become eligible for low-interest emergency disaster loans.\nUSDA has several permanent disaster assistance programs designed to help producers repair damaged land following natural disasters. It also has authority to issue disaster payments to farmers with funds from \"Section 32,\" or the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). Finally, USDA can use a variety of existing programs to address disaster issues as they arise, such as allowing emergency grazing on land enrolled in the Conservation Reserve Program.\nThe Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-334) made a number of amendments to the permanent farm bill disaster assistance programs, NAP, and crop insurance, including changes to payment limits, definitions, eligibility, and coverage.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_308"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_309","query":"Congress created offices of inspector general (OIGs) to assist in its oversight of the executive branch. OIGs provide independent, nonpartisan analysis, conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, to identify and recommend ways to limit waste, fraud, and abuse in federal programs and enhance program and operational efficiency and effectiveness. OIGs' activities supplement and complement those of the Government Accountability Office (GAO), which serves a similar, though not identical, role in assisting congressional oversight of the executive branch. Together, OIGs and GAO provide Congress with information and analysis needed to conduct effective oversight and, in the process, help Congress maintain its balance of power with the presidency.\nOIGs exist in more than 70 federal agencies, including all departments and larger agencies, numerous boards and commissions, and other entities. The U.S. Small Business Administration's Office of Inspector General (SBA OIG) was created under authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-452, as amended). Its three primary statutory purposes are to\n1. conduct and supervise audits and investigations of the SBA's programs and operations; 2. recommend policies designed to promote the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the SBA's programs and operations and to prevent and detect fraud and abuse; and 3. keep both the SBA Administrator and Congress \"fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations and the necessity for and progress of corrective action.\"\nDuring FY2018, the SBA OIG issued 26 audit reports containing 111 recommendations for improving the SBA's programs and operations, and its investigations resulted in 62 indictments or informations and 43 convictions. The SBA OIG claimed that its recommendations resulted in monetary savings and recoveries of nearly $224.5 million in FY2018. In addition, the SBA OIG's annual Report on the Most Serious Management and Performance Challenges Facing the SBA focuses attention \"on areas that are particularly vulnerable to fraud, waste, error, and mismanagement, or otherwise pose a significant risk and generally have been subject to one or more OIG or GAO reports.\"\nThis report examines the SBA OIG's statutory authorities; reporting requirements; funding ($22.9 million in FY2018); staffing and organizational structure; and recent activities (audits, investigations, etc.). It also examines the SBA OIG's impact on monetary savings, SBA programs and operations, and legislation affecting the agency. The report concludes with observations concerning the SBA OIG's relationship with Congress.\nSome areas of possible congressional interest, other than SBA OIG funding and staffing issues, include exploring ways to more accurately quantify the SBA OIG's claims of monetary savings and to determine if the SBA OIG should undertake additional tracking and monitoring activities to more accurately quantify the office's impact on SBA programs, operations, and legislation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_309"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_310","query":"The farm bill is an omnibus, multiyear law that governs an array of agricultural and food programs. The farm bill has typically undergone reauthorization about every five years. The current farm bill\u2014the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-334), often called the \"2018 farm bill\"\u2014was enacted in December 2018 and expires in 2023.\nThe farm bill provides an opportunity for Congress to choose how much support, if any, to provide for various agriculture and nutrition programs and how to allocate it among competing constituencies. Under congressional budgeting rules, many programs are assumed to continue beyond the end of a farm bill. From a budgetary perspective, this provides a baseline for comparing future spending reauthorizations, reallocations to other programs, and reductions to projected spending. Since 2000, congressional goals for the farm bill's budget have varied: The 2002 farm bill increased spending over 10 years, the 2008 farm bill was essentially budget neutral, the 2014 farm bill reduced spending, and the 2018 farm bill is budget neutral, according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).\nThe farm bill authorizes programs in two spending categories: mandatory spending and discretionary spending. Mandatory spending is not only authorized but also actually provided via budget enforcement rules. Discretionary spending may be authorized in a farm bill but is not actually provided until budget decisions are made in a future annual appropriations act.\nThe CBO baseline is a projection at a particular point in time of future federal spending on mandatory programs under current law. When a new bill is proposed that would affect mandatory spending, the cost impact (score) is measured in relation to the baseline. Changes that increase spending relative to the baseline have a positive score; those that decrease spending relative to the baseline have a negative score. Federal budget rules such as \"PayGo\" may require budgetary offsets to balance new spending so that there is no increase in the federal deficit.\nThe April 2018 CBO baseline was the official benchmark to measure changes made by the 2018 farm bill. The five-year baseline was $426 billion over FY2019-FY2023 (what the 2014 farm bill would have spent had it been continued). The budgetary impact of the 2018 farm bill is measured relative to that baseline. Among its impacts are these four points:\n1. The enacted farm bill increases net outlays in the first five years by $1.8 billion, which is offset by the same amount of net reductions in outlays during the second five years. Therefore, over 10 years, the net impact is budget neutral. 2. Eight titles in the enacted law have increased outlays over the five-year period, including Farm Commodities, Conservation, Trade, Nutrition, Research, Energy, Horticulture, and Miscellaneous. Two of those titles\u2014Conservation and Nutrition\u2014have reductions in the second five years of the budget window that make them budget neutral over 10 years. 3. Most of the budget reductions at the title level that provide offsets for the increases above, especially in the 10-year budget window, are from changes in the rural development title. 4. The 2018 farm bill provides continuing funding and, in some cases, permanent baseline, for 23 of the 39 so-called programs without baseline from the 2014 farm bill.\nProjected outlays for the 2018 farm bill at enactment are $428 billion over the FY2019-FY2023 five-year life of the act. The Nutrition title and its largest program, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), account for $326 billion (76%) of those projected outlays. The remaining 24%, $102 billion, is for agricultural programs, mostly in crop insurance (8.9%), farm commodity programs (7.3%), and conservation (6.8%). Other titles of the farm bill account for 1% of the mandatory spending, some of which are funded primarily with discretionary spending.\nHistorical trends in farm bill spending show increased SNAP outlays after the 2009 recession, increased crop insurance outlays based on insurable coverage, farm commodity programs outlays that vary inversely with markets, and steadily increasing conservation program outlays that have leveled off in recent years.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_310"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_311","query":"In response to concerns over the adequacy of firefighter staffing, the Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response Act, known as the SAFER Act, was enacted by the 108th Congress as Section 1057 of the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 108-136). The SAFER Act authorizes grants to career, volunteer, and combination local fire departments for the purpose of increasing the number of firefighters to help communities meet industry-minimum standards and attain 24-hour staffing to provide adequate protection from fire and fire-related hazards. Also authorized are grants to volunteer fire departments for recruitment and retention of volunteers. SAFER is administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).\nOn January 3, 2018, the President signed the United States Fire Administration, AFG, and SAFER Program Reauthorization Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-98). P.L. 115-98 extends the SAFER and AFG authorizations through FY2023; extends the sunset provisions for SAFER and AFG through September 30, 2024; provides that the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) may develop and make widely available an online training course on SAFER and AFG grant administration; expands SAFER hiring grant eligibility to cover the conversion of part-time or paid-on-call firefighters to full-time firefighters; directs FEMA, acting through the Administrator of USFA, to develop and implement a grant monitoring and oversight framework to mitigate and minimize risks of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement related to the AFG and SAFER grant programs; and makes various technical corrections to the SAFER and AFG statute.\nThe Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6) provided $700 million for firefighter assistance in FY2019, including $350 million for SAFER and $350 million for AFG. For FY2020, the Administration requested $688.688 million for firefighter assistance, including $344.344 million for SAFER and $344.344 million for AFG. This is the same amount the Administration requested in its FY2019 budget proposal and a 1.6% reduction from the FY2019 appropriation.\nAn overall issue for the 116th Congress is how equitably and effectively grants are being distributed and used to protect the health and safety of the public and firefighting personnel against fire and fire-related hazards. Another continuing issue is budget appropriations for SAFER and AFG. As is the case with many federal programs, concerns over the federal budget deficit could impact budget levels for SAFER and AFG. At the same time, firefighter assistance budgets will likely receive heightened scrutiny from the fire service community, given the local budgetary shortfalls that many fire departments may face.\nAdditionally, a continuing issue related to SAFER hiring grants has been whether SAFER statutory restrictions should be waived to permit grantees to use SAFER funds for retention and rehiring. Division F, Title III, Section 307 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 stated that FEMA \"may\" grant SAFER waiver authority. However, for the 2018 round of SAFER awards, FEMA has chosen not to exercise that authority, and thus will not provide SAFER hiring grants for retaining or rehiring firefighters. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6) also includes SAFER waiver authority for the FY2019 round of SAFER awards. The Administration's FY2020 budget proposal does not request SAFER waiver authority.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_311"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_312","query":"The House minority leader, the head of the \"loyal opposition,\" is elected every two years by secret ballot of his or her party caucus or conference. The minority leader occupies a number of important institutional and party roles and responsibilities, and his or her fundamental goal is to recapture majority control of the House.\nFrom a party perspective, the minority leader has a wide range of assignments, all geared toward retaking majority control of the House. Five principal party activities direct the work of the minority leader. First, he or she provides campaign assistance to party incumbents and challengers. Second, the minority leader devises strategies, in consultation with like-minded colleagues, to advance party objectives. Third, the minority leader works to promote and publicize the party's agenda. Fourth, the minority leader, if his or her party controls the White House, confers regularly with the President and his aides about issues before Congress, the Administration's agenda, and political events generally. Fifth, the minority leader strives to promote party harmony so as to maximize the chances for legislative and political success.\nFrom an institutional perspective, the rules of the House assign a number of specific responsibilities to the minority leader. For example, Rule XIII, clause 6, grants the minority leader (or a designee) the right to offer a motion to recommit with instructions; and Rule II, clause 6, states that the Inspector General shall be appointed by joint recommendation of the Speaker, majority leader, and minority leader. The minority leader also has other institutional duties, such as appointing individuals to certain federal or congressional entities.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_312"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_313","query":"The \"child nutrition programs\" refer to the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service (USDA-FNS) programs that provide food for children in school or institutional settings. The best known programs, which serve the largest number of children, are the school meals programs: the National School Lunch Program (NSLP) and the School Breakfast Program (SBP). The child nutrition programs also include the Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP), which provides meals and snacks in day care and after school settings; the Summer Food Service Program (SFSP), which provides food during the summer months; the Special Milk Program (SMP), which supports milk for schools that do not participate in NSLP or SBP; and the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program (FFVP), which funds fruit and vegetable snacks in select elementary schools.\nFunding: The vast majority of the child nutrition programs account is considered mandatory spending, with trace amounts of discretionary funding for certain related activities. Referred to as open-ended, \"appropriated entitlements,\" funding is provided through the annual appropriations process; however, the level of spending is controlled by benefit and eligibility criteria in federal law and dependent on the resulting levels of participation. Federal cash funding (in the form of per-meal reimbursements) and USDA commodity food support is guaranteed to schools and other providers based on the number of meals or snacks served and participant category (e.g., free meals for poor children get higher subsidies).\nParticipation: The child nutrition programs serve children of varying ages and in different institutional settings. The NSLP and SBP have the broadest reach, serving qualifying children of all ages in school settings. Other child nutrition programs serve more-narrow populations. CACFP, for example, provides meals and snacks to children in early childhood and after-school settings among other venues. Programs generally provide some subsidy for all food served but a larger federal reimbursement for food served to children from low-income households.\nAdministration: Responsibility for child nutrition programs is divided between the federal government, states, and localities. The state agency and type of local provider differs by program. In the NSLP and SBP, schools and school districts (\"school food authorities\") administer the program. Meanwhile, SFSP (and sometimes CACFP) uses a model in which sponsor organizations handle administrative responsibilities for a number of sites that serve meals.\nReauthorization: The underlying laws covering the child nutrition programs were last reauthorized in the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (HHFKA, P.L. 111-296, enacted December 13, 2010). This law made significant changes to child nutrition programs, including increasing federal financing for school lunches, expanding access to community eligibility and direct certification options for schools, and expanding eligibility options for home child care providers. The law also required an update to school meal nutrition guidelines as well as new guidelines for food served outside the meal programs (e.g., snacks sold in vending machines and cafeteria a la carte lines).\nCurrent Issues: The 114th Congress began but did not complete a 2016 child nutrition reauthorization, and there was no significant legislative activity with regard to reauthorization in the 115th Congress. However, the vast majority of operations and activities continue with funding provided by appropriations laws. Current issues in the child nutrition programs are discussed in CRS Report R45486, Child Nutrition Programs: Current Issues.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_313"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_314","query":"Streamgages are fixed structures at streams, rivers, lakes, and reservoirs that measure water level and related streamflow\u2014the amount of water flowing through a water body over time. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) in the Department of the Interior operates streamgages in every state, the District of Columbia, and the territories of Puerto Rico and Guam. The USGS Streamgaging Network encompasses 10,300 streamgages, which record water levels or streamflow for at least a portion of the year. Approximately 8,200 of these streamgages measure streamflow year round as part of the National Streamflow Network. The USGS also deploys temporary rapid deployment gages to measure water levels during storm events, and select streamgages measure water quality.\nStreamgages provide foundational information for diverse applications that affect a variety of constituents. The USGS disseminates streamgage data free to the public and responds to over 670 million requests annually. Direct users of streamgage data include a variety of agencies at all levels of government, private companies, scientific institutions, and recreationists. Data from streamgages inform real-time decisionmaking and long-term planning on issues such as water management and energy development, infrastructure design, water compacts, water science research, flood mapping and forecasting, water quality, ecosystem management, and recreational safety.\nCongress has provided the USGS with authority and appropriations to conduct surveys of streamflow since establishing the first hydrological survey in 1889. Many streamgages are operated cooperatively with nonfederal partners, who approach the USGS and sign joint-funding agreements to share the cost of streamgages and data collection. The USGS Cooperative Matching Funds (CMF) Program provides up to a 50% match with tribal, regional, state, and local partners, as authorized by 43 U.S.C. \u00a750. The average nonfederal cost-share contribution has increased from 50% in the early 1990s to 63% in FY2018. In the early 2000s, the USGS designated federal priority streamgage (FPS) locations based on five identified national needs. The SECURE Water Act of 2009 (Title IX, Subtitle F, of P.L. 111-11) directed the USGS to operate by FY2019 no less than 4,700 federally funded streamgages. In FY2018, 3,640 of the 4,760 FPSs designated by the USGS were operational, with 52% of their funding from the USGS.\nCongressional appropriations and agreements with 1,400 nonfederal partners funded USGS streamgages at $189.5 million in FY2018. The USGS share included $24.7 million for FPSs and $29.8 million for cooperative streamgages through CMF. A dozen other federal agencies provided $40.7 million. Nonfederal partners, mostly affiliated with CMF, provided $94.3 million. In FY2019, Congress appropriated level funding for FPS and CMF streamgages. Congress directed an additional $8.5 million to pilot a Next Generation Integrated Water Observing System (NextGen), establishing dense networks of streamgages in representative watersheds in order to model streamflow in analogous watersheds. The President's budget request for FY2020 does not include NextGen system funding and would reduce CMF for streamgages by $250,000.\nThe USGS uses appropriated funding to develop and maintain the USGS Streamgaging Network. The USGS and numerous stakeholders have raised funding considerations including user needs, priorities of partners, federal coverage, infrastructure repair, disaster response, inflation, and technological advances. Some stakeholders advocate for maintaining or expanding the network. Others may argue that Congress should consider reducing the network in order to prioritize other activities and that other entities operate streamgages tailored to localized needs. Congress might also consider whether to invest in streamgage restoration and new technologies.\nCongress may consider outlining the future direction for the USGS Streamgaging Network through oversight or legislation. As the USGS faces a deadline by the SECURE Water Act of 2009 to operate no less than 4,700 FPSs by FY2019, Congress directed the USGS through appropriations legislation to invest in the NextGen system. Congress may consider such policy options as pursuing both the FPS mandate and the NextGen system simultaneously, amending the SECURE Water Act of 2009, and the relative emphasis of the NextGen system.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_314"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_315","query":"The Purple Heart is one of the oldest and most recognized American military medals, awarded to servicemembers who were killed or wounded by enemy action. The conflicts 2001 to the present have greatly increased the number of Purple Hearts awarded to servicemembers.\nEvents over the past few years have spurred debate on the eligibility criteria for the Purple Heart. Shootings on U.S. soil and medical conditions such as traumatic brain injury (TBI) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) have prompted changes to the eligibility requirements for the Purple Heart. Some critics believe that these changes may lessen the value of the medal and the sacrifices of past recipients on the battlefield. In the past, efforts to modify the Purple Heart's eligibility requirements were contentious, and veterans groups were vocal concerning eligibility changes.\nWhile medal requirements are often left to the military and executive branch to decide, Congress is involved in Purple Heart eligibility, utilizing its constitutional power \"To Make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces\" (U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, clause 14). The Carl Levin and Howard P. \"Buck\" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (P.L. 113-291) included language that expands eligibility for the Purple Heart.\nPrevious debates have raised several questions about the Purple Heart. In some respects, how an event is defined can determine eligibility: Is a servicemember the victim of a crime or a terrorist attack? Conversely, arguing that killed or wounded servicemembers \"should\" be eligible for the Purple Heart can redefine an event: Is the servicemember an advisor to a foreign military or a combatant? Are PTSD and other mental health conditions adequate injuries to warrant the Purple Heart? These are questions that Congress might consider if it chooses to act on this issue.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_315"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_316","query":"Cuba remains a one-party authoritarian state with a poor human rights record. Current President Miguel D\u00edaz-Canel succeeded Ra\u00fal Castro in April 2018, although Castro is continuing as first secretary of Cuba's Communist Party. Over the past decade, Cuba has implemented gradual market-oriented economic policy changes, but critics maintain that it has not taken enough action to foster sustainable economic growth. Most observers do not anticipate major policy changes under D\u00edaz-Canel, at least in the short term; the president faces the enormous challenges of reforming the economy and responding to desires for greater freedom.\nU.S. Policy\nCongress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of legislation strengthening and at times easing U.S. economic sanctions. Since the early 1960s, the centerpiece of U.S. policy has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at isolating the Cuban government. In 2014, however, the Obama Administration initiated a major policy shift, moving away from sanctions toward a policy of engagement. The policy change included the restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015); the rescission of Cuba's designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015); and an increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba implemented through regulatory changes.\nIn June 2017, President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba that increased sanctions and partially rolled back some of the Obama Administration's efforts to normalize relations. The most significant changes include restrictions on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban military and the elimination of individual people-to-people travel. In response to unexplained injuries of members of the U.S. diplomatic community at the U.S. Embassy in Havana, the State Department reduced the staff of the U.S. Embassy by about two-thirds; the reduction has affected embassy operations, especially visa processing, and made bilateral engagement more difficult.\nLegislative Activity\nIn the 115th Congress, debate over Cuba policy continued, especially with regard to economic sanctions. The 2018 farm bill, P.L. 115-334 (H.R. 2), enacted in December 2018, has a provision permitting funding for two U.S. agricultural export promotion programs in Cuba. Two FY2019 House appropriations bills, Commerce (H.R. 5952) and Financial Services (H.R. 6258 and H.R. 6147), had provisions that would have tightened economic sanctions, but final action was not completed by the end of the 115th Congress. Other bills were introduced, but not acted upon, that would have eased or lifted sanctions altogether: H.R. 351 and S. 1287 (travel); H.R. 442\/S. 472 and S. 1286 (some economic sanctions); H.R. 498 (telecommunications); H.R. 525 (agricultural exports and investment); H.R. 572 (agricultural and medical exports and travel); H.R. 574, H.R. 2966, and S. 1699 (overall embargo); and S. 275 (private financing for U.S. agricultural exports).\nCongress continued to provide funding for democracy and human rights assistance in Cuba and for U.S.-government sponsored broadcasting. For FY2017, Congress provided $20 million in democracy assistance and $28.1 million for Cuba broadcasting (P.L. 115-31). For FY2018, it provided $20 million for democracy assistance and $28.9 million for Cuba broadcasting (P.L. 115-141; explanatory statement to H.R. 1625). For FY2019, the Trump Administration requested $10 million in democracy assistance and $13.7 million for Cuba broadcasting. The House Appropriations Committee's FY2019 State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations bill, H.R. 6385, would have provided $30 million for democracy programs, whereas the Senate version, S. 3108, would have provided $15 million; both bills would have provided $29 million for broadcasting. The 115th Congress approved a series of continuing resolutions (P.L. 115-245 and P.L. 115-298 ) that continued FY2019 funding at FY2018 levels through December 21, 2018, but did not complete action on FY2019 appropriations, leaving the task to the 116th Congress.\nIn other action, several approved measures\u2014P.L. 115-232, P.L. 115-244, and P.L. 115-245\u2014have provisions extending a prohibition on FY2019 funding to close or relinquish control of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; the conference report to P.L. 115-232 also requires a report on security cooperation between Russia and Cuba. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-254) requires the Transportation Security Administration to brief Congress on certain aspects of Cuban airport security and efforts to better track public air charter flights between the United States and Cuba. In April 2018, the Senate approved S.Res. 224, commemorating the legacy of Cuban democracy activist Oswaldo Pay\u00e1. For more on legislative initiatives in the 115th Congress, see Appendix A.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_316"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_317","query":"On December 21, 2018, President Trump signed into law the First Step Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-391). The act was the culmination of several years of congressional debate about what Congress might do to reduce the size of the federal prison population while also creating mechanisms to maintain public safety. This report provides an overview of the provisions of the act.\nThe act has three major components: (1) correctional reform via the establishment of a risk and needs assessment system at the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), (2) sentencing reform via changes to penalties for some federal offenses, and (3) the reauthorization of the Second Chance Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-199). The act also contains a series of other criminal justice-related provisions.\nThe First Step Act requires the Department of Justice (DOJ) to develop a risk and needs assessment system to be used by BOP to assess the recidivism risk of all federal prisoners and to place prisoners in programs and productive activities to reduce this risk. Prisoners who successfully complete recidivism reduction programming and productive activities can earn additional time credits that will allow them to be placed in prerelease custody (i.e., home confinement or a Residential Reentry Center) earlier than they were previously allowed. The act prohibits prisoners convicted of any one of dozens of offenses from earning additional time credits, though these prisoners can earn other benefits, such as additional visitation time, for successfully completing recidivism reduction programming. Offenses that make prisoners ineligible to earn additional time credits can generally be categorized as violent, terrorism, espionage, human trafficking, sex and sexual exploitation, repeat felon in possession of firearm, certain fraud, or high-level drug offenses.\nThe act makes changes to the penalties for some federal offenses. The act modified mandatory minimum prison sentences for some drug traffickers with prior drug convictions by increasing the threshold for prior convictions that count toward triggering higher mandatory minimums for repeat offenders, reducing the 20-year mandatory minimum (applicable where the offender has one prior qualifying conviction) to a 15-year mandatory minimum, and reducing a life-in-prison mandatory minimum (applicable where the offender has two or more prior qualifying convictions) to a 25-year mandatory minimum. The act made the provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-220) retroactive so that currently incarcerated offenders who received longer sentences for possession of crack cocaine than they would have received if sentenced for possession of the same amount of powder cocaine before the enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act can submit a petition in federal court to have their sentences reduced. The act also expands the safety valve provision, which allows courts to sentence low-level, nonviolent drug offenders with minor criminal histories to less than the required mandatory minimum for an offense. Finally, the act eliminated the stacking provision, which allowed prosecutors to charge offenders with a second and subsequent use of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking or violent offense in the same criminal incident, which, if the offender is convicted, carries a 25-year mandatory minimum. Now, the mandatory minimum will only apply when the offender has a prior conviction for use of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking or violent crime from a previous criminal prosecution.\nThe First Step Act contains the Second Chance Reauthorization Act of 2018. This act reauthorizes appropriations for and expands the scope of some grant programs that were initially authorized under the Second Chance Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-199). The reauthorized programs include the Adult and Juvenile State and Local Offender Demonstration Program, Grants for Family-Based Substance Abuse Treatment, Careers Training Demonstration Grants, the Offender Reentry Substance Abuse and Criminal Justice Collaboration Program, and the Community-Based Mentoring and Transitional Service Grants to Nonprofit Organizations Program. The act also reauthorized and modified a pilot program that allows BOP to place certain elderly and terminally ill prisoners on home confinement to serve the remainder of their sentences.\nFinally, the First Step Act includes a series of other criminal justice-related provisions. These provisions include a prohibition on the use of restraints on pregnant inmates in the custody of BOP and the U.S. Marshals Service; a change to the way good time credit is calculated so prisoners can earn 54 days of good time credits for each year of imposed sentence rather than for each year of time served; a requirement for BOP to provide a way for employees to safely store firearms on BOP grounds; a requirement for BOP to try to place prisoners within 500 driving miles of their primary residences; authority for the Federal Prison Industries to sell products to public entities for use in correctional facilities, disaster relief, or emergency response, to the District of Columbia government, and to nonprofit organizations; a prohibition against the use of solitary confinement for juvenile delinquents in federal custody; and a requirement that BOP aid prisoners with obtaining identification before they are released.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_317"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_318","query":"Social Security, the largest program in the federal budget (in terms of outlays), provides monthly cash benefits to retired or disabled workers and their family members as well as to the family members of deceased workers. In 2018, benefit outlays were approximately $989 billion, with roughly 63 million beneficiaries and 176 million workers in Social Security-covered employment. Under current law, Social Security's revenues are projected to be insufficient to pay full scheduled benefits after 2035.\nMonthly benefit amounts are determined by federal law. Social Security is of ongoing interest both because of its role in supporting a large portion of the population and because of its long-term financial imbalance, and policymakers have considered numerous proposals to change its benefit computation rules.\nThe Social Security benefits that are paid to worker beneficiaries and to workers' dependents and survivors are based on workers' past earnings. The computation process involves three main steps\nFirst, a summarized measure of lifetime earnings is computed. That measure is called the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME). Second, a benefit formula is applied to the AIME to compute the primary insurance amount (PIA). The benefit formula is progressive. As a result, workers with higher AIMEs receive higher Social Security benefits, but the benefits received by people with lower earnings replace a larger share of past earnings. Third, an adjustment may be made based on the age at which a beneficiary chooses to begin receiving payments. For retired workers who claim benefits at the full retirement age (FRA) and for disabled workers, the monthly benefit equals the PIA. Retired workers who claim earlier receive lower monthly benefits, and those who claim later receive higher benefits.\nRetired worker benefits can be affected by other adjustments. For example, the windfall elimination provision can reduce benefits for individuals who receive a pension from non-Social Security-covered earnings, and benefits can be withheld under the retirement earnings test if an individual continues to work and earns above a certain amount. Although not an adjustment, Social Security benefits can be subject to income tax, thereby affecting the beneficiary's net income.\nBenefits for eligible dependents and survivors are based on the worker's PIA. For example, a dependent spouse receives a benefit equal to 50% of the worker's PIA, and a widow(er) receives a benefit equal to 100% of the worker's PIA. Dependent benefits may also be adjusted based on the age at which they are claimed and other factors.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_318"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_319","query":"The United States and Turkey have been NATO allies since 1952 and share some vital interests, but harmonizing their priorities can be difficult. These priorities sometimes diverge irrespective of who leads the two countries, based on contrasting geography, threat perceptions, and regional roles.\nTurkey's core security and economic relationships and institutional links remain with Western nations, as reflected by some key U.S. military assets based in Turkey and Turkey's strong trade ties with the European Union. However, various factors complicate U.S.-Turkey relations. For example, Turkey relies to some degree on nations such as Russia and Iran for domestic energy needs and coordination on regional security, and therefore balances diplomatically between various actors. Additionally, Turkey's president and longtime leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan appears to be concerned that the United States and some other Western countries harbor sympathies for some of the groups that have been marginalized domestically under Erdogan. Also, Turkey has played a larger role in the Middle East since the 2000s, but has faced a number of setbacks and has problematic relations with Israel and most Sunni Arab countries other than Qatar.\nBilateral relations between the Trump Administration and the Erdogan government have been difficult, but have improved somewhat since October 2018, when a Turkish court allowed Pastor Andrew Brunson to return to the United States after a two-year imprisonment. The following are current points of tension in the U.S.-Turkey relationship.\nF-35 aircraft acquisition endangered by possible S-400 acquisition from Russia. Turkey's planned purchase of an S-400 air defense system from Russia could trigger U.S. sanctions under existing law and decrease Turkey's chances of acquiring U.S.-origin F-35 aircraft. The possible S-400 transaction has sparked broader concern over Turkey's relationship with Russia and implications for NATO. U.S. officials seek to prevent the deal by offering Patriot air defense systems as an alternative to the S-400.\nSyria and the Kurds. Turkey's political stances and military operations in Syria have fed U.S.-Turkey tensions, particularly regarding Kurdish-led militias supported by the United States against the Islamic State over Turkey's strong objections. President Trump's announcement in December 2018 that U.S. troops would withdraw from Syria came after a call with President Erdogan in which Erdogan accepted responsibility for countering the Islamic State in Syria. Efforts to coordinate U.S. and Turkish actions related to a U.S. withdrawal have triggered debate about the possible consequences of Turkish intervention in northeast Syria, especially for those Kurdish-led militias, which have links with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party). The PKK is a U.S.-designated terrorist organization that originated in Turkey and wages an on-and-off insurgency against the Turkish government while using safe havens in both Syria and Iraq.\nCongressional initiatives. Within the tense bilateral context, the 115th Congress required the Trump Administration\u2014in the FY2019 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 115-232)\u2014to report on the status of U.S.-Turkey relations, with particular emphasis on the possible S-400 deal and its implications. The Department of Defense (DOD) submitted a mostly classified report to Congress in November 2018. Appropriations legislation proposed for FY2019 in the 116th Congress (H.R. 648) would require an update to the DOD report.\nTurkey's domestic trajectory and financial distress. President Erdogan rules in an increasingly authoritarian manner, with his power further consolidated in June 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections. A number of developments (a globally stronger dollar, rule of law concerns and political uncertainty, significant corporate debt) led to a precipitous drop in the value of Turkey's currency during 2018. A major September 2018 interest rate hike by Turkey's central bank helped reverse some of the currency's downward slide, but concerns remain about Turkey's financial position and the possible consequences that higher interest rates might have for economic growth. Local elections are scheduled for March 2018 against the backdrop of these economic concerns.\nThe next steps in relations between the United States and Turkey will take place with Turkey facing a number of political and economic challenges. Given Erdogan's consolidation of power, observers now question how he will govern a polarized electorate and deal with the foreign actors who can affect Turkey's financial solvency, regional security, and political influence. U.S. officials and lawmakers can refer to Turkey's complex history, geography, domestic dynamics, and international relationships in evaluating how to encourage Turkey to align its policies with U.S. interests.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_319"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_320","query":"The budget resolution reflects an agreement between the House and Senate on a budgetary plan for the upcoming fiscal year. Once agreed to by both chambers in the exact same form, the budget resolution creates parameters that may be enforced by (1) points of order and (2) using the budget reconciliation process.\nWhen the House and Senate do not reach final agreement on this plan, it may be more difficult for Congress to reach agreement on subsequent budgetary legislation, both within each chamber and between the chambers.\nIn the absence of agreement on a budget resolution, Congress may employ alternative legislative tools to serve as a substitute for a budget resolution. These substitutes are typically referred to as \"deeming resolutions,\" because they are deemed to serve in place of an annual budget resolution for the purposes of establishing enforceable budget levels for the upcoming fiscal year.\nSince the creation of the budget resolution, there have been 10 years in which Congress did not come to agreement on a budget resolution. In each of those years, one or both chambers employed at least one deeming resolution to serve as a substitute for a budget resolution.\nWhile referred to as deeming resolutions, such mechanisms are not formally defined and have no specifically prescribed content. Instead, they represent the House and Senate, often separately, engaging legislative procedures to deal with enforcement issues on an ad hoc basis. As described below, the mechanisms can vary significantly in content and timing. This report covers the use of deeming resolutions pertaining to fiscal years for which the House and Senate did not agree on a budget resolution.\nWhile neither the House nor Senate have yet adopted a budget resolution for FY2020, they may still do so. In the meantime, on April 9, 2019, the House passed a deeming resolution for FY2020, H.Res. 293.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_320"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_321","query":"The growth of the national debt, which is considered unsustainable under current policies, continues to be one of the central issues of domestic federal policymaking.\nAddressing a federal budget deficit that is unsustainable over the long run involves choices. Fundamentally, the issues require deciding what government goods, services, and transfers are worth paying taxes for. Most people would agree that the country benefits from a wide range of government services\u2014air traffic controllers, border security, courts and corrections, and so forth\u2014provided by the federal government. Yet federal government provision of goods and services comprises only a modest portion of the federal budget. Transfers, including interest payments, accounted for around 75% of the federal budget.\nCentral findings of this analysis include the following:\nA comparatively small share of federal spending is for the direct provision of domestic government goods and services. Transfers and payments to persons and to state and local governments constitute most of federal spending, about 75% of all federal spending. Defense spending, accounting for about 15% of federal spending, has declined as a share of output over the past 35 years, but it also tends to vary depending, in part, on the presence and magnitude of international conflicts. The problem with the debt lies not in the past but in the future, as growth in spending for health and Social Security is projected to continue faster than the economy as a whole. The increase in deficits and debt, in turn, leads to a significant increase in interest payments. Because much of the pressure on future spending arises from imbalances in Social Security and Medicare Part A (Hospital Insurance) trust funds, keeping these funds and their sources of financing intact is a concern that could constrain choices. Preserving entitlements would likely require significant increases in taxes, such as raising rates, reducing tax expenditures, increasing other taxes, or introducing new revenue sources. Reductions in discretionary spending are insufficient to reduce the deficit to a sustainable level, so limiting taxes as a percentage of output or constraining the overall size of the government to current levels would likely require significant cuts in mandatory spending, including entitlement programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. Because the federal government provides about one-fifth of the revenue for state and local governments, cutbacks in transfers to these governments may, in part, shift the burden of providing services from the national to subnational governments rather than altering the overall size of government services.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_321"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_322","query":"Several countries, primarily in Europe, and the European Commission have proposed or adopted taxes on revenue earned by multinational corporations (MNCs) in certain \"digital economy\" sectors from activities linked to the user-based activity of their residents. These proposals have generally been labeled as \"digital services taxes\" (DSTs). For example, beginning in 2019, Spain is imposing a DST of 3% on online advertising, online marketplaces, and data transfer service (i.e., revenue from sales of user activities) within Spain. Only firms with \u20ac750 million in worldwide revenue and \u20ac3 million in revenues with users in Spain are to be subject to the tax. In 2020, the UK plans to implement a 3% DST that would apply only to businesses whose revenues exceed \u00a325 million per year and groups that generate global revenues from search engines, social media platforms, and online marketplaces in excess of \u00a3500 million annually. The UK labels its DST as an \"interim\" solution until international tax rules are modified to allow countries to tax the profits of foreign MNCs if they have a substantial enough \"digital presence\" based on local users. The member states of the European Commission are also actively considering such a rule. These policies are being considered and enacted against a backdrop of ongoing, multilateral negotiations among members and nonmembers of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These negotiations, prompted by discussions of the digital economy, could result in significant changes for the international tax system.\nProponents of DSTs argue that digital firms are \"undertaxed.\" This sentiment is driven in part by some high-profile tech companies that reduced the taxes they paid by assigning ownership of their income-producing intangible assets (e.g., patents, marketing, and trade secrets) to affiliate corporations in low-tax jurisdictions. Proponents of DSTs also argue that the countries imposing tax should be entitled to a share of profits earned by digital MNCs because of the \"value\" to these business models made by participation of their residents through their content, reviews, purchases, and other contributions. Critics of DSTs argue that the taxes target income or profits that would not otherwise be subject to taxation under generally accepted income tax principles. U.S. critics, in particular, see DSTs as an attempt to target U.S. tech companies, especially as minimum thresholds are high enough that only the largest digital MNCs (such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon) will be subject to these specific taxes.\nDSTs are structured as a selective tax on revenue (akin to an excise tax) and not as a tax on corporate profits. A tax on corporate profits taxes the return to investment in the corporate sector. Corporate profit is equal to total revenue minus total cost. In contrast, DSTs are \"turnover taxes\" that apply to the revenue generated from taxable activities regardless of costs incurred by a firm. Additionally, international tax rules do not allow countries to tax an MNC's cross-border income solely because their residents purchase goods or services provided by that firm. Rather, ownership of assets justifies a country to be allocated a share of that MNC's profits to tax. Under these rules and their underlying principles, the fact that a country's residents purchase digital services from an MNC is not a justification to tax the MNC's profits.\nDSTs are likely to have the economic effect of an excise tax on intermediate services. The economic incidence of a DST is likely to be borne by purchasers of taxable services (e.g., companies paying digital economy firms for advertising, marketplace listings, or user data) and possibly consumers downstream from those transactions. As a result, economic theory and the general body of empirical research on excise taxes predict that DSTs are likely to increase prices in affected markets, decrease quantity supplied, and reduce investment in these sectors. Compared to a corporate profits tax\u2014which, on balance, tends to be borne by higher-income shareholders\u2014DSTs are expected to be more regressive forms of raising revenue, as they affect a broad range of consumer goods and services.\nCertain design features of DSTs could also create inequitable treatment between firms and increase administrative complexity. For example, minimum revenue thresholds could be set such that primarily large, foreign (and primarily U.S.) corporations are subject to tax. Requirements to identify the location of users could also introduce significant costs on businesses.\nThis report traces the emergence of DSTs from multilateral tax negotiations in recent years, addresses various purported policy justifications of DSTs, provides an economic analysis of their effects, and raises several issues for Congress.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_322"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_323","query":"Firearms regulation is an area of shared authority among federal, state, and local governments. Individual states have enacted a diverse range of laws relating to the possession, registration, and carrying of firearms, among other things. Federal law establishes a regulatory framework for the lawful manufacture, sale, and possession of firearms at the national level. The federal framework generally serves as a floor for permissible firearm use and transactions, leaving states free to supplement with additional restrictions so long as they do not conflict with federal law.\nFederal laws regulating firearms date back roughly a century, and over time lawmakers have established more stringent requirements for the transfer, possession, and transportation of firearms. The two principal federal firearms laws currently in force are the National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA) and the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA), as amended. The NFA was the first major piece of federal legislation regulating the sale and possession of firearms. Through a taxation and registration scheme, the law sought to curb the rise of violence connected to organized crime by targeting the types of weapons that (at the time of passage) were commonly used by gang members. Congress passed the GCA in the wake of the assassinations of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and Senator Robert Kennedy to prevent firearm possession by prohibited persons and to help law enforcement stem increasing crime rates. The GCA is a complex statutory regime that has been supplemented regularly in the decades since its inception. Broadly speaking, the GCA, as amended, regulates the manufacture, transfer, and possession of firearms, extending to categories of weapons that fall outside the scope of the NFA. In general terms, the GCA sets forth who can\u2014and cannot\u2014sell, purchase, and possess firearms, how those sales and purchases may lawfully take place, what firearms may lawfully be possessed, and where firearm possession may be restricted. The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act amended the GCA to require a background check for many, but not all, firearms transfers.\nNumerous constitutional considerations may inform congressional proposals to modify the current framework for regulating firearms sales and possession. Although Congress has broad constitutional authority to regulate firearms, any firearm measure must be rooted in one of Congress's enumerated powers. In enacting firearms laws, Congress has typically invoked its tax, commerce, and spending powers. For example, the NFA invokes Congress's tax power, and many GCA provisions invoke Congress's commerce power. Additionally, Congress has used its spending power to incentivize states, through offering grant money, to provide comprehensive records to the FBI's National Instant Background Check System (NICS).\nWhen exercising its enumerated powers, Congress nevertheless must be mindful of other constitutional restraints. Congress may want to look to the Supreme Court's Second Amendment jurisprudence\u2014chiefly, District of Columbia v. Heller\u2014when imposing any firearm restriction. In Heller, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment provides an individual right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes. Further, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment limits Congress's ability to deprive a person of any constitutionally protected interest, such as Second Amendment firearms rights, and rights in property, such as firearms and accessories. Moreover, when enacting measures seeking to limit state firearm schemes, Congress may want to consider the federalism limits inherent in the Constitution's system of dual sovereignty, such as the anti-commandeering doctrine.\nThese constitutional considerations are relevant to the scope of legislation that the 115th and 116th Congresses have considered to amend the existing federal statutory framework of firearms regulation. Among other things, such legislation has focused on issues arising from the dissemination of 3D-printed and untraceable firearms, gaps in the collection of records for background checks of prospective firearm purchasers, restrictions on certain types of firearms and accessories, possession of firearms by the mentally ill, interstate reciprocity for lawful concealed carry of firearms, and laws permitting courts to order that firearms be temporarily removed from persons deemed to be a risk to themselves or others.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_323"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_324","query":"Artificial intelligence (AI) is a rapidly growing field of technology with potentially significant implications for national security. As such, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and other nations are developing AI applications for a range of military functions. AI research is underway in the fields of intelligence collection and analysis, logistics, cyber operations, information operations, command and control, and in a variety of semiautonomous and autonomous vehicles. Already, AI has been incorporated into military operations in Iraq and Syria. Congressional action has the potential to shape the technology's development further, with budgetary and legislative decisions influencing the growth of military applications as well as the pace of their adoption.\nAI technologies present unique challenges for military integration, particularly because the bulk of AI development is happening in the commercial sector. Although AI is not unique in this regard, the defense acquisition process may need to be adapted for acquiring emerging technologies like AI. In addition, many commercial AI applications must undergo significant modification prior to being functional for the military. A number of cultural issues also challenge AI acquisition, as some commercial AI companies are averse to partnering with DOD due to ethical concerns, and even within the department, there can be resistance to incorporating AI technology into existing weapons systems and processes.\nPotential international rivals in the AI market are creating pressure for the United States to compete for innovative military AI applications. China is a leading competitor in this regard, releasing a plan in 2017 to capture the global lead in AI development by 2030. Currently, China is primarily focused on using AI to make faster and more well-informed decisions, as well as on developing a variety of autonomous military vehicles. Russia is also active in military AI development, with a primary focus on robotics.\nAlthough AI has the potential to impart a number of advantages in the military context, it may also introduce distinct challenges. AI technology could, for example, facilitate autonomous operations, lead to more informed military decisionmaking, and increase the speed and scale of military action. However, it may also be unpredictable or vulnerable to unique forms of manipulation. As a result of these factors, analysts hold a broad range of opinions on how influential AI will be in future combat operations. While a small number of analysts believe that the technology will have minimal impact, most believe that AI will have at least an evolutionary\u2014if not revolutionary\u2014effect.\nMilitary AI development presents a number of potential issues for Congress:\nWhat is the right balance of commercial and government funding for AI development? How might Congress influence defense acquisition reform initiatives that facilitate military AI development? What changes, if any, are necessary in Congress and DOD to implement effective oversight of AI development? How should the United States balance research and development related to artificial intelligence and autonomous systems with ethical considerations? What legislative or regulatory changes are necessary for the integration of military AI applications? What measures can Congress take to help manage the AI competition globally?","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_324"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_325","query":"Over the past several years, the nation has seen an uptick in the use and abuse of opioids\u2014both prescription opioids and non-prescription opioids such as heroin. In 2016, there were an estimated 948,000 individuals (0.4% of the 12 and older population) who reported using heroin within the past year\u2014up from 0.2% to 0.3% of this population reporting use in the previous decade. In addition to an increase in heroin use over the past several years, there has been a simultaneous increase in its availability in the United States. The increase in availability has been fueled by a number of factors, including increased production and trafficking of heroin\u2014principally by Mexican criminal networks.\nMexican transnational criminal organizations are the major suppliers and key producers of most illegal drugs smuggled into the United States. They have been increasing their share of the U.S. drug market\u2014particularly with respect to heroin\u2014even though the United States still receives some heroin from South America and, to a lesser extent, Southwest Asia. To facilitate the distribution and sale of drugs in the United States, Mexican drug traffickers have formed relationships with U.S. gangs.\nHeroin seizures across the country, as well as those at the Southwest border, have generally increased over the past decade. Nationwide heroin seizures reached 7,979 kg in 2017, with 3,090 kg (39%) seized at the Southwest border. This is up from about 2,000 kg seized at the Southwest border a decade prior. Further, there has been an increase in federal arrests and sentences for heroin-related crimes. For instance, the Drug Enforcement Administration made 5,408 heroin-related arrests in 2017\u2014up from about 2,500 a decade prior. In addition, U.S. Sentencing Commission data indicate that from 2007 to 2017, there was a general increase in the number of individuals sentenced for heroin trafficking offenses in U.S. District Courts.\nThe federal government\u2014specifically, law enforcement\u2014relies on a number of tools and initiatives to counter heroin trafficking. Many of these efforts focus on drug trafficking broadly and prioritize the greatest drug trafficking threats in a given area, whether those threats come from trafficking heroin or other illicit drugs or substances.\nGoing forward, there are a number of issues policymakers may consider as they address heroin trafficking. For instance, what is known about drug trafficking is contingent on data surrounding poppy cultivation, heroin production, and product inflows into the United States. Given that these are often based on snapshots of knowledge from disparate sources, Congress may question how these data are collected and their adequacy. In addition, Congress may examine current law enforcement efforts to dismantle heroin trafficking networks and prosecute their leaders. Policymakers may also look at existing federal strategies on drug control and transnational crime to evaluate whether they are able to target the heroin trafficking threat effectively.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_325"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_326","query":"Title IV of the Higher Education Act (HEA) authorizes programs that provide financial assistance to students to assist them in obtaining a postsecondary education at certain institutions of higher education (IHEs). These IHEs include public, private nonprofit, and proprietary institutions. For students attending such institutions to be able to receive Title IV assistance, an institution must meet basic criteria, including offering at least one eligible program of education (e.g., programs leading to a degree or preparing a student for gainful employment in a recognized occupation).\nIn addition, an IHE must satisfy the program integrity triad, under which it must be\nlicensed or otherwise legally authorized to operate in the state in which it is physically located, accredited or preaccredited by an agency recognized for that purpose by the Department of Education (ED), and certified by ED as eligible to participate in Title IV programs.\nThese requirements are intended to provide a balance between consumer protection, quality assurance, and oversight and compliance in postsecondary education providers participating in Title IV student aid programs.\nAn IHE must also fulfill a variety of other related requirements, including those that relate to institutional recruiting practices, student policies and procedures, and the administration of the Title IV student aid programs.\nFinally, additional criteria may apply to an institution depending on its control or the type of educational programs it offers. For example, proprietary institutions must meet HEA requirements that are otherwise inapplicable to public and private nonprofit institutions, including deriving at least 10% of their revenues from non-Title IV funds (also known as the 90\/10 rule). While an institution is ineligible to participate in Title IV programs if more than 50% of its courses are offered by correspondence or if 50% or more of its students are enrolled in correspondence courses.\nThis report first describes the types of institutions eligible to participate in Title IV programs and discusses the program integrity triad. It then discusses additional issues related to institutional eligibility, including program participations agreements, required campus safety policies and crime reporting, and distance and correspondence education.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_326"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_327","query":"The Navy began procuring Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers, also known as Aegis destroyers, in FY1985, and a total of 82 have been procured through FY2019. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests funding for the procurement of three more DDG-51s, which would be the 83rd, 84th, and 85th ships in the class.\nDDG-51s planned for procurement in FY2018-FY2022 are being procured under a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract that Congress approved as part of its action on the Navy's FY2018 budget. DDG-51s procured in FY2017 and subsequent years are being built to a new design (the Flight III DDG-51 design), which incorporates a new and more capable radar called the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) or SPY-6 radar.\nThe Navy procured DDG-51s from FY1985 through FY2005, and resumed procuring them in FY2010. In FY2007-FY2009, during the time when the Navy was not procuring DDG-51s, the Navy procured three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers. The Navy plans no further procurement of DDG-1000s. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests $155.9 million in procurement funding to help complete the total procurement cost of the three DDG-1000 class ships.\nThe Navy estimates the combined procurement cost of the three DDG-51s requested for procurement in FY2020 at $5,463.0 million, or an average of $1,821.0 million each. The ships have received $363.7 million in prior-year Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) advance procurement (AP) funding (i.e., funding for up-front batch orders of components of DDG-51s to be procured under the FY2018-FY2022 MYP contract). The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests the remaining $5,099.3 million in procurement funding needed to complete the estimated procurement cost of the three DDG-51s, as well as $224.0 million in EOQ funding for DDG-51s to be procured in FY2021 and FY2022, bringing the total amount requested for the DDG-51 program for FY2020 to $5,323.3 million, excluding outfitting and post-delivery costs.\nThe Navy wants to procure the first ship of a new class of large surface combatants in FY2025. Under the Navy's plan, FY2025 would be the final year of DDG-51 procurement.\nIssues for Congress for FY2019 for the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 destroyer programs include the following:\nwhether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 funding requests for the DDG-51 and DDG-1000 programs; cost, schedule, and technical risk in the Flight III DDG-51 effort; the potential impact on the DDG-51 program of a possible change in the surface force architecture; and the Navy's plan to shift the mission orientation of the DDG-1000s from an emphasis on naval surface fire support (NSFS) to an emphasis on surface strike.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_327"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_328","query":"For more than four decades, Congress has authorized and refined several programs to help communities address water supply and wastewater problems. The agencies that administer these programs differ in multiple ways. In terms of funding mechanisms, projects developed by the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) typically require direct, individual project authorizations from Congress.\nIn contrast, standing program authorizations provide project funding for other agencies, including\nthe Department of Agriculture (USDA), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).\nThe key practical difference is that with the individual project authorizations, there is no predictable assistance or even guarantee of funding after a project is authorized, because funding must be secured each year in the congressional appropriations process. The programs, on the other hand, have set program criteria, are generally funded from year to year, and provide a process under which project sponsors compete for funding.\nIn terms of scope and mission, the primary responsibilities of USACE are to maintain inland navigation, provide for flood and storm damage reduction, and restore aquatic ecosystems, while EPA's mission relates to protecting public health and the environment. The Department of Commerce and HUD focus on community and economic development. Likewise, the specific programs\u2014while all address water supply and wastewater treatment to some degree\u2014differ in important respects. Some are national in scope (those of USDA, EPA, and the Department of Commerce, for example), while others are regionally focused (Reclamation's programs and projects). Some focus primarily on urban areas (HUD) and some on rural areas (USDA), and others do not distinguish based on community size (e.g., EPA, USACE).\nFederal funding for the programs and projects discussed in this report varies greatly. Collectively, congressional funding for these programs in recent years has been somewhat eroded by overall competition among the many programs that are supported by discretionary spending, despite the continuing pressure from stakeholders and others for increased funding. FY2019 appropriations highlights include the following:\n$1.164 billion for capitalization grants to states under EPA's State Revolving Fund (SRF) loan program for drinking water systems and $1.694 billion for EPA's SRF program for wastewater projects; $60 million in subsidy costs for the EPA-administered Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (WIFIA) program, allowing the agency to provide approximately $5.5 billion in credit assistance for drinking water and wastewater infrastructure projects; $400 million for USDA's rural water and waste disposal grant program and direct loan authority of approximately $1.4 billion; $3.4 billion for HUD Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds (water and wastewater projects are among many eligible uses); and $58.6 million for Reclamation's Title XVI reclamation\/recycling projects.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_328"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_329","query":"The Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program provides monthly benefits to retired or disabled workers and their family members and to the family members of deceased workers. These monthly benefits constitute a substantial portion of income for a large segment of recipients.\nThe OASDI program is financed primarily by payroll taxes on covered earnings up to an annual limit, as well as federal income taxes paid by some beneficiaries on a portion of their OASDI benefits. OASDI program revenues are invested in federal government securities held by the Federal Old-Age Survivors Insurance (OASI) and Federal Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Funds, where they earn interest. The interest earned on assets in the trust funds provides a third stream of revenue to the OASDI program.\nThe OASDI Trust Funds are overseen by a Board of Trustees, which is composed of six members: the Secretary of the Treasury, who is the managing trustee; the Secretary of Labor; the Secretary of Health and Human Services; the Commissioner of Social Security; and two public trustees, who are appointed by the President with advice and consent of the Senate. By law, the assets of the OASDI Trust Funds may be invested only in federal government securities issued by the Secretary of the Treasury. Although the Managing Trustee may invest in U.S. securities that are sold on the open market (marketable securities) if it is deemed in the public interest to do so, in practice, the OASDI Trust Funds' assets are invested in nonmarketable U.S. securities, known as special issues. The practice of investing solely in special issues has led the Board of Trustees to effectively adopt the principles of (1) nonintervention in the private economy, (2) security, (3) neutrality, and (4) minimal management. Although not explicitly codified in the Social Security Act, these principles have provided a framework to guide the trustees in their investment operations.\nAt the beginning of 2018, the trust funds reported asset reserves of around $2.9 trillion, which represents the projected peak value of the funds. The OASDI program's total costs are projected to exceed its total revenues, due largely to the aging of the baby boomers, thus requiring the trust funds to draw down their assets to pay scheduled benefits. The trustees expect this trend to continue indefinitely, with the trust funds' reserves reaching depletion in 2034. To extend the trust funds' solvency, some argue the trust funds' assets should be invested in equities (i.e., stocks sold on the open market). The main argument for this approach is that equities have historically produced higher rates of return, on average, than U.S. securities, which are the trust funds' only investment option under current law. Proposals favoring equity investment seek to earn higher rates of return for the trust funds than provided by special issues. However, the higher average rates of return associated with equity investing come with more risk. Investing the trust funds in equities would expose them to a higher degree of volatility than the current investment practices.\nThe trustees estimate that bringing OASDI program revenues into balance with program costs would require an immediate permanent increase of 2.78 percentage points in the payroll tax rate, from 12.40% to 15.18%, a permanent reduction in benefits of about 17%, or some combination of the two approaches. Although investing in equities may result in a higher return on the trust funds' assets, such a proposal would, by itself, have little effect on the program's long-term outlook, and it would have budgetary implications by requiring the immediate liquidation of the trust funds' existing assets. Because the trust funds are projected to be depleted in 2034 and because costs are expected to exceed revenues indefinitely, any proposal to invest the trust funds' asset in equities without first bringing the OASDI program into balance would result in little change to the program's solvency. Should Congress pass legislation that reduces the actuarial deficit, research indicates that including equity in the trust funds' investment practices could improve the program's financial position. This practice, if enacted, would disregard several of the trust funds' investment principles.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_329"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_330","query":"The United States, as the largest consumer and producer of oil, plays a major role in the world market. Policy decisions can affect the price of oil and petroleum products (e.g., gasoline) for U.S. consumers and companies operating in U.S. oil production, transportation, and refining sectors. Congress considers policies that can affect the world oil market, including trade, sanctions, protection of trade routes, the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), and alternative fuel standards.\nTechnological advancements, supportive policies, and other aspects of the U.S. oil industry have reversed a multidecade downward trend in U.S. oil production. In 2018, U.S. oil production nearly doubled compared to 2008. The United States is also the number one consumer of crude oil and refined petroleum products in the world. The pricing of crude oil contributes to the price consumers pay for petroleum products in the United States.\nCongress has maintained an interest in oil policy. Following the 1973 Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) oil embargo, Congress passed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA; P.L. 94-163). In response to rapid price escalation and perceived scarcity, the EPCA, among many other things, restricted U.S. produced crude oil exports. As the oil sector evolved, Congress has amended the EPCA. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113) repealed Section 103 of the EPCA removing any restrictions to crude oil exports.\nSupply, demand, price, and other factors all combine and interact with one another to create the world oil market. Saudi Arabia, historically, has been the world's leading oil producer and along with the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Counties (OPEC) has held enough spare capacity to influence global oil supply and prices. World oil demand typically follows world economic conditions. Oil prices are set in the world market and are primarily a function of supply and demand fundamentals, but also a number of other factors, such as quality, location, and transport infrastructure availability (e.g., pipelines). While the world oil market historically follows the world economy, supply generally does not follow demand smoothly and this results in price volatility. As economies grow, so too does the demand for crude oil and petroleum products, including fuels, paints, lubricants, and plastics. China and India are forecasted by the International Energy Agency (IEA) to contribute a large portion of oil demand growth, representing around 20% of total world demand by 2023. Asia, by IEA's forecast, will remain a net importer of crude oil through 2023.\nOil policy can be influential as a response to or in anticipation of undesirable international behavior or as a means to bring balance and stability to an otherwise volatile market. OPEC, especially in conjunction with other major producers (e.g., Russia), can exert influence on the oil market. Several bills introduced in the 115th Congress addressed the U.S. relationship with OPEC, such as the No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels (NOPEC) Act of 2018 (H.R. 5904 and S. 3214). The United States has utilized the oil market as a political tool. National oil companies (NOCs) operate under government ownership or are companies under influence by national governments. The United States, by placing sanctions on crude oil and crude oil-related industries, can send a message to those governments (e.g., Iran). Physical threats to oil supply still exist, particularly along certain trade routes. For instance, roughly 24% of the world oil market transited the Strait of Hormuz in the first half of 2018. A disruption to world supply along trade routes could permeate into geopolitical relationships, secondary industries (e.g., petrochemicals, agriculture), and the economy at large.\nThe United States plays a multifaceted role in the world oil market, which may affect policy decisions for Congress. Congress has in the past enacted legislation to promote a stable, reliable supply of oil. For example, the EPCA created the SPR and established the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standard for vehicles, in part, as strategies to reduce U.S. exposure to future supply disruptions. Additionally, Congress has enacted legislation to diversify transportation fuels, including tax credits for electric vehicles and the Renewable Fuel Standard. As the oil market continues to evolve, Congress may want to consider these and other major policy options that could include international trade policies, infrastructure, diversification of transportation fuels, and funding in research and development.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_330"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_331","query":"The Social Security full retirement age (FRA) is the age at which workers can first claim full Social Security retired-worker benefits. Among other factors, a worker's monthly benefit amount is affected by the age at which he or she claims benefits relative to the FRA. Benefit adjustments are made based on the number of months before or after the FRA the worker claims benefits. The adjustments are intended to provide the worker with roughly the same total lifetime benefits, regardless of when he or she claims benefits, based on average life expectancy. Claiming benefits before the FRA results in a permanent reduction in monthly benefits (to take into account the longer expected period of benefit receipt); claiming benefits after the FRA results in a permanent increase in monthly benefits (to take into account the shorter expected period of benefit receipt).\nThe FRA was 65 at the inception of Social Security in the 1930s. Under legislation enacted in 1983, the FRA is increasing gradually from 65 to 67 over a 22-year period (for those reaching age 62 between 2000 and 2022). The FRA will reach 67 for workers born in 1960 or later (i.e., for workers who become eligible for retirement benefits at age 62 in 2022). Currently, the FRA is 66 and 6 months for workers who become eligible for retirement benefits in 2019 (i.e., workers born in 1957).\nWorkers can claim reduced retirement benefits as early as age 62 (the early eligibility age). Spouses can also claim reduced retirement benefits starting at age 62. Other dependents, such as widow(er)s, can claim benefits at earlier ages. For workers with an FRA of 66, for example, claiming benefits at age 62 results in a 25% reduction in monthly benefits. For workers with an FRA of 67, claiming benefits at age 62 results in a 30% benefit reduction. A majority of retired-worker beneficiaries claim benefits before the FRA. In 2017, 37% of new retired-worker beneficiaries were age 62; almost two-thirds (64%) were under the age of 66.\nWorkers who delay claiming benefits until after the FRA receive a delayed retirement credit, which applies up to the age of 70. For workers with an FRA of 66, for example, claiming benefits at age 70 results in a 32% increase in monthly benefits. For workers with an FRA of 67, claiming benefits at age 70 results in a 24% benefit increase. In 2017, almost one-fourth (23%) of new retired-worker beneficiaries were age 66; 12% were over the age of 66.\nSome lawmakers have called for increasing the Social Security retirement age in response to the system's projected financial imbalance, citing gains in life expectancy for the population overall. Other lawmakers, however, express concern that increasing the retirement age would disproportionately affect certain groups within the population, citing differences in life expectancy by socioeconomic groups. Differential gains in life expectancy are important in the context of Social Security because the actuarial adjustments for claiming benefits before or after the full retirement age are based on average life expectancy. Proposals to increase the retirement age are also met with concerns about the resulting hardship for certain workers, such as those in physically demanding occupations, who may be unable to work until older ages and may not qualify for Social Security disability benefits. For an in-depth discussion of potential changes in the Social Security retirement age in the context of life expectancy trends, see CRS Report R44846, The Growing Gap in Life Expectancy by Income: Recent Evidence and Implications for the Social Security Retirement Age.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_331"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_332","query":"Since 2011, the Syria conflict has presented significant policy challenges for the United States. (For a brief conflict summary, see Figure 2). U.S. policy toward Syria since 2014 has prioritized counterterrorism operations against the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL\/ISIS), but also has included nonlethal assistance to Syrian opposition groups, diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the civil war, and humanitarian aid to Syria and regional countries affected by refugee outflows. U.S. forces deployed to Syria have trained, equipped, and advised local partners under special authorization from Congress and have worked primarily \"by, with, and through\" those local partners to retake nearly all areas formerly held by the Islamic State.\nFollowing an internal policy review, Administration officials in late 2018 had described U.S. policy toward Syria as seeking (1) the enduring defeat of the Islamic State; (2) a political settlement to the Syrian civil war; and (3) the withdrawal of Iranian-commanded forces. President Trump's December 2018 announcement that U.S. forces had defeated the Islamic State and would leave Syria appeared to signal the start of a new U.S. approach. However, in February 2019, the White House stated that several hundred U.S. troops would remain in Syria, and the President is requesting $300 million in FY2020 defense funding to continue to equip and sustain Syrian partner forces. The FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 115-232) required the Administration to clarify its Syria strategy and report on current programs in order to obligate FY2019 defense funds for train and equip purposes in Syria.\nThe United States continues to advocate for a negotiated settlement between the government of Syrian President Bashar al Asad and Syrian opposition forces in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254 (which calls for the drafting of a new constitution and U.N.-supervised elections). However, the Asad government's use of force to retake most opposition-held areas of Syria has reduced pressure on Damascus to negotiate, and U.S. intelligence officials in 2019 assessed that Asad has little incentive to make significant concessions to the opposition. U.S. officials have stated that the United States will not contribute aid to reconstruction in Asad-held areas unless a political solution is reached.\nThe United States has directed more than $9.1 billion toward Syria-related humanitarian assistance, and Congress has appropriated billions more for security and stabilization initiatives in Syria and neighboring countries. The Defense Department has not disaggregated the costs of military operations in Syria from the overall cost of the counter-IS campaign in Syria and Iraq (known as Operation Inherent Resolve, OIR), which had reached $28.5 billion by September 2018.\nThe 115th Congress considered proposals to authorize or restrict the use of force against the Islamic State and in response to Syrian government chemical weapons attacks, but did not enact any Syria-specific use of force authorizations. The 116th Congress may seek clarification from the Administration concerning its overall Syria policy, plans for the withdrawal of U.S. military forces, the U.S role in ensuring a lasting defeat for the Islamic State, U.S. investments and approaches to postconflict stabilization, the future of Syrian refugees and U.S. partners inside Syria, and the challenges of dealing with the Iran- and Russia-aligned Asad government.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_332"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_333","query":"Four months into 2019, unification talks intended to end the division of Cyprus after 55 years as a politically separated nation and 45 years as a physically divided country have remained suspended since July 2017. Attempts by the United Nations to find common ground between the two Cypriot communities to resume the negotiations have not been successful. The talks have fallen victim to the realities of five decades of separation and both sides' inability to make the necessary concessions to reach a final settlement. As a result, the long-sought bizonal, bicommunal, federal solution for the island has remained elusive and may no longer be attainable.\nCyprus negotiations typically exhibit periodic levels of optimism, quickly tempered by the political reality that difficult times between Greek and Turkish Cypriots always lay ahead. In June 2018, in an attempt to jump-start the talks, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres appointed Jane Holl Lute as his new adviser for Cyprus. Her mission was to consult with the two Cypriot leaders, Nicos Anastasiades and Mustafa Akinci, and the three guarantor parties (Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain) to determine if sufficient conditions existed to resume U.N.-hosted negotiations and, if so, to prepare a comprehensive \"terms of reference\" document by the end of 2018. This document was supposed to include a version of a 2017 \"framework\" proposed by Guterres, previous \"convergences\" both sides had reportedly reached on many issues, and a proposed road map for how the negotiations would proceed.\nLute conducted her first consultations in September 2018 and a second round in October. Although the talks reportedly were \"productive,\" they did not result in an agreement to resume the talks and Lute announced she would have to return to the island in early 2019, reaffirming the difficulty many thought she would encounter in trying to reach agreement on the provisions of the \"terms of reference.\" Lute's initial return in January 2019 was short and inconclusive.\nSubsequently, Lute returned to meet with Anastasiades and Akinci on April 7. What Lute apparently found was that both sides were seemingly farther apart. Aside from the long-standing disagreement on security guarantees, a big sticking point was Akinci's insistence that the Turkish Cypriots have political equality, demanding that on all issues taken up at any new federal level, a positive Turkish Cypriot vote would be necessary. Anastasiades expressed a willingness to discuss Akinci's proposal for some issues but rejected the demand claiming, it would give the Turkish Cypriots an absolute veto over all policy issues, potentially resulting in gridlock. At the same time, Anastasiades resurrected an old proposal that the new government be a cross between a presidential system, in which the president would be a Greek Cypriot, and a parliamentary system in which a prime minister would rotate between the two communities. Akinci rejected this proposal, claiming it reinforced his view that the Greek Cypriots will always see the Turkish Cypriots as a minority and not a coequal partner.\nLute's fourth attempt failed to achieve an agreement between the two Cypriot leaders on how to restart the talks and suggested that negotiations were likely to remain suspended indefinitely.\nThe United States historically has held an \"honest broker\" approach to achieving a just, equitable, and lasting settlement of the Cyprus issue. However, some observers have seen recent actions within Congress and the Administration in support of Cyprus's unfettered energy development in the Eastern Mediterranean and lifting of restrictions on arms sales to Cyprus as an admission by the United States that an equitable solution has become more difficult. These policy directions also suggest that U.S. interests in the Eastern Mediterranean have moved on to security and energy concerns for which closer relations with the Republic of Cyprus have become a higher priority.\nThis report provides an overview of the negotiations' history and a description of some of the issues involved in those talks.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_333"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_334","query":"Foreign assistance is the largest component of the international affairs budget and is viewed by many as an essential instrument of U.S. foreign policy. On the basis of national security, commercial, and humanitarian rationales, U.S. assistance flows through many federal agencies and supports myriad objectives. These include promoting economic growth, reducing poverty, improving governance, expanding access to health care and education, promoting stability in conflict regions, countering terrorism, promoting human rights, strengthening allies, and curbing illicit drug production and trafficking. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, foreign aid has increasingly been associated with national security policy. At the same time, many Americans and some Members of Congress view foreign aid as an expense that the United States cannot afford given current budget deficits.\nIn FY2017, U.S. foreign assistance, defined broadly, totaled an estimated $49.87 billion, or 1.2% of total federal budget authority. About 44% of this assistance was for bilateral economic development programs, including political\/strategic economic assistance; 35% for military aid and nonmilitary security assistance; 18% for humanitarian activities; and 4% to support the work of multilateral institutions. Assistance can take the form of cash transfers, equipment and commodities, infrastructure, or technical assistance, and, in recent decades, is provided almost exclusively on a grant rather than loan basis. Most U.S. aid is implemented by nongovernmental organizations rather than foreign governments. The United States is the largest foreign aid donor in the world, accounting for about 24% of total official development assistance from major donor governments in 2017 (the latest year for which these data are available).\nKey foreign assistance trends in the past decade include growth in development aid, particularly global health programs; increased security assistance directed toward U.S. allies in the anti-terrorism effort; and high levels of humanitarian assistance to address a range of crises. Adjusted for inflation, annual foreign assistance funding over the past decade was the highest it has been since the Marshall Plan in the years immediately following World War II. In FY2017, Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, and Egypt received the largest amounts of U.S. aid, reflecting long-standing aid commitments to Israel and Egypt, the strategic significance of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the strategic and humanitarian importance of Jordan as the crisis in neighboring Syria continues. The Near East region received 27% of aid allocated by country or region in FY2017, followed by Africa, at 25%, and South and Central Asia, at 15%. This was a significant shift from a decade prior, when Africa received 19% of aid and the Near East 34%, reflecting significant increases in HIV\/AIDS-related programs concentrated in Africa between FY2007 and FY2017 and the drawdown of U.S. military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Military assistance to Iraq began to decline starting in FY2011, but growing concern about the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has reversed this trend.\nThis report provides an overview of the U.S. foreign assistance program by answering frequently asked questions on the subject. It is intended to provide a broad view of foreign assistance over time, and will be updated periodically. For more current information on foreign aid funding levels, see CRS Report R45168, Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs: FY2019 Budget and Appropriations, by Susan B. Epstein, Marian L. Lawson, and Cory R. Gill.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_334"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_335","query":"The federal government collects various fees from businesses and households. Choosing to raise public funds via user fees, as opposed to other means such as taxes, has important administrative and economic consequences. Many fees stem from \"business-like activities,\" in which the government provides a service or benefit in return for payment. For example, many national parks charge entry fees, which then help fund maintenance projects. Such fees and charges that result from voluntary choices, such as entering a national park, are distinguished from taxes\u2014which stem from the government's sovereign power to compel payments. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) defines a user fee as a \"fee assessed to users for goods or services provided by the federal government. User fees generally apply to federal programs or activities that provide special benefits to identifiable recipients above and beyond what is normally available to the public.\"\nUser fees and charges have several advantages as a means of financing public activities. They are voluntary, they connect the burden of financing activities to those who directly benefit from them, and can help decentralize decisionmaking by bypassing centralized allocation of resources. Some have expressed concerns that user fee arrangements may bypass regular congressional scrutiny and dilute Congress's power of the purse. Collections of fees and charges may also be more sensitive to economic fluctuations, which could complicate financing of programs dependent on those revenue streams.\nMany user fees or charges are classified as offsetting collections, which are deposited into expenditure accounts. Offsetting collections can be used to offset agency spending and typically require no further congressional approval to use. Other fees and charges are classified as offsetting receipts, which are collected into revenue accounts and typically require congressional authorization to be spent. User fees and charges can be classified as discretionary or mandatory spending, depending on how they are legally authorized. The levels and administration of some fees are specified in detailed statutory text, while other fees are created under broader agency authorities. Certain agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), have increased their reliance on user fees in past decades. Some critics have raised concerns that increased reliance on user fees could shift incentives facing those agencies.\nSome legislative proposals, such as H.R. 850 introduced in the 115th Congress, would limit or eliminate most exceptions and require most fees and charges to be deposited in the U.S. Treasury General Fund. Congress could fund agencies and activities now funded in whole or in part via user fees directly through the annual appropriations process. Such proposals would mark a departure from past practice. Statutory text governing many fees has evolved over many years and involves substantive policy decisions, often related to the industry or programmatic concerns. A general change in funding from user fees and charges to annual appropriations would likely shift the division of responsibilities between authorizing committees and appropriations committees.\nCongress may also enhance its oversight of agencies reliant on user fees by requiring more timely and detailed financial reports as well as more precise and systematic explanations of linkages between those fees and associated programs. Congress could also ask for greater transparency in fiscal data. While the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the U.S. Treasury Bureau of the Fiscal Service provide extensive data on user fees and charges, it is difficult to conduct governmentwide analyses using publicly available sources. Congress could mandate more detailed and more easily accessed data on user fees and charges. Additional funding may be needed to develop the capacity to issue those data.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_335"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_336","query":"This report describes online tools, reports, and data compilations created by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) that contain statistics about federal employees and the federal workforce.\nThe report also describes key characteristics of each resource and briefly discusses selected methodological differences, with the intention of facilitating the selection of appropriate data for specific purposes. This report is not intended to be a definitive list of all information on the federal workforce. It describes significant and recurring products that contain specific data often requested by Members or congressional staff.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_336"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_337","query":"Between 1969 and 1999, almost 3,500 people died as a result of political violence in Northern Ireland, which is one of four component \"nations\" of the United Kingdom (UK). The conflict, often referred to as \"the Troubles,\" has its origins in the 1921 division of Ireland and has reflected a struggle between different national, cultural, and religious identities. Protestants in Northern Ireland (48%) largely define themselves as British and support remaining part of the UK (unionists). Most Catholics in Northern Ireland (45%) consider themselves Irish, and many desire a united Ireland (nationalists).\nOn April 10, 1998, the UK and Irish governments and key Northern Ireland political parties reached a negotiated political settlement. The resulting Good Friday Agreement (also known as the Belfast Agreement) recognized the \"consent principle\" (i.e., a change in Northern Ireland's status can come about only with the consent of a majority of its people). It called for devolved government\u2014the transfer of power from London to Belfast\u2014with a Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive Committee in which unionist and nationalist parties would share power; it also contained provisions on decommissioning (disarmament) of paramilitary weapons, policing, human rights, UK security normalization (demilitarization), and the status of prisoners.\nDespite a much-improved security situation since 1998, full implementation of the peace accord has been challenging. For many years, decommissioning and police reforms were key sticking points that generated instability in the devolved government. In 2007, however, the hard-line Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Fein, the associated political party of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), reached a landmark power-sharing deal.\nAlthough many analysts view implementation of the most important aspects of the Good Friday Agreement as having been completed, tensions remain in Northern Ireland and distrust persists between the unionist and nationalist communities and their respective political parties. In January 2017, the devolved government led by the DUP and Sinn Fein collapsed, prompting snap Assembly elections in March 2017. Amid a renewable energy scandal involving DUP leader Arlene Foster and unease in much of Northern Ireland about \"Brexit\"\u2014the UK's expected exit from the European Union (EU)\u2014Sinn Fein made significant electoral gains. Negotiations to form a new power-sharing government have been unsuccessful to date.\nNorthern Ireland continues to face a number of broader challenges in its search for peace and reconciliation. These challenges include reducing sectarian strife, fully grappling with Northern Ireland's legacy of violence (often termed dealing with the past); addressing lingering concerns about paramilitary and dissident activity; and promoting further economic development. Brexit also may have significant political and economic repercussions for Northern Ireland. The future of the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland was a central issue in the UK's withdrawal negotiations with the EU and has posed a key stumbling block to approving the withdrawal agreement in the UK Parliament. Brexit also has renewed questions about Northern Ireland's status within the UK in the longer term.\nSuccessive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have actively supported the Northern Ireland peace process. For decades, the United States provided development aid through the International Fund for Ireland (IFI). In recent years, congressional hearings have focused on the peace process, police reforms, and the status of public inquiries into several murders in Northern Ireland in which collusion between the security forces and paramilitary groups is suspected. Such issues may continue to be of interest in the 116th Congress.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_337"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_338","query":"The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) provides the President broad authority to regulate a variety of economic transactions following a declaration of national emergency. IEEPA, like the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) from which it branched, sits at the center of the modern U.S. sanctions regime. Changes in the use of IEEPA powers since the act's enactment in 1977 have caused some to question whether the statute's oversight provisions are robust enough given the sweeping economic powers it confers upon the President upon declaration of a state of emergency.\nOver the course of the twentieth century, Congress delegated increasing amounts of emergency power to the President by statute. The Trading with the Enemy Act was one such statute. Congress passed TWEA in 1917 to regulate international transactions with enemy powers following the U.S. entry into the First World War. Congress expanded the act during the 1930s to allow the President to declare a national emergency in times of peace and assume sweeping powers over both domestic and international transactions. Between 1945 and the early 1970s, TWEA became a critically important means to impose sanctions as part of U.S. Cold War strategy. Presidents used TWEA to block international financial transactions, seize U.S.-based assets held by foreign nationals, restrict exports, modify regulations to deter the hoarding of gold, limit foreign direct investment in U.S. companies, and impose tariffs on all imports into the United States.\nFollowing committee investigations that discovered that the United States had been in a state of emergency for more than 40 years, Congress passed the National Emergencies Act (NEA) in 1976 and IEEPA in 1977. The pair of statutes placed new limits on presidential emergency powers. Both included reporting requirements to increase transparency and track costs, and the NEA required the President to annually assess and extend, if appropriate, the emergency. However, some experts argue that the renewal process has become pro forma. The NEA also afforded Congress the means to terminate a national emergency by adopting a concurrent resolution in each chamber. A decision by the Supreme Court, in a landmark immigration case, however, found the use of concurrent resolutions to terminate an executive action unconstitutional. Congress amended the statute to require a joint resolution, significantly increasing the difficulty of terminating an emergency.\nLike TWEA, IEEPA has become an important means to impose economic-based sanctions since its enactment; like TWEA, Presidents have frequently used IEEPA to restrict a variety of international transactions; and like TWEA, the subjects of the restrictions, the frequency of use, and the duration of emergencies have expanded over time. Initially, Presidents targeted foreign states or their governments. Over the years, however, presidential administrations have increasingly used IEEPA to target individuals, groups, and non-state actors such as terrorists and persons who engage in malicious cyber-enabled activities.\nAs of March 1, 2019, Presidents had declared 54 national emergencies invoking IEEPA, 29 of which are still ongoing. Typically, national emergencies invoking IEEPA last nearly a decade, although some have lasted significantly longer--the first state of emergency declared under the NEA and IEEPA, which was declared in response to the taking of U.S. embassy staff as hostages by Iran in 1979, may soon enter its fifth decade.\nIEEPA grants sweeping powers to the President to control economic transactions. Despite these broad powers, Congress has never attempted to terminate a national emergency invoking IEEPA. Instead, Congress has directed the President on numerous occasions to use IEEPA authorities to impose sanctions. Congress may want to consider whether IEEPA appropriately balances the need for swift action in a time of crisis with Congress' duty to oversee executive action. Congress may also want to consider IEEPA's role in implementing its influence in U.S. foreign policy and national security decision-making.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_338"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_339","query":"Authorized by P.L. 106-554, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001 (Appendix H: the New Markets Venture Capital Program Act of 2000), the New Markets Venture Capital (NMVC) program, which is no longer active, is designed to promote economic development and the creation of wealth and job opportunities in low-income geographic areas by addressing the unmet equity investments needs of small businesses located in those areas. Modeled on the Small Business Association's (SBA's) Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) program, SBA-selected, privately owned and managed NMVC companies provide funding and operational assistance to small businesses. To do so, they use private capital the NMVC company has raised (called regulatory capital) and up to 150% of that amount (called leverage) from the sale of SBA-guaranteed 10-year debentures, or loan obligations, to third parties, subject to the availability of funds. Because the SBA guarantees the debenture, the SBA is able to obtain favorable interest rates. NMVC companies are responsible for meeting the terms and conditions set forth in the debenture. At least 80% of the investments must be in small businesses located in a low-income area.\nSpecialized Small Business Investment Companies (SSBICs) established under the SBIC program are also eligible for NMVC operational assistance grants, which are awarded on a dollar-to-dollar matching basis. Six companies participated in the NMVC program.\nThe NMVC program was appropriated $21.952 million in FY2001 to support up to $150 million in SBA-guaranteed debentures and $30 million to fund operational assistance grants for FY2001 through FY2006. The funds were provided in a lump sum in FY2001 and were to remain available until expended. In 2003, the unobligated balances of $10.5 million for the NMVC debenture subsidies and $13.75 million for operational assistance grants were rescinded. The program continued to operate, with the number and amount of financing declining in recent years as the program's initial investments expired and NMVC companies increasingly engaged only in additional follow-on financings with the small businesses in their portfolios. The NMVC program's active unpaid principal balance peaked at $698 million in FY2008, and then fell each year thereafter until reaching $0 in FY2018.\nThis report examines the NMVC program's legislative origins and describes the program's eligibility and performance requirements for NMVC companies, eligibility requirements for small businesses seeking financing, and definition of low-income areas. It also reviews regulations governing the SBA's financial assistance to NMVC companies and provides program statistics.\nThe report concludes with an examination of (1) efforts to eliminate the program based on concerns that it duplicated other SBA programs and is relatively expensive, (2) the rescission of the program's unobligated funding in 2003, and (3) congressional efforts to provide the program additional funds.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_339"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_340","query":"The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant funds a wide range of benefits and services for low-income families with children. TANF was created in the 1996 welfare reform law (P.L. 104-193). This report responds to some frequently asked questions about TANF; it does not describe TANF rules (see, instead, CRS Report RL32748, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant: A Primer on TANF Financing and Federal Requirements, by Gene Falk).\nTANF Funding and Expenditures. TANF provides fixed funding for the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the territories, and American Indian tribes. The basic block grant totals $16.5 billion per year. States are also required in total to contribute, from their own funds, at least $10.3 billion annually under a maintenance-of-effort (MOE) requirement.\nThough TANF is best known for funding cash assistance payments for needy families with children, the block grant and MOE funds are used for a wide variety of benefits and activities. In FY2017, expenditures on basic assistance totaled $7.1 billion\u201423% of total federal TANF and MOE dollars. Basic assistance is often\u2014but not exclusively\u2014paid as cash. In addition to funding basic assistance, TANF also contributes funds for child care and services for children who have been, or are at risk of being, abused and neglected. Some states also count expenditures in prekindergarten programs toward the MOE requirement.\nThe TANF Assistance Caseload. A total of 1.2 million families, composed of 3.1 million recipients, received TANF- or MOE-funded assistance in September 2018. The bulk of the \"recipients\" were children\u20142.3 million in that month. The assistance caseload is heterogeneous. The type of family once thought of as the \"typical\" assistance family\u2014one with an unemployed adult recipient\u2014accounted for 32% of all families on the rolls in FY2016. Additionally, 31% of cash assistance families had an employed adult, while 38% of all TANF families were \"child-only\" and had no adult recipient. Child-only families include those with disabled adults receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI), adults who are nonparents (e.g., grandparents, aunts, uncles) caring for children, and families consisting of citizen children and ineligible noncitizen parents.\nCash Assistance Benefits. TANF cash benefit amounts are set by states. In July 2017, the maximum monthly benefit for a family of three ranged from $1,021 in New Hampshire to $170 in Mississippi. Only New Hampshire (at 60% of the federal poverty guidelines) had a maximum TANF cash assistance amount for this sized family in excess of 50% of poverty-level income.\nWork Requirements. TANF's main federal work requirement is actually a performance measure that applies to the states. States determine the work rules that apply to individual recipients. TANF law requires states to engage 50% of all families and 90% of two-parent families with work-eligible individuals in work activities, though these standards can be reduced by \"credits.\" Therefore, the effective standards states face are often less than the 50% or 90% targets, and vary by state. In FY2017, states achieved, on average, an all-family participation rate of 53.0% and a two-parent rate of 69.5%. In FY2017, two jurisdictions did not meet the all-family participation standard: Nevada and Guam. This is a reduction from FY2012, when 16 states did not meet that standard. In FY2017, nine jurisdictions did not meet the two-parent standard. States that do not meet work standards are at risk of being penalized by a reduction in their block grant.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_340"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_341","query":"This guide provides information on locating military unit histories and individual service records of discharged, retired, and deceased military personnel. It also provides information on locating and replacing military awards and medals. Included is contact information for military history centers, websites for additional sources of research, and a bibliography of other publications, including related CRS reports.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_341"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_342","query":"This report summarizes selected congressional roll call votes related to instances in which U.S. Armed Forces have been sent abroad in potentially hostile situations. These votes reflect the type of congressional actions that observers maintain bear directly on issues affecting policy and the funding of troops abroad, often in the context of the War Powers Resolution, continued presence or withdrawal of troops, and the \"use of force.\" The cases of Lebanon (1982-1983), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), the Persian Gulf War (1990-1991), Somalia (1992-1995), Haiti (1993-1996), Bosnia (1992-1998), Kosovo (1999), the terrorist attack against the United States (2001) (including the use of U.S. Armed Forces in Afghanistan), and the use of U.S. Armed Forces against Iraq (2002-2003) and Iraq and Afghanistan (2001-Present) are examined, as are the revolution in Libya and its aftermath, the uprising and war in Syria, and military action against the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS a.k.a, ISIS\/ISIL). The roll call votes that are available online (since 1990 in the House and 1989 in the Senate) are hyperlinked in the text.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_342"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_343","query":"Venezuela remains in a deep political crisis under the authoritarian rule of President Nicol\u00e1s Maduro of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). Maduro, narrowly elected in 2013 after the death of Hugo Ch\u00e1vez (1999-2013), is unpopular. Nevertheless, he has used the courts, security forces, and electoral council to repress the opposition.\nOn January 10, 2019, Maduro began a second term after winning reelection on May 20, 2018, in an unfair contest deemed illegitimate by the opposition-controlled National Assembly and most of the international community. The United States, the European Union, the Group of Seven, and most Western Hemisphere countries do not recognize the legitimacy of his mandate. They view the National Assembly as Venezuela's only democratic institution.\nMaduro's inauguration capped his efforts to consolidate power. In 2017, protesters called for Maduro to release political prisoners and respect the opposition-led National Assembly. Security forces quashed protests, with more than 130 killed and thousands injured. Maduro then orchestrated the controversial July 2017 election of a National Constituent Assembly; this assembly has usurped most legislative functions. During 2018, Maduro's government arrested dissident military officers and others suspected of plotting against him. Efforts to silence dissent may increase, as the National Assembly (under its new president, Juan Guaid\u00f3), the United States, and the international community push for a transition to a new government.\nVenezuela also is experiencing a serious economic crisis, and rapid contraction of the economy, hyperinflation, and severe shortages of food and medicine have created a humanitarian crisis. President Maduro has blamed U.S. sanctions for these problems, while conditioning receipt of food assistance on support for his government and increasing military control over the economy. He maintains that Venezuela will seek to restructure its debts, although that appears unlikely. The government and state oil company Petr\u00f3leos de Venezuela, S. A. (PdVSA) defaulted on bond payments in 2017. Lawsuits over nonpayment and seizures of PdVSA assets are likely.\nU.S. Policy\nThe United States historically had close relations with Venezuela, a major U.S. oil supplier, but relations have deteriorated under the Ch\u00e1vez and Maduro governments. U.S. policymakers have expressed concerns about the deterioration of human rights and democracy in Venezuela and the country's lack of cooperation on counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts. U.S. democracy and human rights funding, totaling $15 million in FY2018 (P.L. 115-141), has aimed to support civil society.\nThe Trump Administration has employed targeted sanctions against Venezuelan officials responsible for human rights violations, undermining democracy, and corruption, as well as on individuals and entities engaged in drug trafficking. Since 2017, the Administration has imposed a series of broader sanctions restricting Venezuelan government access to U.S. financial markets and prohibiting transactions involving the Venezuelan government's issuance of digital currency and Venezuelan debt. The Administration provided almost $97 million in humanitarian assistance to neighboring countries sheltering more than 3 million Venezuelans.\nCongressional Action\nThe 115th Congress took several actions in response to the situation in Venezuela. In February 2017, the Senate agreed to S.Res. 35 (Cardin), which supported targeted sanctions. In December 2017, the House passed H.R. 2658 (Engel), which would have authorized humanitarian assistance for Venezuela, and H.Res. 259 (DeSantis), which urged the Venezuelan government to accept humanitarian aid. For FY2019, the Administration requested $9 million in democracy and human rights funds for Venezuela. The 115th Congress did not complete action on the FY2019 foreign assistance appropriations measure. The House version of the FY2019 foreign aid appropriations bill, H.R. 6385, would have provided $15 million for programs in Venezuela; the Senate version, S. 3108, would have provided $20 million.\nThe 116th Congress likely will fund foreign assistance to Venezuela and neighboring countries sheltering Venezuelans. Congress may consider additional steps to influence the Venezuelan government's behavior in promoting a return to democracy and to relieve the humanitarian crisis.\nAlso see CRS In Focus IF10230, Venezuela: Political and Economic Crisis and U.S. Policy; CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions; and CRS In Focus IF11029, The Venezuela Regional Migration Crisis.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_343"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_344","query":"The current and planned size and composition of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy's shipbuilding plans have been oversight matters for the congressional defense committees for many years.\nOn December 15, 2016, the Navy released a force-structure goal that calls for achieving and maintaining a fleet of 355 ships of certain types and numbers. The 355-ship force-level goal is the result of a Force Structure Assessment (FSA) conducted by the Navy in 2016. The Navy states that a new FSA is now underway as the successor to the 2016 FSA. This new FSA, Navy officials state, is to be completed by the end of 2019. Navy officials have suggested in their public remarks that this new FSA could change the 355-ship figure, the planned mix of ships, or both.\nThe Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests funding for the procurement of 12 new ships, including one Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier, three Virginia-class attack submarines, three DDG-51 class Aegis destroyers, one FFG(X) frigate, two John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers, and two TATS towing, salvage, and rescue ships. The Navy's FY2020 five-year (FY2020-FY2024) shipbuilding plan includes 55 new ships, or an average of 11 new ships per year.\nThe Navy's FY2020 30-year (FY2020-FY2049) shipbuilding plan includes 304 ships, or an average of about 10 per year. If the FY2020 30-year shipbuilding plan is implemented, the Navy projects that it will achieve a total of 355 ships by FY2034. This is about 20 years sooner than projected under the Navy's FY2019 30-year shipbuilding plan\u2014an acceleration primarily due to a decision announced by the Navy in April 2018, after the FY2019 plan was submitted, to increase the service lives of all DDG-51 destroyers to 45 years. Although the Navy projects that the fleet will reach a total of 355 ships in FY2034, the Navy in that year and subsequent years will not match the composition called for in the FY2016 FSA.\nOne issue for Congress is whether the new FSA that the Navy is conducting will change the 355-ship force-level objective established by the 2016 FSA and, if so, in what ways. Another oversight issue for Congress concerns the prospective affordability of the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan. Decisions that Congress makes regarding Navy force structure and shipbuilding plans can substantially affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_344"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_345","query":"In the years following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Navy has carried out a variety of irregular warfare (IW) and counterterrorism (CT) activities. Among the most readily visible of these were operations carried out by Navy sailors serving ashore in the Middle East and Afghanistan, as well as the May 1-2, 2011, U.S. military operation in Abbottabad, Pakistan, that killed Osama bin Laden.\nDuring these years, the Navy took certain actions intended to improve its IW capabilities. For example, the Navy established the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) informally in October 2005 and formally in January 2006. NECC consolidated and facilitated the expansion of a number of Navy organizations that have a role in IW operations. The Navy also established the Navy Irregular Warfare Office in July 2008, published a vision statement for irregular warfare in January 2010, and established \"a community of interest\" (COI) to develop and advance ideas, collaboration, and advocacy related to IW in December 2010.\nThe Navy during these years also reestablished its riverine force and initiated The Global Maritime Partnership, which was a U.S. Navy initiative to achieve an enhanced degree of cooperation between the U.S. Navy and foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces, for the purpose of ensuring global maritime security against common threats. In addition, the Navy operated the Southern Partnership Station (SPS) and the Africa Partnership Station (APS), which were Navy ships, such as amphibious ships or high-speed sealift ships, that deployed to the Caribbean and to waters off Africa, respectively, to support U.S. Navy engagement with countries in those regions, particularly for purposes of building security partnerships with those countries and for increasing the capabilities of those countries for performing maritime-security operations.\nThe Navy's current IW and CT activities pose a number of potential oversight issues for Congress, including how much emphasis to place on IW and CT activities in Navy budgets, particularly in a context of constraints on Navy budgets and Navy desires to devote resources to developing \"high end\" combat capabilities for countering improved conventional military capabilities of countries such as China and Russia.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_345"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_346","query":"Throughout the years, Congress has expressed interest and concern for businesses recovering from disasters. For nearly a century, the federal government's policy for providing disaster assistance to businesses has been limited primarily to low interest loans rather than grant assistance. More recently, Congress has contemplated whether grants should be made available to small businesses after a major disaster. During this debate, some have questioned why small businesses are not eligible for disaster grants when residences, nonprofit groups, and state and local governments are eligible. In addition to concerns about equity, proponents of small business disaster grants argue that small businesses should be eligible for grant assistance because of the important role they play in the national economy. Major disasters can severely disrupt economic activity by causing immediate losses of output, income, and employment. While reports vary on the number of small businesses that fail after a disaster, even the low estimates could be considered significant. The Institute for Business and Home Safety found that 25% of businesses that close following a disaster fail to reopen, and a study on businesses in New Orleans recovering from Hurricane Katrina found that 12% of businesses remained closed 26 months after the storm. The number of failing businesses after a disaster reported by Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are higher. According to FEMA, \"roughly 40%-60% of small businesses never reopen their doors following a disaster.\"\nTo some, these findings suggest that the federal government should play a greater role in business disaster recovery. As part of this expanded role, Congress could consider providing grants to businesses to help them rebuild and recover from disasters. Changing the federal government's approach to business disaster policy, however, could be complex and require some careful decisionmaking. Steps would need to be taken to avoid and remedy potential grant and loan duplication. Congress would also have to determine under what circumstances and situations the grant program would be put into effect. Eligibility requirements would need to be developed to determine under what situations and circumstances grants would be provided as well as what types of businesses should be eligible to receive grants. Similarly, Congress might consider whether grants could be used for rebuilding, mitigation, or economic loss, in addition to other recovery activities. In addition to these concerns and others, Congress may want to investigate the potential cost implications of a small business disaster grant program.\nThis report examines the historical development of federal disaster assistance to help explain possible reasons why businesses are currently provided disaster loans rather than grants. This is followed by a discussion of policy considerations and options related to a potential disaster grant program for small businesses, including\nhow to minimize duplication of operations and benefits; whether to authorize the program in the Small Business Act, the Stafford Act, or other statute; the potential cost implications of a small business disaster grant program; and eligibility requirements (such as business size standards, eligible activities, and grant award amounts).\nAlternatively, Congress could explore other policy options to support small businesses struggling to recover from a disaster, including\nloan forgiveness; decreased interest rates; and establishing programs to help small (and large) businesses develop disaster and business continuity plans.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_346"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_347","query":"South Africa is a majority black, multiracial country of nearly 58 million people. It has cordial relations with the United States, notwithstanding some occasional strains, and is the largest U.S. trade partner in Africa. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa is spearheading efforts to address years of weak economic growth and multiple corruption scandals under his predecessor, Jacob Zuma. These issues helped spur Zuma's resignation in early 2018\u2014prior to a likely vote of no confidence by parliament\u2014and led to the election of Ramaphosa, who was selected to lead the African National Congress (ANC) party in late 2017. If the ANC wins a majority in forthcoming elections in May 2019, as polls suggest is probable, he will likely remain president.\nCorruption linked to Zuma and a network of business and political associates was reportedly so systematic that it was dubbed \"state capture.\" Multiple efforts to address this problem are underway, including a high-profile commission of judicial inquiry. Zuma is also being tried on charges linked to a 1990s-era arms procurement scandal. Broader challenges include high levels of poverty, social inequality, and unemployment, and unequal access to public services. Such problems disproportionately affect the generally poor black majority, the main victims of apartheid\u2014a codified system of racial bias that ended in 1994, when the first universal suffrage elections were held. Unequal access to land is a particularly sensitive issue. State land redistribution efforts have sought to ensure greater access to land by blacks and other historically disadvantaged groups, but progress has been slow. In 2018, pressure to speed this process prompted the government to launch an ongoing effort to amend the constitution to permit uncompensated land expropriation. South Africa also struggles with violent crime, labor unrest, and protests over public service delivery and corruption.\nSouth Africa has the most diversified and industrialized economy in Africa, but has suffered years of anemic growth attributable to a range of international and domestic factors. The Ramaphosa administration has made economic growth a priority, and is pursuing a range of efforts to reduce unemployment, poverty, and socioeconomic inequality; improve education and healthcare; and unite a socioeconomically, geographically, and racially divided society. It is also seeking to attract $100 billion in new investment over five years and has elicited at least $55 billion to date.\nCongress played a leading international role in efforts to end apartheid, although some South African decisionmakers appear to harbor abiding resentments toward the United States as a result of the Reagan Administration's approach to achieving this goal and its posture toward the ANC. Contemporary U.S.-South African ties are cordial, based on shared democratic values and often-concordant views on regional development goals. The two countries maintain a bilateral strategic dialogue, and the United States provides substantial aid to South Africa, primarily to combat the country's HIV\/AIDS epidemic. U.S.-South African views regularly diverge, however, on international policy matters (e.g., Palestinian statehood, and responses to Iran and Venezuela). There have also been periodic trade frictions; in 2015-2016 the two countries had a poultry and meat trade dispute and in 2018 the Trump Administration imposed tariffs on U.S. imports of steel and aluminum, including from South Africa. South Africa was later exempted from many of these tariffs, but prospective U.S. tariffs on autos and auto parts could spur renewed strains. The Trump Administration has not otherwise pursued any major changes in the bilateral relationship. An August 2018 tweet by President Trump alleging that South Africa's government was seizing white-owned farmland and that large numbers of farmers were being killed, however, drew criticism from the South African government.\nU.S.-South African relations arguably have the potential to deepen, although such an outcome might require dedicated efforts by the two sides. If President Ramaphosa demonstrates concrete progress in reasserting the rule of law and turning around the ailing economy, following substantial deterioration in these areas under former President Zuma, the country may become more attractive as a U.S. partner. Greater cooperation and collaboration can be envisioned regarding bilateral trade and investment, responses to political-military and development challenges in Africa, educational and cultural exchange, and technical cooperation in multiple areas. In recent years, South Africa-related congressional activity has mainly focused on U.S. healthcare assistance, trade issues, and consultations during periodic congressional travel to the country. Given South Africa's economic and political influence with in Africa and on African and developing country positions in multilateral contexts\u2014which do not always dovetail with those of the United States\u2014some Members of Congress may see a need to expand the scope and broaden the focus of congressional and other U.S. engagement with South Africa.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_347"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_348","query":"Like most federal agencies, the Department of Education (ED) receives funds in support of its mission through various federal budget and appropriations processes. While not unique, the mechanisms by which ED receives, obligates, and expends funds can be complex. For example, ED receives both mandatory and discretionary appropriations; ED is annually provided forward funds and advance appropriations for some\u2014but not all\u2014discretionary programs; ED awards both formula and competitive grants; and a portion of ED's budget subsidizes student loan costs (direct loans and loan guarantees). As such, analyzing ED's budget requires an understanding of a broad range of federal budget and appropriations concepts. This report provides an introduction to these concepts as they are used specifically in the context of the congressional appropriations process for ED.\nThe first section of this report provides an introduction to key terms and concepts in the federal budget and appropriations process for ED. In addition to those mentioned above, the report includes explanations of terms and concepts such as authorizations versus appropriations; budgetary allocations, discretionary spending caps, and sequestration; transfers and reprogramming; and matching requirements.\nThe second section answers frequently asked questions about federal funding for ED or education in general. These are as follows:\nHow much funding does ED receive annually? How much does the federal government spend on education? Where can information be found about the President's budget request and congressional appropriations for ED? How much ED funding is in the congressional budget resolution? What is the difference between the amounts in appropriations bills and report language? What happens to education funding if annual appropriations are not enacted before the start of the federal fiscal year? What happens if an ED program authorization \"expires\"?\nThe third section includes a brief description of, and links to, reports and documents that provide more information about budget and appropriations concepts.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_348"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_349","query":"This report details the evolution of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees' subcommittee structure from the 1920s to the present. In 1920, the House adopted a change in its rules to consolidate jurisdiction over all appropriations in the Appropriations Committee. After the enactment of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, the House reorganized its Appropriations Committee by establishing for the first time a set of subcommittees to consider appropriations bills based on the administrative organization of the executive branch. The Senate followed suit in 1922, and the two chambers have continued under that basic organizational approach since that time.\nIt is possible to divide the evolution of the modern Appropriations subcommittee structure into four eras. The first era, stretching roughly from the initial reorganization in the 1920s until the end of the Second World War, was marked by stability. Most of the changes in Appropriations structure resulted from combining bills (e.g., the Treasury Department bill with the Post Office Department bill beginning in 1924), although one new bill (and subcommittee) was created when the appropriations bill for the Department of Labor was split off from the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and Labor bill in 1939.\nThe second era, from the end of the Second World War through 1970, saw a number of significant changes. During this period, Congress attempted to keep pace with executive branch reorganizations (e.g., creation of subcommittees to consider appropriations for the new Departments of Defense in 1947 and Transportation in 1967) and changing national priorities (e.g., creation of a separate appropriations bill, and later subcommittee, for foreign operations).\nThe third era, from 1971 through 2003, was marked by a renewed stability. While some appropriations subcommittees were renamed to reflect changes in agency and departmental status, these changes did not represent major shifts in jurisdiction.\nFollowing major changes in organization involving nearly every subcommittee in the 108th, 109th, and 110th Congresses, the two chambers have once again settled into an era of stable organization. In 2003, both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees merged their subcommittees on Transportation and Treasury and created new subcommittees to consider appropriations for the newly created Department of Homeland Security. In 2005, both chambers undertook major reorganizations, eliminating three subcommittees in the House and one in the Senate. This reorganization, however, left the two chambers with differing subcommittee jurisdictions. In 2007 the two Appropriations Committees reorganized again to reestablish parallel subcommittees that have remained in place since.\nDuring the first session of the 110th Congress (2007), the House created the Select Intelligence Oversight Panel of the appropriations committee to oversee spending on federal intelligence activities. This panel was eliminated in 2011 at the beginning of the 112th Congress.\nThis report will be updated to reflect any changes in Appropriations subcommittee structure.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_349"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_350","query":"The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is an interagency body comprised of nine Cabinet members, two ex officio members, and other members as appointed by the President, that assists the President in reviewing the national security aspects of foreign direct investment in the U.S. economy. While the group often operated in relative obscurity, the perceived change in the nation's national security and economic concerns following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the proposed acquisition of commercial operations at six U.S. ports by Dubai Ports World in 2006 placed CFIUS's review procedures under intense scrutiny by Members of Congress and the public. In 2018, prompted by concerns over Chinese and other foreign investment in U.S. companies with advanced technology, Members of Congress and the Trump Administration enacted the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA), which became effective on November 11, 2018. This measure marked the most comprehensive revision of the foreign investment review process under CFIUS since the previous revision in 2007, the Foreign Investment and National Security Act (FINSA).\nGenerally, efforts to amend CFIUS have been spurred by a specific foreign investment transaction that raised national security concerns. Despite various changes to the CFIUS statute, some Members and others question the nature and scope of CFIUS reviews. The CFIUS process is governed by statute that sets a legal standard for the President to suspend or block a transaction if no other laws apply and if there is \"credible evidence\" that the transaction threatens to impair the national security, which is interpreted as transactions that pose a national security risk.\nThe U.S. policy approach to international investment traditionally established and supported an open and rules-based trading system that is in line with U.S. economic and national security interests. Recent debate over CFIUS reflects long-standing concerns about the impact of foreign investment on the economy and the role of economics as a component of national security. Some Members question CFIUS's performance and the way the Committee reviews cases involving foreign governments, particularly with the emergence of state-owned enterprises, and acquisitions involving leading-edge or foundational technologies. Recent changes expand CFIUS's purview to include a broader focus on the economic implications of individual foreign investment transactions and the cumulative effect of foreign investment on certain sectors of the economy or by investors from individual countries.\nChanges in U.S. foreign investment policy have potentially large economy-wide implications, since the United States is the largest recipient and the largest overseas investor of foreign direct investment. To date, six investments have been blocked, although proposed transactions may have been withdrawn by the firms involved in lieu of having a transaction blocked. President Obama used the FINSA authority in 2012 to block an American firm, Ralls Corporation, owned by Chinese nationals, from acquiring a U.S. wind farm energy firm located near a Department of Defense (DOD) facility and to block a Chinese investment firm in 2016 from acquiring Aixtron, a Germany-based firm with assets in the United States. In 2017, President Trump blocked the acquisition of Lattice Semiconductor Corp. by the Chinese investment firm Canyon Bridge Capital Partners; in 2018, he blocked the acquisition of Qualcomm by Broadcom; and in 2019, he directed Beijing Kunlun Co. to divest itself of Grindr LLC, an online dating site, over concerns of foreign access to personally identifiable information of U.S. citizens. Given the number of regulatory changes mandated by FIRRMA, Congress may well conduct oversight hearings to determine the status of the changes and their implications.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_350"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_351","query":"There are five major sources of airport capital development funding: the federal Airport Improvement Program (AIP); local passenger facility charges (PFCs) imposed pursuant to federal law; tax-exempt bonds; state and local grants; and airport operating revenue from tenant lease and other revenue-generating activities such as landing fees. Federal involvement is most consequential in AIP, PFCs, and tax-exempt financing.\nThe AIP has been providing federal grants for airport development and planning since the passage of the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-248). AIP funding is usually spent on projects that support aircraft operations such as runways, taxiways, aprons, noise abatement, land purchase, and safety or emergency equipment. The funds obligated for AIP are drawn from the airport and airway trust fund, which is supported by a variety of user fees and fuel taxes. Different airports use different combinations of these sources depending on the individual airport's financial situation and the type of project being considered. Although smaller airports' individual grants are of much smaller dollar amounts than the grants going to large and medium hub airports, the smaller airports are much more dependent on AIP to meet their capital needs. This is particularly the case for noncommercial airports, which received over 25% of AIP grants distributed in FY2018. Larger airports are much more likely to issue tax-exempt bonds or finance capital projects with the proceeds of PFCs.\nThe FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-254) provided annual AIP funding of $3.35 billion from the airport and airway trust fund for five years from FY2019 to FY2023. The act left the basic structure of AIP unchanged, but authorized supplemental annual funding of over $1 billion from the general fund to the AIP discretionary funds, starting with $1.02 billion in FY2019, and required at least 50% of the additional discretionary funds to be available to nonhub and small hub airports. The act included a provision permitting eligible projects at small airports (including those in the State Block Grant Program) to receive a 95% federal share of project costs (otherwise capped at 90%), if such projects are determined to be successive phases of a multiphase construction project that received a grant in FY2011.\nThe 2018 reauthorization expanded the number of states that could participate in the State Block Grant Program from 10 to 20 and also expanded the existing airport privatization pilot program (now renamed the Airport Investment Partnership Program) to include more than 10 airports. The law included a provision that forbids states or local governments from levying or collecting taxes on a business at an airport that \"is not generally imposed on sales or services by that State, political subdivision, or authority unless wholly utilized for airport or aeronautical purposes.\"\nThe airport improvement issues Congress generally faces in the context of FAA reauthorization include the following:\nShould airport development funding be increased or decreased? Should the $4.50 ceiling on PFCs be eliminated, raised, or kept as it is? Could AIP be restructured to address congestion at the busiest U.S. airports, or should a large share of AIP resources continue to go to noncommercial airports that lack other sources of funding? Should Congress set tighter limits on the purposes for which AIP and PFC funds may be spent?\nThis report provides an overview of airport improvement financing, with emphasis on AIP and the related passenger facility charges. It also discusses some ongoing airport issues that are likely to be included in a future FAA reauthorization debate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_351"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_352","query":"This report provides an overview and analysis of FY2019 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The primary focus of this report is on congressional direction and funding provided to DHS through the appropriations process. It includes an Appendix with definitions of key budget terms used throughout the suite of Congressional Research Service reports on homeland security appropriations. It also directs the reader to other reports providing context for specific component appropriations.\nAs part of an overall DHS budget that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimated to be $74.88 billion, the Trump Administration requested $47.43 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority through the appropriations process for DHS for FY2018. The request amounted to a $0.29 billion (0.6%) decrease from the $47.72 billion in annual appropriations enacted for FY2018 through the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141, Division F).\nThe Administration also requested discretionary funding for DHS components that does not count against discretionary spending limits and is not reflected in the adjusted net discretionary budget authority total. The Administration requested an additional $6.65 billion for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in disaster relief funding, as defined by the Budget Control Act (P.L. 112-25; BCA), and in the budget request for the Department of Defense (DOD), $165 million in Overseas Contingency Operations designated funding (OCO) from the Operations and Maintenance budget of the U.S. Navy.\nOn June 21, 2018, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported out S. 3109, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019, accompanied by S.Rept. 115-283. Committee-reported S. 3109 included $48.33 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for FY2019. This was $901 million (1.9%) above the level requested by the Administration, and $611 million (1.3%) above the enacted level for FY2018. The Senate committee-reported bill included the Administration-requested levels for disaster relief funding, and included the OCO funding in an appropriation to the Coast Guard, rather than as a transfer from the U.S. Navy.\nOn July 26, 2018, the House Appropriations Committee marked up H.R. 6776, its version of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019. H.Rept. 115-948 was filed September 12, 2018. Committee-reported H.R. 6776 included $51.44 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority. The House committee-reported bill included the Administration-requested levels for disaster relief funding, but unlike S. 3109, did not include the OCO funding for the Coast Guard.\nAs some of the annual appropriations for FY2019 remained unfinished, a consolidated appropriations bill that included a continuing resolution was passed by Congress and signed into law on September 28, 2018. The resolution, which covered DHS along with several other departments and agencies, continued funding at a rate of operations equal to FY2018 with some exceptions. This continuing resolution was extended through December 21, 2018, after which point annual appropriations lapsed. A partial government shutdown ensued for 35 days until continuing appropriations were resumed January 25, 2019, by P.L. 116-5.\nP.L. 116-6, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, was passed by Congress on February 14, 2019, and signed into law the following day. Division A of the act included the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2019, which included $49.41 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority, $12 billion designated for the costs of major disasters, and $165 million in OCO funding for the Coast Guard.\nThis report will be updated in the event of FY2019 supplemental appropriations actions.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_352"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_353","query":"The 115th Congress enacted several provisions affecting management of the National Forest System (NFS), administered by the Forest Service (in the Department of Agriculture), and the lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM, in the Department of the Interior). The provisions were enacted through two laws: the Stephen Sepp Wildfire Suppression Funding and Forest Management Activities Act, enacted as Division O of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141, commonly referred to as the FY2018 omnibus), and the Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-334, Title VIII, commonly referred to as the 2018 farm bill).\nMany of the provisions enacted by the 115th Congress affect Forest Service and BLM implementation of two laws: the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and the Healthy Forests Restoration Act (HFRA). These laws, among others, authorize specific forest management activities and establish decisionmaking procedures for those activities. The enacted provisions are summarized and analyzed in the following categories: project planning and implementation, wildland fire management, forest management and restoration programs, and miscellaneous. Ongoing issues for Congress include oversight of (i) the agencies' implementation of the new laws, and (ii) the extent these provisions achieve their specified purposes, such as improving agency efficiencies, increasing the scale, scope, and implementation of forest restoration projects, and reducing hazardous fuel levels to mitigate against the risk of catastrophic wildfire.\nBoth the FY2018 omnibus and 2018 farm bill included provisions that affect Forest Service and BLM decisionmaking processes by changing certain aspects of the NEPA process and the interagency consultation requirements established in Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). For example, each law specified that certain forest management projects would be considered actions categorically excluded from the requirements of NEPA. Also, both laws expanded various authorities originally authorized in HFRA intended to expedite decisionmaking for specific projects. This included reauthorizing the use of procedures intended to expedite priority projects in designated NFS insect and disease treatment areas and amending the definition of an authorized fuel reduction project to include additional activities.\nThe FY2018 omnibus and 2018 farm bill also contained provisions that affect federal wildland fire management. The FY2018 omnibus directed the Secretary of Agriculture to adapt the national-scale wildfire hazard potential map for use at the community level to inform risk management decisions. Both laws directed Forest Service and DOI to provide annual reports on a variety of wildfire-related metrics. The FY2018 omnibus also changed how Congress appropriates funding specifically for wildfire suppression purposes. The so-called wildfire funding fix authorized an adjustment to the discretionary spending limits for wildfire suppression operations for each year from FY2020 through FY2027. However, statutory spending limits are set to expire after FY2021, meaning that the adjustment is effectively in place for two years.\nCongress has established specific forest restoration programs for Forest Service and BLM, or has authorized forest restoration to be one of many activities or land management objectives for some programs. Forest restoration activities address concerns related to forest health, such as improving forest resistance and resilience to disturbance events (e.g., insect and disease infestation or uncharacteristically catastrophic wildfires). The 115th Congress established two new programs for Forest Service (water source protection and watershed condition framework) and amended three others: the Collaborative Forest Landscape Restoration Program (CFLRP, available only for Forest Service), stewardship contracting authority, and the good neighbor authority. Aspects of several of these programs allow Forest Service and BLM to partner with various stakeholders in different ways to perform specified forest management and restoration activities.\nBoth the FY2018 omnibus and the 2018 farm bill enacted various other provisions related to land acquisition, exchange and disposal; the issuance of special use authorizations for the use or occupancy of federal lands; the payments, activities, and Resource Advisory Committees authorized by the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act; and forest management on tribal lands.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_353"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_354","query":"Compared with most other tax provisions, the potential revenue gain scored for an increase in capital gains taxes is strongly affected by behavioral responses assumed by the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) and the Department of the Treasury. As an illustration, the Obama Administration estimated in February 2010 that allowing the Bush tax cuts for capital gains to expire would have raised $16 billion of revenue in FY2019. Yet, based on Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections in January 2010, the current effective capital gains tax was 13.3% in 2008 and would have increased to 17.9% in 2019; applying the differential in these rates to the realizations in 2019 would have produced a revenue difference of $40 billion. Although some of this differential could arise from different forecasts, assumptions about behavioral responses are the main reason for the reduction in projected revenues.\nBecause these behavioral responses limit the potential revenue scored from a tax increase on capital gains and because of concerns that most income of very high-income individuals is in the form of capital gains (whether accrued or realized), proposals have been advanced to tax capital gains currently (as accrued) by marking to market publicly traded securities and imposing a look-back tax on difficult-to-value assets. Such a change faces a number of difficulties; thus it is important to understand the evidence of the behavioral responses. The analysis in this study suggests that the Administration's projections and those of the JCT, absent a change in their realizations response, may understate revenue gains from increasing capital gains tax rates.\nRealizations responses in revenue projections by the revenue-estimating agencies (Joint Committee on Taxation and the Treasury) were publicly discussed at the end of the 1980s, in the midst of a contentious debate. The larger the absolute value of the elasticity (the percentage change in realizations divided by the percentage change in taxes), the smaller the revenue gain; with elasticities larger than one in absolute value, a loss would occur. Estimated elasticities in the literature prior to 1990 ranged from 0.3 to almost 3.8, leaving limited guidance for revenue-estimating agencies. JCT used an elasticity of 0.76, whereas Treasury used an elasticity of one.\nConcerns were raised at that time that there were serious problems with this evidence. Perhaps the most significant concern was that the larger results from studies of individuals reflected a timing or transitory response (high-income taxpayers with variable income chose to realize gains when tax rates were temporarily low). This transitory response is not appropriate for assessing a permanent change.\nEvidence and studies since that time suggest that the permanent elasticity is considerably lower than what appeared to be the case in 1990. The surge in realizations in 1986 as a capital gains tax rate increase was preannounced provided compelling evidence of the importance of a transitory response. A study of the limits of realizations (which cannot exceed accruals in the long run) suggested the elasticity (percentage change in realizations divided by the percentage change in the tax rate) could be no more than 0.5 in absolute value (evaluated at a 22% tax rate), and a midpoint of 0.25. A number of new econometric studies, using new techniques to isolate the permanent response, suggested elasticities of around 0.5 or less. Other recent studies suggested larger responses. The JCT appears to maintain its original assumption, while the Treasury response has been reduced to be similar to JCT's; both appear to exceed the realizations limit.\nSimulations indicate that an increase in capital gains tax rates of five percentage points would raise slightly more than $40 billion on a static basis for 2019, about $30 billion using the 0.25 elasticity and $18 billion using the 0.5 elasticity. The JCT estimates would likely be around $10 billion, reflecting a 0.68 elasticity. Taxing gains on an accrual basis would eliminate this response in the long run and gain additional revenues on currently unrealized gains.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_354"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_355","query":"The annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations legislation funds many of the nondefense international affairs activities of the United States. The State Department portion makes up about one-third of the funding, and the Foreign Operations accounts comprise the remainder. SFOPS is one of 12 annual appropriations acts that fund the federal government each fiscal year.\nCongress appropriated SFOPS in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), under Division F, \"Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2019.\" That act is divided into eight titles. Each title funds a variety of government activities, ranging from the operational and administrative costs of government agencies, to direct grant funds for private nonprofit or multilateral organizations. By title, SFOPS provisions set out activities as follows:\nTitle I\u2014Department of State and Related Agency: Funds State Department general operations and diplomatic programs, such as cultural exchange programs, dues to the United Nations, international broadcasting, and grants to U.S. diplomacy-focused nongovernmental organizations such as the National Endowment for Democracy. Title II\u2014United States Agency for International Development (USAID): Funds general operations of USAID, but not USAID foreign assistance programs (see Title III). Title III\u2014Bilateral Economic Assistance: The primary funding source for humanitarian and international development programs of the U.S. government. Includes bilateral assistance for disaster relief, global health, and economic development activities, as well as funding several independent development-oriented agencies, notably the Millennium Challenge Corporation and Peace Corps. Title IV\u2014International Security Assistance: The primary title for U.S. security cooperation programs abroad outside of the National Defense appropriations bill. Includes antinarcotics and rule of law strengthening programs; nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, and demining programs; some assistance to foreign militaries; and some funding for international peacekeeping efforts. Title V\u2014Multilateral Assistance: Contributes funds to several multilateral finance and grant-making institutions. Title VI\u2014Export and Investment Assistance: Funds the three independent export promotion agencies of the U.S. government, the Export-Import Bank; the Overseas Private Investment Corporation; and the Trade and Development Agency. Title VII\u2014General Provisions: Establishes guidance for the allocation of funds appropriated in other titles and lays out restrictions and priorities for programming. Title VIII\u2014Overseas Contingency Operations\/Global War on Terrorism: Provides additional funding to accounts in Titles I to V, to address ongoing U.S. military operations priorities overseas, particularly terrorist threats in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as worldwide.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_355"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_356","query":"The Small Business Administration (SBA) administers several types of programs to support small businesses, including loan guaranty and venture capital programs to enhance small business access to capital; contracting programs to increase small business opportunities in federal contracting; direct loan programs for businesses, homeowners, and renters to assist their recovery from natural disasters; and small business management and technical assistance training programs to assist business formation and expansion.\nCongressional interest in the SBA's loan, venture capital, training, and contracting programs has increased in recent years, primarily because small businesses are viewed as a means to stimulate economic activity and create jobs. Many Members of Congress also regularly receive constituent inquiries about the SBA's programs.\nThis report provides an overview of the SBA's programs, including\nentrepreneurial development programs (including Small Business Development Centers, Women's Business Centers, SCORE, and Microloan Technical Assistance); disaster assistance; capital access programs (including the 7(a) loan guaranty program, the 504\/Certified Development Company loan guaranty program, the Microloan program, International Trade and Export Promotion programs, and lender oversight); contracting programs (including the 8(a) Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program, the Historically Underutilized Business Zones [HUBZones] program, the Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Program, the Women-Owned Small Business [WOSB] Federal Contract Program, and the Surety Bond Guarantee Program); SBA regional and district offices; the Office of Inspector General; the Office of Advocacy; and capital investment programs (including the Small Business Investment Company program, the New Markets Venture Capital program, the Small Business Innovation Research [SBIR] program, the Small Business Technology Transfer program [STTR], and growth accelerators).\nThe report also discusses recent programmatic changes resulting from the enactment of legislation (such as P.L. 111-5, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, P.L. 111-240, the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, P.L. 114-38, the Veterans Entrepreneurship Act of 2015, P.L. 114-88, the Recovery Improvements for Small Entities After Disaster Act of 2015 [RISE After Disaster Act of 2015], P.L. 115-123, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, and P.L. 115-189, the Small Business 7(a) Lending Oversight Reform Act of 2018).\nIn addition, it provides an overview of the SBA's budget and references other CRS reports that examine these programs in greater detail.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_356"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_357","query":"The Constitution vests Congress with the legislative power, which includes authority to establish federal agencies and conduct oversight of those entities. Criminal investigations and prosecutions, however, are generally regarded as core executive functions assigned to the executive branch. Because of the potential conflicts of interest that may arise when the executive branch investigates itself, there have often been calls for criminal investigations by prosecutors with independence from the executive branch. In response, Congress and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) have used both statutory and regulatory mechanisms to establish a process for such inquiries. These frameworks have aimed to balance the competing goals of independence and accountability with respect to inquiries of executive branch officials.\nUnder the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, for example, Congress authorized the appointment of \"special prosecutors,\" who later were known as \"independent counsels.\" Under this statutory scheme, the Attorney General could request that a specially appointed three-judge panel appoint an outside individual to investigate and prosecute alleged violations of criminal law. These individuals were vested with \"full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department of Justice\" with respect to matters within their jurisdiction. Ultimately, debate over the scope, cost, and effect of the investigations (perhaps most notably the Iran-Contra and the Whitewater investigations) resulted in the law's expiration and nonrenewal in 1999.\nFollowing the lapse of these statutory provisions, DOJ promulgated regulations authorizing the Attorney General (or, if the Attorney General is recused from a matter, the Acting Attorney General) to appoint a \"special counsel\" from outside the federal government to conduct specific investigations or prosecutions that may be deemed to present a conflict of interest if pursued under the normal procedures of the agency. Special counsels are not subject to \"day-to-day supervision\" by any official and are vested \"within the scope of his or her jurisdiction, the full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions of any United States Attorney.\"\nThe independent nature of these investigations has raised constitutional questions about the propriety of the appointment and removal mechanisms provided for the officials leading the inquiries. These concerns were addressed by the Supreme Court in the 1988 case of Morrison v. Olson, which upheld the constitutionality of the independent counsel statute. The reasoning of that opinion has been challenged, however, and the Court's subsequent analysis of related issues in the 1997 case of Edmond v. United States and the 2010 case Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Accounting Oversight Board did not apply the standard enunciated in Morrison. The constitutional status of a statutory framework similar to the independent counsel statute is thus subject to debate. Several bills introduced in the 116th Congress (including S. 71 and H.R. 197, which merge aspects of two preceding bills introduced in the 115th Congress, S. 1735 and S. 1741) would statutorily insulate a special counsel from removal, echoing aspects of the independent counsel statute's provisions. Whether such proposals would withstand constitutional challenge today might ultimately turn on the continued vitality of the analysis applied in Morrison.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_357"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_358","query":"The Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) is one of the most-tracked single accounts funded by Congress each year. Managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), it is the primary source of funding for the federal government's domestic general disaster relief programs. These programs, authorized under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.), outline the federal role in supporting state, local, tribal, and territorial governments as they respond to and recover from a variety of incidents. They take effect in the event that nonfederal levels of government find their own capacity to deal with an incident is overwhelmed.\nThe appropriation which feeds the DRF predates current disaster relief programs and FEMA itself. It dates back to a half-million dollar deficiency appropriation to the President in 1948 that was drafted to allow him to use these resources to provide temporary emergency assistance to communities in the wake of unspecified potential natural disasters. Although the appropriation was provided with one particular Upper Midwest flooding incident in mind, the legislative language allowed the funding to be used more broadly, if the President wished to do so. This policy of providing general disaster relief was a shift from previous policy, which largely left emergency management, disaster relief, and disaster recovery in the hands of other levels of government and private relief organizations. Prior to the development of the general relief program, when the federal government got involved in disaster response and recovery, it was on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis. By comparison, the annual appropriation for the DRF in FY2018\u201470 years after the initial appropriation for general disaster relief\u2014was $7.9 billion.\nThe evolving federal role in disaster relief is partially illuminated in the funding stream provided for it through the DRF. What is a fixture of federal policy today was not a given a century ago. Examining the history of the program and its funding through the DRF may help Congress consider future approaches to disaster relief.\nThis report introduces the DRF and provides a brief history of federal disaster relief programs. It goes on to discuss the appropriations that fund the DRF, and provides a funding history from FY1964 to the present day, discussing factors that contributed to those changing appropriations levels. It concludes with discussion of how the budget request for the DRF has been developed and structured, given the unpredictability of the annual budgetary impact of disasters, and raises some potential issues for congressional consideration.\nThis report is updated on an annual basis.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_358"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_359","query":"Afghanistan has been a central U.S. foreign policy concern since 2001, when the United States, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led a military campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban government that harbored and supported it. In the intervening 17 years, the United States has suffered around 2,400 fatalities in Afghanistan (including seven in 2019 to date) and Congress has appropriated approximately $133 billion for reconstruction there. In that time, an elected Afghan government has replaced the Taliban, and nearly every measure of human development has improved, although future prospects of those measures remain mixed. The fundamental objective of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan is \"preventing any further attacks on the United States by terrorists enjoying safe haven or support in Afghanistan.\"\nIn early 2019, U.S. military engagement in Afghanistan appears closer to ending than perhaps ever before as U.S. officials negotiate directly with Taliban interlocutors on the issues of counterterrorism and the presence of U.S. troops. However, U.S. negotiators caution that talks are still at a preliminary stage, and Afghan government representatives have not been directly involved. Lead U.S. negotiator Zalmay Khalilzad insists that the United States seeks a comprehensive peace agreement but some worry that the United States will prioritize a military withdrawal over a complex political settlement that preserves some of the social, political, and humanitarian gains made since 2001. It remains unclear what kind of political arrangement could satisfy both Kabul and the Taliban to the extent that the latter fully abandons armed struggle.\nPress reports in December 2018 and early 2019 indicate that the Trump Administration may be considering withdrawing some U.S. forces, though U.S. officials maintain that no policy decision has been made to reduce U.S. force levels. Many observers assess that a full-scale U.S. withdrawal would lead to the collapse of the Afghan government and perhaps even the reestablishment of Taliban control. By many measures, the Taliban are in a stronger military position now than at any point since 2001, though at least some once-public metrics related to the conduct of the war have been classified or are no longer produced (including district-level territorial and population control assessments, as of the April 30, 2019, quarterly report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction). Underlying the negotiations is the unsettled state of Afghan politics, which is a major complicating factor: Afghanistan held inconclusive parliamentary elections in October 2018 and the all-important presidential election, originally slated for April 2019, has been postponed twice and is now scheduled for September 2019.\nFor background information and analysis on the history of congressional engagement with Afghanistan and U.S. policy there, as well as a summary of recent Afghanistan-related legislative proposals, see CRS Report R45329, Afghanistan: Legislation in the 115th Congress, by Clayton Thomas.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_359"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_360","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nStarting in September 2017, the first borrowers became eligible and began applying to have their loans forgiven through the PSLF program. GAO was asked to review the PSLF program.\nThis report examines the (1) number of borrowers pursuing PSLF and the extent to which Education has conducted outreach to increase borrower awareness of program eligibility requirements, and (2) extent to which Education has provided key information to the PSLF servicer and borrowers. GAO analyzed data from the PSLF servicer on employment and loan certifications and loan forgiveness applications as of April 2018; reviewed Education's guidance and instructions for the PSLF servicer; assessed the information used by Education and the PSLF servicer and communicated to borrowers against federal internal control standards; and interviewed officials from Education and the four largest loan servicers, including the PSLF servicer.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAs of April 2018, over a million borrowers had taken steps to pursue Public Loan Service Forgiveness (PSLF) from the Department of Education (Education), but few borrowers have been granted loan forgiveness to date. The PSLF program, established by statute in 2007, forgives borrowers' federal student loans after they make at least 10 years of qualifying payments while working for certain public service employers and meeting other requirements. Over 890,000 borrowers have passed a first step towards potentially qualifying for PSLF by voluntarily having their employment and loans certified as eligible for PSLF as of April 2018, according to data from Education's PSLF loan servicer. While borrowers first became eligible to apply for loan forgiveness in September 2017, few applicants had met all requirements as of April 2018, with 55 borrowers having received loan forgiveness (see figure). Education has used various outreach methods to inform borrowers about PSLF, but the large number of denied borrowers suggests that many are still confused by the program requirements. A recently enacted law requires Education to conduct additional outreach to help borrowers understand how to meet program requirements.\nEducation does not provide key information to the PSLF servicer and borrowers.\nGuidance and instructions: Education provides piecemeal guidance and instructions to the PSLF servicer it contracts with to process certification requests and loan forgiveness applications. This information is fragmented across the servicing contract, contract updates, and hundreds of emails. As a result, PSLF servicer officials said their staff are sometimes unaware of important policy clarifications. Education officials said they plan to create a comprehensive PSLF servicing manual but have no timeline for doing so.\nQualifying employers: Education has not provided the PSLF servicer and borrowers with a definitive source of information for determining which employers qualify a borrower for loan forgiveness, making it difficult for the servicer to determine whether certain employers qualify and for borrowers to make informed employment decisions.\nQualifying loan payments: Education does not ensure the PSLF servicer receives consistent information on borrowers' prior loan payments from the eight other federal loan servicers, which could increase the risk of miscounting qualifying payments. Borrowers also lack sufficiently detailed information to easily identify potential payment counting errors that could affect their eligibility for loan forgiveness.\nThese weaknesses are contrary to federal internal control standards for using and communicating quality information, creating uncertainty for borrowers and raising the risk some may be improperly granted or denied loan forgiveness.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that Education (1) develop a timeline for issuing a comprehensive guidance and instructions document for the PSLF servicer, (2) provide the PSLF servicer and borrowers with additional information about qualifying employers, (3) standardize payment information other loan servicers provide to the PSLF servicer, and (4) ensure borrowers receive sufficiently detailed information to help identify potential payment counting errors. Education agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_360"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_361","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIRS attempts to collect tax debts to promote tax compliance but does not have resources to pursue all debts. A 2015 law required IRS to contract with private collection agencies for certain tax debts. However, stakeholders such as the National Taxpayer Advocate have noted that safeguards are needed to protect taxpayers from risks, such as scammers impersonating collection agencies.\nGAO was asked to review IRS's PDC program. This report assesses the extent to which IRS (1) documented program objectives and measures, (2) documented revenue collection and cost results data, (3) used data to improve the program and meet its objectives, and (4) addressed risks to prevent or address scams and other harmful effects on taxpayers. GAO analyzed IRS's documents on PDC program administration and planning; collections and costs reporting; and managing risks. GAO interviewed officials from IRS and external groups that represent taxpayer interests.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Internal Revenue Service (IRS) documented objectives and proposed measures for its private debt collection (PDC) program for sending tax debt cases to private collection agencies, but the objectives are not clearly defined and their linkages with program measures are unclear. For example, one objective is to provide taxpayers an opportunity to understand and resolve their tax debts, but the proposed measure focuses on taxpayer satisfaction with collection agencies rather than taxpayers' understanding. The objectives also do not include some key program risks, such as scams. Without clearly defined objectives and measures, IRS will have limited ability to assess program results.\nIRS's reports to Congress on the PDC program have not provided complete financial information. For example, as of September 2018, IRS reported program revenue collections of about $89 million and costs of $67 million, suggesting a positive balance of $22 million for the general fund of the Treasury (the Treasury). However, the report did not clarify that about $51 million collected went to the Treasury and the remaining $38 million were retained by IRS in two special funds to pay current and future program costs. Without this information, Congress has an incomplete picture of the program's true costs and revenues.\nIRS has not analyzed PDC program results to identify the types of cases that should not be assigned to collection agencies because they do not result in collections. GAO's analysis of IRS data shows that between April 2017 and September 2018 about 73,000 of 111,000 cases closed by collection agencies had little or no revenue collected because the collection agencies were unable to contact the taxpayer or collect the debt, among other reasons. Given the costs associated with managing these cases, without such analyses, IRS may continue to use resources inefficiently and assign cases with little or no potential for revenue collection, or miss opportunities to assign other cases that could produce more revenue.\nIRS has identified and taken steps to mitigate some PDC program risks that could harm taxpayers. However, IRS has not completed the process of identifying and documenting all risks nor has it fully assessed risks to taxpayers from the program or its response to these risks. Specifically, GAO found that\nIRS identified and documented 6 taxpayer risks related to the PDC program, such as scammers impersonating collection agencies, but had not identified an additional 10 risks that GAO did, such as taxpayers agreeing to debt payments they cannot afford.\nIRS had not consistently assessed the impact or likelihood of the identified risks. As a result, IRS's responses to mitigate risks were broad in nature, and were not prioritized or aligned to address specific risks.\nIRS monitors a sample of collection agencies' telephone calls with taxpayers and reviews taxpayer complaints, but these methods do not provide information on whether IRS's responses to risks are effective.\nWithout addressing these risk management issues, IRS cannot ensure it has fully identified PDC program risks and effectively responded to protect taxpayers from them.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO makes 12 recommendations, including that IRS improve PDC program objectives and measures, revenue and cost reporting, analysis to assign cases, and management of taxpayer risks. IRS agreed with nine recommendations, partially agreed with GAO's recommendation on improving objectives\u2014which GAO clarified in response\u2014and disagreed with two recommendations to include certain costs in reporting and analyze data to identify cases not collectible. GAO maintains the recommendations would more fully report PDC program federal costs and prevent waste.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_361"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_362","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe federal government continues to work to reduce its real property inventory and associated costs. GSA provides space for agencies in government-owned and commercially leased buildings. In 2015, the OMB issued a memorandum requiring the 24 agencies with chief financial officers to reduce their domestic office and warehouse space. These agencies are required to set annual reduction targets for a 5-year time period and update their real property plans annually.\nGAO was asked to review the implementation of this space reduction initiative. This report discusses: (1) the approaches and any challenges the 24 agencies identified to achieving their reduction targets for all their domestic office and warehouse space; (2) the extent these agencies reduced their space and met their fiscal year 2016 targets; and (3) how GSA manages vacated space it had leased to these agencies.\nGAO conducted a content analysis of the 24 agencies' real property plans for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 and analyzed agencies' data as submitted to GSA on their targets and reductions for fiscal year 2016, the only year for which data were available. GAO selected five agencies as case studies based on several factors, including size of the agencies' office and warehouse portfolio, agency reduction targets, and fiscal year 2016 reported reductions. GAO reviewed relevant documentation and interviewed officials from GSA, OMB, and GAO's case study agencies. GAO provided a draft of this product to GSA, OMB, and our case study agencies for comment. GAO incorporated technical comments, as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nMost of the 24 agencies with chief financial officers reported to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the General Services Administration (GSA) that they planned to consolidate their office and warehouse space and allocate fewer square feet per employee as the key ways to achieve their space reduction targets. For example, the Department of Agriculture reported it will consolidate staff from five component agencies in two office buildings. When complete, the space allocated per employee will average about 250 square feet down from a high of 420 square feet per employee. In taking these actions, the agencies most often identified the cost of space reduction projects as a challenge to achieving their targets. Agencies cited costs such as for space renovations to accommodate more staff and required environmental clean-up before disposing of property as challenges to completing projects. Some agencies required to maintain offices across the country reported that their mission requirements limit their ability to reduce their space.\nIn fiscal year 2016, 17 of the 24 agencies reported they reduced their space, but had varying success achieving their first-year targets. Of the 17 agencies, 9 exceeded their target and reduced more space than planned, 7 missed their target (by anywhere between 2.8 and 96.7 percent), and 1 reduced space, despite a targeted increase. Agency officials said that it is not unusual for projects to shift to different years and that such shifts could lead to missing targets one year and exceeding them the next.\nGSA has processes to manage the space vacated by agencies that is leased through GSA. For example, starting in November 2016, GSA started tracking agencies' space release requests centrally to help standardize the process and established an e-mail address to which agencies can submit requests. GSA relies on regional offices to manage real property in their regions and to identify tenants for vacant space or to remove unused space from the inventory. GSA's regional officials said regular monitoring and coordinating with agencies minimizes the likelihood GSA is caught off guard by a return of space. These processes also help them to plan ahead. GSA met its 2016 performance goal to have an annual vacant space rate of no more than 3.2 percent in its federally owned and leased buildings. However, given the recent implementation of the space reduction initiative, it is too early to determine the extent to which agencies will return space to GSA prior to the end of their leases and the effect on GSA's inventory.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_362"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_363","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nMany state and local crime labs have backlogs of requests for DNA analysis of crime scene evidence, as reported by grantees participating in DOJ's CEBR grant program. These backlogs can include sexual assault kits. Since 2011, DOJ's Office of Justice Programs\u2014the primary grant-making arm of DOJ\u2014has awarded nearly $500 million to states and local jurisdictions through the CEBR grant program to help reduce DNA evidence awaiting analysis at crime labs. There have been concerns that these backlogs of unanalyzed evidence have enabled serial offenders to reoffend or have delayed justice.\nThis statement is based on preliminary observations and analyses from GAO's ongoing review of (1) the level of crime scene DNA evidence backlogs among CEBR grantees and the factors that contribute to such backlogs; (2) the extent to which DOJ has clearly defined goals for CEBR; and (3) the extent to which OJP has controls for CEBR related to federal conflicts of interest and lobbying requirements. To develop these preliminary findings, GAO reviewed CEBR grantee data from 2011-2016 (the latest data available) and studies relevant to the DNA backlog, visited selected labs, and interviewed DOJ officials, among others.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO's preliminary analysis found that, among the Department of Justice's (DOJ) DNA Capacity Enhancement and Backlog Reduction Program (CEBR) grantees (state and local entities with forensic crime labs), the reported aggregated backlog of crime scene DNA analysis requests has increased by 77 percent from 2011-2016. The growth in this reported aggregate backlog is the result of labs receiving more requests than they were able to complete, although they were receiving and completing more requests, as shown in the figure below.\nGAO's preliminary analysis also found that the National Institute of Justice (NIJ)\u2014the component within DOJ's Office of Justice Programs (OJP) that is responsible for administering CEBR grants\u2014has not defined CEBR program-wide goals in clear, specific, and measurable terms. Additionally, GAO's ongoing work identified statements in NIJ and CEBR program documentation that communicated program-wide goals, but the documentation did not consistently identify the same goals or cite the same number of goals. GAO continues to evaluate CEBR program goals and is in the process of evaluating related CEBR performance measures as part of its ongoing work.\nGAO's preliminary analysis found that OJP has some controls to implement federal requirements associated with conflicts of interest and lobbying that apply to both OJP CEBR grant administrators as well as recipients of CEBR grant funding, but OJP has not fully established all appropriate controls related to lobbying.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making recommendations in this testimony but will consider them, as appropriate, as it finalizes its work.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_363"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_364","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nState spends millions of dollars annually on allowances to compensate its employees for costs and hardships related to foreign assignments. Many of these assignments are critical to U.S. foreign policy objectives. In accordance with U.S. law, State employees working abroad may be reimbursed for costs related to working overseas, including the cost of living in expensive locations, dependent education costs, and the costs of maintaining family members away from post. They also may be eligible for such allowances in locations where they encounter harsh or dangerous living conditions. These allowances cover over 13,000 employees across more than 275 posts.\nGAO was asked to review State's administration of allowances for its employees. GAO's September 2017 report focused on State hardship and danger pay allowances ( GAO-17-715 ), while this report (1) describes all of the allowances that State offers its employees serving overseas and (2) examines the amount State spent annually on these allowances in fiscal years 2011 through 2016. GAO analyzed State data and documents and communicated with State officials in Washington, D.C., and Charleston, South Carolina, the location of State's Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of State (State) offers 14 different allowances to compensate State employees serving at overseas posts for costs and hardships related to foreign assignments across four categories.\nCost-of-living allowances consist of six types of allowances that reimburse employees for certain costs incurred from employment overseas, such as the cost for dependent education that would normally be free in the United States.\nRecruitment and retention incentive allowances consist of three types of allowances that compensate employees for service at posts where conditions may be difficult or dangerous. For example, hardship pay compensates employees for service where conditions differ substantially from those in the United States.\nQuarters allowances consist of three types of allowances that reimburse employees for substantially all housing costs at posts where government housing is not provided. For example, the temporary quarters subsistence allowance pays for temporary housing when government-provided housing is not available.\nOther allowances consist of two types of allowances that reimburse employees, such as ambassadors, who must maintain an official residence in-country or employees who incur expenses representing the U.S. government in an official capacity to a foreign government.\nState spent almost $480 million per year on its 14 allowances for employees serving overseas, totaling almost $2.9 billion in fiscal years 2011 through 2016. Most of this amount went toward cost-of-living and recruitment and retention allowances. During this period, the three largest individual allowances accounted for about 70 percent of the total spending on all allowances. These were the education allowance, about $853.0 million; hardship pay, about $732.3 million; and post allowance, used to offset the higher cost of living at certain posts, about $417.3 million.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_364"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_365","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFHA insures private lenders against losses from defaults on single-family mortgages. According to independent actuarial reviews, in fiscal years 2009\u20132014, FHA's MMI Fund (which insures $1.2 trillion in single-family traditional and reverse mortgages) did not meet its statutory 2 percent capital requirement. Also, a budgetary review determined that the fund required $1.69 billion in supplemental funds in fiscal year 2013.\nGAO was asked to examine issues concerning the MMI Fund's capital requirement and actuarial reviews. This report examines the types of information provided by assessments of the fund's financial condition, FHA's capital requirement and stress testing practices, and trade-offs associated with including reverse mortgages in the fund's capital assessment.\nGAO analyzed actuarial and budgetary assessments of the MMI Fund. GAO reviewed financial institution and regulatory capital and stress testing principles to develop an evaluative framework and applied it to FHA. GAO also interviewed federal and mortgage industry officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Federal Housing Administration's (FHA) budgetary reviews of the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMI Fund) assess whether it needs more budget authority to cover expected future costs, and independent actuarial reviews provide complementary information on the fund's finances. FHA uses the actuarial reviews to assess whether the MMI Fund's capital ratio (economic value divided by insurance obligations) meets the 2 percent requirement and how fund components would perform under alternative economic scenarios. While the actuarial assessment does not directly determine the need for additional budget authority, it evaluates the fund's ability to absorb unexpected losses and may prompt changes in FHA policies and insurance premiums.\nCapital requirements and stress testing practices\u2014tools for managing financial risks\u2014for the MMI Fund are not consistent with all elements of a framework GAO developed to help assess these tools in the context of FHA's single-family mortgage insurance programs. In accordance with the framework, FHA's capital assessments and stress tests are transparent and incorporate a number of relevant risk factors. However, areas of inconsistency include the following:\nScenario-based requirement . The statutory capital requirement is intended to help ensure the fund can absorb unexpected losses but is not based on a specified risk threshold, such as an adverse economic scenario the fund would be expected to withstand without requiring supplemental funds.\nAccountability mechanisms . The capital requirement also does not include accountability mechanisms, such as a set of steps FHA would have to take if the capital ratio again fell below the 2 percent minimum.\nFund-wide stress tests . FHA has conducted separate stress tests\u2014projections of financial condition under adverse scenarios\u2014of its forward (traditional) and reverse mortgage (loans against home equity available to seniors) portfolios, but has not performed tests on a fund-wide basis.\nStress test objectives . FHA has not defined specific objectives for its stress tests such as determining the amount of additional capital, if any, that would be needed to withstand conditions similar to the last housing crisis.\nStrengthening FHA's capital requirement and stress testing practices could help ensure that the MMI Fund is able to withstand economic downturns and that stress test results are as relevant and useful as possible for risk management.\nIncluding reverse mortgages in the fund's capital assessment has advantages and disadvantages. Unlike for stress tests, FHA jointly assesses forward and reverse mortgages to calculate a combined capital ratio. Subjecting the reverse mortgage portfolio to capital assessment has made its financial condition more transparent. But, the portfolio's sensitivity to changes in economic assumptions makes the combined ratio more unpredictable. Alternative approaches also pose trade-offs. For example, a separate reverse mortgage capital requirement may help ensure the financial transparency of both portfolios, but requiring FHA to hold more capital to account for the volatility of the reverse mortgage portfolio could compel FHA to raise insurance premiums or lower borrowing limits.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nCongress should consider specifying the economic conditions the MMI Fund would be expected to withstand without supplemental funds, and FHA should conduct stress tests on a fund-wide basis and specify the objectives of its stress tests. GAO also continues to maintain that Congress should incorporate accountability mechanisms into FHA's capital requirement (as stated in GAO-13-722 ). FHA agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_365"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_366","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFederal regulations require that contracting officers assign the NAICS code that best describes the principal purpose of the acquisition. SBA's OHA is responsible for reviewing appeals of NAICS code assignments. Questions have been raised about whether agencies assign the appropriate NAICS codes to ID\/IQ contracts with multiple task orders.\nGAO was asked to review several issues related to NAICS codes. In this report, GAO examines (1) what contracting officers consider when assigning NAICS codes to federal contracts and the status of efforts to clarify code assignment and (2) industry views on NAICS code assignment and the number and outcomes of appeals.\nGAO reviewed policies and procedures of the four agencies with the highest ID\/IQ obligations from fiscal years 2011\u20132015: Army, Navy, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS); reviewed one contract and 10 related task orders at each of the selected agencies and interviewed the related contracting officers; analyzed 2016 federal contracting data to identify commonly used NAICS codes and size standards; interviewed three industry groups and five firms that filed appeals for industry views on NAICS code assignment; and analyzed SBA decisions on NAICS code appeals in 2014\u20132016.\nThe Department of Defense, DHS, and SBA had no comments on the report. The General Services Administration and HHS had technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAgencies' contracting officers consider various factors in assigning North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes to federal contracts, and the Small Business Administration (SBA) issued a rule in 2013 intended to clarify NAICS code assignment. NAICS codes are the basis for SBA's size standards; therefore, the code that the contracting officer assigns determines whether a firm is eligible for federal contracting preferences, such as small business set-asides. The contracting officers GAO interviewed cited several factors that affect their assignment of NAICS codes, including information on the work to be performed and input from agency small business specialists. However, they stated that assigning a NAICS code can be challenging when one or more codes could apply to a contract. In the 2013 rule, SBA clarified that under certain circumstances, contracting officers may assign more than one code to multiple-award contracts. Such contracts are awarded to two or more contractors under a single solicitation and include indefinite delivery\/indefinite quantity (ID\/IQ) contracts used when quantities and timing are not known at the time of the award. However, updates to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)\u2014the rules governing the federal government's purchasing process\u2014are required to fully implement SBA's final rule. The agencies GAO interviewed plan to implement this rule after it is adopted into the FAR and they can make necessary updates to their information technology for contracting. This FAR rule-making process is ongoing.\nSome industry groups and firms GAO interviewed expressed concerns about how contracting officers assign NAICS codes, but SBA's Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) dismissed most appeals and denied more than half of the remaining appeals. Some industry groups and firms GAO interviewed expressed concerns that contracting officers may assign NAICS codes based on the size standard (thereby affecting the number of firms that can compete as a small business) and not the work to be performed. However, some also stated it was difficult to determine how often this practice occurs, and OHA officials noted it is the office's role to review the appropriateness of appealed NAICS codes, not the contracting officer's intention when assigning the code. Of the 62 NAICS code appeals that were filed in calendar years 2014\u20132016, OHA dismissed 35, denied 15, and granted 12 (see fig.). Appeals were dismissed because, among other things, they were untimely or the contracting officer cancelled the acquisition.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_366"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_367","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOD continues to confront organizational challenges that hinder collaboration. To address these challenges, section 911 of the NDAA for FY 2017 directed the Secretary of Defense to issue an organizational strategy that identifies critical objectives that span multiple functional boundaries and would benefit from the use of cross-functional teams. Additionally, DOD is to establish cross-functional teams to support this strategy, issue guidance on these teams, and provide training to team members and civilian leaders in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.\nThe NDAA also included a provision for GAO to periodically assess DOD's actions in response to section 911. This is GAO's third report on the implementation of section 911. It assesses the status of DOD's efforts to (1) establish cross-functional teams, (2) issue an organizational strategy, and (3) issue guidance on cross-functional teams and provide training to team members and Office of the Secretary of Defense leaders.\nGAO reviewed documentation on DOD's implementation of its cross-functional teams and DOD's draft organizational strategy, draft guidance on establishing cross-functional teams, and draft training curricula. GAO also interviewed DOD officials on efforts to implement section 911.\nGAO is not making new recommendations in this report. DOD concurred and is taking actions to address GAO's previous recommendations on DOD's implementation of section 911. DOD also concurred with the findings in a draft of this report.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) has implemented some statutory requirements in section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017, enacted in December 2016, to address organizational challenges. However, senior leadership has not implemented several requirements intended to support cross-functional teams and promote department-wide collaboration (see table).\nDOD has established 10 cross-functional teams, which are in various stages of implementation. Specifically, DOD is in the early stages of establishing one cross-functional team to address the backlog of the department's personnel security clearance background investigations and has assigned an interim leader and seven members to this team. In addition, DOD established 9 cross-functional teams to implement reform initiatives intended to improve the efficiency of the department's business operations. DOD generally appointed senior department officials to lead these teams, and the size of the teams, as of May 2018, ranged from 5 to 12 members.\nDOD has drafted, but not issued, an organizational strategy. DOD officials stated that they have not completed the strategy because they want to align it with two department-wide strategy documents\u2014the National Defense Strategy, which was issued in January 2018, and the National Defense Business Operations Plan, which was issued in May 2018.\nDOD also has not fulfilled three statutory requirements related to guidance and training for cross-functional teams and civilian leaders in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Specifically, DOD has not (1) provided training to cross-functional team members, (2) issued guidance on cross-functional teams, or (3) provided training to presidential appointees in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. DOD officials stated that they plan to send the guidance and training curricula to the Secretary of Defense for review and approval after DOD issues the organizational strategy. Fully implementing these requirements and GAO's prior recommendations related to the organizational strategy, guidance, and training, will better position DOD to effectively implement its cross-functional teams and advance a collaborative culture as required by the NDAA.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_367"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_368","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFederal agencies collect a wide variety of information to ensure the public is kept safe from harm, receives benefits to which they are entitled, and fulfill their missions. Such collections can also impose significant burdens on the public. The goal of the PRA is to minimize the burden of these collections and maximize their utility. To help accomplish this, the PRA requires agencies to estimate the burden, and consult with the public on these estimates.\nThis report examines (1) how agencies estimate burden hours and costs of their collections, and any limitations of agencies' approaches; and (2) the extent to which agencies consult with the public on estimated burden. To address these objectives, GAO selected four agencies with the largest burden hour estimates, reviewed the 50 ICRs with the largest burden hour estimates at each agency, with a focus on the 2 largest ICRs at each as case studies, and interviewed agency officials and OMB staff.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAgencies GAO reviewed\u2014the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Health and Human Services (HHS), and Transportation (DOT), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)\u2014generally used existing data, such as historical data, to estimate the time, or \u201cburden hours,\u201d it takes for the public to complete an information collection request (ICR). IRS reported gathering original data on public burden through surveys of taxpayers to help estimate the burden for its two largest ICRs. When data were unavailable for one or more elements of the burden calculation (e.g., average time per response), agencies relied on professional judgment, informed in some instances by internal consultation with issue area experts.\nGAO found two limitations with the agencies' current approaches for estimating burden. First, 76 of 200 ICRs that GAO reviewed, including the 2 largest ICRs at IRS and DOT, did not translate burden hours into dollars, or estimated \u201crespondent time costs.\u201d Although the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requires agencies to include these costs, it reviewed and approved all 76 ICRs. ICRs that included respondent time costs did not consistently include fringe benefits, such as insurance contributions, in part because of a lack of clear guidance from OMB. Inconsistencies in estimating respondent time costs could lead to inconsistent implementation of new requirements under Executive Order 13771 that agencies offset the incremental costs of new regulations with reductions in regulatory burden, including paperwork burden, elsewhere.\nSecond, while all agencies and OMB reported having independent review processes in place, as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), GAO found instances where 3 of the 4 selected agencies\u2014USDA, HHS, and DOT\u2014did not detect math errors through these review processes or inconsistencies among estimates provided on Reginfo.gov, and in the more detailed ICR supporting statements. For example, GAO found that one ICR underestimated burden by as much as $270 million, and another overestimated burden time by more than 12 million hours. Agencies acknowledged they followed their review processes but not detect the errors and inconsistencies. OMB also did not detect the errors and inconsistencies in its review of the ICRs. Until agencies ensure that their review processes detect errors or inconsistencies, the public may have less confidence in agencies' ability to effectively manage and minimize burden.\nWhile the agencies solicited public comments through the Federal Register , as required by the PRA, IRS and DOT did not always provide the level of information in the notices (e.g., the frequency of the collection) needed to allow the public to evaluate the burden estimates. Also, agencies did not always consult with the public beyond these notices, as required under the PRA. Of the 200 ICRs GAO reviewed, 113 contained information in their supporting statements indicating public consultation beyond the Federal Register notices. Only 6 of these 113 indicated that public outreach was related to the burden hour estimates. OMB could help ensure that agencies consistently obtain public input by directing agencies to consult with the public beyond the Federal Register notices on each ICR, as required in the PRA. However, OMB continues to believe that additional consulting should occur only for ICRs where important information may be missed by the public notice and comment period. Congressional action to clarify the PRA requirement may be needed.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nCongress should consider more explicitly requiring agencies to consult with the public beyond the Federal Register notices. GAO is also making 11 recommendations: 1 to OMB on ensuring consistent application of the requirement for estimating respondent time costs; 4 on reexamining processes for reviewing ICRs to OMB, USDA, HHS, and DOT; 2 on improving public notices to IRS and DOT; and 4 on better leveraging existing public consultation to USDA, HHS, DOT, and IRS. USDA, HHS, DOT, and IRS agreed with the recommendations. OMB staff did not agree or disagree.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_368"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_369","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Border Patrol has primary responsibility for securing the border between U.S. ports of entry. On the southwest border, Border Patrol deploys agents along the immediate border and in areas up to 100 miles from the border as part of a layered approach known as the defense in depth strategy. Immigration checkpoints, generally located between 25 and 100 miles from the border, are one element of this strategy. GAO was asked to review the defense in depth strategy.\nThis report addresses: (1) the factors Border Patrol considers in deploying agents, (2) where apprehensions of illegal crossers and seizures of contraband are occurring, and (3) what data show about how checkpoints contribute to apprehensions and seizures, among other objectives. To answer these questions, GAO analyzed Border Patrol documents and data on apprehensions and seizures from fiscal year 2012 through 2016, visited two southwest border sectors, interviewed officials from the other seven southwest border sectors and Border Patrol headquarters, and reviewed prior GAO work on border security.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAccording to U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol), agent deployment decisions are based on factors such as staffing levels and the availability of agents, among other things. As of May 2017, nationwide, Border Patrol had about 1,900 fewer agents than authorized, which officials cited as a key challenge for optimal agent deployment. In recent years, attrition has exceeded hiring (an average of 904 agents compared to 523 agents) according to officials. GAO analyzed scheduling data, including time that agents were scheduled to be not working (for example, off duty or on leave) because these activities can affect deployment decisions by reducing the number of agents available on a particular day. GAO found that agents were available for deployment about 43 percent of the time.\nFrom fiscal years 2012 through 2016, Border Patrol apprehended a total of almost 2 million individuals along the southwest border, and these apprehensions increasingly occurred closer to the border, with 42 percent of apprehensions occurring one-half mile or less from the border in fiscal year 2016 compared to 24 percent in fiscal year 2012. One driver for this change is the increasing number of apprehensions of children, whom officials report may turn themselves in to Border Patrol without attempting to evade detection. Meanwhile, over this period, the locations where seizures of contraband occurred remained roughly the same, with the majority occurring 10 or more miles from the border.\nFor fiscal years 2013 through 2016, GAO found that 2 percent of apprehensions and 43 percent of seizures occurred at checkpoints; however, determining the extent to which apprehensions and seizures are attributable to checkpoints is difficult because of long-standing data issues. More apprehensions and seizures may be attributable to checkpoints, but Border Patrol's reporting does not distinguish apprehensions that occurred \u201cat\u201d versus \u201caround\u201d a checkpoint. Border Patrol is drafting guidance to clarify how checkpoint apprehension and seizure data are to be recorded that would respond to a 2009 GAO recommendation to improve the internal controls for management oversight of checkpoint data. GAO also determined that seizures at checkpoints differed from those at other locations. Specifically, 40 percent of seizures at checkpoints were 1 ounce or less of marijuana from U.S. citizens. In contrast, seizures at other locations were more often higher quantities of marijuana seized from aliens.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making any new recommendations at this time but has previously recommended that Border Patrol establish internal controls for checkpoint data, among other things. DHS concurred with this recommendation and has taken some steps to improve the quality of checkpoint data, but additional actions are needed to fully implement the recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_369"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_370","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSeveral U.S. agencies train police in the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, where corruption and human rights abuses have traditionally plagued civilian police forces. State, the primary agency responsible for foreign police assistance, allocated about $37 million to train police in these countries from appropriations for fiscal years 2014 through 2017. Although it is not a focus of their efforts, DOD and USAID also train police in the Northern Triangle.\nSenate Report 115-125 includes a provision for GAO to report on various aspects of U.S. police training efforts in the Northern Triangle. In this report, GAO examines, among other objectives, the extent to which U.S. agencies have (1) established objectives for and delivered training to professionalize police, including promoting respect for human rights, and (2) collected data related to police training indicators. GAO analyzed agency data and project documents, including for 22 State and USAID-funded projects implemented during fiscal years 2014 through 2017 that agencies identified as including assistance for police. GAO also conducted fieldwork in El Salvador and interviewed agency officials in Honduras; Guatemala; and Washington, D.C., who oversee and conduct police training.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAgencies have established objectives and delivered training to professionalize police in Central America's Northern Triangle but have not consistently done so to promote police respect for human rights. U.S. strategies include objectives to professionalize police, and the Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have delivered related training (see figure). These strategies also highlight the importance of police respect for human rights, but agencies have few objectives or other control mechanisms to ensure police receive related training. For instance, none of the 14 State projects and 2 of the 8 USAID projects that GAO reviewed had such objectives. Officials said this is because objectives were designed to be broader in focus. DOD also does not have objectives but has other control mechanisms to ensure its training includes human rights content. Federal standards for internal control call for managers to establish control mechanisms consistent with priorities. Without them, it may be difficult for State and USAID to ensure that training supports agencies' goals to promote police respect for human rights.\nDOD, State, and USAID collect information on police training, but State lacks readily available, reliable data on the number of police trained\u2014a key indicator in the U.S. Strategy for Central America . State's data are not readily available because, according to officials, the process to track training is decentralized and data are not consolidated. Further, GAO found State's fiscal year 2017 police training data to be unreliable because, among other reasons, the data did not include training delivered by some implementers. Officials noted that State did not have sufficient internal control mechanisms and staff in place to collect data as it expanded police training in the Northern Triangle. Without such data, State cannot accurately assess its efforts in Central America.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nTo improve oversight of police training in the Northern Triangle, State and USAID should design control mechanisms to ensure human rights content is included as appropriate, and State should improve police training data. State and USAID concurred.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_370"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_371","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe U.S. food supply is generally considered safe, but the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimate that Salmonella and Campylobacter in food cause about 2 million human illnesses per year in the United States. In 2014, GAO identified challenges USDA faced in reducing pathogens in poultry products, including standards that were outdated or nonexistent and limited control over factors that affect pathogen contamination outside of meat and poultry slaughter and processing plants, such as practices on the farm.\nGAO was asked to review USDA's approach to reducing pathogens in meat and poultry products. This report examines (1) the extent to which USDA has developed standards for meat and poultry products and (2) any additional steps USDA has taken to address challenges GAO identified in 2014. GAO reviewed relevant regulations, documents, and data and interviewed officials from USDA and CDC, as well as 17 stakeholders representing industry, consumer groups, and researchers selected based on their knowledge of USDA's meat and poultry slaughter inspections and food safety.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nTo help ensure the safety of our nation's food supply, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has developed standards limiting the amount of Salmonella and Campylobacter \u2014pathogens that can cause foodborne illness in humans\u2014permitted in certain meat (beef and pork) and poultry (chicken and turkey) products, such as ground beef, pork carcasses, and chicken breasts. However, the agency has not developed standards for other products that are widely available, such as turkey breasts and pork chops. Further, its process for deciding which products to consider for new standards is unclear because it is not fully documented, which is not consistent with federal standards for internal control. For example, USDA has informed stakeholders that it will take into account factors including consumption and illness data, but the agency has not documented this process going forward. Previously, USDA had developed new standards after widespread outbreaks indicated the need. For example, in 2016, USDA concluded that new standards were needed for certain poultry products to reduce Salmonella after reviewing outbreaks from these products in 2011, 2013, and 2015\u2014outbreaks in which 794 people were sickened and 1 died. By documenting the agency's process for deciding which products to consider for new standards, USDA could better ensure that such decisions will be risk-based.\nUSDA is taking steps to address challenges GAO identified in 2014 for reducing pathogens in poultry products, but these challenges are ongoing and could affect USDA's ability to reduce pathogens in meat as well. For example, one challenge GAO identified is that the level of pathogens in poultry products can be affected by practices on farms where poultry are raised. GAO recommended in 2014 that to help overcome this challenge, USDA guidelines on practices for controlling Salmonella and Campylobacter on farms include information on the effectiveness of each of the practices, consistent with a recommendation from a USDA advisory committee. Since GAO's 2014 report, USDA drafted revised guidelines to include information on the effectiveness of on-farm practices for controlling pathogens in poultry and beef cattle, in 2015 and 2017, respectively. However, USDA's draft guidelines for controlling Salmonella in hogs do not contain such information. By including such information as it finalizes its draft guidelines, USDA could better inform industry of the potential benefits of adopting on-farm practices included in the guidelines and encourage implementation of such practices.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making three recommendations, including that USDA document its process for deciding which products to consider for new standards and that it include information on the effectiveness of on-farm practices in its guidelines for Salmonella control in hogs. USDA agreed with GAO's recommendations and described actions it will take to implement them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_371"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_372","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOD relies on a multi-tiered supply chain to provide SRMs, the propulsion systems behind the various missile systems that provide defense capabilities to meet U.S. national security objectives. The SRM industrial base includes manufacturers that turn to an extensive network of suppliers that provide the raw materials, components, and subsystems needed to build SRMs. DOD is responsible for developing a strategy for the national industrial base that ensures that defense contractors and their suppliers are capable of providing the goods and services needed to achieve national security objectives.\nGAO was asked to review the state of the U.S. industrial base for SRMs. This report addresses (1) SRM industry trends, (2) single source supplier risks, and (3) opportunities for SRM manufacturers' engineering workforce development. GAO analyzed DOD's annual industrial capabilities reports to Congress for fiscal years 2009 through 2016, which reflect DOD's most current information on SRM risks, and reviewed DOD budget data and information from missile prime contractors and SRM manufacturers. GAO also interviewed missile prime contractors, SRM manufacturer representatives, and officials from DOD and the military departments.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nOver the past two decades, the solid rocket motor (SRM) industrial base has undergone various changes including consolidation and recent expansion. Specifically, since 1995, the industry has consolidated from six U.S. manufacturers to two U.S. manufacturers. With regard to expansion, a foreign supplier entered the market in 2012, and in 2017, a U.S. firm, which is ultimately foreign-owned, was also established. According to the Department of Defense (DOD) while it supports competition, its current demand for SRMs can only sustain two manufacturers. Although at this stage it is too early to know how, or if, these new entrants will impact the economic viability of the more long-standing U.S. manufacturers.\nThe consolidation in the SRM industrial base has also been accompanied by a decrease of suppliers throughout the supply chain. For example, one SRM manufacturer estimated a decrease in suppliers, from approximately 5,000 to 1,000, over the last 20 years. This increases the risk of production delays and disruptions in the event that key components and materials available from a single source become unavailable from that source. GAO found that DOD and industry are taking steps to identify and mitigate these risks, such as by establishing alternative sources and requiring advance notice when suppliers are considering exiting the market.\nIn its annual industrial capabilities reports to Congress, DOD has consistently stated that the limited number of new missile development programs inhibits its ability to provide opportunities to help SRM manufacturers maintain their workforce capabilities. Specifically, with few new missile programs being initiated, engineers have had fewer opportunities to develop their engineering skills related to SRM concept designs, system development, and production, which are critical if SRM performance issues arise. However, in 2016, DOD funded a 4-year project to enhance engineering design skills for less experienced engineers working for the two U.S. manufacturers and help them develop advanced SRM technologies.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making recommendations at this time.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_372"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_373","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nPuget Sound is the nation's second-largest estuary and serves as an important economic engine in Washington State, supporting millions of people, major industries, and a wide variety of species. However, according to the CCMP, human use and development have degraded water quality and habitats and harmed critical species such as salmon.\nGAO was asked to review efforts to restore Puget Sound. This report examines, among other objectives, (1) Puget Sound restoration efforts and related expenditures for fiscal years 2012 through 2016, (2) how federal and nonfederal entities coordinate their restoration efforts, and (3) the framework for assessing progress toward Puget Sound restoration. GAO reviewed restoration plans and other documentation, conducted a two-phase survey of the more than 25 federal and state entities that GAO determined had participated in restoration efforts, conducted discussion groups with tribal and local representatives, and interviewed representatives from these federal and nonfederal entities.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThrough its survey of federal and Washington State entities, GAO identified numerous federal and state efforts that, in whole or in part, supported Puget Sound restoration from fiscal years 2012 through 2016. The efforts involved a variety of activities, including habitat protection, water quality improvement, and monitoring. Some of these efforts focused exclusively on Puget Sound restoration, while others had a broader geographic or programmatic scope. Funding for these efforts came from a variety of sources, such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which reported expending about $142 million for activities in Puget Sound through the National Estuary Program and the Puget Sound Geographic Program during this time frame. However, total expenditures for all efforts are unknown, in part because of difficulties isolating expenditures specific to Puget Sound. A 2017 state audit recommended that two state agencies develop a plan to create a more complete inventory of restoration efforts and related funding. The state agencies concurred and have plans to develop this inventory by August 2019.\nFederal and nonfederal entities coordinate restoration efforts through two primary interagency groups. First, the state-led Puget Sound Management Conference has developed a comprehensive conservation and management plan (CCMP), approved by EPA under the National Estuary Program, that serves as the primary planning document for Puget Sound restoration. Second, the Puget Sound Federal Task Force complements the work of the management conference by coordinating the efforts of federal agencies to support the CCMP, including by developing a draft Federal Action Plan that identifies priority federal actions to protect and restore Puget Sound.\nThe CCMP lays out a framework for assessing restoration progress, including 6 goals, 47 indicators, and recovery targets for 31 of the indicators. In 2017, the Puget Sound Partnership, a state agency, reported that progress had been made in some areas, but many key indicators had not shown improvement. For example:\nOne indicator that showed improvement was acres of harvestable shellfish beds, which the Partnership reported increased from 2007 to 2016.\nOne indicator that showed no improvement was the abundance of Puget Sound Chinook salmon populations, which the Partnership reported remained below desired levels.\nThe Partnership also reported that most of the 31 recovery targets that the management conference has adopted for 2020 are not likely to be attained. However, the Partnership's ability to assess progress has been limited in some instances, in part because the management conference has not developed targets for 16 of the 47 indicators. GAO has identified measurable targets as a key attribute of successful performance measures. By working with the management conference to help ensure that measurable targets are developed where possible for the highest priority indicators currently lacking such targets, EPA would better position the Partnership to assess progress toward restoration goals.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making two recommendations, including that EPA work with the management conference to help ensure that measurable targets are developed where possible for the highest priority indicators currently lacking such targets. EPA agreed with GAO's recommendations and highlighted steps the agency has begun taking and plans to take to address the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_373"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_374","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSince 2012, the United States has provided approximately $36 billion in humanitarian assistance to save lives and alleviate human suffering. Much of this assistance is provided in areas plagued by conflict or other issues that increase the risk of financial crimes. The World Bank and others have reported that humanitarian assistance organizations face challenges in accessing banking services that could affect project implementation.\nGAO was asked to review the possible effects of decreased banking access for nonprofit organizations on the delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance. In this report, GAO examines (1) the extent to which State and USAID partners experienced banking access challenges, (2) USAID partners' reporting on such challenges, and (3) actions U.S. agencies have taken to help address such challenges. GAO selected four high-risk countries\u2014Syria, Somalia, Haiti, and Kenya\u2014based on factors such as their inclusion in multiple financial risk-related indices, and selected a non-generalizable sample of 18 projects in those countries. GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed U.S. officials and the 18 partners for the selected projects.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nImplementing partners (partners) for 7 of 18 Department of State (State) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) humanitarian assistance projects that GAO selected noted encountering banking access challenges, such as delays or denials in transferring funds overseas. Of those 7 projects, 1 partner told us that banking access challenges adversely affected its project and 2 additional partners told us that the challenges had the potential for adverse effects. Moreover, the majority of partners (15 out of 18) for the 18 projects noted experiencing banking access challenges on their global portfolio of projects over the previous 5 years.\nUSAID's partners' written reports do not capture potential risks posed by banking access challenges because USAID generally does not require most partners to report in writing any challenges that do not affect implementation. Six of the 7 projects that encountered challenges were USAID-funded. Of those 6 USAID projects, 5 partners told us that these challenges did not rise to the threshold of affecting project implementation that would necessitate reporting, and 1 did not report challenges although its project was adversely affected. Additionally, GAO's review of about 1,300 USAID partner reports found that the few instances where challenges were mentioned lacked sufficient detail for GAO to determine their type, severity, or origin. Without information on banking access challenges that pose potential risks to project implementation, USAID is not aware of the full extent of risks to achieving its objectives.\nThe Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and State have taken various actions to help address banking access challenges encountered by nonprofit organizations (NPO), but USAID's efforts have been limited. Treasury's efforts have focused on engagement between NPOs and U.S. agencies, while State has issued guidance on the topic to its embassies and designated an office to focus on these issues. In contrast, USAID lacks a comparable office, and NPOs stated that it is difficult to find USAID staff to engage with on this topic. Further, GAO found that awareness of specific challenges was generally limited to USAID staff directly overseeing the project. Without communicating these challenges to relevant parties, USAID may not be aware of all risks to agency objectives and may not be able to effectively engage with external entities on efforts to address these challenges.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that USAID should take steps to (1) collect information on banking access challenges experienced by USAID's partners and (2) communicate that information both within USAID and with external entities, such as other U.S. agencies and partners. USAID concurred with our recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_374"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_375","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Taxpayer Bill of Rights entitles taxpayers with the right to appeal a decision of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in an independent forum. GAO was asked to review this administrative appeal process within IRS.\nAmong other things, this report (1) describes the IRS appeal process and staffing; (2) assesses how IRS monitors and manages the time to receive and resolve taxpayer appeals cases; and (3) evaluates the extent to which Appeals communicates customer service standards and assesses taxpayer satisfaction with the appeal process.\nGAO reviewed IRS guidance, publications, and documentation on the appeal process. GAO analyzed IRS data for administrative appeal cases closed in fiscal years 2014 through 2017 to compare appeal case resolution time for different types of cases. GAO interviewed IRS officials and a non-generalizable sample of external stakeholders, including attorneys and accountants, knowledgeable about the appeal process. Among other things, GAO compared IRS actions to federal standards for internal control and customer service.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has a standard process to resolve a diverse array of taxpayer requests to appeal IRS proposed actions to assess additional taxes and penalties or collect taxes owed. The process begins with a taxpayer filing an appeal with the IRS examination or collection unit proposing the compliance action and ends with a decision from the Office of Appeals (Appeals).\nAppeals must have staff with expertise in all areas of tax law to review taxpayer appeals. However, its staffing levels declined by nearly 40 percent from 2,172 in fiscal year 2010 to 1,345 in fiscal year 2017. Appeals anticipates a continued risk of losing subject matter expertise given that about one-third of its workforce was eligible for retirement at the end of last fiscal year.\nAppeals monitors the number of days to resolve taxpayer appeals of examination, collection, and other tax disputes. However, IRS does not monitor the timeliness of transfers of all incoming appeal requests. GAO analysis showed that the time to transfer appeal requests from compliance units varied depending on the type of case (see table below).\nCollections workstreams \u2014taxpayer appeals where IRS (1) filed a notice of federal tax lien or proposed a levy (collection due process) or (2) rejected an offer to settle a tax liability for less than owed (offer in compromise).\nThe Internal Revenue Manual (IRM), IRS's primary source of instructions to staff, requires transfer to Appeals within 45 days for the largest collection workstream. With manager approval, collection staff may have an additional 45 days to work with the taxpayer. Nearly 90 percent of collection appeals closed in fiscal years 2014 to 2017 were transferred to Appeals within 90 days.\nExamination workstreams \u2014taxpayer appeals of additional tax and penalty assessments IRS proposed based on its auditing of tax returns over a wide range of examination issues.\nIRS does not have an IRM requirement with guidelines and procedures for timely transfer for examination appeals. Accordingly, more than 20 percent of examination appeals closed in fiscal years 2014 to 2017 took more than 120 days to be transferred to Appeals. Delays in transferring appeals can result in increased interest costs for taxpayers.\nAlthough Appeals maintains data on total appeal resolution time\u2014from IRS receipt to Appeals' decision\u2014such information is not readily transparent to IRS compliance units or the public. GAO analysis of IRS data found that, for fiscal years 2014 to 2017, about 15 percent of all appeal cases closed within 90 days (see figure below). About 85 percent of all cases were resolved within one year of when the taxpayer requested an appeal. Total resolution times differed by case type. However, without easily accessible information on resolution times, taxpayers are not well informed on what to expect when requesting an appeal.\nAlthough Appeals has customer a service standard and conducts a customer satisfaction survey, its standard and related performance results are not readily available to the public. Under the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) and Executive Orders, the Department of the Treasury is responsible for customer service performance. Appeals conducts outreach to the tax practitioner community but does not regularly solicit input before policy changes. Without a mechanism, such as leveraging existing IRS advisory groups or alternatively developing its own advisory body, Appeals is missing an opportunity to obtain public input on policy changes affecting the taxpayer's experience in the appeal process.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO makes seven recommendations to help enhance controls over and transparency of the IRS appeals process (several of the recommendations are detailed on the following page).\nGAO recommends, among other things, that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue\nEstablish timeframes and monitoring procedures for timely transfer of taxpayer appeals requests by examination compliance units to the Office of Appeals.\nDirect the Office of Appeals to regularly report and share with each compliance unit the data on the time elapsed between when a taxpayer requests an appeal to when it is received in the Office of Appeals.\nProvide more transparency to taxpayers on historical average total appeal resolution times.\nGAO recommends, among other things, that the Secretary of the Treasury, consistent with its responsibilities under GPRAMA and Executive Orders for customer service, ensure that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue develops a mechanism to solicit and consider customer feedback on a regular basis on current and proposed IRS appeal policies and procedures.\nTreasury and IRS agreed with GAO's recommendations, and IRS said it will provide detailed corrective action plans.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_375"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_376","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFederally funded employment and training (E&T) programs help job seekers enhance their job skills, identify job opportunities, and obtain employment. In 2011, GAO identified overlap and fragmentation among E&T programs administered by nine federal agencies. The Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA) was enacted in 2014, in part, to improve coordination and integration among these programs.\nThis report examines (1) how the number of and obligations for federal E&T programs have changed since GAO's 2011 review, (2) the extent to which E&T programs continue to provide similar services to similar populations and examples of potential effects, and (3) the extent to which agencies have taken actions to address previously identified fragmentation and overlap among E&T programs and what agencies have learned about the results. To address these objectives, GAO surveyed E&T program administrators, reviewed relevant reports and studies, and interviewed federal agency officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe number of federal employment and training (E&T) programs and program obligations have declined since GAO's 2011 report. In that review, GAO identified 47 E&T programs and found that 44 had overlap with at least one other program in that they provided similar services to a similar population. In fiscal year 2017, the most recent year data are available, GAO identified 43 E&T programs, or 4 fewer than in 2011 (see figure). From fiscal year 2009 to 2017, federal agencies' annual obligations for E&T programs decreased from about $20 billion to $14 billion. GAO analysis of survey data found the decrease in obligations was largely due to the expiration of funding from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which had provided additional funding for selected E&T programs during and after the Great Recession.\nSurvey results from federal administrators of the 43 E&T programs show that the programs continue to span nine agencies and generally overlap by providing similar services, such as employment counseling and assessment services (39 of 43) and job readiness training (38 of 43). Further, programs targeting a specific population, such as Native Americans, veterans, or youth, also provided similar services. In some cases, such overlap may be appropriate or beneficial, but it may also suggest opportunities for greater efficiency.\nAlmost all (38 of 43) E&T programs reported at least one action to manage fragmentation or overlap, such as co-locating services and sharing information. However, the agencies were not able to consistently provide information on the results of these actions and few evaluations encompassed multiple programs. Among studies GAO identified, six examined more than one E&T program, but only one assessed how any coordinated activities benefited the population served. None of the six studies focused on Native Americans, youth, or refugees. The Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA) encourages agencies to conduct evaluations, and specifically requires the Department of Labor (DOL) to publish a 5-year plan describing certain E&T priorities, consistent with the purpose of aligning and coordinating certain programs. While DOL reported it took some steps, it continues to lack a strategic plan for E&T evaluations over a multi-year period. As a result, DOL does not know whether actions to manage overlap are successful.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DOL, in consultation with other federal agencies, develop and publish a multi-year strategic plan for its evaluations of employment and training that includes assessing the completeness and results of efforts to coordinate among E&T programs. DOL agreed with our recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_376"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_377","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Secret Service is responsible for protecting the President and his family, including adult children when they travel. The Secret Service can request assistance in its mission from other agencies, such as DOD and the Coast Guard. When the President travels, he must fly on DOD aircraft.\nGAO was asked to review the travel- related costs for four trips that the President took to Mar-a-Lago and three trips that the President's adult children made to certain overseas destinations. This report examines (1) the costs incurred by federal agencies associated with the President's travel on selected trips to Mar-a-Lago, (2) the costs incurred by federal agencies associated with certain overseas trips taken by Donald Trump, Jr. and Eric Trump, and (3) the extent to which the Coast Guard, the Secret Service, and DOD have reported their costs pursuant to the Presidential Protection Assistance Act of 1976. GAO analyzed agency cost data in connection with the President's travel to Mar-a-Lago and the President's adult children's trips to certain overseas locations. GAO also reviewed the law, agency guidance, and semiannual reports related to the Presidential Protection Assistance Act of 1976.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO estimated that federal agencies incurred costs of about $13.6 million for the President's four trips to Mar-a-Lago from February 3 through March 5, 2017. This estimate consisted of approximately $10.6 million for operating costs of government aircraft and boats and $3 million for temporary duty costs of government personnel supporting the President's travel, including transportation, lodging, and meals and incidental expenses. These figures do not include certain classified cost information or the salaries and benefits of government personnel traveling with the President because, salaries and benefits would be paid regardless of whether the President was traveling.\nThe United States Secret Service (Secret Service) incurred about $396,000, primarily for temporary duty costs, while protecting Donald Trump, Jr. and Eric Trump during three international trips taken in January and February 2017. Eric Trump traveled to Uruguay and the Dominican Republic and Donald Trump, Jr., Eric Trump, and their spouses traveled to the United Arab Emirates. Documentation provided by Secret Service officials confirmed that the Trumps and their spouses flew on commercial aircraft. Officials from the 89th Airlift Wing confirmed that no military aircraft supported these trips. Secret Service agents protecting the Trump family flew by commercial aircraft.\nGAO found that, of the three agencies required to report by the Presidential Protection Assistance Act of 1976, as amended, only the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard) reported protection costs semiannually to Congress for fiscal years 2015 through 2017. GAO found that the Secret Service does not have a policy for ensuring that the semiannual reports are prepared and has not consistently submitted the reports. Secret Service officials last submitted reports in fiscal year 2015 and were unaware that reports had not been submitted in fiscal years 2016 and 2017 until GAO requested this information. GAO also found that the Department of Defense (DOD) has a policy but did not produce and submit the reports as required. Moreover, weaknesses in DOD's existing policy and instruction do not clearly establish the responsibility for preparing and reporting the costs incurred to support protection activities. Absent clear policies with an oversight mechanism to ensure that the reports are produced, Congress has not been provided required information concerning the costs for providing protective services for the President and others.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making recommendations to the Secret Service and DOD to ensure that the reports required under the Presidential Protection Assistance Act of 1976, as amended, are prepared and submitted. The Department of Homeland Security and DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_377"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_378","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nReported improper payment estimates totaled over $1.2 trillion government-wide from fiscal years 2003 through 2016. Agencies are statutorily required to perform improper payment risk assessments to identify programs and activities that may be susceptible to significant improper payments and are required to report an improper payment estimate for ones that are susceptible to significant improper payments.\nGAO was asked to review federal agencies' improper payment risk assessments. This report examines the extent to which (1) the 24 CFO Act agencies followed OMB guidance for reporting on improper payment risk assessments and (2) selected CFO Act agencies properly designed control activities to include all of their programs and activities in an improper payment risk assessment at least once every 3 years, as statutorily required. GAO analyzed the 24 CFO Act agencies' AFRs and PARs and reviewed the procedures at 9 selected agencies. GAO selected 9 agencies that did not report improper payment estimates in fiscal year 2015, except for those estimates that were mandated to be reported pursuant to the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013. For this review, GAO did not evaluate the quality of improper payment risk assessments completed.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO's review of the 24 Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (CFO Act) agencies' fiscal years 2014 through 2016 agency financial reports (AFR) and performance and accountability reports (PAR) found that these agencies generally adhered to the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) improper payment risk assessment reporting directives. However, GAO found instances of nonadherence, including the following:\nThere were two instances of nonadherence to OMB's directive for agencies to report the basis for how they grouped programs and activities, both of which occurred in fiscal year 2014. All agencies that completed risk assessments adhered to this directive for fiscal years 2015 and 2016.\nThe Improper Payments Information Act of 2002, as amended, identifies seven risk factors and OMB guidance includes two additional risk factors that agencies are to consider when conducting risk assessments. For fiscal years 2015 and 2016 reporting, OMB directed agencies to report the risk factors considered in their risk assessments. However, GAO found six agencies that did not report one or more of the nine risk factors in their AFRs or PARs.\nOMB's revised guidance for fiscal year 2017 no longer directs agencies to report on their risk assessments. OMB staff stated that their primary motivation for removing such reporting was to reduce the administrative burden. After GAO notified OMB of the importance of certain data, OMB staff plan to direct agencies to provide additional data, including a listing of risk assessed programs and activities, on www.paymentaccuracy.gov for reporting beginning in fiscal year 2017. OMB staff also plan to revise the guidance for fiscal year 2018 for agencies to report the other risk assessment information in their AFRs or PARs.\nGAO also found that three of the nine selected agencies (the Departments of Energy and Justice and the U.S. Agency for International Development) that it reviewed had designed and documented control activities to help ensure that all programs and activities were assessed every 3 years. For the remaining six agencies, GAO found that the agencies did not properly design control activities for this purpose. Specifically, GAO found the following:\nThree agencies\u2014the Department of Commerce, the National Science Foundation, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission\u2014did not have documented procedures for conducting risk assessments during fiscal years 2014 through 2016 but subsequently documented them.\nThree agencies\u2014the Departments of the Interior (Interior) and State (State) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)\u2014documented procedures for conducting risk assessments but did not include all programs and activities in their risk assessments. Interior later drafted revisions to its procedures and State updated its procedures to include them.\nWithout properly designed and documented control activities, there is a risk that an agency may not identify all programs and activities that require a risk assessment, which could result in the agency failing to develop and report improper payment estimates for programs and activities that should have been identified as susceptible to significant improper payments.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that NASA revise its procedures to help ensure that all programs and activities are assessed for susceptibility to significant improper payments at least once every 3 years. NASA concurred with the recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_378"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_379","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOD has until January 1, 2020, to equip its aircraft with ADS-B Out technology that would provide DOD, FAA, and private citizens the ability to track their flights in real-time and track flight patterns over time. This technology is a component of NextGen, a broader FAA initiative that seeks to modernize the current radar-driven, ground-based air transportation system into a satellite-driven space-based system.\nSenate Report 114-255 included a provision for GAO to assess the national defense implications of FAA's implementation of ADS-B. This report assesses the extent to which (1) DOD and FAA have identified operations and security risks and approved solutions to address these risks to ADS-B Out -equipped military aircraft; and (2) DOD has implemented key tasks in the 2007 memorandum on implementing NextGen.\nGAO analyzed risks identified by DOD and FAA related to ADS-B vulnerabilities, and how they could affect current and future air defense and air traffic missions. GAO also reviewed the tasks in the 2007 NextGen Memorandum and assessed whether the eight tasks specifically related to ADS-B were implemented.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nSince 2008, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Transportation's Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have identified a variety of risks related to Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out technology that could adversely affect DOD security and missions. However, they have not approved any solutions to address these risks. Compared with other tracking technology, ADS-B Out provides more information, such as an aircraft's precise location, velocity, and airframe dimensions, and better enables real-time and historical flight tracking. Individuals\u2014including adversaries\u2014could track military aircraft equipped with ADS-B Out technology, presenting risks to physical security and operations. This readily available public information allowed GAO to track various kinds of military aircraft. ADS-B Out is also vulnerable to electronic warfare and cyber-attacks. Since FAA is planning to divest radars as part of ADS-B implementation, homeland defense could also be at risk, since the North American Aerospace Defense Command relies on information from FAA radars to monitor air traffic. DOD and FAA have drafted a memorandum of agreement that focuses on equipping aircraft with ADS-B Out but does not address specific security risks. Unless DOD and FAA focus on these risks and approve one or more solutions in a timely manner, they may not have time to plan and execute actions that may be needed before January 1, 2020\u2014when all aircraft are required to be equipped with ADS-B Out technology.\nOf the eight tasks associated with the implementation of ADS-B Out technology in the 2007 DOD NextGen memorandum\u2014issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to ensure that the NextGen vision for the future national airspace system met DOD's requirements and the appropriate management of DOD's resources\u2014DOD has implemented two, has partially implemented four, and has not implemented two. DOD has established a joint program office and identified a lead service, but it has only partially validated ADS-B Out requirements, developed a directive, issued an implementation plan, and incorporated NextGen into the planning, budgeting, and programming process. DOD has not taken significant action to integrate the needs and requirements of DOD components related to ADS-B into cohesive plans and policies for inclusion in NextGen joint planning and development, and has not provided periodic and recurring NextGen progress reports to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. As a result of DOD not fully implementing the 2007 NextGen memorandum, DOD components have lacked direction and cohesion while trying to address FAA's requirement to equip military aircraft.\nThis is a public version of a classified report GAO issued in January 2018.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is recommending that DOD and FAA approve one or more solutions to address ADS-B -related security risks; and that DOD implement key tasks to facilitate consistent, long-term planning and implementation of NextGen. DOD and the Department of Transportation generally concurred and described planned actions to implement the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_379"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_380","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe U.S. government relies on U.S.-flag vessels that trade internationally to transport cargo and to provide a pool of U.S. mariners who could be called upon in times of crisis for DOD's reserve fleet. Through financial support and cargo preferences, the United States has supported the viability of the U.S.-flag fleet. However, in recent years concern has grown about the sustainability of the U.S.-flag fleet, and in 2014, Congress statutorily mandated that DOT develop national strategies related to the sustainability of the U.S.-flag fleet including recommendations for the future.\nGAO was asked to review U.S. government support for these U.S.-flag vessels that trade internationally. This report discusses: (1) the effect the U.S. government's support for the U.S.-flag fleet has had on national defense needs and other government programs; (2) the challenges identified by stakeholders in sustaining the U.S.-flag fleet for defense needs; and (3) the status of the mandated national strategies related to the U.S.-flag fleet.\nGAO reviewed relevant laws and analyzed DOT and DOD documents and government cargo data for fiscal years 2012\u20132017. GAO also interviewed officials from DOT, DOD, and other federal agencies subject to cargo preference; MSP vessel operators; and other stakeholders.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nU.S. government support for the U.S.-registered (U.S.-flag) fleet has helped meet national defense needs, but it has had a negative effect on some non-defense government programs. Specifically, the U.S. government supports U.S.-flag vessels through: (1) an annual stipend provided through the Maritime Security Program (MSP) and (2) cargo preferences that require federal agencies to transport certain percentages of government cargo on U.S.-flag vessels. These supports have helped ensure that a sufficient number of U.S.-flag vessels are available to meet the Department of Defense's (DOD) cargo capacity needs. Although cargo preference requirements have helped support the financial viability of U.S.-flag vessels that participate in the MSP, they have had a negative impact on some non-defense programs. For example, the requirement pursuant to which food-aid agencies send a certain percentage of food aid on U.S.-flag vessels has resulted in higher shipping costs for these agencies and has negatively affected their missions, according to officials at these agencies.\nStakeholders GAO spoke to identified two primary challenges in sustaining the internationally trading U.S.-flag fleet for national defense needs.\nFirst, even with the annual MSP stipend, maintaining the financial viability of U.S.-flag vessels is a challenge. This challenge largely results from the higher costs of operating a U.S.-flag vessel. According to U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) officials, the additional cost of operating a U.S. flag vessel compared to a foreign-flag vessel has increased\u2014from about $4.8 million annually in 2009 and 2010 to about $6.2 to $6.5 million currently\u2014making it harder for such vessels to remain financially viable. In addition, government cargo volumes have fallen in recent years. In response to this challenge, Congress increased the MSP stipend from $3.5 million per vessel for fiscal year 2016 to $4.99 million per vessel for fiscal year 2017. MARAD officials said this increase has temporarily stabilized the financial situation of MSP vessel operators. However, MARAD officials stated trends in operating costs and government cargo suggest this will remain an ongoing challenge.\nSecond, a potential shortage of U.S.-citizen mariners available to crew the government-owned reserve fleet during a crisis is a challenge. DOD counts on mariners working on U.S.-flag vessels to crew this fleet when activated. A MARAD working group recently estimated a shortage of over 1,800 mariners in the case of a drawn-out military effort, although it also recommended data improvements to increase the accuracy of the count of available mariners.\nThe Department of Transportation (DOT) has drafted but not issued the national maritime strategies mandated by Congress. The strategies are intended to address U.S.-flag vessels' competitiveness and ensure the long-term viability of U.S.-flag vessels and U.S.-citizen mariners. According to DOT officials, a combined draft strategy was developed under the previous administration but is now being reviewed by the current administration. DOT has not established a timeline for finalizing the strategy even though it was to be completed by 2015. Without establishing a timeline to complete this required strategy, DOT continues to delay providing decision-makers the information they need to determine how best to address the challenges facing the U.S.-flag fleet.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DOT complete the national maritime strategy and establish time frames for its issuance. DOT concurred with our recommendation and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_380"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_381","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOD plans to spend about $1.66 trillion to develop its current portfolio of major weapon systems. Potential adversaries have developed advanced cyber-espionage and cyber-attack capabilities that target DOD systems. Cybersecurity\u2014the process of protecting information and information systems\u2014can reduce the likelihood that attackers are able to access our systems and limit the damage if they do.\nGAO was asked to review the state of DOD weapon systems cybersecurity. This report addresses (1) factors that contribute to the current state of DOD weapon systems' cybersecurity, (2) vulnerabilities in weapons that are under development, and (3) steps DOD is taking to develop more cyber resilient weapon systems.\nTo do this work, GAO analyzed weapon systems cybersecurity test reports, policies, and guidance. GAO interviewed officials from key defense organizations with weapon systems cybersecurity responsibilities as well as program officials from a non-generalizable sample of nine major defense acquisition program offices.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) faces mounting challenges in protecting its weapon systems from increasingly sophisticated cyber threats. This state is due to the computerized nature of weapon systems; DOD's late start in prioritizing weapon systems cybersecurity; and DOD's nascent understanding of how to develop more secure weapon systems. DOD weapon systems are more software dependent and more networked than ever before (see figure).\nAutomation and connectivity are fundamental enablers of DOD's modern military capabilities. However, they make weapon systems more vulnerable to cyber attacks. Although GAO and others have warned of cyber risks for decades, until recently, DOD did not prioritize weapon systems cybersecurity. Finally, DOD is still determining how best to address weapon systems cybersecurity.\nIn operational testing, DOD routinely found mission-critical cyber vulnerabilities in systems that were under development, yet program officials GAO met with believed their systems were secure and discounted some test results as unrealistic. Using relatively simple tools and techniques, testers were able to take control of systems and largely operate undetected, due in part to basic issues such as poor password management and unencrypted communications. In addition, vulnerabilities that DOD is aware of likely represent a fraction of total vulnerabilities due to testing limitations. For example, not all programs have been tested and tests do not reflect the full range of threats.\nDOD has recently taken several steps to improve weapon systems cybersecurity, including issuing and revising policies and guidance to better incorporate cybersecurity considerations. DOD, as directed by Congress, has also begun initiatives to better understand and address cyber vulnerabilities. However, DOD faces barriers that could limit the effectiveness of these steps, such as cybersecurity workforce challenges and difficulties sharing information and lessons about vulnerabilities. To address these challenges and improve the state of weapon systems cybersecurity, it is essential that DOD sustain its momentum in developing and implementing key initiatives. GAO plans to continue evaluating key aspects of DOD's weapon systems cybersecurity efforts.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making any recommendations at this time. GAO will continue to evaluate this issue.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_381"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_382","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nNNSA has several mission needs for enriched uranium, including providing LEU to fuel a nuclear reactor that produces tritium\u2014a key isotope used in nuclear weapons. NNSA has a pressing defense need for unobligated LEU to fuel this reactor, meaning the uranium, technology and equipment used to produce the LEU, must be U.S. in origin. Because the United States lost its only source of unobligated LEU production in 2013, the supply is finite.\nA House Armed Services Committee report included a provision for GAO to assess NNSA's plans to manage tritium and enriched uranium. This report examines (1) the actions NNSA is taking to extend its existing LEU inventories to address near-term tritium needs; (2) the extent to which NNSA's plan to analyze long-term options for supplying enriched uranium is consistent with DOE directives; and (3) NNSA's preliminary cost estimates for long-term uranium enrichment technology options and the extent to which they meet best practices for reliable estimates. GAO analyzed NNSA plans on costs, schedules, and risks; compared them with its guide on best practices in cost estimating; and interviewed NNSA and other officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), is taking or plans to take four actions to extend inventories of low-enriched uranium (LEU) that is unobligated, or carries no promises or peaceful use to foreign trade partners until about 2038 to 2041. Two of the actions involve preserving supplies of LEU, and the other two involve diluting highly enriched uranium (HEU) with lower enriched forms of uranium to produce LEU. GAO reviewed these actions and found the actual costs and schedules for those taken to date generally align with estimates. NNSA and GAO have identified risks associated with two of these actions. One of these risks has been resolved; NNSA is taking steps to mitigate another, while others, such as uncertainty of future appropriations, are unresolved.\nNNSA's preliminary plan for analyzing options to supply unobligated enriched uranium in the long term is inconsistent with DOE directives for the acquisition of capital assets, which state that the mission need statement should be a clear and concise description of the gap between current capabilities and the mission need. The scope of the mission need statement that NNSA has developed can be interpreted to meet two different mission needs: (1) a need for enriched uranium for multiple national security needs, including tritium, and (2) a specific need for enriched uranium to produce tritium. The DOE directives also state that mission need should be independent of and not defined by a particular solution. However, NNSA is showing preference toward a particular solution\u2014building a new uranium enrichment capability\u2014and the agency has not included other technology options for analysis. Without (1) revising the scope of the mission need statement to clarify the mission need it seeks to achieve and (2) adjusting the range of options it considers in the analysis of alternatives process, NNSA may not consider all options to satisfy its mission need.\nAlthough the scope of the mission need statement is unclear, NNSA has prepared preliminary cost estimates for the two uranium enrichment technology options\u2014the large and small centrifuge\u2014that the agency considers to be the most feasible. However, these estimates are limited in scope and do not fully meet best practices for reliable cost estimates. Based on GAO's review of NNSA documents, NNSA appears to favor an incremental approach to reestablishing an enrichment capability that could ultimately meet all national security needs for enriched uranium. The estimates' scope is limited, however, in that they reflect only the costs of the first increment\u2014producing LEU for tritium\u2014and do not reflect the full costs of building a uranium enrichment facility that could meet the range of enriched uranium needs. GAO's cost guide\u2014which provides cost estimating best practices\u2014states that the scope of preliminary cost estimates should reflect full life-cycle costs. Also, NNSA's estimates for the two options minimally or partially met best practice characteristics for reliable cost estimates even when assessed for the more limited mission scope. For example, the estimates excluded certain costs and did not describe the calculations used. NNSA officials said that the cost estimates are preliminary and will be revised. By developing reliable cost estimates that are aligned with the revised mission need statement and consistent with best practices, NNSA will reasonably ensure that it has reliable information to make a decision about which option to select.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making two recommendations, including that NNSA revise the scope of its mission need statement and ensure that the scope of its cost estimates are aligned with the revised statement while developing estimates consistent with best practices. NNSA described actions planned and in process to address both recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_382"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_383","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nVeterans' access to timely health care at VA medical facilities has been a long-standing problem identified by GAO and VA's Office of Inspector General. The remote nature of the Pacific Islands creates some unique challenges for VAPIHCS, which may affect its ability to provide the approximately 50,000 veterans it serves in American Samoa, Guam, Hawaii, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands with timely access to primary, mental health, and specialty care.\nHouse Report 114\u2013497 included a provision for GAO to review VHA's efforts to provide timely access to health care within VAPIHCS. Among other things, this report examines: the extent to which the VAPIHCS veterans received (1) timely primary and mental health care, and (2) timely specialty care; and (3) any challenges VAPIHCS faced in recruiting and retaining physicians, and strategies to resolve them. GAO reviewed relevant policy documents and a randomly selected, non-generalizable sample of 164 medical records, and interviewed VHA, VAPIHCS, and DOD officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFor the sample of veterans' medical records that GAO reviewed, most veterans received primary and mental health care from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Pacific Islands Health Care System (VAPIHCS) within timeliness goals set by VA's Veterans Health Administration (VHA). However, GAO also found that some of these veterans experienced delays related to the processing of their enrollment applications, contacting them to schedule appointments, and completing comprehensive mental health evaluations. These delays were similar to some GAO had identified in previous work pertaining to veterans' access to care nationwide.\nFor the sample of veterans' medical records that GAO reviewed, VAPIHCS referred nearly all specialty care to non-VA providers within VHA's timeliness goal, but the time taken to provide care was variable and sometimes lengthy. Specifically, VAPIHCS sent specialty care referrals to\nthe Veterans Choice Program (Choice Program)\u2014for veterans that GAO reviewed, the number of days to receive care from the Choice Program was, on average, 75 days.\nDepartment of Defense (DOD) military treatment facilities\u2014for veterans that GAO reviewed, the number of days to receive care from the two DOD facilities for which VAPIHCS has agreements was, on average, 37 days from one facility and 47 days from the other.\nGAO identified weaknesses in VAPIHCS' management of its referral process for sending veterans for specialty care services at one of the two military treatment facilities. GAO found VAPIHCS did not always manage referrals to the military treatment facility in a timely way and there was inconsistent guidance describing the roles and responsibilities of the VAPIHCS staff involved in the process. These weaknesses may have contributed to the amount of time it took for veterans to receive specialty care services.\nGAO also found that VAPIHCS faces challenges recruiting and retaining physicians. As of October 2017, 17 of approximately 100 VAPIHCS physician positions were vacant, as were several other types of health care providers. Some of the challenges VAPIHCS faced are unique to the Pacific Islands, such as the availability of only one local medical school from which to recruit, along with travel burdens and a high cost of living that may discourage physicians from relocating there. Other challenges were similar to those GAO has previously identified as faced by VA medical centers across the country, such as differences in interpretation of hiring and recruiting policies. VAPIHCS officials said they use several strategies to help recruit and retain physicians, including VHA strategies used by other VA medical centers such as financial incentives and an educational debt reduction program. Although they described limits to the success of some of these strategies, they have not evaluated their effectiveness. Without completing an evaluation of its strategies, VAPIHCS may not be optimizing its resources to improve its hiring efforts and may continue to struggle with physician shortages.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO makes four recommendations, including that VAPIHCS improve monitoring of referrals to one DOD facility and evaluate the effectiveness of physician recruitment and retention strategies. VA concurred with three recommendations and partially concurred with the fourth. GAO maintains that monitoring referrals to the DOD facility is needed, as discussed in the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_383"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_384","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nHUD established DEC in 1998 to consolidate enforcement functions. In fiscal year 2017, DEC received about 2,800 referrals from program offices for oversight of and enforcement actions against property owners, public housing agencies, and state and local grantees that do not comply with requirements.\nThe Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, included a provision for GAO to assess DEC's effectiveness addressing noncompliance. GAO examined (1) the processes selected program offices have in place to make referrals, (2) how DEC assesses its performance, and (3) challenges that may affect the ability of DEC to achieve its mission. GAO reviewed agreements and referral data between DEC and three of the nine HUD program offices that made referrals to DEC from fiscal years 2014 to 2017 (accounting for 73 percent of the total referrals during that period), and interviewed HUD staff in headquarters and field offices.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe three program offices of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) that GAO examined have a process in place for referring cases of potential noncompliance to the Departmental Enforcement Center (DEC), but two of the offices do not provide their staff with specific guidance on when to make referrals. The Office of Multifamily Housing makes referrals to DEC based on defined thresholds for noncompliance, such as for properties that do not pass physical inspections. In contrast, the Offices of Public and Indian Housing (PIH) and Community Planning and Development (CPD) have broad guidelines but not specific thresholds for when to refer an entity to DEC. These two offices do not provide field staff with specific guidance to help determine which housing agencies or grantees to refer to DEC for possible enforcement action. As a result, the offices cannot ensure that decisions on whether to make referrals are made on a well-supported and consistent basis, potentially limiting DEC's effectiveness in fulfilling its mission of providing independent oversight of HUD's programs. In addition, PIH and CPD have targets for how many annual referrals the program office will make to DEC, but the targets are not based on program risk. According to federal internal control standards, management should identify, analyze, and respond to risks related to achieving the defined objectives. Without a target number of referrals based on program risk, PIH and CPD cannot be confident that the number of cases referred to DEC is appropriate and that DEC resources are being used efficiently.\nDEC tracks some performance measures, but it largely measures outputs, such as number of work assignments completed, rather than outcomes, such as financial performance improvements resulting from its work, that would help assess the impact of its activities. DEC also does not track the status of recommendations it makes to program offices or measure indicators of its timeliness in completing its reviews for the referrals it receives. In addition, GAO found that DEC staff did not consistently record two key data elements (including the corrective action taken) in the spreadsheet used to track referrals. Improving DEC's performance measurement system and data recording would be consistent with federal internal control standards and allow DEC to better assess its effectiveness, ensure accountability, and identify potential improvements.\nDEC has experienced various information technology challenges that have affected its ability to carry out its mission. For example, DEC's current system is not designed to allow staff to easily determine the basis for certain referrals or identify and analyze trends in referrals over multiple years. In addition, DEC has experienced continuing outages and breaks in service. HUD has developed plans for a replacement system, but funding constraints have delayed the implementation of the new system. DEC staff also noted that the organizational location of DEC within the Office of General Counsel was a challenge to carrying out its mission because it limited DEC's ability to hold program offices accountable for corrections. HUD disagreed and also stated that the department has no plans to relocate DEC. Based on GAO's review, other factors, such as the lack of guidance for making referrals (discussed above), may better explain why DEC may not be utilized more effectively.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making eight recommendations to HUD related to DEC, including for staff guidance on when to make referrals; targets for the number of DEC referrals based on program risk; outcome measures to track performance; and controls to ensure consistent data recording. HUD agreed with five of the eight recommendations, noting that setting referral targets was inconsistent with basing them on program risk. GAO maintains that setting referral targets can help ensure that program offices make referrals to DEC.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_384"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_385","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nWhile federal law prohibits federal funding for abortions in most circumstances, state Medicaid programs are required to cover abortions in limited circumstances. CMS is responsible for monitoring state compliance with federal requirements. However, concerns have been raised about challenges women may face obtaining Medicaid coverage for abortions eligible for federal funding, as well as with abortion access more broadly.\nGAO was asked to review issues related to abortion access. This report examines (1) factors that may present challenges to women, including Medicaid beneficiaries, accessing abortions; and (2) federal and state information on the number of abortions eligible for federal Medicaid funding. GAO reviewed federal laws, regulations, and data sources; surveyed and received responses from Medicaid program officials in all 50 states and the District of Columbia; conducted a literature review; and interviewed CMS officials and eight abortion providers selected based on factors such as variation in Medicaid abortion coverage and geography.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nWomen could face various challenges accessing abortions depending on where they live, and Medicaid beneficiaries may face additional challenges in some states. GAO identified seven key factors that could pose challenges to women accessing abortions, based on its interviews with providers and review of the literature: gestational limits, mandatory counseling, out-of-pocket costs, parental involvement requirements, provider availability, stigma and harassment, and waiting period requirements. The presence of these factors and their effect on abortion access\u2014such as delays in care or increased costs\u2014varied by state.\nGAO also found that state variation in Medicaid abortion coverage and payment requirements could further complicate access for program beneficiaries. State Medicaid programs are generally required to cover abortions and can seek federal funding for such coverage when the pregnancy is the result of an act of rape or incest, or the life of the pregnant woman would be endangered unless an abortion is performed. States may also cover abortions under other circumstances, but federal funds may not be used. In GAO's survey, one state reported not covering abortions in cases of rape or incest, and 14 states reported not covering the drug used in medical abortions, which they are generally required to cover if the abortion is otherwise eligible for federal funding. Officials from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the federal agency that oversees Medicaid, were unaware that these states were not covering the drug, and thus, have not taken any actions to address states' non-compliance.\nFederal information on the number of abortions eligible for federal Medicaid funding is incomplete, limiting CMS's ability to ensure proper payments and states' coverage of such abortions. For example, the form CMS-64, which states use to report Medicaid expenditures, does not collect information on the number of abortions paid for by managed care\u2014the delivery system serving most Medicaid beneficiaries. It also does not include this information from 8 states that GAO identified as incorrectly reporting abortion costs on the form. While also not complete, state information reported in GAO's survey was more comprehensive, and showed a wide range in the number of abortions eligible for federal funding covered across the 42 states that reported such information.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making three recommendations to CMS to ensure state compliance with federal requirements for Medicaid abortion coverage, including coverage of the drug used for medical abortions. The Department of Health and Human Services concurred with these recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_385"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_386","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nWhile foreign states generally cannot be sued in a U.S. court, under FSIA, parties can sue governments for certain crimes such as injury or death from an act of terrorism, if certain factors are present. State is required by statute to serve notice of such suits or default judgments when other means for effecting service are not available, and charges plaintiffs a fee of $2,275 to complete this task. Plaintiffs in such cases may also qualify for compensation from a fund that Congress established called the U.S. Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund.\nIn this report, GAO examines (1) how State completes this service and the length of time it takes to complete requests, and (2) whether State has implemented key controls for executing service requests promptly. GAO reviewed State regulations, guidance, case files, and data from 2007 through 2017; and interviewed State officials in Washington, D.C., the Czech Republic, Germany, and Switzerland, which handle the vast majority of cases. GAO assessed State's controls against federal internal control standards.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of State (State) notifies sovereign defendants of court proceedings under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) in a four stage process that has taken on average about 5 months to complete. State headquarters has overall responsibility for delivering legal documents but U.S. embassies and foreign governments play key roles as well. From 2007 through 2017, State completed 229 requests for delivery of legal documents in an average of about 5 months, but about 28 percent of the requests took longer than 6 months and 7 requests took more than a year. Slow delivery could adversely affect a plaintiff's ability to obtain compensation from a special victims' fund that Congress set up in 2015.\nState's guidance and federal internal control standards require controls such as accurate and complete record-keeping, continuous monitoring, and analysis of data; however, GAO found that State lacks several key controls to manage its delivery of legal documents. First, State's records are incomplete. For example, for 82 percent of the cases, State had no information about when it received court requests. Second, State did not monitor the progress of cases, resulting in slow service. This slow service led State to waive fees of about $57,000 because checks had expired. Third, State did not analyze case data to identify factors contributing to slow service, or establish timeframes for completing service. As a result, managers lack a sound basis for making decisions on how to improve timeliness. In June 2018, State took some actions based on GAO's review to improve its performance, including preparing step-by-step guidance and developing a new record-keeping system, but further actions could fill the gaps that have impaired program performance.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making five recommendations to State, including that it update its record-keeping guidance to ensure its records are accurate and complete, monitor the progress of requests, periodically analyze data to identify causes of slow service and take corrective actions, and establish timeframes for completing service. State concurred with all five of GAO's recommendations and identified actions it plans to take to address them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_386"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_387","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nVHA oversees one of the largest health care systems, serving approximately 9-million veterans at numerous health care facilities, including 170 medical centers. To ensure a safe environment for veterans and employees, VHA must keep its facilities clean and well maintained.\nGAO was asked to examine (1) how VHA medical centers identify maintenance and repair needs and challenges they face in addressing those needs, and (2) to what extent VHA provides oversight to ensure medical centers are providing a safe, clean, and functional environment.\nGAO reviewed VHA's procedures and standards related to facility operations and maintenance functions at medical centers and interviewed VHA's administrative office officials regarding oversight of these functions. GAO also interviewed VHA officials from three regional offices and six medical centers selected based on factors such as geographic location and veteran population served, and conducted site visits at four of these medical centers.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nVeterans Health Administration's (VHA) medical centers conduct regular inspections of the settings in which patients receive health care services, called the \u201cenvironment of care\u201d, to identify maintenance and repair needs. These inspections also help ensure compliance with accreditation standards requiring, among other things, that utility systems operate properly and that areas are clean and in good repair. The main three steps in the process associated with these inspections are shown below. In addition to the environment of care inspections, VHA conducts other periodic assessments of facilities' major systems, such as plumbing and air conditioning.\nVHA inspections routinely identify deficiencies reflective of an aging infrastructure\u2014VHA's buildings are on average 55 years old. This situation in turn is leading to workload and staffing challenges in addressing maintenance and repair needs. For example, according to VHA's 2017 data, medical centers reported conducting approximately 11,000 total inspections for the year that resulted in about 128,000 identified deficiencies. Most of these deficiencies were closed within 14 business days, as required by VHA. However, nearly 30,000 of them were not closed or had been addressed through a plan for future work. Medical center officials added that correcting deficiencies may only be a temporary solution for issues related to aging structures that need extensive repairs and renovations. In addition, VA headquarters and field officials said that staff vacancies are common and can affect the efficiency and speed of maintenance and repairs.\nVHA provides guidance and selected oversight to ensure medical centers implement the process for environment of care inspections. However, VHA lacks performance goals, objectives, and measures that would enable it to provide effective oversight, address challenges, and assess how well it is achieving a clean, safe, and functional environment. As part of ensuring compliance with the inspection process, VHA measures whether medical centers meet certain requirements, such as having appropriate staff present for inspections. VHA does not, however, have measures that enable it to assess how well medical centers are achieving desired outcomes. Although it has stated its intent to develop such measures, VHA has not yet committed to a time frame for doing so.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that VHA set a timeline for defining goals, objectives, and outcome-oriented performance measures that can address challenges and help achieve a clean and safe care environment. VA concurred with the recommendation and provided general and technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_387"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_388","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe cost of the decennial census has steadily increased over the past several decades, with self-response rates declining over the same period. The largest and costliest operation that the Bureau undertakes, NRFU is the Bureau's attempt to enumerate households not initially self-responding to the census.\nGAO was asked to review NRFU implementation during the 2018 Census Test as well as the Bureau's overall readiness for peak field operations, which cover the actual enumeration of residents. This report examines (1) how peak field operations, including NRFU, were implemented during the test; and (2) the extent to which prior test implementation issues have been addressed. GAO reviewed test planning and training documentation, as well as production and payroll data. At the test site, GAO observed and interviewed enumerators, field supervisors, and managers conducting peak operations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn preparation for the 2020 census, the Census Bureau (Bureau) set out to enumerate over 140,000 housing units during the 2018 Census Test at a site in Providence County, Rhode Island. The 2018 Census Test marked the Bureau's last chance to test enumeration procedures for peak field operations under census-like conditions before 2020. Implementation of this test identified the following concerns:\nThe Bureau experienced operational issues during implementation of the Non-Response Follow-Up (NRFU) as part of the 2018 Census Test. For example, the Bureau had not finalized procedures for data collection during late phases of NRFU (e.g., after multiple attempts to interview had been made) until after the work had already started. As a result, enumerators and their supervisors did not have standardized procedures during the test, which made it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the test procedures. GAO also observed a range of other NRFU implementation issues during the test, such as the Bureau's use of progress reporting that overstates the number of NRFU cases not needing any additional fieldwork and the Bureau having fewer of its enumerators work Saturdays, which can be among the most productive interview days. The Bureau is taking steps to assess and mitigate these and other issues that GAO identified.\nThe Bureau's field workforce was not fully prepared to face all of the enumeration challenges that arose during the test. For instance, the Bureau expects census field supervisors to provide front-line coaching to enumerators but did not screen these employees to ensure they had the needed skills. Moreover, it did not provide them with the authorities and information that would have helped them serve that role. As a result, we believe that supervisors did not have the casework expertise, information, or authority to help enumerators with procedural questions, and higher-level census field managers ended up providing direct support to enumerators.\nWhile the Bureau provided extensive online and in-person training to enumerators prior to NRFU fieldwork for the 2018 Census Test, the Bureau lacked any standardized form of mid-operation training or guidance as new procedures were implemented. GAO observed that during the test some enumerators continued to have questions and were uncertain about procedures. Developing targeted, location-specific training could help ensure that, in 2020, enumerators receive the guidance they need to collect census data consistently and in accordance with NRFU procedures.\nThe Bureau has made progress addressing prior test implementation issues but still faces challenges. For example, the Bureau improved its collection of enumerator case notes, which reflect real-time knowledge gained during enumeration. However, enumerators did not always report cases using flags built in to their interviewing device that would benefit from supervisory review, such as for language barriers. Moreover, supervisors were not systematically analyzing case notes to identify cases not flagged properly. As a result, critical data on fieldwork challenges were not being communicated effectively to those who could analyze and use them.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that the Bureau (1) determine procedures for late-NRFU data collection; (2) align census field supervisor screening, authorities, and information flows; (3) prepare for targeted mid-operation training or guidance as needed; and (4) improve training on reporting cases that need supervisory attention and alternative ways to communicate these cases.\nThe Department of Commerce agreed with GAO's findings and recommendations, and the Bureau provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_388"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_389","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nNo federal law requires testing of drinking water for lead in schools that receive water from public water systems, although these systems are regulated by the EPA. Lead can leach into water from plumbing materials inside a school. The discovery of toxic levels of lead in water in Flint, Michigan, in 2015 has renewed awareness about the danger lead exposure poses to public health, especially for children.\nGAO was asked to review school practices for lead testing and remediation. This report examines the extent to which (1) school districts are testing for, finding, and remediating lead in drinking water; (2) states are supporting these efforts; and (3) federal agencies are supporting state and school district efforts. GAO administered a web-based survey to a stratified, random sample of 549 school districts, the results of which are generalizable to all school districts. GAO visited or interviewed officials with 17 school districts with experience in lead testing, spread among 5 states, selected for geographic variation. GAO also interviewed federal and state officials and reviewed relevant laws and documents.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAn estimated 43 percent of school districts, serving 35 million students, tested for lead in school drinking water in 2016 or 2017, according to GAO's nationwide survey of school districts. An estimated 41 percent of school districts, serving 12 million students, had not tested for lead. GAO's survey showed that, among school districts that did test, an estimated 37 percent found elevated lead (lead at levels above their selected threshold for taking remedial action.) (See figure.) All school districts that found elevated lead in drinking water reported taking steps to reduce or eliminate exposure to lead, including replacing water fountains, installing filters or new fixtures, or providing bottled water.\nAccording to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), at least 8 states have requirements that schools test for lead in drinking water as of 2017, and at least 13 additional states supported school districts' voluntary efforts with funding or in-kind support for testing and remediation. In addition, the five states GAO visited provided examples of technical assistance to support testing in schools.\nEPA provides guidance and other resources to states and school districts regarding testing and remediating lead in drinking water, and the Department of Education (Education) provides some of this information on its websites. School district officials that used EPA's written guidance said they generally found it helpful. Although EPA guidance emphasizes the importance of addressing elevated lead levels, GAO found that some aspects of the guidance, such as the threshold for taking remedial action, were potentially misleading and unclear, which can put school districts at risk of making uninformed decisions. In addition, many school districts reported a lack of familiarity with EPA's guidance, and their familiarity varied by region of the country. Education and EPA do not regularly collaborate to support state and school district efforts on lead in drinking water, despite agreeing to do so in a 2005 memorandum of understanding. Such collaboration could encourage testing and ensure that more school districts will have the necessary information to limit student and staff exposure to lead.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making seven recommendations, including that EPA update its guidance on how schools should determine lead levels requiring action and for EPA and Education to collaborate to further disseminate guidance and encourage testing for lead. EPA and Education agreed with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_389"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_390","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn 1974, the Settlement Act was intended to provide for the final settlement of a land dispute between the Navajo and Hopi tribes that originated nearly a century ago. The act created ONHIR to carry out the relocation of Navajo and Hopi Indians off land partitioned to the other tribe. ONHIR's relocation efforts were scheduled to end by 1986. However, those efforts continue today.\nGAO was asked to review ONHIR's operations. Among other things, this report discusses (1) ONHIR's management and the status of relocation activities and (2) executive branch and legislative actions that may be needed for ONHIR to close and transfer remaining activities. GAO reviewed documentation; interviewed officials at ONHIR and other federal agencies, as well as from the Navajo Nation and Hopi Tribe; and conducted two site visits to ONHIR's offices and the Navajo reservation in Arizona.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAs of December 2017, the Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation, and its predecessor agency (collectively, ONHIR), has relocated 3,660 Navajo and 27 Hopi families off disputed lands that were partitioned to the two tribes and provided new houses for them. Although the Navajo-Hopi Settlement Act of 1974 (Settlement Act) intended for ONHIR to complete its activities 5 years after its relocation plan went into effect, the agency has continued to carry out its responsibilities for over three decades beyond the original deadline and the potential remains for relocation activities to continue into the future. For example, GAO found that by the end of fiscal year 2018\nat least 240 households whose relocation applications were previously denied could still file for appeals in federal court and if the court rules in their favor these households could become eligible for relocation benefits under the Settlement Act, and\nONHIR is still responsible for helping homeowners who might request repairs for 52 relocation homes that remain under warranty.\nONHIR believes that it has substantially completed its responsibilities under the Settlement Act and has stated its intent to close by September 2018. However, ONHIR does not have the authority to close its operations and has not yet taken the steps necessary to facilitate such a closure. GAO identified a number of areas where either executive branch or congressional actions would be needed to affect a closure of ONHIR, as shown in these examples:\nThe Settlement Act states that ONHIR will cease to exist when the President determines that its functions have been fully discharged. ONHIR, however, has not requested a determination nor provided specific information to the President that could facilitate such a decision.\nONHIR has prepared a transition plan and identified potential successor agencies that could assume its remaining activities. However, officials at these agencies said they currently do not have authority under the Settlement Act to undertake ONHIR's activities. Without congressional authorization these agencies would not be able to succeed ONHIR.\nONHIR has prepared an implementation plan to guide its closure but has not yet taken necessary steps to ensure that all the key information about its activities has been compiled. For example, ONHIR's database for tracking warranty requests is missing information, such as the date of warranty repairs and other contractor information. Similarly, ONHIR has not prepared complete information from its files on the remaining denied households who could file for federal appeals. Federal internal control standards state that agencies should identify and respond to risks and use quality information. By not preparing complete information on the relocation activities it has been engaged in, ONHIR places an effective transition of its functions to another agency at risk. This is because any successor agency authorized to continue these activities will not have the complete information needed to effectively fulfill these functions.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making four matters for congressional consideration; including that Congress provide successor agencies necessary authority to continue ONHIR's remaining activities if it closes. GAO is also making five recommendations to ONHIR, including that it request a closure determination from the President and prepare necessary information to facilitate the transfer of its activities to a successor. ONHIR neither agreed nor disagreed with the five recommendations and stated it had either already taken steps or planned to once a successor is identified. GAO continues to believe the recommendations are valid, as discussed in the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_390"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_391","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn 2014, NASA awarded two firm-fixed-price contracts to Boeing and SpaceX, worth a combined total of up to $6.8 billion, to develop crew transportation systems and conduct initial missions to the ISS. In February 2017, GAO found that both contractors had made progress, but their schedules were under mounting pressure. The contractors were originally required to provide NASA all the evidence it needed to certify that their systems met its requirements by 2017.\nA House report accompanying H.R. 5393 included a provision for GAO to review the progress of NASA's human exploration programs. This report examines the Commercial Crew Program, including (1) the extent to which the contractors have made progress towards certification and (2) how NASA's certification process addresses safety of the contractors' crew transportation systems. GAO analyzed contracts, schedules, and other documentation and spoke with officials from NASA, the Commercial Crew Program, Boeing, SpaceX, and two of NASA's independent review bodies that provide oversight.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nBoth of the Commercial Crew Program's contractors, Boeing and Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX), are making progress finalizing designs and building hardware for their crew transportation systems, but both contractors continue to delay their certification milestone (see figure). Certification is the process that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) will use to ensure that each contractor's system meets its requirements for human spaceflight for the Commercial Crew Program.\nFurther delays are likely as the Commercial Crew Program's schedule risk analysis shows that the certification milestone is likely to slip. The analysis identifies a range for each contractor, with an earliest and latest possible completion date, as well as an average. The average certification date was December 2019 for Boeing and January 2020 for SpaceX, according to the program's April 2018 analysis. Since the Space Shuttle was retired in 2011, the United States has been relying on Russia to carry astronauts to and from the International Space Station (ISS). Additional delays could result in a gap in U.S. access to the space station as NASA has contracted for seats on the Russian Soyuz spacecraft only through November 2019. NASA is considering potential options, but it does not have a contingency plan for ensuring uninterrupted U.S. access.\nNASA's certification process addresses the safety of the contractors' crew transportation systems through several mechanisms, but there are factors that complicate the process. One of these factors is the loss of crew metric that was put in place to capture the probability of death or permanent disability to an astronaut. NASA has not identified a consistent approach for how to assess loss of crew. As a result, officials across NASA have multiple ways of assessing the metric that may yield different results. Consequently, the risk tolerance level that NASA is accepting with loss of crew varies based upon which entity is presenting the results of its assessment. Federal internal controls state that management should define risk tolerances so they are clear and measurable. Without a consistent approach for assessing the metric, the agency as a whole may not clearly capture or document its risk tolerance with respect to loss of crew.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making five recommendations, including that NASA develop a contingency plan for ensuring a U.S. presence on the ISS and clarify how it will determine its risk tolerance for loss of crew. NASA concurred with three recommendations; partially concurred on the recommendation related to loss of crew; and non-concurred with a recommendation to report its schedule analysis to Congress. GAO believes these recommendations remain valid, as discussed in the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_391"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_392","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSNAP is the largest federally funded nutrition assistance program. In fiscal year 2017, it provided about $63 billion in benefits. USDA and the states jointly administer SNAP and partner to address issues that affect program integrity, including improper payments and fraud. GAO has previously reported on various aspects of SNAP, including state SNAP E&T programs, improper payment rates, recipient fraud, and retailer trafficking.\nThis testimony discusses GAO's prior and ongoing work on (1) SNAP E&T programs, including program participants, design, and USDA oversight, and (2) USDA's efforts to address SNAP program integrity, including improper payments, as well as recipient and retailer fraud. As part of its ongoing work on SNAP E&T programs, GAO analyzed E&T expenditures and participation data from fiscal years 2007 through 2016, the most recent data available; reviewed relevant research from USDA; and interviewed USDA and selected state and local officials. The prior work discussed in this testimony is based on four GAO products on E&T programs (GAO-03-388), improper payments (GAO-16-708T), recipient fraud (GAO-14-641), and retailer trafficking (GAO-07-53). Information on the scope and methodology of our prior work is available in each product.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nOverseen by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and administered by states, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Employment and Training (E&T) programs served about 0.5 percent of the approximately 43.5 million SNAP recipients in an average month of fiscal year 2016, according to the most recent USDA data available. These programs are generally designed to help SNAP recipients increase their ability to obtain regular employment through services such as job search and training. Some recipients may be required to participate. According to USDA, about 14 percent of SNAP recipients were subject to work requirements in an average month of fiscal year 2016, while others, such as children and the elderly, were generally exempt from these requirements. States have flexibility in how they design their E&T programs. Over the last several years, states have 1) increasingly moved away from programs that mandate participation, 2) focused on serving able-bodied adults without dependents whose benefits are generally time-limited unless they comply with work requirements, and 3) partnered with state and local organizations to deliver services. USDA has taken steps to increase support and oversight of SNAP E&T since 2014, including collecting new data on participant outcomes from states. GAO has ongoing work reviewing SNAP E&T programs, including USDA oversight.\nUSDA and the states partner to address issues that affect program integrity, including improper payments and fraud, and USDA has taken some steps to address challenges in these areas, but issues remain.\nImproper Payments. In 2016, GAO reviewed SNAP improper payment rates and found that states' adoption of program flexibilities and changes in federal SNAP policy in the previous decade, as well as improper payment rate calculation methods, likely affected these rates. Although USDA reported improper payment estimates for SNAP in previous years, USDA did not report an estimate for benefits paid in fiscal years 2015 or 2016 due to data quality issues in some states. USDA has since been working with the states to improve improper payment estimates for the fiscal year 2017 review.\nRecipient Fraud. In 2014, GAO made recommendations to USDA to address challenges states faced in combatting recipient fraud. For example, GAO found that USDA's guidance on the use of transaction data to uncover potential trafficking lacked specificity and recommended USDA develop additional guidance. Since then, USDA has provided technical assistance to some states, including on the use of data analytics. GAO has ongoing work reviewing states' use of data analytics to identify SNAP recipient fraud.\nRetailer Trafficking. In 2006, GAO identified several ways in which SNAP was vulnerable to retailer trafficking\u2014a practice involving the exchange of benefits for cash or non-food items. For example, USDA had not conducted analyses to identify high-risk retailers and target its resources. Since then, USDA has established risk levels for retailers based on various factors. GAO has ongoing work assessing how USDA prevents, detects, and responds to retailer trafficking and reviewing the usefulness of USDA's estimates of the extent of SNAP retailer trafficking.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making new recommendations. USDA generally concurred with GAO's prior recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_392"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_393","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn response to Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the President announced the ERI, to reassure allies in Europe of U.S. commitment to their security. This initiative has been funded using OCO appropriations, which Congress provides in addition to DOD's base budget appropriations.\nThe Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, included a provision for GAO to review matters related to ERI. In this report, we (1) describe changes in ERI's objectives, funding under ERI, and DOD's posture in Europe since 2014 and (2) evaluate the extent to which DOD's planning processes for posture initiatives funded under ERI prioritize those initiatives, estimate their long-term costs, and communicate their estimated costs to Congress. GAO analyzed DOD strategy documentation, budget and cost analysis guidance, budget justification materials, and cost and obligations data. GAO also interviewed knowledgeable officials within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. European Command, the military services, and the State Department.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nSince 2014, the Department of Defense (DOD) has expanded the European Reassurance Initiative's (ERI) objectives, increased its funding, and planned enhancements to European posture. DOD expanded ERI's objectives from the short-term reassurance of allies and partners to include deterring Russian aggression in the long term and developing the capacity to field a credible combined force should deterrence fail. With respect to funding, DOD will have requested approximately $4.5 billion for ERI's posture enhancements through the end of fiscal year 2017 (about $3.2 billion for fiscal year 2017 alone), and in July 2016 EUCOM identified funding needs for future posture initiatives. The expansion of ERI's objectives has contributed to DOD's enhancing its posture in Europe. Specifically, DOD has increased the size and duration of Army combat unit deployments, planned to preposition Army equipment in Eastern Europe, added new enduring locations (e.g., locations that DOD expects to access and use to support U.S. security interests for the foreseeable future), improved infrastructure, and negotiated new agreements with European nations. As of April 2017, DOD was considering further force enhancements under ERI as part of the department's ERI budget request. DOD also was reviewing whether new enduring locations to support ERI were needed and was considering other improvements to existing infrastructure.\nDOD's process for planning ERI has not established priorities among posture initiatives funded under ERI relative to those in its base budget, nor estimated long-term sustainment costs for some posture initiatives funded under ERI, nor communicated future costs to Congress. ERI is being planned using a separate process from DOD's established processes and is funded from DOD's overseas contingency operations (OCO) appropriations. GAO found several weaknesses:\nLack of prioritization : DOD establishes priorities among ERI posture initiatives but has not evaluated them against base budget initiatives using its posture management process. As a result, DOD lacks an understanding of the relative importance of ERI initiatives and may be investing in projects that it will not continue should OCO funding become unavailable.\nLack of sustainment costs : EUCOM and the military services have not fully estimated the long-term costs to sustain equipment and construction funded under ERI. Based on DOD's approach for calculating rough order sustainment costs, GAO determined that these costs could be substantial. DOD officials said that GAO correctly applied DOD's approach for estimating sustainment costs, but noted that actual costs may be lower, because the military services may not fully fund sustainment. In the absence of comprehensive estimates, DOD has been limited in its ability to assess affordability and plan for future costs.\nNot communicating future costs : DOD limits Congress's visibility into the resources needed to implement ERI and achieve its objectives because it does not include future costs in its ERI budget request.\nThis is a public version of a classified report issued in August 2017. Information on specific posture planning, guidance, and budget estimates that DOD deemed to be classified have been omitted from this report.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DOD prioritize ERI posture initiatives against initiatives in its base budget, develop cost estimates for sustaining initiatives, and communicate future costs to Congress. DOD partially concurred with GAO's recommendations. GAO continues to believe that these recommendations are warranted.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_393"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_394","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn May 2015, DOD discovered that one of its laboratories (formerly called the Life Sciences Division) at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, had inadvertently made 575 shipments of live Bacillus anthracis \u2014the bacterium that causes anthrax\u2014to 194 laboratories and contractors worldwide from 2004 through 2015. A December 2015 investigation by the Army determined that there was insufficient evidence to establish a single point of failure and made recommendations for improving safety and security at DOD laboratories that handle BSAT.\nThe NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision for GAO to review DOD's actions to address the Army's recommendations. GAO assessed the extent to which (1) DOD has implemented recommendations from the Army's 2015 investigation report, (2) the Army has implemented the BSAT Biosafety and Biosecurity Program and developed a strategy and implementation plan, (3) the Army's biological T&E mission is independent from its biological R&D mission, and (4) DOD has carried out a required study and evaluation. GAO reviewed DOD documents and key actions in response to the Army's recommendations and conducted site visits to DOD's BSAT laboratories.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) has made progress by taking a number of actions to address the 35 recommendations from the Army's 2015 investigation report on the inadvertent shipments of live Bacillus anthracis (anthrax). However, DOD has not yet developed an approach to measure the effectiveness of these actions. As of March 2018, DOD reports 18 recommendations as having been implemented and 17 as having actions under way to implement them. These actions are part of a broader effort to improve biosafety, biosecurity, and overall program management. For example, in March 2016, DOD established the Biological Select Agents and Toxins (BSAT) Biorisk Program Office to assist in overseeing the BSAT Biosafety and Biosecurity Program and implementation of the recommendations. Measuring the effectiveness of each implemented recommendation would help better determine if the actions taken are working, if there are unintended consequences, or if further action is necessary.\nThe Secretary of the Army, as DOD's Executive Agent, has implemented a BSAT Biosafety and Biosecurity Program to improve management, coordination, safety, and quality assurance for the DOD BSAT enterprise. However, DOD has not developed a strategy and implementation plan for managing the program. Without a strategy and implementation plan, Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, and DOD's laboratory facilities that currently produce and handle BSAT may be unclear about DOD's strategy to harmonize BSAT operations to ensure safety, security, and standardization of procedures throughout DOD's BSAT enterprise.\nThe Army has not fully institutionalized measures to ensure that its biological test and evaluation (T&E) mission remains independent from its biological research and development (R&D) mission so that its T&E procedures are objective and reliable. In April 2016, the Army directed the transfer of the operational T&E mission from West Desert Test Center-Life Sciences Division at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, to Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, Maryland. The Army issued a memorandum of agreement between the two entities to lay out roles and responsibilities for test processes and procedures. However, the memorandum does not distinguish T&E from R&D mission requirements, and does not contain guidelines to mitigate risks associated with potential conflicts of interest between the R&D and T&E missions. Without these measures, there is a potential risk to the independence of the T&E mission.\nThe National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017 required DOD to report by February 1, 2017, on the feasibility of consolidating BSAT facilities within a unified command, partnering with industry for the production of BSAT in lieu of maintaining such capabilities within the Army, and whether such operations should be transferred to another government or commercial laboratory. DOD has not completed this required study and evaluation of its BSAT infrastructure which, when complete, will affect the future infrastructure of the BSAT Biosafety and Biosecurity Program. Further, DOD officials have no estimated time frames for when DOD will complete the study and evaluation. Without time frames for completing the study and evaluation, DOD is unable to provide decision makers with key information on its infrastructure requirements.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DOD develop an approach to assess the effectiveness of the recommendations, a strategy and implementation plan for its BSAT Biosafety and Biosecurity Program, measures to ensure independence, and time frames to complete a study. DOD concurred with all four of GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_394"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_395","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nContingent faculty play a large role in postsecondary education but may not have the same job protections as tenured or tenure-track faculty. In 2015, GAO reported that contingent workers\u2014those in temporary, contract, or other non-standard employment arrangements\u2014earn less, are less likely to have work-provided benefits, and are more likely to experience job instability than standard workers. GAO was asked to examine issues related to contingent faculty.\nThis report examines (1) what is known about the makeup and utilization of the postsecondary instructional workforce; (2) the roles different types of faculty fill at selected institutions and the factors administrators consider when determining faculty makeup; (3) what is known about how economic circumstances compare across different faculty types; and (4) what contingent faculty members report as advantages and disadvantages of their work.\nGAO analyzed data from nationally representative sources and from public institutions in three states\u2014Georgia, North Dakota, and Ohio. GAO selected these states based primarily on data availability. GAO interviewed administrators from 9 postsecondary institutions in these states and one large for-profit institution. GAO selected institutions based on factors such as institution size and percent of contingent faculty. GAO also conducted 21 discussion groups with contingent faculty.\nThe Department of Education did not have comments on this report. The National Science Foundation provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAccording to 2015 Department of Education data, contingent faculty\u2014those employed outside of the tenure track\u2014made up about 70 percent of postsecondary instructional positions nationwide, though this varied by type of institution. In addition, data from three selected states show that contingent faculty teach about 45 to 54 percent of all courses at 4-year public institutions, and higher proportions at 2-year public institutions. In terms of job stability, some full-time contingent positions with annual or longer contracts may be relatively stable while part-time positions with short-term contracts may be among the least stable, though it is unknown whether faculty in these positions have other employment. In contrast, tenure-track positions are often viewed as having a high degree of job security that is somewhat unique to postsecondary education.\nAdministrators GAO interviewed at selected postsecondary institutions said full-time contingent faculty generally carry heavy teaching loads, and some also take on additional responsibilities, such as conducting research or advising students. However, administrators stated that part-time contingent faculty generally focus solely on teaching. As shown in the figure below, administrators also described factors they consider in determining their institution's faculty makeup.\nGAO examined recent data from North Dakota and Ohio public institutions and found that, among faculty who primarily teach\u2014which excludes individuals such as administrators or researchers\u2014part-time and full-time contingent faculty were paid about 75 percent and 40 percent less per course, respectively, compared to full-time tenure-track faculty. This comparison includes earnings for all of their responsibilities, including teaching and any other duties. However, when estimating faculty earnings for teaching duties only, pay disparities decreased to about 60 percent and 10 percent less per course for these contingent faculty, respectively. In addition, state and national data also showed that relatively few part-time contingent faculty received work-provided health or retirement benefits.\nIn discussion groups with GAO, contingent faculty cited advantages such as the flexibility to balance professional and personal responsibilities, skill development, or working with students, and described disadvantages that included uncertainty due to short-term contracts, untimely contract renewals, and pay\u2014including a lack of compensation for some of their work. Other concerns they cited included limited career advancement opportunities, not having a voice in institutional decision-making, and not having certain types of institutional support.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_395"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_396","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nTSA conducts security threat assessment screening and credentialing activities for millions of workers and travelers in the maritime, surface, and aviation transportation industries that are seeking access to transportation systems. In 2008, TSA initiated the TIM program to enhance the sophistication of its security threat assessments and to improve the capacity of its supporting systems. However, the program experienced significant cost and schedule overruns, and performance issues, and was suspended in January 2015 while TSA established a new strategy. The program was rebaselined in September 2016 and is estimated to cost approximately $1.27 billion and be fully operational by 2021 (about $639 million more and 6 years later than originally planned).\nGAO was asked to review the TIM program's new strategy. This report determined, among other things, the extent to which (1) TSA implemented selected key practices for transitioning to Agile software development for the program; and (2) TSA and DHS are effectively overseeing the program's cost, schedule, and performance. GAO compared program documentation to key practices identified by the Software Engineering Institute and the Office of Management and Budget, as being critical to transitioning to Agile and for overseeing and governing programs.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) new strategy for the Technology Infrastructure Modernization (TIM) program includes using Agile software development, but the program only fully implemented two of six leading practices necessary to ensure successful Agile adoption. Specifically, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA leadership fully committed to adopt Agile and TSA provided Agile training. Nonetheless, the program had not defined key roles and responsibilities, prioritized system requirements, or implemented automated capabilities that are essential to ensuring effective adoption of Agile. Until TSA adheres to all leading practices for Agile implementation, the program will be putting at risk its ability to deliver a quality system that strengthens and enhances the sophistication of TSA's security threat assessments and credentialing programs.\nTSA and DHS fully implemented one of the key practices for overseeing the TIM program, by establishing a process for ensuring corrective actions are identified and tracked. However, TSA and DHS did not fully implement the remaining three key practices, which impede the effectiveness of their oversight. Specifically,\nTSA and DHS documented selected policies and procedures for governance and oversight of the TIM program, but they did not develop or finalize other key oversight and governance documents. For example, TSA officials developed a risk management plan tailored for Agile; however, they did not update the TIM system life-cycle plan to reflect the Agile governance framework they were using.\nThe TIM program management office conducted frequent performance reviews, but did not establish thresholds or targets for oversight bodies to use to ensure that the program was meeting acceptable levels of performance. In addition, department-level oversight bodies have focused on reviewing selected program life-cycle metrics for the TIM program; however, they did not measure the program against the rebaselined cost, or important Agile release-level metrics.\nTIM's reported performance data were not always complete and accurate. For example, program officials reported that they were testing every line of code, even though they were unable to confirm that they were actually doing so, thus calling into question the accuracy of the data reported.\nThese gaps in oversight and governance of the TIM program were due to, among other things, TSA officials not updating key program management documentation and DHS leadership not obtaining consensus on needed oversight and governance changes related to Agile programs. Given that TIM is a historically troubled program and is at least 6 months behind its rebaselined schedule, it is especially concerning that TSA and DHS have not fully implemented oversight and governance practices for this program. Until TSA and DHS fully implement these practices to ensure the TIM program meets its cost, schedule, and performance targets, the program is at risk of repeating past mistakes and not delivering the capabilities that were initiated 9 years ago to protect the nation's transportation infrastructure.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making 14 recommendations, including that DHS should prioritize requirements and obtain leadership consensus on oversight and governance changes. DHS concurred with all 14 recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_396"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_397","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe global terrorist threat to surface transportation \u2013 freight and passenger rail, mass transit, highway, maritime and pipeline systems \u2013 has increased in recent years, as demonstrated by the 2017 London vehicle attacks and a 2016 thwarted attack on mass transit in the New York area. TSA is the primary federal agency responsible for securing surface transportation in the United States.\nGAO was asked to review TSA surface inspector activities. This report addresses (1) how TSA surface inspectors implement the agency's surface transportation security mission, and (2) the extent to which TSA has used a risk-based approach to prioritize and implement surface inspector activities. GAO analyzed TSA data on surface inspector activities from fiscal year 2013 through March 24, 2017, reviewed TSA program and risk documents and guidance, and observed surface inspectors conducting multiple activities. GAO also interviewed TSA officials in 17 of 49 surface field offices and 15 industry stakeholders.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nTransportation Security Administration (TSA) surface transportation security inspectors\u2014known as surface inspectors\u2014conduct a variety of activities to implement the agency's surface security mission, including:\nRegulatory Inspections: Surface inspectors enforce freight rail, passenger rail, and maritime security regulations. GAO found that, according to TSA data, surface inspectors reported spending approximately 20 percent of their time on these activities from fiscal years 2013 to 2017.\nNon-regulatory assessments and assistance: Surface inspectors conduct voluntary assessments and provide training to surface transportation entities, among other things. GAO found that, according to TSA data, inspectors reported spending approximately 80 percent of their time on these activities.\nIn addition to mission-related activities, surface inspectors can assist with aviation-related activities. However, GAO found that TSA has incomplete information on the total time surface inspectors spend on these activities because of limitations in TSA's data system. Addressing these limitations would provide TSA with complete information when making decisions about inspector activities.\nGAO also found that TSA prioritized inspector activities in the surface transportation mode with the lowest risk because TSA did not incorporate risk assessment results when planning and monitoring activities. Specifically, in fiscal year 2016, the last full year for which data on inspectors' activities in the surface modes was available, surface inspectors reported spending more than twice as much time on the lowest risk surface transportation mode according to TSA risk assessments than on the highest risk surface transportation mode. Incorporating risk assessment results when prioritizing inspector activities would help TSA ensure that its surface security resources address the highest risks.\nIn fiscal year 2017, TSA fully implemented a new risk mitigation program\u2014Risk Mitigation Activities for Surface Transportation (RMAST)\u2014intended to focus time and resources on high-risk surface transportation entities and locations. However, GAO found that TSA has not identified or prioritized these high-risk entities and locations, or defined the RMAST program's objectives and associated activities in a measurable and clear way. According to TSA officials, they have not done so because there are too many potential entities to list them all for prioritization and TSA has not identified an approach for determining the effectiveness of activities under the program. However, prioritizing high-risk entities, such as by type, characteristics, or location does not require a complete list of entities. By identifying and prioritizing high-risk entities and locations for RMAST, and clearly defining the program's activities and objectives, TSA would be better able to implement RMAST activities in a risk-based manner and measure their effectiveness.\nThis is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in October 2017. Information that TSA deemed sensitive has been omitted.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that TSA (1) address limitations in its data system to collect complete information, (2) ensure inspector activities more closely align with the results of risk assessments, (3) identify and prioritize entities and locations for its risk mitigation program, and (4) define measurable and clear objectives for the program. TSA concurred with these recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_397"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_398","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nApproximately 4.6 million youth ages 16 to 24 were neither in school nor employed in 2016. WIOA, enacted in July 2014, provides, in part, grants to states and local areas to assist youth\u2014particularly out-of-school youth\u2014in accessing employment, education, and training services. It also emphasizes the provision of work experiences to in- and out-of-school youth.\nGAO was asked to review how states and local areas are using WIOA grants to serve youth. This report examines (1) what is known about states' and local areas' progress in meeting WIOA spending requirements for serving out-of-school youth and for providing youth with work experiences; (2) how local areas are addressing WIOA's emphasis on serving out-of-school youth and any challenges, and (3) how local areas are addressing WIOA's emphasis on youth work experiences and any challenges. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; interviewed DOL officials; analyzed DOL state level WIOA youth program expenditure data from program years 2015 and 2016, the most recent data available; surveyed a nationally representative sample of local workforce development areas; and visited nine local workforce development areas in three states selected for their relatively large WIOA Youth funding allotments and relatively high rates of out-of-school youth.\nGAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOL and the Department of Education provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which were incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nMost states reported they were on target to meet the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act's (WIOA) requirement to spend 75 percent of their Program Year 2015 and 2016 youth grant funding to serve out-of-school youth, according to Department of Labor (DOL) data. Because deadlines had not arrived for the spending of state youth grant allotments for these program years, compliance could not be determined. Similarly, most local areas reported they were on track to meet the out-of-school youth spending requirement, as well as the requirement that 20 percent of local youth grant funds be spent on providing work experiences to youth. Through GAO's survey, many local areas reported it was not challenging or only slightly challenging to meet the spending requirements, but some reported experiencing greater challenges (see figure). Under WIOA, DOL does not collect local expenditure information, but states must monitor local areas' compliance while DOL monitors state oversight. DOL has taken some steps to determine whether states are carrying out their monitoring responsibilities, including limited on-site monitoring and ongoing dialogue with states. According to DOL officials, the agency's monitoring of the new requirements has thus far focused on providing technical assistance and guidance, but they reported plans for more formal compliance monitoring.\nNote: All percentage estimates in this figure have a margin of error of plus or minus 10 percentage points or fewer. Percentages do not add to 100 due to rounding and because a small number of survey respondents answered \u201cdon't know\u201d or did not respond.\nLocal areas reported in GAO's survey that they used a combination of strategies to meet the WIOA spending requirement for serving out-of-school youth and to address other related challenges. For example, many local areas reported suspending enrollment of in-school-youth to help meet the requirement to spend 75 percent of youth grant funds on out-of-school youth. In addition, local areas reported having taken steps to address challenges locating, retaining, and serving out-of-school youth in their WIOA-funded programs, including increasing their recruiting efforts and strengthening partnerships with other WIOA programs, state and local government agencies, and community-based organizations.\nTo meet WIOA's 20 percent spending requirement for work experiences, local areas reported expanding work experience opportunities for youth, most commonly with temporary paid employment. An estimated 81 percent of local areas reported they paid youth participants' salaries, with most paying the entire salary. Many local areas also reported challenges, including youths' lack of job-readiness and employers' reluctance to hire WIOA participants. To address these challenges, local areas reported providing job-readiness training for youth and strengthening partnerships with employers.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_398"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_399","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nEM manages DOE's radioactive and hazardous waste cleanup program using compliance agreements negotiated between DOE and other federal and state agencies. Within the agreements, milestones outline cleanup work to be accomplished by specific deadlines. EM's cleanup program faces nearly $500 billion in future environmental liability, which has grown substantially.\nGAO was asked to review DOE's cleanup agreements. This report examines the extent to which EM (1) tracks the milestones in cleanup agreements for EM's cleanup sites; (2) has met, missed, or postponed cleanup-related milestones at selected sites and how EM reports information; and (3) has analyzed why milestones are missed or postponed and how EM considers those reasons when renegotiating milestones.\nGAO reviewed agreements and milestones at EM's 16 cleanup sites and compared information tracked by EM headquarters and these sites; interviewed officials from four selected sites (chosen for variation in location and scope of cleanup, among other factors); and reviewed EM guidance related to milestone negotiations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe cleanup process at the 16 sites overseen by the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) is governed by 72 agreements and hundreds of milestones specifying actions EM is to take as it carries out its cleanup work. However, EM headquarters and site officials do not consistently track data on the milestones. EM headquarters and site officials provided GAO with different totals on the number of milestones in place at the four sites GAO selected for review. These discrepancies result from how headquarters and selected sites define and track milestones. First, not all sites make the same distinction between major (i.e., related to on-the-ground cleanup) and non-major milestones and, as a result, are not consistently reporting the same milestones to EM headquarters. Second, sites do not consistently provide EM headquarters with the most up-to-date information on the status of milestones at each site. These inconsistencies limit EM's ability to use milestones to manage the cleanup mission and monitor its progress.\nEM does not accurately track met, missed, or postponed cleanup-related milestones at the four selected sites, and EM's milestone reporting to Congress is incomplete. EM sites renegotiate milestone dates before they are missed, and EM does not track the history of these changes. This is because once milestones change, sites are not required to maintain or track the original milestone dates. GAO has previously found that without a documented and consistently-applied schedule change control process, program staff may continually revise the schedule to match performance, hindering management's insight into the true performance of the project. Further, since 2011, EM has not consistently reported to Congress on the status of the milestones each year, as required, and the information it has reported is incomplete. EM reports the most recently renegotiated milestone dates with no indication of whether or how often those milestones have been missed or postponed. Since neither EM headquarters nor the sites track renegotiated milestones and their baseline dates at the sites, milestones do not provide a reliable measure of program performance.\nEM officials at headquarters and selected sites have not conducted root cause analyses on missed or postponed milestones; thus, such analyses are not part of milestone negotiations. Specifically, EM has not done a complex-wide analysis of the reasons for missed or postponed milestones. Similarly, officials GAO interviewed at the four selected sites said that they were not aware of any site-wide review of why milestones were missed or postponed. Best practices for project and program management outlined in GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide note the importance of identifying root causes of problems that lead to schedule delays. Additionally, in a 2015 directive, DOE emphasized the importance of conducting such analysis. Analyzing the root causes of missed or postponed milestones would better position EM to address systemic problems and consider those problems when renegotiating milestones with regulators. Without such analysis, EM and its cleanup regulators lack information to set more realistic and achievable milestones and, as a result, future milestones are likely to continue to be pushed back, further delaying the cleanup work. As GAO has reported previously, these delays lead to increases in the overall cost of the cleanup.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making four recommendations, including that EM establish a standard definition of milestones across the cleanup sites, track and report original and renegotiated milestone dates, and identify the root causes of why milestones are missed or postponed. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOE agreed with three of the recommendations and partially agreed with a fourth.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_399"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_400","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCRAs collect, maintain, and sell to third parties large amounts of sensitive data about consumers, including Social Security numbers and credit card numbers. Businesses and other entities commonly use these data to determine eligibility for credit, employment, and insurance. In 2017, Equifax, one of the largest CRAs, experienced a breach that compromised the records of at least 145.5 million consumers.\nGAO was asked to examine issues related to federal oversight of CRAs. Among other things, this report discusses (1) measures FTC has taken to enforce CRA compliance with requirements to protect consumer information, (2) measures CFPB has taken to ensure CRA protection of consumer information, and (3) actions consumers can take after a breach. GAO reviewed relevant laws, documentation related to CRA examinations, and policies and practices of selected CRAs; and interviewed representatives of regulatory agencies, CRAs, consumer and industry groups, and Attorneys General from four states with consumer reporting requirements.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nSince 2008, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has settled 34 enforcement actions against various entities related to consumer reporting violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), including 17 actions against consumer reporting agencies (CRA). Some of these settlements included civil penalties\u2014fines for wrongdoing that do not require proof of harm\u2014for FCRA violations or violations of consent orders. However, FTC does not have civil penalty authority for violations of requirements under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), which, unlike FCRA, includes a provision directing federal regulators and FTC to establish standards for financial institutions to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security of customer records. To obtain monetary redress for these violations, FTC must identify affected consumers and any monetary harm they may have experienced. However, harm resulting from privacy and security violations can be difficult to measure and can occur years in the future, making it difficult to trace a particular harm to a specific breach. As a result, FTC lacks a practical enforcement tool for imposing civil money penalties that could help to deter companies, including CRAs, from violating data security provisions of GLBA and its implementing regulations.\nSince 2015, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has had five public settlements with CRAs. Four of these settlements included alleged violations of FCRA; and three included alleged violations of unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices provisions. CFPB is also responsible for supervising larger CRAs (those with more than $7 million in annual receipts from consumer reporting) but lacks the data needed to ensure identification of all CRAs that meet this threshold. Identifying additional sources of information on these CRAs, such as by requiring them to register with the agency through a rulemaking or leveraging state registration information, could help CFPB ensure that it can comprehensively carry out its supervisory responsibilities. According to CFPB staff, the bureau does not have authority to examine for or enforce the GLBA\u2019s safeguards provisions. After the Equifax breach, however, CFPB used its existing supervisory authority to examine the data security of certain CRAs. CFPB\u2019s process for prioritizing which CRAs to examine does not routinely include an assessment of companies\u2019 data security risks, but doing so could help CFPB better detect such risks and prevent the further exposure or compromise of consumer information.\nIf a CRA experiences a data breach, affected consumers can take actions to mitigate the risk of identity theft\u2014such as implementing a fraud alert or credit freeze\u2014and can file a complaint with FTC or CFPB. However, consumers are limited in the direct actions they can take against the CRA. Consumers generally cannot exercise choice in the consumer reporting market\u2014such as by choosing which CRAs maintain their information\u2014if they are dissatisfied with a CRA\u2019s privacy or security practices. In addition, according to CFPB, consumers cannot remove themselves from the consumer reporting market entirely because they do not have a legal right to delete their records with CRAs. This limited control by consumers, coupled with the large amount and sensitive nature of the information CRAs possess, underscores the importance of appropriate federal oversight of CRAs\u2019 data security.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that Congress consider giving FTC civil penalty authority to enforce GLBA\u2019s safeguarding provisions. GAO also recommends that CFPB (1) identify additional sources of information on larger CRAs, and (2) reassess its prioritization of examinations to address CRA data security. CFPB neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO\u2019s recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_400"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_401","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe F-22 was designed and fielded as the Air Force's premier air-to-air fighter. The small fleet of 186 F-22s is central to the Air Force's ability to accomplish its air superiority mission in high threat areas. While the Air Force has focused on other missions over the last 15 years of conflict, it is now trying to refocus on overcoming advanced threats, even as it continues to support ongoing operations. Though the recent introduction of the F-35 gives the Air Force another advanced fighter, the F-35 is primarily designed for the air-to-ground missions and so is intended to complement but not replace the F-22.\nSenate Report 114-255 included a provision for GAO to review a variety of issues related to Air Force F-22 fighter squadrons. This report examines the extent to which the Air Force's (1) organization of its F-22 fleet maximizes availability of aircraft and (2) utilization of its F-22 fleet affects pilot air superiority training. GAO reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) guidance, analyzed maintenance data and training information for the F-22, evaluated the use of F-22s during deployments, and interviewed agency officials. This is a public version of a classified report issued in April 2018. Information DOD deemed classified or sensitive has been omitted.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Air Force's organization of its small F-22 fleet has not maximized the availability of these 186 aircraft. Availability is constrained by maintenance challenges and unit organization. For example, stealth is a central feature of the F-22 and, according to Air Force officials, maintaining the stealth coating on the outside of the aircraft is time consuming and significantly reduces the time F-22s are available for missions. Maintenance availability challenges are exacerbated by the Air Force's decision to organize the F-22 fleet into small units\u201418 or 21 primary mission aircraft per squadron and one or two squadrons per wing. Traditional fighter wings have three squadrons per wing with 24 aircraft in each squadron, which creates maintenance efficiencies because people, equipment, and parts can be shared, according to Air Force officials. Moreover, the Air Force organized F-22 squadrons to operate from a single location. However, it generally deploys only a part of a squadron, and the remaining part struggles to keep aircraft available for missions at home. Larger, traditional Air Force squadrons and deployable units provide a better balance of equipment and personnel, according to service officials. The Air Force has not reassessed the structure of its F-22 fleet since 2010. Without conducting a comprehensive assessment to identify and assess F-22 organization, the Air Force may be foregoing opportunities to improve the availability of its small yet critical F-22 fleet, and support combatant commander air superiority needs in high threat environments.\nThe Air Force's utilization of its F-22 fleet has limited pilot opportunities to train for air superiority missions in high threat environments. To complete the annual training requirements for air superiority missions, F-22 pilots must train almost the entire year. However, F-22 pilots are not meeting their minimum yearly training requirements for the air superiority missions, according to Air Force training reports and service officials. Moreover, the utilization of F-22s for exercises and operational missions that do not require the F-22's unique capabilities interrupt pilot training and lead to reduced proficiency. For example, F-22 units are often directed to participate in partnership building exercises. However, during these exercises, F-22 pilots may be restricted from flying the F-22 the way they would fly it in combat\u2014due to security concerns about exposing the F-22's unique capabilities. These restrictions limit the value of the exercises and can result in pilots developing bad habits, according to Air Force officials. The Air Force also uses F-22s to support alert missions\u2014a mission that requires certain bases to have jets ready at all times to respond to threats from civil or military aviation. The alert mission does not require the advanced capabilities of the F-22, but there are no other operational Air Force fighter squadrons currently based at the F-22 locations in Alaska and Hawaii, so the alert mission falls to the F-22 units. Pilots and aircraft assigned to the alert mission cannot be used for any other purposes, including training. This limits opportunities for pilots to enhance air superiority skills. Without examining and implementing options to improve F-22 pilot training opportunities, the Air Force may be foregoing opportunities to improve its capability to address the high-end air superiority challenges it expects to face.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that the Air Force reassess its F-22 organizational structure to determine alternative approaches to organizing F-22 squadrons, and identify ways to increase F-22 pilot training opportunities for high-end air superiority missions. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_401"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_402","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nOver the past decade, the United States and the international community have sought to improve security in the DRC. In the eastern DRC, armed groups have committed severe human rights abuses, including sexual violence, and reportedly profit from the exploitation of \u201cconflict minerals\u201d\u2014 in particular, tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold, according to the United Nations. Congress included a provision in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act that, among other things, required the SEC to promulgate regulations regarding the use of conflict minerals from the DRC and adjoining countries. The SEC adopted these regulations in 2012. The act also included a provision for GAO to annually assess the SEC regulations' effectiveness in promoting peace and security and report on the rate of sexual violence in the DRC and adjoining countries.\nIn this report, GAO provides information about (1) companies' conflict minerals disclosures filed with the SEC in 2017 compared with disclosures filed in the prior 2 years and (2) the rate of sexual violence in the eastern DRC and adjoining countries published in 2017 and early 2018. GAO analyzed a generalizable random sample of SEC filings and interviewed relevant officials. GAO reviewed U.S., United Nations, and international organizations' reports; interviewed DRC officials, and other stakeholders; and conducted fieldwork in New York at the United Nations headquarters.\nGAO is not making any recommendations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO's review of companies' conflict minerals disclosures filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2017 found that, in general, they were similar to disclosures filed in the prior 2 years. In 2017, 1,165 companies filed conflict minerals disclosures\u2014about the same as in 2016 and 2015. Percentages of companies reporting country-of-origin inquiries in 2017 were also similar to the percentages from those 2 prior years. As a result of the inquiries they conducted, an estimated 53 percent of companies reported in 2017 whether the conflict minerals in their products came from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and adjoining countries\u2014similar to the estimated 49 percent in 2016 and 2015 but significantly higher than the estimate of 30 percent in 2014 (see figure). In their 2017 disclosure reports, many companies described actions they took to improve data collection processes, and most companies indicated some challenges in determining the country of origin.\nSimilar to the prior 2 years, almost all companies required to conduct due diligence, as a result of their country-of-origin inquiries, reported doing so. After conducting due diligence to determine the source and chain of custody of any conflict minerals used, an estimated 37 percent of these companies reported in 2017 that they were able to determine that their conflict minerals came from covered countries or from scrap or recycled sources, compared with 39 and 23 percent in 2016 and 2015, respectively. Four companies in GAO's sample declared their products \u201cDRC conflict-free,\u201d and of those, three included the required Independent Private Sector Audit report (IPSA), and one did not. In 2017, 16 companies filed an IPSA; 19 did so in 2016.\nGAO found information on the rate of sexual violence in the 2017 Uganda and Burundi Demographic and Health Surveys. For Uganda, 22 percent of women and 9 percent of men reported they had experienced sexual violence at least once in their lifetime. For Burundi, 23 percent of women and 6 percent of men reported they had experienced sexual violence at least once in their lifetime. The most recent information on the rate of sexual violence for eastern DRC and Rwanda is from 2016 and is discussed in our previous GAO reports.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_402"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_403","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 included provisions that VA and DOD jointly develop and implement electronic health record systems or capabilities and accelerate the exchange of health care information. The act also required that these systems be compliant with applicable interoperability standards. Further, the act established a joint Interagency Program Office to act as a single point of accountability for the efforts, with the function of implementing, by September 30, 2009, electronic health record systems that allow for full interoperability.\nThis testimony discusses GAO's previously reported findings on the establishment and evolution of the Interagency Program Office over the last decade. In developing this testimony, GAO summarized findings from its reports issued in 2008 through 2018, and information on the departments' actions in response to GAO's recommendations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nSince its establishment in 2008, the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Interagency Program Office has been involved in various approaches to increase health information interoperability. However, the office has not been effectively positioned to function as the single point of accountability for the departments' electronic health record system interoperability efforts. For example,\nBetween July 2008 and January 2010, GAO issued reports on VA's and DOD's efforts to set up the office, which highlighted steps the departments had taken, but also identified deficiencies, such as vacant leadership positions and a lack of necessary plans. GAO recommended that the departments improve management of their interoperability efforts by developing a project plan and results-oriented performance goals and measures.\nIn April 2009, the Interagency Program Office was assigned responsibility for establishing a lifetime electronic record for servicemembers and veterans, called the Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record. GAO reported in February 2011 that, among other things, the office had not developed and approved an integrated master schedule, a master program plan, or performance metrics for the initiative, as outlined in the office's charter. Accordingly, GAO recommended that the departments correct these deficiencies to strengthen their efforts to establish the Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record.\nIn March 2011, VA and DOD committed to jointly developing a new, common integrated electronic health record system and empowered the Interagency Program Office with increased authority, expanded responsibilities, and increased staffing levels for leading the integrated system effort. However, in February 2013, the departments abandoned their plan to develop the integrated system and stated that they would again pursue separate modernization efforts. In February 2014, GAO reported on this decision and recommended that VA and DOD take steps to better position the office to function as the single point of accountability for achieving interoperability between the departments' electronic health record systems.\nVA and DOD stated that they agreed with the above GAO recommendations. However, in several cases the departments' subsequent actions were incomplete and did not fully address all recommendations.\nIn June 2017 VA announced that it planned to acquire the same electronic health record system that DOD has been acquiring. GAO testified in June 2018 that a governance structure had been proposed that would be expected to leverage existing joint governance facilitated by the Interagency Program Office. At that time, VA's program officials had stated that the department's governance plans for the new program were expected to be finalized in October 2018. However, the officials have not yet indicated what role, if any, the Interagency Program Office is to have in the governance process. Ensuring that the role and responsibilities of the office are clearly defined within these governance plans is essential to VA successfully acquiring and implementing the same system as DOD.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that VA clearly define the role and responsibilities of the Interagency Program Office in the governance plans for acquisition of the department's new electronic health record syst","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_403"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_404","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSaving for retirement can be difficult. However, when participants lose their workplace retirement accounts when they change employers or participate in a workplace retirement plan abroad they can encounter additional challenges in securing adequate retirement savings. GAO was asked to review steps federal agencies might take to assist participants with these challenges.\nThis report examines key challenges U.S. participants face with: (1) unclaimed retirement accounts in the United States, and (2) complying with U.S. tax reporting requirements on their foreign retirement savings. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations, and reviewed selected tax treaties. GAO interviewed stakeholders in the United States and in Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom\u2014chosen because these locations host relatively large populations of U.S. individuals and have well-developed workplace retirement systems.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nPlan participants in the United States face challenges after they change jobs, including not receiving communications from their plan sponsor and being vulnerable to unforeseen tax consequences that can result in a loss of retirement savings. GAO previously reported that when participants leave savings in a plan after separating from a job, the onus is on them to update former employers with their new address and to respond to their former employer's communications. GAO found that although an employer may incur costs searching for separated participants, there are no standard practices for the frequency or method of conducting searches. GAO reported that from 2004 through 2013, over 25 million participants in workplace plans separated from an employer and left at least one retirement account behind, despite efforts of sponsors and regulators to help participants manage their accounts. Department of Labor (DOL) officials told GAO that some sponsors do not search for participants when disclosures are returned as undeliverable. DOL has issued guidance on searching for missing participants for some plans that are terminating, but guidance does not exist on what actions DOL expects ongoing plan sponsors to take to keep track of separated participants. A key element of DOL's mission is to protect the benefits of workers and families. However, without guidance on how to search for separated participants who leave behind retirement accounts, sponsors may choose to do little more than remove unclaimed accounts from the plan when possible, and workers may never recover these savings.\nStakeholders told GAO that U.S. individuals who participate in foreign workplace retirement plans face challenges reporting their retirement savings for tax purposes because of complex federal requirements governing the taxation of foreign retirement accounts and a lack of clear guidance on how to report these savings. For example, stakeholders told GAO it is not always clear to U.S individuals or their tax preparers how foreign workplace retirement plans should be reported to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the process for determining this can be complex, time-consuming, and costly. In the absence of clear guidance on how to correctly report these savings, U.S. individuals who participate in these plans may continue to run the risk of filing incorrect returns. Further, U.S. individuals in foreign retirement plans also face problems transferring retirement savings when they switch jobs. In the United States, transfers of retirement savings from one qualified plan to another are exempt from U.S. tax. However, foreign plans are generally not tax-qualified under the Internal Revenue Code, according to IRS officials, and such transfers could have tax consequences for U.S. individuals participating in foreign retirement plans. Officials from the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) told GAO that a change to the U.S. tax code could improve the tax treatment of transfers between foreign retirement plans that Treasury has already examined. Without action to address this issue, U.S. individuals may not consolidate their foreign retirement accounts or may have to pay higher U.S. taxes on transfers than taxpayers participating in qualified plans in the United States, threatening the ability of U.S. individuals to save for retirement abroad.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends Congress consider addressing taxation issues affecting the transfer of retirement assets between plans within the same foreign country. GAO is making seven recommendations, including that DOL issue guidance to help ongoing plan sponsors search for separated participants, and that IRS issue guidance to clarify how U.S. individuals should report foreign retirement savings to the IRS. The agencies generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. IRS disagreed with two of GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_404"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_405","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nTSA employs about 43,000 Transportation Security Officers (TSO) who screen over 2 million passengers and their property each day at airports in the United States. TSA allocates TSOs to airports using both a computer-based staffing model and information from airports intended to provide each airport with the optimum number of TSOs. In the spring of 2016, long screening checkpoint lines at certain U.S. airports raised questions about TSA's process for allocating TSOs to airports. This testimony addresses (1) how TSA monitors wait times and throughput, and (2) tools TSA uses to respond to increases in passenger wait times. This testimony is based on a report GAO issued in February, 2018: GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Uses Current Assumptions and Airport-Specific Data for Its Staffing Process and Monitors Passenger Wait Times Using Daily Operations Data . GAO-18-236 , Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2018. For that report, among other things, GAO analyzed TSA documentation and passenger wait time and throughput data.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn February 2018, GAO reported that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) uses data to monitor passenger wait times and throughput, the number of passengers that are screened at each airport checkpoint, on a daily basis and responds to increases. For example, TSA's Airport Operations Center (AOC) monitors daily wait times and passenger throughput from 28 airports that TSA officials say represent the majority of passenger throughput nationwide or are operationally significant. Furthermore, TSA officials at airports are required to report to the AOC when an event occurs--such as equipment malfunctions--that affects airport screening operations and results in wait times that are greater than 30 minutes in standard screening lanes. For its February 2018 report, GAO analyzed wait time data for the AOC-monitored airports for the period of January 2015 through May 2017 and found that TSA's reported wait times met its standard of less than 30 minutes in standard screening 99 percent of the time. Within that time frame, two airports accounted for the longest wait times in the spring of 2016. TSA officials also identified several tools, such as passenger screening canines, that they reported using to respond to increases in passenger wait times at these airports.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making any recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_405"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_406","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe crisis in Flint, Michigan, brought increased attention to lead in drinking water infrastructure. Lead in drinking water primarily comes from corrosion of service lines connecting the water main to a house or building. In 1991, EPA issued the Lead and Copper Rule that required water systems to conduct a \u201cmaterials inventory\u201d of lead service lines. In light of the events in Flint, EPA sent a letter to all states in February 2016 encouraging them to work with water systems to publicly post the materials inventory, along with any additional updated maps or inventories of lead service linesactions the rule does not require.\nA House Committee report accompanying a bill for the Department of the Interior, Environment and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, includes a provision for GAO to review lead service lines. This report examines (1) what is known about the number of existing lead service lines among states and water systems and (2) states' responses to EPA's February 2016 request to work with water systems to publicize inventories of lead service lines and any steps EPA has taken to follow up on these responses. GAO reviewed existing studies of lead service lines, reviewed the websites of the 100 largest water systems, and interviewed EPA officials in headquarters and its 10 regional offices.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe total number of lead service lines is unknown and while national, state, and local estimates exist, approaches used to count lead service lines vary. A 2016 American Water Works Association study estimated that nationally there were 6.1 million lead service lines, but the study has significant sampling limitations and, as a result, likely does not accurately reflect the total number of lead service lines nationwide. In addition, at least two statesMassachusetts and Washingtonpublished reports with estimates of lead service lines and reported 22,023 and 1,000-2,000 lead service lines as of 2016 and 2017, respectively. Certain water systems also have estimates, such as the approximately 7 percent of publicly owned lead service lines out of the area's total number of service lines cited by a representative for the system serving Cincinnati, Ohio and surrounding areas, as of May 2018.\nWhile most states informed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that they intend to fulfill the agency's request to publicize inventories of lead service lines, EPA has identified potential challenges to these efforts. Of the approximately 43 states that responded that they would fulfill EPA's request, almost all (39) reported to EPA that, although they had encouraged water systems to publicize inventories, few systems had completed these actions. GAO found in January 2018 that, of the 100 largest water systems, 12 had publicized information on the inventory of lead service lines. According to EPA, among challenges in conducting inventories of lead service lines and publicizing information about lead service lines were concerns about posting on public websites information about lead service lines on private property; and a lack of records about the locations of lead service lines. EPA told GAO the agency was focused on state compliance with drinking water rules, and not following up with information on how states could address the challenges cited. By sharing information with all states about the approaches that some states and water systems are using to successfully identify and publicize information about lead service lines, including responses to potential challenges, EPA could encourage states to be more transparent to the public and support the agency's objectives for safe drinking water.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that EPA share information about the successful approaches states and water systems use to identify and publicize locations of lead service lines with all states. EPA agreed with the recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_406"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_407","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOD uses both military depots and contractors to maintain its complex weapon systems and equipment. Recognizing the depots' key role and the risk of overreliance on contractors, section 2464 of title 10 of the U.S. Code requires DOD to maintain a core logistics capability that is government-owned and operated, involving a combination of personnel, facilities, equipment, processes, and technology. Section 2464 requires DOD to provide a Biennial Core Report to Congress that addresses 10 reporting elements, including information on its core capability requirements and projected workload for the next fiscal year.\nSection 2464 includes a provision that GAO review DOD's Biennial Core Reports for compliance and completeness. In reviewing the 2018 Biennial Core Report, GAO assessed the extent to which DOD's report (1) addressed the 10 reporting elements required by section 2464(d), and (2) is complete. GAO reviewed and analyzed relevant legislation, DOD guidance, and the 2018 Biennial Core Report, and met with DOD and military service officials to discuss the processes used to develop the information in DOD's 2018 Biennial Core Report.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn its 2018 Biennial Core Report, the Department of Defense (DOD) addressed 8 of 10 reporting elements. Specifically, DOD reported, by military service, its:\ndepot maintenance workload required to sustain core maintenance capability requirements, based on contingency planning scenarios;\nprojected fiscal year 2019 depot maintenance workloads; and\nprojected fiscal year 2019 shortfalls (i.e., insufficient workload to sustain the required level of capability) and rationales and mitigations for those shortfalls.\nThe Army reported a projected workload for fiscal year 2019 that would meet about 84 percent of its identified core capability\u2014a shortfall of 2.9 million direct labor hours (see figure). The Army identified numerous reasons\u2014such as newly established software depot maintenance requirements\u2014for its shortfalls. Furthermore, the Army presented mitigation plans for its shortfalls, such as moving software-related work from contractor to military sources.\nThe other services did not report overall shortfalls, but some services reported shortfalls associated with specific types of work. For example, the Air Force reported a shortage associated with the repair of tactical missiles. As a mitigation plan, the Air Force stated that it plans to use workload associated with repairing strategic missiles to maintain this capability, since the electronics on the two types of missiles are very similar and require the same maintenance skill set.\nDOD did not address two required reporting elements\u2014progress in implementing mitigation plans from the 2016 biennial core report, and the degree to which projected workload reported in the 2016 biennial core report was executed. According to DOD officials, changes in its guidance and processes for developing the 2018 report resulted in the 2016 and 2018 reports not being directly comparable. However, DOD officials stated that they plan to address these two elements in the 2020 Biennial Core Report.\nDOD's 2018 Biennial Core Report is generally complete, in that it lacks obvious errors and aligns with supporting information provided by the services. DOD's concerted efforts to implement better guidance and procedures\u2014in part, according to DOD officials, by implementing GAO's prior recommendations from 2012, 2014, and 2016\u2014assisted in improving the completeness of the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_407"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_408","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nResearch has shown that hospital closures can affect rural residents' access to health care services and that certain rural residents\u2014particularly those who are elderly and low income\u2014may be especially affected by rural hospital closures.\nThis report describes (1) how HHS supports and monitors rural hospitals' financial viability and rural residents' access to hospital services and (2) the number and characteristics of rural hospitals that have closed in recent years and what is known about the factors that have contributed to those closures.\nGAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from HHS and HHS-funded research centers; analyzed data compiled by HHS and an HHS-funded research center, with a focus on 2013 through 2017\u2014the most recent year with complete data; reviewed relevant literature; and interviewed experts and stakeholders. GAO identified hospitals as rural if they met the Federal Office of Rural Health Policy's definition of rural.\nGAO provided a draft of this report to HHS for comment. The Department provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) administers multiple payment policies and programs that provide financial support for rural hospitals and funds research centers to monitor closures and study access. Among the payment policies administered by HHS are special payment designations for rural hospitals in which rural hospitals that meet certain criteria receive higher reimbursements for hospital services than they otherwise would receive under Medicare's standard payment methodology. HHS-funded research centers monitor rural hospitals' profitability and other financial indicators, and study access to facilities and specific services. HHS uses the results of monitoring activities to inform future areas of research and disseminate information.\nGAO's analysis of data from HHS and an HHS-funded research center shows that 64 rural hospitals closed from 2013 through 2017. This represents approximately 3 percent of all the rural hospitals in 2013 and more than twice the number of closures of the prior 5-year period. GAO's analysis further shows that rural hospital closures disproportionately occurred in the South, among for-profit hospitals, and among hospitals that received the Medicare Dependent Hospital payment designation, one of the special Medicare payment designations for rural hospitals.\nAccording to literature GAO reviewed and stakeholders GAO interviewed, rural hospital closures were generally preceded and caused by financial distress. In particular, rural hospitals that closed typically had negative margins that made it difficult to cover their fixed costs. According to these sources, financial distress has been exacerbated in recent years by multiple factors, including the decrease in patients seeking inpatient care and across-the-board Medicare payment reductions. In contrast, according to the literature GAO reviewed and stakeholders GAO interviewed, rural hospitals located in states that increased Medicaid eligibility and enrollment experienced fewer closures.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_408"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_409","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn December 2014, Congress enacted federal IT acquisition reform legislation that included provisions related to ongoing federal data center consolidation efforts. OMB's Federal Chief Information Officer launched DCOI to build on prior data center consolidation efforts; improve federal data centers' performance; and establish goals for inventory closures, cost savings and avoidances, and optimization performance.\nThe 2014 legislation also included a provision for GAO to annually review agencies' data center inventories and strategies. Accordingly, GAO reviewed agencies' data center closures to date and plans for further closures; evaluated agencies' progress in achieving consolidation savings and described their plans for future savings; and assessed agencies' progress against OMB's data center optimization targets. To do so, GAO assessed the 24 DCOI agencies' data center inventories as of August 2017; reviewed their reported cost savings documentation; evaluated their data center optimization strategic plans; and assessed 22 agencies' progress against OMB's established optimization targets. Two agencies did not have a basis to report planned optimization milestones.\nOMB and the 24 DCOI agencies provided mixed responses to GAO's findings on the progress made towards initiative goals. GAO continues to believe that implementation of the recommendations made previously will help the agencies meet OMB's targets for cost savings and optimization of performance.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe 24 agencies participating in the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Data Center Optimization Initiative (DCOI) reported mixed progress toward achieving OMB's goals for closing data centers by September 2018. Over half of the agencies reported that they had either already met, or planned to meet, all of their OMB-assigned goals by the deadline. This would result in the closure of 7,221 of the 12,062 centers that agencies reported in August 2017. However, 4 agencies reported that they do not have plans to meet all of their assigned goals and 2 agencies are working with OMB to establish revised targets.\nWith regard to agencies' progress in achieving cost savings, 20 agencies reported, as of August 2017, that they had achieved $1.04 billion in cost savings for fiscal years 2016 and 2017. In addition, the agencies' DCOI strategic plans identify an additional $0.58 billion in planned savings\u2014for a total of $1.62 billion for fiscal years 2016 through 2018. This total is approximately $1.12 billion less than OMB's DCOI savings goal of $2.7 billion (see figure). This shortfall is the result of 12 agencies reporting less in planned cost savings and avoidances in their DCOI strategic plans, as compared to the savings targets established for them by OMB.\nThe 24 agencies reported limited progress against OMB's five data center optimization targets for server utilization and automated monitoring, energy metering, power usage effectiveness, facility utilization, and virtualization. As of August 2017, 1 agency had met four targets, 1 agency had met three targets, 6 agencies had met either one or two targets, and 14 agencies reported meeting none of the targets. Further, as of August 2017, most agencies were not planning to meet OMB's fiscal year 2018 optimization targets. Specifically, 4 agencies reported plans to meet all of their applicable targets by the end of fiscal year 2018; 14 reported plans to meet some of the targets; and 4 reported that they do not plan to meet any targets.\nIn 2016 and 2017, GAO made a number of recommendations to OMB and the 24 DCOI agencies to help improve the reporting of data center-related cost savings and to achieve optimization targets. As of March 2018, 74 of these 81 recommendations had not been fully addressed.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_409"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_410","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe tactical herbicide Agent Orange was first produced in 1964, and some 12 million gallons were shipped from U.S. ports to Southeast Asia from 1965 to 1970. DOD suspended its use in 1970 and incinerated remaining stockpiles at sea in 1977. Congress has expressed long-standing interest in the effects of Agent Orange exposure.\nThe House report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 included a provision that GAO review the government's handling of Agent Orange on Guam. This report examines (1) information the federal government has about the procurement, distribution, use, and disposition of Agent Orange; (2) DOD and VA efforts to make information about where Agent Orange and its components were tested and stored available; and (3) challenges associated with Agent Orange testing. GAO reviewed agency policies, documents, and available archival records that GAO identified; interviewed DOD, VA, and other agency officials; and met with a non-generalizable sample of 38 veterans and a veterans service organization.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAvailable shipment documentation indicates that nearly all of the Agent Orange procured was either used in U.S. military operations in Southeast Asia, used for testing, damaged, or destroyed. However, some records are incomplete, such as shipment documentation and logbooks that identify ports where vessels stopped on the way to Southeast Asia. GAO obtained and reviewed shipment documentation for over 12.1 million of the 13.9 million gallons of Agent Orange procured by the Department of Defense (DOD). GAO reviewed logbooks for 96 percent (152 of 158) of those shipments and identified that vessels stopped at various ports on the way to Southeast Asia, including at least one vessel carrying Agent Orange that stopped at Guam. While the logbooks GAO reviewed identify when vessels left various ports as they traveled to and from Vietnam, they do not show whether and how much cargo was loaded or unloaded at those ports.\nDOD's official list of herbicide testing and storage locations outside of Vietnam that is posted on the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) website is inaccurate and incomplete. For example, the list lacks clarity in descriptive information and omits both testing and storage locations and additional time periods covered by testing events. Also, the list has not been updated in over a decade, though DOD and VA have obtained reports on its shortcomings since 2006. Both DOD and VA communicate with veterans in response to inquiries about Agent Orange, but some veterans GAO met with expressed confusion regarding how to obtain information on potential exposure. DOD officials acknowledged this confusion and stated that veterans are contacting multiple agencies to obtain such information. However, DOD and VA have not established a formal process for coordinating on how best to communicate information to veterans and the public regarding the presence of Agent Orange outside of Vietnam. Without a reliable list with complete and accurate information and a formal process for DOD and VA to coordinate on communicating this information, veterans and the public do not have quality information about the full extent of locations where Agent Orange was present and where exposure could potentially have occurred.\nChallenges exist with testing for Agent Orange today due to degradation of the herbicide's two chemical components and a potential for sources of contamination other than the herbicide. According to scientific research, the half-life (average time for components to decrease by half of the original amount) of Agent Orange's two chemical components\u2014n-butyl 2,4-D and n-butyl 2,4,5-T\u2014 in soil can range from several days to many months, depending on conditions. The suggested half-life of the dioxin 2,3,7,8-TCDD\u2014a by-product of the 2,4,5-T manufacturing process\u2014is much longer, but there are multiple sources of dioxins, including the burning of wood and waste. DOD and the U.S. and Guam Environmental Protection Agencies are testing for the acid form of the components of Agent Orange at Andersen Air Force Base on Guam. While acknowledging the low probability of conclusively identifying the components of Agent Orange on Guam, DOD has made a decision to move forward with testing to address veterans' and the public's concerns, and it expects to complete the updates for the sampling and analysis plan, field sampling, analysis, and reporting in early 2019.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making six recommendations, including that DOD develop a process for updating its list of Agent Orange testing and storage locations, and that DOD and VA develop a process for coordinating the communication of information on where Agent Orange was known to have been present. DOD concurred with four recommendations. VA concurred with one recommendation and non-concurred with one recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_410"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_411","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nVA provides health care services to almost 9 million veterans and their families and relies on its health information system\u2014VistA\u2014to do so. However, the system is more than 30 years old, is costly to maintain, and does not support interoperability with DOD and private health care providers. Since 2001, VA has pursued multiple efforts to modernize the system. In June 2017, VA announced plans to acquire the same system\u2014the Cerner system\u2014that DOD is implementing.\nGAO was asked to summarize preliminary observations from its ongoing review of VistA and the department's efforts to acquire a new system to replace VistA. Specifically, the statement summarizes preliminary observations regarding (1) costs incurred for the system and related activities during the last 3 fiscal years; (2) key components that comprise VistA and are to be replaced; and (3) actions VA has taken to prepare for its transition to the Cerner system. The statement also discusses common factors critical to the success of IT acquisitions that GAO has previously identified.\nGAO reviewed its prior reports on the VistA modernization and on critical success factors of major IT acquisitions. GAO also reviewed records of obligations for VistA for fiscal years 2015, 2016, and 2017; analyzed VA documentation that describes the scope of VistA, and reviewed program documentation.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAccording to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the Veterans Health Information Systems and Technology Architecture (VistA) and related costs, as approximated by funding obligations, were approximately $1.1 billion, $899 million, and $946 million in fiscal years 2015, 2016 and 2017, respectively. These obligations total about $3.0 billion over 3 years to support the system. As identified by the department, the obligations were to cover the costs for three programs (VistA Evolution, Interoperability, and Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record Health) and other supporting investments for activities such as networks and infrastructure sustainment. The following table provides a summary of the total VistA and VistA-related obligations.\nGAO's preliminary results indicate that VA is working to define VistA and identify system components to be replaced by the new system. However, according to VA officials, there is no single information source that fully defines the scope of VistA. This situation is partly due to differences in VistA at various facilities. In the absence of a complete definition of VistA, program officials have taken a number of steps to define the system's scope and identify the components that the new system will replace. These steps have included conducting analyses, performing preliminary site (medical facility) assessments, and planning for a detailed assessment of each site where the new system will be deployed.\nSince VA announced in June 2017 that the department would acquire the same electronic health record system as the Department of Defense (DOD), GAO's preliminary results indicate that VA has begun taking actions to prepare for the transition from VistA. These actions have included standardizing VistA, clarifying the department's approach to interoperability, establishing governance for the new program and the framework for joint governance with DOD, and preparing initial program plans. VA is early in its effort to transition from VistA to the Cerner system and the department's actions are ongoing.\nIn 2011, GAO reported on nine common factors critical to the success of major IT acquisitions. Such factors include ensuring active engagement of senior officials with stakeholders and having qualified, experienced program staff. These critical success factors can serve as a model of best practices that VA could apply to enhance the likelihood that the acquisition of a new electronic health record system will be successfully achieved.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_411"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_412","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nHUD has encouraged PHAs to balance resident safety with the housing needs of persons with criminal records when administering its rental assistance programs. PHAs are responsible for screening program applicants. The HUD OIG and the FBI implement the Fugitive Felon Initiative to identify and apprehend wanted persons receiving rental assistance.\nGAO was asked to review HUD's criminal history policies and the Fugitive Felon Initiative. This report examines (1) federal requirements for PHAs' criminal history policies, (2) HUD guidance and monitoring of these requirements, and (3) implementation of the Fugitive Felon Initiative. GAO reviewed federal statutes and regulations and interviewed officials from HUD, the HUD OIG, and the FBI; analyzed Fugitive Felon Initiative data from 2013 through 2017; and interviewed staff at a nongeneralizable sample of 10 PHAs (selected based on size and other factors).\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFederal requirements for public housing agencies. Federal statutes and Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulations require public housing agencies (PHA) to conduct criminal history checks on individuals applying for rental assistance under HUD's public housing and Housing Choice Voucher programs and deny assistance for six types of offenses. Mandatory denials include convictions for producing methamphetamine on the premises of federally-assisted housing and lifetime sex offender registrants. Otherwise, PHAs generally have discretion in establishing their criminal history policies and may deny assistance for other offenses or factor in mitigating circumstances.\nHUD monitoring of public housing agencies. From 2011 through 2016, HUD issued new guidance to PHAs on criminal history policies, but these changes are not reflected in HUD's program guidebooks for PHAs. These guidebooks serve as key reference tools, but have not been updated in over 15 years. Updating them would help HUD more accurately communicate its criminal history policies. While HUD officials said their current efforts to update the guidebooks will reflect recent criminal history policy notices, documentation provided by the agency on these updates did not specifically address criminal history guidance. In addition, HUD's compliance reviews of high-risk PHAs do not address some criminal history policy requirements, such as the prohibition on using arrest records as the basis for determining eligibility. Further, these reviews are largely limited to examining PHAs' written policies and do not cover how PHAs implement those policies. More comprehensive compliance reviews would improve HUD's ability to identify areas of noncompliance with criminal history policy requirements.\nFugitive Felon Initiative. From fiscal years 2013 through 2017, the HUD Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) shared data through the Fugitive Felon Initiative, which led to the apprehension of more than 1,200 wanted persons who may have lived in HUD-assisted housing. However, GAO found that the HUD OIG had not defined its regional office responsibilities under the initiative and that four of the seven HUD OIG regions did not participate from 2012 through 2016. The HUD OIG revised its procedures for the initiative in April 2018 to include regional office responsibilities, such as coordinating with law enforcement agencies. According to HUD OIG officials, regional offices are now required to coordinate with law enforcement agencies on a priority list of investigative leads, which include warrants for violent felonies, sexual assault, and narcotics distribution. However, the HUD OIG does not plan to assess regional office implementation of several requirements. Collecting and assessing more comprehensive information on regional office activities would help the HUD OIG determine the extent to which regions are undertaking required activities. In addition, the HUD OIG and the FBI have not consistently shared information on the initiative's results\u2014such as apprehension statistics and program savings\u2014which could help evaluate the effectiveness of the initiative. Further, the HUD OIG's and the FBI's current activities to implement the initiative differ in some areas from the agreed-upon responsibilities listed in their 2012 memorandum of understanding. Updating the memorandum to reflect current responsibilities under the initiative could help improve collaboration between the agencies and improve implementation.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making seven recommendations, including that HUD update PHA guidebooks and improve monitoring procedures; that the HUD OIG assess more comprehensive information on the implementation of the Fugitive Felon Initiative; and that the HUD OIG and the FBI consistently share information on the initiative's results and update their memorandum of understanding to reflect current responsibilities. HUD and the FBI generally agreed. The HUD OIG did not agree with two of our recommendations. GAO maintains the recommendations, as discussed in the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_412"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_413","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nA severe GMD or HEMP event could potentially have significant impacts\u2014 including power outages\u2014on the nation's electric grid, which could affect other sectors that depend on electricity, such as communications. In response, NERC created two regulatory standards requiring certain U.S. and Canadian suppliers to assess their vulnerability to GMD and take appropriate steps in response.\nGAO was asked to review electricity industry actions to prepare for and mitigate electromagnetic risks. This report examines, among other things, (1) to what extent U.S. and Canadian electricity suppliers have identified information about GMD and HEMP effects on the grid, (2) what steps selected U.S. and Canadian suppliers have taken to protect against GMD and HEMP, and (3) what opportunities exist for U.S. suppliers to recover costs for protecting against GMD and HEMP.\nGAO examined government and industry studies and interviewed federal and industry officials about potential GMD and HEMP effects on grid infrastructure; reviewed regulatory standards, monitoring processes, and NERC compliance audit data from April 2015 through August 2017; reviewed federal regulations and interviewed state regulators on cost recovery issues; and interviewed officials from a nongeneralizable sample of 13 U.S. and Canada electricity suppliers, selected based on factors such as GMD experience and preparation for GMD and HEMP events.\nGAO provided a draft of this report to five federal agencies and NERC. Technical comments provided were incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nU.S. and Canadian electricity suppliers\u2014electricity generation and transmission owners and operators\u2014have identified information on the potential effects of a severe geomagnetic disturbance (GMD), resulting from a solar storm, but have identified less information about the potential effects of a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP), resulting from the detonation of a nuclear device, on the electric grid. There is general agreement that more research is needed on both GMD and HEMP. Government and industry have publicly reported on the potential impacts of GMD on the grid. For example, one study identified two main risks: (1) potential voltage instability, causing power system collapse and blackouts; and (2) possible damage to key system components. However, these studies do not address the unique aspects of individual suppliers' networks. Recognizing this, 11 of the 13 selected suppliers GAO contacted said they had assessed their network vulnerability; of these 11, 6 expected GMD effects to be relatively small. In contrast, Department of Energy (DOE) and industry officials told GAO that information on HEMP effects is limited in that suppliers lack key information to fully understand HEMP effects on their networks. Historically, study of HEMP effects focused on impacts to military equipment rather than the commercial electric grid. Recently, DOE and industry began research to better understand HEMP effects. Of the 11 suppliers who responded to GAO about their HEMP efforts, 3 reported having studied the impact of HEMP on their networks and 2 of the 11 had integrated, or planned to integrate, HEMP-resistant features into new control centers.\nOf the 13 selected suppliers GAO contacted, 10 reported making technological and operational improvements to enhance overall network reliability that also provided some protection against GMD and HEMP risks. For example, suppliers reported making technological improvements such as replacement of some older transformers and unprotected control centers. As of May 2017, all 13 suppliers stated they had complied with a GMD regulatory standard issued by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)\u2014the federally designated regulatory authority responsible for developing and enforcing reliability standards\u2013-to develop operating procedures to mitigate GMD effects. A second regulatory standard\u2014which is to be implemented in phases through 2022\u2014will generally require suppliers to further assess their vulnerability to GMD.\nSelected U.S. suppliers told GAO that costs they have incurred to protect against GMD and HEMP have been relatively small so far and they expect to recover those costs through customer rates. Suppliers could face future increased costs depending on corrective actions needed to comply with the second GMD regulatory standard. Federal and state regulators indicated that regulated U.S. suppliers' costs for protecting against GMD are generally recoverable through customer rates, but recovery is less certain for protection against HEMP because less is known about HEMP risks. Further, some suppliers could face challenges to cost recovery. Specifically, independent owners of power plants\u2014those that sell power in wholesale electricity markets and are not part of an integrated utility\u2014must recover reliability improvement costs through their sales of electricity and are not assured of cost recovery; federal regulators told GAO they are aware this could be a challenge for these independent owners.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_413"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_414","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nBetween fiscal years 2005 and 2016, Congress annually appropriated between $2.5 to $9.6 billion in MILCON funding for the active component of the U.S. military to use for projects worldwide. Reliable project construction cost estimates are of great importance, since those estimates drive these appropriations.\nHouse Report 114-537 accompanying a proposed bill authorizing national defense activities for fiscal year 2017 included a provision for GAO to report on DOD's MILCON cost estimating. This report examines the extent to which (1) the active component obligated and expended the MILCON appropriations received during fiscal years 2005-2016, (2) the active component reprogrammed MILCON appropriations during fiscal years 2010 through 2016, and (3) DOD's MILCON cost estimates are reliable for selected projects and DOD's guidance for developing estimates fully incorporates the steps needed for developing reliable estimates. GAO analyzed the active components' MILCON execution data and reviewed DOD's guidance for cost estimating and compared it with the best practices identified in GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide .\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nDuring fiscal years 2005 through 2016, Congress appropriated about $66 billion in military construction funds (MILCON) to the active duty Army, Navy, and Air Force (referred to as the active component) for projects. As of September 30, 2016, the active component had obligated all but about $5.1 billion and expended all but about $11 billion of those funds. Of the $5.1 billion remaining unobligated, about $4.6 billion was still available to be obligated because MILCON appropriations are generally available for new obligations for 5 years. According to Department of Defense (DOD) officials, available but unobligated amounts no longer needed may be either taken back by Congress or reprogrammed to other MILCON projects that the active component identifies as needing additional funding.\nDuring fiscal years 2010 through 2016, the active component reprogrammed about $1.6 billion in MILCON appropriations to fund emergency projects, projects that were authorized but did not receive specific appropriations, and projects needing additional funding. Of this amount, the Army reprogrammed about $789 million; the Navy, about $535 million; and the Air Force, about $295 million.\nDOD's guidance does not fully incorporate the steps needed for developing reliable estimates and the estimates for three projects that GAO reviewed were not reliable. Specifically, two of the three high-value projects GAO examined experienced a more than 30-percent increase from the initial cost estimates submitted to Congress. GAO determined that DOD cost estimators did not follow all the best practices associated with the four characteristics\u2014comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible\u2014of a reliable estimate for these projects. GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide identifies 12 steps that, if used, are more likely to result in reliable and valid cost estimates. However, as shown below, DOD's construction guidance\u2014the Unified Facilities Criteria\u2014does not include all of these steps. Until DOD incorporates these steps, DOD and congressional decision-makers may not have reliable estimates to inform their decisions regarding appropriations and the oversight of projects.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DOD ensure that its cost estimating guidance fully incorporate the steps needed for developing reliable cost estimates. DOD partially concurred with GAO's recommendation and stated that it will issue revised cost guidance in fiscal year 2019 that more fully incorporates those steps that would benefit the military construction program.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_414"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_415","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nRecent data breaches have highlighted the importance of ensuring the security of health information, including Medicare beneficiary data. Such data are created, stored, and used by a wide variety of entities, such as health care providers, insurance companies, financial institutions, researchers, and others.\nGAO was asked to conduct a study of CMS efforts to protect Medicare beneficiary data accessed by external entities. GAO's objectives were to (1) identify the major external entities that collect, store, and process Medicare fee-for-service beneficiary data; (2) determine whether requirements for the protection of Medicare beneficiary data align with federal guidance; and (3) assess CMS oversight of the implementation of those requirements. GAO analyzed information about how external entities access data, reviewed CMS documentation on who they share data with, compared federal standards with CMS security requirements for external entities, and analyzed results of independent security reviews. GAO also interviewed CMS officials about their oversight activities.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) shares Medicare beneficiary data with three major types of external entities: (1) Medicare Administrative Contractors (MAC) that perform processing and distribution functions that support the payment of Medicare benefits; (2) research organizations (researchers) that use Medicare beneficiary data to study how health care services are provided to beneficiaries; and (3) qualified public or private entities that use claims data to evaluate the performance of Medicare service providers and equipment suppliers.\nCMS has developed requirements for implementing security controls that align with federal guidance for two of the three types of external entities that access Medicare beneficiary data. While CMS has developed guidance for MACs and qualified entities, it has not developed equivalent guidance for researchers. Researchers must adhere to broad governmentwide standards, but are not given guidance on which specific controls to implement. According to CMS, the lack of specific guidance gives the researchers more flexibility to independently assess their security risks and determine which controls are appropriate to implement; however, without providing comprehensive, risk-based security guidance to researchers, CMS increases the risk that external entities possessing agency data may not have applied security controls that meet CMS standards.\nAdditionally, CMS has established an oversight program for the security of MAC data, but has not established a corresponding program to oversee security implementation by researchers and qualified entities. Without effective oversight measures in place for researchers and qualified entities, CMS cannot fully ensure that the security of Medicare beneficiary data is being adequately protected. Regarding MACs, although they are subject to two types of independent annual assessments, which have regularly identified weaknesses in their implementation of security controls, the weaknesses that have been assessed as low-risk have not been consistently tracked in the CMS finding tracking system. Without more consistent tracking of these low-risk weaknesses, it may be difficult for CMS to determine if all weaknesses are being addressed in a timely manner. Examples of categories of recurring weaknesses that have been identified during annual assessments are listed in the table.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that CMS develop additional guidance for researchers on implementing security controls required by CMS, consistently track results of independent assessments, and provide oversight of researchers and qualified entities. CMS concurred with GAO's three recommendations and described actions it has planned or taken to address them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_415"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_416","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Presidential Policy Directive on United States Cyber Incident Coordination states that significant cyber incidents are occurring with increasing frequency impacting public and private infrastructure in the United States. Section 1648 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 included a provision that DOD develop a comprehensive plan for CYBERCOM to support civil authorities in responding to cyberattacks by foreign powers against the United States. Section 1648 also included a provision that GAO review DOD's plan.\nThis review assesses the extent to which DOD's Section 1648 report addressed the statutorily required submission elements. To conduct this work, GAO assessed DOD's Section 1648 report against the elements outlined in the statute. GAO also discussed the Section 1648 report with DOD policy, Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commands, and military service officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) did not develop a comprehensive plan for U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM); instead, the department submitted a report consisting of a collection of documents that fully addressed two of the six statutorily required elements; partially addressed three elements; and did not address the sixth element on DOD training activities.\nLegend:\n\u25cb Did not address: Submission does not include required element.\nGAO also found that, in addition to not addressing the training element in the report, DOD had not ensured that staff are trained as required by the Presidential Policy Directive on United States Cyber Incident Coordination or DOD's Significant Cyber Incident Coordination Procedures, which were included DOD's Section 1648 report. Taking action to improve these areas should help DOD sustain progress it has already made. With the President's decision to elevate CYBERCOM to a unified combatant command, such actions will also help as DOD continues to plan to support civil authorities in response to a cyber incident and where CYBERCOM has a significant role.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO has previously recommended that DOD take actions on elements of the Section 1648 report that were partially addressed. GAO is making two new recommendations that DOD update cyber incident coordination training and maintain a list of officials trained in the National Incident Management System. DOD concurred with maintaining a list of trained officials and partially concurred on updating cyber training. GAO continues to believe the updating recommendation is warranted.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_416"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_417","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2016 contains provisions for GAO to review DOD's plans to (1) improve the experience of beneficiaries who receive care through military hospitals and clinics or from civilian providers and (2) reduce variation in the quality of care.\nIn this report, GAO examines (1) measures DOD uses to assess the quality of direct and purchased care, and (2) the extent to which DOD has established performance standards related to the measures and corrective action requirements for providers who do not meet those standards.\nGAO reviewed the measures in DOD's Core Dashboard for direct care and Purchased Care Dashboard for purchased care. It also reviewed DOD documents and reports to Congress, and interviewed MHS officials, including officials from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. GAO also compared the quality measures DOD uses to those used in Medicare and by private insurers, which have been vetted by multiple stakeholders. GAO assessed DOD's use of performance standards and corrective action requirements in the context of federal internal control standards.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2016 (NDAA 2016) directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to align its measures of health care quality used in the Military Health System (MHS) to improve beneficiary experience and reduce variation in the quality of care. GAO reviewed the quality measures DOD identified in March 2017 in response to the NDAA 2016; DOD senior leadership tracks these measures on dashboards to gauge progress on MHS strategic goals. GAO found that DOD does not use a common set of measures on its dashboards to assess the quality of care provided by either military hospitals and clinics\u2014known as direct care\u2014or networks of civilian hospitals and other providers, known as purchased care. (See figure.) As a result, DOD's senior leadership has limited information on the extent to which MHS beneficiaries receive consistently high quality care across the MHS.\nFurthermore, for both direct and purchased care, DOD uses measures on its dashboards that track a limited range of quality care areas and medical conditions compared to the measures adopted by Medicare and by private health insurers. For example, whereas civilian hospitals report to Medicare information on 11 measures of patients' self-reported experience in hospitals, Military hospitals report only 1 such measure. By using a limited range of quality measures, DOD may not detect key quality issues. Further, when selecting quality measures, the MHS does not prioritize using common measures across direct and purchased care or expanding the range of measures it uses.\nGAO also found that for direct care DOD has established performance standards and corrective action requirements for military hospitals or clinics that do not meet those standards in direct care. The performance standards indicate the level of performance providers should meet on the various quality measures DOD tracks on its dashboards, and the corrective action requirements instruct providers to take steps to improve care. However, for purchased care, DOD has not established similar performance standards for individual providers. Without consistent performance standards and corrective action requirements, DOD is limited in its ability to address variation in the quality of care delivered and help ensure that its beneficiaries receive consistent high quality care across the MHS.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nThe MHS should (1) prioritize, as appropriate, selecting quality measures common for both direct and purchased care that expand the range of quality areas covered by the measures and (2) establish consistent performance standards and corrective action requirements for direct and purchased care providers. DOD concurred with both recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_417"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_418","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) budgets about $25 billion annually to operate and support its installations. GAO has designated DOD support infrastructure management as a high-risk area since 1997, in part because DOD has needed to reduce its installation support costs. In 2013, Congress authorized the military services to enter into IGSAs with local and state governments to receive installation services, if an agreement will provide financial benefits or enhance mission effectiveness. As of July 2018, the military services had approved 45 IGSAs at 33 installations.\nIn this report, GAO, among other objectives, evaluated the extent to which the military services have (1) realized and monitored the benefits from IGSAs and (2) supported the use of IGSAs and monitored whether installations are evaluating opportunities to use IGSAs.\nGAO reviewed the IGSA statute and policies and procedures; evaluated a nongeneralizable sample of 8 IGSAs, selected based on factors including the military service involved, the amount of expected financial benefits, and the length of time in place; compared the services' processes and actions against standards for internal control; and interviewed service, installation, and local government officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nBased on analysis of 8 selected intergovernmental support agreements (IGSAs) and interviews with officials, GAO found that the military services have realized financial and nonfinancial benefits from using IGSAs with local or state governments to obtain installation services such as waste removal, grounds maintenance, and stray animal control.\nFinancial benefits. Of the 8 selected IGSAs, 5 resulted in cost savings, in which the actual cost of each IGSA during its first year was lower than the expected cost of a contract the installation had previously used to obtain the installation service. For example, Moody Air Force Base realized an estimated cost savings of $270,000 by using an IGSA for water and wastewater treatment services, versus continuing to obtain this service via contract. Installation officials stated that the other 3 selected IGSAs resulted in cost avoidances, in which the installations used the IGSAs to obtain a service they were not previously paying for at a lower cost than other alternatives.\nNonfinancial benefits. According to officials from all four services, IGSAs have provided nonfinancial benefits such as enhanced mission effectiveness and readiness, reduced administrative time, and improved relationships with local communities.\nHowever, the military services are not fully monitoring benefits being realized from implemented IGSAs because they have not established formal processes to do so. For example, Navy and Marine Corps officials stated that they are not monitoring the financial and nonfinancial performance of implemented IGSAs in part because they are in the early stages of using IGSAs. The Air Force monitors some information on realized IGSA financial benefits, but this information is not complete because reporting by installations is voluntary. Developing and documenting processes to monitor any realized benefits of implemented IGSAs would provide the services with useful information on IGSA performance as they make decisions on devoting resources to developing and implementing these agreements in other locations.\nThe military services have developed various approaches for supporting the use of IGSAs to reduce costs or enhance mission effectiveness. For example, the services have issued policies and procedures for their installations to follow in order to develop, obtain approval for, and implement IGSAs. However, officials from each of the military services told us they are not fully monitoring whether installations are evaluating opportunities to use IGSAs. For example, Army policy states that installations are to review current, soon-to-expire contracts for possible transition to an IGSA, but Army officials said they are not yet monitoring whether installations are doing so. Without a process in place to monitor whether installations are evaluating opportunities to use IGSAs, the military services do not know the extent to which this is occurring and thus may be missing opportunities to further reduce costs or enhance mission effectiveness.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making eight recommendations to monitor both the benefits realized from implemented IGSAs and whether installations are evaluating IGSA opportunities. DOD concurred with six recommendations and non-concurred with two, but plans to implement them all.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_418"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_419","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe F-35 aircraft represents the future of tactical aviation for the U.S. military, and is DOD's most expensive weapon system, with sustainment costs alone estimated at more than $1 trillion over a 60-year life cycle. As the F-35 program approaches full-rate production, DOD is working to deliver an affordable sustainment strategy that is able to meet the needs of the military services. This strategy is being tested as DOD stands up military depots, trains personnel, and supports its first operational squadrons\u2014with plans to establish multi-year, performance-based contracts by 2020.\nThe National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2017 includes a provision for GAO to review the F-35 program's sustainment support structure. This report assesses (1) the status of DOD's efforts to sustain the F-35 fleet and any challenges it has faced; (2) the extent to which DOD is positioned to enter into multi-year, performance-based F-35 sustainment contracts; and (3) the progress, if any, DOD has made toward reducing F-35 sustainment costs and the extent to which costs are transparent. GAO reviewed DOD and contractor documentation, analyzed data, and interviewed relevant officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) is sustaining over 250 F-35 aircraft (F-35) and plans to triple the fleet by the end of 2021, but is facing sustainment challenges that are affecting warfighter readiness (see table). These challenges are largely the result of sustainment plans that do not fully include key requirements or aligned (timely and sufficient) funding. DOD is taking steps to address some challenges, but without more comprehensive plans and aligned funding, DOD risks being unable to fully leverage the F-35's capabilities and sustain a rapidly expanding fleet.\nDOD's plan to enter into multi-year, performance-based F-35 sustainment contracts with the prime contractor has the potential to produce costs savings and other benefits, but DOD may not be well positioned to enter into such contracts by 2020. To date, DOD has not yet achieved its desired aircraft performance under pilot (i.e., trial) performance-based agreements with the prime contractor. In addition, the level of performance DOD has contracted for is generally below what the services desire (see figure 2 for Marine Corps example). Also, the three performance metrics DOD is using to incentivize the contractor under these pilot agreements may not be the appropriate metrics to achieve desired outcomes, in part because they are not fully reflective of processes for which the contractor has control. This can make it difficult for DOD to hold the contractor accountable. Further, due to system immaturity, DOD does not have full information on F-35 sustainment costs and technical characteristics such as reliability and maintainability, which could hinder its ability to effectively negotiate performance-based contracts with the contractor by 2020. Without examining whether it has the appropriate metrics to incentivize the contractor or a full understanding of the actual costs and technical characteristics of the aircraft before entering into multi-year, performance-based contracts, DOD risks overpaying the contractor for sustainment support that does not meet warfighter requirements.\nDOD has taken actions to reduce F-35 sustainment costs, but estimated life cycle costs have increased and are not fully transparent to the military services (see figure 3). Specifically, the services do not fully understand how the costs they are being charged by the program office are linked to the capabilities they are receiving, citing unexplained cost increases and difficulty in tracking their requirements to contracts. For example, the Marine Corps received an initial funding requirement for fiscal year 2017 sustainment of $293 million, which then increased to $364 million in the execution year. This lack of transparency is due in part to insufficient communication between the program office and the services, and it puts the services in a difficult position as they consider critical trade-offs that may make F-35 sustainment more affordable. Without improving communication with the services about the costs they are being charged, the services may not be able to effectively budget for long-term sustainment.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DOD revise sustainment plans, re-examine metrics and ensure that it has sufficient knowledge of costs and technical characteristics before entering into performance-based contracts, and improve communication with the services about sustainment costs. DOD concurred with these recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_419"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_420","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe United States is a member of the OAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH, which promote democracy, health care, agricultural development, and scientific exchange.\nGAO was asked to review U.S. assistance to these four organizations. In this report, GAO (1) assesses the extent to which the organizations' strategic goals align with those of U.S. agencies; (2) examines how the organizations oversee the use of their funds and the extent to which U.S. agencies have supported those efforts; (3) assesses the extent to which U.S. agencies included key monitoring provisions as part of assistance agreements; and (4) assesses the extent to which U.S. agencies had documentation of monitoring activities, including those called for by these provisions. GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from State, USAID, HHS, USDA, and the organizations. GAO also analyzed a nongeneralizable sample of 12 of the 60 assistance agreements that were awarded by State, USAID, HHS, and USDA to OAS, PAHO, and IICA and were active during calendar years 2014 through 2016. For each agency, GAO selected three agreements with the lowest, median, and highest dollar value.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO found that strategic goals of the Organization of American States (OAS), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), and the Pan-American Institute of Geography and History (PAIGH) are predominantly aligned with the strategic goals of the Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). For example, IICA's strategic goals of a productive agricultural sector, enhancing agricultural development, and food security are aligned with USDA's foreign assistance goals. State, USAID, HHS, and USDA fund activities in the form of assistance agreements (e.g., grants and cooperative agreements) with OAS, PAHO, and IICA, which in 2016 totaled $32 million. According to agency officials, the agencies employ mechanisms to ensure that these agreements align with U.S. strategic goals.\nOAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH have established mechanisms for overseeing their use of funds, such as external auditors, internal audit boards, and anti-fraud and ethics policies. State and USDA have directly supported these mechanisms. For example, State engaged in the selection process for OAS's Inspector General.\nGAO's review of 12 selected assistance agreements found that USDA included no financial or performance monitoring provisions in one of its agreements and that State did not include two key monitoring provisions in one of its agreements, called for by applicable guidance. GAO found that the remaining 10 agreements it reviewed contained all key monitoring provisions and that State has since taken corrective action.\nGAO found that U.S. agencies did not have full documentation of 18 of the 42 monitoring activities required by the 12 assistance agreements GAO reviewed (see table). For example, USDA did not have full documentation, such as for financial reports, of any of its 10 required monitoring activities and USDA officials did not explain their lack of documentation. USAID officials explained that their lack of full documentation was due, in part, to grant officers not always following their document management policies. State and HHS have since taken corrective action. If an agency does not have full documentation of monitoring activities, it may lack information needed to make appropriate budgetary and programmatic decisions.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that (1) USDA ensure inclusion of all monitoring provisions as part of agreements and (2) USAID and USDA ensure full documentation of monitoring activities. USDA and USAID concurred with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_420"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_421","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFor more than 4 decades, federal Indian policy has promoted tribal self-government\u2014the practical exercise of Indian tribes and nations' inherent sovereign authority. Under ISDEAA, federally recognized tribes may request to enter into self-determination contracts and self-governance compacts with Interior, transferring the administration of federal programs to the tribe. Under the HEARTH Act, tribes may issue certain leases on their lands without Interior approval if such leases are executed under approved tribal regulations.\nGAO was asked to evaluate issues related to tribal self-government. This report examines factors affecting tribes' use of self-determination contracts, self-governance compacts, and tribal leasing authority under the HEARTH Act. GAO reviewed key legislation and regulations, relevant literature, federal and tribal documents; analyzed agency data; and interviewed federal officials at 12 BIA regional offices, 29 tribes that used at least one of these mechanisms, and 7 tribal organizations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO found that various factors can affect tribes' use of self-determination contracts and self-governance compacts under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 (ISDEAA), as amended, and tribal leasing under the Helping Expedite and Advance Responsible Tribal Home Ownership Act of 2012 (HEARTH Act). A key factor that helps tribes use these self-governance mechanisms is tribal government capacity to administer a federal program or manage these resources. Federal efforts that have helped build this capacity have included training, such as that offered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) in 2014 and 2015 to educate tribes on the benefits of developing tribal leasing regulations under the HEARTH Act. In contrast, GAO found that other factors can hinder tribes' use of these mechanisms including:\nInadequate Information Sharing. The Department of the Interior's (Interior) policy and guidance states that tribes should be provided necessary information to design programs they would like to self-administer, such as the amount of funding available to the tribes for the programs and the amount retained by Interior for inherently federal functions. However, according to several tribal stakeholders and some BIA regional officials GAO spoke to, some of this information is not made available to the tribes prior to self-determination contract negotiations, such as information on funding calculations and determinations of inherently federal functions. Without this information, according to a tribal stakeholder, tribes may be at a disadvantage when negotiating with BIA and designing programs for self-determination contracts.\nDelays in Disbursing Funds. According to tribal stakeholders, Interior's process does not ensure that funds associated with their self-determination contracts and self-governance compacts are disbursed in a timely manner. These funding delays can therefore be a factor that hinders their use of self-government mechanisms. Some tribal stakeholders said that disbursement delays have ranged from weeks to months. GAO was unable to determine the extent to which Interior disburses funds in accordance with ISDEAA or within agreed-upon time frames with the tribes, because Interior does not systematically track and monitor the disbursement of these funds.\nLengthy Review of Proposed Tribal Leasing Regulations. Interior does not have a clearly documented process for reviewing proposed tribal leasing regulations submitted under the HEARTH Act with identified time frames associated with each step of the process. As a result, tribal stakeholders told GAO that they are uncertain about how long the process will take and how it aligns with the 120 day requirement in the Act. According to tribal stakeholders and GAO's analysis of proposed regulations submitted from 2012 through 2017, Interior's review process has resulted in lengthy review times\u2014in some cases, multiple years. Some tribal officials told GAO that Interior's lengthy review process had delayed the tribe's ability to make decisions about the use of their resources. By developing a clearly documented process that includes established time frames for each step in the review, Interior can help eliminate uncertainty and improve the transparency of the review process for the tribes.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making four recommendations, including that Interior develop processes to share how it makes funding and inherently federal function determinations with tribes, to track and monitor the disbursement of funds within agreed upon time frames, and for the review of proposed tribal leasing regulations including review time frames. Interior concurred with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_421"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_422","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn 2003, the United States approved amended compacts of free association with the FSM and RMI, providing a total of $3.6 billion in economic assistance in fiscal years 2004 through 2023 and access to several U.S. programs and services. Compact grant funding, overseen by the Department of the Interior, generally decreases annually. However, the amount of the annual decrease in grants is added to the annual U.S. contributions to the compact trust funds, managed by joint U.S.-FSM and U.S.-RMI trust fund committees. Trust fund earnings are intended to provide a source of income after compact grants end in 2023, but GAO and others have previously found that the trust funds may not provide sustainable income.\nGAO was asked to examine preparations for the transition in 2023. This report examines (1) the use and role of U.S. funds and programs in FSM and RMI budgets, (2) projected trust fund disbursements and potential strategies to address risks to those disbursements, and (3) FSM and RMI plans to prepare for grant decreases and the transition to trust fund income. GAO reviewed compact agreements, audit reports, and U.S. law; modeled trust fund performance under existing conditions and using potential strategies; and reviewed FSM and RMI plans. GAO visited each country and interviewed FSM, RMI, and U.S. officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) continue to rely on U.S. grants and programs, including several that are scheduled to end in 2023. U.S. compact sector and supplemental education grants, both scheduled to end in 2023, support a third of the FSM's and a quarter of the RMI's expenditures. Agreements providing U.S. aviation, disaster relief, postal, weather, and other programs and services are scheduled to end in 2024, but some agencies may provide programs and services similar to those in the agreements under other authorities. FSM and RMI eligibility for some other U.S. grants and programs is expected to continue after 2023.\nDisbursements from the compact trust funds face risks that the trust fund committees have not addressed. GAO found that the trust funds are increasingly likely to provide no annual disbursements in some years and to not sustain their value. Potential strategies such as reduced trust fund disbursements or additional contributions from the countries or other sources could help address these risks. Changing the trust fund disbursement policies could also address these risks but may require revising the trust fund agreements with each country. However, the trust fund committees have not prepared distribution policies, required by the agreements, which could assist the countries in planning for the 2023 transition to trust fund income. The committees also have not prepared the required fiscal procedures for oversight of the disbursements or addressed differences between the timing of their annual determination of the disbursement amounts and the FSM's and RMI's annual budget cycles.\nThe FSM and RMI did not implement planned budget reductions to address decreasing compact grants owing to increased revenues from other sources that offset the grant decreases. Current FSM and RMI infrastructure plans address the 2023 transition, while health and education plans focus on strategic goals. Both countries have established new compact planning committees to identify future challenges and develop plans for the 2023 transition to trust fund income.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that Interior work with the compact trust fund committees to develop distribution policies and fiscal procedures for the funds and to address disbursement timing. Interior concurred with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_422"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_423","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe southwest border has long been vulnerable to cross-border illegal activity. In fiscal year 2016, Border Patrol apprehended over 409,000 illegal entrants. Border Patrol has employed a variety of land-based surveillance technologies to assist in securing the border. GAO has reported regularly on CBP's progress and challenges deploying surveillance technologies.\nGAO was asked to review CBP's use of surveillance technology. This report examines (1) the deployment status of surveillance technology programs and the extent to which CBP has developed plans for future technology deployments and (2) what data are available on the contributions of deployed technologies to CBP's border security efforts and the extent to which CBP has assessed technology performance.\nGAO analyzed technology program documents; interviewed CBP and Border Patrol officials; and conducted site visits to Arizona and south Texas to observe the operation of various land-based technologies. We selected these locations because CBP has deployed or has plans to deploy a mix of technologies there, among other factors.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe U.S. Border Patrol, within the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), has made progress deploying surveillance technology along the southwest U.S. border under its 2011 Arizona Technology Plan (ATP) and 2014 Southwest Border Technology Plan. The ATP called for deployment of a mix of radars, sensors, and cameras in Arizona; the 2014 plan expanded these deployments to the rest of the southwest border. As of October 2017, Border Patrol had completed the planned deployment of select technologies to Arizona, Texas, California, and New Mexico. For example, in Arizona, Border Patrol deployed all planned Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS) and Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC) systems, and 15 of 53 planned Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) systems. Border Patrol also deployed all planned MSC systems to Texas, California, and New Mexico and completed contract negotiations to deploy RVSS to Texas. These technology programs have experienced delays, but are currently on track against revised program schedules and cost baselines. To plan for future technology deployments, Border Patrol reports it will use its Requirements Management Process (RMP)\u2013\u2013a process designed to facilitate planning by, among other things, identifying capability gaps and collecting agents' feedback\u2013\u2013and other initiatives. Border Patrol is currently developing written guidance for the RMP to ensure station officials understand their roles and responsibilities in the process.\nBorder Patrol agents collect and report data on asset assists, which are instances in which technologies or other assets (such as canine teams) contributed to an apprehension or seizure; however, Border Patrol has not provided sufficient guidance to ensure the accuracy and reliability of that data. For example, agents incorrectly attributed some apprehensions or seizures to certain technologies rather than others. Stations in the Rio Grande Valley sector recorded assists from IFTs in about 500 instances from June through December 2016; however, this sector does not have IFTs. Data integrity and quality checks are the responsibility of individual sectors, but Border Patrol has provided limited guidance on how to ensure data quality. Without sufficient guidance to ensure the quality of asset assist data, Border Patrol is limited in its ability to determine the mission benefits of its surveillance technologies and use information on benefits to inform resource allocation decisions.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that Border Patrol issue guidance to improve the quality and usability of its asset assist information. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_423"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_424","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe SFSP, a federal nutrition assistance program, is intended to provide food to children in low-income areas during periods when area schools are closed for vacation. In the last decade, federal expenditures for SFSP have increased as the program has expanded, according to USDA data. GAO was asked to review the SFSP.\nThis report examines (1) what is known about SFSP participation, (2) other programs that help feed low-income children over the summer, and (3) challenges, if any, in providing summer meals to children and the extent to which USDA provides assistance to address these challenges. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; analyzed USDA's SFSP data for fiscal years 2007 through 2016; surveyed state agencies responsible for administering the SFSP in 50 states and the District of Columbia; visited a nongeneralizable group of 3 states and 30 meal sites, selected based on Census data on child poverty rates and urban and rural locations; analyzed meal site data from the 3 states; and interviewed USDA, state and national organization officials, and SFSP providers, including sponsors and site operators.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nNationwide, the total number of meals served to children in low-income areas through the Summer Food Service Program (SFSP) increased from 113 to 149 million (about 32 percent) from fiscal year 2007 through 2016. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) directs states to use the number of meals served, along with other data, to estimate the number of children participating in the SFSP. However, participation estimates have been calculated inconsistently from state to state and year to year. In 2017, USDA took steps to improve the consistency of participation estimates, noting they are critical for informing program implementation and strategic planning. However, GAO determined that the method USDA directs states to use will continue to provide unreliable estimates of participation, hindering USDA's ability to use them for these purposes.\nOther federal and nonfederal programs help feed low-income children over the summer to some extent, according to states GAO surveyed and SFSP providers and others GAO interviewed. For example, in July 2016, USDA data indicate about 26 million meals were served through a separate federal program that allows school meal providers to serve summer meals. Some children also received summer meals through nonfederal programs operated by faith-based organizations and foodbanks, though GAO's state survey and interviews with providers and national organizations indicate the reach of such efforts is limited.\nStates and SFSP providers reported challenges with meal sites, participation, and program administration; USDA has taken steps to address these areas. Specifically, in GAO's survey, a majority of states reported challenges with availability and awareness of meal sites, as well as limited program participation and administrative capacity. National, state, and local officials have taken steps to address these issues, such as increasing outreach and offering activities to attract participation. In addition, 17 states in GAO's survey and providers in the states GAO visited reported a challenge with ensuring meal sites are in safe locations. To address this safety issue, USDA has granted some states and sponsors flexibility from the requirement that children consume meals on-site. However, USDA has not broadly communicated the circumstances it considers when granting this flexibility. Further, some states and sponsors that have requested this flexibility reported difficulty obtaining data to show these circumstances exist, hampering their ability to ensure safe meal delivery.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making four recommendations, including that USDA improve estimates of children's participation in SFSP and communicate the circumstances it considers when granting flexibilities to ensure safe meal delivery. USDA generally agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_424"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_425","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nNSF has identified potential benefits and challenges associated with its use of rotators. Benefits include fresh perspectives and close connections to the scientific community, while challenges include staffing turnover and higher costs for some rotators compared with permanent employees.\nGAO was asked to review NSF's use and management of the IPA and VSEE rotator programs, among other things. This report examines (1) the number, costs, and uses of NSF rotators for fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2017; (2) the strategies NSF has used to manage rotator costs and the results of these efforts; and (3) the extent to which NSF has a workforce strategy for using rotators and has evaluated the results of its rotator programs. GAO analyzed summary-level data on NSF's rotators; reviewed key documents; interviewed NSF officials; conducted semistructured interviews with a nongeneralizable sample of rotators and permanent federal employees selected from different scientific directorates within NSF; and compared NSF's management of the program to key principles for effective strategic workforce planning.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe numbers of rotators\u2014outside scientists, engineers, and educators on temporary assignment\u2014at the National Science Foundation (NSF) and their costs in proportion to other staff remained relatively stable in fiscal years 2008 through 2017. Most rotators joined NSF under its Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) mobility program. IPA rotators comprised about 12 percent of NSF's workforce and 17 percent of staff costs on average and were not subject to a federal salary cap. They remain employees of their home institutions, with NSF reimbursing the institutions for most of their salaries and benefits. The remaining rotators are considered temporary federal employees under the Visiting Scientist, Engineer, and Educator (VSEE) program; their salaries could not exceed the federal maximum for their positions.\nBeginning in fiscal year 2017, NSF adopted IPA rotator program cost management strategies expected to achieve the greatest savings with the least harm to recruitment, but NSF officials said it is too soon to determine the full results. For example, for new IPA rotators who had not yet begun negotiating their assignments, NSF began requiring their home institutions to pay for 10 percent of the rotators' salary and benefits. NSF officials told GAO they expect to issue a report evaluating the strategies in December 2018.\nNSF's IPA program steering committee recommended developing a workforce strategy for balancing the agency's use of rotators with federal staff, but as of June 2018, NSF had not developed a strategy or fully evaluated the IPA and VSEE rotator programs' results, as called for by GAO's key principles for effective strategic workforce planning. NSF officials said they recognized the value of a workforce strategy but were focusing instead on other workforce planning efforts, and they had not fully evaluated program results in part because rotators are blended into the agency's permanent workforce, making a separate evaluation difficult. Without a workforce strategy and evaluation of results, NSF is limited in its ability to manage and, if warranted, adjust its use of rotators.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that NSF develop an agency-wide strategy for balancing the agency's use of rotators with permanent staff and evaluate the contributions of its rotator programs toward NSF's human capital goals and programmatic results. NSF agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_425"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_426","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nEach year, millions of Americans call 911 for help during emergencies. However, the nation's legacy 911 system relies on aging infrastructure that is not designed to accommodate modern communications technologies. As a result, states and localities are upgrading to NG911, which offers improved capabilities, such as the ability to process images, audio files, and video. While deploying NG911 is the responsibility of state and local entities, federal agencies also support implementation, led by NHTSA's National 911 Program, which facilitates collaboration among federal, state, and local 911 stakeholders.\nGAO was asked to review NG911 implementation nationwide. This report examines: (1) state and local progress and challenges in implementing NG911 and (2) federal actions to address challenges and planned next steps. GAO reviewed relevant statutes, regulations, and federal agency reports and plans. GAO also analyzed NHTSA's survey data on state 911 implementation for calendar year 2015, the most recent year for which data were available, and interviewed federal officials, state and local officials from nine states (selected to represent different regions and various phases of NG911 implementation), and officials from industry and advocacy groups.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) National 911 Program's most recent national survey on Next Generation 911 (NG911) implementation indicated that about half of states were in some phase of transition to NG911 in 2015, but that state and local progress varied. Specifically, 10 states reported that all 911 authorities in their state processed calls using NG911 systems; however, 18 states reported having no state or local NG911 transition plans in place\u2014which may indicate these states were in the early phases of planning for the transition to NG911 or had not yet begun. GAO spoke with state and local 911 officials in 9 states, which were in various phases of implementing NG911, and found that none of the 9 selected states were accepting images, audio files, or video. State and local 911 officials identified a number of challenges to implementing NG911. Such challenges are related to funding, evolving technology and operations, and governance. For example, officials in 3 states said that the current funding they collect from telephone service subscribers may not be sufficient to support NG911's transition costs while simultaneously funding the operation of existing 911 systems.\nFederal agencies\u2014including NHTSA, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, the Federal Communications Commission, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security\u2014have responsibilities to support NG911 implementation, such as through coordinating activities and administering grants, and are taking actions to assist state and local entities in addressing challenges to NG911's implementation. Such actions include developing resources, offering technical assistance, and convening stakeholders to explore emerging NG911 issues. For example, as the lead entity for coordinating federal NG911 efforts, NHTSA's National 911 Program is developing resources on NG911 topics, such as federal funding and governance structures. While the National 911 Program is taking steps to facilitate the state and local transition to NG911, the program lacks specific performance goals and measures to assess its progress. Without such goals and measures, it is not clear to what extent the program is effectively achieving its mission.\nIn 2018, the National 911 Program plans to establish an interagency initiative tasked with creating a National NG911 Roadmap. This roadmap is intended to identify next steps for the federal government in supporting the creation of a national, interconnected NG911 system. While the National 911 Program is taking steps to develop a list of national-level tasks as part of its roadmap initiative, the program does not have a plan to identify: (1) roles or responsibilities for federal entities to carry out these tasks or (2) how the program plans to achieve the roadmap's objectives. Collaborating with the appropriate federal agencies to determine federal roles and responsibilities to carry out the roadmap's national-level tasks could reduce barriers to agencies effectively working together to achieve those tasks. Furthermore, developing an implementation plan that details how the roadmap's tasks will be achieved would place the National 911 Program in a better position to effectively lead interagency efforts to implement NG911 nationwide.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that NHTSA's National 911 Program develop performance goals and measures and, for the National NG911 Roadmap, determine agencies' roles and responsibilities and develop an implementation plan. NHTSA agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_426"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_427","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSNAP is the nation's largest federally funded nutrition assistance program. In fiscal year 2017, it provided about $64 billion in benefits. To maintain eligibility for benefits, certain SNAP recipients must comply with the program's work requirements, which may include participating in a state's SNAP E&T program if required by the state.\nThis report examines (1) what is known about SNAP E&T program participants and outcomes over time and (2) the extent to which state SNAP E&T programs have partnered with other programs offering similar services. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; analyzed USDA data on SNAP recipients, work registrants, and SNAP E&T participants from fiscal years 2008 through 2016, the most recent data available; reviewed states' fiscal year 2017 SNAP E&T plans and outcome reports; and interviewed USDA officials and state officials in five states selected, in part, to reflect a range of SNAP E&T program characteristics.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program's (SNAP) Employment and Training (E&T) programs, which are overseen by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and administered by states, have served a small percentage of SNAP recipients over time, and information on participant characteristics and outcomes is limited. In an average month of fiscal year 2016, SNAP E&T served about 0.5 percent of the 43.5 million SNAP recipients. Further, since 2008, the percentage of SNAP recipients served by SNAP E&T has declined. Participation in SNAP E&T may be low, in part, because most SNAP recipients were exempt from work requirements, according to USDA data. In addition, SNAP recipients may participate in other activities to comply with work requirements. Although data on the number of recipients served in SNAP E&T are generally reliable, USDA lacks reliable data on participant characteristics and outcomes because of imprecise instructions on data collection forms and staff confusion at the state level. USDA has taken some steps to address these issues, but data reliability issues persist. As a result, USDA's ability to assess whether agency goals are being met through the SNAP E&T program is limited, as is the department's ability to monitor states' implementation of work requirements and ensure program integrity.\nIn fiscal year 2018, most state SNAP agencies partnered with workforce development system entities, such as community colleges and workforce agencies, to provide services to SNAP E&T participants, according to USDA data. Regional and state officials reported that state SNAP agencies often have used these partnerships to leverage non-federal funding sources and provide additional capacity and expertise to help expand SNAP E&T services. However, 3 states operated their own SNAP E&T programs without partnering with any other program, and a total of 20 states lacked partnerships with workforce agencies, according to USDA data for fiscal year 2018. Federal regulations require that SNAP E&T services be delivered through the state's workforce development system unless the services are not available locally through this system. USDA and state officials described challenges to forming effective partnerships with workforce agencies, including perceived disincentives to serving SNAP recipients. However, states that are not fully leveraging resources available through the workforce development system may miss opportunities to provide a wider variety of services to SNAP E&T participants and serve a greater number of SNAP recipients through SNAP E&T.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making four recommendations, including that USDA take additional steps to address SNAP E&T data reliability issues and to help states leverage available workforce development system resources. USDA officials generally agreed with our recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_427"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_428","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nWeapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile are aging. To refurbish or replace nuclear weapons' aging components, NNSA and DOD undertake LEPs. The B61-12 LEP is the most complex and expensive LEP to date. In October 2016, NNSA formalized a program cost estimate of about $7.6 billion, which is lower than an independent cost estimate of about $10 billion.\nSenate Report 113-44 included a provision for GAO to periodically assess the status of the B61-12 LEP. This report assesses (1) the extent to which NNSA followed best practices for cost estimation in producing the program cost estimate for the B61-12 LEP; (2) the reasons for differences between the program cost estimate and the independent cost estimate and how the differences were reconciled; and (3) the extent to which NNSA and DOD have identified and managed program risks. GAO assessed the program cost estimate against best practices, reviewed NNSA and DOD documents, conducted site visits to four NNSA and Air Force sites responsible for design, production, and management activities, and interviewed NNSA and DOD officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) incorporated most cost estimating best practices to develop the program cost estimate for the B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP), which seeks to consolidate four versions of a nuclear weapon\u2014the B61 bomb\u2014into a bomb called the B61-12. As shown in the figure below, the program substantially met best practices for ensuring the estimate was comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible.\nThe B61-12 LEP's program cost estimate differs from an estimate prepared by another NNSA office independent of the program primarily because the program used different methods and assumptions than the independent office. The program developed its estimate by compiling cost and schedule estimates for activities at each of the NNSA contractor sites participating in the LEP. In contrast, the independent office evaluated program activities completed to date and applied a historical model to estimate costs and durations for remaining activities. NNSA management met with officials from both offices to reconcile the estimates but did not document the rationale for adopting the program estimate unchanged. GAO recommended in a January 2018 report that NNSA document and justify such decisions, in part because GAO's prior work has shown that independent cost estimates historically are higher than programs' cost estimates because the team conducting the independent estimate is more objective and less prone to accept optimistic assumptions. In response to the January 2018 report, NNSA agreed to establish a protocol to document management decisions on significant variances between program and independent cost estimates, but it has not yet provided evidence that it has done so.\nNNSA and the Department of Defense (DOD) have identified and are managing risks that could complicate efforts to meet the LEP's fiscal year 2025 completion date. Risks within the program's areas of responsibility include an aggressive flight test schedule for bomb delivery aircraft. The program is managing these and other risks with a formal risk management process. The program has also taken steps to address risks outside its direct control, such as risks related to the readiness and certification of the weapon's F-35 delivery aircraft, by providing information to the responsible DOD organizations.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making no new recommendations but discusses a prior recommendation that NNSA document and justify decisions regarding independent cost estimates. NNSA provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. DOD did not have any comments.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_428"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_429","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Bureau is required by law to count the population as of April 1, 2020; deliver state apportionment counts to the President by December 31, 2020; and provide redistricting data to the states within 1 year of Census Day, April 1, 2021. To meet these statutory deadlines, the Bureau carries out hundreds of projects, which it manages with an integrated master schedule. Because census operations need to proceed in concert with one another, significant delays could propagate to other activities resulting in increased costs, reduced operational quality, or changes to the design of the census in order to compensate for lost time.\nThis report determines the extent to which the Bureau is using leading practices for scheduling key projects.\nGAO selected three projects for review based on their cost and in-progress status. GAO analyzed schedules and their supporting documents against GAO's Schedule Assessment Guide. GAO also spoke with relevant Bureau officials regarding the three selected projects.\nGAO provided a draft of this report to the Department of Commerce, which agreed with the findings.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe three census project schedules GAO reviewed better reflect characteristics of a reliable schedule compared to a GAO schedule assessment performed in 2013, but weaknesses remain. GAO reviewed three projects that contribute to two of the Census Bureau's (Bureau) largest field operations\u2014address canvassing and nonresponse follow-up. The schedules for all three projects are better constructed and more credible than previously reviewed project schedules. For example, the Bureau has improved the logic of the relationship between activities, and better ensured that all schedules are linked together in a master schedule so that their interactions can be better managed.\nHowever, the three selected schedules have some of the same weaknesses GAO identified in other Bureau schedules in 2009 and 2013. For example, none of the selected schedules contain information on resource needs and availability. GAO has reported that such information assists program offices in forecasting the likelihood that activities will be completed as scheduled. It can also help management compute total labor and equipment hours, calculate total project and per-period cost, resolve resource conflicts, and establish the reasonableness of the plan. If the schedule does not allow insight into current or projected allocation of resources, then the likelihood is significantly increased that the program may slip or need additional resources to complete on time.\nIn GAO's 2009 review of the Bureau's schedule, GAO recommended that the Bureau include in the 2020 master schedule estimates of the resources, such as labor, materials, and overhead costs for each activity as the 2020 schedule was built. The Department of Commerce did not respond to the recommendation at that time. Then, regarding GAO's 2013 assessment of the Bureau's schedule, Bureau officials stated that they hoped to begin identifying the resources needed for each activity in their schedules by early 2014. However, as of May 2018, the Bureau had not taken these steps. Senior Bureau officials have now stated that it would require additional staffing in order to plan for and implement this recommendation.\nAdditionally, the Bureau has not conducted risk assessments for the project schedules GAO assessed. Schedule risk analysis\u2014the systematic analysis of \u201cwhat if\u201d scenarios\u2014is an established leading practice. Risk assessments are needed to determine the likelihood of the project's completion date; how much schedule risk contingency is needed to provide an acceptable level of certainty for completion by a specific date; risks most likely to delay the project; how much contingency reserve each risk requires; and the paths or activities that are most likely to delay the project.\nIn 2013, GAO recommended the Bureau conduct risk assessments for its schedules. The Bureau said it had no disagreement with this recommendation. However, while Senior Bureau officials stated that a schedule risk assessment plan and process were approved by Bureau management in late May 2018, it has not yet implemented this recommendation.\nGAO believes that these prior recommendations still apply and can help the Bureau improve the reliability of its 2020 schedule.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_429"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_430","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nOn August 31, 2016, as part of a shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba, air carriers resumed scheduled commercial flights between the United States and Cuba, a route previously only open to public and private charter carrier operations. In June 2017, travel restrictions were revised to require U.S. travelers going to Cuba to travel as part of a licensed group. TSA, the agency responsible for securing the nation's civil aviation system, assesses Cuban airports and inspects air carriers operating U.S-bound flights to ensure they have effective security measures in place.\nGAO was asked to review TSA's assessments of Cuban aviation security. This report examines (1) the extent to which TSA followed its standard operating procedures when assessing aviation security at Cuban airports in fiscal years 2012 through 2017; (2) the results of TSA's Cuban airport assessments in fiscal years 2012 through 2017; and (3) the results of TSA's air carrier inspections for Cuba in fiscal years 2016\u2014when commercial scheduled air service between the United States and Cuba resumed\u2014and 2017. GAO reviewed TSA policies and procedures, observed TSA air carrier inspections in Cuba, and compared TSA data on assessments and inspections to data from the Department of Transportation.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Transportation Security Administration (TSA) generally followed its standard operating procedures when documenting and resolving findings from its foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections at Cuban airports in fiscal years 2012 through 2017. However, TSA did not perform all the required inspections of air carriers operating U.S.-bound public charter flights from Cuba. Specifically, GAO found that for the five air carriers selected for analysis, TSA performed approximately half of air carrier inspections in Cuba at the frequency established in its standard operating procedures in fiscal years 2012 through 2016. Of the inspections TSA did not perform, over half were not performed because TSA was not able to identify or reliably track U.S.-bound public charter operations from Cuba. Improving TSA's ability to identify public charters requiring inspection in Cuba and implementing a tool it is currently developing that more reliably tracks air carrier operations would better position TSA to meet its goal of inspecting all air carriers operating U.S.-bound public charter flights from Cuba at the frequency established in its standard operating procedures.\nSeveral of the Cuban airports TSA assessed in fiscal years 2012 through 2017 were fully compliant with International Civil Aviation Organization Standards at the time of assessment. The remaining airport assessments reported instances of noncompliance within the five categories: access control, quality control, aircraft and inflight security, passenger and baggage screening, and fencing.\nThe majority of air carrier inspections TSA performed for Cuba in fiscal years 2016 and 2017 resulted in no findings, meaning that TSA determined air carriers operating these flights fully implemented all requirements in their TSA-approved security program at the time of inspection. The remaining inspections resulted in findings, which TSA closed after air carriers took corrective action.\nThis is a public version of a sensitive report issued in May 2018. Information that TSA deemed to be sensitive is omitted from this report.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that TSA improve its ability to identify all public charters requiring inspection in Cuba and develop and implement a tool that more reliably tracks public charter operations between the United States and Cuba. TSA concurred with our recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_430"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_431","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThousands of shipments containing radiological material enter the United States each year through airports across the country. Radiological material is used in various medical and industrial applications, and possession requires a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) or one of the 37 states to which NRC has relinquished licensing authority. Failure to verify the licenses could allow terrorists to acquire radiological material for a dirty bomb, which uses explosives to disperse the material.\nGAO was asked to review CBP policies and procedures related to license verification. This report examines, among other things, (1) the extent to which CBP follows its policies and procedures, and (2) the effectiveness of these policies and procedures. GAO reviewed relevant policies and procedures, analyzed CBP data related to radiological material shipments and license verification, interviewed CBP and NRC officials, and selected four airports to visit based on expected traffic of radiological shipments.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nU.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency officials at U.S. airports have not verified the legitimacy of all licenses for imported radiological materials as required by CBP's policy. The policy requires CBP officials, when alerted, to verify licenses by calling experts in a centralized CBP office. CBP officials at two of four airports GAO visited said they were calling as required. However, CBP officials at the other two airports did not verify many licenses from January 1, 2015, through September 30, 2016, and headquarters officials were unaware of non-compliance with CBP policy. Also, GAO found that during this time frame nationwide, CBP officials were alerted to verify licenses for a significant number of shipments of licensable radiological material for all U.S. airports, but they did not make all the required calls\u2014leaving numerous shipments potentially unverified over this 21-month period. This situation occurred because CBP does not have a monitoring system to ensure that officials make license verification calls as required. Until CBP develops a monitoring system for license verification, it will not have reasonable assurance that it can identify activities inconsistent with its policy and take corrective action.\nCBP procedures cannot effectively implement the agency's policy that its officials verify all radiological material shipments imported into the United States. The procedures are not effective for this policy in part because they rely on automated alerts that are based on some but not all relevant information that could indicate potentially dangerous radiological material. Consequently, CBP's current system and procedures cannot ensure that all such materials will be identified. Under federal internal control standards, agencies are to design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks. However, CBP does not have the information it needs to develop a robust system or revise its procedures because it has not conducted a comprehensive assessment of the information not included in its automated alert system. In particular, CBP has not assessed relevant information not currently included in the automated alert or how to create a more risk-based approach that distinguishes between higher- and lower-risk quantities of radiological materials. Without such an assessment, CBP may be unable to develop a system or procedures that best support its policy for verifying imported radiological materials.\nThis is a public version of a sensitive report GAO issued in September 2017. Information CBP deemed sensitive has been omitted.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that CBP develop a monitoring system to help ensure that CBP officials comply with the agency's license verification policy, conduct an assessment to determine relevant information that is not included in the automated alerts, and develop a system that allows it to identify shipments of greatest risk. CBP concurred with GAO's three recommendations and outlined actions to implement those recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_431"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_432","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDHS and GSA have been managing efforts to consolidate DHS executive leadership, operational management, and other personnel at one secure headquarters location rather than at multiple locations throughout the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. The consolidation is to include the development of multi-billion dollar headquarters facilities at the St. Elizabeths campus in Washington, D.C.\nIn September 2014, GAO issued a report entitled: Federal Real Property: DHS and GSA Need to Strengthen the Management of DHS Headquarters Consolidation (GAO-14-648). This statement summarizes the key findings and recommendations from this report, and provides a status update as of April 2018 on DHS and GSA implementation of GAO's recommendations.\nTo complete the September 2014 report, GAO compared DHS and GSA capital planning efforts against applicable leading practices, interviewed officials, and reviewed cost and schedule estimates for the St. Elizabeths project. To assess subsequent DHS and GSA actions to implement GAO's September 2014 recommendations, GAO conducted periodic follow-up with agency officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn its September 2014 report, GAO found that Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and General Services Administration (GSA) planning for the DHS headquarters consolidation at the St. Elizabeths campus in Washington, D.C. did not fully conform with leading capital decision-making practices intended to help agencies effectively plan and procure assets. Specifically, GAO found that DHS and GSA had not conducted a comprehensive assessment of current needs, identified capability gaps, or evaluated and prioritized alternatives that would help officials adapt consolidation plans to changing conditions and address funding issues as reflected in leading practices. GAO recommended that DHS and GSA conduct various assessments and analyses and use the results to inform updated DHS headquarters consolidation plans. The agencies concurred with this recommendation.\nIn its September 2014 report, GAO also found that DHS and GSA cost and schedule estimates for the headquarters consolidation project at St. Elizabeths did not conform or, only minimally or partially conformed, with leading estimating practices, and were therefore unreliable. Thus, GAO recommended that DHS and GSA develop revised cost and schedule estimates for the remaining portions of the consolidation project in accordance with leading practices, and the agencies concurred with this recommendation.\nThe DHS Headquarters Consolidation Accountability Act of 2015, enacted in April 2016 would, according to the accompanying Senate committee report, ensure that DHS and GSA fully address the recommendations from GAO's September 2014 report and provide Congress the information needed to make sound decisions regarding the project. Among other things, the Act required DHS, in coordination with GSA, to submit information to Congress, including various assessments and updated cost and schedule estimates related to the DHS headquarters consolidation. As of April 2018, however, DHS and GSA had not submitted the information to Congress that would either meet the requirements of the Act or address GAO's recommendations. DHS and GSA officials cited funding instability as one challenge to updating consolidation plans and cost and schedule estimates.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nAmong other things, GAO recommended in its September 2014 report that DHS and GSA develop revised DHS headquarters plans that reflect leading practices for capital decision making and also reliable cost and schedule estimates. DHS and GSA concurred with our recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_432"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_433","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Buy American Act of 1933, as amended, is the main U.S. law promoting domestic purchasing. The Act permits agencies to buy foreign end products only under certain exceptions, such as when domestic items are not available at a reasonable cost. Further, U.S. trade agreements waive the Buy American restrictions for certain products.\nGAO was asked to review implementation of the Buy American Act. This report assesses the extent to which (1) the federal government procures foreign products through Buy American Act exceptions and waivers; and (2) selected agencies provide training and guidance to implement the Act.\nGAO reviewed laws, regulations, and policies related to the Buy American Act and analyzed data for fiscal year 2017 from FPDS-NG. GAO also analyzed a non-generalizable sample of 38 contracts from DOD, HHS, DHS, and VA\u2014the agencies with the most obligations for products in fiscal year 2017. The 38 awards selected include a mix of foreign and domestic products, as well as dollars obligated. Finally, GAO interviewed cognizant contracting and policy officials from the selected agencies.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAccording to data reported in the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) in fiscal year 2017, foreign end products accounted for less than 5 percent\u2014about $7.8 billion\u2014of federal obligations for products potentially subject to the Buy American Act. Federal agencies procured foreign products using exceptions to Buy American Act requirements, as well as through waivers or when the Buy American Act did not apply, as shown in the figure.\nThe amount of foreign end products purchased could be greater than reported in FPDS-NG, however, due to reporting errors and system limitations. GAO found that 6 of the 38 contracts reviewed from the Departments of Defense (DOD), Health and Human Services (HHS), Homeland Security (DHS), and Veterans Affairs (VA) inaccurately recorded waiver or exception information. FPDS-NG system limitations compound these errors because it does not fully capture Buy American Act data. Among other things, the database does not always enable agencies to report the use of exceptions or waivers on contracts for both foreign and domestic products, reducing data accuracy. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is considering strategies to improve Buy American Act data.\nThe four agencies GAO reviewed varied in their approaches to Buy American Act training and guidance. DOD reports that it will have trained more than 18,000 personnel by the end of 2018. DHS reports training almost 1,400 people\u2014approximately 94 percent of its contracting staff\u2014as of April 2018. Some VA courses mention the Act, but none is focused specifically on implementing its requirements. HHS does not have agency-level training or guidance on the Act. GAO found that contracting officers for the contracts it reviewed face challenges implementing Buy American Act requirements. Having specific and targeted Buy American Act guidance and training can better ensure that agencies meet the Act's requirements.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is recommending that OMB take steps to improve Buy American Act data and that HHS, DHS, and VA improve agency guidance and training on implementing the Act. All of the agencies either concurred or generally concurred with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_433"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_434","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe federal government plans to spend almost $96 billion on IT investments in fiscal year 2018; however, as GAO has previously found, too often these investments have cost overruns and schedule delays. To enhance oversight of IT programs, for 2015, Congress directed OMB to identify the 10 highest priority IT programs that are under development across federal agencies and report on their status each quarter. Further, for 2016, Congress directed USDS to provide a quarterly report of current USDS projects, including the top 10 high priority programs.\nGAO was asked to review OMB's oversight of high priority programs. This review evaluated (1) OMB's process for identifying, overseeing, and reporting on the high priority IT investment programs and (2) USDS's process for identifying and prioritizing its projects, including its consideration of the high priority programs, and its reporting on the projects. GAO analyzed OMB memorandums and reports to Congress and interviewed OMB staff, including from USDS. In addition, GAO compared USDS's processes with IT management best practices.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Office of E-Government and Information Technology (E-Gov) reported that it undertook a structured approach to identify the top 10 high priority IT programs in reports to Congress in June 2015 and June 2016. Specifically, OMB staff stated that they chose the top 10 programs from a longer list of agency programs requiring additional oversight (referred to as high impact programs). E-Gov staff reported that the high priority programs were already receiving greater oversight than what was provided to the other major programs due to their high impact designation. This additional oversight included frequent meetings with agency Chief Information Officer (CIO) leadership and quarterly meetings with OMB staff. However, the Federal CIO was not directly involved in this oversight. According to E-Gov staff, the Federal CIO does not typically get involved in individual programs due to the large number of programs. However, past experience has shown that Federal CIO involvement has had a significant impact. For example, Federal CIO-led reviews of troubled projects, known as TechStat reviews, resulted in $3 billion in savings in 2010. Until OMB ensures that the Federal CIO is more directly involved in the oversight of these high priority programs, it may be missing a key opportunity to improve accountability and achieve positive results.\nOMB's 2015 and 2016 reports to Congress on the top 10 high priority programs identified the status of the programs and major milestones. However, the reports were not issued on a quarterly basis, as directed. E-Gov staff stated that they were unable to do so because of other competing reporting requirements and the limited resources available to draft and fully review the report on a quarterly basis. In addition, OMB stopped issuing the reports on the top 10 high priority IT programs after June 2016. OMB stated that Congress' 2016 direction to the U.S. Digital Service (USDS)\u2014an OMB component\u2014to provide a quarterly report that described the status of USDS teams and projects, including the top 10 high priority programs, meant that OMB should only report on USDS projects considered to be high priority. However, continued identification and reporting on the top 10 high priority programs, and not just USDS projects, would further enhance congressional oversight by providing congressional stakeholders information that is not readily available on those programs in the greatest need of attention.\nUSDS issued reports to Congress on the status of its key projects in December 2016 and July 2017; however, the reports did not address the top 10 high priority programs as directed by Congress, according to OMB staff, because of OMB's interpretation of Congress's direction. In addition, the reports were not issued quarterly, as directed. USDS staff attributed this to the time and effort needed to review and prepare the report. However, continuing to identify and report on the top 10 high priority programs while also reporting on USDS's projects would help to enhance congressional oversight and current administration IT governance entities' efforts by providing stakeholders with information that is not readily available.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making three recommendations to OMB for enhancing the oversight of high priority programs and continuing to report on both these programs and USDS projects. OMB neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendations but disagreed with several of GAO's conclusions, which GAO continues to believe are valid as discussed in the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_434"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_435","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nGPS provides positioning, navigation, and timing data to civilian and military users who depend on this satellite-based system. Since 2000, DOD\u2014led by the Air Force\u2014has been working to modernize GPS and to keep the current system of satellites\u2014known as the GPS constellation\u2014operational, although these efforts have experienced cost and schedule growth.\nThe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 contained a provision that the Air Force provide reports to GAO on GPS acquisition programs and that GAO brief the congressional defense committees. GAO briefed the committees in 2016 and 2017. This report summarizes and expands on information presented in those briefings.\nThis report assesses the extent to which DOD faces acquisition challenges (1) sustaining the GPS constellation; (2) developing a new ground control system; and (3) developing and fielding modernized receivers. GAO analyzed GPS quarterly acquisition reports and data, acquisition strategies, software and test plans, and other documents, and interviewed DOD and contractor officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense's (DOD) acquisition of the next generation Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites, known as GPS III, faces a number of acquisition challenges, but these challenges do not threaten DOD's ability to continue operating the current GPS system, which DOD refers to as the constellation, in the near term. Projections for how long the current constellation will be fully capable have increased by nearly 2 years to June 2021, affording some buffer to offset any additional satellite delays. While the first GPS III satellite has a known parts problem, six follow-on satellites\u2014which do not\u2014are currently scheduled to be launched by June 2021.\nDOD is relying on a high-risk acquisition schedule to develop a new ground system, known as OCX, to control the broadcast of a modernized military GPS signal. OCX remains at risk for further delays and cost growth. To mitigate continuing delays to the new ground control system, the Air Force has begun a second new program\u2014Military-code (M-code) Early Use\u2014to deliver an interim, limited broadcast encrypted GPS signal for military use by modifying the current ground system. GAO will continue to monitor OCX progress.\nDOD has made some progress on initial testing of the receiver cards needed to utilize the M-code signal. However, additional development is necessary to make M-code work with over 700 weapon systems that require it. DOD has begun initial planning for some weapon systems, but more remains to be done to understand the cost and schedule needed to transition to M-code receivers. The preliminary estimate for integrating and testing a fraction of the weapon systems that need the receiver cards is over $2.5 billion through fiscal year 2021 with only 28 fully and 72 partially funded (see figure). The cost will increase by billions when as yet unfunded weapon systems are included.\nThe level of development and procurement effort beyond the initial receiver cards is significant and will require close coordination across DOD. After the Air Force develops initial cards, the breadth and complexity of this acquisition will multiply, as the offices responsible for upgrading hundreds of weapon systems begin their own individual efforts to further develop and test the cards. However, DOD does not have an organization assigned to collect test data, lessons learned, and design solutions so that common design solutions are employed to avoid duplication of effort as multiple entities separately mature receiver cards. DOD therefore risks paying to repeatedly find design solutions to solve common problems because each program office is likely to undertake its own uncoordinated development effort.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nDOD should assign responsibility to an organization to collect test data, lessons learned, and design solutions so they may be shared. DOD concurred with the recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_435"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_436","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nConducting R&D on technologies is vital to enhancing the security of the nation. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, designates S&T as responsible for coordinating all R&D activities of DHS. Questions have been raised about S&T's ability to demonstrate the impact of its R&D investments. Since DHS began operations in 2003, GAO has made recommendations to help improve DHS's efforts to coordinate and oversee R&D.\nGAO was asked to review DHS's R&D efforts. This report examines (1) how much DHS has obligated for R&D and what types of R&D DHS conducts, (2) to what extent S&T coordinates R&D across DHS, and (3) how, if at all, DHS identifies and tracks R&D efforts.\nGAO reviewed documentation from DHS related to the conduct, coordination, tracking, and evaluation of R&D projects. GAO interviewed DHS officials with responsibilities related to, among other things, R&D financial reporting, performance evaluation, and the IPT process, including officials from the 10 DHS components that participate in the IPTs. GAO also reviewed DHS R&D budget and obligation data from fiscal years 2010 through 2017.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Homeland Security (DHS) obligated more than $10 billion for research and development (R&D) from fiscal years 2010 through 2017. Seven DHS components have budget authority to conduct R&D, and the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) obligated nearly 80 percent of all DHS R&D funds during this time period. These components conduct a wide range of R&D, from cybersecurity to border security projects. S&T generally leads or funds R&D projects by providing technology and knowledge products to support four homeland security mission areas:\nDisaster resilience . Improving community resilience to natural disasters through technology and tools;\nCritical incidents . Improving response technological capabilities;\nBorder security . Improving the nation's ability to detect, interdict and prosecute illegal activity across air, land and sea.\nCybersecurity . Developing technologies and tools to secure systems and critical infrastructures against cyberattacks.\nS&T strengthened its R&D coordination efforts across DHS, but some challenges remain. In 2015, DHS established an R&D coordination mechanism, to be led by S&T, and in 2017 issued R&D coordination-related guidance. Specifically, to improve coordination, DHS established an Integrated Product Team (IPT) process to serve as the key R&D coordination mechanism within DHS. All ten DHS components that GAO interviewed stated that the IPT process improved visibility into DHS R&D efforts. However, the component that obligated approximately 17 percent of DHS R&D funds in 2017, or $176 million, did not participate in the IPT process in 2018, as required. Nonparticipation poses a risk to R&D coordination efforts across DHS, including R&D project information not being shared among components. Furthermore, ensuring that all required components participate in the IPT process would help S&T maintain visibility of R&D projects in order to fulfill its statutory role of coordinating R&D, and mitigate the risk of potential duplication of effort.\nS&T, in its coordination role for DHS, uses disparate information sources to identify and track R&D project information and faces challenges to track progress and other information for ongoing R&D projects. For example, R&D project information is stored in multiple information sources leading to difficulty in integrating complete R&D project information and resulting in reporting that is not comprehensive. By developing a mechanism to address these challenges, S&T can further improve its efforts to report and analyze R&D project information, and have improved visibility on R&D efforts across DHS. GAO also identified challenges in collecting information related to R&D performance. Among other things, DHS is not well positioned to integrate the results and share lessons learned because limited R&D customer feedback information is collected and analyzed. Of the seven DHS components with R&D budget authority, two reported having formal customer feedback mechanisms. As a result, DHS is unable to more fully understand its customers' perceptions and experience which would allow DHS to better assess the performance of its R&D efforts.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making four recommendations, with which DHS concurred, including that DHS: 1) ensure all components participate in the IPT process, 2) develop a mechanism that aligns R&D project tracking sources, and 3) collect feedback from R&D customers.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_436"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_437","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nEXIM serves as the official export credit agency of the United States, providing a range of financial products to support the export of U.S. goods and services. Following the 2007\u20132009 financial crisis, demand for EXIM support increased. However, from July 2015 to May 2019, EXIM lacked a quorum on its Board of Directors and, as a result, was unable to approve medium- and long-term transactions greater than $10 million.\nThe Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2012 includes a provision for GAO to evaluate EXIM's underwriting process. This report discusses the extent to which EXIM's (1) process for updating its underwriting policies and procedures is properly designed and implemented and (2) underwriting policies and procedures for loan and loan guarantee transactions are consistent with guidance for managing federal credit programs. To address these objectives, GAO evaluated EXIM's underwriting policies and procedures against federal guidance and discussed the underwriting process with EXIM officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO found that Export-Import Bank's (EXIM) process for updating its underwriting policies and procedures was properly designed and implemented. EXIM's Loan, Guarantee and Insurance Manual (Manual) describes EXIM's underwriting policies and procedures for its short-, medium-, and long-term loans and loan guarantees. The Manual describes the responsibilities of divisions and loan officers involved in the underwriting process and is required to be updated at least annually, except for material changes (e.g., changes resulting from legislative actions or compliance with sanctions), which are required to be made as soon as possible.\nEXIM has initiated a process to streamline the Manual, which consists of over 1,400 pages, by separating the policies and procedures, thus allowing for continuous reviews. The underwriting sections of the Manual are tentatively scheduled for review in 2019.\nThe primary guidance for designing and managing federal credit programs is Office of Management and Budget Circular A-129, Policies for Federal Credit Programs and Non-Tax Receivables . GAO found that EXIM\u2018s policies and procedures were consistent with three of five areas of federal guidance; two areas related to lender and servicer eligibility and risk sharing practices were partially consistent with federal guidance.\nApplicant screening. EXIM's policies and procedures were consistent with guidance in that they require applicants to provide relevant financial information and assessments of applicant eligibility and creditworthiness.\nLoan documentation. EXIM's process was consistent with guidance in that it requires the preparation of loan files, which include the application, credit reports, and related analyses, as well as collateral documentation and loan agreements.\nCollateral requirements. EXIM's process was consistent with guidance in that it requires a security interest in the financed export items.\nLender and servicer eligibility. EXIM established eligibility and decertification procedures for short-term delegated authority lenders that were consistent with guidance. However, it did not establish similar procedures for medium-term delegated authority lenders.\nRisk sharing practices. EXIM's process was generally consistent with guidance in that EXIM provides loan guarantee terms that officials stated were necessary to achieve program purposes. However, federal guidance also calls for an agency to periodically review programs in which the government bears more than 80 percent of any loss. While EXIM prepares various program reviews, it has not developed procedures to help ensure that its risk sharing practices are routinely reviewed.\nWithout enhancements to its policies and procedures, EXIM may allow lenders that are not qualified to underwrite transactions and runs the risk that it will not effectively review its programs.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making two recommendations to enhance EXIM's policies and procedures related to (1) the use of medium-term delegated authority lenders and (2) periodic program reviews. EXIM concurred with GAO's recommendations and described actions planned to address them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_437"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_438","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nVA operates the largest health care delivery system in America and VistA is essential to helping deliver the health care services and ensure the quality of health care received by the nation's veterans and their dependents. The system has been in operation for more than 30 years, is costly to maintain, and does not readily support VA's need to electronically exchange health records with the Department of Defense and private health care providers. VA has pursued initiatives to modernize VistA, using government contractors to support its efforts. In June 2017, VA announced a new effort to purchase a commercial solution to replace VistA.\nGAO was requested to review VA's prior and current efforts to modernize VistA. This review determined (1) VA's efforts to modernize VistA, including key contractors, contract costs, and expected contractor activities and (2) VA's current plans for modernizing VistA and the progress that has been achieved to date. To conduct its study, GAO reviewed VA documentation and its prior work and requested and obtained data on contracts, related obligations, and expected contractor activities for previous efforts. GAO also obtained documentation on plans for VA's current modernization efforts and progress made on the efforts, and interviewed VA officials.\nGAO has made recommendations to VA aimed at improving its prior modernization efforts. The department concurred with the recommendations and generally took responsive actions. GAO is making no recommendations at this time. VA provided technical comments on this report, which were incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has, since 2001, pursued four separate initiatives to modernize its health information system\u2014the Veterans Health Information Systems and Technology Architecture (VistA). These efforts\u2014HealtheVet, the integrated Electronic Health Record (iEHR), VistA Evolution, and the Electronic Health Record Modernization (EHRM)\u2014reflect varying approaches that the department has considered to achieve a modernized health system over the course of nearly two decades (see figure). This latest effort, the EHRM program, is to include the adoption of the same commercial electronic health record system that the Department of Defense is in the process of acquiring.\nVA obligated about $1.1 billion to 138 different contractors that worked on iEHR and VistA Evolution (the two efforts for which VA could provide contract data) during fiscal years 2011 through 2016. Funding for the 34 contractors that worked on both efforts totaled about $793 million of the $1.1 billion obligated for contracts on the two initiatives. The top 15 of the contractors that worked on the two efforts (key contractors) accounted for approximately $741 million\u2014$411 million for the development of new system capabilities, $256 million for project management activities, and $74 million for operations and maintenance for iEHR and VistA Evolution.\nVA has begun planning for the transition from VistA Evolution to EHRM. However, the department is still early in its efforts and has begun developing plans that are intended to guide the new EHRM program. According to the EHRM Executive Director, the department intends to complete development of its plans for EHRM within 90 days after awarding the contract for its new system, which is planned to occur in early 2018. VA has also begun to staff the EHRM program's leadership positions. The department's dedication to completing and effectively executing the planning activities that it has identified will be essential to helping minimize program risks and expeditiously guide this latest electronic health record modernization initiative to a successful outcome\u2014which VA, for almost two decades, has been unable to achieve.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_438"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_439","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe U.S. Department of Commerce's NIST provides measurement services and supports standards that promote U.S. competitiveness. For example, NIST provides calibrations for manufacturing equipment and reference materials used in testing. NIST also supports private sector organizations in developing standards to help ensure product performance, among other things, such as Wi-Fi. In recent years, NIST has sought to improve the delivery of its services and documentary standards activities.\nGAO was asked to review NIST measurement services and standards-support activities. This report examines (1) the challenges NIST faces in providing measurement services and supporting documentary standards development, and (2) the extent to which NIST has taken steps to address these challenges and how those steps align with federal guidance and policy. GAO analyzed testimony, reports, laws, and policies; conducted focus groups with academics and industry representatives; and interviewed various stakeholders.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) faces challenges in providing measurement services and supporting private sector development of specifications for products' designs or performance\u2014referred to as \u201cdocumentary standards.\u201d Based on reviews of relevant testimony, reports, and other documents; interviews with stakeholders; and focus groups with academics and industry representatives, GAO identified challenges including:\nIdentifying and prioritizing what measurement services, such as calibrating large force-measurement tools used by aerospace manufacturers, or what documentary standards activities, such as serving as a technical advisor on fire safety standards, are most needed by U.S. industry, and\nCoordinating with other federal agencies on standards development issues.\nNIST has taken steps to address these challenges, including industry outreach and reviews of measurement services and standards activities. However, some efforts do not fully align with federal guidance or NIST policy. For example, NIST's measurement-services and standards-activity reviews have not included a comprehensive examination of how these services and standards activities align with stakeholder needs. Federal internal control standards call for managers to use quality information to determine if the agency is meeting its objectives. Comprehensively reviewing NIST's measurement services and documentary-standards activities would provide NIST with greater confidence that its services and activities align with stakeholders' needs.\nGAO also found that NIST coordinates with other agencies on standards development and related activities, but that some efforts do not fully align with specific leading practices GAO has previously identified for enhancing and sustaining interagency collaboration. For example, NIST and other agencies coordinate on standards activities through a NIST-chaired interagency committee. However, GAO found that the committee has not updated its charter since 2000\u2014contrary to leading practices to update and monitor collaborative agreements. GAO also found that NIST has not worked with other committee members to fully clarify agencies' roles and responsibilities. Without ensuring that member agencies' roles and responsibilities are current and fully clarified, NIST and other agencies may miss opportunities to strengthen coordination.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making seven recommendations, including that NIST comprehensively review measurement services and documentary-standards activities, and work with other agencies to take steps to strengthen interagency coordination. The Department of Commerce agreed with six recommendations and disagreed with one, citing risks to the private-sector-led U.S. standards system. GAO clarified its recommendation and continues to believe this action is needed, as discussed in the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_439"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_440","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOE and its contractor are building the WTP\u2014which consists of multiple facilities\u2014to treat a large portion of nuclear waste at Hanford. The project has faced persistent challenges, including quality assurance problems that have delayed it by decades and more than tripled its costs, to nearly $17 billion. DOE's quality assurance framework aims to ensure that all problems are identified and do not recur.\nSenate Report 114-49 accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 included a provision for GAO to carry out an ongoing evaluation of the WTP. This first report examines (1) the actions DOE has taken to identify and address WTP quality assurance problems, (2) the extent to which DOE has ensured that quality assurance problems have been identified and do not recur, and (3) the extent to which DOE's organizational structure at ORP provides the Quality Assurance Division with independence to effectively oversee the contractor's quality assurance program. GAO reviewed DOE documents and obtained the insights of ORP's internal experts on WTP quality assurance efforts and outcomes.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Energy (DOE) has taken several actions to identify and address quality assurance problems at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) at its Hanford site in Washington. Among the actions taken is the implementation of the Managed Improvement Plan by DOE's Office of River Protection (ORP) and the WTP contactor. The plan is intended to ensure that the WTP can operate in compliance with DOE-approved safety and quality requirements. The contractor has stated that the plan is fully implemented, but GAO found that a number of key activities may be incomplete and ORP officials will not be able to verify the extent of implementation until December 2018.\nAccording to DOE documents that GAO reviewed and ORP quality assurance experts GAO spoke with, ORP has not ensured that all WTP quality assurance problems have been identified and some previously identified problems are recurring. For example, a 2016 DOE report found quality assurance problems, such as engineering errors and construction deficiencies, that neither ORP nor the contractor had identified when the work was conducted. ORP quality assurance experts GAO spoke with reiterated the issues identified in reports. In addition, DOE audits have found that previously identified quality assurance problems have recurred in key areas, such as the procurement of items that do not meet requirements or perform as specified. These problems were also raised by several of the ORP quality assurance experts GAO interviewed. According to these experts, such recurring problems may lead to significant rework at WTP facilities in the future if work is not stopped and the issues addressed. ORP's quality assurance framework requires the contractor to determine the extent to which quality assurance problems exist in all WTP structures, systems, and components when such problems are identified, and allows ORP to stop work at a facility if recurring issues arise. However, ORP has neither directed the contractor to make this determination nor stopped work when problems recur because it has confidence in the Managed Improvement Plan.\nORP's organizational structure may not provide its Quality Assurance Division with sufficient independence from the office's upper management to oversee the contractor's quality assurance program effectively. GAO has previously found that an oversight organization should be structurally distinct and separate from program offices responsible for cost and schedule performance to avoid conflict between mission objectives and safety. However, a 2017 DOE headquarters assessment found that ORP's Quality Assurance Division's effectiveness has been limited. This is because in some cases ORP upper management had mischaracterized its findings, and in other instances, ORP upper management had not used this division to evaluate the extent of potential quality assurance problems. ORP quality assurance experts GAO spoke to were also concerned that ORP's organizational structure does not always ensure the independence of the division. For example, two of these experts described instances when ORP upper management had downgraded the division's findings so that the contractor could take less stringent corrective measures. By providing the Quality Assurance Division adequate independence, DOE can better ensure that compliance with nuclear safety requirements will not be subordinated to other project management goals, such as meeting cost and schedule targets.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DOE direct the WTP contractor to determine the extent of problems in WTP structures, systems, and components and order work stops when problems recur, and DOE should direct ORP to revise its organizational structure to ensure the independence of the Quality Assurance Division. DOE generally agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_440"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_441","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nVA operates one of the largest health care systems in the United States, utilizing more than 6,000 federally owned and 1,500 leased buildings. DOD has repeatedly applied the BRAC process to reduce the amount of unneeded property that it owns and leases and to save billions of dollars that could be applied to higher priority defense needs.\nThis statement is based on GAO's April 2017 report related to VA facility alignment ( GAO-17-349 ) and numerous GAO reports related to the BRAC process as summarized in a June 2011 testimony ( GAO-11-704T ) and a March 2012 testimony ( GAO-12-513T ). This statement addresses (1) the factors that affect VA's facility alignment and the extent to which VA's capital-planning process facilitates the alignment of facilities with the veterans' population, and (2) the key elements and challenges affecting DOD and the Commission in BRAC 2005. Detailed information on our scope and methodologies for this work can be found in these published products, cited throughout this testimony.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGeographic shifts in the veterans' population, changes in health care delivery, aging infrastructure, and limited stakeholder involvement affect the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) efforts to align its services and real property portfolio to meet the needs of veterans. For example, a shift over time from inpatient to outpatient care will likely result in underutilized space once used for inpatient care. Further, the historic status of some VA facilities adds to the complexity of converting or disposing of them. In such instances, it is often difficult and costly for VA to modernize, renovate, and retrofit these older facilities.\nGAO reported that two of the planning processes VA uses to align its facilities\u2014VA's Strategic Capital Investment Planning (SCIP) and the VA Integrated Planning (VAIP)\u2014have limitations that undermine VA's efforts to achieve its goals. Specifically:\nVA relies on the SCIP process to plan and prioritize capital projects, but VA routinely asks its facility planners to submit their next year's planned project narratives before knowing if their previous submissions have been funded. The overlapping budget cycle, which is outside of VA's control, combined with other SCIP limitations\u2014including subjective narratives, long time frames, and restricted access to information\u2014make it difficult for VA to rely on SCIP to accurately identify the capital necessary to address its service and infrastructure gaps. VA concurred that it needs to address SCIP limitations that are within its control, as GAO recommended; VA has made some progress in implementing the recommendation has made some progress in implementing the recommendation.\\\nThe VAIP process is estimated to cost $108 million and to produce market-level service delivery plans and facility master plans. However, the VAIP master plans incorrectly assume that all future growth in services will be provided directly through VA facilities without considering alternatives, such as purchasing care from the community. GAO recommended that VA consider discontinuing the VAIP facility master plans pending an assessment of their value as a facility-planning tool. VA agreed with the recommendation and is implementing it while pursuing a national realignment strategy..\nKey elements of the Department of Defense's (DOD) 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process could benefit VA's asset and infrastructure review. The key elements included: (1) establishing goals for the process, (2) developing criteria for evaluating closures and realignments, and (3) establishing an organizational structure to develop closure and realignment options. GAO identified key challenges that affected DOD's implementation of BRAC 2005 and the results achieved; these challenges would need to be addressed if VA is to successfully apply the process. These challenges included: (1) large, complex recommendations required sustained senior leadership's attention and a high level of coordination among many stakeholders, and (2) the large number of actions that depend on each other for successful implementation.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nIn the April 2017 report, GAO made recommendations related to capital planning and stakeholder involvement. VA concurred with the recommendations to the extent that they were within its control and has started making improvements.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_441"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_442","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nVA's disability compensation program pays cash benefits to veterans with disabilities connected to their military service. In recent years, the time needed to complete appeals of VA's decisions on claims has increased. For appeals resolved in fiscal year 2017, veterans waited an average of 3 years. The subset of appeals resolved by the Board of Veterans Appeals\u2014a separate VA agency that provides a higher level of appeals review\u2014took on average 7 years to resolve.\nThe Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017 makes changes to VA's current (legacy) process, giving veterans options to have their claims further reviewed by VA or appeal directly to the Board. The Act requires VA to submit a plan to Congress and GAO for implementing a new appeals process (which VA submitted in November 2017) and periodic updates (which VA submitted in February and May 2018). The Act also includes a provision for GAO to assess VA's original plan.\nIn March 2018, GAO found that VA could help ensure successful implementation of appeals reform by addressing gaps in planning and made four recommendations, with which VA agreed. This testimony focuses on the steps VA has taken to address GAO's recommendations and what aspects remain unaddressed.\nFor this statement, GAO reviewed VA's May 2018 updated plan, and interviewed VA officials and reviewed information they provided about steps taken to implement GAO's recommendations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn a March 2018 report, GAO assessed the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) November 2017 plan for changing how veterans appeal disability claim decisions and found that VA could do more to successfully implement these reforms. The March 2018 report made four recommendations to address planning gaps. Since then, VA has updated its plan and taken some steps to address aspects of these recommendations, but further steps are needed:\nAddress all legally required elements . GAO reported that VA's plan did not address one and partially addressed four of 22 elements required by the Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017 (Act), and recommended VA fully address them all. In a May 2018 update to its plan, VA took steps to address the five elements, such as developing productivity projections and a model to forecast resource needs for processing appeals. These steps address one element related to projecting productivity, and partially address the four remaining elements.\nArticulate performance measurement . GAO also recommended VA clearly articulate how it will monitor and assess the new appeals process relative to the legacy process. This recommendation includes specifying timeliness goals for five new appeals options to be made available to veterans, and additional goals or measures of performance, such as accuracy in processing appeals. VA's updated plan states that the agency will develop goals and measures for all appeals options after fully implementing appeals reform. Contrary to sound planning practices, it does not articulate these performance goals and measures now, which would provide a vision for what successful implementation would look like. Lacking this vision, VA does not have an \u201cend state\u201d to guide its implementation and help establish accountability.\nAugment project plan . GAO recommended VA augment its master schedule for implementing appeals reform to include all key activities and reflect other sound practices for guiding implementation and establishing accountability. Although VA's May 2018 updated master schedule added activities, it omitted a pilot test of the new Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) options. More generally, the plan does not reflect interdependencies among activities. Until all key activities are accounted for and the master schedule reflects sound practices, VA cannot provide reasonable assurance that it has the essential information needed to manage its appeals reform implementation.\nAddress risk fully . GAO recommended that VA's appeals plan more fully address risks in implementing a new process by, for example, testing all appeals options prior to full implementation. In its updated plan, VA stated it will pilot all five new appeals options. By taking these steps, VA should be better positioned to assess implementation risks. However, the updated plan does not have well-defined, measurable criteria for assessing lessons learned from these pilots and does not articulate how well these lessons translate to a broader context. Taking these steps would improve VA's ability to assess and mitigate risks as it implements its reforms.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_442"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_443","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Coast Guard spends billions of dollars on its major acquisition programs to meet its missions. GAO's prior work has identified the Coast Guard's reliance on its annual budget process to manage its acquisition portfolio as a challenge.\nGAO was asked to review the recapitalization of the Coast Guard's acquisition portfolio. This report assesses, among other topics, the extent to which the Coast Guard has made changes to how it manages its acquisition portfolio.\nGAO assessed Coast Guard's major acquisition programs to determine changes since GAO's 2014 portfolio review. GAO analyzed program baselines and interviewed Coast Guard officials. GAO analyzed the CIP for fiscal years 2014 through 2018, and reviewed the EOC's documentation.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Coast Guard, a component within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), continues to manage its acquisitions through its annual budget process and the 5-year Capital Investment Plan (CIP)\u2014congressionally mandated and used for oversight. This management approach creates constant churn as program baselines must continually re-align with budget realities instead of budgets being formulated to support program baselines. Further, Coast Guard officials said the CIP reflects the highest priorities of the department\u2014such as the Offshore Patrol Cutter, which is the Coast Guard's highest priority\u2014and that trade-off decisions are made as part of the annual budget process. However, the effects of these decisions, such as which acquisitions would take on more risk so others can be prioritized and adequately funded, are not communicated in the CIP to key decision makers, because including such information is not statutorily required. Over the years, this approach has left the Coast Guard with a build up\u2014or bow wave\u2014of near-term unfunded acquisitions, negatively affecting recapitalization efforts and limiting the effectiveness of long-term planning. Including the effects of these trade-offs in the CIP would align with GAO's cost estimating best practices. Until it does so, the Coast Guard limits its ability to manage its acquisition portfolio in the long-term, beyond the time covered in the 5-year CIP.\nIn response to a September 2012 GAO recommendation, the Coast Guard updated the Executive Oversight Council's (EOC)\u2014a cross-directorate group that oversees major acquisition programs\u2014charter in 2014 to require annual reviews of the acquisition portfolio collectively. However, EOC officials said that these annual reviews never occurred, and GAO found that the annual review requirement was removed from the charter in 2017. Thus, the Coast Guard is without a senior-level group charged to collectively review and ensure affordability of its acquisition portfolio. The Office of Management and Budget's Capital Programming Guide states that a senior-level executive committee should be responsible for reviewing the agency's entire asset portfolio and for making decisions on the proper composition of assets needed to achieve strategic goals within budget constraints.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that the annual CIPs reflect acquisition trade-off decisions and their effects, and that the EOC review the overall acquisition portfolio and its affordability annually. DHS concurred with the CIP recommendation. DHS did not concur with the EOC recommendation. It noted that other existing Coast Guard bodies are responsible for evaluating and prioritizing funding. However, DHS stated that the EOC charter will be updated to require it to review the overall acquisition portfolio, including long-term planning. If this long-term planning accounts for budget realities for the acquisition portfolio, GAO believes the intent of the recommendation will be met.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_443"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_444","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn 2018, DOD estimated that its 82 major defense acquisition programs would cost over $1.69 trillion in total to acquire. DOD relies on program offices\u2014composed of civilian, military and contractor support personnel\u2014to manage and oversee these technically complex programs.\nGAO was asked to review factors affecting DOD's personnel needs for its acquisition programs and how DOD budgets for the costs associated with these personnel.\nThis report describes (1) factors affecting the workforce size, composition, and mix of contractor and government personnel, as well as organizational structure for selected programs; and (2) how personnel costs associated with those selected programs are included in DOD's budget justification documents.\nGAO reviewed DOD acquisition, workforce, and financial management policies and regulations and identified a non-generalizable sample of 11 major defense acquisition programs, including programs from each military department that were recently approved to enter into system development. GAO requested information from each of these programs to identify the number and type of personnel supporting the program, reviewed program documentation, and interviewed program officials. GAO also reviewed DOD's budget justification documents for fiscal years 2018 and 2019.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe workforce size, composition, and mix, as well as the organizational structure of the 11 Department of Defense (DOD) major defense acquisition programs GAO reviewed were influenced by several interrelated factors. These factors include the government's role in developing and integrating key technologies, the availability of government personnel to provide the skills needed, and whether the program was managed as part of a portfolio of related programs or as a stand-alone program. For example, programs that assumed more responsibility for developing and integrating key technologies generally had a larger workforce, which was primarily composed of engineering and technical personnel. Program officials GAO met with stated that they generally prefer to use government personnel, but use contractor support when the number of government personnel allocated to the program is not sufficient to meet their needs, the technical skills are not available or are limited within the government, or to fulfill short-term tasks that are too brief to justify hiring government personnel. GAO also found that DOD structured the 11 programs to allow them to leverage available personnel with the necessary skills. Two programs were structured as standalone programs because they were new, high priority, and complex. The other nine programs were managed as a part of a portfolio of related programs. For example, the Air Force's F-15 program office manages a number of programs that add capabilities to the existing system.\nDOD's Financial Management Regulation, which governs the formulation and presentation of DOD's budget request, gives DOD flexibility in how it submits program personnel costs. Consequently, the personnel costs for the 11 programs GAO reviewed were not separately and distinctly identified from other costs. For example, costs for civilian and military personnel are often centrally funded through appropriations categories that support many DOD activities and do not provide information on specific program personnel costs. GAO also found that costs for contractor support are often combined with other costs in individual program budget exhibits.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_444"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_445","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn 2018, FCC estimated that 35 percent of Americans living on tribal lands lack broadband service compared to 8 percent of Americans overall. Various federal programs support increasing broadband deployment in unserved areas, including tribal lands. Tribes can form partnerships with private sector companies and others to deploy broadband infrastructure on tribal lands. GAO was asked to provide information on these partnerships.\nThis report discusses (1) examples and outcomes of tribal partnership arrangements, (2) the amount of federal funding provided to tribal entities for broadband deployment, and (3) stakeholder-identified barriers that tribes face in obtaining federal funding and the extent to which federal agencies have addressed those barriers. GAO identified partnerships by reviewing federally funded broadband projects that included a partnership component; analyzed federal funding dedicated to broadband deployment; interviewed agency and tribal government officials, tribal associations, tribally owned broadband providers, and industry stakeholders; and assessed RUS's efforts to address the regulatory funding barriers tribes may face. The information presented is illustrative and is not generalizable to all tribes or all partnerships.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO identified some partnership arrangements between tribes and other entities to increase broadband access on tribal lands. Among the seven examples GAO identified, tribes partnered with different types of entities including private broadband providers, a community access network provider, an electric cooperative, a regional consortium, and tribally owned broadband providers. According to the tribes participating in the partnerships, almost all of the partnerships improved broadband service on tribal lands.\nThe Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) are the primary sources of federal funding to deploy broadband infrastructure where the cost of providing service is high, including on tribal lands. GAO reviewed funding for four programs, three in FCC and one grant program in RUS, and found that in total, less than 1 percent has gone directly to tribes or to tribally owned broadband providers to expand broadband service. GAO found that 14 tribal entities received federal funding from FCC and RUS to increase broadband deployment for 2010\u20132017.\nThe tribal officials, tribal associations, and tribally owned broadband providers GAO contacted cited several barriers tribes face in obtaining federal funding to deploy broadband service on tribal lands. For example, they said tribes face regulatory barriers in applying for RUS's grant funding, including (1) preparing existing and proposed network design, (2) demonstrating financial sustainability of the broadband project within 5 years, and (3) obtaining matching funds. An interagency council recently recommended that federal agencies identify and address regulatory barriers that may unduly impede broadband deployment. Although RUS conducts some outreach with tribes, it has not undertaken a formal assessment to identify and address the regulatory barriers that tribes may face in obtaining RUS's funding for broadband deployment. RUS officials told GAO that they do not have the resources to do so. Nevertheless, lacking such an assessment, tribes may continue to face regulatory barriers in obtaining RUS funding for broadband deployment on their lands. By identifying and addressing any regulatory barriers that impede tribal entities' access to RUS funding, RUS could help tribes obtain funding to expand broadband deployment on tribal lands.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that RUS identify and address regulatory barriers that impede tribal entities from obtaining RUS funding for broadband deployment. RUS neither agreed nor disagreed with this recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_445"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_446","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThrough its civil works program, the Corps plans, designs, constructs, operates, and maintains a range of water resources projects for purposes such as aquatic ecosystem restoration, flood risk management, and navigation. To support these projects, the Corps requests funding through the annual budget and appropriation process. For fiscal year 2017, the President's budget requested $4.6 billion for Corps' water resources projects, of which about $1 billion was for construction projects.\nGAO was asked to review budget requests for construction projects under the Corps' civil works program, including the geographic distribution of those projects. This report examines for fiscal years 2008 through 2017 (1) the geographic distribution of the construction projects included in the President's budget requests for the Corps, and (2) how the Corps prioritized such projects for inclusion in the President's budget requests. GAO summarized available budget data for fiscal years 2008 through 2017; reviewed the Corps' budget guidance and documents; mapped locations for construction projects in budget requests for years when sufficient information was available; and interviewed Corps headquarters and division officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFor fiscal years 2008 through 2017, construction projects included in the President's budget requests to Congress for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) were geographically distributed in 31 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. During this 10-year period, the President requested over $12.9 billion for 164 construction projects included in the Corps' three main missions\u2014aquatic ecosystem restoration, flood risk management, and navigation. The Corps provided GAO with detailed information on the location of construction projects included in the budget requests for the 3 most recent fiscal years at the time of its review\u20142015 through 2017. These projects, shown in the figure below, spanned 26 states and Puerto Rico. They were typically located near sources of water or Corps-constructed water infrastructure.\nTo prioritize construction projects to include in the President's budget requests for fiscal years 2008 through 2017, the Corps used a process involving each of its three organizational levels\u2014districts, divisions, and headquarters. Districts divided projects into work packages and assigned 1 of 6 priority levels to indicate the order in which work packages from the same project should be completed. Districts grouped these work packages by business line or appropriations account based on the Corps' budget guidance for the fiscal year and then ranked them. Then Corps divisions and headquarters ranked the work packages. To assign rankings, Corps officials applied criteria specific to the business line of each project. These criteria often varied by fiscal year to address changes to policy guidance. Across the organization, Corps officials ranked more than 25,000 packages for fiscal year 2017. After assigning rankings, headquarters developed final budget recommendations to submit to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, who in turn provided the recommendations to the Office of Management and Budget for review and potential inclusion in the President's budget requests.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making recommendations in this report. The Department of Defense stated that they had no comments on the draft report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_446"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_447","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn December 2014, Congress enacted FITARA, which was intended to improve covered agencies' acquisitions of IT. FITARA also provided an opportunity to strengthen the authority of CIOs to provide needed direction and oversight of agencies' IT budgets.\nGAO was asked to review whether CIOs' IT budgeting practices are consistent with FITARA and OMB's implementing guidance. This report addresses the extent to which selected federal agencies (1) established policies and procedures that address IT budgeting requirements, (2) could demonstrate that they had developed fiscal year 2017 IT budgets for sampled investments consistent with FITARA and OMB guidance, and (3) implemented processes to ensure that annual IT budgets are informed by reliable cost information.\nGAO selected four departments to review. These departments had the two highest and the two lowest average initial selfassessments scores of compliance with OMB's FITARA guidance, as well as a fiscal year 2017 IT budget of at least $1 billion. Within each of the departments, GAO also selected the component agencies with the largest fiscal year 2017 IT budget. For each selected department and component agency, GAO reviewed relevant IT budget policies and procedures, analyzed a sample of major and non-major investment proposals against key OMB requirements, and determined whether selected departments captured government labor costs, among other things.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe departments GAO reviewed\u2014the Departments of Energy (DOE), Health and Human Services (HHS), Justice (DOJ), and the Treasury (Treasury)\u2014took steps to establish policies and procedures that align with eight selected Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requirements intended to implement information technology (IT) acquisition reform legislation (commonly referred to as the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act, or FITARA) and to provide the chief information officer (CIO) visibility into and oversight over the IT budget. For example, of the eight OMB requirements, all four departments had established policies and procedures related to the level of detail with which IT resources are to be described in order to inform the CIO during the planning and budgeting processes. Agencies varied, however, as to how fully they had established policies and procedures related to some other OMB requirements, and none of the four departments had yet established procedures for ensuring that the CIO had reviewed whether the IT portfolio includes appropriate estimates of all IT resources included in the budget request. (See table.)\nWhere the departments had not fully established policies and procedures, it was due, in part, to having not addressed in their FITARA implementation and delegation plans how they intended to implement the OMB requirements. Until departments develop comprehensive policies and procedures that address IT budgeting requirements established by OMB, they risk inconsistently applying requirements that are intended to facilitate the CIO's oversight and approval of the IT budget.\nDepartments varied in the extent to which they could demonstrate implementation of key IT budgeting requirements when developing fiscal year 2017 funding requests for sampled investments. Specifically, while DOJ demonstrated that it had fully implemented the selected requirements for the majority of the investments GAO sampled, HHS and Treasury partially demonstrated implementation for a majority of the sampled investments, and DOE could not demonstrate implementation for the majority of the sampled investments. For example, DOE, HHS, and Treasury were not able to fully show that their CIOs had reviewed whether estimates of IT resources included in the budget request were appropriate for two of their respective departments' largest fiscal year 2017 IT investments. Departments often could not demonstrate that they had implemented selected IT budgeting requirements at the investment level because they had not established comprehensive policies and procedures that required them to do so. As a result, departments could not show that CIOs were sufficiently involved in planning fiscal year 2017 IT expenditures at the individual investment level.\nAll four selected departments lacked quality assurance processes for ensuring their IT budgets were informed by reliable cost information. Specifically, the selected departments did not have IT capital planning processes for (1) ensuring government labor costs have been accurately reported, (2) aligning contract costs with IT investments, and (3) utilizing budget object class data to capture all IT programs. This resulted in billions of dollars in requested IT expenditures without departments having comprehensive information to support those requests, and nearly $4.6 billion in IT contract spending that was not explicitly aligned with investments in selected departments' IT portfolios. This was due to a lack of processes for periodically reviewing data quality and estimation methods for government labor estimates, as well as a lack of mechanisms to cross-walk IT spending data in their procurement and accounting systems with investment data in their IT portfolio management systems. In August 2017, OMB developed a new approach of using a standard set of categories to group IT spending that, if properly implemented, has the potential to provide departments and CIOs enhanced visibility into IT costs across the portfolio. Nevertheless, until departments establish processes for assessing or otherwise ensuring the quality of relevant IT cost data used to inform their IT budgets, department CIOs will have less assurance that their budget includes appropriate and comprehensive estimates of IT resources.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making 43 recommendations to the eight selected departments and component agencies to address gaps in their IT budgeting policies and procedures, demonstrate implementation of OMB requirements, and establish procedures to ensure IT budgets are informed by reliable cost information. HHS, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, DOJ, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Internal Revenue Service agreed with our recommendations. DOE partially agreed with one recommendation and agreed with the other recommendations made to it, as well as with the recommendations made to its component agency\u2014the National Nuclear Security Administration. Treasury neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_447"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_448","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nResearch has found that sports participation yields many benefits for youth. Girls' participation in sports has increased dramatically since the passage of Title IX in 1972, but is still lower than for boys. Further, investigations by OCR, which enforces and implements Title IX, have highlighted instances of disparities in the resources provided to girls' and boys' teams.\nGAO was asked to review how public high schools encourage equal athletic opportunities. This report examines (1) measures public high schools and athletics administrators have taken to encourage equal athletic opportunities for boys and girls, and (2) factors that affect boys' and girls' participation levels in public high school sports programs. GAO conducted a nationally generalizable probability survey of athletics administrators at 784 public high schools. GAO interviewed nine subject matter specialists selected to provide a range of perspectives. GAO also reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance and interviewed OCR officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAccording to GAO's nationally generalizable survey of athletics administrators, public high schools recently took various measures to encourage equal opportunities for boys and girls in sports. For example, a majority assessed resources such as equipment, travel opportunities, and facilities that they provided to girls' and boys' teams and some schools took steps to gauge student interest in specific sports as a means of encouraging equal opportunities, according to GAO's survey. Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR) guidance indicates that Title IX coordinators\u2014which school districts are required to designate and make visible per regulations for Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments (Title IX)\u2014should work closely with athletics administrators to determine whether action is needed to address any underrepresentation, or to otherwise encourage equal athletic opportunities. However, GAO estimates that 51 percent of athletics administrators either were unaware of or unsupported by their Title IX coordinator, according to the survey (see figure). These findings raise questions as to whether Title IX coordinators are familiar with and using Education's guidance. Officials from an association for Title IX coordinators said this lack of communication with athletics administrators may be related to some Title IX coordinators' limited understanding of Title IX and athletics. OCR officials said that they did not know the extent to which Title IX coordinators are working with their athletics administrators to encourage equal athletic opportunities because Education generally does not collect this information. Better information on Title IX coordinators could help Education support school districts' efforts to encourage equal sports opportunities for girls and boys.\nThe factors that most affect boys' and girls' participation in public high school sports are the number of, and interest in, participation opportunities offered, according to GAO's survey and interviews with nine subject matter specialists. Though the survey provided no clear consensus on factors that discourage students from participating in sports, athletics administrators most often perceived students' competing responsibilities as discouraging participation.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is recommending that OCR determine the extent of K-12 Title IX coordinators' knowledge and use of tools in its existing guidance and use this information in its efforts to encourage them to work with athletics administrators to help ensure equal athletic opportunities. Education partially concurred, stating it would consider GAO's recommendation in its complaint investigations, technical assistance activities, and communication practice reviews.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_448"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_449","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAs the opioid crisis has increased in recent years, so has the number of pregnant women who use opioids, which can result in NAS. A recent peer-reviewed study found that cases of NAS have grown nearly five-fold between 2000 and 2012 and that most infants with NAS are covered under Medicaid.\nThe Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 includes a provision for GAO to examine NAS in the United States and related treatment services covered under Medicaid. This report 1) describes the hospital and non-hospital settings for treating infants with NAS and how Medicaid pays for services, 2) describes recommended practices and challenges for addressing NAS, and 3) examines HHS's strategy for addressing NAS.\nGAO reviewed HHS documentation and interviewed HHS officials. GAO also conducted site visits to four states\u2014Kentucky, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin\u2014selected based on several factors, including incidence rates of NAS and geographic variation. GAO interviewed stakeholders from 32 organizations, including health care providers and state officials in the selected states.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe prenatal use of opioids or other drugs can produce a withdrawal condition in newborns known as neonatal abstinence syndrome (NAS). Health care providers, state officials, and other stakeholders told GAO that most infants with NAS are treated in the hospital\u2014such as in a neonatal intensive care unit\u2014though some may be referred to a non-hospital setting\u2014such as a neonatal withdrawal center with nursery rooms\u2014to complete their treatment. The table below provides more information on settings for treating infants with NAS and on how Medicaid pays for services in these settings.\nAccording to stakeholders GAO interviewed and literature reviewed, there are several recommended practices and challenges associated with addressing NAS. The most frequently recommended practices included prioritizing non-pharmacologic treatment to infants\u2014treatment that does not involve medications\u2014such as allowing the mother to reside with the infant during treatment; educating mothers and health care providers on treatment of NAS, among other things; and using a protocol in the hospital or non-hospital setting for screening and treating infants with NAS. The most frequently cited challenges included the maternal use of multiple drugs\u2014or polysubstance use\u2014as it can exacerbate NAS symptoms; stigma faced by pregnant women who use opioids; hospital staff burden and limited physical capacity to care for infants with NAS; limited coordination of care for mothers and infants with NAS; and gaps in research and data on NAS, such as research on the long-term effects of the condition.\nIn May 2017, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) published a strategy document that makes key recommendations to address NAS. The Strategy recommends, for example, that health care providers receive continuing education on managing and treating infants with NAS and promote non-pharmacologic treatment. According to HHS officials, these recommendations will inform planning and policy across the department. However, HHS has yet to determine how and when the recommendations will be implemented, including establishing priorities; the roles and responsibilities of other federal, state, and public stakeholders; implementation timeframes; and methods for assessing progress. HHS officials told GAO that they expect to develop an implementation plan sometime in 2017 but had no timeline for doing so. Without a plan that clearly specifies how HHS will implement the Strategy and assess its progress, the department increases the risk that its recommendations for addressing NAS will not be implemented.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nHHS should expeditiously develop a plan for implementing the recommendations included in its strategy related to addressing NAS. HHS concurred that it should expeditiously address NAS, but noted implementation of the strategy is contingent on funding.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_449"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_450","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nMeat and poultry slaughter and processing is one of the most hazardous industries in the United States. GAO was asked to review federal efforts to help ensure meat and poultry worker safety and health.\nThis report (1) describes the efforts OSHA has made to help ensure worker safety and assesses any challenges to these efforts, (2) examines how OSHA and FSIS have collaborated to ensure worker safety, and (3) assesses factors that may affect OSHA and FSIS efforts to protect workers from chemical hazards. GAO analyzed OSHA inspection data from 2005\u2014when GAO last reported on this issue\u2014through 2016. GAO also interviewed OSHA staff in headquarters and six field offices; officials at four other federal agencies; worker advocates; and industry representatives. GAO visited four plants and interviewed workers at six sites in five states selected based on factors such as meat or poultry production.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) increased its annual inspections of the meat and poultry industry from 177 in 2005 to 244 in 2016. OSHA officials told GAO that this increase was related to several new enforcement programs focusing on the poultry industry, as well as new reporting requirements that prompt additional inspections. However, OSHA faces challenges identifying and addressing worker safety concerns because workers may be reluctant to contact OSHA for fear of employer retaliation, although employers are prohibited from doing so by federal law. If workers are afraid to share concerns, OSHA may not be able to identify or address conditions that endanger them. In particular, OSHA may not be aware of the scope of problems workers could face gaining timely access to bathrooms. When asked by GAO, workers in five selected states cited bathroom access as a concern and said they fear speaking up at work, where OSHA inspectors typically interview them. Taking additional steps to encourage workers to disclose sensitive concerns and gathering additional information to determine the scope of bathroom access issues could enable OSHA to better identify worker safety and health concerns.\nOSHA's and the Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service's (FSIS) main vehicle for collaboration on worker safety is their 1994 memorandum of understanding (MOU), but efforts to implement and evaluate the MOU have been limited. The MOU outlines plans for collaboration, such as referrals of plant hazards to OSHA by FSIS inspectors, training of FSIS staff, and information sharing. OSHA and FSIS have taken some steps to implement the policies and procedures outlined in the MOU. However, GAO found issues with the MOU's implementation in these three areas, hampering achievement of the MOU's goals. For example, according to FSIS officials, FSIS inspectors may be reluctant to make referrals to OSHA about hazards in plants because they fear it could trigger an OSHA inspection of FSIS. Further, the agencies have not evaluated the implementation of the MOU. Evaluating the implementation of the MOU and making any needed changes would help ensure the goals of the MOU are met and further protect the safety and health of both plant workers and FSIS inspectors.\nGaps in federal efforts create challenges to protecting workers from certain chemical hazards. For example, depending on a chemical's intended use, it may not undergo a federal review of the risks it poses to worker safety and health before it is used in a plant. FSIS collects information on how to protect its inspectors from new chemicals, but it does not have a process to share this information with OSHA or plants, among others, so that plant workers can be similarly protected. By FSIS establishing a process to regularly share the worker safety information it collects, the federal government will be better positioned to use existing resources to support the safety and health of plant workers and FSIS inspectors.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making seven recommendations, including that OSHA encourage workers to disclose sensitive concerns and gather bathroom access information; OSHA and FSIS strengthen their MOU; and FSIS share worker safety information. OSHA had concerns about two of these recommendations and did not address one. FSIS expressed concerns but described planned actions to address the recommendations. GAO believes the recommendations should be fully implemented.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_450"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_451","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFighter pilots operate aircraft that are critical to achieving and maintaining air dominance during combat operations. The military services invest significant time and funding to train, compensate, and retain fighter pilots. According to Air Force officials, it costs between $3-$11 million and takes approximately 5 years to develop an individual fighter pilot to lead combat missions.\nSenate Report 114-255 included a provision for GAO to review the Department of Defense's (DOD) management of the fighter pilot workforce. GAO's report (1) assesses the extent to which the military services had differences in the number of fighter pilots compared to authorizations, and describes any contributing factors as well as initiatives to address the differences, and (2) assesses the extent to which the military services had reevaluated squadron requirements for the number of fighter pilots needed, including consideration of UAS pilot requirements.\nGAO analyzed military service personnel data, documentation on service initiatives to address factors contributing to fighter pilot shortages, and service documentation of requirements; met with a non-generalizable sample of fighter pilots at seven locations; and interviewed DOD and service officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps had gaps between the actual numbers of fighter pilots and authorizations (i.e. funded positions) in fiscal years (FY) 2013 through 2017. In FY 2017 the Air Force's gap was the widest at 27 percent of authorizations (see fig. below) and is projected to continue through FY 2023. The Marine Corps' gap grew from 6 percent in FY 2006 to 24 percent in FY 2017; it is concentrated in fighter pilots below the rank of major. While the Navy did not have comparable data, it had a gap at fighter pilots' first operational tours that grew from 12 percent in FY 2013 to 26 percent in FY 2017, and Navy officials stated it could increase through mid-2019. Service officials attributed these gaps to aircraft readiness challenges, reduced training opportunities, and increased attrition of fighter pilots due to career dissatisfaction. To help increase fighter pilot numbers, the military services are taking actions, including increasing the amounts of financial incentives to retain pilots.\nThe military services have not recently reevaluated squadron requirements to reflect increased fighter pilot workload and the emergence of unmanned aerial systems (UAS). According to service guidance, squadron requirements are to be reviewed on a 2-year schedule and to be updated as conditions change (in June 2017 the Navy revised its guidance to extend its schedule from 2 years to 5 years). However, service officials acknowledged that they have not updated all squadron requirements within the last 2 years. These officials stated that the requirements have not been reevaluated because existing conditions do not warrant the change. However, fighter pilots and squadron leaders interviewed at locations GAO visited consistently stated that the typical workload has significantly increased in recent years due to, among other things, changes in fighter aircraft tactics and technology and reductions to administrative support in squadrons. Further, the military services have not assessed the effect of increased reliance on UAS on fighter pilot requirements. The Air Force's vision for UAS notes that systems will work in tandem with cockpit-operated aircraft and that autonomous technologies will potentially lead to personnel efficiencies. Without re-evaluating squadron requirements to reflect current and emerging conditions, the nature of the gap may be inaccurate and thus make it difficult for the military services to target strategies to meet their personnel needs.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps reevaluate fighter pilot squadron requirements. DOD concurred with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_451"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_452","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe securities industry is generally regulated by a combination of federal and industry oversight. FINRA, a self-regulatory organization, is responsible for regulating securities firms doing business with the public in the United States. SEC oversees FINRA's operations and programs.\nSection 964 of the Dodd-Frank Act includes a provision for GAO, following an initial report, to triennially review and report on aspects of SEC's oversight of FINRA. GAO issued its first report in May 2012 ( GAO-12-625 ) and its second report in April 2015 ( GAO-15-376 ).\nThis report (1) determines if SEC's oversight of FINRA included the 10 areas specified in Section 964 of the Dodd-Frank Act and (2) evaluates the extent to which selected SEC internal guidance for examinations of FINRA follows generally accepted government auditing standards and the extent to which SEC's examinations of FINRA's governance practices followed SEC internal guidance. GAO reviewed all SEC examinations relating to a Section 964 area completed since fiscal year 2015 (including five that were governance-related), reviewed certain SEC procedures used to examine self-regulatory organizations against Government Auditing Standards , and compared completed inspections against SEC guidance. GAO also interviewed SEC and FINRA staff.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nSince fiscal year 2015, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) examinations of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA) covered each of the 10 areas specified in Section 964 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), such as governance, funding, and transparency. The most commonly covered area was FINRA examinations of its members.\nSelected SEC guidance used to examine FINRA, including requirements for planning, prefieldwork scoping, and communicating findings, was consistent with generally accepted government auditing standards, and SEC inspections of FINRA were consistent with SEC's guidance. The five governance-related inspections of FINRA that GAO reviewed were consistent with SEC guidance for planning examinations and communicating findings (see fig.). Not all the requirements were applicable (because in certain instances completion of one requirement eliminated the need to satisfy others).\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making any recommendations. SEC agreed with GAO's findings.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_452"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_453","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Coast Guard, a component of DHS, serves as the principal federal agency responsible for maritime safety, security, and environmental stewardship in U.S. ports and waterways. To ensure that the Coast Guard is effectively fulfilling its missions, agency managers must have accurate information and base decisions on sound analyses for effective program management.\nThis statement discusses Coast Guard actions needed to (1) improve the quality of data used for program management and (2) improve the transparency of its data for reporting on mission performance and planning.\nThis statement is based on relevant products GAO issued from June 2014 through December 2017 on Coast Guard strategic planning and management issues, as well as related recommendation follow-up conducted through February 2018. GAO reviewed applicable laws, regulations, policies and guidance. GAO also interviewed Coast Guard officials responsible for administering these programs and obtained information on how they used data to inform decisionmaking. GAO interviewed a range of stakeholders, including federal and industry officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO's prior work recommended multiple actions to improve the Coast Guard's program management by improving the quality of data it uses to manage and report on its mission performance. Specifically, GAO recommended actions such as collecting more complete data and clarifying the data limitations to facilitate more effective program management. For example, in December 2017, GAO found that more information is needed to calculate vessel safety statistics that could enhance the Coast Guard's knowledge about accident, injury, and fatality trends involving commercial fishing vessels. Having more complete information could be useful to carrying out its marine safety mission, and GAO recommended, among other things, that the Coast Guard ensure that data collected during commercial fishing vessel incident investigations is accurately captured. In 2018, the Coast Guard reported taking initial steps to capture more accurate data.\nGAO's prior work also identified areas where the Coast Guard could improve the transparency of the data it uses for reporting on its mission performance as well its capital planning purposes. For example, in an October 2017 report on performance goals, GAO found the Coast Guard's Annual Performance Report (APR) has not been released publicly since 2011. Consequently, there has not been full visibility over performance across all of the Coast Guard's missions. Coast Guard officials stated that a decision by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership to limit the number of performance goals shared publicly had deterred the Coast Guard from public release of its APR. GAO recommended that APRs be available on the Coast Guard's website; the Coast Guard plans to publicly release future APRs. In addition, previous GAO reports found that the Coast Guard's annual 5-year capital investment plan, which projects acquisition funding needs for the upcoming 5 years, did not consistently reflect current total cost estimates or the effects of tradeoffs made as part of the annual budget cycle. GAO made recommendations to help the Coast Guard plan for future acquisitions and the difficult trade off decisions it will face given funding constraints. The Coast Guard agreed, but it is unclear when it will complete the 20-year plan.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making new recommendations in this statement but has made them to the Coast Guard and DHS in the past on improving its program management through, among other things, better quality and more transparent data. DHS and the Coast Guard agreed with these recommendations and reported actions or plans to address them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_453"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_454","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFederal law enforcement agencies purchase firearms, ammunition, and tactical equipment, such as riot shields, to support their missions. GAO was asked to review these purchases for federal law enforcement agencies, and inventory controls at HHS, EPA, and IRS specifically.\nThis report examines, among other objectives (1) firearms, ammunition, and selected tactical equipment spending by federal agencies with 250 or more FLEOs from fiscal years 2010 through 2017; (2) the extent to which select agencies accurately reported purchases of firearms and ammunition in publicly-available data; and (3) inventory controls in place at HHS, EPA, and IRS.\nGAO obtained available data on purchases from 20 agencies and from USASpending.gov, and reviewed inventory information and controls within HHS, EPA, and IRS. GAO also conducted site visits to HHS, EPA, and IRS offices to observe inventory controls, selected based on data discrepancies or reports of loss or theft, among other factors.\nThis is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in October 2018. Information that HHS, IRS, and the Transportation Security Administration deemed sensitive has been omitted.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe 20 federal law enforcement agencies in GAO's review reported spending at least $38.8 million on firearms, $325.9 million on ammunition, and $1.14 billion on tactical equipment\u2014at least $1.5 billion in total\u2014from fiscal years 2010 through 2017, based on data agencies provided to GAO.\nThe internal agency data on firearms and ammunition purchases for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, U.S. Forest Service, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) did not always match data that were publicly available on USASpending.gov\u2014a government source for federal contract data. In particular, the dollar value of firearms purchases by ICE in USASpending.gov was approximately 8 times greater than the value of the purchases reported by ICE to GAO. Some differences result from other agencies using ICE contracts to make firearms and ammunition purchases, and ICE not properly identifying the funding agency for those purchases in the system that supplies data to USASpending.gov. Because ICE does not accurately report the agency that funded these purchases, the public does not have accurate information on how much ICE\u2014and the agencies that make purchases using ICE contracts\u2014have spent on firearms and ammunition. This decreases accountability and transparency of federal purchases, which is in conflict with the intended purpose of this system.\nDepartment of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) have inventory controls for tracking, verifying, and securing federal law enforcement officers' (FLEOs) firearms. GAO observed these agencies' law enforcement components and found them to be generally following their inventory and security policies at selected locations. In instances where agencies were not in compliance with their policies, the agencies made corrections during the course of GAO's review. Each component has a process whereby at least once yearly officials review the firearms inventory to ensure that firearms match with records in the office's inventory system. The figure below illustrates a general process that all components GAO reviewed follow to verify their firearms inventory. Ammunition and tactical equipment inventory controls varied because agencies generally did not consider these items to be as sensitive as firearms. Examples of these controls include security for, and limited access to, equipment that might be vulnerable to risk of loss or unauthorized use, such as silencers or pyrotechnics.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that the Director of ICE update ICE's contracting process to provide the name of the agency funding the purchase of firearms and ammunition to improve the accuracy of publicly available data. ICE concurred with the recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_454"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_455","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe federal government has a number of programs to help increase access to affordable homeownership for first-time buyers and lower-income households, including programs that provide guarantees for certain types of mortgages and funding that can be used for down-payment assistance. Generally, homeowners can build home equity by making payments on a mortgage to reduce the outstanding principal (assuming home value does not depreciate). Recently, there has been interest in mortgage products that accelerate home equity building.\nGAO was asked to explore options for building equity through homeownership. This report discusses (1) how federal homeownership assistance programs affect home equity building; and (2) options, including private-sector mortgage products, through which borrowers can accelerate home equity building and the trade-offs of these options for both borrowers and lenders.\nGAO analyzed relevant laws and program guidance of federal homeownership assistance programs. GAO attended housing conferences and interviewed relevant federal and state agency officials, academics, and industry stakeholders, including mortgage insurers and lenders, to identify existing and proposed accelerated equity-building products and mechanisms and to better understand the benefits and trade-offs of accelerated equity building. GAO also developed examples of mortgage scenarios to illustrate the trade-offs of accelerated equity building. Federal agencies provided technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFederal homeownership assistance programs generally are not designed to accelerate equity building (home equity is the difference between the value of a home and the amount owed on a mortgage). For example, programs that offer grants for down-payment assistance can provide a one-time boost to home equity. However, these programs are not specifically designed to accelerate equity building\u2014that is, increasing the pace of paying off principal more quickly than would be the case with a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage. Instead, the focus of federal programs is on providing affordable access to homeownership, including through grants, loans, and mortgage insurance or guarantees. For instance, federal mortgage insurance programs help provide market liquidity by protecting lenders from losses, in turn increasing access to credit and homeownership, and ultimately, the opportunity for equity building for home buyers.\nBorrowers have options to accelerate equity building that include obtaining shorter-term mortgages, making more frequent or additional payments, or choosing a mortgage product designed to accelerate equity building. For example, a mortgage product introduced by private lenders in 2014\u2014the Wealth Building Home Loan (WBHL)\u2014has features designed to accelerate equity building, including shorter terms (15 or 20 years) and the option to buy down the interest rate. The product also allows for no down payment. However, these products have trade-offs, including the following:\nShorter-term loans build home equity (in terms of principal reduction) at a faster rate, but require higher monthly payments (see fig.). Payments for a 15-year fixed-rate mortgage can be more than 40 percent higher than for a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage.\nHigher payments may make mortgages less affordable or limit access for lower-income borrowers. For example, higher payments may result in a higher debt-to-income ratio for some home buyers, which may prevent them from qualifying for a mortgage unless they buy a less expensive home.\nIn contrast, all else equal, loans with a shorter term generally have reduced credit risk\u2014the likelihood of a home buyer defaulting on a mortgage\u2014for lenders.\nNote: Monthly mortgage payments do not include property tax or any type of insurance. Interest rates used are generally consistent with market rates in September and October 2017.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_455"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_456","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn fiscal year 2016, private entities operated about 94,000 oil and gas wells on federal lands overseen by BLM. Once wells cease production, they can become inactive and potentially orphaned if an operator does not perform required reclamation and if an operator's bond is insufficient to cover the expenses. BLM considers oil and gas wells on federal and Indian lands and the associated leased lands as potential liabilities for the federal government because BLM may have to cover the costs of reclaiming well sites. To better manage its potential liabilities, BLM issued well and bond adequacy review policies in 2012 and 2013, respectively.\nGAO was asked to review how BLM manages its potential oil and gas well liabilities. This report examines, among other things: (1) how BLM's actual costs and potential oil and gas well liabilities have changed for fiscal years 2010 through 2017 and (2) the extent to which BLM has implemented its well and bond review policies. GAO analyzed BLM's policies and data and interviewed BLM officials and representatives from stakeholder organizations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO's analysis indicates that the Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) actual costs incurred and potential liabilities for reclaiming oil and gas wells have likely increased for fiscal years 2010 through 2017. However, the full extent of the increase is not known because BLM does not systematically track needed data. Based on GAO's analysis of data obtained from 13 of BLM's 33 field offices that manage oil and gas programs, the average annual reclamation cost was $267,600, an increase compared to the $171,500 annual average across all BLM offices that GAO reported in 2010. Similarly, GAO's analysis of BLM data found that the number of known orphaned wells, those that generally have no responsible or liable parties, for all field offices has increased from 144 in 2010 to 219 as of 2017. However, BLM's database that contains information on oil and gas wells on federal and Indian lands does not collect information on costs incurred or on potential liabilities that might result from an increase in the number of orphaned wells. Under federal internal control standards, management should use quality information to achieve the entity's objectives. Without systematically tracking such information, BLM does not have assurance that it has sufficient bonds or financial assurances to cover the costs of reclaiming orphaned wells.\nGAO was unable to fully assess the extent to which BLM field and state offices have implemented the agency's policies on reviewing wells and bond adequacy in part because of deficiencies in BLM's monitoring approach. For example, reports BLM headquarters used to monitor field offices' implementation of the policies have limitations. GAO identified discrepancies between the well and bond adequacy review reports that BLM state offices submitted to headquarters and the national summary consolidating states' information. Out of 10 state offices, 3 reported a different number of reviews completed in fiscal year 2016 than what BLM reported in its fiscal year 2016 national summary. Leading practices for monitoring the implementation of agency policies call for taking steps such as collecting and analyzing data on performance indicators. Without strengthening BLM's approach to monitoring, its ability to assess field offices' reviews of all inactive wells and determine the adequacy of all bonds is limited.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making seven recommendations, including that BLM systematically track the agency's actual reclamation costs and potential liabilities and strengthen its approach to monitoring field offices' implementation of the well review and bond adequacy review policies. BLM agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_456"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_457","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAccording to the Navy, its 51 attack submarines provide the United States an asymmetric advantage to gather intelligence undetected, attack enemy targets, and insert special forces, among others. These capabilities make attack submarines some of the most\u2013requested assets by the global combatant commanders.\nGAO was asked to review the readiness of the Navy's attack submarine force. This report discusses the extent to which the Navy (1) has experienced maintenance delays in its attack submarine fleet and costs associated with any delays; and (2) has addressed any challenges and developed mitigation plans for any maintenance delays. GAO analyzed readiness information from fiscal years 2008-2018, operating and support costs, maintenance performance, and other data; visited attack submarines and squadrons; and interviewed public and private shipyard and fleet officials.\nThis is a public version of a classified report issued in October 2018. Information the Department of Defense deemed classified or sensitive, such as attack submarine force structure requirements and detailed data on attack submarine maintenance delays, has been omitted.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Navy has been unable to begin or complete the vast majority of its attack submarine maintenance periods on time resulting in significant maintenance delays and operating and support cost expenditures. GAO's analysis of Navy maintenance data shows that between fiscal year 2008 and 2018, attack submarines have incurred 10,363 days of idle time and maintenance delays as a result of delays in getting into and out of the shipyards. For example, the Navy originally scheduled the USS Boise to enter a shipyard for an extended maintenance period in 2013 but, due to heavy shipyard workload, the Navy delayed the start of the maintenance period. In June 2016, the USS Boise could no longer conduct normal operations and the boat has remained idle, pierside for over two years since then waiting to enter a shipyard (see figure). GAO estimated that since fiscal year 2008 the Navy has spent more than $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2018 constant dollars to support attack submarines that provide no operational capability\u2014those sitting idle while waiting to enter the shipyards, and those delayed in completing their maintenance at the shipyards.\nThe Navy has started to address challenges related to workforce shortages and facilities needs at the public shipyards. However, it has not effectively allocated maintenance periods among public shipyards and private shipyards that may also be available to help minimize attack submarine idle time. GAO's analysis found that while the public shipyards have operated above capacity for the past several years, attack submarine maintenance delays are getting longer and idle time is increasing. The Navy may have options to mitigate this idle time and maintenance delays by leveraging private shipyard capacity for repair work. But the Navy has not completed a comprehensive business case analysis as recommended by Department of Defense guidelines to inform maintenance workload allocation across public and private shipyards. Navy leadership has acknowledged that they need to be more proactive in leveraging potential private shipyard repair capacity. Without addressing this challenge, the Navy risks continued expenditure of operating and support funding to crew, maintain, and support attack submarines that provide no operational capability because they are delayed in getting into and out of maintenance.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that the Navy conduct a business case analysis to inform maintenance workload allocation across public and private shipyards. The Department of Defense concurred with GAO's recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_457"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_458","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 and Senate Report 114-57 included provisions for GAO to report on VHA's OSI and the opioid prescribing practices of its health care providers.\nThis report examines, among other issues, (1) the extent to which VHA has met OSI goals established in 2014 and (2) the extent to which VHA providers adhere to key opioid risk mitigation strategies. To do this work, GAO reviewed data and documents related to OSI efforts and goals and interviewed VHA officials. In addition, GAO reviewed a random, nongeneralizable selection of medical records for 103 veterans who were prescribed opioids at five selected VHA medical facilities from March 2016 through March 2017. GAO selected the facilities to obtain diversity in geography and rates of opioid prescribing. At the selected facilities, GAO reviewed facility data and documents related to opioid safety and interviewed officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Veterans Health Administration (VHA) has made progress improving opioid safety through its Opioid Safety Initiative (OSI). Launched in 2013, the OSI aims to help ensure that veterans are prescribed opioids in a safe and effective manner. Since the OSI began, VHA has seen reductions in opioid prescribing rates. For example, from the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2013 to the first quarter of fiscal year 2018, the percentage of patients dispensed an opioid decreased from about 17 percent to about 10 percent, or by about 267,000 veterans. Also, available evidence suggests VHA has accomplished six of nine OSI goals established in 2014; however, it is unclear whether the remaining three goals have been fully met. For example, in the case of OSI goal four (establishing safe and effective regional tapering programs for patients on opioids and benzodiazepines), GAO found that VHA lacked documentation that its regional networks established these programs. VHA also did not establish measures of safety or effectiveness under this goal. These limitations prevent VHA from fully evaluating progress and accurately determining the extent to which its efforts to help ensure safe and effective prescribing of opioids have been successful.\nIn a review of a nongeneralizable sample of 103 veterans' medical records at five selected VHA medical facilities, GAO found that VHA providers did not always adhere to key opioid risk mitigation strategies, which are required by VHA policy or relevant to OSI goals. For example, among 53 veterans who were prescribed long-term opioid therapy (defined as a 90-day supply in the last 6 months), GAO found that\n40 veterans did not have their names queried in a state-run prescription drug monitoring program database. The databases are used to identify patients who are receiving multiple prescriptions that may place them at greater risk for misusing opioids or overdosing;\n21 veterans did not have a urine drug screening within the year prior to having their prescription filled. The screenings are used to determine whether veterans are taking their opioid medications as prescribed; and\n12 veterans did not provide written informed consent. Informed consent is a formal acknowledgement that the veteran has been educated on the risks and benefits of opioid use prior to initiating long-term opioid therapy.\nGAO found several factors that may have contributed to inconsistent adherence to key opioid risk mitigation strategies at the selected VHA facilities. For example, four of the five selected facilities did not have a pain champion (a primary care position required by VHA that can help providers adhere to opioid risk mitigation strategies), and not all facilities had access to academic detailing, a program in which trained clinical pharmacists work one-on-one with providers to better inform them about evidence-based care related to the appropriate treatment of relevant medical conditions. In addition, three of the five facilities did not consistently review veterans' medical records to ensure provider adherence to these strategies. To the extent that these factors affect all VHA facilities, VHA will continue to face challenges ensuring that its providers prescribe opioids in a safe and effective manner.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making five recommendations to VHA, including that it document actions and develop measurable outcomes related to its OSI goals, ensure that providers are adhering to opioid risk mitigation strategies, and ensure that all its regional networks have implemented academic detailing programs and that all VHA medical facilities have a designated primary care pain champion, as required. The Department of Veterans Affairs concurred with GAO's recommendations and described steps it will take to implement them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_458"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_459","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nTraining is key to building readiness\u2014the military's ability to fight and meet the demands of its missions. Through the Department of Defense (DOD) budget cycle, the Marine Corps estimates or programs its funding needs for training and spends funds to accomplish its training mission. Questions have been raised about whether the Marine Corps' training budget estimates are sufficiently detailed to determine training costs at the unit level or the expected readiness generated by those costs.\nHouse Report 115-200 included a provision for GAO to examine the military services' budgeting processes to build unit-level training readiness. This report examines the extent to which the Marine Corps (1) tracks unit-level training funds for ground combat forces through the budget cycle, and (2) links ground combat forces' unit-level training funds to readiness. GAO analyzed budget data and studies conducted by the Marine Corps and others, examined tools used by units to link training funds with readiness, and interviewed knowledgeable officials at various levels in the Marine Corps.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Marine Corps cannot fully track all unit-level training funds for ground combat forces through the budget cycle. According to GAO's analysis of data provided by the Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs), the principal warfighting organization for the Marine Corps, units can track some, but not all, funds for training exercises from the budget request through use of the funds. The Marine Corps cannot fully track all training funds through the budget cycle, in part, because it has not established the consistent use of fiscal codes. Two key fiscal codes that officials identified as relevant to track funds for unit-level training are the Marine Corps Programming Code (MCPC) and the Special Interest Code (SIC). The Marine Corps uses MCPCs to program funds, but GAO found that when the Marine Corps spends those funds, it uses a different set of fiscal codes. This makes it difficult to link the programmed intent of funds to the execution of those funds. The Marine Corps uses SICs to track funds associated with training exercises, but GAO found that units do not use SICs consistently. For example, officials at all three MEFs told GAO that units generate SICs for large-scale training exercises, but may not do so for small-scale exercises. The Marine Corps is taking steps to align fiscal codes across the budget cycle, but this effort is in its early stages and will not include MCPCs, and may not address the inconsistent use of SICs. Without the ability to track unit-level training funds through the budget cycle, the Marine Corps lacks readily available data to assess whether funds were obligated consistent with their programmed intent and to adequately forecast and defend budget requests for training.\nAlthough internal Marine Corps assessments and guidance state that the Marine Corps needs an enterprise-wide process to link resources to readiness, the Marine Corps has made little progress establishing a link between training funds for ground combat forces and readiness. The Marine Corps identified challenges with linking funds to readiness in a series of reports from fiscal years 2009 through 2014, citing factors such as stove-piped efforts and limited data availability and quality. Guidance directed that the Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources organize quality coordination events with key stakeholders to synchronize activities within major lines of effort, but officials from this office stated that they have not been given the authority to direct the various efforts. Therefore, challenges have persisted, in part, because the Marine Corps has not designated a single entity with authority to oversee and coordinate efforts to link training funds to readiness. In the absence of a single oversight entity, two separate and overlapping tools were developed\u2014the Cost to Run a MEF (C2RAM) tool and the Predictive Readiness Model (PRM). Although each tool had its own particular use and design, both were intended to link resources to readiness. Moreover, both faced similar challenges, such as data quality limitations, and relied on some of the same data sources. The Marine Corps recently assessed and discontinued development of PRM, however, it has not assessed C2RAM and how it could support an enterprise wide performance management process linking resources to readiness. Without dedicating a single entity with authority, and conducting an assessment of C2RAM, the Marine Corps is unlikely to make headway in addressing the challenges posed by trying to link resources to readiness.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that the Marine Corps (1) tracks training funds through the budget cycle, (2) designates a single entity to oversee establishment of a process that links resources to readiness, and (3) conducts an assessment of C2RAM. DOD concurred, and based on its comments, GAO modified one recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_459"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_460","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nGAO designated NASA's acquisition management as a high-risk area in 1990 after a history of persistent cost growth and schedule slippage in many of NASA's major projects. In more recent years, GAO found that NASA had taken some steps to improve its management, and, in May 2017, GAO found that projects were continuing a generally positive trend of limiting cost and schedule growth. But at the same time, GAO noted that many of these projects, including some of the most expensive ones, were approaching the phase in their life cycles when cost and schedule growth is most likely.\nThis statement summarizes GAO's 2018 findings from its 10th annual snapshot of how well NASA is planning and executing its major acquisition projects, and describes (1) the cost and schedule performance of NASA's portfolio of major projects and (2) the extent to which NASA faces risks for further cost increases and schedule delays. To conduct its review for the 2018 report, GAO-18-280SP , GAO analyzed cost, schedule, and other data for NASA's 26 major projects, each with a life-cycle cost of over $250 million; reviewed monthly project status reports; and interviewed NASA officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe cost and schedule performance of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) portfolio of major projects has deteriorated, but the extent of cost performance deterioration is unknown. NASA expects cost growth for the Orion crew capsule\u2014one of the largest projects in the portfolio\u2014but does not have a current cost estimate. In addition, the average launch delay for the portfolio was 12 months, the highest delay GAO has reported in its 10 years of assessing major NASA projects (see figure below).\nThe deterioration in portfolio performance was the result of 9 of the 17 projects in development experiencing cost or schedule growth.\nFour projects encountered technical issues that were compounded by risky program management decisions. For example, the Space Launch System and Exploration Ground Systems programs are large-scale, technically complex human spaceflight programs, and NASA managed them to aggressive schedules and with insufficient levels of cost and schedule reserves. This made it more difficult for the programs to operate within their committed baseline cost and schedule estimates.\nTwo projects ran into technical challenges that resulted in delays in the integration and test phase. For example, in December 2017, GAO found that the James Webb Space Telescope project encountered delays primarily due to the integration of the various spacecraft elements taking longer than expected, as well as the need to resolve technical issues during testing. GAO has previously found that integration and testing is when projects are most at risk of incurring cost and schedule growth.\nThree projects experienced cost growth or schedule delays due to factors outside of the projects' control, such as delays related to their launch vehicles.\nNASA continues to face increased risk of cost and schedule growth in future years due to new, large and complex projects that will enter the portfolio and expensive projects remaining in the portfolio longer than expected.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making any new recommendations in this statement. GAO has made recommendations in prior reports to strengthen NASA's acquisition management of its major projects. NASA generally agreed with these recommendations, but has not fully addressed some of them. GAO continues to believe they should be fully addressed.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_460"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_461","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nRecent large-scale data breaches of public and private entities have put hundreds of millions of people at risk of identity theft or other harm. GAO was asked to review issues related to consumers' options to address risks of harm from data breaches. This report, among other things, examines information and expert views on the effectiveness of consumer options to address data breach risks. GAO analyzed available data on options, collected and analyzed related documentation, conducted a literature review of studies, and interviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 35 experts (from academia, government entities, consumer and industry organizations) and identity theft service providers to reflect a range of views.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nNo one solution can address the range of potential risks from a data breach, according to interviews with academic, consumer, government, and industry experts and documentation GAO reviewed. Perpetrators of fraud can use stolen personal information\u2014such as account numbers, passwords, or Social Security numbers\u2014to take out loans or seek medical care under someone else's name, or make unauthorized purchases on credit cards, among other crimes. Foreign state-based actors can use personal information to support espionage or other nefarious uses.\nPublic and private entities that experience a breach sometimes provide complimentary commercial identity theft services to affected individuals to help monitor their credit accounts or restore their identities in cases of identity theft, among other features. Consumers also may purchase the services. As of November 30, 2018, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) had obligated about $421 million for a suite of credit and identity monitoring, insurance, and identity restoration services to offer to the approximately 22 million individuals affected by its 2015 data breaches. As of September 30, 2018, about 3 million had used the services and approximately 61 individuals had received payouts from insurance claims, for an average of $1,800 per claim. OPM re-competed and awarded a contract to the previously contracted company in December 2018.\nGAO's review did not identify any studies that analyzed whether consumers who sign up for or purchase identity theft services were less subject to identity theft or detected financial or other fraud more or less quickly than those who monitored their own accounts for free. A few experts said consumers could sign up for such services if offered for free. Credit monitoring may be convenient for consumers and personalized restoration services may help identity theft victims recover their identities, but such services do not prevent fraud from happening in the first place. The services also do not prevent or directly address risks of nonfinancial harm such as medical identity theft.\nConsumer, government, and industry experts highlighted other free options, including a credit freeze, which prevents one type of fraud. A freeze restricts businesses from accessing a person's credit report\u2014and can prevent the illicit opening of a new account or loan in the person's name. A provision of federal law that took effect in September 2018 made it free for consumers to place or lift credit freezes quickly at the three nationwide consumer reporting agencies (Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion). Consumers also can regularly monitor their accounts and review their credit reports for free every 12 months. In addition, they can take advantage of free federal assistance such as the guidance on the Federal Trade Commission's IdentityTheft.gov website.\nFinally, large amounts of personal information are outside of consumers' control and bad actors can use stolen information for years after a breach. Therefore, experts noted that data security at entities that hold such information\u2014and efforts to make stolen information less useful for identity thieves, through use of new identity verification technologies, for example\u2014are important ways to mitigate risks of harm for consumers.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO reiterates a matter for congressional consideration and a recommendation from its 2017 report on identity theft services ( GAO-17-254 ). In that report, GAO found that legislation requiring federal agencies that experience data breaches, including OPM, to offer certain levels of identity theft insurance coverage to affected individuals requires coverage levels that are likely unnecessary. Therefore, Congress should consider permitting agencies to determine the appropriate coverage level for such insurance. GAO also recommended the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) update its guidance for agency responses to data breaches, after analyzing the effectiveness of identity theft services relative to lower-cost alternatives. OMB did not agree or disagree and had not taken action as of early March 2019.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_461"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_462","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nVA's disability compensation program pays cash benefits to veterans with disabilities connected to their military service. In recent years, the number of appeals of VA's benefit decisions has been rising. For decisions made on appeal in fiscal year 2017, veterans waited an average of 3 years for resolution by either VBA or the Board, and 7 years for resolution by the Board. The Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017 makes changes to VA's current (legacy) appeals process, giving veterans new options to have their claims further reviewed by VBA or appeal directly to the Board. The Act requires VA to submit to Congress and GAO a plan for implementing a new appeals process, and includes a provision for GAO to assess VA's plan.\nThis report examines the extent to which VA's plan (1) addresses the required elements in the Act, and (2) reflects sound planning practices identified in prior GAO work. GAO reviewed and assessed VA's appeals plan and related documents against sound planning practices, and solicited VA's views on its assessments.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) plan for implementing a new disability appeals process while attending to appeals in the current process addresses most, but not all, elements required by the Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017 (Act). VA's appeals plan addresses 17 of 22 required elements, partially addresses 4, and does not address 1. For example, not addressed is the required element to include the resources needed by the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) and the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) to implement the new appeals process and address legacy appeals under the current process. VA needs this information to certify, as specified under the Act, that it has sufficient resources to implement appeals reform and make timely appeals decisions under the new and legacy processes.\nVA's appeals plan reflects certain sound planning practices, but it could benefit from including important details in several key planning areas:\nPerformance measurement : VA's plan reflects steps taken to track performance, but could articulate a more complete and balanced set of goals and measures for monitoring and assessing performance on a range of dimensions of success. Specifically, the plan reports that VA is developing a process to track timeliness of the new and legacy processes. However, contrary to sound planning practices, the plan does not include timeliness goals for all five appeals options available to veterans, does not include goals or measures for additional aspects of performance (such as accuracy or cost), and does not explain how VA will monitor or assess the new process compared to the legacy process. Unless VA clearly articulates a complete and balanced set of goals and measures, it could inadvertently incentivize staff to focus on certain aspects of appeals performance over others or fail to improve overall service to veterans.\nProject management : VA's plan includes a master schedule for implementing the new appeals plan. However, this schedule falls short of other sound practices for guiding implementation and establishing accountability, such as articulating interim goals and needed resources for, and interdependencies among, activities. Unless VA augments its master schedule to include all key activities and reflect sound practices, VA may be unable to provide reasonable assurance that it has the essential program management information needed for this complex and important effort.\nRisk assessment : VA has taken steps to assess and mitigate some risks related to appeals reform by, for example, pilot testing two of the five appeals options through its Rapid Appeals Modernization Program (RAMP). However, as designed, RAMP does not include key features of a well-developed and documented pilot test. For example, VA has not articulated how it will assess RAMP before proceeding with full implementation. In addition, RAMP is not pilot testing three options and, as a result, VA will not have data on the extent to which veterans will appeal directly to the Board when given the option. Unless VA identifies and mitigates key risks associated with implementing a new process, VA is taking a chance that untested aspects will not perform as desired.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that VA (1) fully address all legally required elements in its appeals plan, (2) articulate how it will monitor and assess the new appeals process as compared to the legacy process, (3) augment its master schedule for implementation, and (4) address risk more fully. VA agreed with GAO's recommendations and outlined its planned actions to address them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_462"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_463","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIRS relies extensively on IT investments to annually collect more than $3 trillion in taxes, distribute more than $400 billion in refunds, and carry out its mission of providing service to America's taxpayers in meeting their tax obligations. For fiscal years 2016 and 2017, the agency reported spending approximately $2.7 billion and $2.6 billion, respectively, for IT investments.\nGAO was asked to review IRS's IT operations. GAO's specific objectives were to (1) evaluate the performance of selected IRS IT investments, (2) summarize any risks associated with selected legacy systems and evaluate the steps the agency has taken to manage such risks, and (3) determine the extent to which IRS has implemented key IT workforce planning practices.\nGAO analyzed planned versus actual performance information for nine selected investments for fiscal year 2016 and the first 2 quarters of fiscal year 2017\u2014four in development and five in the operations and maintenance phase; identified risks facing three legacy investments and analyzed IRS's efforts to manage these risks against key practices; and analyzed IRS's IT workforce planning efforts against best practices.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe performance of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) selected information technology (IT) investments that GAO reviewed varied. Specifically, the four selected investments in the development phase that GAO reviewed spent less than planned, but most were behind schedule and delivered less scope than planned (see table below). In addition, the five selected investments in the operations and maintenance phase that GAO reviewed had performed internal qualitative assessments of performance as required by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB); however, none of the analyses addressed all key factors specified in OMB guidance.\nThree investments GAO reviewed in the operations and maintenance phase that are legacy investments\u2014Individual Master File (IMF), Integrated Data Retrieval System (IDRS), and Mainframes and Servers Services and Support (MSSS)\u2014 are facing significant risks due to their reliance on legacy programming languages, outdated hardware, and a shortage of human resources with critical skills. For example, IRS reported that it used assembly language code and Common Business Oriented Language (both developed in the 1950s) for IMF and IDRS, which exposes these investments to a rise in procurement and operating costs, and a decrease in staff available with the proper skill sets. Further, MSSS relies on a significant amount of outdated hardware exposing the investment to rising warranty and maintenance fees, as well as equipment failures. Despite these risks, the agency has not fully implemented key risk management practices and may be challenged in mitigating risks effectively so that they do not impact the agency's ability to carry out its mission.\nIRS has not yet fully implemented any of the key IT workforce planning practices GAO has previously identified. Specifically, the agency has developed a tool to automate the IT workforce planning process, but the tool is in the initial stages of implementation. IRS officials attributed the limited progress in implementing IT workforce planning practices to resource constraints and competing priorities. Nevertheless, until the agency fully implements these practices, it will continue to face challenges in assessing and addressing the gaps in knowledge and skills that are critical to the success of its key IT investments.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that IRS perform operational analyses consistent with guidance, implement key risk management practices, and fully implement key IT workforce planning practices. IRS did not agree or disagree with the recommendations, but said it would provide a plan for addressing each recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_463"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_464","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nTCS programs offer state tax credits to individuals or businesses that donate to scholarship funds for students to attend private elementary and secondary schools. Through these credits, donors may reduce the amount they owe in state taxes by the full or a partial amount of their donation, depending on each program's rules. Designing a TCS program requires that many decisions be made, such as which students will be eligible to receive scholarships and the effect donations will have on donors' state taxes. GAO was asked to review key characteristics of TCS programs.\nThis report examines (1) state TCS programs' policies regarding student eligibility and scholarship awards, and (2) how donating to a TCS program could affect the amount of state and federal taxes owed by donors.\nFor both objectives, GAO reviewed publicly-available documents about student eligibility and tax provisions for all 22 programs authorized as of January 2018 and verified the accuracy of the information with state program officials. GAO did not conduct an independent legal review of state laws and regulations. GAO also interviewed federal officials and reviewed relevant federal guidance and policy documents.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn 2018, there were 22 tax credit scholarship (TCS) programs authorized across 18 states, which provide state tax credits for individual and business donations that fund scholarships for students to attend elementary and secondary private schools (see figure).\nTo determine the eligibility of students for these scholarships, most TCS programs use household income and have various approaches to determine scholarship award amounts. Income limits vary widely among programs, ranging from approximately $32,000 to $136,500 per year for students from a four-person household in school year 2017-2018. Programs have different requirements for how students can use their scholarships and different methods for calculating scholarship amounts. More than half of the programs (13 of 22) allow students to use their scholarship money for costs like transportation and books in addition to tuition, whereas the remaining programs (9 of 22) require scholarships funds to be used for tuition only. Average scholarship awards in school year 2016-2017 ranged from $500 to $5,468 per student among the 16 programs that published or provided GAO with such information.\nThe effect of TCS donations on donors' tax liability depends on program characteristics and donors' financial circumstances. Specifically, half of the 22 programs allow eligible donors to claim 100 percent of their donations as state tax credits, meaning that for each dollar donated, state taxes owed are reduced by a dollar, up to any maximum set by the state. The remaining 11 programs allow donors to claim from 50 to 85 percent of their donations as state tax credits. Programs often specify a maximum tax credit that may be claimed each year by a donor, by all donors combined, or both. Individual donors may also reduce their federal tax liabilities through the federal deduction for charitable contributions, depending on their financial circumstances and applicable tax provisions.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_464"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_465","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAccording to the Census Bureau, by 2030, about 1 in 5 Americans will be 65 and older. This aging of the population presents challenges and opportunities for policymakers and service providers in helping ensure that the older population's needs\u2014including housing and health services\u2014are met. Federal agencies with programs that provide housing assistance to low-income older households include HUD and USDA. Several HHS programs provide those households with health services.\nThis report assesses the extent to which the three agencies collaborated to address the housing and health service needs of older adults living in federally assisted housing.\nGAO compared agency efforts to leading collaboration practices it has identified (including written agreements; roles and responsibilities; leveraged resources; relevant participants; and defined outcomes) and interviewed HUD, HHS, and USDA officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Departments of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and Health and Human Services (HHS) have collaborated on older adult housing and health issues, but these efforts did not fully demonstrate leading practices GAO identified for effective collaboration.\nThe HUD-HHS efforts demonstrated some leading practices. For example, the agencies have written agreements for data-sharing projects and have leveraged resources to conduct research on older adults.\nThe Department of Agriculture (USDA) was not included in the efforts although it provides housing assistance to older rural households. GAO identified the inclusion of all relevant participants as a leading practice. According to HUD, the efforts were intended to explore the health of HUD-assisted households. However, by not including USDA in future collaborations, HUD and HHS may miss opportunities to leverage expertise and USDA may not be able to benefit from any resulting insights and improvements.\nThe HUD-HHS collaborative efforts also did not define common outcomes, another leading practice GAO identified, likely because their collaboration is relatively new. Without common outcomes (for instance, focused on recipient impact or cost savings), the agencies lack measures against which to monitor, evaluate, and report the results of any collaborations.\nFuture collaborations would benefit from consistent USDA involvement. And by defining common outcomes, the agencies would help inform Congress and stakeholders of results achieved and strategies or areas on which to focus.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making three recommendations (one each to HUD, HHS, and USDA). They focus on including USDA in collaborations on older adult housing and health services and defining outcomes for the efforts. The three agencies concurred with GAO's recommendations. HUD stated that it had begun examining challenges relating to services for low-income rural older adults.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_465"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_466","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOD manages a portfolio of real property assets that as of fiscal year 2016 reportedly included about 568,000 facilities with a combined plant replacement value of about $1 trillion and 27.2 million acres of land. DOD requires the military services and Washington Headquarters Services to collect and maintain information about each of the assets in their inventories to assist the department with management decision making.\nIn May 2017, the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Readiness, asked GAO to review DOD's management and use of its real property data. This report evaluates (1) how accurately and completely RPAD reflects DOD's real property assets, (2) DOD's processes to ensure accuracy and completeness in recording and reporting real property data, and (3) DOD's actions to ensure it has addressed risks that may affect the use of real property information for managing its assets. GAO analyzed the RPAD and military services' data for fiscal years 2014-2016; reviewed documentation; conducted site visits; and interviewed DOD officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO found that the Department of Defense's (DOD) Real Property Assets Database (RPAD) contained inaccurate data and lacked completeness, although certain data that GAO reviewed had improved their accuracy since fiscal year 2014. RPAD is a department-wide database of real property data annually compiled by the Office of the Secretary of Defense from the inventories of the military services and DOD's Washington Headquarters Services, which manages real property in the National Capital region. DOD uses RPAD to report on DOD's real property to Congress and other federal agencies, such as the Office of Management and Budget and the General Services Administration to assist in managing federal real property.\nDOD has weaknesses in its processes for recording and reporting real property data that have led to inaccurate and incomplete information. GAO and others found military services have not consistently recorded real property transactions (i.e., acquisition of, change to, and disposal of a real property asset) and physical inventories of assets. GAO also found that the military services have not corrected identified discrepancies in their data systems, such as missing entries for utilization and facility condition and overdue asset reviews. GAO reviewed records of 120 facilities with identified discrepancies in fiscal year 2015 RPAD data and compared them to the records in the respective data system in 2017 and found that 61 discrepancies remained. The military services had corrected the data in the remaining 59 reviewed facilities in their data systems. DOD's efforts to prepare for an upcoming financial audit have helped identify issues and improve accuracy of some data. However, if DOD does not require the military services to fully monitor recording processes and implement corrective actions to resolve data discrepancies, the department will continue to have incomplete and inaccurate real property data and unreliable RPAD information.\nDOD has not addressed three risks that can adversely affect its ability to use its information to manage its real property. Specifically, DOD (1) has unfilled real property positions limiting its capacity to manage its data, (2) lacks a department-wide approach to improving its data quality, and (3) has not identified how it will complete implementation of an effort to improve access to data. These risks exist, in part, because DOD has not developed a strategy that identifies and addresses risks with accompanying time frames and performance metrics. If DOD does not develop a strategy that identifies and addresses risks to data quality and information accessibility, DOD may miss the opportunity to reasonably ensure that the information needed for effective decision making by DOD, Congress, and other federal agencies is available to meet real property accountability and reporting objectives.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making six recommendations to improve DOD's real property data, including fully monitoring recording processes; developing and implementing corrective actions for identified data discrepancies; and developing a strategy to address risks associated with data quality and information accessibility. DOD concurred or partially concurred with all draft recommendations. In response, GAO agreed to combine two recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_466"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_467","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIRS continues to confront the ongoing problems of identity theft (IDT) refund fraud. The agency estimates that at least $1.68 billion was paid in IDT refund fraud in 2016. To help address this issue, consistent with GAO's prior reporting, the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 advanced the deadline for employers to file W-2s to SSA to January 31 (about 1 to 2 months earlier than in prior years). This change allows IRS more time to match wage information to tax returns through systemic verification, and identify any discrepancies before issuing refunds.\nGAO was asked to assess how well IRS implemented systemic verification. GAO assessed IRS's performance using systemic verification and the extent to which IRS analyzed the effectiveness of the refund hold on this process. GAO analyzed IRS and SSA data and documents, observed SSA's paper W-2 process, and interviewed IRS and SSA officials. GAO compared IRS actions to laws; IRS policies; and standards for internal control, fraud risk management, and program evaluation.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nBeginning in 2017, as required by law, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) held all refunds for taxpayers claiming the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) or Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC) until February 15. IRS also took actions to verify wage and other information reported on tax returns before issuing refunds, referred to as systemic verification, but several factors limited its success. IRS received over twice as many (over 214 million) Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statement (W-2) by February 15 compared to the same time in 2016, and reported that W-2 data were responsible for improving fraud detection and reducing taxpayer burden. However, IRS was unable to verify over half of the returns it held until February 15 before issuing the refunds. For example, IRS received W-2s daily but its information technology systems processed them weekly. In response to GAO's review, IRS reported it is planning to assess options for processing W-2s daily. Also, some employers submit W-2s late, but IRS did not track the extent to which late W-2s are associated with fraud or noncompliance. Further, IRS has not assessed options for enforcing late W-2 penalties earlier. Additionally, about 9 percent (about 23 million) of W-2s were filed on paper, which IRS does not begin to receive from the Social Security Administration (SSA) until March. By law, employers who file 250 or more W-2s are required to file W-2s electronically, while those who file fewer than 250 W-2s may opt to file on paper or electronically. In August 2014, GAO suggested that Congress provide the Secretary of the Treasury with the authority to lower the electronic filing requirement from 250 W-2s to 5 to 10. This action could also have the benefit of reducing SSA's W-2 paper processing costs by $9.7 to $11.3 million per year. These issues reduce IRS's access to timely W-2 data, limiting its ability to prevent fraud and reduce noncompliance before issuing refunds.\nIRS's preliminary and final analyses of the February 15 refund hold both showed that IRS could have detected significantly more in potential fraud and noncompliance if it held all refunds until late February, when it had more W-2 data available. There are differences between these analyses. For example, the final analysis included more returns and estimated total revenue IRS could protect by extending the refund hold and expanding it to all taxpayers. In that analysis, IRS estimated that it could have protected $100 million in fraud and noncompliance had it held all taxpayer refunds until February 15\u2014$35 million more than it protected by holding refunds with EITC or ACTC. IRS further estimated that moving the refund hold to March 1 for all taxpayers could protect $895 million compared to $533 million if it only held refunds with EITC or ACTC until that date. However, GAO found limitations to IRS's analyses. For example, while IRS has plans to further explore holding refunds longer, it does not have an evaluation plan to assess the effectiveness of the refund hold on systemic verification. Also, IRS did not fully assess the benefits and costs, including taxpayer burden, of the refund hold, nor how its analysis informs its broader fraud risk management or compliance efforts. As a result, IRS does not have sufficient information to inform a decision on potential changes to the refund hold date and those subjected to it. Finally, IRS has not assessed the benefits and costs of expanding systemic verification to use for pre-refund compliance checks in other areas such as income underreporting and employment fraud. Therefore, IRS may be missing opportunities to maximize use of early W-2 data.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends IRS collect data to track late W-2 filing penalties and assess options for earlier enforcement; assess the benefits and costs of using existing authority to hold refunds longer, hold all refunds, or both, and expanding systemic verification to other areas; and take actions based on the assessments. IRS listed steps to respond to 5 of 6 recommendations, but said it could not enforce penalties earlier. GAO recognizes the challenges but clarified that assessing other options would provide benefits, as discussed in the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_467"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_468","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nVA medical centers spend hundreds of millions of dollars annually on medical supplies and services. In December 2016, VA instituted a major change in how it purchases medical supplies\u2014the MSPV-NG program\u2014to gain effectiveness and efficiencies.\nGAO was asked to examine VA's transition to the MSPV-NG program and its use of emergency procurements. This report assesses the extent to which (1) VA's implementation of MSPV-NG was effective in meeting program goals, and (2) VA awards contracts on an emergency basis. GAO analyzed VA's MSPV-NG requirements development and contracting processes, and identified key supply chain practices cited by four leading hospital networks. GAO also reviewed a non-generalizable sample of 18 contracts designated in VA's database as emergency procurements with high dollar values; and met with contracting, logistics, and clinical officials at 6 medical centers, selected based on high dollar contract obligations in fiscal years 2014-2016 and geographic representation.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) established the Medical Surgical Prime Vendor-Next Generation (MSPV-NG) program to provide an efficient, cost-effective way for its facilities to order supplies, but its initial implementation was flawed, lacked an overarching strategy, stable leadership, and sufficient workforce that could have facilitated medical center buy-in. VA developed requirements for a broad range of MSPV-NG items with limited clinical input. As a result, the program has not met medical centers' needs, and usage remains far below VA's 40 percent target. VA also established cost avoidance as a goal for MSPV-NG, but currently only has a metric in place to measure broader supply chain cost avoidance, not savings specific to MSPV-NG. Also, starting in June 2015, VA planned to award competitive contracts for MSPV-NG items, but instead, 79 percent were added using non-competitive agreements. (See figure.) This was done primarily to meet VA's December 2016 deadline to establish the formulary, the list of items available for purchase through MSPV-NG.\nThe roll-out of MSPV-NG ran counter to practices of leading hospitals that GAO spoke with, which highlighted key steps, such as prioritizing supply categories and obtaining continuing clinician input to guide decision-making. VA has taken steps to address some deficiencies identified in the first phase of implementation and is considering a new approach for this program. However, until VA addresses the existing shortcomings in the MSPV-NG program, such as the lack of medical center buy-in, it will face challenges in meeting its goals.\nMedical centers often rely on emergency procurements to obtain routine goods and services\u2014some of which could be made available at lower cost via MSPV-NG. Sixteen of the 18 contracts in GAO's sample were not competed, which puts the government at risk of paying more. For instance, one medical center procured medical gas on an emergency basis through consecutive non-competitive contracts over a 3-year period. VA policy clearly defines emergency actions; however, inefficiencies in planning, funding, and communication at the medical centers contributed to emergency procurements, resulting in the contracting officers quickly awarding contracts with no competition.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making 10 recommendations, including that VA expand clinician input in requirements development, calculate MSPV-NG cost avoidance, establish a plan for awarding future competitive contracts, and identify opportunities to strategically procure supplies and services frequently purchased on an emergency basis. VA agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_468"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_469","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSmall and medium-sized manufacturers are an important part of the U.S. economy. In 1988, to enhance the competitiveness, productivity, and technological performance of U.S. manufacturing, NIST established what is now called the MEP program. The program supports manufacturers through services provided by MEP centers. The centers, located in all 50 states and Puerto Rico, are operated by nonfederal organizations. The MEP centers provide assistance, either directly or through third parties, to help improve manufacturing firms' processes and productivity; expand their capacity; and help them adopt new technologies, utilize best management practices, and accelerate company growth. NIST enters into a cooperative agreement with the nonfederal organization that runs each center to provide federal financial assistance conditional upon the center contributing nonfederal matching funds\u2014known as a cost share.\nThe AICA included a provision for GAO to review the effect of the 2017 cost share adjustment. This report describes (1) the MEP centers' views regarding the extent to which the recent cost share adjustment has helped them serve manufacturers and (2) the extent to which NIST data show impacts of the cost share adjustment on centers' finances and activities. GAO surveyed all 51 MEP centers, analyzed NIST data on the MEP program, and interviewed NIST and MEP center officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nMost Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) centers reported that the January 2017 American Innovation and Competitiveness Act (AICA) cost share adjustment has helped them serve manufacturers, especially very small (i.e., less than 20 employees) and rural ones. The AICA adjusted the cost share ratio to remain at 1:1, that is, $1 of nonfederal contributions for each $1 of federal assistance. Before the adjustment, MEP centers' cost share requirement increased over the course of their cooperative agreements from 1:1 to 2:1, requiring centers to obtain a greater proportion of revenue from nonfederal sources. In GAO's survey of all 51 MEP centers, 44 centers cited positive effects of the adjustment on center operations, such as helping to improve center services or better reach underserved manufacturers. Also, 41 centers indicated the adjustment increased their financial stability, which some centers stated has allowed them to focus less on revenue generation and to serve very small and rural manufacturers. However, some MEP center officials observed that the AICA cost share adjustment impact is hard to distinguish from other factors, such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) recompetition of nearly all centers' cooperative agreements between fiscal years 2014 and 2017. The recompetition increased the level of federal financial assistance for most centers and reset many centers' cost share ratio from 2:1 to 1:1 prior to the 2017 adjustment. Still, center officials said that if the cost share requirement reverted to what it was prior to the 2017 adjustment, centers would be less able to serve manufacturers, particularly very small and rural ones.\nNIST data show that there have been some changes in MEP centers' finances and activities since the AICA cost share adjustment; however, these changes generally began prior to the adjustment. For example, NIST data on centers' finances show an increase in federal assistance and a decrease in reported nonfederal contributions from fiscal year 2017 to 2018, but these changes generally began around fiscal year 2014, when NIST began the recompetition process. Similarly, NIST data on centers' activities show an overall increase in the numbers of very small and rural manufacturers served from fiscal year 2017 to 2018. While the change in the number of very small manufacturers served began around fiscal year 2014, the number of rural manufacturers served fluctuated from fiscal years 2014 through 2018. Like MEP center officials, NIST officials said the impact of the AICA cost share adjustment is intertwined with the recompetition impacts and, going forward, the AICA adjustment may help sustain recent increases in the number of very small and rural manufacturers served.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_469"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_470","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe federal government can reduce duplicative efforts and free up resources for mission-critical activities by consolidating mission-support services that multiple agencies need\u2014such as payroll or travel\u2014within a smaller number of providers so they can be shared among agencies. However, migrating to a shared services provider has not consistently increased cost savings, efficiencies, or customer satisfaction, according to OMB and others who have observed these migrations.\nGAO was asked to review previous shared services initiatives. This report: (1) identifies the progress and challenges associated with federal shared services initiatives for selected HR and financial management activities and (2) assesses OMB and GSA's actions to address those challenges. GAO analyzed planning and performance documents and interviewed officials from selected customer and provider agencies and from agencies involved with shared services policy and guidance. GAO also interviewed subject-matter experts familiar with shared services. GAO reviewed steps OMB and GSA are taking to identify and address challenges from past migrations to improve shared services performance.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nEfforts to promote greater use of shared services for human resources (HR) and financial management activities resulted in some cost savings and efficiency gains, but challenges impeded more widespread adoption. For example, the Office of Personnel Management estimates that shared services for HR, including payroll resulted in more than $1 billion in government-wide cost-savings and cost avoidance between fiscal years 2002 and 2015. However, challenges include limited oversight, demand uncertainty among providers, and limited choices for customers. To address these challenges, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the General Services Administration (GSA), as the shared services initiative leaders, introduced a new marketplace model in 2018 meant to better meet the needs of customers and service providers by offering more choices for purchasing shared services (see figure). They are also working on plans to create Service Management Offices and Task Order Review Boards to work with agencies to adopt standards for common management activities.\nGAO found that OMB and GSA were following some key change management practices such as improving interagency collaboration in their design of the marketplace model. However, implementation weaknesses may limit their success. For example, OMB and GSA do not have a plan to monitor the implementation of NewPay, a 2018 payroll shared services initiative designed to determine how well the new model works. A monitoring plan which includes performance goals and milestones could help OMB and GSA avoid gaps in service or costly delays as agencies transition to the new model for obtaining shared services.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making four recommendations to OMB including to work with GSA to finalize a plan for monitoring the implementation of NewPay, among other actions. OMB staff did not comment on GAO's recommendations, but noted that OMB may update its shared services policy in the future.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_470"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_471","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nARPA-E provides funding for research to overcome long-term and high-risk technological barriers in developing energy technologies. Since 2009, ARPA-E has awarded approximately $1.3 billion to universities, public and private companies, and national laboratories to fund energy research projects. Starting in May 2017, DOE began reviewing its financial assistance department-wide, including ARPA-E's, to determine if it met the administration's priorities.\nGAO was asked to examine this review process as it pertained to ARPA-E. This report describes (1) how DOE implemented the financial assistance review process; and (2) the perspectives of ARPA-E selectees on the impacts of the review process.\nGAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials at ARPA-E and DOE's Office of Management, which coordinated the review. GAO also interviewed a nonprobability sample of 10 of the 68 ARPA-E award selectees whose financial assistance was evaluated under the review. GAO identified selectees to interview based on representation across ARPA-E's recipient types, including universities, private companies, and national laboratories, among other criteria. While the views of selectees GAO interviewed cannot be generalized to all affected ARPA-E selectees, they provide illustrative examples of the effects of DOE's review.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Energy (DOE) developed and implemented a new process to review its financial assistance to ensure that all new work funded by the department\u2014including by DOE's Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E)\u2014was consistent with the current administration's priorities. The review process covered funding opportunity announcements as well as certain other types of financial assistance. New awards were delayed until the review of the underlying financial assistance opportunity was completed. DOE reviewed and approved ARPA-E's financial assistance on a rolling basis from May through September 2017, and nearly all ARPA-E financial assistance was approved. DOE Office of Management officials met with ARPA-E officials on several occasions to discuss their review of ARPA-E financial assistance. DOE officials GAO interviewed said they wanted to complete the review as quickly as possible to minimize effects on DOE programs. GAO determined that the delay was not reportable under the Impoundment Control Act. The Impoundment Control Act requires the President to notify Congress if an agency wants to withhold the obligation of funds. GAO has separately informed Congress of an impoundment of $91 million in funds that were not allocated to any financial assistance awards, and was not related to DOE's review process.\nAccording to the 10 ARPA-E project selectees GAO interviewed, DOE's financial assistance review process created uncertainty, which led to a variety of project impacts. The impacts most commonly cited by selectees included potentially delayed project timelines, as well as difficulties in staffing their project teams, among other impacts as shown below.\nDOE officials GAO interviewed said that they are reviewing DOE financial assistance in fiscal year 2018. DOE officials said that a key benefit of the fiscal year 2017 review process was an opportunity to better identify and coordinate future financial assistance department-wide on crosscutting issues. However, DOE plans to review fiscal year 2018 financial assistance prior to issuing funding opportunity announcements to the public, and thus before any recipients apply or are selected. As a result, DOE officials said, the uncertainty that ARPA-E selectees experienced during the fiscal year 2017 review process should be reduced.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making any recommendations. DOE provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_471"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_472","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAmericans increasingly rely on mobile wireless communications for safety-related communications like calling 911 and receiving weather alerts. Mobile wireless networks face risks from physical incidents including extreme weather events and intentional and accidental damage. For example, in 2017 several major hurricanes damaged wireless network infrastructure, leaving many U.S. citizens without reliable access to wireless communications.\nGAO was asked to review federal efforts to improve the resiliency of wireless networks following natural disasters and other physical incidents. This report examines: (1) trends in mobile wireless outages reported to FCC since 2009 and (2) actions federal agencies and industry have taken since 2013 (after Hurricane Sandy) to improve wireless network resiliency, among other objectives. GAO analyzed wireless outage data from 2009 to 2016 (4 years before and after Hurricane Sandy); reviewed FCC, DHS, and industry documents; and interviewed stakeholders who represented a variety of perspectives, such as industry, public safety, and consumer groups. GAO assessed FCC's efforts to monitor an industry initiative to improve wireless network resiliency against federal internal control standards.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe number of wireless outages attributed to a physical incident\u2014a natural disaster, accident, or other manmade event, such as vandalism\u2014increased from 2009 to 2016, as reported to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). During this time, the number of outages substantially increased from 189 to 1,079 outages, with most of the increase occurring from 2009 to 2011. FCC officials said this increase was due in part to growth in wireless customers and wireless infrastructure. Almost all outages attributed to a physical incident were due to an accident, such as damage to a cable due to a digging error (74 percent) or a natural disaster (25 percent). However, outages due to a natural disaster had a longer median duration (ranging from 19 to 36 hours), which was more than twice as long as outages caused by an accident. Power failures and failures in other providers' networks also play a role in wireless outages attributed to physical incidents. For instance, carriers reported that 87 percent of wireless outages attributed to a physical incident were due to a failure in another provider's network on which they rely.\nSince 2013, federal agencies and industry have taken actions to improve the resiliency of wireless networks. For example, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and FCC charter federal advisory committees that have examined resiliency issues and potential solutions, such as sharing infrastructure during emergencies. FCC also proposed a rule that would disclose how individual wireless carriers' networks performed during emergency events. In response, an industry coalition announced an initiative\u2014the Wireless Network Resiliency Cooperative Framework\u2014whereby carriers agreed to allow roaming on each other's networks and aggregated statistics to be published on how networks performed during emergency events. This initiative prompted FCC to not adopt its proposed rule. FCC said it would engage with industry about the framework's implementation and use, but FCC has limited formal plans to oversee or spread knowledge of the framework:\nFCC developed a plan to track the completion of initial implementation tasks outlined in the framework, but this plan does not include steps to track or evaluate any outputs or outcomes from the framework.\nFCC and industry documents describe broad goals for the framework, such as advancing information sharing during and after emergency events, but neither FCC nor industry has set any specific measures to help determine whether the framework achieves these broad goals.\nAlthough some public safety officials and other stakeholders GAO contacted were not aware of the framework, FCC did not have plans to actively communicate information about the framework to these audiences.\nMore robust measures and a better plan to monitor the framework would help FCC collect information on the framework and evaluate its effectiveness. Such steps could help FCC address any challenges or decide whether further action is needed. Also, by promoting awareness about the framework, FCC would help public safety officials and other industry participants to be well positioned to use the framework to help them prepare for or respond to emergency events.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nFCC should work with industry to develop specific performance measures for the Wireless Network Resiliency Cooperative Framework, monitor the framework's outcomes, and promote awareness of it. FCC agreed with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_472"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_473","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSupporting efforts to promote democracy has been a foreign policy priority for the U.S. government. In recent years, USAID and State have allocated about $2 billion per year toward democracy assistance overseas. Congress required USAID and State to each establish guidelines for and report on the use of contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements for certain democracy programs.\nGAO was asked to review U.S. democracy assistance. This report (1) examines funding USAID, NED, and State obligated for democracy assistance primarily through contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements and (2) evaluates documentation of USAID award-type decisions, among other objectives.\nGAO analyzed USAID, NED, and State democracy assistance award data for fiscal years 2012\u20132016. GAO also reviewed relevant regulation and agency policies and analyzed documentation for a nongeneralizable sample of USAID awards selected based on factors such as award type, program area, and country.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn fiscal years 2012\u20132016, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) obligated $5.5 billion and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) obligated $610.2 million in democracy assistance funding. The total funding the Department of State (State) obligated for democracy assistance could not be reliably determined. One-third of all USAID obligations were provided through public international organizations (PIOs), which under USAID guidance are composed principally of countries or other organizations designated by USAID; 94 percent of PIO obligations were provided to the World Bank for democracy assistance projects in Afghanistan. The remaining two-thirds of USAID obligations were provided through contracts, grants (excluding PIOs), and cooperative agreements. Of the 10 State bureaus providing democracy assistance, 3 were unable to provide reliable funding data for fiscal years 2012\u20132016. Data from these bureaus were incomplete, nonstandard, or inaccurate. Federal internal control standards call for agencies to use quality information from reliable sources to achieve intended objectives and to monitor activities. Without such data, State cannot effectively monitor its democracy assistance programming and report reliable data externally.\nFor the awards GAO sampled, USAID generally did not document decisions about whether to award a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement (known as award-type decisions) in a complete and timely manner. According to applicable USAID guidance, agency officials were required to (1) document the final award-type decision with their written determination, including a rationale based on the requirements of the Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act, and (2) complete this documentation before award solicitation occurs or, for noncompetitive awards, before USAID initiated communications with a potential sole-source awardee. However, USAID provided both complete and timely documentation of the award-type decision for 5 of the 41 awards GAO sampled. For the remaining 36 awards, the documentation was either incomplete, not timely or timeliness was indeterminate, or both (see table). While USAID has taken steps to improve documentation for award-type decisions by updating its guidance and templates, it has not assessed whether these updates have resulted in complete and timely documentation. It is important that USAID document these decisions in advance of solicitation because the selection of an award type may affect requirements for administering the award, including competition and oversight requirements and whether or not profit is permissible.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nState should improve the reliability and completeness of its democracy assistance funding data, and USAID should assess whether steps taken are resulting in complete and timely documentation of democracy assistance award-type decisions. State and USAID concurred with GAO's recommendations and described actions planned or under way to address them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_473"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_474","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe UI program, which is overseen by DOL and administered by states, paid $30 billion to about 5.7 million individuals in 2017. Under federal law, to be eligible for benefits, individuals are generally required to actively search for work, but the specific work search requirements vary by state. Yet, states found that some benefits were overpaid to UI claimants who were ineligible because they were not meeting work search requirements. GAO was asked to review improper payments due to UI claimants' failure to actively search for work. Building on GAO's prior work ( GAO-18-133R ), this report examines (1) state administrative practices associated with work search overpayments; (2) selected states' approaches to address work search overpayments; and (3) DOL's oversight and support of states' efforts.\nGAO analyzed DOL data, including the results of state reviews of a representative random sample of UI payments made from fiscal years 2013 through 2017. GAO also reviewed UI information from six states selected for variation in work search requirements and overpayment rates, interviewed DOL and state officials, and reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO's analysis of Department of Labor (DOL) data found that certain state administrative practices, such as reviewing a higher percentage of claimant-reported work search activities and frequent use of formal warnings, were associated with lower estimated work search overpayment rates for the Unemployment Insurance (UI) program. According to DOL data, 22 states were warning claimants after the first discovered occurrence of their failure to meet work search requirements (i.e., issuing formal warnings) rather than reporting that an overpayment was made, while the other states were reporting such cases as overpayments. In 2017, DOL determined that federal law does not permit states to use such policies. GAO's analysis of DOL data shows that in fiscal year 2017, estimated work search overpayments were nearly $1.4 billion (see fig.), but would have been an estimated $1.8 billion (+\/-$0.2 billion) greater if states had not issued formal warnings and established overpayments. DOL officials told GAO in July 2017 that the agency would issue a letter to states informing them that federal law does not permit them to warn claimants instead of establishing an overpayment. To date, DOL has not issued the letter. Until DOL provides states with such notification, states may continue to report inconsistent information on overpayments.\nState officials GAO interviewed reported using multiple approaches to address work search overpayments, including using their online systems that automate collecting information on claimants' work search activities; conducting audits of claimants work search activities beyond those required; and sending automated messages to claimants regarding their work search requirements. Officials said that their approaches encouraged claimants to conduct a more active work search and prevented work search overpayments in some cases.\nDOL monitors states' work search overpayment rate estimates and has helped states address such overpayments, but lacks clear procedures for how states should verify claimants' work search activities. DOL directs states to verify a \u201csufficient\u201d number of work search activities during their audits but has not provided information on what is considered sufficient. DOL data show that some states did not review claimants' work search activities for a majority of audited cases. DOL officials said that the agency plans to clarify its procedures after issuing a letter about formal warnings. By clarifying these procedures, DOL will have greater assurance that states are complying with verification requirements.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making four recommendations to DOL, including that it provide states information about its determination that the use of state formal warning policies is no longer permissible and clarify its work search verification requirements. DOL agreed with GAO's recommendations and stated that it would take action to address them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_474"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_475","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAccidents at grade crossings are a major source of fatalities in the railroad industry. FRA\u2014the federal agency responsible for providing regulatory oversight of grade-crossing safety\u2014\u2013issued regulations on the use of train horns in 2005. Railroads generally support sounding the horn, whereas, communities often support quiet zones to reduce noise.\nCongress included a provision in statute for GAO to examine FRA's train horn regulations, including those on quiet zones. Among other things, this report: (1) describes benefits and costs of quiet zones, and (2) examines how FRA evaluates the effectiveness of its train horn regulations. GAO analyzed FRA's documentation on quiet zones, including FRA's train horn regulations and 2011 and 2013 studies on quiet zone safety; reviewed literature; and interviewed FRA program officials in headquarters, Grade Crossing Managers in FRA's 8 regions, and a nongeneralizable sample of another 32 stakeholders from 6 states, railroads, public authorities, and private industry consulting firms. State and public authorities were selected based on the number of quiet zones, geographic diversity, and FRA's recommendations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO found that the benefits of quiet zones\u2014\u2013i.e., highway-rail at-grade crossings (grade crossings) where train horns are not sounded\u2014have not been quantified and that the costs to establish quiet zones vary. The Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) train horn regulations allow public authorities (e.g., cities or towns) the opportunity to establish quiet zones if they install safety measures that reduce risks associated with the absence of the train horn (see fig.). While GAO did not identify any research that has quantified the benefits of quiet zones, most stakeholders GAO interviewed said that these quiet zones provide benefits to communities, such as reducing noise or increasing economic development. According to FRA guidance, the factors that affect the costs to establish quiet zones can vary based on the number of grade crossings and types of safety measures used. Public authorities, which typically incur the costs and receive the benefits of quiet zones, must therefore decide whether the benefits of quiet zones exceed the costs.\nTo evaluate the effectiveness of its train horn regulations, FRA has analyzed data on grade crossings in quiet zones and is transitioning to a formal process for inspecting quiet zones.\nAnalyses: FRA's analyses showed grade crossings in quiet zones were generally as safe as they were when train horns were sounded. However, these analyses did not control for changes to grade crossings' characteristics over time\u2014\u2013e.g., train speeds or frequency. Such changes may decrease the analyses' reliability. A revised methodology that accounts for these changes could provide FRA with better information on the long-term effects of the train horn regulations, including the safety of quiet zones.\nInspections: Recognizing the need for additional oversight, FRA has taken steps to formalize its process for inspecting quiet zones. FRA has primarily relied on public authorities to oversee quiet zones and ensure compliance with the train horn regulations, in addition to informal inspections by FRA's Grade Crossing Managers. In September 2017, FRA began conducting formal inspections of quiet zones using Grade Crossing Inspectors. However, FRA has not developed guidance for how inspections are to be conducted, including how frequently inspections are to be performed or what should be examined. Without guidance, FRA cannot ensure that inspections are being conducted consistently across FRA's eight regions.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that FRA: (1) revise its methodology for analyzing the safety of quiet zones, and (2) develop guidance on conducting quiet zone inspections. The Department of Transportation partially concurred with the first recommendation, saying it would consider it, and fully concurred with the second. GAO continues to believe changes to the methodology are needed, as discussed in the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_475"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_476","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nMore than 4 decades ago, Congress authorized the creation of the SPR to reduce the impact of disruptions in supplies of petroleum products. DOE manages the SPR. As a member of the International Energy Agency, the United States is obligated to maintain reserves equivalent to at least 90 days of the previous year's net imports (imports minus exports). The SPR's storage and related infrastructure is aging, and DOE has plans to modernize these facilities. Since 2015, Congress has mandated crude oil sales. As of March 2018, the SPR held about 665 million barrels of crude oil.\nGAO was asked to examine the SPR's ability to meet U.S. energy security needs. This report examines, among other things, the extent to which (1) DOE has identified the optimal size of the SPR, and (2) DOE's plans for modernizing the SPR take into account the effects of congressionally mandated crude oil sales. GAO reviewed DOE's plans and studies, and interviewed agency officials and nine experts selected based on prior work, referrals, and a literature review.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Energy (DOE) has not identified the optimal size of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). In 2016, DOE completed a long-term strategic review of the SPR after its last comprehensive examination conducted in 2005. The 2016 review examined the benefits of several SPR sizes, but it did not identify an optimal size and its review was limited in several ways. In particular, DOE did not fully consider recent and expected future changes in market conditions, such as the implications of falling net imports, or the role that increased levels of private reserves (reserves held by private companies for their own purposes) may play in responding to supply disruptions. These changes have contributed to SPR and private reserves reaching historically high levels on a net imports basis (see figure). These changes are expected to continue to evolve\u2014according to government projections, the United States will become a net exporter in the late 2020s before again becoming a net importer between 2040 and 2050. GAO has found that agencies should reexamine their programs if conditions change. Without addressing the limitations of its 2016 review and periodically performing reexaminations in the future, DOE cannot be assured that the SPR will be sized appropriately into the future.\nDOE has taken steps to take into account congressionally mandated sales of SPR crude oil in its $1.4 billion modernization plans for SPR's infrastructure and facilities. The SPR is projected to hold 405 million barrels of oil by the end of fiscal year 2027. However, DOE's current plans are based on information analyzed prior to recently mandated sales. According to DOE officials, the agency began a study in March 2018 to assess the effects of these sales on the SPR's modernization. However, this study is not examining all options for handling any excess SPR assets that may be created by currently mandated sales or any additional sales that may be mandated in the future, inconsistent with an agency order on real property asset management that calls for identifying excess assets. For example, DOE does not plan to examine the potential to lease unused SPR storage capacity to the private sector because DOE is not currently authorized to enter into such leases, according to agency officials. If authorized, leasing capacity could generate revenues that could help offset the costs of modernization. By not examining a full range of options, DOE risks missing beneficial ways to modernize the SPR while saving taxpayer resources.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making four recommendations, including that DOE (1) supplement the 2016 review by conducting an additional analysis, (2) ensure that the agency periodically reexamines the size of the SPR, and (3) consider a full range of options for handling potentially excess assets as it conducts its study, among other things. DOE agreed with two, partially agreed with one, and disagreed with another recommendation on refined product reserve studies. GAO maintains that the recommendations are valid.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_476"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_477","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nWith the goal of providing safe, decent, affordable housing, HUD provides rental assistance to low-income households through its HCV program, administered locally by approximately 2,200 PHAs around the country. In fiscal year 2016, the HCV program received approximately $20 billion in funding and provided rental assistance to approximately 2.4 million households. Local demand in the program may exceed voucher supply, and individuals may wait years before receiving a voucher. After receiving a voucher, participants have a limited amount of time to secure a rental. Accordingly, PHAs have issued alerts about criminals targeting program participants with fraud schemes, such as by claiming to offer admission to the program for a fee.\nThis report describes (1) the types of reported fraud schemes against HCV participants, including older adults, PHAs' awareness of such schemes and their frequency, and indicators of such schemes online; and (2) HUD's and PHAs' antifraud regulations, guidance, and information related to fraud risks affecting program participants. GAO reviewed online fraud alerts and consumer complaint data from calendar years 2011 to 2016; conducted a generalizable survey of PHA officials about their awareness of fraud against participants; interviewed agency officials and experts; and conducted online covert tests of 350 rental ads and 26 commercial websites. GAO visited eight PHAs, selected based on size and location, among other factors.\nGAO is not making recommendations in this report. HUD had no comments on a draft of this report.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nPublic Housing Agencies (PHA) have reported various types of fraud schemes against Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) participants, including older adults, but were aware of limited instances of such schemes. Similarly, GAO identified few potential indicators of these schemes in online covert testing of rental ads and websites. According to GAO's analysis of fraud alerts and complaint data, the type of fraud participants may encounter\u2014such as waiting-list, rental, and side-payment fraud\u2014depends on where they are in the HCV process and whether they are applicants, voucher holders, or landlords, as shown in the figure below. For example, side-payment fraud involves agreements\u2014mutual or compelled\u2014in which the voucher holder pays additional rent or other payments to the landlord for benefits, for example to secure a rental or avoid eviction.\nAccording to GAO's survey of PHAs representing approximately 1.9 million households, PHAs reported few incidents of the various fraud types, although side-payment fraud, a program violation, was noted most frequently. Specifically, GAO estimates that while 41 percent of PHAs were aware of instances of side-payment fraud in the prior year, most reported 2 to 5 incidents in the prior year. In addition, 3 to 10 percent of PHAs were aware of instances of the other types of fraud GAO identified. GAO's online covert testing also found few indicators of potential fraud. For example, some websites requested payment for information about the HCV application process, but none explicitly offered to do something prohibited by program rules, such as placing someone on a waiting list for a fee.\nThe Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) and PHAs' antifraud regulations, guidance, and information largely focus on efforts to protect the HCV program. For example, PHAs are required by HUD to inform families of program-related fraud and abuse, including the prohibition against side payments. In addition, GAO found that several PHAs voluntarily provide targeted messages to participants about fraud schemes by outside parties. Through industry associations, PHAs have mechanisms through which they share best practices that could include these and other issues.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_477"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_478","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nPuerto Rico, the largest and most populous territory of the United States, is subject to congressional authority, although it has broad authority over matters of internal governance. After it defaulted on over $1.5 billion in public debt since 2015, Congress passed PROMESA to establish federal oversight of fiscal affairs. This debt crisis coincided with DOL finalizing the 2016 Overtime Rule, which was invalidated in federal court and is being appealed. PROMESA included a provision for GAO to assess the rule's impact on Puerto Rico and examine its economic condition.\nThis report (1) examines the economic conditions in Puerto Rico as of the end of 2016, and (2) assesses the potential effects of applying the 2016 Overtime Rule to Puerto Rico. GAO analyzed 1990-2016 economic data and replicated DOL's impact analysis of the 2016 Overtime Rule using 2015 ACS data, the same year used by DOL in its analysis. GAO also reviewed federal laws, regulations, court documents, agency guidance, and criteria related to the federal overtime rule; facilitated group discussions with employers in Puerto Rico from industries most likely to be impacted by the rule; and interviewed relevant stakeholders and labor groups.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nUnreliable economic and limited labor data make conditions in Puerto Rico difficult to evaluate.\nPuerto Rico Planning Board data show that from 2005 to 2016 Puerto Rico's gross domestic product (GDP), a principal economic indicator, decreased by over 9 percent, after adjusting for inflation, and the devastation brought by Hurricane Maria in 2017 has worsened economic conditions. While the overall downward trend is reliable, GAO found that the Planning Board uses outdated methods to calculate GDP, which results in unreliable data from year to year and can make it difficult for policymakers to fully analyze specific economic needs and develop long-range plans. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), within the U.S. Department of Commerce (Commerce), does not calculate GDP for Puerto Rico, as it does for the other U.S. territories. For 6 years, BEA has provided technical support to the Planning Board to update its methods and Planning Board officials described plans to do so, but its methods remain outdated. A 2016 Congressional Task Force recommended that BEA calculate Puerto Rico's GDP, and BEA considers it a long-term goal; however, BEA has not taken steps to do so.\nFurther, Puert Rico has limited labor statistics because it is not included in the Current Population Survey (CPS), which is produced by Commerce's Census Bureau (Census) and Department of Labor's (DOL) Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). CPS provides detailed information about employment, such as hours of work and earnings. The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) suggested that Census conduct a study to determine the feasibility of expanding data collection to include Puerto Rico. Census officials said that they estimated the cost of such a study but have not yet conducted it. Census officials also cited concerns with data collection burdens. However, without CPS data on Puerto Rico, policymakers are limited in estimating the full economic impact of different policy changes. For example, DOL did not have the data needed to include Puerto Rico in its assessment of the economic impact of DOL's 2016 Overtime Rule. Conducting such a study would help policymakers consider the tradeoffs of including Puerto Rico in the CPS.\nGAO used a different dataset\u2014American Community Survey (ACS)\u2014to assess the potential effects of applying the 2016 Overtime Rule, which would have increased the salary level threshold from $23,660 to $47,476 at which executive, administrative, and professional workers would not be eligible for overtime pay. GAO estimated that about 47,250 of 1.06 million workers in Puerto Rico would be affected\u2014that is, they would become eligible for overtime pay. In response to a salary level threshold increase, employers from selected industries in Puerto Rico told GAO that they might increase certain workers' salaries, but cut overtime hours for other workers, and adjust the number of staff. An economist and a labor group official said that employers could respond by adjusting the number of staff or their hours, but the impacts to employers may be limited and the workforce could benefit. In 2017, a federal district court invalidated the 2016 Overtime Rule and the overtime salary threshold remains at $23,660, but that decision is currently on appeal.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that BEA include Puerto Rico in its reporting on GDP and that Census and BLS study the feasibility of including Puerto Rico in the CPS. Commerce agreed with our recommendations and DOL did not have any comments on the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_478"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_479","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCRAs such as Equifax assemble information about consumers to produce credit reports and may provide other services, such as identity verification to federal agencies and other organizations. Data breaches at Equifax and other large organizations have highlighted the need to better protect sensitive personal information.\nGAO was asked to report on the major breach that occurred at Equifax in 2017. This report (1) summarizes the events regarding the breach and the steps taken by Equifax to assess, respond to, and recover from the incident and (2) describes actions by federal agencies to respond to the breach. To do so, GAO reviewed documents from Equifax and its cybersecurity consultant related to the breach and visited the Equifax data center in Alpharetta, Georgia, to interview officials and observe physical security measures. GAO also reviewed relevant public statements filed by Equifax. Further, GAO analyzed documents from the IRS, SSA, and USPS, which are Equifax's largest federal customers for identity-proofing services, and interviewed federal officials related to their oversight activities and response to the breach.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn July 2017, Equifax system administrators discovered that attackers had gained unauthorized access via the Internet to the online dispute portal that maintained documents used to resolve consumer disputes (see fig.). The Equifax breach resulted in the attackers accessing personal information of at least 145.5 million individuals. Equifax's investigation of the breach identified four major factors including identification, detection, segmenting of access to databases, and data governance that allowed the attacker to successfully gain access to its network and extract information from databases containing personally identifiable information. Equifax reported that it took steps to mitigate these factors and attempted to identify and notify individuals whose information was accessed. The company's public filings since the breach occurred reiterate that the company took steps to improve security and notify affected individuals.\nThe Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Social Security Administration (SSA), and U.S. Postal Service (USPS)\u2014three of the major federal customer agencies that use Equifax's identity verification services\u2014conducted assessments of the company's security controls, which identified a number of lower-level technical concerns that Equifax was directed to address. The agencies also made adjustments to their contracts with Equifax, such as modifying notification requirements for future data breaches. In the case of IRS, one of its contracts with Equifax was terminated. The Department of Homeland Security offered assistance in responding to the breach; however, Equifax reportedly declined the assistance because it had already retained professional services from an external cybersecurity consultant. In addition, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection and the Federal Trade Commission, which have regulatory and enforcement authority over consumer reporting agencies (CRAs) such as Equifax, initiated an investigation into the breach and Equifax's response in September 2017. The investigation is ongoing.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making recommendations in this report. GAO plans to issue separate reports on federal oversight of CRAs and consumer rights regarding the protection of personally identifiable information collected by such entities. A number of federal agencies and Equifax provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_479"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_480","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nOver the next 5 years, DOD plans to spend over $65 billion on its space system acquisitions portfolio, including many systems that rely on software for key capabilities. However, software-intensive space systems have had a history of significant schedule delays and billions of dollars in cost growth.\nSenate and House reports accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 contained provisions for GAO to review challenges in software-intensive DOD space programs. This report addresses, among other things, (1) the extent to which these programs have involved users; and (2) what software-specific management challenges, if any, programs faced.\nTo do this work, GAO reviewed four major space defense programs with cost growth or schedule delays caused, in part, by software. GAO reviewed applicable statutes and DOD policies and guidance that identified four characteristics of effective user engagement. GAO reviewed program documentation; and interviewed program officials, contractors, and space systems users. GAO also analyzed program metrics, test and evaluation reports, and external program assessments.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe four major Department of Defense (DOD) software-intensive space programs that GAO reviewed struggled to effectively engage system users. These programs are the Air Force's Joint Space Operations Center Mission System Increment 2 (JMS), Next Generation Operational Control System (OCX), Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS); and the Navy's Mobile User Objective System (MUOS). These ongoing programs are estimated to cost billions of dollars, have experienced overruns of up to three times originally estimated cost, and have been in development for periods ranging from 5 to over 20 years. Previous GAO reports, as well as DOD and industry studies, have found that user involvement is critical to the success of any software development effort. For example, GAO previously reported that obtaining frequent feedback is linked to reducing risk, improving customer commitment, and improving technical staff motivation. However, the programs GAO reviewed often did not demonstrate characteristics of effective user engagement that are identified in DOD policy and statute:\nEarly engagement. OCX involved users early; JMS planned to but, in practice, did not; SBIRS and MUOS did not plan to involve users early.\nContinual engagement. JMS, OCX, and SBIRS all planned to continually involve users but, in practice, did not fully do so; MUOS did not plan to do so.\nFeedback based on actual working software. OCX and SBIRS provided users opportunities to give such feedback but only years into software development; JMS and MUOS did not provide opportunities for feedback.\nFeedback incorporated into subsequent development. JMS, OCX, and SBIRS all planned to incorporate user feedback but, in practice, have not done so throughout development; MUOS did not plan to do so.\nAs reflected above, actual program efforts to involve users and obtain and incorporate feedback were often unsuccessful. This was due, in part, to the lack of specific guidance on user involvement and feedback. Although DOD policies state that users should be involved and provide feedback on software development projects, they do not provide specific guidance on the timing, frequency, and documentation of such efforts. Without obtaining user feedback and acceptance, programs risk delivering systems that do not meet users' needs. In selected instances, the lack of user involvement has contributed to systems that were later found to be operationally unsuitable.\nThe programs GAO reviewed also faced software-specific challenges in using commercial software, applying outdated software tools, and having limited knowledge and training in newer software development techniques. For example, programs using commercial software often underestimated the effort required to integrate such software into an overall system. Secondly, selected programs relied on obsolete software tools that they were accustomed to using but which industry had since replaced. Finally, GAO found that two of the reviewed programs lacked knowledge of more modern software development approaches. DOD has acknowledged these challenges and has efforts underway to address each of them.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making two recommendations that DOD ensure its guidance that addresses software development provides specific, required direction on the timing, frequency, and documentation of user involvement and feedback. DOD concurred with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_480"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_481","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThis testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's June 2018 report, entitled Identity Theft: IRS Needs to Strengthen Taxpayer Authentication Efforts ( GAO-18-418 ).\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has identified over 100 interactions requiring taxpayer authentication based on potential risks to IRS and individuals. IRS authenticates millions of taxpayers each year via telephone, online, in person, and correspondence to ensure that it is interacting with legitimate taxpayers. IRS's estimated costs to authenticate taxpayers vary by channel.\nIRS has made progress on monitoring and improving authentication, including developing an authentication strategy with high-level strategic efforts. However, it has not prioritized the initiatives supporting its strategy nor identified the resources required to complete them, consistent with program management leading practices. Doing so would help IRS clarify relationships between its authentication efforts and articulate resource needs relative to expected benefits. Further, while IRS regularly assesses risks to and monitors its online authentication applications, it has not established equally rigorous internal controls for its telephone, in-person, and correspondence channels, including mechanisms to collect reliable, useful data to monitor authentication outcomes. As a result, IRS may not identify current or emerging threats to the tax system.\nIRS can further strengthen authentication to stay ahead of fraudsters. While IRS has taken preliminary steps to implement National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) new guidance for secure digital authentication, it does not have clear plans and timelines to fully implement it by June 2018, as required by the Office of Management and Budget. As a result, IRS may not be positioned to address its most vulnerable authentication areas in a timely manner. Further, IRS lacks a comprehensive process to evaluate potential new authentication technologies. Industry representatives, financial institutions, and government officials told GAO that the best authentication approach relies on multiple strategies and sources of information, while giving taxpayers options for actively protecting their identity. Evaluating alternatives for taxpayer authentication will help IRS avoid missing opportunities for improving authentication.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_481"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_482","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nVA provides health care services, including pharmacy services, to approximately 9 million veterans each year. Since 2000, VAMCs have faced recurring challenges in managing their pharmacy inventories, including difficulties with accurately accounting for and updating inventory totals through their pharmacy systems.\nGAO was asked to review VA pharmacy inventory management. This report (1) describes approaches selected VAMCs use to manage their pharmacy inventories and (2) assesses the extent to which VA oversees VAMCs' efforts to manage their pharmacy inventories.\nTo conduct this work, GAO visited a non-generalizable selection of five VAMCs chosen for the complexity of services offered and variation in location. GAO also reviewed VA national policies and local polices for the selected VAMCs and interviewed VA officials at the headquarters, regional, and local levels. GAO assessed VA's oversight of pharmacy management in the context of federal internal control standards.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nSelected Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) medical centers (VAMC) use generally similar approaches for managing their pharmacy inventories. For example, all VAMCs store certain medications in secured areas. However, GAO found that VAMCs have also taken unique approaches for procuring and tracking medications, as allowed under VA policy. For example, to better address medication shortages, one VAMC pharmacy GAO visited established a shortage committee that meets on a weekly basis. Another VAMC pharmacy uses an automated dispensing machine together with compatible software that allows the pharmacy to track the location of most inpatient medications in real-time (see figure).\nGAO also found that VA's oversight of VAMCs' pharmacy inventory management is limited as VA lacks a comprehensive inventory management system or a focal point for system-wide oversight. In May 2018, VA signed a contract for a new electronic health records system that should allow VA to monitor VAMCs' inventories; however, VA officials expect implementation of this system to take up to 10 years. Based on a review of VA policies and interviews with VA officials, GAO found that VA has not designated a focal point with defined responsibilities for system-wide oversight of VAMCs' pharmacy inventory management. This is inconsistent with federal internal control standards for monitoring and establishing structure and authority to achieve an entity's objectives. Without a focal point for system-wide oversight, VA has limited awareness of the unique approaches that VAMCs use to manage their inventories and is missing an opportunity to evaluate these approaches. Additionally, VA cannot effectively share and standardize inventory management best practices as appropriate. Having a focal point is especially important given that VAMCs have historically had challenges in managing their inventories and a comprehensive pharmacy inventory management system may not be available for the foreseeable future.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that VA designate a focal point for overseeing VAMCs' pharmacy inventory management efforts system-wide and define the focal point's responsibilities. VA concurred in principle with the recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_482"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_483","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn 2018, FCC estimated that 35 percent of Americans living on tribal lands lack broadband service compared to 8 percent of Americans overall. Broadband service can be delivered through wireless technologies using radio frequency spectrum. According to FCC, increasing tribal access to spectrum would help expand broadband service on tribal lands. GAO was asked to review spectrum use by tribal entities\u2014tribal governments and tribally owned telecommunications providers.\nThis report examines (1) tribal entities' ability to obtain and access spectrum to provide broadband services and the reported barriers that may exist, and (2) the extent to which FCC promotes and supports tribal efforts to obtain and access spectrum. GAO interviewed 16 tribal entities that were using wireless technologies. Selected entities varied geographically, among other characteristics. GAO analyzed FCC's license and auction data as of September 2018, reviewed FCC's rulemakings on spectrum for broadband services, and interviewed other tribal and industry stakeholders and FCC officials. The information presented is not generalizable to all tribes or industry participants.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe tribal entities GAO contacted cited various barriers to obtaining spectrum licenses in bands that can be used to provide broadband services. According to its analysis of data from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), GAO identified 18 tribal entities that held active spectrum licenses in such bands. For example, of these 18 tribal entities, 4 obtained licenses through secondary market transactions\u2014that is, they bought or leased the license from another provider, and 2 obtained a license through an FCC spectrum auction. Licensed spectrum is generally preferred because it offers better quality of service compared to unlicensed spectrum; however, almost all of the tribal entities GAO contacted said that they are accessing unlicensed spectrum to provide Internet service. They identified barriers to obtaining licensed spectrum through auctions and secondary market transactions, barriers such as high costs and, in the case of secondary market transactions, a lack of information on who holds licenses over tribal lands. Because most spectrum allocated for commercial use has already been assigned, the secondary market is one of very few avenues available to tribal entities that would like to access licensed spectrum.\nFCC has taken steps to promote and support tribal access to spectrum. For example, FCC issued proposed rulemakings in 2011 and 2018 that sought comment on tribal-specific proposals, such as establishing tribal-licensing priorities and initiating processes to transfer unused spectrum licenses to tribal entities. However, FCC has not finalized these rules and is in the process of responding to comments to the 2018 rulemaking. Also, while FCC has made additional spectrum available for broadband use in recent years, tribal stakeholders cited limitations with the spectrum FCC has made available. For example, FCC allows broadband providers to operate in unused television broadcast bands on an unlicensed basis. While stakeholders GAO interviewed cited some advantages of these bands, such as being useful to reach remote customers, they also noted technical and cost limitations that reduced the potential to improve tribal access to spectrum. FCC stated that it is implementing spectrum initiatives and recognizes the importance of promoting a robust secondary market to improve communications throughout the United States, including tribal lands. However, GAO found that FCC has not collected data related to tribal access to spectrum, analyzed unused licensed spectrum that exists over tribal lands, or made data available to tribal entities in an accessible and easy manner that could be beneficial in their efforts to obtain spectrum licenses from other providers. By collecting data on the extent that tribal entities are obtaining and accessing spectrum, FCC could better understand tribal spectrum issues and use this information as it implements ongoing spectrum initiatives. Further, given that the secondary market is one of few ways for tribal entities to access licensed spectrum to be able to provide Internet service, FCC could promote a more robust secondary market by analyzing unused licensed spectrum over tribal lands and using that information to inform FCC's oversight of the secondary market. Additionally, by making information available on who holds spectrum licenses over tribal lands, FCC could remove a barrier tribes may face in attempting to obtain spectrum through the secondary market.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nFCC should (1) collect data on tribal access to spectrum; (2) analyze unused licensed spectrum over tribal lands; and (3) make information available in a more accessible manner that would promote tribes' ability to purchase or lease spectrum licenses over their lands from other providers. FCC agreed with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_483"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_484","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nMultiemployer plans are collectively bargained pension agreements often between labor unions and two or more employers. CSPF is one of the nation's largest multiemployer defined benefit pension plans, covering about 385,000 participants. Since 1982, the plan has operated under a court-enforceable consent decree which, among other things, requires that the plan's assets be managed by independent parties. Within 7 years, CSPF estimates that the plan's financial condition will require severe benefit cuts. GAO was asked to review the events and factors that led to the plan's critical financial status and how its investment outcomes compare to similar plans.\nGAO describes (1) what is known about the factors that contributed to CSPF's critical financial condition; (2) what has been CSPF's investment policy, and the process for setting and executing it, since the consent decree was established; and (3) how CSPF's investments have performed over time, particularly compared to similar pension plans.\nGAO reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations; interviewed CSPF representatives, International Brotherhood of Teamsters officials and members, federal officials, and knowledgeable industry stakeholders; reviewed CSPF documentation including investment policy statements and board of trustee meeting minutes; and analyzed investment returns and fees from required, annual pension plan filings and from consultant benchmarking reports.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund (CSPF) was established in 1955 to provide pension benefits to trucking industry workers, and is one of the largest multiemployer plans. According to its regulatory filings, CSPF had less than half the estimated funds needed to cover plan liabilities in 1982 at the time it entered into a court-enforceable consent decree that provides for oversight of certain plan activities. Since then, CSPF has made some progress toward achieving its targeted level of funding; however, CSPF has never been more than 75 percent funded and its funding level has weakened since 2002, as shown in the figure below.\nStakeholders GAO interviewed identified numerous factors that contributed to CSPF's financial condition. For example, stakeholders stated that changes within the trucking industry as well as a decline in union membership contributed to CSPF's inability to maintain a healthy contribution base. CSPF's active participants made up about 69 percent of all participants in 1982, but accounted for only 16 percent in 2016. The most dramatic change in active participants occurred in 2007 when the United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) withdrew from the plan. At that time, UPS accounted for about 30 percent of the plan's active participants (i.e. workers). In addition, the market declines of 2001 to 2002 and 2008 had a significant negative impact on the plan's long-term investment performance. Stakeholders noted that while each individual factor contributed to CSPF's critical financial condition, the interrelated nature of the factors also had a cumulative effect on the plan's financial condition.\nBoth CSPF's investment policy and the process for setting and executing it have changed several times since the consent decree was established in 1982. The original consent decree gave an independent asset manager\u2014called a named fiduciary\u2014exclusive authority to set and change the plan's investment policies and manage plan assets, and prohibited CSPF trustees from managing assets or making investment decisions. Initially, the named fiduciaries sold the troubled real estate assets acquired during the pre-consent decree era. Subsequent changes include the following:\nIn 1993, the named fiduciaries started to increase investment in equities, and their policies continued to direct that asset allocations be weighted toward equities until early 2017.\nBetween 2003 and 2010, the court approved three plan decisions to move a total of 50 percent of CSPF's assets into passively-managed accounts (passive management typically seeks to match the performance of a specific market index and reduce investment fees).\nAn early-2017 investment policy change precipitated by CSPF's deteriorating financial condition will continue to move plan assets into fixed income investments ahead of projected insolvency, or the date when CSPF is expected to have insufficient assets to pay promised benefits when due. As a result, assets will be gradually transitioned from \u201creturn-seeking assets\u201d\u2014such as equities and emerging markets debt\u2014to high-quality investment grade debt and U.S. Treasury securities with intermediate and short-term maturities. The plan is projected to become insolvent on January 1, 2025. CSPF officials and named fiduciary representatives said these changes are intended to reduce the plan's exposure to market risk and volatility, and provide participants greater certainty prior to projected insolvency.\nGAO found that CSPF's investment returns and expenses were generally in line with similarly sized institutional investors and with demographically similar multiemployer pension plans. For example, GAO's analysis of returns using the peer group measure used by CSPF known as the Wilshire Associates' Trust Universe Comparison Service (TUCS), showed that CSPF's annual investment returns since 1995 were above the median about as many times as they were below. Similarly, comparing CSPF's returns to a peer group of similar multiemployer defined benefit plans using federally required annual reports found that CSPF's annual investment returns were in line with those of its peers. Specifically, CSPF's annual returns were above the median nine times and below it six times\u2014and CSPF's overall (dollar-weighted) average annual return from 2000 through 2014 was close to that of the peer median average return of 4.8 percent.\nIn addition, GAO found that CSPF's investment fees and other administrative expenses have also been in line with other large multiemployer plans. For example:\nCSPF's investment fees as a percentage of assets were about 9 percent lower than the median of large defined benefit multiemployer plans over the 2000 through 2014 period\u2014though much of that difference is accounted for by a relative reduction in investment fees since 2007. CSPF's investment fees as a percentage of assets were, on average, about 34 basis points (or 0.34 percent).\nCSPF's administrative expenses related to the day-to-day operations of the plan have also been in line with other large multiemployer plans. CSPF's administrative expenses per participant were below the median for large defined benefit multiemployer plans for 12 of the 15 years over the 2000 through 2014 period. As of 2014, CSPF's administrative expense was $98 per participant, which is about 16 percent less than the median for large defined benefit multiemployer plans.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making recommendations in this report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_484"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_485","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nBroadband furthers economic development, educational attainment, and public health and safety; however, residents of tribal lands have lower levels of broadband access relative to the U.S. population. Congress has prioritized identifying and targeting funds to unserved areas. FCC uses data from broadband providers to develop maps and reports depicting broadband availability in the United States, with specific information on tribal lands. GAO was asked to review FCC's efforts to collect broadband data for tribal lands.\nThis report examines the extent to which: (1) FCC's approach to collecting broadband data accurately captures broadband access on tribal lands and (2) FCC obtains tribal input on the data. GAO interviewed stakeholders from 25 tribal governments or tribally owned providers, and visited nine tribal lands. The selected tribes varied geographically and in levels of broadband availability, among other characteristics. GAO also reviewed FCC's rulemakings on broadband data and interviewed other tribal stakeholders, FCC officials, and 13 non-tribal broadband providers selected to include a diversity of technologies. Provider and tribal interviews were based on non-generalizable samples.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Federal Communications Commission (FCC) collects data on broadband availability from providers, but these data do not accurately or completely capture broadband access on tribal lands. Specifically, FCC collects data on broadband availability; these data capture where providers may have broadband infrastructure. However, FCC considers broadband to be \u201cavailable\u201d for an entire census block if the provider could serve at least one location in the census block. This leads to overstatements of service for specific locations like tribal lands (see figure). FCC, tribal stakeholders, and providers have noted that this approach leads to overstatements of broadband availability. Because FCC uses these data to measure broadband access, it also overstates broadband access\u2014the ability to obtain service\u2014on tribal lands.\nAdditionally, FCC does not collect information on several factors\u2014such as affordability, quality, and denials of service\u2014that FCC and tribal stakeholders stated can affect the extent to which Americans living on tribal lands can access broadband services. FCC provides broadband funding for unserved areas based on its broadband data. Overstatements of access limit FCC's and tribal stakeholders' abilities to target broadband funding to such areas. For example, some tribal officials stated that inaccurate data have affected their ability to plan their own broadband networks and obtain funding to address broadband gaps on their lands. By developing and implementing methods for collecting and reporting accurate and complete data on broadband access specific to tribal lands, FCC would be better able to target federal broadband funding to tribal areas that need it the most and to more accurately assess FCC's progress toward its goal of increasing all Americans' access to affordable broadband.\nFCC does not have a formal process to obtain tribal input on the accuracy of provider-submitted broadband data. In the National Broadband Plan , FCC highlighted the need for a targeted approach to improve broadband availability data for tribal lands. As outlined in the plan, such an approach would include working with tribes to ensure that information is accurate and useful. About half of the tribal stakeholders GAO interviewed raised concerns that FCC relies solely on data from providers, and most stated FCC should work with tribes to improve the accuracy of FCC's data. Establishing a formal process to obtain input from tribal governments on the accuracy of provider-submitted broadband data could help improve the accuracy of FCC's broadband data for tribal lands.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making three recommendations to FCC, including that it collect and report data that accurately measure tribal broadband access as well as develop a process to obtain tribal input on the accuracy of the data. FCC agreed with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_485"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_486","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nPoverty can have a profound effect on academic outcomes and college readiness and students from low-income families are less likely to go to college. The low rates of degree attainment for low-income students raises questions about whether the students who wish to pursue higher education have access to courses that support their readiness for college. GAO was asked to review college preparatory course offerings in U.S. high schools.\nThis report (1) examines the extent to which high schools of different poverty levels offer courses to prepare students academically for college, and (2) describes the challenges students in high-poverty schools face being prepared to attend college. GAO analyzed 2015-16 Education data on course offerings by school poverty level, type, and size, and developed a generalized linear regression model to explore whether certain school-level characteristics may be associated with course offerings; reviewed a generalizable sample of public 4-year college websites for course requirements for admission; and interviewed officials from Education and the Department of Justice. GAO also conducted site visits to 12 high-poverty high schools in 3 states selected to provide variation in course offerings, among other things. In this review, GAO focused on public 4-year colleges because they offer a bachelor's degree and are generally a more affordable 4-year option.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nStudents in relatively poor and small schools had less access to high school courses that help prepare them for college, according to GAO's analysis of Department of Education (Education) data for school year 2015-16 (the most recent available). While most public high schools, regardless of poverty level, offered courses like algebra and biology, disparities in access were associated with school poverty level for more advanced courses like calculus, physics, and those that may allow students to earn college credit, like Advanced Placement (AP) courses (see figure). High-poverty schools were less likely to offer the math and science courses that most public 4-year colleges expect students to take in high school, according to GAO's analysis of college websites. GAO's regression analysis also showed that smaller schools and certain types of schools, like charter schools, are less likely to offer the college preparatory math or science courses that many colleges look for during the admissions process.\nOfficials GAO interviewed in selected high-poverty high schools said their students can face a number of complex challenges in preparing for college. For instance, officials said that many students are academically behind when they enter high school and are unable to progress to more advanced courses. Further, high-poverty schools may not offer rigorous courses, such as AP courses, due to lack of resources or teaching staff. Students in high-poverty schools also face other stressors that can make going to college challenging. Officials at 9 of the 12 schools GAO visited cited the effects of poverty on their students, such as homelessness, hunger, and trauma, that make preparing for college difficult. School officials also said the steps involved in applying to and enrolling in college can be difficult to navigate for many students in high-poverty schools. Officials in selected schools reported efforts to address these challenges, such as offering free college courses and obtaining outside supports to assist with college advising.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_486"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_487","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nHHS-OIG has the authority to exclude providers and other entities that have committed certain acts, such as submitting false or fraudulent claims, from participation in federal health care programs. However, HHS-OIG can enter into agreements\u2014CIAs and IAs\u2014with providers and other entities as an alternative to exclusion. HHS-OIG is responsible for negotiating such agreements\u2014which it typically does at the same time the Department of Justice (DOJ) is negotiating a legal settlement to resolve related allegations\u2014and then monitoring the entities' compliance with them.\nGAO was asked to review HHS-OIG's use of these agreements. This report describes (1) the number of agreements and their general characteristics; (2) the circumstances that may lead to an agreement and the standard provisions of agreements; and (3) monitoring efforts and actions taken, if any, in response to noncompliance with the agreements.\nGAO examined agreements entered into from July 2005 (when HHS-OIG created its database) through July 2017 (most current at the time of GAO's analyses) and used HHS-OIG data to describe agreements' characteristics and actions to address noncompliance. GAO reviewed HHS-OIG documentation, including agreement templates and a selection of agreements to identify standard provisions. GAO also interviewed HHS-OIG and DOJ officials.\nGAO provided a draft of this report to HHS and DOJ. The agencies provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nTo help improve adherence to federal health care program requirements by entities that have allegedly engaged in certain acts, such as submitting false or fraudulent claims, the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Inspector General (HHS-OIG) entered into 652 agreements with those entities from July 2005 to July 2017. Since 2010, two types of agreements have been used: Corporate Integrity Agreements (CIA) and Integrity Agreements (IA). The more commonly used CIAs apply to larger entities, compared to IAs, which apply to individual practitioners or small businesses. From July 2005 through July 2017, about half of all agreements were with 3 types of entities\u2014individual or small group practices, hospitals, and skilled nursing facilities.\nFor new agreements since July 2005, the most common initial allegations that led to an entity entering into an agreement included billing for services not provided and providing medically unnecessary services. When negotiating agreements, HHS-OIG uses one of six templates that address the different types of entities or conduct involved. Across agreements the provisions are generally similar\u2014for example, requirements to provide training on specified topics or to hire a compliance officer.\nHHS-OIG uses multiple strategies to oversee agreements, such as requiring periodic reports from the entities that demonstrate compliance and assigning a monitor to review these reports and conduct site visits. HHS-OIG can also take certain actions to address noncompliance. For example, for new agreements from July 2005 through July 2017, HHS-OIG imposed monetary penalties 41 times, ranging from $1,000 to more than $3 million (median of $18,000), and excluded 4 entities from participation in federal health care programs.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_487"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_488","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nPub. L. No. 110-229, enacted in 2008, amended the U.S.-CNMI covenant to apply federal immigration law to the CNMI after a transition period. The law required the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish a temporary work permit program for foreign workers. DHS is required to decrease the number of permits issued annually, reducing them to zero by the end of the transition period, scheduled for December 31, 2019.\nTo implement the law, DHS established a new work permit program in 2011. Under the program, foreign workers can obtain, through their employers, nonimmigrant CW-1 status that allows them to work in the CNMI. The law was amended in August 2017 to, among other things, restrict future permits for workers in construction and extraction occupations.\nProposed legislation\u2014Senate bill S. 2325\u2014would, among other things, extend the transition period through December 31, 2029; increase the number of available permits from the 2018 level; and set required decreases in the annual numerical limit for the permits. (See figure for past numerical limits established by DHS and future limits proposed by S. 2325.)\nThis testimony discusses (1) recent trends in the CNMI economy and (2) preliminary observations about the number of approved CW-1 permits and characteristics of permit holders, drawn from GAO's ongoing work. GAO updated information about the CNMI's economy that it reported in May 2017 (see GAO-17-437 ). GAO also analyzed data and documents from U.S. agencies and the CNMI government.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands' (CNMI) inflation-adjusted gross domestic product (GDP) has grown each year since 2012, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis. In 2016, the CNMI's GDP rose by 29 percent, partly as a result of construction investment. While tourism has fluctuated in recent years, visitor arrivals in the CNMI rose by nearly a third from 2016 to 2017. After nearly a decade of annual decline, the total number of workers employed in the CNMI increased from 2013 through 2016, according to the most recent available CNMI tax data. Foreign workers made up 53 percent of those employed in 2016, compared with roughly 75 percent in 2002.\nGAO's preliminary analysis indicates that the number of approved CNMI-Only Transitional Worker (CW-1) permits for foreign workers in the CNMI grew from over 7,100 for fiscal year 2012 to nearly 13,000 for fiscal year 2017. In addition, GAO identified trends in the country of birth, occupation, and employment duration of foreign workers with CW-1 permits approved for fiscal years 2012 through 2018. Workers born in the Philippines received the highest number of CW-1 permits each year. As of January 2018, 750 CW-1 permits had been granted to construction workers for fiscal year 2018\u2014a 75 percent decline from the prior fiscal year. GAO estimated that approximately 2,350 foreign workers with approved CW-1 permits maintained continuous employment in the CNMI from fiscal year 2014 through January 2018. About 80 percent of these workers were born in the Philippines.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_488"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_489","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIoT generally refers to devices (or \u201cthings\u201d), such as vehicles and appliances, that use a network to communicate and share data with each other. The increasing popularity of wireless IoT devices that use spectrum has created questions about spectrum needs. GAO was asked to examine issues related to spectrum and IoT. This report discusses, among other things, (1) spectrum challenges related to IoT, (2) how the federal government plans for IoT\u2019s spectrum needs, and (3) how selected leading countries prepare for IoT\u2019s spectrum needs.\nGAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from FCC and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration as well as 24 officials from a variety of sectors, including government, commercial, and manufacturing. Stakeholders were selected based on a literature review, among other factors. GAO interviewed government and commercial representatives from four leading countries regarding IoT planning and development and reviewed associated documents. These countries were selected based on criteria that included level of economic development among other criteria.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe stakeholders GAO spoke with identified two primary spectrum-related challenges for the internet of things (IoT)\u2014the availability of spectrum and managing interference. Although not considered an immediate concern, Federal Communications Commission (FCC) staff and some stakeholders noted that rapid increases in IoT devices that use large amounts of spectrum\u2014called high-bandwidth devices\u2014could quickly overwhelm networks, as happened with smart phones. Stakeholders and FCC staff also indicated that managing interference is becoming more challenging as the number of IoT and other wireless devices grows, particularly in bands that do not require a spectrum license. The figure below illustrates the uses of radio frequency spectrum, including unlicensed use.\nFCC plans for IoT\u2019s spectrum needs by broadly tracking spectrum demand and making additional spectrum available as needed. Ensuring sufficient spectrum to support commercial demand is one way FCC pursues its strategic goal of promoting economic growth. FCC has made additional spectrum publicly available at least four times since 2015 by repurposing over 11 gigahertz of spectrum. However, FCC does not track the growth of IoT devices in two areas that pose the greatest risk to IoT\u2019s growth\u2014high bandwidth and unlicensed-spectrum devices. In 2014, FCC\u2019s Technical Advisory Council (TAC) recommended that FCC monitor high-bandwidth IoT devices and make sufficient unlicensed spectrum available. FCC officials said that FCC monitors spectrum use broadly and makes spectrum available as needed. However, since the process of reallocating spectrum is lengthy, FCC may not have adequate time to take actions to avoid a shortage, possibly hindering IoT\u2019s growth and associated economic growth.\nSpectrum planners in four leading countries\u2014France, Germany, the Netherlands, and South Korea\u2014have taken steps similar to those taken by the United States in preparation for IoT\u2019s expansion, including taking a technology-neutral approach that stakeholders believe encourages innovation. Unlike the United States, officials from two leading countries said they are concerned about spectrum congestion from the growth of IoT devices, but only one is actively monitoring congestion. In addition, three leading countries have developed nationwide low power wide-area networks that use unlicensed spectrum with potential benefits including low costs and low barriers to entry.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nFCC should track the growth in (1) high-bandwidth IoT devices and (2) IoT devices that rely on unlicensed spectrum. FCC did not believe these actions are necessary but noted that it would ask its TAC to periodically review and report on IoT\u2019s growth. GAO continues to believe the recommendations are valid.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_489"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_490","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFirstNet is charged with establishing a nationwide public-safety broadband network that is reliable, secure, and interoperable. To inform this work, FirstNet is consulting with a variety of stakeholders. In March 2017, FirstNet awarded a 25-year contract to AT&T to build, operate, and maintain the network. FirstNet's oversight of AT&T's performance is important given the scope of the network and the duration of the contract.\nThis testimony provides information on (1) FirstNet's efforts to establish the network; (2) stakeholder views on network reliability, security, and interoperability challenges FirstNet faces and its efforts to address them; and (3) FirstNet's plans to oversee its network contractor. This statement is based on GAO's June 2017 report ( GAO-17-569 ). For this report, GAO reviewed FirstNet documentation, key contract oversight practices identified in federal regulations and other sources, tribal communication practices identified by federal agencies, and assessed FirstNet's efforts and plans against these practices. GAO also interviewed FirstNet officials and a nongeneralizable selection of public safety, tribal, and other stakeholders selected to obtain a variety of viewpoints.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn June 2017, GAO reported that the First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet) had conducted key efforts to establish the network, namely releasing the request for proposal (RFP) for the network and awarding the network contract to AT&T. As the contractor, AT&T will be responsible for the overall design, development, production, operation, and evolution of the network. Additionally, FirstNet consulted with state and local, federal, and tribal stakeholders. State officials GAO contacted were generally satisfied with FirstNet's efforts to engage them. However, tribal stakeholders GAO contacted expressed concern that FirstNet has not fully engaged in effective communication with tribes. FirstNet engaged tribes through a variety of mechanisms, such as through state points of contact and a working group, but tribes noted that individuals with first-hand knowledge of tribes' experiences are unable to represent tribal views directly among FirstNet's key decision makers. Although FirstNet is required to consult with tribes through state points of contact, a key principle of effective tribal communication is to seek full understanding of tribal concerns and reach consensus where possible. By fully exploring and proposing actions to address tribal stakeholders' concerns, FirstNet could help improve its relations with tribes and better meet stakeholders' needs.\nAccording to stakeholders GAO contacted, FirstNet faces various challenges to ensure the network's reliability, security, and interoperability. For example, stakeholders raised concerns related to:\nproviding coverage to rural areas, in buildings, or underground;\nensuring the network's overall resiliency and cybersecurity; and\nmanaging frameworks for user identity, credentialing of users, access management, and prioritization of users on the network.\nFirstNet has taken action to address these challenges, such as by opening a test lab to test public safety devices and applications before deploying them on the network. The majority of stakeholders GAO contacted were satisfied with FirstNet's efforts but many noted that much uncertainty remains about how the network will be implemented.\nFirstNet established offices to oversee its network contractor, developed policies and procedures to guide contract administration\u2014including management and oversight\u2014and is receiving assistance from another federal agency with contract administration experience, although FirstNet plans to assume full responsibility in the future. For example, FirstNet established the Network Program Office to oversee the contractor's performance and facilitate quality assurance of contract deliverables, among other things. Although this office will perform essential contract-administration functions, FirstNet had not conducted long-term projections of staffing needs for the office as of April 2017. As a result, FirstNet lacks reasonable assurance that it will have sufficient resources to handle increases in its responsibilities over time. Planning for and assigning adequate resources, including people, and assessing resource needs is a key practice for planning and executing effective contract oversight. By performing a long-term staffing assessment for the Network Program Office, FirstNet would be in a better position to fully understand its staffing needs and respond to staffing changes and risks as it assumes full responsibility of contract administration in the future.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nIn June 2017, GAO recommended that FirstNet fully explore tribal stakeholders' concerns and assess its long-term staffing needs. FirstNet agreed with GAO's recommendations and described actions to address them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_490"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_491","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nQuestions have been raised about the lack of timeliness of TPAs' payments to community providers under the Choice Program and how this may affect the willingness of providers to participate in the program as well as in the forthcoming Veterans Community Care Program. You asked GAO to review issues related to the timeliness of TPAs' payments to community providers under the Choice Program.\nThis report examines, among other things, (1) the length of time TPAs have taken to pay community providers' claims and factors affecting timeliness of payments, and (2) actions taken by VA and the TPAs to reduce the length of time TPAs take to pay community providers for Choice Program claims.\nGAO reviewed TPA data on the length of time taken to pay community provider claims from November 2014 through June 2018, the most recent data available at the time of GAO's review. GAO also reviewed documentation, such as the contracts between VA and its TPAs, and interviewed VA and TPA officials. In addition, GAO interviewed a non-generalizable sample of 15 community providers, selected based on their large Choice Program claims volume, to learn about their experiences with payment timeliness.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Veterans Choice Program (Choice Program) was created in 2014 to address problems with veterans' timely access to care at VA medical facilities. The Choice Program allows eligible veterans to obtain health care services from providers not directly employed by VA (community providers), who are then reimbursed for their services through one of the program's two third-party administrators (TPA). GAO's analysis of TPA data available for November 2014 through June 2018 shows that the length of time the TPAs took to pay community providers' clean claims each month varied widely\u2014from 7 days to 68 days. VA and its TPAs identified several key factors affecting timeliness of payments to community providers under the Choice Program, including VA's untimely payments to TPAs, which in turn extended the length of time TPAs took to pay community providers' claims; and inadequate provider education on filing claims.\nVA has taken actions to address key factors that have contributed to the length of time TPAs have taken to pay community providers. For example, VA updated its payment system and related processes to pay TPAs more quickly. According to VA data, as of July 2018, VA was paying at least 90 percent of the TPAs' invoices within 7 days. In addition, VA and the TPAs have taken steps to improve provider education to help providers resolve claims processing issues. However, 9 of the 15 providers GAO interviewed said they continue to experience lengthy telephone hold times. According to VA and TPA officials, steps have been taken to improve the customer service offered to community providers. However, VA officials do not collect data on or monitor TPA compliance with customer service requirements\u2014such as calls being answered within 30 seconds or less\u2014for provider calls because they said they are not enforcing the requirements and are allowing TPAs to prioritize calls from veterans. Without collecting data and monitoring compliance, VA does not have information on challenges providers may face when contacting TPAs to resolve payment issues.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making two recommendations, including that VA should collect data on and monitor compliance with its requirements pertaining to customer service for community providers. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations and described steps it will take to implement them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_491"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_492","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe tax gap\u2014the difference between tax amounts that taxpayers should have paid and what they actually paid\u2014has been a persistent problem for decades. The tax gap estimate is an aggregate estimate of the five types of taxes that IRS administers\u2014individual income, corporation income, employment, estate, and excise taxes. For each tax type, IRS attempts to estimate the tax gap based on three types of noncompliance: (1) underreporting of tax liabilities on timely filed tax returns; (2) underpayment of taxes due from timely filed returns; and (3) nonfiling, when a taxpayer fails to file a required tax return altogether or on time.\nGAO was asked to review IRS's tax gap estimate for tax years 2008 to 2010. This report provides information on (1) the main drivers of the tax gap; (2) IRS's confidence in the tax gap estimates; (3) IRS's goals, if any, for reducing the tax gap; and (4) the extent to which IRS uses tax gap estimates and underlying data to develop strategies to reduce the tax gap. GAO reviewed IRS tax gap data and reports and interviewed IRS officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) latest tax gap estimate found that taxpayers voluntarily and timely paid about 81.7 percent of the taxes they should have paid for tax years 2008-2010.\nAs with past estimates, underreporting of individual income taxes accounted for the largest portion of the 2008-2010 tax gap. IRS believes the tax gap estimates are sufficiently reliable to provide a snapshot of tax compliance as a whole because much of the estimates are based on the most current data available, such as from IRS's National Research Program (NRP).\nIRS previously set or acknowledged goals to improve voluntary compliance. However, IRS has since moved away from that approach. IRS officials now believe there are limited benefits to establishing goals because IRS cannot control all aspects of compliance and updated methodologies may cause fluctuations in the estimates. IRS does, however, have an impact on taxpayers' compliance through its service and enforcement programs. Without long-term, quantitative goals for improving voluntary compliance, it will be difficult for IRS to determine the success of its compliance efforts and adjust its approaches.\nThe Internal Revenue Manual states IRS needs to measure taxpayer compliance and other factors so compliance information and tools can be improved. IRS uses tax gap data to study compliance behaviors and update computer formulas designed to identify tax returns with a high likelihood of noncompliance. Yet IRS has not documented a comprehensive strategy that shows how it intends to use NRP data to update compliance strategies. Officials said the uses of NRP are widely known from general documentation about NRP. Without developing and documenting a strategy for using the NRP data to update compliance strategies, IRS may not fully leverage the compliance data or allocate enforcement resources in the most cost-effective manner, and it may be difficult for Congress and others to understand the merits of what they are being asked to fund.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that IRS re-establish goals for improving voluntary compliance and develop and document a strategy that outlines how it will use its data to update compliance strategies to address the tax gap. IRS disagreed with GAO's recommendation on establishing goals and agreed with the recommendation on compliance strategies. GAO continues to believe that goals are essential for results-oriented management.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_492"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_493","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe federal government provides billions of dollars in grant funding to organizations offering social services, including FBOs. In carrying out their mission, some FBOs prefer to hire individuals who share their religious beliefs. Although the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits employment discrimination based on religion, section 702(a) of the Act exempts FBOs from this prohibition, thereby allowing them to hire based on religion. However, some federal grant programs contain statutory restrictions prohibiting this practice. Since a 2007 DOJ legal opinion, federal agencies allow faith-based grantees to use RFRA as a basis for seeking an exemption to allow religious-based hiring.\nGAO was asked to review the extent to which faith-based grantees have sought RFRA exemptions from statutory restrictions on religious-based hiring. This report describes (1) what is known about faith-based grantees that have certified exemption from statutory restrictions on religious-based hiring, per RFRA, since 2007; and (2) how agencies inform grantees of statutory restrictions on religious-based hiring and requirements for demonstrating their eligibility for an exemption.\nGAO reviewed information from DOJ, HHS, and DOL grantees from fiscal years 2007 to 2015 that were subject to statutory restrictions on religious-based hiring. GAO interviewed faith-based grantees that certified as exempt and a selection of those that did not. GAO also reviewed agency grant documentation and guidance provided to grantees and interviewed cognizant officials to understand the processes FBOs must follow to certify as exempt.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFrom fiscal years 2007 through 2015, few faith-based grantees sought an exemption based on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) from nondiscrimination laws related to religious-based hiring. Specifically, GAO found that the Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and Department of Labor (DOL) awarded funding to at least 2,586 grantees through at least 53 grant programs containing nondiscrimination hiring restrictions during this time. The number of relevant grant programs could be higher, because GAO could not identify all such programs due to data limitations. Across the 3 agencies, GAO identified 117 grantees that were potential Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs). Of the 117 potential FBOs, 9 DOJ grantees were FBOs that certified as being exempt from statutory restrictions on religious-based hiring. GAO interviewed 6 of these FBOs, all of which stated that hiring individuals who share their religious beliefs was critical to their mission, and that had the RFRA exemption not been available to them, they likely would not have sought the grant.\nDOJ, DOL, and HHS inform grant applicants and recipients of statutory restrictions on religious-based hiring and processes for obtaining an exemption from such restrictions generally through grant materials. DOJ and DOL also provide relevant information on their web sites. All three agencies require grantees that seek to make employment decisions based on religion to self-certify that they meet requirements to be eligible for an exemption, but vary in how they review and approve requests for exemptions. For example, DOJ, DOL, and HHS have policies requiring grantees to submit their exemption self-certification, but only DOL reviews exemption requests and either approves them or provides a reason for denial.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_493"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_494","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSuperfund is EPA's principal program to address sites with hazardous substances, and some of the most seriously contaminated of these sites are listed on the NPL. Many of these sites can affect Indian tribes or their land. EPA has a policy to consult with tribes when EPA actions or decisions may affect tribal interests, including on cleanup of NPL sites that are on tribal property or that affect tribes.\nGAO was asked to analyze NPL sites that are on tribal property or that affect tribes and EPA's consultation with tribes at these sites. This report: (1) examines the extent to which EPA has reliable data identifying NPL sites that are located on tribal property or that affect tribes, (2) examines the extent to which EPA has reliable data on the agency's consultation with tribes regarding NPL sites, and (3) describes the actions EPA has taken to address the unique needs of tribes when making decisions about cleanup actions at Superfund sites. GAO reviewed laws and policies, assessed EPA data on NPL sites, and interviewed EPA and tribal officials about cleanup actions and consultations at six non-generalizable NPL sites selected in part for their geographic diversity.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) does not have reliable data identifying National Priorities List (NPL) sites that are located on tribal property or that affect tribes. Specifically, EPA collects data on whether sites are on tribal property or have Native American Interest (a data variable indicating sites where tribal members or tribal land would be directly affected by the release of hazardous substances), as well as which tribes are associated with NPL sites. However, EPA's data are not always accurate or complete for a number of reasons. For example, EPA can have difficulty identifying some tribal property boundaries, and NPL site boundaries may evolve as the site is investigated and remediated. EPA does not have a regular review process for its data on whether an NPL site is on tribal property. In addition, EPA's guidance for determining whether a site has Native American Interest is unclear, and regions may not interpret it consistently. Without improving its review process and clarifying its guidance, EPA will not have reasonable assurance that its data on tribes that are affected by NPL sites are accurate or complete.\nEPA consults with tribes when actions at an NPL site may affect tribal interests, but the agency does not have reliable data on its consultations with tribes. Data from EPA's system for tracking consultation did not include documentation of some consultations that GAO confirmed had occurred. One possible reason that EPA data are incomplete is that the agency's policy is unclear on which interactions are considered consultation and are therefore to be documented in EPA's system of record, which is not consistent with federal standards for internal control. EPA's policy provides a broad definition of consultation and specifies which staff are responsible for determining when consultation may be appropriate. However, the policy does not provide further guidance on the circumstances under which consultation should be considered. For example, it does not specify any specific points in the hazardous substance cleanup process at which consultation should be considered or provide further detail on which tribal interests should be considered when determining if tribal interests on NPL sites are affected. Without clarifying guidance to clearly define circumstances under which consultation with tribes should be considered, EPA cannot have reasonable assurance that it is applying its consultation policy consistently.\nEPA has taken various actions to address the unique needs of tribes when making decisions about cleanup actions. These actions include minimizing tribal members' exposure to contaminants because of tribal lifestyle (e.g., greater consumption of local fish and game) and limiting potential damage to culturally important sites. For example, EPA officials said that at one site, they altered the design and route of the roads used to remove contaminated materials to minimize the impact of cleanup activities' on cultural resources. EPA also published a memorandum in 2017 with recommendations on considering tribes' traditional ecological knowledge in the cleanup process if tribes offer it.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making four recommendations to EPA, including that it take actions to improve the data it collects and to clearly define circumstances under which consultation with tribes should be considered. EPA generally agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_494"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_495","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nModernization of the nation's nuclear stockpile depends on timely procurement and production of nonnuclear parts and components. Such parts and components make up over 80 percent of the items in a nuclear weapon. The Kansas City site procures or produces most of these parts, under NNSA oversight. In fiscal year 2012, the site completed construction of a modern production facility. The new facility was expected to accommodate rising future workload demands, based on the forecasts that were current in 2012, according to Kansas City site contractor representatives.\nThe Senate committee report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 included a provision for GAO to review the Kansas City site's staffing plans and capabilities to meet national security requirements. This report examines (1) workload forecasts for the site since 2012, and (2) management challenges the site has identified for achieving the forecasted workload, and actions the site has taken to mitigate these challenges.\nGAO reviewed NNSA and contractor documents from 2012 through 2018 relevant to workload changes, and associated workload capacity, including information on infrastructure, equipment, and business processes\u2014as well as personnel data. GAO also interviewed NNSA program and field officials and contractor representatives.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nWorkload forecasts have significantly changed at the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) primary site for procuring or producing nonnuclear parts and components of nuclear weapons since the site's modern production facility was built in 2012. Specifically, workload projections made by the contractor operating the site, known as the Kansas City National Security Campus (Kansas City site), has increased significantly from forecasts used in planning the site's new production facility. More recent forecasts show that to meet workload requirements, production and administrative staff will need to almost double by 2020 compared to 2014 levels. For example, workload to modernize the B61-12 and W88 weapons systems will double during fiscal years 2020 through 2022.\nAccording to NNSA officials and contractor staff, the site has identified and begun to mitigate management challenges to meeting future workload, including:\nEnsuring sufficient production and office space. Because the current space is not sufficient for the increase in projected workload, the site is leasing additional space until long-term solutions, currently in planning, can be implemented.\nUpdating production equipment. To update aging production equipment, the site is developing a 10-year equipment strategy, among other things.\nRetaining and recruiting a sufficient workforce. The site has offered rewards and benefits to retain existing staff, about a third of whom are eligible to retire. It is also recruiting skilled new staff in tight labor markets and seeking to expedite security clearances for them.\nEnsuring adequate external supplier capacity. The site procures about 65 percent of its nonnuclear components from external suppliers. The site is assessing capacity and risk of existing suppliers and developing new ones.\nCurrent mitigation efforts should help the site meet currently planned increased workload and capacity demands, according to contractor and NNSA analyses. However, the February 2018 Nuclear Posture Review\u2014conducted by the Department of Defense under the direction of the President to determine the role of nuclear weapons in the nation's security strategy\u2014may change requirements and add to the site's workload in ways not yet fully known because studies and plans in response to the review are not fully complete.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_495"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_496","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDuring open enrollment, eligible returning consumers may re-enroll in their existing health insurance exchange plan or choose a different plan. Those who do not actively enroll in a plan may be automatically reenrolled into a plan. According to the Department of Health and Human Services, automatic re-enrollment is intended to help ensure consumers' continuity in coverage. However, some have questioned whether automatic reenrollment could have unintended financial consequences for consumers.\nGAO was asked to review automatic reenrollment and benchmark plans. GAO examined 1) the extent to which plans identified as benchmark plans remained the same plans from year to year, and how premiums for benchmark plans changed; 2) the proportion of exchange consumers who were automatically re-enrolled into the same or similar plans, and how these proportions compared to those for consumers who actively re-enrolled, and 3) the extent to which consumers' financial responsibility for premiums changed for those who were automatically re-enrolled compared to those who actively re-enrolled.\nGAO reviewed relevant guidance and analyzed county-based data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) for the 37 states that used the federal information platform, healthcare.gov, from 2015 through 2017. GAO also interviewed CMS and ASPE officials and analyzed information from ASPE on reenrollment from 2015 to 2016.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThrough the exchanges established under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, consumers can directly compare and select among health plans based on a variety of factors, including premiums. Most consumers who purchase health plans through the exchanges receive tax credits to help them pay for their premiums. The value of a consumer's premium tax credit is based, in part, on the premium for the benchmark plan, which is the second lowest cost option available in the consumer's local area within the exchange's silver metal tier (one of four metal tiers that indicate the value of plans). Because plan premiums and plan availability can change over time, the benchmark plan in each local market can also change over time. GAO analyzed changes in benchmark plans and premiums from 2015 through 2017 and found:\nIn most of the nearly 2,600 counties included in the analysis, the plans identified as benchmark plans, and the premiums for these plans, changed from year to year. For example, in 85 percent of counties, the 2015 benchmark plans were not benchmark plans in either 2016 or 2017.\nGross benchmark premiums (exclusive of tax credits) increased from year to year, and increases were higher from 2016 to 2017 than they were from 2015 to 2016.\nPremium tax credits would limit the costs of increasing premiums for most consumers, though some consumers, including those not eligible for premium tax credits, would have incurred more or all of the higher premium costs.\nDuring the annual open enrollment period, consumers who do not make an active plan selection are automatically reenrolled into their existing plan or, if that plan is no longer available, they are generally re-enrolled into a similar plan if one has been identified. GAO analyzed information from the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE) for consumers enrolled in both 2015 and 2016 and found:\nAbout 30 percent of consumers were automatically re-enrolled in 2016, while the remaining 70 percent chose to actively re-enroll.\nMedian net monthly premiums\u2014what consumers paid after premium tax credits\u2014increased less from 2015 to 2016 for those who actively enrolled ($5) than for those who were automatically reenrolled ($22), although there was variation. Our findings are consistent with other work by ASPE that suggests that consumers consider possible cost savings when deciding to switch plans.\nThe Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_496"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_497","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThis testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's September 2017 report, entitled Low-Dose Radiation: Interagency Collaboration on Planning Research Could Improve Information on Health Effects ( GAO-17-546 ).\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Energy (DOE), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Food and Drug Administration generally used the advice of scientific advisory bodies to develop and apply radiation protection requirements and guidance for workers and the public in the radiation exposure settings that GAO reviewed. These settings were: (1) the operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants; (2) the cleanup of sites with radiological contamination; (3) the use of medical equipment that produces radiation; and (4) accidental or terrorism-related exposure to radiation. Specifically, the agencies relied on the advice of three scientific advisory bodies that supported the use of a model that assumes the risk of cancer increases with every incremental radiation exposure. Accordingly, the agencies have set regulatory dose limits and issued guidance to confine exposure to levels that reduce the risk of cancer, while recognizing that scientific uncertainties occur in estimating cancer risks from low-dose radiation. For example, NRC requires nuclear power plants to consider measures for limiting workers' exposure below NRC's regulatory dose limit, such as by using robots for maintenance work in radiation areas.\nGAO identified seven federal agencies that funded research on low-dose radiation's health effects. In fiscal years 2012 to 2016, DOE, NRC, EPA, and four other federal agencies obligated about $210 million for such research . Although the agencies have collaborated on individual projects on radiation's health effects, they have not established a collaborative mechanism to set research priorities. GAO's previous work has shown that federal agencies can use such mechanisms to implement interagency collaboration to develop and coordinate sound science policies. In the past, DOE took a leading role in this area because DOE provided stable funding and advocated for greater coordination on research on low-dose radiation's health effects. However, since fiscal year 2012, DOE has phased out funding for one of its main research programs in this area. This has created a void in coordination efforts among federal agencies, and no other agency has stepped forward to fill this void. Because of DOE's prior experience as a leader in this area of research and its research responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, it could play an important role in helping federal agencies establish a coordinating mechanism for low-dose radiation research.\nDollars are in millions and have not been adjusted for inflation\nSource: GAO analysis of agency data. | GAO-17-546","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_497"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_498","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe HUBZone program is intended to stimulate economic development in economically distressed areas. Certified HUBZone firms are eligible for federal contracting benefits, including limited competition awards such as set-aside contracts, and are required to be recertified every 3 years. The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act of 2016 required SBA to develop criteria and guidance for a risk-based approach to verify firm eligibility for the program and included a provision for GAO to review SBA's development and implementation of the required criteria and guidance. This report examines, among other objectives, (1) SBA's development of criteria and guidance on using a risk-based approach for certifying and recertifying HUBZone firms, and (2) SBA's implementation of the revised policies and procedures for firms located in Puerto Rico.\nGAO analyzed SBA documents and reviewed files of a non-generalizable sample of 12 firms located in Puerto Rico that received certification between March 2017 and March 2018. GAO also interviewed SBA officials, representatives from HUBZone-certified firms in Puerto Rico, and local economic development agencies in Puerto Rico.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Small Business Administration (SBA) adopted criteria and guidance for a risk-based approach to certifying and recertifying firms for the Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) program in March 2017, but the extent to which it conducted a risk assessment to inform its approach is unclear. In 2009, in response to GAO's prior recommendations to address weaknesses in the HUBZone certification process, SBA increased documentation requirements for certification, but not recertification (which every 3 years determines continued program eligibility).\nIn March 2017, SBA changed its recertification criteria and guidance to require firms with $1 million or more in HUBZone contract awards to provide documentation to support continuing eligibility.\nSBA officials stated they completed a risk assessment of the HUBZone recertification process, but as of July 2018, had not provided GAO with documentation on when they performed the risk assessment, which risks were identified and considered, or what analysis established the $1 million threshold.\nGAO previously found SBA lacked key controls for its recertification process and recommended in 2015 that SBA assess the process.\nGAO continues to believe that an assessment of the recertification process would help inform a risk-based approach to reviewing and verifying information from firms that appear to pose the most risk to the program.\nBased on GAO's review of case files for a non-generalizable sample of 12 firms in Puerto Rico that received HUBZone certification in March 2017\u2013March 2018, SBA did not consistently document or follow its policies and procedures for certification reviews.\nSBA did not have complete documentation in 9 of 12 cases. SBA officials described alternative procedures they used to determine firms' eligibility, but SBA has not updated its internal policy manuals to reflect these procedures and analysts did not document use of such procedures in the files GAO reviewed.\nIn 4 of 12 cases, SBA did not follow its policy to conduct three levels of review (by an analyst, a senior analyst, and the program director or deputy) when determining to approve or deny a firm.\nIt is not known to what extent SBA reviewed staff compliance with certification and recertification review procedures. SBA provided an assurance letter stating it evaluated the Office of HUBZone's internal controls and concluded the controls were effective, but the letter did not specify what steps SBA took for the evaluation.\nStandards for internal control state management should document its control policies and conduct periodic reviews to ensure controls are effective. Because SBA has not updated its internal policy manuals or conducted a documented review of staff compliance with its quality review procedures, it lacks reasonable assurance that firms are eligible or its review process is effective. In turn, this increases the risk of ineligible firms participating in the HUBZone program and receiving contracting preferences to which they are not entitled.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that SBA (1) update internal policy manuals to reflect current policies and procedures, and (2) review and document staff compliance with procedures for certification and recertification reviews of firms. SBA generally agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_498"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_499","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSince 2002, MDA has been developing a Ballistic Missile Defense System that can identify and intercept enemy threats. MDA has received approximately $132 billion and is planning to spend an additional $47.8 billion through fiscal year 2022 to continue its efforts.\nThe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 included a provision that GAO annually assess and report on the extent to which MDA has achieved its acquisition goals and objectives. This report addresses (1) the progress MDA made in achieving fiscal year 2017 goals; (2) the extent to which MDA uses contracting vehicles known as undefinitized contract actions; and (3) the extent to which models provide credible information about the system's operational performance. To do this work, GAO reviewed planned fiscal year 2017 baselines and other documentation and assessed them against baseline reviews and GAO's acquisition best practices guides. In addition, GAO interviewed relevant officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn fiscal year 2017, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) made mixed progress in achieving its delivery and testing goals.\nMDA continued to deliver assets to the military services. However, system-level integrated capabilities, such as some discrimination and integrated cyber defense improvements, were delayed and delivered with performance limitations.\nSeveral programs achieved notable firsts, including the first intercept of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. However, one program experienced a failure, and other tests were delayed or deleted.\nMoreover, GAO found challenges in MDA's processes for communicating the extent and limitations of integrated capabilities when they are delivered. As a result, warfighters do not have full insight into the capabilities MDA delivers.\nGAO found that the average length of the undefinitized period and the not-to-exceed price of MDA's undefinitized contract actions, which authorize contractors to begin work before an agreement on terms, specifications, or price have been agreed upon, have increased over the past 5 years. While MDA policy permits use of undefinitized contracts on a limited basis, GAO and others have found that they can place unnecessary cost risks on the government.\nMDA does not completely assess BMDS performance using traditional flight tests. Instead, MDA relies on models, some of which produce data with limited credibility. According to Department of Defense and MDA policy, models used to operationally assess weapons systems must be accredited to ensure they reflect the real-world system. In addition, using unaccredited models increases the risk that test results could be distorted, and leaves decision makers without key information on how the system will perform. While MDA has taken steps to improve its models, it has used many models in system operational ground tests that were not certified for that use (see figure). Additionally, MDA does not communicate model limitations to some decision makers.\nPercentage of Accredited Models Used in Operational Assessments of Ballistic Missile Defense System Capability Deliveries, 2015 through 2017\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making six recommendations to, among other things, improve the way MDA communicates capability deliveries; better report information about MDA's use of undefinitized contract actions; and address the challenges MDA has encountered with certifying its test models and communicating limitations of those models. DOD partially concurred with the first recommendation and concurred with the other five. GAO continues to believe the recommendations are valid as discussed in the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_499"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_500","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIndustrial security addresses the information systems, personnel, and physical security of facilities and their cleared employees who have access to or handle classified information. The National Industrial Security Program was established in 1993 to safeguard federal government classified information that may be or has been released to contractors, among others. GAO last reported on this program in 2005 and the Department of Defense has since implemented 13 of the 16 related recommendations.\nGAO was asked to examine how DSS administers the program. This report assesses to what extent DSS: 1) changed how it administers the program since GAO's last report; and 2) addressed challenges as it pilots a new approach to monitoring contractors with access to classified information.\nGAO reviewed guidance and regulations since 2005, including the program's operating manual. GAO analyzed data from DSS's electronic databases and also selected a non-generalizable sample of contractor facilities based on clearance level, geographic location, and type of agreement to address foreign influence. We also reviewed documents and interviewed relevant government and contractor officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Defense Security Service (DSS) has upgraded its capabilities but also faces challenges in administering the National Industrial Security Program, which applies to all executive branch departments and agencies, and was established to safeguard federal government classified information that current or prospective contractors may access. Since we last reported on this program in 2005, DSS has:\nstreamlined facility clearance and monitoring processes, and\nstrengthened the process for identifying contractors with potential foreign influence.\nHowever, under its current approach, DSS officials indicated that they face resource constraints, such as an inability to manage workloads and complete training necessary to stay informed on current threats and technologies. In its most recent report to Congress, DSS stated that it was unable to conduct security reviews at about 60 percent of cleared facilities in fiscal year 2016. Further, DSS recently declared that the United States is facing the most significant foreign intelligence threat it has ever encountered. As a result, in 2017, DSS announced plans to transition to a new monitoring approach to address emerging threats at facilities in the program. For a comparison of the current and new approaches, see below.\nDSS has not addressed immediate challenges that are critical to piloting this new approach. For example, GAO found it is unclear how DSS will determine what resources it needs as it has not identified roles and responsibilities. Moreover, DSS has not established how it will collaborate with stakeholders\u2014government contracting activities, the government intelligence community, other government agencies, and contractors\u2014under the new approach. Federal Internal Control Standards establish the importance of coordinating with stakeholders, including clearly defining roles and responsibilities. In addition, GAO's leading practices for interagency collaboration state that it is important for organizations to identify the resources necessary to accomplish objectives. Until DSS identifies roles and responsibilities and determines how it will collaborate with stakeholders for the piloting effort, it will be difficult to assess whether the new approach is effective in protecting classified information.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends DSS determine how it will collaborate with stakeholders, including identifying roles and responsibilities and related resources, as it pilots a new approach. DSS concurred with the recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_500"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_501","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nGAO's High-Risk Series identifies federal program areas needing attention from Congress and the executive branch. GAO added federal management of programs that serve Indian tribes and their members to its February 2017 biennial update of high-risk areas in response to serious problems with management and oversight by Interior and HHS.\nThis testimony identifies GAO's recommendations to Interior and HHS from prior GAO reports on the federal management and oversight of Indian education, energy resources, and health care that remain unimplemented. It also examines agencies' recent actions to address the recommendations and the extent to which these actions address GAO's recommendations. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed and analyzed agency documentation on actions taken to implement the recommendations and conducted interviews with agency officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAs discussed in the 2017 High Risk report, GAO has identified numerous weaknesses in how the Department of the Interior (Interior) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) manage programs serving Indian tribes. Specifically, these weaknesses were related to Interior's Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)\u2014under the Office of the Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs (Indian Affairs)\u2014in overseeing education services and managing Indian energy resources, and HHS's Indian Health Service (IHS) in administering health care services. GAO cited nearly 40 recommendations in its 2017 High Risk report that were not implemented, and has since made an additional 12 recommendations in two new reports on BIE school safety and construction published in late May of this year. Interior and HHS have taken some steps to address these recommendations but only one has been fully implemented.\nEducation. GAO has found serious weaknesses in Indian Affairs' oversight of Indian education. For example, in 2016, GAO found that the agency's lack of oversight of BIE school safety contributed to deteriorating facilities and equipment in school facilities. At one school, GAO found seven boilers that failed inspection because of safety hazards, such as elevated levels of carbon monoxide and a natural gas leak. In 2017, GAO found key weaknesses in the way Indian Affairs oversees personnel responsible for inspecting BIE school facilities for safety and manages BIE school construction projects. Of GAO's 23 recommendations on Indian education\u2014including recommendations cited in GAO's 2017 High Risk report and in two late May reports\u2014none have been fully implemented.\nEnergy resource management. In three prior reports on Indian energy, GAO found that BIA inefficiently managed Indian energy resources and the development process, thereby limiting opportunities for tribes and their members to use those resources to create economic benefits and improve the well-being of their communities. GAO categorized concerns associated with BIA management of energy resources and the development process into four broad areas, including oversight of BIA activities, collaboration, and BIA workforce planning. GAO made 14 recommendations to BIA to address its management weaknesses, which were cited in the 2017 High Risk report. However, none have been fully implemented.\nHealth care. GAO has found that IHS provides inadequate oversight of its federally operated health care facilities and of its Purchased\/Referred Care program. For example, in 2016 and 2017, GAO found that IHS provided limited and inconsistent oversight of the timeliness and quality of care provided in its facilities and that inconsistencies in quality oversight were exacerbated by significant turnover in area leadership. GAO also found that IHS did not equitably allocate funds to meet the health care needs of Indians. Of GAO's 13 recommendations on Indian health care cited in GAO's 2017 High Risk report, one has been fully implemented.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO cited nearly 40 unimplemented recommendations in its February 2017 High Risk report on federal programs for Indian tribes in education, energy development, and health care, and added 12 recommendations in two new reports on BIE school safety and construction in late May of this year. Sustained focus by Interior and HHS in fully implementing these recommendations and continued oversight by Congress are essential to achieving progress in these areas.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_501"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_502","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThis testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's June 2018 report, entitled Drug Discount Program: Federal Oversight of Compliance at 340B Contract Pharmacies Needs Improvement ( GAO-18-480 ).\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe 340B Drug Pricing Program (340B Program), which is administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), requires drug manufacturers to sell outpatient drugs at a discount to covered entities so that their drugs can be covered by Medicaid. Covered entities include certain hospitals and federal grantees (such as federally qualified health centers). About one-third of the more than 12,000 covered entities contract with outside pharmacies--contract pharmacies--to dispense drugs on their behalf. GAO's review of 30 contracts found that all but one contract included provisions for the covered entity to pay the contract pharmacy a flat fee for each eligible prescription. The flat fees generally ranged from $6 to $15 per prescription, but varied by several factors, including the type of drug or patient's insurance status. Some covered entities also agreed to pay pharmacies a percentage of revenue generated by each prescription.\nThirty of the 55 covered entities GAO reviewed reported providing low-income, uninsured patients discounts on 340B drugs at some or all of their contract pharmacies. Of the 30 covered entities that provided discounts, 23 indicated that they pass on the full 340B discount to patients, resulting in patients paying the 340B price or less for drugs. Additionally, 14 of the 30 covered entities said they determined patients' eligibility for discounts based on whether their income was below a specified level, 11 reported providing discounts to all patients, and 5 determined eligibility for discounts on a case-by-case basis.\nGAO found weaknesses in HRSA's oversight that impede its ability to ensure compliance with 340B Program requirements at contract pharmacies, such as:\nHRSA audits do not fully assess compliance with the 340B Program prohibition on duplicate discounts for drugs prescribed to Medicaid beneficiaries. Specifically, manufacturers cannot be required to provide both the 340B discount and a rebate through the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program. However, HRSA only assesses the potential for duplicate discounts in Medicaid fee-for-service and not Medicaid managed care. As a result, it cannot ensure compliance with this requirement for the majority of Medicaid prescriptions, which occur under managed care.\nHRSA requires covered entities that have noncompliance issues identified during an audit to assess the full extent of noncompliance. However, because HRSA does not require all the covered entities to explain the methodology they used for determining the extent of the noncompliance, it does not know the scope of the assessments and whether they are effective at identifying the full extent of noncompliance.\nHRSA does not require all covered entities to provide evidence that they have taken corrective action and are in compliance with program requirements prior to closing the audit. Instead, HRSA generally relies on each covered entity to self-attest that all audit findings have been addressed and that the entity came into compliance with 340B Program requirements.\nGiven these weaknesses, HRSA does not have a reasonable assurance that covered entities have adequately identified and addressed noncompliance with 340B Program requirements.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_502"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_503","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThis testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's November 2017 report, entitled VA Health Care: Improved Policies and Oversight Needed for Reviewing and Reporting Providers for Quality and Safety Concerns ( GAO-18-63 ).\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nDepartment of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical center (VAMC) officials are responsible for reviewing the clinical care delivered by their privileged providers\u2014physicians and dentists who are approved to independently perform specific services\u2014after concerns are raised. The five VAMCs GAO selected for review collectively required review of 148 providers from October 2013 through March 2017 after concerns were raised about their clinical care. GAO found that these reviews were not always documented or conducted in a timely manner. GAO identified these providers by reviewing meeting minutes from the committee responsible for requiring these types of reviews at the respective VAMCs, and through interviews with VAMC officials. The selected VAMCs were unable to provide documentation of these reviews for almost half of the 148 providers. Additionally, the VAMCs did not start the reviews of 16 providers for 3 months to multiple years after the concerns were identified. GAO found that VHA policies do not require documentation of all types of clinical care reviews and do not establish timeliness requirements. GAO also found that the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) does not adequately oversee these reviews at VAMCs through its Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN), which are responsible for overseeing the VAMCs. Without documentation and timely reviews of providers' clinical care, VAMC officials may lack information needed to reasonably ensure that VA providers are competent to provide safe, high quality care to veterans and to make appropriate decisions about these providers' privileges.\nGAO also found that from October 2013 through March 2017, the five selected VAMCs did not report most of the providers who should have been reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) or state licensing boards (SLB) in accordance with VHA policy. The NPDB is an electronic repository for critical information about the professional conduct and competence of providers. GAO found that\nselected VAMCs did not report to the NPDB eight of nine providers who had adverse privileging actions taken against them or who resigned during an investigation related to professional competence or conduct, as required by VHA policy, and\nnone of these nine providers had been reported to SLBs.\nGAO found that officials at the selected VAMCs misinterpreted or were not aware of VHA policies and guidance related to NPDB and SLB reporting processes resulting in providers not being reported. GAO also found that VHA and the VISNs do not conduct adequate oversight of NPDB and SLB reporting practices and cannot reasonably ensure appropriate reporting of providers. As a result, VHA's ability to provide safe, high quality care to veterans is hindered because other VAMCs, as well as non-VA health care entities, will be unaware of serious concerns raised about a provider's care. For example, GAO found that after one VAMC failed to report to the NPDB or SLBs a provider who resigned to avoid an adverse privileging action, a non-VA hospital in the same city took an adverse privileging action against that same provider for the same reason 2 years later.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_503"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_504","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOD has taken steps to modernize its Military Health System to ensure that it operates efficiently. For example, in September 2013, the Defense Health Agency was created, in part, to implement common clinical and business processes across the services. Essential to this effort are the services' ability to effectively staff their medical facilities, including the processes used for staffing dental clinics and the services' ability to recruit and retain military dentists.\nSenate Report 115-125 included a provision for GAO to review the services' processes for determining requirements for dentists and its programs for recruiting and retaining military dentists, among other things. GAO assessed the extent to which the services (1) use validated dental clinic staffing models that also incorporate cross-service staffing standards, and (2) have recruited and retained military dentists and measured the effectiveness of their recruitment and retention programs. GAO assessed service dental clinic models, analyzed recruitment and retention data from fiscal year 2012 through 2016, and interviewed DOD and service officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Army and the Air Force use validated staffing models for their respective dental clinics, and the Navy has developed a model that is under review. The Army and the Air Force's models are based on service-specific staffing standards. For example, the Army's model generally projects dental clinic staffing based on historical facility data and, according to officials, the Air Force model is largely a population-based model that requires one dentist for every 650 servicemembers. In contrast, in the absence of a validated model, officials stated that, the Navy uses a general ratio of one dentist for every 1,000 servicemembers to staff its dental clinics. The Navy has developed a model that is under review, and if approved, according to officials, will be subject to the Navy's validation processes.\nWhile the services have developed and implemented cross-service staffing standards for 42 medical specialties, according to a key official involved in developing these standards, they currently do not plan to develop a similar set of standards for dental care. Cross-service staffing standards help the services standardize clinic staffing to address the common day-to-day health needs of patients. Service officials maintain that they must operate their respective dental clinics autonomously and in a manner that best supports their service-specific needs and unique command structures. However, as oral health requirements for servicemembers are standardized across the Department of Defense (DOD), it is unclear why dental care has been excluded from the staffing standardization effort\u2014especially because the services have implemented cross-service staffing standards for 42 other medical specialties.\nThe Army, the Navy, and the Air Force meet their needs for military dentists by recruiting both dental students and fully qualified dentists. The services generally met their recruitment goals for dental students between fiscal years 2012 and 2016, but faced challenges recruiting and retaining fully qualified dentists during that period. For example, the Army missed its recruitment goals for fully qualified dentists in all 5 years, the Navy missed its goals in 2 out of 5 years, and the Air Force missed its goals in 3 out of 5 years. These challenges are most pronounced for certain specialties. For example, service data indicate that the Army and the Navy were unable to recruit any oral surgeons, while the Air Force recruited 50 percent of the oral surgeons it needed. Service officials cited various reasons for not meeting recruitment goals, including the availability of more lucrative careers in the private sector and quality of life concerns associated with military service.\nThe services rely on various programs, including scholarships and special pay and incentives, to attract and retain military dentists, and service officials stated that they monitor their programs by reviewing their goals, among other actions. However, GAO found that some services continue to provide incentive bonuses for positions that are overstaffed and have met or exceeded recruitment goals, but they do not know whether this is necessary because they have not evaluated the effectiveness of their programs. Without evaluating their programs, the services lack the information necessary to ensure that they are using recruitment and retention incentives effectively and efficiently for attracting and retaining dentists.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that each of the services develop cross-service staffing standards to be incorporated into their staffing models, and evaluate the effectiveness of their recruitment and retention programs. DOD did not provide comments on a draft of this report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_504"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_505","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Coast Guard, within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), owns or leases more than 20,000 shore facilities, such as piers, docks, boat stations, air stations, and housing units, at more than 2,700 locations. In June 2017, the Coast Guard testified to Congress that it had a $1.6 billion recapitalization backlog for its shore infrastructure, which had a replacement value of about $20 billion.\nGAO was asked to review the Coast Guard's management of its shore infrastructure. This report examines: (1) what is known about the condition and costs of managing the Coast Guard's shore infrastructure, and (2) the extent to which the Coast Guard's process for managing its shore infrastructure meets leading practices.\nTo answer these questions, GAO reviewed relevant laws and Coast Guard annual reports on its shore infrastructure, analyzed Coast Guard data, and interviewed Coast Guard officials. GAO also compared Coast Guard policies and procedures, and actions taken during fiscal years 2012 through 2018 to manage its shore infrastructure, against the leading practices that GAO previously identified for managing public sector maintenance backlogs.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAbout 45 percent of the Coast Guard's shore infrastructure is beyond its service life, and its current backlogs of maintenance and recapitalization projects, as of 2018, will cost at least $2.6 billion to address, according to Coast Guard information. The deferred maintenance backlog included more than 5,600 projects, with an estimated cost of $900 million. The recapitalization and new construction backlog had 125 projects, with an estimated cost of at least $1.77 billion as of 2018 (see figure). GAO's analysis of Coast Guard data found that as of November 2018 there were hundreds of recapitalization projects without cost estimates\u2014the majority of recapitalization projects. Coast Guard officials told GAO that these projects are in the preliminary stages of development.\nThe Coast Guard's process for managing its shore infrastructure did not fully meet 6 of 9 leading practices that GAO previously identified. Of the nine leading practices, the Coast Guard met three, partially met three, and did not meet three. For example, the Coast Guard generally has not employed models for predicting the outcome of maintenance investments and optimizing among competing investments, as called for in leading practices. In one instance, the Coast Guard used a model to optimize maintenance for its aviation pavement and, according to Coast Guard officials, found that it could save nearly $14 million by accelerating investment in this area (e.g., paving runways) sooner rather than deferring such maintenance. Coast Guard officials told us that such modeling could be applied within and across all of its shore infrastructure asset types, but the Coast Guard did not implement the results of this model and does not require their use. Without requiring the use of such models, the Coast Guard could be missing opportunities to achieve cost savings and better manage its maintenance backlogs.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making six recommendations, which DHS agreed to implement, including that the Coast Guard align its management of its shore infrastructure backlogs with leading practices by requiring the use of models for predicting the outcome of, and optimizing among, competing investments for maintenance projects.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_505"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_506","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDuring emergencies, reliable communications are critical. Disasters, such as 2017's hurricanes, continue to test the nation's emergency communications capabilities. As disasters can cross jurisdictional boundaries, collaboration within and across regions is very important.\nGAO was asked to review implementation of the Post-Katrina Act's provisions related to disaster preparedness, response, and recovery. This report examines: (1) challenges related to emergency communications that selected stakeholders have experienced; (2) their views on DHS's emergency communications assistance; and (3) the regional working groups established by the Post-Katrina Act and their effect on emergency communications capabilities. GAO reviewed DHS's reports and grant data for fiscal years 2011\u20132016 and conducted case studies of three cities\u2014Houston, Los Angeles, and Boston\u2014selected based on the number of declared disasters, DHS grant funding, and geographic diversity. GAO interviewed DHS officials; leaders of all 10 regional working groups and other stakeholders, including public safety officials in the case study cities; and others chosen for their expertise.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nSelected first responders and public safety officials identified various challenges related to emergency communications. These challenges include attaining the interoperability of communication systems, obtaining funding, ensuring ongoing training, and increasing the emphasis on communications during emergency response exercises. For example, some stakeholders told GAO about challenges related to equipment that is not interoperable, and others said first responders need training after investments are made in new interoperable communications equipment.\nTo help address these challenges and as required by the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has provided technical assistance, such as training, and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grants. It has also established regional emergency communications coordination working groups, which bring together stakeholders from different levels of government and the private sector within FEMA's 10 regions.\nWhile emergency communications challenges persist, stakeholders told GAO that DHS's technical assistance generally meets their needs and that FEMA grants have helped them enhance emergency communications capabilities. In particular, stakeholders found training for specific communications positions was useful. Houston-area officials said this training was critical in preparing first responders for Hurricane Harvey. Some stakeholders told GAO that FEMA grants helped them address needs that would otherwise go unfunded, including interoperable communications networks and equipment.\nGAO found that the regional working groups have enhanced emergency communications capabilities through building relationships and sharing information. Within the respective regions, group members have:\nassisted each other during disasters and emergencies,\ndeveloped technical solutions to enhance interoperability, and\naddressed policy concerns, such as the use of interoperable radio channels during emergencies.\nHowever, most regional group leaders told GAO that more collaboration across the groups was needed. GAO's prior work has also found that including all relevant participants can enhance collaborative efforts. Further, DHS's strategic plan for emergency communications established a vision of collaboration among stakeholders across the nation. While FEMA has encouraged collaboration among regional working-group leaders, cross-regional efforts have been limited and do not involve all group members. Developing and implementing an appropriate ongoing mechanism for collaboration could enhance emergency communications capabilities, such as by helping group members address common challenges. Without ways for all members of these groups to collaborate across regions, members may be missing opportunities to share information and leverage the knowledge and experiences of their counterparts throughout the nation.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nFEMA should work with regional working-group members to reach consensus and implement an ongoing mechanism, such as a national-level working group, to encourage nationwide collaboration across regions. DHS concurred with this recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_506"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_507","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nOne of the goals of federal criminal restitution is to restore victims of federal crimes to the position they occupied before the crime was committed by providing compensation. Various entities within the federal government are involved in the process of requesting, ordering, and collecting restitution for crime victims, including DOJ and the judiciary.\nThe Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016 includes a provision for GAO to review the federal criminal restitution process for fiscal years 2014 through 2016. This report addresses, among other things: (1) the extent to which information is available on restitution requested by DOJ and ordered by courts; (2) the amount of restitution debt DOJ collected and the amount that remains outstanding; and, (3) the extent to which DOJ has conducted oversight on the collection of restitution. GAO analyzed laws, policies and procedures as well as USSC data on restitution orders and DOJ data on restitution collected from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. GAO also selected a non-generalizable sample of six federal judicial districts based on restitution collections and spoke with USAO officials and federal probation officers.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nOfficials from selected U.S. Attorney's Offices (USAO) stated that they document requests for restitution in case files and employ other internal controls, such as the use of templates and forms, throughout the prosecution process to ensure that prosecutors request restitution as appropriate. GAO's analysis of U.S. Sentencing Commission (USSC) data\u2014an agency within the judiciary\u2014showed that information on restitution orders was available for 95 percent of all offenders sentenced from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. Specifically, 214,578 federal offenders were sentenced during this time period and restitution was ordered for 33,158, or 15 percent, of those offenders. Collectively, courts ordered these offenders to pay $33.9 billion in restitution. Most federal offenders sentenced during these years were sentenced for immigration or drug-related offenses. In interviews, USAO officials stated that these offenses do not typically have victims requiring restitution. GAO found that data on reasons why restitution was not ordered were incomplete for 5 percent of all offenders sentenced from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. Determining why data on restitution orders are incomplete may inform the judiciary of the cause of the incomplete data and any efforts needed to improve USSC data.\nGAO's analysis of Department of Justice (DOJ) data showed that USAOs collected $2.95 billion in restitution debt in fiscal years 2014 through 2016, see figure below. However, at the end of fiscal year 2016, $110 billion in previously ordered restitution remained outstanding, and USAOs identified $100 billion of that outstanding debt as uncollectible due to offenders' inability to pay.\nDOJ identified improving debt collection\u2014including restitution\u2014as a major management initiative in its 2014-2018 Strategic Plan. While DOJ is developing analytical tools to monitor the collection of restitution, it has not established performance measures or goals. Performance measures and goals would allow DOJ to gauge USAOs' success in collecting restitution and, by extension, the department's success in achieving a major management initiative.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making three recommendations. GAO is making one to the judiciary to determine why data on restitution orders are incomplete. GAO is making two recommendations to DOJ, including one to implement performance measures and goals for the collection of restitution. The judiciary and DOJ concurred with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_507"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_508","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nNIH's success depends on its ability to attract, retain, develop, and otherwise support biomedical investigators\u2014including those employed in its intramural research program as well as those working in its extramural program at universities, academic health centers, and other research institutions. For decades, the agency has faced challenges in supporting early career investigators and those from underrepresented groups, including ethnic and racial minorities and women. The 21st Century Cures Act included provisions that NIH coordinate policies and programs to promote early research independence and enhance the diversity of the scientific workforce.\nThe act also contained a provision that GAO examine NIH's efforts. GAO reviewed the actions NIH has taken to support (1) investigators beginning their biomedical careers; and (2) investigators from underrepresented groups and women. GAO analyzed NIH data from fiscal years 2013 through 2017 on grant funding for investigators by career phase and demographic status. GAO also reviewed relevant laws and NIH policies, programs, and initiatives, and interviewed NIH officials and stakeholders from the scientific research community.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe National Institutes of Health (NIH), within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), plays a prominent role in the nation's biomedical research. While it employs investigators in its intramural research program, over 80 percent of its budget supports its extramural program, primarily through grant funding to investigators at other research institutions. Given this, NIH has a vested interest in supporting a robust national biomedical workforce, but the agency has acknowledged that the environment is highly competitive and many investigators find that it takes years to obtain the type and amount of funding that typically spurs research independence. GAO's analysis found that extramural investigators who had received at least one large NIH research grant during fiscal years 2013 through 2017 were more likely to receive such grants in subsequent application cycles than investigators who had not yet received such grants. In response to the 21st Century Cures Act, enacted in December 2016, NIH introduced an initiative to prioritize these grants for (1) early stage investigators, who are beginning their careers and have never received a large research grant, and (2) intermediate stage investigators, who are within 10 years of receiving their first large grant as an early stage investigator. However, it is too early to assess this new initiative, which was introduced in August 2017. NIH is currently considering revising the program to include investigators whose careers are more advanced.\nNIH implemented recommendations made by internal advisory bodies to support investigators from racial and ethnic groups considered by NIH to be underrepresented in biomedical research. GAO's analysis shows disparities for underrepresented racial and ethnic groups, and for female investigators, from 2013 through 2017. For example, in 2017, about 17 percent of investigators from underrepresented racial groups\u2014African Americans, American Indians\/Alaska Natives, and Native Hawaiian\/Pacific Islanders combined\u2014who applied for large grants received them. In contrast, about 24 percent of Hispanic or Latino applicants, an underrepresented ethnic group, received such grants. Asians and whites\u2014well represented groups\u2014were successful in receiving large grants about 24 and 27 percent of the time, respectively. Though women represent about half of all doctorates in biological science, GAO found that women investigators employed by NIH in its intramural program comprised about one-quarter of tenured investigators. NIH has taken positive steps such as establishing the position of Chief Officer of Scientific Workforce Diversity, who in turn created a strategic workforce diversity plan, which applies to both extramural and intramural investigators. The plan includes five broad goals for expanding and supporting these investigators. However, NIH has not developed quantitative metrics, evaluation details, or specific time frames by which it could measure the agency's progress against these goals.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nThe Director of NIH should develop quantitative metrics, evaluation details, and time frames to assess NIH's efforts to diversify its scientific workforce against its diversity strategic plan goals, and take action as needed. HHS agreed with GAO's recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_508"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_509","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCovered entities can provide 340B drugs to eligible patients and generate revenue by receiving reimbursement from patients' insurance. The number of pharmacies covered entities have contracted with has increased from about 1,300 in 2010 to nearly 20,000 in 2017. GAO was asked to provide information on the use of contract pharmacies. Among other things, this report: 1) describes financial arrangements selected covered entities have with contract pharmacies; 2) describes the extent that selected covered entities provide discounts on 340B drugs dispensed by contract pharmacies to low-income, uninsured patients; and 3) examines HRSA's efforts to ensure compliance with 340B Program requirements at contract pharmacies. GAO selected and reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 30 contracts between covered entities and pharmacies, 20 HRSA audit files, and 55 covered entities to obtain variation in the types of entities and other factors. GAO also interviewed officials from HRSA and 10 covered entities.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe 340B Drug Pricing Program (340B Program), which is administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), requires drug manufacturers to sell outpatient drugs at a discount to covered entities so that their drugs can be covered by Medicaid. Covered entities include certain hospitals and federal grantees (such as federally qualified health centers). About one-third of the more than 12,000 covered entities contract with outside pharmacies\u2014contract pharmacies\u2014to dispense drugs on their behalf. GAO's review of 30 contracts found that all but one contract included provisions for the covered entity to pay the contract pharmacy a flat fee for each eligible prescription. The flat fees generally ranged from $6 to $15 per prescription, but varied by several factors, including the type of drug or patient's insurance status. Some covered entities also agreed to pay pharmacies a percentage of revenue generated by each prescription.\nThirty of the 55 covered entities GAO reviewed reported providing low-income, uninsured patients discounts on 340B drugs at some or all of their contract pharmacies. Of the 30 covered entities that provided discounts, 23 indicated that they pass on the full 340B discount to patients, resulting in patients paying the 340B price or less for drugs. Additionally, 14 of the 30 covered entities said they determined patients' eligibility for discounts based on whether their income was below a specified level, 11 reported providing discounts to all patients, and 5 determined eligibility for discounts on a case-by-case basis.\nGAO found weaknesses in HRSA's oversight that impede its ability to ensure compliance with 340B Program requirements at contract pharmacies, such as:\nHRSA audits do not fully assess compliance with the 340B Program prohibition on duplicate discounts for drugs prescribed to Medicaid beneficiaries. Specifically, manufacturers cannot be required to provide both the 340B discount and a rebate through the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program. However, HRSA only assesses the potential for duplicate discounts in Medicaid fee-for-service and not Medicaid managed care. As a result, it cannot ensure compliance with this requirement for the majority of Medicaid prescriptions, which occur under managed care.\nHRSA requires covered entities that have noncompliance issues identified during an audit to assess the full extent of noncompliance. However, because HRSA does not require all the covered entities to explain the methodology they used for determining the extent of the noncompliance, it does not know the scope of the assessments and whether they are effective at identifying the full extent of noncompliance.\nHRSA does not require all covered entities to provide evidence that they have taken corrective action and are in compliance with program requirements prior to closing the audit. Instead, HRSA generally relies on each covered entity to self-attest that all audit findings have been addressed and that the entity came into compliance with 340B Program requirements.\nGiven these weaknesses, HRSA does not have a reasonable assurance that covered entities have adequately identified and addressed noncompliance with 340B Program requirements.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making seven recommendations, including that HRSA's audits assess for duplicate discounts in Medicaid managed care, and HRSA require information on how entities determined the scope of noncompliance and evidence of corrective action prior to closing audits. HHS agreed with four of the recommendations, but disagreed with three recommendations, which GAO continues to believe are warranted to improve HRSA's oversight as explained in the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_509"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_510","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAs the peer support workforce has grown, there has been increased attention to standardizing the competencies of peer support specialists through certification.\nThe 21st Century Cures Act included a provision for GAO to conduct a study to identify best practices related to training and certification in peer support programs in selected states that receive funding from SAMHSA. This report, among other things, describes leading practices for certifying peer support specialists identified by program officials in selected states.\nGAO interviewed state program officials in six selected states and reviewed online, publicly available information about their peer support programs. GAO selected the states in part based on the state's certification program being well-established (at least 2 years old), use of SAMHSA funding for peer support, and stakeholder recommendations. The six selected states\u2014Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas--are among the 41 states and the District of Columbia that, as of July 2016, had programs to certify peer support specialists. In addition to the state program officials, GAO interviewed SAMHSA officials and 10 stakeholders familiar with peer support specialist certification, including mental health researchers and officials from training organizations, among others.\nGAO provided a draft of this report to HHS for review and comment. The Department did not have any comments.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAccording to officials from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), shortages in the behavioral health workforce are a key reason that individuals with mental illnesses do not receive needed treatment. In recent years, there has been an increased focus on using peer support specialists\u2014individuals who use their own experience recovering from mental illness to support others\u2014to help address these shortages. Program officials GAO interviewed in selected states generally cited six leading practices for certifying that peer support specialists have a basic set of competencies and have demonstrated the ability to support others.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_510"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_511","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCongress established the RFS in 2005 and expanded it 2 years later. The RFS generally mandates that transportation fuels\u2014typically gasoline and diesel\u2014sold in the United States contain increasing amounts of biofuels. In addition, the RFS is designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by replacing petroleum-based fuels with biofuels expected to have lower associated greenhouse gas emissions. The most common biofuel currently produced in the United States is corn-starch ethanol, distilled from the sugars in corn. EPA uses RINs associated with biofuels blended with petroleum-based fuels to regulate compliance with the program.\nIn 2014, GAO found that refiners' costs for complying with the RFS had increased, and in 2016, GAO found that greenhouse gas emissions are unlikely to be reduced to the extent anticipated because production of advanced biofuels\u2014which reduce greenhouse gas emissions more than corn-starch ethanol\u2014has not kept pace with the yearly increases or the target of 21 billion gallons by 2022 called for by the statute. GAO was asked to review additional issues related to the effects of the RFS.\nThis report examines what is known about (1) the effect the RFS has had to date on retail gasoline prices in the United States and (2) the RFS's effect on greenhouse gas emissions and whether the RFS will meet its goals for reducing those emissions. The report also provides information about RINs.\nTo address the likely effects of the RFS on gasoline prices, GAO reviewed studies and interviewed experts and industry stakeholders, and conducted a statistical analysis of state ethanol mandates that were similar to the mandates of the RFS. GAO selected the experts based on their published work and recognition in the professional community. GAO selected stakeholders representing a range of perspectives, including stakeholders from the renewable fuels, petroleum, and agricultural industries, as well as from environmental groups.\nBecause the RFS was implemented on a nationwide basis at the same time that other factors, such as the global price of crude oil and domestic demand for retail gasoline, were affecting retail gasoline prices across the nation, it is not possible to directly isolate and measure the effect the RFS had on gasoline prices nationwide given data available to GAO. Instead GAO developed and extensively tested an econometric model that estimated the effects on retail gasoline prices of state ethanol mandates. These state mandates are similar to the RFS but were put in place voluntarily by states before the RFS led to widespread ethanol blending in every state. This model estimated how ethanol mandates affected gasoline prices in these five states. These estimates suggest the RFS likely had effects in states that did not have state-wide mandates. These states incrementally blended ethanol because of the increasing volumes of ethanol required to be blended nationally by the RFS.\nRegarding the RFS's effect on greenhouse gas emissions, GAO interviewed 13 experts in government and academia. GAO selected these experts based on their published work, prior GAO work, and recommendations from other experts.\nDuring the course of the work, GAO gathered information on the topic of RINs through interviews, a review of relevant literature, and prior GAO work.\nGAO makes no recommendations in this report. In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA disagreed with GAO's finding that the RFS has had a limited effect on greenhouse gas emissions, citing research on the effects of ethanol on reducing emissions generally. GAO reported on the specific effects of the RFS on emissions. USDA also criticized GAO's methodology using experts' views. GAO employed that method to reach consensus among those with a range of perspectives. DOE and EPA did not comment on the draft report.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nEffect on prices. Evidence from studies, interviews with experts, and GAO's analysis suggest that the nationwide Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) was likely associated with modest gasoline price increases outside of the Midwest and that these price increases may have diminished over time. Variations in these gasoline price effects likely depended, in part, on state-by-state variation in the costs to transport and store ethanol. For example, the Midwest was already producing and blending ethanol when the RFS came into effect, so that region had lower transportation costs and had already invested in necessary storage infrastructure. Other regions began blending ethanol later to meet the RFS's requirements, thereby incurring new transportation and storage infrastructure costs that resulted in gasoline prices that were several cents per gallon higher than they otherwise would have been.\nIn addition, experts told GAO that the RFS caused an initial increase in refining investment costs that, over the long term, reduced refining costs for gasoline. Specifically, once all locations had made the infrastructure investments and most gasoline blendstock produced was consistent with blending ethanol then there would be two continuing effects: (1) the transportation and blending costs of ethanol, which would tend to push retail prices higher and depend on the distance traveled and the modes of transport, and (2) the lower cost of producing lower octane blendstock. The former effect might dominate for locations far from the production source of ethanol and for which more costly modes of transport were used, while the lower blendstock costs might dominate for locations close to the production source of ethanol and\/or those that have low transportation costs.\nGAO's analysis of the effect that state ethanol mandates had on gasoline prices also showed gasoline price effects that differed in the Midwest and elsewhere. Specifically, during the period GAO studied, when the ethanol mandates in Minnesota and Missouri were in effect, all else remaining equal, retail gasoline prices were lower by about 8 and 5 cents per gallon in these states, respectively, than they would have been without the mandates. In contrast, when the ethanol mandates in Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington were in effect, GAO's model showed that retail gasoline prices were higher by about 8, 2, and 6 cents per gallon, respectively, than they would have been without the ethanol mandates. These results suggest that the RFS likely had gasoline price effects in other states that did not have state-wide ethanol mandates but that incrementally began blending ethanol as a result of increasing RFS requirements that by around 2010 had led to almost all gasoline sold in the United States being blended with 10 percent ethanol.\nEffect on greenhouse gas emissions. Most of the experts GAO interviewed generally agreed that, to date, the RFS has likely had a limited effect, if any, on greenhouse gas emissions. According to the experts and GAO's prior work, the effect has likely been limited for reasons including: (1) the reliance of the RFS to date on conventional corn-starch ethanol, which has a smaller potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions compared with advanced biofuels, and (2) that most corn-starch ethanol has been produced in plants exempt from emissions reduction requirements, likely limiting reductions early on when plants were less efficient than they are today.\nFurther, the RFS is unlikely to meet the greenhouse gas emissions reduction goals envisioned for the program through 2022. Specifically, GAO reported in November 2016 that advanced biofuels, which achieve greater greenhouse gas reductions than conventional corn-starch ethanol, have been uneconomical to produce at the volumes required by the RFS statute so the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has waived most of these requirements (see figure).\nRenewable identification numbers. EPA uses renewable identification numbers (RINs) to regulate industry compliance with RFS requirements for blending biofuels into the nation's transportation fuel supply. In GAO's March 2014 report on petroleum refining, GAO noted that the RFS had increased compliance costs for the domestic petroleum refining industry or individual refiners. GAO reported that corn-based ethanol RIN prices had been low\u2014from 1 to 5 cents per gallon from 2006 through much of 2012\u2014but in 2013, RIN prices increased to over $1.40 per gallon in July before declining to about 20 cents per gallon as of mid-November 2013. Since the March 2014 report, corn-ethanol RIN prices have experienced more periods of volatility. Most experts and stakeholders GAO interviewed recently stated that RINs had either a small effect on prices or no effect on prices, though a few disagreed. Finally, GAO's past work, as well as EPA analysis, has identified several issues of concern with RINs, including possible fraud in the market and concerns about the effect on small refiners, price volatility, and the point of obligation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_511"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_512","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nTo help comply with federal policies aimed at improving federal building energy and environmental management, GSA has implemented a smart buildings program nationwide in federally owned buildings under its custody and control. Two key technologies included in the program are Internet-connected advanced utility meters and an analytical software application, GSAlink, which alerts staff to potential building system problems, such as equipment operating outside of normal hours.\nGAO was asked to review GSA's smart buildings program. This report examines: (1) what is known about the costs and benefits of the program, (2) the extent to which GSA has developed performance goals and measures to help it manage the performance of the program, and (3) any challenges GSA faces in implementing the technologies used in the program and GSA's actions to mitigate those challenges. GAO reviewed relevant GSA documentation, interviewed officials at GSA's central and regional offices, and visited a sample of GSA smart buildings in San Francisco, California, and Washington, D.C. that were selected based on the high concentration of GSA smart buildings located in each city.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nLimited quantified information exists on the costs and benefits of the General Services Administration's (GSA) smart buildings program's key technologies. GSA officials stated that the approximate cost of equipping a building with these technologies ranged between about $48,000 to $155,000. However, they stated that accurately calculating installation costs is challenging because GSA typically installs these technologies in selected buildings incrementally and sometimes as part of other capital improvement projects. Additionally, GSA officials identified perceived operational benefits of the smart buildings program's key technologies, including that these technologies enable officials to more precisely identify building system problems and more closely monitor contractors. However, existing data on the smart buildings program are of limited usefulness in quantifying the program's benefits. For example, according to GSA officials, while data from an application within GSAlink that estimates avoided costs from addressing each fault that GSAlink identifies are useful for prioritizing maintenance actions, the imprecise estimates preclude their use as a measure of actual avoided costs in quantifying program benefits.\nGSA does not have documented, clearly defined goals for the smart buildings program, nor has GSA developed performance measures that would allow it to assess the program's progress. These omissions are contrary to leading practices of results-oriented organizations identified in previous GAO work. GSA officials verbally described broad goals for the smart buildings program to GAO, but the agency has not documented these goals. Further, because GSA has not clearly defined its verbally expressed goals, it cannot demonstrate progress in achieving them. For example, GSA officials said that the agency cannot measure progress for the stated goal of improving tenant productivity and comfort because of the subjective nature of individual tenant preferences, such as for office temperatures. Additionally, GSA has not developed performance measures to assess the program, and GSA's lack of data that can be used to quantify benefits of the program impedes its ability to measure the success of the program. Without clearly defined goals, related performance measures, and data that can be used to measure its progress, GSA is limited in its ability to make informed decisions about the smart buildings program.\nGSA faces challenges in implementing the smart buildings program and has taken steps to mitigate these challenges. Since smart building technologies are Internet-connected, they are potentially vulnerable to cyberattacks that could compromise security or cause harm to facilities or their occupants. GSA has taken actions intended to mitigate cybersecurity challenges, such as instituting policies to address threats and known vulnerabilities and moving Internet-connected building systems to GSA's secured network. Separately, according to GSA officials, GSA faces implementation challenges related to the limited technological proficiency of some GSA building managers and contractors or lack of buy-in from them. GSA is taking actions intended to address these challenges. For example, it has provided training to staff and contractors, and its central office monitors the extent to which staff address problems detected by the smart buildings program's key technologies.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that GSA establish clearly defined performance goals and related performance measures for the smart buildings program, and identify and develop data to measure progress. GSA concurred with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_512"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_513","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn February 2017, components of California's Oroville Dam failed, leading to the evacuation of nearly 200,000 nearby residents. FERC is the federal regulator of the Oroville Dam and over 2,500 other dams associated with nonfederal hydropower projects nationwide. FERC issues and renews licenses\u2014which can last up to 50 years\u2014to dam operators and promotes safe dam operation by conducting safety inspections and reviewing technical engineering studies, among other actions.\nGAO was asked to review FERC's approach to overseeing dam safety. This report examines: (1) how FERC collects information from its dam safety inspections and the extent of its analysis, and (2) how FERC evaluates engineering studies of dam performance to analyze safety, among other objectives. GAO analyzed documentation on a non-generalizable sample of 42 dams associated with projects relicensed from fiscal years 2014 through 2017, selected based on geography and hazard classifications, among other factors. GAO also reviewed FERC regulations and documents; and interviewed FERC staff associated with the selected projects and technical consultants, selected based on the frequency and timing of their reviews.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) staff generally followed established guidance in collecting safety information from dam inspections for the dams GAO reviewed, but FERC has not used this information to analyze dam safety portfolio-wide. For these 42 dams, GAO found that FERC staff generally followed guidance in collecting safety information during inspections of individual dams and key structures associated with those dams. (See figure.) However, FERC lacks standard procedures that specify how and where staff should record safety deficiencies identified. As a result, FERC staff use multiple systems to record inspection findings, thereby creating information that cannot be easily analyzed. Further, while FERC officials said inspections help oversee individual dam's safety, FERC has not analyzed this information to identify any safety risks across its portfolio. GAO's prior work has highlighted the importance of evaluating risks across a portfolio. FERC officials stated that they have not conducted portfolio-wide analyses because officials prioritize the individual dam inspections and response to urgent dam safety incidents. However, following the Oroville incident, a FERC-led initiative to examine dam structures comparable to those at Oroville identified 27 dam spillways with varying degrees of safety concerns, on which FERC officials stated they are working with dam licensees to address. A similar and proactive portfolio-wide approach, based on analysis of common inspection deficiencies across the portfolio of dams under FERC's authority, could help FERC identify safety risks prior to a safety incident.\nGuidelines recognize that each dam is unique and allow for flexibility and exemptions in its use. FERC staff use the studies to inform other components of their safety approach, including the analysis of dam failure scenarios and their review of safety to determine whether to renew a license.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that FERC: (1) develop standard procedures for recording information collected as part of its inspections, and (2) use inspection information to assess safety risks across FERC's portfolio of dams. FERC agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_513"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_514","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nHUD insures single-family mortgage loans and is authorized to sell defaulted loans under the National Housing Act. In fiscal years 2010\u20132016, FHA auctioned off approximately 111,000 loans to private purchasers under DASP. DASP helped reduce a backlog of federally insured defaulted loans stemming from the 2007\u20132011 financial crisis and was intended to protect the MMI Fund by paying insurance claims before the costly foreclosure process.\nGAO was asked to evaluate DASP. This report examines, among other things, certain DASP procedures, including verifying loan eligibility criteria, and documentation; FHA's evaluation of the identified outcomes of sold loans and how these compare with similar, unsold loans; and the potential effects that changes to DASP might have on the MMI Fund. GAO reviewed FHA policies, contracts, and reports, and interviewed FHA officials, selected servicers and purchasers based on sales participation, and other stakeholders. GAO also conducted a statistical analysis comparing outcome data for sold loans and similar loans that remained FHA-insured and analyzed the effect of loan pool characteristics on bidder participation.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Federal Housing Administration (FHA) uses multiple entities to check loan eligibility for the Distressed Asset Stabilization Program (DASP)\u2014in which FHA accepts assignment of eligible, defaulted single-family loans from servicers in exchange for claim payments and sells the loans in competitive auctions. After servicers submit loans for sale, FHA and its contractors concurrently check loan data for completeness, validity, and eligibility. FHA relies on servicers to check eligibility a few weeks before and again after the bid date. The status of delinquent loans can be fluid, and a change in eligibility status close to this date may not be detected. GAO's analysis of fiscal year 2016 default data indicates about 2.67 percent of loans that FHA sold were ineligible based on length of delinquency or loss mitigation status. Without checking loan eligibility closer to bidding, FHA risks selling ineligible loans, and borrowers could lose access to benefits.\nFHA does not evaluate outcomes for sold loans against similar unsold loans. GAO found that, in aggregate, sold defaulted loans were more likely to experience foreclosure than comparable unsold defaulted loans (see figure). However, GAO's analysis identified varying outcomes by purchasers and sales. For example, some purchasers' loans had higher probabilities of avoiding foreclosure, with borrowers making regular payments again by 24 months after the transfer of loans. Also, loans sold in 2016 sales were less likely to experience foreclosure compared to unsold loans. HUD policy states that the agency's evaluations isolate program effects from other influences. Evaluating outcomes for sold loans against similar unsold loans could help FHA determine whether DASP is meeting its objective of maximizing recoveries to the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMI Fund) and understand the extent to which DASP helps borrowers.\nChanging some of FHA's auction processes may help the MMI Fund. FHA could increase participation and MMI Fund recoveries in its auctions by communicating upcoming sales earlier. One purchaser said that additional notice would allow it time to plan for the capital needed to bid. Also, FHA set reserve prices (minimum acceptable price) based on the amount it expected to recover after loans completed foreclosure\u2014yet GAO estimates that some of these loans will avoid foreclosure (see figure). As a result, FHA risks recovering less for the MMI Fund in loan sales than if the loans had not been sold.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making nine recommendations to FHA, including establishing specific time frames to check loan eligibility, evaluating loan outcome data, and changing auction processes to help protect the MMI Fund. FHA generally agreed with seven recommendations, and neither agreed nor disagreed with two. GAO maintains that all the recommendations are valid.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_514"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_515","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThousands of Coast Guard servicemembers have left the military and transitioned into civilian life, and some of these new veterans may face significant challenges, such as finding and maintaining employment. To help them prepare, federal law mandated that DHS provide separating Coast Guard servicemembers with counseling, employment assistance, and information on veterans' benefits through TAP. GAO was asked to examine TAP implementation.\nThis review analyzes (1) the reliability of TAP data on participation levels for Coast Guard servicemembers and the factors that affect participation, and (2) the Coast Guard's performance measures and monitoring efforts related to TAP. GAO interviewed Coast Guard headquarters staff; surveyed 12 Coast Guard installations that conduct TAP (100 percent response rate); collected and reviewed participation data for reliability; and interviewed TAP managers from three installations selected for size and location, and 25 Coast Guard servicemembers at one location. (For a companion report on TAP implementation for separating and retiring servicemembers in other military services, see GAO-18-23 .)\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard), which is overseen by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), lacks complete or reliable data on participation in the Transition Assistance Program (TAP), designed to assist servicemembers returning to civilian life. According to senior Coast Guard officials, a major reason why data are not reliable is the lack of an up-to-date Commandant Instruction that specifies when to record TAP participation data. Consequently, the data are updated on an ad-hoc basis and may not be timely or complete, according to officials. Federal internal control standards call for management to use quality information to achieve the entity's objectives. Until the Coast Guard issues an up-to-date Commandant Instruction that establishes policies and procedures to improve the reliability and completeness of TAP data, it will lack quality information to gauge the extent to which it is meeting TAP participation requirements in the VOW to Hire Heroes Act of 2011.\nAccording to GAO's survey of Coast Guard installations, various factors affected participation, such as servicemembers serving at geographically remote locations or separating from the Coast Guard rapidly. TAP officials and Coast Guard servicemembers GAO interviewed said commanders and direct supervisors sometimes pulled servicemembers out of TAP class or postponed participation because of mission priorities. TAP managers also said they rely on delivering TAP online because many Coast Guard servicemembers are stationed remotely.\nThe Coast Guard cannot effectively measure performance to ensure key TAP requirements are met because it lacks reliable data and does not monitor compliance with several TAP requirements. Further, the Coast Guard has not established a formal performance goal against which it can measure progress, although federal internal control standards stipulate that management should consider external requirements\u2014such as the laws with which the entity is required to comply\u2014to clearly define objectives in specific and measurable terms. Establishing a goal could help the Coast Guard define expected performance. In addition, the Coast Guard does not monitor TAP requirements regarding the timeliness of servicemembers' TAP participation or their access to additional 2-day classes. Consequently, it cannot know whether servicemembers are starting TAP early enough to complete the program or those who elected to attend additional 2-day classes were able to do so before separation or retirement, as required by the Act. Finally, the Coast Guard lacks an up-to-date Commandant Instruction that establishes the roles and responsibilities of Coast Guard staff in implementing TAP. Federal internal control standards stipulate that management should assign responsibility and delegate authority to key roles throughout the entity. Issuing an up-to-date Commandant Instruction that defines roles and responsibilities would clarify who is ultimately responsible for ensuring Coast Guard servicemembers attend TAP, thereby facilitating accountability.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making seven recommendations, including that the Coast Guard issue a new Commandant Instruction establishing data collection policies, set TAP performance goals, monitor timeliness and access, and define roles and responsibilities. DHS agreed with all of GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_515"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_516","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOD obligated about $150 billion on contracted services\u2014such as information technology support and maintenance of defense facilities\u2014in fiscal year 2016. DOD has faced long-standing challenges in effectively managing its service acquisitions.\nThe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 amended existing requirements for DOD to annually collect data on contracted services and to compile and review an inventory of the functions performed by contractor personnel. The Act also contained a provision for GAO to report on the status of this data collection and to assess DOD's use of the inventory. This report addresses how DOD (1) collected data to create an inventory of fiscal year 2016 contracted services and (2) used the inventory to inform workforce planning, workforce mix, and budget decisions. GAO has reported on DOD's inventory of contracted services since 2010.\nGAO reviewed OSD and the military departments' guidance, as well as the military departments' inventory submissions to OSD. GAO also analyzed contracted services data and interviewed OSD and military department officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO found that the Department of Defense (DOD) used the same sources as it did in prior years to collect data and create an inventory of fiscal year 2016 contracted services, which is intended, in part, to help DOD make more strategic workforce decisions and better align resources. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) guidance, issued in September 2017 to implement congressional direction, required the military departments to include in their submissions, at a minimum, purchases of services with a total contract value of $3 million or more, and in four services acquisition portfolio groups\u2014logistics management, equipment-related, knowledge-based, and electronics and communications.\nAs permitted under OSD's inventory guidance, the military departments varied somewhat in how they reported their contracted services data to OSD. For example, the Army and Air Force included purchases both over and under $3 million and the Air Force also identified purchases by the four portfolio groups. The Navy submitted summary data of contracted services but did not provide a list of purchases in time to be included in an inventory summary for Congress. An OSD official said, however, that the information provided was sufficient to prepare the inventory summary, which OSD submitted to Congress in February 2018. The Navy subsequently provided a list of its fiscal year 2016 service purchases to OSD in March 2018.\nMilitary departments generally have not developed plans to use the inventory for workforce and budget decisions, as statutorily required. This is consistent with what GAO found in November 2014 and October 2016. GAO's analysis found that the military departments' guidance generally does not require using the inventory in workforce and budget decisions (see table).\nArmy manpower officials told GAO that inventory information such as the number of contractor full-time equivalents and the functions performed can be used to inform workforce mix decisions. However, workforce and budget officials at the Army, Navy, and Air Force stated they make limited use of the inventory to inform decision-making, in part because by the time the inventory is available, the data reflected are often too outdated to inform strategic decisions. GAO has previously recommended ways to improve use of the inventory. In November 2014, for example, GAO found that a lack of officials at the military departments who are accountable for integrating the use of the inventory leaves the department at continued risk of not complying with the legislative requirement to use the inventory to support management decisions. This issue persists, as the military departments have not made final designations for accountable officials responsible for developing plans and enforcement mechanisms to use the inventory.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making new recommendations in this report. Seven of 18 prior GAO recommendations related to the inventory remain open, including a recommendation for DOD to identify officials at the military departments responsible for developing plans and enforcement mechanisms to use the inventory. In its comments, DOD stated it is committed to improving its inventory processes.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_516"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_517","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nEducation provided over $122 billion in grants, loans and work study funds to help students pay for college at about 6,000 schools in fiscal year 2017. Education is responsible for certifying that these schools are eligible for and capable of properly administering federal student aid funds. Schools are required to submit an annual compliance audit that provides information on schools' administrative capability, which Education considers in its school certification decisions. GAO was asked to review Education's process for certifying schools to receive federal student aid.\nThis report examines (1) how Education certifies schools to administer federal student aid and how frequently schools are approved and denied certification; and (2) the role of compliance audits in the certification process and what, if any, steps Education has taken to address the quality of the audit information. GAO analyzed data on school certification outcomes for calendar years 2006-2017 (when GAO determined data were most reliable); reviewed data and reports summarizing Education's reviews of compliance audit quality for fiscal years 2006-2017; reviewed a non-generalizable sample of 21 school certification decisions from fiscal years 2015 and 2016, selected for a mix of decisions, school characteristics, and geographic regions; examined relevant federal laws, regulations, policy manuals and guidance; and interviewed Education officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Education (Education) is responsible for evaluating a variety of information to determine whether a postsecondary school should be certified to administer federal student aid programs, and agency data show that it approves most schools that apply. Education procedures instruct regional office staff to review school policies, financial statements, and compliance audits prepared by independent auditors, among other things. Education can certify schools to participate in federal student aid programs for up to 6 years, or it can provisionally certify them for less time if it determines that increased oversight is needed\u2014for example, when a school applies for certification for the first time or when it has met some but not all requirements to be fully certified. In calendar years 2006 through 2017, Education fully or provisionally approved most schools applying for initial or recertification to receive federal student aid (see figure).\nNote: Schools applying for certification for the first time and approved are placed in provisional certification.\nIn deciding whether to certify schools, Education particularly relies on compliance audits for direct information about how well schools are administering federal student aid, and Education's offices of Federal Student Aid and Inspector General have taken steps to address audit quality. The Inspector General annually selects a sample of compliance audits for quality reviews based on risk factors, such as auditors previously cited for errors. In fiscal years 2006 through 2017, 59 percent of the 739 selected audits received failing scores. Audits that fail must be corrected; if not, the school generally must repay federal student aid covered by the audit. Because higher risk audits are selected for review, Inspector General officials said they cannot assess the overall prevalence of quality problems in compliance audits. These two Education offices have taken steps to improve audit quality. For example, the Inspector General offered additional training to auditors on its revised 2016 audit guide and provided guidance to schools on hiring an auditor, while Federal Student Aid created a working group to strengthen its procedures for addressing poor quality compliance audits. Education's efforts to address audit quality could help ensure that these audits provide reliable information for school certification decisions.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making recommendations in this report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_517"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_518","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSSDI, which is administered by SSA, provides financial and other assistance to qualifying individuals who are unable to work due to their disabilities. SSDI is primarily funded by employee and employer payroll taxes that are placed in the Disability Insurance Trust Fund, which is currently projected to not be able to pay full benefits starting in 2028. While there are a number of ways to address the fiscal condition of the Disability Insurance Trust Fund, some researchers have proposed expanding employer-provided PDI. GAO was asked to review whether expanding PDI could result in potential savings to the Disability Insurance Trust Fund.\nThis report examines (1) what is known about how coverage and key features of SSDI and PDI compare, and (2) the potential implications of three distinct proposals to expand employer-sponsored PDI on the Disability Insurance Trust Fund and various stakeholders.\nGAO analyzed data on SSDI and PDI coverage from SSA and BLS for 2016 and 2017; reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; reviewed three PDI policies that three large insurers we selected described as typical for their companies; reviewed three distinct proposals to expand PDI identified through a literature review; and interviewed SSA and Department of Labor officials, authors, researchers, and representatives of insurance, employer, employee, and disability groups for a range of perspectives.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO's analysis found that coverage and key features of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and long-term employer-sponsored private disability insurance (PDI) differ in a number of ways. Key differences include the number of workers covered; characteristics of covered workers; and eligibility, benefits, and return to work assistance. For example:\nAccording to GAO's analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics and Social Security Administration (SSA) data, SSDI covers an estimated 96 percent of workers, while 33 percent of workers have PDI coverage through their employers. Also, PDI coverage is more prevalent among workers with higher wages (e.g., management positions) and in certain business sectors (e.g., finance).\nGAO's review of SSDI and PDI policies found that some PDI policies may pay benefits for medical conditions that SSDI would not. However, these PDI policies may time limit payments for mental health and musculoskeletal disorders, while SSDI does not. In addition, while both SSDI and PDI policies include features designed to help beneficiaries return to work, PDI policies may provide such supports more quickly than SSDI.\nGAO's review of the literature identified three distinct proposals for expanding PDI that the proposals' authors believe would address SSDI's fiscal challenges. Specifically, all three proposals suggest that cost savings for the Disability Insurance Trust Fund could be expected by expanding PDI. According to the proposals, this would happen because expanding PDI would provide workers earlier access to cash and employment supports, which would reduce the number of SSDI claims or the length of time SSDI benefits are paid to claimants. However, GAO's review of the three proposals noted that none of them provide enough information to assess how SSDI enrollment and costs might be affected with an expansion of PDI. Therefore, it is unclear whether cost savings to the Disability Insurance Trust Fund would actually be realized. For example, the proposals do not provide information on the type and timing of return-to-work services that would be provided under expanded PDI, nor do they take into account the differences in the populations served by SSDI and PDI policies. Moreover, stakeholders that GAO interviewed about these proposals raised a number of issues about other implications of PDI expansion that the proposals do not explicitly or fully address. For example:\nInsurers told GAO that is was unclear how expanding PDI would affect PDI premiums and the impact this would have on enrollment.\nEmployers told GAO they were concerned about potential additional requirements or administrative burdens that would be placed on them if PDI were expanded.\nEmployee and disability advocacy groups told GAO they were concerned about whether PDI expansion would provide standard services or employee protections currently available under SSDI, especially with respect to PDI expansion proposals that would replace SSDI for 2 years.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_518"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_519","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nMany individuals receive medical care for a serious or life-limiting condition during the last months of life, which may involve making difficult decisions about life-sustaining treatment. Advance care planning helps ensure that physicians, families, and friends have documentation outlining individuals' wishes under these circumstances.\nGAO was asked to identify issues related to completing and accessing advance care planning documents. This report describes, among other things, (1) the challenges individuals and providers face completing and accessing the documents, and (2) selected states' strategies for improving individuals' and providers' understanding of and access to advance care planning documents.\nGAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from national stakeholder organizations involved in advance care planning or aging issues, and conducted a literature review of relevant articles published from January 2012 to April 2018 in peer-reviewed and other publications. In addition, GAO interviewed officials from state agencies and stakeholder organizations in California, Idaho, Oregon, and West Virginia. GAO selected those four states because they were active in encouraging advance care planning and had registries for completed documents that were in different stages of development.\nThe Department of Health and Human Services, states, and stakeholders provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAdvance care planning documents\u2014including advance directives and physician orders for life sustaining treatment (POLST)\u2014allow individuals to express their wishes for end-of-life care. Advance directives, which include living wills and health care power of attorney, provide direction regarding care when an individual becomes incapacitated. POLST documents are appropriate for seriously ill individuals whose health status indicates the need for medical orders to be documented in their medical records.\nStakeholders from national organizations and officials in the four states GAO selected to review cited several challenges\u2014affecting both individuals and health care providers\u2014related to the use of advance care planning documents. In particular, they noted a lack of understanding about how to complete the documents and how to initiate conversations about advance care planning. They also cited challenges related to the difficulty of ensuring access to completed documents when needed, such as in an emergency situation.\nOfficials from state agencies and stakeholder organizations in the four selected states reported pursuing various strategies to improve understanding of advance care planning documents by conducting education efforts for individuals and providers. In addition, the states utilized strategies to improve access to completed documents, such as improving the electronic exchange of information between health records and a state registry, which is a central repository intended to improve access to the documents. Further, stakeholder officials reported strategies related to the acceptance of out-of-state advance care planning documents; all four selected states had statutory provisions that address the validity of documents executed in another state.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_519"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_520","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAir Force aircraft maintainers are responsible for ensuring that the Air Force's aircraft are operationally ready and safe for its aviators\u2014duties critical to successfully executing its national security mission. With more than 100,000 maintainers across the Air Force's active and reserve components, according to Air Force officials, aircraft maintenance is the Air Force's largest enlisted career field\u2014accounting for about a quarter of its active duty enlisted personnel.\nThe conference report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 included a provision for GAO to review the adequacy of the Air Force's aircraft maintainer workforce. This report assesses the extent to which, from fiscal years 2010 through 2017, the Air Force (1) had aircraft maintainer staffing gaps, (2) experienced attrition of maintainers and took steps to help retain maintainers, and (3) met its annual technical school completion rate goals for maintainers.\nGAO analyzed aircraft maintainer staffing levels, loss and reenlistment rates, and technical school completion rates from fiscal years 2010-2017, the most recent data available; conducted five non-generalizable discussion groups with maintainers; and interviewed aviation industry, Department of Defense, and Air Force officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Air Force has reduced overall aircraft maintainer staffing gaps, but continues to have a gap of experienced maintainers. The Air Force reduced the overall gap between actual maintainer staffing levels and authorized levels from 4,016 maintainers (out of 66,439 authorized active component positions) in fiscal year 2015, to 745 in fiscal year 2017 (out of 66,559 positions). However, in 7 of the last 8 fiscal years, the Air Force had staffing gaps of experienced maintainers\u2014those who are most qualified to meet mission needs and are needed to train new maintainers. Maintainers complete technical school as 3-levels and initially lack the experience and proficiency needed to meet mission needs. Following years of on-the-job training, among other things, maintainers upgrade to the 5- and 7-levels. In fiscal year 2017, the Air Force had gaps of more than 2,000 5-level and 400 7-level maintainers, and a surplus of over 1,700 3-levels. Air Force officials anticipate that staffing gaps will continue off and on through fiscal year 2023.\nOver the past 8 fiscal years, the Air Force has increasingly lost experienced aircraft maintainers, and it does not have goals and a strategy to help retain maintainers. While overall maintainer loss rates have remained generally stable, loss rates of 5-levels increased from 9 percent in fiscal year 2010 to 12 percent in fiscal years 2016 and 2017 (see figure). Air Force officials expect 7-level loss rates to also increase. Air Force officials stated that they need to retain more maintainers to help address experience gaps, but the Air Force has not developed annual retention goals for maintainers. In addition, while the Air Force has increased its use of retention bonuses since fiscal year 2015, according to Air Force officials, it does not have a strategy to improve retention. Without goals to measure progress and a retention strategy to guide efforts, the Air Force could face further challenges in managing its maintenance workforce, including ensuring there are enough experienced maintainers to meet mission needs.\nThe Air Force consistently met technical school completion rate goals for aircraft maintainers from fiscal years 2010 through 2017. In fiscal year 2017, about 9,600 active component maintainers completed technical school, an increase from about 5,700 in fiscal year 2015. This increase in completions has helped to address overall staffing gaps, but cannot immediately resolve experience imbalances, due to the time and training needed to reach the 5- and 7- levels.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that the Air Force develop annual retention goals and a retention strategy for aircraft maintainers. The Air Force concurred with both recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_520"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_521","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe federal government owns billions of dollars of personal property\u2014such as office furniture, scientific equipment, and industrial machinery. By law, each agency is required to follow GSA's disposal process so that an agency's unneeded property can be used by other agencies or certain non-federal entities. Since 2012, agencies have reduced their office and warehouse space due to government-wide initiatives, a reduction that in turn has required agencies to dispose of some affected personal property.\nGAO was asked to review how federal agencies identify and dispose of unneeded personal property. This report examines (1) how selected agencies assess whether personal property is needed and (2) how these agencies dispose of unneeded property and how, if at all, space reduction efforts have affected disposals. GAO reviewed federal statutes and regulations, and selected five agencies\u2014EPA, Forest Service, GSA, HUD, and IRS\u2014mainly based on space reduction results and goals. GAO reviewed these agencies' property disposal data for 2012 through 2016 and interviewed headquarters and field staff about their property management and disposal processes.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe five agencies GAO reviewed\u2014the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Forest Service, General Services Administration (GSA), Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Internal Revenue Service (IRS)\u2014generally do not have policies or processes for identifying unneeded personal property, such as office furniture, on a proactive basis. Instead, officials from these agencies said they typically identified unneeded property as a result of a \u201ctriggering event,\u201d such as an office space reduction. Executive agencies are required by law to continuously review property under their control to identify unneeded personal property and then dispose of it promptly. Without such policies or processes, agencies may not be routinely identifying unneeded property that could be used elsewhere, and efforts to maximize federal personal property use and minimize unnecessary storage costs may not be effective. GSA has issued regulations establishing a government-wide disposal process for unneeded personal property. However, according to GSA officials, the agency lacks the authority to promulgate regulations or formal guidance on management of in-use agency property, and there is no government-wide guidance to agencies on identifying unneeded personal property. Agencies are required to have internal control activities\u2014such as policies and procedures\u2014for reasonable assurance of efficient operations and minimal resource waste, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides guidance to agencies on implementing such activities. Guidance from OMB that emphasizes agencies' internal control responsibilities could help ensure that agencies are proactively and regularly identifying property that is no longer needed.\nThe selected agencies reported little difficulty in following GSA's personal property disposal process, reporting over 37,000 items as unneeded property in fiscal years 2012 through 2016. This property was disposed of through transfers to other agencies, donations to authorized recipients, sales, or discarding. When disposing of personal property from space reduction projects at locations GAO visited, agencies also reported using GSA's process (see figure). Overall, agencies said they have not experienced major challenges with disposing of personal property from space reduction efforts. This lack of challenges could be because projects are geographically dispersed and spread over several years.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nOMB should provide guidance to executive agencies on managing their personal property, emphasizing that agencies' policies or processes should reflect the requirement to continuously review and identify unneeded personal property. OMB did not comment on GAO's recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_521"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_522","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nGender-related price differences occur when consumers are charged different prices for the same or similar goods and services because of factors related to gender. While variation in costs and consumer demand may give rise to such price differences, some policymakers have raised concerns that gender bias may also be a factor. While the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Fair Housing Act prohibit discrimination based on sex in credit and housing transactions, no federal law prohibits businesses from charging consumers different prices for the same or similar goods targeted to different genders.\nGAO was asked to review gender-related price differences for consumer goods and services sold in the United States. This report examines, among other things, (1) how prices compared for selected goods and services marketed to men and women, and potential reasons for any price differences; (2) what is known about price differences for men and women for products not differentiated by gender, such as mortgages; and (3) the extent to which federal agencies have identified and addressed any concerns about gender-related price differences.\nTo examine these issues, GAO analyzed retail price data, reviewed relevant academic studies, analyzed federal consumer complaint data, and interviewed federal agency officials, industry experts, and academics.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFirms differentiate many consumer products to appeal separately to men and women by slightly altering product attributes like color or scent. Products differentiated by gender may sell for different prices if men and women have different demands or willingness to pay for these product attributes. Of 10 personal care product categories (e.g., deodorants and shaving products) that GAO analyzed, average retail prices paid were significantly higher for women's products than for men's in 5 categories. In 2 categories\u2014shaving gel and nondisposable razors\u2014men's versions sold at a significantly higher price. One category\u2014razor blades--had mixed results based on two price measures analyzed, and two others\u2014disposable razors and mass-market perfumes\u2014showed no significant gender price differences. GAO found that the target gender for a product is a significant factor contributing to price differences identified, but GAO did not have sufficient information to determine the extent to which these gender-related price differences were due to gender bias as opposed to other factors, such as different advertising costs. Though the analysis controlled for several observable product attributes, such as product size and packaging type, all underlying differences in costs and demand for products targeted to different genders could not be fully observed.\nStudies GAO reviewed found limited evidence of gender price differences for four products or services not differentiated by gender\u2014mortgages, small business credit, auto purchases, and auto repairs. For example, with regard to mortgages, women as a group paid higher average mortgage rates than men, in part due to weaker credit characteristics, such as lower average income. However, after controlling for borrower credit characteristics and other factors, three studies did not find statistically significant differences in borrowing costs between men and women, while one found women paid higher rates for certain subprime loans. In addition, one study found that female borrowers defaulted less frequently than male borrowers with similar credit characteristics, and the study suggested that women may pay higher mortgage rates than men relative to their default risk. While these studies controlled for factors other than gender that could affect borrowing costs, several lacked important data on certain borrower risk characteristics, such as credit scores, which could affect analysis of gender disparities. Also, several studies analyzed small samples of subprime loans that were originated in 2005 or earlier, which limits the generalizability of the results.\nIn their oversight of federal antidiscrimination statutes, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, Federal Trade Commission, and Department of Housing and Urban Development have identified limited consumer concerns based on gender-related pricing differences. GAO's analysis of complaint data received by the three agencies from 2012\u20132017 found that they had received limited consumer complaints about gender-related price differences. The agencies provide general consumer education resources on discrimination and consumer awareness. However, given the limited consumer concern, they have not identified a need to incorporate additional materials specific to gender-related price differences into their existing consumer education resources.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_522"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_523","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThousands of facilities have hazardous chemicals that could be targeted or used to inflict mass casualties or harm surrounding populations in the United States. In accordance with the DHS Appropriations Act, 2007, DHS established the CFATS program in 2007 to, among other things, identify and assess the security risk posed by chemical facilities. DHS inspects high-risk facilities after it approves facility security plans to ensure that the facilities are implementing required security measures and procedures.\nThis statement summarizes progress and challenges related to DHS's CFATS program management. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from July 2012 through June 2017, along with updates conducted in June 2018 on DHS actions to address prior GAO recommendations. To conduct the prior work, GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and DHS policies for administering the CFATS program, how DHS assesses risk, and data on high-risk chemical facilities. GAO also interviewed DHS officials and reviewed information on DHS actions to implement its prior recommendations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made progress addressing challenges that GAO's past work identified to managing the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. The following summarizes progress made and challenges remaining in key aspects of the program.\nIdentifying high-risk chemical facilities. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS used self-reported and unverified data to determine the risk of facilities holding toxic chemicals that could threaten surrounding communities if released. GAO recommended that DHS should better verify the accuracy of facility-reported data. DHS implemented this recommendation by revising its methodology so it now calculates the risk of toxic release, rather than relying on facilities to do so.\nAssessing risk and prioritizing facilities. In April 2013, GAO reported weaknesses in multiple aspects of DHS's risk assessment and prioritization approach. GAO made two recommendations for DHS to review and improve this process, including that DHS enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all of the elements of consequence, threat, and vulnerability associated with a terrorist attack involving certain chemicals. DHS launched a new risk assessment methodology in October 2016 and is currently gathering new or updated data from about 27,000 facilities to (1) determine which facilities should be categorized as high-risk because of the threat of sabotage, theft or diversion, or a toxic release and (2) assign those facilities deemed high risk to one of four risk-based tiers. GAO has ongoing work assessing these efforts and will report later this summer on the extent to which they fully address prior recommendations.\nReviewing and approving facilities' site security plans . DHS is to review security plans and visit facilities to ensure their security measures meet DHS standards. In April 2013, GAO reported a 7 to 9 year backlog for these reviews and visits. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS had made substantial progress in addressing the backlog\u2014estimating that it could take between 9 and 12 months for DHS to review and approve security plans for the approximately 900 remaining facilities. DHS has since taken additional action to expedite these activities and has eliminated this backlog.\nInspecting facilities and ensuring compliance. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS conducted compliance inspections at 83 of the 1,727 facilities with approved security plans. GAO found that nearly half of the inspected facilities were not fully compliant with their approved security plans and that DHS did not have documented procedures for managing facilities' compliance. GAO recommended that DHS document procedures for managing compliance. As a result, DHS has developed an enforcement procedure and a draft compliance inspection procedure and expects to finalize the compliance inspection procedure by the end of fiscal year 2018.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO has made various recommendations to strengthen DHS's management of the CFATS program, with which DHS has generally agreed. DHS has implemented or described planned actions to address most of these recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_523"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_524","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nUSMS mission areas include fugitive apprehension, witness protection, and federal prisoner transportation, among others. USMS whistleblowers recently alleged that USMS officials engaged in improper promotion practices\u2014such as routinely preselecting favored candidates. Investigations have substantiated multiple whistleblower allegations which has raised questions about the integrity of USMS's merit promotion process. USMS announces about 260 law enforcement promotion opportunities annually.\nGAO was asked to review USMS's promotion processes and policies and effects that USMS promotion practices have on employee morale. This report examines (1) the extent to which the USMS's merit promotion policies are aligned with federal guidelines; (2) the extent to which USMS monitors its merit promotion processes; and (3) the steps, if any, USMS has taken to understand and address employee concerns about its merit promotion policies and processes. GAO analyzed data and documents on USMS promotions from October 2015 through April 2017, and found these data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of GAO's study. GAO also analyzed USMS documentation, and interviewed USMS officials and non-generalizable groups of employees (85 in total) in four district locations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe U.S. Marshals Service's (USMS) merit promotion policy aligns with relevant provisions in title 5 of the United States Code and Code of Federal Regulations, which are the government-wide laws and related provisions agencies must follow to make federal appointments. Agencies must design and administer merit promotion programs to ensure a systematic means of selection for promotion based on merit and these programs must conform to five key requirements outlined in title 5. GAO found that the USMS merit promotion plan, as revised in November 2016, aligned with each of these five requirements. For example, the first requirement states that agencies must establish merit-based procedures for promoting employees that are available in writing to candidates. The USMS merit promotion plan, which is available to employees, outlines such procedures.\nUSMS is taking steps to improve how it monitors the implementation of the scoring component of its process to rate promotion applications, but lacks documented guidance to ensure consistent compliance with its merit promotion policy. GAO found that USMS does not adequately monitor the rating process, which allowed for conflicts of interest with raters who may compete with candidates whose applications they score. USMS also does not monitor the rating process to ensure that raters complied with a key requirement\u2014that raters decline to score applications of candidates with whom there is a conflict of interest, such as a supervisor-employee relationship. USMS is implementing a process change that, if implemented effectively, can address these two deficiencies. The new process entails having a third-party contractor, rather than USMS employees, determine candidates' scores. Finally, GAO found that USMS lacks documented guidance on rater scoring. USMS only provides verbal guidance to instruct raters on how to score the experience category of merit promotion packages, creating inconsistent application of the guidelines. Employees GAO met with expressed the view that such discrepancies create the perception that the rating process is unfairly subjective. Developing clear and specific documented guidance on how raters should apply the benchmark guidelines could minimize scoring inconsistency and potential rater subjectivity for both the current rating process and the new competency-based assessment.\nUSMS has taken limited steps to understand and address employee concerns about the promotion process. An estimated 41 percent of USMS respondents to the 2016 Office of Personnel Management Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey strongly disagreed or disagreed that USMS promotions are merit-based, while 34 percent strongly agreed or agreed, and 25 percent neither agreed nor disagreed. During discussion groups GAO held at four USMS district locations across the U.S., employees frequently expressed negative views and many indicated low or no trust that the process is fair and merit-based. Although USMS has acknowledged employees' negative perceptions of the promotion process, it has not developed an agency-wide action plan in accordance with federal guidance to better understand the nature and causes of employee concerns across districts and divisions. Providing specific and consistent information to employees about key steps in the merit promotion process and internal management decisions could improve transparency and help mitigate employee perceptions of favoritism that have negatively impacted employee morale.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that USMS develop specific rater guidance and develop and implement an agency-wide action plan to better understand and address employee concerns, among other steps. USMS concurred with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_524"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_525","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAccording to UNHCR, as of June 2017, more than 21 million people were refugees worldwide. State manages the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) and coordinates with UNHCR, which refers the most applicants to USRAP, and USCIS, which adjudicates refugee applications. Deterring and detecting fraud is essential to ensuring the integrity of USRAP and an increase in the number of applicants approved for resettlement in the United States from countries where terrorists operate has raised questions about the adequacy of applicant screening.\nThis statement addresses (1) how State works with UNHCR to ensure program integrity in the UNHCR resettlement referral process; (2) the extent to which State and RSCs have policies and procedures on refugee case processing and State has overseen RSC activities; (3) the extent to which USCIS has policies and procedures for adjudicating refugee applications; and (4) the extent to which State, USCIS, and their partners follow leading practices to reduce the risk of staff and applicant fraud in USRAP. This statement is based on GAO's July 2017 reports regarding USRAP. To conduct that work, GAO analyzed State, USCIS, and UNHCR policies; interviewed relevant officials; conducted fieldwork in 2016 at selected UNHCR offices, as well as at RSCs in Austria, Jordan, Kenya, and El Salvador, where GAO observed a nongeneralizable sample of refugee screening interviews (selected based on application data and other factors).\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of State (State) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have worked together on measures designed to ensure integrity in the refugee resettlement referral process and have established a framework to guide their partnership. Working with State, UNHCR has implemented standard operating procedures and other guidance that, according to UNHCR officials, provides baseline requirements throughout the referral process. UNHCR also uses databases to help verify the identities of, and manage information about, refugees.\nState and the nine worldwide Resettlement Support Centers (RSC) have policies and procedures for processing refugee applications. Overseen by State, the organizations that operate RSCs hire staff to process and prescreen applicants who have been referred for resettlement consideration. GAO observed 27 prescreening interviews conducted by RSC caseworkers in four countries and found that, for example, RSCs generally recorded key information and submitted any required security checks. However, State has not established outcome-based performance indicators to evaluate whether RSCs were consistently and effectively prescreening applicants and preparing case files\u2014key RSC activities that have important implications for timely and effective adjudication and security checks. Developing outcome-based performance indicators would better position State to determine whether RSCs are meeting their responsibilities.\nThe Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has policies and procedures for adjudicating refugee applications for resettlement in the United States, including how officers are to conduct interviews and adjudicate applications. GAO observed 29 USCIS interviews and found that officers completed all parts of the required assessment. USCIS also provides guidance to help officers identify national security concerns in applications, which can be challenging to identify as country conditions evolve. In 2016, USCIS determined that its pilot to send officers with national security expertise overseas to support interviewing officers was successful. USCIS has taken steps to fill these positions, but it has not yet developed a plan for deploying these additional officers, whose expertise could help improve the effectiveness of the adjudication process.\nState, USCIS, and their partners have implemented antifraud measures to reduce the risk of staff and applicant fraud\u2014both of which have occurred\u2014but could further assess fraud risks. Officials from all nine RSCs stated that they assign staff fraud risk management responsibilities to designated individuals. However, not all RSCs reported complying with all required program integrity measures\u2014reported compliance at individual RSCs ranged from 86 to 100 percent. State has also not required RSCs to conduct regular staff fraud risk assessments tailored to each RSC or examined the suitability of related controls. Without taking additional steps to address these issues, State and RSCs may face challenges in identifying new staff fraud risks or gaps in the program's internal control system and implementing new control activities to mitigate them. Further, State and USCIS have not jointly assessed applicant fraud risk program-wide. Doing so could help them ensure that fraud detection and prevention efforts across USRAP are targeted to those areas that are of highest risk.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO made recommendations to State and USCIS to strengthen the implementation of USRAP. State and USCIS agreed with GAO's recommendations and have begun taking actions to address them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_525"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_526","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe DATA Act was enacted to increase accountability and transparency and, among other things, expanded on the required federal spending information that agencies are to submit to Treasury for posting to a publicly available website. The act also includes provisions requiring a series of oversight reports by agencies' OIGs and GAO.\nThe objectives of this report are to describe (1) the reported scope of work covered and type of audit standards OIGs used in their reviews of agencies' DATA Act spending data; (2) any variations in the reported implementation and use of data standards and quality of agencies' data, and any common issues and recommendations reported by the OIGs; and (3) the actions, if any, OMB and Treasury have reported taking or planning to take to use the results of OIG reviews to help monitor agencies' implementation of the act.\nTo address these objectives, GAO reviewed 53 OIG reports issued on or before January 31, 2018, that assessed agencies' first submissions of spending data for the second quarter of fiscal year 2017 and surveyed the OIGs to obtain additional information.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act) requires agencies' Offices of Inspector General (OIG) to issue reports on their assessments of the quality of the agencies' spending data submissions and compliance with the DATA Act. The scope of all OIG reviews covered their agencies' second quarter fiscal year 2017 submissions. The files the OIGs used to select and review sample transactions varied based on data availability, and OIGs performed different types of reviews under generally accepted government auditing standards. Some OIGs reported testing a statistical sample of transactions that their agencies submitted and other OIGs reported testing the full population of submitted transactions. Because of these variations, the overall error rates reported by the OIGs are not fully comparable and a government-wide error rate cannot be projected.\nAccording to the OIG reports, about half of the agencies met Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Department of the Treasury (Treasury) requirements for the implementation and use of data standards. The OIGs also reported that most agencies' first data submissions were not complete, timely, accurate, or of quality.\nOIG survey responses show that OIGs generally reported higher (projected) overall error rates for the accuracy of data than for completeness and timeliness. OIGs reported certain errors that involve inconsistencies in how the Treasury broker (system that collects and validates agency-submitted data) extracted data from certain federal award systems that resulted in government-wide issues outside the agencies' control, while other errors may have been caused by agency-specific control deficiencies. For example, OIGs reported deficiencies related to agencies' lack of effective procedures or controls and systems issues. Most OIGs made recommendations to agencies to address identified concerns.\nOMB staff and Treasury officials told GAO that they reviewed the OIG reports to better understand issues identified by the OIGs. OMB issued new guidance in June 2018 requiring agencies to develop data quality plans intended to achieve the objectives of the DATA Act. Treasury officials told GAO that they are collaborating with OMB and the Chief Financial Officers Council DATA Act Audit Collaboration working group to identify and resolve government-wide issues.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making recommendations in this report. The Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) noted that GAO's report provides useful information on OIG efforts to meet oversight and reporting responsibilities under the DATA Act. OMB, Treasury, and CIGIE also provided technical comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_526"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_527","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFull implementation of GPRAMA could facilitate efforts to reform the federal government and make it more effective. GPRAMA includes a provision for GAO to review the act's implementation. This report assesses how GPRAMA implementation has affected the federal government's progress in resolving key governance challenges in (1) addressing cross-cutting issues, (2) ensuring performance information is useful and used, (3) aligning daily operations with results, and (4) building a more transparent and open government.\nTo address these objectives, GAO reviewed statutory requirements, OMB guidance, and GAO's recent work related to GPRAMA implementation and the key governance challenges. GAO also interviewed OMB staff and surveyed a stratified random sample of 4,395 federal managers from 24 agencies on various performance and management topics. With a 67 percent response rate, the survey results are generalizable to the government-wide population of managers.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and agencies have made some progress in more fully implementing the GPRA Modernization Act (GPRAMA), but GAO's work and 2017 survey of federal managers highlight numerous areas where improvements are needed.\nCross-cutting issues: Various GPRAMA provisions are aimed at addressing cross-cutting issues, such as cross-agency and agency priority goals and related data-driven reviews of progress towards those goals. To ensure alignment with the current administration's priorities, OMB's 2017 guidance removed the priority status of those goals, which stopped quarterly data-driven reviews and related public progress reports until new goals are published. OMB plans to resume implementation of these provisions in February 2018. GPRAMA also requires OMB and agencies to implement an inventory of federal programs, which could help decision makers better identify and manage fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. OMB and agencies implemented the inventory once, in May 2013. In October 2014, GAO found several issues limited the usefulness of that inventory. Since then, OMB has postponed updating the inventory, citing among other reasons the passage of subsequent laws. OMB has yet to develop a systematic approach for resuming implementation of the inventory and specific time frames for doing so. A systematic approach to developing the inventory could help ensure it provides useful information for decision makers and the public.\nPerformance information: Survey results show federal managers generally reported no improvements in their use of performance information in decision making for various management activities, or practices that can enhance such use, since GAO's 2013 survey. For example, the use of performance information to streamline programs to reduce duplicative activities (an estimated 33 percent in 2017) is statistically significantly lower relative to 2013 (44 percent). In contrast, managers who were familiar with and whose programs were subject to quarterly data-driven reviews reported that those reviews were used to make progress toward agency priority goals. Identifying and sharing practices to expand the use of such reviews\u2014for other performance goals and at lower levels within agencies\u2014could lead to increased use of performance information.\nDaily operations: Agencies have made progress in developing results-oriented cultures but need to take additional actions. GAO's past work found that high-performing organizations use performance management systems to help individuals connect their daily activities to organizational goals. In 2017, about half of federal managers reported using performance information when setting expectations with employees (no change from GAO's last survey in 2013).\nTransparent and open government: GAO's past work identified a number of needed improvements to Performance.gov, the central government-wide website required by GPRAMA. The site is to provide quarterly updates on priority goals in effect through September 2017, but those updates stopped in December 2016. According to OMB, the existing information for cross-agency priority goals is the final update, and agencies should publish final updates on their priority goals in annual performance reports. Performance.gov does not provide users with this information, thereby limiting the transparency and accessibility of those results.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nIn addition to following through on plans to resume implementation of key GPRAMA provisions, GAO recommends that OMB (1) consider a systematic approach to developing the program inventory, (2) revise guidance to provide specific time frames for inventory implementation, (3) identify and share practices for expanding the use of data-driven reviews, and (4) update Performance.gov to explain that reporting on priority goals was suspended and provide the location of final progress updates. OMB staff agreed with these recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_527"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_528","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe IRS, a bureau of the Department of the Treasury, relies extensively on IT to annually collect more than $3 trillion in taxes, distribute more than $400 billion in refunds, and carry out its mission of providing service to America's taxpayers in meeting their tax obligations. For fiscal year 2016, IRS expended approximately $2.7 billion for IT investments, 70 percent of which was allocated for operational systems.\nGAO has long reported that the effective and efficient management of IT acquisitions and operational investments has been a challenge in the federal government. Accordingly, in February 2015, GAO introduced a new government-wide high-risk area, Improving the Management of IT Acquisitions and Operations. GAO has also reported on challenges IRS has faced in managing its IT acquisitions and operations, and identified opportunities for IRS to improve the management of these investments.\nIn light of these challenges, GAO was asked to testify about IT management at IRS. To do so, GAO summarized its prior work regarding IRS's IT management, including the agency's management of operational, or legacy, IT systems.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO has issued a series of reports in recent years which have identified numerous opportunities for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to improve the management of its major acquisitions and operational, or legacy, information technology (IT) investments. For example,\nIn June 2016, GAO reported that IRS had developed a structured process for allocating funding to its operations activities, consistent with best practices; however, GAO found that IRS did not have a similarly structured process for prioritizing modernization activities to which the agency allocated hundreds of millions of dollars for fiscal year 2016. Instead, IRS officials stated that they held discussions to determine the modernization efforts that were of highest priority to meet IRS's future state vision and technology roadmap, and considered staffing resources and lifecycle stage. However, they did not use formal criteria for making final determinations. GAO concluded that establishing a structured process for prioritizing modernization activities would better assist Congress and other decision makers in ensuring that the right priorities are funded. Accordingly, GAO recommended that IRS establish, document, and implement policies and procedures for prioritizing modernization activities. IRS agreed with the recommendation and has efforts underway to address it.\nIn the same report, GAO noted that IRS could improve the accuracy of reported performance information for key development investments to provide Congress and other external parties with pertinent information about the delivery of these investments. This included investments such as Customer Account Data Engine 2, which IRS is developing to replace its 50-year old repository of individual tax account data, and the Return Review Program, IRS's system of record for fraud detection. GAO recommended that IRS take steps to improve reported investment performance information. IRS agreed with the recommendation, and has efforts underway to address it.\nIn a May 2016 report on legacy IT systems across the federal government, GAO noted that IRS used assembly language code to program key legacy systems. Assembly language code is a computer language initially used in the 1950s that is typically tied to the hardware for which it was developed; it has become difficult to code and maintain. One investment that used this language is IRS's Individual Master File which serves as the authoritative data source for individual taxpayer accounts. GAO noted that, although IRS has been working to replace the Individual Master File, the bureau did not have time frames for its modernization or replacement. Therefore, GAO recommended that the Department of Treasury identify and plan to modernize and replace this legacy system, consistent with applicable guidance from the Office of Management and Budget. The department had no comments on the recommendation.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO has made a number of recommendations to IRS to improve its management of IT acquisitions and operations. IRS has generally agreed with the recommendations and is in various stages of implementing them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_528"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_529","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCrashes at highway-rail grade crossings are one of the leading causes of railroad-related deaths. According to FRA data, in 2017, there were more than 2,100 crashes resulting in 273 fatalities. Since 2009 crashes have occurred at a fairly constant rate. The federal government provides states funding to improve grade-crossing safety through FHWA's Section 130 Program. The persistence of crashes and deaths raises questions about the effectiveness of the federal grade-crossing-safety program.\nGAO was asked to review federal efforts to improve grade-crossing safety. This report examines: (1) the focus of FRA's grade-crossing-safety research, (2) how states select and implement grade-crossing projects and what data are available from FRA to inform their decisions, and (3) the challenges states reported in implementing and assessing projects and the extent to which FHWA assesses the program's effectiveness. GAO analyzed FRA data; reviewed FRA's, FHWA's, and states' documents; reviewed a study of states' selection of projects; and interviewed FRA and FHWA headquarters and field staff, and officials from a non-generalizable sample of eight states, selected to include a mix in the number of grade crossings and crashes, and geographic diversity.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nResearch sponsored by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has identified driver behavior as the main cause of highway-rail grade crossing crashes and that factors such as train and traffic volume can contribute to the risk of a crash. (See figure.) Over 70 percent of fatal crashes in 2017 occurred at grade crossings with gates.\nTo meet the requirements of the federal grade-crossing program, states are responsible for selecting and ensuring the implementation of grade-crossing improvement projects. Most state DOT officials and other relevant transportation officials use local knowledge of grade crossings to supplement the results of models that rank grade crossings based on the risk of an accident. These states generally consider the same primary risk factors, such as vehicle and train traffic. FRA is taking steps to improve the data used in its model to help states assess risk factors at grade crossings. For example, FRA's grade-crossing inspectors will review and identify issues with railroad- and state-reported inventory data. FRA is currently developing guidelines, which it plans to finalize by the end of 2018, to implement these inspections as it has for other types of FRA inspections.\nOfficials we spoke with in eight states reported challenges in pursuing certain types of projects that could further enhance safety, in part because of federal requirements. While safety has improved, many crashes occur at grade crossings with gates, and officials said there could be additional ways to focus program requirements to continue improving safety. States' and the Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) reporting focuses on the program's funding and activity, such as the number and types of projects, yet the low number of crashes makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of projects in reducing crashes and fatalities. FHWA reports the program has been effective in reducing fatalities by about 74 percent since 1975. However, since 2009, annually there have been about 250 fatalities\u2014almost one percent of total highway fatalities. FRA expects future crashes to grow, in part, due to the anticipated increase in rail and highway traffic. An evaluation of the program should consider whether its funding and other requirements allow states to adequately address ongoing safety issues. FHWA officials said they are not required to perform such evaluations. GAO has previously reported on the importance of program evaluations to determine the extent to which a program is meeting its objectives. An evaluation of the program could lead FHWA to identify changes that could allow states to more strategically address problem areas.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that FHWA evaluate the program's requirements to determine if they allow states the flexibility to address ongoing safety issues. The Department of Transportation concurred with GAO's recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_529"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_530","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOD spends billions of dollars each year to maintain key enterprise business operations intended to support the warfighter, including systems and processes related to the management of contracts, finances, the supply chain, and support infrastructure. The 2018 National Defense Strategy identified reform of DOD's business practices as one of DOD's three strategic goals. GAO has previously reported that weaknesses in these business operations have resulted in inefficiencies and billions of dollars wasted. GAO has also identified the need for a CMO with significant authority and experience to focus concerted attention on DOD's long-term business transformation efforts. Congress initially established such a position in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017.\nThis report evaluates the extent to which DOD has implemented its CMO position and issued guidance to communicate within the department the authorities and responsibilities of the position. GAO analyzed the statutory authorities and responsibilities assigned to the CMO position and evaluated DOD's actions to implement them.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) has taken steps to implement its Chief Management Officer (CMO) position which has been given the responsibility for managing DOD's business operations; however, unresolved issues remain for DOD to fully institutionalize the CMO's authorities and responsibilities. DOD has restructured the Office of the CMO (OCMO) to more closely align with the CMO's statutory authorities and responsibilities. Further, the OCMO is working to strengthen its data capabilities and has hired a Chief Data Officer and formed a Data Management and Analytics Steering Committee. Additionally, OCMO officials told us they are establishing cost baselines for each of DOD's major business functions.\nHowever, DOD has not fully addressed three key issues related to the CMO's authorities and responsibilities:\nThe CMO's authority to direct the military departments on business reform issues . The law gave the CMO authority to direct the secretaries of the military departments on matters over which the CMO has responsibility. However, DOD has not determined how the CMO will exercise this authority, particularly when there is disagreement between the departments and the CMO.\nThe CMO's oversight responsibilities of the Defense Agencies and DOD Field Activities (DAFAs) . The CMO is responsible for exercising authority, direction, and control over the designated DAFAs that provide shared business services\u2014those business functions, such as supply chain and logistics and human resources operations, that are provided across more than one DOD organization. However, DOD has not determined how the CMO will exercise this authority, such as which DAFAs will submit their proposed budgets for CMO review.\nTransfer of responsibilities from the Chief Information Officer to the CMO. Under the law, the CMO will exercise responsibilities relating to business systems and management that previously belonged to the Chief Information Officer. However, DOD has not determined which, if any, responsibilities will transition from the Chief Information Officer to the CMO or assessed the impact of such a transition on associated resources.\nIn part because these issues remain unresolved, DOD agreed that it does not have department-wide guidance that fully and clearly articulates how the CMO's authorities and responsibilities should be operationalized. Making determinations on the three unresolved issues and issuing guidance would help ensure a shared understanding throughout the department of the CMO's role in leading DOD's enterprise-wide business reform efforts.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making four recommendations, including that DOD should address each of the three unresolved issues that impede its progress in institutionalizing statutory authorities and responsibilities, and issue guidance, such as a chartering directive that addresses how the CMO's authorities should be operationalized. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_530"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_531","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCDC is responsible for detecting and responding to emerging health threats and controlling dangerous substances. In carrying out its mission, CDC relies on information technology systems to receive, process, and maintain sensitive data. Accordingly, effective information security controls are essential to ensure that the agency's systems and information are protected from misuse and modification.\nGAO was asked to examine information security at CDC. In June 2018, GAO issued a limited official use only report on the extent to which CDC had effectively implemented technical controls and an information security program to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information on selected information systems.\nThis current report is a public version of the June 2018 report. In addition, for this public report, GAO determined the extent to which CDC has taken corrective actions to address the previously identified security program and technical control deficiencies and related recommendations for improvement. For this report, GAO reviewed supporting documents regarding CDC's actions on previously identified recommendations and interviewed personnel at CDC.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAs GAO reported in June 2018, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) implemented technical controls and an information security program that were intended to safeguard the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information systems and information. However, GAO identified control and program deficiencies in the core security functions related to identifying risk, protecting systems from threats and vulnerabilities, detecting and responding to cyber security events, and recovering system operations (see table below). GAO made 195 recommendations to address these deficiencies.\nAs of August 2018, CDC had made significant progress in resolving many of the security deficiencies by implementing 102 of 184 (about 55 percent) technical control recommendations, and partially implementing 1 of 11 information security program recommendations made in the June 2018 report. The figure shows the status of CDC's efforts to implement the 195 recommendations.\nAdditionally, CDC has created remedial action plans to implement the majority of the remaining open recommendations by September 2019. Until CDC implements these recommendations and resolves the associated deficiencies, its information systems and information will remain at increased risk of misuse, improper disclosure or modification, and destruction.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_531"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_532","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nInvestments in federal IT too often result in failed projects that incur cost overruns and schedule slippages. Recognizing the severity of issues related to government-wide IT management, Congress enacted federal IT acquisition reform legislation in December 2014. Among other things, the law states that OMB require in its annual IT capital planning guidance that CIOs certify that IT investments are adequately implementing incremental development.\nGAO was asked to review agencies' use of incremental development. This report addresses the number of investments certified by agency CIOs as implementing adequate incremental development and any reported challenges, and whether agencies' CIO certification policies and processes were in accordance with FITARA. GAO analyzed data for major IT investments in development, as reported by 24 agencies, and identified their reported challenges and use of certification information. GAO also reviewed the 24 agencies' policies and processes for the CIO certification of incremental development and interviewed OMB staff.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAgencies reported that 62 percent of major information technology (IT) software development investments were certified by the agency Chief Information Officer (CIO) for implementing adequate incremental development in fiscal year 2017, as required by the Federal IT Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) as of August 2016. However, a number of responses for the remaining investments were incorrectly reported due to agency error. Officials from 21 of the 24 agencies in GAO's review reported that challenges hindered their ability to implement incremental development, which included: (1) inefficient governance processes; (2) procurement delays; and (3) organizational changes associated with transitioning from a traditional software methodology that takes years to deliver a product, to incremental development, which delivers products in shorter time frames. Nevertheless, agencies reported that the certification process was beneficial because they used the information from the process to assist with identifying investments that could more effectively use an incremental approach, and using lessons learned to improve the agencies' incremental processes.\nAs of August 2017, only 4 of the 24 agencies had clearly defined CIO incremental development certification policies and processes that contained: descriptions of the role of the CIO in the process; how the CIO's certification will be documented; and included definitions of incremental development and time frames for delivering functionality consistent with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance (see figure).\nIn addition, OMB's fiscal year 2018 capital planning guidance did not establish how agency CIOs are to make explicit statements to demonstrate compliance with FITARA's incremental provisions, while the 2017 guidance did. However, OMB's fiscal year 2019 guidance provides clear direction on reporting incremental certification and is a positive step in addressing this issue.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making 19 recommendations to 17 agencies, including 3 to improve reporting accuracy and 16 to update or establish certification policies. Eleven agencies agreed with GAO's recommendations, 1 partially agreed, and 5 did not state whether they agreed or disagreed. OMB disagreed with several of GAO's conclusions, which GAO continues to believe are valid, as discussed in the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_532"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_533","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThis testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's September 2018 report, entitled Native American Youth: Involvement in Justice Systems and Information on Grants to Help Address Juvenile Delinquency ( GAO-18-591 ).\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO's analysis of available data found that the number of American Indian and Alaska Native (Native American) youth in federal and state and local justice systems declined across all phases of the justice process\u2014arrest, adjudication, and confinement\u2014from 2010 through 2016. During this period, state and local arrests of Native American youth declined by almost 40 percent from 18,295 in 2010 to 11,002 in 2016. The vast majority of Native American youth came into contact with state and local justice systems rather than the federal system.\nHowever, more Native American youth were involved in the federal system than their percentage in the nationwide population (1.6 percent). For example, of all youth arrested by federal entities during the period, 18 percent were Native American. According to Department of Justice (DOJ) officials, this is due to federal jurisdiction over certain crimes involving Native Americans. Comprehensive data on Native American youth involvement in tribal justice systems were not available for analysis. GAO's analysis showed several differences between Native American and non-Native American youth in the federal justice system. For example, the majority of Native American youths' involvement was for offenses against a person, such as assault and sex offenses. In contrast, the majority of non-Native American youths' involvement was for public order offenses (e.g., immigration violations) or drug or alcohol offenses. On the other hand, in state and local justice systems, the involvement of Native American and non-Native American youth showed many similarities, such as similar offenses for each group.\nDOJ and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) offered at least 122 discretionary grants and cooperative agreements (grant programs) from fiscal years 2015 through 2017 that could be used to address juvenile delinquency among Native American youth. DOJ and HHS made approximately $1.2 billion in first-year awards to grantees during the period, of which the agencies awarded approximately $207.7 million to tribal governments or Native American organizations. Officials from the agencies, tribal governments, and Native American organizations identified factors they believe affect success in applying for grant programs. For example, some tribal governments and Native American organizations found being able to call or meet with federal officials during the application process helpful but found that short application deadlines are a challenge.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_533"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_534","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAutomated vehicle technology may eventually make commercial trucking more efficient and safer, but also has the potential to change the employment landscape for nearly 1.9 million heavy and tractor-trailer truck drivers, among others. GAO was asked to examine the potential workforce effects of automated trucking.\nThis report addresses (1) what is known about how and when automated vehicle technologies could affect commercial trucks; (2) what is known about how the adoption of automated trucks could affect the commercial trucking workforce; and (3) the extent to which DOT and DOL are preparing to assist drivers whose jobs may be affected. GAO reviewed research since 2014 on automated trucking technology, viewed demonstrations of this technology, and analyzed federal data on the truck driver workforce. GAO also interviewed officials from DOT and DOL, as well as a range of stakeholders, including technology developers, companies operating their own trucking fleets, truck driver training schools, truck driver associations, and workforce development boards.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAutomated trucks, including self-driving trucks, are being developed for long-haul trucking operations, but widespread commercial deployment is likely years or decades away, according to stakeholders. Most technology developers said they were developing trucks that can travel without drivers for part of a route, and some stakeholders said such trucks may become available within 5 to 10 years. Various technologies, including sensors and cameras, could help guide a truck capable of driving itself (see figure). However, the adoption of this technology depends on factors such as technological limitations and public acceptance.\nStakeholders GAO interviewed predicted two main scenarios for how the adoption of automated trucks could affect the trucking workforce, which varied depending on the future role of drivers or operators. Technology developers, among others, described one scenario in which self-driving trucks are used on highway portions of long-haul trips. Stakeholders noted this scenario would likely reduce the number of long-haul truck drivers needed and could decrease wages because of lower demand for such drivers. In contrast, groups representing truck drivers, among others, predicted a scenario in which a truck would have an operator at all times for complex driving and other non-driving tasks, and the number of drivers or operators would not change as significantly. However, stakeholders lacked consensus on the potential effect this scenario might have on wages and driver retention. Most stakeholders said automated trucking could create new jobs, and that any workforce effects would take time\u2014providing an opportunity for a federal response, such as any needed policy changes.\nThe Department of Transportation (DOT) is consulting with the Department of Labor (DOL) to conduct a congressionally-directed analysis of the workforce impacts of automated trucking by March 2019. As part of this analysis, DOT and DOL have coordinated to conduct stakeholder outreach. However, they do not currently plan to convene stakeholders on a regular basis to gather information because they have focused on completing this analysis first. Continuing to convene stakeholders could provide the agencies foresight about policy changes that may be needed to prepare for any workforce effects as this technology evolves.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making four recommendations, including that both DOT and DOL should continue to convene key stakeholders as the automated trucking technology evolves to help the agencies analyze and respond to potential workforce changes that may result. DOT and DOL agreed with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_534"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_535","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nNative American youth face unique challenges when it comes to their contact with justice systems. Research shows that risk factors such as high rates of poverty and substance abuse make them susceptible to being involved with justice systems at the federal, state and local, and tribal levels. GAO was asked to examine the extent of Native American youth involvement in justice systems, and federal grant programs that may help address Native American youth delinquency.\nThis report examines (1) what available data show about the number and characteristics of Native American youth in federal, state and local, and tribal justice systems; and (2) federal discretionary grant programs that could help prevent or address delinquency among Native American youth, and tribal government and Native American organizations' access to those grants. GAO analyzed federal, state and local, and tribal arrest, adjudication, and confinement data from 2010 through 2016 (the most recent available) from DOJ and the Department of the Interior. GAO also analyzed DOJ and HHS grant program award documentation from fiscal years 2015 through 2017, and application information for a sample of the grant programs chosen based on the amount of funding awarded and other factors. GAO also interviewed officials from DOJ, HHS, and 10 tribal governments or Native American organizations chosen to include successful and unsuccessful applicants to the grant programs, among other things.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO's analysis of available data found that the number of American Indian and Alaska Native (Native American) youth in federal and state and local justice systems declined across all phases of the justice process\u2014arrest, adjudication, and confinement\u2014from 2010 through 2016. During this period, state and local arrests of Native American youth declined by almost 40 percent from 18,295 in 2010 to 11,002 in 2016. The vast majority of Native American youth came into contact with state and local justice systems rather than the federal system.\nHowever, more Native American youth were involved in the federal system than their percentage in the nationwide population (1.6 percent). For example, of all youth arrested by federal entities during the period, 18 percent were Native American. According to Department of Justice (DOJ) officials, this is due to federal jurisdiction over certain crimes involving Native Americans. Comprehensive data on Native American youth involvement in tribal justice systems were not available for analysis. GAO's analysis showed several differences between Native American and non-Native American youth in the federal justice system. For example, the majority of Native American youths' involvement was for offenses against a person, such as assault and sex offenses. In contrast, the majority of non-Native American youths' involvement was for public order offenses (e.g., immigration violations) or drug or alcohol offenses. On the other hand, in state and local justice systems, the involvement of Native American and non-Native American youth showed many similarities, such as similar offenses for each group.\nDOJ and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) offered at least 122 discretionary grants and cooperative agreements (grant programs) from fiscal years 2015 through 2017 that could be used to address juvenile delinquency among Native American youth. DOJ and HHS made approximately $1.2 billion in first-year awards to grantees during the period, of which the agencies awarded approximately $207.7 million to tribal governments or Native American organizations. Officials from the agencies, tribal governments, and Native American organizations identified factors they believe affect success in applying for grant programs. For example, some tribal governments and Native American organizations found being able to call or meet with federal officials during the application process helpful but found that short application deadlines are a challenge.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_535"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_536","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nTax noncompliance, including refund fraud, threatens the integrity of the tax system and costs the federal government hundreds of billions of dollars annually. RRP is IRS's primary pre-refund system for detecting and preventing the issuance of invalid refunds. IRS reported that between January 2015 and November 2017 RRP prevented the issuance of more than $6.51 billion in invalid refunds.\nGAO was asked to examine RRP's capabilities. This report (1) describes how RRP detects and selects suspicious returns and prevents invalid refunds; (2) assesses how IRS monitors and adapts RRP; and (3) examines what else, if anything, IRS can do to strengthen RRP and use it to address other enforcement issues.\nGAO reviewed IRS plans for RRP and documents on its performance. GAO compared IRS's efforts to federal internal control standards, GAO's Fraud Risk Framework and IRS's strategic plan. GAO interviewed IRS officials who work on and use RRP.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Return Review Program (RRP) detects and selects potentially fraudulent returns to prevent the issuance of invalid refunds. According to IRS, RRP uses advanced analytic techniques and various data sources, including prior-year tax returns, to assign multiple scores to individual returns based on characteristics of identity theft and other refund fraud.\nGAO found that IRS routinely monitors RRP's performance and adapts RRP to improve detection and address evolving fraud threats. Each year IRS updates RRP's detection tools to improve accuracy for the next filing season.\nIRS has plans to continue developing RRP to further prevent invalid refunds, including using RRP to analyze and detect fraudulent business returns. However, GAO identified other opportunities for IRS to improve RRP's fraud detection and to use RRP for other enforcement activities:\nRRP's ability to accurately detect and select suspicious returns could benefit from having information on Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statements (W-2) available for analysis more frequently. As of April 2018, IRS officials said they were drafting but had not yet approved a work request to load W-2s into RRP daily instead of weekly for the 2019 filing season.\nIRS could collect more information electronically from paper filers. One approach IRS evaluated in 2012 is to digitize some paper returns using barcoding technology, but it has not updated that analysis or expanded it to consider other digitizing technologies. IRS requested that Congress require that returns prepared electronically but filed on paper include a scannable code printed on the return, but Congress had not done so as of May 2018.\nIRS could apply RRP's capabilities to improve other tax enforcement activities, such as audit selection or underreporting detection. Individuals' underreporting of tax liabilities accounts for hundreds of billions in lost tax revenue. Until IRS evaluates the costs and benefits of expanding RRP to analyze returns not claiming refunds, IRS will not have the information needed to make decisions that could help streamline processes for detecting and treating additional types of noncompliance and fraud.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO suggests Congress consider legislation to require that returns prepared electronically but filed on paper include a scannable code. GAO is also making five recommendations to IRS, including that IRS take action to make incoming W-2s available to RRP more frequently, update and expand a 2012 analysis of the costs and benefits of digitizing returns filed on paper, evaluate the costs and benefits of expanding RRP to analyze returns not claiming refunds, and take any appropriate action based on those evaluations. IRS agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_536"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_537","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nEPA's mission is to protect human health and the environment. To accomplish this mission, EPA develops and enforces environmental regulations; awards grants; and studies environmental issues, among other things. GAO has conducted reviews focused on various aspects of EPA's operations and programs. Through this work, GAO has made numerous recommendations to improve EPA's performance and the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations.\nGAO follows up with executive branch agencies to determine the extent to which they have implemented its recommendations. In fiscal year 2015, GAO began sending letters annually to the heads of key executive branch agencies, including EPA, identifying unimplemented recommendations that warrant priority attention.\nThis statement discusses (1) the status of EPA's implementation of GAO recommendations made since fiscal year 2007 and how these recommendations relate to EPA's operations and programs and (2) examples of benefits realized by EPA and others based on GAO's work, including through the agency's implementation of these recommendations. This statement is based on GAO's work since fiscal year 2007 and on an analysis of recommendations GAO has made to EPA during this period.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAs of August 23, 2017, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had implemented 191 of the 318 recommendations GAO made since fiscal year 2007. EPA had not yet implemented the remaining 127 recommendations. The figure below shows the status of the 318 recommendations. The recommendations fall into six broad categories that relate to EPA programs and operations: (1) management and operations; (2) water issues; (3) environmental contamination and cleanup; (4) toxics, chemical safety, and pesticides; (5) public health and environmental justice; and (6) air quality, climate change, and energy efficiency. Almost three-fourths of the recommendations fall into the first three categories and include actions for EPA to better manage grants, improve the regulation of drinking water contaminants, and better manage hazardous waste cleanup. Most of the recommendations that have not yet been implemented concern EPA management and operations and water issues. For example, regarding management and operations, EPA has not yet implemented GAO's recommendation to link its workforce plan with its strategic plan to help ensure EPA has an appropriately skilled workforce to achieve its mission. Similarly, for water issues, EPA has not fully implemented GAO's recommendation to provide guidance to regional offices on overseeing state water quality programs.\nGAO has identified many benefits\u2014that is, process and programmatic improvements and financial benefits\u2014based on EPA taking actions on GAO's recommendations and related work. For example, in October 2012, GAO recommended that EPA and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) develop guidelines to assist states in developing uniform environmental analyses to meet state and federal requirements for water and wastewater infrastructure projects. EPA and USDA issued a joint memorandum in February 2017 that, among other things, highlighted best practices to eliminate duplicative environmental reviews. In addition, GAO has identified financial benefits from the implementation of its recommendations and related work. For example, during the course of work related to a July 2008 report, GAO identified an error in EPA's calculation of recoverable indirect costs for hazardous waste cleanup. EPA acknowledged the error and published revised indirect costs rates. As a result, GAO estimated in 2010 that EPA had recovered or would recover $42.2 million.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_537"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_538","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn order for the Army to maintain its technological edge over potential adversaries, it plans to invest in near- and long-term modernization efforts. However, the Army has struggled with modernization initiatives in the past. For example, the Future Combat System was canceled after a cost of $21 billion and delivery of few new capabilities.\nThe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 included a provision for GAO to report on the Army's modernization strategy. This report assesses (1) the status of the Army's near- and long-term modernization efforts; and (2) the extent to which the Army has applied leading practices to these efforts. GAO reviewed Army directives, procedures, and policies; and compared the Army's efforts with leading practices for requirements and technology development, effective cross-functional teams, and mergers and organizational transformations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nSince 2017, when the Army announced its initiative to update its forces and equipment with improved capabilities\u2014known as modernization\u2014it has\nestablished and assigned eight cross-functional teams to pilot how to address these needs;\nestablished the Army Futures Command as the focal point for modernization efforts, with a four-star general to oversee it; and\nrealigned over $1 billion in science and technology funding to support modernization efforts within the $7.5 billion expected to be spent over the next 5 years.\nTo date, the Army has generally applied leading practices identified by GAO to its modernization efforts. For example, the cross-functional team pilots generally applied leading practices for determining requirements and technology development and for establishing effective teams. Similarly, as the Army began the process of establishing the Army Futures Command, it has started to apply the leading practices for mergers and organizational transformations by establishing a clearly defined mission and providing a clear consistent rationale for the command. However, GAO identified other areas where the Army has not fully applied leading practices to its modernization efforts including the following:\nUnder the modernization effort, the Army plans to begin weapon systems development at a lower level of maturity than what is recommended by leading practices. GAO has raised concerns about this type of practice for almost two decades for other Army acquisitions, because proceeding into weapon systems development at earlier stages of technology maturity raises the risk that the resulting systems could experience cost increases, delivery delays, or failure to deliver desired capabilities. Taking this approach for acquisitions under the modernization effort raises similar concerns for the Army's six prioritized capability needs.\nThe Army has not developed a plan for capturing the lessons learned from the cross-functional team pilots, and therefore may miss an opportunity to leverage the experience of these teams in applying leading practices.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making four recommendations, including that the Army follow leading practices for maturing technologies to a higher level than currently planned and develop a plan to capture lessons learned from the cross-functional teams. DOD concurred with all the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_538"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_539","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nLaw enforcement encounters with individuals with mental illness may require special training and skills and can sometimes involve volatile situations, risking tragic injuries or even death.\nThe 21st Century Cures Act includes a provision for GAO to review the practices that federal first responders, tactical units, and corrections officers (for the purposes of this study, \u201claw enforcement officers and agents\u201d) are trained to use in responding to incidents involving individuals with mental illness. This report addresses (1) challenges that federal law enforcement officers and agents face; (2) applicable training, policies, and guidance; and (3) existing leading practices, relevant tools, and efforts to leverage information.\nGAO selected the five DHS and five DOJ law enforcement components (e.g., Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation) that represent the largest concentration of law enforcement officers within the two departments. GAO reviewed the training, policies, and guidance in place, as well as efforts to enhance them, and discussed these matters with knowledgeable officials. In addition, GAO held discussion groups with a nongeneralizable sample of law enforcement officers and agents, selected through component contacts, to discuss their perspectives. GAO also reviewed studies on law enforcement responses to individuals with mental illness to help identify leading practices and tools and interviewed stakeholders, selected through a structured process, to obtain their perspectives.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nLaw enforcement officers and agents from the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Justice (DOJ) cited a number of challenges in our discussion groups related to their response to incidents involving individuals with a mental illness.\nAll of the federal law enforcement components in GAO's review either offer, receive, or are developing some form of training to their law enforcement officers and agents that addresses responding to incidents involving individuals with a mental illness. Further, all components have relevant policies or guidance in place, and all are undertaking efforts to enhance their practices in accordance with departmental guidance. Since DHS and DOJ components have varying missions and operational needs and interact with the public in different capacities, the nature and scope of training, as well as the number and duration of courses offered in response to individuals with mental illness varies; however, they generally include elements focusing on de-escalation and communication. In addition, DHS and DOJ both have efforts underway to have components review their training and policies under departmental guidance and plan to begin implementing any changes by 2018.\nStakeholders cited leading practices and tools for effective law enforcement responses, and DHS and DOJ components have generally leveraged information from other knowledgeable parties. For example, the Crisis Intervention Team approach involves training selected law enforcement officers on mental health topics and dispatching those officers on mental-health related calls. While models like this are typically used by state and local law enforcement agencies, their benefits could be considered in other settings such as federal law enforcement. DHS and DOJ officials are also using collaborative mechanisms within their departments, such as conference calls and working groups with officials, that have helped them leverage information from knowledgeable parties. In addition, DOJ's Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), which supports programs and initiatives in the areas of law enforcement, among other activities, has developed and makes publicly available resources such as its Police-Mental Health Collaboration Toolkit. BJA also is working to stand up a national training and technical assistance center to improve law enforcement responses to people with mental illness. While aimed at state, local, and tribal law enforcement, a BJA official also acknowledged that the center could serve as an additional resource for federal law enforcement agencies to consult as they review relevant trainings, policies, and guidance on this topic.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_539"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_540","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe 2017 hurricanes (Harvey, Irma, and Maria) caused an estimated $265 billion in damage, primarily in Texas, Florida, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. As of February 2019, Congress had provided over $35 billion to HUD for CDBG-DR grants to help communities recover. Communities may use these funds to address unmet needs for housing, infrastructure, and economic revitalization. GAO was asked to evaluate the federal government's response to the 2017 hurricanes. In this initial review of CDBG-DR, GAO examined, among other things, (1) the status of the 2017 grants, (2) HUD's review of the initial steps grantees have taken and its plans for future monitoring, and (3) challenges HUD and grantees face in administering grants.\nGAO reviewed documentation from the four largest 2017 CDBG-DR grantees and HUD. GAO also reviewed prior work on CDBG-DR and interviewed officials from HUD and the four grantees.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAs of September 2018, the four states and territories that received the most 2017 Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) funds had signed grant agreements with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Before signing the agreements, HUD certified the grantees' financial processes and procedures. It also approved the grantees' assessments of their capacity to carry out the recovery and of unmet needs (losses not met with insurance or other forms of assistance). Before funding begins to reach disaster victims, the grantees need to take additional steps, such as finalizing plans for individual activities. As of January 2019, Texas had drawn down about $18 million (of $5 billion) for administration and planning only, and Florida had drawn down about $1 million (of $616 million) for administration, planning, and housing activities. Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands had not drawn down any of the $1.5 billion and $243 million, respectively, they had been allocated.\nHUD lacks adequate guidance for staff reviewing the quality of grantees' financial processes and procedures and assessments of capacity and unmet needs, and has not completed monitoring or workforce plans. The checklists used to review grantees' financial processes and procedures and assessments ask the reviewer to determine if the grantee included certain information, such as its procurement processes, but not to evaluate the adequacy of that information. In addition, the checklists, which include a series of \u201cyes\u201d or \u201cno\u201d questions, do not include guidance that the HUD reviewer must consider. HUD also does not have a monitoring plan that identifies the risk factors for each grantee and outlines the scope of monitoring. Further, HUD has not developed a workforce plan that identifies the critical skills and competencies HUD needs and includes strategies to address any staffing gaps. Adequate review guidance, a monitoring plan, and strategic workforce planning would improve HUD's ability to oversee CDBG-DR grants.\nWithout permanent statutory authority and regulations such as those that govern other disaster assistance programs, CDBG-DR appropriations require HUD to customize grant requirements for each disaster in Federal Register notices\u2014a time-consuming process that has delayed the disbursement of funds. In a July 2018 report, the HUD Office of Inspector General found that as of September 2017, HUD used 61 notices to oversee 112 active CDBG-DR grants. Officials from one of the 2017 grantees told us that it was challenging to manage the multiple CDBG-DR grants it has received over the years because of the different rules. CDBG-DR grantees have faced additional challenges such as the need to coordinate the use of CDBG-DR funds with other disaster recovery programs that are initiated at different times and administered by other agencies. HUD officials said that permanently authorizing CDBG-DR would allow HUD to issue permanent regulations for disaster recovery. Permanent statutory authority could help address the challenges grantees face in meeting customized grant requirements for each disaster, such as funding lags, varying requirements, and coordination with multiple programs. The expected increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events underscores the need for a permanent program to address unmet disaster needs.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nCongress should consider permanently authorizing a disaster assistance program that meets unmet needs in a timely manner. GAO also makes five recommendations to HUD, which include developing guidance for HUD staff to use in assessing grantees, developing a monitoring plan, and conducting workforce planning. HUD generally agreed with three recommendations and partially agreed with two, which GAO clarified to address HUD's comments.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_540"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_541","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nOne aspect of DOE's mission is to secure U.S. leadership in energy technologies. To that end, DOE funds R&D for energy projects, including for advanced fossil energy (innovative technologies for coal, natural gas, and oil). DOE provides funding for R&D projects, including large projects designed to demonstrate the commercial viability of technologies. Also, DOE is authorized to make loan guarantees to support certain energy projects through its Loan Guarantee Program, which is administered by its Loan Programs Office.\nGAO was asked to review DOE's funding for advanced fossil energy projects. This report describes DOE's funding for advanced fossil energy R&D projects started from fiscal years 2010 through 2017 and the types of projects and recipients that received funding, among other objectives. For purposes of this report, GAO used the term funding to mean obligations.\nGAO analyzed relevant laws, regulations, and guidance; DOE data on R&D funding for fiscal years 2010 through 2017; and DOE documents. GAO also interviewed DOE officials in the Office of Fossil Energy, the National Energy Technology Laboratory, and the Loan Programs Office.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Energy (DOE) provided $2.66 billion in funding, or obligations, for 794 research and development (R&D) projects started from fiscal years 2010 through 2017 to develop advanced fossil energy technologies. Such technologies include processes for converting coal into synthesis gas composed primarily of carbon monoxide and hydrogen, and recovering methane from gas hydrates. Of the $2.66 billion, DOE provided $1.12 billion in funding for 9 later-stage, large demonstration projects, which were to assess the readiness for commercial viability of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies. CCS involves capturing man-made carbon dioxide at its source and storing it permanently underground. DOE provided the remaining $1.54 billion in funding for 785 other projects in amounts that were relatively small\u2014over half were for less than $1 million.\nSix demonstration projects researched CCS technologies using coal, while three used other fuels. The nine demonstration projects received funding ranging from $13 million to $284 million. As shown in the figure, three projects implementing CCS technologies were active as of the end of fiscal year 2017. Also, DOE withdrew its support for four projects, and two projects were withdrawn by the recipients\u2014all before completion. These projects did not reach completion due to several factors, such as a lack of technical progress, or changes in the relative prices of coal and natural gas that made the projects economically unviable.\nOf the 785 other projects, about 89 percent involved R&D of coal technologies, such as coal gasification\u2014the conversion of carbon-containing material into synthesis gas. The other 11 percent of the 785 projects involved R&D of oil and gas technologies, such as the development of technologies to find, characterize, and recover methane from gas hydrates.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making any recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_541"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_542","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nArsenic, an element in the earth's crust, can be harmful to human health and may be present in water and certain foods, such as rice. Rice may be more susceptible to arsenic contamination than other crops due to the flooded conditions in which it is typically grown. FDA and USDA work to address food safety risks. FDA's responsibilities for rice include regulatory and research programs; USDA's include research programs.\nGAO was asked to review issues related to arsenic and rice. GAO examined (1) what NRC and recent key scientific reviews have reported about the effects of ingestion of arsenic on human health, (2) the extent to which FDA and USDA have managed the risk to human health from arsenic in rice, and (3) the extent to which FDA has coordinated with USDA and other federal agencies on actions to manage the risk. GAO analyzed a 2013 NRC report on inorganic arsenic, 14 reviews of scientific studies on the human health effects of ingesting arsenic published from January 2015 to June 2017, and agency documents; interviewed agency officials; and compared good practices with actions FDA and USDA took to manage risk and that FDA took to coordinate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academy of Sciences, in 2013, and more recent key scientific reviews reported evidence of associations between long-term ingestion of arsenic and adverse human health effects, such as cardiovascular disease. Many of the studies NRC reviewed as part of its survey of the scientific literature examined the ingestion of arsenic in drinking water, but others looked at arsenic from all sources, including dietary sources such as rice. NRC stated that evidence suggests that food, particularly rice, may be a significant source of inorganic arsenic, the more toxic of the two forms of arsenic; however, consumption of rice and levels of arsenic in rice vary widely, making it difficult to estimate arsenic intake from rice. NRC identified stronger evidence for some health effects at higher levels of arsenic\u2014defined by NRC as 100 parts per billion or higher in drinking water\u2014than at lower levels, which are more common in the United States, and noted that research on the health effects of ingesting lower levels of arsenic is ongoing.\nThe Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) have taken actions to manage the risk of arsenic in rice to human health, including assessing the type and prevalence of health effects that may result from long-term ingestion of arsenic in rice. FDA also has taken action to publicly communicate and report on the risk. In 2016, FDA issued a risk assessment about the human health effects from long-term ingestion of arsenic in rice and draft guidance recommending industry not exceed a level of 100 parts per billion of inorganic arsenic in infant rice cereal. FDA noted it issued this guidance because infants face a higher risk owing to their less-varied diets. However, FDA has not updated the risk assessment, which was informed by a review of scientific studies published before February 2015, or finalized the draft guidance. In prior work, GAO has found that sharing risk information and incorporating stakeholder feedback can help organizations identify and better manage risks, as well as increase transparency and accountability to Congress and taxpayers. FDA officials stated that they may update the risk assessment based on newly-available information and consider public comments before finalizing the draft guidance. However, FDA officials could not provide a specific timeline for either. By developing such a timeline, FDA could help clarify when it will take action and improve the transparency of its decisions.\nFDA coordinated with USDA and other federal agencies on actions to manage the risk of arsenic in rice to varying extents. For example, FDA and USDA coordinated on developing arsenic detection methods for rice to a limited extent, although both agencies have crosscutting strategic goals for developing detection methods for foodborne contaminants, including arsenic. GAO has noted in prior work that developing interagency mechanisms to coordinate crosscutting issues may reduce potentially duplicative efforts. FDA and USDA officials stated that they coordinated on an informal basis but have no mechanism for coordinating more formally. By developing a coordination mechanism, FDA and USDA could enhance their ability to use their resources efficiently and avoid potentially duplicative efforts.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making five recommendations, including that FDA develop a timeline for updating its risk assessment and finalizing its draft guidance and that FDA and USDA develop a coordination mechanism for developing methods to detect foodborne contaminants, including arsenic. FDA and USDA generally agreed with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_542"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_543","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon oil spills are two of the largest offshore oil spills in U.S. history, causing long-lasting damage to marine and coastal resources. OPA includes provisions to prevent and respond to such oil spills by authorizing (1) federal-state trustee councils that manage billions of dollars from legal settlements and (2) an interagency committee to coordinate oil pollution research, among other things.\nGAO was asked to review the federal government's response, restoration, and research efforts after the Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon oil spills. This report examines, among other things, (1) how the trustee councils have used the restoration trust funds and the status of restoration and (2) the interagency committee's coordination of oil spill research efforts.\nGAO reviewed the councils' plans for the funds and how they were used, federal funding of oil spill research by member agencies, and key laws. Also, GAO evaluated the coordination of such efforts against a leading collaboration practice. GAO interviewed members of the trustee councils and the interagency committee.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe trustee councils, composed of federal and state members, have used portions of the restoration trust funds from the Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon oil spill settlements to restore natural resources. From October 1992 to January 2018, the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council used about 86 percent of the fund's roughly $1 billion, primarily on habitat protection and restoration of damaged natural resources. According to the council, all but 5 of the 32 natural resources and human services identified as damaged by the spill have recovered or are recovering. The health of Pacific herring is one example of a resource that has not yet recovered. Further, the presence of lingering oil remains a concern almost 30 years after the spill. In May 2018, GAO accompanied trustee council researchers to the spill area and observed the excavation of three pits that revealed lingering oil roughly 6 inches below the surface of the beach, as captured in the photo below. The Deepwater Horizon Natural Resource Damage Assessment Trustee Council finalized a programmatic restoration plan in 2016; four trustee implementation groups have since issued initial restoration plans for designated restoration areas, and three anticipate issuing restoration plans in 2019 or later. From April 2012 to December 2017, the council used 13 percent of the at least $8.1 billion restoration trust fund, mostly on habitat protection, enhancing recreation, and marine wildlife and fishery restoration.\nThe Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), which was enacted after the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989, established the Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research (interagency committee) to coordinate oil pollution research among federal agencies and with relevant external entities, among other things. However according to the trustee council members that manage the restoration trust funds, the committee does not coordinate with the trustee councils and some were not aware that the interagency committee existed. The research of the member agencies could be relevant to the trustee councils' work on restoration. By coordinating directly with the trustee councils, the interagency committee could ensure better knowledge sharing between groups and leverage its member agencies' resources to inform and support the work of the councils.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends, among other things, that the interagency committee coordinate with the trustee councils to support their work and research needs. The agency agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_543"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_544","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn response to an aging workforce, countries around the world have developed policies to encourage older workers to work longer to improve the financial sustainability of national pension systems and address shortages of skilled workers. Phased retirement is one option that can be used to encourage older workers to stay in the workforce. GAO was asked to look at phased retirement programs in the United States and other countries. In June 2017, GAO issued a report (GAO-17-536) that looked at phased retirement in the United States, where formal phased retirement programs are as yet uncommon. This report looks at phased retirement in other countries.\nSpecifically, GAO examined (1) the extent to which phased retirement exists in other countries with aging populations, (2) the key aspects of phased retirement programs in selected countries, and (3) the experiences of other countries in providing phased retirement and how their experiences can inform policies in the United States.\nGAO analyzed relevant data, reviewed academic research, and conducted interviews to identify countries with phased retirement, and selected four countries with national policies permitting phased retirement programs with broad coverage for case studies. GAO also conducted interviews with government officials, unions, employer associations, and other experts.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO's review of studies and interviews with employment and retirement experts identified 17 countries with aging populations and national pension systems similar to the Social Security program in the United States. These countries also have arrangements that allow workers to reduce their working hours as they transition into retirement, referred to as \u201cphased retirement.\u201d Phased retirement arrangements encourage older workers who might otherwise retire immediately to continue working, which could help alleviate pressures on national pension systems as well as address labor shortages of skilled workers. The17 countries had established phased retirement programs in different ways: at the national level via broad policy that sets a framework for employers; at the industry or sector level; or by single employers, often through the collective bargaining process.\nGAO's four case study countries\u2014Canada, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (UK)\u2014were described as employing various strategies at the national level to encourage phased retirement, and specific programs differed with respect to design specifics and sources of supplemental income for participants. Canada and the U.K. were described as having national policies that make it easier for workers to reduce their hours and receive a portion of their pension benefits from employer-sponsored pension plans while continuing to accrue pension benefits in the same plan. Experts described two national programs available to employers and workers in Germany, with one program using tax preferences. Experts also said Sweden implemented a policy in 2010 that allows partial retirement and access to partial pension benefits to encourage workers to stay in the labor force longer.\nEven with unique considerations in the United States, other countries' experiences with phased retirement could inform U.S. efforts. Some employer-specific conditions, such as employers offering employee-directed retirement plans and not being covered by collective bargaining are more common in the United States, but the case study countries included examples of designs for phased retirement programs in such settings. Certain programs allow access to employer-sponsored or national pension benefits while working part-time. For example, experts said the U.K. allows workers to draw a portion of their account based pension tax-free, and one U.K. employer GAO spoke to also allows concurrent contributions to those plans. In addition, experts said that certain program design elements help determine the success of some programs. Such elements could inform the United States experience. For instance, U.S. employers told us that while offering phased retirement to specific groups of workers may be challenging because of employment discrimination laws, a union representative in Germany noted that they reached an agreement where employers may set restrictions or caps on participation, such as 3 percent of the workforce, to manage the number of workers in the program. Employers in the U.S. could explore whether using a similar approach, taking into consideration any legal concerns or other practical challenges, could help them to control the number of workers participating in phased retirement programs.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making recommendations in this report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_544"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_545","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIndividuals who do not agree with the initial decision on a claim for Social Security disability benefits can ultimately appeal the decision by requesting a hearing before one of SSA's approximately 1,500 administrative law judges. However, the rate at which these judges have allowed benefits has varied, raising questions about the reasons for this variation. GAO was asked to review aspects of SSA's oversight of judges' decisions.\nThis report examines (1) to what extent allowance rates vary across administrative law judges, and factors associated with this variation; and (2) the extent to which SSA has processes to monitor the accuracy and consistency of hearings decisions.\nGAO developed a statistical model to analyze SSA data on adult disability decisions made by administrative law judges from fiscal years 2007 through 2015, the most current data available at the time of GAO's analysis; reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and agency documents; and interviewed SSA officials and chief judges in SSA's 10 regions, as well as officials from organizations representing judges, disability claimants, and claimant representatives.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAllowance rates\u2014the rate at which Social Security Administration (SSA) administrative law judges allowed disability benefits to be paid when claimants appealed\u2014varied across judges, even after holding constant certain characteristics of claimants, judges, hearing offices, and other factors that could otherwise explain differences in allowance rates. Specifically, GAO estimated that the allowance rate could vary by as much as 46 percentage points if different judges heard a typical claim (one that was average in all other factors GAO analyzed). SSA officials said that this level of variation is not surprising, given the complexity of appeals and judicial discretion. Nonetheless, the variation declined by 5 percentage points between fiscal years 2007 and 2015 (see figure), a change officials attributed to enhanced quality assurance efforts and training for judges. GAO also identified various factors that were associated with a greater chance that a claimant would be allowed benefits. In addition to characteristics related to disability criteria, such as the claimant's impairment and age, GAO found that claimants who had representatives, such as an attorney or family member, were allowed benefits at a rate nearly 3 times higher than those without representatives. Other factors did not appear related to allowance rates, such as the percentage of backlogged claims in a hearing office.\nSSA has various reviews to monitor the accuracy and consistency of hearings decisions by administrative law judges, but some of these reviews may overlap and SSA has not systematically evaluated them. Specifically, SSA conducts five types of quality assurance reviews of hearings decisions, several of which have similar goals and may look at similar claims. SSA has not evaluated the efficiency or effectiveness of these reviews, despite spending at least $11 million on them in fiscal year 2016. Moreover, the agency has struggled to sustain all of its quality reviews due to competing priorities\u2014two of the five reviews were curtailed in 2016 because SSA reassigned staff to help expedite claims decisions. By evaluating which quality assurance reviews are most effective and efficient in improving accuracy and consistency, SSA would be better positioned to meet its goals within its resources.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making two recommendations, including that SSA systematically evaluate its quality assurance reviews and take steps to reduce or better manage any unnecessary overlap among them. SSA concurred and plans to address them through a comprehensive assessment of its oversight.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_545"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_546","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Presidential Transitions Improvements Act of 2015 includes a provision for GAO to assess multiple characteristics of final significant regulatory actions promulgated by executive departments during presidential transition periods (September 23 through January 20) at the end of Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama's administrations and compare them to each other and to regulations issued during the same 120-day period in nontransition years since 1996.\nAmong other objectives, GAO assessed the extent to which there was variation in 1) the number of regulations, their scope, and other indicators; and 2) agencies' reported compliance with procedural requirements for promulgating the regulations. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed the text of the regulations published in the Federal Register , and reviewed the universe of all 527 economically significant final regulations (generally those with an annual effect of $100 million or more) published during the specified transition and nontransition periods and a generalizable stratified random sample of 358 of the 1,633 significant final regulations published during the same time periods.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nDuring transition periods at the end of presidential administrations, agencies published more final regulations and more frequently provided advanced notice to the public on those regulations compared to nontransition periods. The Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations published on average roughly 2.5 times more economically significant regulations during transition periods than during nontransition periods. But agencies more often, relative to nontransition periods, provided the public an opportunity to influence the development of the transition-period regulations by providing advanced notice of their issuance and opportunities to comment on proposed regulations before they were finalized.\nIn their published regulations, agencies reported that compliance with four of five procedural requirements was high during both transition and nontransition periods, but not with the Congressional Review Act (CRA). During all periods, agencies reported complying with requirements, such as the Regulatory Flexibility Act, for nearly all economically significant regulations and the majority of significant regulations. Agencies less often complied with one or more CRA requirements. (See figure.) Though agencies are responsible for complying with CRA, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is responsible for oversight of agencies' rulemaking, consistent with law, and reviews regulations before publication, which provides an opportunity to identify and help agencies avoid potential noncompliance. The most common CRA deficiency was agencies' failure to provide Congress the required time to review and possibly disapprove regulations, which GAO has also identified as a deficiency in previous work. Economically significant regulations for which OMB completed its review within 3 months before the planned effective date were at high risk of not complying with CRA, thus increasing the risk that agencies would not provide Congress with the required time for its reviews.\nEconomically Significant Regulations Determined to be Noncompliant with the Congressional Review Act\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that OMB, as part of its regulatory review process, identify economically significant regulations at potential risk of not complying with CRA and work with agencies to ensure compliance. OMB staff did not agree or disagree with the recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_546"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_547","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nState staffs Foreign Service employees to more than 270 embassies and consulates worldwide to advance U.S. foreign policy and economic interests. In 2009 and 2012, GAO identified ongoing Foreign Service staffing gaps.\nGAO was asked to review State's Foreign Service staffing. This report examines (1) vacancies in State's Foreign Service staffing at overseas posts, (2) reported effects of Foreign Service vacancies on diplomatic readiness, and (3) State's efforts to address Foreign Service vacancies. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed State's Global Employment Management System data as of March 2018. The system includes information on Foreign Service and Civil Service positions, including the total number of authorized Foreign Service positions and whether each position is filled or vacant. GAO also reviewed its relevant prior reports and State workforce planning documents. In addition, GAO interviewed State staff at 10 overseas posts, selected on the basis of large numbers of Foreign Service vacancies and diversity in the types of Foreign Service positions that were vacant at these posts, among other factors.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of State's (State) data show persistent Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts since 2008. According to the data, 13 percent of overseas Foreign Service positions were vacant as of March 2018. This percentage is similar to the percentages GAO reported for 2008 and 2012, when 14 percent of these positions were vacant. In addition, State's data show persistent vacancies at overseas posts in generalist positions that help formulate and implement U.S. foreign policy and in specialist positions that support and maintain the functioning of overseas posts. State's data also show persistent Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts with State's highest foreign policy priorities and in regions with security risks that could threaten U.S. foreign policy interests.\nAccording to staff at overseas posts, Foreign Service vacancies adversely affect State's ability to carry out U.S. foreign policy. Staff at overseas posts told us that vacancies increase workloads, contributing to low morale and higher stress for Foreign Service staff and that vacancies in Political and Economic positions\u201420 percent and 16 percent, respectively\u2014limit the reporting on political and economic issues that posts are able to provide to State headquarters. Notably, officials also stated that vacancies in specialist positions may heighten security risks at overseas posts and disrupt post operations. For instance, some overseas post staff said that vacancies in Information Management positions had increased the vulnerability of posts' computer networks to potential cybersecurity attacks and other malicious threats.\nState described various efforts\u2014implemented by multiple offices in the department \u2014to help address overseas Foreign Service vacancies, but these efforts are not guided by an integrated action plan to reduce persistent vacancies. An example of State's efforts is the \u201cHard-to-Fill\u201d program, which allows Civil Service staff an opportunity to fill a Foreign Service vacancy on a single overseas tour. According to GAO's 2017 High-Risk Series report, an agency should design and implement an action plan\u2014integrated across its relevant offices\u2014that defines the root causes of all skills gaps and suggests corrective measures. However, State has not developed such an action plan for reducing persistent overseas Foreign Service vacancies. Without developing an integrated action plan, overseas Foreign Service vacancies may persist. As a result, State's ability to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals and help ensure secure and efficient operations could be adversely impacted.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that State develop an integrated action plan that defines the root causes of persistent Foreign Service vacancies at overseas posts and suggests corrective measures to reduce such vacancies. State concurred with our recommendation and noted that it will take steps to develop an integrated action plan.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_547"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_548","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nPatriot is a mobile Army surface-to-air missile system deployed worldwide to defend critical assets and forces. The Army plans to extend the life of Patriot equipment until at least 2048 through maintaining and modernizing the system. To achieve this, the Army performs two maintenance processes, restoring equipment returning from combat back to pre-deployment conditions (\u201creset\u201d) and comprehensively overhauling (\"recapitalizing\") a portion of its equipment annually.\nThe conference report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision that GAO assess the Army's Patriot maintenance and recapitalization plans to ensure that operational needs are met. This report (1) evaluates the extent to which the Army's reset process supports the timely delivery of Patriot equipment back to units; and (2) describes the Army's plans for supporting the long-term viability of the Patriot system through recapitalization and any challenges associated with its plans. GAO analyzed Army guidance and equipment and maintenance data; interviewed Army officials; and assessed the Army's recapitalization plans.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Army uses reset and recapitalization to extend the life of its Patriot surface-to-air missile system. The reset process\u2014which is intended to repair recently-deployed equipment\u2014has often returned equipment to Patriot units late, which has affected unit training. GAO found that of the seven Patriot battalions that underwent reset from fiscal years 2014 through 2017, only one received its equipment within 180 days, in accordance with Army policy (see figure). Patriot unit officials told GAO that such delays reduced the time available for unit training, creating challenges in meeting training requirements as units prepare for their next mission. The Army has identified and analyzed several factors affecting reset timeliness, ranging from supply chain issues to transportation. However, the Army has not comprehensively analyzed the relative importance of these factors. Such an analysis would better position the Army to target its efforts effectively to ensure units receive equipment back in a timely manner.\nPatriot Equipment Reset Timeliness for Units, Fiscal Years 2014-2017\nWith respect to recapitalization, the Army has decided to recapitalize each battalion set of Patriot equipment once every 15 years to support the system's long-term viability through 2048, while recognizing that this approach introduces some challenges. The Army would prefer to recapitalize Patriot equipment every 10 years, but Army officials stated this is not feasible for the following reasons:\nReducing the amount of equipment for ongoing operational commitments to increase the pace of recapitalization is not feasible given current commitments and the projected security environment.\nBuying extra equipment to provide to additional units undergoing recapitalization is not feasible because the Army has prioritized replacing the Patriot radar to improve its capability to defend against advanced threats.\nArmy officials told GAO that the current pace of recapitalization is not optimal and could introduce challenges, such as the possibility of equipment failure and increased maintenance costs. However, the Army has concluded that the current pace is the best path forward.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that the Army conduct an analysis of the primary factors affecting the Patriot program's reset timeliness to identify their relative importance and develop and implement appropriate corrective actions. The Department of the Army concurred with GAO's recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_548"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_549","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nBoth the Coast Guard\u2014a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)\u2014and the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) are investing significant resources to recapitalize their aging fleets of ships. Ensuring that the Coast Guard and NOAA maintain their ships and address potential capability gaps is vital for protecting national security and scientific interests.\nThis statement summarizes lessons that GAO has identified from its prior reviews of Coast Guard and Navy acquisitions, which can be applied to the Coast Guard's and NOAA's shipbuilding efforts. Specifically, this testimony provides information on, among other things, (1) long-term strategic planning for acquisitions, (2) the need for a sound business case, and (3) the leveraging of the Navy's acquisition resources and shipbuilding expertise. In its prior work, GAO reviewed Coast Guard and Navy programs and interviewed officials. For this testimony, GAO obtained publicly available information on NOAA's ship acquisition efforts.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO has found that acquisition programs can benefit from long-term strategic planning that identifies how tradeoff decisions would affect the future of the acquisition portfolio. In July 2018, GAO found the Coast Guard continues to manage its acquisitions through its annual budget process and the 5-year Capital Investment Plan. As a result of this planning process, the Coast Guard has continued to defer planned acquisitions to future years and left a number of operational capability gaps unaddressed. Incorporating the use of a long-term strategic plan and additional tradeoff discussion into the Capital Investment Plan could lead to more informed choices before irreversible commitments are made.\nGAO's prior work has also found that acquisition programs should start with solid business cases before setting program baselines and committing resources. At the heart of a business case is a knowledge-based approach\u2014successful shipbuilding programs build on attaining critical levels of knowledge at key points in the shipbuilding process before significant investments are made (see figure).\nIn September 2018, GAO found the Coast Guard did not have this type of sound business case when it established the program baselines for its polar icebreaker program in March 2018 due to risks in technology, design, cost, and schedule. For example, the Coast Guard's planned delivery dates were not informed by a realistic assessment of shipbuilding activities, but rather were primarily driven by the potential gap in icebreaking capabilities once the Coast Guard's only operating heavy polar icebreaker reaches the end of its service life.\nAgencies have partnered with the Navy to take advantage of its resources and shipbuilding expertise, including the Coast Guard when acquiring the polar icebreakers. For example, in September 2018, GAO found that the Coast Guard and the Navy had established an integrated program office and a ship design team. These teams provided input to Navy cost estimators, who developed the polar icebreaker program's cost estimate.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO has previously recommended that the Coast Guard develop a 20-year fleet modernization plan, reflect acquisition trade-off decisions in its annual Capital Investment Plans, and address risks to establish a sound business case for its polar icebreakers acquisition. DHS concurred with these recommendations and is taking steps to implement them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_549"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_550","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCongress has long recognized that IT has the potential to enable federal agencies to accomplish their missions more quickly, effectively, and economically. However, fully exploiting this potential has presented challenges to covered agencies, and the federal government's management of IT has produced mixed results.\nAs part of its effort to reform the government-wide management of IT, in December 2014 Congress enacted FITARA. The law included specific requirements related to enhancing Chief Information Officers' (CIO) authorities, improving the risk management of IT investments, reviewing agencies' portfolio of IT investments, consolidating federal data centers, and purchasing software licenses. GAO has reported numerous times on agencies' effectiveness in implementing the provisions of the law and highlighted agencies that have had success in implementing selected provisions.\nIn this report, GAO identifies practices that agencies have used to effectively implement FITARA. GAO selected five provisions of FITARA to review: (1) CIO authority enhancements; (2) enhanced transparency and improved risk management; (3) portfolio review; (4) data center consolidation; and (5) software purchasing. GAO then selected nine agencies that had success in implementing at least one of the five provisions. GAO compiled practices where at least one agency was better positioned to implement a provision or realized an IT management improvement or cost savings.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nNine selected agencies (the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, and Veterans Affairs; the Agency for International Development; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; and the General Services Administration) identified 12 practices that helped them to effectively implement one or more Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act provisions (commonly referred to as FITARA). The following figure identifies the 12 practices, including the four overarching ones, considered vital to implementing all provisions.\nBy applying the overarching practices, covered agencies were better positioned to implement FITARA. In addition, by implementing the practices relative to the five FITARA provisions GAO selected, covered agencies realized information technology (IT) management improvements, such as decommissioning old systems and cost savings.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_550"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_551","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nHUD administers the Public Housing program, which provides federally assisted rental units to low-income households through PHAs. In 2010, HUD estimated its aging public housing stock had $25.6 billion in unmet capital needs. To help address these needs, the RAD program was authorized in fiscal year 2012. RAD allows PHAs to move (convert) properties in the public housing program to Section 8 rental assistance programs, and retain property ownership or transfer it to other entities. The conversion enables PHAs to access additional funding, including investor equity, generally not available for public housing properties.\nGAO was asked to review public housing conversions under RAD and any impact on residents. This report addresses, among other objectives, HUD's (1) assessment of conversion outcomes; (2) oversight of resident safeguards; and (3) provisions to help preserve the long-term affordability of units. GAO analyzed data on RAD conversions through fiscal year 2017; reviewed a sample of randomly selected, nongeneralizable RAD property files; and interviewed HUD officials, PHAs, developers, academics, and affected residents.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) put procedures in place to evaluate and monitor the impact of conversion of public housing properties under the Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program. RAD's authorizing legislation requires HUD to assess and publish findings about the amount of private-sector leveraging. HUD uses a variety of metrics to measure conversion outcomes. But, the metric HUD uses to measure private-sector leveraging\u2014the share of private versus public funding for construction or rehabilitation of assisted housing\u2014has limitations. For example, HUD's leveraging ratio counts some public resources as leveraged private-sector investment and does not use final (post-completion) data. As a result, HUD's ability to accurately assess private-sector leveraging is limited.\nHUD does not systematically use its data systems to track effects of RAD conversions on resident households (such as changes in rent and income, or relocation) or monitor use of all resident safeguards. Rather, since 2016, HUD has required public housing agencies (PHA) or other post-conversion owners to maintain resident logs and collect such information. But the resident logs do not contain historical program information. HUD has not developed a process for systematically reviewing information from its data systems and resident logs on an ongoing basis. HUD has been developing procedures to monitor compliance with some resident safeguards\u2014such as the right to return to a converted property\u2014and begun a limited review of compliance with these safeguards. However, HUD has not yet developed a process for monitoring other safeguards\u2014such as access to other housing voucher options. Federal internal control standards require agencies to use quality information to achieve objectives, and obtain and evaluate relevant and reliable data in a timely manner for use in effective monitoring. Without a comprehensive review of household information and procedures for fully monitoring all resident safeguards, HUD cannot fully assess the effects of RAD on residents.\nRAD authorizing legislation and the program's use agreements (contracts with property owners) contain provisions intended to help ensure the long-term availability of affordable units, but the provisions have not been tested in situations such as foreclosure. For example, use agreements between HUD and property owners specify affordability and use restrictions that according to the contract would survive a default or foreclosure. HUD officials stated that HUD intends to develop procedures to identify and respond to risks to long-term affordability, including default or foreclosure in RAD properties. However, HUD has not yet done so. According to federal internal control standards, agencies should identify, analyze, and respond to risks related to achieving goals and objectives. Procedures that address oversight of affordability requirements would better position HUD to help ensure RAD conversions comply with program requirements, detect potential foreclosure and other risks, and take corrective actions.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO makes five recommendations to HUD intended to improve leveraging metrics, monitoring of the use and enforcement of resident safeguards, and compliance with RAD requirements. HUD agreed with our recommendations to improve metrics and build on existing oversight.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_551"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_552","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCMS has noted that it is important for enrollees to maintain continuous health insurance coverage to ensure the stability of the FFE. Certain rules allow for enrollment flexibilities\u2014such as special enrollment periods and a 3-month grace period that is allowed before coverage is terminated for recipients of federal income-based subsidies who default on their premiums. However, some issuers have stated that these rules could be misused, resulting in non-continuous coverage. There are little data on the extent to which enrollees maintain continuous coverage during a year and, more specifically, on the extent to which coverage is terminated for nonpayment of premiums.\nGAO examined (1) the extent to which FFE enrollees maintained coverage in 2015 and (2) the extent to which CMS has reliable data on termination of enrollees' coverage for nonpayment of premiums. GAO analyzed CMS's 2015 FFE enrollment data (the most recent year of available data); interviewed CMS officials and selected issuers; and reviewed applicable laws and guidance from CMS.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn 2015, 9.2 million individuals enrolled in the federal health insurance exchange in 37 states. Eligible individuals (e.g., U.S. citizens or those lawfully present in the United States) are able to enroll in health coverage during the annual open enrollment period. Outside of open enrollment, eligible individuals may enroll in coverage or change their coverage selection during special enrollment periods. Individuals may enroll under a special enrollment period if, for example, they lost their coverage from another source, such as Medicaid or an employer, or due to relocation. Under federal regulations, enrollees may not sign up for coverage under a special enrollment period citing loss of coverage if the coverage was lost due to nonpayment of premiums.\nAbout half (53 percent) of the 2015 federally facilitated exchange (FFE) enrollees maintained continuous health insurance coverage throughout the year\u2014that is, they began coverage between January 1 and March 1, 2015, and maintained it through December 31, 2015. These individuals had an average of 11.6 months of coverage. The remaining 47 percent of FFE enrollees started their coverage later or ended it during the year; they averaged 5.0 months of coverage. Enrollees could have voluntarily ended coverage\u2014due to gaining other coverage, for example\u2014or have had it terminated by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) or the issuers of coverage for valid reasons, including losing eligibility for exchange coverage or for nonpayment of premiums.\nCMS does not have reliable data on issuer-generated terminations of coverage for enrollees' nonpayment of premiums. Although CMS and issuers share data on the terminations each generates and reconcile their data on a monthly basis to ensure data accuracy, the agency does not require issuers to consistently report data on the reasons for terminations. Officials told us they do not track these data because they are not critical to ensure the accuracy of the federal subsidy amounts\u2014which is the main function of the monthly reconciliation process. Further, CMS lacks a transparent process to ensure the accuracy of these data, as the monthly reconciliation files transmitted between CMS and issuers do not include a place to capture data on termination reasons. Issuers said that they are therefore unable to ascertain whether data they provide on the reasons for termination match CMS's data, and thus they cannot make corrections where necessary.\nThe agency's lack of reliable data on terminations for nonpayment limits its ability to effectively oversee certain federal regulations. For example, because CMS is not systematically tracking these data, it cannot tell whether enrollees applying for coverage under a special enrollment period had lost their coverage for nonpayment of premiums\u2014in which case they would be ineligible for the special enrollment period per federal regulations. CMS could capitalize on its existing process, already familiar to issuers, by adding a variable that captures data on termination reasons to the monthly reconciliation file. By taking this step, in addition to requiring issuers to report these data, CMS could help ensure it has reliable and transparent data on terminations of enrollee coverage for nonpayment of premiums, and it could use these data to assess the effects of CMS policies and the overall stability of the exchange.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that CMS ensures it has (1) complete data on terminations of coverage for nonpayment of premiums; and (2) a transparent process to reconcile discrepancies and ensure the accuracy of these data. The Department of Health and Human Services concurred with both recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_552"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_553","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Coast Guard, a component within DHS, is spending billions of dollars to acquire assets, such as cutters and aircraft. This portfolio of major acquisition programs is intended to help the Coast Guard accomplish its missions\u2014including interdicting illegal drugs and search and rescue missions. GAO's extensive prior work on Coast Guard acquisitions has found that the Coast Guard's reliance on its annual budget process to manage its portfolio is a major management challenge. In the report issued today, GAO discusses particular challenges with the Coast Guard's approach in managing its acquisition portfolio, such as not performing a collective assessment of the portfolio to ensure affordability.\nThis statement addresses the challenges the Coast Guard faces in (1) managing its overall acquisition portfolio, and (2) sustaining aging assets. This statement is based on GAO's extensive body of published and ongoing work examining the Coast Guard's acquisition efforts over several years.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Coast Guard's approach of relying on the annual budget process and the 5-year Capital Investment Plan (CIP) to manage its acquisition portfolio does not provide the best basis for making decisions to develop a more balanced and affordable portfolio in the long term. Specifically, the Coast Guard's annual budget-driven trade-off approach creates constant churn as program baselines must continually re-align with budget realities instead of budgets being formulated to support program baselines. Further, Coast Guard officials have told GAO the CIP reflects trade-off decisions made as part of the annual budget process, but it does not describe the effects of those trade-offs because including such information is not statutorily required. This short-term approach has also left the Coast Guard with a bow wave of near-term unfunded acquisition programs, putting future missions at risk. Until these trade-offs are transparent to all stakeholders and decision makers, the effectiveness of Coast Guard's long-term acquisition portfolio planning is limited.\nUntil new assets being acquired become available, the Coast Guard plans to rely on aging assets, many of which are already past their intended service lives\u2014the time an asset is expected to operate. For example, the Coast Guard plans to replace the Medium Endurance Cutters (see figure) with the Offshore Patrol Cutters beginning in 2023, but the Medium Endurance Cutters exhausted their intended service lives in 2014.\nThe Coast Guard plans to extend service lives for some of the Medium Endurance Cutters to keep them operating longer; however, maintenance for these vessels is becoming more expensive, and some systems are obsolete. GAO will continue to monitor the maintenance effort for the Medium Endurance Cutter and the Offshore Patrol Cutter acquisition in an annual review of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) major acquisition programs.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nThe report on which this statement is primarily based ( GAO-18-454 ) recommends that the Coast Guard work with Congress to include in its annual CIP a discussion of how trade-off decisions could affect other acquisition programs. DHS agreed with this recommendation. GAO has also made other recommendations in this area in the past, as discussed in this testimony.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_553"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_554","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAccording to TSA, the federal agency responsible for securing the nation's civil aviation system, the introduction of explosive devices in air cargo shipments is a significant threat. To mitigate this threat, TSA is to review the security procedures carried out by all air carriers with U.S.-bound flights and at foreign airports servicing those air carriers. In addition, TSA assesses the commensurability of foreign countries' air cargo security programs.\nGAO was asked to evaluate TSA's progress in assessing and mitigating air cargo security risks. This report addresses (1) steps TSA takes to help ensure that U.S-bound air cargo is secure, (2) the status of TSA's efforts to recognize and monitor foreign governments' air cargo security programs, and (3) the extent to which TSA measures the effectiveness of its efforts to secure U.S.-bound air cargo. GAO reviewed TSA policies and procedures, analyzed TSA program data, observed a nongeneralizable sample of 17 air carrier inspections at two foreign airports (selected based on high air cargo volume and other factors), and interviewed TSA, foreign government, and air carrier representatives.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Transportation Security Administration (TSA) inspects air carriers and assesses foreign airports to help ensure the security of U.S.-bound air cargo.\nAir carrier inspections . GAO observed 17 air carrier inspections and found that TSA inspectors consistently followed TSA procedures. Further, GAO's analysis of TSA data found air carriers were in full compliance with cargo security requirements in 84 percent of the nearly 5,000 cargo inspections conducted during fiscal years 2012 through 2017. TSA officials were able to resolve a majority of the violations identified during the inspection process.\nForeign airport assessments . GAO analysis of TSA data found that about 75 percent of the foreign airport assessments that TSA conducted during fiscal years 2012 through 2017 fully complied with international air cargo security standards. As of the end of 2017, foreign officials had addressed about 40 percent of the non-compliance issues. TSA continues to work with foreign officials to address the remaining non-compliance issues.\nAs of June 2018, TSA had recognized the national cargo security programs (NCSP) of the European Union and 12 other countries as commensurate with TSA's, and TSA uses a variety of mechanisms to monitor NCSP implementation. TSA's process for NCSP recognition, which is voluntary, involves comparing air cargo security requirements to TSA's and conducting visits to the countries to validate their use. Once TSA determines a program is commensurate with TSA's, it monitors NCSP implementation through regular air carrier inspections, foreign airport assessments, and dialog with government officials. TSA may decide not to recognize a country's NCSP but, instead, make recommendations for improving air cargo security. In countries where TSA has not recognized their NCSP, all U.S.-bound cargo is subject to TSA security requirements.\nTSA's performance measures do not allow it to specifically determine the effectiveness of its efforts to secure U.S.-bound air cargo. For example, TSA measures whether foreign airports take actions to address all noncompliance issues identified during airport assessments, but such a broad measure could obscure progress made in resolving cargo-specific vulnerabilities. Similarly, TSA officials stated that they are developing a measure to gauge the effectiveness of air carrier inspections, but they do not plan to differentiate efforts to secure air cargo from those for securing passengers. Developing and monitoring outcome-based performance measures that separately account for cargo noncompliance issues and violations could help TSA better determine the extent to which its foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections improve the security of U.S.-bound air cargo. In addition, TSA measures the number of countries it has recognized in the NCSP Recognition Program, but this metric does not address the effectiveness of the program. Developing and monitoring outcome-based performance measures for the NCSP Recognition Program would help TSA better determine whether the resources invested are yielding the intended results. This is a public version of a sensitive report issued in October 2018. Information that TSA deemed to be sensitive is omitted from this report.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is recommending that TSA develop and monitor outcome-based performance measures to assess the effectiveness of (1) the cargo portion of foreign airport assessments, (2) air carrier cargo inspections, and (3) the NCSP Recognition Program. TSA concurred with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_554"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_555","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn June 2018, the United States Marine Corps plans to select a contractor and begin low-rate production for the ACV, a vehicle used to transport Marines from ship to shore under hostile conditions. The ACV will replace all or part of the current Assault Amphibious Vehicle fleet.\nThe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 included a provision for GAO to annually review and report on the ACV program until 2018. This report, GAO's last under that provision, assesses the extent to which the Marine Corps is making progress toward (1) meeting cost and schedule goals for the ACV program and (2) demonstrating manufacturing readiness.\nGAO reviewed program cost estimates, updated schedules, and program assessments of test results and production readiness, as well as compared ACV acquisition efforts to DOD guidance and GAO-identified best practices. GAO also interviewed program and testing officials, and visited both ACV primary assembly locations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe first version of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV 1.1) is on track to meet development cost goals with no additional anticipated delays for major acquisition milestones. With regard to costs, the development phase of ACV 1.1 is on pace to not exceed cost goals that were established at the start of development, based on a recent Navy estimate, the ACV program office, and reporting from the contractors. For example, a September 2017 program progress review reported a Navy estimate of the cost of development at $750.7 million, less than the $810.5 million baseline established at the beginning of development. With regard to schedule, the ACV program has made no major changes to the acquisition schedule since GAO previously reported on the program in April 2017. ACV 1.1 program officials are in the process of preparing to down-select to a single contactor and enter low-rate production in June 2018, start a second round of low rate production the following year, and begin full-rate production in 2020. ACV 1.1 may be followed by the acquisition of other versions (ACV 1.2 and ACV 2.0) with advanced capabilities such as higher water speeds.\nThe ACV program is preparing to start production of ACV 1.1, which includes determining that the contractors' manufacturing capabilities are sufficiently mature. However, program officials are considering entering production with a lower level of manufacturing maturity than called for in Department of Defense (DOD) guidance or GAO identified best practices. The ACV program measures manufacturing maturity with manufacturing readiness levels (MRL) for risk areas such as design, materials, process capability and control, and quality management. DOD guidance for weapons acquisition production recommends that programs achieve an MRL of 8 across all risk areas before entering low-rate production and that a program achieve an MRL of 9 at the start of full-rate production. GAO's previous reviews about manufacturing best practices found that achieving manufacturing maturity and identifying production risks early in the acquisition cycle and assessing those risks prior to key decision points, such as the decision to enter production, reduces the likelihood of quality issues, cost growth, and delays. The Marine Corps contract option for producing the first round of low-rate production for ACV 1.1 will be exercised after June 2018; the contract also contains additional options for production vehicles. Making the decisions to proceed with the second round of low-rate production and for the start of full-rate production before meeting called-for levels of manufacturing readiness criteria increases the risk that ACV 1.1 will witness delays and increased costs.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends the Marine Corps (1) not enter the second year of low-rate production for ACV 1.1 until after the contractor has achieved an overall MRL of 8 and (2) not enter full-rate production until achieving an overall MRL of 9. DOD partially concurred with both recommendations, but noted that it is reasonable to proceed at lower MRL levels if steps are taken to mitigate risk. GAO made no changes to its recommendations in response to these comments.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_555"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_556","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOD continues to confront organizational challenges that hinder collaboration. To address these challenges, section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 directed the Secretary of Defense to issue an organizational strategy that identifies critical objectives which span multiple functional boundaries and that would benefit from the use of cross-functional teams. Additionally, DOD is to establish cross-functional teams to support this strategy.\nThe NDAA also included a provision for GAO to assess DOD's actions in response to section 911. This report evaluates the extent to which DOD, in accordance with statutory requirements and leading practices, has (1) developed and issued an organizational strategy, (2) established Secretary of Defense-empowered cross-functional teams, and (3) provided associated training for Office of the Secretary of Defense leaders. GAO analyzed DOD's draft organizational strategy, draft guidance on establishing cross-functional teams, and draft training curriculum. GAO also interviewed DOD officials and subject-matter experts and identified leading practices for effective cross-functional teams.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) has implemented some of the statutory requirements outlined in section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017 to address organizational challenges, but could do more to promote department-wide collaboration, as required under the NDAA. Specifically, DOD:\nDrafted an organizational strategy that includes the two required statutory elements, but does not outline how DOD will advance a more collaborative culture, as required by statute. Incorporating GAO's leading practices on mergers and organizational transformations, such as setting goals, would help DOD better advance a collaborative culture.\nPlans to coordinate review of the organizational strategy with some DOD offices, but has not followed GAO's leading practices for collaboration\u2014to coordinate with key stakeholders, such as the Secretary of Defense and the military departments\u2014in drafting the strategy. Without obtaining key stakeholder input, DOD may not be well positioned to improve collaboration across the department.\nEstablished one cross-functional team to address the backlog on security clearances and developed draft guidance for cross-functional teams that addresses six of seven required statutory elements and incorporates five of eight leading practices that GAO has identified for effective cross-functional teams (see figure). Fully incorporating all statutory elements and leading practices will help the teams consistently and effectively address DOD's strategic objectives.\nDeveloped a draft training curriculum for Presidential appointees in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. However, the curriculum addresses only one of four required statutory elements, and has not been provided to appointees. In addition, although the statute allows a waiver for this training, DOD has not developed criteria for such a waiver. Providing training for these officials or ensuring that appropriate criteria are used to waive training will improve DOD's ability to implement its new organizational strategy.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making four recommendations to DOD, including revising its organizational strategy, collaborating with key stakeholders on the development of its organizational strategy, revising cross-functional team guidance, and providing training. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_556"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_557","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nNearly 40,000 providers hold privileges in VHA's 170 VAMCs. VAMCs must identify and review any concerns that arise about the clinical care their providers deliver. Depending on the findings from the review, VAMC officials may take an adverse privileging action against a provider that either limits the care a provider is allowed to deliver at the VAMC or prevents the provider from delivering care altogether.\nGAO was asked to review VHA processes for reviewing concerns about providers' clinical care. This report examines, among other things, selected VAMCs' (1) reviews of providers' clinical care after concerns are raised and VHA's oversight of these reviews, and (2) VAMCs' reporting of providers to the NPDB and SLBs and VHA's oversight of reporting. GAO visited a non-generalizable selection of five VAMCs selected for the complexity of services offered and variation in location. GAO reviewed VHA policies and files from the five selected VAMCs, and interviewed VHA, VISN, and VAMC officials. GAO also evaluated VHA's practices using federal internal control standards.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nDepartment of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical center (VAMC) officials are responsible for reviewing the clinical care delivered by their privileged providers\u2014physicians and dentists who are approved to independently perform specific services\u2014after concerns are raised. The five VAMCs GAO selected for review collectively required review of 148 providers from October 2013 through March 2017 after concerns were raised about their clinical care. GAO found that these reviews were not always documented or conducted in a timely manner. GAO identified these providers by reviewing meeting minutes from the committee responsible for requiring these types of reviews at the respective VAMCs, and through interviews with VAMC officials. The selected VAMCs were unable to provide documentation of these reviews for almost half of the 148 providers. Additionally, the VAMCs did not start the reviews of 16 providers for 3 months to multiple years after the concerns were identified. GAO found that VHA policies do not require documentation of all types of clinical care reviews and do not establish timeliness requirements. GAO also found that the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) does not adequately oversee these reviews at VAMCs through its Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN), which are responsible for overseeing the VAMCs. Without documentation and timely reviews of providers' clinical care, VAMC officials may lack information needed to reasonably ensure that VA providers are competent to provide safe, high quality care to veterans and to make appropriate decisions about these providers' privileges.\nGAO also found that from October 2013 through March 2017, the five selected VAMCs did not report most of the providers who should have been reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) or state licensing boards (SLB) in accordance with VHA policy. The NPDB is an electronic repository for critical information about the professional conduct and competence of providers. GAO found that\nselected VAMCs did not report to the NPDB eight of nine providers who had adverse privileging actions taken against them or who resigned during an investigation related to professional competence or conduct, as required by VHA policy, and\nnone of these nine providers had been reported to SLBs.\nGAO found that officials at the selected VAMCs misinterpreted or were not aware of VHA policies and guidance related to NPDB and SLB reporting processes resulting in providers not being reported. GAO also found that VHA and the VISNs do not conduct adequate oversight of NPDB and SLB reporting practices and cannot reasonably ensure appropriate reporting of providers. As a result, VHA's ability to provide safe, high quality care to veterans is hindered because other VAMCs, as well as non-VA health care entities, will be unaware of serious concerns raised about a provider's care. For example, GAO found that after one VAMC failed to report to the NPDB or SLBs a provider who resigned to avoid an adverse privileging action, a non-VA hospital in the same city took an adverse privileging action against that same provider for the same reason 2 years later.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making four recommendations, including for VA to direct VHA to require VAMCs to document reviews of providers' clinical care after concerns are raised, develop timeliness requirements for these reviews, and ensure proper VISN oversight of such reviews as well as timely VAMC reporting of providers to the NPDB and SLBs. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations and described steps it will take to implement them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_557"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_558","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nGAO's High Risk List identifies federal program areas that are high risk due to their vulnerability to mismanagement, among other things. GAO added the federal management of programs that serve Indian tribes and their members to its February 2017 biennial update of high-risk areas in response to management weaknesses at Interior and HHS.\nThis testimony provides examples of actions taken and progress made by these agencies to address the five criteria GAO uses for determining whether to remove a high-risk designation (leadership commitment, capacity, action plan, monitoring, and demonstrated progress).\nTo conduct this work, GAO drew on findings from GAO reports issued from September 2011 through September 2017 and updated that work by reviewing agency documentation and interviewing agency officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO designated the federal management of programs that serve tribes and their members as high risk, and officials from the Department of the Interior's Office of the Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs (Indian Affairs), the Bureau of Indian Education (BIE), the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Indian Health Service (IHS) expressed their commitment to addressing the issues that led to the designation. Since GAO last testified before this committee on September 13, 2017, Indian Affairs, BIE, BIA, and IHS have demonstrated varying levels of progress to partially meet most or all of the criteria for removing a high-risk designation. However, additional progress is needed to fully address management weaknesses, particularly in the areas of leadership commitment and capacity.\nLeadership commitment . To meet the leadership commitment criterion for removal of a high-risk designation, the agency needs to have demonstrated strong commitment and top leadership support to address management weaknesses. Indian Affairs, BIE, BIA, and IHS each took some actions to partially meet the leadership criterion. For example, the BIE Director formed an internal working group, convened meetings with other senior leaders within Indian Affairs, and publicly stated that his agency is committed to ensuring the implementation of prior GAO recommendations on Indian education. In addition, BIA officials demonstrated leadership commitment by, for example, issuing a memorandum requiring the use of a centralized data management system to track requests for land ownership records. To fully meet the leadership commitment criterion, all the agencies need, among other things, stable, permanent leadership that has assigned the tasks needed to address weaknesses and that holds those assigned accountable for progress.\nCapacity . To meet the capacity criterion, an agency needs to demonstrate that it has the capacity (i.e., people and other resources) to resolve its management weaknesses. Indian Affairs, BIE, BIA, and IHS each made progress identifying capacity and resources to partially meet the capacity criterion. For example, BIE hired school safety officers and personnel in offices supporting the oversight of school spending. BIA conducted a survey to identify workforce needs related to energy development to support staffing decisions for the recently created Indian Energy Service Center. IHS officials told us that the agency is expanding the role of internal audit staff within its enterprise risk management program to augment internal audits and complement audits by the HHS Inspector General and GAO. However, all the agencies have vacancies in key offices. For example, BIA officials said the agency does not have the staff or resources to implement a comprehensive workforce planning system to ensure it has staff in place at its agency offices to meet its organizational needs concerning numerous activities, including energy resources. To fully meet the capacity criterion, all the agencies need to assess tradeoffs between these and other administration priorities in terms of people and resources, and should provide key information to decision makers on resources needed to address the criteria and related management weaknesses.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO has made 52 recommendations to improve management weaknesses at some Interior and HHS agencies, of which 34 are still open. Some of these weaknesses led to the agencies' placement on the High Risk List. GAO sees varying levels of progress at the agencies in understanding what they need to do to be removed from the list and will continue to closely monitor their progress.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_558"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_559","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nMisconduct is generally considered an action by an employee that impedes the efficiency of the agency's service or mission. Misconduct incidents can affect other aspects of employee morale and performance and impede an agency's efforts to achieve its mission.\nGAO was asked to examine how executive branch agencies address employee misconduct. This report (1) describes the process agencies are required to follow in responding to employee misconduct; (2) identifies alternative approaches to the formal process that agencies can use and assesses what factors affect agencies' responses to misconduct; (3) describes trends in removals and other adverse actions resulting from misconduct; and (4) identifies key practices agencies can use to help them better prevent and address misconduct. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed relevant sections of title 5 of the U.S.C; analyzed MSPB and OPM data, and interviewed, among others, agency officials and subject-matter experts.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nChapter 75 of title 5 of the U.S. Code specifies the formal legal process that most agencies must follow when taking adverse actions, i.e., suspensions, demotions, reductions in pay or grade, and removals, for acts of employee misconduct. Chapter 75 details the built-in procedural rights certain federal employees are entitled to when faced with adverse actions.\nDepending on the nature of misconduct, an agency may use utilize alternative discipline approaches traditionally used in government to correct behavior. Alternative discipline is an approach to address misconduct that is available to agencies in lieu of traditional penalties (e.g., letters of reprimand and suspensions of 14 days or less). An example is a last chance agreement, whereby an employee recognizes the agency's right to terminate him or her should another act of misconduct occur.\nBased on the data collected by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), agencies formally discipline an estimated 17,000 employees annually under Chapter 75, or less than 1 percent of the federal workforce, for misconduct. Based on OPM data, in 2016, agencies made 10,249 suspensions, 7,411 removals, and 114 demotions for misconduct. However, because of weaknesses in OPM's data on employee misconduct, which is provided by the agencies, OPM is unable to accurately target supervisory training to address misconduct, and decision-makers do not know the full extent or nature of this misconduct.\nKey lessons learned can help agencies better prevent and respond to misconduct. For example, tables of penalties provide a list of the infractions committed most frequently by agency employees, along with a suggested range of penalties for each to ensure consistent treatment for similar offenses. However, not all agencies have a table of penalties, including OPM, nor are agencies required by statute, case law or OPM regulations. Subject-matter experts we contacted identified additional promising practices that agencies can use to respond employee misconduct. Some of these are presented below.\nAgencies are accountable for providing required training to their managers. However, agency officials and subject-matter experts we interviewed said federal managers may not address misconduct because they are unfamiliar with the disciplinary process, have inadequate training, or receive insufficient support from their human resources offices.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that OPM, working with the Chief Human Capital Officers Council, (1) take steps to improve the quality of data collected on misconduct; (2) leverage lessons learned to help agencies address misconduct; and (3) improve guidance on training supervisors and human resources staff on addressing misconduct. OPM partially concurred with two recommendations, and disagreed with the first, stating that its guidance has been successfully relied upon by agencies. GAO maintains the action is needed to help strengthen oversight.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_559"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_560","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nOne of the Bureau's most important functions is to conduct a complete and accurate decennial census of the U.S. population, which is mandated by the Constitution and provides vital data for the nation. A complete count of the nation's population is an enormous undertaking as the Bureau seeks to control the cost of the census, implement operational innovations, and use new and modified IT systems. In recent years, GAO has identified challenges that raise serious concerns about the Bureau's ability to conduct a cost-effective count. For these reasons, GAO added the 2020 Census to its high-risk list in February 2017.\nIn light of these challenges, GAO was asked to testify about the Bureau's progress in preparing for the 2020 Census. To do so, GAO summarized its prior work regarding the Bureau's planning efforts for the 2020 Census. GAO also included observations from its ongoing work on the 2018 End-to-End Test. This information is related to, among other things, recent decisions on preparations for the 2020 Census; progress on key systems to be used for the 2018 End-to-End Test, including the status of IT security assessments; execution of the test at three test sites; and efforts to update the life-cycle cost estimate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Census Bureau (Bureau) is planning several innovations for the 2020 Decennial Census, including re-engineering field operations, using administrative records to supplement census data, verifying addresses in-office using on-screen imagery, and allowing the public to respond using the Internet. These innovations show promise for controlling costs, but they also introduce new risks, in part because they include new procedures and technologies that have not been used extensively in earlier decennial censuses, if at all. GAO's prior work has emphasized the importance of the Bureau conducting a robust testing program to demonstrate that the systems and operations perform as intended under census-like conditions prior to the 2020 Census. However, because of budget uncertainties the Bureau canceled its 2017 field test and then scaled back its 2018 End-to End Test, placing these innovation areas more at risk.\nThe Bureau continues to face challenges in managing and overseeing the information technology (IT) programs, systems, and contracts supporting the 2020 Census. For example, GAO's ongoing work indicates that the system development schedule leading up to the 2018 End-to-End test has experienced several delays. Further, the Bureau has not yet addressed several security risks and challenges to secure its systems and data, including making certain that security assessments are completed in a timely manner and that risks are at an acceptable level. Given that certain operations for the 2018 End-to-End Test began in August 2017, it is important that the Bureau quickly address these challenges. GAO plans to monitor the Bureau's progress as part of its ongoing work.\nIn addition, the Bureau's cost estimate is not reliable and is out-of-date. Specifically, in June 2016, GAO reported that the cost estimate for the 2020 Census did not fully reflect characteristics of a high-quality estimate and could not be considered reliable. Moreover, since the Bureau did not follow cost estimation best practices, its annual budget requests based on the cost estimate may not be fully informed. Additionally, the Bureau has not yet updated its October 2015 cost estimate, but GAO expects that the cost of the current census design (around $12.5 billion in 2020 constant dollars) will increase due to, for example, expected increases in 2020 program IT costs (see figure). GAO made several recommendations to address these concerns, and the Bureau plans to address these recommendations in an updated cost estimate to be released later this fall.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nOver the past 4 years, we have made 33 recommendations specific to the 2020 Census to address the issues raised in this testimony and others. As of October 2017, the Bureau had fully implemented 10 of the recommendations, and was at varying stages of implementing the remaining recommendations.\nor Robert Goldenkoff at (202) 512-2757 or goldenkoffr@gao.gov .","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_560"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_561","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThrough the SBIR and STTR programs, federal agencies have awarded about 162,000 contracts and grants totaling $46 billion to small businesses to help them develop and commercialize new technologies. Eleven federal agencies participate in the SBIR program, and 5 agencies also participate in the STTR program. Each program has three phases, which take projects from initial feasibility studies through commercialization activities. SBA oversees both programs.\nIn response to the 2011 reauthorization of the programs, SBA and the participating agencies developed benchmarks to measure small businesses' progress in developing and commercializing technologies. GAO was asked to review SBA's and the agencies' efforts related to these benchmarks. This report examines the extent to which SBA and the participating agencies have implemented these benchmarks, including assessing businesses against them and establishing the consequence of not meeting them. GAO analyzed award data and interviewed officials from SBA and the 11 participating agencies.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nData challenges have limited the Small Business Administration's (SBA) and the 11 participating federal agencies' efforts to assess businesses against two benchmarks\u2014the Transition Rate Benchmark and the Commercialization Benchmark\u2014of the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs.\nTransition Rate Benchmark. Small businesses that received more than 20 awards for the first phase of the programs in the past 5 fiscal years\u2014excluding the most recent fiscal year\u2014must have received an average of 1 award for the second phase of the programs for every 4 first phase awards. Since 2014, SBA and the agencies participating in the programs have regularly assessed small businesses against this benchmark. From 2014 through 2017, SBA determined that 4 to 7 businesses did not meet the benchmark each year. SBA officials provided GAO guidance on how to enter data into the programs' awards database they said is available to agencies, but GAO found evidence that suggests agencies are not fully utilizing it. For example, GAO found that the database used to perform the assessments contained inaccurate and incomplete data, such as about 2,700 businesses with multiple records with different spellings of their names and more than 1,400 instances in which a unique identification number had errors, such as an incorrect number of digits, all zeros, or hyphens. Thus, it could be difficult to determine which small businesses should be subject to the benchmark.\nCommercialization Benchmark. Small businesses that received more than 15 awards for the second phase of the programs in the past 10 fiscal years\u2014excluding the most recent 2 fiscal years\u2014must have received a certain amount of sales, investments, or patents resulting from their efforts. SBA and participating agencies have assessed small businesses against this benchmark only once, in 2014, and identified 12 businesses that did not meet the benchmark. This is, in part, due to challenges in collecting and verifying the accuracy of the data that small businesses report and that are needed to implement the benchmark, according to officials from SBA and several agencies. For example, agency officials told GAO that some needed data, such as for reported sales, are not consistently applicable across agencies or projects. The Small Business Act and policy directives provide flexibility in how the agencies can implement the benchmark. Working together to implement it as designed or revise it so that it can be implemented could allow the agencies to fulfill statutory requirements.\nSBA and the participating agencies have provided inconsistent information to small businesses about the consequence of not meeting the benchmarks. SBA and the agencies agreed to change how the consequence of not meeting the benchmarks was to be implemented, starting in 2017, from ineligibility to receive certain awards to ineligibility to submit certain proposals. However, as of November 2017, some agencies had not updated this information in their project solicitations. Furthermore, SBA has not updated this information in its policy directives. Without consistent information, businesses may be confused about their eligibility to submit proposals or receive awards and could invest time developing and submitting proposals when they are not eligible to do so.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making 11 recommendations to SBA and other agencies to take actions to improve implementation of the benchmarks, including improving the reliability of award data; implementing or revising the Commercialization Benchmark; and updating information about the consequence of not meeting the benchmarks. SBA and these agencies agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_561"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_562","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSince 2001, DOD has received more than $1.8 trillion in OCO funds. DOD defines \u201ccontingency operations\u201d as small, medium, or large-scale military operations, while \u201cbase\u201d activities include operating support for installations, civilian pay, and other costs that would be incurred, regardless of contingency operations. Congress separately appropriates amounts for base and OCO activities into the same appropriation accounts and directs how funds are to be spent by designating amounts in conference reports or explanatory statements accompanying the annual appropriations acts.\nThe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 included a provision for GAO to report on the feasibility of separating OCO expenditures from other DOD expenditures. This report (1) describes internal controls that selected DOD components use to separately account for OCO and base amounts during budget execution and (2) identifies and examines alternatives that Congress or DOD could use to separate funding for OCO and base activities.\nGAO reviewed documentation of DOD internal controls for separating OCO and base amounts in the O&M account, interviewed financial management officials, and, among other things, conducted a literature review to identify alternatives that Congress or DOD could use to separate funding for OCO and base activities. Also, GAO administered a questionnaire to DOD and non-DOD officials to identify positive and negative aspects of these alternatives.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nSelected Department of Defense (DOD) components use coding and other internal control activities to separately account for overseas contingency operations (OCO) and base amounts in their operation and maintenance (O&M) accounts during budget execution. To record and track OCO and base amounts separately, the military services, U.S. Special Operations Command, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency use coding in their financial systems. These DOD components also have instituted some internal control activities to help ensure separation of OCO amounts. For example, Army and Defense Security Cooperation Agency officials stated that the financial systems they use incorporate system controls that automatically maintain the categories of funding, such as OCO, designated during allotment through subsequent actions to ensure the OCO coding remains throughout budget execution.\nGAO identified at least four alternatives to the processes used to separate funding for DOD's OCO and base activities:\nMove enduring costs to the base budget . DOD could request funding for enduring costs\u2014costs that would continue in the absence of contingency operations\u2014through its base budget rather than its OCO budget.\nUse specific purpose language . Congress could use legally binding language in the annual DOD appropriations acts to specify the purposes\u2014programs, projects and activities\u2014for which OCO amounts may be obligated.\nCreate separate appropriation accounts . Congress could create separate appropriation accounts for OCO and base funding.\nUse a transfer account . Congress could appropriate funds for OCO into a non-expiring transfer account. DOD would fund OCO with its base budget and later reimburse its base accounts using funds from a transfer account.\nImplementing these alternatives would require Congress and DOD to take action in different phases of the budget process (see figure).\nEach alternative includes tradeoffs that Congress and DOD would have to consider to strike the desired balance between agency flexibility and congressional control. The alternatives, and GAO's summary of their positive and negative aspects identified by questionnaire respondents, could be a reference for Congress and DOD as they consider potential changes to processes for separating the funding of amounts for OCO and base activities.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_562"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_563","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nTRANSCOM reported spending about $81 billion flying personnel and cargo worldwide in fiscal years 2007-2017. TRANSCOM manages the Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF) to provide air, land, and sea transportation for the Department of Defense (DOD). TRANSCOM sets some rates it charges below costs to be competitive with commercial air service providers. The Air Force generally pays for expenses not covered by TWCF rates through the ARA.\nA House Report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 included a provision for GAO to review the ARA and the TWCF. GAO's report discusses the extent to which (1) ARA funds were requested, allotted, and expended for airlift activities; (2) the Air Force provided ARA information in its budget requests and informed its requests with information from TRANSCOM; and (3) TRANSCOM has implemented a rate-setting process for airlift services and uses workload forecasts to estimate the annual ARA funding request. GAO analyzed ARA funds and costs and revenues for airlift services for fiscal years 2007-2017; interviewed officials about the ARA budget preparation process; and analyzed TRANSCOM rate-setting and forecasting guidance and results.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFor fiscal years 2007 through 2017, the Air Force requested $2.8 billion from Congress for Airlift Readiness Account (ARA) requirements, as part of its annual Operations and Maintenance appropriation. The Air Force allotted $2.8 billion (i.e., directed the use of the appropriated funds) and expended $2.4 billion of these funds for the ARA. U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) uses ARA funds to support airlift operations. Specifically, the Air Force requests ARA funds in its annual Operations and Maintenance budget request and subsequently provides these funds to TRANSCOM to assist in paying for airlift services (see figure). Amounts requested, allotted, and expended varied from year-to-year, in some cases by hundreds of millions of dollars, in part due to changes in the amount of airlift services provided by TRANSCOM.\nThe Air Force has not been including specific ARA information in its budget requests since fiscal year 2010. For fiscal years 2007 through 2009, Air Force budget requests explicitly stated ARA amounts. Air Force officials stated their budget presentation was changed to reduce the overall number of budget line items. In addition, TRANSCOM has not been providing cost estimates in time to support Air Force budget preparations. Specifically, TRANSCOM has been providing this information 2 months later than the Air Force needs it to support budget deliberations. The Air Force and TRANSCOM have taken some initial steps to address this issue, but these efforts lack substantive details regarding formalizing the necessary processes to ensure timely information. Until the Air Force and TRANSCOM resolve this issue, Congress will not have sufficient and complete information to inform its decisions on appropriating funds for ARA.\nTRANSCOM has a rate-setting process, but faces challenges producing accurate workload forecasts. To provide information to its customers during the annual budget development process, TRANSCOM sets airlift rates in advance of the fiscal year of expenditure. Workload forecasts influence the rate-setting process. Inaccurate forecasts can lead to unreliable budget requests and hinder effective and efficient operational planning. GAO found that forecast inaccuracy (i.e., the variance between the forecast and the actual workload) averaged 25 percent and was becoming increasingly inaccurate since fiscal year 2007. GAO found that TRANSCOM has several workload forecasting challenges. Specifically, TRANSCOM lacks an effective process to gather workload projections from customers. It also no longer uses forecasting accuracy metrics and has not established forecast accuracy goals to monitor its performance. Furthermore, TRANSCOM does not have an action plan to improve its increasingly inaccurate workload forecasts. Taking steps to address these issues would enable TRANSCOM to improve the accuracy of workload forecasts.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making five recommendations to DOD, including improving the clarity and completeness of budget estimates, and taking steps to improve the accuracy of airlift workload forecasts. DOD concurs with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_563"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_564","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nZika\u2014a virus primarily transmitted through mosquito bites\u2014can cause symptoms that include fever, rash, and joint and muscle pain. In pregnant women, the Zika virus can be passed to the fetus and cause severe brain defects. In response to an outbreak in the United States and its territories, Congress appropriated $932 million in September 2016 through the Zika Response and Preparedness Act to HHS and its agencies to prevent, prepare for, and respond to the Zika virus and its related health conditions, and conduct related research.\nThe act also included a provision that GAO study the activities supported with the appropriated funds. This report describes (1) the status of funds obligated and disbursed from the Zika supplemental funding appropriated to HHS and its agencies; and (2) how selected awardees used their Zika supplemental funding, and their experiences with applying for and managing the funding. To do this work, GAO reviewed agency documents on Zika supplemental funding and activities, and interviewed officials from the HHS agencies and selected awardees. To select awardees, GAO identified states based on the amount of initial Zika supplemental funding they received from CDC, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, and the Health Resources and Services Administration; and selected states with the highest and lowest funding. In total, GAO selected 12 awardees: 10 states, as well as one county and one city from 2 of the 10 states.\nGAO provided a draft of this report to HHS. In response, HHS provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAs of September 30, 2017, Department of Health and Human Services\u2019 (HHS) agencies had obligated nearly all of the $932 million of Zika supplemental funding Congress appropriated in 2016 through the use of multiple funding mechanisms, including cooperative agreements, grants, and contracts. Four HHS agencies had small unobligated balances as of the September 30, 2017, obligation deadline; these balances cannot be used to incur new obligations, but may be used to adjust award amounts in future years. Disbursement of the obligated funds was ongoing, with about 21 percent of the Zika supplemental funding (approximately $195.5 million) disbursed as of December 31, 2017. The agencies have until September 30, 2022, to disburse the remainder.\nThe 12 awardees GAO interviewed\u2014officials from 10 states and two local entities\u2014funded multiple activities with their Zika supplemental funding, and had varying experiences applying for and managing the funds.\nAwardees told GAO that they used their funding to support such activities as collection of information about individuals affected by the Zika virus (human surveillance), mosquito control activities, laboratory capacity building, public outreach, and health care services. For example, Florida used Zika supplemental funding in its state-run laboratories to purchase materials for testing Zika virus-related specimens.\nA majority of the awardees GAO spoke with reported positive experiences applying for and managing the Zika supplemental funding, including good communication with agency officials and awardees\u2019 familiarity with the mechanisms used to make the awards. However, some awardees noted challenges, such as time frames to use the funding that varied among multiple awards and identifying the activities that could be funded. These challenges added administrative burdens to applying for and managing the Zika supplemental funding while officials were responding to the outbreak, according to the awardees. In October 2017, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued a new notice of funding opportunity that agency officials said is intended to help minimize the administrative burden on states and certain localities during emergencies\u2014such as preparing applications\u2014by pre-approving public health departments in these jurisdictions to be eligible to rapidly receive future awards.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_564"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_565","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFederal agencies can provide additional compensation by using seven broadly available special payment authorities to recruit and retain employees to address needed skills. Though special payments can help fill mission-critical skills gaps, agencies also face constrained budgets, which underscores the importance of cost-effective use of authorities. OPM and the CHCO Council play important roles in assuring effective federal human capital management.\nGAO was asked to examine agency use, challenges, and improvements needed, if any. This report 1) describes CHCO agencies' use of special payment authorities in fiscal years 2014-2016; 2) assesses to what extent CHCO agencies examined effectiveness; and 3) evaluates how OPM has helped agencies address recruitment and retention needs. GAO obtained information from CHCO agencies on use of authorities through a questionnaire. GAO also analyzed OPM personnel data and agency documents, and interviewed agency officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGenerally, federal agencies have seven broadly available government-wide special payment authorities to help address recruitment and retention challenges. Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO) Council agencies reported using these authorities to varying degrees but overall for few employees in fiscal years 2014-2016. For example, in fiscal year 2016, less than 6 percent of the over 2 million CHCO agencies' employees received compensation from at least one of the authorities (see figure). The two most frequently used\u2014special rates and retention incentives\u2014were used for over 74,000 employees and over 13,000 employees, respectively, each year. The least-used\u2014critical position pay\u2014was used for as few as seven employees a year. CHCO agencies also reported using the range of authorities to help address skills gaps, particularly for science, technology, engineering, and mathematics occupations.\nCHCO Agency Employees Receiving Special Payments, Fiscal Year 2016\nCHCO agencies reported that these authorities had positive impacts\u2014such as on-staff retention and applicant quality\u2014but had few documented effectiveness assessments. Nine of 10 agencies that reported having documented assessments provided them, but GAO found that only 3 had information on effectiveness, such as its impact on meeting staffing needs.\nThe Office of Personnel Management (OPM) collects agency data on use but has not tracked data to analyze how much authorities help agencies improve recruitment and retention government-wide. OPM may be missing opportunities to promote strategic use by providing guidance and tools on assessing effectiveness. For example, OPM has not explored reasons for trends in use of critical position pay or consistently shared best practices and innovative ways to use authorities. Without tracking data and providing guidance to help agencies assess effectiveness, OPM will be unable to determine whether use of special payment authorities helps agencies to improve recruitment and retention.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making three recommendations, including that OPM should work with the CHCO Council on tracking data and providing guidance and tools to assess effectiveness of authorities, among others. OPM concurred or partially concurred with all recommendations, and described planned steps to implement them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_565"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_566","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nTraumatic injury is a major cause of death and disability in the military, but improved trauma care has the potential to improve these outcomes. DOD has worked to improve trauma care over time, such as by establishing a Joint Trauma System Defense Center of Excellence to examine trauma care and share best practices.\nTo improve trauma care across DOD, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 directed DOD to establish a new JTS within DOD's Defense Health Agency. The NDAA requires that the new JTS include four specified elements, and also required DOD to submit to Congress an implementation plan that included the four elements. The NDAA also included a provision for GAO to review DOD's planning for the new JTS.\nGAO assessed whether the implementation plan includes the four required elements and the extent to which DOD's planning efforts to date reflect leading practices from prior GAO work, such as identifying goals and strategies to achieve those goals. To conduct its work, GAO assessed DOD's implementation plan and other supplemental planning documents identified by DOD, and interviewed DOD officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Joint Trauma System (JTS) implementation plan submitted to Congress by the Department of Defense (DOD) in August 2017 includes a description of the four elements required by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and an overview of implementation activities. For example, it indicates how the Army's current JTS Defense Center of Excellence will become part of DOD's new JTS.\nHowever, the plan and other supplemental planning documents prepared to date do not fully incorporate leading practices for planning as identified by prior GAO work. GAO has previously found that implementation plans incorporating these leading practices\u2014goals, strategies to achieve goals, risks that can affect goals, and plans to assess progress toward goals\u2014help ensure organizations achieve their objectives. For each of the four required elements, GAO found that these leading practices either were partially incorporated or had not been incorporated:\nElement 1\u2014Serve as the reference body for all trauma care provided across the military health system. DOD documents include specific goals, such as consolidating data from multiple trauma registries. They also include some strategies to achieve the goals, such as identifying lead offices and time frames to complete specific actions. However, the documents provide limited details on actions DOD plans to take, and do not indicate how DOD plans to address risks or assess its progress.\nElement 2\u2014Establish standards of care for trauma care services. DOD documents include a goal to develop, publish, and assess clinical practice guidelines that serve as standards of trauma care. These documents also describe how the new JTS will continue to produce, update, and monitor adherence to the guidelines. However, they do not fully indicate plans to address risks, such as ensuring effective dissemination.\nElement 3\u2014Coordinate the translation of research from DOD centers of excellence into standards of clinical trauma care. DOD planning documents do not incorporate any leading practices for this element. DOD officials told GAO that clinical standards incorporate relevant research and that officials responsible for trauma care standards routinely interact with officials responsible for research. Officials expect this practice to continue under the new JTS.\nElement 4\u2014Coordinate the incorporation of lessons learned from trauma education and training partnerships into clinical practice. DOD planning documents do not incorporate any leading practices for this element. According to officials, DOD must first establish a separate directorate responsible for partnerships with civilian trauma centers before determining how to incorporate lessons from partnerships into the new JTS.\nAccording to DOD, the JTS implementation plan is a general overview of implementation activities, and planning efforts are ongoing. By not fully incorporating leading practices in its planning documents, DOD may be missing opportunities to ensure that the JTS is effectively implemented, to provide more effective trauma care across the military, and to help reduce trauma-related deaths and disabilities.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DOD incorporate leading practices in its planning to guide implementation efforts. DOD agreed with the recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_566"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_567","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nWhen awarding a contract competitively, DOD may use the LPTA process, under which the lowest price is the determining factor when selecting an offer. Section 813, as amended, contained a provision for GAO to submit four annual reports on DOD's use of the LPTA process for contracts exceeding $5 million as well as how contracting officials considered eight specific criteria. GAO issued its first report in response to this provision in November 2017.\nThis second report, among other things, assesses the extent to which (1) DOD used the LPTA process in fiscal year 2017 and (2) contracting officials considered Section 813 criteria when using the LPTA process.\nGAO selected a generalizable sample of 172 DOD contracts and orders valued at $5 million and above that were competitively awarded in fiscal year 2017. GAO verified that 46 of these contracts and orders used the LPTA process by reviewing solicitations. GAO selected 14 contracts and orders from the 46 based on the most frequently purchased products and services, reviewed documents, and interviewed officials to determine if the Section 813 criteria were considered.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO estimates that about 26 percent of the Department of Defense's (DOD) contracts and orders valued $5 million and above in fiscal year 2017 were competitively awarded using the lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) process. DOD used the LPTA process to buy such things as equipment, fuel, information technology services and construction services.\nSection 813 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, as amended, mandated that DOD revise its regulations to require that eight criteria be considered when using the LPTA process. As of September 2018, DOD had not yet done so. Accordingly, a DOD acquisition policy official stated that contracting officers are not yet required to consider these criteria. Nevertheless, GAO found that contracting officials generally considered five of the eight criteria for the 14 contracts and orders GAO reviewed (see table).\nSource: GAO analysis of Section 813, DOD source selection guidance, contract file documents and interviews with contracting officials. | GAO-19-54\nA DOD official stated that the updated regulations will reflect these eight criteria, including that justifications be documented. However, the official could not comment on whether the revisions will clarify how DOD contracting officials should implement the two other criteria that were generally not considered. Some contracting officials GAO interviewed were confused about how to apply these two criteria. Four of the 14 contracting officials stated that they did not understand how to apply the criterion regarding whether purchased goods are predominantly expendable in nature, nontechnical, or have a short life expectancy or shelf life. Additionally, 8 of the 14 contracting officials stated the criterion regarding an assessment of life-cycle costs was not applicable to their acquisitions. Absent clarification on how to consider these two criteria, DOD increases the risk that its contracting officials will not consistently implement the requirements in Section 813, as amended.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DOD address, as regulations are updated, how contracting officials should apply two Section 813 criteria that were generally not considered. DOD concurred with the recommendations and plans to revise its regulations and issue additional guidance by the end of fiscal year 2019.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_567"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_568","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nOver 4 decades ago, Congress authorized the SPR\u2014the world's largest government-owned stockpile of emergency oil\u2014to release oil to the market during supply disruptions and protect the U.S. economy from damage. The SPR is managed by DOE. According to DOE's strategic plan, the SPR benefits the nation by providing an insurance policy against actual and potential interruptions in U.S. petroleum supplies caused by international turmoil and hurricanes, among other things. The SPR also helps the United States meet its obligations, including to holding reserves of oil or refined petroleum products equaling 90 days of net petroleum imports, as one of 29 members of the IEA\u2014an international energy forum established to help members respond to major oil supply disruptions. The SPR held almost 674 million barrels of oil at the end of September 2017.\nThis testimony primarily focuses on preliminary observations from ongoing work on (1) DOE's use of the SPR in response to domestic petroleum supply disruptions, (2) the extent to which the SPR is able to respond to domestic petroleum supply disruptions, and (3) how other IEA members structure their strategic reserves and extent to which DOE has examined these structures. GAO reviewed past work from August 2006 through September 2014 and DOE and IEA documentation. GAO also interviewed DOE and IEA officials, as part of GAO's ongoing work.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO's preliminary analysis of Department of Energy (DOE) documents indicates that DOE has primarily used the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to an exchange of oil to companies in response to domestic supply disruptions, such as hurricanes. In the event of a supply disruption, the SPR can supply the market by either exchanging oil for an equal quantity of oil plus an additional amount as a premium to be returned to the SPR in the future or selling stored oil. Since the SPR was authorized in 1975, DOE has released oil 11 times in response to domestic supply disruptions. All but one were in the form of an exchange, including six exchanges in response to hurricanes. For example, Hurricane Harvey in 2017 closed or restricted ports through which 2 million barrels of oil per day were imported. In response, DOE exchanged 5 million barrels of oil to Gulf Coast refineries. According to DOE officials, exchanges from the SPR allowed refineries to operate, ensuring continued production of refined petroleum products for use by consumers.\nBased on past GAO work and preliminary observations, the SPR is limited in its ability to respond to domestic supply disruptions, including severe weather events, for three main reasons. First, as GAO reported in September 2014 (GAO-14-807), the SPR is almost entirely composed of oil and not refined products like gasoline, which may not be effective in responding to all disruptions. For example, following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, nearly 30 percent of U.S. refining capacity was shut down for weeks, disrupting supplies of gasoline and other petroleum products. The SPR could not mitigate the effects of disrupted supplies. Second, as GAO also reported in September 2014, the SPR is nearly entirely located in the Gulf Coast, so it may not be responsive to disruptions in other regions, such as the West Coast. Third, GAO's ongoing work reviewed DOE and energy task force reports that found that statutory authorities governing SPR releases may inhibit their use for regional disruptions.\nGAO's preliminary observations show that other International Energy Agency (IEA) member countries generally have used one of five reserve structures configured in various ways. The structures are defined by whether countries hold either public reserves (e.g., the SPR), industry reserves (e.g., placing reserve holding requirements on industry), or a combination. Most IEA members hold refined petroleum products in reserve, with many members holding at least a third of their reserves in these products. For example, in Germany, 55 percent of reserves are in petroleum products. In addition, some IEA members' reserves are geographically dispersed in their countries to respond to disruptions. For example, France has reserves in each of its seven regions and has used these to address fuel supply disruptions as a result of recent domestic strikes. DOE has taken some steps to evaluate other structures but has not formally evaluated the structures of other countries in over 35 years. In addition, DOE contractors studied the feasibility of regional product reserves in the Southeast and West Coast regions to address supply vulnerabilities from hurricanes and earthquakes, respectively but DOE did not finalize the two 2015 studies. In 2016, DOE released a long- term strategic review of the SPR that Congress had required and GAO recommended. However, DOE did not include the results of the two studies in its 2016 review.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making recommendations but will consider making them, as appropriate, as it finalizes its work.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_568"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_569","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAccording to health experts, exposure to elevated levels of PFOS and PFOA could cause increased cancer risk and other health issues in humans. DOD has used firefighting foam containing PFOS, PFOA, and other PFAS since the 1970s to quickly extinguish fires and ensure they do not reignite. EPA has found elevated levels of PFOS and PFOA in drinking water across the United States, including in drinking water at or near DOD installations.\nThis statement provides information on actions DOD has taken to address elevated levels of PFOS and PFOA in drinking water at or near military installations and to address concerns with firefighting foam.\nThis statement is largely based on a GAO report issued in October 2017 ( GAO-18-78 ). To perform the review for that report, GAO reviewed DOD policies and guidance related to PFOS and PFOA and firefighting foam, analyzed DOD data on testing and response activities for PFOS and PFOA, reviewed the four administrative orders issued by EPA and state regulators to DOD on addressing PFOS and PFOA in drinking water, visited seven installations, and interviewed DOD and EPA officials. This statement also includes updated information based on two 2018 DOD reports to Congress\u2014one on PFOS and PFOA response and one on firefighting foam\u2014as well as discussions with DOD officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO reported in October 2017 that the Department of Defense (DOD) had initiated actions to address elevated levels of perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS) and perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) in drinking water at or near military installations. PFOS and PFOA are part of a larger class of chemicals called per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), which can be found in firefighting foam used by DOD. In May 2016, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued nonenforceable drinking water health advisories for those two chemicals. Health advisories include recommended levels of contaminants that can be present in drinking water at which adverse health effects are not anticipated to occur over specific exposure durations.\nIn response to those health advisories, DOD's military departments directed their military installations to (1) identify locations with a known or suspected release of PFOS and PFOA and address any releases that pose a risk to human health, which can include people living outside DOD installations, and (2) test for PFOS and PFOA in installation drinking water and address any contamination above the levels in EPA's health advisories. For example:\nAs of August 2017, DOD had identified 401 active or closed military installations with known or suspected releases of PFOS or PFOA.\nThe military departments had reported spending approximately $200 million at or near 263 installations for environmental investigations and responses related to PFOS and PFOA, as of December 2016. According to DOD, it may take several years for the department to determine how much it will cost to clean up PFOS and PFOA contamination at or near its military installations.\nDOD reported taking actions (such as providing alternative drinking water and installing treatment systems) as of August 2017 to address PFOS and PFOA levels exceeding those recommended in EPA's health advisories for drinking water for people (1) on 13 military installations in the United States and (2) outside 22 military installations in the United States.\nIn addition to actions initiated by DOD, GAO reported in October 2017 that the department also had received and responded to four orders from EPA and state regulators that required DOD to address PFOS and PFOA levels that exceeded EPA's health advisory levels for drinking water at or near four installations.\nGAO also reported in October 2017 that DOD was taking steps to address health and environmental concerns with its use of firefighting foam that contains PFAS. These steps included restricting the use of existing foams that contain PFAS; testing foams to identify the amount of PFAS they contain; and funding research on developing PFAS-free foam that can meet DOD's performance requirements, which specify how long it should take for foam to extinguish a fire and keep it from reigniting. In a June 2018 report to Congress, DOD stated that no commercially available PFAS-free foam has met DOD's performance requirements and that research to develop such a PFAS-free foam is ongoing.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_569"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_570","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nPHMSA oversees the safety of interstate and intrastate natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines. PHMSA certifies states to oversee intrastate pipelines, and some states also act as PHMSA's \u201cagents\u201d to supplement the federal inspection workforce for interstate pipelines. In recent years PHMSA has signaled a move away from using interstate agent agreements. Recent funding increases have enabled PHMSA to hire additional federal inspectors. States may receive annual grants to reimburse up to 80 percent of the cost of their pipeline safety activities.\nCongress included a provision in statute for GAO to review the federal and state responsibilities and resources used to inspect interstate pipelines. This report addresses (1) how state participation has affected interstate pipeline oversight and (2) PHMSA's assessment of the resources needed to conduct interstate pipeline inspections. GAO reviewed relevant laws and PHMSA guidance on state participation in these inspections; analyzed the most recent 6 years of PHMSA funding and inspector staffing data; and interviewed pipeline safety officials from PHMSA and 22 states selected based on level of participation in interstate inspections.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nState involvement in interstate pipeline inspections can enhance oversight, although the three types of agreements that the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) uses to allow state participation are not used extensively. Annual interstate agent agreements \u2014held by 9 states\u2014allow states to participate in all inspection activities and can bolster interstate pipeline oversight. For instance, an inspection conducted in 2014 by New York state officials led to $61,900 in federal civil penalties. Temporary interstate agreements \u2014used in 6 states to date\u2014allow PHMSA to request states to participate in specific interstate pipeline inspections. PHMSA officials said these agreements provide the agency greater flexibility. Some current interstate agents GAO interviewed said that temporary interstate agreements are useful, but are not substitutes for interstate agent status because states do not participate in the full range of inspections. Finally, PHMSA as authorized by federal law recently established joint inspections allowing states to request to participate in interstate inspections. However, state officials were concerned that their role is limited and that they must bear the full cost to participate. PHMSA officials said they intend to clarify the state inspector role in joint inspections and acknowledged that federal grants cannot be used by states to support joint inspection activities.\nPHMSA allocated recently hired inspectors based on regional workload, but has not assessed future resource needs. From fiscal years 2012 to 2017, PHMSA's appropriations increased over 40 percent, allowing the agency to expand its inspector workforce by about 25 percent. PHMSA allocated the additional inspectors across the agency's five regions based on workload. For example, PHMSA's central region received a greater percentage of inspectors than other regions to help oversee a number of new pipeline construction projects. However, PHMSA has not planned for future workforce needs for interstate pipeline inspections. In particular, it has not assessed the resources and benefits that states can provide through the three types of agreements. Leading practices for workforce planning indicate that such forward-looking analyses are essential for effective workforce planning. Without such analyses, PHMSA cannot proactively plan for future inspection needs to ensure that federal and state resources are in place to provide effective oversight of interstate pipelines.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nPHMSA should develop a workforce plan for interstate pipeline inspections, considering, among other things, the additional resources and safety oversight that state pipeline officials can provide. DOT concurred with our recommendation and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_570"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_571","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAccording to the Bank, it serves as a financier of last resort for U.S. firms seeking to sell to foreign buyers but that cannot obtain private financing for their deals. Its programs support tens of thousands of American jobs and enable billions of dollars in U.S. export sales annually, the Bank says. The Bank is also backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government, meaning that taxpayers could be responsible for Bank losses.\nThe Export-Import Bank Reform Reauthorization Act of 2015 included a provision for GAO to review the Bank's antifraud controls within 4 years, and every 4 years thereafter. This report examines the extent to which the Bank has adopted the four components of GAO's Fraud Risk Framework\u2014commit to combating fraud; regularly assess fraud risks; design a corresponding antifraud strategy with relevant controls; and evaluate outcomes and adapt. GAO reviewed Bank documentation; interviewed a range of Bank managers; and surveyed Bank employees about the extent to which the Bank has established an organizational culture and structure conducive to fraud risk management.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn managing its vulnerability to fraud, the Export-Import Bank of the United States (the Bank) has adopted some aspects of GAO's A Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs (Fraud Risk Framework). This framework describes leading practices in four components: organizational culture, assessment of inherent program risks, design of tailored antifraud controls, and evaluation of outcomes. As provided in the framework, for example, the Bank has identified a dedicated entity within the Bank to lead fraud risk management. GAO also found that Bank managers and staff generally hold positive views of the Bank's antifraud culture. However, GAO also found that management and staff hold differing views on key aspects of that culture. These differing views include how active the Bank should be in addressing fraud. For example, Bank managers told GAO the Bank's current approach has been appropriate for dealing with fraud. However, about one-third of Bank staff responding to a GAO employee survey said the Bank should be \u201cmuch more active\u201d or \u201csomewhat more active\u201d in preventing, detecting, and addressing fraud. These and other divergent views indicate an opportunity to better ensure the Bank sets an antifraud tone that permeates the organizational culture, as provided in the Fraud Risk Framework.\nGAO found the Bank has taken some steps to assess fraud risk. For example, the Bank's practice has generally been to assess particular fraud risks and lessons learned following specific instances of fraud encountered, according to Bank managers. However, the Bank has not conducted a comprehensive fraud risk assessment, as provided in the framework. The Bank has also been compiling a \u201cregister\u201d of risks identified across the organization, including fraud. This register, however, does not include some known methods of fraud, such as submission of fraudulent documentation, thus indicating it is incomplete. Without planning and conducting regular fraud risk assessments as called for in the framework, the Bank is vulnerable to failing to identify fraud risks that can damage its reputation or harm its ability to support U.S. jobs through greater exports. As provided in the framework, managers should determine where fraud can occur and the types of internal and external fraud the program faces, including an assessment of the likelihood and impact of fraud risks inherent to the program.\nAt the conclusion of GAO's review, Bank managers said they will fully adopt the GAO framework. They said they plan to complete a fraud risk assessment by December 2018, and to determine the Bank's fraud risk profile\u2014that is, document key findings and conclusions from the assessment\u2014by February 2019. Work to adopt other framework components will begin afterward, the managers said. However, they did not provide details of how their efforts will be in accord with leading practices of the framework. As a result, GAO makes framework-specific recommendations in order to enumerate relevant issues and to present clear benchmarks for assessing Bank progress. This complete listing of recommendations is important in light of the Bank's recent embrace of the framework; recent changes in Bank leadership; and expected congressional consideration of the Bank's reauthorization in 2019.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO makes seven recommendations, centering on conducting a fraud risk assessment, tailored to the Bank's operations, to serve as the basis for the design and evaluation of appropriate antifraud controls. The Bank agreed with GAO's recommendations, saying it will take steps to improve its fraud risk management activities.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_571"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_572","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSSA provides vital benefits and services that affect the lives of many Americans. In fiscal year 2017, it paid out nearly $1 trillion in retirement and disability benefits to 67 million beneficiaries, and an average of 420,000 people call or visit one of its 1,200 field offices each day.\nHowever, SSA has struggled to manage its disability workloads, maintain program integrity, and modernize its service delivery and information technology systems. GAO has issued a number of reports on these challenges, and placed SSA's disability programs on GAO's High Risk List, in part due to challenges with workloads and claims processing.\nGAO was asked to testify on challenges facing SSA. This statement summarizes ongoing SSA challenges described in SSA's strategic plan and past GAO work in three areas: 1) managing disability workloads and ensuring program integrity; 2) modernizing physical infrastructure and service delivery methods; and 3) modernizing information technology.\nAlthough GAO is not making recommendations in this statement, our prior work included recommendations to help SSA address these challenges, many of which SSA has agreed with and initiated actions on. SSA provided technical comments on a draft of this statement, which we incorporated, as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO's prior work and Social Security Administration's (SSA) strategic plan for fiscal years 2018-2022 highlight significant demographic and technological challenges facing the agency. For example, SSA's workloads are increasing due to 80 million baby boomers entering their disability-prone and retirement years, and institutional knowledge and leadership at SSA will be depleted due to an expected 21,000 employees retiring by the end of fiscal year 2022. GAO's prior work has identified related management challenges and opportunities for SSA to further modernize and improve its disability programs, service delivery, and information technology (IT) systems.\nManaging disability workloads and program integrity. SSA has long struggled to process disability claims and, more recently, appeals of denied claims, in a timely manner. Consistent with our 2013 recommendation, SSA produced a broad vision for improving service delivery, including ensuring prompt and accurate disability decisions. However, SSA is still developing concrete plans to implement its vision. Although SSA has initiatives underway to improve appeals backlogs, GAO reported that some of SSA's appeals initiatives are either contingent on additional funding or have met with limited success when tried in the past. GAO's prior work also identified other challenges related to SSA's disability programs, and actions SSA could take, for example, to modernize disability criteria, prevent and recover overpayments, and manage fraud risks.\nModernizing physical infrastructure and service delivery. Advances in technology have the potential to change how and where SSA delivers its services. For example, individuals can now apply for some disability benefits online rather than in person. However, GAO found that SSA did not have readily available data on problems customers had with online applications or why staff support was needed. Additionally, the agency had not established performance goals to determine whether new service delivery options, such as off-site kiosks, are succeeding. In addition, we found that SSA has not developed a long-term plan for its building space that, among other things, includes a strategy for downsizing offices to better reflect changes in service delivery. We recommended SSA improve building plans and do more to assess and monitor service delivery, with which SSA agreed.\nModernizing information technology. SSA's legacy IT systems are increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain and GAO identified SSA's needed investment in infrastructure operations and maintenance as among the 10 largest expenditures at federal agencies in fiscal year 2015. GAO recommended SSA identify and plan to modernize or replace legacy systems, in accordance with forthcoming Office of Management and Budget guidance. SSA agreed, and reported that it is finalizing its Information Technology Modernization Plan.\nContinuing focus by SSA leadership is critical to addressing these broad and long-term challenges and effectively delivering benefits and services to the many Americans who depend on SSA programs.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_572"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_573","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Navy and Marine Corps have identified a need to improve their ability to conduct amphibious operations\u2014an operation launched from the sea by an amphibious force.\nSenate and House reports accompanying bills for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included provisions for GAO to review Navy and Marine Corps training. This report examines the extent to which (1) the Navy and Marine Corps have completed training for amphibious operations priorities and taken steps to mitigate any training shortfalls, (2) these services' efforts to improve naval integration for amphibious operations incorporate leading collaboration practices, and (3) the Marine Corps has integrated selected virtual training devices into operational training. GAO analyzed training initiatives; interviewed a nongeneralizable sample of officials from 23 units that were selected based on their training plans; analyzed training completion data; and selected a nongeneralizable sample of six virtual training devices to review based on factors such as target audience.\nThis is a public version of a classified report GAO issued in August 2017. Information that DOD deemed classified has been omitted.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nNavy and Marine Corps units that are deploying as part of an Amphibious Ready Group and Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG-MEU) completed their required training for amphibious operations, but other Marine Corps units have been limited in their ability to conduct training for other amphibious operations\u2013related priorities. GAO found that several factors, to include the decline in the fleet of the Navy's amphibious ships from 62 in 1990 to 31 today limited the ability of Marine Corps units to conduct training for other priorities, such as recurring training for home-station units (see figure). As a result, training completion for amphibious operations was low for some but not all Marine Corps units from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. The services have taken steps to address amphibious training shortfalls, such as more comprehensively determining units that require training. However, these efforts are incomplete because the services do not have an approach to prioritize available training resources, evaluate training resource alternatives, and monitor progress towards achieving priorities. Thus, the services are not well positioned to mitigate any training shortfalls.\nThe Navy and Marine Corps have taken some steps to improve coordination between the two services, but have not fully incorporated leading collaboration practices to improve integration of the two services\u2014naval integration\u2014for amphibious operations. For example, the Navy and Marine Corps have not defined and articulated common outcomes for naval integration that would help them align efforts to maximize training opportunities for amphibious operations.\nThe Marine Corps has taken steps to better integrate virtual training devices into operational training, but gaps remain in its process to develop and use them. GAO found that for selected virtual training devices, the Marine Corps did not conduct front-end analysis that considered key factors, such as the specific training tasks that a device would accomplish; consider device usage data to support its investment decisions; or evaluate the effectiveness of existing virtual training devices because of weaknesses in the service's guidance. As a result, the Marine Corps risks investing in devices that are not cost-effective and whose value to operational training is undetermined.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that the Navy and Marine Corps develop an approach for amphibious operations training and define and articulate common outcomes for naval integration; and that the Marine Corps develop guidance for the development and use of its virtual training devices. The Department of Defense concurred.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_573"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_574","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCommonly known for protecting the President, the Secret Service also plays a leading role in investigating and preventing financial and electronic crimes. To accomplish its mission, the Secret Service relies heavily on the use of IT infrastructure and systems. In 2009, the component initiated the IITT investment\u2014a portfolio of programs and projects that are intended to, among other things, improve systems availability and security in support of the component's business operations.\nGAO was asked to review the Secret Service's oversight of its IT portfolio and workforce. This report discusses the extent to which the (1) CIO implemented selected IT oversight responsibilities, (2) Secret Service implemented leading IT workforce planning and management practices, and (3) Secret Service and DHS implemented selected performance monitoring practices for IITT. GAO assessed agency documentation against 14 selected component CIO responsibilities established in DHS policy; 15 selected leading workforce planning and management practices within 5 topic areas; and two selected leading industry project monitoring practices that, among other things, were, in GAO's professional judgment, of most significance to managing IITT.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe U.S. Secret Service (Secret Service) Chief Information Officer (CIO) fully implemented 11 of 14 selected information technology (IT) oversight responsibilities, and partially implemented the remaining 3. The CIO partially implemented the responsibilities to establish a process that ensures the Secret Service reviews IT contracts; ensure that the component's IT policies align with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) policies; and set incremental targets to monitor program progress. Additional efforts to fully implement these 3 responsibilities will further position the CIO to effectively manage the IT portfolio.\nOf the 15 selected practices within the 5 workforce planning and management areas, the Secret Service fully implemented 3 practices, partly implemented 8, and did not implement 4 (see table). Within the strategic planning area, the component partly implemented the practice to, among other things, develop IT competency needs. While the Secret Service had defined general core competencies for its workforce, the Office of the CIO (OCIO) did not identify all of the technical competencies needed to support its functions. As a result, the office was limited in its ability to address any IT competency gaps that may exist. Also, while work remains to improve morale across the component, the Secret Service substantially implemented the employee morale practices for its IT staff.\nSecret Service officials said the gaps in implementing the workforce practices were due to, among other things, their focus on reorganizing the IT workforce within OCIO. Until the Secret Service fully implements these practices for its IT workforce, it may be limited in its ability to ensure the timely and effective acquisition and maintenance of the component's IT infrastructure and services.\nOf the two selected IT project monitoring practices, DHS and the Secret Service fully implemented the first practice to monitor the performance of the Information Integration and Technology Transformation (IITT) investment. In addition, for the second practice\u2014to monitor projects on incremental development metrics\u2014the Secret Service fully implemented the practice on one of IITT's projects and partially implemented it on another. In particular, OCIO did not fully measure post-deployment user satisfaction with the system on one project. OCIO plans to conduct a user satisfaction survey of the system by September 2018, which should inform the office on whether the system is meeting users' needs.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making 13 recommendations, including that the Secret Service establish a process that ensures the CIO reviews all IT contracts, as appropriate; and identify the skills needed for its IT workforce. DHS concurred with all recommendations and provided estimated dates for implementing each of them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_574"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_575","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAn adequate, well-trained physician workforce is essential for providing access to quality health care. While a number of factors affect the supply and distribution of physicians, GME is a significant determinant. A significant portion of GME training funds come from federal programs and states.\nThis report (1) describes the amount and distribution of federal government and state Medicaid agency spending on GME; (2) describes what is known about GME costs; and (3) examines the extent to which the federal government collects information to understand its investment in GME. GAO reviewed reports, agency websites, and interviewed agency officials to identify federal programs that fund the clinical training of residents and were authorized through 2017. GAO analyzed 2015 data\u2014the most recent data available at the time of GAO's analysis\u2014including from a state survey. All 50 states and the District of Columbia responded to the survey. GAO reviewed literature, interviewed experts from seven organizations knowledgeable about GME costs, and analyzed Medicare data. GAO also reviewed documentation from HHS and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and interviewed agency officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFederal agencies and state Medicaid agencies spent over $16.3 billion in 2015 to fund graduate medical education (GME) training for physicians\u2014commonly known as residency training. The federal government spent $14.5 billion through five programs, and 45 state Medicaid agencies spent $1.8 billion. About half of teaching sites that received funding\u2014such as teaching hospitals\u2014received funds from more than one of the five programs.\nGME training costs vary due to the characteristics of teaching sites, such as the number of residents trained and their specialty, which can make it difficult to compare training costs across sites. Further, challenges exist in measuring training costs because some costs, such as faculty teaching time, are difficult to identify. Also, there is no standard method for identifying and capturing training costs, and each teaching site may vary in how it does so.\nWhile federal agencies generally collect information needed to manage their individual programs, this information is not sufficient to comprehensively understand whether the federal investment in GME training meets national physician workforce needs. The information agencies collect is not always complete or consistent within or across programs. For example, national data on GME training costs are not systematically collected, and some agencies lacked data to understand the total amount spent, or the outcomes of their programs, such as where supported residents went on to practice. GAO recommended in 2015 that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) develop a comprehensive planning approach to identify and address areas of health care workforce need. HHS concurred and identified steps it could take. While HHS has yet to take these steps, the information currently available is also insufficient for such planning. Comprehensive information is needed to identify gaps between federal GME programs and national physician workforce needs\u2014particularly the distribution of physicians geographically or across specialties\u2014and to make or recommend to Congress changes to improve the efficient and effective use of federal funds to meet those needs.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that HHS coordinate with federal agencies, including VA, to (1) identify information needed to evaluate federal GME programs, and (2) identify opportunities to improve the quality and consistency of information, and implement these improvements. HHS concurred with both recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_575"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_576","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe improper payment rate is a sentinel measure of program integrity risks for the Medicaid program. CMS and the states oversee Medicaid, whose size, structure, and diversity make it vulnerable to improper payments. CMS estimates the Medicaid improper payment rate annually through its PERM, which includes an estimate for Medicaid managed care, in which states contract with MCOs to provide services to Medicaid enrollees.\nGAO was asked to study the PERM methodology for managed care. In this report, GAO examined the extent to which the PERM accounts for program integrity risks in Medicaid managed care, including CMS's and states' oversight. GAO identified program integrity risks reported in 27 federal and state audits and investigations issued between January 2012 and September 2017; reviewed federal regulations and guidance on the PERM and CMS's Focused Program Integrity Reviews; and contacted program integrity officials in the 16 states with a majority of 2016 Medicaid spending for managed care, as well as CMS officials and program integrity experts.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) estimate of improper payments for Medicaid managed care has limitations that are not mitigated by the agency's and states' current oversight efforts. One component of the Payment Error Rate Measurement (PERM) measures the accuracy of capitated payments, which are periodic payments that state Medicaid agencies make to managed care organizations (MCO) to provide services to enrollees and to cover other allowable costs, such as administrative expenses. However, the managed care component of the PERM neither includes a medical review of services delivered to enrollees, nor reviews of MCO records or data. Further, GAO's review of the 27 federal and state audits and investigations identified key program risks.\nTen of the 27 federal and state audits and investigations identified about $68 million in overpayments and unallowable MCO costs that were not accounted for by PERM estimates; another of these investigations resulted in a $137.5 million settlement.\nThese audits and investigations were conducted over more than 5 years and involved a small fraction of the more than 270 MCOs operating nationwide as of September 2017.\nTo the extent that overpayments and unallowable costs are unidentified and not removed from the cost data used to set capitation rates, they may allow inflated MCO payments and minimize the appearance of program risks in Medicaid managed care.\nCMS and states have taken steps to improve oversight of Medicaid managed care through updated regulations, focused reviews of states' managed care programs, and federal program integrity contractors' audits of managed care services.\nHowever, some of these efforts went into effect only recently, and others are unlikely to address the risks in managed care across all states.\nFurthermore, these efforts do not ensure the identification and reporting of overpayments to providers and unallowable costs by MCOs.\nFederal internal control standards call for agency management to identify and respond to risks. Without addressing key risks, such as the extent of overpayments and unallowable costs, CMS cannot be certain that its estimated improper payment rate for managed care (0.3 percent compared with 12.9 percent in Medicaid fee-for-service) accurately reflects program risks.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nThe Administrator of CMS should consider and take steps to mitigate the program risks that are not measured in the PERM, such as overpayments and unallowable costs; such an effort could include actions such as revising the PERM methodology or focusing additional audit resources on managed care. HHS concurred with this recommendation. HHS also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_576"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_577","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe public transit landscape is changing, as advances in technology have enabled more on-demand mobility services, such as ridesourcing and bike-share services. In response, some transit agencies have started to partner with private mobility companies with the aim of offering public transit riders more efficient and convenient options through on-demand services. FTA supports public transportation systems through a variety of federal grant programs.\nGAO was asked to review various issues related to such partnerships. This report examines, among other things: (1) the types of partnership projects that selected transit agencies have initiated with private mobility companies and (2) how DOT's efforts and funding and federal requirements may impact such partnerships. GAO interviewed DOT officials and reviewed DOT documents; interviewed 16 local transit agencies and 13 private mobility companies involved in transit partnerships; and reviewed 22 projects initiated by the selected partners, including 5 funded by the Mobility on Demand Sandbox grant program. GAO selected these partners to represent a range of service types and geographic locations; the results are non-generalizable.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nSome local transit agencies are pursuing partnerships with private mobility companies\u2014including car-share and \"ridesourcing\" companies such as Lyft and Uber, which provide access to a shared vehicle \u201con demand\u201d\u2014with the aim of offering public transit riders more efficient and convenient service options. Most of the transit partnership projects that GAO selected (14 of 22) involved private partners providing on-demand transportation for the \u201cfirst- and last-mile\u201d connections to or from public transit stations (see figure). Local transit agencies use first- and last-mile connections to increase their public transit ridership. Other services provided through selected projects included filling transit service gaps in under-served areas. Most selected projects have not yet been evaluated to determine whether they achieved intended outcomes.\nThe Department of Transportation's (DOT) efforts, especially the Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) initiation of the Mobility on Demand Sandbox program, have facilitated partnerships, but confusion about how to meet some requirements and how to report data pose challenges to implementing projects. In October 2016, FTA announced the selection of 11 projects to receive grants and has since provided assistance to the grantees. FTA also issued clarifications about how certain federal requirements\u2014such as those related to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)\u2014apply to transit partnerships. However, most selected local transit agencies (14 of 16) said that additional information beyond what FTA has already disseminated, including how agencies have successfully structured partnerships and met federal requirements, would be helpful. Collecting and disseminating such information could help FTA be better positioned to respond to changes in the transit industry that could impact its own efforts and goals, such as planning for future Mobility on Demand grants. In addition, most selected local transit agencies reported confusion related to reporting information about their on-demand projects into the FTA's National Transit Database, including confusion about which on-demand project data would qualify for entry. This confusion has led to possible reporting inconsistencies by some local transit agencies. Ensuring that data contained in the National Transit Database are complete and accurate is important, since according to FTA officials, FTA uses these data (1) to apportion certain grant funds to local transit agencies based on factors such as passenger miles traveled, and (2) to track its progress in achieving goals such as promoting efficient transportation systems, among other things.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making three recommendations including that FTA disseminate information about how partnership projects met federal requirements and how data on partnerships should be entered into the National Transit Database. DOT concurred with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_577"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_578","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nA key component of mitigating and responding to cyber threats is having a qualified, well-trained cybersecurity workforce. The act requires OPM and federal agencies to take several actions related to cybersecurity workforce planning. These actions include categorizing all IT, cybersecurity, and cyber-related positions using OPM personnel codes for specific work roles, and identifying critical staffing needs.\nThe act contains a provision for GAO to analyze and monitor agencies' workforce planning. GAO's objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which federal agencies have assigned work roles for positions performing IT, cybersecurity, or cyber-related functions and (2) describe the steps federal agencies took to identify work roles of critical need. GAO administered a questionnaire to 24 agencies, analyzed coding data from personnel systems, and examined preliminary reports on critical needs. GAO selected six of the 24 agencies based on cybersecurity spending levels to determine the accuracy of codes assigned to a random sample of IT positions. GAO also interviewed relevant OPM and agency officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe 24 reviewed federal agencies generally assigned work roles to filled and vacant positions that performed information technology (IT), cybersecurity, or cyber-related functions as required by the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2015 (the act). However, six of the 24 agencies reported that they had not completed assigning the associated work role codes to their vacant positions, although they were required to do so by April 2018. In addition, most agencies had likely miscategorized the work roles of many positions. Specifically, 22 of the 24 agencies assigned a \u201cnon-IT\u201d work role code to 15,779 (about 19 percent) of their IT positions within the 2210 occupational series. Further, the six agencies that GAO selected for additional review had assigned work role codes that were not consistent with the work roles and duties described in corresponding position descriptions for 63 of 120 positions within the 2210 occupational series that GAO examined (see figure).\nHuman resource and IT officials from the 24 agencies generally reported that they had not completely or accurately categorized work roles for IT positions within the 2210 occupational series, in part, because they may have assigned the associated codes in error or had not completed validating the accuracy of the assigned codes. By assigning work roles that are inconsistent with the IT, cybersecurity, and cyber-related positions, the agencies are diminishing the reliability of the information they need to improve workforce planning.\nThe act also required agencies to identify work roles of critical need by April 2019. To aid agencies with identifying their critical needs, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) developed guidance and required agencies to provide a preliminary report by August 2018. The 24 agencies have begun to identify critical needs and submitted a preliminary report to OPM that identified information systems security manager, IT project manager, and systems security analyst as the top three work roles of critical need. Nevertheless, until agencies accurately categorize their positions, their ability to effectively identify critical staffing needs will be impaired.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making 28 recommendations to 22 agencies to review and assign the appropriate codes to their IT, cybersecurity, and cyber-related positions. Of the 22 agencies to which GAO made recommendations, 20 agreed with the recommendations, one partially agreed, and one did not agree with one of two recommendations. GAO continues to believe that all of the recommendations are warranted.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_578"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_579","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOD's defense labs help sustain, among other things, U.S. technological superiority and the delivery of technical capabilities to the warfighter. Over time Congress has granted unique flexibilities\u2014such as the ability to hire qualified candidates who meet certain criteria using direct hire authorities\u2014to the defense labs to expedite the hiring process and facilitate efforts to compete with the private sector.\nSenate Report 114-255 included a provision for GAO to examine the labs' hiring structures and effective use of hiring authorities. This report examines (1) the defense labs use of existing hiring authorities and officials' views on the benefits of authorities and challenges of hiring; (2) the extent to which DOD evaluates the effectiveness of hiring, including hiring authorities at the defense labs; and (3) the extent to which DOD has time frames for approving and implementing new hiring authorities. GAO analyzed DOD hiring policies and data; conducted a survey of 16 defense lab officials involved in policy-making; interviewed DOD and service officials; and conducted nongeneralizable interviews with groups of officials, supervisors, and new hires from 6 labs\u20142 from each of the 3 military services, selected based on the labs' mission.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense's (DOD) laboratories (defense labs) have used the laboratory-specific direct hire authorities more than any other category of agency-specific or government-wide hiring authority for science, technology, engineering, and mathematics personnel. As shown below, in fiscal years 2015\u20142017 the labs hired 5,303 personnel out of 11,562 total hires, or 46 percent using these direct hire authorities. Lab officials, however, identified challenges to hiring highly qualified candidates, such as delays in processing security clearances, despite the use of hiring authorities such as direct hire.\nSource: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data. | GAO-18-417 .\na Other includes all other defense laboratory-specific direct hiring authorities used.\nb All other includes remaining five categories of hiring authorities.\nc Percentages may not sum to total due to rounding.\nDOD and the defense labs track hiring data, but the Defense Laboratories Office (DLO) has not obtained or monitored these data or evaluated the effectiveness of the labs' hiring, including the use of hiring authorities. While existing lab data can be used to show the length of time of the hiring process, effectiveness is not currently evaluated. According to lab officials, timeliness data do not sufficiently inform about the effectiveness of the authorities and may not reflect a candidate's perception of the length of the hiring process. Further, the DLO has not developed performance measures to evaluate the effectiveness of hiring across the defense laboratories. Without routinely obtaining and monitoring hiring data and developing performance measures, DOD lacks reasonable assurance that the labs' hiring and use of hiring authorities\u2014in particular, those granted by Congress to the labs\u2014result in improved hiring outcomes.\nDOD does not have clear time frames for approving and implementing new hiring authorities. The defense labs were unable to use a direct hire authority granted by Congress in fiscal year 2015 because it took DOD 2\u00bd years to publish a federal register notice\u2014the process used to implement new hiring authorities for the labs\u2014for that authority. DOD officials identified coordination issues associated with the process as the cause of the delay and stated that DOD is taking steps to improve coordination\u2014including meeting to formalize roles and responsibilities for the offices and developing a new approval process\u2014between offices responsible for oversight of the labs and personnel policy. However, DLO's new federal register approval process does not include time frames for specific stages of coordination. Without clear time frames for its departmental coordination efforts related to the approval and implementation of new hiring authorities, officials cannot be certain they are taking action in a timely manner.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DOD (1) routinely obtain and monitor defense lab hiring data to improve oversight; (2) develop performance measures for evaluating the effectiveness of hiring; and (3) establish time frames to guide hiring authority approval and implementation. DOD concurred with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_579"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_580","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Department of Defense and NNSA have sought for nearly a decade to replace the capabilities of the aging W78 nuclear warhead used by the U.S. Air Force. NNSA undertakes LEPs to refurbish or replace the capabilities of nuclear weapons components. In fiscal year 2014, NNSA was directed to suspend a program that was evaluating a capability that could replace the W78 and also be used by the U.S. Navy. NNSA's most recent estimate\u2014reported in October 2018\u2014was that the combined program would cost about $10 billion to $15 billion. NNSA has been directed by the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review to restart a program to replace the W78 for the Air Force in fiscal year 2019. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review also directed NNSA and the Navy to further evaluate whether the Navy could also use the warhead.\nSenate report 115-125 included a provision for GAO to review NNSA's progress on the program to replace the W78.\nGAO's report describes NNSA's steps in key early planning areas\u2014including program management, technology assessment, and coordination with facilities and capabilities\u2014to prepare to restart a program to replace the W78. GAO reviewed documentation on areas such as program management, technologies, and facilities needed for the program, and interviewed NNSA and DOD officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has taken steps to prepare to restart a life extension program (LEP) to replace the capabilities of the Air Force's W78 nuclear warhead\u2014a program which was previously suspended. According to NNSA officials, these steps are typically needed to conduct any LEP. Therefore, they can be undertaken despite the current uncertainty about whether the final program will develop the warhead for the Air Force only or for both the Air Force and the Navy. Specifically, NNSA has taken the steps described below:\nProgram management. NNSA has begun to establish the program management functions needed to execute a W78 replacement program, as required by NNSA's program execution instruction. For example, NNSA has started to develop a risk management plan to define the process for identifying and mitigating risks. In addition, NNSA has created a preliminary schedule to restart the program in fiscal year 2019 in the feasibility and design options phase with the goal of producing the first unit in fiscal year 2030. (See figure)\nTechnology assessment. In May 2018, NNSA completed an assessment of 126 technologies for potential use in a W78 replacement. These included nine technologies that are needed to replace obsolete or no longer available technologies or materials. These are considered \u201cmust-do\u201d because they are the only technologies or materials available to meet minimum warhead requirements established by the Department of Defense and NNSA. NNSA officials said that in fiscal year 2019 they will use the assessment to further evaluate technologies for potential use in the warhead.\nCoordination with facilities and capabilities. NNSA's program manager is identifying the facilities and capabilities needed to provide components for the warhead. This information will be used to produce a report that identifies aspects of the program\u2014including facilities and capabilities to support it\u2014that could affect the program's schedule and technical risk. However, several of the needed facilities must be built or repaired, and these activities are separately managed and supported outside the W78 replacement program\u2014representing a critical external risk to the program. As mitigation, the program intends to coordinate with the offices that oversee these facilities to draft agreements that describe the work to be performed and timeframes, among other things.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making recommendations. NNSA and DOD provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_580"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_581","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nEducation programs in STEM fields are intended to enhance the nation's global competitiveness. GAO reported in 2012 that there were more than 200 federal STEM education programs in fiscal year 2010. Since then, this portfolio of programs has changed. GAO was asked to review the landscape of federal STEM education programs.\nThis report examines (1) how the federal investment in STEM education programs changed from 2010 to 2016, and (2) the extent to which the STEM education portfolio has been assessed.To answer these questions, GAO administered a web-based questionnaire to all federal STEM education programs funded in fiscal year 2016 and analyzed the results. GAO also reviewed relevant federal laws and agency documents, examined the implementation of relevant assessment requirements, and interviewed officials from relevant federal agencies.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe federal investment in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education programs remained relatively stable from fiscal years 2010 to 2016, although the number of programs declined from 209 to 163 (see figure). While agencies reported that many of the same STEM education programs existed during this time period, the portfolio underwent various changes, including program consolidations, creations, and terminations. Nearly all STEM education programs in fiscal year 2016 overlapped to some degree with at least one other program in that they offered similar services to similar groups in similar STEM fields to achieve similar objectives. The Committee on STEM Education, an interagency body responsible for implementing the federal STEM education strategic plan, reported it managed this overlap through coordination with agencies administering these programs.\nThe Committee on STEM Education has not fully met its responsibilities to assess the federal STEM education portfolio. Specifically, the Committee has not reviewed programs' performance assessments, as required by its authorizing charter, nor has it documented those assessments in its inventory, as required by law. Such efforts could encourage the use of evidenced-based practices across the portfolio\u2014a key national goal of the STEM education strategic plan. These efforts could also enhance public awareness of the administering agencies' efforts to assess programs' performance. In addition, the Committee has not reported the participation rates of underrepresented groups in federal STEM education programs, as required by law. By reporting this information, the Committee could better assess whether programs are broadening access to groups historically underrepresented in STEM fields\u2014another key goal of the strategic plan.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making four recommendations, including three to the Committee on STEM Education to review performance assessments of STEM education programs, document those assessments, and report programs' participation rates of underrepresented groups. The Committee on STEM Education agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_581"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_582","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe federal government is the largest real property owner in the United States and spends billions of dollars to operate and maintain these assets, which include buildings, roads, bridges, and utility systems. Federal agencies are responsible for developing asset management policies, processes, and plans. In 2014, the ISO 55000 asset management standards were issued.\nGAO was asked to examine federal agencies' real property asset management practices and the applicability of ISO 55000. This report discusses: (1) key characteristics of an effective asset management framework and how selected federal agencies' frameworks reflect these characteristics, and (2) whether government-wide asset management guidance and information reflect standards and key characteristics of an effective asset management framework, among other objectives.\nTo conduct this work, GAO reviewed the ISO 55000 standards, relevant studies and literature, and interviewed 22 experts and 10 practitioners. GAO selected six federal agencies as case studies, including agencies with the largest real property portfolio and some agencies that were using the ISO 55000 standards. GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from these six agencies, GSA, and OMB.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO identified six key characteristics of an effective asset management framework (see table 1) that can help federal agencies manage their assets and resources effectively. GAO identified these key characteristics through reviews of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 55000 standards\u2014an international consensus standard on asset management\u2014studies and articles on asset management practices, and interviews with experts. GAO reviewed the asset management practices of six federal agencies: the U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard); U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps); General Services Administration (GSA); National Park Service (Park Service); National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); and U.S. Forest Service (Forest Service). Each of the six federal-agency frameworks GAO reviewed included some of the key characteristics.\nSource: GAO analysis of ISO 55000 standards, asset management literature, and comments from experts. | GAO-19-57\nWhile the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has issued guidance to inform federal agencies' real property management efforts, the existing guidance does not reflect an effective asset management framework because it does not fully align with ISO 55000 standards and the key characteristics. For example, this guidance does not direct agencies to develop a comprehensive approach to asset management that incorporates strategic planning, capital planning, and operations, or maintaining leadership support, promoting a collaborative organizational culture, or evaluating and improving asset management practices. In addition, the guidance does not reflect information on successful agency asset management practices, information that officials from three of the six agencies GAO spoke with said would be helpful to them. OMB staff said that they did not plan to update existing government-wide guidance because OMB's real property management focus has shifted to the Reduce the Footprint initiative, which emphasizes efficiently managing and using buildings and warehouse space, rather than all assets. Without a more comprehensive approach, as described above, federal agencies may not have the knowledge needed to maximize the value of their limited resources.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nOMB should take steps to improve information on asset management to reflect leading practices. OMB had no comments on this recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_582"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_583","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAccording to the Surgeon General, adolescence and young adulthood are critical at-risk periods for illicit substance use, and such use can harm the developing brain. Congress included a provision in law for GAO to review how federal agencies, through grants, are addressing substance use prevention, treatment, and recovery among adolescents and young adults.\nRelated to prevention, treatment, and recovery targeting adolescents (aged 12 to 17) and young adults (aged 18 to 25), this report describes (1) grant programs to provide services; (2) NIDA grant-funded research, and (3) gaps stakeholders identified in related services or research.\nGAO selected four agencies to review\u2014HHS, ONDCP, DOJ, and Education\u2014the key agencies that fund grant programs for services for adolescents and young adults. GAO analyzed documents on grant programs and on research funded by NIDA. GAO interviewed officials from the four agencies and 20 stakeholder groups (including advocacy and education, and research organizations, as well as a non-generalizable selection of state substance abuse, education, and judicial agencies in four states) about gaps in services or research and agency efforts to help address them. States were selected for variation in geography and overdose rates.\nHHS, DOJ, and ONDCP provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO identified 12 federal grant programs within three federal agencies that funded substance use prevention, treatment, and recovery services in fiscal year 2017 and targeted adolescents' and young adults' use of illicit substances such as marijuana and nonmedical use of prescription opioids. The three agencies included the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), and the Department of Justice (DOJ). While the Department of Education (Education) has grant programs that can fund prevention services for adolescents, they do not specifically target such services.\nEight programs targeted substance use prevention. In total, they had 1,146 active grantees in fiscal year 2017 and provided about $266 million in awards that year.\nFour programs targeted treatment and recovery services. In total, they had 57 active grantees in fiscal year 2017. Two of the 4 grant programs awarded about $23 million in funding in that year (the other two awarded funding in prior years).\nIn addition, other grant programs beyond these 12 also fund substance use prevention, treatment, and recovery services across age groups, but are not specifically targeted to adolescents and young adults.\nHHS's National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA)\u2014the agency that is the primary funder of research on illicit substance use\u2014also had 186 active grant-funded research projects focused on substance use prevention, treatment, and recovery among adolescents and young adults as of October and November 2017.\nMost of these research projects\u2014126\u2014were examining prevention, 45 were examining treatment, 4 were examining recovery, and 11 were examining a combination of research categories.\nIn total, these 186 research projects received about $61 million from NIDA in fiscal year 2017.\nMost of the 20 stakeholders GAO interviewed identified gaps in services for adolescents and young adults, including insufficient access to recovery services and a shortage of treatment providers, and described financial and other reasons that likely contribute to these gaps. Federal agency officials GAO interviewed agreed that these gaps exist, and described grant programs and other efforts to help address them, such as a grant program that HHS established in 2018 to expand recovery services for these age groups. Stakeholders also identified gaps in research, such as too few treatment studies with adolescent participants, and described reasons for these gaps, including too few federal grants focused on adolescent research. NIDA officials agreed that these gaps exist, and stated that NIDA had eight grant opportunities (as of May 2018) that focused on these age groups or included them as a population of interest, three of which were new in 2018.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_583"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_584","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nMilitary families with special medical and educational needs face unique challenges because of their frequent moves. To help assist these families, DOD provides services plans, which document the support a family member requires. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision for GAO to review the Services' EFMPs, including DOD's oversight of these programs.\nThis report examines the extent to which (1) each Service provides family support and (2) the Services monitor and DOD evaluates assignment coordination and family support.\nGAO analyzed DOD and Service-specific EFMP guidance and documents; analyzed fiscal year 2016 EFMP data (the most recent available); visited seven military installations, selected for their large numbers of military-connected students; and interviewed officials responsible for implementing each Service's EFMP, as well as officials in OSN that administer DOD's EFM policy.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe support provided to families with special needs through the Department of Defense's (DOD) Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP) varies widely for each branch of Military Service. Federal law requires DOD's Office of Special Needs (OSN) to develop a uniform policy that includes requirements for (1) developing and updating a services plan for each family with special needs and (2) resources, such as staffing, to ensure an appropriate number of family support providers. OSN has developed such a policy, but DOD relies on each Service to determine its compliance with the policy. However, Army and Navy officials said they have not received feedback from OSN about the extent to which their Service-specific guidance complies. Federal internal control standards call for developing clear policies to achieve agency goals. In addition, DOD's most recent annual reports to Congress do not indicate the extent to which each Service provides services plans or allocates sufficient resources for family support providers. According to GAO's analysis, the Military Services have developed relatively few services plans, and there is wide variation in the number of family support providers employed, which raises questions about potential gaps in services for families with special needs (see table).\nEach Service uses various mechanisms to monitor how servicemembers are assigned to installations (assignment coordination) and obtain family support, but DOD has not established common performance measures to assess these activities. DOD has taken steps to better support families with special needs, according to the DOD officials GAO interviewed. For example, DOD established a working group to identify gaps in services. However, OSN officials said that DOD lacks common performance measures for assignment coordination and family support because the Services have not reached consensus on what those measures should be. In addition, OSN does not have a process to systematically evaluate the results of the Services' monitoring activities. Federal internal control standards call for assessing performance over time and evaluating the results of monitoring activities. Without establishing common performance measures and assessing monitoring activities, DOD will be unable to fully determine the effect of its efforts to better support families with special needs and the adequacy of the Services' EFMPs as required by federal law.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO makes a total of three recommendations to DOD. DOD should assess and report to Congress on the extent to which each Service provides sufficient family support personnel and services plans, develop common performance metrics for assignment coordination and family support, and evaluate the results of the Services' monitoring activities. DOD agreed with these recommendations and plans to develop performance metrics for assignment coordination and develop plans to evaluate the Services' monitoring activities.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_584"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_585","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe United States has undertaken several efforts, including DOD's Global Train and Equip program, to help foreign partners strengthen their security capacity. Presidential Policy Directive 23 states that agencies should target security assistance where it can be effective and highlights the importance of addressing several planning elements in project proposals. DOD develops proposals, using guidance implementing the directive, and selects projects with the Department of State.\nThe fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act included a provision for GAO to review the Global Train and Equip program. In this report, GAO examines (1) the status of funding DOD allocated for Global Train and Equip projects in fiscal years 2009 through 2017, (2) the extent to which DOD addressed key security assistance planning elements in project proposals in fiscal years 2016 and 2017, and (3) DOD's reporting on the achievement of Global Train and Equip project objectives and any factors affecting its ability to achieve those objectives. GAO analyzed agency data and program documents and interviewed DOD and State Department officials in Washington, D.C., and at selected combatant commands and embassies.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) obligated $3.7 billion of $4.1 billion allocated for the Global Train and Equip program in fiscal years 2009 through 2017 to build partner nations' capacity to counter terrorism. DOD increased allocations for the program in 2016, responding to an influx of funding from appropriations to the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund. As of December 2017, DOD had disbursed about $2.5 billion of the obligated funds.\nGlobal Train and Equip project proposals for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 consistently addressed only one of four elements of security assistance planning outlined in Presidential Policy Directive 23 . GAO found all 72 proposals in those years included the first element, project objectives. From 2016 to 2017, the percentage of proposals addressing the second element\u2014absorptive capacity\u2014rose from 32 percent to 84 percent. Most 2016 and 2017 proposals included the third element, baseline assessments, but less than three-quarters included complete sustainment plans, the fourth element. DOD guidance for 2016 and 2017 did not include instructions for addressing project sustainment when sustainment was not anticipated, though the 2017 guidance included instructions for addressing the other three planning elements. According to DOD officials, they have developed an informal quality review process to better ensure that 2018 project proposals address all four planning elements. However, DOD has not formalized this informal process as written policy. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for documenting internal control activities and policies. Formalizing the proposal review process would help DOD provide consistent oversight of project development and ensure access to complete information about each planning element, including sustainment needs. Such information is critical in helping decision makers ensure efficient use of funding to build partners' capacity.\nDOD reporting for 2016 and 2017 indicates progress in building partner capacity to combat terrorism and conduct stability operations as well as factors affecting the progress achieved. According to DOD documents, partner nation recipient units' overall capabilities were greater after implementation of 8 of 21 Global Train and Equip projects, and some of the remaining 13 projects produced some positive results. DOD documents and officials also identified factors\u2014such as equipment suitability and procurement issues\u2014that may have limited the achievement of project objectives.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends DOD (1) update project proposal guidance to include instructions for documenting sustainment planning and (2) formalize as written policy its informal process for ensuring Global Train and Equip project proposals fully document the four required planning elements. DOD agreed with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_585"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_586","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Treasury Judgment Fund, managed by Fiscal Service, annually pays billions of dollars of claims on behalf of federal agencies. Transparent and reliable information is important for Congress to provide effective oversight of the Judgment Fund. In May 2017, the Committee requested that Treasury provide (1) Schedules of the Judgment Fund for fiscal years 2010 to 2016 prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP, including appropriate disclosures to answer nine questions, and (2) information on processes and procedures used when paying claims.\nGAO was asked to review the information that Treasury provided to the Committee. This report (1) evaluates the extent to which the Treasury-prepared information responds to the Committee's request and reconciles to financial information included in annual, audited financial reports and other reports and (2) describes Fiscal Service's documented procedures and related control activities for processing agency claims. To address these objectives, GAO compared the information provided by Treasury to other Treasury reports, conducted interviews with agency officials, and reviewed documented procedures for processing claims.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of the Treasury (Treasury) did not provide the House Committee on the Judiciary (Committee) with the information the Committee requested on the Treasury Judgment Fund. Specifically, Treasury did not provide the Committee the Schedules of the Judgment Fund Non-Entity Assets, Non-Entity Costs, and Custodial Revenues that were prepared in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (U.S. GAAP). Treasury also did not include appropriate note disclosures or Management's Discussion and Analysis, as requested by the Committee. Rather, Treasury provided nine exhibits containing selected Judgment Fund information to answer nine questions included in the Committee's request.\nIn addition, GAO identified numerous differences between amounts included in Treasury's exhibits and its annual Judgment Fund transparency reports to Congress and certain audited financial reports. GAO requested explanations for these differences, and Treasury provided explanations for some of them. Subsequently, Treasury officials discovered and explained that the exhibits were created in a faulty manner, resulting in an increased risk that they may contain unreliable information. Treasury officials stated that rather than expending resources to further explain differences and reconcile the exhibits with the other information, Bureau of the Fiscal Service (Fiscal Service) staff planned to submit new exhibits to the Committee; however, they did not provide a date by which they would do so.\nGAO found that Treasury did not take appropriate steps consistent with its existing guidance for disseminating information to the public, such as performing appropriate reviews of information in the exhibits prior to providing them to the Committee, to ensure the quality and responsiveness of the information provided. The lack of reliable information on the Judgment Fund impairs the Committee's ability to provide effective oversight, including considering whether enacting new legislation would benefit the American people by ensuring better management of the Judgment Fund.\nFiscal Service has policies and procedures to help ensure that it only certifies payments for awards, judgments, and compromise settlements (claims) from the Judgment Fund that meet the following four tests: (1) claims are final, (2) claims are monetary, (3) one of the authorities specified in the Judgment Fund statute permits payment, and (4) payment is not legally available from any other source of funds (e.g., claims are only paid from the Judgment Fund when payment is not otherwise provided for in a specific appropriation or by another statutory provision).\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that Fiscal Service take steps to ensure that information provided to Congress undergoes a documented review to ensure the quality and responsiveness of the information provided. Fiscal Service did not concur or nonconcur with the recommendation but agreed with GAO concerns regarding the reliability of information provided to the Committee.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_586"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_587","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nVHA has designated patient advocates at each VAMC to receive and document feedback from veterans or their representatives, including requests for information, compliments, and complaints. In recent years, the importance of a strong patient advocacy program has taken on new significance given concerns with VHA's ability to provide veterans timely access to health care, among other issues.\nThe Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 included a provision for GAO to review VHA's patient advocacy program. This report examines the extent to which VHA has (1) provided guidance on the governance of the program; (2) provided guidance on staffing the program; (3) assessed the training needs of patient advocates and monitored training completion; and (4) monitored patient advocacy program data-entry practices and reviewed program data. GAO reviewed VHA and VAMC documents, including summaries of program data. GAO interviewed VHA officials about the program, as well as officials from a non-generalizable selection of eight VAMCs and five VISNs selected based on the volume of veteran complaints and other factors. GAO also compared VHA policies and practices to federal internal control standards.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Veterans Health Administration (VHA) provided limited guidance to Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical centers (VAMC) on the governance of its patient advocacy program and its guidance, a program handbook, has been outdated since 2010. VAMCs are still expected to follow the outdated handbook, which does not provide needed details on governance, such as specifying the VAMC department to which patient advocates should report. Officials from most of the VAMCs that GAO reviewed noted that the VAMC department to which patient advocates report can have a direct effect on the ability of staff to resolve veterans' complaints. The lack of updated and complete guidance may impede the patient advocacy program from meeting its expectations, to receive and address complaints from veterans in a convenient and timely manner.\nVHA also has provided limited guidance to VAMCs on staffing the patient advocacy program. VHA's handbook states that every VAMC should have at least one patient advocate and appropriate support staff; however, it did not provide guidance on how to determine the number and type of staff needed. Officials at all but one of the eight VAMCs in GAO's review stated that their patient advocacy program staff had more work to do than they could accomplish. This limited guidance on staffing could impede VAMCs' efforts to ensure that they have the appropriate number and type of staff to address veterans' complaints in a timely manner.\nFurther, VHA has recommended training for patient advocates, but it has not developed an approach to routinely assess their training needs or monitored training completion. VHA officials stated that they relied on VAMC and Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN) staff to conduct these activities. However, GAO found that for the eight VAMCs in its review, the training needs of patient advocates were not routinely assessed, and training completion was not always monitored. Without conducting these activities, VHA increases its risk that staff may not be adequately trained to advocate on behalf of veterans.\nFinally, VHA has not monitored patient advocacy program data-entry practices or reviewed the data to assess program performance. VHA officials stated that they relied on VISN and VAMC officials to ensure that all complaints were consistently entered into VHA's Patient Advocate Tracking System (PATS). However, GAO identified inconsistencies in the extent to which VAMC officials did so. VHA's lack of monitoring may pose a risk that not all complaints are entered into this tracking system\u2014a goal of the program. Additionally, VHA officials stated they did not systemically review data in the system to assess program performance and identify potential system-wide improvements because VHA considered this the responsibility of VAMCs. As a result, VHA officials may miss opportunities to improve veterans' experiences.\nVHA is beginning to address many of these governance, staffing, training, and data issues, including directing a workgroup to provide recommendations by spring of 2018. However, because the recommendations will be advisory, and because program deadlines have slipped in the past, the nature and timing of the actions needed to resolve these issues remain unclear.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making 6 recommendations to improve guidance for and oversight of the patient advocacy program, focusing on governance, staffing, training, and PATS data entry and assessment. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_587"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_588","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFollowing Hurricane Katrina, Congress required FEMA to establish advance contracts for goods and services to enable the government to quickly and effectively mobilize resources in the aftermath of a disaster, like those that affected the United States in 2017.\nGAO was asked to review the federal government's response to the three 2017 hurricanes and California wildfires. This report assesses, among other things, (1) FEMA and USACE's use of advance contracts, (2) FEMA's planning and reporting of selected advance contracts, and (3) challenges, if any, with FEMA's use of these contracts.\nGAO analyzed data from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation through May 31, 2018; selected a non-generalizable sample of 14 FEMA and USACE advance contracts that were competed and obligated over $50 million, or non-competed and obligated over $10 million, in response to the 2017 disasters; and interviewed FEMA and USACE officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn response to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, as well as the 2017 California wildfires, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) relied heavily on advance contracts. As of May 31, 2018, FEMA and USACE obligated about $4.5 billion for various goods and services through these contracts, see figure below.\nGAO found limitations in FEMA's use of some advance contracts that provided critical goods and services to survivors, including\nan outdated strategy and unclear guidance on how contracting officers should use advance contracts during a disaster, and\nchallenges performing acquisition planning.\nFEMA also did not always provide complete information in its reports to congressional committees. Specifically, GAO found 29 advance contract actions that were not included in recent reports due to shortcomings in FEMA's reporting methodology, limiting visibility into its disaster contract spending.\nFEMA identified challenges with advance contracts in 2017, including federal coordination with states and localities on their use. FEMA is required to coordinate with states and localities and encourage them to establish their own advance contracts with vendors. However, GAO found inconsistencies in that coordination and the information FEMA uses to coordinate with states and localities on advance contracts. Without consistent information and coordination with FEMA, states and localities may not have the tools needed to establish their own advance contracts for critical goods and services and quickly respond to future disasters.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making nine recommendations to FEMA, including that it update its strategy and guidance to clarify the use of advance contracts, improve the timeliness of its acquisition planning activities, revise its methodology for reporting disaster contracting actions to congressional committees, and provide more consistent guidance and information to contracting officers to coordinate with and encourage states and localities to establish advance contracts. FEMA concurred with our recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_588"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_589","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Forest Service, an agency within USDA, performs a variety of tasks as steward of 193 million acres of public forests and grasslands. Its budget execution process for carrying out its mission includes (1) allotments, which are authorizations by an agency to incur obligations within a specified amount, and (2) unliquidated obligations, which represent budgetary resources that have been committed but not yet paid. Deobligation refers to an agency's cancellation or downward adjustments of previously incurred obligations, which may result in funds that may be available for reobligation.\nGAO was asked to review the Forest Service's internal controls over its budget execution processes. This report examines the extent to which the Forest Service properly designed control activities over (1) allotments of budgetary resources, its system for administrative control of funds, and any fund transfers between Forest Service appropriations; (2) reimbursables and related collections; and (3) review and certification of unliquidated obligations.\nGAO reviewed the Forest Service's policies, procedures, and other documentation and interviewed agency officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn fiscal years 2015 and 2016, the Forest Service received discretionary no-year appropriations of $5.1 billion and $5.7 billion, respectively. It is critical for the Forest Service to manage its budgetary resources efficiently and effectively. While the Forest Service had processes over certain of its budget execution activities, GAO found the following internal control deficiencies:\nBudgetary resources . The purpose statute requires that amounts designated in appropriations acts for specific purposes are used as designated. The Forest Service did not have an adequate process and related control activities to reasonably assure that amounts were used as designated. In fiscal year 2017, GAO issued a legal opinion that the Forest Service had failed to comply with the purpose statute with regard to a $65 million line-item appropriation specifically provided for the purpose of acquiring aircraft for the next-generation airtanker fleet. Further, the Forest Service lacked a process and related control activities to reasonably assure that unobligated no-year appropriation balances from prior years were reviewed for their continuing need; did not have a properly designed system for administrative control of funds, which keeps obligations and expenditures from exceeding limits authorized by law; and had not properly designed control activities for fund transfers to its Wildland Fire Management program. These deficiencies increase the risk that the Forest Service may make budget requests in excess of its needs.\nReimbursable agreements . To carry out its mission, the Forest Service enters into reimbursable agreements with agencies within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), other federal agencies, state and local government agencies, and nongovernment entities. The Forest Service (1) did not have adequately described processes and related control activities in manuals and handbooks for its reimbursable agreement processes and (2) lacked control activities related to segregating incompatible duties performed by line officers and program managers. For example, line officers may be responsible for initiating cost sharing agreements, modifying cost settlement packages, and changing or canceling the related receivable, which represent incompatible duties. As a result, programs and resources may not be protected from waste, fraud, and mismanagement.\nUnliquidated obligations . The Forest Service's processes and control activities over the review and certification of unliquidated obligations were not properly designed to reasonably assure the best use of funds and that unliquidated obligations would be efficiently and effectively deobligated and made available for other program needs. Further, the current process, as designed, was inconsistent with USDA and Forest Service policy.\nIn addition, the Forest Service's manuals and handbooks, which provide directives for the areas that GAO reviewed, had not been reviewed by management in accordance with the Forest Service's 5-year review policy. Further, standard operating procedures and desk guides prepared by staff to supplement the manuals and handbooks were not issued as directives and therefore were not considered official policy. This increases the risk that control activities may not be consistently performed across the agency.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making 11 recommendations to improve processes and related internal control activities over the management of the Forest Service's budgetary resources, reimbursable receivables and collections, and its process for reviewing unliquidated obligations. The Forest Service generally agreed with the report and stated that it has made significant progress to address the report findings.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_589"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_590","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nMedicare paid $7.1 billion for 433 million laboratory tests in 2017. These tests help health care providers prevent, diagnose, and treat diseases.\nPAMA included a provision for GAO to review CMS's implementation of new payment rates for these tests. This report addresses, among other objectives, (1) how CMS developed the new payment rates; (2) challenges CMS faced in setting accurate payment rates and what factors may have mitigated these challenges; and (3) the potential effect of the new payment rates on Medicare expenditures. GAO analyzed 2016 Medicare claims data (the most recent data available when GAO started its work and the year on which new payment rates were based) and private-payer data CMS collected. GAO also interviewed CMS and industry officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) revised the Clinical Laboratory Fee Schedule (CLFS) for 2018, establishing new Medicare payment rates for laboratory services. Prior to 2018, these rates were based on historical laboratory fees and were typically higher than the rates paid by private payers. The Protecting Access to Medicare Act of 2014 (PAMA) required CMS to develop a national fee schedule for laboratory tests based on private-payer data. To revise the rates, CMS collected data on private-payer rates from approximately 2,000 laboratories and calculated median payment rates, weighted by volume. GAO found that the median private-payer rates were lower than Medicare's maximum payment rates in 2017 for 88 percent of tests. CMS is gradually phasing in reductions to Medicare payment rates, limited annually at 10 percent over a 3-year period (2018 through 2020), as outlined in PAMA.\nCMS relied on laboratories to determine whether they met data reporting requirements, but agency officials told GAO that CMS did not receive data from all laboratories required to report. CMS did not estimate the amount of data it should have received from laboratories that were required to report but did not. CMS took steps to exclude inaccurate private-payer data and estimated how collecting certain types and amounts of additional private-payer data could affect Medicare expenditures. However, it is not known whether CMS's estimates reflect the actual risk of incomplete data resulting in inaccurate Medicare payment rates. GAO found that PAMA's phased in reductions to new Medicare payment rates likely mitigated this risk of inaccurate Medicare payment rates from 2018 through 2020. However, GAO found that collecting incomplete data could have a larger effect on the accuracy of Medicare payment rates in future years when PAMA allows for greater payment-rate reductions.\nCMS's implementation of the new payment rates could lead Medicare to pay billions of dollars more than is necessary and result in CLFS expenditures increasing from what Medicare paid prior to 2018 for two reasons. First, CMS used the maximum Medicare payment rates in 2017 as a baseline to start the phase in of payment-rate reductions instead of using actual Medicare payment rates. This resulted in excess payments for some laboratory tests and, in some cases, higher payment rates than those Medicare previously paid, on average. GAO estimated that Medicare expenditures from 2018 through 2020 may be $733 million more than if CMS had phased in payment-rate reductions based on the average payment rates in 2016. Second, CMS stopped paying a bundled payment rate for certain panel tests (groups of laboratory tests generally performed together), as was its practice prior to 2018, because CMS had not yet clarified its authority to do so under PAMA, according to officials. CMS is currently reviewing whether it has the authority to bundle payment rates for panel tests to reflect the efficiency of conducting a group of tests. GAO estimated that if the payment rate for each panel test were unbundled, Medicare expenditures could increase by as much as $10.3 billion from 2018 through 2020 compared to estimated Medicare expenditures using lower bundled payment rates for panel tests.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that the Administrator of CMS (1) collect complete private-payer data from all laboratories required to report or address the estimated effects of incomplete data, (2) phase in payment-rate reductions that start from the actual payment rates rather than the maximum payment rates Medicare paid prior to 2018, and (3) use bundled rates for panel tests. HHS concurred with GAO's first recommendation, neither agreed nor disagreed with the other two, and has since issued guidance to help address the third. GAO believes CMS should fully address these recommendations to prevent Medicare from paying more than is necessary.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_590"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_591","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nUsing sunscreen as directed with other sun protective measures may help reduce the risk of skin cancer\u2014the most common form of cancer in the United States. In the United States, sunscreen is considered an over-the-counter drug, which is a drug available to consumers without a prescription. Some sunscreen active ingredients not currently marketed in the United States have been available in products in other countries for more than a decade. Companies that manufacture some of these ingredients have sought to market them in the United States by applying to add the ingredients to the sunscreen monograph, which lists ingredients that can be used in sunscreens without FDA's premarket approval. FDA reviews the applications and corresponding safety and effectiveness data for the ingredients.\nThe Sunscreen Innovation Act includes a provision for GAO to examine FDA's implementation of the act. This report examines (1) the extent to which FDA implemented requirements for reviewing applications for sunscreen active ingredients within mandated time frames, and (2) the status of the sunscreen applications. GAO reviewed FDA regulations and guidance documents, Federal Register notices, and FDA and sponsor documents for all eight sunscreen applications. GAO also interviewed FDA officials; sponsors of sunscreen applications; and stakeholders with interests in sunscreen, including health care providers, researchers, and industry groups. Stakeholders were selected based on knowledge of the monograph process and sunscreen active ingredients. The perspectives of these stakeholders are not generalizable.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Food and Drug Administration (FDA), within the Department of Health and Human Services, implemented requirements for reviewing applications for sunscreen active ingredients within time frames set by the Sunscreen Innovation Act, which was enacted in November 2014. For example, the agency issued a guidance document on safety and effectiveness testing in November 2016.\nAs of August 2017, all applications for sunscreen active ingredients remain pending after the agency determined more safety and effectiveness data are needed. By February 2015, FDA completed its initial review of the safety and effectiveness data for each of the eight pending applications, as required by the act. FDA concluded that additional data are needed to determine that the ingredients are generally recognized as safe and effective (GRASE), which is needed so that products using the ingredients can subsequently be marketed in the United States without FDA's premarket approval. To make a GRASE determination, FDA requested that the application sponsors provide additional data, including human clinical studies, animal studies, and efficacy studies.\nSponsors of some of the sunscreen applications and some stakeholders GAO interviewed questioned FDA's requests, stating, for example, that the agency's recommended absorption test has never been conducted on sunscreen ingredients and there is a lack of knowledge on how to conduct it. At the same time, other stakeholders support the additional testing FDA requested. FDA reports that the increase in the amount and frequency of sunscreen usage, coupled with advances in scientific understanding and safety evaluation methods, has informed the agency's perspective that it needs additional data to determine that sunscreen active ingredients are GRASE. However, none of the sponsors reported current plans to provide the requested information\u2014that is, they are either still considering whether to conduct the additional tests or they do not plan to do so. They cited the following reasons:\nReturn on investment. The testing FDA requested is extensive, would cost millions of dollars, or take several years to conduct, according to sponsor representatives. Some stakeholders and sponsor representatives said that sponsors are currently working to develop newer sunscreen ingredients and are therefore reluctant to invest in the testing FDA requested for the older ingredients covered by the pending applications.\nAlternatives not accepted. Some sponsor representatives and stakeholders said that when they proposed alternative testing methods for absorption, for example, the agency rejected the alternatives.\nAnimal testing. One stakeholder and some sponsor representatives reported concerns about the effect that the animal testing requested by FDA may have on companies' marketing of sunscreen products worldwide. Additionally, one stakeholder and representatives from one sponsor expressed concern that sunscreen manufacturers may face backlash from animal rights groups and shareholders if animal testing is conducted.\nThe Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_591"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_592","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nWildlife trafficking\u2014the poaching and illegal trade of plants, fish, and wildlife\u2014is a multibillion-dollar, global criminal activity that imperils thousands of species. FWS and NOAA enforce laws prohibiting wildlife trafficking that authorize the agencies to pay financial rewards for information about such illegal activities.\nGAO was asked to review FWS's and NOAA's use of financial rewards to combat wildlife trafficking. This report examines (1) laws that authorize FWS and NOAA to pay rewards for information on wildlife trafficking and the extent to which the agencies paid such rewards from fiscal years 2007 through 2017, (2) the agencies' reward policies, (3) information available to the public on rewards, and (4) the extent to which the agencies reviewed the effectiveness of their use of rewards.\nGAO reviewed laws, examined FWS and NOAA policies and public communications on rewards, analyzed agency reward data for fiscal years 2007 through 2017 and assessed their reliability, interviewed FWS and NOAA officials, and compared agency policies and public communications on rewards to federal internal control standards.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nMultiple laws\u2014such as the Endangered Species Act and Lacey Act\u2014authorize the Departments of the Interior's U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to pay rewards for information on wildlife trafficking. FWS and NOAA reported paying few rewards from fiscal years 2007 through 2017. Specifically, the agencies collectively reported paying 27 rewards, totaling $205,500. Agency officials said that the information was complete to the best of their knowledge but could not sufficiently assure that this information represented all of their reward payments.\nFWS and NOAA have reward policies that outline the general process for preparing reward proposals, but FWS's policy does not specify factors for its agents to consider when developing proposed reward amounts. Some FWS agents GAO interviewed said that in developing proposals, they did not know whether their proposed reward amounts were enough, too little, or too much. By augmenting its policy to specify factors for agents to consider, FWS can better ensure that its agents have the necessary quality information to prepare proposed reward amounts, consistent with federal internal control standards.\nFWS and NOAA communicate little information to the public on rewards. For example, most agency websites did not indicate that providing information on wildlife trafficking could qualify for a reward. This is inconsistent with federal standards that call for management to communicate quality information so that external parties can help achieve agency objectives. FWS and NOAA officials said they have not communicated general reward information because of workload concerns, but they said it may be reasonable to provide more information in some instances. By developing plans to communicate more reward information to the public, the agencies can improve their chances of obtaining information on wildlife trafficking that they otherwise might not receive.\nFWS and NOAA have not reviewed the effectiveness of their use of rewards. The agencies have not done so because using rewards has generally not been a priority. FWS and NOAA officials agreed that such a review would be worthwhile but provided no plans for doing so. By reviewing the effectiveness of their use of rewards, FWS and NOAA can identify opportunities to improve the usefulness of rewards as a tool for combating wildlife trafficking.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making seven recommendations, including that FWS and NOAA track reward information, FWS augment its reward policy to specify factors for agents to consider when developing proposed reward amounts, FWS and NOAA develop plans to communicate more reward information to the public, and FWS and NOAA review the effectiveness of their reward use. Both agencies concurred with these recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_592"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_593","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nRRB collects payroll taxes and administers retirement, disability, and Medicare benefits for rail workers and their families. A financial interchange exists between RRB, SSA, and HHS in order to put the trust funds for these benefits in the same financial position as if Social Security covered rail workers. RRB generally transfers to the Social Security and Hospital Insurance trust funds the taxes that would be collected from rail workers and employers, while SSA provides RRB the benefits that would otherwise be paid directly to rail workers. GAO was asked to review the financial interchange calculation process.\nThis report examines (1) the steps taken to calculate financial interchange amounts, (2) factors that could account for trends in transfers over time, and (3) the extent to which RRB, SSA, and HHS provide oversight to ensure calculations are accurate. GAO reviewed agency policies, procedures, and regulations; observed RRB staff calculating four cases selected for beneficiary type; reviewed data on payment and beneficiary trends; and interviewed agency officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nEstablished in 1937, the Railroad Retirement Board (RRB) administers retirement and disability benefits for rail workers and their families. A financial interchange between RRB and the Social Security Administration (SSA) was created in 1951, which as GAO previously reported, helped finance RRB benefits as they increased over time to keep pace with growing Social Security benefits to individuals. Through its financial interchange calculation, RRB takes steps each year to estimate the amount of funds that would have flowed in and out of Social Security's trust funds if rail beneficiaries were covered by Social Security instead of RRB. Five key steps go into the annual calculation:\nRRB is credited for (1) the estimated amount of benefits it would have paid to beneficiaries under SSA rules, (2) administrative costs, and (3) interest accrued on the financial interchange amount.\nSSA is credited for the revenues it would have received from rail workers if they paid into Social Security; specifically, (4) payroll taxes and (5) income taxes paid on benefits received.\nThe determined net amounts are transferred between the agencies, which since 1958 have been from SSA to RRB each year. RRB received $4.1 billion in fiscal year 2016, almost one-third of the $12.4 billion in retirement and disability benefits it paid that year. The financial interchange was expanded to Medicare in 1965 to facilitate funding of Medicare benefits to rail workers; RRB transfers Medicare payroll taxes collected, income taxes paid on benefits received, and interest, minus administrative costs to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).\nA high ratio of beneficiaries to active railroad workers primarily explains the net transfers from Social Security's trust funds to RRB each year since 1958. Rail employment has fallen steadily since World War II, and the number of beneficiaries has exceeded the number of workers since 1961. RRB had 2.7 beneficiaries for every worker in 2015. As a result, RRB has paid out more in benefits than it has collected in payroll taxes and projects this to continue for the foreseeable future.\nRRB takes a number of steps each year to ensure the accuracy of its calculations, such as checking that the sample of cases used to estimate benefit payments is complete, reviewing the work of new employees, and using electronic alerts to help prevent staff from entering incorrect information into its computer system. SSA and HHS also conduct high-level reviews of the calculation results to identify any significant changes from one year to the next. However, RRB's process includes manual data entry and its electronic edit checks cannot flag entries that are incorrect but plausible, which could lead to calculation errors. RRB also has limited documentation of its calculation process, and does not have formal policies on how staff should address some potential calculation errors and on how supervisors should review staff work. This is contrary to internal control standards for having quality data and documenting procedures. In terms of SSA and HHS, they do not currently review case-level calculations made by RRB, and cannot reasonably ensure that work used to determine the transfers they made and received is correct.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO makes eight recommendations, including that RRB create formal policies and improve documentation of its processes, work with SSA to obtain data electronically, and that SSA and HHS increase their oversight. RRB and SSA agreed, while HHS did not, asserting that statute limits its authority; however, HHS continues to review this issue. HHS should seek this authority if it determines it necessary.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_593"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_594","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe MOX project, located at DOE's Savannah River Site in South Carolina and overseen by NNSA, experienced significant cost increases and schedule delays following the start of construction in 2007. After spending nearly $6 billion, NNSA terminated the project in October 2018. While DOE and NNSA have made some recent progress, they have historically struggled to complete, within their original cost and schedule estimates, other major construction projects intended to help maintain the nuclear security complex.\nGAO was asked to review issues related to oversight of the MOX project. This report examines (1) when NNSA's project management oversight processes recognized cost and schedule problems at the MOX project and the actions the agency took to address them and (2) the extent to which DOE requires that project management lessons learned from MOX and other projects be documented and shared. GAO reviewed agency documents, visited the MOX project, and interviewed DOE and NNSA officials and representatives of the MOX contractor.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has strengthened its oversight of the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MOX) project since 2011 and, as a result, began recognizing cost and schedule problems. The project, begun in 1997, was intended to dispose of large quantities of weapons-grade plutonium no longer required for national security. Prior to 2011, NNSA's project staff failed to recognize signs that the project would not be completed on time or within its approved cost. An independently conducted analysis, prepared in 2014 in response to a GAO recommendation, determined that NNSA staff did not recognize early problems because they were inexperienced in project management. To strengthen oversight, NNSA in late 2010 and 2011 began actions, such as conducting additional reviews and transferring oversight of the project to a newly established office specializing in project management. NNSA continued to identify the contractor's performance problems, such as the lack of credible, reliable cost and schedule data. These continued problems contributed to NNSA's decision to terminate the project.\nDOE requires that project staff document and share project management lessons learned on capital asset projects like the MOX project, but not all lessons are to be documented consistently or shared in a timely manner. GAO found that DOE's and NNSA's offices document project management lessons learned differently and that not all of the documented lessons learned are readily accessible to other staff. Additionally, GAO found that DOE does not require that project staff share lessons learned for capital asset projects until the start of construction, which can occur many years after the start of the project. Under key practices, such lessons should be stored in a logical, organized manner, be easily retrievable, and be submitted in a timely manner (see fig.). By developing requirements that clearly define how and where project management lessons learned should be documented and requiring that the lessons be shared in a timely manner, DOE could improve its lessons-learned process and help improve the success of future capital asset projects. Also, for capital asset projects, DOE does not require the evaluation of the results of all corrective actions to respond to lessons learned to ensure that problems are resolved, consistent with key practices. By developing requirements to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions, DOE could better verify whether the actions had the intended outcome.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making three recommendations, including that DOE and NNSA develop requirements for defining how and where project management lessons learned for capital asset projects should be documented and shared routinely and in a timely manner, and for evaluating the effectiveness of corrective actions taken in response to lessons learned. DOE agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_594"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_595","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe San Francisco Bay Delta watershed\u2014which drains a vast area of California from the Sierra Nevada Mountains to the Pacific Ocean\u2014supplies drinking water for 25 million people and provides irrigation for about half the nation's fruit and vegetable production. Decades of development and agriculture have led to large reductions in water quality and supply, natural flood protection, and habitats across the watershed's three major regions: the Bay, the Delta, and the upper watershed. Federal entities have been working with nonfederal entities for decades to protect and restore the watershed. GAO was asked to review restoration efforts in the watershed.\nThis report examines, among other objectives, (1) the extent to which federal and nonfederal entities coordinate watershed restoration efforts and (2) information on the status of these efforts and related expenditures for fiscal years 2007 through 2016, the most recent data available. GAO reviewed laws; regional databases, plans, and reports; and budget documents. It also surveyed the 72 members of interagency groups (48 responded) and interviewed federal and nonfederal officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFederal entities, including the Department of the Interior, and nonfederal entities, such as California state agencies and nonprofits, carry out and coordinate a wide range of restoration efforts in the San Francisco Bay Delta watershed. These efforts have multiple benefits, such as improved water quality and habitat in restored marshland (see fig. below). The entities coordinate comprehensive efforts in the San Francisco Bay area (Bay) and Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta (Delta) through two groups. Federal efforts across the watershed are to be led and coordinated by Interior and the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) through a 2009 Interim Federal Action Plan, but not all federal entities are using the plan. Interior officials said the plan is no longer relevant because state and federal roles have changed. For example, they said a state-led committee acts as the coordinating body for federal entities; however, this committee focuses on one region of the watershed, while federal funding supports efforts in all three regions. By updating or revising the Interim Action Plan, Interior and CEQ could help clarify federal roles in supporting restoration efforts in the watershed.\nInformation on the status of all restoration efforts across the watershed, including their accomplishments, is unknown because information is not being fully collected or reported. Also, related expenditures for fiscal years 2007 through 2016 are unknown, in part because federal reports do not include complete or reliable data for restoration efforts in the watershed. The 2004 CALFED Bay-Delta Authorization Act requires Interior and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to report annually to Congress on restoration accomplishments and federal and state expenditures in the watershed, respectively. Interior has not issued these reports since 2009, when the state agency from which Interior had obtained the state data was abolished. OMB has issued its reports with federal, but not state, data for the same reason. However, Interior and OMB have not reached out to other state entities for this information. Without obtaining and reporting available information, as required by law, Interior and OMB will not have reasonable assurance that they are providing Congress with the information needed to monitor federal and nonfederal restoration efforts and expenditures.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO made seven recommendations, including that Interior and CEQ update or revise the Interim Federal Action Plan and that Interior and OMB coordinate with the state to meet the CALFED Act's reporting requirements. Interior partially concurred with the recommendations, and CEQ and OMB neither agreed nor disagreed with them. GAO maintains its recommendations are valid.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_595"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_596","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFOIA requires federal agencies to provide the public with access to government records and information based on the principles of openness and accountability in government. Each year, individuals and entities file hundreds of thousands of FOIA requests for information on numerous topics that contribute to the understanding of government actions. In the last 9 fiscal years, federal agencies subject to FOIA have received about 6 million requests.\nGAO was asked to summarize its draft report on federal agencies' compliance with FOIA requirements. GAO's objectives, among others, were to (1) determine the extent to which agencies have implemented selected FOIA requirements; (2) describe the methods established by agencies to reduce backlogged requests and the effectiveness of those methods; and (3) identify any statutory exemptions that have been used by agencies as the basis for withholding (redacting) information from requesters.\nTo do so, GAO selected 18 agencies based on their size and other factors and assessed their policies against six FOIA requirements. GAO also reviewed the agencies' backlog reduction plans and developed a catalog of statutes that agencies have used to withhold information.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn its draft report, GAO determined that all 18 selected agencies had implemented three of six Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requirements reviewed. Specifically, all agencies had updated response letters to inform requesters of the right to seek assistance from FOIA public liaisons, implemented request tracking systems, and provided training to FOIA personnel. For the three additional requirements, 15 agencies had provided online access to government information, such as frequently requested records, 12 agencies had designated chief FOIA officers, and 5 agencies had published and updated their FOIA regulations to inform the public of their operations. Until these agencies address all of the requirements, they increase the risk that the public will lack information that ensures transparency and accountability in government operations.\nThe 18 selected agencies had backlogs of varying sizes, with 4 agencies having backlogs of 1,000 or more requests during fiscal years 2012 through 2016. These 4 agencies reported using best practices identified by the Department of Justice, such as routinely reviewing metrics, as well as other methods, to help reduce their backlogs. Nevertheless, these agencies' backlogs fluctuated over the 5-year period (see figure). The 4 agencies with the largest backlogs attributed challenges in reducing their backlogs to factors such as increases in the number and complexity of FOIA requests. However, these agencies lacked plans that described how they intend to implement best practices to reduce backlogs. Until agencies develop such plans, they will likely continue to struggle to reduce backlogs to a manageable level.\nAgencies used various types of statutory exemptions to withhold information when processing FOIA requests during fiscal years 2010 to 2016. The majority of these fell into the following categories: personally identifiable information, national security, law enforcement and investigations, and confidential and commercial business information.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO's draft report contains recommendations to selected agencies to post records online, designate chief FOIA officers, update regulations consistent with requirements, and develop plans to reduce backlogs.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_596"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_597","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nLong Island Sound, an estuary bordered by Connecticut and New York, provides numerous economic and recreational benefits. However, development and pollution have resulted in environmental impacts, such as the degradation of water quality. EPA partnered with both states to create the Study to restore and protect the Sound. The Study developed a comprehensive conservation and management plan in 1994 and updated the plan in 2015.\nGAO was asked to examine federal efforts to restore the Sound. This report examines, among other objectives, (1) what is known about the progress made toward achieving the 1994 plan, (2) how Study members plan to measure and report on progress toward achieving the 2015 plan, and (3) estimated costs of the restoration. GAO reviewed Study plans, reports, and data. GAO also interviewed 12 Study members\u2014including federal and state agency officials\u2014and representatives of 5 Study work groups about restoration efforts and progress made.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Long Island Sound Study (the Study) is a federal-state partnership formed in 1985 to restore Long Island Sound. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and officials from Connecticut and New York provide oversight for the Study, which includes federal and state agencies, nonprofit organizations, and other groups. GAO found the following:\nProgress toward 1994 Plan. The Study established an initial plan for the Sound in 1994 and has collected data on certain indicators of the Sound's health and published progress reports on its website. However, the Study has not comprehensively assessed progress against the 1994 plan. In the absence of such an assessment, GAO interviewed Study members who generally agreed that moderate progress has been made in achieving goals for five of the six problem areas in the 1994 plan. Without a comprehensive assessment, it is not possible to determine the extent these views reflect actual progress.\nReporting Progress for the 2015 Plan. The Study's 2015 management plan identifies 20 long-term targets and associated numerical indicators that will be used to measure future progress. The Study has also updated the format for pages on its website to provide more consistent progress reports for these targets. However, the reports do not yet fully incorporate leading practices for performance reporting that GAO has previously identified. For example, they do not include evaluations of goals that are not met for 15 targets. By ensuring that leading practices are fully incorporated into the Study's performance reporting efforts, EPA can help the Study better assess and report on future progress.\nEstimating Costs of Restoration. The Study has estimated that the future costs of restoration will be at least $18.9 billion through 2035. However, the current estimates are understated because they do not include the costs of all activities that will be needed to accomplish the 2015 plan, and they do not reflect the uncertainty associated with some of the costs. By capturing the full costs and uncertainties in cost estimates, the Study can provide decision makers critical information needed to allocate resources effectively.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that EPA work with the Study to ensure that it fully incorporates leading practices into its performance reporting efforts and that its cost estimates include the full range of activities as well as those for which there is uncertainty. EPA agreed with GAO's recommendations and highlighted steps the agency will take to meet the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_597"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_598","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFMD is a highly contagious viral disease that causes painful lesions on the hooves and mouths of some livestock, making it difficult for them to stand or eat, thus greatly reducing meat and milk production. The United States has not had an FMD outbreak since 1929, but FMD is present in much of the world. An FMD outbreak in the United States could have serious economic impacts, in part because trade partners would likely halt all imports of U.S. livestock and livestock products until the disease was eradicated. These imports were valued at more than $19 billion in 2017.\nGAO was asked to review USDA's efforts to prepare for an FMD outbreak. This report examines (1) USDA's planned approach for responding to an FMD outbreak; (2) challenges USDA would face in pursuing its response goals; and (3) how USDA identifies, prioritizes, and monitors corrective actions to mitigate the challenges. GAO observed a USDA FMD preparedness exercise; reviewed agency documents and nongeneralizable questionnaire responses from 29 respondents from federal and state government, livestock industries, and universities; and interviewed officials from federal and state governments and representatives of livestock industries and universities.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) planned approach for responding to an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) includes several strategies. These strategies generally rely on killing infected and susceptible animals, vaccinating uninfected animals, or a combination of both approaches. USDA would implement one or more of the strategies, depending on factors such as the outbreak's size and the resources available, according to agency documents.\nUSDA would likely face significant challenges in pursuing its response goals of detecting, controlling, and containing FMD quickly; eradicating FMD while seeking to stabilize industry and the economy; and facilitating continuity of commerce in uninfected animals. GAO identified challenges in 11 areas\u2014including allocating a limited supply of FMD vaccine\u2014based on its review of USDA documents, responses to GAO's questionnaire, and interviews with agency officials and others with expertise on FMD. According to USDA, the agency may not have a sufficient supply of FMD vaccine to control more than a small outbreak because of limited resources to obtain vaccine. As shown below, the current vaccine supply would be sufficient to protect about 14 percent of Texas's cattle or about 4 percent of Iowa's swine; these states' cattle and swine populations are the nation's largest. The Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 includes a provision to increase the FMD vaccine supply.\nUSDA has identified dozens of corrective actions to mitigate the challenges of responding to an FMD outbreak, as called for in USDA procedures, but has not prioritized these corrective actions or monitored their completion, as also called for in its procedures. USDA has identified the corrective actions through exercises simulating FMD outbreaks, surveys, and lessons learned from other foreign animal disease outbreaks. However, USDA has not completed all of the corrective actions, including actions related to vaccination. Agency officials stated that they have not completed such corrective actions because they have been responding to outbreaks of other animal diseases and have limited resources. Without following agency procedures to prioritize and monitor corrective actions, USDA cannot ensure that it is allocating its resources to the most beneficial actions to prepare for a possible FMD outbreak.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is recommending that USDA follow its procedures to prioritize and monitor the completion of corrective actions that the agency has identified for FMD preparedness. USDA agreed with these recommendations, and described actions it will take to implement them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_598"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_599","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nForeign acquisitions of U.S. companies can pose challenges for the U.S. government as it balances the economic benefits of foreign direct investment with the need to protect national security. CFIUS is an interagency group, led by Treasury, that reviews certain transactions\u2014foreign acquisitions or mergers of U.S. businesses\u2014to determine their effect on U.S. national security and whether the transaction may proceed.\nGAO was asked to review DOD's ability, as a member of CFIUS, to address defense issues. This report assesses factors, if any, that affect DOD's ability to identify and address national security concerns through the CFIUS process, among other objectives. GAO analyzed data on DOD co-led transactions from January 2012 through December 2017, the most recent data available. GAO also interviewed DOD and Treasury officials and reviewed documentation to identify DOD's CFIUS processes, resources, and responsibilities and selected a non-generalizable sample of nine DOD component reviewers, based on their participation in the CFIUS process.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) faces challenges identifying and addressing evolving national security concerns posed by some foreign investments in the United States.\nResources: DOD's Office of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy represents the department and coordinates DOD's participation on the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). As a committee member, DOD co-leads CFIUS's review and investigation of transactions between foreign acquirers and U.S. businesses where it has expertise. DOD co-led 99 transactions in calendar year 2017, or 57 percent more transactions than it co-led in 2012, while the annual authorized positions increased from 12 to 17 during that same time period. DOD's workload has also been affected by the volume and complexity of the transactions it is responsible for co-leading, in addition to other CFIUS responsibilities, such as identifying transactions that foreign acquirers do not voluntarily file with CFIUS. DOD has taken some steps to address its resource limitations, but has not fully assessed the department-wide resources needed to address its growing workload.\nEmerging Technology and Proximity: DOD officials identified some investments that pose national security concerns from foreign acquirers gaining access to emerging technologies or being in close proximity to critical military locations, which, according to officials, cannot always be addressed through CFIUS because the investments would not result in foreign control of a U.S. business. DOD and Department of the Treasury (Treasury) officials said addressing these investments may require legislative action. DOD is taking steps to identify critical emerging technologies and military locations that should be protected from foreign investment. However, DOD has not fully assessed risks from these types of foreign investment or what additional authorities, if any, may be necessary for it to address them.\nPolicy: DOD's CFIUS Instruction does not clearly identify some reviewer responsibilities or processes for identifying transactions that foreign acquirers do not voluntarily file with CFIUS. The policy is also outdated and inconsistent with current practices.\nDOD's CFIUS Instruction and federal internal control standards emphasize the importance of assessing organizational structures, policies, and procedures to respond to risks. Without assessing resources needed to address its CFIUS workload and risks from foreign investment in emerging technologies or in proximity to critical military locations, and ensuring its policies and processes clearly reflect the issues facing the department, DOD is at risk of being unable to respond to evolving national security concerns.\nThis is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in April 2018. Information that DOD and Treasury deemed sensitive has been omitted.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making eight recommendations, including that DOD assess resources needed to address workload, assess risks from foreign investment in emerging technologies and in close proximity to critical military locations, and update its policies and processes to better reflect the evolving national security concerns facing the department. DOD and Treasury agreed with GAO's recommendations, and have identified some actions to address them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_599"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_600","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nUnder the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, as amended, federal judges and certain judicial employees must file financial disclosure reports that can be made available to the public. Federal law accounts for the potential security risks of the judiciary and authorizes the redaction of information from judicial officials' reports if the Judicial Conference, in consultation with the United States Marshals Service (USMS), finds that revealing certain information could endanger judicial officials or members of their families.\nThis report addresses the following for calendar years 2012 through 2016, the most recent years for which full data were available: (1) Actions taken by the Judicial Conference to ensure judicial officials file financial disclosure reports, and the number of reports filed; (2) The judiciary's compliance with procedures for responding to requests for financial disclosure reports and the number of reports released; and (3) The number of redaction requests made, the types of information requested to be redacted, and the judiciary's consistency in reporting results to Congress in a timely manner.\nGAO interviewed AOUSC and USMS officials, reviewed relevant laws and guidance, and analyzed data on redaction requests.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Judicial Conference, the federal judiciary's principle policy-making body, developed an electronic filing system, guidance, and a compliance process to help ensure judicial officials file financial disclosure reports that adhere to applicable laws and regulations, and data provided by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC) show that more than 4,000 reports were required to be filed annually from 2012 through 2016. According to AOUSC officials, as of March 2018, all financial disclosure reports required to be filed from 2012 through 2016 were filed, except for one in 2015 and one in 2016. AOUSC officials are working with the filers to ensure these reports will be filed.\nThe Judicial Conference established procedures for responding to requests for copies of financial disclosure reports, and the number of reports released has varied. From 2012 through 2016, AOUSC annually received, on average, about 70 requests for copies of judicial officials' reports and released approximately 16,000 reports during this time. Each request can vary\u2014from a request for a single judicial official's report to a request for multiple judicial officials' reports.\nFrom 2012 through 2016, a small percentage of judicial officials requested redactions from their financial disclosure reports. On average, 3.2 percent of financial disclosure reports filed included a redaction request and about 85 percent of those requests were granted. Of the information requested to be redacted, about 76 percent was related to the unsecured location of a judicial official's spouse, child, or residence. AOUSC is required by federal law to submit annual reports to Congress on use of the judicial redaction authority, such as the number of reports with redactions and types of information redacted, but AOUSC has not consistently submitted the reports on an annual basis in recent years. GAO found that AOUSC does not have a formal process for preparing and submitting the reports to Congress. Implementing a more formal process, with specified steps and timeframes, would better position AOUSC to provide Congress with more timely reports.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that AOUSC develop and implement a formal process, with steps and timeframes, to better ensure that required annual reports are submitted to Congress within the following year. AOUSC concurred with the recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_600"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_601","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Navy's Columbia class ballistic missile submarines will replace the 14 Ohio class that currently provide the sea-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, slated to begin retiring in 2027. The first Columbia must begin patrols in 2031 to prevent a gap in deterrent capabilities; the class will ultimately carry up to 70 percent of the nation's strategic nuclear capability. The program is a top Navy priority with an expected cost of $267 billion over its life cycle, including $128 billion to research, develop, and buy 12 submarines.\nHouse Report 114-102 included a provision for GAO to examine the Columbia class program. Among other things, this review examines (1) the status of key Columbia class technologies; and (2) potential risks with the Navy's planned approach for design and construction.\nGAO reviewed the Navy's technology readiness assessment, technology development plan, and the status of key prototyping efforts, and compared efforts with GAO's identified best practices for shipbuilding programs and technology readiness assessments. GAO also assessed the status of design maturity and the Navy's acquisition strategy and interviewed relevant officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAdditional development and testing are required to demonstrate the maturity of several Columbia class submarine technologies that are critical to performance, including the Integrated Power System, nuclear reactor, common missile compartment, and propulsor and related coordinated stern technologies (see figure). As a result, it is unknown at this point whether they will work as expected, be delayed, or cost more than planned. Any unexpected delays could postpone the deployment of the lead submarine past the 2031 deadline.\nFurther, the Navy underrepresented the program's technology risks in its 2015 Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) when it did not identify these technologies as critical. Development of these technologies is key to meeting cost, schedule, and performance requirements. A reliable TRA serves as the basis for realistic discussions on how to mitigate risks as programs move forward from the early stages of technology development. Not identifying these technologies as critical means Congress may not have had the full picture of the technology risks and their potential effect on cost, schedule, and performance goals as increasing financial commitments were made. The Navy is not required to provide Congress with an update on the program's progress, including its technology development efforts, until fiscal year 2020\u2014when $8.7 billion for lead ship construction will have already been authorized. Periodic reporting on technology development efforts in the interim could provide decision makers assurances about the remaining technical risks as the Navy asks for increasing levels of funding.\nConsistent with GAO's identified best practices, the Navy intends to complete much of the submarine's overall design prior to starting construction to reduce the risk of cost and schedule growth. However, the Navy recently awarded a contract for detail design while critical technologies remain unproven\u2014a practice not in line with best practices that has led to cost growth and schedule delays on other programs. Proceeding into detail design and construction with immature technologies can lead to design instability and cause construction delays. The Navy plans to accelerate construction of the lead submarine to compensate for an aggressive schedule, which may lead to future delays if the technologies are not fully mature before construction starts, planned for 2021.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO had suggested a matter for congressional consideration related to additional reporting on the Columbia class technologies, but removed it because of recent legislation that implements this requirement. Department of Defense comments on the draft were incorporated as appropriate in this report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_601"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_602","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nVA provides services and benefits to veterans through hospitals and other facilities nationwide. Misconduct by VA employees can have serious consequences for some veterans, including poor quality of care. GAO was asked to review employee misconduct across VA. This report reviews the extent to which VA (1) collects reliable information associated with employee misconduct and disciplinary actions, (2) adheres to documentation-retention procedures when adjudicating cases of employee misconduct, (3) ensures allegations of misconduct involving senior officials are reviewed according to VA investigative standards and these officials are held accountable, and (4) has procedures to investigate whistle-blower allegations of misconduct; and the extent to which (5) data and whistle-blower testimony indicate whether retaliation for disclosing misconduct occurs at VA.\nGAO analyzed 12 information systems across VA to assess the reliability of misconduct data, examined a stratified random sample of 544 misconduct cases from 2009 through 2015, analyzed data and reviewed cases pertaining to senior officials involved in misconduct, reviewed procedures pertaining to whistle-blower investigations, and examined a nongeneralizable sample of whistle-blower disclosures from 2010 to 2014.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) collects data related to employee misconduct and disciplinary actions, but fragmentation and data-reliability issues impede department-wide analysis of those data. VA maintains six information systems that include partial data related to employee misconduct. For example, VA's Personnel and Accounting Integrated Data system collects information on disciplinary actions that affect employee leave and pay, but the system does not collect information on other types of disciplinary actions. The system also does not collect information such as the offense or date of occurrence. GAO also identified six other information systems that various VA administrations and program offices use to collect specific information regarding their respective employees' misconduct and disciplinary actions. GAO's analysis of all 12 information systems found data-reliability issues\u2014such as missing data, lack of identifiers, and lack of standardization among fields. Without collecting reliable misconduct and disciplinary action data on all cases department-wide, VA's reporting and decision making on misconduct are impaired.\nVA inconsistently adhered to its guidance for documentation retention when adjudicating misconduct allegations, based on GAO's review of a generalizable sample of 544 out of 23,622 misconduct case files associated with employee disciplinary actions affecting employee pay. GAO estimates that VA would not be able to account for approximately 1,800 case files. Further, GAO estimates that approximately 3,600 of the files did not contain required documentation that employees were adequately informed of their rights during adjudication procedures\u2014such as their entitlement to be represented by an attorney. The absence of files and associated documentation suggests that individuals may not have always received fair and reasonable due process as allegations of misconduct were adjudicated. Nevertheless, VA's Office of Human Resource Management does not regularly assess the extent to which files and documentation are retained consistently with applicable requirements.\nVA did not consistently ensure that allegations of misconduct involving senior officials were reviewed according to investigative standards and these officials were held accountable. For example, based on a review of 23 cases of alleged misconduct by senior officials that the VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) referred to VA facility and program offices for additional investigation, GAO found VA frequently did not include sufficient documentation for its findings, or provide a timely response to the OIG. In addition, VA was unable to produce any documentation used to close 2 cases. Further, OIG policy does not require the OIG to verify the completeness of investigations, which would help ensure that facility and program offices had met the requirements for investigating allegations of misconduct. Regarding senior officials, VA did not always take necessary measures to ensure they were held accountable for substantiated misconduct. As the figure below shows, GAO found that the disciplinary action proposed was not taken for 5 of 17 senior officials with substantiated misconduct.\nAs a result of June 2017 legislation, a new office within VA\u2014the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection\u2014will be responsible for receiving and investigating allegations of misconduct involving senior officials.\nVA has procedures for investigating whistle-blower complaints, but the procedures allow the program office or facility where a whistle-blower has reported misconduct to conduct the investigation. According to the OIG, it has the option of investigating allegations of misconduct, or exercising a \u201cright of first refusal\u201d whereby it refers allegations of misconduct to the VA facility or program office where the allegation originated. VA does not have oversight measures to ensure that all referred allegations of misconduct are investigated by an entity outside the control of the facility or program office involved in the misconduct, to ensure independence. As a result, GAO found instances where managers investigated themselves for misconduct, presenting a conflict of interest.\nData and whistle-blower testimony indicate that retaliation may have occurred at VA. As the table below shows, individuals who filed a disclosure of misconduct with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) received disciplinary action at a much higher rate than the peer average for the rest of VA in fiscal years 2010\u20132014.\nAdditionally, GAO's interviews with six VA whistle-blowers who claim to have been retaliated against provided anecdotal evidence that retaliation may be occurring. These whistle-blowers alleged that managers in their chain of command took several untraceable actions to retaliate against the whistle-blowers, such as being denied access to computer equipment necessary to complete assignments.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO makes numerous recommendations to VA to help enhance its ability to address misconduct issues (several of the recommendations are detailed on the following page).\nGAO recommends, among other things, that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs\ndevelop and implement guidance to collect complete and reliable misconduct and disciplinary-action data department-wide; such guidance should include direction and procedures on addressing blank fields, lack of personnel identifiers, and standardization among fields;\ndirect applicable facility and program offices to adhere to VA's policies regarding misconduct adjudication documentation;\ndirect the Office of Human Resource Management to routinely assess the extent to which misconduct-related files and documents are retained consistently with applicable requirements;\ndirect the Office of Accountability and Whistleblower Protection (OAWP) to review responses submitted by facility or program offices to ensure evidence produced in senior-official case referrals demonstrates that the required elements have been addressed;\ndirect OAWP to issue written guidance on how OAWP will verify whether appropriate disciplinary action has been implemented; and\ndevelop procedures to ensure (1) whistle-blower investigations are reviewed by an official independent of and at least one level above the individual involved in the allegation, and (2) VA employees who report wrongdoing are treated fairly and protected against retaliation.\nGAO also recommends, among other things, that the VA OIG\nrevise its policy and require verification of evidence produced in senior-official case referrals.\nVA concurred with nine recommendations and partially concurred with five. In response, GAO modified three of the recommendations. The VA OIG concurred with one recommendation and partially concurred with the other. GAO continues to believe that both are warranted.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_602"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_603","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Lab was created as a USAID bureau in April 2014. The Lab was intended to institutionalize and improve USAID's ability to harness and leverage science, technology, innovation, and partnerships in addressing development issues and goals worldwide. The Lab supports projects and activities and announces, issues, and manages awards\u2014or funding opportunities\u2014for innovators to propose new ideas, approaches, and technologies. The Lab also incorporates external (i.e., non-USAID) contributions into its programming.\nSenate Report 114-290 included a provision for GAO to review the Lab. GAO's report examines, among other things, (1) the Lab's programs, funding, and staffing resources and (2) the extent to which the Lab has documented its oversight of awards with non-USAID contributions and clearly reported these contributions. GAO reviewed and analyzed agency documents and interviewed agency officials in Washington, D.C., and from six missions. GAO also analyzed selected Lab documentation for fiscal years 2014 through 2017.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) Global Development Lab (the Lab) has programs and activities for each of its five strategic objectives: science, technology, innovation, and partnerships (STIP) and agency integration of STIP. The Lab comprises five centers and two support offices (see figure). The centers house more than 25 Lab programs focused on issues such as development research, digital development, innovation ventures, and private sector engagement. The Lab's funding for its programs has generally been decreasing, as have its staffing numbers, since fiscal year 2015. USAID allocations of program funds to the Lab decreased from $170.7 million in fiscal year 2015 to $77 million in fiscal year 2017.\nAlthough the Lab has documented its oversight of awards that include non-USAID contributions, some data it collects for these contributions are outdated and its public reporting of such data lacks transparency.\nFor awards GAO reviewed, the Lab consistently documented its compliance with key award oversight requirements. However, its Internal Guide to Accounting for Leverage (internal guide) does not include instructions for ensuring the data for these contributions are current. As a result, GAO found the Lab's management information system contained outdated data for non-USAID contributions in 10 of 24 awards GAO reviewed.\nThe Lab publicly reports a broader range of non-USAID contributions than the types described in USAID policy. However, the Lab's internal guide does not require the Lab to disclose the types of contributions represented in its public reporting. As a result, the Lab's public reporting of such contributions lacks transparency.\nUSAID policy and standards for internal control in the federal government require the use and communication of timely and reliable information. Revising the Lab's internal guide to include instructions for updating data on non-USAID contributions and requiring the Lab's public reporting to disclose the types of contributions represented would help the Lab ensure accuracy and transparency in the information it reports to Congress and the public.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that USAID ensure that the Lab revises its Internal Guide to Accounting for Leverage to (1) include instructions for updating data on non-USAID contributions for awards and (2) require its public reporting of non-USAID contributions to disclose the types of contributions represented.\nUSAID concurred with both recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_603"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_604","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn fiscal year 2017, federal agencies obligated more than $500 billion to acquire products and services. These products and services included military aircraft, information technology software, and maintenance services.\nAmid this large spending, the federal government has taken steps to reform federal acquisitions, increase efficiencies, and improve results. For example, in the Services Acquisition Reform Act of 2003, Congress established the Acquisition Advisory Panel to review federal acquisition laws, regulations, and policies; and identify opportunities for improvement. The Panel issued its final report in 2007, addressing topics that span all three phases of the contracting life cycle identified by GAO: pre-contract award, contract award, and post-contract award.\nGAO was asked to follow up on the Panel's report and identify progress made since 2007. This report identifies the actions the federal government has taken to address key issues raised in the Panel's report, and the challenges that remain. GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed personnel from federal agencies and the private sector. These personnel included staff from OMB that are responsible for federal procurement policy, as well as staff supporting a panel addressing DOD's acquisition regulations and processes, known as the Section 809 Panel. GAO also leveraged its large body of work on federal acquisitions.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nCongress and the executive branch have taken numerous actions to address key issues the Acquisition Advisory Panel (Panel) identified in its 2007 report, but these actions have not eliminated some enduring challenges. The figure below presents the key issues the Panel addressed in relation to the life cycle of a typical contract as identified by GAO.\nThree of the key issues, and the corresponding challenges, align with specific phases in the contracting life cycle:\nRequirements Definition: The Panel found that fully identifying requirements before a contract is awarded is key to achieving the benefits of competition. GAO has found that unrealistic requirements have contributed to poor program outcomes at the Department of Defense (DOD), and that the Army's requirements development workforce decreased by 22 percent from 2008 to 2017.\nCompetition and Pricing: The Panel said that competition can help reduce prices. GAO's work shows that competition rates have remained steady government-wide, and declined at DOD. See figure below.\nGAO has also found that agencies are sometimes using bridge contracts\u2014which GAO has generally defined as either extensions to existing contracts or new short-term, sole-source contracts\u2014to avoid a lapse in service caused by delay of a follow-on contract award. In some instances, bridge contract awards delay opportunities for competition and can place the government at risk of paying higher prices for multiple years. The figure below depicts how an Army bridge contract for computer support services planned for 12 months was extended to 42 months.\nContractor Oversight: The Panel raised questions about the capacity of federal agencies to oversee contractors. GAO has found that agencies continue to award contracts warranting increased management attention at a steady rate, such as contracts for management support services. With contracts like those for management support services, there is an increased risk that contractors may perform tasks reserved for the government. Additionally, GAO found that heavy workloads at the Department of Veterans Affairs have made it difficult for officials who oversee contractors to ensure contractors adhere to contract terms.\nThree of the key issues, and the corresponding challenges, cut across all the phases of the contracting life cycle:\nAcquisition Workforce: The Panel found that the federal acquisition workforce faces workload and training challenges. GAO's work has shown that DOD has enhanced its workforce, but some workforce gaps endure at DOD and across agencies.\nFederal Procurement Data: The Panel found that the government's primary repository for acquisition data contained some unreliable data. Also, GAO has found that the system has demonstrated limitations. For example, guidance from the Office of Management Budget (OMB) required that agencies collect specific contract award data, but the system did not have the capability to do so.\nSmall Business Participation: The Panel found a number of challenges hindering agencies' efforts to meet small business goals. GAO has found small business participation has increased, but many agencies are not in full compliance with requirements governing Offices of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBUs). For example, the directors of these offices should report directly to agency heads or their deputies, but not all agencies have established this type of direct reporting relationship.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making any new recommendations in this report, but it has made numerous recommendations in the past. The agencies have agreed with many of GAO's recommendations, and have implemented some of them but not others. For example, GAO has made the following recommendations.\nThe Army should assess the resources needed for the requirements development process. The Army agreed, but it has not yet done so.\nOMB should provide guidance for agencies to manage bridge contracts. OMB agreed and has drafted management guidance but has not yet finalized it.\nCertain federal agencies should take steps to document how they conduct market research. The agencies agreed and did so.\nThe Department of Veterans Affairs should develop tools to help oversee contracts. The department agreed and did so.\nDOD should have issued an updated acquisition workforce plan in fiscal year 2016. DOD agreed and issued the plan.\nOMB should take steps to improve how agencies collect certain procurement data. OMB generally agreed, but has not yet addressed the recommendation.\nCertain federal agencies should take steps to comply with OSDBU-related requirements. Most agencies that provided comments agreed or partially agreed. Two agencies\u2014the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the U.S. Agency for International Development\u2014have addressed the recommendations.\nGAO continues to believe the agencies should implement all of these recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_604"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_605","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCountering the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a national security priority that is challenged by weapons advances from existing nuclear states and other actors possessing or attempting to possess nuclear weapons. To help address these issues, Congress directed the Administration in 2015 and 2017 to develop a plan for verification and monitoring relating to the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons, components of such weapons, and fissile material. GAO reviewed the first plan submitted to Congress in 2015, and an update submitted in 2017. GAO reported in March 2018 that this plan and update generally did not address the congressionally mandated reporting requirements.\nIn the fiscal year 2018 NDAA, Congress directed the Administration to develop another plan and included a provision for GAO to review the plan. This report assesses whether the Administration's new plan provided details on the reporting requirements included in the NDAA.\nTo determine whether the plan provided details on the reporting requirements, GAO reviewed the fiscal year 2018 plan and assessed whether the plan included details for each of the elements as required by the NDAA.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO found that the 2018 plan provided details on most of the reporting requirements in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2018, but did not include information on future costs and funding needs (see table below). In the NDAA, Congress directed the President to produce a plan that would address four reporting requirements: (1) a plan and roadmap on verification, detection and monitoring efforts, including details on costs and funding needs over 10 years, (2) an international engagement plan, (3) a research and development plan, and (4) a description of interagency engagement. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy, developed the plan and submitted it to Congress in April 2018.\nAccording to NNSA officials, NNSA did not include long-term costs and funding needs in the plan because identifying these needs is unrealistic for several reasons, including because agencies have little influence over the spending priorities of other departments outside of the President's budget process. However, NNSA and other agencies already develop plans with long-term funding priorities and cost estimates for other programs. Because the plan does not include any estimates on future costs and funding needs, it limits congressional understanding of the long-term affordability of the nation's verification and monitoring efforts and its ability to make necessary funding and policy decisions. GAO has previously reported that providing estimates of future costs and funding needs can help congressional decisionmakers prioritize projects and identify long-term funding needs. By including in its plan estimates of future costs and funding needed to support the activities in the plan, NNSA could help provide assurance that agencies are allocating appropriate resources to the verification and monitoring effort and that these resources are aligned with future activities and processes.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that the Administrator of NNSA should include in its plan estimates of future costs and funding needed to support the activities in the plan. NNSA neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation, but said it planned no further action. GAO maintains that the recommendation is valid.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_605"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_606","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFoster care caseloads have increased in recent years due, in part, to the national opioid epidemic. States have struggled to find foster families for children who can no longer live with their parents, including those who need TFC services. States may use private providers, such as non-profit and for-profit organizations, to help recruit and retain foster families. States may also use federal funds provided by HHS for these efforts. GAO was asked to review states' efforts to recruit and retain foster families.\nThis report examines: (1) how state child welfare agencies recruit foster families, including those who provide TFC services, (2) any challenges in recruiting and retaining foster families, and (3) the extent to which HHS provides support to child welfare agencies in these efforts. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; interviewed HHS officials; surveyed child welfare agencies in all states and the District of Columbia; held discussion groups with private providers and foster parents who provide TFC services; and conducted interviews with officials in California, Georgia, and Indiana, which were selected for factors such as changes in foster care caseloads, opioid abuse rates, and geographic location.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nStates employ a range of strategies to recruit foster families and nearly all use private providers to recruit, particularly for therapeutic foster care (TFC) services, in which parents receive training and support to care for children who need a higher level of care. Recruitment strategies include searching for relatives, conducting outreach to the community, targeting certain populations, and obtaining referrals from current foster families. In response to GAO's national survey, 49 states reported using private providers to recruit foster families. In the three selected states where GAO conducted interviews, private providers were responsible for both recruiting and retaining foster families, such as helping families become licensed and providing them with support (see fig.).\nStates reported various challenges with recruiting and retaining foster families in response to GAO's survey. In recruiting families, over two-thirds of states reported challenges such as limited funding and staff, which can make prioritizing recruitment efforts difficult; extensive licensing processes; and difficulties finding families willing to care for certain children, such as those with high needs. In retaining families, 29 states reported concerns about inadequate support for foster families, which can include difficulties contacting child welfare agency caseworkers. In addition, 31 states reported limited access to services needed to care for children, such as child care.\nThe U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) provides a number of supports to help states recruit and retain foster families, including technical assistance with their recruitment programs, guidance and information, and funding. Most states GAO surveyed found HHS's supports moderately or very helpful. However, several private providers GAO interviewed in three selected states said they have not received guidance or information from child welfare agencies about recruiting and retaining foster families. In addition, 11 of the 14 providers said they were unaware of related HHS supports and all of them described concerns about communication with child welfare agencies. HHS officials said they encourage states to involve all relevant stakeholders in their efforts, though HHS has focused on supporting child welfare agencies. Consistent with internal control standards on communication, determining whether information on working with private providers would be useful to states could help HHS better support states' use of private providers in efforts to recruit and retain foster families.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends HHS seek feedback from states on whether information on effective ways to work with private providers to recruit and retain foster families would be useful and if so, provide such information. HHS agreed with GAO's recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_606"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_607","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe MHS includes more than 241,000 active duty, reserve, federal civilian, and contractor personnel who provide (1) operational medical care in support of war and other contingencies and (2) beneficiary medical care within DOD's hospitals and clinics.\nThe Senate Report 115-125 accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 contained a provision for GAO to review how DOD determines its mix of military, federal civilian, and contractor personnel. This report examines the military departments' planning processes for determining (1) operational medical personnel requirements, including an assessment of the mix of federal civilian, contractor, and active and reserve medical personnel; and (2) the most appropriate workforce mix at MTFs and any challenges in executing their desired workforce mix. GAO compared MHS staffing practices with DOD policy, and analyzed fiscal year 2017 budgetary data to determine the proportion of military, federal civilian, and contractor personnel. GAO also interviewed senior leaders at six MTFs.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe military departments each have their own processes to determine their operational medical personnel requirements; however, their planning processes to meet those requirements do not consider the use of all medical personnel or the full cost of military personnel. Specifically:\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) has not assessed the suitability of federal civilians and contractors to meet operational medical personnel requirements. Federal civilians and contractors play key roles in supporting essential missions, i.e. providing operational assistance via combat support. Military department officials expressed a preference for using military personnel and cited possible difficulties in securing federal civilian and contractor interest in such positions. An assessment of the suitability of federal civilians and contractors could provide options for meeting operational medical personnel requirements.\nWhen determining the balance of active and reserve component medical personnel, the military departments' processes generally do not consider full personnel costs, including education and benefits. Specifically, officials stated that the Army and the Navy do not consider personnel costs in their assessment of the appropriate balance between active and reserve personnel, and the Air Force's analysis had some limitations. DOD policy states that workforce decisions must be made with an awareness of the full costs. Further, in a 2013 report, DOD identified the cost of unit manning, training, and equipping as one of five factors that play a key role in decisions concerning the mix of active and reserve component forces. By developing full cost information for active and reserve component medical personnel, DOD can better ensure an appropriate and cost-effective mix of personnel.\nThe military departments have taken actions, such as establishing policies and procedures, to assess the appropriate workforce mix for beneficiary care within Military Treatment Facilities (MTFs), but challenges remain. The military departments distribute military personnel across the MTFs and then use policies and procedures to consider risks, costs, and benefits to determine how to fill the remaining positions with federal civilians and contractors. However, a number of challenges, including lengthy hiring and contracting processes and federal civilian hiring freezes affect DOD's ability to use federal civilians and contractors. For example, senior officials at each of the six MTFs that GAO spoke with cited challenges with the federal civilian hiring process, and five of six MTFs cited challenges with the contracting process. As a result, senior officials from five of six MTFs reported discontinuing some services and referring patients to DOD's TRICARE network of private sector providers or Veterans Affairs facilities. The Military Health System (MHS) is also preparing for the phased transfer of administrative responsibility for MTFs to the Defense Health Agency (DHA), including management of the MTF workforce. According to GAO's report on agency reform efforts, strategic workforce planning should precede any staff realignments or downsizing. However, according to a senior official, the DHA has not developed a strategic workforce plan. Without developing such a plan, the DHA may continue to face the same challenges experienced by the military departments in executing an appropriate and efficient workforce mix at its MTFs.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DOD, among other things, (1) assess the suitability of federal civilians and contractors to provide operational medical care; (2) develop full cost information for active and reserve component medical personnel; and (3) develop a strategic total workforce plan for the DHA to help ensure execution of an appropriate workforce mix at its MTFs. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with each of GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_607"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_608","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nGAO and others have identified insufficiencies in state-reported Medicaid data that affect CMS's ability to oversee the program effectively. Recent increases in improper payments\u2014estimated at $36.7 billion in fiscal year 2017\u2014exacerbate concerns about program oversight.\nCMS officials identified the T-MSIS initiative, which began in 2011, as its main effort to improve Medicaid data, and cited aspects of T-MSIS aimed at improving the scope and quality of state-reported data. GAO reported in January 2017 that it is unclear when T-MSIS data will be available from all states; how CMS will ensure data quality; or how the data will be used to enhance oversight of Medicaid.\nGAO was asked to review states' experiences with T-MSIS implementation and planned uses of T-MSIS data. This report examines (1) states' experiences regarding T-MSIS implementation, and (2) challenges to CMS's and states' use of T-MSIS data for oversight. GAO reviewed federal laws, guidance, and internal control standards; reviewed documents and interviewed officials from eight states, selected based on their T-MSIS reporting status, location, program expenditures, and other factors; and interviewed CMS officials, CMS contractors, and individuals involved with other states' T-MSIS efforts.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAs of November 2017, 49 states had begun reporting Transformed Medicaid Statistical Information System (T-MSIS) data\u2014a significant increase from 18 states reporting these data one year earlier. All eight states GAO reviewed identified converting their data to the T-MSIS format on an element-by-element basis as the main challenge in their reporting efforts. For some data elements, states had to expand or collapse their data to match the T-MSIS format.\nWith the continued implementation of T-MSIS, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has taken an important step toward developing a reliable national repository for Medicaid data. However, data challenges have hindered states' and CMS's use of the T-MSIS data for oversight.\nNone of the six selected states reporting T-MSIS data in August 2017 was reporting complete data. These states said that certain unreported elements were contingent on federal or state actions, and others were not applicable to the state's Medicaid program. States did not always specify in their documentation whether they planned to report elements in the future or when they would report complete data.\nSix of eight selected states expressed concerns about the comparability of T-MSIS data across states. Further, all states were interested in CMS facilitating information sharing among states. CMS has not compiled and shared information about states' data limitations, which would help states accurately compare their T-MSIS data to other states' T-MSIS data.\nCMS has taken steps for the initial use of T-MSIS data, but does not have a plan or associated timeframes for using these data for oversight. As a result, important CMS goals for T-MSIS, such as reducing states' reporting burden and enhancing program integrity activities, are not being fully realized.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that CMS (1) improve T-MSIS's completeness and comparability to expedite its use, and (2) articulate a specific oversight plan. The Department of Health and Human Services concurred with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_608"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_609","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSubstance abuse and illicit drug use, including the use of heroin and the misuse of or dependence on alcohol and prescription opioids, is a growing problem in the United States. Individuals with SUD may face challenges in remaining drug- and alcohol-free. Recovery housing can offer safe, supportive, drug- and alcohol-free housing to help these individuals maintain their sobriety and can be an important resource for individuals recovering from SUD. However, the media has reported allegations about potentially fraudulent practices on the part of some recovery homes in some states.\nGAO was asked to examine recovery housing in the United States. This report examines (1) what is known about the prevalence and characteristics of recovery housing across the United States; (2) investigations and actions selected states have undertaken to oversee such housing; and (3) SAMHSA funding for recovery housing, and how states have used this or any available state funding. GAO reviewed national and state data, federal funding guidance, and interviewed officials from SAMHSA, national associations, and five states\u2014Florida, Massachusetts, Ohio, Texas, and Utah\u2014selected based on rates of opioid overdose deaths, dependence on or abuse of alcohol and other drugs, and other criteria. State information is intended to be illustrative and is not generalizable to all states.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nNationwide prevalence of recovery housing\u2014peer-run or peer-managed drug- and alcohol-free supportive housing for individuals in recovery from substance use disorder (SUD)\u2014is unknown, as complete data are not available. National organizations collect data on the prevalence and characteristics of recovery housing but only for a subset of recovery homes. For example, the National Alliance for Recovery Residences, a national nonprofit and recovery community organization that promotes quality standards for recovery housing, collects data only on recovery homes that seek certification by one of its 15 state affiliates that actively certify homes. The number of homes that are not certified by this organization is unknown.\nFour of the five states that GAO reviewed\u2014Florida, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Utah\u2014have conducted, or are in the process of conducting, investigations of recovery housing activities in their states, and three of these four states have taken formal steps to enhance oversight. The fifth state, Texas, had not conducted any such investigations at the time of GAO's review. Fraudulent activities identified by state investigators included schemes in which recovery housing operators recruited individuals with SUD to specific recovery homes and treatment providers, who then billed patients' insurance for extensive and unnecessary drug testing for the purposes of profit. For example, officials from the Florida state attorney's office told GAO that SUD treatment providers were paying $300 to $500 or more per week to recovery housing operators for every patient they referred for treatment and were billing patients' insurance for hundreds of thousands of dollars in unnecessary drug testing over the course of several months. Some of these investigations have resulted in arrests and other actions, such as changes to insurance payment policies. Florida, Massachusetts, and Utah established state certification or licensure programs for recovery housing in 2014 and 2015 to formally increase oversight. The other two states in GAO's review\u2014Ohio and Texas\u2014had not passed such legislation but were providing training and technical assistance to recovery housing managers.\nThe Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), administers two federal health care grants for SUD prevention and treatment that states may use to establish recovery homes and for related activities. First, under its Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment block grant, SAMHSA makes at least $100,000 available annually to each state to provide loans to organizations seeking to establish recovery homes. Second, states have discretion to use SAMHSA funding available under a 2-year grant for 2017 and 2018 primarily for opioid use disorder treatment services, to establish recovery homes or for recovery housing-related activities. Of the five states GAO reviewed, only two, Texas and Ohio, have used any of their SAMHSA grant funds for these purposes. Four of the five states\u2014Florida, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Texas\u2014have also used state general revenue funds to establish additional recovery homes.\nHHS had no comments on this report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_609"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_610","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOD buys goods and services from the commercial market to take advantage of new innovations and save on acquisition costs. However, the department's process for determining whether an item can be purchased commercially\u2014and, at a fair and reasonable price\u2014can be long and challenging in certain situations.\nGAO was asked to review this process. This report identifies (1) factors that influenced DOD's commercial item and price reasonableness determinations, and (2) the extent to which DOD has taken steps to make information available to facilitate these determinations.\nTo conduct this work, GAO examined federal regulations and guidance and selected case studies, which included a non-generalizable sample of 15 contracts awarded between fiscal years 2010 and 2018. GAO identified the case studies based on input from multiple sources that those contracts involved commercial item or price reasonableness determination challenges. GAO interviewed government and contractor officials responsible for those contracts.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) has a process to determine if an item is available for purchase in the commercial marketplace at a reasonable price. Among selected case studies, GAO found four interrelated factors, each with its set of challenges that influenced how and whether DOD determines if an item is commercial and if its price is reasonable. These factors are:\nAvailability of marketplace information : Market research is a key component that informs commercial item and price reasonableness determinations. However, GAO found that obtaining market-related information can be challenging because the products DOD requires may not be widely available in the commercial marketplace.\nAbility to obtain contractor data : When adequate market information is not available, DOD officials turn to the contractor for information to support the commercial item determination or data to make a price reasonableness determination. In the case studies GAO reviewed, most contractors provided relevant information, but not without delays and challenges. For example, while pricing data is key to DOD's ability to determine price reasonableness, several contracting officers reported that contractors were less willing to provide this data once an item was determined commercial.\nExtent of modifications to an item : When a commercial item must be modified to meet DOD's requirements, DOD officials may have to take additional steps, such as completing a comparative analysis of commercial items to the modified item. For example, in one case, a commercial navigation system had to be modified to withstand an explosion. To make the commercial item determination DOD officials had to make an on-site visit to the manufacturer to gain in-depth understanding of the services provided and to ensure they met DOD requirements.\nReliability of prior commercial item determinations : Contracting officers may presume that an item is commercial if a DOD component had previously made that determination. However, GAO found that, in some cases, contracting officers reviewing a prior determination discovered that it was based on inaccurate information.\nDOD has taken steps to share more information across the department to inform these determinations, but efforts are in early stages of development or informal. No comprehensive information sharing strategy exists. In 2016, DOD established the Commercial Item Group within the Defense Contract Management Agency to provide recommendations on commercial item determinations. This group created a publicly available database to centralize commercial item information across DOD. However, this effort is incomplete. Also, according to DOD officials, they have not yet established who is responsible for the funding and upkeep of the information. Additionally, GAO case studies included instances where informal information sharing resulted in better outcomes, such as a lower price. Creating more opportunities to share information internally is crucial for DOD to facilitate a timely and efficient process in making these determinations and ensuring the best financial outcome for the government.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DOD develop a strategy for how information related to commerciality and price reasonableness determinations should be shared across the department, including making improvements to the existing database and determining responsibilities for its funding and upkeep. DOD agreed with GAO's recommendation and stated that actions will be taken starting in 2018 to address it.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_610"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_611","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nWe prepared this report to answer the question: What are key methodological elements of an economic analysis that is intended to inform decision-makers and stakeholders?\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO identifies five key methodological elements to the baseline structure of an economic analysis: Objective and scope, Methodology, Analysis of effects, Transparency and Documentation. GAO's assessment methodology evaluates each key element and provides an overall assessment based on the assessment of the individual key elements.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_611"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_612","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn 2010, the Coast Guard initiated an effort\u2014known as IHiS\u2014to replace its aging EHR system with a new system that was to modernize various health care services for its nearly 50,000 military members. However, in October 2015, the Coast Guard announced that the modernization project would be canceled.\nGAO was asked to summarize its report that is being released today on the Coast Guard's actions related to its EHR modernization initiative. GAO's testimony specifically addresses Coast Guard's (1) reasons for deciding to terminate further IHiS development; (2) management and oversight actions for the discontinued project and whether lessons learned were identified; (3) current process for managing health records and the challenges it is encountering; and (4) plans for effectively implementing a new EHR system and the current status of its efforts.\nIn preparing the report on which this testimony is based, GAO reviewed IHiS project expenditures; analyzed key project management documentation; surveyed Coast Guard's Regional Managers and clinical staff; and interviewed key staff.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFinancial, technical, schedule, and personnel risks led to the United States Coast Guard's (Coast Guard) decision to terminate the Integrated Health Information System (IHiS) project in 2015. According to the Coast Guard (a military service within the Department of Homeland Security), as of August 2017, $59.9 million was spent on the project over nearly 7 years and no equipment or software could be reused for future efforts. In addition, the Coast Guard could not fully demonstrate the project management actions taken for IHiS, lacked governance mechanisms, and did not document lessons learned for the failed project.\nIn the absence of an electronic health record (EHR) system, the Coast Guard currently relies on a predominately paper health record management process to document health care services. Currently, the Coast Guard's clinical staff perform various manual steps to process each paper health record. Coast Guard Regional Managers and clinic and sick bay administrators informed GAO of the many challenges encountered in returning to a paper process. These challenges include the inability for some clinics to adequately track vital information such as medications\u2014potentially causing harm to members if they take medications that have dangerous interactions.\nTo help alleviate several of these challenges, the Coast Guard has developed alternative work-around processes. However, these alternative processes may not provide sustained solutions to overcoming these challenges.\nIn February 2016, the Coast Guard initiated the process for acquiring a new EHR system. As of November 2017, agency officials had conducted research and recommended a solution based on performance, risk, cost, and schedule advantages. However, 2 years after canceling IHiS and moving toward a predominately manual process, the agency has not yet made a final determination on this. Successfully and quickly implementing an EHR system is vital to overcoming the challenges the Coast Guard currently faces in managing paper health records. The expeditious implementation of such a system can significantly improve the quality and efficiency of care to the thousands of Coast Guard active duty and reserve members that receive health care.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nIn the report being released today, GAO is recommending that the Coast Guard (1) expeditiously and judiciously pursue a new EHR system, and in doing so (2) ensure key processes are implemented; (3) establish project governance boards; and (4) document lessons learned from the IHiS project. The Department of Homeland Security concurred with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_612"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_613","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFEMA's IA program provides help to individuals to meet their immediate needs after a disaster, such as shelter and medical expenses. When a state, U.S. territory, or tribe requests IA assistance through a federal disaster declaration, FEMA evaluates the request against regulatory factors, such as concentration of damages, and provides a recommendation to the President, who makes a final declaration decision.\nGAO was asked to review FEMA's IA declaration process. This report examines (1) the number of IA declaration requests received, declared, and denied, and IA actual obligations from calendar years 2008 through 2016, (2) the extent to which FEMA accounts for the regulatory factors when evaluating IA requests, and (3) any challenges FEMA regions and select states reported on the declaration process and factors and any FEMA actions to revise them. GAO reviewed FEMA's policies, IA declaration requests and obligation data, and FEMA's RVARs from July 2012 through December 2016, the most recent years for which data were available. GAO also reviewed proposed rulemaking comments and interviewed FEMA officials from all 10 regions and 11 state emergency management offices selected based on declaration requests and other factors.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFrom calendar years 2008 through 2016, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Emergency and Management Agency (FEMA) received 294 Individual Assistance (IA) declaration requests from states, U.S. territories, and tribes to help individuals meet their immediate needs after a disaster. Of these, the President declared 168 and denied 126 requests. Across the various types of IA declaration requests, severe storms (190) were the most common disaster type and drought (1) was among the least common. FEMA obligated about $8.6 billion in IA for disaster declarations during this period.\nGAO found that FEMA regions did not consistently obtain and document information on all elements of established IA regulatory factors when making IA recommendations to headquarters. Following a declaration request, a FEMA region is to prepare a Regional Administrator's Validation and Recommendation (RVAR)\u2014a document designed to include data on each of the six IA regulatory factors for each declaration request as well as the regional administrator's recommendation. GAO reviewed all 81 RVARs from July 2012\u2014the date FEMA began using the new RVAR template\u2014through December 2016. GAO found that regions did not consistently obtain and document information for the elements required under the six regulatory factors (see table). For example, only 44 of the 81 RVARs documented all elements under the concentration of damage factor. By evaluating why regions are not completing all elements of each current IA regulatory factor, FEMA could identify whether any corrective steps are needed.\nOfficials from the 10 FEMA regions and 11 states GAO interviewed, reported positive relationships with each other, but also cited various challenges with the IA declaration process and regulatory factors. For example, these officials told GAO that there are no established minimum thresholds for IA, making final determinations more subjective and the rationale behind denials unclear. However, as required by the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013, FEMA has taken steps to revise the IA factors by issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking. According to FEMA, the proposed rule aims to provide more objective criteria, clarify the threshold for eligibility, and speed up the IA declaration process. As of April 2018, the proposed rule was still under consideration. According to FEMA officials, they plan to finalize the rule in late 2018; therefore, it is too early to know the extent to which it will address these challenges.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that FEMA evaluate why regions are not completing the RVARs for each element of the current IA regulatory factors and take corrective steps, if necessary. DHS concurred with the recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_613"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_614","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn both 2016 and 2017, 15 separate U.S. disasters resulted in losses exceeding $1 billion each. FEMA provides PA grants to state and local governments to help communities recover from such disasters. If applicants disagree with FEMA's decision on their PA grant application, they have two chances to appeal: a first-level appeal to be decided by the relevant FEMA regional office and, if denied, a second-level appeal to be decided within FEMA's Recovery Directorate. Each is subject to a 90-day statutory processing timeframe.\nGAO was asked to review FEMA's appeals process. This report examines: (1) the extent to which FEMA ensures the quality of its appeals data and what these data show about PA appeals inventory and timeliness; (2) what steps FEMA has taken to improve its management of the appeals process and what challenges, if any, remain; and (3) the extent to which FEMA developed goals and measures to assess program performance. GAO analyzed FEMA policies, procedures, and data on appeals and interviewed officials from headquarters and from regional offices with the highest number of pending appeals. GAO also spoke to state officials from the two states within each of the three regions with the highest number of pending appeals.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nWeaknesses in the quality of Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Public Assistance (PA) appeals data limit its ability to oversee the appeals process. For example, FEMA's data are inaccurate and incomplete because regional offices do not consistently track first-level appeals and FEMA does not have processes to ensure data quality. When GAO discussed these weaknesses with FEMA officials, they acknowledged them and provided GAO with corrected data for January 2014 through July 2017. GAO's analyses of the corrected data show fluctuations in the appeal inventory from year to year depending on the number of disasters declared and delays in processing. For example, as shown in the figure, only 9 percent of first-level and 11 percent of second-level appeals were processed within the 90-day statutory timeframe.\nFEMA has taken steps to improve its management of the appeals process\u2014including issues that GAO and the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General identified in 2008 and 2011. For example, FEMA increased its appeal staffing levels and developed standard operating procedures. Despite these efforts, FEMA continued to face a number of workforce challenges that contributed to processing delays, such as staff vacancies, staff turnover, and delays in training. FEMA has not developed a workforce staffing plan to identify hiring, training, and retention needs across its headquarters and regional offices, though FEMA officials acknowledge the potential benefits of having such a plan and stated that they are focused on filling vacancies. In the absence of a workforce plan, FEMA will continue to experience workforce challenges that could further contribute to delays in processing appeals.\nFEMA has not established goals and measures for assessing first-level appeals processing performance, but has done so for second-level appeals. FEMA views establishing these first-level goals and measures as the responsibility of its regional offices. Without goals and measures, FEMA is limited in its ability to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of its overall appeals process and identify and address weaknesses that may lead to delays in making appeal decisions.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making four recommendations, including that FEMA implement a consistent approach for tracking appeals and ensuring data quality, develop a workforce plan, and develop measurable goals for processing first-level appeals. FEMA concurred with all four recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_614"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_615","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFederal agencies are dependent on information systems to carry out operations. The risks to these systems are increasing as security threats evolve and become more sophisticated. To reduce the risk of a successful cyberattack, agencies can deploy intrusion detection and prevention capabilities on their networks and systems.\nGAO first designated federal information security as a government-wide high-risk area in 1997. In 2015, GAO expanded this area to include protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information. Most recently, in September 2018, GAO updated the area to identify 10 critical actions that the federal government and other entities need to take to address major cybersecurity challenges.\nThe federal approach and strategy for securing information systems is grounded in the provisions of the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 and Executive Order 13800. The act requires agencies to develop, document, and implement an agency-wide program to secure their information systems. The Executive Order, issued in May 2017, directs agencies to use the National Institute of Standards and Technology's cybersecurity framework to manage cybersecurity risks.\nThe Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015 contained a provision for GAO to report on the effectiveness of the government's approach and strategy for securing its systems. GAO determined (1) the reported effectiveness of agencies' implementation of the government's approach and strategy; (2) the extent to which DHS and OMB have taken steps to facilitate the use of intrusion detection and prevention capabilities to secure federal systems; and (3) the extent to which agencies reported implementing capabilities to detect and prevent intrusions.\nTo address these objectives, GAO analyzed OMB reports related to agencies' information security practices including OMB's annual report to Congress for fiscal year 2017. GAO also analyzed and summarized agency-reported security performance metrics and IG-reported information for the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies. In addition, GAO evaluated plans, reports, and other documents related to DHS intrusion detection and prevention programs, and interviewed OMB, DHS, and agency officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe 23 civilian agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (CFO Act) have often not effectively implemented the federal government's approach and strategy for securing information systems (see figure below). Until agencies more effectively implement the government's approach and strategy, federal systems will remain at risk. To illustrate:\nAs required by Office of Management and Budget (OMB), inspectors general (IGs) evaluated the maturity of their agencies' information security programs using performance measures associated with the five core security functions\u2014identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover. The IGs at 17 of the 23 agencies reported that their agencies' programs were not effectively implemented.\nIGs also evaluated information security controls as part of the annual audit of their agencies' financial statements, identifying material weaknesses or significant deficiencies in internal controls for financial reporting at 17 of the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies.\nChief information officers (CIOs) for 17 of the 23 agencies reported not meeting all elements of the government's cybersecurity cross-agency priority goal. The goal was intended to improve cybersecurity performance through, among other things, maintaining ongoing awareness of information security, vulnerabilities, and threats; and implementing technologies and processes that reduce malware risk.\nExecutive Order 13800 directed OMB, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to assess and report on the sufficiency and appropriateness of federal agencies' processes for managing cybersecurity risks. Using performance measures for each of the five core security functions, OMB determined that 13 of the 23 agencies were managing overall enterprise risks, while the other 10 agencies were at risk. In assessing agency risk by core security function, OMB identified a few agencies to be at high risk (see figure at the top of next page).\nDHS and OMB facilitated the use of intrusion detection and prevention capabilities to secure federal agency systems, but further efforts remain. For example, in response to prior GAO recommendations, DHS had improved the capabilities of the National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS), which is intended to detect and prevent malicious traffic from entering agencies' computer networks. However, the system still had limitations, such as not having the capability to scan encrypted traffic. The department was also in the process of enhancing the capabilities of federal agencies to automate network monitoring for malicious activity through its Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program. However, the program was running behind schedule and officials at most agencies indicated the need for additional training and guidance. Further, the Federal CIO issued a mandated report assessing agencies' intrusion detection and prevention capabilities, but the report did not address required information, such as the capability of NCPS to detect advanced persistent threats, and a cost\/benefit comparison of capabilities to commercial technologies and tools.\nSelected agencies had not consistently implemented capabilities to detect and prevent intrusions into their computer networks. Specifically, the agencies told GAO that they had not fully implemented required actions for protecting email, cloud services, host-based systems, and network traffic from malicious activity. For example, 21 of 23 agencies had not, as of September 2018, sufficiently enhanced email protection through implementation of DHS' directive on enhanced email security. In addition, less than half of the agencies that use cloud services reported monitoring these services. Further, most of the selected 23 agencies had not fully implemented the tools and services available through the first two phases of DHS's CDM program. Until agencies more thoroughly implement capabilities to detect and prevent intrusions, federal systems and the information they process will be vulnerable to malicious threats.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making two recommendations to DHS, to among other things, coordinate with agencies to identify additional needs for training and guidance. GAO is also making seven recommendations to OMB to, among other things, direct the Federal CIO to update the mandated report with required information, such as detecting advanced persistent threats. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. OMB did not indicate whether it concurred with the recommendations or not.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_615"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_616","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Department of the Navy has committed to rapidly grow its unmanned systems portfolio. It currently has at least 24 types of systems and has budgeted nearly $10 billion for their development and procurement for fiscal years 2018-2022. Personnel who launch, navigate, and recover the systems are integral to effective operations. Senate Report 114-255 included a provision for GAO to review the Navy's and the Marine Corps' strategies for unmanned system operators. GAO examined, among other things, the extent to which the Navy and the Marine Corps have (1) evaluated workforce alternatives (such as the use of civilians and contractors) for unmanned system operators and (2) developed and updated personnel requirements and related policies and goals for selected unmanned systems. GAO compared documentation on unmanned systems with DOD policies and conducted discussion groups with unmanned system operators.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Navy and the Marine Corps are rapidly growing their portfolios of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and unmanned maritime systems and have opted to use military personnel as operators without evaluating alternatives, such as federal civilian employees and private sector contractors. Service officials stated that civilians or contractors are not viable alternatives and policies are unclear about when and how to use them. However, a June 2016 Department of Defense-commissioned study found that alternative staffing strategies could meet the UAS mission more cost-effectively. Military personnel may be the most appropriate option for unmanned systems, but without clarifying policies to identify circumstances in which civilians and contractors may serve in operational roles, the services could continue to make workforce decisions that do not consider all available resources.\nThe Navy and the Marine Corps have sufficient personnel requirements or efforts underway to develop personnel requirements for seven unmanned systems that GAO reviewed (see fig.), but requirements for one system (i.e., the RQ-21 Blackjack UAS) have not been updated. That system's requirements have not been updated because service entities disagree about whether they are sufficient. Since 2015, units have deployed with about two to three times the personnel that headquarters and command officials expected they would need. Marine Corps officials stated that the Blackjack's personnel requirements were based on an outdated concept of operations and are insufficient for supporting workloads. Without updating the personnel requirements for the Blackjack UAS, the services will lack current information about the number of personnel needed.\nThe Department of the Navy has taken positive steps but has not fully evaluated and updated aviation policies that affect personnel requirements for certain UAS and lacks clear goals for informing future requirements for all of its UASs. GAO found that the policies do not fully account for differences between UASs of varying sizes and capabilities. These policies require, for example, that the Blackjack UAS be held to the same maintenance standards designed for larger aircraft and UAS, which in turn affects personnel requirements. Until the Department of the Navy evaluates and updates such policies and clarifies related goals, the services will be hampered in developing and updating future requirements as unmanned system inventories grow and operations expand.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making ten recommendations, including that the Navy and the Marine Corps clarify policies to identify circumstances in which civilians and contractors may serve in operational roles and apply the policies to future evaluations; update personnel requirements for one UAS; and evaluate and update policies and goals to inform future personnel requirements. DOD concurred with eight recommendations and partially concurred with two. As discussed in the report, GAO continues to believe that all ten are warranted.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_616"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_617","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nPopulation growth and drought are among the factors that have placed increasing demands on the U.S. water supply, particularly in the arid West. The reuse of wastewater can help address water management challenges by treating water that is typically unusable and then reusing it for beneficial purposes, such as irrigation, according to the Environmental Protection Agency. Reclamation's Title XVI program awards grants for the study and construction of water reuse projects in 17 western states and Hawaii. From fiscal years 1992 through 2009, Congress individually authorized some Title XVI projects. In 2016, Congress amended the Title XVI program to allow grants to be awarded to additional water reuse projects.\nGAO was asked to review the Title XVI program. This report describes, among other things, for the Title XVI program (1) grants Reclamation has awarded for projects and studies and remaining projects that are eligible for grants, (2) the types and locations of projects and studies that have received grants, and (3) Reclamation's process for selecting projects and studies and its consistency with federal grant regulations as well as how the program's evaluation criteria have changed since 2011. GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and agency guidance; analyzed financial data for fiscal years 1992 through 2017; compared documents related to the project selection process against federal grant regulations; and interviewed agency officials and nonfederal project sponsors with different types of projects.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Bureau of Reclamation, within the Department of the Interior, awarded about $715 million in water reuse grants for 46 construction projects and 71 studies under the Title XVI Water Reclamation and Reuse Program (Title XVI) from fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2017, according to agency documents. Most of the Title XVI funding\u2014about $703 million\u2014has been awarded for construction projects. Some construction projects remain eligible for Title XVI grant funding. About $464 million in eligible Title XVI grant funding not yet awarded remains for projects that Congress individually authorized; for projects eligible under the 2016 amendments to the Title XVI program, about $513 million remains.\nTitle XVI projects and studies cover various uses for reused water. For example, many projects GAO reviewed produce reused water for landscape and agricultural irrigation, as well as water that may later be extracted for drinking water, as shown in the figure. Title XVI projects are located in western urban and rural areas, with California accounting for 36 construction projects.\nReclamation's process to select Title XVI projects and studies to receive grants involves announcing the funding opportunity, establishing criteria to evaluate potential projects, and reviewing applications to make award decisions, according to agency documents GAO reviewed. GAO found that Reclamation's grant award process is consistent with relevant federal regulations for awarding grants. For example, the Title XVI funding opportunity announcements GAO reviewed contained information required by the regulations, such as the criteria used to evaluate applications. In recent years, Reclamation has changed the criteria it uses to evaluate projects, eliminating or adding some criteria and changing the weighting of others. Reclamation officials said that these changes were made in part in response to statutory changes.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_617"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_618","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nGSA, which manages federal real property on behalf of other federal agencies, faces challenges in funding new construction projects due to budget constraints\u2014including obtaining upfront funding\u2014among other reasons. One type of transaction, called a swap exchange, enables GSA to apply the value of federal property to finance construction without relying on appropriated funds. Under such an exchange, GSA transfers the title of the unneeded property to a private investor after receiving the agreed upon construction services at another location. GSA proposed a swap exchange procurement for construction of a new FBI headquarters building in exchange for the Hoover Building and appropriations to compensate for the difference in value between the Hoover Building and the new building. GSA cancelled this procurement in July 2017 due to lack of funding.\nThis statement addresses (1) GSA's and FBI's assessments of the Hoover Building, (2) GSA efforts to implement swap exchanges, and (3) alternative approaches to funding real property projects. It is based on GAO's body of reports on real property from 2011 to 2017, and selected updates from GSA.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn November 2011, GAO reported that, according to General Services Administration (GSA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assessments, the FBI's headquarters building (Hoover Building) and its accompanying facilities in Washington, D.C., did not fully support the FBI's long-term security, space, and building condition requirements. Since GAO's report, the assessments have not materially changed, for example:\nSecurity: GAO's prior work noted that the dispersion of staff in annexes creates security challenges, including where some space was leased by the FBI and other space was leased by nonfederal tenants. Earlier this year, GAO reported the FBI is leasing space in D.C. from foreign owners.\nSpace : In 2011, GAO reported that FBI and GSA studies showed that much of the Hoover Building is unusable. GSA noted in its fiscal year 2017 project prospectus for the FBI headquarters consolidation that the Hoover Building cannot be redeveloped to meet the FBI's current needs.\nBuilding Condition: In GAO's 2011 report, GAO noted that the condition of the Hoover Building was deteriorating, and GSA assessments identified significant recapitalization needs. Since GAO's report and in response to GAO's recommendation, GSA has evaluated its approach to maintaining the building and completed some repairs to ensure safety.\nGSA has limited experience in successfully completing swap exchange transactions and chose not to pursue several proposed swap exchanges, most recently the planned swap exchange for the Hoover Building. GSA has developed criteria for determining when to solicit market interest in a swap exchange, in response to recommendations in GAO's 2014 report. In addition, GSA officials told GAO that they planned to improve the swap exchange process, including the property appraisal process, outreach to stakeholders to identify potential risks associated with future projects, and to the extent possible, mitigate such risks. Nevertheless, several factors may continue to limit use of swap exchanges, including market factors, such as the availability of alternative properties and an investor's approach for valuing properties. For example, in reviewing a proposed swap exchange in Washington, D.C., GAO found in a 2016 report that the proposals from two firms valued the two federal buildings involved in the proposed swap substantially less than GSA's appraised property value.\nIn a 2014 report, GAO identified a number of alternative approaches to funding real property projects. Congress has provided some agencies with specific authorities to use alternative funding mechanisms\u2014including the use of private sector funds or land swaps\u2014for the acquisition, renovation, or disposal of federal real property without full, upfront funding, though GAO has previously reported that upfront funding is the best way to ensure recognition of commitments made in budgeting decisions and maintain fiscal controls. GAO has reported that projects with alternative funding mechanisms present multiple forms of risk that are shared between the agency and any partner or stakeholder. In addition, alternative budgetary structures could be established, such as changing existing or introducing new account structures to fund real property projects.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO has made recommendations in the past to GSA on various real property issues, including to develop additional guidance for swap exchanges and to evaluate its approach to maintaining the Hoover Building. GSA agreed with these two recommendations and addressed them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_618"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_619","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nJWST, a large, deployable telescope intended to be the successor to the Hubble Space Telescope, is one of NASA's most complex and expensive projects, at an anticipated cost of $8.8 billion. Congress set an $8 billion JWST development cost cap in 2011, and the remaining $837 million is for its operations costs. JWST is intended to revolutionize our understanding of star and planet formation and advance the search for the origins of our universe. With significant integration and testing planned for the remaining period until launch, the JWST project will still need to address many challenges during the remainder of integration and testing.\nConference Report No. 112-284, accompanying the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, included a provision for GAO to assess the project annually and report on its progress. This is the sixth such report. This report assesses the extent to which JWST is (1) meeting its schedule commitments, and (2) able to meet its cost commitments. GAO reviewed monthly JWST reports, reviewed relevant policies, conducted independent analysis of NASA and contractor data, and interviewed NASA and contractor officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn 2017, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) project delayed its launch readiness date by at least 5 months, and further delays are likely. The delay\u2014from October 2018 to a launch window between March and June 2019\u2014was primarily caused by components of JWST's spacecraft taking longer to integrate than planned. JWST made considerable progress toward the completion of integration and test activities in the past year. However, the project used all remaining schedule reserve\u2014or extra time set aside in the schedule in the event of delays or unforeseen risks\u2014to address technical issues, including an anomaly on the telescope found during vibration testing. Extending the launch window provided the project up to 4 months of schedule reserve. However, shortly after requesting the new launch window in September 2017, the project determined that several months of schedule reserve would be needed to address lessons learned from the initial folding and deployment of the observatory's sunshield (see image). Given remaining integration and test work ahead\u2014the phase in development where problems are most likely to be found and schedules tend to slip\u2014coupled with only 1.5 months of schedule reserves remaining to the end of the launch window, additional launch delays are likely. The project's Standing Review Board will conduct an independent review of JWST's schedule status in early 2018 to determine if the June 2019 launch window can be met.\nJWST will also have limited cost reserves to address future challenges, such as further launch delays, and is at risk of breaching its $8 billion cost cap for formulation and development set by Congress in 2011. For several years, the prime contractor has overestimated workforce reductions, and technical challenges have prevented these planned reductions, necessitating the use of cost reserves. Program officials said that existing program resources will accommodate the new launch window\u2014provided remaining integration and testing proceeds as planned without any long delays. However, JWST is still resolving technical challenges and work continues to take longer than planned to complete. As a result, the project is at risk of exceeding its $8 billion formulation and development cost cap.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO has made recommendations on the project in previous reports. NASA agreed with and took action on many of GAO's prior recommendations, but not on others\u2014some of which may have provided insight to the current schedule delays. For example, in December 2012, GAO recommended that the JWST project perform an updated integrated cost\/schedule risk analysis.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_619"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_620","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThis testimony summarizes information contained in GAO's May 2018 report entitled Summer Meals: Actions Needed to Improve Participation Estimates and Address Program Challenges , GAO-18-369 . It addresses (1) what is known about SFSP participation, (2) other programs that help feed low-income children over the summer, and (3) challenges in providing summer meals to children and the extent to which USDA provides assistance to address these challenges.\nFor its May 2018 report, GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; analyzed USDA's SFSP data for fiscal years 2007 through 2016; and surveyed state agencies responsible for administering the SFSP in 50 states and the District of Columbia. GAO also visited a nongeneralizable group of 3 states and 30 meal sites, selected based on Census data on child poverty rates and urban and rural locations, and analyzed meal site data from these 3 states. In addition, GAO interviewed USDA, state, and national organization officials, as well as SFSP providers, including sponsors and site operators.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nNationwide, the total number of meals served to children in low-income areas through the Summer Food Service Program (SFSP) increased from 113 to 149 million (about 32 percent) from fiscal year 2007 through 2016, according to GAO's May 2018 report. GAO noted that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) directed states to use the number of meals served, along with other data, to estimate the number of children participating in the SFSP. However, GAO found that participation estimates had been calculated inconsistently from state to state and year to year. In 2017, USDA took steps to improve the consistency of participation estimates, noting they are critical for informing program implementation and strategic planning. However, GAO determined that the method USDA directed states to use would continue to provide unreliable estimates of participation, hindering USDA's ability to use them for these purposes.\nOther federal and nonfederal programs helped feed low-income children over the summer to some extent, according to states GAO surveyed and SFSP providers and others GAO interviewed for its May 2018 report. For example, GAO found that in July 2016, about 26 million meals were served through a separate federal program that allowed school meal providers to serve summer meals, according to USDA data. Some children also received summer meals through nonfederal programs operated by faith-based organizations and foodbanks, though GAO's state survey and interviews with SFSP meal providers and national organizations indicated the reach of such efforts was limited.\nIn GAO's May 2018 report, states and SFSP meal providers reported challenges with issues related to meal sites, participation, and program administration, though USDA, state, and local officials had taken some steps to address these issues. Seventeen states in GAO's survey and several providers in the states GAO visited reported a challenge with ensuring meal sites were in safe locations. To address this issue, USDA granted some states and providers flexibility from the requirement that children consume meals on-site. However, GAO found that USDA had not broadly communicated the circumstances it considered when granting this flexibility or reported to Congress on the use of flexibilities with respect to the on-site requirement in areas where safety was a concern, per requirements. As a result, neither USDA nor Congress knew whether these flexibilities were helping provide meals to children and meeting program goals. Further, officials from national and regional organizations GAO interviewed, as well as providers GAO visited, reported challenges related to the administrative burden associated with participating in multiple child nutrition programs. Although USDA had established program and policy simplifications to help lessen related burdens, the persistence of challenges in this area suggested that information had not reached all relevant state agencies, potentially limiting children's access to meals by discouraging provider participation.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nIn its May 2018 report, GAO made four recommendations, including that USDA improve estimates of children's participation in SFSP, communicate the circumstances it considers when granting flexibilities to ensure safe meal delivery, evaluate and annually report to Congress on its use of waivers and demonstration projects when granting these flexibilities, and disseminate information about existing flexibilities available to streamline administrative requirements for providers participating in multiple child nutrition programs. USDA generally agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_620"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_621","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nOver the past two decades, e-commerce sales have grown rapidly, greatly expanding a category of sales known as remote sales. Under current law, states cannot require all businesses to collect taxes on remote sales. Congress has been considering proposals to change this. Little current, nationwide information exists to inform the debate.\nIn this report, GAO (1) estimated revenue states and localities could gain by being able to require businesses to collect taxes on all remote sales, and (2) described what is known about the related compliance costs and challenges to businesses, and administrative costs and challenges to states.\nGAO estimated 2017 revenue gains to state and local governments based on actual and estimated sales data for remote sellers, excluding certain sales that were exempt from taxation or already collected by remote sellers with a substantial presence in a state. Ranges for GAO's estimates were based on a number of key assumptions that were varied based on available data. To describe related costs and challenges to businesses and states, GAO interviewed officials from state revenue agencies, subject matter specialists, and a wide variety of retailers with remote sales and the organizations that represent them.\nGAO provided a draft of this report to subject matter specialists who agreed with the general approach that GAO followed in making its estimates.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nForty-five states and the District of Columbia levy taxes on the sale of goods and certain services, including those sold remotely, such as over the Internet. In 1992, the Supreme Court ruled in Quill v. North Dakota that a state can only require a business to collect and remit sales tax if the business has substantial presence, referred to as nexus, in that state. However, the decision stated that Congress could pass legislation to overrule this limitation. In general, under present law, if a seller does not have nexus in a state, and therefore does not collect tax, then a purchaser is required to pay a use tax in the same amount to his or her state government.\nGAO estimated that state and local governments can, under current law, require remote sellers to collect about 75 to 80 percent of the taxes that would be owed if all sellers were required to collect tax on all remote sales at current rates. GAO found that the extent to which state and local governments can require businesses to collect taxes varies with the type of remote seller and by state.\nGAO estimated that state and local governments could gain from about $8 billion to about $13 billion in 2017 if states were given authority to require sales tax collection from all remote sellers. This is about 2 to 4 percent of total 2016 state and local government general sales and gross receipts tax revenues.\nSome businesses would likely see increases in several types of costs if required to collect taxes on all remote sales. These costs would be higher for businesses not currently experienced in multistate tax collection. Officials from state revenue departments told us that they generally do not anticipate major administrative costs or challenges if given the authority to require businesses to collect tax on all remote sales.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making recommendations in this report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_621"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_622","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Military Selective Service Act established the Selective Service System whose mission, among other things, is to be prepared to provide trained and untrained manpower to DOD in the event of a national emergency when directed by the President and the Congress. In the NDAA for FY 2017, Congress included a provision requiring that DOD submit a report on the current and future need for a centralized registration system under the Military Selective Service Act. In addition, the act established a Commission to review, among other things, the military selective service process and report on it.\nThe act also included a provision for GAO to review DOD's procedures for evaluating selective service requirements. In this report, GAO compared the information DOD included in its report with the act's required elements and identified additional information that could benefit the Commission as it further reviews the military selective service process.\nGAO reviewed DOD's report and the statutory elements and interviewed officials involved in the military selective service process to identify additional information that could benefit the Commission's ongoing review.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn its July 2017 report to Congress and the National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service (i.e., \u201cthe Commission\u201d), the Department of Defense (DOD) provided information regarding each of the six required reporting elements contained in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017. Specifically, DOD provided information on:\n1. the direct and indirect benefits of the military selective service system;\n2. the functions performed by the Selective Service System that would be assumed by DOD in the absence of a national registration system;\n3. the systems, manpower, and facilities needed by DOD to physically mobilize inductees in the absence of the Selective Service System;\n4. the feasibility and the utility of eliminating the focus on the mass mobilization of primarily combat troops in favor of a system that focuses on the mobilization of military occupational specialties, and the extent to which such a change would impact the need for both male and female inductees;\n5. DOD's personnel needs in the event of an emergency requiring mass mobilization; an analysis of any additional critical skills that would be needed in the event of a national emergency; and a timeline for when DOD would require the first inductees to report for service; and\n6. a list of the assumptions used by DOD to conduct its analysis.\nGAO identified additional information that may benefit the Commission's ongoing evaluation of the military selective service process. The fifth required reporting element required DOD to analyze its personnel needs in the event of an emergency requiring mass mobilization and a timeline for obtaining these inductees. In response, DOD provided the personnel requirements and timeline that were developed in 1994 and that have not been updated since. DOD officials stated that they did not conduct additional analysis to update these requirements because the all-volunteer force is of adequate size and composition to meet DOD's personnel needs. In 2012, GAO recommended that DOD establish a process to periodically reevaluate DOD's requirements for the Selective Service System. Although DOD concurred with this recommendation, it has not yet implemented it. GAO believes this recommendation is still valid. Having updated DOD Selective Service System requirements and timelines for a potential draft may be useful in supporting the ongoing evaluation of the military selective service process by the Commission.\nFurther, military service officials told GAO that their perspectives on how selective service processes that could affect them had not been solicited in the preparation of DOD's report. Since the military services are to receive, train and integrate the inductees; provide support to the Selective Service System during a national emergency; and could help identify critical skill sets needed to meet emerging demands and the impact a draft could have on meeting those demands, the military service officials' perspectives could be useful to the Commission. DOD officials stated that they are currently collecting these perspectives and plan to provide this information to the Commission.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making any new recommendations. GAO believes its 2012 recommendation to DOD to periodically reevaluate its requirements for the Selective Service System, which DOD concurred with, is still valid. DOD had no additional comments on this report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_622"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_623","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSafe operation of the nation's water utilities depends on access to a qualified workforce, particularly certified water operators. Industry reports have cited high rates of retirement eligibility and raised concerns about the water industry's ability to fill job openings.\nGAO was asked to review workforce needs within the drinking water and wastewater industry. This report describes (1) what is known about workforce needs at water utilities compared with workforce needs nationwide and effects of potential unmet workforce needs on the utilities' compliance with the Safe Drinking Water Act and Clean Water Act; (2) approaches used by selected utilities to manage their workforce needs and challenges they have faced in managing those needs; and (3) ways in which federal programs can assist water utilities with workforce needs.\nGAO reviewed workforce projections, relevant laws and regulations, agency documents, and industry studies and interviewed federal, local, and industry officials. GAO also conducted semi-structured interviews with a nongeneralizable sample of 11 water utilities, selected by size, location, and indications of workforce needs.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nProjections from the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) suggest that workforce replacement needs for water operators are roughly similar to workforce needs nationwide across all occupations; however, little is known about the effects of any unmet needs on compliance with the Safe Drinking Water Act and the Clean Water Act. BLS has projected that 8.2 percent of existing water operators will need to be replaced annually between 2016 and 2026. Although BLS projections are intended to capture long-run trends, rather than to forecast precise outcomes in specific years, this predicted replacement rate is roughly similar to the predicted rate of 10.9 percent for all workers across the U.S. economy. Limited information is available to determine whether retirements, or other workforce needs, are affecting drinking water and wastewater utilities' ability to comply with the Safe Drinking Water and Clean Water acts. At a national level, neither the water utilities' industry associations nor the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has analyzed whether there is a relationship between unmet workforce needs and compliance problems. EPA relies on states to inspect utilities to ensure compliance with the acts. EPA's inspection guidance documents, for both drinking water and wastewater, advise states to examine the quality and quantity of staff operating and maintaining water utilities. However, the guidance does not advise states to examine future workforce needs. GAO has found that future workforce needs can be identified through strategic workforce planning, which involves developing long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining staff to achieve program goals. By adding questions to EPA's inspection guidance on strategic workforce planning, such as the number of positions needed in the future, EPA could help make this information available for states to assess future workforce needs. Information on future workforce needs could help states and utilities identity potential workforce issues and take action as needed.\nRepresentatives from 11 selected water utilities reported that by using various approaches, they were generally able to meet their current workforce needs but faced some challenges in doing so. Representatives from the selected utilities said that they recruit operators using word of mouth, websites, newspapers, and partnering with local technical schools. However, representatives from small utilities said that even with these approaches, they had difficulty hiring certified operators and instead hired and trained entry-level employees. Additionally, representatives from large utilities said they face difficulties in recruiting skilled workers, such as electricians and mechanics, part of a larger national pattern.\nFive federal agencies that GAO reviewed\u2014EPA and the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Labor (DOL), Education, and Veterans Affairs (VA)\u2014have programs or activities that can assist utilities with their workforce needs in several ways, including through guidance, funding, and training. EPA has worked with DOL and industry groups to develop a water-sector competency model to support industry training and with VA to help place disabled veterans in water industry jobs. In addition, USDA funds personnel who travel to rural utilities to provide hands-on assistance through its Circuit Rider program. Four of five small utilities GAO interviewed said they used this program and other USDA technical assistance for training operators.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that EPA add strategic workforce planning questions, such as the positions and skills needed in the future, to its inspection guidance documents. EPA generally agreed with GAO's recommendation as it related to drinking water, but neither agreed nor disagreed regarding wastewater. GAO believes the entire recommendation should be implemented.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_623"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_624","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOD spends billions of dollars annually to maintain business functions that support the warfighter. Many of these functions are performed by the DAFAs\u2014DOD's 19 defense agencies and 8 field activities intended to provide department-wide consolidated support functions. GAO has previously identified instances of fragmentation, overlap, and duplication among the DAFAs.\nSenate Report 115-125, accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, included a provision that GAO review the DAFAs. This report evaluates the extent to which (1) DOD has assessed the continuing need for each DAFA; (2) any overlap or fragmentation among the DAFAs that provide human resources services has affected service delivery; and (3) DOD has monitored and evaluated the results of its efficiency initiatives that affect the DAFAs. GAO reviewed legal requirements, assessed prior DOD reports, and analyzed DOD's human resources activities and documentation tracking past efficiency initiatives.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) does not comprehensively or routinely assess the continuing need for its defense agencies and DOD field activities (DAFAs). DOD was statutorily required to review the services and supplies each DAFA provides to ensure there is a continuing need for each and that the provision of services and supplies by each DAFA, rather than by the military departments, is more effective, economical, or efficient. A DOD directive requires the recording of the review. DOD previously issued biennial reports to Congress to record its review. Since 2012, DOD has relied on existing processes to fulfill the requirement; such as the annual budget process and the day-to-day management of the DAFAs. However, DOD did not provide sufficient evidence that these processes satisfy the statute. For example, while DOD reviews the DAFAs during the budget process, it does not specifically review the provision of services by the DAFAs rather than the military departments. Further, DOD does not have internal guidance that provides clear direction for conducting and recording its response to the statutory requirement. Without such guidance, DOD is limited in its ability to clearly define or target the scope of its reviews and any resulting reports. As such, DOD and congressional decision makers may not have reasonable assurance of a continuing need for the DAFAs, or that the provision of services and supplies is effective, economical, and efficient.\nThere is fragmentation and overlap within the DAFAs that provide human resources services to other defense agencies or organizations within DOD. At least six DOD organizations, including three DAFAs, perform human resources services for other parts of the department. One DAFA receives human resources services from all six organizations. This has resulted in negative effects, such as inconsistent performance information regarding hiring, fragmented information technology systems, and inefficiencies associated with overhead costs. For example, DOD officials stated that there are over 800 fragmented information technology systems used to store and record training records across the department, which are costly to maintain. DOD established a reform team to reduce inefficiencies within this business function. However, the team lacks comprehensive information on overhead costs that could guide reform and does not have time frames or deliverables for completing certain reform initiatives. With consistent human resource performance information, comprehensive information on overhead costs, and clear time frames in place, the team would be better positioned to thoroughly assess the department's system for human resources service delivery and develop and implement long-term solutions for better coordination or consolidation of this function.\nDOD has taken some steps to monitor and evaluate the results of key efficiency initiatives that affect the DAFAs. However, DOD has not always established baselines or performed ongoing monitoring of its initiatives. Further, DOD has focused on whether steps have been taken, rather than outcomes achieved. For example, DOD did not evaluate whether a prior efficiency initiative called the Core Business Process Review achieved any of its intended savings or led to expected efficiencies. Without ensuring that efficiency initiatives are fully monitored and evaluated against established baselines over time, DOD lacks a systematic basis for evaluating whether its various initiatives have improved the efficiency or effectiveness of its programs or activities.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making five recommendations, including for DOD to develop internal guidance to conduct and record its reviews of DAFAs; collect consistent performance information and comprehensive overhead cost information; establish time frames and deliverables for key reform efforts; and ensure routine and comprehensive monitoring and evaluation of ongoing efficiency initiatives. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_624"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_625","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nMisuse of prescription opioids can lead to overdose and death. Medicare and Medicaid, two of the nation's largest health care programs, provide prescription drug coverage that can include opioids. GAO and others have reported on inappropriate activities and risks associated with these prescriptions.\nThis statement is based on GAO's October 2017 report (GAO-18-15) and discusses (1) CMS oversight of Medicare beneficiaries who receive opioid prescriptions under Part D, and (2) CMS oversight of providers who prescribe opioids to Medicare Part D beneficiaries. For the October 2017 report, GAO reviewed CMS opioid utilization and prescriber data, CMS guidance for plan sponsors, and CMS's strategy to prevent opioid misuse. GAO also interviewed CMS officials, the six largest Part D plan sponsors, and 12 national associations selected to represent insurance plans, pharmacy benefit managers, physicians, patients, and regulatory and law enforcement authorities.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn October 2017, GAO found that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) provided guidance on the monitoring of Medicare beneficiaries who received opioid prescriptions to plan sponsors\u2014private organizations that implement the Medicare drug benefit, Part D\u2014but it lacked information on most beneficiaries at risk of harm from opioid use. Specifically, GAO found that\nCMS provided guidance to plan sponsors on how they should monitor opioid overutilization among Medicare Part D beneficiaries, and required them to implement drug utilization review systems that use criteria similar to CMS's. Prior to 2018, the agency's criteria focused on beneficiaries who did all the following: (1) received prescriptions of high doses of opioids, (2) received prescriptions from four or more providers, and (3) filled prescriptions at four or more pharmacies. According to CMS, this approach focused actions on beneficiaries the agency determined to have the highest risk of harm. For 2018, CMS revised the criteria to include more at-risk beneficiaries.\nCMS's criteria, including recent revisions, did not provide sufficient information about the larger population of potentially at-risk beneficiaries. CMS estimated that, in 2015, 727,016 beneficiaries would have received high doses of opioids regardless of the number of providers or pharmacies, but only 33,223 would have met its revised criteria. In 2016, CMS began to collect information on some of these beneficiaries using a higher dosage threshold for opioid use. However, based on Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidelines, CMS's approach also missed some who could be at risk of harm. As a result, CMS had limited information to assess progress against the goals of the Medicare and Medicaid programs' Opioid Misuse Strategy, which includes activities to reduce risk of harm to beneficiaries.\nCMS provided oversight on prescribing of drugs at high risk of abuse through a variety of projects, but did not analyze data specifically on opioids. According to CMS officials, CMS and plan sponsors identified providers who prescribed large amounts of drugs with a high risk of abuse, and those suspected of fraud or abuse may be referred to law enforcement. However, GAO found that CMS did not identify providers who may be inappropriately prescribing large amounts of opioids separately from other drugs, and did not require plan sponsors to report actions they take when they identified such providers. As a result, CMS lacked information that it could use to assess how opioid prescribing patterns are changing over time, and whether its efforts to reduce harm are effective.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nIn the October 2017 report, GAO made three recommendations that CMS (1) gather information on the full number of at-risk beneficiaries receiving high doses of opioids, (2) identify providers who prescribe high amounts of opioids, and (3) require plan sponsors to report to CMS on actions related to providers who inappropriately prescribe opioids. HHS concurred with the first two recommendations, but not with the third. GAO continues to believe the recommendation is valid, as discussed in the report and in this statement.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_625"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_626","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nMedicare covered over 58 million people in 2017 and has wide-ranging impact on the health-care sector and the overall U.S. economy. However, the billions of dollars in Medicare outlays as well as program complexity make it susceptible to improper payments, including fraud. Although there are no reliable estimates of fraud in Medicare, in fiscal year 2017 improper payments for Medicare were estimated at about $52 billion. Further, about $1.4 billion was returned to Medicare Trust Funds in fiscal year 2017 as a result of recoveries, fines, and asset forfeitures.\nIn December 2017, GAO issued a report examining how CMS managed its fraud risks overall and particularly the extent to which its efforts in the Medicare and Medicaid programs aligned with GAO's Framework. This testimony, based on that report, discusses the extent to which CMS's management of fraud risks in Medicare aligns with the Framework. For the report, GAO reviewed CMS policies and interviewed officials and external stakeholders.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn its December 2017 report, GAO found that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) antifraud efforts for Medicare partially align with GAO's 2015 A Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs (Framework). The Fraud Reduction and Data Analytics Act of 2015 required OMB to incorporate leading practices identified in this Framework in its guidance to agencies on addressing fraud risks.\nConsistent with the Framework, GAO determined that CMS had demonstrated commitment to combating fraud by creating a dedicated entity to lead antifraud efforts; the Center for Program Integrity (CPI) serves as this entity for fraud, waste, and abuse issues in Medicare. CMS also promoted an antifraud culture by, for example, coordinating with internal stakeholders to incorporate antifraud features into new program design. To increase awareness of fraud risks in Medicare, CMS offered and required training for stakeholder groups such as providers of medical services, but it did not offer or require similar fraud-awareness training for most of its workforce.\nCMS took some steps to identify fraud risks in Medicare; however, it had not conducted a fraud risk assessment or designed and implemented a risk-based antifraud strategy for Medicare as defined in the Framework. CMS identified fraud risks through control activities that target areas the agency designated as higher risk within Medicare, including specific provider types, such as home health agencies. Building on earlier steps and conducting a fraud risk assessment, consistent with the Framework, would provide the detailed information and insights needed to create a fraud risk profile, which, in turn, is the basis for creating an antifraud strategy.\nCMS established monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for its program-integrity control activities that, if aligned with an antifraud strategy, could enhance the effectiveness of fraud risk management in Medicare. For example, CMS used return-on-investment and savings estimates to measure the effectiveness of its Medicare program-integrity activities. In developing an antifraud strategy, consistent with the Framework, CMS could include plans for refining and building on existing methods such as return-on-investment, to evaluate the effectiveness of all of its antifraud efforts.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nIn its December 2017 report, GAO made three recommendations, namely that CMS (1) require and provide fraud-awareness training to its employees; (2) conduct fraud risk assessments; and (3) create an antifraud strategy for Medicare, including an approach for evaluation. The Department of Health and Human Services agreed with these recommendations and reportedly is evaluating options to implement them. Accordingly, the recommendations remain open.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_626"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_627","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nGovernment-wide estimated improper payments totaled almost $1.4 trillion from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2017. IPERA requires IGs to annually assess and report on whether executive branch agencies complied with the six criteria to (1) publish an agency financial report or performance accountability report, (2) conduct program-specific improper payment risk assessments, (3) publish improper payment estimates, (4) publish corrective action plans, (5) publish and meet annual improper payment reduction targets, and (6) report a gross improper payment rate of less than 10 percent.\nThis report examines the extent to which\n1. CFO Act agencies complied with IPERA criteria for fiscal years 2016 and 2017, and the trends evident since 2011, as reported by their IGs;\n2. CFO Act agencies addressed requirements for programs reported as noncompliant with IPERA criteria for 3 or more consecutive years, as of fiscal year 2016, and communicated their strategies to Congress for reducing improper payments and achieving compliance; and\n3. OMB made determinations regarding whether additional funding would help CFO Act agency programs reported as noncompliant with IPERA criteria for 2 consecutive years, as of fiscal years 2016 and 2017, come into compliance.\nGAO analyzed the IGs' fiscal years 2016 and 2017 IPERA compliance reports; reviewed prior GAO reports on agencies' IPERA compliance; reviewed agency information submitted to Congress; and made inquiries to OMB, applicable agencies, and IGs; and assessed such information based on relevant IPERA provisions and OMB and other guidance.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nOver half of the 24 Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (CFO Act) agencies were reported by their inspectors general (IG) as noncompliant with one or more criteria under the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA) for fiscal years 2016 and 2017. Nine CFO Act agencies have been reported as noncompliant in one or more programs every year since the implementation of IPERA in fiscal year 2011, totaling 7 consecutive years of noncompliance.\nThe IGs of the 14 noncompliant agencies reported that a total of 58 programs were responsible for the identified instances of noncompliance in fiscal year 2017. Further, 18 of the 58 programs at 9 agencies were reported as noncompliant for 3 or more consecutive years. Fourteen of these 18 programs accounted for an estimated $74.4 billion of the $141 billion total estimated improper payments for fiscal year 2017; the other 4 programs did not report improper payment estimates. This sum may include estimates that are of unknown reliability. The $74.4 billion is primarily composed of estimates reported for two noncompliant programs, the Department of Health and Human Services' Medicaid program and the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) Earned Income Tax Credit program; estimated improper payments for these two programs are also a central part of certain high-risk areas in GAO's 2017 High-Risk List.\nAgencies with any program reported as noncompliant for 3 or more consecutive years are required to notify Congress of their program's consecutive noncompliance and submit a proposal for reauthorization or statutory change to bring that program into compliance. GAO found that three agencies with one or more programs reported as noncompliant for 3 or more consecutive years, as of fiscal year 2016, did not notify Congress or submit the required proposals. The Departments of Labor and the Treasury submitted proposed legislative changes in response to their programs being previously reported as noncompliant, but did not notify Congress of the programs' continued noncompliance as of fiscal year 2016. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has not notified Congress despite prior GAO and USDA IG recommendations to do so. To address these issues, in June 2018 the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) updated its guidance to clarify the notification requirements for each consecutive year a program is reported as noncompliant.\nGAO found that five agencies did notify Congress as required, and included additional quality information that is not specifically required, but could be useful in updating Congress on their compliance efforts. For example, all five agencies provided information on the root causes, risks, changes, or issues affecting their efforts and corrective actions or strategies to address them; three agencies provided other quality information on accountability mechanisms, designated senior officials, and measurable milestones.\nIn June 2018, OMB updated its guidance to clarify agency reporting requirements for programs reported as noncompliant for 3 or more consecutive years. However, the updated guidance does not direct agencies to include the types of quality information included in these five agencies' notifications for fiscal year 2016. GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government emphasizes the importance of communicating quality information, such as significant matters affecting agencies' efforts to achieve compliance objectives. Such information could be useful in understanding the current challenges of these programs and is essential for assessing agency efforts to address high-risk and other issues. As a result, Congress could have more complete information to effectively oversee agency efforts to address program noncompliance for 3 or more consecutive years.\nWhen programs are reported as noncompliant for 2 consecutive years, IPERA gives OMB authority to determine whether additional funding is needed to help resolve the noncompliance. In April 2018, OMB staff stated that they determined that no additional funding was needed for the 15 programs that were reported as noncompliant for 2 consecutive years, as of fiscal year 2016, and that they primarily rely on the IGs' recommendations in their annual IPERA compliance reports when making funding determinations. OMB staff subsequently stated that they no longer need to conduct a detailed review of the IGs' IPERA compliance reports to identify recommendations related to additional funding needs. Instead, OMB updated its guidance in June 2018 to direct agencies to submit proposals to OMB regarding additional funding needs to help address IPERA noncompliance and clarified that the funding determination process will unfold as part of the annual development of the President's Budget. As of September 2018, OMB was in the process of making funding determinations for 12 programs that were reported as noncompliant as of fiscal year 2017 and stated that any determinations made would be developed in the President's Budget for fiscal year 2020.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that OMB update its guidance to specify other types of quality information that agencies with programs noncompliant for 3 or more consecutive years should include in their notifications to Congress, such as significant matters related to risks, issues, root causes, measurable milestones, designated senior officials, accountability mechanisms, and corrective actions or strategies planned or taken by agencies to achieve compliance.\nGAO provided a draft of this report to OMB and requested comments, and OMB said that it had no comments. GAO also provided a draft of this report to the 24 CFO Act agencies and their IGs and requested comments. In its written comments, the Social Security Administration (SSA) stated that it provided information on measurable milestones, designated senior officials, and accountability mechanisms in its agency financial report. However, SSA did not provide this information in its notifications to Congress for programs reported as noncompliant under IPERA as of fiscal year 2016. GAO believes that OMB should take steps to update OMB's guidance to help ensure that agencies report such significant information and include it in their notifications to Congress. In addition, several agencies and IGs provided technical comments, which were incorporated in the report as appropriate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_627"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_628","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThis testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's September 2017 report, entitled Navy and Marine Corps Training: Further Planning Needed for Amphibious Operations Training ( GAO-17-789 ).\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nNavy and Marine Corps units that are deploying as part of an Amphibious Ready Group and Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG-MEU) completed their required training for amphibious operations, but other Marine Corps units have been limited in their ability to conduct training for other amphibious operations\u2013related priorities. GAO found that several factors, to include the decline in the fleet of the Navy's amphibious ships from 62 in 1990 to 31 today limited the ability of Marine Corps units to conduct training for other priorities, such as recurring training for home-station units (see figure). As a result, training completion for amphibious operations was low for some but not all Marine Corps units from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. The services have taken steps to address amphibious training shortfalls, such as more comprehensively determining units that require training. However, these efforts are incomplete because the services do not have an approach to prioritize available training resources, evaluate training resource alternatives, and monitor progress towards achieving priorities. Thus, the services are not well positioned to mitigate any training shortfalls.\nThe Navy and Marine Corps have taken some steps to improve coordination between the two services, but have not fully incorporated leading collaboration practices to improve integration of the two services\u2014naval integration\u2014for amphibious operations. For example, the Navy and Marine Corps have not defined and articulated common outcomes for naval integration that would help them align efforts to maximize training opportunities for amphibious operations.\nThe Marine Corps has taken steps to better integrate virtual training devices into operational training, but gaps remain in its process to develop and use them. GAO found that for selected virtual training devices, the Marine Corps did not conduct front-end analysis that considered key factors, such as the specific training tasks that a device would accomplish; consider device usage data to support its investment decisions; or evaluate the effectiveness of existing virtual training devices because of weaknesses in the service's guidance. As a result, the Marine Corps risks investing in devices that are not cost-effective and whose value to operational training is undetermined.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_628"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_629","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nMisuse of prescription opioids can lead to overdose and death. In 2016, over 14 million Medicare Part D beneficiaries received opioid prescriptions, and spending for opioids was almost $4.1 billion. GAO and others have reported on inappropriate activities and risks associated with these prescriptions, such as receiving multiple opioid prescriptions from different providers.\nGAO was asked to describe what is known about CMS\u2019s oversight of Medicare Part D opioid use and prescribing. This report examines (1) CMS oversight of beneficiaries who receive opioid prescriptions under Part D, and (2) CMS oversight of providers who prescribe opioids to Medicare Part D beneficiaries.GAO reviewed CMS opioid utilization and prescriber data, CMS guidance for plan sponsors, and CMS\u2019s strategy to prevent opioid misuse. GAO also interviewed CMS officials, the six largest Part D plan sponsors, and 12 national associations selected to represent insurance plans, pharmacy benefit managers, physicians, patients, and regulatory and law enforcement authorities.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) provides guidance on the monitoring of Medicare beneficiaries who receive opioid prescriptions to plan sponsors\u2014private organizations that implement the Medicare drug benefit, Part D\u2014but lacks information on most beneficiaries at risk of harm.\nCMS provides plan sponsors guidance on how they should monitor opioid overutilization among Medicare Part D beneficiaries and requires them to implement drug utilization review systems that use criteria similar to CMS's. CMS's criteria focus on beneficiaries who (1) receive prescriptions of high doses of opioids, (2) receive prescriptions from four or more providers, and (3) fill the prescriptions at four or more pharmacies. According to CMS officials, this approach allows plan sponsors to focus their actions on those beneficiaries it determined to have the highest risk of harm from opioid use.\nCMS\u2019s criteria, including recent revisions, do not provide sufficient information about the larger population of potentially at-risk beneficiaries. CMS estimates that while 33,223 beneficiaries would have met the revised criteria in 2015, 727,016 would have received high doses of opioids regardless of the number of providers or pharmacies. In 2016, CMS began to collect information on some of these beneficiaries using a higher dosage threshold for opioid use. This approach misses some who could be at risk of harm, based on Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidelines. As a result, CMS is limited in its ability to assess progress toward meeting the broader goals of its Opioid Misuse Strategy, which includes activities to reduce the risk of harm from opioid use.\nCMS Estimates of 2015 Part D Beneficiaries with High Opioid Doses and Those Who Would Have Met Revised Overutilization Monitoring Criteria\nCMS oversees the prescribing of drugs at high risk of abuse through a variety of projects, but does not analyze data specifically on opioids. According to CMS officials, CMS and plan sponsors identify providers who prescribe large amounts of drugs with a high risk of abuse, and those suspected of fraud or abuse may be referred to law enforcement. However, GAO found that CMS does not identify providers who may be inappropriately prescribing large amounts of opioids separately from other drugs, and does not require plan sponsors to report actions they take when they identify such providers. As a result, CMS is lacking information that it could use to assess how opioid prescribing patterns are changing over time, and whether its efforts to reduce harm are effective.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that CMS (1) gather information on the full number of at-risk beneficiaries receiving high doses of opioids, (2) identify providers who prescribe high amounts of opioids, and (3) require plan sponsors to report to CMS on actions related to providers who inappropriately prescribe opioids. HHS concurred with the first two recommendations, but not with the third. GAO continues to believe the recommendation is valid, as discussed in the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_629"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_630","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn 2012 and 2015, DOT was provided with additional authority to oversee the safety of rail transit. Within DOT, FTA is now implementing this authority. The DOT's Office of Inspector General has reported, though, that FTA faces challenges in carrying out its enhanced safety oversight. FRA, also in DOT, has long carried out safety oversight of freight, intercity passenger, and commuter railroads.\nGAO was asked to review various rail safety and oversight issues, including the differences between FRA's and FTA's rail safety oversight programs. This report examines (1) key characteristics of FRA's and FTA's rail safety oversight programs and (2) strengths and limitations of FRA's and FTA's rail safety oversight programs. GAO assessed FRA's and FTA's information about rail safety oversight activities against guidance from the Office of Management and Budget, leading practices developed by the transit industry, and federal standards for internal control. GAO also interviewed stakeholders, including rail operators chosen based on mode, size, and location.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and Federal Transit Administration (FTA) carry out different approaches to rail safety oversight. FRA has a more centralized safety oversight program for railroads, while FTA's program for oversight of rail transit safety largely relies on state safety agencies to monitor and enforce rail transit safety, as established in federal statute. Key characteristics of both programs include: (1) safety regulations, (2) inspections and other oversight activities, and (3) enforcement mechanisms to ensure that safety deficiencies are addressed (see figure).\nThere are strengths and limitations to FRA's and FTA's approaches to their safety oversight missions, including how the two agencies develop safety regulations, conduct inspections, and carry out enforcement. The National Transportation Safety Board has reported, and stakeholders GAO spoke with generally agreed, that strengths of FRA's rail safety oversight program include its safety regulations, its risk-based inspection program, and its enforcement authorities. FRA also has potential limitations in its oversight framework, though, such as difficulty evaluating the effectiveness of its enforcement mechanisms. FTA has made some progress implementing changes to the rail transit safety program. However, FTA has not provided all the necessary guidance and support to states' safety agencies to ensure they develop appropriate and effective rail transit safety inspection programs. In particular, FTA has not provided states with guidance on how to develop and implement risk-based inspection programs. Though FTA has said that it will develop such guidance, it does not have a plan or timeline to do so. Without guidance from FTA on how to develop and carry out risk-based inspections, state safety agencies may not allocate their limited resources efficiently, and important safety issues may go undetected. In addition, FTA has not developed a process or methodology to evaluate whether state safety agency enforcement authorities and practices are effective. Without clear evidence that state safety agencies' enforcement is effective, states and FTA may not be able to compel rail transit operators to remedy safety deficiencies. As a result, deficiencies may remain for long periods, potentially contributing to safety incidents.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that FTA (1) create a plan, with timeline, for developing risk-based inspection guidance for state safety agencies, and (2) develop and communicate a method for how FTA will monitor whether state safety agencies' enforcement practices are effective. DOT agreed with our recommendations. DOT, NTSB, and WMATA provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_630"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_631","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSince the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act (SRIA) of 2013, federally recognized Indian tribes affected by major disasters have had the option to make disaster declaration requests directly to the President of the United States or join a state's request for federal disaster assistance. Prior to this, tribes had to receive assistance through a state.\nGAO was asked to assess the implementation of this new authority. This report addresses (1) the factors that influenced selected tribes' decisions about how to seek federal disaster assistance, and (2) the actions FEMA has taken to help tribes exercise the new authority.\nGAO analyzed FEMA's pilot guidance for tribal declarations and interviewed FEMA and tribal emergency management experts. GAO also surveyed the 36 tribes who made requests for disaster assistance in fiscal years 2013-2016 about the factors that influenced their decision making. Twenty three tribes responded. GAO visited seven tribes selected from among the survey respondents to represent different FEMA regions and disaster types. The site visits cannot be generalized but provided valuable insights into the opportunities and challenges of exercising this new authority.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAccording to tribal officials GAO surveyed and interviewed, there are several factors they considered when deciding whether to make a direct request or to join a state's request for a major disaster declaration. Key factors that tribes reported considering were the (1) importance of tribal sovereignty, (2) financial matters such as the timeliness with which they receive funds, (3) the level of support they anticipated receiving from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and (4) their own emergency management capacity. For example, survey results showed that tribal officials' confidence in their capacity to manage the declaration was a key factor in determining whether to make a request directly. Specifically, various elements of emergency management capacity, as illustrated below, could affect tribes' ability to manage a declaration.\nFEMA has developed pilot guidance for tribal declarations and solicited comments from tribes, as part of its effort to consider the needs of tribes and develop regulations. According to FEMA officials, they are currently assessing the effectiveness of policies and procedures based on data collected from tribal declarations since the passage of SRIA. These officials said they intend to begin the rulemaking process as soon as 2 years into the pilot, but may delay if they cannot collect enough data about different disaster situations during that time to conduct a complete analysis. Until the regulations are final, officials say they will exercise flexibility whenever possible. In addition, the agency offers training on the tribal declaration process and has dedicated staff who act as primary points of contact for tribal governments that require technical assistance.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making any recommendations in this report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_631"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_632","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Office of Commercial Space Transportation, which regulates and promotes the U.S. commercial space launch industry, was established in 1984 within the Office of the Secretary of Transportation and transferred to FAA in 1995. In 2015, GAO reported that the Office of Commercial Space Transportation faced challenges associated with the growth of the commercial space launch industry such as licensing more launches. To help meet these and other challenges such as updating regulations, some industry stakeholders and others suggested that the Office of Commercial Space Transportation should be moved back to the Office of the Secretary of Transportation.\nGAO was asked to review issues regarding transferring the Office of Commercial Space Transportation from FAA to the Office of the Secretary of Transportation. This report addresses: (1) selected stakeholders' and officials' perspectives on transferring the Office of Commercial Space Transportation from FAA to the Office of the Secretary of Transportation, (2) what steps would be required to make this transfer, and (3) key practices and considerations GAO has previously identified for organizational changes that could be instructive for such a transfer. GAO interviewed industry stakeholders and FAA and DOT officials, reviewed the steps taken during the office's 1995 transfer, and reviewed prior reports on key practices and questions to consider regarding organizational changes.\nGAO is making no recommendations in this report.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nRepresentatives from commercial space launch companies and spaceports GAO interviewed described advantages and disadvantages of moving the Office of Commercial Space Transportation to the Office of the Secretary of Transportation, but most of them favored moving the office. Conversely, most Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) officials GAO interviewed did not favor the idea. A senior official in the Office of Commercial Space Transportation said that there are advantages and disadvantages to moving the office and that whether such an action would be beneficial depends on the implementation details and the administration's preferences. Officials from the Office of the Secretary of Transportation said they currently do not have plans to move the office. Stakeholders' and officials' perspectives are based on what they perceive could occur as a result of a move, for example:\nCommunication and coordination: Department of Transportation (DOT) officials said that a possible advantage of moving the office would be having a unified point of contact for the industry in communicating about commercial space launch issues, while FAA officials said that moving the office could make it more difficult for FAA offices to coordinate on commercial space activities.\nRegulations: Some stakeholders said that moving the office could help accelerate the pace of commercial space regulatory reform, but DOT officials said that moving the office would not necessarily do so.\nResources: According to some stakeholders and a senior official in the Office of Commercial Space Transportation, moving the office out of FAA could give commercial space launch issues a higher profile and more resources because FAA is focused on aviation as opposed to commercial space. However, officials from the Office of the Secretary of Transportation said that it is uncertain whether the office would receive more resources if it were moved to the Secretary's office.\nThe Secretary of Transportation could move all or part of the office through a delegation of responsibilities for commercial space, as was the case in the prior move in 1995. If the office were moved, other necessary steps would include addressing the differences in pay scales between FAA and the Office of the Secretary of Transportation, obtaining support services and office space, and establishing new coordination and communication processes and procedures.\nGAO's prior work has identified key practices and questions for consideration when evaluating proposals for or implementing organizational changes such as a consolidation or merger. These key practices include: (1) focusing on a key set of principles and priorities at the outset of the transformation, (2) setting implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show progress, and (3) establishing a communication plan. Questions to consider when evaluating consolidation proposals include (1) What are the goals of the consolidation? and (2) What will be the likely costs and benefits of the consolidation?","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_632"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_633","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe current federal legal framework governing buying and selling of firearms does not specifically address the use of the Internet to facilitate these transactions. Additionally, private transactions involving the most-common types of firearms between individuals who are not licensed to commercially sell weapons and who are residents of the same state, including transactions facilitated by the Internet, are generally not subject to federal background-check requirements.\nCongressional requesters asked that GAO assess the extent to which ATF is enforcing existing laws and investigate whether online private sellers sell firearms to people who are not allowed or eligible to possess a firearm. This report describes (1) techniques ATF uses to investigate and enforce generally applicable firearm laws in instances where the firearm or firearm-component transaction is facilitated by the Internet and (2) results of GAO's undercover attempts to buy firearms on the Dark Web and Surface Web.\nGAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials to identify actions ATF has taken to prohibit illegal firearm transactions. GAO also attempted to purchase firearms from Dark Web and Surface Web marketplaces. The results of the testing are illustrative and nongeneralizable.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is responsible for investigating criminal and regulatory violations of firearms statutes and regulations that govern firearms transactions, including sales that are facilitated by the Internet. Two components of the Internet may be used to facilitate Internet firearm sales: the Surface Web and the Dark Web. The Surface Web is searchable with standard web search engines. The Dark Web contains content that has been intentionally concealed and requires specific computer software to gain access. ATF created the Internet Investigations Center (Center) to investigate buyers and sellers who use the Internet to facilitate illegal firearms transactions. The Center uses several tools to provide investigative support to ATF, which has resulted in the arrests of individuals using the Internet to facilitate illegal firearm purchases. ATF officials with the Center also noted that investigations might involve both the Surface Web and the Dark Web. For example, to identify an anonymous user on the Dark Web, the Center works to establish a user's \u201cdigital footprint\u201d on the Surface Web.\nIn 2016, the Center also issued a report about Internet firearm transactions. This and other ATF reports highlighted the following about Internet-facilitated firearm transactions:\nThe relative anonymity of the Internet makes it an ideal means for prohibited individuals to obtain illegal firearms.\nThe more anonymity employed by a firearms purchaser, the greater the likelihood that the transaction violates federal law.\nFirearm transactions that occur on the Dark Web are more likely to be completed in person or via the mail or common carrier, versus through a Federal Firearm Licensee.\nGAO agents attempted to purchase firearms from Dark Web and Surface Web marketplaces. Agents made seven attempts to purchase firearms on the Dark Web. In these attempts, agents did not disclose any information about whether they were prohibited from possessing a firearm. Of these seven attempts, two on a Dark Web marketplace were successful. Specifically, GAO agents purchased and received an AR-15 rifle and an Uzi that the seller said was modified so that it would fire automatically. GAO provided referral letters to applicable law-enforcement agencies for these purchases to inform any ongoing investigations.\nTests performed on the Surface Web demonstrated that private sellers GAO contacted on gun forums and other classified ads were unwilling to sell a firearm to an individual who appeared to be prohibited from possessing a firearm. Of the 72 attempts agents made to purchase firearms on the Surface Web, 56 sellers refused to complete a transaction: 29 sellers stated they would not ship a firearm and 27 refused after the disclosure of the undercover identities' stated prohibited status. Furthermore, in 5 of these 72 attempts, the accounts GAO set up were frozen by the websites, which prevented the agents from using the forums and attempting to make a purchase.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making recommendations in this report. ATF provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_633"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_634","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSince 1993, the U.S. government has committed more than $5 billion in bilateral assistance to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. According to the Department of State, this assistance to the Palestinians promotes U.S. economic and political foreign policy interests by supporting Middle East peace negotiations and financing economic stabilization programs. USAID is primarily responsible for administering ESF assistance to the West Bank and Gaza.\nAppropriations acts for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 included provisions for GAO to review the treatment, handling, and uses of funds provided through the ESF for assistance to the West Bank and Gaza. This report examines (1) the status of ESF assistance and projects provided to the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal years 2015 and 2016, including project assistance and payments to PA creditors, and (2) the extent to which USAID conducted required vetting of PA creditors to ensure that this assistance would not support entities or individuals associated with terrorism and assessed PA ministries' capacity to use ESF assistance as intended. GAO reviewed relevant laws and regulations and USAID financial data, policies, procedures, and documents. GAO also interviewed USAID and State Department officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAs of March 2018, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had allocated about $545 million of funding appropriated to the Economic Support Fund (ESF) for assistance in the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal years 2015 and 2016. USAID obligated about $544 million (over 99 percent) and expended about $351 million (over 64 percent) of the total allocations. Project assistance accounted for approximately $399 million of the obligated funds, while payments to Palestinian Authority (PA) creditors accounted for $145 million (see figure). USAID's obligations for project assistance in the West Bank and Gaza for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 supported three development objectives\u2014Economic Growth and Infrastructure ($239 million), Investing in the Next Generation ($107 million), and Governance and Civic Engagement (about $25 million). In fiscal years 2015 and 2016, USAID made payments directly to PA creditors\u2014two Israeli fuel companies, to cover debts for petroleum purchases, and a local Palestinian bank, to pay off a line of credit used for PA medical referrals to six hospitals in the East Jerusalem Hospital network.\nUSAID vetted PA creditors to ensure that the program assistance would not provide support to entities or individuals associated with terrorism and also conducted external assessments and financial audits of PA ministries of Health and Finance and Planning. USAID documentation showed that, as required, officials checked the vetting status of each PA creditor within 12 months before USAID signed its debt relief grant agreements with the PA. In addition, although USAID determined that it was not legally required to assess the PA Ministry of Health's medical referral services and the Ministry of Finance and Planning's petroleum procurement system, the agency commissioned external assessments of both ministries. These assessments found some weaknesses in both ministries' systems; however, USAID mission officials stated that these weaknesses did not affect USAID debt relief payments to the PA creditors. Nevertheless, USAID took additional steps to mitigate the identified weaknesses. For example, a USAID contractor worked with the Ministry of Health to update, revise, and approve guidelines for medical referrals. In addition, USAID commissioned financial audits of the debt relief grant agreements between USAID and the PA for direct payments to PA creditors in fiscal year 2015 and 2016. The audits did not identify any ineligible costs, reportable material weaknesses in internal control, or material instances of noncompliance with the terms of the agreements.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making recommendations in this report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_634"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_635","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nTo maintain heavy polar icebreaking capability, the Coast Guard and the Navy are collaborating to acquire up to three new heavy polar icebreakers through an integrated program office. The Navy plans to award a contract in 2019. GAO has found that before committing resources, successful acquisition programs begin with sound business cases, which include plans for a stable design, mature technologies, a reliable cost estimate, and a realistic schedule.\nSection 122 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 included a provision for GAO to assess issues related to the acquisition of the icebreaker vessels. In addition, GAO was asked to review the heavy polar icebreaker program's acquisition risks. This report examines, among other objectives, the extent to which the program is facing risks to achieving its goals, particularly in the areas of design maturity, technology readiness, cost, and schedule. GAO reviewed Coast Guard and Navy program documents, analyzed Coast Guard and Navy data, and interviewed knowledgeable officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Coast Guard\u2014a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)\u2014did not have a sound business case in March 2018, when it established the cost, schedule, and performance baselines for its heavy polar icebreaker acquisition program, because of risks in four key areas:\nDesign. The Coast Guard set program baselines before conducting a preliminary design review, which puts the program at risk of having an unstable design, thereby increasing the program's cost and schedule risks. While setting baselines without a preliminary design review is consistent with DHS's current acquisition policy, it is inconsistent with acquisition best practices. Based on GAO's prior recommendation, DHS is currently evaluating its policy to better align technical reviews and acquisition decisions.\nTechnology. The Coast Guard intends to use proven technologies for the program, but did not conduct a technology readiness assessment to determine the maturity of key technologies prior to setting baselines. Coast Guard officials indicated such an assessment was not necessary because the technologies the program plans to employ have been proven on other icebreaker ships. However, according to best practices, such technologies can still pose risks when applied to a different program or operational environment, as in this case. Without such an assessment, the program's technical risk is underrepresented.\nCost. The lifecycle cost estimate that informed the program's $9.8 billion cost baseline substantially met GAO's best practices for being comprehensive, well-documented, and accurate, but only partially met best practices for being credible. The cost estimate did not quantify the range of possible costs over the entire life of the program. As a result, the cost estimate was not fully reliable and may underestimate the total funding needed for the program.\nSchedule. The Coast Guard's planned delivery dates were not informed by a realistic assessment of shipbuilding activities, but rather driven by the potential gap in icebreaking capabilities once the Coast Guard's only operating heavy polar icebreaker\u2014the Polar Star \u2014reaches the end of its service life (see figure).\nGAO's analysis of selected lead ships for other shipbuilding programs found the icebreaker program's estimated construction time of 3 years is optimistic. As a result, the Coast Guard is at risk of not delivering the icebreakers when promised and the potential gap in icebreaking capabilities could widen.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making six recommendations to the Coast Guard, DHS, and the Navy. Among other things, GAO recommends that the program conduct a technology readiness assessment, re-evaluate its cost estimate and develop a schedule according to best practices, and update program baselines following a preliminary design review. DHS concurred with all six of GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_635"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_636","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAn increasing number of Air Force missions use unmanned aerial systems, or RPAs, to provide their specialized capabilities in support of combat operations. The demand for crew members for these systems has grown rapidly. For example, RPA pilot requirements increased by 76 percent since fiscal year 2013 while those for fighter pilots stayed about the same. These requirements include pilots who serve in non-operational staff positions, such as trainers.\nSenate Report 115-125 included a provision that GAO review career advancement for Air Force RPA pilots compared to other pilots. This report, among other things, describes (1) the rates that RPA and other pilots were promoted; (2) the rates that non-operational staff positions requiring RPA pilot expertise were assigned to various organizations, and (3) the extent to which the Air Force has reviewed its oversight process to effectively manage non-operational staff positions requiring aviator expertise.\nAmong other things, GAO analyzed Air Force pilot promotion data from 2006-2017. GAO also analyzed non-operational staff position data from fiscal years 2013-2018 and interviewed officials regarding the management and oversight of these positions.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe promotion rates for Air Force Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) pilots have been generally similar to those of other pilots since 2013 and have increased over time. See figure below for promotion rates from major to lieutenant colonel. Air Force officials stated that RPA pilot promotion rates increased because the creation of a dedicated career field resulted in more competitive candidates.\nSince 2013, over 75 percent of non-operational staff positions requiring RPA pilot expertise were assigned to various organizations within the Air Force, according to GAO's analysis. These positions carry out support and other noncombat-related activities as well as training functions and are essential to the development of officers. However, the overall number of these positions that require a RPA pilot is about one-tenth of the combined number of those requiring other pilots. For example, in fiscal year 2018, 83 non-operational staff positions required RPA pilots compared to 330 requiring fighter pilots. Air Force officials stated that the small number of RPA positions is because the career field is new.\nThe Air Force has not reviewed its oversight process to ensure that it is efficiently managing its non-operational staff positions that require aviator expertise. Air Force officials explained that over the last 10 years, the Air Force reduced the number of squadrons but had not reviewed the number of non-operational staff positions. Similarly, the Air Force has had no widely accessible oversight process to monitor whether it had established an accurate number of non-operational staff positions required to support the new RPA career field. In August 2018, the Air Force identified 513 non-operational staff positions (out of 2,783) as needing further review because they lacked adequate justification of the need for aviator expertise. Officials described the process for managing these positions as time and labor intensive, which can cause delays in obtaining reliable information needed to inform decision-making. By reviewing this process, the Air Force may be able to identify opportunities to create efficiencies and more effectively manage its non-operational staff positions requiring aviator expertise.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that the Air Force review its oversight process for managing the non-operational staff positions, including those for RPA pilots, to identify opportunities to increase efficiencies. DOD concurred with this recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_636"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_637","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nVA manages a $1.9 billion research program that has produced numerous healthcare inventions, such as the pacemaker. In 2000, VA created a program to help transfer VA inventions to the private sector so that they can be commercialized and used by veterans and the public, while VA retains ownership and collects royalties. Many of VA's 3,000 researchers also hold positions at universities, which take the lead in commercializing inventions developed by these researchers. Researchers and universities are required to disclose such inventions to VA, and universities are to report on commercialization activities according to their agreements with VA.\nGAO was asked to examine VA's ability to ensure its ownership of inventions made with VA resources. This report examines, among other things, the extent to which VA has taken steps to ensure that (1) researchers disclose inventions and (2) universities report on commercialization activities for joint inventions. GAO reviewed laws; policies; a nongeneralizable sample of university agreements based on backlogs of disclosures, among other factors; and interviews with officials and researchers from VA medical centers and their affiliated universities.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has taken steps to educate agency researchers about its requirements to disclose inventions to VA, but officials reported that researchers have not consistently done so. VA policy requires researchers to disclose inventions to both VA and the university they work for even when they do not use VA resources. GAO found, through discussions with VA officials and researchers, that several factors contribute to researchers not consistently disclosing their inventions, including that VA researchers may have:\ndisclosed inventions to their university, assuming the university would then disclose them to VA;\nnot been familiar with VA's invention disclosure process, because they may not have frequently developed inventions; or\nthought that invention disclosure was unnecessary when they did not use VA resources to develop their invention.\nIn 2017, VA staff visited universities and VA medical centers 26 times to meet with researchers about invention disclosure. Also, VA created an online training course to educate researchers on the need to disclose inventions, but the training is not mandatory, and about 4 percent of researchers took it. Without mandatory training to communicate invention disclosure requirements\u2014consistent with federal internal control standards for internally communicating quality information\u2014VA researchers may not be fully informed about those requirements, which can result in lost technology transfer opportunities and royalties for VA.\nVA has improved communication with universities but has not ensured that they are consistently reporting information on commercialization activities for joint inventions. VA reported that about three-quarters of VA's 79 university partners did not submit the annual reports required by VA in 2017. GAO reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of agreements VA has with universities and found that reporting requirements about timing and content of reports were unclear. Without providing a standardized method that clearly guides universities in fulfilling VA's reporting requirements, consistent with federal standards for internal control, VA cannot ensure that it has adequate information to account for its licenses and royalties.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that VA (1) make training about invention disclosure mandatory and (2) provide universities with a standardized method for annual reporting. VA concurred with GAO\u2019s recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_637"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_638","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIT systems are essential to the operations of the federal government. The supply chain\u2014the set of organizations, people, activities, and resources that create and move a product from suppliers to end users\u2014for IT systems is complex and global in scope. The exploitation of vulnerabilities in the IT supply chain is a continuing threat. Federal security guidelines provide for managing the risks to the supply chain.\nThis testimony statement highlights information security risks associated with the supply chains used by federal agencies to procure IT systems. The statement also summarizes GAO's 2012 report that assessed the extent to which four national security-related agencies had addressed such risks. To develop this statement, GAO relied on its previous reports, as well as information provided by the national security-related agencies on their actions in response to GAO's previous recommendations. GAO also reviewed federal information security guidelines and directives.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nReliance on a global supply chain introduces multiple risks to federal information systems. Supply chain threats are present during the various phases of an information system's development life cycle and could create an unacceptable risk to federal agencies. Information technology (IT) supply chain-related threats are varied and can include:\ninstallation of intentionally harmful hardware or software (i.e., containing \u201cmalicious logic\u201d);\ninstallation of counterfeit hardware or software;\nfailure or disruption in the production or distribution of critical products;\nreliance on malicious or unqualified service providers for the performance of technical services; and\ninstallation of hardware or software containing unintentional vulnerabilities, such as defective code.\nThese threats can have a range of impacts, including allowing adversaries to take control of systems or decreasing the availability of materials needed to develop systems. These threats can be introduced by exploiting vulnerabilities that could exist at multiple points in the supply chain. Examples of such vulnerabilities include the acquisition of products or parts from unauthorized distributors; inadequate testing of software updates and patches; and incomplete information on IT suppliers. Malicious actors could exploit these vulnerabilities, leading to the loss of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of federal systems and the information they contain.\nGAO reported in 2012 that the four national security-related agencies in its review\u2014the Departments of Defense, Justice, Energy, Homeland Security (DHS)\u2014varied in the extent to which they had addressed supply chain risks. Of the four agencies, Defense had made the most progress addressing the risks. It had defined and implemented supply chain protection controls, and initiated efforts to monitor the effectiveness of the controls. Conversely, Energy and DHS had not developed or documented policies and procedures that defined security measures for protecting against IT supply chain threats and had not developed capabilities for monitoring the implementation and effectiveness of the measures. Although Justice had defined supply chain protection measures, it also had not developed or documented procedures for implementing or monitoring the measures.\nEnergy and Justice fully implemented the recommendations that GAO made in its 2012 report and resolved the deficiencies that GAO had identified with their supply chain risk management efforts by 2016. DHS also fully implemented two recommendations to document policies and procedures for defining and implementing security measures to protect against supply chain threats by 2015, but could not demonstrate that it had fully implemented the recommendation to develop and implement a monitoring capability to assess the effectiveness of the security measures.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nIn its 2012 report, GAO recommended that Justice, Energy, and DHS take eight actions, as needed, to develop and document policies, procedures, and monitoring capabilities that address IT supply chain risk. The departments generally concurred with the recommendations and subsequently implemented seven recommendations and partially implemented the eighth recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_638"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_639","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nNatural gas storage is important for ensuring that natural gas is available when demand increases. There are 415 storage sites\u2014including underground caverns and depleted aquifers and oil and gas reservoirs\u2014located in 31 states, often near population centers (see fig.). Leaks from these sites, such as one near Los Angeles that led to the temporary relocation of about 8,000 families in 2015, can result in environmental and economic damage. Until 2016, states set standards for 211 sites, but there were no standards for 204 sites connected to interstate pipelines subject to federal jurisdiction. With passage of the PIPES Act of 2016, PHMSA, an agency within DOT that sets and enforces standards for energy pipelines, among other things, was tasked with issuing minimum standards for all gas storage sites.\nGAO was asked to review natural gas storage safety standards. This report examines (1) PHMSA's efforts to implement the requirement to issue minimum safety standards for natural gas storage sites and (2) the extent to which PHMSA has planned strategically to enforce its safety standards for these sites. GAO reviewed PHMSA documents and plans, compared them to leading planning practices, and interviewed PHMSA officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nTo meet its requirement under the Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety (PIPES) Act of 2016, the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued minimum safety standards in an interim rule and plans to finalize them by January 2018. Under the interim standards, site operators are to follow industry-developed best practices to detect and prevent leaks and plan for emergencies, among other things. Since the interim rule went into effect in January 2017, the minimum safety standards apply to all 415 natural gas storage sites, and the rule will be subject to further revision before it is final.\nTo enforce its safety standards, PHMSA has taken steps to establish a natural gas storage safety enforcement program. For example, PHMSA has started developing a training program for its inspectors. PHMSA also has identified a strategic goal for its program\u2014to promote continuous improvement in safety performance\u2014and is developing a performance goal for its training program.\nHowever, PHMSA has not yet followed certain leading strategic planning practices. For example, PHMSA has not yet defined the level of performance to be achieved, fully addressed all core program activities, or used baseline data to develop its performance goal. GAO has previously reported that requirements under the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) and GPRA Modernization Act of 2010\u2014which include establishing performance goals to define the level of performance\u2014can serve as leading practices for lower levels of an agency, such as PHMSA. GAO also has found that successful performance goals address all core program activities. PHMSA's goal focuses on training and does not address other core program activities, such as conducting effective inspections. For example, a goal to evaluate whether PHMSA's inspections are effective could be to annually reduce, by a certain percentage, the number of sites not meeting minimum standards. PHMSA officials told GAO that they will strive to add and refine performance goals as the program evolves. As they do so, ensuring that these goals define the level of performance, address all core program activities, and use baseline data could help PHMSA better track progress toward its strategic goal.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making two recommendations, which are that PHMSA (1) define levels of performance and address all core program activities and (2) use budget data to refine performance goals for its gas storage program. DOT concurred with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_639"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_640","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Basin is one of the nation's largest watersheds and extends mainly through four Western states and into Canada. Activities such as power generation and agricultural practices have impaired water quality in some areas, so that human health is at risk and certain species, such as salmon, are threatened or extinct. In December 2016, Congress amended the Clean Water Act by adding Section 123, which requires EPA and OMB to take actions related to restoration efforts in the Basin.\nGAO was asked to review restoration efforts in the Basin. This report examines (1) efforts to improve water quality in the Basin from fiscal years 2010 through 2016; (2) approaches to collaboration that entities have used for selected efforts; (3) sources of funding and federal funding expenditures; and (4) the extent to which EPA and OMB have implemented Clean Water Act Section 123. GAO reviewed documentation, including laws, policies, and budget information; surveyed federal, state, tribal, and nongovernmental entities that GAO determined had participated in restoration efforts; and conducted interviews with officials from most of these entities.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nVarious entities, including federal and state agencies and tribes, implemented restoration efforts to improve water quality in the Columbia River Basin from fiscal years 2010 through 2016, according to GAO survey results. Entities implemented a range of restoration efforts. Efforts included activities to improve surface water quality and restore and protect habitat. For example, the Kootenai Tribe of Idaho implemented projects on the Kootenai River to restore and maintain conditions that support all life stages of native fish.\nEntities used various collaborative approaches . Entities' approaches to collaboration for selected water quality-related efforts in the Basin varied. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sought various entities' voluntary involvement to coordinate toxics reduction efforts in the Basin.\nTotal federal expenditures could not be determined . Entities reported using a mix of federal and nonfederal funding sources for restoration efforts in the Basin, but total federal expenditures could not be determined, in part because there is no federal funding dedicated to restoring the Basin.\nEPA and Office of Management and Budget ( OMB) have not yet implemented Section 123. According to EPA officials, the agency has not yet taken steps to establish the Columbia River Basin Restoration Program, as required by the Clean Water Act Section 123. EPA officials told GAO they have not received dedicated funding appropriated for this purpose; however, EPA has not yet requested funding to implement the program or identified needed resources. By developing a program management plan that identifies actions and resources needed, EPA would have more reasonable assurance that it can establish the program in a timely manner. Also, an interagency crosscut budget has not been submitted. According to OMB officials, they have had internal conversations on the approach to develop the budget but have not requested information from agencies. A crosscut budget would help ensure Congress is better informed as it considers funding for Basin restoration efforts.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making three recommendations, including that EPA develop a program management plan for implementing the Columbia River Basin Restoration Program and that OMB compile and submit an interagency crosscut budget. EPA agreed with its recommendation. OMB did not comment, and GAO maintains its recommendations are valid.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_640"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_641","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFederal spending on services paid for under Medicaid managed care was $171 billion in 2017, almost half of the total federal Medicaid expenditures for that year. Federal and state program integrity efforts have largely focused on Medicaid fee-for-service delivery where the state pays providers directly, rather than managed care, where it pays MCOs. As a result, less is known about the types of payment risks under managed care.\nGAO was asked to examine payment risks in Medicaid managed care. In this report, GAO (1) identified payment risks; (2) identified any challenges to state oversight and strategies to address them; and (3) assessed CMS efforts to help states address payment risks and oversight challenges. To do this work, GAO reviewed findings on managed care payment risks and oversight challenges from federal and state audits and other sources. GAO also interviewed 49 state program integrity stakeholders in 10 states selected based on size, the percent of population in managed care, and geography. Stakeholders included the state Medicaid managed care office, state Medicaid program integrity unit, state auditor, Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, and an MCO.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nUnder Medicaid managed care, managed care organizations (MCO) receive a periodic payment per beneficiary in order to provide health care services. Managed care has the potential to help states reduce Medicaid program costs and better manage the use of health care services. However, managed care payments also have the potential to create program integrity risks. GAO identified six types of payment risks associated with managed care, including four related to payments that state Medicaid agencies make to MCOs, and two related to payments that MCOs make to providers. Of the six payment risks GAO identified, state stakeholders responsible for ensuring Medicaid program integrity more often cited the following two as having a higher level of risk:\nincorrect fee-for-service payments from MCOs, where the MCO paid providers for improper claims, such as claims for services not provided; and\ninaccurate state payments to MCOs resulting from using data that are not accurate or including costs that should be excluded in setting payment rates.\nGAO also identified multiple challenges to program integrity oversight for managed care programs. Stakeholders most frequently cited challenges related to (1) appropriate allocation of resources, (2) quality of the data and technology used, and (3) adequacy of state policies and practices. Some stakeholders offered strategies to address these challenges, including collaborating with other entities to identify problem providers and fraud schemes, as well as having effective data systems to better manage risks.\nThe Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), which oversees Medicaid, has initiated efforts to assist states with program integrity oversight for managed care. However, some of these efforts have been delayed, and there are also gaps in oversight.\nCMS's planned Medicaid managed care guidance to states has been delayed due to the agency's internal review of the regulations; as of May 2018, no issuance date had been set for the guidance.\nCMS established a new approach for conducting managed care audits beginning in 2016. However, only a few audits have been conducted, with none initiated in the past 2 years. In part, this is due to certain impediments identified by states, such as the lack of some provisions in MCO contracts.\nCMS has updated standards for its periodic reviews of the state capitation rates set for MCOs. However, overpayments to providers by MCOs are not consistently accounted for in determining future state payments to MCOs, which can result in states' payments to MCOs being too high.\nLack of guidance and gaps in program integrity oversight are inconsistent with federal internal control standards, as well as with CMS's goals to (1) improve states' oversight of managed care; (2) use audits to investigate fraud, waste, and abuse of providers paid by MCOs; and (3) hold MCOs financially accountable. Without taking action to address these issues, CMS is missing an opportunity to develop more robust program integrity safeguards that will help mitigate payment risks in Medicaid managed care.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that CMS (1) expedite issuing planned guidance on Medicaid managed care program integrity, (2) address impediments to managed care audits, and (3) ensure states account for overpayments in setting future MCO payment rates. The Department of Health and Human Services concurred with these recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_641"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_642","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAccording to OPM, it receives more than 100,000 retirement applications each fiscal year. Between 2014 to 2017, OPM did not meet its goal of processing most retirement applications within 60 days. GAO was asked to review potential improvements in federal retirement processing at OPM. This report (1) describes the root causes of retirement application processing delays, as determined by OPM; and (2) examines what strategies, if any, OPM has taken to address those root causes, and how OPM has evaluated the effectiveness of the strategies.\nGAO reviewed OPM data and documents, and interviewed OPM officials. GAO also interviewed officials from DOD, HHS, NASA, and USPS about their experiences with processing retirement applications. GAO selected these agencies because they represent a variety of application error rates and relatively high application volume.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which administers the federal retirement program, identified three root causes for retirement processing delays:\n1. the continuing reliance on paper-based applications and manual processing;\n2. insufficient staffing capacity, particularly during peak workload season; and\n3. incomplete applications.\nOPM has taken various actions to address these root causes and thereby reduce delays.\nVision for modernizing retirement processing. OPM's strategic vision consists of five key initiatives for modernizing the application process, including developing an electronic application form and an electronic system to store retirement information. However, OPM was unable to provide estimated time frames or costs for the initiatives. OPM officials said that additional information technology (IT) modernization work is dependent on sufficient funding, among other factors. These factors are important but do not preclude OPM from establishing estimated cost ranges and time frames\u2014practices consistent with industry best practices and IT project management principles.\nActions to increase staffing capacity. OPM's actions have included using overtime pay and hiring additional staff. However, OPM generally does not assess the effectiveness of these actions or whether they reduce delays. For example, OPM does not measure overtime productivity or correlate overtime data with application processing data. Federal internal control standards state that management should review its performance compared to its goals. OPM officials stated that they have limited resources for assessments. However, without assessments, OPM is less able to make informed decisions on how to best use staffing practices to improve processing times.\nActions to reduce missing information in applications. OPM provides assistance to agencies through guidance, training, communication through liaisons and email, and error reports. OPM's monthly error reports to agencies include information on the type of error found and the volume of applications with the same error, according to OPM. The four agencies GAO interviewed\u2014Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and U.S. Postal Service (USPS)\u2014reported that aspects of the error reports were not user-friendly. OPM stated that its assistance is intended to help agencies submit complete and accurate retirement packages for quicker processing. Federal internal control standards state that management should communicate quality information externally and periodically reevaluate its communication methods. OPM officials stated that the error report is intended to capture the overarching errors many agencies face and that revising the error report would not be cost-effective. However, the current format of the error report may limit its usefulness to agencies in improving their retirement applications.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making 6 recommendations. These recommendations include that OPM should develop a retirement services IT modernization plan for initial project phases; develop and implement policies for assessing staffing strategies intended to improve processing times; and determine if there are cost-effective ways to make the retirement application error report more user-friendly. OPM concurred with 1 recommendation and partially concurred with 5 recommendations. GAO continues to believe all aspects of the recommendations are valid, as discussed in the report. GAO also incorporated technical comments.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_642"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_643","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCMS, an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), provides health coverage for over 145 million Americans through its four principal programs, with annual outlays of about $1.1 trillion. GAO has designated the two largest programs, Medicare and Medicaid, as high risk partly due to their vulnerability to fraud, waste, and abuse. In fiscal year 2016, improper payment estimates for these programs totaled about $95 billion.\nGAO's Fraud Risk Framework and the subsequent enactment of the Fraud Reduction and Data Analytics Act of 2015 have called attention to the importance of federal agencies' antifraud efforts. This report examines (1) CMS's approach for managing fraud risks across its four principal programs, and (2) how CMS's efforts managing fraud risks in Medicare and Medicaid align with the Fraud Risk Framework.\nGAO reviewed laws and regulations and HHS and CMS documents, such as program-integrity manuals. It also interviewed CMS officials and a sample of CMS stakeholders, including state officials and contractors. GAO selected states based on fraud risk and other factors, such as geographic diversity. GAO selected contractors based on a mix of companies and geographic areas served.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe approach that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has taken for managing fraud risks across its four principal programs\u2014Medicare, Medicaid, the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and the health-insurance marketplaces\u2014is incorporated into its broader program-integrity approach. According to CMS officials, this broader program-integrity approach can help the agency develop control activities to address multiple sources of improper payments, including fraud. As the figure below shows, CMS views fraud as part of a spectrum of actions that may result in improper payments.\nCMS's efforts managing fraud risks in Medicare and Medicaid partially align with GAO's 2015 A Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs (Fraud Risk Framework). This framework describes leading practices in four components: commit , assess , design and implement , and evaluate and adapt . CMS has shown commitment to combating fraud in part by establishing a dedicated entity\u2014the Center for Program Integrity\u2014to lead antifraud efforts. Furthermore, CMS is offering and requiring antifraud training for stakeholder groups such as providers, beneficiaries, and health-insurance plans. However, CMS does not require fraud-awareness training on a regular basis for employees, a practice that the framework identifies as a way agencies can help create a culture of integrity and compliance. Regarding the assess and design and implement components, CMS has taken steps to identify fraud risks, such as by designating specific provider types as high risk and developing associated control activities. However, it has not conducted a fraud risk assessment for Medicare or Medicaid, and has not designed and implemented a risk-based antifraud strategy. A fraud risk assessment allows managers to fully consider fraud risks to their programs, analyze their likelihood and impact, and prioritize risks. Managers can then design and implement a strategy with specific control activities to mitigate these fraud risks, as well as an appropriate evaluation approach consistent with the evaluate and adapt component. By developing a fraud risk assessment and using that assessment to create an antifraud strategy and evaluation approach, CMS could better ensure that it is addressing the full portfolio of risks and strategically targeting the most-significant fraud risks facing Medicare and Medicaid.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that CMS (1) provide and require fraud-awareness training to its employees, (2) conduct fraud risk assessments, and (3) create an antifraud strategy for Medicare and Medicaid, including an approach for evaluation. HHS concurred with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_643"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_644","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nBEP, within Treasury, designs and produces U.S. currency notes at BEP's facilities in Washington, D.C., and Fort Worth, Texas. The Federal Reserve pays for BEP's operational expenses, including currency production. BEP is requesting legal authority to purchase land and construct a new production facility in the D.C. area. BEP officials told GAO that, if it does not receive the necessary legal authority for a new production facility, it will renovate the D.C. facility.\nGAO was asked to review BEP's facility planning process. This report: (1) describes the results of facility studies that BEP has funded and factors that led BEP to propose a new production facility, (2) examines the extent to which BEP's actions align with leading capital planning and cost estimating practices, and (3) describes other factors that could affect total federal costs of BEP's actions.\nGAO analyzed BEP documents and data from 2010-2017 on currency note production, visited both BEP production facilities, assessed BEP's actions against leading capital planning and cost estimating practices, and interviewed officials from BEP, GSA, the Federal Reserve, and Treasury.\nGAO provided the draft report to BEP, GSA, the Federal Reserve, and Treasury for review. BEP coordinated with Treasury in its comments. In the comments, reproduced in Appendix I, BEP emphasized the factors that led BEP to determine that a new facility is the preferred alternative. BEP and the Federal Reserve also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. GSA did not provide comments.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Bureau of Engraving and Printing's (BEP) studies and research determined that a new production facility would be less expensive and better address BEP's need for secure, efficient, and flexible currency production than a renovation of its Washington, D.C. facility. According to 2017 cost estimates, BEP's preferred option\u2014a new production facility in the Washington, D.C., area and some renovated administrative space in its current D.C. facility\u2014would cost approximately $1.4 billion, while a renovation of its current facility for both production and administrative functions would cost approximately $2.0 billion. A new facility similar to BEP's Texas facility could have a secure perimeter that meets federal building security standards. Such a perimeter is not possible with the current facility. A new facility could also house production on a single production floor to allow for a more efficient production process.\nBEP generally followed leading capital-planning practices, and its 2017 cost estimate of a new production facility partially met the characteristics of a reliable cost estimate. BEP's capital planning followed leading practices, for example, by including a needs assessment, a link to BEP's strategic plan, and a long-term capital plan. BEP's cost estimate partially followed leading practices, for example, by including most life-cycle cost components and documentation of the data used for the estimate. However, it did not include sufficient sensitivity analyses, which identify a range of costs-based on varying assumptions. BEP officials stated that they plan to follow the updated GSA guidance that includes GAO's cost-estimating leading practices when updating this early stage estimate.\nThe ability to sell or repurpose any part of the current D.C. facility could affect the total federal costs of BEP's actions. According to officials from the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and the General Services Administration (GSA), there could be savings if Treasury could consolidate staff or operations into the vacated facility. There could also be savings if the unneeded facility could be sold to a private buyer. However there would be costs to prepare the facility for use by other entities or if the unneeded facility does not sell. Agency officials said that it is too early to determine specific costs and savings.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_644"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_645","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nOver 4 decades ago, Congress authorized the SPR\u2014the world's largest government-owned stockpile of emergency crude oil\u2014to reduce the impact of disruptions in supplies of petroleum products. Since 2015, Congress has also mandated sales of SPR oil to fund the modernization of SPR facilities and other national priorities. DOE manages the SPR, whose storage and related infrastructure is aging, and has plans to modernize its facilities. As a member of the International Energy Agency, the United States is obligated to maintain reserves equivalent to at least 90 days of the previous year's net imports (imports minus exports). As of March 2018, the SPR held about 665 million barrels of crude oil, about 138 days of net imports.\nThis testimony highlights GAO's May 2018 report on the SPR, including the extent to which (1) DOE has identified the optimal size of the SPR, and (2) DOE's plans for modernizing the SPR take into account the effects of congressionally mandated crude oil sales. GAO reviewed DOE's documents and studies and interviewed agency officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Energy (DOE) has not identified the optimal size of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). In 2016, DOE completed a long-term strategic review of the SPR after its last comprehensive examination was conducted in 2005. The 2016 review examined the benefits of several SPR sizes, but it did not identify an optimal size and was limited in several ways. In particular, in the review, DOE did not fully consider recent and expected future changes in market conditions, such as the implications of projected fluctuations in net imports or the role of the private sector in responding to supply disruptions. These changes have contributed to SPR and private reserves reaching historically high levels on a net imports basis. These changes are expected to continue to evolve, and according to government projections, the United States will become a net exporter in the late 2020s before again becoming a net importer between 2040 and 2050. GAO has found that agencies should reexamine their programs if conditions change. GAO recommended that DOE supplement its 2016 review by conducting an additional analysis, and take actions to ensure the agency periodically conducts a strategic review of the SPR. DOE generally agreed with these recommendations.\nDOE has taken steps to account for congressionally mandated sales of SPR crude oil in its $1.4 billion modernization plans for SPR's infrastructure and facilities. However, DOE's current plans, developed in 2016, are based on information largely developed prior to recent congressionally mandated sales of an additional 117 million barrels of oil. According to DOE officials, the agency began a study in March 2018 to assess the effects of these sales on the SPR's modernization. However, GAO reported that this study was not examining a full range of options for handling any excess SPR assets that may be created by currently mandated sales or any additional sales that may be mandated in the future, inconsistent with an agency order on real property asset management that calls for identifying excess assets. For example, according to officials, DOE does not currently have the authority to lease unused storage capacity to the private sector, and DOE was not planning to examine this option. If authorized, leasing unused SPR storage capacity could generate revenues that could help offset the costs of modernization. GAO recommended that DOE should consider a full range of options for handling potentially excess assets and, if needed, request congressional authority for the disposition of these assets. DOE agreed with this recommendation.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO made four recommendations, including that DOE (1) supplement the 2016 review by conducting an additional analysis, (2) ensure it periodically reexamines the SPR, and (3) consider a full range of options for handling potentially excess assets. DOE partially agreed with the first recommendation and agreed with the other two recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_645"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_646","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe use of IT is crucial to helping VA effectively serve the nation's veterans and, each year, the department spends billions of dollars on its information systems and assets. However, VA has faced challenges spanning a number of critical initiatives related to modernizing its major systems. To improve all major federal agencies' acquisitions and hold them accountable for reducing duplication and achieving cost savings, in December 2014 Congress enacted federal IT acquisition reform legislation (commonly referred to as the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act , or FITARA).\nGAO was asked to summarize its previous and ongoing work regarding VA's history of efforts to modernize VistA, including past use of contractors, and the department's recent effort to acquire a commercial electronic health record system to replace VistA. GAO was also asked to provide an update on VA's progress in key FITARA-related areas, including (1) data center consolidation and optimization, (2) incremental system development practices, and (3) software license management. VA generally agreed with the information upon which this statement is based.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFor nearly two decades, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has undertaken multiple efforts to modernize its health information system\u2014the Veterans Health Information Systems and Technology Architecture (known as VistA). Two of VA's most recent efforts included the Integrated Electronic Health Record (iEHR) program, a joint program with the Department of Defense (DOD) intended to replace separate systems used by VA and DOD with a single system; and the VistA Evolution program, which was to modernize VistA with additional capabilities and a better interface for all users. VA has relied extensively on assistance from contractors for these efforts. VA obligated over $1.1 billion for contracts with 138 contractors during fiscal years 2011 through 2016 for iEHR and VistA Evolution. Contract data showed that the 15 key contractors that worked on both programs accounted for $741 million of the funding obligated for system development, project management, and operations and maintenance to support the two programs (see figure). VA recently announced that it intends to change its VistA modernization approach and acquire the same electronic health record system that DOD is implementing.\nWith respect to key FITARA-related areas, the department has reported progress on consolidating and optimizing its data centers, although this progress has fallen short of targets set by the Office of Management and Budget. VA has also reported $23.61 million in data center-related cost savings, yet does not expect to realize further savings from additional closures. In addition, VA's Chief Information Officer (CIO) certified the use of adequate incremental development for 10 of the department's major IT investments; however, VA has not yet updated its policy and process for CIO certification as GAO recommended. Finally, VA has issued a software licensing policy and has generated an inventory of its software licenses to inform future investment decisions.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO has made multiple recommendations to VA aimed at improving the department's IT management. VA has generally agreed with the recommendations and begun taking responsive actions.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_646"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_647","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe success of the decennial census depends in large part on the Bureau's ability to locate every household in the United States. To accomplish this monumental task, the Bureau must maintain accurate address and map information for every location where a person could reside. For the 2018 End-to-End Test, census workers known as listers went door-to-door to verify and update address lists and associated maps in selected areas of three test sites\u2014Bluefield-Beckley-Oak Hill, West Virginia; Pierce County, Washington; and Providence County, Rhode Island.\nGAO was asked to review in-field address canvassing during the End-to-End Test. This report determines whether key address listing activities functioned as planned during the End-to-End Test and identifies any lessons learned that could inform pending decisions for the 2020 Census. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed key documents including test plans and training manuals, as well as workload, productivity and hiring data. At the three test sites, GAO observed listers conducting address canvassing.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Census Bureau (Bureau) recently completed in-field address canvassing for the 2018 End-to-End Test. GAO found that field staff known as listers generally followed procedures when identifying and updating the address file; however, some address blocks were worked twice by different listers because the Bureau did not have procedures for reassigning work from one lister to another while listers work offline. Bureau officials told GAO that they plan to develop procedures to avoid duplication but these procedures have not been finalized. Duplicating work decreases efficiency and increases costs.\nGAO also found differences between actual and projected data for workload, lister productivity, and hiring.\nFor the 2020 Census, the Bureau estimates it will have to verify 30 percent of addresses in the field. However, at the test sites, the actual workload ranged from 37 to 76 percent of addresses. Bureau officials told GAO the 30 percent was a nationwide average and not site specific; however, the Bureau could not provide documentation to support the 30 percent workload estimate.\nAt all three test sites listers were significantly more productive than expected possibly because a design change provided better quality address and map data in the field, according to the Bureau.\nHiring, however, lagged behind Bureau goals. For example, at the West Virginia site hiring was only at 60 percent of its goal. Bureau officials attributed the shortfall to a late start and low unemployment rates.\nWorkload and productivity affect the cost of address canvassing. The Bureau has taken some steps to evaluate factors affecting its estimates, but continuing to so would help the Bureau refine its assumptions to better manage the operation's cost and hiring.\nListers used laptops to connect to the Internet and download assignments. They worked offline and went door-to-door to update the address file, then reconnected to the Internet to transmit their completed assignments. Bureau officials told GAO that during the test 11 out of 330 laptops did not properly transmit address and map data collected for 25 blocks. Data were deleted on 7 laptops. Because the Bureau had known there was a problem with software used to transmit address data, it created an alert report to notify the Bureau staff if data were not properly transmitted. However, Bureau officials said that either responsible staff did not follow procedures to look at the alert reports or the reports were not triggered. The Bureau is working to fix the software problem and develop new alert reports, but has not yet determined and addressed why these procedures were not followed.\nThe Bureau's data management reporting system did not always provide accurate information because of a software issue. The system was supposed to pull data from several systems to create a set of real-time cost and progress reports for managers to use. Because the data were not accurate, Bureau staff had to rely on multiple systems to manage address canvassing. The Bureau agreed that not only is inaccurate data problematic, but that creating workarounds is inefficient. The Bureau is developing new requirements to ensure data are accurate but these requirements have not been finalized.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making seven recommendations to the Department of Commerce and Bureau including to: (1) finalize procedures for reassigning work, (2) continue to evaluate workload and productivity data, (3) fix software problem, or determine and address why procedures were not followed, and (4) finalize report requirements to ensure data are accurate. The Department of Commerce agreed with GAO's recommendations, and the Bureau provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_647"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_648","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe ODA provides incentives, including tax credits and exclusive marketing rights, for manufacturers to develop drugs to treat rare diseases, which are typically defined as affecting fewer than 200,000 people in the United States. Approximately 7,000 rare diseases affect an estimated 30 million people in the United States, and only 5 percent of rare diseases have FDA-approved treatments.\nGAO was asked to examine FDA's orphan drug processes. In this report, GAO examines, among other things, (1) the actions FDA has taken to address the growing demand for orphan designations; (2) the extent to which FDA has used consistent criteria and complete information in reviewing orphan designation applications; and (3) the steps FDA has taken to address rare disease drug development challenges. GAO analyzed FDA documents and data, as well as all designation review templates FDA completed as of March 2018 for applications received from October to December 2017. GAO interviewed agency officials, as well as stakeholders, including drug manufacturers, industry experts, and patient advocacy groups.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) Office of Orphan Products Development is responsible for reviewing drug manufacturer applications for orphan designation. Drugs granted this designation treat rare diseases and may receive various incentives under the Orphan Drug Act (ODA). As the number of orphan designation applications received and granted has grown, FDA outlined several process changes in its June 2017 modernization plan to improve designation review timeliness and consistency.\nIn evaluating designation applications, FDA reviewers generally apply two consistent criteria\u2014(1) the size of the rare disease population, and (2) the scientific rationale that the drug may effectively treat the disease. To inform their evaluation, reviewers must record certain background information in a standard review template, such as the drug's U.S. marketing history. Officials told us this information provides important context, such as whether FDA has experience with a little known disease, critical to ensuring a complete designation application review. However, GAO's analysis of 148 designation review templates found that FDA does not consistently record or evaluate background information when making designation decisions. For example, 48 of 148 review templates GAO analyzed were missing information on the drug's U.S. marketing history. As such, FDA cannot be sure that reviewers are conducting complete evaluations that include all critical information needed for assessing its criteria.\nStakeholders GAO interviewed and research GAO reviewed identified a number of rare disease drug development challenges, such as the difficulty in recruiting small populations for clinical trials, with differing opinions about the ODA incentives. For example, several stakeholders were critical of manufacturers obtaining multiple orphan designations\u2014and ODA incentives\u2014for the same drug when the drug may otherwise be profitable from treating multiple patient groups. However, many patient advocacy groups noted that granting ODA incentives in these circumstances is needed to encourage drug manufacturers to study the safety and efficacy of drugs in rare disease populations.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nFDA should ensure that all required information for reviews of orphan designation applications is consistently recorded and evaluated. The agency concurred with our recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_648"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_649","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDHS has employed a variety of technology, tactical infrastructure, and personnel assets to help secure the nearly 2,000 mile long southwest border. Since 2009, GAO has issued over 35 products on the progress and challenges DHS has faced in using technology, infrastructure, and other resources to secure the border. GAO has made over 50 recommendations to help improve DHS's efforts, and DHS has implemented more than half of them.\nThis statement addresses (1) DHS efforts to deploy and measure the effectiveness of surveillance technologies, (2) DHS efforts to maintain and assess the effectiveness of existing tactical infrastructure and to deploy new physical barriers, and (3) staffing challenges the Border Patrol has faced. This statement is based on three GAO reports issued in 2017, selected updates conducted in 2017, and ongoing work related to DHS acquisitions and the construction of physical barriers. For ongoing work GAO analyzed DHS and CBP documents, interviewed officials within DHS, and visited border areas in California.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe U.S. Border Patrol, within the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), has made progress deploying surveillance technology\u2014a mix of radars, sensors, and cameras\u2014along the southwest U.S. border. As of October 2017, the Border Patrol had completed the planned deployment of select technologies to several states along the southwest border. The Border Patrol has also made progress toward assessing performance of surveillance technologies, but additional actions are needed to fully implement GAO's 2011 and 2014 recommendations in this area. For example, the Border Patrol has not yet used available data to determine the contribution of surveillance technologies to border security efforts.\nCBP spent about $2.3 billion to deploy fencing from fiscal years 2007 through 2015 and constructed 654 miles of fencing by 2015. The Border Patrol has reported that border fencing supports agents' ability to respond to illicit cross-border activities by slowing the progress of illegal entrants. GAO reported in February 2017 that CBP was taking a number of steps in sustaining tactical infrastructure\u2014such as fencing, roads, and lighting\u2014along the southwest border. However, CBP has not developed metrics that systematically use data it collects to assess the contributions of border fencing to its mission, as GAO has recommended. CBP concurred with the recommendation and plans to develop metrics by January 2019. Further, CBP established the Border Wall System Program in response to a January 2017 executive order that called for the immediate construction of a southwest border wall. This program is intended to replace and add to existing barriers along the southwest border. In April 2017, DHS leadership gave CBP approval to procure barrier prototypes, which are intended to help inform new design standards for the border wall system.\nPhysical Barriers in San Diego, California, April 2016\nThe Border Patrol has faced challenges in achieving a staffing level of 21,370 agents, the statutorily-established minimum from fiscal years 2011 through 2016. As of September 2017, the Border Patrol reported it had about 19,400 agents. GAO reported in November 2017 that Border Patrol officials cited staffing shortages as a challenge for optimal deployment. As a result, officials had to make decisions about how to prioritize activities for deployment given the number of agents available.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nIn recent reports, GAO made or reiterated recommendations for DHS to, among other things, assess the contributions of technology and fencing to border security. DHS generally agreed, and has actions planned or underway to address these recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_649"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_650","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSince the 1970s, U.S. agencies have recognized that high-volume cigarette sales at duty-free stores near the U.S.\u2013Mexico land border, although lawful, could be related to illicit activity. In 1988, U.S. law limited the quantity of duty-free tobacco products an individual can purchase at stores located in airports, restricting the sale of tobacco products to quantities consistent with personal use. This requirement, however, does not apply to land border duty-free stores.\nGAO was asked to review information on sales of cigarettes at duty-free stores along the southwest border. CBP identified 88 such stores and warehouses. This report describes (1) requirements that govern the lawful sale and export of cigarettes from duty-free stores on the southwest border and schemes for illicit trade in such cigarettes, (2) U.S. agency observations about these exports and efforts to counter illicit trade, (3) the extent to which selected cigarette transaction data submitted by duty-free stores indicate compliance issues. GAO analyzed Census data on these exports; reviewed CBP, ICE, and Department of the Treasury documents; and interviewed agency officials in Washington, D.C., and in several ports along the southwest border, including Laredo, Texas, and the San Diego, California, area.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nDuty-free stores at the southwest border may sell tax-exempt cigarettes in any quantity to passengers departing the United States for Mexico; agencies have identified schemes associated with duty-free cigarette sales used to evade U.S. and Mexican taxes. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), an agency within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), regulates duty-free stores. U.S. regulations require the stores to have procedures to provide reasonable assurance of export of cigarettes and the exporter to report export information on transactions valued at over $2,500. U.S. Census Bureau (Census) data show that about 18,500 such transactions involving cigarettes occurred from 2010 to 2015. According to information from U.S. and Mexican officials, the Mexican government limits the amount of duty-free cigarettes that can be brought into Mexico (see figure). U.S. agencies identified three schemes to evade U.S. and Mexican cigarette-related tax and other laws: (1) diversion from a duty-free store into U.S. commerce; (2) smuggling into Mexico through U.S. ports; and (3) smuggling back into the United States after export to Mexico.\nU.S. agency officials said that some smuggling of duty-free cigarettes across the southwest border has links to organized crime, supplies the illicit tobacco market in Mexico, and poses oversight and enforcement challenges. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials said they have identified links between the smuggling of large quantities of duty-free cigarettes and transnational criminal organizations that use the smuggled cigarettes to launder money and generate revenue. Inexpensive cigarettes made in the United States are part of the trade in duty-free cigarettes along the southwest border, including brands that a Mexican official stated are prohibited for sale in Mexico. U.S. officials reported that their efforts to counter the illicit trade in duty-free cigarettes face challenges, primarily due to the ability to buy unlimited quantities of duty-free cigarettes at the land border.\nAccording to CBP, in many cases, duty-free stores on the southwest border are filing noncompliant information that they are required to report on cigarette exports valued at more than $2,500. For example, officials had compliance concerns with filings in which stores identify themselves, and not the purchaser, as the exporter. CBP and Census have met with representatives of one of the largest operators of duty-free stores on the southwest border to clarify regulatory requirements. However, CBP officials said that this duty-free store operator continues to make incorrect filings. CBP has not issued guidance to all operators to clarify the correct procedure. Without accurate export data, agencies may lack the information they need to enhance their enforcement and intelligence efforts.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nCBP should take steps to strengthen compliance with export reporting requirements for duty-free cigarette sales on the southwest border, such as issuing guidance to all duty-free store operators. DHS agreed and noted CBP plans to address the recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_650"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_651","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSNAP is the largest federally funded nutrition assistance program, providing about $64 billion in benefits to over 20 million households in fiscal year 2017. FNS oversees SNAP at the federal level and is responsible for authorizing and overseeing retailers. While most benefits are used as intended, some retailers have engaged in trafficking, which represents fraud and diverts federal funds from their intended use. GAO was asked to review FNS's efforts to address SNAP retailer trafficking since GAO's last report in 2006.\nThis report examines (1) what is known about the extent of SNAP retailer trafficking, and (2) the extent to which FNS has taken steps intended to improve how it prevents, detects, and responds to retailer trafficking. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations, FNS policies, and studies related to retailer trafficking; assessed FNS's use of statistical standards for federal agencies and selected leading practices in GAO's Fraud Risk Framework ; and interviewed FNS and USDA Office of Inspector General officials and key stakeholders.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food and Nutrition Service's (FNS) estimates of retailer trafficking\u2014when a retailer exchanges Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits for cash instead of food\u2014have limitations, though they suggest trafficking has increased in recent years, to $1 billion each year from 2012 to 2014. One key limitation of the estimates is that FNS has not evaluated the accuracy of its assumption about the percentage of SNAP benefits trafficked. FNS assumes that, among stores that trafficked, 90 percent of the benefits redeemed in small stores, and 40 percent in large stores, were trafficked. A former FNS official stated that this assumption is based on discussions with investigators in the 1990s when FNS first developed its approach to estimate trafficking, and that they have not since evaluated it for accuracy. However, there are options available for evaluating this assumption, such as reviewing SNAP transaction data from stores that are known to have trafficked. Statistical standards for federal agencies indicate that assumptions should be reviewed for accuracy and validated using available, independent information sources. By not evaluating this key assumption, FNS's commonly cited estimates of SNAP fraud are potentially inaccurate.\nFNS has generally taken steps to address retailer trafficking that align with leading fraud risk management practices, but the agency has not pursued additional actions to prevent and respond to trafficking. For example:\nAlthough FNS assigns a risk level to each store when it applies to participate in SNAP, it is not currently using this information to target its reauthorization activities to stores of greatest risk. During reauthorization, FNS reviews previously approved stores for continued compliance with program requirements. FNS currently reauthorizes all stores on the same 5-year cycle, regardless of risk, although its policy states that it will reauthorize certain high-risk stores annually. FNS officials planned to reauthorize a sample of high-risk stores each year, but said they did not follow through with those plans. Officials also stated that they did not document an analysis of the benefits and costs of this practice, which would be consistent with leading fraud risk management practices. As a result, FNS may be missing an opportunity to provide early oversight of risky stores and prevent trafficking.\nThe Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 gave USDA the authority to strengthen penalties for retailers found to have trafficked, but as of November 2018, FNS had not implemented this authority. FNS proposed a related rule change in 2012 and indicated the change was necessary to deter retailers from committing program violations, but the rule was not finalized. By failing to take timely action to strengthen penalties, FNS has not taken full advantage of an important tool for deterring trafficking.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making five recommendations, including that FNS improve its trafficking estimates by, for example, evaluating the accuracy of its assumption of the percentage of benefits that are trafficked; assess the benefits and costs of reauthorizing a sample of high risk stores more frequently than others; and move forward with plans to increase penalties for trafficking. FNS generally agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_651"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_652","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSince the 2007\u20132009 financial crisis, federal financial regulators have issued hundreds of rules to implement reforms intended to strengthen the financial services industry. Financial regulators must comply with rulemaking requirements such as RFA when drafting and implementing regulations. Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to study these financial services regulations annually.\nThis annual report examines the extent to which and how financial regulators performed required RFA analyses and established policies and procedures for complying with RFA requirements, among other objectives. GAO reviewed the RFA section of financial regulators' Federal Register notices of rulemaking, related internal workpapers, and policies and procedures for conducting RFA analyses. GAO also determined the extent to which regulators' analyses reflected RFA requirements, guidance issued by the Office of Advocacy, and OMB guidance on regulatory analysis. GAO's review covered certifications in 66 final rules and regulatory flexibility analyses in 39 proposed and final rules.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nTo comply with the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), agencies generally must assess the rule's potential impact on small entities and consider alternatives that may minimize any significant economic impact of the rule (regulatory flexibility analyses). Alternatively, agencies may certify that a rule would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. GAO found several weaknesses with the analyses of six financial regulators (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Securities and Exchange Commission, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) that could undermine the goal of RFA and limit transparency and public accountability, as shown in the following examples.\nCertifications. In certifications for rules that regulators determined may affect small entities, regulators conducted analyses to support their conclusions. GAO found many analyses across all regulators lacked key information the Small Business Administration's Office of Advocacy and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) recommend. Missing information included discussions of data sources or methodologies, consideration of broader economic impacts of the rulemaking (such as cumulative economic impacts of regulations), and definitions of the criteria regulators used for \u201csubstantial number\u201d and \u201csignificant economic impact.\u201d\nRegulatory flexibility analyses. In many of the initial and final regulatory flexibility analyses that GAO reviewed, financial regulators' evaluation of key components required by RFA\u2014potential economic effects and alternative regulatory approaches\u2014was limited. Most regulators (five of six) also did not disclose data sources or methodologies used for their analyses, as OMB recommends. For most rules GAO reviewed, regulators (five of six) were unable to provide documentation supporting their regulatory flexibility analyses, as OMB recommends, including analyses supporting certification decisions. However, the extent of documentation varied by regulator.\nFederal internal control standards state the importance for agency management to establish policies and procedures to achieve objectives. All but one of the financial regulators have guidelines that restate RFA requirements for certification and for preparing regulatory flexibility analyses and provide some information on how to approach these analyses. However, these regulators generally have not developed specific policies and procedures to assist staff in complying with RFA, which may contribute to the weaknesses GAO identified in the analyses. For example, regulators' guidance generally did not include procedures for evaluating a rule's potential economic impact; identifying and assessing regulatory alternatives that could minimize impact on small entities; disclosing methodology and data sources; and creating and maintaining documentation that supports findings. By not developing and implementing comprehensive policies and procedures for RFA analyses, regulators' ability to consistently and effectively meet RFA objectives may be limited.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making a total of 10 recommendations among the six financial regulators reviewed, including that regulators develop and implement specific policies and procedures for consistently complying with RFA requirements and related guidance for conducting RFA analyses. Five agencies generally agreed with the recommendations and one did not provide written comments.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_652"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_653","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSince the 1980s, the Air Force has used its HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopters to conduct life-saving missions, including for personnel recovery and medical evacuations. The aging HH-60G inventory has shrunk over the years as a result of mishaps. As the inventory was declining, the Air Force began efforts to replace its fleet with the new Combat Rescue Helicopter.\nThe National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2018 includes a provision for GAO to review HH-60G replacement programs. This report examines: (1) the maintenance condition and service life of the Air Force's HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopters; (2) the Air Force's schedule for fielding the new Combat Rescue Helicopter in the active and reserve components; and (3) any training challenges the Air Force has identified related to this schedule.\nGAO analyzed flight hour and availability data and contracts and fielding schedule for new and refurbished personnel recovery helicopters for the Air Force. GAO also analyzed documentation, and interviewed officials from the Air Force Headquarters, the Air Force major commands, including the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, and training and test and evaluation units to discuss challenges the Air Force expects to face as it fields its new helicopters.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe material condition of the Air Forces' aging HH-60G fleet has declined and maintenance challenges have increased, in part due to extensions beyond the designed service life of the helicopters. About 68 percent of the 96-helicopter fleet were mission-capable as of fiscal year 2017, below the Air Force desired mission-capable rate of 75 percent. The fleet is experiencing maintenance challenges. For example, the helicopters undergoing depot-level maintenance spent an average of 332 days undergoing such maintenance in fiscal year 2017 compared with 233 days in fiscal year 2007, more than a 40-percent increase. Air Force officials attribute these challenges to the helicopters exceeding their initially planned service life. Currently, available helicopters across the fleet average about 7,100 flight hours about 18 percent more than their initial expected service life of 6,000 hours.\nAccording to Air Force officials, the schedule for fielding the new Combat Rescue Helicopters generally prioritizes the replacement of helicopters with the highest number of flight hours; as a result, the active component is scheduled to begin receiving its new helicopters in fiscal year 2020, 6 years before the reserve component. In May 2018, the Air Force's active component HH-60Gs averaged about 2,000 more flight hours per helicopter than the reserve component. Under the fielding schedule, the Air National Guard squadrons are to receive new Combat Rescue Helicopters beginning in 2027, at the end of the fielding period. According to officials, in the meantime, to address aging helicopters in the Air National Guard, the Guard is scheduled to receive refurbished Army helicopters beginning in 2019. According to Air Force officials, these helicopters will have 3,000 or fewer flight hours and will be upgraded to the Air Force's HH-60G configuration. The Air Force officials explained that these helicopters are expected to increase reliability rates, reduce the need for unscheduled maintenance, and bridge the gap until the Air National Guard receives the new Combat Rescue Helicopters.\nDue to the Air Force fielding schedule for the Combat Rescue Helicopters, the Air Force may face a challenge in supporting formal training for reserve component squadrons in fiscal year 2025 through 2028. The training squadrons at Kirtland and Nellis Air Force Bases conduct all formal HH-60G training for both the active and reserve components. By 2025, these training squadrons are scheduled to be completely transitioned to the new Combat Rescue Helicopters. Given the fielding schedule, the training squadrons will not have any legacy HH-60Gs for formal training for the reserve component. However, some squadrons in the reserve component are scheduled to continue flying HH-60Gs until 2028 and will still need formal training. Air Force reserve component officials did not concur with the new Combat Rescue Helicopter fielding schedule. However, Air Force officials said that they plan to maintain their fielding schedule because changing it would require renegotiation of the contract, likely increase costs, and possibly delay delivery of the new helicopters. Air Force officials acknowledged this potential training issue and told GAO that the Air Force was considering options to address it; including retaining some legacy HH-60Gs at a training squadron to provide training during any gap period.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making any recommendations in this report. GAO requested comments from the DOD, but none were provided.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_653"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_654","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nUnder PPACA, states could choose to expand Medicaid coverage to certain uninsured, low-income adults. As of December 2017, 31 states and the District of Columbia chose to expand Medicaid to cover these adults, and 19 states did not.\nGAO was asked to provide information about the demographic characteristics of and access to health care services for low-income adults\u2014those with household incomes less than or equal to 138 percent of the federal poverty level\u2014in expansion and non-expansion states. This report describes 2016 national survey estimates of (1) the number and demographic characteristics for low-income adults who were uninsured in expansion and non-expansion states, (2) unmet medical needs for low-income adults in expansion and non-expansion states and by insurance status, (3) barriers to health care for low-income adults in expansion and non-expansion states and by insurance status, and (4) having a usual place of care and receiving selected health care services for low-income adults in expansion and non-expansion states and by insurance status.\nGAO obtained 2016 NHIS estimates from the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), the federal agency within the Department of Health and Human Services that maintains these survey data.\nNHIS is a household interview survey designed to be a nationally representative sample of the civilian, non-institutionalized population residing in the United States. Estimates were calculated for demographic characteristics for uninsured, low-income adults. In addition, estimates were calculated for unmet medical needs, barriers to health care, and having a usual place of care and receiving selected health services for low-income adults in expansion and non-expansion states and by insurance status The estimates were based on responses to selected survey questions. GAO selected these survey questions from the Family and Adult Access to Health Care and Utilization and another section of the 2016 NHIS.\nGAO took steps to assess the reliability of the 2016 NHIS estimates, including interviewing NCHS officials and examining the data for logical errors. GAO determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of its analyses.\nThe Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAccording to the 2016 National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), an estimated 5.6 million uninsured, low-income adults\u2014those ages 19 through 64\u2014had incomes at or below the income threshold for expanded Medicaid eligibility as allowed under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). Estimates from this nationally representative survey showed that about 1.9 million of the 5.6 million uninsured, low-income adults lived in states that chose to expand Medicaid under PPACA, while the remaining 3.7 million lived in non-expansion states\u2014those that did not choose to expand Medicaid. In 2016, over half of uninsured, low-income adults were male, over half were employed, and over half had incomes less than 100 percent of the federal poverty level in both expansion and non-expansion states.\nThe 2016 NHIS estimates showed that low-income adults in expansion states were less likely to report having any unmet medical needs compared with those in non-expansion states, and low-income adults who were insured were less likely to report having unmet medical needs compared with those who were uninsured. Among the low-income adults who were uninsured, those in expansion states were less likely to report having any unmet medical needs compared with those in non-expansion states.\nThe 2016 NHIS estimates also showed that low-income adults in expansion states were less likely to report financial barriers to needed medical care and other types of health care, such as specialty care, compared with those in non-expansion states, and low-income adults who were insured were less likely to report financial barriers to needed medical care compared with those who were uninsured.\nAmong low-income adults who were uninsured, those in expansion states were less likely to report financial barriers to needed medical care compared with those in non-expansion states.\nFinally, the 2016 NHIS estimates showed that low-income adults in expansion states were more likely to report having a usual place of care to go when sick or needing advice about their health and receiving selected health care services compared with those in non-expansion states. The estimates also showed that low-income adults who were insured were generally more likely to report having a usual place of care and receiving selected health care services compared with those who were uninsured. Among the uninsured, relatively similar percentages of low-income adults in expansion and non-expansion states reported having a usual place of care. Similarly, estimates showed that relatively similar percentages of low-income adults who were uninsured in expansion and non-expansion states reported receiving selected health care services, such as receiving a flu vaccine or a blood pressure check.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_654"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_655","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nOffshore seismic surveys provide federal agencies and other entities with a wide range of data, from research on fault zones to geology that may indicate the presence of oil and gas. Companies seeking to conduct such surveys to find oil and gas resources in the OCS must obtain a permit from BOEM\u2014which oversees offshore oil and gas activities. Man-made sources of ocean noise, such as seismic surveys, may harm marine mammals. Entities whose activities may cause the taking of marine mammals, which includes harassing or injuring an animal, may obtain incidental take authorizations for seismic surveys from NMFS or FWS, depending on the potentially affected species.\nGAO was asked to provide information on the seismic permitting process. This report examines (1) BOEM's review process, the number of permit applications reviewed from 2011 through 2016, and its review time frames; and (2) NMFS's and FWS's review process, the number of incidental take authorization applications reviewed from 2011 through 2016, and their review time frames, among other objectives. GAO reviewed laws and regulations and agency documents, analyzed data on applications to BOEM, NMFS, and FWS, and interviewed agency officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of the Interior's Bureau of Ocean Energy Management's (BOEM) process and time frames for reviewing seismic survey applications differ by region along the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). From 2011 through 2016, BOEM reviewed 297 applications and issued 264 seismic survey permits, and the reviews' time frames differed by region (see table). As part of the process, BOEM may require approved \u201cincidental take\u201d authorizations from the Department of Commerce's National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) or Interior's U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), given the possibility such surveys may disturb or injure marine mammals. BOEM does not have statutory review time frame requirements for issuing permits, and officials said the agency starts its formal review once it determines that an application is complete. In some cases, the agency issued a permit on the same day it determined an application was complete.\nNMFS and FWS follow a similar general process for reviewing incidental take authorization applications related to seismic survey activities. From 2011 through 2016, NMFS and FWS reviewed 35 and approved 28 such applications across the three OCS regions, including some authorizations related to BOEM permits as well as research seismic surveys not associated with BOEM permits. NMFS was unable to provide accurate data for the dates the agency determines an application is adequate and complete\u2014and FWS does not record this date. For example, based on GAO's review of NMFS data, in at least two cases, the date NMFS recorded the application had been determined adequate and complete was after the date when the proposed authorization was published in the Federal Register . Federal internal control standards call for agencies to use quality information. Without guidance on how to accurately record review dates, agencies and applicants will continue to have uncertainty around review time frames. Further, under the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the agencies are to review one type of incidental take authorization application\u2014incidental harassment authorization applications\u2014within 120 days of receiving an application for such authorizations. NMFS and FWS have not conducted an analysis of their review time frames. Not conducting such an analysis is inconsistent with federal internal control standards that call for agency management to design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks. Without analyzing the review time frames for incidental harassment authorization applications and comparing them to statutory review time frames, NMFS and FWS are unable to determine whether they are meeting their objectives to complete reviews in the 120-day statutory time frame.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is recommending that both NMFS and FWS develop guidance clarifying how and when staff should record review dates of incidental take authorization applications and analyze how long the reviews take. NMFS agreed and FWS partially agreed with our recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_655"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_656","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThis engagement was initiated in connection with the statutory requirement for GAO to audit the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements. The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act requires that the Secretary of Defense ensure that a full audit is performed on the financial statements of DOD for each fiscal year and that the results be submitted to Congress no later than March 31 of the following fiscal year. The Navy was the first military department to assert real property audit readiness related to DOD's Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness effort.\nFor this report, GAO's objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which the Navy had internal control deficiencies, if any, that may impair its ability to assert that its buildings, as reported in its financial statements, exist and that the information about these buildings is complete and adequately supported by property records and (2) identify the challenges, if any, that Navy faces in valuing its buildings in accordance with federal accounting standards. GAO reviewed the Navy's policies and procedures for control activities over its buildings, performed data analyses, and tested a nongeneralizable sample of buildings. GAO also discussed with Navy officials the challenges in complying with federal accounting standards for valuing its buildings.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAlthough the United States Navy (Navy) has taken actions to become audit ready for its real property, GAO identified internal control deficiencies that impaired the Navy's ability to assert that (1) buildings recorded in the internet Navy Facility Assets Data Store (iNFADS), the Navy's real property system, and reported as assets in its financial statements existed and (2) all of the Navy's buildings were recorded in iNFADS and correctly reported as assets in the Navy's financial statements. As shown in the figure below, the effects of these internal control deficiencies contributed to the Navy (1) continuing to maintain records in iNFADS for buildings that had been demolished, sometimes many years ago, and include these buildings as assets in its financial statements; (2) excluding some of the buildings it owns from being recorded in iNFADS and reported as assets in its financial statements; (3) erroneously reporting nonfunctional buildings as assets in its financial statements; and (4) excluding certain buildings from being reported as assets in its financial statements that met or exceeded the Department of Defense's (DOD) capitalization threshold.\nThe Navy has various efforts under way to address challenges in valuing its buildings for financial reporting in accordance with federal accounting standards. Navy officials have acknowledged that significant delays can sometimes occur in the Navy being able to complete supporting documentation of the final costs to properly report buildings in its financial statements. Additionally, implementation of the Navy's new methodology to properly account for capital improvements will be critical for capturing accurate costs for buildings. Furthermore, the Navy has not consistently completed a physical inventory (asset evaluation) for each building every 5 years as required by DOD policy. These asset evaluations are an important control to help ensure that the information recorded for buildings in iNFADS is accurate. Finally, the Navy also faces a challenge in determining the placed in service dates for those buildings found through inventory procedures. The Navy's use of the date the building was found rather than the estimated date the building was placed in service can substantially affect the accuracy of the information in the Navy's systems and financial statements. Navy officials are aware of these challenges and have various efforts under way to address them. Effective implementation of these efforts is crucial to help address these challenges.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making four recommendations to the Navy to improve internal controls for its buildings by implementing needed written procedures and control activities. The Navy concurred with these recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_656"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_657","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn October 2017, the Department of Commerce (Commerce) announced that the projected life-cycle cost of the 2020 Census had climbed to $15.6 billion, a more than $3 billion (27 percent) increase over its 2015 estimate. A high-quality, reliable cost estimate is a key tool for budgeting, planning, and managing the 2020 Census. Without this capability, the Bureau is at risk of experiencing program cost overruns, missed deadlines, and performance shortfalls.\nGAO was asked to evaluate the reliability of the Bureau's life-cycle cost estimate. This report evaluates the reliability of the Bureau's revised life-cycle cost estimate for the 2020 Census and the extent to which the Bureau is using it as a management tool, and compares the 2015 and 2017 cost estimates to describe key drivers of cost growth. GAO reviewed documentary and testimonial evidence from Bureau officials responsible for developing the 2020 Census cost estimate and used its cost assessment guide ( GAO-09-3SP ) as criteria.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nSince 2015, the Census Bureau (Bureau) has made significant progress in improving its ability to develop a reliable cost estimate. While improvements have been made, the Bureau's October 2017 cost estimate for the 2020 Census does not fully reflect all the characteristics of a reliable estimate. (See figure.) Specifically, for the characteristic of being well-documented, GAO found that some of the source data either did not support the information described in the cost estimate or was not in the files provided for two of its largest field operations. In GAO's assessment of the 2015 version of the 2020 Census cost estimate, GAO recommended that the Bureau take steps to ensure that each of the characteristics of a reliable cost estimate is met. The Bureau agreed and has taken steps, but has not fully implemented this recommendation.\nA reliable cost estimate serves as a tool for program development and oversight, helping management make informed decisions. During this review, GAO found the Bureau used the cost estimate to inform decision making.\nFactors that contributed to cost fluctuations between the 2015 and 2017 cost estimates include:\nChanges in assumptions. Among other changes, a decrease in the assumed rate for self-response from 63.5 percent in 2015 to 60.5 percent in 2017 increased the cost of collecting responses from nonresponding housing units.\nImproved ability to anticipate and quantify risk. In general, contingency allocations designed to address the effects of potential risks increased overall from $1.3 billion in 2015 to $2.6 billion in 2017.\nAn overall increase in information technology (IT) costs. IT cost increases, totaling $1.59 billion, represented almost 50 percent of the total cost increase from 2015 to 2017.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making any new recommendations but maintains its earlier recommendation\u2014that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Bureau to take specific steps to ensure its cost estimate meets the characteristics of a high-quality estimate. In its response to this report, Commerce generally agreed with the findings related to cost estimation improvements, but disagreed that the cost estimate was not reliable. However, until GAO's recommendation is fully implemented the cost estimate cannot be considered reliable.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_657"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_658","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nTax whistleblowers who report on the underpayment of taxes by others have helped IRS collect $3.6 billion since 2007, according to IRS. IRS pays qualifying whistleblowers between 15 and 30 percent of the proceeds it collects as a result of their information. However, until February 9, 2018, IRS did not pay whistleblowers for information that led to the collection of FBAR penalties.\nGAO was asked to review how often and to what extent whistleblower claims involve cases where FBAR penalties were also assessed. Among other objectives, this report (1) describes the extent to which FBAR penalties were included in whistleblower awards prior to the statutory change in definition of proceeds; (2) examines how IRS used whistleblower information on FBAR noncompliance, and how IRS responded to the statutory change in definition of proceeds; and (3) describes the purposes for which IRS collects and uses FBAR penalty data, and assesses controls for ensuring data reliability. GAO reviewed the files of 132 claims closed between January 1, 2012, and July 24, 2017, that likely included FBAR allegations; analyzed IRS data; reviewed relevant laws and regulations, and IRS policies, procedures and publications; and interviewed IRS officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nPrior to February 9, 2018, when Congress enacted a statutory change requiring the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to include penalties for Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) violations in calculating whistleblower awards, IRS interpreted the whistleblower law to exclude these penalties from awards. However, GAO found that some whistleblowers provided information about FBAR noncompliance to IRS. In a sample of 132 whistleblower claims closed between January 2012 and July 2017, GAO found that IRS assessed FBAR penalties in 28 cases. It is unknown whether the whistleblower's information led IRS to take action in all of these cases. These penalties totaled approximately $10.7 million. Had they been included in whistleblower awards, total awards could have increased up to $3.2 million. Over 97 percent of the FBAR penalties collected from these 28 claims came from 10 cases with willful FBAR noncompliance, for which higher penalties apply.\nIRS forwards whistleblower allegations of FBAR noncompliance to its operating divisions for further examination. However, IRS Form 11369, a key form used for making award determinations, does not require examiners to include information about the usefulness of a whistleblower's information FBAR and other non-tax issues. After Congress enacted the statutory change, IRS suspended award determinations for 1 week, but resumed the program before updating the form or its instructions, or issuing internal guidance on new information required on the Form. As of June 28, 2018, IRS had not begun updating the Form 11369 or its instructions. The lack of clear instructions on the form for examiners to include information on FBAR and other non-tax enforcement collections may result in relevant information being excluded from whistleblower award decisions.\nIRS maintains FBAR penalty data in a standalone database. It uses these data for internal and external reporting and to make management decisions. Because of the change in statute, IRS will need these data for determining whistleblower awards. GAO found that IRS does not have sufficient quality controls to ensure the reliability of FBAR penalty data. For example, IRS staff enter data into the database manually but there are no secondary checks to make sure the data entered are accurate. Without additional controls for data reliability, IRS risks making decisions, including award determinations, with incomplete or inaccurate data.\nThis is a public version of a sensitive report issued in August 2018. Information on the FBAR Database that IRS deemed to be sensitive has been omitted.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends IRS update IRS Form 11369 and improve controls for the reliability of FBAR penalty data. IRS agreed with all of GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_658"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_659","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFacilities that produce, use, or store hazardous chemicals could be targeted or used by terrorists to inflict mass casualties, damage, and fear. DHS established the CFATS program to assess the risk posed by these facilities and inspect them to ensure compliance with DHS standards. DHS places high-risk facilities in risk-based tiers and is to conduct inspections after it approves their security plans. Under the CFATS Act of 2014, authorization for the CFATS program expires in January 2019.\nGAO assessed the extent to which DHS has (1) enhanced the process for identifying high-risk facilities and assigning them to tiers, (2) conducted facility inspections and measured facility security, and (3) ensured that information is shared with emergency responders to prepare them for incidents at high-risk facilities. GAO reviewed DHS reports and data on compliance inspections and interviewed DHS officials. GAO also obtained non-generalizable information from 11 trade associations representing chemical facilities regarding DHS outreach and from 15 emergency planning committees about their awareness of CFATS and the chemicals it covers.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nSince 2013, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has strengthened its processes for identifying high-risk chemical facilities and assigning them to tiers under its Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. Among other things, DHS implemented a quality assurance review process to verify the accuracy of facility self-reported information used to identify high-risk facilities. DHS also revised its risk assessment methodology\u2014used to assess whether chemical facilities are high-risk and, if so, assign them to a risk-based tier\u2014by incorporating changes to address prior GAO recommendations and most of the findings of a DHS-commissioned peer review. For example, the updated methodology incorporates revisions to the threat, vulnerability, and consequence scoring methods to better cover the full range of security issues regulated by CFATS. As of February 2018, a total of 29,195 facilities\u2014including all 26,828 facilities previously assessed and 2,367 facilities new to the program\u2014were assessed using DHS's revised methodology. DHS designated 3,500 of these facilities as high-risk and subject to further requirements.\nDHS has also made substantial progress conducting and completing compliance inspections and has begun to take action to measure facility security but does not evaluate vulnerability reduction resulting from the CFATS compliance inspection process. In 2013, GAO found that the backlog of chemical facility security plans awaiting review affected DHS's ability to conduct compliance inspections, which are performed after security plans are approved. Since then DHS has made progress and increased the number of completed compliance inspections. As of May 2018, DHS had conducted 3,553 compliance inspections. DHS has also begun to update its performance measure for the CFATS program to evaluate security measures implemented both when a facility submits its initial security plan and again when DHS approves its final security plan. However, GAO found that DHS's new performance measure methodology does not measure reduction in vulnerability at a facility resulting from the implementation and verification of planned security measures during the compliance inspection process. Doing so would provide DHS an opportunity to begin assessing how vulnerability is reduced\u2014and by extension, risk lowered\u2014not only for individual high-risk facilities but for the CFATS program as a whole.\nDHS shares some CFATS information, but first responders and emergency planners may not have all of the information they need to minimize the risk of injury or death when responding to incidents at high-risk facilities. Facilities are currently required to report some chemical inventory information, but GAO found that over 200 CFATS chemicals may not be covered by these requirements. To improve access to information, DHS developed a secure interface called the Infrastructure Protection (IP) Gateway that provides access to CFATS facility-specific information that may be missing from required reporting. However, GAO found that the IP Gateway is not widely used at the local level. In addition, officials from 13 of the 15 Local Emergency Planning Committees\u2014consisting of first responders and covering 373 CFATS high-risk facilities\u2014told GAO they did not have access to CFATS data in the IP Gateway. By encouraging wider use of the IP Gateway, DHS would have greater assurance that first responders have information about high-risk facilities and the specific chemicals they possess.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DHS take actions to (1) measure reduction in vulnerability of high-risk facilities and use that data to assess program performance; and (2) encourage access to and wider use of the IP Gateway among first responders and emergency planners. DHS concurred with both recommendations and outlined efforts underway or planned.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_659"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_660","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAlthough the United States has one of the safest food supplies in the world, foodborne illness is a common public health problem; some of this illness can be linked to produce. For example, in 2017, a Salmonella outbreak linked to imported papayas sickened more than 200 people in 23 states and killed 1. FDA's produce rule, one of a number of rules required by the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, established the first enforceable national food safety standards for produce. The Agricultural Act of 2014 required that the produce rule include \u201ca plan to systematically\u2026develop an ongoing process to evaluate and respond to business concerns\u201d about the rule and a provision for GAO to report on FDA's efforts 1 year after the promulgation of the final rule and again the following year. In November 2016, GAO issued the first report.\nIn this follow-up report, GAO examined (1) steps FDA has taken since GAO's 2016 review to evaluate and respond to business concerns regarding the produce rule, (2) steps FDA has taken to assess the effectiveness of its efforts to evaluate and respond to business concerns regarding the rule, and (3) challenges FDA officials reported facing in evaluating and responding to business concerns regarding the rule. GAO examined TAN questions submitted by businesses; interviewed FDA officials and representatives from groups, such as the Produce Safety Alliance, working with FDA to implement the rule; and interviewed representatives from produce industry associations and a farming organization.\nGAO is not making any recommendations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nSince GAO's November 2016 report on the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) 2015 produce rule, the agency has continued to use its Technical Assistance Network (TAN) to evaluate and respond to questions and concerns about the rule. GAO found that since the issuance of its 2016 report, which contained data as of September 3, 2016, 2,665 more questions were submitted to the TAN, 230 of which pertained to the produce rule, and of those 230 questions, 154 were submitted by businesses (see fig.).\na The TAN also receives questions about other rules pertaining to the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, such as rules on imported food and the sanitary transportation of food.\nb Others include members of academia, consumers, and federal or state regulators.\nMost produce rule-related TAN questions concerned agricultural water standards, such as methods for testing water. In addition to the TAN, FDA has taken other steps to evaluate and respond to business concerns, including funding training for industry and visiting farms. FDA is also reviewing the rule's water standards and published a proposed rule in September 2017 to extend the compliance dates associated with those standards in response to concerns.\nFDA has begun collecting survey results on the web page used for submitting TAN questions and continues to develop a survey to assess the timeliness and quality of TAN responses. FDA also continued to develop metrics intended to assess its overall efforts to evaluate and respond to business concerns, officials reported. Produce industry representatives told GAO that FDA is open to hearing questions and concerns, but businesses need more information to comply with the rule and are awaiting FDA's forthcoming guidance on parts of the rule.\nFDA officials reported facing two challenges in evaluating and responding to business concerns: identifying businesses subject to the rule and providing consistent, region-specific information in response to concerns. Officials said that the agency's cooperative agreement with 43 states plays a key role in addressing these challenges, as does the Produce Safety Network, a network of region-based FDA food safety experts.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_660"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_661","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFOIA requires federal agencies to provide the public with access to government records and information based on the principles of openness and accountability in government. Each year, individuals and entities file hundreds of thousands of FOIA requests. In the last 9 fiscal years, federal agencies subject to FOIA have received about 6 million requests.\nGAO was asked to review federal agencies' compliance with FOIA requirements. Our objectives, among others, were to (1) determine the extent to which agencies have implemented selected FOIA requirements; (2) describe the methods established by agencies to reduce backlogged requests and the effectiveness of those methods; and (3) identify any statutory exemptions that have been used by agencies as the basis for withholding (redacting) information from requesters.\nTo do so, GAO selected 18 agencies based on their size and other factors and assessed their policies against six FOIA requirements. GAO also reviewed the agencies' backlog reduction plans and developed a catalog of statutes that agencies have used to withhold information.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAll 18 selected agencies had implemented three of six Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requirements reviewed. Specifically, all agencies had updated response letters to inform requesters of the right to seek assistance from FOIA public liaisons, implemented request tracking systems, and provided training to FOIA personnel. For the three additional requirements, 15 agencies had provided online access to government information, such as frequently requested records, 12 agencies had designated chief FOIA officers, and 12 agencies had published and updated their FOIA regulations on time to inform the public of their operations. Until these agencies address all of the requirements, they increase the risk that the public will lack information that ensures transparency and accountability in government operations.\nThe 18 selected agencies had backlogs of varying sizes, with 4 agencies having backlogs of 1,000 or more requests during fiscal years 2012 through 2016. These 4 agencies reported using best practices identified by the Department of Justice, such as routinely reviewing metrics, as well as other methods, to help reduce their backlogs. Nevertheless, these agencies' backlogs fluctuated over the 5-year period (see figure). The 4 agencies with the largest backlogs attributed challenges in reducing their backlogs to factors such as increases in the number and complexity of FOIA requests. However, these agencies lacked plans that described how they intend to implement best practices to reduce backlogs. Until agencies develop such plans, they will likely continue to struggle to reduce backlogs to a manageable level.\nAgencies used various types of statutory exemptions to withhold information when processing FOIA requests during fiscal years 2010 to 2016. The majority of these fell into the following categories: personally identifiable information, national security, law enforcement and investigations, and confidential and commercial business information.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making recommendations to 16 agencies to post records online, designate chief FOIA officers, update regulations, and develop plans to reduce backlogs. Nine agencies agreed with the recommendations, 1 both agreed and disagreed, 2 disagreed, and 4 neither agreed nor disagreed. GAO continues to believe the recommendations are valid.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_661"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_662","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nEach year, the DHS invests billions of dollars in a diverse portfolio of major acquisition programs to help execute its many critical missions. DHS's acquisition activities are on GAO's High Risk List, in part, because of management and funding issues.\nThe Explanatory Statement accompanying the DHS Appropriations Act, 2015 included a provision for GAO to review DHS's major acquisitions. This report, GAO's fourth annual review, assesses the extent to which: (1) DHS's major acquisition programs are on track to meet their schedule and cost goals, and (2) DHS has taken actions to enhance its policies and processes to better reflect key practices for effectively managing a portfolio of investments.\nGAO reviewed 28 acquisition programs, including DHS's largest programs that were in the process of obtaining new capabilities as of April 2017, and programs GAO or DHS identified as at risk of poor outcomes. GAO assessed cost and schedule progress against baselines, assessed DHS's policies and processes against GAO's key portfolio management practices, and met with relevant DHS officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nDuring 2017, 10 of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) programs GAO assessed that had approved schedule and cost goals were on track to meet those goals. GAO reviewed 28 programs in total, 4 of which were new programs that GAO did not assess because they did not establish cost and schedule goals before the end of calendar year 2017 as planned. The table shows the status of the 24 programs GAO assessed. Reasons for schedule delays or cost increases included technical challenges, changes in requirements, and external factors.\nRecent enhancements to DHS's acquisition management, resource allocation, and requirements policies largely reflect key portfolio management practices (see table). However, DHS is in the early stages of implementing these policies.\nGAO identified two areas where DHS could strengthen its portfolio management policies and implementation efforts:\nDHS's policies do not reflect the key practice to reassess a program that breaches\u2014or exceeds\u2014its cost, schedule, or performance goals in the context of the portfolio to ensure it is still relevant or affordable. Acquisition management officials said that, in practice, they do so based on a certification of funds memorandum\u2014a tool GAO has found to be effective for DHS leadership to assess program affordability\u2014submitted by the component when one of its programs re-baselines in response to a breach. Documenting this practice in policy would help ensure DHS makes strategic investment decisions within its limited budget.\nDHS is not leveraging information gathered from reviews once programs complete implementation to manage its portfolio of active acquisition programs. DHS's acquisition policy requires programs to conduct post-implementation reviews after initial capabilities are deployed, which is in line with GAO's key practices. Acquisition management officials said they do not consider the results of these reviews in managing DHS's portfolio because the reviews are typically conducted after oversight for a program shifts to the components. Leveraging these results across DHS could enable DHS to address potential issues that may contribute to poor outcomes, such as schedule slips and cost growth, for other programs in its acquisition portfolio.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends DHS update its acquisition policy to require certification of fund memorandums when programs re-baseline as a result of a breach and assess programs' post-implementation reviews to improve performance across the acquisition portfolio. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_662"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_663","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nNASA obligated over $18 billion in contracts and more than $1 billion in grants in fiscal year 2016, and it relies on a significant number of contractor and grantee employees to accomplish its work. These employees are legally protected from reprisal\u2014such as demotion or firing\u2014for whistleblowing.\nGAO was asked to review NASA's whistleblower reprisal protections for contractor and grantee employees. This report addresses, among other things, the extent to which (1) NASA's Inspector General investigated contractor and grantee whistleblower reprisal complaints; (2) NASA's Administrator reviewed reprisal complaints in a timely manner; and (3) NASA communicated the applicable whistleblower reprisal protections to contractors. GAO reviewed NASA and its Inspector General's policies and guidance; reviewed a generalizable sample of 100 contracts from all NASA centers with contracts in fiscal year 2016; and interviewed relevant officials and contractors, grantees, and advocacy groups.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFrom 2008 through June 2017, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) contractor and grantee employees submitted 48 reprisal complaints such as alleged firing or demotion for reporting fraud, waste, or abuse within the government. NASA's Inspector General addressed all 48 complaints, completed investigations for 6 of those complaints, and forwarded investigation reports to the NASA Administrator, who is responsible for making a final determination of whether reprisal occurred. The Administrator determined that none of the complaints qualified for protection under the law.\nFurther, in 5 of the 6 cases forwarded by the OIG, the Administrator was required by statute to make a final determination of reprisal within 30 days. GAO found that the Administrator did not meet this required time frame for all 5 cases and had no documented response for one of them (see figure for all 5 cases). According to officials from NASA's Office of General Counsel, each case must be handled on a case by case basis to ensure due process and 30 days is insufficient time to issue an order of final determination of reprisal. However, in order to ensure that whistleblower reprisal complaints are handled within required timeframes, NASA would have to monitor and evaluate its processes for making final determinations of reprisal, but it has not yet taken this step. Consequently, NASA does not know what changes may be needed to ensure that it is meeting the statutory 30-day requirement.\nNASA communicates whistleblower protections to contractors through inclusion of a required contract clause. For example, GAO found that almost all\u201498 percent\u2014of contracts would be expected to include a whistleblower clause as required by statute. However, certain elements of NASA whistleblower protection guidance have contributed to a different understanding of reprisal protections among officials at headquarters, a NASA center, and the Inspector General. For example, a July 2014 procurement notice and contract clause language resulted in different interpretations about when the protections apply. Federal internal control standards require that an entity should communicate necessary quality information internally to meet the objectives of its mission. Without additional clarity in its guidance on when the protections apply, NASA centers and procurement officials will be at risk of inconsistent implementation of the law.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making three recommendations to NASA, including evaluating the process for reviewing reprisal complaints to ensure it is meeting the required timeframe and clarifying guidance on when protections apply to contractor employees. NASA agreed with the recommendations and plans to develop a documented process to ensure it reviews reprisal complaints in a timely manner and clarify guidance as appropriate, among other things.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_663"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_664","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nForty railroads including Amtrak, commuter, and freight railroads are currently required by statute to implement PTC, a communications-based system designed to slow or stop a train that is not being operated safely. PTC must be interoperable, meaning trains can operate seamlessly on the same PTC-equipped track, including \u201ctenants\u201d that operate on track owned by another \u201chost\u201d railroad. Although the deadline for PTC implementation is December 31, 2018, railroads may receive a maximum 2-year extension to December 31, 2020, if they meet certain statutory criteria.\nGAO was asked to review railroads' PTC implementation progress. This statement discusses (1) railroads' implementation progress and FRA's steps to assist them and (2) how railroads and FRA plan to approach the 2018 and 2020 deadlines. GAO analyzed railroads' most recent quarterly reports covering activities through June 30, 2018; sent a brief questionnaire to all 40 railroads; and interviewed officials from FRA and 16 railroads, selected in part based on those identified as at-risk by FRA.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAs of June 30, 2018, many railroads remained in the early stages of positive train control (PTC) implementation\u2014including equipment installation and early field testing. About half of the 40 railroads implementing PTC reported that they are still installing equipment, though many are nearing completion. However, with the exception of the largest freight railroads\u2014known as Class I\u2014and Amtrak, most railroads reported less progress in later implementation stages, especially revenue service demonstration (RSD), an advanced form of field testing that is required to fully implement PTC. Of the 28 commuter railroads required to implement PTC, 19 reported initiating field testing, but only 8 reported initiating RSD. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) recently clarified the criteria railroads must meet to qualify for a 2-year extension past the December 31, 2018, PTC implementation deadline. To receive an extension, railroads must meet 6 statutory criteria. For the sixth criterion, commuter and smaller freight railroads are authorized to either initiate RSD on at least one track segment or use FRA-approved substitute criteria. FRA clarified these and other requirements at three PTC symposiums hosted for railroads in summer 2018. For example, FRA officials said that for railroads eligible to use substitute criteria, initiating field testing instead of RSD was one approach that could potentially receive FRA's approval. FRA's actions are consistent with GAO's March 2018 recommendation that the agency communicate to the railroads the requirements and process for an extension.\nMost railroads anticipate needing an extension, leaving substantial work for both railroads and FRA to complete before the end of 2020. Thirty-two of 40 railroads reported to GAO that they, or the railroad which owns the track on which they operate, will apply for an extension. Sixteen commuter and smaller freight railroads reported planning to apply for an extension using substitute criteria, and of these, 12 intend to apply for substitute criteria based on early testing such as field testing. Though substitute criteria are authorized in law, this approach defers time-intensive RSD testing into 2019 and beyond. In addition, railroads expressed concerns with the time and effort involved with interoperability testing\u2014a key remaining hurdle for railroads such as Class I railroads that are further along with implementation. Further, railroads expressed concern that FRA's workload will markedly increase as railroads submit requests for extension approvals. FRA has acknowledged concerns about the pending surge of submissions and has taken recent steps to help manage the forthcoming influx of documentation, such as reallocating resources. Nonetheless, given that as of early September 2018, only 1 railroad\u2014a Class I railroad\u2014had applied for an extension, it remains unclear how many extension requests FRA will receive or what FRA's enforcement strategy will be for noncompliance with the statute, such as for railroads that fail to apply for an extension by the deadline. In addition, challenges related to PTC implementation and FRA's resources raise questions as to the extent FRA and the railroad industry are poised for full PTC implementation by December 31, 2020.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nIn March 2018, GAO recommended FRA take steps to systematically communicate extension information to railroads and to use a risk-based approach to prioritize agency resources and workload. FRA has taken some steps to address these recommendations, such as recently communicating and clarifying extension requirements to all railroads during three symposiums, and GAO will continue to monitor FRA's progress.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_664"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_665","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDetermining that a new medical device is safe and effective is a substantial investment of time and resources for the sponsor and FDA, the agency that regulates medical devices. FDA relies on the device sponsor to provide supporting data at the time of its original submission, and the agency can request additional information during the review. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as amended, requires that when FDA requests additional information from sponsors, the agency consider the least burdensome means of evaluating a medical device.\nGAO was asked to provide information on FDA's implementation of the least burdensome requirements in its medical device review process. This report (1) describes FDA's requests for additional information and sponsor disagreements, (2) describes its least burdensome training efforts, and (3) describes FDA actions to improve its requests for additional information and examines the extent to which it has evaluated its implementation of the least burdensome requirements. GAO reviewed FDA documents and guidance and interviewed agency officials. GAO also interviewed officials from four relevant medical device manufacturing associations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nSince 1997, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has been required to consider the least burdensome means of evaluating certain types of medical devices for marketing, including when requesting that sponsors\u2014generally manufacturers\u2014seeking to market their medical devices provide information in addition to what was provided in their submissions. GAO found that, from 2001 through 2016, FDA issued letters asking sponsors to provide such information for a majority of the more than 62,000 medical device submissions that it reviewed. Sponsors may formally disagree with the request on the grounds that it is not the least burdensome method needed for FDA to review the submission. For example, sponsors appealed FDA decisions internally to agency management 63 times from 2013 through 2016, and of these, FDA identified 33 such appeals in which the sponsor raised an issue related to least burdensome requirements. FDA agreed or partially agreed with the sponsors in 11 of these appeals. Medical device industry representatives noted that these appeals may not fully represent the number of such disagreements, because applicants are generally concerned that an appeal would damage their relationship with FDA and potentially negatively affect future device applications.\nFDA provided staff training that was specifically dedicated to addressing the least burdensome requirements from 1997 through 1999. Since 1999, FDA has not offered a course dedicated to the least burdensome requirements, but has incorporated related concepts into other training programs, such as in a training mandatory for most new reviewers. In response to the 21st Century Cures Act, enacted in 2016, FDA is providing new least burdensome training to all relevant employees, and said that 80 percent had received the training as of October 2, 2017. Although FDA did not specifically evaluate the effectiveness of past training on least burdensome requirements, it is implementing an evaluation of all device-related training, including the new least burdensome training. It also plans to complete a required audit of training on least burdensome requirements by June 2018.\nFDA has not specifically evaluated implementation of the least burdensome requirements. However, in response to broader evaluations, such as an independent assessment of its medical device review process, the agency is in the early stages of developing processes that may improve its requests for additional information. For example, FDA plans to conduct an audit of letters requesting additional information. FDA is developing the audit's methodology and expects it will assess whether the agency's process was followed. However, due to their early stage, the extent to which these efforts will allow FDA to assess implementation of the least burdensome requirements is unclear. In 2002, FDA stated that it planned to periodically assess the implementation of the least burdensome principles, and federal internal control standards identify the importance of performance metrics for such assessments. However, the agency has yet to develop performance metrics to do so. Until such measures are developed and used, FDA will not be able to evaluate whether it effectively and consistently applies a least burdensome approach in its medical device reviews.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making one recommendation that FDA develop and use performance metrics to evaluate the implementation of the least burdensome requirements. The Department of Health and Human Services agreed with GAO's recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_665"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_666","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nColombia is the world's leading producer of cocaine, with production levels more than tripling from 2013 through 2017 (see figure). The U.S. and Colombian governments have been longstanding partners in the fight against drug trafficking. Since the launch of Plan Colombia in 1999, the U.S. government has invested over $10 billion in counternarcotics efforts in Colombia. This assistance has supported a range of eradication, interdiction, and alternative development programs.\nGAO was asked to review U.S. counternarcotics assistance to Colombia. This report examines (1) to what extent the U.S. government has assessed the effectiveness of its counternarcotics efforts in Colombia and (2) what is known about the effectiveness of U.S.-supported eradication, interdiction, and alternative development programs in Colombia. GAO reviewed data and documentation from U.S. agencies, performed a literature review of relevant research on counternarcotics efforts in Colombia, conducted fieldwork in Colombia, and interviewed U.S. and Colombian officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nU.S. agencies that provide counternarcotics assistance to Colombia conduct performance monitoring of their activities, such as by tracking the hectares of coca fields eradicated and the amount of cocaine seized, but have not consistently evaluated the effectiveness of their activities in reducing the cocaine supply. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has evaluated some of its alternative development programs, but the Department of State (State), which has lead responsibility for U.S. counternarcotics efforts, has not evaluated the effectiveness of its eradication and interdiction activities, as called for by its evaluation policies. Additionally, State has not conducted a comprehensive review of the U.S. counternarcotics approach, which relies on a combination of eradication, interdiction, and alternative development. Without information about the relative benefits and limitations of these activities, the U.S. government lacks key information to determine the most effective combination of counternarcotics activities.\nGAO's review of U.S. agency performance monitoring data and third-party research offers some information about the relative effectiveness of eradication, interdiction, and alternative development activities. For example, available evidence indicates that U.S.-supported eradication efforts in Colombia may not be an effective long-term approach to reduce the cocaine supply, due in part to coca growers responding to eradication by moving coca crops to national parks and other areas off limits to eradication. Agency data show that U.S.-supported interdiction efforts in Colombia seized hundreds of tons of cocaine and arrested thousands of drug traffickers, yet the net cocaine supply has increased and third-party studies have mixed findings on the long-term effectiveness of interdiction efforts. USAID evaluations indicate that alternative development programs in Colombia have provided legal economic opportunities to some rural populations previously involved in illicit crop production. However, USAID as well as third-party research suggests that alternative development requires significant and sustained investment and some programs have had design and sustainability challenges.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that State, in consultation with relevant agencies, (1) evaluate the effectiveness of eradication and interdiction in reducing the cocaine supply in Colombia and (2) undertake a comprehensive review of the U.S. counternarcotics approach in Colombia that considers the relative benefits and limitations between eradication, interdiction, and alternative development efforts. State generally concurred with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_666"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_667","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIRS faces a number of challenges that pose risks to meeting its mission if not managed effectively. Key to addressing IRS's challenges is its workforce. Cultivating a well-equipped, diverse, flexible, and engaged workforce requires strategic human capital management.\nGAO was asked to review IRS's enterprise-wide strategic workforce planning efforts. GAO assessed (1) how IRS defines its workforce needs and develops strategies for shaping its workforce; (2) the extent to which IRS identified the critical skills and competencies it will require to meet its goals, and its strategy to address skills gaps in its workforce; and (3) the extent to which IRS's Human Capital Office has the capacity to hire employees in hard to fill positions.\nGAO analyzed trends in staffing across IRS and in selected mission critical occupations; compared IRS strategic workforce management processes, practices, and activities with federal regulations and leading practices; analyzed IRS documents and interviewed agency officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has scaled back strategic workforce planning activities in recent years. IRS officials told GAO that resource constraints and fewer staff with strategic workforce planning skills due to attrition required IRS to largely abandon strategic workforce planning activities.\nHowever, a number of indicators, such as increasing rates of retirement eligible employees and declining employee satisfaction, led IRS to determine that continuing to make short-term, largely nonstrategic human capital decisions was unsustainable. One way IRS sought to address these issues was to develop a strategic workforce plan and associated workforce planning initiative. Initiative implementation, however, is behind schedule and on hold. IRS attributed the delay to a combination of: 1) personnel resources redirected to implement Public Law 115-97\u2014commonly referred to as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, 2) lack of workforce planning skills within its Human Capital Office, and 3) delayed deployment at the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) related to a new workforce planning system. As a result, IRS lacks information about what mission critical skills it has on board, where skills gaps exist, and what skills will be needed in the future.\nIRS staffing has declined each year since 2011, and declines have been uneven across different mission areas. GAO found the reductions have been most significant among those who performed enforcement activities, where staffing declined by around 27 percent (fiscal years 2011 through 2017). IRS attributed staffing declines primarily to a policy decision to strictly limit hiring. Agency officials told GAO that declining staffing was a key contributor in decisions to scale back activities in a number of program and operational areas, particularly in enforcement, where the number of individual returns audited from fiscal years 2011 through 2017 declined by nearly 40 percent.\nIRS has skills gaps in mission critical occupations, and the agency's efforts to address these skills gaps do not target the occupations in greatest need, such as tax examiners and revenue officers. However, the results of an interagency working group effort that began in 2011, and was intended to address skill gaps among IRS revenue agents and other occupations with skills gaps across the government, may hold important lessons for addressing skills gaps in other mission critical occupations at IRS.\nIRS's Human Capital Office has limited staffing capacity to hire employees in hard to fill positions, which holds risks for the agency's ability to implement the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. IRS is undertaking a variety of activities to improve its hiring capacity, but has not determined how each activity will be evaluated and will contribute to increased hiring capacity or associated outcomes. In addition, changes in the agency's hiring processes have been confusing to managers and contributed to hiring delays. Clear guidance on hiring request requirements would better position IRS to avoid the risk of hiring delays for mission critical occupations.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making six recommendations to IRS that include implementing its delayed workforce planning initiative, evaluate actions to improve the agency's hiring capacity, and address changes in its processes that have contributed to hiring delays. IRS agreed with GAO's recommendations. GAO also recommends Treasury clarify guidance to IRS on a forthcoming workforce planning system. Treasury agreed with the recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_667"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_668","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDuring the tax filing season, generally from January to mid-April, IRS processes over 100 million individual tax returns and provides telephone, correspondence, online, and in-person service to tens of millions of taxpayers. In 2018, IRS had to begin taking steps to implement major tax law changes passed in what is commonly referred to as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act that affect both individuals and businesses.\nGAO was asked to review IRS's performance during the 2018 filing season and its efforts to implement the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. GAO assessed IRS's (1) performance providing service to taxpayers and processing individual tax returns and (2) early efforts to implement the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.\nGAO analyzed IRS documents and data and interviewed IRS officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Internal Revenue Service (IRS) generally improved its customer service during the 2018 filing season compared to prior years and managed multiple return processing challenges. For the third year in a row, IRS improved its telephone service by answering 80 percent of calls seeking live assistance and reducing wait times to about 5 minutes, as of the end of the 2018 filing season. This compares to 37.5 percent of calls answered with an average wait time of about 23 minutes during the 2015 filing season. Taxpayer use of online services also increased, including irs.gov and its online account tool for taxpayers to view their balances due. However, answering taxpayer correspondence remains a challenge\u2014IRS was late responding to about 37 percent of correspondence as of the end of the 2018 filing season compared to about 26 percent at the same time in 2017. In 2015, GAO recommended that the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) include timeliness in handling taxpayer correspondence as part of its performance goals, but as of June 2018 Treasury had not done so. Overall, despite multiple challenges including mid-filing season changes to tax law and a computer system failure, IRS met its processing targets for individual tax returns.\nIn 2018, IRS began taking steps to implement significant tax law changes from Public Law 115-97\u2014commonly referred to by the President and many administrative documents as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. To implement the changes, IRS established a centralized office to coordinate implementation across IRS offices and divisions. IRS officials cited the broad scope and complexity of the changes\u2014which will require extensive changes to tax forms, publications, and computer systems\u2014along with the 1 year time frame as key implementation challenges. Although IRS has taken steps to address these challenges, such as developing a project planning tool, GAO found that the new coordination office did not initially fully include the Human Capital Office (HCO), the division responsible for managing the agency's workforce. Based on GAO's discussions with IRS officials, representatives from HCO now attend weekly coordination meetings discussing and planning the tax law changes. Involving HCO in these discussions will better position IRS to hire new employees and train them and the existing workforce. It will also help HCO better understand training requirements and staffing needs ahead of the 2019 filing season.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nBecause HCO is now attending the weekly meetings, GAO is not making a related recommendation. In addition, GAO believes that its 2015 recommendation to Treasury to include timeliness in handling correspondence as part of its performance goals, which Treasury neither agreed or disagreed with, is still valid. IRS generally concurred with GAO's findings but noted concerns with interpreting the percentage of correspondence considered \u201coverage\u201d (more than 45 days old). GAO clarified its report but notes that while the open inventory of overage correspondence at the end of the fiscal year is not representative of total overage items for the year, the overage rates are relatively consistent throughout the year.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_668"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_669","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nEntities undertaking shellfish aquaculture activities (i.e., the breeding and harvesting of oysters, clams, and mussels) may need to submit an application to the Corps in certain circumstances for authorization to conduct these activities. The Corps authorizes such activities using various permits, as long as the activities comply with various environmental and other laws.\nGAO was asked to review the Corps' process for authorizing shellfish aquaculture activity in U.S. coastal waters. This report describes, for 2012 through 2017, (1) the number and outcomes of the applications the Corps received for shellfish aquaculture activities and the types of permits the Corps used to authorize such activities, and (2) the experiences of permit applicants in selected districts in seeking Corps' authorization for their shellfish aquaculture activities.\nGAO reviewed laws and permitting documents and analyzed data on the number, outcomes, and types of permits the Corps used for 2012 through 2017 from the Corps' permitting database and assessed its reliability. GAO also reviewed detailed information from a non-generalizable sample of 15 permit applications and interviewed the applicants and Corps officials from four Corps districts, selected to reflect variation in geographic location and shellfish activity; the information from the four districts is not generalizable to other Corps districts.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) authorized most (87 percent) of the 3,751 shellfish aquaculture applications it received from 2012 through 2017, according to Corps data. Of the 19 Corps districts that have coastal waters within their geographic areas of responsibility, 17 districts received and authorized applications. The majority of those districts (13 of 17) authorized applications using Nationwide Permit 48, a type of permit intended to streamline the authorization process for shellfish aquaculture activities. Additionally, districts may add conditions to nationwide permits or develop region-specific permits to address state or regional environmental concerns. Of the four districts GAO reviewed in detail, two districts added regional conditions applicable to Nationwide Permit 48, such as prohibiting shellfish activity within submerged aquatic vegetation beds or saltmarshes.\nThe 15 permit applicants from the four districts GAO reviewed had mixed views on their experiences with seeking authorization for their shellfish aquaculture activities. For example, 10 applicants across the four districts described the length of time to authorize their activities\u2014ranging from 1 day to about 4 months\u2014as reasonable, with several applicants indicating the Corps was efficient in reviewing their applications. In contrast, five applicants from three Corps districts said that the amount of time it took for the Corps to authorize their shellfish aquaculture activities\u2014ranging from 18 days to about 8 months\u2014was unreasonable. Corps officials from the four districts indicated they have taken some steps to help reduce authorization review time. For example, the four districts took steps to more efficiently conduct reviews under the Endangered Species Act. This has in turn helped reduce the Corps' time frames for issuing authorizations, according to Corps officials GAO interviewed. For instance, officials from one district said their review time declined from over 30 days to 1 to 2 days as a result of the change in the review process.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_669"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_670","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nRetail prescription drug expenditures were estimated to account for about 12 percent of total personal health care service spending in the United States in 2015, up from about 7 percent through the 1990s. Much of this growth was driven by use of expensive brand-name drugs, but price increases have been reported for some generic drugs as well. Prior GAO reports have identified multiple reasons for drug price increases, including limited competition. Experts have questioned whether consolidation among drug companies could reduce competition and R&D investment in new drugs.\nGAO was asked to examine changes in the drug industry. This report describes: (1) how the financial performance and structure of the industry have changed over time, (2) how reported R&D spending and new drug approvals have changed, and (3) what is known about the potential effects of consolidation on drug prices and new drug development. GAO analyzed Bloomberg drug industry financial data for 2006 through 2015, and examined select publicly available estimates of company market shares for 2014 and market shares for certain therapeutic classes for 2016. GAO also analyzed estimates of company self-reported R&D spending and federal funding for biomedical R&D data, aggregate tax credit claims data, and drug approval data for the same approximate time period. All data were the most current available. In addition, GAO also reviewed published research and interviewed federal agency officials, economists, and representatives from industry and advocacy groups.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO's analysis of revenue, profit margin, and merger and acquisition deals within the worldwide drug industry from 2006 through 2015 identified key trends:\nEstimated pharmaceutical and biotechnology sales revenue increased from $534 billion to $775 billion in 2015 dollars.\nAbout 67 percent of all drug companies saw an increase in their annual average profit margins from 2006 to 2015. Among the largest 25 companies, annual average profit margin fluctuated between 15 and 20 percent. For comparison, the annual average profit margin across non-drug companies among the largest 500 globally fluctuated between 4 and 9 percent.\nThe number of reported mergers and acquisitions generally held steady during this period, but the median disclosed deal value increased.\nThe largest 10 companies had about 38 percent of the drug industry's sales revenue in 2014. However, concentration was higher for narrower markets, such as for certain drugs in the same therapeutic class. In addition, experts noted that market pressures such as rising research and development (R&D) costs, fewer drugs in development, and competition from generic drugs, have driven structural changes in the industry such as increased use of acquisition by large drug companies to obtain access to new research.\nFrom 2008 through 2014, worldwide company-reported R&D spending, most of which went to drug development (rather than research), increased slightly from $82 billion to $89 billion in 2015 dollars. During the same period, federal spending, which funded a greater amount of basic research relative to industry, remained stable at around $28 billion. In addition to grants, several federal tax provisions provided incentives for industry R&D spending, including the orphan drug credit, available for companies developing drugs intended to treat rare diseases, which increased more than five-fold from 2005 through 2014. Pertaining to drug approvals, the total number of new drugs approved for marketing in the United States fluctuated between 2005 and 2016, ranging from 179 to 263 drug approvals annually. Novel drugs\u2014innovative products that serve previously unmet medical need or help advance patient care\u2014accounted for about 13 percent of all approvals each year. Biologics\u2014drugs derived from living rather than chemical sources\u2014and orphan drugs accounted for growing shares of drug approvals, reflecting market and policy incentives to invest in these areas, according to experts GAO interviewed.\nResearch GAO reviewed indicates that fewer competitors in the drug industry are associated with higher prices, particularly for generic drugs. Research also suggests that drug company mergers can have varied impacts on innovation as measured by R&D spending, patent approvals, and drug approvals. Certain merger retrospective studies have found a negative impact on innovation.\nThe Department of Health and Human Services, Federal Trade Commission, Internal Revenue Service, and National Science Foundation provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which we incorporated as appropriate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_670"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_671","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDemonstrations\u2014which represented roughly a third of the more than $300 billion in federal Medicaid spending in 2015\u2014are a powerful tool to test new approaches to providing coverage and delivering Medicaid services that could reduce costs and improve beneficiaries' outcomes. Evaluations are essential to determining whether demonstrations are having their intended effects. States are required to evaluate their demonstrations and CMS can initiate its own federal evaluations of demonstrations.\nGAO was asked to examine evaluations of demonstrations, including how the results have been used to inform Medicaid policy. This report examines (1) state-led evaluations and (2) federal evaluations. GAO reviewed evaluation documentation for eight states with high demonstration expenditures that varied in the number of years their demonstrations had been in effect and by geography. GAO also reviewed documentation for the ongoing federal evaluations and interviewed state and federal Medicaid officials. GAO assessed evaluation practices against federal standards for internal control and leading evaluation guidelines.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nUnder section 1115 of the Social Security Act, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) may approve Medicaid demonstrations to allow states to test new approaches to providing coverage and for delivering services that can transform large portions of states' programs. However, GAO found that selected states' evaluations of these demonstrations often had significant limitations that affected their usefulness in informing policy decisions. The limitations included gaps in reported evaluation results for important parts of the demonstrations. (See table.) These gaps resulted, in part, from HHS's Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) requiring final, comprehensive evaluation reports after the expiration of the demonstrations rather than at the end of each 3- to 5-year demonstration cycle. CMS has taken a number of steps since 2014 to improve the quality of state-led evaluations, and in October 2017, officials stated that the agency planned to require final reports at the end of each demonstration cycle for all demonstrations. However, the agency has not established written procedures for implementing such requirements, which could allow for gaps to continue. CMS also plans to allow states to conduct less rigorous evaluations for certain types of demonstrations but has not established criteria defining under what conditions limited evaluations would be allowed.\nFederal evaluations led by CMS have also been limited due to data challenges that have affected the progress and scope of the work. For example, delays obtaining data directly from states, among other things, led CMS to considerably reduce the scope of a large, multi-state evaluation, which was initiated in 2014 to examine the impact of state demonstrations in four policy areas deemed to be federal priorities. Though CMS has made progress in obtaining needed data, it is uncertain when results from the multi-state and other federal evaluations will be available to policymakers because CMS has no policy for making results public. By not making these results public in a timely manner, CMS is missing an opportunity to inform important federal and state policy discussions.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that CMS: (1) establish written procedures for requiring final evaluation reports at the end of each demonstration cycle, (2) issue criteria for when it will allow limited evaluations of demonstrations, and (3) establish a policy for publicly releasing findings from federal evaluations of demonstrations. HHS concurred with these recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_671"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_672","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nOn March 13, 2017, the President issued an executive order requiring a comprehensive reorganization of executive branch agencies. In April 2017, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provided guidance to federal agencies for developing their reform and workforce reduction proposals. Past proposals to reform and reorganize government have not always come to fruition and can take years to implement fully. GAO's prior work has shown that successful reforms or transformations depend upon following change management practices, such as agreement on reform goals, and the involvement of the Congress, federal employees, and other key stakeholders.\nThis report identifies the key questions that Congress, OMB, and agencies can use to assess the development and implementation of agency reforms. To meet this objective, GAO reviewed its prior work and leading practices on organizational transformations; collaboration; government streamlining and efficiency; fragmentation, overlap, and duplication; high-risk; and on other agency longstanding management challenges. GAO also identified subject matter specialists knowledgeable about issues related to government reform and strategic human capital management who reviewed and commented on GAO's draft questions.\nGAO is not making recommendations to OMB in this report. OMB staff provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_672"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_673","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCongress funds DCTAG through an annual appropriation, which was $40 million in fiscal year 2018. DCTAG provides D.C. residents up to $10,000 per year to attend college.\nThe Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, included a provision for GAO to review DCTAG. This report examines, among other things, the characteristics of DCTAG recipients and steps taken by the program to support recipients, as well as the extent to which OSSE reports DCTAG's performance to internal and external stakeholders.\nGAO assessed the most recent data available on DCTAG, covering academic years 2007\u20132016, as well as data on college graduation, tuition, and fees from the Department of Education's Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System for academic years 2007\u20132016, and data on enrollment in high schools and median household income in D.C. from the U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey for 2007\u20132016; interviewed representatives of DCTAG and the entities it partners with to support recipients; and reviewed relevant laws, the applicability of standards for internal control, and guidance on performance management.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe federally funded District of Columbia Tuition Assistance Grant (DCTAG) program was created in 1999 to give college-bound District of Columbia (D.C.) residents greater choices among institutions of higher education. Since its creation, the DCTAG program has awarded over $440 million to more than 26,000 residents to defray costs charged to out-of-state residents at some of the nation's public colleges and universities. While the program serves students from families with a wide range of household incomes, about half the students receiving a DCTAG award in academic years 2007\u20132016 came from the three D.C. wards with the lowest household incomes, as the figure below illustrates. DCTAG coordinates with public and private partners in the community to help students prepare for college, complete financial aid applications, and stay on track to graduate college.\nAlthough the Office of the State Superintendent of Education (OSSE), which manages DCTAG on behalf of the Mayor of the District of Columbia, issues various annual reports, these reports do not relate program performance to the program's four goals. One of these goals is to help D.C. students make smarter college choices. OSSE officials stated that they regularly communicate information about DCTAG data and activities internally and externally. However, these efforts do not provide the context necessary for program managers, Congress, or the public to understand the program's goals, nor determine whether DCTAG is making progress toward meeting them. Standards for internal control state that program managers should communicate information that internal and external stakeholders need to help the program achieve its objectives. Absent an annual report relating performance to goals, DCTAG's stakeholders will be limited in their ability to assess the program's performance or identify opportunities to improve it.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends OSSE issue annual reports relating DCTAG's performance to program goals. In response to the recommendation, the Mayor stated that OSSE will expand annual reporting to include direct linkages and combine data points to better illustrate the program's performance.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_673"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_674","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nUnder the Arms Export Control Act and its implementing regulations, DOD is required to recover nonrecurring costs\u2014unique one-time program-wide expenditures\u2014for certain major defense equipment sold under the FMS program. These costs include research, development, and one-time production costs, such as expenses for testing equipment. The Act also permits those costs to be waived under certain circumstances, such as to standardize equipment with select allies or to avoid a loss of sale.\nGAO was asked to review DOD's use of nonrecurring cost waivers. This report addresses the (1) nonrecurring cost waivers approved by DOD from fiscal years 2012 through 2017, (2) factors DOD considers when reviewing waivers, and (3) efficiency of the waiver review process.\nTo conduct this work, GAO analyzed DOD data of nonrecurring cost waivers for fiscal years 2012 through 2017, the most recent and complete data, to identify the value of waivers. GAO then reviewed a non-generalizable sample of 24 of these waivers that included a mix of justifications and geographic regions. GAO reviewed relevant DOD policy and interviewed DOD officials about the process to assess these waivers.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn the past 6 years, the Department of Defense (DOD) approved waivers valued at nearly $16 billion that it might otherwise have collected from foreign governments as part of its sales of major defense equipment through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. The Arms Export Control Act, as delegated, authorizes the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) within DOD to waive nonrecurring costs under certain circumstances, such as to standardize equipment with allies. From fiscal years 2012 through 2017, DSCA reviewed 813 waivers and denied 3, resulting in an approval rate of 99 percent. As shown in the figure below, the value of approved waivers significantly increased to nearly $6 billion last year, which is due to 2 waivers totaling nearly $3.5 billion for sales of missiles and related support systems.\nTotal Value of Approved Foreign Military Sales Nonrecurring Cost Waivers from Fiscal Years 2012 through 2017\nWhen reviewing waivers, DSCA considers foreign policy and national security factors, such as interoperability with allies, and economic factors, such as support for the U.S. defense industrial base. Agency officials stated that approving waivers helps ensure sales go through and such broader benefits are realized. DSCA's practice to approve waivers is consistent with the authority it has been delegated under the Arms Export Control Act and is influenced by these benefits.\nThe process DOD has established to consider waivers is, at times, inefficient and repetitive. DSCA has final approval authority; however, multiple DOD offices must review and provide input on each waiver, with some offices reviewing waivers for the same purpose. Federal standards for internal control call for agencies to allocate resources and assign responsibilities to achieve efficiency and effectiveness. DOD has already taken steps to improve the efficiency of the waiver review process; for example, by reducing the time a few offices take to review the waivers. Nonrecurring cost waivers are one part of the larger FMS process, and continuing to streamline the waiver review process would better position DSCA and the military departments to identify opportunities to maximize efficiencies.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nDSCA should continue to identify opportunities to streamline the waiver review process. DSCA concurred with GAO's recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_674"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_675","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nMultiemployer plans are collectively bargained pension agreements often between labor unions and two or more employers. CSPF is one of the nation's largest multiemployer defined benefit pension plans, covering about 385,000 participants. Since 1982, the plan has operated under a court-enforceable consent decree which, among other things, requires that the plan's assets be managed by independent parties. Within 7 years, CSPF estimates that the plan's financial condition will require severe benefit cuts. GAO was asked to review the events and factors that led to the plan's critical financial status and the oversight DOL provides under the consent decree and under other federal laws.\nGAO reviewed (1) what is known about the factors that contributed to CSPF's critical financial condition, (2) DOL's role in the administration of the 1982 CSPF consent decree and what actions the agency has taken under that role, and (3) what actions, if any, DOL has taken to oversee CSPF, beyond those required under the consent decree. GAO reviewed the consent decree and its amendments, relevant federal laws and regulations, agency guidance on plan management, and DOL protocols for investigating plans; interviewed CSPF representatives, International Brotherhood of Teamsters officials and members, federal officials, and industry stakeholders; and reviewed correspondence between DOL and CSPF and documents related to DOL investigations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund (CSPF) was established in 1955 to provide pension benefits to trucking industry workers and is one of the largest multiemployer plans. According to its regulatory filings, CSPF had less than half the estimated funds needed to cover plan liabilities in 1982 at the time it entered into a court-enforceable consent decree that provides for oversight of certain plan activities. Since then, CSPF has made some progress toward achieving its targeted level of funding; however, CSPF has never been more than 75 percent funded and its funding level has weakened since 2002, as shown in the figure below.\nStakeholders GAO interviewed identified numerous factors that contributed to CSPF's financial condition. For example, stakeholders stated that changes within the trucking industry, as well as a decline in union membership, contributed to CSPF's inability to maintain a healthy contribution base. CSPF's active participants made up about 69 percent of all participants in 1982, but accounted for only 16 percent in 2016. The most dramatic change in active participants occurred in 2007 when the United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) withdrew from the plan. At that time, UPS accounted for about 30 percent of the plan's active participants (i.e. workers). In addition, the market declines of 2001 to 2002 and 2008 had a significant negative impact on the plan's long-term investment performance. Stakeholders noted that, while each individual factor contributed to CSPF's critical financial condition, the interrelated nature of the factors also had a cumulative effect on the plan's financial condition.\nThe 1982 consent decree between the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) and CSPF came about as a result of an investigation of alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and mismanagement of plan assets, and is intended to prevent their reoccurrence. In addition to reiterating the requirement that the plan comply with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)\u2014the primary law governing the treatment of private-sector pensions in the United States\u2014the consent decree further outlines requirements for the plan to help ensure fiduciary controls and plan management, including seeking court approvals for the appointment of new trustees and changes to the plan's investment policy. The consent decree also delineates roles for DOL and other stakeholders. For example, it allows DOL to object to or comment on certain proposed plan actions, but does not require the agency to do so. GAO's review of plan documents found that the agency provided oversight and technical assistance in the areas specifically identified for its involvement under the consent decree, such as vetting proposed trustees prior to the court's approval.\nDOL is primarily responsible for enforcing the reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary provisions of ERISA for all tax-qualified pension plans, including CSPF. ERISA sets forth a \u201cprudent man standard of care\u201d in the execution of fiduciary duties that, according to DOL, focuses on the process for making proper fiduciary decisions. Plan fiduciaries are responsible for selecting and monitoring investment managers, but are generally not liable for the individual investment decisions of those managers. To enforce ERISA, DOL conducts examinations and investigations. Since the consent decree was established, DOL officials reported that the agency has completed two investigations of CSPF. The two investigations\u2014completed in 1998 and 2004\u2014were closed without adverse findings against the plan. Beyond the agencies' oversight role, DOL collaborated with CSPF and others on steps intended to improve the plan's financial position, including contributing to discussions on proposed legislation and working with CSPF on its application to reduce benefits under the Multiemployer Pension Reform Act of 2014. The application was not approved by the U.S. Department of the Treasury.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making recommendations in this report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_675"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_676","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOD provides health care, including mental health care, to eligible beneficiaries through TRICARE. Beneficiaries who use TRICARE Prime, a managed care option, must enroll to receive care. Prior to Jan. 1, 2018, beneficiaries did not need to enroll for TRICARE Standard, a fee-for-service option, or TRICARE Extra, a preferred provider organization option (referred to as nonenrolled beneficiaries). Although the TRICARE Standard and Extra options were terminated effective Jan. 1, 2018, the new TRICARE Select option has similar benefits for obtaining care from network and nonnetwork providers.\nThe National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008 directed DOD to conduct surveys of nonenrolled beneficiaries and civilian providers about access to care under the TRICARE Standard and Extra options. It also directed GAO to review the surveys' results. Additionally, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision for GAO to review access to care under TRICARE Extra. This report addresses both provisions.\nGAO analyzed DOD's surveys to determine (1) nonenrolled beneficiaries' access to care, (2) nonenrolled beneficiaries' ratings of TRICARE, (3) civilian providers' awareness and acceptance of TRICARE, and (4) nonenrolled beneficiaries' access by individual geographic area. GAO interviewed agency officials, analyzed the 2012-2015 surveys, and compared them to DOD's 2008-2011 surveys and to surveys of Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with GAO's findings.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense's (DOD) most recent surveys of TRICARE beneficiaries and civilian health care providers show that access to care has generally improved for nonenrolled beneficiaries who used the TRICARE Standard and Extra options. Specifically, GAO found the following:\nNonenrolled beneficiaries reported improved access to care in the most recent 4-year survey (2012-2015), compared to the prior survey (2008-2011). For example, a lower percentage of nonenrolled beneficiaries reported that they experienced problems finding a civilian provider in the most recent survey (29 percent) than those in the prior survey (31 percent). In addition, a higher percentage of nonenrolled beneficiaries (90 percent) reported that they were usually or always able to obtain a non-urgent appointment as soon as they thought they needed compared to the prior survey (87 percent).\nThe percentage of nonenrolled beneficiaries who reported positive experience ratings of TRICARE ranged from 71 to 83 percent over five categories, including ratings of primary, specialty, and mental health care providers. These ratings were generally higher than the prior survey. When compared to other federal health plans, nonenrolled TRICARE beneficiaries' positive experience ratings of primary and specialty care providers were lower than those of Medicare fee-for service beneficiaries, but higher than those of Medicaid beneficiaries.\nThe percentage of civilian providers who were aware of TRICARE increased from 82 percent in the prior survey to 84 percent. However, the percentage who accepted new TRICARE patients decreased from 58 percent to 55 percent. According to GAO's analysis of survey data, this overall decrease was mainly attributable to a decrease in mental health care providers' acceptance rates, as the acceptance rates for primary and specialty care providers remained unchanged. Network providers reported both higher awareness and acceptance of TRICARE than providers not in the network (referred to as nonnetwork providers). The biggest gap in both awareness and acceptance between network and nonnetwork providers was for mental health care providers:\nAbout 96 percent of network mental health care providers reported awareness of TRICARE compared to 72 percent of nonnetwork mental health care providers.\nAbout 79 percent of network mental health care providers reported accepting new TRICARE patients compared to 30 percent of nonnetwork mental health care providers.\nGAO's analysis of both the beneficiary and provider surveys identified locations in New York, Washington, Texas, and Washington, D.C. where access to providers may be particularly problematic. Specifically, in these locations, beneficiaries reported more problems finding providers who accepted TRICARE and providers reported lower acceptance of TRICARE, compared to national averages.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_676"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_677","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nWith approval from CMS, the federal agency responsible for overseeing state Medicaid programs, states can provide long-term care services and supports for disabled and aged individuals under one or more types of HCBS programs. State and federal Medicaid HCBS spending was about $87 billion in 2015. Effective needs assessments help states ensure appropriate access to, and manage utilization of, services and therefore costs. States' processes vary, and challenges include the potential for assessors to have conflicts of interest leading to over- or under-estimating of beneficiaries' needs for HCBS.\nGAO was asked to examine states' needs assessment processes for provision of long-term services and supports. This report addresses (1) how selected states assess needs for HCBS, and (2) steps CMS has taken to improve coordination and effectiveness of needs assessments, among other objectives. GAO studied six states that varied in terms of assessment tools in use, participation in federal initiatives, HCBS delivery systems, and geographic location; reviewed federal requirements and documents; and interviewed CMS officials and stakeholders.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe six selected states that GAO reviewed used multiple approaches to assess individuals' needs for Medicaid home- and community-based services (HCBS). Each state may have multiple HCBS programs authorized under different sections of the Social Security Act. These programs serve beneficiaries who generally need assistance with daily activities, such as bathing or dressing. States establish needs assessment processes to collect data on functional needs, health status, and other areas that they use to determine individuals' eligibility for HCBS and to plan services, such as the amount of services needed. The selected states varied in the extent to which they used different assessments across HCBS programs and used multiple types of entities\u2014such as state or government agencies, contractors, or providers\u2014to conduct them.\nThe Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has taken steps to improve needs assessments but concerns about conflict of interest remain in regard to HCBS providers and managed care plans. HCBS providers may have a financial interest in the outcome of needs assessments, which could lead to overstating needs and overprovision of services. CMS has addressed risks associated with HCBS provider conflicts, such as by requiring states to establish standards for conducting certain needs assessments, but these requirements do not cover all types of HCBS programs. For example, specific conflict of interest requirements are generally not in place for needs assessments that are used to inform HCBS eligibility determinations. In addition, requirements for states to establish standards to address HCBS providers' potential for conflict of interest in conducting needs assessments that are used for service planning do not apply across all programs.\nSimilarly, managed care plans may have a financial interest in the outcome of HCBS assessments used for both determining eligibility and service amounts. Managed care plans could have an incentive to enroll beneficiaries with few needs, as plans typically receive a fixed payment per enrollee. For example, a plan in one state admitted in a settlement with the federal government to enrolling 1,740 individuals, from 2011 through 2013, whose needs did not qualify them. In 2013, CMS issued guidance that managed care plans may not be involved in assessments used to determine eligibility for HCBS, but CMS has not consistently required states to prevent this involvement. Among three states GAO reviewed with managed care HCBS programs, CMS required one to stop allowing plans to conduct such assessments but allowed plan involvement in two states. The absence of conflict-of-interest requirements across all types of HCBS programs and states is not consistent with federal internal control standards, which require agencies to respond to risks to program objectives.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that CMS ensure that all Medicaid HCBS programs have requirements for states to address both service providers' and managed care plans' potential for conflicts of interest in conducting assessments. HHS concurred with GAO's recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_677"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_678","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAs of December 2018, the UN had 14 ongoing peacekeeping operations with approximately 103,000 personnel. The United States is the single largest financial contributor to these operations, assessed by the UN to contribute an estimated $1.7 billion in fiscal year 2018, according to State. It is also a member of the Security Council, the UN body tasked with maintaining international peace and security.\nGAO was asked to review UN peacekeeping operations. In this report, GAO examines (1) the UN's process to establish and renew peacekeeping operations, including the tasks these operations perform; (2) State's assessment of the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations; (3) how the United States works within the UN to adjust peacekeeping mandates and associated resources; and (4) member states' concerns regarding the UN's performance information. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed UN and U.S. documents and interviewed UN and U.S. officials. GAO also interviewed officials at peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Kosovo, and Lebanon. GAO selected these operations because they represent those that perform a variety of tasks and are located in diverse regions.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe United Nations (UN) Security Council establishes and renews peacekeeping operations by issuing resolutions, generally referred to as mandates, which can include a range of tasks, such as monitoring ceasefires and protecting civilians. Generally once or twice a year, the Security Council renews an operation's mandate and makes adjustments as needed.\nGAO's review of the Department of State's (State) assessments as of December 2018 and discussions with State officials found that UN peacekeeping operations generally do not fully meet U.S. principles for effective peacekeeping, which include host country consent and an exit strategy, among others. GAO's review of 11 operations found that all 11 met or partially met the principle of host country consent, while five included or partially included an exit strategy. State officials stated that they must continue to work with the UN to ensure peacekeeping operations meet principles of effectiveness, which they noted are key to success.\nThe United States works with the UN Security Council and member states to adjust peacekeeping mandates, but it lacks sufficient information to determine if associated resources accurately reflect these adjustments. State officials noted that they do not have this information because UN peacekeeping budgets do not estimate costs by mandated task. UN peacekeeping guidance states that when the UN changes a peacekeeping mandate, it should make commensurate changes to that operation's resources. Without information on estimated costs by task, member states have difficulty determining that resources for UN peacekeeping operations accurately reflect mandate changes.\nThe UN has taken steps to improve peacekeeping performance data, but member states have raised concerns about that information's quality, including its completeness and timeliness. Among other concerns, member states note that the UN does not have complete information to assess the performance of civilians, who comprised about 14 percent of peacekeeping personnel, as of December 2018. In March 2018 the UN began peacekeeping reforms, including those to improve performance data. However, according to State officials, these efforts are in the early stages and more work is needed. Without fully addressing member states' concerns about the quality of information, the UN is limited in its ability to improve the performance of peacekeeping operations.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that State take additional steps to ensure that the UN (1) peacekeeping operations meet principles of effectiveness, (2) provides information on the estimated costs of mandated tasks, and (3) addresses member states' concerns about the quality of performance information. State agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_678"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_679","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn fiscal year 2017, DOD provided health care to 9.4 million beneficiaries, including servicemembers, retirees, and their families at a cost of $43 billion. For more than a decade, partially in response to congressional mandates, DOD has worked to address inefficiencies in the Military Health System to control costs.\nTo further achieve efficiencies, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 required DOD to develop an implementation plan that addressed four elements related to transferring the administration of the MTFs to the DHA. DOD issued the plan in June 2018.\nThe NDAA also included a provision for GAO to review the plan. GAO determined whether (1) DOD's plan included the statutory elements related to the transfer of administration of the MTFs to the DHA and (2) additional information would be useful to demonstrate that the plan will reduce or better manage duplication and improve efficiencies. GAO assessed DOD's plan against the required elements and, where appropriate, considered the extent to which the plan provided detailed information related to key change management practices identified in past GAO work.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense's (DOD) June 2018 plan addressed the four statutory elements for the transfer of the administration of the military treatment facilities (MTFs) from the military departments to the Defense Health Agency (DHA). Specifically, the plan provided information on (1) how the DHA will take administrative responsibility of the MTFs; (2) efforts to eliminate duplicative activities; (3) efforts to maximize efficiencies in the DHA's activities; and (4) reductions of headquarters-level military, civilian, and contractor personnel. DOD dedicated most of the plan to describing the governance structure of the proposed administrative framework and to describing the timeline for a phased transfer of the approximately 457 MTFs to the DHA by October 1, 2021. Initially, DOD was to transfer responsibility for the administration of the MTFs to the DHA by October 1, 2018. However, Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019 amended the law to allow, among other things, DOD to complete the transfer by September 30, 2021.\nDOD has taken key steps in its June 2018 plan to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the administration of MTFs. However, DOD's plan has two weaknesses that could be mitigated with additional information. Specifically,\nDOD excluded 16 operational readiness and installation-specific medical functions from consideration for transfer to the DHA. DOD did not define or analyze the potential effect of excluding these functions, which include dental care, substance abuse, and occupational health. Senior officials from the DHA and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs acknowledged that transferring the dental care function, for example, from the military departments to the DHA could potentially reduce duplicative activities.\nDOD's plans to achieve the stated goal of reducing headquarters-level personnel, including contractor personnel, by 10 percent are unclear. In its June 2018 plan, DOD states that the DHA will experience personnel growth during each phase of the transition, but that it expects to reduce headquarters-level personnel by 10 percent by 2021. However, the plan does not provide specific details about how DOD will achieve the established goal of reducing headquarters-level personnel by 10 percent while the DHA experiences personnel growth. Further, the plan does not address whether and how contractor personnel factor into the reduction. This lack of clarity exists because DOD has not validated headquarters-level personnel requirements or conducted a comprehensive review to identify the least costly mix of military, civilian, and contractor personnel to meet the validated requirements.\nUntil DOD takes action to resolve these two weaknesses, DOD will likely not be well positioned to reduce or better manage duplication and improve efficiencies, including reducing headquarters-level personnel across the Military Health System. Furthermore, Congress will lack important information to determine the extent to which the transfer of the administration of the MTFs to the DHA is being planned and implemented effectively and efficiently.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DOD define and analyze the 16 operational readiness and installation-specific medical functions for duplication, validate headquarters-level personnel requirements, and identify the least costly mix of personnel. DOD concurred with all three recommendations and noted actions it was taking to address each one.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_679"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_680","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nVA is one of the largest federal property-holding agencies, and its inventory of vacant buildings has generally increased over the last 6 years. Disposing of its excess properties has been a long-standing challenge.\nGAO was asked to review how VA manages its real property disposals. This report addresses: (1) the challenges VA faces in disposing of its vacant properties and how it is addressing those challenges and (2) the extent to which VA is tracking and monitoring the disposal of its vacant properties.\nGAO reviewed VA's policies and planning documents regarding property disposals. GAO also selected 31 properties that were either disposed of or planned for disposal in fiscal year 2017, among other selection criteria. GAO interviewed VA officials and stakeholders involved in the disposal of the 31 selected properties and familiar with VA's disposal process, including steps VA is taking to address challenges.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nConducting required environmental and historic reviews in a timely manner is among the challenges the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) faces in its real property disposal process. These reviews include assessing the potential effects of property disposals on the environment and historic preservation. VA is taking steps to address these ongoing challenges. For example, VA has established a working group consisting of experts in historic preservation, environmental reviews, and real property to assist facilities' managers in expediting disposals. However, other ongoing challenges remain, including the marketability of VA properties and VA's lack of clear procedures for property disposals. While VA has guidance on disposals at the broad portfolio level, GAO determined that this guidance does not contain step-by-step procedures at the project level to assist facilities' managers to plan, implement, and execute disposals for the different disposal options. (See figure.) For example, a number of managers told GAO that they were not familiar with actions to take when transferring properties to a third party or turning over excess property to the General Services Administration for disposal. VA officials commented that facilities' managers do not frequently dispose of properties, so a procedural document outlining the steps and who is responsible for taking those steps may help staff navigate more complex disposal processes and avoid missteps and delays.\nVA has enhanced its data collection on vacant properties, but the agency does not collect information needed to track and monitor disposal projects at the headquarters level. For example, VA requires facilities' managers to verify and certify the validity of vacant property data in the database used to manage real property\u2014the Capital Asset Inventory. On disposal projects, however, VA lacks certain information, such as the status of environmental or historical reviews, to monitor progress. According to VA, the Capital Asset Inventory currently does not have enough capacity to collect key information and supporting documentation. VA officials said they plan to increase the capacity, but VA has not yet included some key information in the Capital Asset Inventory that could enable VA to monitor the progress of disposals. Without information on the status of disposal projects, VA cannot readily track and monitor its progress and identify areas where facilities' managers may need additional assistance.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making three recommendations. These include developing disposal procedures for facilities' managers to help plan, implement, and execute disposal projects and collecting key information on the status of disposal projects, as VA implements its plans to increase the capacity of VA's Capital Asset Inventory. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_680"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_681","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn 2011, President Obama announced that the United States would turn its attention to the Asia-Pacific region and make the U.S. presence there a top priority. Rebalancing to the Pacific became strategic guidance that informed military planning. By the end of 2015, DOD published strategy documents that included references to the rebalance to the Pacific or related concepts. In February 2018, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs stated that while DOD continues to prioritize the Asia-Pacific region, the rebalance to the Pacific is no longer U.S. policy. DOD has published the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which establishes an objective of maintaining a favorable regional balance in the Pacific region, among other regions.\nPrior to the change in policy, House Report 114-102 included a provision for GAO to review matters related to the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. GAO evaluated the extent to which DOD developed strategy documents to guide the rebalance to the Pacific that included desired elements of an effective national strategy.\nGAO analyzed six DOD strategy documents that officials identified as providing guidance for the rebalance to the Pacific to determine whether, as a set, they included desired elements associated with an effective national strategy. DOD had no comments on this report.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nDepartment of Defense (DOD) strategy documents that collectively guided the rebalance to the Pacific included most of the desired elements of an effective national strategy. The U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), which is responsible for the Asia-Pacific region, used DOD strategy documents to implement the President's direction to rebalance to the Pacific, which generally refocused U.S. efforts to that region. PACOM officials told GAO that there was no single rebalance-specific strategy document. Instead, officials identified a number of strategy documents published since 2012 that guided activities associated with the rebalance to the Pacific, including: Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense ; Quadrennial Defense Review ; National Military Strategy ; Guidance for the Employment of the Force ; Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan ; and the PACOM 2015 Theater Campaign Plan (DRAFT) .\nBased on GAO's analysis, DOD's six strategy documents that guided the rebalance to the Pacific included 24 of the 31 desired elements of an effective national strategy. However, two key elements were missing from the group of strategy documents: (1) a definition of the rebalance to the Pacific, and (2) the identification of the overall results desired, or end state, for the rebalance. DOD officials also could not identify a definition for the rebalance to the Pacific in the strategy documents or provide a definition that was used consistently across the department.\nAccording to a DOD official with performance management responsibilities, defining the rebalance to the Pacific and identifying the initiative's strategic objectives, or end state, were important for establishing accountability and measuring progress. For instance, a clear definition of rebalance could have helped those charged with implementation to distinguish activities essential to operationalizing the strategic guidance from activities that were peripheral to that effort. Similarly, knowing the end state could have helped management make the best use of resources, enable the assessment of progress, and facilitate the development of strategic and military objectives. In moving forward in the Asia-Pacific region, considering the identification of strategic end states as well as other missing elements could help position DOD to achieve its objectives in the region.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_681"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_682","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nTickets for concerts, theater, and sporting events can be purchased\u2014typically online\u2014from the original seller (primary market) or a reseller (secondary market). Some state and federal officials and others have raised issues about ticketing fees, the effect of the secondary market on ticket prices, and the transparency and business practices of some industry participants. Event ticketing is not federally regulated. However, federal legislation enacted in 2016 restricts bots (ticket-buying software). Also, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has taken two enforcement actions related to deceptive marketing by ticket sellers under its broad FTC Act authority.\nGAO was asked to review issues around online ticket sales. This report examines (1) what is known about online ticket sales, (2) consumer protection issues related to such sales, and (3) potential advantages and disadvantages of selected approaches to address these issues.\nGAO focused on concert, theater, and major league sporting events for which there is a resale market. GAO analyzed data on fees, ticket volume, and resale prices from a variety of sources; reviewed the largest ticket sellers' websites and purchase processes; and reviewed federal and state laws and relevant academic literature. GAO also interviewed and reviewed documentation from government agencies; consumer organizations; ticket sellers; venue operators; promoters and managers; sports leagues; and academics (selected for their experience and to provide a range of perspectives).\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nTicket pricing, resale activity, and fees for events vary. Tickets to popular events sold on the primary market sometimes are priced below the market price, partly because performers want to make tickets affordable and maintain fans' goodwill, according to industry representatives. Tickets are often resold on the secondary market at prices above face value. In a nongeneralizable sample of events GAO reviewed, primary and secondary market ticketing companies charged total fees averaging 27 percent and 31 percent, respectively, of the ticket's price.\nConsumer protection issues include difficulty buying tickets at face value and the fees and marketing practices of some market participants.\nProfessional resellers, or brokers, have a competitive advantage over consumers in buying tickets as soon as they are released. Brokers can use numerous staff and software (\u201cbots\u201d) to rapidly buy many tickets. As a result, many consumers can buy tickets only on the resale market at a substantial markup.\nSome ticket websites GAO reviewed did not clearly display fees or disclosed them only after users entered payment information.\n\u201cWhite-label\u201d resale sites, which often appear as paid results of Internet searches for venues and events, often charged higher fees than other ticket websites\u2014sometimes in excess of 40 percent of the ticket price\u2014and used marketing that might mislead users to think they were buying tickets from the venue.\nSelected approaches GAO reviewed, such as ticket resale restrictions and disclosure requirements, would have varying effects on consumers and businesses.\nNontransferable tickets. At least three states restrict nontransferable tickets\u2014that is, tickets whose terms do not allow resale. Nontransferable tickets allow more consumers to access tickets at a face-value price. However, they also limit consumers' ability to sell tickets they cannot use, can create inconvenience by requiring identification at the venue, and according to economists, prevent efficient allocation of tickets.\nPrice caps. Several states cap the price at which tickets can be resold. But according to some state government studies, the caps generally are not effective because they are difficult to enforce.\nDisclosure requirements. Stakeholders and government research GAO consulted generally supported measures to ensure clearer and earlier disclosure of ticket fees, although views varied on the best approach (for example, to include fees in an \u201call-in\u201d price or disclose them separately).\nSome market-based approaches are being used or explored that seek to address concerns about secondary market activity. These approaches include technological tools and ticket-buyer verification to better combat bots. In addition, a major search engine recently required enhanced disclosures from ticket resellers using its advertising platform. The disclosures are intended to protect consumers from scams and prevent potential confusion about who is selling the tickets.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_682"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_683","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFederal agencies and the nation's critical infrastructures\u2014such as energy, transportation systems, communications, and financial services\u2014are dependent on information technology systems to carry out operations. The security of these systems and the data they use is vital to public confidence and national security, prosperity, and well-being.\nThe risks to these systems are increasing as security threats evolve and become more sophisticated. GAO first designated information security as a government-wide high-risk area in 1997. This was expanded to include protecting cyber critical infrastructure in 2003 and protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information in 2015.\nGAO was asked to update its information security high-risk area. To do so, GAO identified the actions the federal government and other entities need to take to address cybersecurity challenges. GAO primarily reviewed prior work issued since the start of fiscal year 2016 related to privacy, critical federal functions, and cybersecurity incidents, among other areas. GAO also reviewed recent cybersecurity policy and strategy documents, as well as information security industry reports of recent cyberattacks and security breaches.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO has identified four major cybersecurity challenges and 10 critical actions that the federal government and other entities need to take to address them. GAO continues to designate information security as a government-wide high-risk area due to increasing cyber-based threats and the persistent nature of security vulnerabilities.\nGAO has made over 3,000 recommendations to agencies aimed at addressing cybersecurity shortcomings in each of these action areas, including protecting cyber critical infrastructure, managing the cybersecurity workforce, and responding to cybersecurity incidents. Although many recommendations have been addressed, about 1,000 have not yet been implemented. Until these shortcomings are addressed, federal agencies' information and systems will be increasingly susceptible to the multitude of cyber-related threats that exist.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO has made over 3,000 recommendations to agencies since 2010 aimed at addressing cybersecurity shortcomings. As of July 2018, about 1,000 still needed to be implemented.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_683"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_684","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCreated in the mid-1980s, FCC's Lifeline program provides discounts to eligible low-income households for home or wireless telephone and, as of December 2016, broadband service. Lifeline reimburses telephone companies that offer discounts through the USF, which in turn is generally supported by consumers by means of a fee charged on their telephone bills.\nThis testimony is based on GAO's May 2017 report and discusses steps FCC has taken to measure Lifeline's performance in meeting goals; steps FCC and USAC have taken to enhance controls over finances, subscribers, and providers; and any weaknesses that might remain.\nFor the May 2017 report, GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from FCC and USAC. GAO also analyzed subscriber data from 2014 and performed undercover tests to identify potential improper payment vulnerabilities. The results of this analysis and testing are illustrative, not generalizable.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn its May 2017 report GAO found the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has not evaluated the Lifeline program's (Lifeline) performance in meeting its goals of increasing telephone and broadband subscribership among low-income households by providing financial support, but it has recently taken steps to begin to do so. FCC does not know how many of the 12.3 million households receiving Lifeline as of December 2016 also have non-Lifeline phone service, or whether participants are using Lifeline as a secondary phone service. FCC revamped Lifeline in March 2016 to focus on broadband adoption; however, broadband adoption rates have steadily increased for the low-income population absent a Lifeline subsidy for broadband. Without an evaluation, which GAO recommended in March 2015, FCC is limited in its ability to demonstrate whether Lifeline is efficiently and effectively meeting its program goals. In a March 2016 Order, FCC announced plans for an independent third party to evaluate Lifeline design, function, and administration by December 2020.\nFCC and the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC)\u2014the not-for-profit organization that administers the Lifeline program\u2014have taken some steps to enhance controls over finances and subscriber enrollment. For example, FCC and USAC established some financial and management controls regarding billing, collection, and disbursement of funds for Lifeline. To enhance the program's ability to detect and prevent ineligible subscribers from enrolling, FCC oversaw completion in 2014 of an enrollment database and, in June 2015, FCC adopted a rule requiring Lifeline providers to retain eligibility documentation used to qualify consumers for Lifeline support to improve the auditability and enforcement of FCC rules.\nNevertheless, in its May 2017 report, GAO found weaknesses in several areas. For example, Lifeline's structure relies on over 2,000 Eligible Telecommunication Carriers that are Lifeline providers to implement key program functions, such as verifying subscriber eligibility. This complex internal control environment is susceptible to risk of fraud, waste, and abuse as companies may have financial incentives to enroll as many customers as possible. On the basis of its matching of subscriber to benefit data, GAO was unable to confirm whether about 1.2 million individuals of the 3.5 million it reviewed, or 36 percent, participated in a qualifying benefit program, such as Medicaid, as stated on their Lifeline enrollment application. FCC's 2016 Order calls for the creation of a third-party national eligibility verifier by the end of 2019 to determine subscriber eligibility. Further, FCC maintains the Universal Service Fund (USF)\u2014with net assets of $9 billion, as of September 2016\u2014outside the Department of the Treasury in a private bank account. In 2005, GAO recommended that FCC reconsider this arrangement given that the USF consists of federal funds. In addition to addressing any risks associated with having the funds outside the Treasury, FCC identified potential benefits of moving the funds. For example, by having the funds in the Treasury, USAC would have better tools for fiscal management of the funds. In March 2017, FCC developed a preliminary plan to move the USF to the Treasury. Until FCC finalizes and implements its plan and actually moves the USF funds, the risks that FCC identified will persist and the benefits of having the funds in the Treasury will not be realized.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nIn its May 2017 report, GAO made seven recommendations, including that FCC ensure plans to transfer the USF from the private bank to the Treasury are finalized and implemented expeditiously. FCC generally agreed with all the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_684"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_685","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe LIHTC program, established under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, is the largest source of federal assistance for developing affordable rental housing and will represent an estimated $8.5 billion in forgone revenue in 2017. LIHTC encourages private-equity investment in low-income rental housing through tax credits. The program is administered by IRS and allocating agencies, which are typically state or local housing finance agencies established to meet affordable housing needs of their jurisdictions. Responsibilities of allocating agencies (in Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code and regulations of the Department of the Treasury) encompass awarding credits, assessing the reasonableness of project costs, and monitoring projects.\nIn this testimony, GAO discusses (1) how allocating agencies implement federal requirements for awarding LIHTCs, assess reasonableness of property costs, and monitor properties' ongoing compliance; and (2) IRS oversight of the LIHTC program. This statement is based primarily on three reports GAO issued in July 2015 ( GAO-15-330 ), May 2016 ( GAO-16-360 ), and February 2017 ( GAO-17-285R ). GAO also updated the status of recommendations made in these reports by reviewing new or revised IRS policies, procedures, and reports and interviewing IRS officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn its May 2016 report on the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), GAO found that state and local housing finance agencies (allocating agencies) implemented requirements for allocating credits, reviewing costs, and monitoring projects in varying ways. Moreover, some allocating agencies' day-to-day practices to administer LIHTCs also raised concerns. For example,\nqualified allocation plans (developed by 58 allocating agencies) that GAO analyzed did not always mention all selection criteria and preferences that Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code requires; and\nallocating agencies could increase (boost) the eligible basis used to determine allocation amounts for certain buildings if needed for financial feasibility. However, they were not required to document the justification for the increases. The criteria used to award boosts varied, with some allocating agencies allowing boosts for specific types of projects and one allowing boosts for all projects in its state.\nIn its 2015 and 2016 reports, GAO found IRS oversight of the LIHTC program was minimal. Additionally, IRS collected little data on or performed limited analysis of compliance in the program. Specifically, GAO found that\nSince 1986, IRS conducted seven audits of the 58 allocating agencies we reviewed. Reasons for the minimal oversight may include LIHTC being viewed as a peripheral program in IRS in terms of its mission and priorities for resources and staffing.\nIRS had not reviewed the criteria allocating agencies used to award discretionary basis \u201cboosts,\u201d which raised concerns about oversubsidizing projects (and reducing the number of projects funded).\nIRS guidance to allocating agencies on reporting noncompliance was conflicting. As a result, allocating agencies' reporting of property noncompliance was inconsistent.\nIRS had not participated in and leveraged the work of the physical inspection initiative of the Rental Policy Working Group\u2014established to better align the operations of federal rental assistance programs\u2014to augment its databases with physical inspection data on LIHTC properties that the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) maintains.\nIn its prior reports, GAO made a total of four recommendations to IRS. As of July 2017, IRS had implemented one recommendation to include relevant IRS staff in the working group. IRS has not implemented the remaining three recommendations, including improving the data quality of its LIHTC database, clarifying guidance to agencies on reporting noncompliance, and evaluating how the information HUD collects could be used for identifying noncompliance issues. In addition, because of the limited oversight of LIHTC, in its 2015 report GAO asked that Congress consider designating certain oversight responsibilities to HUD because the agency has experience working with allocating agencies and has processes in place to oversee the agencies. As of July 2017, Congress had not enacted legislation to give HUD an oversight role for LIHTC.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_685"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_686","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCMS required prior authorization as a demonstration in 2012 for certain power mobility devices, such as power wheelchairs, in seven states. Under the prior authorization process, MACs review prior authorization requests and make determinations to approve or deny them based on Medicare coverage and payment rules. Approved requests will be paid as long as all other Medicare payment requirements are met.\nGAO was asked to examine CMS's prior authorization programs. GAO examined 1) the changes in expenditures and the potential savings for items and services subject to prior authorization demonstrations, 2) reported benefits and challenges of prior authorization, and 3) CMS's monitoring of the programs and plans for future prior authorization. To do this, GAO examined prior authorization program data, CMS documentation, and federal internal control standards. GAO also interviewed CMS and MAC officials, as well as selected provider, supplier, and beneficiary groups.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nPrior authorization is a payment approach used by private insurers that generally requires health care providers and suppliers to first demonstrate compliance with coverage and payment rules before certain items or services are provided to patients, rather than after the items or services have been provided. This approach may be used to reduce expenditures, unnecessary utilization, and improper payments. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has begun using prior authorization in Medicare through a series of fixed-length demonstrations designed to measure their effectiveness, and one permanent program. According to GAO's analyses, expenditures decreased for items and services subject to a demonstration. GAO's analyses of actual expenditures and estimated expenditures in the absence of the demonstrations found that estimated savings from all demonstrations through March 2017 could be as high as about $1.1 to $1.9 billion. While CMS officials said that prior authorization likely played a large role in reducing expenditures, it is difficult to separate the effects of prior authorization from other program integrity efforts. For example, CMS implemented a durable medical equipment competitive bidding program in January 2011, and according to the agency, it resulted in lower expenditures.\nMany provider, supplier, and beneficiary group officials GAO spoke with reported benefits of prior authorization, such as reducing unnecessary utilization. However, provider and supplier group officials reported that providers and suppliers experienced some challenges. These include difficulty obtaining the necessary documentation from referring physicians to submit a prior authorization request, although CMS has created templates and other tools to address this concern. In addition, providers and suppliers reported concerns about whether accessories deemed essential to the power wheelchairs under the permanent durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies (DMEPOS) program are subject to prior authorization. In practice, Medicare Administrative Contractors (MAC) that administer prior authorization programs review these accessories when making prior authorization determinations, even though they are not technically included in the program and therefore cannot be provisionally affirmed. As a result, providers and suppliers lack assurance about whether Medicare is likely to pay for these accessories. This is contrary to a CMS stated benefit of prior authorization\u2014to provide assurance about whether Medicare is likely to pay for an item or service\u2014and to federal internal control standards, which call for agencies to design control activities that enable an agency to achieve its objectives.\nCMS monitors prior authorization through various MAC reports. CMS also reviews MAC accuracy and timeliness in processing prior authorization requests and has contracted for independent evaluations of the demonstrations. Currently, prior authorization demonstrations are scheduled to end in 2018. Despite its interest in using prior authorization for additional items, CMS has not made plans to continue its efforts. Federal internal control standards state that agencies should identify, analyze, and respond to risks related to achieving objectives. CMS risks missed opportunities for achieving its stated goals of reducing costs and realizing program savings by reducing unnecessary utilization and improper payments.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that CMS (1) subject accessories essential to the power wheelchairs in the permanent DMEPOS program to prior authorization and (2) take steps, based on results from evaluations, to continue prior authorization. The Department of Health and Human Services neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendations but said it would continue to evaluate prior authorization programs and take GAO's findings and recommendations into consideration in developing plans or determining appropriate next steps.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_686"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_687","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSince January 2017, the Navy has suffered four significant mishaps at sea that resulted in serious damage to its ships and the loss of 17 sailors. Three of these incidents involved ships homeported in Japan. In response to these incidents, the Chief of Naval Operations ordered an operational pause for all fleets worldwide, and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations directed a comprehensive review of surface fleet operations, stating that these tragic incidents are not limited occurrences but part of a disturbing trend in mishaps involving U.S. ships.\nThis statement provides information on the effects of homeporting ships overseas, reducing crew size on ships, and not completing maintenance on time on the readiness of the Navy and summarizes GAO recommendations to address the Navy's maintenance, training, and other challenges.\nIn preparing this statement, GAO relied on work it has published since 2015 related to the readiness of ships homeported overseas, sailor training and workload issues, maintenance challenges, and other issues. GAO updated this information, as appropriate, based on Navy data.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO's prior work shows that the Navy has increased deployment lengths, shortened training periods, and reduced or deferred maintenance to meet high operational demands, which has resulted in declining ship conditions and a worsening trend in overall readiness. The Navy has stated that high demand for presence has put pressure on a fleet that is stretched thin across the globe. Some of the concerns that GAO has highlighted include:\nDegraded readiness of ships homeported overseas: Since 2006, the Navy has doubled the number of ships based overseas. Overseas basing provides additional forward presence and rapid crisis response, but GAO found in May 2015 that there were no dedicated training periods built into the operational schedules of the cruisers and destroyers based in Japan. As a result, the crews of these ships did not have all of their needed training and certifications. Based on updated data, GAO found that, as of June 2017, 37 percent of the warfare certifications for cruiser and destroyer crews based in Japan\u2014including certifications for seamanship\u2014had expired. This represents more than a fivefold increase in the percentage of expired warfare certifications for these ships since GAO's May 2015 report. The Navy has made plans to revise operational schedules to provide dedicated training time for overseas-based ships, but this schedule has not yet been implemented.\nCrew size reductions contribute to sailor overwork and safety risks: GAO found in May 2017 that reductions to crew sizes the Navy made in the early 2000s were not analytically supported and may now be creating safety risks. The Navy has reversed some of those changes but continues to use a workweek standard that does not reflect the actual time sailors spend working and does not account for in-port workload\u2014both of which have contributed to some sailors working over 100 hours a week.\nInability to complete maintenance on time: Navy recovery from persistently low readiness levels is premised on adherence to maintenance schedules. However, in May 2016, GAO found that the Navy was having difficulty completing maintenance on time. Based on updated data, GAO found that, in fiscal years 2011 through 2016, maintenance overruns on 107 of 169 surface ships (63 percent) resulted in 6,603 lost operational days (i.e., the ships were not available for training and operations).\nLooking to the future, the Navy wants to grow its fleet by as much as 30 percent but continues to face challenges with manning, training, and maintaining its existing fleet. These readiness problems need to be addressed and will require the Navy to implement GAO's recommendations\u2014particularly in the areas of assessing the risks associated with overseas basing, reassessing sailor workload and the factors used to size ship crews, managing investments to modernize and improve the efficiency of the naval shipyards, and applying sound planning and sustained management attention to its readiness rebuilding efforts. In addition, continued congressional oversight will be needed to ensure that the Navy demonstrates progress in addressing its maintenance, training, and other challenges.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO made 14 recommendations in prior work cited in this statement. The Department of Defense generally concurred with all of them but has implemented only 1. Continued attention is needed to ensure that these recommendations are addressed, such as the Navy assessing the risks associated with overseas basing and reassessing sailor workload and factors used in its manpower requirements process.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_687"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_688","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThis testimony summarizes information contained in GAO's August 2017 report, entitled International Mail Security: Costs and Benefits of Using Electronic Data to Screen Mail Need to Be Assessed ( GAO-17-606 ).\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nU.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the primary federal agency tasked with targeting and inspecting inbound international items and seizing illegal goods, including illegal or inadmissible drugs and merchandise. As mail and express cargo arrive in the United States, both the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) and express consignment operators (such as FedEx and DHL) provide items to CBP for inspection. However, unlike express consignment operators, USPS is not currently required to provide CBP with electronic advance data (EAD), such as the shipper's and recipient's name and address, for inbound international mail and does not have control over mail prior to its arrival in the United States. Thus, USPS relies on foreign postal operators to collect and provide EAD voluntarily or by mutual agreement.\nIn 2014 and 2015, USPS and CBP initiated two pilot programs at the New York International Service Center (ISC) to target certain mail for inspection using some of the EAD obtained under data-sharing agreements with foreign postal operators. Under the pilots, CBP uses EAD to target a small number of pieces of mail each day. According to USPS officials, when USPS employees scan either individual targeted pieces or larger sacks containing this targeted mail, they are alerted that CBP has targeted the item and set the item or sack aside for inspection. According to USPS and CBP, USPS has been unable to provide some targeted mail for inspection because locating targeted mail once it arrives at an ISC has been a challenge. Since the pilots began, USPS has provided CBP with about 82 percent of targeted mail for one pilot, and about 58 percent of targeted mail for the other. However, while USPS and CBP have collected some performance information for these pilots (including the percentage of targeted mail provided for inspection), this information is not linked to a specific performance target agreed upon by USPS and CBP--such as a specific percentage of targeted mail provided to CBP for inspection. Further, the agencies have not conducted an analysis to determine if the pilot programs are achieving desired outcomes. Because CBP and USPS lack clear performance goals for these pilots, they risk spending additional time and resources expanding them prior to fully assessing the pilots' success or failure.\nIn our report we found that the costs and benefits of using EAD to target mail for inspection are unclear. For example, according to USPS and CBP officials, increasing the use of EAD to target mail for inspection may have benefits, such as reducing time and resources needed for the screening process--potentially decreasing costs--and may increase the security of inbound mail. However, the costs of collecting and implementing the use of EAD are not yet known, and neither USPS nor CPB currently collect the data necessary to know whether using EAD might increase the security of inbound mail or decrease the time and costs associated with screening. For example, CBP has collected data on the percentage of inspections resulting in a seizure for mail inspected as a result of targeting in the pilot programs at the New York ISC. However, CBP does not collect comparable data for seizures resulting from inspections conducted based on current methods of choosing mail for inspection. In light of the challenges that collecting and using these data present, it is important that CBP and USPS carefully consider actions to enhance inbound international mail security to avoid wasting time and money on potentially ineffective and costly endeavors.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nIn our report, we recommended that CBP, in coordination with USPS: (1) establish measureable performance goals to assess pilot programs and (2) evaluate the costs and benefits of using EAD to target mail for inspection compared with other targeting methods. CBP and USPS agreed with these recommendations and CBP plans to implement them by February 28, 2018.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_688"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_689","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOE's NNSA is responsible for managing the nuclear weapons stockpile and supporting nuclear nonproliferation efforts. DOE's Office of Environmental Management's mission includes decontaminating and decommissioning facilities that are contaminated from decades of nuclear weapons production.\nOver the last few years, GAO has reported on a wide range of challenges facing DOE and NNSA. These challenges contribute to GAO's continuing inclusion of DOE's and NNSA's management of major contracts and projects on the list of agencies and program areas that are at high risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or are in need of transformation. GAO also recently added the U.S. government's environmental liabilities to this list.\nThis statement is based on 25 GAO reports issued from April 2011 through January 2018 and discusses (1) challenges related to the affordability of NNSA's nuclear modernization plans; (2) challenges related to DOE's environmental liability; (3) the status of DOE's efforts to improve its management of contracts, projects, and programs; and (4) challenges facing NNSA's nonproliferation programs.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) faces challenges related to the affordability of its nuclear modernization programs. In April 2017, GAO found a misalignment between NNSA's modernization plans and the estimated budgetary resources needed to carry out those plans. Specifically, GAO found that NNSA's estimates of funding needed for its modernization plans sometimes exceeded the budgetary projections included in the President's planned near-term and long-term modernization budgets by billions of dollars. GAO also found that the costs of some major modernization programs\u2014such as for nuclear weapon refurbishments\u2014may also increase and further strain future modernization budgets. GAO recommended in April 2017 that NNSA include an assessment of the affordability of its modernization programs in future versions of its annual plan on stockpile stewardship; NNSA neither agreed nor disagreed with that recommendation.\nDOE also faces challenges with addressing its environmental liabilities\u2014the total cost of its cleanup responsibilities. In February 2017, GAO found that DOE was responsible for over 80 percent ($372 billion) of the U.S. government's estimated $450 billion environmental liability. However, this estimate does not reflect all of DOE's cleanup responsibilities. Notably, this estimate does not reflect all of the future cleanup responsibilities that DOE may face. For example, in January 2017, GAO found that the cost estimate for DOE's proposal for separate defense and commercial nuclear waste repositories excluded the costs and time frames for site selection and site characterization, and therefore full costs are likely to be billions of dollars more than DOE's reported environmental liabilities. To effectively address cleanup, GAO has made at least 28 recommendations to DOE and other federal agencies, which could reduce long-term costs as well as environmental risks more quickly. Of these, 13 remain not implemented.\nDOE has taken several important steps that demonstrate its commitment to improving contract and project management, but challenges persist. Specifically, DOE's revised project management order, issued in May 2016, made several changes in response to recommendations GAO made in prior years, such as requiring that projects develop cost estimates and analyses of alternatives according to our best practices. However, DOE's recent efforts do not address several areas, such as acquisition planning for major contracts and aspects of program and project management, where the department continues to struggle. GAO has made several recommendations related to these areas, and DOE has generally agreed with and begun to take action on most of them.\nFinally, NNSA faces challenges in implementing its nonproliferation programs. For example, in September 2017, GAO found that selected programs in NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) did not measure performance against schedule and cost baselines, as recommended by program management leading practices because DNN's program management policy did not require programs to measure performance in this way. GAO recommended that DNN revise its policy to require programs to measure performance against cost and schedule baselines. NNSA indicated it plans to take action to revise its policy.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO has previously suggested that Congress consider changes to the laws governing environmental cleanup activities. In addition to these suggestions, GAO has made numerous recommendations to DOE to address its management challenges.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_689"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_690","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nResearch has shown that students who experience discipline that removes them from the classroom are more likely to repeat a grade, drop out of school, and become involved in the juvenile justice system. Studies have shown this can result in decreased earning potential and added costs to society, such as incarceration and lost tax revenue. Education and Justice are responsible for enforcing federal civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination in the administration of discipline in public schools.\nGAO was asked to review the use of discipline in schools. To provide insight into these issues, this report examines (1) patterns in disciplinary actions among public schools, (2) challenges selected school districts reported with student behavior and how they are approaching school discipline, and (3) actions Education and Justice have taken to identify and address disparities or discrimination in school discipline. GAO analyzed discipline data from nearly all public schools for school year 2013-14 from Education's Civil Rights Data Collection; interviewed federal and state officials, as well as officials from a total of 5 districts and 19 schools in California, Georgia, Massachusetts, North Dakota, and Texas. We selected these districts based on disparities in suspensions for Black students, boys, or students with disabilities, and diversity in size and location. We also reviewed federal laws and a non-generalizable sample of seven recently resolved federal school discipline investigations (selected in part based on the type of alleged discrimination). We incorporated technical comments from the agencies as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nBlack students, boys, and students with disabilities were disproportionately disciplined (e.g., suspensions and expulsions) in K-12 public schools, according to GAO's analysis of Department of Education (Education) national civil rights data for school year 2013-14, the most recent available. These disparities were widespread and persisted regardless of the type of disciplinary action, level of school poverty, or type of public school attended. For example, Black students accounted for 15.5 percent of all public school students, but represented about 39 percent of students suspended from school\u2014an overrepresentation of about 23 percentage points (see figure).\nOfficials GAO interviewed in all five school districts in the five states GAO visited reported various challenges with addressing student behavior, and said they were considering new approaches to school discipline. They described a range of issues, some complex\u2014such as the effects of poverty and mental health issues. For example, officials in four school districts described a growing trend of behavioral challenges related to mental health and trauma. While there is no one-size-fits-all solution for the issues that influence student behavior, officials from all five school districts GAO visited were implementing alternatives to disciplinary actions that remove children from the classroom, such as initiatives that promote positive behavioral expectations for students.\nEducation and the Department of Justice (Justice) documented several actions taken to identify and address school discipline issues. For example, both agencies investigated cases alleging discrimination. Further, to help identify persistent disparities among the nation's schools, Education collects comprehensive data on school discipline every other year through its Civil Rights Data Collection effort.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_690"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_691","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSince 1989, DOD has received billions of dollars to fund the National Guard's participation in a counterdrug program focused on domestic drug interdiction activities. DOD received $261 million for this program in fiscal year 2018. This program provides military support to assist state, local, and tribal law enforcement organizations with counterdrug activities and operates in 54 states and territories across the United States.\nSenate Report 115-125 included a provision for GAO to evaluate the National Guard counterdrug program. This report (1) evaluates the extent to which DOD has strategy and implementing guidance for the National Guard counterdrug program, and (2) assesses DOD's processes to approve states' counterdrug plans and distribute funding to the program, among other things. GAO reviewed DOD's counterdrug strategy and guidance; DOD funding and personnel data; and its processes to distribute funding.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) lacks current strategy and guidance to implement the National Guard counterdrug program. Although a number of key national-level strategies, such as the National Drug Control Strategy, have been updated since 2011 to address changing drug threats, GAO found that DOD's 2011 Counternarcotics and Global Threats Strategy has not been updated to reflect these changes. In addition, the National Guard lacks detailed procedures and processes for the states to implement the National Guard counterdrug program, such as how to conduct cross-state aerial reconnaissance. Without current strategy or guidance, it will be difficult for the National Guard to operate its counterdrug program effectively.\nDOD's processes to approve state counterdrug plans and distribute funding to the state-level counterdrug programs could be improved. Since at least 2009, DOD has provided funding to the states without first approving state plans for counterdrug activities, as required by statute. GAO found that the delay in approval of state counterdrug plans has worsened since fiscal year 2009; in fiscal year 2018, approval took over 9 months (283 days); see figure below. In 2018, DOD took some steps to address the timely review of state plans, but GAO found that those steps did not rectify the problem.\nGAO also found that the process used by the National Guard to distribute funding to the states within the program does not incorporate DOD's strategic counternarcotics priorities, such as the U.S. southwest and northern border areas. GAO's work on results-oriented management states that strategy should inform program activities and resourcing. Until National Guard's process to distribute funding to state counterdrug programs is improved, it risks directing funding toward lower priority counterdrug activities at the expense of higher priority activities.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making a total of five recommendations, including, among others, that DOD issue a strategic framework that addresses current drug threats, the National Guard issue guidance with detailed procedures on how states should administer the program, DOD assess the revised process for approving state plans, and the National Guard incorporate DOD's strategic counternarcotics priorities into its funding distribution process. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_691"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_692","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nTreasury established the HHF program in 2010 to help stabilize the housing market and assist homeowners facing foreclosure in the states hardest hit by the housing crisis. Through HHF, Treasury has obligated a total of $9.6 billion in Trouble Asset Relief Program funds to 19 state HFAs. HFAs use funds to implement programs that address foreclosure and help stabilize local housing markets\u2014for example, by demolishing blighted properties. Congress extended HHF in 2015, and HFAs must disburse all HHF funds by December 31, 2021, or return them to Treasury.\nThe Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 included a provision for GAO to report on Troubled Asset Relief Program activities. This report focuses on the HHF program and examines, among other objectives, (1) the extent to which Treasury's monitoring addresses leading practices for program oversight and (2) HFAs' progress toward program targets.\nGAO reviewed documentation of Treasury's HHF monitoring practices, interviewed HFAs (selected based on differences in program types implemented) and Treasury officials, and reviewed information on how HFAs developed program targets.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFor its Housing Finance Agency Innovation Fund for Hardest Hit Markets (HHF), the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) has addressed or partially addressed all 14 leading monitoring practices that GAO identified. For example, Treasury periodically collects performance data from housing finance agencies (HFA) and analyzes and validates these data. However, while Treasury requires HFAs to regularly assess the risks of their programs, it does not systematically collect or analyze these assessments. As a result, Treasury is missing an opportunity to ensure that HFAs are appropriately assessing their risk. Also, Treasury does not require HFAs to consistently document which of their staff are responsible for internal control execution. This documentation could help HFAs wind down their programs, particularly as staff turn over.\nMost HFAs met Treasury's goals for drawing down HHF funds, with $9.1 billion disbursed to HFAs as of September 2018. HHF programs have assisted hundreds of thousands of distressed homeowners since 2010. However, the data Treasury has collected are of limited use for determining how well HFAs met their goals for assisting households and demolishing blighted properties, or for evaluating the HHF program overall. For example, Treasury did not develop a consistent methodology for HFAs to use when setting performance targets, which limits Treasury's ability to compare across programs or assess the HHF program as a whole. Further, GAO's guide to designing evaluations states that where federal programs operate through multiple local public or private agencies, it is important that the data these agencies collect are sufficiently consistent to permit aggregation nationwide. Although HFAs have until the end of 2021 to disburse their HHF funds, many programs are beginning to close, making it too late for meaningful changes to Treasury's approach to performance measurement. However, should Congress authorize Treasury to extend the program beyond December 2021 or establish a similar program in the future, it would be useful at that time for Treasury to develop a program evaluation design that would allow the agency to assess overall program performance, as well as performance across HFAs and program types.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that Treasury collect and evaluate HFAs' risk assessments and routinely update staffing documentation. Treasury agreed with these recommendations and stated that it has already taken steps toward addressing them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_692"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_693","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSince the Space Shuttle was retired in 2011, the United States has been relying on Russia to carry astronauts to and from the space station. NASA's Commercial Crew Program is facilitating private development of a domestic system to meet that need safely, reliably, and cost-effectively before the seats it has contracted for on a Russian spacecraft run out in 2019.\nIn 2014, NASA awarded two firm-fixed-price contracts to Boeing and SpaceX worth a combined total of up to $6.8 billion to develop crew transportation systems and conduct initial missions to the space station. In February 2017, GAO found that both contractors had made progress, but their schedules were under mounting pressure.\nThis statement provides preliminary observations on the extent to which the contractors and the program are making progress toward meeting NASA's standards for human spaceflight, a process called certification.\nThis statement is based on ongoing work and information contained in GAO's February 2017 report on this program ( GAO-17-137 ). To do this work, GAO analyzed contracts, schedules, and other documentation.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nBoth Boeing and Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) are making progress toward their goal of being able to transport American astronauts to and from the International Space Station (ISS). However, both continue to experience schedule delays. Such delays could jeopardize the ability of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Commercial Crew Program to certify either company's option\u2014that is, to ensure that either option meets NASA standards for human spaceflight\u2014before the seats the agency has contracted for on Russia's Soyuz spacecraft run out in 2019. (See figure.)\nGAO's ongoing work has identified three key risks, which are consistent with challenges reported in February 2017 that could further delay certification of each contractor's crew transportation system:\nAggressive schedules \u2014NASA, Boeing, SpaceX, and independent review bodies have all noted that the contractors' schedule plans are aggressive. The anticipated schedule risks have since materialized.\nProgrammatic and safety risks \u2014SpaceX and Boeing are addressing technical risks, which is not uncommon for NASA projects as they often push the state of the art in space technology. In addition, the contractors' systems must meet a standard for crew safety. Additional work remains to determine whether the contractors will meet this requirement.\nProgram office workload \u2014Program officials told GAO that one of their greatest upcoming challenges will be to complete two oversight activities\u2014conducting phased safety reviews and verifying that contractors meet requirements\u2014concurrently. The program's ability to smooth its workload is limited, as the contractors generally control their development schedules. In February 2017, GAO found that proposed schedule changes could alleviate some overlap.\nDelays and uncertain final certification dates raise questions about whether the United States will have uninterrupted access to the ISS after 2019, and may lessen NASA's return on investment with the contractors. GAO will continue to assess the contractors' and program's progress.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making any new recommendations. In February 2017, GAO recommended that NASA develop a contingency plan to maintain access to the ISS beyond 2018, when its contract with Russia for seats on the Soyuz was scheduled to end. NASA agreed with this recommendation and purchased Soyuz seats through 2019.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_693"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_694","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn 2016, VBA awarded 12 contracts to five private firms for up to $6.8 billion lasting up to 5 years to conduct veterans' disability medical exams. Both VBA contracted medical examiners and medical providers from the Veterans Health Administration perform these exams, with a growing number of exams being completed by contractors. Starting in 2017, VBA contracted examiners conducted about half of all exams. GAO was asked to review the performance and oversight of VBA's disability medical exam contractors.\nThis report examines (1) what is known about the quality and timeliness of VBA contracted exams; (2) the extent to which VBA monitors contractors' performance; and (3) how VBA ensures that its contractors provide qualified and well-trained examiners. GAO analyzed the most recent reliable data available on the quality and timeliness of exams (January 2017 to February 2018), reviewed VBA and selected contract documents and relevant federal laws and regulations, and interviewed agency officials, exam contractors, an audit firm that checks examiners' licenses, and selected veterans service organizations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) has limited information on whether contractors who conduct disability compensation medical exams are meeting the agency's quality and timeliness targets. VBA contracted examiners have completed a growing number of exams in recent years (see figure). VBA uses completed exam reports to help determine if a veteran should receive disability benefits. VBA reported that the vast majority of contractors' quality scores fell well below VBA's target\u201492 percent of exam reports with no errors\u2014for the first half of 2017. Since then, VBA has not completed all its quality reviews, but has hired more staff to do them. VBA officials acknowledged that VBA also does not have accurate information on contractor timeliness. VBA officials said the exam management system used until spring 2018 did not always retain the initial exam report completion date, which is used to calculate timeliness. In spring 2018, VBA implemented a new system designed to capture this information.\nVBA monitoring has addressed some problems with contractors, such as reassigning exams from contractors that did not have enough examiners to those that did. However, the issues GAO identified with VBA's quality and timeliness information limit VBA's ability to effectively oversee contractors. For example, VBA officials said they were unable to track the timeliness of exam reports sent back to contractors for corrections, which is needed to determine if VBA should reduce payment to a contractor. The new system implemented in spring 2018 tracks more detailed data on exam timeliness. However, VBA has not documented how it will ensure the data are accurate or how it will use the data to track the timeliness and billing of corrected exam reports. VBA also has no plans to use the new system to analyze performance data to identify trends or other program-wide issues. Without such plans, VBA may miss opportunities to improve contractor oversight and the program overall.\nA third-party auditor verifies that contracted examiners have valid medical licenses, but VBA does not verify if examiners have completed training nor does it collect information to assess training effectiveness in preparing examiners. While VBA plans to improve monitoring of training, it has not documented plans for tracking or collecting information to assess training. These actions could help ensure that VBA contractors provide veterans with high-quality exams and help VBA determine if additional training is needed.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends VBA (1) develop a plan for using its new data system to monitor contractors' quality and timeliness performance, (2) analyze overall program performance, (3) verify that contracted examiners complete required training, and (4) collect information to assess the effectiveness of that training. The Department of Veterans Affairs agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_694"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_695","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nPower plants' electricity output must be matched continuously with demand, which varies depending on the time of day and year. To maintain a reliable supply of electricity, operators of the electricity grid\u2014a complex network of power plants and power lines managed by utility companies and other operators\u2014take steps to ensure power plants are available to generate electricity when needed. Increasingly, renewable sources of energy, such as solar and wind, are being integrated into the grid.\nEnergy storage allows for electricity to be stored and used later when it is needed and could change the operating capabilities of the electricity grid. Batteries and other energy storage technologies can store energy in one form\u2014such as chemical, mechanical, or thermal energy\u2014and transform that energy to generate electrical power at a later time.\nGAO was asked to provide information on the role of energy storage in grid operations. This report describes (1) how energy storage can be used to enhance grid operations and performance; (2) factors that affect the deployment of energy storage for grid operations; and (3) federal and state policies and other efforts that address the deployment of energy storage. GAO reviewed studies published from 2012 through 2017; and interviewed 41 stakeholders, including officials from government agencies and representatives of industry and other groups based on their knowledge of energy storage and grid operations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nEnergy storage can be used in various ways to enhance the reliability, resilience, and efficiency of grid operations, according to studies GAO reviewed and stakeholders GAO interviewed. Such storage can be deployed throughout the electricity system and act as a generation, transmission, distribution, or customer-sited asset to provide various services, address operational challenges and needs, and potentially reduce costs, as shown in the figure below. For example, storage can help grid operators address supply disruptions and the variability of renewable energy resources, such as solar and wind; relieve transmission congestion; defer the need for transmission or distribution system upgrades; and provide backup power during a power outage.\nExamples of Potential Storage Applications on the Electricity Grid\nVarious factors affect energy storage deployment. These include industry and technology readiness, safety concerns and stringency of siting requirements, increasing use of renewable resources, cost-competitiveness of storage and challenges with quantifying the value of storage, and the regulatory environment, according to studies GAO reviewed and stakeholders GAO interviewed. For example, industry and technical challenges include uncertainty about the performance of certain technologies over time and in various operating conditions.\nFederal and state policymakers have used various policies and other efforts to encourage the deployment of storage and address market barriers. For example, the Department of Energy has undertaken various efforts, including research and development focused on improving factors that affect the cost and capacity of certain storage technologies. In addition, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has issued proposed and final rules to address market barriers to storage deployment in wholesale markets. Lastly, state policies and other efforts that aim to encourage the deployment of storage or to address market barriers include establishing mandates and targets for storage adoption, revising planning requirements, and offering financial incentives and funding.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_695"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_696","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nTo help address long-standing financial management system deficiencies, DHS initiated its TRIO project, which has focused on migrating three of its components to a modernized financial management system provided by IBC, an OMB-designated, federal SSP. House Report Number 3128 included a provision for GAO to assess the risks of DHS using IBC in connection with its modernization efforts.\nThis report examines (1) the extent to which DHS and the TRIO components followed best practices in analyzing alternatives, and the key factors, metrics, and processes used in their choice of a modernized financial management system; (2) the extent to which DHS managed the risks of using IBC for its TRIO project consistent with risk management best practices; and (3) the key factors and challenges that have impacted the TRIO project and DHS's plans for completing remaining key priorities. GAO interviewed key officials, reviewed relevant documents, and determined whether DHS followed best practices identified by GAO as necessary characteristics of a reliable, high-quality AOA process and other risk management best practices.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) TRIO project represents a key effort to address long-standing financial management system deficiencies. During 2012 and 2013, the TRIO components\u2014U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)\u2014each completed an alternatives analysis (AA) to determine a preferred alternative for modernizing its financial management system. GAO found that DNDO's AA substantially met the four characteristics\u2014well-documented, comprehensive, unbiased, and credible\u2014that GAO previously identified for a reliable, high-quality analysis of alternatives (AOA) process. However, Coast Guard's and TSA's AAs did not fully or substantially meet three of these characteristics, and DHS guidance for conducting AAs did not substantially incorporate certain best practices, such as identifying significant risks and mitigation strategies and performing an independent review to help validate the AOA process. Based on these analyses and other factors, the TRIO components determined that migrating to a federal shared service provider (SSP) represented the best alternative, and in 2014, DHS selected the Department of the Interior's Interior Business Center (IBC) as the federal SSP for the project. However, because Coast Guard's and TSA's AAs did not fully or substantially reflect all of the characteristics noted above, they are at increased risk that the alternative selected may not achieve mission needs.\nDHS also did not fully follow best practices for managing project risks related to its use of IBC on the TRIO project. Specifically, DHS followed three of seven risk management best practices, such as determining risk sources and categories and establishing a risk management strategy. However, it did not fully follow four best practices for defining risk parameters, identifying risks, developing risk mitigation plans, and implementing these plans largely because its guidance did not sufficiently address these best practices. For example, although DHS created joint teams with IBC and provided additional resources to IBC to help address risk mitigation concerns, it did not always develop sufficiently detailed risk mitigation plans that also included contingency plans for selected critical risks. As a result, although IBC's capacity and experience for migrating large agencies the size of Coast Guard and TSA was identified as a risk in July 2014, a contingency plan working group to address this concern was not established until January 2017. By not fully following risk management best practices, DHS is at increased risk that potential problems may not be identified or properly mitigated.\nDHS, IBC, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and other federal oversight agencies identified various challenges that have impacted the TRIO project and contributed to a 2-year delay in the implementation of Coast Guard's and TSA's modernized solutions. These challenges include the lack of sufficient resources, aggressive schedule, complex requirements, increased costs, and project management and communication concerns. To help address these challenges, DHS and IBC established review teams and have taken other steps to assess potential mitigating steps. In May 2017, DHS determined that migrating the solution from IBC to a DHS data center represented the best option and initiated discovery efforts to further assess this as its path forward for the TRIO project.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DHS more fully follow best practices for conducting an AOA process and managing risks. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations and described actions it will take, or has taken, in response.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_696"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_697","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nGrowth of voucher and ESA programs has drawn attention to the ways states ensure accountability and transparency to the public and prospective parents. With over half of voucher and ESA programs specifically designed for students with disabilities, there is interest in the information parents receive about special education services and rights when enrolling in a choice program. GAO was asked to examine these topics in more depth.\nThis report examines (1) academic, administrative, and financial accountability mechanisms in private choice programs; (2) information available to the public and families on private choice programs and participating schools; and (3) how parents of students with disabilities are informed about changes in rights when enrolling in private choice programs. GAO analyzed information from all voucher and ESA programs operating in January 2017 and interviewed officials from Education, national groups, and six of the largest private choice programs. GAO reviewed websites of a nationally representative sample of private voucher schools, and worked with private choice groups and national organizations to contact families that recently interacted with a choice program. GAO interviewed all 17 families that responded.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nStates include different academic, administrative, and financial accountability mechanisms in their voucher and education savings account (ESA) programs\u2014programs that use public funds for private school educational expenses (see figure). Of the 27 programs operating in January 2017, most had academic and administrative accountability mechanisms for participating schools, such as academic testing requirements (18 of 27) or health and safety requirements (25 of 27). In addition, 15 of 27 programs required schools to demonstrate financial soundness and 8 of 27 programs required annual financial audits.\nAlmost all of the 27 private school choice program websites provide a directory of participating schools and some provide guidance on selecting schools. However, GAO estimates that no more than half of all schools participating in any type of voucher program mention students with disabilities anywhere on their websites, according to GAO's review of a nationally generalizable sample of websites of private schools in voucher programs. Further, GAO estimates that no more than 53 percent of private schools in voucher programs designed for students with disabilities provide disability-related information on their websites.\nGAO found private school choice programs inconsistently provide information on changes in rights and protections under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) when parents move a child with a disability from public to private school. In 2001, the U.S. Department of Education (Education) strongly encouraged states and school districts to notify parents of these changes, but according to Education, IDEA does not provide it with statutory authority to require this notification. According to GAO's review of information provided by private school choice programs, and as confirmed by program officials, in school year 2016-17, 83 percent of students enrolled in a program designed specifically for students with disabilities were in a program that provided either no information about changes in IDEA rights or provided information that Education confirmed contained inaccuracies about these changes. Officials from national stakeholder groups, private choice programs, and Education told GAO that some parents do not understand that certain key IDEA rights and protections\u2014such as discipline procedures and least restrictive environment requirements\u2014change when parents move their child from public to private school. Ensuring that quality information is communicated consistently and accurately to parents can help address potential misunderstanding about changes in federal special education rights.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nCongress should consider requiring states to notify parents\/guardians about changes in federal special education rights when a parent moves a child from public to private school. In addition, GAO recommends Education review and correct inaccurate IDEA-related information provided by states. Education generally agreed with our recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_697"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_698","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn 2015, 3.8 million Americans reported misusing prescription drugs within the last month, and deaths from prescription opioids have more than quadrupled since 1999. About half of the people who reported misusing prescription drugs in 2015 received them from a friend or relative.\nOne way to help prevent this kind of diversion and potential misuse is by providing secure and convenient ways to dispose of unused, unneeded, or expired prescription medications. The Secure and Responsible Drug Disposal Act of 2010 authorizes pharmacies and other entities already authorized by DEA to handle controlled substances to also collect unused prescription drugs for disposal. In 2014, DEA finalized regulations for the implementation of the Act, establishing a voluntary process for eligible entities to become authorized collectors of unused prescription drugs using disposal bins.\nGAO was asked to review participation among authorized collectors that maintain disposal bins. In this report GAO describes (1) participation rates among entities eligible to collect unused prescription drugs and (2) factors that affect participation. GAO analyzed the most currently available DEA data from April 2017 on entities eligible to participate and those participating as authorized collectors. GAO also conducted interviews with DEA officials and a nongeneralizable sample of 11 stakeholder organizations selected to illustrate different types of authorized collectors and long-term care facilities. GAO is not making any recommendations. DEA provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO found that about 3 percent of pharmacies and other entities eligible to collect unused prescription drugs for disposal have volunteered to do so. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) authorizes these entities to dispose of unused drugs to help reduce their potential misuse. Analysis of DEA data shows that as of April 2017, 2,233 of the 89,550 (2.49 percent) eligible entities\u2014that is, certain entities already authorized by DEA to handle controlled substances\u2014had registered with DEA to use disposal bins to collect unused prescription drugs. Most\u2014about 81 percent\u2014of the authorized collectors were pharmacies, followed by hospitals or clinics. GAO also found that participation rates varied by state, though in 44 states less than 5 percent of the state's pharmacies and other eligible entities had registered to become authorized collectors.\nStakeholders cited several factors that may explain why relatively few pharmacies and other eligible entities have registered with DEA as authorized collectors of unused drugs. Most notably, stakeholders representing authorized collectors told GAO that because participation is voluntary, the cost associated with maintaining a disposal bin\u2014which includes purchasing and installing the bin according to DEA requirements and paying for the destruction of its contents\u2014is an important factor to weigh against potential benefits. DEA noted that availability of disposal by law enforcement agencies also contributes to low participation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_698"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_699","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn 2014, the Secretary of Defense directed two reviews of DOD's nuclear enterprise. These reviews identified problems with leadership, organization, investment, morale, policy, and procedures, as well as other shortcomings that adversely affected the nuclear deterrence mission. The reviews also made recommendations to address these problems. In 2015, DOD conducted a review focused on NC3 systems, which resulted in additional recommendations.\nThe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 includes a provision for GAO to review DOD's processes for addressing these recommendations, and House Report 114-537 includes a provision for GAO to review changes to DOD's nuclear personnel reliability assurance programs. This report addresses the extent to which DOD and the military services have (1) made progress in implementing recommendations to improve the nuclear enterprise and (2) made changes to their personnel reliability assurance programs. GAO reviewed relevant documents and interviewed agency officials from DOD and the military services. This is a public version of a classified report GAO issued in August 2017. It omits information DOD deemed classified.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) has made progress in implementing the recommendations from the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews and the 2015 nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) systems report.\nIn December 2016, the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) provided the military services with guidance that emphasizes using performance measures and milestones to evaluate progress to aid them in tracking and analyzing their implementation of the recommendations from the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews. However, CAPE's guidance does not require the military services and other DOD components to identify and document risks as part of its recommendation tracking processes. As a result, DOD does not consistently identify and document risks, and it may not be identifying and communicating potential risks related to the nuclear enterprise. One of the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews found that the avoidance of managing risks by many leaders within the enterprise adversely affected the mission. Developing additional guidance on identifying and documenting risks could enhance DOD's ability to provide oversight of its efforts to monitor progress and make informed responses to address any identified risks.\nFor recommendations made in the 2015 NC3 report, DOD's Office of the Chief Information Officer (DOD CIO) uses an internal spreadsheet to track implementation but has not yet identified performance measures, milestones, or risks. DOD CIO has drafted a template that, once it has been approved and implemented, will provide a form that could be used for documenting performance measures, milestones, and risks. By identifying and communicating this information, DOD CIO could improve its efforts to track the progress of DOD's actions, evaluate their effects, and formulate responses to risks.\nDOD and the military services have implemented changes to their personnel reliability assurance programs in response to recommendations from the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews. These programs are intended to ensure that DOD personnel who work with nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons systems, NC3 systems and equipment, and special nuclear material are trustworthy, reliable, and capable of performing their assigned nuclear weapons-related mission. The 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews found that these personnel reliability assurance programs were overly complex and administratively burdensome and that frequent and intrusive inspections left nuclear units more focused on preparing for and responding to inspections than on ensuring personnel reliability. DOD and the services have updated their guidance for personnel reliability assurance programs, including focusing on nine essential elements of reliability. For example, the Air Force has incorporated these elements into the standards it uses for its security forces. Additionally, the Air Force has centralized some of its administrative processes, and the Joint Staff has updated inspection procedures in a way that may ease the burden on personnel being inspected.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nDOD should develop additional guidance on identifying and documenting risks, and should identify and communicate performance measures and risks. DOD concurred and provided information about planned actions to implement them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_699"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_700","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nApproximately 300 foreign airports offer last point of departure flights to the United States. TSA is the federal agency with primary responsibility for securing the nation's civil aviation system and assesses foreign airports and inspects air carriers to ensure they have in place effective security measures. While TSA is authorized under U.S. law to conduct foreign airport assessments, it does not have authority to impose or otherwise enforce security requirements at foreign airports. TSA is authorized to impose and enforce requirements on air carriers. The Aviation Security Act of 2016 includes a provision for GAO to review TSA's effort to enhance security at foreign airports.\nThis report addresses (1) steps TSA has taken to enhance foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections since 2011, (2) the results of TSA's foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections, and (3) steps TSA takes to address any deficiencies identified during foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections. GAO reviewed TSA program data, interviewed TSA officials, and conducted site visits to TSA field locations that manage assessments and inspections.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has taken steps to enhance its foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections since 2011, including aligning resources based on risk, resolving airport access issues, making evaluations more comprehensive, and creating operational efficiencies. For example, TSA has implemented targeted foreign airport assessments in locations where risk is high and developed the Global Risk Analysis and Decision Support System to strengthen data analysis. In addition, TSA has increased the number of joint airport assessments with the European Commission. Specifically, TSA officials GAO met with indicated that TSA's strong relationship with the European Commission has afforded the agency excellent access to foreign airports in Europe and a better understanding of vulnerabilities at these locations, which has resulted in more comprehensive assessments.\nIn its analysis of TSA foreign airport assessment results, GAO found that during fiscal years 2012 through 2016 there was considerable regional variation among last point of departure airports in the level of compliance with select International Civil Aviation Organization security standards and recommended practices. TSA attributed this regional variation to lack of airport resources or technical knowledge, among other factors. TSA officials also stated that while these challenges are not easy to overcome, agency efforts, such as training host country staff, can help foreign airports reduce their vulnerability scores over time. GAO's analysis of TSA's foreign airport assessment data confirmed that point by demonstrating that most foreign airports categorized with poor vulnerability ratings in fiscal year 2012 improved their vulnerability score in at least one follow-up assessment during fiscal years 2012 through 2016.\nMeanwhile, U.S. and foreign-flagged air carriers providing last point of departure service to the United States from foreign airports complied with all TSA security requirements in most inspections, and TSA was able to resolve the majority of security deficiencies it identified with on-the-spot counseling. In some cases, TSA inspectors submitted violations for investigation because the violations were considered serious enough to potentially warrant an enforcement action.\nTSA addresses identified deficiencies at foreign airports through capacity development, such as training and on-the-spot counseling. However, GAO found that TSA's database for tracking the resolution status of security deficiencies did not have comprehensive data on security deficiencies' root causes and corrective actions. In addition, the database lacked adequate categorization mechanisms. For example, while it captures three broad categories of root causes (e.g., lack of knowledge) it does not capture subcategories (e.g., supervision) that would better explain the root causes of security deficiencies. Fully collecting these data and improving the specificity of categorization would help TSA strengthen analysis and decision making. For example, TSA would be better positioned to determine the extent to which airports that received particular types of capacity development assistance were able to close security vulnerabilities. This is a public version of a sensitive report issued in October 2017. Information that TSA deemed to be sensitive is omitted from this report.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nTo help strengthen TSA's analysis and decision making, GAO recommends that TSA fully capture and more specifically categorize data on the root causes of security deficiencies that it identifies and corrective actions. TSA concurred with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_700"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_701","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCongress created several authorities that provide DOD research labs with ways to increase efficiency and foster innovation.\nSenate report 114-255 contained a provision for GAO to study governance models used by federal labs. This report evaluates DOD labs' use of authorities to foster innovation and efficiency.\nGAO selected four authorities that recent work on best practices for science and technology management and expedited defense lab hiring have shown to be the most crucial for supporting innovation; administered a survey to 44 lab directors to gain insight into their use of the authorities; interviewed key lab officials and contractors; and reviewed relevant policies and guidance.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nCongress has provided the Department of Defense's (DOD) research labs with several authorities to enhance management and operations. Four authorities that GAO examined provide lab directors with greater ability to make their own decisions regarding the funding of projects, hiring, lab management, and purchasing of equipment or services.\n1. Laboratory initiated research authority. This authority, as implemented, provides labs with a means to fund new science and technology projects that they consider a priority. Labs may use a percentage of all funds available to the lab and are permitted to charge customers of the lab a percentage fee of the costs for activities performed by the lab for the customer.\n2. Direct hire authority. This authority enables labs to compete with private industry for high-quality talent. For example, it provides for streamlined hiring of applicants with relevant advanced degrees, or students enrolled in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics programs.\n3. Laboratory enhancement pilot program authority. This authority generally allows lab directors to propose alternative methods that might lead to more effective lab management, and waive certain policies or procedures that might affect implementation of these methods.\n4. Micro-purchase authority. This authority raises the threshold for small purchases for DOD research lab activities from $3,500 to $10,000 to facilitate acquisitions.\nWhile labs have used these authorities, their use has sometimes been limited, particularly with the laboratory initiated research authority. DOD lab directors at Air Force, Navy, and Army cited several obstacles that impede wider use of that authority, specifically:\nAir Force: Financial management officials at the Air Force stated that the service's accounting system does not currently have an automated capability to transfer the allowable percentage fee of costs to a central account at the Air Force Research Laboratory. This lack of capability, officials noted, creates a significant administrative burden related to charging these fees.\nNavy: In fiscal year 2017, Navy labs invested $7.3 million in lab infrastructure projects, compared to $32.9 million and $53.7 million at the Air Force and Army, respectively. Navy lab officials told us that they were restricted in their use of infrastructure funds available under the laboratory initiated research authority due to a lack of clear guidance as to whether and how to use this authority within the Capital Investment Program of the Navy Working Capital Fund.\nArmy: The Army requires its labs to use a similar percentage of funds from two sources: (1) what it refers to as directly appropriated funds and (2) funds labs charge for customer activities. Some Army lab directors reported assessing a lower rate on customer funds than allowed so as not to drive customers away. The labs then generally charge a lower than desired rate on their directly appropriated funds, which further constrains the total funding available to them.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making three recommendations to enhance DOD's use of laboratory initiated research authority, including that the Air Force assess potential accounting system improvements, the Navy clarify how labs can use the authority for infrastructure improvements, and the Army assess its policy to determine whether changes are needed to remove disincentives for labs to use the authority. DOD concurred with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_701"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_702","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn 2014, the Secretary of Defense directed two reviews of DOD's nuclear enterprise. These reviews identified problems with leadership, organization, investment, morale, policy, and procedures, as well as other shortcomings that adversely affected the nuclear deterrence mission. The reviews also made recommendations to address these problems. In 2015, DOD conducted a review focused on NC3 systems, which resulted in additional recommendations.\nThe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 includes a provision for GAO to review DOD's processes for addressing these recommendations. This report addresses the extent to which DOD and the military services have (1) made progress in the implementation, tracking, and evaluation\u2014including identifying and documenting risk\u2014of the recommendations of the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews and the 2015 NC3 report and (2) improved oversight of the defense nuclear enterprise and managed roles, responsibilities, and collaboration among various organizations. GAO reviewed relevant documents and interviewed agency officials from DOD and the military services.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) has made progress in implementing the recommendations from the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews and a 2015 nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) review and has improved its tracking and evaluation of this progress. For example, since GAO last reported\u2014in October 2017\u2014an additional 74 of the 247 sub-recommendations from the 2014 reviews have been closed; 96 remain open. In January 2018, in response to a GAO recommendation, the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) issued guidance to aid the military services in identifying, assessing, and documenting risks associated with the 2014 recommendations, such as unintended consequences from their implementation. The guidance calls on them to update their risk assessments periodically as new data become available. The Air Force and Navy have begun to provide risk information in CAPE's and their own tracking tools. In July 2018, in response to a GAO recommendation, DOD's Chief Information Officer issued guidance to improve tracking and evaluation of progress in implementing the 2015 recommendations.\nDOD and the military services have taken steps to improve oversight of the nuclear enterprise in response to the 2014 reviews but lack clear roles and responsibilities and methods for collaboration. The Secretary of Defense created the Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group (NDERG) in 2014 to ensure the long-term health of the nuclear enterprise by addressing resourcing, personnel, organizational, and enterprise policy issues. However, DOD guidance has not clearly defined roles and responsibilities for the NDERG or provided methods for the NDERG to communicate and collaborate with other nuclear oversight organizations, including those shown in the figure. Nor has NC3 oversight guidance been updated to reflect changes in roles and responsibilities and to include methods for communication and collaboration among NC3 oversight groups. In the absence of defined roles and responsibilities for the NDERG and NC3 oversight bodies and methods for how the NDERG and NC3 oversight groups are to communicate and collaborate, senior leaders may not be in a position to effectively manage resourcing and risk across the department.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO makes four recommendations for DOD to clarify roles, responsibilities, and methods of communication and collaboration for both the NDERG and NC3 oversight bodies. DOD concurred with all four recommendations and provided information about planned actions to implement them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_702"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_703","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nForty railroads are currently required by statute to implement PTC, a communications-based system designed to slow or stop a train that is not being operated safely. Of these, 29 passenger railroads collectively provide over 500 million passenger trips annually. Although the deadline for PTC implementation is December 31, 2018, railroads may receive a maximum 2-year extension to December 31, 2020, if they meet certain statutory criteria.\nGAO was asked to review passenger railroads' progress toward PTC implementation. This statement discusses (1) passenger railroads' PTC progress and FRA's steps to assist them, and (2) how passenger railroads and FRA plan to approach the 2018 and 2020 deadlines. GAO analyzed railroads' most recent quarterly reports covering activities through June 30, 2018; sent a brief questionnaire to all 40 railroads; and interviewed officials from FRA and 16 railroads, selected in part based on those identified as at-risk by FRA.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAs of June 30, 2018, passenger railroads (28 commuter railroads and Amtrak) generally remained in the early stages of positive train control (PTC) implementation\u2014including equipment installation and early field testing. However, many passenger railroads are nearing completion of the equipment installation stage. For example, two-thirds of passenger railroads reported being more than 90 percent complete with equipment installation. With regard to testing, Amtrak has reported that it has initiated both field testing and revenue service demonstration (RSD), an advanced form of field testing that is required to fully implement PTC. However, most commuter railroads reported slower progress with testing. Of the 28 commuter railroads required to implement PTC, 19 reported initiating field testing, but only eight reported initiating RSD. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) recently clarified the criteria railroads must meet to qualify for a 2-year extension past the December 31, 2018, PTC implementation deadline. To receive an extension, railroads must meet six statutory criteria. For the sixth criterion, commuter railroads are authorized to either initiate RSD on at least one track segment or use FRA-approved substitute criteria. FRA clarified these and other requirements at three PTC symposiums hosted for railroads in summer 2018. For example, FRA officials said that initiating field testing instead of RSD was one approach that commuter railroads could potentially take to receive FRA's approval of substitute criteria. FRA's actions are consistent with GAO's March 2018 recommendation that the agency communicate to railroads the requirements and process for an extension.\nChallenges related to PTC implementation and FRA's resources raise questions as to the extent FRA and the passenger railroad industry are poised for full PTC implementation by December 31, 2020. Most passenger railroads anticipate needing an extension, leaving substantial work for both railroads and FRA to complete before the end of 2020. Almost three-quarters of passenger railroads (21 of 29) reported that they, or the railroad which owns the track on which they operate, will apply for an extension. More than half of these railroads reported planning to apply for an extension using substitute criteria, and of these, eight intend to apply for substitute criteria based on field testing. Though use of substitute criteria is authorized in law, this approach defers time-intensive RSD testing into 2019 and beyond. In addition, passenger railroads reported that they continue to face many of the same challenges GAO previously identified, such as software defects and limited industry-wide availability of vendors. Further, passenger railroads expressed concern that FRA's workload will markedly increase as railroads submit requests for extension approvals. FRA has acknowledged concerns about the pending surge of submissions and agency officials said they have taken recent steps to help manage the forthcoming influx of documentation, such as reallocating resources. However, as of September 21, 2018, only one passenger railroad had applied for an extension. It remains unclear how many extension requests FRA will receive or what FRA's enforcement strategy will be for noncompliance with the statute, such as for railroads that fail to apply for an extension by the deadline.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nIn March 2018, GAO recommended FRA take steps to systematically communicate extension information to railroads and to use a risk-based approach to prioritize agency resources and workload. FRA has taken some steps to address these recommendations, such as recently communicating and clarifying extension requirements to all railroads during three symposiums. GAO will continue to monitor FRA's progress.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_703"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_704","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nNutrient pollution\u2014caused by excess nitrogen and phosphorus entering water bodies\u2014poses significant risks to the nation's water quality. Nutrients can enter water bodies from point sources and nonpoint sources. The Clean Water Act establishes the basic structure for regulating discharges of pollutants, including excess nutrients. Under the act, authorized states\u2014assisted and overseen by EPA\u2014set limits on nutrients impairing a water body and limits on point source discharges. EPA encourages states to use nutrient credit trading to address nutrient pollution. According to EPA, trading allows a point source to meet nutrient discharge limits by buying pollutant credits from a source that has reduced its discharges more than required.\nGAO was asked to examine nutrient credit trading programs. This report describes (1) the extent to which nutrient credit trading programs have been used and what the outcomes of the programs have been, (2) how states and EPA oversee nutrient credit trading programs, and (3) what key factors stakeholders view as affecting participation in nutrient credit trading. GAO reviewed EPA documents and interviewed EPA officials to gather information on trading programs. GAO then selected a nongeneralizable sample of three programs with the most trades in 2014 (based on the most recent available data); reviewed program documents; and interviewed EPA, state, and program officials and other stakeholders about the programs.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn 2014, 11 states had 19 nutrient credit trading programs, and trading provided flexibility for some point sources, such as wastewater treatment plants, to meet nutrient discharge limits, according to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) data and officials. The majority of nutrient credit trading during 2014 occurred in three state programs\u2014programs in Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. A review of trading data from these programs showed that most point sources participating in the three state programs did not purchase credits in 2014 to meet their discharge limits, which are established in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits under the Clean Water Act. For the point sources that did purchase credits in 2014, state officials in the three states told GAO that the total amount in pounds of nutrients that point sources purchased as credits was generally small. Nevertheless, state officials explained that nutrient credit trading was useful because it allowed point sources to manage risk, reduce the cost of compliance, and better manage the timing of upgrades of nutrient removal technology.\nStates oversee nutrient credit trading programs, and EPA helps ensure that programs are consistent with the act. States oversee nutrient credit trading programs by approving and verifying the generation of credits to ensure that credits represent real reductions in nutrient pollution. A state's approval and verification process varies depending on whether the credit generator is a point or nonpoint source, such as runoff from agricultural and urban areas. For point sources, the states GAO reviewed followed a process for verifying credits that is based on the existing oversight process for NPDES permits. Because nonpoint sources do not have NPDES permits, states use a separate process to approve and verify that nonpoint sources' pollution reduction activities have generated credits for trading. When questions or concerns arise, EPA uses its oversight authority to ensure that trades and trading programs are fully consistent with the act. EPA officials told GAO that they conduct oversight primarily through the regional offices, which (1) review NPDES permits, (2) review and comment on state regulatory frameworks for trading, (3) conduct periodic on-site inspections, and (4) provide national-level guidance and training to state programs and stakeholders.\nAccording to stakeholders, two key factors have affected participation in nutrient credit trading\u2014the presence of discharge limits for nutrients and the challenges of measuring the results of nonpoint sources' nutrient reduction activities. Officials from the three states GAO reviewed and other stakeholders cited the importance of discharge limits for nutrients as a driver to create demand for trading. Without such a driver, point sources have little incentive to purchase nutrient credits. The challenges of measuring nutrient reductions by nonpoint sources create uncertainties about the value of credits generated by nonpoint sources. In part, because of these uncertainties, the states GAO reviewed either did not allow nonpoint sources to trade or created special rules for nonpoint sources. State officials and stakeholders also told GAO that even if a program allows nonpoint sources to trade, point sources often prefer to trade with other point sources because they have similar permit and monitoring requirements.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_704"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_705","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nEach year, the federal government sells millions of dollars of timber from federal forests. Federal law generally prohibits the export of unprocessed logs harvested from federal lands in the western United States. It also prohibits substitution of federal logs for privately sourced timber in domestic mills when the privately sourced timber is exported without processing.\nGAO was asked to examine the issue of illegal federal timber export and substitution. This report (1) describes the extent to which the Forest Service and BLM identified violations of the timber export and substitution ban that occurred from 2007 through 2017 and the likelihood of violations and (2) examines the agencies' regulations, policies, and practices to help prevent, detect, and respond to illegal timber export and substitution.\nGAO reviewed laws, regulations, and policies regarding illegal timber export and substitution; compared agency regulations with laws, and agency policies with federal internal control standards; and interviewed agency officials and stakeholders\u2014such as trade groups and state officials\u2014 selected to provide a range of perspectives.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Forest Service, within the Department of Agriculture, and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), within the Department of the Interior, found no violations of the ban on federal timber export and substitution from 2007 through 2017, according to agency documents and officials. All agency officials and stakeholders GAO interviewed said the likelihood of illegal timber export and substitution is low, citing several reasons, including economic factors associated with log markets, which have changed over the years. For example, many officials and stakeholders said the timber harvested from federal lands is smaller and of lower quality compared to what was harvested in the 1990s, making it less likely to be exported.\nThe Forest Service and BLM did not issue new regulations related to illegal federal timber export and substitution, and some agency policies related to export and substitution are outdated or unclear. The agencies did not issue regulations to implement the Forest Resources Conservation and Shortage Relief Act of 1997, as required by the act. Without issuing new regulations or obtaining legislative relief from this requirement, the agencies will continue to be out of compliance with the act. The agencies have policies to help prevent, detect, and respond to illegal timber export and substitution, such as policies that require the marking of logs to identify them as coming from federal lands. However, the agencies have not reviewed their policies for continued relevance and effectiveness as called for by federal standards for internal control, and some policies are outdated or unclear. For example, Forest Service policy calls for the collection of a certification form to help determine whether timber purchasers are engaged in export or substitution, but the form expired in 1999. Also, it is unclear what BLM considers a violation of the export ban because agency policy does not define what constitutes a violation. Forest Service officials said the agency has not reviewed its policies since 1997, largely due to competing priorities, but agreed it would be beneficial to do so. BLM officials said they reviewed the agency's export regulations in 2010, but this effort did not include a review of timber export policies. By reviewing agency policies and making changes as necessary, the agencies will have better assurance that their policies are relevant and effective for addressing the risk of illegal timber export and substitution.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that the Forest Service and BLM issue new regulations or seek legislative relief from the requirement to do so, and review their policies for relevance and effectiveness and issue new policies as necessary. The agencies generally agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_705"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_706","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nA key component of mitigating and responding to cyber threats is having a qualified, well-trained cybersecurity workforce. The Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2015 requires OPM and federal agencies to take several actions related to cybersecurity workforce planning.\nGAO is to monitor agencies' progress in implementing the act's requirements. For this report, GAO assessed whether: (1) OPM developed a coding structure and procedures for assigning codes to cybersecurity positions and submitted a progress report to Congress; (2) CFO Act agencies submitted complete, reliable baseline assessments of their cybersecurity workforces; and (3) CFO Act agencies established procedures to assign codes to cybersecurity positions. GAO examined OPM's coding procedures and progress report on the act's implementation, and baseline assessments and coding procedures from the 24 CFO Act agencies. GAO also interviewed relevant OPM and agency officials about efforts to address the act's requirements.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAs required by the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2015 (act), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) developed a cybersecurity coding structure under the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) as well as procedures for assigning codes to federal civilian cybersecurity positions. However, OPM issued the coding structure and procedures 5 and 4 months later than the act's deadlines because OPM was working with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to align the structure and procedures with the draft NICE Cybersecurity Workforce Framework , which NIST issued later than planned. OPM also submitted a progress report to Congress on the implementation of the act 1 month after it was due. The delays in issuing the coding structure and procedures have extended the expected time frames for implementing subsequent provisions of the act.\nMost of the 24 agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act submitted baseline assessment reports to Congress but the results may not be reliable. As of March 2018, 21 of the 24 CFO Act agencies had conducted baseline assessments identifying the extent to which their cybersecurity employees held professional certifications and had submitted the assessment reports to Congress as required by the act. Three agencies had not conducted the assessments for various reasons, such as a lack of resources and tools to do so. Of the 21 agencies that did, 4 did not address all of the reportable information, such as the extent to which personnel without professional certifications were ready to obtain them or strategies for mitigating any gaps. Additionally, agencies were limited in their ability to obtain complete or consistent information about their cybersecurity employees and the certifications they held. This was because agencies had not yet fully identified all members of their cybersecurity workforces or did not have a consistent list of appropriate certifications for cybersecurity positions. As a result, the agencies had limited assurance that their assessment results accurately reflected all relevant employees or the extent to which those employees held appropriate certifications. This diminishes the usefulness of the assessments in determining the certification and training needs of these agencies' cybersecurity employees.\nMost of the 24 CFO Act agencies established coding procedures, but 6 agencies only partially addressed certain activities required by OPM in their procedures. Of the 24 agencies reviewed, 23 had established procedures to identify their civilian cybersecurity positions and assign the appropriate employment codes to the positions as called for by the act. However, 6 of the 23 agencies did not address one or more of 7 activities required by OPM in their procedures, such as the activities to review all filled and vacant positions and annotate reviewed position descriptions with the appropriate employment code. These 6 agencies cited a variety of reasons for not addressing all of the required activities in their coding procedures. For example, these agencies stated that they addressed the activities in existing guidance or did not include activities that their components did not have the responsibility to perform. By not addressing all of the required activities in their coding procedures, the 6 agencies lack assurance that the activities will be performed or performed consistently throughout their agency.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making 30 recommendations to 13 agencies to fully implement two of the act's requirements on baseline assessments and coding procedures. Of the 12 agencies to which we made recommendations that provided comments on the report, 7 agreed with the recommendations made to them, 4 did not state whether they agreed or disagreed, and 1 did not agree with one of two recommendations made to it. GAO continues to believe that the recommendation is valid as discussed in this report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_706"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_707","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThis testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's January 2018 report, entitled Intellectual Property: Agencies Can Improve Efforts to Address Risks Posed by Changing Counterfeits Market , ( GAO-18-216 ).\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nChanges in the market for counterfeit goods entering the United States pose new challenges for consumers, the private sector, and U.S. agencies that enforce intellectual property rights (IPR). Specifically, growth in e-commerce has contributed to a shift in the sale of counterfeit goods in the United States, with consumers increasingly purchasing goods online and counterfeiters producing a wider variety of goods that may be sold on websites alongside authentic products. For example, 20 of 47 items GAO purchased from third-party sellers on popular consumer websites were counterfeit, according to testing by the products' rights holders (see table), highlighting potential risks to consumers. The changes in the market for counterfeit goods can also pose challenges to the private sector\u2014for example, the challenge of distinguishing counterfeit from authentic goods listed for sale online\u2014and complicate the enforcement efforts of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).\nCBP and ICE engage in a number of activities to enhance IPR enforcement; however, while ICE has assessed some of its efforts, CBP has taken limited steps to do so. CBP's and ICE's IPR enforcement activities broadly include detecting imports of potentially IPR-infringing goods, conducting special operations at U.S. ports, engaging with international partners, and undertaking localized pilot programs or port-led initiatives. CBP and ICE have collected some performance data for each of the eight activities GAO reviewed, and ICE has taken some steps to understand the impact of its efforts. However, CBP has conducted limited evaluation of its efforts to enhance IPR enforcement. Consequently, CBP may lack information needed to ensure it is investing its resources in the most efficient and effective activities.\nCBP and ICE generally collaborate on IPR enforcement, but according to private sector representatives, restrictions on CBP's information sharing limit private sector enforcement efforts. GAO found that CBP and ICE have undertaken efforts that align with selected key practices for interagency collaboration, such as participating in developing a national IPR enforcement strategy and agreeing on roles and responsibilities. However, sharing additional information about seized items with rights-holding companies and e-commerce websites could improve enforcement, according to private sector representatives. CBP officials said they share information to the extent allowed under current regulations, but CBP has not completed an assessment of what, if any, additional information would be beneficial to share with private sector entities. Without such an assessment, CBP will not know if sharing additional information requires regulatory or legal changes.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_707"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_708","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIHS is charged with providing health care to AI\/AN people who are members or descendants of 573 tribes. According to IHS, AI\/AN people born today have a life expectancy that is 5.5 years less than all races in the United States, and they die at higher rates than other Americans from preventable causes. The ability to recruit and retain a stable clinical workforce capable of providing quality and timely care is critical for IHS. GAO was asked to review provider vacancies at IHS.\nThis report examines (1) IHS provider vacancies and challenges filling them; (2) strategies IHS has used to recruit and retain providers; and (3) strategies IHS has used to mitigate the negative effects of provider vacancies. GAO reviewed IHS human resources data for the provider positions that the agency tracks. GAO also reviewed policies, federal internal control standards, and legal authorities related to providers in federally operated IHS facilities. GAO interviewed IHS officials at the headquarters and area level and at selected facilities. GAO selected facilities based on variation in their number of direct care outpatient visits and inpatient hospital beds in 2014.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIndian Health Service (IHS) data show sizeable vacancy rates for clinical care providers in the eight IHS geographic areas where the agency provides substantial direct care to American Indian\/Alaska Native (AI\/AN) people. The overall vacancy rate for providers\u2014physicians, nurses, nurse practitioners, certified registered nurse anesthetists, certified nurse midwives, physician assistants, dentists, and pharmacists\u2014was 25 percent, ranging from 13 to 31 percent across the areas.\nIHS officials told GAO that challenges to filling these vacancies include the rural location of many IHS facilities and insufficient housing for providers. Officials said long-standing vacancies have a negative effect on patient access, quality of care, and employee morale.\nIHS uses multiple strategies to recruit and retain providers, including offering increased salaries for certain positions, but it still faces challenges matching local market salaries. IHS also offers other financial incentives, and has made some housing available when possible. In addition, IHS uses strategies, such as contracting with temporary providers, to maintain patient access to services and reduce provider burnout. Officials said these temporary providers are more costly than salaried employees and can interrupt patients' continuity of care. However, IHS lacks agency-wide information on the costs and number of temporary providers used at its facilities, which impedes IHS officials' ability to target its resources to address gaps in provider staffing and ensure access to health services across IHS facilities.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that IHS obtain, on an agency-wide basis, information on temporary provider contractors, including their associated cost and number of full-time equivalents, and use this information to inform decisions about resource allocation and provider staffing.\nIHS concurred with GAO's recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_708"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_709","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOD continues to confront organizational challenges that hinder collaboration. To address these challenges, section 911 of the NDAA for FY 2017 directed the Secretary of Defense to issue an organizational strategy that identifies critical objectives that span multiple functional boundaries; establish cross-functional teams to support this strategy and provide related guidance and training; and take actions to streamline the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Further, section 921 of the NDAA for FY 2019 calls for the Secretary of Defense to reform the department's enterprise business operations.\nThe NDAAs for FY 2017 and 2019 also included provisions for GAO to assess DOD's actions in response to sections 911 and 921, respectively. This report assesses the extent to which DOD has made progress in (1) addressing the requirements of section 911, and (2) reforming the department's enterprise business operations under section 921. GAO reviewed documentation on DOD's implementation of sections 911 and 921; interviewed cross-functional team leaders, members, and other DOD officials; and compared DOD's implementation of its cross-functional teams to GAO's key practices.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) has implemented four statutory requirements in section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017, but has not addressed five requirements intended to support cross-functional teams and promote department-wide collaboration (see table).\nFor two of these requirements, DOD has missed the statutory deadline by more than a year. GAO previously recommended that DOD take actions to improve its implementation of section 911, and DOD reported it is doing so, such as revising its draft cross-functional team guidance to address statutory requirements. Fully implementing GAO's prior recommendations and the remaining statutory requirements would better position DOD to effectively implement its cross-functional teams and advance a collaborative culture, as required by the NDAA.\nNine cross-functional teams are driving DOD's enterprise business reform efforts under section 921 of the FY 2019 NDAA, but the teams' progress has been uneven. As of September 2018, DOD reported that these nine teams were pursuing a total of 135 business reform initiatives. However, 104 of these initiatives have not reached the implementation phase. A key challenge facing the teams is that some lack resources to fully implement their approved initiatives. For example, DOD officials stated that the department did not fulfill four of nine funding requests from the teams in fiscal year 2018 to implement their initiatives. As of September 2018, DOD officials estimated that the teams need about $6.7 billion to implement their initiatives from FYs 2018 through 2024, but DOD has not identified sources for this funding. GAO's prior work on efficiency initiatives found that up-front investments may be required to realize long-term savings. In addition, GAO's prior work on leading practices for implementing effective cross-functional teams highlights the importance of providing teams with access to resources and having well-defined team operations with established rules and procedures. However, DOD has not established a process for identifying and prioritizing available funding for implementing the teams' initiatives. Without such a process, DOD and the teams may not be able to adequately plan for and execute their reform initiatives.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DOD establish a process to identify and prioritize funding for implementing its cross-functional teams' business reform initiatives. DOD concurred with this recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_709"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_710","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAs the demand for VHA's services grows\u2014due, in part, to increasing demand from servicemembers returning from the United States' military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and the growing needs of an aging veteran population\u2014attracting, hiring, and retaining top talent is critical to VHA's mission to provide high quality and timely care for the nation's veterans.\nPhysicians\u2014who provide and supervise a broad range of care including primary and specialty care\u2014serve an integral role in VHA's mission. Certain physician types are consistently among the most difficult to recruit and retain, and are thus considered mission-critical by VHA.\nOver the past two decades, GAO and others have expressed concern about VHA's ability to ensure that it has the appropriate clinical workforce, including physicians, to meet the current and future needs of veterans.\nThis statement is based on GAO's October 2017 report and examines (1) VHA information on how many mission critical physicians provided care at VAMCs, (2) VHA guidance for determining its physician staffing needs, and (3) the strategies VHA used to support the recruitment and retention of physicians at VAMCs, and the extent to which it has evaluated these strategies to determine their effectiveness.\nFor this statement, GAO updated the information from its October 2017 report and obtained information from VHA officials in June 2018 about steps they have taken to implement the 2017 recommendations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Veterans Health Administration (VHA) continues to face challenges related to physician staffing, recruitment, and retention, though it has begun work to implement recommendations made in GAO's October 2017 report. Specifically, GAO's report found the following:\nVHA's data on the number of physicians that provided care at VA medical centers (VAMC) were incomplete. GAO found that data were incomplete because they did not include data on the number of contract physicians and contained only limited data on the number of physician trainees\u2014two types of physicians that augment the care provided by physicians employed by VHA. Thus, VHA data underestimated the total number of physicians providing care in its medical centers leaving it unable to ensure that its workforce planning processes sufficiently addressed gaps in staffing. GAO recommended that VHA implement a process to accurately count all its physicians. VHA did not concur with this recommendation, stating that it used other tools for workforce planning. VHA has since implemented a new human resources (HR) database\u2014HR Smart\u2014that has the capability to track each position at its VAMCs. However, VHA officials told us they do not plan to include information on physician contractors in this database.\nVHA provided VAMCs with guidance on how to determine the number of physicians and support staff needed for some physician occupations, although it lacked sufficient guidance for its medical and surgical specialties. GAO recommended that VHA issue guidance to VAMCs on determining appropriate staffing levels for all physicians. VHA concurred and reported it would develop staffing guidance for its medical and surgical specialties. VHA officials told GAO VHA signed a specialty care workgroup charter November 27, 2017; the primary goal of the workgroup was to develop a specialty care staffing model that would include staffing information for all specialty care. VHA anticipates completing its work and issuing staffing guidance by December 2018.\nVHA used various strategies to recruit and retain its physician workforce, but had not comprehensively evaluated them to assess effectiveness . Without such an evaluation, VHA did not have complete information on the underlying causes of the difficulties VAMCs face, or whether its recruitment and retention strategies were meeting physician workforce needs. GAO recommended VHA (1) establish a system-wide method to share information about physician trainees to help fill vacancies across VAMCs and (2) conduct a comprehensive, system-wide evaluation of VAMCs' physician recruitment and retention efforts and establish an ongoing monitoring program. VHA concurred and reported it has since taken steps to address the recommendations. For example, VHA's Office of Workforce Management and Consulting has partnered with its Partnered Evidence-based Policy Resource Center to evaluate and recommend a systematic approach for allocating workforce management resources. In addition, VHA has added the capability to track physician trainees to its HR Smart database. VHA expects to complete its efforts by September 2018 and September 2019, respectively.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_710"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_711","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDeficiencies identified in multiple DOL Inspector General audits since 2009 and two student deaths in 2015 have raised concerns regarding the safety and security of Job Corps students. GAO was asked to review safety and security of students in the Job Corps program. GAO's June 2017 testimony summarized preliminary observations. This report further examines (1) the number and types of reported safety and security incidents involving Job Corps students; (2) student perceptions of their safety at Job Corps centers; and (3) the extent to which ETA has taken steps to address safety and security at Job Corps centers.\nGAO analyzed ETA's reported incident data for Job Corps centers from July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2017. GAO also analyzed ETA's student survey data from the same period, reviewed relevant documentation, and interviewed ETA officials at its national office and all six regions. GAO also visited two Job Corps centers that had different operators and at least 100 recent incidents. These two centers are not generalizable to all centers.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nJob Corps centers reported 13,673 safety and security incidents involving students from July 2016 to June 2017, according to GAO's analysis of the Department of Labor's (DOL) Employment and Training Administration's (ETA) data. Most reported incidents occurred onsite and involved recently enrolled male students under age 20. During that time, the program served about 79,000 students at 125 Job Corps centers, according to ETA officials. ETA's Office of Job Corps administers the program, which is the nation's largest residential, educational, and career and technical training program for low-income youth generally between the ages of 16 and 24. Drug-related incidents and assaults accounted for 48 percent of all reported incidents (see fig.).\nStudents generally felt safe at Job Corps centers, yet fewer felt safe in some situations, based on GAO's analysis of ETA's September 2016 and March 2017 Job Corps student satisfaction surveys. At least 70 percent of students reported that they felt safe on half of the 12 safety-related questions in the 49 question survey about their experiences in the Job Corps program; but fewer students reported feeling safe when asked if they were made to feel unimportant or if they heard students threaten each other. ETA plans to administer a new survey nationally by January 2019 that focuses solely on safety and security issues.\nETA has initiated several actions to improve safety and security at Job Corps centers, but insufficient guidance for its monitoring staff and absence of a comprehensive plan for safety and security may put the success of these actions at risk. Among its actions, ETA adopted a new risk-based monitoring strategy to identify emerging problems at the centers. Officials GAO spoke with in five of ETA's regional offices said that the new strategy has improved monitoring, but that more guidance on how to interpret and apply safety and security policies is needed to promote consistency across centers. Also, ETA lacks a comprehensive plan linking its new efforts to an overall safety and security framework. ETA officials told GAO that limited staff capacity and lack of expertise have hindered their efforts in developing such a plan. Without a comprehensive plan, ETA runs the risk that its new efforts will not be successful.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making three recommendations to DOL, including that ETA develop additional monitoring guidance and a comprehensive plan for safety and security. DOL agreed with GAO's three recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_711"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_712","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDHS is the lead agency tasked with protecting the nation's critical infrastructure from cyber threats. The Homeland Security Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2014 required DHS to identify, categorize, and assign employment codes to all of the department's cybersecurity workforce positions. These codes define work roles and tasks for cybersecurity specialty areas such as program management and system administration. Further, the act required DHS to identify and report its cybersecurity workforce critical needs.\nThe act included a provision for GAO to analyze and monitor DHS's implementation of the requirements. GAO's objectives were to assess the extent to which DHS has (1) identified, categorized, and assigned employment codes to its cybersecurity positions and (2) identified its cybersecurity workforce areas of critical need. GAO analyzed DHS and OPM workforce documentation and administered a data collection instrument to six major DHS components. GAO also interviewed relevant DHS and OPM officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken actions to identify, categorize, and assign employment codes to its cybersecurity positions, as required by the Homeland Security Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2014 ; however, its actions have not been timely and complete. For example, DHS did not establish timely and complete procedures to identify, categorize, and code its cybersecurity position vacancies and responsibilities. Further, DHS has not yet completed its efforts to identify all of the department's cybersecurity positions and accurately assign codes to all filled and vacant cybersecurity positions. In August 2017, DHS reported to the Congress that it had coded 95 percent of the department's identified cybersecurity positions. However, GAO's analysis determined that the department had, at that time, coded approximately 79 percent of the positions. DHS's 95 percent estimate was overstated primarily because it excluded vacant positions, even though the act required DHS to report these positions.\nIn addition, although DHS has taken steps to identify its workforce capability gaps, it has not identified or reported to the Congress on its department-wide cybersecurity critical needs that align with specialty areas. The department also has not reported annually its cybersecurity critical needs to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), as required, and has not developed plans with clearly defined time frames for doing so. (See table).\nWithout ensuring that its procedures are complete and that its progress in identifying and assigning codes to its positions is accurately reported, DHS will not be positioned to effectively examine its cybersecurity workforce, identify its critical skill gaps, or improve its workforce planning. Further, until DHS establishes plans and time frames for reporting on its critical needs, the department may not be able to ensure that it has the necessary cybersecurity personnel to help protect the department's and the nation's federal networks and critical infrastructure from cyber threats. The commitment of DHS's leadership to addressing these matters is essential to helping the department fulfill the act's requirements.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DHS take six actions, including ensuring that its cybersecurity workforce procedures identify position vacancies and responsibilities; reported workforce data are complete and accurate; and plans for reporting on critical needs are developed. DHS concurred with our six recommendations and described actions the department plans to take to address them. OPM did not have any comments.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_712"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_713","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Navy is planning to dismantle and dispose of CVN 65 after 51 years of service. In 2013, the estimated cost to complete the CVN 65 work as originally planned increased to well over $1 billion, leading the Navy to consider different dismantlement and disposal options.\nThe Senate Report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 included a provision for GAO to review the Navy's plans for CVN 65. This report addresses (1) dismantlement and disposal options under consideration; (2) nuclear regulatory authority considerations; and (3) funding and reporting practices.\nGAO reviewed budget, cost, and schedule documentation, as well as applicable laws, regulations, executive orders, policies, and guidance. GAO interviewed officials from the Navy and commercial companies about the dismantlement and disposal options, and NRC and state agencies about regulatory considerations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Navy is assessing two options to dismantle and dispose of its first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier\u2014ex-USS Enterprise (also known as CVN 65). CVN 65 dismantlement and disposal will set precedents for processes and oversight that may inform future aircraft carrier dismantlement decisions.\nCharacteristics of the Navy's Potential CVN 65 Dismantlement and Disposal Options\nSource: GAO analysis of Navy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission information. | GAO-18-523\nThe Navy could rely on its extensive regulatory experience for the naval shipyard option. However, the Navy's ability to effectively evaluate the full commercial option is hampered by a disagreement with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which oversees the commercial nuclear industry. Naval Reactors officials assert that NRC's regulatory authority should apply to the full commercial option. NRC disagrees with this position. Coordination between the two agencies to identify the applicable regulatory authority and craft a regulatory plan would help ensure accountability, solidify cost estimates, and facilitate a CVN 65 decision.\nThe budget documentation and reporting that the Navy typically uses for ship dismantlement and disposal projects will not enable adequate oversight of CVN 65\u2014a multi-year project with a cost that may exceed $1 billion. The documents that support Navy budget requests for dismantlement and disposal funding do not provide data that decision makers can readily use to track dismantlement costs against an established baseline or to evaluate funding plans for future years. Further, the Navy has no reporting requirements to support accountability for CVN 65 activities. Large defense acquisition programs generally are required to submit more detailed budget information and report on cost, schedule, and performance. These practices could be adapted for CVN 65 to provide information that will facilitate oversight commensurate with the scale of the effort.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nCongress should consider requiring Naval Reactors to coordinate with NRC to identify the applicable regulatory authority for a CVN 65 commercial dismantlement and disposal. GAO is also making four recommendations, including that the Navy take action to provide additional budget information and reporting to facilitate improved transparency and accountability for the CVN 65 cost, schedule, and risks. The Department of Defense agreed with all four recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_713"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_714","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSince 2005, the federal government has enacted various statutes aimed at accelerating the environmental review process for highway and transit projects. In addition, the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act may require three federal agencies\u2014the Corps, FWS, and NMFS\u2014to issue permits or perform consultations before a project can proceed.\nGAO is required by statute to assess the extent to which statutory provisions have accelerated and improved environmental permitting and consulting processes for highway and transit projects. This report examines, among other things: 1) the impact of streamlining provisions on consulting and permitting time frames, and (2) additional actions used by federal resource agencies to streamline their reviews. GAO analyzed permitting and consulting data from the 3 federal agencies and interviewed officials from the 3 agencies, 16 agency field offices, and 7 state DOTs for their perspectives on the effect of streamlining provisions and other efforts. GAO selected these offices to include a range of locations and those with a greater number of permits and consultations, among other factors.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFederally funded highway and transit projects must be analyzed for their potential environmental effects, as required by the National Environmental Policy Act, and may be subject to other environmental protection laws, including the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act. These laws may require the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to issue permit decisions and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to conduct consultations before a project can proceed. These three agencies are referred to as \u201cresource agencies\u201d for this report. The three most recent transportation reauthorization acts include provisions that are intended to streamline various aspects of the environmental review process; 18 of these provisions could potentially affect time frames for the environmental permitting and consulting processes for highway and transit projects.\nWhile officials GAO interviewed at resource agencies and state departments of transportation (state DOT) noted that some actions called for by the 18 statutory provisions have helped streamline the consultation and permitting processes for highway and transit projects, GAO found that a lack of reliable agency data regarding permitting and consulting time frames hinders a quantitative analysis of the provisions' impact. Officials said, for example, that a provision that allows federal liaison positions at resource agencies to focus solely on processing applications for state DOT projects has helped avoid delays in permit and consultation reviews. However, none of the three resource agencies could provide enough reliable data to analyze changes in the durations of consultations and permit reviews over time for any of the provisions. Further, GAO identified limitations, such as negative or missing values, and inconsistent data entry practices for FWS and NMFS data. FWS and NMFS have limited controls, such as electronic safeguards and other data-entry procedures, to ensure the accuracy and reliability of their data on the duration of consultations. Left unaddressed, these data quality issues may impair the agencies' ability to accurately determine whether they are meeting their 135-day statutory and regulatory deadlines to complete consultations and provide biological opinions, and could affect their ability to provide accurate data on time frames for efforts of the Office of Management and Budget to track agencies' performance in conducting environmental reviews. While FWS and NMFS officials stated that the agencies plan to improve their tracking systems, the agencies do not have documented plans or time frames for the improvements and it is unclear whether the efforts will include internal controls to improve data reliability.\nSome federal resource agency and state DOT officials GAO interviewed identified additional actions that have been used to streamline the consultation and permitting processes to avoid delays in agency reviews. For example, 16 of the 23 resource agency and state DOT officials said that field office staff provided training to state DOT staff about the information field offices required for permit or consultation applications. Resource agency and state DOT officials also identified electronic systems with environmental data and for submitting documents as streamlining actions that have been helpful.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making two recommendations, one to FWS and one to NMFS, to develop plans and time frames for improving their tracking systems and to develop internal controls to improve data reliability.\nThe Departments of Commerce and Interior concurred with our recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_714"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_715","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFraud poses a significant risk to the integrity of federal programs and erodes public trust in government. Implementing effective fraud risk management processes can help ensure that federal programs fulfill their intended purpose, spend their funding effectively, and safeguard assets.\nFRDAA requires agencies to establish internal controls to manage their fraud risks and to report implementation progress for the first 3 years after enactment. It also directs OMB to (1) develop guidelines for agencies to establish fraud risk management controls and (2) establish a working group to share best practices in fraud risk management and data analytics.\nGAO was asked to review agencies' and OMB's efforts to implement FRDAA. This report examines steps (1) agencies and (2) OMB have taken to implement FRDAA. GAO conducted a survey of the 72 agencies subject to the act, held a roundtable discussion with 14 selected agencies, reviewed 24 selected annual financial reports, examined OMB guidelines, and interviewed OMB staff.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAt varying stages, agencies have begun planning for and implementing fraud risk activities (like conducting an evaluation of fraud risks) required by the Fraud Reduction and Data Analytics Act of 2015 (FRDAA), according to GAO's survey of agencies subject to the act. Overall, most of the 72 surveyed agencies (85 percent) indicated that they have started planning how they will meet FRDAA requirements, and about 78 percent indicated that they have also started taking steps to implement the requirements.\nTo assist agencies in implementing fraud risk management activities, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) established FRDAA-related guidelines and a working group, as required by the act. However, agencies experienced challenges with OMB's guidelines and the working group, among other things, according to GAO's survey and roundtable discussion results (see figure below).\nImplementation guidelines. To meet FRDAA requirements, OMB updated Circular No. A-123 guidelines that govern executive agencies. However, this update included limited information on the methodologies agencies can use to assess, document, and report on internal controls required by FRDAA, according to GAO's review of the guidelines. Surveyed agencies had mixed perspectives on the usefulness of OMB's guidelines for implementing FRDAA controls. Similarly, agencies identified the lack of clear requirements and guidance as top challenges in GAO's roundtable discussion with 14 selected agencies.\nReporting on implementation progress. Although not required by FRDAA, OMB updated annual financial report guidelines to include FRDAA requirements, but GAO found that the guidelines did not contain enough information to aid agencies in producing complete and detailed progress reports in 2017, the first year of reporting. Additional guidelines from OMB could help agencies produce more complete and detailed reports for 2019, the final year of required reporting. Without a longer reporting period, however, Congress may not have the useful information for continued oversight of agencies' progress.\nWorking Group. OMB has taken steps to establish the working group, but GAO found the working group did not fully meet FRDAA requirements. As Chair, OMB did not (1) involve all agencies subject to the act in the working group or (2) hold the required number of meetings in 2017. Most surveyed agencies indicated a lack of involvement with and information from the working group as challenges in implementing FRDAA.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making three recommendations, including that OMB (1) enhance its guidelines for establishing controls, (2) enhance guidelines for reporting on agencies' progress, and (3) fully implement the working group. OMB did not concur with the need for the recommendations. GAO continues to believe the recommendations are valid, as discussed in the report. Additionally, Congress should consider extending agencies' reporting requirements.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_715"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_716","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) authorized the establishment of PCORI to carry out CER and improve its quality and relevance. PPACA also established new requirements for HHS to, among other things, disseminate findings from federally funded CER, including findings published by PCORI; and coordinate with relevant federal health programs to build data capacity for this research. To fund CER activities, PPACA established the Trust Fund from which PCORI and HHS are expected to receive an estimated $4.0 billion from fiscal years 2010 through 2019.\nPPACA included a provision for GAO to review PCORI's and HHS's use of the Trust Fund. This report examines (1) PCORI's use of the Trust Fund for CER activities, including the dissemination and use of research findings; and (2) HHS's use of the Trust Fund for these activities.\nGAO examined PCORI and HHS documents and data related to use of the Trust Fund, such as commitment, obligation, and expenditure data; PCORI's audited financial statements; and descriptions of CER activities. GAO also interviewed PCORI and HHS officials responsible for planning and carrying out CER activities and interviewed officials from stakeholder organizations representing potential users of CER, including public and private payer organizations, provider organizations, and patient organizations. PCORI and HHS provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI) made about $2 billion in commitments for awards in fiscal years 2010 through 2017. PCORI is a federally funded, nonprofit corporation established to carry out and improve comparative clinical effectiveness research (CER), which evaluates and compares the health outcomes and the clinical effectiveness, risks, and benefits of two or more medical treatments, services, or items. PCORI provides funding through award commitments from the Patient Centered Outcomes Research Trust Fund (Trust Fund) and may pay these awards over multiple years. Of the $2 billion PCORI committed as of the end of fiscal year 2017, about $1.6 billion (or 79 percent of its commitments) is for research awards, and $325 million (or 16 percent) is for building the capacity to use existing health data for research. Through fiscal year 2017, commitments for dissemination and implementation awards\u2014intended to share CER findings with potential users of this research\u2014were limited because most PCORI-funded research was still underway. PCORI projects to commit an additional $721 million for awards in fiscal years 2018 through 2021. In addition to awards, PCORI spent $310 million on program and administrative support services in fiscal years 2010 through 2017 and projects to spend an additional $206 million for these services through fiscal year 2024.\nFrom fiscal years 2011 through 2017, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) obligated about $448 million from the Trust Fund. Of this amount, HHS obligated about $260 million (or 58 percent of all obligations) to the dissemination and implementation of CER findings. As most PCORI-funded CER had not yet been completed due to the time needed to conduct this research, HHS efforts focused instead on the dissemination and implementation of CER funded by other federal entities. Additionally, HHS obligated funds for efforts to train researchers on conducting CER, build data capacity, and on administrative activities. HHS projects to obligate an additional $120 million for these activities in fiscal years 2018 through 2020.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_716"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_717","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOD must be able to rapidly deploy forces to respond to a range of worldwide contingencies, and in 2007 it established the GRF to enhance that capability. The GRF is a set, or \u201cmenu,\u201d of forces from the military services, each of which possesses unique capabilities, and which the Secretary of Defense can deploy rapidly anywhere in the world.\nHouse Report 114-537, accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, included a provision for GAO to evaluate challenges DOD may be facing regarding the GRF. GAO reviewed the extent to which (1) DOD has used the GRF, and assessed any risks associated with its use of the GRF; and (2) GRF-assigned units are trained to meet GRF missions individually and as a joint force. GAO reviewed GRF deployment information from 2010 to 2017 and the GRF Execute Order, observed a training exercise, and interviewed knowledgeable officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense's (DOD) Global Response Force (GRF) has two distinct uses: one is to enhance DOD's ability to rapidly deploy forces in response to a range of worldwide contingencies with a tailorable joint force; and the other is to provide a set, or \u201cmenu,\u201d of units that combatant commands can request to augment their capabilities in light of unexpected challenges when requirements exceed their capabilities. Since 2010, according to officials, DOD has used the GRF 35 times in support of worldwide contingencies, with 32 of those times involving deployment of individual GRF units to augment combatant commander needs, and 3 times involving their use as part of a joint task force. This predominant use of individual GRF units to augment combatant commanders' needs has diminished the set of units available for mission scenarios related to the GRF's use as a tailorable joint force. For example, when DOD deployed a ballistic missile defense unit as a part of the GRF to augment a combatant command's missile defense capabilities, the particular capability it supplied to the GRF was not available for participation in a tailorable joint force to respond quickly to a potential worldwide contingency, if such an event occurred. DOD does not know what risks it assumes to readiness for GRF mission scenarios due to its general reliance upon the GRF as an augmentation capability available to individual geographic combatant commands, because DOD has not assessed those risks. Without conducting a risk assessment and taking steps to address any identified risk to accomplishing the GRF's intended uses, DOD's attempt to satisfy one of the uses (that is, individual GRF-assigned units assisting combatant commands) may hamper the other use (that is, deployment of a joint task force for a contingency).\nGRF units train individually to meet GRF missions, but DOD does not conduct any GRF-specific joint training exercises, and the individual GRF units have limited opportunities to train as part of an integrated joint force, according to DOD officials. While the GRF Execute Order calls for integrating elements of the GRF into existing joint training, the military services lack the authority to direct other services to supply forces for joint training exercises, even when those forces are currently on a GRF rotation. Moreover, since the disestablishment in 2011 of U.S. Joint Forces Command\u2014which, among other things, was the lead agent for joint force training\u2014and because units designated for the GRF mission may be assigned to different combatant commands or may be service-retained, no single commander has the authority to require joint force training of GRF units. As a result, no joint training exercises are specifically designed to exercise GRF units as a joint task force. Army officials told GAO that joint exercises are important because they give individual units from different services the opportunity to identify challenges and develop solutions, thereby enhancing the GRF's joint task force capability. Without an entity having the responsibility and authority to plan, direct, and conduct joint training exercises focused on GRF-assigned units deploying as a joint task force as appropriate, DOD risks undermining the effectiveness of the rapid deployment of a GRF joint task force in response to unforeseen worldwide contingencies.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DOD (1) assess the risks assumed in its reliance upon the GRF as both an augmentation capability and a tailorable joint force; (2) design appropriate responses following the risk assessment; and (3) designate an authority to establish and enforce integrated joint training as appropriate for GRF-assigned units. DOD concurred with GAO's three recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_717"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_718","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCBP began work on ACE in 1994 to update the agency's existing electronic trade processing system. In 2006, Congress broadened this effort by mandating creation of a \u201csingle portal\u201d International Trade Data System to, among other things, efficiently regulate the flow of commerce and more effectively enforce laws and regulations relating to international trade. Performance problems halted implementation of ACE from 2010 to 2013. In 2014, the President set a deadline of December 31, 2016, for completing the system.\nThe Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 included a provision for GAO to report on issues related to ACE implementation. In this report, GAO examines (1) CBP efforts to complete core ACE capabilities since 2013; (2) agencies' access to ACE and use of the system to process imports; (3) any cost savings and trade enforcement benefits from using ACE; and (4) the approach that will be used to manage ACE after core capabilities are completed. GAO reviewed information from 22 agencies as well as importers, exporters, and brokers and interviewed agency and trade community representatives.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nSince renewing efforts to implement the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) in 2013, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has deployed a number of key ACE activities, processes, and functions that it terms core capabilities. After several delays, CBP reported that it had finished implementing these capabilities\u2014other than a capability for revenue collections\u2014in February 2018. CBP expects to decide how to proceed with collections by the end of March 2018, according to agency officials.\nThe 22 agencies CBP identified as requiring documentation to clear or license cargo are all authorized to access ACE, although GAO found considerable variation in their use of the system for import processing. For example, the Food and Drug Administration has integrated its systems with ACE and uses ACE data to review imports under its jurisdiction and target public health risks. In contrast, the Fish and Wildlife Service has not yet integrated ACE into its operations.\nACE users at CBP and partner agencies and in the trade community told GAO that using ACE has reduced costs by making trade processing more efficient and has strengthened enforcement of trade laws and regulations. CBP has developed metrics for itself and the trade community and estimated savings that could result from the increased efficiency of some processes in ACE. CBP also reported efforts to expand its metrics to capture more ACE benefits\u2014for example, to estimate the value of increased efficiencies for partner agencies.\nCBP has not yet established an approach for the management of ACE after February 2018. The agency plans to enhance ACE to address shortcomings ACE users have identified\u2014such as difficulty in transmitting messages and required information \u2014but has not established a process for prioritizing all suggested enhancements. CBP also has not identified funding for continued ACE development, including enhancements, after fiscal year 2018. CBP is leading an interagency effort to develop an ACE management approach that includes processes for prioritizing enhancements and sharing costs, but this approach has not been finalized. Federal guidance calls for establishing the organizational structure necessary to operate effectively and for examining efforts as needed to adopt coordinated approaches. Until processes for prioritizing ACE enhancements and sharing costs are finalized, agencies and the trade community will not realize the system's full potential benefits.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nThe Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure that the Commissioner of CBP, in collaboration with partner agencies, finalizes an interagency approach to managing ACE that includes processes for prioritizing enhancements and sharing system costs. CBP concurred with GAO's recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_718"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_719","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) offers subsidized health-care coverage for qualifying applicants. States may operate their own health-care marketplaces or rely on the FFM, maintained by CMS. In PY 2015, 37 states relied on the FFM and over 8 million plan selections were made through the FFM. PPACA represents a significant fiscal commitment for the federal government, which pays subsidies to issuers on participants' behalf.\nGAO was asked to examine enrollment into the FFM for PY 2015, the most current data available at the time of GAO's review. This report examines the extent to which indications of potentially improper or fraudulent enrollments existed in the FFM's application, enrollment, and eligibility-verification process for the 2015 enrollment period.\nGAO reviewed relevant federal statutes, regulations, and policies for PY 2015 and interviewed CMS officials. GAO analyzed eligibility and enrollment data for about 8.04 million applicants in PY 2015 to identify applicants (1) who had a citizenship, status as a national, or lawful presence inconsistency; (2) whose information did not match SSA records; or (3) who were reportedly deceased. GAO also reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 45 applicants to more fully understand verification processes.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nA small percentage\u2014about 1 percent\u2014of plan year (PY) 2015 enrollments were potentially improper or fraudulent. These applicants had unresolved inconsistencies related to citizenship, status as a national, lawful presence, or Social Security number (SSN), or received coverage while reportedly deceased, according to GAO's analysis of federally facilitated marketplace (FFM) eligibility and enrollment data. To verify applicant information, such as citizenship, status as a national, or lawful presence, and SSNs, the FFM uses data from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Social Security Administration (SSA), among other sources. When an applicant's information does not match the available data sources, the FFM generates an inconsistency, and the FFM should take steps, such as requesting applicant documentation, to resolve it. Having an SSN is not a condition of eligibility; however, unresolved inconsistencies could indicate that an enrollment is potentially improper or fraudulent. The FFM did not actively resolve SSN inconsistencies for PY 2015, but the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has since completed system upgrades and established procedures for verifying SSNs with applicant-provided documentation, according to CMS officials.\nNote: Some applicants may be included in more than one category.\nGAO found that applicants or enrollees may have received or maintained coverage with an associated subsidy after their reported death because the FFM did not always identify individuals as deceased in a timely manner, such as prior to automatic reenrollment. CMS relied on third parties, such as family members, to report the death of an enrollee to the FFM, but did not always receive adequate notification to verify the death. According to CMS officials, CMS is exploring approaches to identify enrollees who may be deceased and should therefore be unenrolled from coverage. The FFM checks applicants' information against death information from SSA before initial enrollment but does not recheck death information prior to reenrollment. According to CMS officials, the FFM does not reverify information, other than income, when automatically reenrolling applicants to help encourage individuals to maintain enrollment in coverage from one year to the next. Without rechecking SSA death information prior to automatic reenrollment, the FFM remains at risk of providing subsidized coverage to deceased individuals with related costs to the federal government.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that CMS assess and document the feasibility of approaches to identify the deaths of individuals prior to automatic reenrollment. HHS concurred with GAO's recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_719"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_720","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nEach year, GSA spends hundreds of millions of dollars on R&A projects to address the repair, renovation, or modernization needs of the more than 1,600 federally owned buildings under the agency's custody and control\u2014the average building's age is 47 years old. In fiscal year 2018, Congress appropriated $666 million in obligational authority from the Federal Buildings Fund for GSA's R&A program. Collecting information is fundamental to monitoring progress and assessing projects' performance.\nGAO was asked to review issues about GSA's collection of information needed to manage its R&A projects. This report examines how GSA (1) collects information on individual R&A projects and (2) assesses the performance of R&A projects.\nGAO reviewed documentation on the systems that GSA uses to support its management of the R&A program, as well as internal GSA reports on regional offices' use of the system that tracks projects' status. GAO also interviewed officials from GSA's central office and four regional offices to understand the types of information collected on R&A projects and how the information is input in GSA's systems. To identify the regional officials to be interviewed, GAO selected a non-generalizable sample of four capital R&A projects and eight small R&A projects, active between October 2013 and August 2017, based on a preliminary analysis of GSA data.\nGSA had no comments on the report.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe General Services Administration (GSA) requires its regional offices to collect information on their repair and alteration (R&A) projects electronically and is working to improve the completeness and timeliness of this collection. Since 2011, GSA has required its regional offices to input and update information on both capital projects (those costing more than $3.095 million as of fiscal year 2018) and small projects (those costing less than $3.095 million). Officials from the four regions GAO interviewed said they find this system to be useful for forecasting how a capital project will progress. Regarding small projects' information, GSA has taken steps to improve regional offices' collection by, for example, conducting monthly checks to ensure that all small projects have been created in the system, assessing the number of projects that have missing information, and introducing a simplified way that GSA's regions can enter information in the system. GSA officials reported that, moving forward, they are continuing to emphasize the importance of collecting complete and timely information, which is needed to assess the performance of all R&A projects.\nGSA uses schedule- and budget-focused measures to assess the individual, the regional, and the national performance of capital and small R&A projects and is working to create a consistent understanding of performance. GSA's measures rely on information input by regional officials. For example, during the construction phase, GSA uses two \u201cproject delivery\u201d measures, which compare a project's estimated schedule and budget with actual outcomes. GSA produces regional and national reports detailing projects' performance relative to these measures. However, not all regional officials GAO spoke with view these reports as useful because they are not specific to the officials' information needs. As a result, some regions have created their own reports, contributing to an inconsistent understanding of R&A projects' performance across the agency. GSA has conducted outreach to its regions and has begun to introduce new \u201cdashboard\u201d reports that present a consolidated view of R&A projects' information. Moving forward, GSA's ability to assess R&A projects' performance will continue to rely on regional officials' complete and timely input of information for both capital and small projects.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_720"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_721","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe United States belongs to several inter-American organizations, including the OAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH, which promote democracy, security, health care, agricultural development, and scientific exchange in the Western Hemisphere. The United States helps finance these organizations' operating expenses through assessed contributions. The United States also provides voluntary contributions through the federal funding of assistance agreements to OAS, PAHO, and IICA.\nThis testimony is based on GAO's June and December 2017 reports that, among other things, (1) determined the amounts and percentages of U.S. assessed contributions to the four organizations, (2) assessed the extent to which U.S. agencies included and documented key monitoring provisions as part of their assistance agreements, and (3) assessed the extent to which the organizations' strategic goals align with those of U.S. agencies.\nGAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from State, HHS, USAID, USDA, and the four organizations. GAO analyzed the four organizations' audited financial reports and a nongeneralizable sample of 12 assistance agreements awarded by State, USAID, HHS, and USDA active in calendar years 2014 through 2016.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nWhile the United States' assessed contributions constituted over 57 percent of total assessed contributions by member states to four inter-American organizations from 2014 to 2016, the U.S. share may be reduced in the near future (see table). In response to a statutory requirement, the U.S. Department of State (State) said it submitted to Congress a strategy that included working with the Organization of American States (OAS) member states toward ensuring that the OAS would not assess any single member state a contribution amounting to more than 50 percent of all OAS assessed contributions. At the OAS General Assembly in June 2017, OAS member states voted to draft a proposal to modify its system for determining member states' assessed contributions to potentially reduce the maximum assessed contribution to below 50 percent. The other three organizations use OAS's system for setting assessed contributions. Hence, any change in contributions at OAS should also be reflected at Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), and the Pan-American Institute of Geography and History (PAIGH).\nState, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) provide voluntary contributions to OAS, PAHO, and IICA in the form of assistance agreements (e.g., grants and cooperative agreements). In December 2017, GAO reported that its review of 12 such agreements across the four agencies found that State and USDA did not include all key monitoring provisions in their agreements as called for by applicable guidance. State has since taken corrective action. GAO also found that all four U.S. agencies did not have full documentation of 18 of the 42 monitoring activities required by the 12 assistance agreements GAO reviewed. For example, USDA did not have full documentation, such as financial reports, of any of its 10 required monitoring activities, and USAID did not have full documentation of 2 of its 11 required activities. State and HHS said they initiated corrective action before our review. If an agency does not have full documentation of monitoring activities, it may lack information needed to make appropriate budgetary and programmatic decisions.\nGAO found that the strategic goals of the OAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH are predominantly aligned with the strategic goals of State, USAID, HHS, and USDA. According to agency officials, the agencies employ mechanisms to ensure that assistance agreements with these organizations align with U.S. goals.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nIn its December 2017 report, GAO recommended that (1) USDA ensure inclusion of all monitoring provisions as part of agreements and (2) USAID and USDA ensure full documentation of monitoring activities. USDA and USAID concurred with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_721"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_722","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe federal government spends approximately $137 billion annually on research and development\u2014mostly at DOD, DOE, NASA, and NIH\u2014to further agencies' missions, including at federal labs. Multiple laws have directed agencies and labs to encourage commercial use of their inventions, in part by licensing patents, to private sector companies and others that aim to further develop and bring the inventions to market.\nGAO was asked to review agency practices for managing inventions developed at federal labs, with a particular focus on patent licensing. This report examines (1) challenges in licensing patents and steps taken to address and report them and (2) information to guide establishing financial terms in patent licenses at DOD, DOE, NASA, and NIH. GAO reviewed relevant literature, laws, and agency documents, including patent licenses from 2014, to match the most recent NIST summary report when the licenses were requested, and GAO interviewed agency officials and knowledgeable stakeholders, including organizations that assist federal labs in licensing patents.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFederal agency and laboratory (lab) officials identified challenges in licensing patents across the federal government, and agencies have taken some steps to address and report them. Patent licensing is a technology transfer activity that allows, for example, federal inventions to be legally transferred to the private sector for commercial use. Specifically, officials at the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Energy (DOE), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and National Institutes of Health (NIH), as well as external stakeholders, noted challenges in having researchers identify potentially patentable inventions. DOD, DOE, and NIH officials also cited having inadequate internal systems to keep track of inventions developed in the labs. In addition, several stakeholders stated that licensing patented inventions can be lengthy and bureaucratic, which may deter companies from licensing. The agencies reported taking steps to address these challenges, such as implementing model license agreements across labs to expedite the process.\nThe Department of Commerce has delegated to its National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to annually report agencies' technology transfer activities, including patent licensing. Although NIST has reported some challenges, it has not fully reported the range of challenges identified by agency and lab officials and stakeholders. NIST officials stated that they were generally aware of the challenges but had not considered including them to a greater degree in their annual reports to Congress. By fully reporting the range of challenges in federal patent licensing, NIST has the opportunity to further ensure that Congress is more aware of challenges that limit agencies' efforts and ways for potentially addressing those challenges.\nFederal agencies and labs have limited information to guide officials when establishing the financial terms of patent licenses. For example, while federal labs can use comparable licenses to help establish financial terms, their access to information on comparable licenses from other labs varies, and such information is not formally shared among the agencies. Based on its established interagency role, NIST is best positioned to assist agencies in sharing information on comparable licenses, in accordance with leading practices for interagency collaboration. By doing so, NIST would provide federal agencies and labs with useful information that can help them better establish financial terms and successfully license inventions.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making seven recommendations, including that Commerce instruct NIST to fully report the range of challenges in federal patent licensing in its annual reports to Congress and facilitate information sharing among agencies. Commerce, DOD, DOE, NASA, and NIH generally agreed with GAO's recommendations and are taking steps to implement them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_722"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_723","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nWestern Hemisphere nations such as Mexico and Colombia are major sources of illicit drugs such as cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana. Precursor chemicals used in the production of illicit fentanyl and other dangerous synthetic drugs often originate in China but typically enter the United States through Canada and Mexico. U.S. agencies implementing the National Drug Control Strategy conduct several activities to disrupt the flow of illicit drugs and dismantle the organizations that control them (see fig.). In December 2016, Congress established the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission to, among other things, evaluate the U.S.-funded counternarcotics programs in the Western Hemisphere.\nIn this context, GAO was asked to review key issues related to U.S. counternarcotics efforts in the Western Hemisphere. This report examines (1) U.S. agencies' spending for counternarcotic efforts in the Western Hemisphere during fiscal years 2010-2015, the most recent data available; (2) how agencies are gathering and sharing best practices and lessons learned from their counternarcotics efforts domestically and internationally; and (3) mechanisms U.S. agencies have used to address changing drug threats. GAO analyzed agencies' data and documents, interviewed agency officials, and conducted fieldwork at the U.S. Southern Command and Joint Interagency Task Force South in Florida.\nGAO is not making any recommendations in this report. Several agencies provided technical comments on a draft of this report which we incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nU.S. agencies implementing the National Drug Control Strategy identified billions in spending for Western Hemisphere counternarcotics efforts in fiscal years 2010 through 2015. Agencies that track their counternarcotics spending regionally\u2014the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development\u2014reported spending nearly $5 billion for such activities in the region during this period. Agencies that do not track counternarcotics spending regionally\u2014DHS's Customs and Border Protection and Coast Guard; and the Department of Justice's Drug Enforcement Administration and Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces\u2014reported spending about $34 billion for counternarcotics activities in fiscal years 2010 through 2015. According to officials of these four agencies, most of their counternarcotics activities are in the Western Hemisphere. We are not reporting Federal Bureau of Investigation counternarcotics spending separately, since it is included as part of Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces.\nThe Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), which coordinates the National Drug Control Program, facilitates the sharing of best practices and lessons learned at meetings such as the North American Drug Dialogue workshop, including Canada, Mexico, and the United States. In addition, 7 of the 10 agencies GAO reviewed described processes they have in place for identifying and collecting best practices or lessons learned from counternarcotics efforts in the Western Hemisphere. For example, DOD reported using a process, known as the Joint Lessons Learned Program, that consists of five phases: discovery, validation, resolution, evaluation, and dissemination.\nU.S. agencies use a variety of mechanisms to address changing narcotics conditions in the Western Hemisphere. ONDCP collaborates with agencies working directly on regional counternarcotics efforts to address emerging threats, as reflected in the annually updated National Drug Control Strategy and the Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy. In addition, documentary evidence GAO reviewed showed that a variety of interagency groups, task forces, and committees have been created to coordinate the U.S. government's responses to counternarcotics threats. For example, the National Heroin Coordination Group was established to provide guidance aimed at reducing the growing supply of heroin and illicit fentanyl in the U.S. market.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_723"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_724","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nARNG provides trained and equipped units ready to defend life and property in the 54 states, territories, and the District of Columbia. In 2011, the Army Audit Agency reported weaknesses in internal controls over soldier incentive payments in the California ARNG that led to some improper payments. DOD initially took actions to recoup some of these payments, but the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 allowed for the waiver or other forgiveness of debt.\nThe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision for GAO to assess policies and procedures for minimizing and waiving the recoupment of improper payments. This report (1) evaluates the extent to which ARNG has implemented and planned to adjust the internal controls for its Selected Reserve Incentive Program to prevent improper payments and (2) describes which DOD organizations have the authority to waive ARNG incentive debts and steps taken to improve waiver documentation. GAO conducted site visits to six states based on the value of their incentive programs, reviewed documentation used to manage incentive programs, examined incentive debt waiver cases, and interviewed DOD officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn response to the over $22 million in improper payments the California Army National Guard (ARNG) made in cash bonuses and other soldier incentives from 2004 through 2010, ARNG officials implemented some internal controls to prevent future improper incentive payments. These internal controls include automated and manual checks of soldier incentive contracts to verify soldiers' eligibility for incentive payments. For example, ARNG implemented automated rules in its Guard Incentive Management System\u2014an online system that tracks incentive contracts\u2014to monitor a soldier's eligibility for an incentive by comparing the data received from multiple personnel systems against the soldier's contract. If any issues are found, the Guard Incentive Management System will flag the incentive case for review by state ARNG officials and will stop future payments until the issue is resolved.\nWhile these internal controls have improved accountability over soldier incentive payments, ARNG is still in the process of completing further actions. For example, in April 2017, ARNG issued the fiscal year 2017 Selected Reserve Incentive Program policy. However, ARNG did not incorporate changes as a result of this policy into the Guard Incentive Management System to ensure that the automated checks captured these policy changes\u2014including one that affects approximately 8,000 solider incentive contracts, according to ARNG officials. ARNG officials told us that they had not updated the Guard Incentive Management System with this policy because of technical challenges resulting from a transition in vendors for the Reserve Component Manpower System\u2014an information system that houses the Guard Incentive Management System. ARNG officials also told us that they plan to update the Guard Incentive Management System to include the 2017 policy in February 2018.\nGAO also found that ARNG had not developed and implemented a plan for future significant changes that could affect its internal controls over soldier incentive payments. These changes include, for example, the end of the current vendor contract in 2020 to support the Reserve Component Manpower System and the Army National Guard's migration to the Integrated Personnel and Pay System \u2013 Army that is scheduled to occur in 2018. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should identify, analyze, and respond to significant changes that could affect an internal control system. Specifically, because conditions affecting an organization and its environment continually change, management needs to anticipate and plan for significant changes by using a forward-looking process to prepare for those changes. Without taking action to plan for such changes, ARNG puts itself at risk of making improper payments in the future.\nThe Defense Finance and Accounting Service and the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals review and adjudicate requests for waivers of incentive debt. DOD has taken two steps to improve the availability of documentation needed to adjudicate waiver cases. First, DOD has clarified the policy in its Financial Management Regulation on the documentation soldiers are required to provide. Second, officials review documentation in the Guard Incentive Management System before validating an incentive payment, which may reduce delays associated with missing documentation when processing waiver requests.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that ARNG develop and implement a plan that identifies, analyzes, and responds to significant changes that could affect internal controls for its Selected Reserve Incentive Program. ARNG concurred with the recommendation and has identified planned actions to address the recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_724"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_725","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn fiscal years 2006 through 2016, the federal government spent almost $193 billion on DOE's M&O contracts\u2014a form of contract that traces its origins to the Manhattan Project. Six DOE offices use M&O contracts to manage and operate federally owned sites that perform work to fulfill DOE's diverse missions, such as conducting scientific research and maintaining nuclear weapons.\nGAO was asked to review DOE's performance management of its M&O contracts. This report examines, among other things, (1) how DOE offices evaluated M&O contractor performance in fiscal years 2006 through 2016; (2) the extent to which DOE's fiscal year 2016 M&O contractor PERs provide information on contractors' technical, administrative, and cost performance; and (3) the results of DOE's M&O contractor performance evaluations for fiscal years 2006 through 2016.\nGAO reviewed performance evaluation documents for 21 of the 22 DOE M&O contracts; analyzed DOE policies, procedures, and guidelines, and federal regulations; analyzed technical, administrative, and cost aspects of M&O contracts' 2016 PERs; and interviewed DOE officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn fiscal years 2006 through 2016, six offices within the Department of Energy (DOE) generally used one of three different approaches to evaluate management and operating (M&O) contractor performance. Although these approaches varied in the performance criteria and methodologies used for determining contractor ratings and incentives, all the offices annually set expectations for contractors and assessed performance.\nIn analyzing DOE's fiscal year 2016 Performance Evaluation Reports (PER), GAO found that these reports provided less information on M&O contractors' cost performance than on contractors' technical and administrative performance. The cost information provided in the PERs often was not detailed, did not indicate the significance of the performance being described, and applied only to specific activities. Further, the information is of limited use for acquisition decision-making, such as deciding whether to extend the length of a contract, because it does not permit an overall assessment of cost performance. A key reason PERs did not include more cost performance information is that the DOE offices' policies do not require specific assessments of cost performance or discuss how to ensure cost information is useful for future acquisition decision-making. By updating policies to require inclusion of quality cost performance information in PERs, DOE offices could better assess M&O contractors' costs, improve acquisition decision-making, and ensure performance evaluations fully address required elements.\nBased on GAO's review of DOE M&O contractor performance evaluations from fiscal years 2006 through 2016, DOE generally provided high performance ratings and more than 90 percent of available performance incentives (see figure). Ratings for some areas of contractor performance, as well as ratings for contractor performance at specific DOE sites, varied from this trend. For example, three times during this period contractors received 50 percent or less of available award and incentive fees due to a major accident and safety and security issues.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making seven recommendations to DOE, including to each of the six DOE offices to update their policies requiring that PERs include quality information to enable an overall assessment of M&O contractor cost performance. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOE generally agreed with these recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_725"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_726","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nUSPS's competitive products have become increasingly important, comprising about 28 percent of USPS's total revenue. USPS scans these packages at various points throughout the postal network. When scans are inaccurate or missing, questions are raised about the veracity of USPS's data on scanning performance and can lead to customer complaints.\nGAO was asked to review USPS's scanning policies and procedures. In this report, GAO (1) describes USPS's scanning performance and (2) examines how USPS ensures accurate scanning. GAO reviewed USPS's policies and procedures and assessed them against internal control standards; interviewed officials from USPS and five high-volume mailers; and conducted site visits to six post offices in two USPS districts that represented a range of volume, number of routes, and performance.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nMail products over which the United States Postal Service (USPS) does not exercise market dominance, such as many of its packages, are called competitive products. These items are scanned throughout the mail delivery system to track their progress (see figure). USPS data show that these products are almost always scanned. For example, USPS data showed that for the first three quarters of fiscal year 2018; all but one of USPS's 67 districts met their scanning goals. Additionally, mailers that account for a high volume of USPS's competitive products told GAO that they believed USPS was generally scanning products correctly. However, a small percentage of missed or inaccurate scans occur. For example, a report from one USPS district showed that for one week, 0.73 percent of the products delivered were missing a scan and that for the fiscal year to date almost 155,000 competitive products were missing a delivery scan.\nUSPS has designed and implemented procedures and activities to help ensure accurate scanning, but some limitations could contribute to scanning errors. For example, USPS has not based its operational procedures for scanning on any internal control standards. USPS officials said the procedures were based on USPS's unique responsibilities, management experience, and sound business practices, but the officials could not identify specific standards or a framework that they followed as the basis for the procedures. USPS officials said they did not believe any internal controls standards applied to these procedures. By not basing procedures on standards, USPS may miss opportunities to improve how it achieves its mission to scan and measure the performance of competitive products. Additionally, USPS's scanning procedure documents, such as for outlining specific delivery scanning steps, are not always consistent, and USPS relies on more informal methods, such as meetings with employees to communicate changes. Thus, employees may not have accurate procedures available to them. Finally, USPS lacks procedures to help managers identify and address incorrect scans, address customer complaints or otherwise address scanning irregularities. For example, USPS's guidance for managers is limited to a list of bullet-points that do not detail the steps managers should follow to resolve scanning irregularities. In addition, this list has not been updated since 2005. Without consistent or detailed procedures, USPS's employees and managers may not scan items accurately or find information needed to resolve scanning issues\u2014a situation that could hinder USPS's ability to reduce inaccurate or missing scans for these important mail products.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that USPS: (1) identify and adopt internal control standards for its operational activities such as for scanning of competitive products; (2) improve the communication of procedures for scanning competitive products; and, (3) create procedures for supervisors on how to address inaccurate scans and resolve scanning issues. USPS agreed to explore addressing the first recommendation and agreed with the other two recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_726"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_727","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFederal agencies are exploring ways to use telework as a tool to reduce the federal footprint and use space more efficiently. GAO was asked to examine the effects of telework on agencies' space-planning efforts. In this report, GAO reviewed: (1) how the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies reported using telework in office space planning; (2) the specific ways selected agencies and GSA used telework in their office space planning; and (3) any challenges the civilian CFO Act agencies faced in using telework in office space planning.\nGAO surveyed all 23 civilian CFO Act agencies, analyzed each agency's space-planning documents, and Real Property Efficiency Plans . GAO reviewed four agencies in greater detail based on analysis of telework data and other factors. For those four agencies GAO conducted site visits, interviewed officials, and analyzed agency documents. GAO also identified challenges agencies faced in using telework in space planning, based on survey results, agency documents, and interviews.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe 23 civilian Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Act agencies reported various ways of considering and using telework as a space-planning tool, by, for example, implementing desk-sharing for employees who telework in order to relinquish leased space, or increasing the number of staff working in an existing space without increasing its size. All of the 23 agencies discussed telework in the context of space planning and achieving greater space efficiencies in either their space-planning documents or Real Property Efficiency Plans . The agencies that used telework as a space-planning tool generally reported implementing smaller or unassigned workstations.\nThree of the four agencies GAO reviewed in greater detail\u2013\u2013the General Services Administration (GSA); the Office of Justice Programs at the Department of Justice; the Centers for Disease Control at the Department of Health and Human Services; and the Bureau of the Fiscal Service at the Department of the Treasury\u2013\u2013leveraged telework to reduce or use office space more efficiently. For example, GSA and the Office of Justice Programs used telework to accommodate more employees in a smaller office space as illustrated in figure 1 below. The Centers for Disease Control used telework to accommodate more employees in the same amount of space. The Bureau of the Fiscal Service reduced space without telework by reducing the size of individual workstations.\nThe 23 civilian CFO Act agencies reported several challenges in using telework to reduce space including human capital issues, mission suitability, and measuring cost savings attributable to telework. About two-thirds of the agencies said they would find it helpful to have additional information, assistance, or resources in using telework as a space-planning tool. GSA provides guidance to improve space utilization. However, GAO found that GSA last developed relevant formal guidance in 2006. This information, and that on GSA's telework and space-planning websites, was neither specific nor detailed and therefore of limited assistance to agencies that would like to use telework as a space-planning tool. Additionally, GSA's space-planning tool\u2014the Workplace Investment and Feasibility Tool, intended to help agencies quantify the benefits and costs of telework\u2013\u2013remains under development after more than 4 years, and GSA officials have not decided whether to make the tool available to other federal agencies. As such, agencies reported that they lack adequate guidance to determine how best to reduce space or use it more efficiently, and how to assess the benefits and costs of using telework in space planning.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGSA concurred with recommendations that GSA should: (1) develop guidance on how agencies can use telework as a strategic space-planning tool and make this guidance readily available and (2) complete and make the Workplace Investment and Feasibility Tool available to federal agencies for use in assessing the benefits and costs of telework.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_727"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_728","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe FMS program is one of the primary ways the U.S. government supports its foreign partners, by providing them with defense equipment and services. The program charges FMS customers overhead fees to cover the U.S. government's operating costs. They include the administrative fee for costs such as civilian employee salaries and facilities, and the CAS fee for the cost of contract quality assurance, management, and audits. In 1989, Congress excluded from administrative expenses certain costs associated with military personnel who work on the FMS program as well as unfunded civilian retirement and other benefits. As of May 2018, the administrative fee rate is 3.5 percent, and the CAS fee rate is 1.2 percent.\nHouse Report 114-537 and Senate Report 114-255 included provisions that GAO review DSCA's collection and management of these fees. This report examines, for fiscal years 2007 to 2017, the balance of and controls over (1) the administrative account and (2) the CAS account. GAO analyzed Department of Defense (DOD) data and documents, modeled projections for the administrative account, and interviewed DOD officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Foreign Military Sales (FMS) administrative account balance grew by over 950 percent from fiscal years 2007 to 2017\u2014from $391 million to $4.1 billion\u2014due in part to insufficient management controls, including the lack of timely rate reviews. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) has some controls to manage the account balance. For example, DSCA has established a method for calculating a minimum desired balance to ensure it has sufficient funds to complete FMS cases despite uncertain future sales. At the end of fiscal year 2017, the account balance was $2.7 billion above this minimum. DSCA, however, has completed rate reviews less frequently than directed by its policy. Moreover, DSCA has not adopted the best practice of setting an upper bound for the account that would, along with the minimum level, provide a target range for the account balance. By not performing timely rate reviews or setting an upper bound, DSCA has limited its ability to prevent excessive balance growth. GAO modeling indicates that, even with a planned fee rate reduction to 3.2 percent, the account balance would likely remain above its minimum level through fiscal year 2024, including if annual expenditures increased by 15 percent more than expected. As such, the account has the potential to pay for additional expenses. These could include expenses first excluded by statute in 1989 at a time when the account balance was negative and which have since been paid from other appropriated funds. DOD told GAO it is willing to revisit these exclusions.\nThe FMS contract administration services (CAS) account grew from fiscal years 2007 to 2015 from $69 million to $981 million, due in part to insufficient management controls, including not setting an upper bound. The balances for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 overstated the amount of funds available due to a systems issue and limited related oversight. Since 2014, DSCA has implemented some controls for the CAS account, such as regular reviews of the account balance, but weaknesses remain. In particular, DSCA does not plan to follow its internal guidance to conduct the next CAS fee rate review within 5 years. DSCA also has inconsistently calculated the desired minimum level for the account. Finally, DSCA has not set an upper bound for the account to help officials follow internal guidance that directs them to determine when the balance is excessive and a fee rate reduction should be considered. As a result, DSCA is limited in its ability to make timely, appropriate decisions on the fee rate.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nCongress should consider redefining what it considers an allowable expense to be charged from the administrative account. GAO is making six recommendations to help DSCA improve its controls over both accounts, including completing more timely reviews and establishing a desired range for balance levels. DOD generally concurred.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_728"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_729","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe LDA, as amended, requires lobbyists to file quarterly disclosure reports and semiannual reports on certain political contributions. The law also includes a provision for GAO to annually audit lobbyists' compliance with the LDA. GAO's objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which lobbyists can demonstrate compliance with disclosure requirements, (2) identify challenges to compliance that lobbyists report, and (3) describe the resources and authorities available to USAO in its role in enforcing LDA compliance, and the efforts USAO has made to improve enforcement. This is GAO's 11th report under the provision.\nGAO reviewed a stratified random sample of 98 quarterly disclosure LD-2 reports filed for the third and fourth quarters of calendar year 2016 and the first and second quarters of calendar year 2017. GAO also reviewed two random samples totaling 160 LD-203 reports from year-end 2016 and midyear 2017. This methodology allowed GAO to generalize to the population of 45,818 disclosure reports with $5,000 or more in lobbying activity, and 30,594 reports of federal political campaign contributions. GAO also met with officials from USAO to obtain status updates on its efforts to focus resources on lobbyists who fail to comply.\nGAO is not making any recommendations in this report. GAO provided a draft of this report to the Department of Justice for review and comment. The Department of Justice provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFor the 2017 reporting period, most lobbyists provided documentation for key elements of their disclosure reports to demonstrate compliance with the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, as amended (LDA). For lobbying disclosure (LD-2) reports and political contributions (LD-203) reports filed during the third and fourth quarter of 2016 and the first and second quarter of 2017, GAO estimates that\n87 percent of lobbyists filed reports as required for the quarter in which they first registered; the figure below describes the filing process and enforcement;\n99 percent of all lobbyists who filed (up from 83 percent in 2016) could provide documentation for income and expenses; and\n93 percent filed year-end 2016 LD-203 reports as required.\nThese findings are generally consistent with prior reports GAO issued for the 2010 through 2016 reporting periods. However, in recent years GAO's findings showed some variation in the estimated percentage of reports with supporting documentation. For example, an estimated increase in lobbyists who could document expenses is notable in 2017 and represents a statistically significant increase from 2016.\nAs in GAO's other reports, some lobbyists were still unclear about the need to disclose certain previously held covered positions, such as paid congressional internships or certain executive agency positions. GAO estimates that 15 percent of all LD-2 reports may not have properly disclosed previously held covered positions. On the other hand, over the past several years of reporting on lobbying disclosure, GAO found that most lobbyists in the sample rated the terms associated with LD-2 reporting as \u201cvery easy\u201d or \u201csomewhat easy\u201d to understand.\nThe U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia (USAO) stated it has sufficient resources and authority to enforce compliance with the LDA. USAO continued its efforts to bring lobbyists into compliance by reminding them to file reports or by applying civil penalties.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_729"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_730","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act created the Innovation Center within CMS to test new approaches to health care delivery and payment\u2014known as models\u2014for use in Medicare, Medicaid, or CHIP. The Innovation Center became operational in November 2010. In 2012, GAO reported on the early implementation of the Innovation Center. GAO found that, during the first 16 months of operations, the Innovation Center focused on implementing 17 new models and developed preliminary plans for evaluating the effects of each model and for assessing the center's overall performance.\nGAO was asked to update its previous work. In this report, GAO: (1) describes the status of payment and delivery models implemented and the resources used; (2) describes the center's use of model evaluations; and (3) examines the center's assessment of its own performance. GAO reviewed available documentation, such as model fact sheets and frequently asked questions, and evaluation reports for models that have been implemented. GAO reviewed obligation data and performance information for the time period for which complete data or information were available. GAO also interviewed officials from the Innovation Center and CMS's Office of the Actuary.\nThe Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAs of March 1, 2018, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (Innovation Center) had implemented 37 models that test new approaches for delivering and paying for health care with the goal of reducing spending and improving quality of care. These models varied based on several characteristics, including the program covered\u2014Medicare, Medicaid, the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), or some combination of the three\u2014and the nature of provider participation\u2014voluntary or mandatory. Going forward, the Innovation Center indicated that the center plans to continue focusing on the use of voluntary participation models and to develop models in new areas, including prescription drugs, Medicare Advantage, mental and behavioral health, and program integrity. Through fiscal year 2016, the Innovation Center obligated $5.6 billion of its $10 billion appropriation for fiscal years 2011 through 2019.\nThe Innovation Center has used evaluations of models (1) to inform the development of additional models, (2) to make changes to models as they are implemented, and (3) to recommend models for expansion. For example, Innovation Center officials noted that, for some instances where evaluations have shown reduced spending with maintained or improved quality of care, the center has developed new models that build upon the approaches of earlier models, but with adjustments intended to address reported limitations. In addition, the Innovation Center used evaluations to recommend two models to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) Office of the Actuary for certification for expansion. According to CMS officials, a model evaluation and a certification for expansion differ in that a model evaluation assesses the impact of a delivery and payment approach for model participants only, while a certification for expansion assesses the future impact on program spending more broadly across all beneficiaries, payers, and providers who would be affected by the expanded model. As a result, the Office of the Actuary used the results of the evaluation and other information, such as Medicare claims data and published studies, to certify the expansion of both models.\nTo assess the center's overall performance, the Innovation Center established performance goals and related measures and reported meeting its targets for some goals in 2015, the latest year for which data were available (see table below).\nInnovation Center officials told GAO that the center also recently developed a methodology to estimate a forecasted return on investment for its model portfolio. The center is in the early stages of refining the methodology and applying it broadly across its models.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_730"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_731","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nO&S costs\u2014the costs used to operate and sustain a program\u2014can account for up to 70 percent of a program's total cost. End users rely on O&S funds for maintenance, spares, and personnel. DHS programs initially identify O&S costs in their life-cycle cost estimate at the outset of the acquisition. This estimate informs the program's budget and affects the amount the department designates for the program's use. In 2015, GAO found that DHS's budget requests did not reflect all estimated costs\u2014including O&S\u2014for certain programs, which limits visibility for decision makers.\nGAO was asked to review O&S activities for major acquisition programs at DHS. This report examines the extent that (1) DHS's budget management and reporting affects operations and oversight, and (2) cost estimates are comprehensive and accurate, as well as regularly updated.\nGAO selected a non-generalizable sample of 11 major acquisition programs, based on asset type and acquisition status, as case studies from selected DHS components. GAO analyzed selected programs' O&S cost estimates, funding, and spending. In addition, GAO interviewed DHS officials at the headquarters, component, and program office level.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nWhile the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) budget management provides flexibility to conduct operations, such as shifting funds to programs within the same mission area to cover unforeseen needs, budget reporting does not provide Congress with insight into specific programs' operations and support O&S costs. The O&S budget information that DHS reports to Congress is oriented by mission\u2014for example, Integrated Operations\u2014instead of by program\u2014for example, the Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft Program. The figure depicts the mission-oriented nature of the budget.\nWhile some program-oriented O&S data are available at the component level, this information does not appear in DHS's budget reports to Congress. This disparity is due in part to the manner in which the department reports budget information. However, these limitations are not insurmountable. Standards for internal controls state that managers should communicate quality information, in this case full program costs. Providing additional data on O&S costs in budget reports would preserve DHS's flexibility in its use of funds while providing Congress a better understanding of the budgetary and programmatic effect of its funding decisions.\nGAO reviewed the O&S portion of the most recently approved cost estimates for selected programs and found that 10 of the 11 estimates provided a complete accounting of all resources and associated cost elements. Further, all the programs had appropriately updated their cost estimates as required, a GAO best practice in cost estimating. Due to the sensitive nature of some programs' cost models, GAO could not verify all aspects of accuracy for all estimates reviewed.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making three recommendations, including that DHS work with Congress to add program-level O&S funding details to the budget information it provides Congress. DHS concurred.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_731"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_732","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe United States has five territories: Puerto Rico, American Samoa, CNMI, Guam, and USVI. The territories, like U.S. states in some cases, borrow through financial markets. Puerto Rico in particular has amassed large amounts of debt, and defaulted on billions of dollars of debt payments. In response to the fiscal crisis in Puerto Rico, Congress enacted and the President signed the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) in June of 2016, which established an Oversight Board with broad powers of budgetary and financial control over Puerto Rico and requires GAO to study fiscal issues in all five U.S. territories.\nIn this report, for each territory for fiscal years 2005-2015, GAO examined (1) trends in public debt and its composition, (2) trends in revenue and its composition, (3) the major reported drivers of the territory's public debt, and (4) what is known about the ability of each territory to repay public debt.\nGAO analyzed the territories' single audit reports; interviewed officials from the territories' governments, ratings agencies, and subject matter experts; and reviewed documents and prior GAO work.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nPuerto Rico: Between fiscal years 2005 and 2014, the latest figures available, Puerto Rico's total public debt outstanding (public debt) grew from $39.2 billion to $67.8 billion, reaching 66 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Despite some revenue growth, Puerto Rico's net position was negative and declining during the period, reflecting its deteriorating financial position. Experts pointed to several factors as contributing to Puerto Rico's high debt levels, and in September 2016 Puerto Rico missed up to $1.5 billion in debt payments. The outcome of the ongoing debt restructuring process will determine future debt repayment.\nAmerican Samoa: American Samoa's public debt more than doubled in fiscal year 2015 to $69.5 million, but remained small relative to its economy, with a debt to GDP ratio of 10.9 percent. American Samoa's debt was primarily used to fund infrastructure projects. Between fiscal years 2005 and 2015, revenues grew and the government's net position was positive and generally improving. GAO previously reported that American Samoa relies heavily on the tuna processing and canning industry. Disruptions in this industry could affect its ability to repay debt.\nCommonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI): CNMI's public debt declined from $251.7 million to $144.7 million between fiscal years 2005 and 2015, decreasing CNMI's debt to GDP ratio to 16 percent. Most of CNMI's debt was used to refinance prior debt and fund infrastructure projects. Despite revenue growth since fiscal year 2011, CNMI's net position was negative and generally declining during the period. GAO previously reported that labor shortages may affect GDP. This could impede CNMI's ability to repay debt in the future.\nGuam: Between fiscal years 2005 and 2015, Guam's public debt more than doubled from almost $1 billion to $2.5 billion, with a debt to GDP ratio of 44 percent for fiscal year 2015. Most of Guam's debt was used to comply with federal requirements and court orders. Revenue grew during this period, and net position fluctuated significantly, with a negative balance in fiscal year 2015. Despite recent and expected economic growth, GAO found that large unfunded pension and other post-employment benefit (OPEB) liabilities may present a risk.\nU.S. Virgin Islands (USVI): Between fiscal years 2005 and 2015, USVI's public debt nearly doubled, reaching $2.6 billion and a debt to GDP ratio of 72 percent. Since 2010, most of USVI's debt was used to fund general government operations. Revenue remained stagnant and net position was negative and declining during the period, reflecting a deteriorating financial position. While USVI holds a year's worth of debt service payments in reserve, GAO found that economic uncertainty and looming government pension fund insolvency by 2023 may hamper repayment. In early 2017, USVI was unable to access capital markets to issue new debt at favorable rates. Although the government adopted a financial plan intended to reduce expenditures and increase revenue, the plan does not address USVI's significant unfunded pension and OPEB liabilities and it is unclear whether the plan will produce the intended level of savings.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making recommendations in this report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_732"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_733","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nPatents can promote innovation by giving inventors exclusive rights to their inventions, and patent owners can bring infringement lawsuits against anyone who uses, makes, sells, offers to sell, or imports a patented invention without authorization. As GAO previously reported, such lawsuits can take years and cost several million dollars. USPTO's CBM program provides a trial proceeding to challenge a patent's validity at USPTO's board for, according to stakeholders, a fraction of the time and money that would be spent in the federal courts. The CBM program began in September 2012 and is slated to sunset in September 2020.\nGAO was asked to examine the CBM program. This report (1) describes the extent to which the program has been used to challenge patents, and the results of those challenges; (2) examines the extent to which USPTO ensures timeliness of trial decisions, reviews decisions for consistency, and engages with stakeholders to improve proceedings for the program; and (3) discusses stakeholder views on the effects of the program and whether it should be extended past its sunset date. GAO analyzed CBM trial data from September 2012 through September 2017, reviewed USPTO documents, and interviewed 38 stakeholders, such as legal and academic commentators, selected for their knowledge of or direct involvement in such trials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFrom September 2012 through September 2017, entities facing patent infringement lawsuits filed 524 petitions challenging the validity of 359 patents under the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's (USPTO) covered business method (CBM) program, resulting in decisions against about one-third of these patents. The CBM program provides entities facing infringement lawsuits an opportunity to challenge the validity of a business method patent by demonstrating that it did not meet requirements for patentability. Business method patents focus on ways of doing business in areas such as banking or e-commerce. The rate of filing petitions over this period has fluctuated but has generally declined since 2015, and none were filed in August or September 2017.\nUSPTO has taken several steps to ensure the timeliness of trial decisions, review past decisions, and engage with stakeholders to improve proceedings under the program:\nTimeliness: USPTO regularly informs relevant parties about paperwork requirements and due dates throughout trials. According to program data, as of September 2017, all 181 completed trials were completed within statutorily required time frames.\nDecision review: USPTO has taken several steps to review its decisions and has monitored the rate at which the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirms or reverses them. However, USPTO does not have guidance, such as documented procedures, for reviewing trial decisions, or the processes leading to decisions, for consistency. Without guidance, such as documented procedures, USPTO cannot fully ensure that it is meeting its objective of ensuring consistency of decisions.\nStakeholder engagement: USPTO judges have engaged with stakeholders by participating in public roundtables and webinars, and attending judicial conferences, among other things.\nStakeholders GAO interviewed generally agreed that the CBM program has reduced lawsuits involving business method patents in the federal courts. While many stakeholders favored maintaining aspects of the program, there was not strong consensus among stakeholders for how future trials should be designed.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that USPTO develop guidance, such as documented procedures, for reviewing trial decisions for consistency. USPTO agreed with GAO's recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_733"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_734","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn 1996 Congress provided DOD with authorities enabling it to obtain private-sector financing and management to repair, renovate, construct, and operate military housing. DOD has since privatized 99 percent of its domestic housing.\nThe Senate Report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for 2017 included a provision that GAO review privatized military housing projects and the effect of recent changes in the basic allowance for housing on long-term project sustainability. This report examines the extent to which DOD has (1) assessed and reported the financial condition of each privatized housing project; (2) assessed the effects of recent reductions in the basic allowance for housing on privatized housing; and (3) defined notification requirements for project changes and risk tolerances relative to privatized housing goals. GAO reviewed policies, project oversight reports, and financial statements, and interviewed DOD officials and privatized housing developers.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) has regularly assessed the financial condition of its privatized housing projects; however, it has not used consistent measures or consistently assessed future sustainment (that is, the ability to maintain the housing in good condition), or issued required reports to Congress in a timely manner. Specifically:\nSome data used to report on privatized housing across the military services are not comparable. For example, there are inconsistencies among the projects in the measurements of current financial condition (for example, the ability to pay debts and maintain quality housing).These differences have not been identified in reports to Congress.\nThe military departments vary in the extent to which they use measures of future sustainment, and information regarding the sustainment of each of the privatized housing projects has not been included in the reports to Congress.\nDOD's reporting to Congress has not been timely. DOD is statutorily required to report to Congress the financial condition of privatized housing projects on a semiannual basis, but it has not reported on any fiscal year since 2014.\nBy taking steps to improve the consistency of the information provided and meet the reporting requirement, DOD would provide decision makers in Congress with useful, timely information about the financial condition of the privatized housing projects as they provide required oversight.\nDOD has not fully assessed the effects of reductions, relative to calculations of market rates for rent and utilities, in servicemembers' basic allowance for housing payments on the financial condition of its privatized housing projects. In August 2015, DOD required the military departments to review their privatized housing portfolios and outline any effects of the reductions. Each military department reported that the reductions would decrease cash flows to their long-term sustainment accounts. However, the reports did not specify the significance of the reductions on each project's future sustainment or identify specific actions to respond to shortfalls at individual projects. If DOD fully assesses the effects of the basic allowance for housing reductions on privatized housing and identifies actions to respond to any risks, DOD and Congress will be better informed to make decisions affecting the projects.\nDOD has not defined when project changes require prior notice to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment or its tolerance for risk relative to its goal of providing servicemembers with quality housing, including the risk from reduced sustainment funding. Specifically, the military departments had different understandings of when project changes, such as financial restructurings, required prior notice. Additionally, DOD has not required the military departments to define their risk tolerances\u2014the acceptable level of variation in performance relative to the objectives\u2014regarding the future sustainability of the projects. By clearly defining the conditions that require advance notification and developing risk tolerance levels, DOD would have consistent information that would improve its oversight of privatized housing and inform its response to any future sustainment challenges.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making eight recommendations, including that DOD improve the consistency and timeliness of the information reported on the financial condition of its privatized housing projects, fully assess the effects of the reductions in basic allowance for housing on the projects, clarify when project changes require notice, and define tolerances for project risks. DOD concurred with each of our recommendations and identified actions it plans to take to implement them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_734"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_735","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nImproper payments are a long-standing problem in the federal government, estimated at almost $141 billion for fiscal year 2017. Agencies are required to perform risk assessments to identify programs that may be susceptible to significant improper payments.\nGAO was asked to review federal agencies' improper payment risk assessments. This report examines the extent to which certain agencies' improper payment risk assessments for selected programs provided a reasonable basis for determining their susceptibility to significant improper payments. GAO analyzed the most recent risk assessments, from 2015 through 2017, for the following five programs: USDA's Agriculture Risk Coverage and Price Loss Coverage programs; HHS's Head Start; DOJ's Law Enforcement; and Treasury's Interest on the Public Debt and Home Affordable Modification Program. GAO selected these programs, focusing on programs that recently underwent a risk assessment and size of programs' gross outlays\u2014which totaled about $330 billion in fiscal year 2017 for the five programs GAO selected.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Improper Payments Information Act of 2002, as amended (IPIA), defines \u201csignificant\u201d improper payments as improper payments in the preceding fiscal year that may have exceeded either (1) 1.5 percent of program outlays and $10 million or (2) $100 million (regardless of the improper payment rate). GAO found that the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Treasury (Treasury), Justice (DOJ), and Agriculture (USDA) assessed the five programs GAO selected for review as at low risk for susceptibility to significant improper payments; however, HHS, Treasury, and DOJ lacked sufficient documentation to assess the extent to which their risk assessments provided a reasonable basis for their risk determinations. On the other hand, USDA's quantitative risk assessment of its program's susceptibility to significant improper payments provided a reasonable basis for its low-risk determination.\nAlthough HHS, Treasury, and DOJ considered, among other factors, the nine risk factors from IPIA and Office of Management and Budget guidance, they did not document or effectively demonstrate how these factors affected their programs' susceptibility to significant improper payments. These programs' risk assessments did not contain sufficient documentation to determine how the agencies arrived at their risk determinations for each risk factor, or how the total scores for all risk factors led to low-risk determinations. For example, HHS determined that its Head Start program was at high risk for several risk factors\u2014including complexity per transaction and volume of payments\u2014but did not document how these high-risk ratings informed its overall determination that Head Start was not susceptible to significant improper payments.\nFurther, the agencies did not have documentation to demonstrate how they determined the weighting of each risk factor or the risk level ranges from the risk assessment templates as they relate to the programs' susceptibility to significant improper payments. For example, based on GAO's analysis of Treasury's risk assessment template, the agency could identify areas of risk related to each of the nine risk factors. But because of the assigned weights given to each risk factor, Treasury's final risk calculation would still not determine the program to be at high risk of susceptibility to significant improper payments. Without documenting the basis for the assigned weights, Treasury cannot demonstrate, and GAO cannot determine, that its process for determining its programs' susceptibility to significant improper payments was reasonable. Until HHS, Treasury, and DOJ revise their risk assessment processes to help ensure that they result in reliable assessments, they cannot be certain whether their programs are susceptible to significant improper payments and therefore whether they are required to estimate the amount of improper payments.\nGAO also found that HHS did not assess many of its programs and activities at least once during the 3-year period from fiscal years 2015 through 2017, as required by IPIA. Based on the analysis of HHS information, GAO identified at least 140 programs or activities that were not assessed during the 3-year period. When not all eligible programs are reviewed as required, there is an increased risk that the agency may not identify all risk-susceptible programs and activities, resulting in incomplete improper payment estimates.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that Treasury, DOJ, and HHS revise their improper payment risk assessment processes, and that HHS revise its procedures to help ensure that all programs are assessed at least once every 3 years. In their responses, Treasury and HHS agreed with the recommendations, and DOJ disagreed with GAO's recommendation. GAO continues to believe that the recommendation is valid, as discussed in the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_735"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_736","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nOil and gas leases on federal lands generate billions of dollars in rents and royalty payments for the federal government each year, but these revenues can be reduced if leases are suspended (i.e., placed on hold). Questions have been raised about whether some suspensions, particularly those in effect for more than 10 years, may hinder oil and gas production or adversely affect the use of federal lands for other purposes, such as recreation.\nGAO was asked to review oil and gas lease suspensions on federal lands managed by BLM. This report examines, among other things, (1) the extent of and reasons for such suspensions and (2) the approach BLM uses to monitor the status of lease suspensions. GAO analyzed all data on suspensions in a BLM database and the official lease files for a nongeneralizable sample of 48 leases recorded as suspended in, Montana and Wyoming, which GAO selected based in part on the large number of suspensions these states had. GAO also reviewed BLM documents and interviewed BLM officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAccording to data at the end of fiscal year 2016 from the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), a small portion of oil and gas leases were suspended for various lengths of time (as shown below), but the reasons for the suspensions were difficult to determine. During a suspension, the government generally does not collect revenues from the lease. Determining the reasons for suspensions is difficult, in part because BLM does not require the inclusion of this information in its database. To obtain this information, BLM officials would have to review the official lease files, of which many are in hard copy. Under Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government , management should use quality information to achieve the entity's objectives. BLM field officials GAO interviewed said that additional, more detailed information in the database on reasons for suspensions would be helpful in tracking lease suspensions. By including a data field in the database to record the reasons for suspensions, BLM could better ensure that federal lands are not being inappropriately kept from development\u2014potentially foregoing revenue\u2014or from other valuable uses of public lands.\nThe approach BLM uses to monitor lease suspensions does not ensure consistent and effective oversight because BLM does not have procedures in place for monitoring. BLM state offices generally delegate responsibility for monitoring lease suspensions to their field offices. Officials from 12 selected field offices in two states with relatively large numbers of lease suspensions reported various frequencies in their monitoring of suspensions, ranging from every few months to rarely or not at all. In the absence of BLM monitoring procedures, field officials have discretion in how and when to monitor. By developing procedures for monitoring lease suspensions, including when to conduct monitoring efforts, BLM could better ensure that lease suspensions in effect are warranted.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nTo better ensure that federal lands are not being inappropriately kept from development, GAO is making four recommendations, including that BLM record the reasons for lease suspensions in its database and develop procedures for monitoring suspensions. Interior concurred with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_736"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_737","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn 2014, instability driven by insecurity, lack of economic opportunity, and weak governance led to a rapid increase of unaccompanied alien children (UAC) from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras arriving at the U.S. border. In fiscal year 2017, the Department of Homeland Security reported (DHS) apprehending more than 200,000 nationals from these countries and removed nearly 75,000 nationals, including UAC, of these countries from the United States and returned them to their home countries. Current estimates also indicate nearly 350,000 individuals may need to be reintegrated to El Salvador and Honduras over the next few years when their Temporary Protected Status in the United States expires.\nGAO was asked to review U.S. efforts to support the reintegration of Central American migrants. This report describes (1) USAID efforts to assist reception and reintegration of migrants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras into their home countries since fiscal year 2014; and (2) what is known about the effectiveness of these efforts. GAO reviewed agency program documents and funding data; interviewed officials from U.S. government agencies, IOM, and host governments and beneficiaries; and conducted site visits in these countries.\nGAO is not making any recommendations in this report. USAID and IAF provided formal comments, which are reproduced in this report, and all agencies provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nSince fiscal year 2014, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided approximately $27 million to the International Organization for Migration (IOM)\u2014an intergovernmental organization focusing on migration\u2014for assistance to migrants returning to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Assistance to migrants includes short-term reception services, such as food and transportation, renovating reception centers, and collecting data on returning migrants that are used to support their reintegration. Assistance also includes long-term reintegration efforts, such as counseling services and employment assistance to make it easier for migrants to readjust to and stay in their home countries. These various efforts are in different stages of development.\nWhile reception services for migrants have improved, USAID has not yet assessed the effectiveness of reintegration efforts. USAID monitored and assessed reception services through site visits, meetings, and reports from IOM. IOM's early efforts improved the three host governments' capacity to provide reception services to returning migrants. For example, since fiscal year 2014, IOM renovated the seven reception centers and shelters being used in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Further, with IOM's assistance, the host governments have improved their capacity to collect data about returning migrants. According to USAID and IOM, host governments are using these data to design policies and develop programs to provide reintegration assistance. While USAID has not yet assessed the effectiveness of reintegration efforts, many of these programs are just beginning. USAID expects to sign a new agreement by the end of December 2018 that would involve, among other things, monitoring and evaluating reintegration efforts in the three countries.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_737"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_738","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSince January 2017, the Navy has suffered four significant mishaps at sea that resulted in serious damage to its ships and the loss of 17 sailors. Three of these incidents involved ships homeported in Japan. In response to these incidents, the Chief of Naval Operations ordered an operational pause for all fleets worldwide, and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations directed a comprehensive review of surface fleet operations, stating that these tragic incidents are not limited occurrences but part of a disturbing trend in mishaps involving U.S. ships.\nThis statement provides information on the effects of homeporting ships overseas, reducing crew size on ships, and not completing maintenance on time on the readiness of the Navy and summarizes GAO recommendations to address the Navy's maintenance, training, and other challenges.\nIn preparing this statement, GAO relied on previously published work since 2015 related to the readiness of ships homeported overseas, sailor training and workload issues, maintenance challenges, and other issues; GAO updated this information, as appropriate, based on Navy data.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO's prior work shows that the Navy has increased deployment lengths, shortened training periods, and reduced or deferred maintenance to meet high operational demands, which has resulted in declining ship conditions and a worsening trend in overall readiness. The Navy has stated that high demand for presence has put pressure on a fleet that is stretched thin across the globe. Some of the concerns that GAO has highlighted include:\nDegraded readiness of ships homeported overseas : Since 2006, the Navy has doubled the number of ships based overseas. Overseas basing provides additional forward presence and rapid crisis response, but GAO found in May 2015 that there were no dedicated training periods built into the operational schedules of the cruisers and destroyers based in Japan. As a result, the crews of these ships did not have all of their needed training and certifications. Based on updated data, GAO found that, as of June 2017, 37 percent of the warfare certifications for cruiser and destroyer crews based in Japan\u2014including certifications for seamanship\u2014had expired. This represents more than a fivefold increase in the percentage of expired warfare certifications for these ships since GAO's May 2015 report. The Navy has made plans to revise operational schedules to provide dedicated training time for overseas-based ships, but this schedule has not yet been implemented.\nCrew size reductions contribute to sailor overwork and safety risks: GAO found in May 2017 that reductions to crew sizes the Navy made in the early 2000s were not analytically supported and may now be creating safety risks. The Navy has reversed some of those changes but continues to use a workweek standard that does not reflect the actual time sailors spend working and does not account for in-port workload\u2014both of which have contributed to some sailors working over 100 hours a week.\nInability to complete maintenance on time: Navy recovery from persistently low readiness levels is premised on adherence to maintenance schedules. However, in May 2016, GAO found that the Navy was having difficulty completing maintenance on time. Based on updated data, GAO found that, in fiscal years 2011 through 2016, maintenance overruns on 107 of 169 surface ships (63 percent) resulted in 6,603 lost operational days (i.e., the ships were not available for training and operations).\nLooking to the future, the Navy wants to grow its fleet by as much as 30 percent but continues to face challenges with manning, training, and maintaining its existing fleet. These readiness problems need to be addressed and will require the Navy to implement GAO's recommendations\u2014particularly in the areas of assessing the risks associated with overseas basing, reassessing sailor workload and the factors used to size ship crews, and applying sound planning and sustained management attention to its readiness rebuilding efforts. In addition, continued congressional oversight will be needed to ensure that the Navy demonstrates progress in addressing its maintenance, training, and other challenges.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO made 11 recommendations in prior work cited in this statement. The Department of Defense generally concurred with all of them but has implemented only 1. Continued attention is needed to ensure that these recommendations are addressed, such as the Navy assessing the risks associated with overseas basing and reassessing sailor workload and factors used in its manpower requirements process.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_738"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_739","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nBLM has primary responsibility for managing oil and gas development on federal and Indian lands. To help ensure operator compliance with laws and regulations, BLM administers the Inspection and Enforcement program. Under the program, BLM inspects operators' drilling, production, and plugging activities and can issue various enforcement actions, such as monetary assessments, for violations. GAO was asked to examine key aspects of the Inspection and Enforcement program.\nThis report (1) describes the distribution of BLM's oil and gas Inspection and Enforcement program's workload and workforce among agency field offices for the most recent 5 years for which such data were available (fiscal years 2012 through 2016) and (2) examines the extent to which BLM conducted internal control reviews in accordance with its July 2012 oversight policy for fiscal years 2013 through 2018, the most recent period for which such data were available. GAO examined BLM policies, data, and documents; interviewed BLM headquarters, state and field office officials; visited six BLM field offices selected based on their level of resource development activity; and toured oil and gas drilling, production, and plugging sites at three of these six field offices.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nBased on GAO's analysis of Bureau of Land Management (BLM) data, the distribution of BLM's oil and gas Inspection and Enforcement program's workload and workforce showed an imbalance among BLM's 33 field offices in fiscal years 2012 through 2016. GAO analyzed BLM data on the overall percentage of the workload and workforce distributed at each field office (i.e., activity level) and grouped similar activity level field offices together into highest, medium and lowest activity categories. GAO found that the program distributed the majority of its workload to 6 highest activity offices and distributed the majority of the workforce to 21 medium activity offices (see fig.). Based on GAO's review of BLM documentation and interviews with agency officials, BLM took both short- and long-term actions in fiscal years 2012 through 2016 to address this imbalance, such as temporarily re-assigning inspectors from some medium activity offices to some of the highest activity offices.\nBLM has not completed all required internal control reviews of its field offices. BLM's July 2012 oversight policy instructs its state offices to periodically conduct internal control reviews of field offices, which are to, among other things, identify staffing needs. BLM state offices completed internal control reviews at 6 of 33 field offices from 2013 through 2017, and 5 more are scheduled from 2018 through 2020. Officials from BLM state offices told GAO that some human capital and workload challenges hindered their ability to complete reviews, including long-term vacancies in some state offices positions. However, a senior BLM official said that headquarters did not consistently track and monitor the extent to which state offices completed field office internal control reviews, and headquarters officials said they were not aware that so few reviews had been completed. Under federal standards for internal control, management should design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks, such as by comparing actual performance to expected results and analyzing significant differences. Identifying the reasons it did not complete internal control reviews, developing and implementing a plan to address those challenges, and monitoring state offices' progress toward completing required reviews will better position BLM to ensure that its state offices are completing all required internal control reviews as called for by its July 2012 oversight policy.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making three recommendations to BLM, including taking actions to increase monitoring of state offices' progress toward completing internal control reviews. BLM concurred with all three recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_739"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_740","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nHBCUs play a prominent role in our nation's higher education system. For example, about one-third of African-Americans receiving a doctorate in science, technology, engineering, or mathematics received undergraduate degrees from HBCUs. To help HBCUs facing challenges accessing funding for capital projects, in 1992, federal law created the HBCU Capital Financing Program, administered by Education, to provide HBCUs with access to low-cost loans. GAO was asked to review the program.\nThis report examines HBCUs' capital project needs and their funding sources, and Education's efforts to help HBCUs access and participate in the HBCU Capital Financing Program. GAO surveyed all 101 accredited HBCUs and 79 responded, representing a substantial, but nongeneralizable, portion of HBCUs. GAO analyzed the most recent program participation data (1996-2017) and finance data (2015-16 school year); reviewed available HBCU master plans; visited nine HBCUs of different sizes and sectors (public and private); and interviewed Education officials and other stakeholders.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nHistorically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), stakeholders, and planning documents identified extensive and diverse capital project needs at HBCUs and GAO found HBCUs rely on a few funding sources\u2014such as state appropriations and tuition and fees\u2014to address those needs. HBCUs responding to GAO's survey reported that 46 percent of their building space, on average, needs repair or replacement. Based on a review of master plans\u2014which assess the condition of HBCU facilities\u2014and visits to nine HBCUs, GAO identified significant capital project needs in the areas of deferred maintenance, facilities modernization, and preservation of historic buildings. The Department of Education's (Education) HBCU Capital Financing Program has provided access to needed funding for some HBCUs and has helped modernize their facilities to improve student recruitment. However, fewer than half of HBCUs have used the program, according to Education data, which was specifically designed to help them address capital project needs (see figure).\nEducation has undertaken several efforts to help HBCUs access and participate in the HBCU Capital Financing Program. For example, Education conducts outreach through attending conferences. However, some HBCUs in GAO's survey and interviews were unaware of the program. Moreover, public HBCUs in four states reported facing participation challenges due to state laws or policies that conflict with program requirements. For example, participants are required to provide collateral, but public HBCUs in two states reported they cannot use state property for that purpose. In March 2018, a federal law was enacted requiring Education to develop an outreach plan to improve program participation. An outreach plan that includes direct outreach to individual HBCUs and states to help address these issues could help increase participation. Without direct outreach, HBCUs may continue to face participation challenges. In addition, two HBCUs recently defaulted on their program loans and 29 percent of loan payments were delinquent in 2017. Education modified a few loans in 2013 and was recently authorized to offer loan deferment, but has no plans to analyze the potential benefits to HBCUs and the program's cost of offering such modifications in the future. Until Education conducts such analyses, policymakers will lack key information on potential options to assist HBCUs.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends Education (1) include direct outreach to individual HBCUs and steps to address participation challenges for some public HBCUs in its outreach plan, and (2) analyze the potential benefits and costs of offering loan modifications in the program. Education outlined plans to address the first recommendation, and partially agreed with the second. GAO continues to believe both recommendations are warranted.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_740"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_741","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAccording to DOD, about 3 million people in the United States receive drinking water from DOD public water systems, which are to comply with EPA and state health-based regulations. EPA and DOD have detected elevated levels of two unregulated, DOD-identified emerging contaminants found in firefighting foam\u2014PFOS and PFOA\u2014in drinking water at or near installations. Perchlorate, an unregulated chemical used by DOD in rocket fuel, can also be found in drinking water.\nThe Senate Report accompanying a bill for national defense authorization for fiscal year 2017 included a provision for GAO to review DOD management of drinking water contaminants. This report examines the extent to which DOD has (1) internally reported data on compliance with health-based drinking water regulations at military installations and used those data to assess compliance at its two types of public water systems, and (2) taken actions to address concerns with its firefighting foam and elevated levels of PFOS, PFOA, and perchlorate in drinking water at or near military installations. GAO reviewed DOD guidance and EPA drinking water regulations, advisories, and orders; analyzed DOD and EPA drinking water data; and visited seven installations from among those addressing emerging contaminants in drinking water.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) has not internally reported all data on compliance with health-based drinking water regulations or used available data to assess compliance. DOD data for fiscal years 2013-2015 indicate that DOD public water systems complied with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and state health-based drinking water regulations at levels comparable with other systems in the United States. However, the military departments did not report all violations to DOD, i.e., while 77 installations reported violations to DOD, GAO found that at least 16 additional installations did not. Until DOD takes steps to increase the clarity and understanding of its internal reporting requirements, it may not have the data it needs to fully oversee compliance. DOD also has not used its data to determine why its two types of systems\u2014one that provides DOD-treated water and another that provides non-DOD-treated water\u2014have different compliance rates. Specifically, DOD's data indicate that about 99 percent of the people who received non-DOD-treated drinking water were served by systems with no violations, while about 89 percent of the people who received DOD-treated drinking water were served by systems with no violations. Absent further analysis of its data, DOD may not be able to improve overall compliance.\nDOD has initiated actions to address concerns with both its firefighting foam and also with elevated levels in drinking water of perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS), perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), and perchlorate, which are DOD-identified emerging contaminants. PFOS and PFOA can be found in DOD's firefighting foam. DOD has restricted its use of this foam and is funding efforts to develop a new foam that meets DOD performance requirements. Additionally, at 11 military installations (see fig.), DOD has shut down wells, provided alternate water sources, or installed water treatment systems to respond to elevated levels of PFOS and PFOA, at times in response to EPA and state orders.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making five recommendations to improve DOD's reporting and use of data on compliance with health-based drinking water regulations. DOD concurred with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_741"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_742","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nU.S. diplomats and their families in Havana, Cuba, were affected by incidents that were associated with injuries, including hearing loss and brain damage. Over State has reported that over 20 U.S. diplomats and family members in Havana have suffered from medical conditions believed to be connected to the incidents, which began in late 2016 and have continued into 2017. By law, State is generally required to convene an ARB within 1260 days of incidents that result in serious injury at, or related to, a U.S. mission abroad, but the Secretary of State can determine that a 60 day extension is necessary. According to State's policy, M\/PRI is responsible for initiating and leading State's ARB incident vetting process.\nThis report is part of a broader request to review State's response to the incidents in Cuba. In this report, GAO examines the extent to which State's ARB policy ensures that M\/PRI is made aware of incidents that may meet the ARB statute criteria. GAO analyzed relevant federal laws, State policies, and other State documents. GAO also interviewed cognizant State officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of State's (State) Accountability Review Board (ARB) policy does not ensure that the responsible office\u2014State's Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation (M\/PRI)\u2014is made aware of incidents that may meet the ARB statute criteria, such as those that occurred in Cuba and were associated with injuries to U.S. personnel. According to State policy, as soon as M\/PRI becomes aware of potentially qualifying incidents, M\/PRI will start the process for considering whether the incident warrants an ARB. M\/PRI relies on informal communication to identify potentially qualifying incidents to begin the vetting process because State does not have a policy, procedure, or process for internal communication of such incidents to M\/PRI, according to State officials and GAO analysis. As illustrated in the figure below, other State entities began responding to the incidents in early 2017, but M\/PRI was not made aware of the incidents until mid-August 2017, when a former M\/PRI official contacted the office after seeing media reports. If M\/PRI is not aware of incidents, it cannot initiate State's ARB incident vetting process. This situation puts State at risk of not meeting statutory time frames for convening an ARB and could result in State being less able to improve security programs and practices at other U.S. diplomatic posts. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government call for internal communication to achieve the entity's objectives and note that management should document responsibilities through policy.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that State revise its policies to define responsibilities for internal communication to M\/PRI of relevant incidents. State concurred with GAO\u2019s recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_742"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_743","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSince 1994, GSA has spent more than $8 billion to construct 78 new federal buildings through its Design Excellence program. Some design choices can affect a building's O&M costs and functionality.\nGAO was asked to review GSA's ability to manage O&M costs under the Design Excellence program. This report assesses the extent to which: (1) GSA's design choices affect O&M costs; (2) GSA considers O&M costs and functionality when planning and designing buildings; and (3) GSA systematically collects and shares information on O&M costs.\nGAO conducted a web-based survey of building managers for the 78 Design Excellence buildings. GAO also visited 10 Design Excellence buildings in three GSA regions selected based on several factors, including geographic and agency diversity. GAO reviewed GSA documents, and interviewed GSA officials and building tenants. Information obtained through site visits and interviews is not generalizable.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe goals of the General Services Administration's (GSA) Design Excellence Program are to creatively design federal buildings that meet federal agencies' functional needs and become public landmarks. Some design choices for Design Excellence buildings have decreased ongoing operations and maintenance (O&M) costs, but others have increased those costs. GSA's building managers and tenants told GAO that design choices that have reduced O&M costs include the use of durable materials and low maintenance landscaping. Other design choices have increased O&M costs. For example, according to GAO's survey of 78 building managers of Design Excellence buildings, multistory atriums often led to additional O&M costs, including the need to erect expensive scaffolding for maintenance.\nWhile GSA aims to create Design Excellence buildings that are cost-effective and functional, it makes design choices without fully considering their effect on O&M costs and functionality. For example, GSA officials do not estimate the majority of O&M costs, such as the building maintenance associated with their design choices until the design is almost finalized. This outcome is partly because GSA procedures do not direct GSA officials to develop such estimates during the design and planning of Design Excellence buildings and because building and regional managers responsible for addressing the O&M consequences are also not involved in the design and planning process. As a result, important cost information that could help building project teams make the most cost-effective design choices is not available to help them. In addition, while building managers GAO surveyed reported that GSA's design choices generally support a building's functionality, they also reported that some design choices increased O&M costs without improving functionality. For example, they identified design choices related to material color and lighting that increased O&M costs but did not enhance the functionality of the building for the tenants.\nAlthough GSA has developed some information on how design choices can affect O&M costs, it does not consistently collect and share such information. For example, GSA has evaluated the performance of only six Design Excellence buildings, and does not systematically collect information on how design choices have affected O&M costs in all existing buildings. Without a process to collect and share such information, future buildings may not benefit from these lessons, and problematic choices may be repeated.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making four recommendations to update existing GSA procedures for planning and designing new buildings to: (1) estimate full O&M costs; (2) obtain information from personnel responsible for addressing the O&M consequences of design decisions; (3) further consider how design choices may affect building functionality; and (4) systematically collect and share lessons from existing buildings. GSA agreed with these recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_743"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_744","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThis testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's July 2017 report, entitled DOD Excess Property: Enhanced Controls Needed for Access to Excess Controlled Property ( GAO-17-532 ).\nmerrittz@gao.gov or Wayne A. McElrath at (202) 512-2905 or mcelrathw@gao.gov .\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has taken some actions and is planning additional actions to address identified weaknesses in its excess controlled property program. However, internal control deficiencies exist for, among other things, ensuring that only eligible applicants are approved to participate in the Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO) program and receive transfers of excess controlled property. DLA is establishing memorandums of understanding with participating federal agencies intended to, among other things, establish general terms and conditions for participation, revise its program application to require additional prospective participant information, and plans to provide additional online training for participating agencies that is expected to begin in late 2017. However, GAO created a fictitious federal agency to conduct independent testing of the LESO program's internal controls and DLA's transfer of controlled property to law enforcement agencies.\nThrough the testing, GAO gained access to the LESO program and obtained over 100 controlled items with an estimated value of $1.2 million, including night-vision goggles, simulated rifles, and simulated pipe bombs, which could be potentially lethal items if modified with commercially available items . GAO's testing identified that DLA has deficiencies in the processes for verification and approval of federal law enforcement agency applications and in the transfer of controlled property, such as DLA personnel not routinely requesting and verifying identification of individuals picking up controlled property or verifying the quantity of approved items prior to transfer. Further, GAO found that DLA has not conducted a fraud risk assessment on the LESO program, including the application process. Without strengthening DLA and LESO program internal controls over the approval and transfer of controlled property to law enforcement agencies, such as reviewing and revising policy or procedures for verifying and approving federal agency applications and enrollment, DLA lacks reasonable assurance that it has the ability to prevent, detect, and respond to potential fraud and minimize associated security risks.\nExamples of Controlled Property Items Obtained\nDLA maintains a public Internet site to address statutory requirements to provide information on all property transfers to law enforcement agencies. DLA's public Internet site shows all transferred property, and, as of April 2017, in response to GAO's findings, has included a definition of controlled property to distinguish for the general public what items are considered controlled.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_744"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_745","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nTSA is responsible for ensuring that all airline passengers and their property are screened for items that could pose a threat to airplanes and passengers at 440 airports across the United States. Since 2016, TSO Basic Training\u2014initial training for newly hired TSOs, including both TSA-employed and private screeners\u2014has consisted of an intensive two-week course at the TSA Academy located at FLETC. TSA has obligated about $53 million for the program from its inception through March 2018. In 2015 and 2017, the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General raised questions about the effectiveness of checkpoint screening, which prompted concerns about training.\nGAO was asked to review TSA's training of new TSOs. This report (1) describes the reasons why TSA established the TSO Basic Training program; (2) discusses factors OTD considers when updating TSO Basic Training curriculum; and (3) assesses the extent to which TSA evaluates its TSO Basic Training program. GAO reviewed documents on the development and modification of TSO Basic Training curriculum; visited FLETC; interviewed TSA officials; and compared TSA's program evaluation to leading practices.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Transportation Security Administration (TSA) established the Transportation Security Officer (TSO) Basic Training program at the TSA Academy at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia to obtain benefits from centralized training. Prior to the Basic Training program, TSO training was conducted at individual airports, often by TSOs for whom instruction was a collateral duty. According to a business case developed by TSA for Congress in 2017 and TSA officials, TSA expected implementation of the TSO Basic Training program to provide efficiencies to the delivery of new-hire training for TSOs and to enhance the professionalism and morale of newly hired screeners. For example, GAO observed that TSO Basic Training facilities have airport checkpoint equipment and x-ray image simulators for students to practice skills, eliminating the challenge of finding available equipment and training times in a busy airport environment. According to program officials, centralized training also provides trainees with an increased focus on the TSA mission and instills a common culture among TSOs.\nTSA's Office of Training and Development (OTD) updates and modifies the TSO Basic Training curriculum in response to evolving security threats and evaluations of effectiveness, among other factors. For example, OTD holds regular meetings with TSA's Office of Security Operations\u2014the office responsible for managing TSO performance\u2014to discuss issues such as imminent threats. The offices also discuss analyses of TSO effectiveness identified through covert tests, in which role players attempt to pass threat objects\u2014such as knives, guns, or simulated improvised explosive devices\u2014through the screening checkpoints. The two offices identify ways to address issues identified in covert testing, which are then incorporated into TSO Basic Training. OTD also gathers input from TSO Basic Training instructors and from participants to adjust training curriculum.\nTSA has implemented a training evaluation model but has not yet established specific program goals and performance measures to assess TSO Basic Training. The Kirkpatrick model used by TSA is a commonly-accepted training evaluation model endorsed by the Office of Personnel Management and used throughout the federal government. While TSA reported expected benefits of TSO Basic Training in its business case and implemented the Kirkpatrick model to begin assessing training, it has not yet identified specific goals that the program is expected to achieve, nor has it developed applicable performance measures to evaluate progress toward goals, as called for by leading management practices for training evaluation. TSA officials told GAO that TSO Basic Training is a relatively new program and they planned to collect more data on TSO screening performance before further evaluating the potential impacts of the training program. However, TSO Basic Training serves as the foundation for TSOs to learn core skills and procedures, and it is important to establish goals and measures to better assess the effectiveness of the training they receive. This will help TSA determine the extent to which TSOs are able to fulfill their important role in ensuring passenger safety while also showing results for the funds spent on such training each year.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that TSA establish specific goals and performance measures for the TSO Basic Training program. TSA concurred with the recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_745"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_746","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe federal government invested more than $90 billion on IT in fiscal year 2016. However, prior IT expenditures have produced failed projects. Recognizing the severity of issues, in December 2014 Congress enacted IT acquisition reform legislation (referred to as the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act, or FITARA). Among other things, OMB's FITARA implementation guidance requires covered agencies' chief acquisition officers to identify IT contracts for the CIOs to review and approve.\nGAO's objectives were to determine the extent to which (1) federal agencies identify IT contracts and how much is invested in them, and (2) federal agency CIOs are reviewing and approving IT acquisitions. To do so, GAO reviewed data on IT contracts from fiscal year 2016 at 22 agencies and compared agency actions to law and OMB guidance.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nMost of the 22 selected agencies did not identify all of their information technology (IT) contracts. The selected agencies identified 78,249 IT-related contracts, to which they obligated $14.7 billion in fiscal year 2016. However, GAO identified 31,493 additional contracts with $4.5 billion obligated, raising the total amount obligated to IT contracts in fiscal year 2016 to at least $19.2 billion (see figure).The percentage of additional IT contract obligations GAO identified varied among the selected agencies. For example, the Department of State did not identify 1 percent of its IT contract obligations. Conversely, 8 agencies did not identify over 40 percent of their IT-related contract obligations.\nMany of the selected agencies that did not identify these IT acquisitions did not follow Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) guidance. Specifically, 14 of the 22 agencies did not involve the acquisition office in their process to identify IT acquisitions for Chief Information Officer (CIO) review, as required by OMB. In addition, 7 agencies did not establish guidance to aid officials in recognizing IT. Until agencies involve the acquisitions office in their IT identification processes and establish supporting guidance, they cannot ensure that they will identify all IT acquisitions. Without proper identification of IT acquisitions, agencies and CIOs cannot effectively provide oversight of these acquisitions.\nIn addition to not identifying all IT contracts, 14 of the 22 selected agencies did not fully satisfy OMB's requirement that the CIO review and approve IT acquisition plans or strategies. Further, only 11 of 96 randomly selected IT contracts at 10 agencies that GAO evaluated were CIO-reviewed and approved as required by OMB's guidance. The 85 IT contracts not reviewed had a total possible value of approximately $23.8 billion. Until agencies ensure that CIOs review and approve IT acquisitions, CIOs will continue to have limited visibility and input into their agencies' planned IT expenditures and will not be able to use the increased authority that FITARA's contract approval provision is intended to provide. Further, agencies will likely miss an opportunity to strengthen CIOs' authority and the oversight of IT acquisitions. As a result, agencies may award IT contracts that are duplicative, wasteful, or poorly conceived.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making 39 recommendations, including that agencies ensure that acquisition offices are involved in identifying IT and issue related guidance; and to ensure IT acquisitions are reviewed according to OMB guidance. OMB and 20 agencies generally agreed with or did not comment on the recommendations. One agency agreed with one recommendation, but disagreed with another. GAO believes this recommendation is warranted. One agency disagreed with two recommendations. GAO subsequently removed one of these, but believes the other recommendation is warranted, as discussed in the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_746"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_747","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSSA in October 2008 implemented CAL to fast track individuals with certain conditions through the disability determination process by prioritizing their disability benefit claims. Since then, SSA has expanded its list of CAL conditions from 50 to 225.\nThis testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's August 2017 report entitled SSA's Compassionate Allowance Initiative: Improvements Needed to Make Expedited Processing of Disability Claims More Consistent and Accurate , GAO-17-625 . It examines the extent to which SSA has procedures for (1) identifying conditions for the CAL list; (2) identifying claims for CAL processing; and (3) ensuring the accuracy and consistency of CAL decisions.\nFor its August 2017 report, GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; analyzed SSA data on disability decisions for CAL claims from fiscal years 2009 through 2016 and on CAL claims with manual actions in fiscal year 2016; reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 74 claim files with fiscal year 2016 initial determinations; and interviewed medical experts, representatives from patient advocacy groups, and SSA officials in headquarters and six DDS offices selected for geographic dispersion and varied CAL caseloads.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Social Security Administration (SSA) does not have a formal or systematic approach for designating certain medical conditions for the Compassionate Allowance initiative (CAL). CAL was established in 2008 to fast-track through the disability determination process claimants who are likely to be approved because they have certain eligible medical conditions. SSA has in recent years relied on advocates for individuals with certain diseases and disorders to bring conditions to its attention for potential inclusion in CAL. However, by relying on advocates, SSA may overlook disabling conditions that have no advocates, potentially resulting in individuals with these conditions not receiving expedited processing. Further, SSA does not have clear, consistent criteria for designating conditions for potential CAL inclusion, which is inconsistent with federal internal control standards. As a result, external stakeholders lack key information about how to recommend conditions for inclusion on the CAL list.\nTo identify disability claims for expedited CAL processing, SSA primarily relies on software that searches for key words in claims. However, if claimants include incorrect or misspelled information in their claims the software is hindered in its ability to flag all claimants with CAL conditions or may flag claimants for CAL processing that should not be flagged. SSA has guidance for disability determination services (DDS) staff on how to manually correct errors made by the software, but the guidance does not address when such corrections should occur. Without clear guidance on when to make manual changes, DDS examiners may not take timely actions and may hinder expedited processing for appropriate claims.\nSSA has taken some steps to ensure the accuracy and consistency of decisions on CAL claims, including developing detailed descriptions of CAL conditions, known as impairment summaries. These summaries help examiners make decisions about whether to allow or deny a claim. However, nearly one-third of the summaries are 5 or more years old. Experts and advocates that GAO spoke to suggested that summaries should be updated every 1 to 3 years to reduce the risk of SSA making disability determinations using medically outdated information. In addition, GAO found that SSA does not leverage data it collects to identify potential challenges to accurate and consistent decision-making on CAL claims. Without regular analyses of available data, SSA is missing an opportunity to ensure the accuracy and consistency of CAL decision-making.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nIn its August 2017 report, GAO made eight recommendations, including that SSA develop a process to systematically gather information on potential CAL conditions, communicate criteria for designating CAL conditions, clarify guidance for manual corrections on CAL claims, update CAL impairment summaries, and use available data to ensure accurate, consistent decision-making. SSA agreed with all of GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_747"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_748","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSince the attacks of September 11, 2001, TSA has spent billions of dollars on aviation security programs. However, recent attacks involving aircraft and airports in other countries underscore the continued threat to aviation and the need for an effective aviation security program.\nGAO was asked to review TSA's passenger aviation security countermeasures. This report examines the extent to which TSA has (1) information on the effectiveness of selected passenger aviation security countermeasures and (2) systematically analyzed the cost and effectiveness tradeoffs among countermeasures.\nGAO reviewed TSA documentation on the effectiveness of six passenger aviation security countermeasures in fiscal year 2015\u2014the most recent year for which data were available. GAO selected these countermeasures because they involve direct interaction with passengers, their belongings, or their personal information, and are largely operated and funded by TSA. GAO also reviewed TSA documents and interviewed TSA officials regarding efforts to systematically analyze cost and effectiveness tradeoffs across countermeasures.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has data on the effectiveness of some, but not all of its passenger aviation security countermeasures. Specifically, TSA has data on passenger prescreening, checkpoint and checked baggage screening, and explosives detection canines. Further, TSA is taking steps to improve the quality of this information. However, it does not have effectiveness data for its Behavior Detection and Analysis (BDA) program and the U.S. Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS). For BDA\u2014a program to identify potential threats by observing passengers for behaviors indicative of stress, fear, or deception\u2014in July 2017, GAO reported that (1) TSA does not have valid evidence supporting most of its behavioral indicators, and (2) TSA should continue to limit future funding for its behavior detection activities until it can provide such evidence. For FAMS\u2014a program that deploys armed law enforcement officers on certain flights at an annual cost of about $800 million for fiscal year 2015\u2014officials reported that one of the primary security contributions is to deter attacks. However, TSA does not have information on its effectiveness in doing so, nor does it have data on the deterrent effect resulting from any of its other aviation security countermeasures. While officials stated that deterrence is difficult to measure, the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, as updated, provides that agencies are to assess the effectiveness of their programs. Further, the Office of Management and Budget and GAO have suggested approaches for measuring deterrence. Developing such methods for TSA countermeasures, especially for an effort such as FAMS in which the primary goal is deterrence, would enable TSA to determine whether its substantial investment is yielding results.\nTSA has a tool to compare the security effectiveness of some aviation security countermeasures, but has no efforts underway to systematically evaluate potential cost and effectiveness tradeoffs across all countermeasures. In 2014, the agency developed a tool to analyze the security effectiveness of alternate combinations of some countermeasures for the purpose of informing acquisition and deployment decisions, but does not have a tool to assess such tradeoffs across the entire system of countermeasures. TSA officials explained that the aviation security system is constantly evolving, and assessing a system in flux is challenging. However, DHS policy and TSA's strategic plan call for the systematic evaluation of costs and effectiveness of TSA's chosen mix of aviation security countermeasures. Without such an analysis, TSA is not well positioned to strike an appropriate balance of costs, effectiveness, and risk.\nThis is a public version of a classified report that GAO issued in August 2017. Information that TSA deemed classified or sensitive security information, such as the results of TSA's covert testing and details about TSA's screening procedures, have been omitted.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that TSA (1) explore and pursue methods to assess the deterrent effect of TSA's passenger aviation security countermeasures, with FAMS as a top priority to address, and (2) systematically evaluate the potential cost and effectiveness tradeoffs across aviation security countermeasures. DHS concurred with these recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_748"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_749","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Navy is responsible for providing ready forces for current operations and contingency response in the Arctic Ocean. According to data from the National Snow and Ice Data Center, the coverage of sea ice in the Arctic has diminished significantly since 1981. This could potentially increase maritime activities there, leading to a need for a greater U.S. military and homeland security presence in the region.\nPublic Law 115-91 required the Navy to report to Congress on the Navy's capabilities in the Arctic, including any capability gaps and requirements for ice-hardened vessels. It also included a provision for GAO to review the Navy's report. This report (1) assesses the extent to which the Navy's report aligns with current assessments of Arctic threat levels and capabilities required to execute DOD's 2016 Arctic Strategy and (2) describes any current requirements for ice-hardened vessels and DOD's approach for evaluating the capabilities needed as Arctic requirements evolve.\nGAO reviewed the Navy's report along with DOD's assessments of Arctic threats and naval capabilities. GAO also reviewed the 2016 DOD Arctic Strategy\u2014 the most current strategy, DOD and Department of State information on the freedom of navigation program as well as DOD's processes for developing capabilities and assessing Arctic capability gaps.\nGAO is not making any recommendations in this report. DOD provided written technical comments which were incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Navy's June 2018 report aligns with Department of Defense (DOD) assessments that the Arctic is at low risk for conflict and that DOD has the capabilities to execute the 2016 DOD Arctic Strategy . The June 2018 report also aligns with assessments of Arctic capabilities and gaps in the Navy's 2014 roadmap for implementing the strategy. The June 2018 report states that the Navy can execute the strategy with subsurface, aviation, and surface assets. The report notes the significant limitations for operating surface ships in the Arctic, but states that the Navy has the capabilities required for executing the strategy , and so has no plan to design ice-hardened surface ships. In addition, DOD officials stated that the United States has options other than Navy surface ships for demonstrating the U.S. right to operate in the Arctic, including using Coast Guard vessels, Navy submarines, or military aircraft.\nNavy officials said that the Navy does not have a specific requirement for ice-hardening existing vessels or constructing new ones. The Navy plans to continue to use DOD's established process, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System to reassess Arctic-related requirements as conditions evolve (see fig.). In October 2017, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated U.S. Northern Command's initial capabilities document identifying three gaps in the ability to exercise\/deploy, position, and conduct deterrence\/decisive operations in ice-diminished Arctic waters. At the time of GAO's review, the Joint Staff had validated the capability gaps, which will now compete for resources with other issues designated for further study. Officials said additional study may identify alternative solutions such as adding capabilities to Coast Guard ships or partnering with allies to achieve common strategic goals in the Arctic.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_749"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_750","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe federal government plans to invest almost $96 billion in IT in fiscal year 2018. Historically, IT investments have too often failed or contributed little to mission-related outcomes. Further, increasingly sophisticated threats and frequent cyber incidents underscore the need for effective information security. As a result, GAO added two areas to its high-risk list: IT security in 1997 and the management of IT acquisitions and operations in 2015.\nThis statement summarizes agencies' progress in improving IT management and ensuring the security of federal IT. It is primarily based on GAO's prior reports issued between February 1997 and May 2018 (and an ongoing review) on (1) CIO responsibilities, (2) agency CIOs' involvement in approving IT contracts, (3) data center consolidation efforts, (4) the management of software licenses, and (5) compliance with cybersecurity requirements.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and federal agencies have taken steps to improve the management of information technology (IT) acquisitions and operations and ensure the security of federal IT through a series of initiatives. As of May 2018, agencies had fully implemented about 61 percent of the approximately 800 IT management-related recommendations that GAO made from fiscal years 2010 through 2015. Likewise, since 2010, agencies had implemented about 66 percent of the approximately 2,700 security-related recommendations as of May 2018. Even with this progress, significant actions remain to be completed.\nChief Information Officer (CIO) responsibilities . Laws such as the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) and related guidance assigned 35 key IT management responsibilities to CIOs to help address longstanding challenges. However, in a draft report on CIO responsibilities, GAO's preliminary results suggest that none of the 24 selected agencies have policies that fully address the role of their CIO, as called for by federal laws and guidance. GAO intends to recommend that OMB and each of the selected 24 agencies take actions to improve the effectiveness of CIO's implementation of their responsibilities.\nIT contract approval . According to FITARA, covered agencies' CIOs are required to review and approve IT contracts. Nevertheless, in January 2018, GAO reported that most of the CIOs at 22 selected agencies were not adequately involved in reviewing billions of dollars of IT acquisitions. Consequently, GAO made 39 recommendations to improve CIO oversight over IT acquisitions.\nConsolidating data centers . OMB launched an initiative in 2010 to reduce data centers, which was codified and expanded in FITARA. According to agencies, data center consolidation and optimization efforts have resulted in approximately $3.9 billion of cost savings through 2018. Even so, additional work remains. GAO has made 160 recommendations to OMB and agencies to improve the reporting of related cost savings and to achieve optimization targets; however, as of May 2018, 80 of the recommendations have not been fully addressed.\nManaging software licenses . Effective management of software licenses can help avoid purchasing too many licenses that result in unused software. In May 2014, GAO reported that better management of licenses was needed to achieve savings, and made 135 recommendations to improve such management. Four years later, 78 of the recommendations remained open.\nImproving the security of federal IT systems . While the government has acted to protect federal information systems, agencies need to improve security programs, cyber capabilities, and the protection of personally identifiable information. Over the last several years, GAO has made about 2,700 recommendations to agencies aimed at improving the security of federal systems and information. These recommendations identified actions for agencies to take to strengthen their information security programs and technical controls over their computer networks and systems. As of May 2018, about 800 of the information security-related recommendations had not been implemented.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nFrom fiscal years 2010 through 2015, GAO made about 800 recommendations to OMB and federal agencies to address shortcomings in IT acquisitions and operations. Since 2010, GAO also made about 2,700 recommendations to federal agencies to improve the security of federal systems. These recommendations include those to improve the implementation of CIO responsibilities, the oversight of the data center consolidation initiative, software license management efforts, and the strength of security programs and technical controls. Most agencies agreed with these recommendations, and GAO will continue to monitor their implementation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_750"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_751","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nTens of thousands of American Indians and Alaska Natives do not have safe drinking water or wastewater disposal in their home\u2014referred to as needs arising from a sanitation deficiency\u2014at a higher percentage than the general population, according to IHS. Among other things, IHS assesses homes, either individually or by reviewing public water systems, to determine any deficiencies. Seven agencies, including IHS, EPA, and USDA, have programs that provide drinking water and wastewater infrastructure assistance to Indian tribes.\nGAO was asked to review federal efforts to provide water infrastructure assistance to Indian tribes. This report examines, among other objectives, the extent to which selected federal agencies (1) identified tribes' drinking water and wastewater infrastructure needs and (2) funded tribal water infrastructure projects, including tribes' most severe sanitation deficiencies. GAO reviewed agency data on tribal needs, analyzed agency funding data for tribal water infrastructure projects, reviewed agency policy documents, and interviewed agency officials and officials from 22 tribes representing different geographic locations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFederal agencies have identified several billion dollars in existing and future tribal drinking water and wastewater infrastructure needs. Specifically, the Indian Health Service (IHS) worked with tribes to identify, in fiscal year 2016, an estimated $3.2 billion in water infrastructure projects to address existing sanitation deficiencies in Indian homes, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) identified an additional $2.4 billion in future tribal drinking water infrastructure needs over the next 20 years. However, IHS could enhance the accuracy of its information about the water infrastructure needs of some Indian homes. In February 2018, the database that IHS uses to track Indian homes' sanitation deficiencies showed that about one-third of the homes (138,700) had no deficiency. However, because the database does not provide IHS with a way to record if a home's deficiency has been assessed, IHS could not determine whether these homes had no deficiency or if they had not yet been assessed to identify a deficiency. IHS officials stated that improving the database's accuracy would be beneficial. By implementing a way to indicate in its database whether these homes' deficiencies have been assessed, IHS could also more efficiently address any deficiencies in these homes.\nFederal agencies provided about $370 million for tribal drinking water and wastewater infrastructure projects in fiscal year 2016, including some projects to address what the agencies identified as the most severe sanitation deficiencies (i.e., communities that lack safe drinking water or wastewater disposal). IHS and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) policies direct the agencies to fund tribal projects that address these deficiencies. However, agency scoring processes may not always prioritize the projects that address them:\nIHS assigns points to projects using eight scoring factors, including sanitation deficiency and cost. Based on GAO's review of IHS documents and interviews with agency officials, IHS's process for selecting projects can discourage funding some projects that address the most severe sanitation deficiencies, especially those with a relatively high cost per home. As a result, some projects to serve homes without water infrastructure can remain unfunded for many years. IHS officials said the scoring factors balance a number of interests, and the agency is looking to improve the extent to which it funds projects that address these deficiencies.\nUSDA uses a different set of scoring factors to assign points when evaluating project applications for its tribal water program, including rural population and income levels. However, USDA does not have a scoring factor to assign points to a project based on whether it will serve homes that lack safe drinking water or wastewater disposal, as it does with another program with similar goals. Instead, USDA officials said they use discretionary points to score projects on this basis, but these points may not be awarded at all. As a result, USDA may not have reasonable assurance that it consistently evaluates project applications in a way that aligns with agency policy to fund projects that address the most severe sanitation deficiencies.\nBy IHS reviewing and USDA updating their scoring processes, the agencies could have more assurance that the projects they fund address the most severe sanitation deficiencies in Indian communities.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making 16 recommendations, including that (1) IHS develop a way to indicate in its database if homes' deficiencies have been assessed and (2) IHS and USDA review and update project scoring processes. IHS agreed with these recommendations, and USDA proposed an approach for addressing the recommendation on scoring, as discussed in the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_751"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_752","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nImpacts from a changing climate can pose serious risks to the global economy and affect many economic sectors, according to reports. Public companies are generally required to disclose certain risks in their SEC filings. In 2010, SEC issued guidance to clarify how existing disclosure requirements apply for climate-related matters.\nGAO was asked to review (1) steps SEC has taken to clarify to companies their disclosure requirements for climate-related risks, (2) steps SEC has taken to examine changes companies may have made to their climate-related disclosures since the release of its 2010 Guidance, and (3) constraints SEC faces when reviewing climate-related disclosures and stakeholders' views of those disclosures.\nGAO reviewed SEC's disclosure requirements, guidance, and reports on changes in climate-related disclosures; queried SEC's filings system to identify comment letters with issues on climate-related disclosures; identified examples of climate-related disclosures in companies' filings; and interviewed SEC staff and representatives of stakeholder groups, such as industry associations from five industry groups, and nonprofit organizations that work with investors. We selected these stakeholders because they either were from industries likely to be affected by climate change-related matters due to the nature of their operations, or have a key interest in climate-related issues.\nSenior staff from SEC's Division of Corporation Finance generally agreed with GAO's findings.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nTo help clarify to companies their disclosure requirements for climate-related matters, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued the Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change in 2010 (2010 Guidance). The 2010 Guidance was SEC's primary form of communication to clarify companies' climate-related disclosure requirements. In addition, SEC issued individual comment letters to specific companies on their climate-related disclosures. These letters are publicly available and companies can view these letters to understand SEC's assessment of a particular company's disclosures. Representatives from industry associations with whom GAO spoke stated that they consider the disclosure requirements for climate-related risks to be clear and have no need for additional guidance.\nSEC issued two reports to Congress in 2012 and 2014 that examined changes in climate-related disclosures in select industries. SEC found that most of these filings included some level of climate-related disclosures and reported that there were no notable year-to-year changes. SEC staff also continue to periodically assess climate-related disclosures in addition to its regular disclosure review process. Additionally, in April 2016, SEC requested public input on modernizing certain business and financial disclosure requirements, including potential changes on reporting climate-related risks in SEC's filings. As of December 2017, SEC staff said they are considering recommendations for the Commission's consideration based on comments received.\nSEC faces constraints in reviewing climate-related and other disclosures because it primarily relies on information that companies provide. SEC senior staff explained that SEC's Division of Corporation Finance staff assess companies' filings for compliance with federal securities laws\u2014which require companies to disclose material risks\u2014but do not have the authority to subpoena additional information from companies. Additionally, companies may report similar climate-related disclosures in different sections of the filings, and climate-related disclosures in some filings contain disclosures using generic language, not tailored to the company, and do not include quantitative metrics. When companies report climate-related disclosures in varying formats and specificity, SEC reviewers and investors may find it difficult to compare and analyze related disclosures across companies' filings. SEC has tools, mechanisms, and resources\u2014including internal supervisory controls, regulations and guidance, a two-level filing review process, internal and external data, and staff training and experience\u2014that help SEC staff consistently review filing disclosures, according to SEC documents and staff. Representatives of industry associations told GAO that they consider the current climate-related disclosure requirements adequate and no additional climate-related disclosures are needed. However, some investor groups and asset management firms have highlighted the need for companies to disclose more climate-related information. But, members of SEC's Investor Advisory Committee told GAO that investors have not agreed on the priority of climate-related disclosures. Also, additional disclosure requirements or increased scrutiny of companies' climate-related information\u2014which, if necessary, SEC and Congress can consider\u2014could have mission and resource implications for SEC's Division of Corporation Finance.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_752"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_753","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nWith revenue of about $450 million in fiscal year 2017, the Trust Fund paid about $184 million in benefits to more than 25,000 coal miners and eligible dependents. However, the Trust Fund also borrowed about $1.3 billion from the Treasury's general fund in fiscal year 2017 to cover its debt repayment expenditures. Adding to this financial challenge, the coal tax that supports the Trust Fund is scheduled to decrease by about 55 percent beginning in 2019. GAO was asked to review the financial positon of the Trust Fund and identify options to improve it.\nThis report examines (1) factors that have challenged the financial position of the Trust Fund since its inception and (2) the extent to which Trust Fund debt may change through 2050, and selected options that could improve its future financial position. GAO reviewed Trust Fund financial data from fiscal years 1979 through 2017. GAO also interviewed officials from the Departments of Labor, Treasury, Health and Human Services (HHS) and representatives of coal industry and union groups. Using assumptions, such as the about 55 percent coal tax decrease and moderately declining coal production, GAO simulated the extent to which Trust Fund debt may change through 2050. GAO also simulated how selected options, such as forgiveness of debt, could improve finances. The options simulated are not intended to be exhaustive. Further, GAO is not endorsing any particular option or combination of options.\nGAO provided a draft of this report to DOL, Treasury, and HHS. The agencies provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nMultiple factors have challenged Black Lung Disability Trust Fund (Trust Fund) finances since it was established about 40 years ago. Its expenditures have consistently exceeded its revenues, interest payments have grown, and actions taken that were expected to improve Trust Fund finances did not completely address its debt. When necessary to make expenditures, the Trust Fund borrows with interest from the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) general fund. Because Trust Fund expenditures have consistently exceeded revenue, it has borrowed almost every year since 1979, its first complete fiscal year, and as a result debt and interest payments increased. Legislative actions were taken over the years including (1) raising the rate of the coal tax that provides Trust Fund revenues and (2) forgiving debt. For example, the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 provided an appropriation toward Trust Fund debt forgiveness; about $6.5 billion was forgiven, according to Department of Labor (DOL) data (see figure). However, coal tax revenues were less than expected due, in part, to the 2008 recession and increased competition from other energy sources, according to DOL and Treasury officials. As a result, the Trust Fund continued to borrow from Treasury's general fund from fiscal years 2010 through 2017 to cover debt repayment expenditures.\nGAO's simulation suggests that Trust Fund borrowing will likely increase from fiscal years 2019 through 2050 due, in part, to the coal tax rate decrease of about 55 percent that will take effect in 2019 and declining coal production. The simulation estimates that Trust Fund borrowing may exceed $15 billion by 2050 (see figure). However, various options, such as adjusting the coal tax and forgiving interest or debt, could reduce future borrowing and improve the Trust Fund's financial position. For example, maintaining the current coal tax rates and forgiving debt of $2.4 billion could, under certain circumstances, balance the Trust Fund by 2050, whereby revenue would be sufficient to cover expenditures. However, a coal industry representative said that maintaining or increasing the coal tax would burden the coal industry, particularly at a time when coal production has been declining. Further, Treasury officials noted that the costs associated with forgiving Trust Fund interest or debt would be paid by taxpayers.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_753"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_754","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSafety lapses continue to occur at some of the 276 laboratories in the United States that conduct research on select agents\u2014such as Ebola virus or anthrax bacteria\u2014that may cause serious or lethal infection in humans, animals, or plants, raising concerns about whether oversight is effective.\nGAO was asked to review the federal oversight approach for select agents and approaches from other countries or regulatory sectors. This report (1) evaluates the extent to which the Select Agent Program has elements of effective oversight and strategic planning documents to guide it, and (2) identifies approaches selected countries and regulatory sectors have used to promote effective oversight.\nGAO convened a meeting of experts with the help of the National Academy of Sciences to discuss oversight of select agents. GAO also reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and guidance, and interviewed officials from the Select Agent Program and laboratories it oversees. GAO also reviewed documents and interviewed officials from two countries and other U.S. sectors selected because they have alternate oversight approaches.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Federal Select Agent Program (Select Agent Program)\u2014jointly managed by the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Agriculture (USDA)\u2014oversees laboratories' handling of certain hazardous pathogens known as select agents, but the program does not fully meet all key elements of effective oversight, as illustrated in the following examples:\nGAO's past work identified independence as a key element of effective oversight. However, the Select Agent Program is not structurally independent from all laboratories it oversees, and it has not assessed risks posed by its current structure or the effectiveness of mechanisms it has to reduce organizational conflicts of interest. Without conducting such assessments and taking actions as needed to address risks, the program may not effectively mitigate impairments to its independence.\nAnother key element of effective oversight is the ability to perform reviews. Some experts and laboratory representatives raised concerns that the program's reviews may not target the highest-risk activities, in part because it has not formally assessed which activities pose the highest risk. Without assessing the risk of activities it oversees and targeting its resources appropriately, the program cannot ensure it is balancing its resources against their impact.\nTechnical expertise is another key element GAO identified in past work. The Select Agent Program has taken steps to hire additional expert staff and improve training, but workforce and training gaps remain.\nMoreover, the program does not have joint strategic planning documents to guide its oversight. Although it began taking steps to develop a joint strategic plan during GAO's review, the program is not developing workforce plans as part of this effort. GAO's past work has found that strategic workforce planning is an essential tool to help agencies align their workforces with their missions and develop long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining staff. Developing a joint workforce plan that assesses workforce and training needs for the program as a whole would help the program leverage resources to ensure all workforce and training needs are met.\nSelected countries and regulatory sectors GAO reviewed promote effective oversight using approaches that differ from the U.S. Select Agent Program's approaches:\nIn Great Britain, oversight of laboratories that work with pathogens is under an independent government agency focused on health and safety.\nIn both Great Britain and Canada, regulators focus their oversight on (1) biological safety, due to safety incidents which provided the impetus for laboratory oversight in these countries; and (2) regulation of all potentially hazardous pathogens and activities in laboratories.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making 11 recommendations for the Select Agent Program, including to (1) assess risks from its current structure and the effectiveness of its mechanisms to reduce conflicts of interest and address risks as needed, (2) assess the risk of activities it oversees and target reviews to high-risk activities, and (3) develop a joint workforce plan. HHS and USDA agreed with GAO's recommendations.\nor John Neumann at (202) 512-3841 or neumannj@gao.gov .","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_754"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_755","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSoftware is integral to the operation and functionality of DOD equipment, platforms, and weapon systems, including tactical and combat vehicles, aircraft, ships, submarines, and strategic missiles. DOD estimates that software sustainment funding will total at least $15 billion over the next 5 fiscal years. DOD carries out software sustainment at various locations, where DOD uses its maintenance capabilities to maintain, overhaul, and repair its military weapon systems.\nGAO was asked to review several issues relating to the sustainment of operational system software for DOD weapon systems. This report examines, among other things, the extent to which (1) DOD has policies and organizations in place to manage the sustainment of operational system software for weapon systems; and (2) DOD and the military departments track costs to sustain weapon system software. GAO reviewed DOD policies and procedures and interviewed cognizant officials from select DOD software centers, among others, who perform weapon system software sustainment activities.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) has policies and organizations to manage the sustainment of operational system software. DOD policy defines software sustainment and software maintenance activities synonymously, to comprise any activities or actions that change the software baseline, as well as modifications or upgrades that add capability or functionality. One example of such an action is the Air Force's modifying the security software on the B-52 bomber to better protect against attempted system penetration. The figure below defines the four categories of software sustainment actions.\nDOD policies on life-cycle management of weapon systems address software sustainment, and several DOD organizations\u2014including DOD software centers\u2014play key roles in overseeing and managing software sustainment. DOD policy includes software maintenance as part of core logistics, and it requires the military departments to report biennially to Congress on their estimated workloads to sustain core logistics capabilities, including estimated costs of these workloads. However, while the Army and Air Force categorize and report software sustainment as part of core logistics, the Navy does not. Without the Navy's categorizing and reporting its software sustainment costs, DOD and Congress are not fully informed of the magnitude and cost of core software sustainment capability requirements. This impedes DOD's efforts to plan for a ready and controlled source of technical competence, and to budget resources in peacetime while preserving necessary surge capabilities.\nDOD's ability to track weapon system software sustainment costs is impeded by limitations in its collection of software cost data. First, GAO found that the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation's (CAPE) Cost and Software Data Reporting system did not collect weapon system cost data from DOD software centers. Recognizing this, CAPE directed in January 2017 that cost and software data efforts on major acquisition programs should begin to be collected from government organizations, including DOD software centers. However, CAPE acknowledges that it lacks an implementation plan to execute and monitor the requirement for these centers to submit cost and software data. Second, GAO also found that the military departments' operating and support cost systems have incomplete software sustainment cost data. DOD policy requires the military departments to collect and maintain actual operating and support costs, including software sustainment costs. Without CAPE's taking steps to prioritize obtaining complete information on operating and support costs for software sustainment, CAPE is challenged in its ability to accurately compile total program costs or provide reliable life-cycle cost estimates to DOD and Congress.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making five recommendations, including that (1) the Navy categorize and report its software sustainment costs in accordance with DOD policy; and (2) CAPE improve the collection of weapon system software cost data. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_755"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_756","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn 2017, the UI program provided about $30 billion in temporary income support to 5.7 million claimants who became unemployed through no fault of their own. The federal government provides various resources states can use to help UI claimants achieve reemployment. GAO was asked to review how states identify and serve claimants who need such assistance.\nThis report examines, among other things, (1) what key federal programs and approaches states used to help UI claimants return to work, and (2) how states used profiling systems to identify claimants who are most likely to exhaust their benefits and need assistance returning to work. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and guidance; analyzed the most recent available national data on UI claimant participation in key workforce programs, from July 2015 through June 2016; interviewed officials from DOL, six states with key reemployment practices, and three additional states with a variety of profiling practices; and reviewed national studies examining state profiling systems.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nNationwide, four key federally funded workforce programs helped states provide reemployment services, such as career counseling and job search assistance, to millions of unemployment insurance (UI) claimants, according to data from July 2015 through June 2016, the most recent period available (see table). The six selected states GAO reviewed in-depth reported using these key programs to support their efforts to help claimants return to work. Selected state officials described skills assessments, job search assistance, and interview and resume workshops as the types of services they use to connect UI claimants to jobs quickly. Officials also described varying service delivery approaches, with some of the selected states emphasizing the use of online services, while others relied to a greater extent on in-person services.\nAccording to a 2014 national questionnaire to states, most states used a statistical system to identify UI claimants who are most likely to exhaust their benefits and need assistance returning to work (known as profiling). Six of the nine states GAO reviewed used statistical systems and three used non-statistical approaches. GAO identified several concerns with the Department of Labor's (DOL) oversight and support of state UI profiling systems:\nAlthough a 2007 DOL-commissioned study found that some statistical systems may not perform well, DOL has not collected the information needed to identify states at risk of poor profiling system performance.\nSome selected states have faced technical challenges in implementing and updating their statistical systems. However, DOL does not have a process for identifying and providing technical assistance to states at risk of poor system performance or those facing technical challenges. Instead, it only provides assistance to those states that request it.\nWhile states have latitude to choose their preferred profiling approach, DOL's 1994 guidance encourages all states to use statistical systems. Because DOL has not updated this guidance to ensure that it clearly communicates all available profiling system options, some states may not be aware that they have greater flexibility in choosing an option that best suits their needs.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DOL (1) systematically collect sufficient information to identify states at risk of poor profiling system performance, (2) develop a process for providing risk-based technical assistance to such states, and (3) update guidance to clarify state profiling options. DOL agreed with these recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_756"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_757","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nNASA depends heavily upon IT to conduct its work. The agency spends at least $1.5 billion annually on IT investments that support its missions, including ground control systems for the International Space Station and space exploration programs.\nThe National Aeronautics and Space Administration Transition Authorization Act of 2017 included a provision for GAO to review the effectiveness of NASA's approach to overseeing and managing IT, including its ability to ensure that resources are aligned with agency missions and are cost effective and secure. Accordingly, GAO's specific objective for this review was to determine the extent to which NASA has established and implemented leading IT management practices in strategic planning, workforce planning, governance, and cybersecurity. To address this objective, GAO compared NASA IT policies, strategic plans, workforce gap assessments, and governance board documentation to federal law and leading practices. GAO also assessed NASA IT security plans, policies, and procedures against leading cybersecurity risk management practices.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has not yet effectively implemented leading practices for information technology (IT) management. Specifically, GAO identified weaknesses in NASA's IT management practices for strategic planning, workforce planning, governance, and cybersecurity.\nNASA has not documented its IT strategic planning processes in accordance with leading practices. While NASA's updated IT strategic plan represents improvement over its prior plan, the updated plan is not comprehensive because it does not fully describe strategies for achieving desired results or describe interdependencies within and across programs. Until NASA establishes a comprehensive IT strategic plan, it will lack critical information needed to align resources with business strategies and investment decisions.\nOf the eight key IT workforce planning activities, the agency partially implemented five and did not implement three. For example, NASA does not assess competency and staffing needs regularly or report progress to agency leadership. Until NASA implements the key IT workforce planning activities, it will have difficulty anticipating and responding to changing staffing needs.\nNASA's IT governance does not fully address leading practices. While the agency revised its governance boards, updated their charters, and acted to improve governance, it has not fully established the governance structure, documented improvements to its investment selection process, fully implemented investment oversight practices and ensured the Chief Information Officer's visibility into all IT investments, or fully defined policies and procedures for IT portfolio management. Until NASA addresses these weaknesses, it will face increased risk of investing in duplicative investments or may miss opportunities to ensure investments perform as intended.\nNASA has not fully established an effective approach to managing agency-wide cybersecurity risk. An effective approach includes establishing executive oversight of risk, a cybersecurity risk management strategy, an information security program plan, and related policies and procedures.\nAs NASA continues to collaborate with other agencies and nations and increasingly relies on agreements with private companies to carry out its missions, the agency's cybersecurity weaknesses make its systems more vulnerable to compromise. Until NASA leadership fully addresses these leading practices, its ability to ensure effective management of IT across the agency and manage cybersecurity risks will remain limited.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making 10 recommendations to NASA to address the deficiencies identified in NASA IT strategic planning, workforce planning, governance, and cybersecurity. NASA concurred with seven recommendations, partially concurred with two, and did not concur with one. GAO maintains that all of the recommendations discussed in this report remain valid.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_757"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_758","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOD's MWR programs provide servicemembers and their families with three categories of programs: Category A (e.g., fitness and libraries), Category B (e.g., camping and performing arts), and Category C (e.g., golf). DOD oversees the percentage of appropriated funding allocated to MWR programs by category and measures the military services' compliance with established funding targets. DOD set the targets at 85 percent for Category A and 65 percent for Category B. DOD did not set a target for Category C since this category has the ability to generate revenue from user fees.\nHouse Report 115-200 accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 includes a provision for GAO to review DOD' s MWR programs. GAO assessed the extent to which (1) the services have met DOD's established funding targets for each category of MWR programs and DOD has comprehensively evaluated the relevance of its targets, and (2) DOD has oversight structures and performance measures that include measurable goals, including those for cost-effectiveness, by which to review MWR programs. GAO analyzed MWR program information for fiscal years 2012-2017 and compared DOD's MWR policy with guidance for using measures and evaluating goals.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) established funding targets for two categories of Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs\u2014Category A, which promotes the physical and mental well-being of servicemembers, and Category B, which funds community support systems for servicemembers and their families. These targets are intended to ensure that the military services adequately fund these programs with appropriated funds instead of requiring servicemembers and their families to pay fees out of pocket to cover program costs. However, GAO found the following:\nIn fiscal years 2012-2017, the military services generally met the DOD-set target to provide 85 percent of appropriated funding for Category A programs but not the 65-percent target for Category B programs. Service officials said they are taking steps to meet the Category B target, such as by restoring targeted levels of appropriated funding support in future budget planning. Data GAO reviewed indicate that these steps are helping the services get closer to meeting the target for Category B.\nDOD has not comprehensively evaluated the targets, established more than 20 years ago, to ensure that they are appropriate. DOD officials said they agree that it is time to evaluate the relevancy of the targets as the current operating environment is fundamentally different than when the targets were established 2 decades ago. Further, DOD officials said that they are unsure of the process or methodology used to originally develop the targets because they have no documentation supporting these decisions. Until DOD comprehensively evaluates the appropriateness of the targets and, based on its evaluation, documents any changes made, it cannot be certain that the targets reflect the current operating environment and do not pose undue financial burden on servicemembers.\nDOD established oversight structures and performance measures for MWR programs, but has not established measurable goals to assess the cost-effectiveness of the 55 activities that make up MWR programs. DOD's MWR policy identifies six broad performance measure categories for the program. DOD officials responsible for developing MWR program goals acknowledged that DOD's MWR policy does not include measurable goals for assessing the cost-effectiveness of program activities, and do not currently have plans to make any changes to the goals. Service officials told GAO that they collect and use various types of information within the categories to assess specific activities. While both the categories established by DOD and the service-specific efforts provide useful context about the status of individual MWR activities, they do not replace the need for measurable goals that can be used to assess whether the programs are operating cost-effectively. The services are in the early stages of developing more specific performance measures, but it is too early to determine whether these efforts will result in measurable goals that can be used to assess cost-effectiveness. Until DOD develops performance measures that include measurable goals, it cannot ensure that MWR programs meet servicemember needs in a cost-effective manner.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DOD evaluate the funding targets and document any changes needed and develop measurable goals for MWR programs' performance measures. DOD concurred with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_758"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_759","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nUnder its rural housing program, RHS provides mortgages and rental assistance to support affordable rental units for low-income tenants (see figure). When these mortgages reach the end of their terms (mature), property owners may exit the program; current law does not allow RHS to continue providing rental assistance when such exiting occurs. As a result, tenants in properties with mortgages that are maturing may face rent increases or lose their housing altogether.\nGAO was asked to examine how RHS is addressing the risks posed by maturing mortgages. This report examines RHS's efforts to (1) estimate rural housing property exit dates and (2) preserve the affordability of rural rental properties with maturing mortgages. GAO reviewed RHS mortgage loan data and preservation documents, and interviewed RHS officials and industry stakeholders.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe U.S. Department of Agriculture's Rural Housing Service (RHS) implemented an automated tool to estimate when properties could exit the rural rental housing program, but RHS lacked sufficient controls to ensure the accuracy, completeness, and timeliness of those estimates. In 2016, RHS developed its Multi-Family Housing Property Preservation Tool to replace a manual process of estimating exit dates. RHS data suggest that a smaller number of properties could exit RHS's program in the near term, but between 2028 and 2050, over 90 percent of RHS's properties and units could exit the program (about 13,000 properties with 407,000 units). However, RHS lacked controls that would better ensure the accuracy and completeness of these estimated exit dates, such as the verification of key data input at mortgage origination. In addition, RHS had not established a regular process to update the preservation tool's underlying data due to staff turnover and data system challenges. Without these controls, RHS may lack assurance that is has reliable data for calculating exit dates and initiating preservation efforts.\nWhile RHS has taken actions to address properties with maturing mortgages, such as offering property owners options designed to prevent property exits, about 60 percent of properties with maturing mortgages exited the program between 2014 through 2017. The agency's planning efforts lacked key steps such as (1) establishing preservation goals, (2) developing metrics for evaluating preservation efforts, and (3) analyzing and responding to risks facing its portfolio such as resource limits and growing capital rehabilitation needs. Without taking these actions, RHS is not well positioned to preserve affordable housing in the near term or when much larger numbers of properties and units could exit the program starting in 2028. Although taking the steps above would help RHS's preservation efforts, some tenants may still be at risk of losing rental assistance when mortgages mature. Accordingly, allowing RHS to renew rental assistance after mortgage maturity could protect assisted low-income tenants from increased rents or displacement from their units. When the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) faced a similar loss of affordable housing subsidies, Congress authorized the department in 2011 to continue providing rental assistance at properties after contracts expired.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nCongress should consider granting RHS authority to continue providing rental assistance to tenants in properties with maturing mortgages. GAO is also making five recommendations, including that RHS improve data quality and take steps to comprehensively plan for preserving properties with maturing mortgages. We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to RHS and HUD. RHS agreed with all five of GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_759"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_760","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn fiscal year 2017, VA provided about $11 billion in education benefits to about 14,460 schools to help eligible veterans and their beneficiaries pay for postsecondary education and training. VA typically contracts with state agencies to help it provide oversight of schools participating in this education benefit program.\nThe Harry W. Colmery Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2017 included a provision for GAO to review VA's and states' oversight of schools receiving VA education benefits. This report examines (1) how, if at all, the available level of funding to state agencies has affected states' and VA's ability to carry out their oversight responsibilities, (2) to what extent VA and state agencies use risk-based approaches to oversee schools, and (3) to what extent VA coordinates and shares information with the states to support their oversight activities. GAO reviewed VA documents; assessed VA funding data for fiscal years 2003-2018; interviewed VA and selected state agency officials; and reviewed correspondence between these officials. GAO interviewed officials from eight state agencies who were past or present officials at the association representing state agencies, and officials from three other states, including one that did not renew its contract with VA in fiscal year 2018.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is responsible for overseeing schools nationwide that provide VA education benefits to veterans. To help provide this oversight, VA contracts with state agencies to oversee schools in their states and provide outreach and training to school officials and allocates them funding to cover the cost of oversight, outreach, and training activities. However, since fiscal year 2006, funding for oversight, outreach, and training has remained at about $19 million, and only recently increased in fiscal year 2018 to $21 million. State agency officials told GAO that the limited level of funding they have received from VA has been a long-standing problem that has strained their ability to (1) adequately cover staff costs, (2) pay for travel for school visits, and (3) provide needed technical assistance and training to the schools about VA education benefit requirements. As a result, a few states, such as New Mexico, have chosen to withdraw from their school oversight roles. When this happens, VA must take over the state agencies' oversight responsibilities. GAO found that assuming additional oversight responsibilities is likely to stretch VA's staff resources, especially in large states, where schools are geographically dispersed and school visits are time consuming and costly. VA has begun but has not completed an assessment of the risks that potential future state agency withdrawals could have on its ability to provide school oversight. Moreover, VA has not developed a contingency plan for how it will oversee more schools if additional states do not renew their oversight contracts. Federal standards for internal control state that agencies should identify and assess risks related to achieving objectives, and define contingency plans for assigning responsibilities if key roles are vacated. Until VA takes these steps, the agency runs the risk of being unprepared to conduct effective oversight in the event that more state agencies withdraw from their contracts in the future.\nVA and state agencies use certain risk factors to select schools for oversight. VA officials said that they prioritize schools for annual reviews of compliance with program requirements based on findings from prior reviews as well as other risk factors, such as schools with a history of VA benefit payment errors. GAO found that VA and state agencies have recently begun a joint effort to explore a new strategy that they expect will strengthen the school review selection and prioritization process. According to VA officials, as of mid-October 2018, VA used this strategy to select five schools to undergo risk-based reviews. VA officials said they expect these five reviews to be completed by late December 2018.\nVA and state agencies coordinate and share information about their oversight activities in a variety of ways. For example, VA has shared information with the state agencies on how to conduct annual reviews of schools in their states. However, according to officials at the association representing state agencies, VA has not provided specific direction on conducting targeted reviews in response to complaints. VA officials acknowledged that the procedures they currently have in place are outdated and said that they are being revised to provide state agencies with more details. As of late October 2018, VA officials said these procedures were undergoing internal review. Once implemented, VA's new procedures have the potential to enhance VA's and state agencies' efforts to conduct reviews at those schools for which they have received complaints.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that VA complete the identification and assessment of oversight risks, and prepare a contingency plan for overseeing schools if additional states do not renew their oversight contracts. VA concurred with the recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_760"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_761","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nBOP's rising costs and offender recidivism present incarceration challenges to both DOJ and the nation. For example, BOP's operating costs have generally increased over time, and in fiscal year 2017 amounted to more than $6.9 billion, or 24 percent of DOJ's total discretionary budget. In addition, from 1980 through 2013, BOP's prison population increased by almost 800 percent, from 24,640 to 219,298. While the prison population began to decline in 2013, DOJ has continued to identify prison crowding as a critical issue. GAO has examined a number of DOJ efforts to slow the growth of the prison population and to reduce recidivism through the use of reentry programs to help offenders successfully return to the community.\nThis statement summarizes findings and recommendations from recent GAO reports that address (1) DOJ's incarceration reduction initiatives, and (2) BOP reentry programs.\nThis statement is based on prior GAO products issued from February 2012 through June 2016, along with updates on the status of recommendations obtained as of December 2017. For the updates on DOJ's progress in implementing recommendations, GAO analyzed information provided by DOJ officials on actions taken and planned.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Justice (DOJ) has fully addressed two of six GAO recommendations related to its incarceration reduction initiatives . In June 2015 and June 2016, GAO reported that to help address challenges associated with incarceration, DOJ had, among other things, taken steps to reduce the prison population by pursuing initiatives to use alternatives to incarceration for low-level nonviolent crimes. GAO made six recommendations to DOJ related to these efforts. As of December 2017, DOJ has implemented two of the six recommendations and has not fully addressed the remaining four. Specifically, to enhance efforts to measure program outcomes, DOJ issued guidance on proper data entry and began tracking data on different types of pretrial diversion programs that allow certain offenders to avoid incarceration if they satisfy program requirements. In addition, as of December 2017, DOJ has taken steps to partially implement GAO's recommendation to address unnecessary delays in reviewing inmates' petitions to commute their sentences.\nDOJ has not taken action to address recommendations to better assess the results of pretrial diversion programs or another effort to prioritize prosecutions and reform sentencing to eliminate unfair disparities, among other goals. Further, in December 2017, DOJ noted there had been policy changes since GAO made a recommendation related to enhancing measures to monitor prioritizing prosecution and sentencing reform. Although DOJ reported taking some actions to implement GAO's recommendation, these actions did not include establishing measures that incorporate key elements of successful performance measurement systems.\nDOJ has addressed two of four GAO recommendations related to its reentry programs . As part of its mission to protect public safety, DOJ's Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) provides reentry programming that aims to facilitate offenders' successful return to the community and reduce recidivism (a return to prison or criminal behavior). These reentry efforts include programs offered in BOP facilities as well as contractor-managed residential reentry centers (RRC)\u2014also known as halfway houses\u2014and home confinement services that allow inmates to serve the final months of their sentences in the community. GAO issued three reports in February 2012, June 2015, and June 2016 and made four recommendations to BOP in this area.\nAs of December 2017, DOJ has implemented two of the four recommendations and has begun to take action to address one of the remaining two. Specifically, to implement one of GAO's recommendations, DOJ established a plan to evaluate the effectiveness of all the 18 reentry programs it offers to inmates in BOP facilities. To implement another GAO recommendation to improve cost management, DOJ began requiring contractors to submit separate prices for RRC beds and home confinement services. As of December 2017, DOJ noted it has taken initial steps to address a recommendation to track outcome data for its RRC and home confinement programs; however, it has not taken action to develop measures to assess the performance of these programs.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO has made 10 recommendations to DOJ in prior reports to help improve performance measurement and resource management. DOJ generally concurred and has addressed or taken steps to address several. GAO continues to believe all of these recommendations should be fully implemented.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_761"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_762","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nProtecting federal employees and facilities from security threats is of critical importance. Most federal agencies are generally responsible for their facilities and have physical security programs to do so.\nGAO was asked to examine how federal agencies assess facilities' security risks. This report examines: (1) how selected agencies' assessment methodologies align with the ISC's risk management standard for identifying necessary countermeasures and (2) what management challenges, if any, selected agencies reported facing in conducting physical security assessments and monitoring the results.\nGAO selected four agencies\u2014CBP, FAA, ARS, and the Forest Service\u2014based on their large number of facilities and compared each agency's assessment methodology to the ISC Standard; analyzed facility assessment schedules and results from 2010 through 2016; and interviewed security officials. GAO also visited 13 facilities from these four agencies, selected based on geographical dispersion and their high risk level.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nNone of the four agencies GAO reviewed\u2014U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Agricultural Research Service (ARS), and the Forest Service\u2014used security assessment methodologies that fully aligned with the Interagency Security Committee's Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities standard (the ISC Standard). This standard requires that methodologies used to identify necessary facility countermeasures\u2014such as fences and closed-circuit televisions\u2014must:\n1. Consider all of the undesirable events (i.e., arson and vandalism) identified by the ISC Standard as possible risks to facilities.\n2. Assess three factors\u2014threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences\u2014for each of these events and use these three factors to measure risk.\nAll four agencies used methodologies that included some ISC requirements when conducting assessments. CBP and FAA assessed vulnerabilities but not threats and consequences. ARS and the Forest Service assessed threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, but did not use these factors to measure risk. In addition, the agencies considered many, but not all 33 undesirable events related to physical security as possible risks to their facilities. Agencies are taking steps to improve their methodologies. For example, ARS and the Forest Service now use a methodology that measures risk and plan to incorporate the methodology into policy. Although CBP and FAA have updated their methodologies, their policies do not require methodologies that fully align with the ISC standard. As a result, these agencies miss the opportunity for a more informed assessment of the risk to their facilities.\nAll four agencies reported facing management challenges in conducting physical security assessments or monitoring assessment results. Specifically, CBP, ARS, and the Forest Service have not met the ISC's required time frame of every 3 years for conducting assessments. For example, security specialists have not conducted required reassessments of two ARS and one Forest Service higher-level facilities. While these three agencies have plans to address backlogs, CBP's plan does not balance conducting risk assessments with other competing security priorities, such as updating its policy manual, and ARS and the Forest Service lack a means to monitor completion of future assessments. Furthermore, CBP, ARS, and the Forest Service did not have the data or information systems to monitor assessment schedules or the status of countermeasures at facilities, and their policies did not specify such data requirements. For example, ARS and the Forest Service do not collect and analyze security-related data, such as countermeasures' implementation. FAA does not routinely monitor the performance of its physical security program. Without improved monitoring, agencies are not well equipped to prioritize their highest security needs, may leave facilities' vulnerabilities unaddressed, and may not take corrective actions to meet physical security program objectives. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in August 2017. Information that the agencies under review deemed sensitive has been omitted.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends: (1) that CBP and FAA update policies to require the use of methodologies fully aligned with the ISC Standard; (2) that CBP revise its plan to eliminate the assessments backlog; and (3) that all four agencies improve monitoring of their physical security programs. All four agencies agreed with the respective recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_762"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_763","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nMuch has changed since the federal government's employment policies were designed generations ago. Without careful attention to strategic human capital management, the federal government may continue to struggle to compete for workers with the skills needed to address the nation's social, economic, and security challenges.\nGAO was asked to review issues related to the future of federal work and the workforce. This report identifies: (1) key trends affecting federal work and workers, and (2) key talent management strategies for achieving a high-performing workforce, given those trends.\nGAO analyzed data from OPM and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and reviewed reports from GAO, OPM, and selected think tanks. GAO also held group interviews with agency Chief Human Capital Officers, and interviewed human capital experts and representatives of federal labor unions, managers, and executives. Additionally, GAO spoke with private consulting firms and foreign governments regarding human capital strategies that officials said were helpful to improving their organizations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFederal work is changing amid demographic and technological trends (see figure below).\nGiven these trends, key talent management strategies can help agencies better manage the current and future workforce. These strategies are all within agencies' existing authorities:\nAlign human capital strategy with current and future mission requirements. With shifting attitudes toward work, technological advances, and increased reliance on nonfederal partners, agencies need to identify the knowledge and skills necessary to respond to current and future demands. Key practices include identifying and assessing existing skills, competencies, and skills gaps.\nAcquire and assign talent. To ensure agencies have the talent capacity to address evolving mission requirements and negative perceptions of federal work (e.g., that it is too bureaucratic), agencies can cultivate a diverse talent pipeline, highlight their respective missions, recruit early in the school year, support rotations, and assign talent where needed.\nIncentivize and compensate employees. While federal agencies may struggle to offer competitive pay in certain labor markets, they can leverage existing incentives that appeal to workers' desire to set a schedule and to work in locations that provide work-life balance.\nEngage employees. Engaged employees are more productive and less likely to leave, according to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Agencies can better ensure their workforces are engaged by managing employee performance, involving employees in decisions, and developing employees.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO has open recommendations to OPM related to key talent management strategies, including developing a core set of metrics that agencies should use to close mission-critical skills gaps. OPM agreed with most of these recommendations and has made some progress, but additional actions are needed. OPM provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_763"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_764","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSafety incidents in recent years on WMATA's rail system have raised questions about its processes for performing critical maintenance and replacing capital assets. WMATA initiated a new preventive maintenance program for its rail track in 2017, and is currently implementing a new capital planning process.\nGAO was asked to examine issues related to WMATA's capital funding and maintenance practices. This report examines: (1) how WMATA spent its capital funds from fiscal years 2011 through 2017, (2) how WMATA's new capital planning process addresses weaknesses it identified in the prior process, and (3) WMATA's progress toward its track preventive maintenance program's goals and how the program aligns with leading program management practices. GAO analyzed WMATA's financial and program information, interviewed officials of WMATA, the Federal Transit Administration, and five transit agencies selected for similarities to WMATA. GAO compared WMATA's capital planning process and track maintenance program with leading practices.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFrom fiscal years 2011 through 2017, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) spent almost $6 billion on a variety of capital assets, with the largest share spent on improving its rail and bus fleet (see figure). Over this period, WMATA's capital spending was, on average, about $845 million annually.\nWMATA's new capital planning process could address some weaknesses it identified in the prior process. WMATA established a framework for quantitatively prioritizing capital needs (investments to a group of related assets) over a 10-year period. However, WMATA has not established documented policies and procedures for implementing the new process, such as those for selecting specific projects for funding in its annual capital budget. WMATA is currently using its new capital planning process to make fiscal year 2020 investment decisions. WMATA has proposed a fiscal year 2020 capital budget of $1.4 billion. Without documented policies and procedures for implementing the new planning process, WMATA's stakeholders do not have reasonable assurance that WMATA is following a sound process for making investment decisions.\nWMATA has made significant progress toward its track preventive maintenance program's goals, which are to reduce both track-defect and electrical-fire incidents by 50 percent in fiscal year 2019 compared with 2017. In fiscal year 2018, WMATA met its goal for reducing track defect incidents and reduced electrical fire incidents by 20 percent. However, in designing the program, WMATA did not fully assess risks. For example, WMATA did not quantitatively assess the impact of track defects or electrical fires on its ability to provide service, nor did it consider other risks such as non-electrical track fires, which represent about 30 percent of all fires on the system, or other factors, such as resources or track time. Without a comprehensive risk assessment, WMATA lacks reasonable assurance that the program is designed to address risks affecting the safety of the rail system or other risks that could hinder the new program's success.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making five recommendations, including that WMATA establish documented policies and procedures for the new capital planning process and conduct a comprehensive risk assessment for the track preventive maintenance program. WMATA described actions planned or underway to address GAO's recommendations. GAO believes the recommendations should be fully implemented, as discussed in the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_764"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_765","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nInfringement of IPR through the illegal importation and distribution of counterfeit goods harms the U.S. economy and can threaten the health and safety of U.S. consumers. CBP leads IPR enforcement at U.S. ports of entry by detecting and seizing counterfeit goods that enter the United States. CBP works with ICE, which investigates IPR violations and builds cases for prosecution.\nGAO was asked to review CBP's and ICE's IPR enforcement at U.S. borders. In this report, GAO examines (1) what is known about counterfeit goods entering the United States and the challenges they present, (2) efforts CBP and ICE have undertaken to enhance IPR enforcement and the extent to which they have assessed the results, and (3) the extent of CBP's and ICE's collaboration on IPR enforcement and ways they coordinate with the private sector. GAO reviewed agency data and documents, interviewed agency officials, and conducted field work at port locations selected on the basis of factors such as the volume of IPR seizures and variety of modes of transportation at each location. GAO also conducted undercover purchases of commonly counterfeited consumer goods on popular consumer websites, using investigative tools and techniques.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nChanges in the market for counterfeit goods entering the United States pose new challenges for consumers, the private sector, and U.S. agencies that enforce intellectual property rights (IPR). Specifically, growth in e-commerce has contributed to a shift in the sale of counterfeit goods in the United States, with consumers increasingly purchasing goods online and counterfeiters producing a wider variety of goods that may be sold on websites alongside authentic products. For example, 20 of 47 items GAO purchased from third-party sellers on popular consumer websites were counterfeit, according to testing by the products' rights holders (see table), highlighting potential risks to consumers. The changes in the market for counterfeit goods can also pose challenges to the private sector\u2014for example, the challenge of distinguishing counterfeit from authentic goods listed for sale online\u2014and complicate the enforcement efforts of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).\nCBP and ICE engage in a number of activities to enhance IPR enforcement; however, while ICE has assessed some of its efforts, CBP has taken limited steps to do so. CBP's and ICE's IPR enforcement activities broadly include detecting imports of potentially IPR-infringing goods, conducting special operations at U.S. ports, engaging with international partners, and undertaking localized pilot programs or port-led initiatives. CBP and ICE have collected some performance data for each of the eight activities GAO reviewed, and ICE has taken some steps to understand the impact of its efforts. However, CBP has conducted limited evaluation of its efforts to enhance IPR enforcement. Consequently, CBP may lack information needed to ensure it is investing its resources in the most efficient and effective activities.\nCBP and ICE generally collaborate on IPR enforcement, but according to private sector representatives, restrictions on CBP's information sharing limit private sector enforcement efforts. GAO found that CBP and ICE have undertaken efforts that align with selected key practices for interagency collaboration, such as participating in developing a national IPR enforcement strategy and agreeing on roles and responsibilities. However, sharing additional information about seized items with rights-holding companies and e-commerce websites could improve enforcement, according to private sector representatives. CBP officials said they share information to the extent allowed under current regulations, but CBP has not completed an assessment of what, if any, additional information would be beneficial to share with private sector entities. Without such an assessment, CBP will not know if sharing additional information requires regulatory or legal changes.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making two recommendations to CBP, recommending that it (1) evaluate its efforts to enhance IPR enforcement and (2) assess potential additional information sharing with the private sector. CBP agreed with these recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_765"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_766","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn 1999, Congress required DOD to monitor the time that individual service members spend away from home and set a threshold to limit excessive time away. At the time, the threshold was no more than 220 days served away from home in a 365-day period. In the interest of national security, in 2001 DOD exercised a provision in the law and waived the requirement to limit time away for service members. Recently, DOD leaders have stated that the continued high pace of military operations have limited their ability to rebuild readiness.\nSenate Report 114-255 includes a provision for GAO to review the root causes of degraded readiness, including reviewing DOD's management of perstempo. This report assesses the extent to which DOD, the services, and SOCOM have (1) policies with specific and measurable thresholds on perstempo and (2) reliable data to monitor perstempo.\nGAO analyzed DOD, service, and SOCOM perstempo policies and analyzed DOD-wide perstempo data for fiscal years 2012-2016.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD), military service, and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) policies vary in identifying specific and measurable thresholds on the total time individual service members can be away from home, known as personnel tempo or \u201cperstempo.\u201d DOD's policy issued in 2013 states that service members should not be deployed for longer than they are at home. However, the policy does not set thresholds for perstempo, which includes time away from home for exercises and training in addition to deployment. Service members are sometimes away from home for long periods for training, exercises, or other activities. For example, Air Force officials told GAO that F-16 pilots participate in multiple exercises every year that require them to spend significant time away from home. The Navy and SOCOM set specific and measurable perstempo thresholds in policy in 2014 and 2016, respectively. However, the other services either are not enforcing or have not established specific and measurable perstempo thresholds in their policies. DOD has maintained the waiver of statutory perstempo thresholds since 2001, and officials have cited the effect of the high pace of operations and training on service members; however, DOD has not taken action to focus attention on the management of perstempo thresholds within the services and department-wide. Unless DOD ensures that perstempo thresholds are established and followed while statutory thresholds are waived, DOD will be unable to judge whether service members are spending too much total time away from home and, if so, whether this has resulted in any associated effects on military readiness.\nDOD does not have reliable data to monitor perstempo because the data are incomplete. Based on available DOD-wide data, GAO estimated that for fiscal year 2016 at least 51,000 service personnel spent more than 7 months away from home. However, that number is conservative because the analysis is limited by incomplete data. Specifically:\nDOD analysis shows that perstempo records are missing for at least 145,000 personnel who deployed in fiscal years 2014-2016.\nFor fiscal years 2012-2016, 30 percent of DOD's perstempo records were missing information that identifies service members' occupations, 14 percent were missing information that identifies the purpose of the perstempo events, and 8 percent were missing information that identifies the category of perstempo events.\nThe Navy identified about 13,000 personnel who spent more than 220 days away from home in fiscal year 2016 but were not accounted for in the DOD-wide data, and DOD officials could not explain why they were missing.\nWithout taking steps to emphasize the collection of complete and reliable perstempo data, DOD will be limited in its ability to assess the amount of time service members are serving away from home for all perstempo events and in its ability to use that information to assist in gauging the stress on the force.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DOD (1) clarify its policy to include specific and measurable department-wide perstempo thresholds for use while statutory thresholds are waived or ensure service-level policies are established and followed, and (2) take steps to emphasize the collection of complete and reliable perstempo data. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_766"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_767","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn fiscal year 2017, the federal government awarded approximately $675 billion in grants to state and local governments. GAO was asked to review the federal grants workforce training. GAO reviewed (1) OPM's, OMB's, and the CFOC's actions to address the grants workforce's training needs; (2) the extent to which grants workforce training at selected agencies is consistent with leading practices; and (3) how selected agencies monitor and oversee training of their grants workforce. GAO selected HHS, USDA, and Education and several of their sub-agencies based on their grants spending and numbers of grants management specialists. GAO reviewed OPM and OMB memorandums and guidance, compared selected agency training practices against leading training practices, and interviewed officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Offices of Personnel Management (OPM) and Management and Budget (OMB) and the Chief Financial Officers Council (CFOC) have taken some steps to help ensure the federal grants workforce receives training. For example, OMB worked with the CFOC to issue five basic grants training modules and a \u201cCareer Roadmap\u201d for grants managers; however, they did not widely publicize the resources. Many of the officials with whom GAO spoke at selected sub-agencies at the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS), Agriculture (USDA), and Education (Education) were unfamiliar with the Career Roadmap and made limited use of the training resources. Further, OMB and CFOC do not collect detailed user data or feedback, limiting their abilities to determine the usefulness of these resources.\nGAO found that sub-agencies at HHS, USDA, and Education vary in following leading training practices for planning, designing, implementing, and evaluating their grants training programs. Additionally, HHS, USDA, and Education could not readily identify grants management specialists\u2014the 1109 job series\u2014or employees in other job series working on grants without querying each sub-agency. These agencies cannot do so because their central offices do not have a reporting mechanism tracking their sub-agencies' grants workforce. Further, agency central offices do not evaluate sub-agency grants training efforts. Without sufficient monitoring and oversight, the agencies cannot have reasonable assurance that their sub-agencies are sufficiently training their grants workforce so they have the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to properly manage, administer, and monitor the billions of dollars that the federal government spends on grants annually.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making five recommendations including that OMB, working with the CFOC, should (1) publicize the Career Roadmap and (2) collect data metrics and user feedback on its use. HHS, USDA, and Education should establish processes to centrally monitor and evaluate their grants training, including identifying the grants workforce and ensuring consistency with leading practices. HHS and USDA concurred, Education generally concurred, and OMB partially concurred with our recommendations. OPM had no comments on the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_767"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_768","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFirst fielded in 1976 on Shemya Island in Alaska, the Cobra Dane radar faces growing sustainment challenges that DOD plans to address through modernization projects. Anticipating future needs, DOD began investing in new radar systems that share capabilities with Cobra Dane to support ballistic missile defense and space surveillance, including the LRDR (Alaska), the Space Fence (Marshall Islands), and the Pacific Radar (location to be determined).\nThe conference report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 included a provision that GAO review the Air Force's report to Congress on the operation and sustainment of Cobra Dane. This report identifies information included in the Air Force's report and describes additional information that GAO reviewed on (1) the capabilities of the Cobra Dane radar and other planned radars to meet DOD's mission requirements, (2) Cobra Dane's operational availability and the plan to mitigate the effect on those missions when Cobra Dane is not available, and (3) DOD's funding plan and project cost estimates for the operation and sustainment of Cobra Dane and its site at Shemya Island. GAO reviewed the Air Force report and related documentation, and interviewed relevant officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn its January 2018 report to Congress, the Air Force reported how the Cobra Dane radar and the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) have shared and unique capabilities to support ballistic missile defense and space surveillance missions. The report noted that the respective locations of both radar systems affect their ability to provide those capabilities. The Department of Defense (DOD) also has other radar investments\u2014the Pacific Radar and the Space Fence, which, according to DOD officials, may reduce DOD's reliance on Cobra Dane to provide ballistic missile defense and space surveillance capabilities.\nThe Air Force's report to Congress noted that Cobra Dane met its requirement for operational availability, which refers to the percentage of time that the radar is able to meet its missions. GAO found that the Air Force has developed procedures to mitigate risks when Cobra Dane is not available. For example, U.S. Northern Command and Missile Defense Agency (MDA) officials stated that they can mitigate risks when Cobra Dane is not available by using the Sea-Based X-band radar to provide support for ballistic missile defense. The Air Force would face some limitations in its ability to conduct space surveillance if Cobra Dane were not available, as Cobra Dane tracks objects no other radar can track. However, MDA officials noted there are no plans to take Cobra Dane offline long enough to compromise space surveillance.\nThe Air Force and MDA plan to contribute total funding of $278.6 million for the operation and sustainment of Cobra Dane, according to their fiscal year 2019 budget plans. Specifically, the Air Force and MDA plan to share funding for the operation and maintenance of the Cobra Dane radar and for three modernization projects that make up their sustainment plan for the radar. Further, the Air Force report noted that the Air Force also plans to provide $140 million in funding for the sustainment and maintenance of operational access to Cobra Dane's site at Shemya Island. In addition, GAO found that the Air Force developed a total cost estimate for one project\u2014known as the transmitter group replacement\u2014but not for its other two projects. Air Force officials plan to complete cost estimates for those two projects in conjunction with their fiscal year 2020 budget submission.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_768"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_769","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nBiological threats come from a variety of sources and can pose a catastrophic danger to public health, animal and plant health, and national security. Threat awareness, which consists of activities such as collecting and analyzing intelligence, developing risk assessments, and anticipating future threats, is vital to help federal agencies identify necessary biodefense capabilities and ensure investments are prioritized to make effective use of federal funds.\nGAO was asked to review how key federal agencies develop and share threat awareness information, and how that information informs further investments in biodefense. This report describes: (1) the types of actions that key federal agencies have taken to develop biological threat awareness, and how that information is used to support investment decisions; (2) the extent to which these agencies have developed shared threat awareness; and (3) how DHS's NBACC determines what additional threat characterization knowledge to pursue.\nGAO analyzed federal policies, directives, and strategies related to biodefense, as well as agency documents such as threat assessments and modeling studies. We identified five key biodefense agencies based on review of the roles designated in these documents. GAO interviewed officials from these agencies about threat awareness activities, and reviewed prior GAO work and related biodefense studies. Each of the key agencies reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nKey biodefense agencies\u2014the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Defense (DOD), Agriculture (USDA), and Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Environmental Protection Agency\u2014conduct a wide range of activities to develop biological threat awareness for intentional and naturally occurring threats, and reported using that information to support investment decisions.\nIntelligence gathering: Agencies use a combination of intelligence gathering on adversaries' capabilities to cause harm with a biological weapon and global disease surveillance to monitor threats from naturally occurring health threats that might impact humans, animals, or plants.\nScientific research: Agencies use traditional laboratory research to help understand the characteristics of various threat agents, including their virulence, stability, and ability to be dispersed through various methods. Scientific research is also performed on emerging pathogens to understand their means of transmission, host susceptibility, and effects of infection.\nAnalysis activities: Agencies use modeling studies and other analytical work to help determine the scope and impact of possible biological threats.\nThese three activities help agencies identify and prioritize the most dangerous biological threats, which can then be used to guide biodefense investments. For example, USDA told GAO it uses threat information to determine which foreign animal diseases represent its highest priorities based on the potential of those agents to cause catastrophic harm, and those priorities are used to inform investments. Similarly, HHS said it conducts threat awareness activities to help inform the development and acquisition of human medical countermeasures.\nFederal agencies with key roles in biodefense share biological threat information through many different mechanisms designed to facilitate collaboration among government partners, including working groups and interagency agreements. For example, agency officials reported using collaborative mechanisms to coordinate activities and avoid duplication and overlap. However, as GAO and others have noted, opportunities exist to better leverage shared resources and inform budgetary tradeoffs. Recent legislation requires key biodefense agencies to create a national biodefense strategy that has the potential to help address these issues, by, among other things, supporting shared threat awareness. Until the strategy is developed, the extent to which it will meet this need is unknown.\nThe threat characterization research agenda at DHS's National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) is based primarily on the results and knowledge gaps identified through the Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA). According to DHS officials, the knowledge gaps deemed most critical include data about biological agents that have a high impact on BTRA consequence estimates and also a high degree of uncertainty. Each year NBACC produces an annual plan that outlines new research projects intended to address these knowledge gaps, and incorporates additional planning criteria, such as interagency stakeholder input, resource availability, and maintenance of required technical capabilities. According to DHS officials, the results of NBACC research were used to directly enhance the BTRA, including updating data associated with eight biological agents since 2010.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_769"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_770","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nMuch of the voting equipment acquired with federal funds after the enactment of the Help America Vote Act in 2002 may now be reaching the end of its life span, and some states and local election jurisdictions\u2014which number about 10,300 and generally have responsibility for conducting federal elections\u2014have or are considering whether to replace their equipment. GAO was asked to examine voting equipment use and replacement.\nThis report addresses (1) the types of voting equipment jurisdictions used for the 2016 general election and their perspectives on the equipment; (2) factors considered when deciding whether to replace equipment and replacement approaches in selected jurisdictions; and (3) stakeholder perspectives on how federal voting system guidelines affect replacing and developing equipment.\nGAO surveyed officials from a nationwide generalizable sample of 800 local jurisdictions (68 percent weighted response rate) and all 50 states and the District of Columbia (46 responded) to obtain information on voting equipment use and replacement. GAO also interviewed officials from (1) five jurisdictions, selected based on population size and type of voting equipment used, among other things, to illustrate equipment replacement approaches; and (2) seven voting system vendors, selected based on prevalence of jurisdictions' use of equipment, type of equipment manufactured, and systems certified, to obtain views on federal voting system guidelines. These interviews are not generalizable, but provide insights into jurisdictions' and vendors' experiences.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nLocal election jurisdictions primarily used optical scan and direct recording electronic (DRE), also known as touch screen, equipment during the 2016 general election and were generally satisfied with voting equipment performance. Specifically, on the basis of GAO's nationwide generalizable survey of local election jurisdictions, GAO estimated that jurisdictions with 63 percent (from 54 to 72 percent) of the population nationwide used optical or digital scan equipment as their predominant voting equipment during the election, while jurisdictions with 32 percent (from 23 to 41 percent) of the population nationwide used DREs. In addition, the survey results indicated that accurate vote counting and efficiency of operation were top benefits experienced by jurisdictions for both types of equipment, and storage and transportation costs were a top challenge. Further, GAO estimated that jurisdictions with 93 percent (from 88 to 96 percent) of the population nationwide did not experience equipment errors or malfunctions on a very or somewhat common basis and jurisdictions with 96 percent (from 94 to 98 percent) of the population were very or generally satisfied with the performance of their equipment during the 2016 general election.\nGAO identified four key factors that jurisdictions and states consider when deciding whether to replace voting equipment\u2014(1) need for equipment to meet federal, state, and local voting system standards and requirements; (2) cost to acquire new equipment and availability of funding; (3) ability to maintain equipment and receive timely vendor support; and (4) overall performance and features of equipment. When replacing equipment, the five jurisdictions GAO selected for interviews used varying approaches based on their specific needs and resources. For example, Los Angeles County, California, which has a large and diverse electorate, is self-designing its own voting equipment and, according to officials, has incorporated a user-centered approach that prioritizes the needs and expectations of its voters. Lafayette County, Florida, which has a small population, joined a consortium of other small counties to help obtain funding and pool purchasing power to replace its equipment.\nThe state election officials we surveyed and the seven selected voting system vendors we interviewed, among other stakeholders, had varying perspectives on how the current voluntary federal voting system guidelines affected the replacement and development of voting equipment. These guidelines can be used to test and certify equipment to verify that it meets baseline functionality, accessibility, and security requirements. The stakeholders we surveyed or interviewed generally indicated that the guidelines and their associated testing processes provide helpful guidance for equipment developers, cost savings for states that do not have to duplicate federal testing, and assurance that certified equipment meets certain requirements. However, some of these stakeholders stated that aspects of the guidelines could discourage the development of innovative equipment and limit the choices of voting equipment on the market. The Election Assistance Commission (EAC), which is responsible for developing the federal guidelines, is updating them with stakeholder input and plans to issue a new version in late summer 2018.\nGAO incorporated technical comments provided by the EAC and election officials from the selected local jurisdictions and their respective states as appropriate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_770"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_771","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCongress can provide budget authority to federal agencies and programs through the annual appropriations process. It can also provide budget authority through laws other than annual appropriations acts, or through permanent appropriations that permit the agency to obligate budget authority without further congressional action. Analysis of these authorities helps provide Congress with visibility into spending authority that is not considered during the annual appropriations process.\nGAO was asked to update its 1996 report that had provided an inventory of accounts with spending authority and permanent appropriations for fiscal years 1985 through 1994. This report discusses (1) federal budget accounts with spending authority and permanent appropriations, including the statutory references for the authorities, changes in the number of accounts and dollar amounts since fiscal year 1994, and other relevant information; and (2) whether the identified accounts are subject to or exempt from sequestration, or subject to any special sequestration rules or limitations. GAO also is providing an online dataset of the inventory of accounts with spending authority and permanent appropriations on GAO's public website at https:\/\/www.gao.gov\/products\/GAO-19-36 .\nGAO analyzed Office of Management and Budget (OMB) budget data to identify accounts with spending authority and permanent appropriations. GAO reviewed data through fiscal year 2015 because that was the most recent data available when GAO began its work. GAO reviewed agency information to confirm data and statutory authority. Agencies also reviewed and verified the final data for their accounts. For the sequestration designation, GAO analyzed OMB data for fiscal years 2013 and 2015--the most recently completed years for which sequestration occurred and OMB identified designations when GAO began its work.\nGAO provided a draft of this report and the online dataset to the Director of OMB for review and comment. OMB staff provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nA total of $3.2 trillion in spending authority and permanent appropriations was reported in fiscal year 2015; an increase of 88 percent from fiscal year 1994 adjusted for inflation in fiscal year 2015 dollars. Fiscal year 1994 was the last year included in GAO's prior work. For the purposes of this report, spending authority and permanent appropriations is budget authority provided to agencies through laws other than annual appropriations acts or available permanently by law without further legislation. These authorities include permanent appropriations, contract authority, borrowing authority, offsetting collections, and monetary credits or bartering. Permanent appropriations were the primary driver of the increase in spending authority and permanent appropriations. Offsetting collections authority--which includes certain fees, fines, and penalties--also grew. Agencies reported no use of monetary credits or bartering.\na\nPermanent appropriations fund federal entitlement programs, such as Medicare, administered by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Social Security Administration's (SSA) Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance program. These programs are a significant proportion of reported budget authority in GAO's inventory of accounts in fiscal year 2015. These programs continue to show spending increases largely as a result of the aging population and rising health care costs and are projected to continue to increase in the future. In fiscal year 2015, 7 of the 10 accounts reporting the largest dollar amounts of spending authority and permanent appropriations funded entitlement programs.\nThree agencies comprised three quarters of the total government-wide spending authority and permanent appropriations in fiscal year 2015.\nHHS reported the largest amount of spending authority and permanent appropriations with $979 billion, or about 30 percent--mainly from Medicare. HHS overtook SSA and reported the highest dollar amounts of permanent appropriations for the first time in fiscal year 2006.\nSSA reported $920 billion, or about 28 percent of total spending authority and permanent appropriations--mainly from its Old-Age and Survivor's Insurance program and the Disability Insurance program.\nThe Department of the Treasury reported the third largest amount--$542 billion, or about 17 percent--the majority of which is for interest on debt held by the public and intragovernmental debt. This interest dropped as a percentage of permanent appropriations since fiscal year 1994, due to lower interest rates that allow the government to borrow money more cheaply. However, interest rates are predicted to rise in the long term, which would increase the net interest costs on the debt.\nThe second largest reported budget authority type was offsetting collections--a total of $421 billion in fiscal year 2015, more than double the fiscal year 1994 amount, adjusted for inflation. The Postal Service reported the largest use of offsetting collections authority in fiscal year 2015 in its Postal Service Fund, which includes revenue from mail services.\nSequestration--cancellation of budgetary resources under a presidential order--is a process established in statute which helps to enforce spending limits and thereby control the deficit. In fiscal year 2015, 57 percent of spending authority and permanent appropriations authorities were exempt from sequestration, up from 37 percent in fiscal year 1994. This means that fewer of these authorities were subject to this budgetary enforcement mechanism in fiscal year 2015.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_771"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_772","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Veterans Health Administration (VHA is responsible for providing a safe and secure, yet welcoming environment for staff, patients, and visitors at nearly 170 medical centers. These facilities have been the target of violence, threats, and other security-related incidents. Assessing and managing risks a critical element for ensuring adequate physical security at these facilities.\nGAO was asked to review VA's physical security risk-management policies and practices. This report: (1) assesses how VA's policies for risk management reflect prevailing standards, and (2) evaluates VA's oversight of risk management at VHA medical facilities. GAO compared VA policies to ISC standards; reviewed VA documents; interviewed VA and ISC officials; and assessed risk assessment activities at nine medical centers selected based on factors such as patient and security-incident data and geographical diversity. While not generalizable, these nine locations provide illustrative examples of how VA's policies are carried out.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) risk management policies include some but not all of the elements of standards set by the Interagency Security Committee (ISC). ISC was established via executive order to develop security standards and best practices that federal agencies are to follow when developing and conducting risk assessments. As part of this process, VA's policy identifies minimum countermeasures as called for in ISC's standards. In other areas, VA policy only partially adheres or does not adhere to ISC's standards, for example:\nOf the five factors ISC calls for when calculating a facility's security level, VA considers three but does not consider a facility's population and size.\nVA policy does not include performance measures, such as the number of countermeasures in use or the percentage of facility assessments completed; this percentage is a key element of ISC's standards for assessing the effectiveness of an agency's security programs.\nOfficials at VA said that its risk management program was developed prior to the ISC standards' being issued in 2013 and that it is up to each agency to determine how to best apply the standards. Nevertheless, VA officials said they are currently reexamining their policies. Until VA reviews its policies in accordance with ISC standards, its approach to risk management may not yield the appropriate security posture needed to adequately protect its medical centers.\nVA's oversight activities for risk management do not encompass key aspects of the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and Circular A-123 from the Office of Management and Budget that require agencies to conduct oversight activities to ensure the accountability and effectiveness of agency programs. VA has an oversight process to ensure that biennial assessments of individual facilities' security are completed. However, VA:\ndoes not review the quality of medical centers' required risk assessments,\ndoes not identify whether countermeasures were implemented appropriately by the medical centers, and\ndoes not collect system-wide data to gain an understanding of physical security issues across medical centers.\nIn the absence of a comprehensive VA-wide strategy or guidance that reflects these internal control standards, individual sites have established their own approaches to carrying out VA's risk management policy. For example, the nine sites GAO reviewed conducted their security assessments differently, and none of the assessments indicated that all of the threat categories in VA's policy were reviewed. The lack of a system-wide oversight strategy means that the differences among medical center approaches, along with the security effects of those different approaches, are unknown. Accordingly, VA does not know if its medical centers are adequately protected, and it may be missing opportunities to leverage resources nationally and make better informed, proactive policy decisions.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that the Department of Veterans Affairs review and revise its risk management policies to reflect prevailing standards, and develop an oversight strategy to assess the effectiveness of risk management programs at VHA facilities. VA agreed with GAO's recommendations and identified steps to implement them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_772"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_773","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn recent years, some Southwest border residents and businesses reported difficulty accessing banking services, including experiencing bank account terminations and bank branch closings in the region. In addition, the World Bank and others have reported that some money transmitters have been losing access to banking services with depository institutions.\nThis statement is based on findings from GAO's February 2018 report on access to banking services along the Southwest border ( GAO-18-263 ) and March 2018 report on the effects of derisking on remittance flows to fragile countries ( GAO-18-313 ). GAO discusses (1) the extent to which banks are terminating accounts and closing branches in the Southwest border region, (2) the extent to which money transmitters serving selected fragile countries are facing banking access challenges, and (3) actions relevant U.S. agencies have taken to respond to these challenges. For those reports, GAO surveyed more than 400 banks, developed an econometric model on the drivers of branch closures, and conducted case studies on four countries to assess the effects of derisking on remittances flows.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\n\u201cDerisking\u201d is the practice of depository institutions limiting certain services or ending their relationships with customers to, among other things, avoid perceived regulatory concerns about facilitating money laundering or other criminal activity such as financing to terrorist groups. In its February 2018 report, GAO found that money laundering risk is high in the Southwest border region because of the high volume of cash transactions, the number of cross-border transactions, and foreign account holders. According to GAO's nationally representative survey of banks, an estimated 80 percent (+\/- 11) of Southwest border banks limited or did not offer accounts to customers that are considered high risk for money laundering because the customers drew heightened Bank Secrecy Act\/anti-money laundering (BSA\/AML) oversight\u2014behavior that could indicate derisking. Nationally, GAO's econometric analysis suggested that counties that were urban, younger, had higher income, or had higher money laundering-related risk were more likely to lose branches.\nIn March 2018, GAO found that money transmitters (businesses that facilitate global money transfers) serving Haiti, Liberia, Nepal, and especially Somalia\u2014 countries it identified as fragile\u2014all reported losing bank accounts or having restrictions placed on them during the last 10 years. As a result, 9 of the 12 money transmitters GAO interviewed, including all 4 that served Somalia, reported using channels outside the banking system (hereafter referred to as nonbanking channels), such as transporting cash to transfer funds, and that this increased their operational costs and exposure to risks. Furthermore, some banks GAO interviewed reported that they closed the accounts of money transmitters because of the high cost of due diligence actions they considered necessary to minimize the risk of fines under BSA\/AML regulations. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) officials noted that despite information that some money transmitters have lost bank accounts, Treasury saw no evidence that the volume of remittances was falling or that costs of sending remittances were rising.\nTo address concerns about derisking, Treasury and federal banking regulators (the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), have taken actions including issuing guidance to banks and conducting some evaluations to assess the extent to which derisking is occurring. While agencies were engaged in BSA\/AML regulatory reviews, these were limited in scope and had not evaluated how regulatory concerns may influence banks to engage in derisking or to close branches. Without assessing the full range of BSA\/AML factors that may be influencing banks to derisk or close branches, Treasury, the federal banking regulators, and Congress do not have the information needed to determine if BSA\/AML regulations and their implementation can be made more effective or less burdensome. Moreover, in March 2018 GAO reported that Treasury could not assess the effects of money transmitters' loss of banking access on remittance flows because existing data did not allow Treasury to identify remittances transferred through banking and nonbanking channels. Nonbanking channels are generally less transparent than banking channels and thus more susceptible to the risk of money laundering and terrorism financing.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO made five recommendations in the two reports: to Treasury and the federal banking regulators to conduct a retrospective review of BSA\/AML regulations and their implementation, and to Treasury to assess shifts in remittance flows to nonbanking channels. Banking regulators agreed with the recommendations. GAO requested comments from Treasury, but none were provided.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_773"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_774","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nMillions of households subscribe to cable, satellite, and telephone companies\u2014known as MVPDs\u2014for television, which is generally delivered via a set-top box attached to a television. Congress directed FCC to adopt regulations to assure a commercial market for devices to access MVPDs, and in February 2016, FCC proposed a rule intended to do so. Many industry stakeholders raised concerns about the proposal's potential effects, and FCC did not issue the proposed rule. This report examines: (1) the role of set-top boxes in accessing video programming content and (2) views of selected stakeholders and experts on the need for FCC regulation regarding set-top boxes and FCC's analysis of such need.\nGAO analyzed data from a media research group regarding the video market and interviewed 35 industry stakeholders including 12 MVPDs, 5 video content producers, 3 device manufacturers, 12 industry associations, and others; GAO selected stakeholders based on comments filed with FCC on its 2016 proposed rule. GAO also interviewed 11 industry analysts and experts selected based on industry coverage and publications.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nSet-top boxes play a significant but diminishing role in delivering video content in an evolving video market. Subscribers to multichannel video programming distributors (MVPD)\u2014companies that provide pay television services via subscriptions such as cable and satellite companies\u2014generally need a set-top box to access MVPD television services, and most subscribers lease a set-top box from their MVPD. However, consumers can now access video through a wide range of Internet-based services without a set-top box, using a variety of Internet-capable devices, such as tablets. Internet-based services include those providing on-demand video such as Netflix and some, such as Sling TV, providing live content similar to that from MVPDs. Some Internet-capable devices, such as Roku, allow people to watch Internet-based video on televisions. In recent years, subscriptions to MVPDs have fallen as more Internet-based services have become available. Partly in response to this competition, many MVPDs have begun offering content over the Internet to subscribers, accessible on many Internet-capable devices, including streaming devices that display it on televisions. While in most cases, MVPD subscribers still need a set-top box, a few MVPDs GAO interviewed now allow subscribers to access content they subscribe to solely over the Internet, without a set-top box.\nThe Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has conducted limited analysis of the need for regulations to assure a commercial market for devices, such as set-top boxes, to access MVPD services. Most stakeholders and experts GAO interviewed said that further regulations for this purpose were not needed, given recent changes in the video content market. FCC is directed by law to set regulations to assure a commercial market for devices to access MVPD services. However, the law also specifies that any such regulations may no longer apply if FCC determines that the markets for both MVPD services and devices to access MVPDs are fully competitive. Moreover, while it does not extend to independent agencies, Office of Management and Budget guidance says agencies could use analyses to evaluate the need for proposed actions. However, FCC proposed a new rule in 2016 to promote a commercial set-top box market without undertaking a comprehensive analysis of the competitiveness of the market to support the proposed rule. FCC did not enact a final rule. Stakeholders had differing views on the potential effects of the proposed rule, but some raised concerns that the rule could have had negative effects on MVPDs and content providers. As described above, widespread changes in the video market in recent years have expanded consumers' choices for video services as well as devices to access those services. Nineteen of the 35 industry stakeholders GAO interviewed said rules are not needed at this time, while 8 said rules are still needed. (The rest gave uncertain answers or did not comment on this issue.) Without a comprehensive analysis, FCC lacks information on the extent of consumer choice and, furthermore, the extent to which increased options for video services affect the relative importance of consumer choice for devices to access MVPDs. Such an analysis could help FCC determine if additional regulations are needed and, as the market likely continues its rapid evolution, could serve as a benchmark in FCC's further consideration of whether market conditions have been met such that regulations may no longer apply.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that FCC conduct a comprehensive analysis of how recent industry changes related to video services affect consumer choice for devices to access video services.\nFCC agreed with GAO's recommendation and provided technical comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_774"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_775","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nEach year, DOD spends billions of dollars to develop, produce, and field large, complex satellites. For such satellite systems, a single adversary attack or on-orbit failure can result in the loss of billions of dollars of investment and significant loss of vital capabilities. As DOD plans new space systems and addresses an increasingly contested space environment, it has the opportunity to consider different acquisition approaches. One such approach is to integrate a government sensor or payload onto a commercial host satellite.\nHouse Armed Services Committee report 115-200, accompanying a bill for the Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act, included a provision for GAO to review DOD's use of commercially hosted payloads. This report (1) determines the extent to which DOD uses commercially hosted payloads and (2) describes and assesses factors that affect their use.\nGAO reviewed DOD policies, documentation, and planning documents, and interviewed a wide range of DOD and civil government officials, and commercial stakeholders.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO and others have found that using commercial satellites to host government sensors or communications packages\u2014called payloads\u2014may be one way DOD can achieve on-orbit capability faster and more affordably. Using hosted payloads may also help facilitate a proliferation of payloads on orbit, making it more difficult for an adversary to defeat a capability. Since 2009, DOD has used three commercially hosted payloads, with three more missions planned or underway through 2022 (see figure below).\nDOD estimates that it has achieved cost savings of several hundred million dollars from using commercially hosted payloads to date, and expects to realize additional savings and deliver faster capabilities on orbit from planned missions. Cost savings can result from sharing development, launch, and ground system costs with the commercial host company.\nAmong the factors that affect DOD's use of hosted payloads are\na perception among some DOD officials that matching government payloads to commercial satellites is too difficult; and\nlimited, fragmented knowledge on how to mitigate various challenges\nGAO found that further opportunities to use hosted payloads may emerge as DOD plans new and follow-on space systems in the coming years. However, DOD's knowledge on using hosted payloads is fragmented, in part because programs are not required to share information. In 2011, the Air Force created a Hosted Payload Office to provide expertise and other tools to facilitate matching government payloads with commercial hosts. However, GAO found that DOD programs using hosted payloads are not required and generally do not provide cost and technical data, or lessons learned, to the Hosted Payload Office, or another central office for analysis. Requiring programs that use hosted payloads agency-wide to provide this information to a central location would better position DOD to make informed decisions when considering acquisition approaches for upcoming space system designs.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DOD require programs using commercially hosted payloads to contribute resulting data to a central location. In implementing this recommendation, DOD should assess whether the Air Force's Hosted Payload Office is the appropriate location to collect and analyze the data. DOD concurred with the recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_775"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_776","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn April 2018, Facebook disclosed that a Cambridge University researcher may have improperly shared the data of up to 87 million of its users with a political consulting firm. This disclosure followed other recent incidents involving the misuse of consumers' personal information from the Internet, which is used by about three-quarters of Americans. GAO was asked to review federal oversight of Internet privacy. This report addresses, among other objectives: (1) how FTC and FCC have overseen consumers' Internet privacy and (2) selected stakeholders' views on the strengths and limitations of how Internet privacy currently is overseen and how, if it all, this approach could be enhanced.\nGAO evaluated FTC and FCC Internet privacy enforcement actions and authorities and interviewed representatives from industry, consumer advocacy groups, and academia; FTC and FCC staff; former FTC and FCC commissioners; and officials from other federal oversight agencies. Industry stakeholders were selected to represent different sectors, and academics were selected because of their expertise in privacy, consumer protection, and regulatory issues.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe United States does not have a comprehensive Internet privacy law governing the collection, use, and sale or other disclosure of consumers' personal information. At the federal level, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) currently has the lead in overseeing Internet privacy, using its statutory authority under the FTC Act to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive trade practices. However, to date FTC has not issued regulations for Internet privacy other than those protecting financial privacy and the Internet privacy of children, which were required by law. For FTC Act violations, FTC may promulgate regulations but is required to use procedures that differ from traditional notice-and-comment processes and that FTC staff said add time and complexity.\nIn the last decade, FTC has filed 101 enforcement actions regarding Internet privacy; nearly all actions resulted in settlement agreements requiring action by the companies. In most of these cases, FTC did not levy civil penalties because it lacked such authority for those particular violations. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has had a limited role in overseeing Internet privacy. From 2015 to 2017, FCC asserted jurisdiction over the privacy practices of Internet service providers. In 2016, FCC promulgated privacy rules for Internet service providers that Congress later repealed. FTC resumed privacy oversight of Internet service providers in June 2018.\nStakeholders GAO interviewed had varied views on the current Internet privacy enforcement approach and how it could be enhanced. Most Internet industry stakeholders said they favored FTC's current approach\u2014direct enforcement of its unfair and deceptive practices statutory authority, rather than promulgating and enforcing regulations implementing that authority. These stakeholders said that the current approach allows for flexibility and that regulations could hinder innovation. Other stakeholders, including consumer advocates and most former FTC and FCC commissioners GAO interviewed, favored having FTC issue and enforce regulations. Some stakeholders said a new data-protection agency was needed to oversee consumer privacy. Stakeholders identified three main areas in which Internet privacy oversight could be enhanced:\nStatute . Some stakeholders told GAO that an overarching Internet privacy statute could enhance consumer protection by clearly articulating to consumers, industry, and agencies what behaviors are prohibited.\nRulemaking . Some stakeholders said that regulations can provide clarity, enforcement fairness, and flexibility. Officials from two other consumer protection agencies said their rulemaking authority assists in their oversight efforts and works together with enforcement actions.\nCivil penalty authority. Some stakeholders said FTC's Internet privacy enforcement could be more effective with authority to levy civil penalties for first-time violations of the FTC Act.\nComprehensive Internet privacy legislation that establishes specific standards and includes traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking and broader civil penalty authority could enhance the federal government's ability to protect consumer privacy.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nCongress should consider developing comprehensive legislation on Internet privacy that would enhance consumer protections and provide flexibility to address a rapidly evolving Internet environment. Issues that should be considered include what authorities agencies should have in order to oversee Internet privacy, including appropriate rulemaking authority.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_776"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_777","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nReverse auctions are intended to result in enhanced competition, lower prices, and reduced acquisition costs. GAO has previously found that agencies did not maximize these benefits.\nGAO was asked to review federal agencies' use of reverse auctions. This report examines (1) the use of reverse auctions and the extent to which selected agencies achieved benefits, such as competition; and (2) the extent to which selected agencies had insight into reverse auction fees.\nGAO collected and analyzed data on federal agencies' use of reverse auctions from fiscal years 2013 to 2017. For five of the largest users of reverse auctions\u2014the Departments of the Army, Homeland Security, Interior, Navy, and State\u2014GAO reviewed documentation for 40 auctions that resulted in contract awards in fiscal year 2016 (the most recent data available when the review began), and that were selected to obtain a mix of dollar values and levels of competition, among other factors. GAO also interviewed contracting officials and analyzed agency guidance.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFederal agencies' use of reverse auctions\u2014a process where vendors bid against each other with lower prices to win government contracts\u2014declined between fiscal years 2013 and 2017, from about 34,000 to 19,000 auctions valued at about $1.9 billion and $1.5 billion, respectively. In fiscal year 2016, the year GAO studied in detail, nearly three-quarters of auctions at the agencies GAO reviewed resulted in iterative bidding\u2014when there are multiple bidders and at least one bidder submits more than one bid during the auction (see figure).\nContracting officers said reverse auctions reduce administrative burden, especially during peak contracting times. Reverse auctions data indicate that selected agencies may have saved more than $100 million in 2016.\nThe five agencies GAO reviewed indirectly paid about $13 million in fees to reverse auction providers through awardees in 2016. However, 28 of the 30 contracting officials GAO interviewed did not fully understand how fees were set. Further, in 2016, agencies GAO reviewed indirectly paid approximately $3 million in fees for reverse auctions for which a fee-free alternative was likely available. None of the guidance GAO reviewed provided sufficient information for contracting officers to assess the appropriateness of these fees (see table). Without better information, contracting officials may be offsetting potential savings by paying more in fees than necessary for the level of services required.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making a total of 21 recommendations to the five agencies in GAO's review, including that agencies inform contracting officials about fees to better compare available provider options. Defense, State, and Interior concurred with this recommendation. DHS did not, stating that contracting officials should obtain this knowledge during market research. GAO believes managing this information centrally could eliminate confusion and minimize duplicate efforts.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_777"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_778","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIncarcerated students are generally prohibited from receiving Pell grants, which provide need-based federal financial aid to low-income undergraduate students. However, Education has the authority to waive specific statutory or regulatory requirements for providing federal student aid at schools approved to participate in its experiments. Accordingly, the department initiated the multi-year Second Chance Pell pilot in 2015 to test whether allowing incarcerated individuals to receive Pell grants increases their participation in higher education programs and influences their academic and life outcomes, or creates any obstacles to schools' administration of federal financial aid programs.\nGAO was asked to review the Second Chance Pell pilot. This report examines (1) actions Education, schools, and other stakeholders have taken to implement the pilot; (2) experiences participating schools are having as they implement the pilot; and (3) how Education is monitoring and evaluating the pilot and whether opportunities for improvement exist.\nGAO analyzed summary-level Education data from the 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 school years and interviewed a non-generalizable sample of 12 schools (and associated prison partners) that were selected for variation in type of school (i.e., public and private nonprofit), type of prisons served, and other variables. GAO also interviewed Education officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Education (Education) selected 64 schools across 26 states to participate in the Second Chance Pell pilot, and participating schools collaborated with prisons and other stakeholders to implement the pilot. Across the pilot's first 2 years, schools awarded approximately $35.6 million in Pell grants to about 8,800 incarcerated students.\nOfficials from the 12 schools GAO interviewed reported experiencing some challenges implementing the pilot. First, school officials said they experienced challenges establishing incarcerated applicants' eligibility for Pell grants, since some applicants had not registered for Selective Service and some had an existing federal student loan in default. However, many applicants were able to complete the necessary steps\u2014such as making a set number of payments on their defaulted loans\u2014to reestablish eligibility. Second, obtaining documents from incarcerated applicants to support verification\u2014which helps the department's efforts to reduce improper payments of federal student aid\u2014was another challenge officials reported. School officials also said that providing college classes in prisons required them to develop new processes and creative solutions to overcome technology limitations, space limitations, and the transfer of students to other prisons. Officials from 8 of 12 schools told GAO they hired additional staff or developed new approaches in response to their pilot efforts.\nIncarcerated College Students inside New York's Sing Sing Correctional Facility\nEducation monitors the pilot by collecting data from participating schools, but had not established how it intended to evaluate Second Chance Pell or measure the pilot's performance against its objectives. Education is required to review and evaluate experiments under the Experimental Sites Initiative\u2014of which Second Chance Pell is a part\u2014and make recommendations, as appropriate, to improve the delivery of federal student aid. In its comments on the draft report, Education stated that it was planning to evaluate the pilot, consistent with the pilot's objectives, and described a number of steps it was taking to do so. Completing this evaluation can help ensure policymakers have the information needed to make decisions about the future of Pell grants for incarcerated students.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that the Secretary of Education complete its evaluation of the pilot to report on its findings and conclusions. Education concurred, with clarification, and stated that it had actions underway to evaluate the pilot.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_778"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_779","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSSA delivers services that touch the lives of almost every American, and relies heavily on IT resources to do so. Its systems support a range of activities, such as processing Disability Insurance payments, to calculating and withholding Medicare premiums, and issuing Social Security numbers and cards. For fiscal year 2018, the agency planned to spend approximately $1.6 billion on IT.\nGAO has previously reported that federal IT projects have often failed, in part, due to a lack of oversight and governance. Given the challenges that federal agencies, including SSA, have encountered in managing IT acquisitions, Congress and the administration have taken steps to improve federal IT, including enacting federal IT acquisition reform legislation and issuing related guidance.\nThis statement summarizes GAO's previously reported findings regarding SSA's management of IT acquisitions and operations. In developing this testimony, GAO summarized findings from its reports issued in 2011 through 2018, and information on SSA's actions in response to GAO's recommendations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Social Security Administration (SSA) has improved its management of information technology (IT) acquisitions and operations by addressing 14 of the 15 recommendations that GAO has made to the agency. For example,\nIncremental development . The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has emphasized the need for agencies to deliver IT investments in smaller increments to reduce risk and deliver capabilities more quickly. In November 2017, GAO reported that agencies, including SSA, needed to improve their certification of incremental development. As a result, GAO recommended that SSA's CIO (1) report incremental development information accurately, and (2) update its incremental development policy and processes. SSA implemented both recommendations.\nSoftware licenses . Effective management of software licenses can help avoid purchasing too many licenses that result in unused software. In May 2014, GAO reported that most agencies, including SSA, lacked comprehensive software license policies. As a result, GAO made six recommendations to SSA, to include developing a comprehensive software licenses policy and inventory. SSA implemented all six recommendations.\nHowever, SSA's IT management policies have not fully addressed the role of its CIO. Various laws and related guidance assign IT management responsibilities to CIOs in six key areas. In August 2018, GAO reported that SSA had fully addressed the role of the CIO in one of the six areas (see table). Specifically, SSA's policies fully addressed the CIO's role in the IT leadership and accountability area by requiring the CIO to report directly to the agency head, among other things.\nIn contrast, SSA's policies did not address or minimally addressed the IT workforce and IT strategic planning areas. For example, SSA's policies did not include requirements for the CIO to annually assess the extent to which personnel meet IT management skill requirements or to measure how well IT supports agency programs. GAO recommended that SSA address the weaknesses in the remaining five key areas. SSA agreed with GAO's recommendation and stated that the agency plans to implement the recommendation by the end of this month.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO has made 15 recommendations to SSA to improve its management of IT acquisitions and operations from 2011 through 2018, and 1 recommendation to improve its CIO policies. While SSA has implemented nearly all of them, it would be better positioned to overcome longstanding IT management challenges when it addresses the CIO's role in its policies.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_779"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_780","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nOpen data can foster accountability and public trust by providing citizens with information on government activities and their outcomes. It can also promote private sector innovation. The DATA Act requires that the federal government collect and present open data on roughly $4 trillion in annual federal spending. The DATA Act also includes a provision requiring GAO to review its implementation.\nThis report (1) identifies key practices for transparently reporting government data; and (2) evaluates the extent to which USAspending.gov is consistent with those key practices and other requirements. GAO developed the key practices by systematically evaluating and synthesizing information from literature on open data, as well as interviews with open data experts and good governance groups. GAO used these key practices as well as existing federal website standards and applicable laws to evaluate USAspending.gov.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO identified five key practices for transparently reporting government data, as well as actions to implement each practice. These key practices and actions can assist managers of open government data programs in the transparent presentation of their data. Open data are information that can be freely used, modified, or shared by anyone for any purpose.\nUSAspending.gov aligns with several key practices. However, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) has not fully aligned the website with all of the key practices, the requirements of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 (FFATA), and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance (see table.) FFATA, as amended by the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act), directed Treasury to develop and manage USAspending.gov to provide detailed information on federal spending.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making five recommendations including that Treasury (1) establish a process to ensure that additions to USAspending.gov meet security requirements, (2) provide structured metadata and licensing information on the website, and (3) ensure that users can search for awards by city and program source as required by law. Treasury agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_780"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_781","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOD has reported printing costs that totaled about $608 million, on average, during fiscal years 2010 through 2015. DLA Document Services has key DOD-wide responsibilities for (1) printing and reproduction, (2) print device procurement, and (3) electronic content management (e.g., digital document repositories). Other DOD components, including the military services, also maintain some document services capabilities at various locations.\nHouse Report 115-200 accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2018 included a provision for GAO to examine DOD's document services. This report evaluates (1) the progress DOD has made in achieving efficiencies in its document services and opportunities, if any, to achieve further efficiencies, and (2) the extent to which DOD reports accurate financial information about its document services to key stakeholders. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials regarding DOD's efficiency initiatives, including DLA Document Services' transformation plan; reviewed print device procurement contracts and pricing information; and analyzed DOD budget data for fiscal years 2012 through 2016.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) has taken steps to achieve efficiencies in its document services, including implementing a transformation plan to consolidate existing Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Document Services facilities. However, GAO identified four areas where further gains may be possible:\nManaging fragmentation in printing and reproduction services. DOD has designated DLA Document Services as the single manager for printing and reproduction services, but DOD customers, citing concerns with DLA's services, have also obtained these services directly from the Government Publishing Office and via in-house print facilities (see fig.). DOD has not assessed DLA's performance in this role or whether additional efficiencies may be possible in light of DLA's transformation plan.\nReducing overlap in procuring print devices. GAO found that DOD components used at least four different contract sources to acquire print devices. DOD has not assessed which acquisition approach represents the best value; doing so might better position DOD to further reduce its costs.\nMeeting goals to reduce the number of print devices. DOD and the military services have not demonstrated that they achieved established goals for reducing the number of print devices. Additional controls and assignment of oversight responsibilities to monitor progress could better enable DOD to achieve its cost savings goals, estimated to be millions of dollars annually.\nConsolidating DLA facilities. DLA is closing or consolidating 74 of its 112 facilities in the United States. However, GAO found that for four of seven types of specialty services, DLA plans to retain facilities that are responsible for less than 5 percent of the total revenue for each of those specialties, which suggests that further consolidations are possible.\nDOD includes the cost of non-printing activities, such as the purchase of advertising time for recruiting, within its budget materials for printing and reproduction. It does not include costs to acquire print devices and for electronic content management. As a result, DOD and the Congress lack the oversight into total document services costs needed to make informed decisions.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making six recommendations, including that DOD evaluate options to achieve additional cost savings and other efficiencies in its document services and report more accurate budget data. DOD generally agreed with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_781"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_782","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nA 2004 federal directive and the related standard set forth a vision for using information technology to verify the identity of individuals accessing federal buildings. The vision calls for secure and reliable forms of identification that work in conjunction with access control systems. Interoperability of these systems across departments and agencies is part of the vision. OMB and GSA have government-wide responsibilities related to this effort. ISC provides guidance to non-military executive branch agencies on physical security issues. GAO was asked to examine PACS implementation efforts.\nThis report discusses (1) steps OMB and GSA have taken to fulfill their government-wide responsibilities related to PACS and (2) challenges selected federal agencies face in meeting current requirements. For review, GAO analyzed documents from Commerce, GSA, ISC, and OMB. GAO selected five non-military agencies based on factors including number of buildings and geographic location. GAO reviewed relevant requirements and key practices. GAO also interviewed federal agency officials, PACS vendors, and knowledgeable industry officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the General Services Administration (GSA) have taken steps to help agencies procure and implement secure, interoperable, GSA-approved \u201cphysical access control systems\u201d (PACS) for federal buildings. PACS are systems for managing access to controlled areas within buildings. PACS include identification cards, card readers, and other technology that electronically confirm employees' and contractors' identities and validate their access to facilities (see figure). Steps taken include the following:\nOMB issued several memos to clarify agencies' responsibilities. For example, OMB issued a 2011 memo citing Department of Homeland Security (DHS) guidance that agencies must upgrade existing PACS to use identity credentials before using relevant funds for other activities. But, GAO found OMB's oversight efforts are hampered because it lacks baseline data on agencies' implementation of PACS. Without such data, OMB cannot meet its responsibility to ensure agencies adhere to PACS requirements or track progress in implementing federal PACS requirements and achieving the vision of secure, interoperable systems across agencies.\nGSA developed an Approved Products List that identifies products that meet federal requirements through a testing and evaluation program. Federal agencies are required to use the Approved Products List to procure PACS equipment. GSA also has provided procurement guidance to agencies through its identity management website.\nOfficials from the five selected agencies that GAO reviewed identified a number of challenges relating to PACS implementation including cost, lack of clarity on how to procure equipment, and difficulty adding new PACS equipment to legacy systems. Officials from OMB, GSA, and industry not only confirmed that these challenges exist but also told GAO that they were most likely present across the federal government. The Interagency Security Committee (ISC), chaired by the DHS and consisting of 60 federal departments and agencies, has a mission to develop security standards for non-military agencies. In this capacity the ISC is well-positioned to determine the extent that PACS implementation challenges exist across its membership and to develop strategies to address them. An ISC official told GAO that the ISC has taken steps to do so including setting up a working group to assess what additional PACS guidance would be beneficial.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends (1) that OMB determine and regularly monitor a baseline level of progress on PACS implementation and (2) that ISC assess the extent of, and develop strategies to address, government-wide challenges to implementing PACS. OMB had no comment on the recommendation. DHS concurred with the recommendation to ISC.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_782"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_783","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nBOP is the largest employer within DOJ and is responsible for the care and custody of an inmate population of about 186,000. BOP has faced challenges retaining staff at correctional facilities, although it has used retention incentives, along with other human capital flexibilities. GAO was asked to review BOP's use of retention incentives.\nThis report addresses: (1) how BOP used its authority to pay retention incentives; (2) internal controls BOP has in place for the use of retention incentives; and (3) the extent to which BOP plans for and evaluates the use of retention incentives. GAO obtained employee-level retention incentive expenditure data from DOJ's Justice Management Division for fiscal years 2012 through 2016. GAO also reviewed agency documentation, such as policy statements and 40 randomly selected retention incentive application packet case files from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. GAO also interviewed officials from BOP's Central Office and four correctional facilities that use retention incentives, selected to reflect variation in the number and types of employees receiving retention incentives, BOP regions, and BOP institution security levels.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFrom fiscal years 2012 to 2016, the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) total retention incentive expenditures generally increased from $10.7 to $14.0 million and the number of employees receiving retention incentives increased from 2,024 to 2,460. During those five years, BOP spent more than 97 percent of its total retention incentive expenditures on employees at four BOP institutions in California and for medical professionals nationwide. Further, total retention incentive expenditures for medical professionals increased by an average of 21 percent per year (see figure). According to BOP officials, BOP uses retention incentives, for example, to supplement BOP's medical professionals' salaries which are generally lower than private sector salaries.\nBOP has a variety of internal controls in place throughout the retention incentive process that help ensure retention incentive applications and approvals meet requirements. For example, each application goes through multiple levels of review to verify its accuracy and completeness.\nBOP takes steps to determine workforce needs and how to fill those needs, but has not strategically planned for and evaluated its use of retention incentives. According to BOP, planning for human capital needs is conducted at institutions during quarterly meetings, but discussions about these incentives respond to short-term staffing situations rather than proactively addressing future staffing needs. Including human capital goals and strategies in BOP's human capital plan would create a roadmap so the agency could move from being reactive to its current workforce needs to being strategic in trying to achieve its long-term workforce goals. Additionally BOP has not evaluated the effectiveness of its use of retention incentives in retaining staff. As a result, BOP does not know whether retention incentives have contributed to employees' retention in relation to other incentives used by BOP. Consistent with key principles for strategic human capital planning, planning for and evaluating the use of retention incentives could help BOP better determine if these incentives are an efficient and effective means by which to retain staff.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that BOP (1) include human capital goals and how retention incentives will be used to achieve these goals in its human capital plan; and (2) evaluate the use of retention incentives. BOP concurred with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_783"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_784","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOE, including NNSA, is the largest federal civilian contracting agency, spending about 90 percent of its appropriations on contracts with companies, universities, and others for federal research and development, engineering, and production. DOE headquarters and local offices oversee contractors\u2019 activities, including their management of subcontracts.\nGAO was asked to review contracting at DOE, including the use of subcontractors. This report examines, for fiscal year 2016, (1) the parties that participated in DOE\u2019s largest prime contracts and the extent to which they subcontracted their work; (2) the extent to which DOE ensured that those contractors audited subcontractors\u2019 costs, as required; and (3) the extent to which DOE ensured that contractors met other subcontract oversight requirements. GAO reviewed DOE\u2019s fiscal year 2016 data and documents, analyzed regulations, and interviewed federal officials and contractor representatives for DOE\u2019s 24 largest fiscal year 2016 prime contracts.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn fiscal year 2016, 28 entities participated in the Department of Energy\u2019s (DOE) and its National Nuclear Security Administration\u2019s (NNSA) 24 largest prime contracts, which totaled $23.6 billion of DOE\u2019s fiscal year 2016 obligations. The contractors awarded about $6.9 billion (nearly 30 percent) of those obligations to thousands of subcontractors. Further, multiple companies, universities, and other entities can join together to bid on a contract (i.e., become a \u201cparty to\u201d a contract). GAO\u2019s review of data about these contracts and subcontracts identified complex ownership relationships among the contractors and subcontractors. For example, GAO found that almost all of the 28 parties to the prime contracts in its review were also subcontractors to some prime contracts, holding a total of nearly 3,000 subcontracts with fiscal year 2016 obligations totaling about $927 million (see figure). GAO found that it can be difficult to track changes in the ownership of parties to the contracts and to understand the relationships between parties.\nDOE and NNSA did not always ensure that contractors audited subcontractors\u2019 incurred costs as required in their contracts. GAO\u2019s review of 43 incurred-cost assessment and audit reports identified more than $3.4 billion in subcontract costs incurred over a 10-year period that had not been audited as required, and some subcontracts remained unaudited or unassessed for more than 6 years. Completing audits in a timely manner is important because of a 6-year statute of limitations to recover unallowable costs that could be identified through such audits. DOE headquarters has not issued procedures or guidance that requires local offices to monitor contractors to ensure that required subcontract audits are completed in a timely manner, consistent with federal standards for internal control. Without such procedures or guidance, unallowable costs may go unidentified beyond the 6-year limitation period of the Contract Disputes Act, preventing DOE from recovering those costs.\nDOE and NNSA perform several reviews to ensure that contractors meet other subcontract oversight requirements. For example, DOE\u2019s local offices review proposed subcontracts to ensure they are awarded consistent with policies related to potential conflicts of interest. However, local officials do not independently review information on subcontractor ownership because doing so is not required, although such information could alert officials to potential conflicts of interest. By requiring contracting officers to independently review subcontractor ownership information, DOE and NNSA would have better assurance that contractors are adequately identifying and mitigating organizational conflicts of interest.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making six recommendations, including that DOE develop procedures that require local offices to monitor contractors to ensure timely completion of required subcontract audits, and require local DOE officials to independently review subcontractor ownership information to identify potential conflicts of interest. DOE partially concurred with five of GAO\u2019s six recommendations but did not agree to independently review subcontractor ownership information. GAO maintains that the recommended actions are valid.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_784"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_785","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSafeguarding confidentiality to the maximum extent possible is essential for encouraging whistleblowers to report wrongdoing without fear of reprisal. In fiscal year 2018, DODIG received over 12,000 contacts from potential whistleblowers related to fraud, waste, abuse, employee misconduct, or other violations. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision for GAO to review the integrity of DOD's whistleblower program. This report assesses the extent to which DODIG and the military service IGs (1) met and took steps to achieve key fiscal year 2018 timeliness and quality goals, (2) established processes to protect whistleblower confidentiality, and (3) are able to safeguard sensitive information necessary to handle whistleblower complaints. It also evaluates (4) the extent to which select cases involving certain senior DOD civilian officials met key requirements.\nGAO assessed fiscal year 2018 IG performance data, surveyed all 108 DODIG employees who directly handle whistleblower complaints, reviewed IT security controls, and analyzed all 125 cases involving civilian DOD Presidential appointees with Senate confirmation dismissed by DODIG in fiscal years 2013-2017.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DODIG) and military service offices of inspector general (IG) met some but not all fiscal year 2018 timeliness and quality goals for handling whistleblower complaints. For example, DODIG met its goals related to referring complaints to the appropriate agency within a certain number of days. All IGs also generally met goals related to the quality of investigations. However, about 85 percent of DODIG reprisal and senior official misconduct investigations exceeded statutory and internal timeliness goals. Further, military service IGs did not meet most goals for handling cases within prescribed timeframes. For example, the service IGs averaged between 17 and 84 days to notify DODIG of their receipt of whistleblower reprisal allegations, exceeding the 10-day goal. The IGs have various initiatives underway to improve timeliness, such as a Naval IG program to reduce timeframes for initial credibility determinations. However, additional actions could provide a more targeted approach to improving performance against unmet timeliness goals\u2014such as for senior official misconduct investigations\u2014and better assure whistleblowers that their cases will be handled expeditiously.\nDODIG and the military service IGs have policies to protect whistleblower confidentiality, but some gaps exist. For example, DODIG guidance for protecting whistleblowers who report internal DODIG misconduct does not specify key steps investigators should take to protect confidentiality, such as not identifying complainants during interviews with case subjects. Also, Air Force, Naval, and Marine Corps IG guidance does not specify when whistleblower identities can be disclosed without consent. Without updated guidance, the IGs cannot ensure the consistent implementation of confidentiality protections.\nThe IGs have taken steps to safeguard whistleblower information in their information technology (IT) systems and applications, such as by restricting access to case information through unique user permissions and by taking actions to follow DOD's IT risk management process. However, between 2016 and 2018, employees in all of the IGs have been able to access sensitive whistleblower information without a need to know. For example, DODIG determined that numerous restricted whistleblower records in its document repository were accessible to DODIG personnel without a need to know. Similarly, the Air Force IG's application did not restrict users from other DOD components from viewing Air Force IG case descriptions and complainant identities, while the Army IG's application and the Naval IG's system did not restrict personnel within those IGs from viewing allegations or investigations involving other personnel within those IGs. Additionally, employees in Marine Corps IG offices were able to see whistleblower cases assigned to other IG offices without a need to know. While some actions have been taken to address these issues, additional steps are needed to restrict access to case information in order to mitigate ongoing risks to whistleblower confidentiality.\nDODIG generally met key documentation requirements for the 125 cases it dismissed without investigation involving civilian DOD Presidential appointees with Senate confirmation.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making 12 recommendations, including that the IGs take additional actions to improve timeliness, develop additional procedures to protect whistleblower confidentiality, and take steps to further limit IG employee access to sensitive whistleblower information. DOD concurred with all of the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_785"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_786","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nTo promote international peace and security, the UN had 16 ongoing peacekeeping operations worldwide as of June 30, 2017, with a total budget of almost $8 billion in UN fiscal year 2017 and contributions of over 100,000 military, police, and civilian personnel from more than 120 countries. The United States is the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, providing an average of about 28 percent of total funding annually.\nThe Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2017, includes a provision for GAO to compare the costs, strengths, and limitations of UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations. This report (1) compares the reported costs of a specific UN operation to the estimated costs of a hypothetical, comparable operation implemented by the United States; (2) identifies factors that affect cost differences; and (3) identifies stakeholder views on the relative strengths of UN and U.S. peacekeeping operations.\nGAO worked with the UN, DOD, and State to generate a cost estimate of a hypothetical U.S.-led operation in the Central African Republic comparable to MINUSCA. GAO developed this estimate using DOD's cost estimating tool for contingency operations and State data on civilian costs, assuming a U.S. operation using roughly the same levels of military and civilian personnel as MINUSCA. The cost estimate should not be construed as suggesting that the United States would likely implement such an operation in the Central African Republic or that it would implement such an operation in the same way.\nGAO is making no recommendations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nBased on United Nations (UN) and Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) data, GAO estimates that it would cost the United States more than twice as much as it would cost the UN to implement a hypothetical operation comparable to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). MINUSCA cost the UN approximately $2.4 billion for the first 39 months of the operation. GAO estimates that a hypothetical U.S. peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic of roughly the same size and duration would cost nearly $5.7 billion\u2014almost eight times more than the $700 million the United States contributed to MINUSCA over the same time period.\nVarious factors affect differences between the actual cost of MINUSCA and the estimated cost of a hypothetical, comparable U.S. operation in the Central African Republic. The United States and the UN would source and transport some supplies and equipment differently, affecting the cost of both operations; for example, the United States would airlift water into the Central African Republic, while the UN does not do so to the same extent. The United States also would incur the cost of civilian police and military reservist salaries, while the UN does not pay any troop or police salaries. Finally, some higher standards for facilities, intelligence, and medical services increase the U.S. cost estimate relative to UN costs for similar operational elements.\nUN and U.S. peacekeeping operations have various relative strengths, according to U.S. and UN officials. These officials said that, because the UN is a multilateral organization, UN peacekeeping operations have international acceptance and are more likely to be viewed as impartial. Officials also said that the UN enjoys global access to expertise and experience, and can leverage assistance from multilateral donors and development banks. Relative strengths of a U.S. peacekeeping operation would include faster deployment and superior command and control, logistics, intelligence, and counterterrorism capability, according to U.S. and UN officials.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_786"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_787","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn fiscal year 2017, ICE operated on a budget of nearly $3 billion to manage the U.S. immigration detention system, which houses foreign nationals whose immigration cases are pending or who have been ordered removed from the country. In recent years, ICE has consistently had to reprogram and transfer millions of dollars into, out of, and within its account used to fund its detention system. The explanatory statement accompanying the DHS Appropriations Act, 2017, includes a provision for GAO to review ICE's methodologies for determining detention resource requirements. This report examines (1) how ICE formulates its budget request for detention resources, (2) how ICE develops bed rates and determines ADP for use in its budget process, and (3) to what extent ICE's methods for estimating detention costs follow best practices. GAO analyzed ICE's budget documents, including CBJs, for fiscal years 2014 to 2018, examined ICE's models for projecting ADP and bed rates, and evaluated ICE's cost estimating process against best practices.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nU.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) formulates its budget request for detention resources based on guidance from the Office of Management and Budget and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). To project its detention costs, ICE primarily relies on two variables\u2014the average dollar amount to house one adult detainee for one day (bed rate) and the average daily population (ADP) of detainees.\nU.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Formula to Calculate Detention Costs\nGAO found a number of inconsistencies and errors in ICE's calculations for its congressional budget justifications (CBJs). For example, in its fiscal year 2015 budget request, ICE made an error that resulted in an underestimation of $129 million for immigration detention expenses. While ICE officials stated their budget documents undergo multiple reviews to ensure accuracy, ICE was not able to provide documentation of such reviews. Without a documented review process for reviewing the accuracy of its budget request, ICE is not positioned to ensure the credibility of its budget requests.\nICE has models to project the adult bed rate and ADP for purposes of determining its budget requests. However, ICE consistently underestimated the actual bed rate due to inaccuracies in the model, and it is unclear if the ADP used in the budget justification is based on statistical analysis. GAO identified factors in ICE's bed rate model\u2014such as how it accounts for inflation and double counts certain costs\u2014that may lead to its inaccurate bed rate projections. For example, in fiscal year 2016, ICE's projections underestimated the actual bed rate by $5.42 per day. For illustrative purposes, underestimating the bed rate by $5 per day, assuming an ADP of 34,000, yields a more than $62 million underestimation in the detention budget request. By assessing its methodology and addressing identified inaccuracies, ICE could ensure a more accurate estimate of its actual bed rate cost. Additionally, ICE reported that the ADP projections in its CBJs are based on policy decisions that account, for example, for anticipated policies that could affect the number of ICE's detainees. While ICE's projected ADP may account for policy decisions, documenting the methodology and rationale by which it determined the projected ADP would help demonstrate how the number was determined and that it was based on sound assumptions.\nICE's methods for estimating detention costs do not fully meet the four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate, as outlined in GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide . For example, while ICE's fiscal year 2018 detention cost estimate substantially met the comprehensive characteristic, it partially met the well-documented and accurate characteristics, and minimally met the credible characteristic. By taking steps to fully reflect cost estimating best practices, ICE could better ensure a more reliable budget request.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that the Director of ICE: (1) document and implement its review process to ensure accuracy in its budget documents; (2) assess ICE's adult bed rate methodology; (3) update ICE's adult bed rate methodology; (4) document the methodology and rationale behind the ADP projection used in budget requests; and (5) take steps to ensure that ICE's detention cost estimate more fully addresses best practices. DHS concurred with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_787"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_788","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nColleges and other postsecondary schools must plan for various potential emergencies, ranging from natural disasters to violence. A number of federal agencies, including DHS, DOJ, and Education, offer resources to support these efforts. GAO was asked to review colleges' awareness of these resources.\nThis report examines how (1) selected colleges prepare for emergencies, and (2) federal agencies support college emergency preparedness efforts, including the extent to which selected colleges reported awareness of federal resources.\nTo answer these questions, GAO interviewed officials from a non-generalizable sample of 18 colleges selected for diversity in size, type, and location. GAO also interviewed officials from three states (Colorado, Kansas, and Virginia) in which some of these schools operated. The states were selected to represent varied approaches to supporting colleges' emergency preparedness efforts. GAO also reviewed federal emergency preparedness resources, agency written responses, applicable federal laws, and federal internal control standards, and interviewed federal officials and representatives from several associations recommended by agency officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nEmergency managers at 18 colleges across the country told GAO that their efforts to prepare for emergencies involved working with the campus community to develop, communicate, and practice plans, as well as working with state and local partners. Campus community members who are involved often include personnel from offices such as public safety, student affairs, or facilities. Officials at all 18 colleges reported developing emergency plans addressing a range of potential events\u2014an approach consistent with federal emergency management principles. To publicize plans, officials often reported using websites, text messages, or presentations to the campus community. Colleges also reported practicing plans through drills. College officials noted that buy-in from the college president and other top campus leaders was critical to their efforts; several officials reported struggling to obtain such support. Most officials also said they coordinate with local or state partners such as police and relied on these partners for advice or to obtain emergency preparedness resources.\nThe Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and Education (Education) offer a variety of emergency preparedness resources to colleges (see figure). However, officials GAO interviewed at 18 colleges described mixed awareness of federal resources, especially those specifically tailored to colleges, despite federal efforts to publicize these resources in a variety of ways. Federal officials and other stakeholders acknowledged this mixed awareness and identified potential causes, such as college emergency managers having networks comprised of local officials who are more likely to know about federal resources for local agencies versus those for colleges, or some college officials devoting limited time to researching federal resources for various reasons.\nDHS, DOJ, and Education all publicize their resources through electronic mailing lists, websites, or other methods, but GAO identified missed opportunities in their dissemination approaches. For example, the electronic mailing list for one key resource may reach the approximately 1,000 officials from colleges subscribed, but may miss at least 3,000 additional schools. GAO also found two federal agency websites that did not include key resources from other federal agencies. Federal internal control standards state that agencies should consider the most appropriate methods for communicating with their external audiences. By identifying opportunities to improve dissemination, federal agencies may increase their ability to effectively communicate important information to colleges.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DHS, DOJ, and Education work together to identify opportunities to more effectively publicize emergency preparedness resources to colleges. All three agencies concurred with the recommendations or described actions to implement them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_788"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_789","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nNRC is responsible for regulating the commercial nuclear industry, including nuclear power plants. NRC provides services, such as inspections, for regulated entities that hold licenses\u2014that is, licensees. NRC recovers the costs for these services by assessing fees and billing licensees quarterly. In fiscal year 2016, NRC collected about $321 million in service fees. From 2006 to 2016, audits of NRC's fees identified problems with NRC's billing process. For example, a 2012 audit identified about $24 million in unbilled fees from fiscal years 2011 and 2012.\nGAO was asked to review NRC's billing process for service fees. This report examines (1) the actions NRC is taking to address problems with its billing process identified by internal reviews and (2) the challenges selected licensees identified with NRC's billing process and the extent to which NRC's actions are addressing them.\nGAO reviewed audits of NRC's billing process and other documents related to this process. GAO also interviewed NRC staff and a nongeneralizable sample of 13 licensees, selected based on the amount of service fees charged from October 2015 through July 2017, and compared NRC's actions against criteria on internal controls and project planning.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Office of the Inspector General for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and internal reviews conducted by NRC identified several problems with the agency's billing process, and NRC has implemented or plans to implement several changes to address the recommendations. For example, the codes that NRC staff use to record their work hours on time cards\u2014referred to as activity codes\u2014did not describe the work and did not have a consistent naming convention, which increased the risk of staff charging their time to the wrong activity codes. This could lead, in some cases, to billing errors. To address these problems, NRC created a standard naming convention for activity codes that provides more information about the activity. See the figure below for the steps in NRC's billing process for work that NRC or contractor staff performed.\nSome of the 13 licensees that GAO interviewed identified challenges with NRC's billing process, including its method for delivering paper invoices by mail. For example, two of these licensees stated that with invoices taking up to 10 days to arrive in the mail, they sometimes do not have sufficient time to properly review charges and remit payment to NRC within the 30-day deadline for paying the invoice. One licensee said that delays in receiving an invoice resulted in late fees. NRC is undertaking an initiative to transition to electronic billing, which may address the challenges the licensees identified and, according to NRC staff, improve the agency's billing process. However, NRC has not developed planning documents for this initiative and, according to staff, the planning phase is already past its original deadline of October 2017. The Project Management Institute has identified standards related to project management processes, including project planning. By developing a project management plan that is consistent with best practices and includes steps for involving licensees in system development and assessing results of the project, NRC would have reasonable assurance that it can better manage its electronic billing initiative.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making five recommendations, including that NRC develop a project management plan for its electronic billing initiative that follows project management standards and includes steps for involving licensees and assessing results. NRC agreed with these recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_789"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_790","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn 2000, Congress authorized the WOSB program, allowing contracting officers to set aside procurements to women-owned small businesses in industries in which they are substantially underrepresented. To be eligible to participate in the WOSB program, firms have the option to self-certify or be certified by a third-party certifier. However, the 2015 NDAA changed the WOSB program by (1) authorizing SBA to implement sole-source authority, (2) eliminating the option for firms to self-certify as being eligible for the program and (3) allowing SBA to implement a new certification process.\nGAO was asked to review the WOSB program. This report discusses (1) the extent to which SBA has addressed the 2015 NDAA changes, (2) SBA's efforts to address previously identified deficiencies, and (3) use of the WOSB program. GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and program documents; analyzed federal contracting data from April 2011 through June 2018; and interviewed SBA officials, officials from contracting agencies selected to obtain a range of experience with the WOSB program, and three of the four private third-party certifiers.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Small Business Administration (SBA) has implemented one of the three changes to the Women-Owned Small Business (WOSB) program authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2015 (2015 NDAA). Specifically, in September 2015 SBA published a final rule to implement sole-source authority, effective October 2015. As of February 2019, SBA had not eliminated the option for program participants to self-certify that they are eligible to participate, as required by 2015 NDAA. SBA officials stated that this requirement would be addressed as part of the new certification process for the WOSB program, which they expect to implement by January 1, 2020.\nSBA has not addressed WOSB program oversight deficiencies identified in GAO's 2014 review (GAO-15-54). For example, GAO previously recommended that SBA establish procedures to assess the performance of four third-party certifiers\u2014private entities approved by SBA to certify the eligibility of WOSB firms. While SBA conducted a compliance review of the certifiers in 2016, it has no plans to regularly monitor them. By not improving its oversight of the WOSB program, SBA is limiting its ability to ensure third-party certifiers are following program requirements. In addition, the implementation of sole-source authority in light of these continued oversight deficiencies can increase program risk. Consequently, GAO maintains that its prior recommendations should be addressed. In addition, similar to previous findings from SBA's Office of Inspector General, GAO found that about 3.5 percent of contracts using a WOSB set-aside were awarded for ineligible goods or services from April 2011 through June 2018. SBA does not review contracting data that could identify this problem and inform SBA which agencies making awards may need targeted outreach or training. As a result, SBA cannot provide reasonable assurance that WOSB program requirements are being met and that the program is meeting its goals.\nWhile federal contract obligations to all women-owned small businesses and WOSB program set-asides have increased since fiscal year 2012, WOSB program set-asides remain a small percentage (see figure).\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that SBA develop a process for periodically reviewing the extent to which WOSB program set-asides are awarded for ineligible goods or services and use the results to address identified issues, such as through targeted outreach or training on the WOSB program. SBA agreed with the recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_790"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_791","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn 2017, approximately 25.6 million firearm-related background checks were processed through NICS, and about 181,000 of the attempted purchases at the federal and state levels combined were denied because the individual was prohibited from possessing a firearm under federal or state law. Individuals who certify that they are not prohibited from purchasing or receiving a firearm and are subsequently determined to be prohibited could be subject to investigation, and if prosecuted, a fine, imprisonment, or both.\nGAO was asked to examine firearms denials. This report (1) describes the extent to which federal and selected state law enforcement agencies investigate and prosecute firearms denial cases; (2) examines related challenges faced by these agencies; and (3) describes the circumstances that lead to investigations and prosecutions. GAO reviewed laws and regulations; analyzed federal and state data from 2011 through 2017; and interviewed officials from ATF headquarters, 6 of 25 ATF field divisions (the 6 that investigated the most cases), and the 13 states that process all NICS checks within their state. Results from state interviews are not generalizable but provide insights on state practices.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nInvestigations and prosecutions. Federal and selected state law enforcement agencies that process firearm-related background checks through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) collectively investigate and prosecute a small percentage of individuals who falsify information on a firearms form (e.g., do not disclose a felony conviction) and are denied a purchase. Federal NICS checks resulted in about 112,000 denied transactions in fiscal year 2017, of which the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) referred about 12,700 to its field divisions for further investigation. U.S. Attorney's Offices (USAO) had prosecuted 12 of these cases as of June 2018.\nAt the state level, officials from 10 of 13 selected states said they did not investigate or prosecute firearm denials, some citing competing resource demands and the lack of statutes with which states prosecute as reasons. The remaining 3 states investigated a high proportion of firearms denials. One of the 3 states reported about 1,900 referrals for prosecution in 2017 and about 470 convictions.\nChallenges. ATF and selected states reported challenges in investigating and prosecuting firearms denials. Officials from six selected ATF field divisions said that investigating the increasing number of denial cases referred to field divisions\u2014which increased from about 5,200 in fiscal year 2011 to about 12,700 in fiscal year 2017\u2014has been time intensive and required use of their limited resources. ATF policy provides that field divisions may send \u201cwarning notices\u201d to denied persons in lieu of prosecution, but ATF has not assessed field divisions' use of these notices, which could provide greater awareness of their deterrence value and inform whether any policy changes are needed. Officials from the Executive Office for United States Attorneys said that prosecuting denial cases can require significant effort and may offer little value to public safety compared to other cases involving gun violence. Selected state officials said that denial investigations can take law enforcement officials away from their core duties. State prosecutors said gathering evidence to prove individuals knew they were prohibited was a challenge.\nTypes of cases. ATF field divisions investigate denial cases based on USAO criteria and generally only refer cases to USAOs for prosecution when aggravating circumstances exist, such as violent felonies or multiple serious offenses over a short period of time. Officials from two of three selected states refer all denial cases for investigation, while one state uses risk-based criteria for selecting cases that include conditions such as felony convictions and misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence. Prosecutors from these three states said they generally pursue cases that involve indications of violence, though individual prosecutors had differing priorities based on public safety concerns.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that ATF assess the extent to which ATF field divisions use warning notifications as an enforcement tool, which would inform whether changes to policy are needed. DOJ concurred with GAO's recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_791"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_792","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThis testimony summarizes the information contained in two GAO reports: Broadband Internet: FCC\u2019s Data Overstate Access on Tribal Lands , ( GAO-18-630 ) and Tribal Broadband: Few Partnerships Exist and the Rural Utilities Service Needs to Identify and Address Any Funding Barriers Tribes Face ( GAO-18-682 ). Specifically, it addresses (1) the extent to which FCC\u2019s approach to collecting broadband availability data accurately captures broadband access on tribal lands, (2) the extent to which FCC obtains tribal input on the data, (3) partnerships tribes have formed with entities to deploy broadband infrastructure on tribal lands, and (4) barriers tribes face in obtaining federal funding. For these reports, GAO analyzed FCC and RUS data, and interviewed agency officials as well as a non-generalizable sample of stakeholders representing tribes and broadband providers.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Federal Communications Commission\u2019s (FCC) approach to collecting data on broadband availability causes it to overstate broadband access\u2014the ability to obtain service\u2014on tribal lands. In FCC\u2019s approach, broadband is considered to be \u201cavailable\u201d for an entire census block if the provider could serve at least one location in the census block. FCC, tribal stakeholders, and providers have noted that this approach leads to overstatements of broadband availability. Because FCC uses these data to measure broadband access, it also overstates broadband access on tribal lands. By developing and implementing methods for collecting and reporting accurate and complete data on broadband access specific to tribal lands, FCC would be better able to target federal broadband funding to tribal areas that need it the most.\nFCC does not have a formal process to obtain tribal input on the accuracy of provider-submitted broadband data. Most of the tribal stakeholders GAO interviewed stated FCC should work more directly with tribes to improve the accuracy of FCC\u2019s data. Establishing a formal process to obtain input from tribal governments could help improve the accuracy of FCC\u2019s broadband data for tribal lands.\nTribes have formed partnerships with different types of entities to deploy broadband infrastructure on tribal lands, but such partnerships are not widespread. The partnerships GAO identified included private providers, a community access network provider, an electric cooperative, a regional consortium, and tribally owned broadband providers.\nGAO reviewed four federal programs to deploy broadband services and found that from 2010 to 2017, less than 1 percent of funding has gone directly to tribes or tribally owned providers. The tribal entities GAO contacted cited barriers to obtaining funds from the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) grant funding, such as preparing network design, demonstrating financial sustainability of the broadband project within 5 years, and obtaining matching funds required to apply for federal grants. However, according to RUS officials, RUS has not taken steps to identify or address the barriers tribes face when applying for RUS grant funding due to limited resources and multiple competing priorities for those resources. By identifying and addressing regulatory barriers that may impede tribal entities\u2019 access to RUS funding, RUS could help tribes obtain funding to expand broadband deployment on tribal lands.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nIn GAO-18-630 , GAO made three recommendations to FCC, two of which related to improving its collection of broadband data. In GAO-18-682 , GAO made one recommendation to RUS to address regulatory barriers. FCC agreed and RUS neither agreed nor disagreed and both agencies described actions planned to address the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_792"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_793","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCloud computing enables on-demand access to shared computing resources providing services more quickly and at a lower cost than having agencies maintain these resources themselves. In 2012, OMB began requiring agencies to assess all IT investments for cloud services.\nGAO was asked to review agencies' reported use of cloud services. This report discusses selected agencies' progress in implementing cloud services, the extent to which those agencies increased cloud service spending and achieved savings or cost avoidances, and examples of agency-reported cloud investments with notable benefits. GAO selected 16 agencies to review based on their fiscal year 2017 IT budgets and analyzed their use of cloud services, associated spending and savings data, and guidance for assessing investments for these services. GAO interviewed agency officials in charge of cloud services and reviewed pertinent documents to identify acquisitions with notable benefits. GAO also interviewed OMB staff about their agency's role in federal cloud computing and related OMB guidance.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe 16 agencies GAO reviewed made progress in implementing cloud computing services (cloud services)\u2014namely, they established assessment guidance, performed assessments, and implemented these services\u2014but the extent of their progress varied. To encourage cloud service acquisition, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) began requiring agencies to assess all information technology (IT) investments for cloud services. However, only 10 of the 16 agencies reviewed had established assessment guidance. In addition, while the agencies assessed the majority of their planned fiscal year 2019 IT investments for cloud services, 12 agencies had not completed an assessment of 10 or more investments. Nevertheless, 10 of the agencies reported increasing their use of cloud services between fiscal years 2016 through 2019 (see figure). Six agencies noted that inconsistent reporting of cloud investments and investment consolidation impacted their reported percentage.\nFurther, the 16 agencies reported that they had increased their cloud service spending since 2015 and 13 of the 16 agencies had saved $291 million to date from these services. However, these agencies identified issues in tracking and reporting cloud spending and savings data, including not having consistent processes in place to do so. Agencies also noted that OMB guidance did not require them to explicitly report savings from cloud implementations and, therefore, they had to specifically collect this data to meet GAO's request. As a result of these identified issues, it is likely that agency-reported cloud spending and savings figures were underreported.\nOfficials from 15 of the 16 agencies reported that they had identified significant benefits from acquiring cloud services, including improved customer service and the acquisition of more cost-effective options for managing IT services. In addition, these agencies identified nine cloud investments that, among other things, enhanced the availability of weather-related information, facilitated collaboration and information sharing among federal, state, and local agencies related to homeland security, and provided benefits information to veterans, as examples of systems that realized these benefits. One agency reported that it had not realized benefits because it did not have any completed migration efforts.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making one recommendation to OMB on cloud savings reporting, and 34 recommendations to the 16 agencies on cloud assessments and savings. Fourteen agencies agreed with all recommendations, OMB and one agency neither agreed nor disagreed, and one (Defense) agreed with one recommendation but not the other. GAO continues to believe its recommendation to the department is appropriate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_793"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_794","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDHS is the lead agency tasked with protecting the nation's critical infrastructure from cyber threats. The Homeland Security Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2014 required DHS to identify, categorize, and assign employment codes to all of the department's cybersecurity workforce positions. These codes define work roles and tasks for cybersecurity specialty areas such as program management and system administration. Further, the act required DHS to identify and report its cybersecurity workforce critical needs.\nGAO was asked to testify on the extent to which DHS has (1) identified, categorized, and assigned employment codes to its cybersecurity positions and (2) identified its cybersecurity workforce areas of critical need. To do so, GAO summarized the findings discussed in its February 2018 report on DHS's cybersecurity workforce ( GAO-18-175 ).\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken actions to identify, categorize, and assign employment codes to its cybersecurity positions, as required by the Homeland Security Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2014 ; however, its actions have not been timely and complete. For example, DHS did not establish timely and complete procedures to identify, categorize, and code its cybersecurity position vacancies and responsibilities. Further, DHS did not complete efforts to identify all of the department's cybersecurity positions and accurately assign codes to all filled and vacant cybersecurity positions. In August 2017, DHS reported to Congress that it had coded 95 percent of the department's identified cybersecurity positions. However, the department had, at that time, coded approximately 79 percent of the positions. DHS's 95 percent estimate was overstated primarily because it excluded vacant positions, even though the act required DHS to report these positions.\nIn addition, although DHS has taken steps to identify its workforce capability gaps, it has not identified or reported to Congress on its departmentwide cybersecurity critical needs that align with specialty areas. The department also has not reported annually its cybersecurity critical needs to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), as required, and has not developed plans with clearly defined time frames for doing so. (See table).\nWithout ensuring that its procedures are complete and that its progress in identifying and assigning codes to its cybersecurity positions is accurately reported, DHS will not be positioned to effectively examine its cybersecurity workforce, identify critical skill gaps, or improve its workforce planning. Further, until DHS establishes plans and time frames for reporting on its critical needs, the department may not be able to ensure that it has the necessary cybersecurity personnel to help protect the department's and the nation's federal networks and critical infrastructure from cyber threats. The commitment of DHS's leadership to addressing these matters is essential to helping the department fulfill the act's requirements.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nIn its February 2018 report, GAO recommended that DHS take six actions, including ensuring that its cybersecurity workforce procedures identify position vacancies and responsibilities; reported workforce data are complete and accurate; and plans for reporting on critical needs are developed. DHS concurred with the six recommendations and described actions the department plans to take to address them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_794"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_795","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe federal government faces a long- term, unsustainable fiscal path based on an imbalance between federal revenues and spending. While addressing this imbalance will require fiscal policy changes, in the near term opportunities exist in a number of areas to improve this situation, including where federal programs or activities are fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative.\nTo call attention to these opportunities, Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to identify and report on federal programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives\u2014either within departments or government-wide\u2014that have duplicative goals or activities.\nGAO also identifies areas that are fragmented or overlapping and additional opportunities to achieve cost savings or enhance revenue collection. GAO's 2018 annual report is its eighth in this series ( GAO-18-371SP ).\nThis statement discusses\nnew areas identified in GAO's 2018 annual report;\nthe progress made in addressing actions GAO identified in its 2011 to 2017 reports; and\nexamples of open actions directed to Congress or executive branch agencies.\nTo identify what actions exist to address these issues, GAO reviewed and updated prior work, including recommendations for executive action and matters for congressional consideration.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO's 2018 annual report identifies 68 new actions that Congress or executive branch agencies can take to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government in 23 new program areas. For example:\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) could potentially save approximately\n$527 million over 5 years by minimizing unnecessary overlap and duplication in its U.S. distribution centers for troop support goods.\nThe Department of Energy may be able to reduce certain risks and save tens of billions of dollars by adopting alternative approaches to treat a portion of its low-activity radioactive waste at its Hanford Site.\nThe Department of Veterans Affairs could potentially save tens of millions of dollars when acquiring medical and surgical supplies by better adhering to supply chain practices of leading hospitals.\nThe Coast Guard should close its boat stations that provide unnecessarily duplicative search and rescue coverage to improve operations and potentially save millions of dollars .\nSignificant progress has been made in addressing many of the 724 actions that GAO identified from 2011 to 2017. As of March 2018, Congress and executive branch agencies have fully or partially addressed 551 (76 percent) of these actions. This has resulted in about $178 billion in financial benefits, of which $125 billion has been realized and at least an additional $53 billion is estimated to accrue. These estimates are based on a variety of sources that considered different time periods, assumptions, and methodologies. GAO estimates that tens of billions of additional dollars could be saved should Congress and executive branch agencies fully address the remaining 365 open actions, including the 68 new ones identified in 2018.\nFurther steps are needed to fully address these remaining actions. For example:\nCongress and the Internal Revenue Service could realize hundreds of millions of dollars in savings and increased revenues by enhancing online services and improving efforts to prevent identity theft refund fraud.\nMedicare could save $1 to 2 billion annually if Congress equalized the rates paid for certain health care services, which often vary depending on where the service is performed.\nDOD could achieve billions of dollars in savings over the next several years by continuing to employ best management practices on its weapon systems acquisition programs.\nCongress could consider modifying how Medicare pays certain cancer hospitals to achieve almost $500 million annually in program savings.\nThe Social Security Administration could help prevent the loss of billions of dollars by preventing overpayments to beneficiaries of the Disability Insurance program and improper waivers of beneficiaries' overpayment debt.\nCongress could consider modifying tobacco tax rates to eliminate significant tax differentials between similar products to address future revenue losses caused by manufacturers and consumers substituting tobacco products. Federal losses ranged from $2.6 to 3.7 billion between April 2009 and February 2014.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_795"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_796","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe effects of climate change, combined with other factors, may alter human migration trends across the globe, according to the International Organization for Migration. For example, climate change can increase the frequency and intensity of natural disasters, causing populations to move from an area. Climate change can also intensify slow-onset disasters, such as drought, crop failure, or sea level rise, potentially altering longer-term migration trends.\nGAO was asked to review how U.S. agencies address climate change as a potential driver of global migration. For State, USAID, and DOD, this report (1) describes executive branch actions related to climate change and migration from fiscal years 2014 through 2018; (2) examines the extent to which the agencies discussed the potential effects of climate change on migration in their plans and risk assessments; and (3) describes agency activities on the issue. GAO analyzed documents on administration priorities; reviewed agency plans, risk assessments, and documentation of agency activities; and interviewed agency officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFrom fiscal years 2014 through 2018, a variety of executive branch actions related to climate change\u2014such as executive orders and strategies\u2014affected the Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense (DOD), including their activities that could potentially address the nexus of climate change and migration. For example, a fiscal year 2016 presidential memorandum\u2014rescinded in 2017\u2014required agencies to develop implementation plans to identify the potential impact of climate change on human mobility, among other things. In general, however, climate change as a driver of migration was not a focus of the executive branch actions. For example, a fiscal year 2014 executive order\u2014also rescinded in 2017\u2014requiring agencies to prepare for the impacts of climate change did not highlight migration as a particular concern.\nState, USAID, and DOD have discussed the potential effects of climate change on migration in agency plans and risk assessments. For example, State and USAID required climate change risk assessments when developing country and regional strategies, and a few of the strategies reviewed by GAO identified the nexus of climate change and migration as a risk. However, State changed its approach in 2017, no longer providing missions with guidance on whether and how to include climate change risks in their integrated country strategies. In doing so, State did not include in its 2018 guidance to the missions any information on how to include climate change risks, should the missions choose to do so. Without clear guidance, State may miss opportunities to identify and address issues related to climate change as a potential driver of migration.\nThe three agencies have been involved in climate change related activities but none were specifically focused on the nexus with global migration. For example, USAID officials said that the agency's adaptation efforts, such as its Pastoralist Areas Resilience Improvement through Market Expansion project in Ethiopia, were the most likely to include activities, such as enhancing resilience, that can indirectly address the issue of climate change as a driver of migration.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that State provide missions with guidance that clearly documents its process for climate change risk assessments for country strategies. In commenting on a draft of this report, State indicated that it would update its integrated country strategy guidance and will specifically note that missions have the option to provide additional information on climate resilience and related topics.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_796"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_797","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services pays LTCHs for care provided to Medicare beneficiaries. There were about 400 LTCHs across the nation in 2016.\nThe 21st Century Cures Act included a provision for GAO to examine certain issues pertaining to LTCHs. This report examines (1) the health care needs of Medicare beneficiaries who receive services from the two qualifying hospitals; (2) how Medicare LTCH payment polices could affect the two qualifying hospitals; and (3) how the two qualifying hospitals compare with other LTCHs and other facilities that may treat Medicare patients with similar conditions.\nGAO analyzed the most recently available Medicare claims and other data for the two qualifying hospitals and other facilities that treat patients with spinal cord injuries. GAO also interviewed HHS officials and stakeholders from the qualifying hospitals, other facilities that treat spinal cord patients, specialty associations, and others.\nGAO provided a draft of this report to HHS. HHS provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. We also provided the two qualifying hospitals summaries of information we collected from them, to confirm the accuracy of statements included in our draft report. We incorporated their comments, as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nSpinal cord injuries may result in secondary complications that often lead to decreased functional independence and quality of life. The 21st Century Cures Act changed how Medicare pays certain long-term care hospitals (LTCH) that provide spinal cord specialty treatment. For these hospitals, the act included a temporary exception from how Medicare pays other LTCHs. Two LTCHs\u2014Craig Hospital in Englewood, Colorado and Shepherd Center in Atlanta, Georgia\u2014have qualified for this exception. GAO found that most Medicare beneficiaries treated at these two hospitals typically receive specialized care for multiple chronic conditions and other long-term complications that develop after initial injuries, such as pressure ulcers that can result in life-threatening infection. The two hospitals also provide specialty care for acquired brain injuries, such as traumatic brain injuries.\nGAO's simulations of Medicare payments to these two hospitals using claims data from two baseline years\u2014fiscal years 2013 and 2016\u2014illustrate potential effects of payment policies. LTCHs are paid under a two-tiered system for care provided to beneficiaries: they receive the LTCH standard federal payment rate\u2014or standard rate\u2014for certain patients discharged from the LTCH, and a generally lower rate\u2014known as a \u201csite-neutral\u201d rate\u2014for all other discharges. Under the temporary exception, Craig Hospital and Shepherd Center receive the standard rate for all discharges during fiscal years 2018 and 2019. Assuming their types of discharges remain the same as in fiscal years 2013 and 2016, GAO's simulations of Medicare payments in the baseline years indicate:\nMost of the discharges we examined would not qualify for the standard rate, if the exception did not apply.\nMedicare payments would generally decrease under fiscal year 2020 payment policy, once the exception expires.\nHowever, the actual effects of Medicare's payment policies on these two hospitals could vary based on factors, including the severity of patient conditions (e.g., Medicare payment is typically higher for more severe injuries), and whether hospitals' discharges meet criteria for the standard rate.\nSimilarities and differences may exist between the two qualifying hospitals and other facilities that treat Medicare patients with spinal cord and brain injuries. Patients with spinal cord and brain injuries may receive care in other LTCHs, but GAO found that most Medicare beneficiaries at these other LTCHs are treated for conditions other than spinal cord and brain injuries. Certain inpatient rehabilitation facilities (IRF) also provide post-acute rehabilitation services to patients with spinal cord and brain injuries. While data limitations make a direct comparison between these facilities and the two qualifying hospitals difficult, GAO identified some similarities and differences. For example, officials from some IRFs we interviewed reported providing several of the same programs and services as the two qualifying hospitals to medically complex patients, but the availability of services and complexity of patients varied. Among other reasons, the different Medicare payment requirements that apply to LTCHs and IRFs affect the types of services they provide and the patients they treat.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_797"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_798","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAcquisition management has been a long-standing challenge at NASA, although GAO has reported on improvements the agency has made in recent years. Three space telescope projects are the key enablers for NASA to achieve its astrophysics' science goals, which include seeking to understand the universe. In its fiscal year 2018 budget request, NASA asked for about $697 million for these three projects, which represents over 50 percent of NASA's budget for its astrophysics' major projects. In total, these projects represent an expected investment of at least $12.4 billion.\nThis statement reflects preliminary observations on (1) the current status and cost of NASA's major telescope projects and (2) lessons learned that can be applied to NASA's management of its telescope projects. This statement is based on ongoing work on JWST and ongoing work on the status of NASA's major projects. Both reports are planned to be published in Spring 2018. This statement is also based on past GAO reports on JWST and NASA's acquisitions of major projects, and NASA input.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) current portfolio of major space telescopes includes three projects that vary in cost, complexity, and phase of the acquisition life cycle.\nGAO's ongoing work indicates that these projects are each making progress in line with their phase of the acquisition cycle but also face some challenges. For example, the current launch date for the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) project reflects a 57-60-month delay from the project's original schedule. GAO's preliminary observations indicate this project still has significant integration and testing to complete, with very little schedule reserve remaining to account for delays. Therefore, additional delays beyond the delay of up to 8 months recently announced are likely, and funding available under the $8 billion Congressional cost cap for formulation and development may be inadequate.\nThere are a number of lessons learned from its acquisitions that NASA could consider to increase the likelihood of successful outcomes for its telescope projects, as well as for its larger portfolio of projects, such as its human spaceflight projects. For example, twice in the history of the JWST program, independent reviews found that the program was not holding adequate cost and schedule reserves. GAO has found that NASA has not applied this lesson learned to all of its large projects, and similar outcomes to JWST have started to emerge. For example, NASA did not incorporate this lesson with its human spaceflight programs. In July 2016 and April 2017, GAO found that these programs were holding inadequate levels of cost and schedule reserves to cover unexpected cost increases or delays. In April 2017, GAO recommended that NASA reassess the date of the programs' first test flight. NASA concurred and, in November 2017, announced a launch delay of up to 19 months.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making any recommendations in this statement, but has made recommendations in prior reports to strengthen NASA's acquisition management of its major projects. NASA has generally agreed with GAO's recommendations and taken steps to implement them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_798"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_799","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe United States economy has historically been the largest recipient of foreign direct investment in the world\u2014receiving $373 billion in 2016, according to U.S. government statistics. Ensuring that these foreign investments do not harm national security can be a challenge. CFIUS is an interagency group that reviews transactions under its authority\u2014certain foreign acquisitions or mergers of U.S. businesses\u2014to determine their effects on U.S. national security, while maintaining an open investment climate. If CFIUS identifies concerns, it may work with parties to the transaction to mitigate them. In rare cases, CFIUS may recommend that the President block or suspend a transaction.\nGAO was asked to review the CFIUS process and possible changes to that process. This report (1) examines changes in CFIUS's workload and staffing from 2011 through 2016, and (2) provides information on stakeholder views on potential changes to CFIUS. GAO analyzed CFIUS information on staffing levels and transactions reviewed, and interviewed officials from member agencies, selected nonmember agencies that have CFIUS-related expertise, and knowledgeable external experts, such as think tanks.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nstates that management should establish the organizational structure necessary to achieve its objectives and periodically evaluate this structure. Treasury\u2014the agency that leads CFIUS\u2014 has not coordinated member agencies' efforts to better understand the staffing levels needed to address the current and future workload associated with core functions of the committee. Without this information, CFIUS may be limited in its ability to fulfill its objectives and address national security concerns.\nOfficials from CFIUS member agencies and selected nonmember agencies, as well as external experts, expressed a range of views on the potential benefits and drawbacks to possible changes to CFIUS. GAO organized the possible changes into three categories: (1) altering the structure of CFIUS, (2) redefining which transactions should be considered for CFIUS review, and (3) expanding the factors CFIUS considers when evaluating the impacts of a foreign transaction on national security. Agency officials were generally satisfied with CFIUS' structure, such as the committee's chair and membership. Views among officials and experts varied on redefining which transactions should be considered for review, such as requiring CFIUS to review all transactions covered by its authority regardless of notification. Officials and experts generally did not support expanding the list of national security factors CFIUS considers, such as by adding a net economic benefit test. Agency officials and experts agreed that one trade-off related to some possible changes is a likely increase to the CFIUS workload, which they noted is already straining agencies' staff resources.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nTreasury, as CFIUS lead, should coordinate member agencies' efforts to better understand the staffing levels needed to address the current and projected CFIUS workload associated with core committee functions. Treasury concurred.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_799"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_800","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCertain Afghan or Iraqi nationals who worked for the U.S. government and may have experienced serious threats due to this work may qualify for an SIV. An SIV allows them and eligible family members to resettle in the United States, and since 2008 over 60,000 SIV holders (principal holder and family members) have done so. Upon arrival, they are eligible for resettlement assistance from State and HHS. GAO was asked to review SIV holders' resettlement outcomes and challenges. This report examines (1) available data on SIV holders' employment and other outcomes, (2) challenges affecting their resettlement, and (3) federal efforts to help address challenges. GAO analyzed the most recent federal data (State: 2010-2016; and HHS: 2016) on SIV holders' outcomes; interviewed officials from nine national resettlement agencies; and visited three states (CA, TX, and VA) where over half of SIV holders resettled. In these states, GAO interviewed the states' refugee coordinators and, for two local areas with relatively high levels of SIV resettlement, interviewed local resettlement agency officials and conducted focus groups with SIV holders. GAO also reviewed relevant federal laws and policies and interviewed federal officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nSince fiscal year 2011, about 13,000 Afghan and Iraqi nationals (excluding family members) have resettled in the United States under special immigrant visas (SIV), but limited data on their outcomes are available from the Department of State (State) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). State collects data on SIV holders' resettlement outcomes once\u201490 days after they arrive. GAO's analysis of State's data from October 2010 through December 2016 showed that the majority of principal SIV holders\u2014those who worked for the U.S. government\u2014were unemployed at 90 days, including those reporting high levels of education and spoken English. Separately, HHS collects data on about one-third of resettled SIV holders (those in one HHS grant program). According to HHS's fiscal year 2016 data (the only year available), most of these SIV holders were employed and not receiving cash assistance 6 months after arrival; however, these data are not representative of all SIV holders. GAO did not identify any outcome data for SIV holders beyond 6 months after arrival. HHS annually surveys refugees up to 5 years after arrival, but does not do so for SIV holders. However, it has occasionally used its survey of refugees to analyze selected groups at no additional reported cost. Such analysis could provide valuable information on whether SIV holders have achieved longer-term assimilation, consistent with HHS' mission and program goals.\nStakeholders GAO interviewed reported several resettlement challenges, including capacity issues in handling large numbers of SIV holders, difficulties finding skilled employment, and SIV holders' high expectations. Officials from local resettlement agencies in Northern Virginia reported capacity challenges for their agencies and the community due to the large increase of SIV holders. In almost all of GAO's focus groups with principal SIV holders, participants expressed frustration at the need to take low-skilled jobs because they expected that their education and prior work experience would lead to skilled work.\nState and HHS have taken steps to address some resettlement challenges. For example, in 2017 State placed restrictions on where SIV holders could resettle and HHS announced a new grant to support career development programs for SIV holders, refugees, and others. In addition, State provides information to prospective SIV holders about resettlement. However, the information is general, and lacks detail on key issues such as housing affordability, employment, and available government assistance. Providing such specifics could lead to more informed decisions by SIV holders on where to resettle and help them more quickly adapt to potential challenges once in the United States.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that 1) HHS consider including SIV holders in its annual survey on refugees' longer-term outcomes, and that 2) State provide more detailed information on key issues to prospective SIV holders. Both agencies agreed with our recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_800"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_801","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nWMATA transports more than 1 million rail and bus passengers each weekday in the nation's capital and surrounding areas. However, recent safety incidents and declines in ridership and revenues have focused public attention on how WMATA manages its workforce and associated costs.\nGAO was asked to review WMATA's workforce management. This report examines, among other things, (1) how WMATA's workforce costs have changed from fiscal years 2006 through 2017 and factors contributing to those changes, and (2) how WMATA has designed and implemented its employee performance management systems. GAO reviewed WMATA's annual financial statements and budgets from fiscal years 2006 through 2017, and compared WMATA's workforce cost and performance management efforts to leading practices and internal control and actuarial principles. GAO also reviewed a non-generalizable sample of employee performance evaluations selected to include occupations with the highest number of evaluations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority's (WMATA) workforce costs\u2014including wages, salaries, and benefits for employees and retirees\u2014increased on average by about 3 percent annually from fiscal years 2006 through 2017. This increase was largely driven by the cost of employee and retiree benefits. Specifically, the amount WMATA was required to contribute to its pension plans increased by an annual average of about 19 percent during this period. Due to their relative size, proportion of retirees compared to active members, and investment decisions, these pension plans pose significant risk to WMATA's financial operations, yet WMATA has not fully assessed the risks. Without comprehensive information on the risks facing its pension plans, WMATA may not be prepared for economic scenarios that could increase its required contributions to an extent that might jeopardize its ability to provide some transit service.\nWMATA has implemented two employee performance management systems that cover all employees, but these systems lack some key elements of an effectively designed and implemented performance management system. For example, WMATA's performance management systems are not designed to make meaningful distinctions in performance, a key element of an effective system. This design is due in part to WMATA's lack of comprehensive policies and procedures for its performance management systems. In addition, WMATA lacks sufficient controls to ensure that supervisors complete required performance evaluations accurately and on-time. For example, in 10 of 50 performance evaluations we reviewed, we found scoring errors where employees were assigned a performance rating inconsistent with the supporting review. Without comprehensive policies and procedures or sufficient controls over its performance management systems, WMATA lacks tools and information to move employees toward achieving WMATA's strategic goals.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making five recommendations to WMATA, including that it develop a comprehensive assessment of risks posed by its pension plans, comprehensive policies and procedures for its employee performance management systems, and controls to ensure supervisors complete required performance evaluations, among other actions.\nWMATA agreed with four recommendations and neither agreed nor disagreed with the fifth.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_801"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_802","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn January and March 2017, the President issued a series of executive orders related to border security and immigration. The orders direct federal agencies to take a broad range of actions with potential resource implications. For example, Executive Order 13767 instructs DHS to construct a wall or other physical barriers along the U.S. southern border and to hire an additional 5,000 U.S. Border Patrol agents. Executive Order 13768 instructs federal agencies, including DHS and DOJ, to ensure that U.S immigration law is enforced against all removable individuals and directs ICE to hire an additional 10,000 immigration officers. Executive Order 13780 directs agencies to develop a uniform baseline for screening and vetting standards and procedures; and established nationality-based entry restrictions with respect to visa travelers for a 90-day period, and refugees for 120 days.\nGAO was asked to review agencies' implementation of the executive orders and related spending. This report addresses (1) actions DHS, DOJ, and State have taken, or plan to take, to implement provisions of the executive orders; and (2) resources to implement provisions of the executive orders, particularly funds DHS, DOJ, and State have obligated, expended, or shifted. GAO reviewed agency planning, tracking, and guidance documents related to the orders, as well as budget requests, appropriations acts, and internal budget information. GAO also interviewed agency officials regarding actions and budgetary costs associated with implementing the orders.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and State issued internal and public reports such as studies and progress updates, developed or revised policies, and took initial planning and programmatic actions to implement Executive Orders 13767, 13768, and 13780. For example:\nDHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) started the acquisition process for a Border Wall System Program and issued task orders to design and construct barrier prototypes. In November 2017, CBP awarded a contract worth up to $297 million to help with hiring 5,000 U.S. Border Patrol agents, 2,000 CBP officers, and 500 Air and Marine Operations agents.\nDOJ issued memoranda providing guidance for federal prosecutors on prioritizing certain immigration-related criminal offenses. Additionally, from March through October 2017, DOJ detailed approximately 40 immigration judge positions to detention centers and to the southern border to conduct removal and other related proceedings, according to DOJ officials.\nState participated in an interagency working group to develop uniform standards related to the adjudication of visa applications, interviews, and system security checks. State also implemented visa and refugee entry restrictions in accordance with the Supreme Court's June 26, 2017, ruling.\nAgency officials anticipate that implementing the executive orders will be a multi-year endeavor comprising additional reporting, planning, and other actions.\nDHS, DOJ, and State used existing fiscal year 2017 resources to support initial executive order actions that fit within their established mission areas. GAO found that it was not always possible to disaggregate which fiscal year 2017 funds were used for implementation of the orders versus other agency activities. All three agencies indicated that they used existing personnel to implement the orders and, in some cases, these efforts took substantial time. For example, according to ICE data, personnel spent about 14,000 regular hours (the equivalent of 1,750 8-hour days) and 2,400 overtime hours planning for the ICE hiring surge from January 2017 through January 2018.\nIn March 2017, the President submitted a budget amendment along with a request for $3 billion in supplemental appropriations for DHS to implement the orders. In May 2017, DHS received an appropriation of just over $1.1 billion, some of which DHS used to fund actions to implement the orders. For example, CBP received $65 million for hiring and, according to CBP officials, used these funds to plan and prepare for the surge in U.S. Border Patrol agents. As of January 2018, CBP had obligated $18.8 million of the $65 million.\nAgencies plan to continue to use their base budgets and request additional funds as needed to carry out their missions and implement the orders. For example, for fiscal year 2018, CBP requested approximately $1.6 billion and received (in March 2018) approximately $1.3 billion to build new and replace existing sections of physical barriers along the southern border. For fiscal year 2019, ICE requested $571 million to hire 2,000 immigration officers and DOJ requested approximately $40 million to hire new immigration judges and supporting staff.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_802"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_803","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOD's contracting process is designed to protect taxpayers' interests, among other things, and can take time. DOD leadership and contractors have expressed concern about the length of time to award contracts and DOD has proposed reducing that time.\nGAO was asked to evaluate the length of time to award weapon systems contracts. This report examines (1) DOD's efforts to determine the time it takes to award contracts; (2) data on the time interval from solicitation to contract award for selected contracts; and (3) factors identified as contributing to contract award time frames.\nGAO used the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation to identify new weapon systems-related contracts awarded in fiscal years 2014 through 2016, valued over $5 million, among other factors. GAO selected a nongeneralizable sample of 129 contracts at four DOD components with the highest total dollar value and highest number of contracts from those fiscal years for further analysis. GAO analyzed contract documentation and surveyed contracting officials on a subset of contracts to determine the factors affecting the time between solicitation issuance and award.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAlthough the Department of Defense (DOD) has proposed reducing the time it takes to award contracts related to weapon systems, the department has a limited understanding of how long it currently takes and therefore lacks a baseline to measure success. The DOD components GAO reviewed\u2014Air Force, Army, Defense Logistics Agency, and Navy\u2014collect data on their time frames for awarding contracts. However, they do so in different ways in the absence of a DOD-wide strategy for what information should be collected. For example, the Air Force measures the time to award beginning with solicitation issuance, while the other components use a different starting point. As a result, information the components collect is not comparable and is of limited use for understanding contract award time frames department-wide. Determining what information is needed to monitor time taken to award contracts consistently across components should help DOD assess its progress toward reducing the time.\nGAO analyzed the time from solicitation issuance to award for 129 weapon systems-related contracts and found it ranged from less than a month to over 4 years. Although some DOD and industry officials stated that contract value could affect contract award time frames, GAO observed a wide range of time intervals and did not observe any patterns based on this characteristic. (See figure below.)\nAccording to DOD contracting officials GAO surveyed, factors that can help reduce\u2014or, alternatively lengthen\u2014the time between when a solicitation is issued to when a contract is awarded include a decision to make the contract award an office priority and how quickly contractors respond to requests for additional information after initial proposals are received.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DOD develop a strategy that identifies the information it needs to collect and how it will use the information to assess contract award time frames. DOD concurred.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_803"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_804","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFederal financial regulators must comply with various rulemaking and review requirements, including those in RFA and EGRPRA. These statutes require analyses relating to regulatory burden, small entities, or both. RFA requires analyses of a rule's impact on small entities and alternatives that may minimize any significant economic impact. It also requires agencies to review rules (within 10 years) to determine if the rules should be amended or rescinded. EGRPRA directs specified regulators to review regulations at least every 10 years and identify areas that are outdated, unnecessary, or unduly burdensome on insured depository institutions.\nThis statement is based on findings from GAO's January 2018 report on RFA implementation ( GAO-18-256 ) and February 2018 report on regulatory burden on community banks and credit unions ( GAO-18-213 ). GAO discusses regulatory burdens and how financial regulators address regulatory burdens through the rulemaking process and retrospective reviews. For those reports, GAO's work included reviewing Federal Register notices; regulators' workpapers, policies and procedures; and reports to Congress on EGRPRA reviews. GAO also interviewed more than 60 community banks and credit unions.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nMore than 60 smaller depository institutions told GAO that regulations for reporting mortgage characteristics; reviewing transactions for potentially illicit activity; and disclosing fees, conditions, and mortgage terms to consumers were the most burdensome. Institution representatives said these regulations were time-consuming and costly because the requirements were complex and required reporting that had to be reviewed for accuracy. Financial regulators and others noted these regulations provide various benefits as well, such as preventing lending discrimination or use of the banking system for illicit activity.\nThe Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) requires federal agencies to analyze the impact of their regulations on small entities. GAO found several weaknesses with the analyses of six financial regulators\u2014Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Securities and Exchange Commission, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)\u2014that could undermine the goal of RFA and limit transparency and public accountability. For example, some analyses lacked important information, such as data sources, methodologies, and consideration of broad economic impacts. Evaluations of potential economic effects and alternative regulatory approaches also were limited. Finally, regulators generally lacked comprehensive policies and procedures for RFA implementation. By not developing such policies and procedures, regulators' ability to consistently and effectively meet RFA objectives may be limited.\nThe Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996 (EGRPRA) and RFA require regulators to conduct retrospective reviews, and GAO found weaknesses.\nEGRPRA. GAO found limitations in activities regulators undertook for retrospective reviews under EGRPRA. CFPB, which has regulatory authority for a number of consumer financial laws, was not included in the most recent review process. Moreover, as part of their EGRPRA reviews, the Federal Reserve, OCC, FDIC, and the National Credit Union Administration had not conducted and reported analyses of quantitative data nor had these regulators assessed the cumulative effect of regulations. Addressing these limitations in the EGRPRA processes likely would make the analyses they perform more transparent, and potentially result in additional burden reduction.\nRFA. The issues GAO identified with RFA retrospective reviews (section 610 reviews) included some regulators using the EGRPRA process to fulfill RFA requirements and gaps or weaknesses in analysis and documentation. But EGRPRA requirements do not fully align with RFA's, and it is not clear if the EGRPRA process satisfies the requirements of section 610. Also, regulators generally have not developed policies and procedures for section 610 reviews. By meeting section 610 review requirements, regulators will be in a better position to minimize any significant economic impact of a rule on a substantial number of small entities, as the statute seeks to ensure.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO made a total of 20 recommendations to the financial regulators in the two reports to improve their policies and procedures and analysis under RFA and in retrospective reviews. The regulators generally agreed with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_804"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_805","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAccording to a U.S. government study, increased U.S. energy trade with Canada and Mexico\u2014two of the United States' top energy trade partners\u2014is viewed as a major contributor to U.S. economic prosperity and energy security. In recent years, North American energy production has experienced changes. For example, the United States has become the world's top oil producer, Canada has substantially increased its oil outputs, and Mexico has implemented energy reforms. To address energy production and trade issues, the public sector and private sector stakeholders have advocated for further integration of the three North American countries' energy sectors.\nGAO was asked to review the role of U.S. agencies in supporting energy integration in North America. This report examines (1) ways in which the U.S., Canadian, and Mexican governments cooperate on North American energy integration; (2) U.S. agencies' activities to facilitate North American energy integration; (3) U.S. agencies' efforts to coordinate among themselves on North American energy integration; (4) ways in which U.S. agencies receive feedback from U.S. industry and civil society regarding North American energy integration; and (5) steps that U.S., Canadian, and Mexican officials suggested to further facilitate North American energy integration. GAO reviewed bilateral and trilateral cooperation activities and mechanisms; surveyed U.S. agencies involved in energy integration; and interviewed U.S., Canadian, and Mexican energy officials.\nGAO is not making any recommendations in this report.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nCooperation. The United States cooperates with Canada and Mexico on integrating North American energy markets and infrastructure (energy integration). Cooperation occurs at the presidential and ministerial levels (e.g., the countries' secretaries or ministers of energy) for strategic issues and at the agency level for technical issues. However, progress on some strategic issues has been limited. For example, development of a North American energy strategy, which the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) proposed in March 2017, was suspended later that year because of disagreement about its scope. Discussions of the strategy resumed in 2018, according to DOE officials.\nAgency activities. Eight U.S. agencies have engaged in multiple efforts to facilitate North American energy integration. DOE generally serves as the lead agency on energy integration issues, while the Department of State\u2014the lead agency on foreign policy\u2014also leads some bilateral and trilateral efforts. Other agencies play roles in areas such as regulatory compliance or efforts to open energy markets. Agency officials GAO surveyed and interviewed identified 81 energy integration\u2013related activities conducted in 2014 through 2017, including international agreements and other instruments, research and development, technical forums and assistance, regulatory cooperation, and trade promotion.\nInteragency coordination. U.S. agency officials reported coordinating on energy integration through high-level U.S. interagency meetings, summits, and other means. For example, agencies participating in a National Security Council\u2013led working group share information, provide advice, and coordinate on activities. Agency officials also reported using mechanisms such as stakeholder forums and staff discussions to coordinate on energy integration issues.\nStakeholder feedback. U.S. agencies receive feedback on energy integration issues from the private sector and civil society through formal mechanisms such as comments in the Federal Register and public\u2013private advisory entities. For example, the U.S.\u2013Mexico Energy Business Council is designed to capture private sector feedback. Informal feedback comes through activities such as emails, phone calls, and letters.\nSteps suggested by U.S., Canadian, and Mexican officials . Officials in the three countries expressed general satisfaction with intergovernmental cooperation on energy integration and said cooperative activities had helped foster integration. They also suggested further work in areas such as aligning energy regulations.\nSource: GAO analysis of information provided by U.S, Canadian, and Mexican officials. | GAO-18-575","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_805"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_806","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFederal agencies and the nation's critical infrastructures\u2014such as energy, transportation systems, communications, and financial services\u2014are dependent on information technology systems to carry out operations. The security of these systems and the data they use is vital to public confidence and national security, prosperity, and well-being.\nThe risks to these systems are increasing as security threats evolve and become more sophisticated. GAO first designated information security as a government-wide high-risk area in 1997. This was expanded to include protecting cyber critical infrastructure in 2003 and protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information in 2015.\nThis report provides an update to the information security high-risk area. To do so, GAO identified the actions the federal government and other entities need to take to address cybersecurity challenges. GAO primarily reviewed prior work issued since the start of fiscal year 2016 related to privacy, critical federal functions, and cybersecurity incidents, among other areas. GAO also reviewed recent cybersecurity policy and strategy documents, as well as information security industry reports of recent cyberattacks and security breaches.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO has identified four major cybersecurity challenges and 10 critical actions that the federal government and other entities need to take to address them. GAO continues to designate information security as a government-wide high-risk area due to increasing cyber-based threats and the persistent nature of security vulnerabilities.\nGAO has made over 3,000 recommendations to agencies aimed at addressing cybersecurity shortcomings in each of these action areas, including protecting cyber critical infrastructure, managing the cybersecurity workforce, and responding to cybersecurity incidents. Although many recommendations have been addressed, about 1,000 have not yet been implemented. Until these shortcomings are addressed, federal agencies' information and systems will be increasingly susceptible to the multitude of cyber-related threats that exist.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO has made over 3,000 recommendations to agencies since 2010 aimed at addressing cybersecurity shortcomings. As of August 2018, about 1,000 still needed to be implemented.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_806"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_807","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nMore than 2.7 million miles of pipeline transport and distribute oil, natural gas, and other hazardous products throughout the United States. Interstate pipelines run through remote areas and highly populated urban areas, and are vulnerable to accidents, operating errors, and malicious physical and cyber-based attack or intrusion. The energy sector accounted for 35 percent of the 796 critical infrastructure cyber incidents reported to DHS from 2013 to 2015. Several federal and private entities have roles in pipeline security. TSA is primarily responsible for the oversight of pipeline physical security and cybersecurity.\nGAO was asked to review TSA's efforts to assess and enhance pipeline security and cybersecurity. This report examines, among other objectives: (1) the guidance pipeline operators reported using to address security risks and the extent that TSA ensures its guidelines reflect the current threat environment; (2) the extent that TSA has assessed pipeline systems' security risks; and (3) the extent TSA has assessed its effectiveness in reducing pipeline security risks.\nGAO analyzed TSA documents, such as its Pipeline Security Guidelines ; evaluated TSA pipeline risk assessment efforts; and interviewed TSA officials, 10 U.S. pipeline operators\u2014selected based on volume, geography, and material transported\u2014and representatives from five industry associations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nPipeline operators reported using a range of guidelines and standards to address physical and cybersecurity risks, including the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Pipeline Security Guidelines , initially issued in 2011. TSA issued revised guidelines in March 2018 to reflect changes in the threat environment and incorporate most of the principles and practices from the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity . However, TSA's revisions do not include all elements of the current framework and TSA does not have a documented process for reviewing and revising its guidelines on a regular basis. Without such a documented process, TSA cannot ensure that its guidelines reflect the latest known standards and best practices for physical security and cybersecurity, or address the dynamic security threat environment that pipelines face. Further, GAO found that the guidelines lack clear definitions to ensure that pipeline operators identify their critical facilities. GAO's analysis showed that operators of at least 34 of the nation's top 100 critical pipeline systems (determined by volume of product transported) deemed highest risk had identified no critical facilities. This may be due, in part, to the guidelines not clearly defining the criteria to determine facilities' criticality.\nTo assess pipeline security risks, TSA conducts pipeline security reviews\u2014Corporate Security Reviews and Critical Facility Security Reviews\u2014to assess pipeline systems' vulnerabilities. However, GAO found that the number of TSA security reviews has varied considerably over the last several years, as shown in the table on the following page.\nTSA officials stated that staffing limitations have prevented TSA from conducting more reviews. Staffing levels for TSA's Pipeline Security Branch have varied significantly since fiscal year 2010 with the number of staff ranging from 14 full-time equivalents in fiscal years 2012 and 2013 to 1 in 2014. Further, TSA does not have a strategic workforce plan to help ensure it identifies the skills and competencies\u2014such as the required level of cybersecurity expertise\u2014necessary to carry out its pipeline security responsibilities. By establishing a strategic workforce plan, TSA can help ensure that it has identified the necessary skills, competencies, and staffing.\nGAO also identified factors that likely limit the usefulness of TSA's risk assessment methodology for prioritizing pipeline system reviews. Specifically, TSA has not updated its risk assessment methodology since 2014 to reflect current threats to the pipeline industry. Further, its sources of data and underlying assumptions and judgments regarding certain threat and vulnerability inputs are not fully documented. In addition, the risk assessment has not been peer reviewed since its inception in 2007. Taking steps to strengthen its risk assessment, and initiating an independent, external peer review would provide greater assurance that TSA ranks relative risk among pipeline systems using comprehensive and accurate data and methods.\nTSA has established performance measures to monitor pipeline security review recommendations, analyze their results, and assess effectiveness in reducing risks. However, these measures do not possess key attributes\u2014such as clarity, and having measurable targets\u2014that GAO has found are key to successful performance measures. By taking steps to ensure that its pipeline security program performance measures exhibit these key attributes, TSA could better assess its effectiveness at reducing pipeline systems' security risks. Pipeline Security Branch officials also reported conducting security reviews as the primary means for assessing the effectiveness of TSA's efforts to reduce pipeline security risks. However, TSA has not tracked the status of Corporate Security Review recommendations for the past 5 years. Until TSA monitors and records the status of these reviews' recommendations, it will be hindered in its efforts to determine whether its recommendations are leading to significant reduction in risk.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO makes 10 recommendations to TSA to improve its pipeline security program management (many are listed on the next page), and DHS concurred.\nGAO recommends, among other things, that the TSA Administrator take the following actions:\nimplement a documented process for reviewing, and if deemed necessary, for revising TSA's Pipeline Security Guidelines at defined intervals;\nclarify TSA's Pipeline Security Guidelines by defining key terms within its criteria for determining critical facilities;\ndevelop a strategic workforce plan for TSA's Security Policy and Industry Engagement\u2018s Surface Division;\nupdate TSA's pipeline risk assessment methodology to include current data to ensure it reflects industry conditions and threats;\nfully document the data sources, underlying assumptions and judgments that form the basis of TSA's pipeline risk assessment methodology;\ntake steps to coordinate an independent, external peer review of TSA's pipeline risk assessment methodology;\nensure the Security Policy and Industry Engagement\u2018s Surface Division has a suite of performance measures which exhibit key attributes of successful performance measures; and\nenter information on Corporate Security Review recommendations and monitor and record their status.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_807"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_808","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nContractor business systems produce critical data that contracting officers use to help negotiate and manage defense contracts. These systems and their related internal controls act as important safeguards against fraud, waste, and abuse of federal funding. Federal and defense acquisition regulations and DOD policies require that DOD take steps to review the adequacy of certain business systems, but GAO and other oversight entities have raised questions about the sufficiency and consistency of DOD's review process.\nThe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 contained a provision for GAO to evaluate how DOD implemented legislation intended to improve its business system review process. Among other things, this report examines (1) the changes DOD made to its review process and (2) the extent to which DOD is ensuring timely business system reviews.\nGAO analyzed DOD acquisition regulations, policies, and procedures for conducting contractor business system reviews and analyzed data on reviews conducted between fiscal years 2013 and 2018.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nSince 2011, the Department of Defense (DOD) has implemented several changes to its processes for reviewing contractor business systems\u2014which include systems such as accounting, estimating, and purchasing. Among other changes, DOD\nclarified the roles and responsibilities of the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA)\u2014the two agencies that are responsible for conducting the reviews;\nclarified timeframes for business system reviews and established criteria for business systems; and\nwithheld payments from contractors that were found to have significant deficiencies in their business systems.\nDOD does not have a mechanism to monitor and ensure that these reviews are being conducted in a timely manner. For its part, DCAA has conducted few business system audits since 2013, as it focused its efforts on other types of audits. DCAA plans to significantly increase the number of business system audits over the next 4 years, but its success in doing so depends on its ability to shift resources from other audits; to use public accounting firms to conduct other, non-business system audits; and DCAA staff's ability to execute new audit plans in a timely manner.\nDCMA relies on the three offices responsible for conducting DCMA-led reviews to manage the reviews, but DCMA does not formally monitor whether these reviews are being conducted consistent with policy nor does it monitor DCAA's efforts to complete the audits for which it is responsible. DCMA is ultimately responsible for approving a contractor's business systems. DCMA currently lacks a mechanism based on relevant and reliable information, such as the number of reviews that are outstanding and the resources available to conduct such reviews, to ensure reviews are being completed in a timely fashion. Such information could help inform more strategic oversight on whether the current review process is achieving its intended results, or whether additional changes to the timing of or criteria for conducting reviews are needed.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DCMA, in collaboration with DCAA, develop a mechanism to monitor and ensure contractor business system reviews are conducted in a timely fashion. DOD concurred with the recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_808"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_809","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAirlines recently came under scrutiny for their treatment of passengers\u2014including a high-profile incident in which a passenger was forcibly removed from an overbooked flight. However, airlines maintain that service has improved, citing better on-time performance and lower airfares. DOT has the authority to issue and enforce certain consumer protection requirements. DOT also educates passengers about their rights.\nGAO was asked to examine airline consumer protection issues. This report examines, among other issues, (1) trends in DOT's data on airline service; (2) the effectiveness of DOT's compliance efforts; and (3) the extent to which DOT's passenger education efforts align with key practices for consumer outreach. GAO reviewed DOT data on airline service and analyzed passenger complaint data for the 12 largest domestic airlines from 2008 through 2017; reviewed relevant documents and data on DOT's compliance program; assessed DOT's educational efforts against key practices for successful consumer outreach; and interviewed DOT officials. GAO interviewed or obtained written information from 11 of the 12 airlines.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Transportation's (DOT) data offered mixed information on whether airlines' service improved from 2008 through 2017. While DOT's operational data on rates of late flights, denied boardings, and mishandled baggage generally suggested improvement, the rate of passenger complaints received by DOT increased about 10 percent\u2014from about 1.1 complaints per 100,000 passengers to 1.2 complaints per 100,000 passengers.\nDOT conducts five key activities to ensure airlines' compliance with consumer protection requirements (see table). However, GAO found that DOT lacked performance measures to help it evaluate some of these activities and that it could improve its procedures (i.e., guidance documents and training materials), that analysts use to code passenger complaints.\nPerformance measures : DOT has established objectives for each of its five key compliance activities that state what it seeks to achieve; however, DOT lacks performance measures for three objectives. For example, DOT lacks a performance measure for conducting inspections of airlines' compliance with consumer protection requirements at airlines' headquarters and at airports. As a result, DOT is missing opportunities to capture critical information about airlines' compliance with consumer protection requirements.\nProcedures : DOT has procedures to help analysts code passenger complaints and identify potential consumer protection violations. GAO found that DOT's guidance for coding passenger complaints did not consistently include definitions or examples that illustrate appropriate use or help analysts select among the various complaint categories. Additional procedures would help DOT ensure that complaints are consistently coded and that potential violations are properly identified.\nGAO found that while DOT has taken steps to educate passengers on their rights, its efforts did not fully align with four of nine key practices GAO previously identified for conducting consumer education. For example, while DOT has defined the goals and objectives of its outreach efforts, it has not used budget information to prioritize efforts or established performance measures to assess the results. DOT has also not solicited input directly from passengers to understand what they know about their rights. Taking such actions would provide DOT with greater assurance that its efforts are meeting passengers' needs.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making six recommendations, including that DOT: develop performance measures for compliance activities, improve its procedures for coding airline passengers' complaints, and improve how passenger education aligns with GAO's key practices. DOT concurred with our recommendations and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_809"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_810","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe World Health Organization estimates that tobacco use kills over 7 million people each year, more than tuberculosis, HIV\/AIDS, and malaria combined. Since the 1990s, Congress has enacted restrictions regarding the use of certain appropriated funds to promote U.S. tobacco exports.\nGAO was asked to review the implementation of these restrictions. This report examines (1) guidance select U.S. agencies have issued to implement these restrictions, (2) whether overseas officials from select U.S. agencies were aware of the restrictions and guidance, and (3) select U.S. agencies' implementation of the guidance overseas. GAO reviewed U.S. laws, agency guidance, and internal communications; analyzed Commerce data; and interviewed agency officials in Washington, D.C. and in 24 offices across 11 overseas posts in 9 countries. GAO selected these countries based on criteria that included U.S. tobacco export totals, smoking rates, and geographic dispersion.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nCongress has restricted the use of certain appropriated funding to promote tobacco exports and the Departments of State (State), Commerce (Commerce), and Agriculture (USDA) have issued interagency guidance through the cable system that they rely on to implement these restrictions. State collaborates with these and other agencies to periodically update this cable. The cable informs officials about the types of actions they should take\u2014such as providing routine business facilitation services to all U.S. companies\u2014and the types of actions they should not take\u2014such as attending events sponsored by tobacco companies.\nMost, but not all, officials overseas that GAO interviewed were aware of the restrictions and received some guidance concerning the restrictions. However, GAO found that some officials did not recall receiving the interagency guidance cable. In addition, State and USDA's current training materials do not address the restrictions. Federal internal control standards state that appropriate training is essential to an organization's operational success. Thus, providing officials overseas with training about the funding restrictions and related guidance would help to ensure that officials are aware of the restrictions.\nU.S. officials overseas have implemented restrictions on promoting tobacco, but some officials said that the interagency guidance lacks clarity. Officials said that they have not promoted tobacco by, for example, attending events sponsored solely by tobacco companies. However, officials identified three areas of the guidance that are unclear: (1) attendance at events not sponsored by U.S. tobacco companies but attended by representatives of these companies; (2) the types of services officials can provide tobacco companies; and (3) the description of tobacco products, such as whether component parts for electronic cigarettes are included. Federal standards for internal control state that management should clearly document internal controls in policies and guidance to prevent officials from failing to achieve an objective or address a risk. By providing more specific guidance, the agencies would help ensure that officials consistently implement the funding restrictions on promoting tobacco.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that (1) State and USDA include information about the funding restrictions and guidance in training materials for relevant employees and (2) State, in consultation with Commerce and USDA, assess and update the interagency guidance cable, as needed, on promoting tobacco in light of questions raised by officials at posts overseas. State and USDA concurred with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_810"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_811","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn 2010, the Coast Guard initiated an effort\u2014known as IHiS\u2014to replace its aging EHR system with a suite of modernized systems that was to automate various health care services for its nearly 50,000 military members. However, in October 2015, the Coast Guard announced that the modernization project would be canceled.\nGAO was asked to review the Coast Guard's efforts to develop a modernized EHR system. GAO's objectives were to (1) describe what led the Coast Guard to terminate further IHiS development, and how much was spent on the project; (2) evaluate the Coast Guard's management and oversight for the discontinued project and what, if any, lessons learned were identified; (3) describe the Coast Guard's current process for managing health records and the challenges, if any, it is encountering; and (4) determine the Coast Guard's plans for effectively implementing a new EHR system and the current status of its efforts. To do so, GAO reviewed project expenditures, analyzed key project management documentation, surveyed Regional Managers and clinical staff, and interviewed knowledgeable staff.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFinancial, technical, schedule, and personnel risks led to the United States Coast Guard's (Coast Guard) decision to terminate the Integrated Health Information System (IHiS) project in 2015. According to the Coast Guard (a military service within the Department of Homeland Security), as of August 2017, $59.9 million was spent on the project over nearly 7 years and no equipment or software could be reused for future efforts. In addition, the Coast Guard could not fully demonstrate the project management actions taken for IHiS, lacked governance mechanisms, and did not document lessons learned for the failed project.\nAs a result of the cancelation of the IHiS project and the decommissioning of the two legacy electronic health record (EHR) systems IHiS was to replace, the Coast Guard directed its clinics to revert to maintaining health records using a predominantly paper process. Coast Guard Regional Managers and clinic and sick bay administrators informed GAO of the many challenges encountered in returning to a paper process. These challenges include the inability for some clinics to adequately track vital information such as the medications members are taking\u2014potentially causing harm to them.\nTo help alleviate several of these challenges, the Coast Guard has developed alternative work-around processes. However, these alternative processes may not provide sustained solutions to overcoming these challenges.\nIn February 2016, the Coast Guard initiated the process for acquiring a new EHR system. As of November 2017, agency officials had conducted research and recommended a solution based on performance, risk, cost, and schedule advantages. However, 2 years after canceling IHiS and moving toward a predominately manual process, the agency has not yet made a final determination on this. Successfully and quickly implementing an EHR system is vital to overcoming the challenges Coast Guard currently faces in managing paper health records. The expeditious implementation of such a system can significantly improve the quality and efficiency of care to the thousands of Coast Guard active duty and reserve members that receive health care.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is recommending the Coast Guard (1) expeditiously and judiciously pursue the acquisition of a new EHR system, and in doing so (2) ensure key processes are implemented, (3) establish project governance boards, and (4) document lessons learned. The Department of Homeland Security concurred with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_811"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_812","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFWS awarded $1.5 billion in grants in fiscal year 2016, which represented about half of the agency's budget. In general, FWS awards two types of grants: (1) formula grants, which are distributed to recipients based on a required formula, and (2) competitive grants, where potential recipients submit an application for funding that is reviewed and scored against criteria. Within FWS, WSFR manages several grant programs.\nGAO was asked to review WSFR's management of its competitive grant programs. This report (1) identifies and describes competitive grant programs that WSFR awards and monitors; (2) examines how WSFR awards grants under these programs and the extent to which this is consistent with relevant regulations; and (3) examines how WSFR monitors grants under these programs and the extent to which this is consistent with relevant regulations. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and FWS guidance; analyzed agency data for fiscal years 2012-2016; reviewed award documents for fiscal year 2016 and a sample of monitoring documents for grants awarded in fiscal year 2015 (selected to ensure sufficient time for required reports to be submitted) and compared these with requirements from relevant regulations; interviewed WSFR headquarters and regional officials and grant recipients.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's (FWS) Wildlife and Sport Fish Restoration (WSFR) program, within the Department of the Interior, awards and monitors five competitive grant programs. These grant programs fund different types of projects ranging from building docks to acquiring wetlands. GAO found that the number of grants and funding awarded varied by grant program from fiscal years 2012 through 2016.\nDollars in thousands\nThe award process WSFR uses for the five competitive grant programs generally involves publicly announcing the grant opportunity through a Notice of Funding Opportunity, which contains information applicants need to consider when applying, such as available funding and criteria that will be used to score applications. A panel comprised of WSFR staff, and in some cases other FWS staff or a third party organization, reviews and scores the applications based on the criteria in the Notice of Funding Opportunity and develops a list of recommended projects and funding amounts. The list is forwarded to the Director of FWS for review and approval. GAO found that WSFR's grant award process is consistent with federal regulations for awarding federal grants.\nWSFR monitors its competitive grants by reviewing financial and performance reports submitted by grant recipients. In general, this process is consistent with relevant regulations, but some of the performance reports were missing required information. Specifically, for fiscal year 2015 grants GAO reviewed, financial and performance reports were generally submitted on time by grant recipients, but several performance reports (9 of 51) did not include a comparison of actual accomplishments to the goals of the grant, as required by regulations. WSFR does not have a template for grant recipients to follow in preparing these reports for most of the grant programs, and the template used by one region does not clearly ask for all required information. WSFR officials have said the agency plans to develop a more standardized reporting process but no timeline has been established. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government , management should design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks, including designing mechanisms to help monitor performance. Without a template or standardized method that facilitates the collection of performance information, WSFR grant recipients may continue to submit performance reports that are missing information needed by FWS to monitor its competitive grant programs.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that FWS develop a template or other standardized method to facilitate collection of all required information for grant performance reports. The Department of the Interior concurred with this recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_812"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_813","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nVA spends billions every year to procure goods and services and is required to give preference to veteran-owned small businesses when awarding contracts\u2014a program known as Veterans First. In turn, those firms must comply with limitations on the use of subcontracting. A 2006 statute established Veterans First, and a 2016 Supreme Court decision clarified conflicting interpretations, resulting in changes to how VA must now implement the program.\nGAO was asked to review VA's implementation of Veterans First since the Supreme Court decision. Among other things, this report assesses the extent to which (1) changes occurred in procurement obligations to veteran-owned small businesses from fiscal years 2014 through 2017; (2) VA has encountered any challenges in implementing Veterans First policies; and (3) VA has mechanisms to oversee contractor compliance with subcontracting limitations.\nGAO analyzed VA regulations, policies, and contracting data; conducted three site visits; and reviewed a non-generalizable sample, selected based on factors such as high dollar value, of 35 contracts and orders, 29 of which VA awarded under Veterans First.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO found that the percentage of Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) obligations set aside for veteran-owned small businesses under its Veterans First program was higher in 2017\u2014the first full year following the 2016 Supreme Court decision\u2014than in previous years. In its decision, the court clarified that VA contract competitions must be restricted to these businesses if they meet two criteria: (1) the contracting officer reasonably expects that at least two such businesses will submit offers, and (2) the award can be made at a fair and reasonable price and best value to the government. This has become known as the \u201cVA Rule of Two.\u201d VA created a new policy for implementing Veterans First following the 2016 decision. The percentage of obligations set aside for veteran-owned small businesses increased from fiscal years 2014 to 2017 (see figure).\nContracting officers face challenges implementing aspects of Veterans First, some of which VA has addressed through policy and optional training. However, 12 of the 30 contracting officers GAO interviewed cited difficulty in assessing the second criterion of the VA Rule of Two when making a set-aside decision. Eight of them stated that they sometimes lacked confidence in their fair and reasonable price determinations. VA's training, however, does not fully address these more challenging aspects of implementing the Veterans First policy. More targeted training would provide VA with greater assurance that its contracting officers have the knowledge and skills necessary to implement the policy. Additionally, assessing whether training on this policy should be mandatory would allow VA to determine if it would be beneficial for all contracting officers.\nGAO found that VA conducts limited oversight of contractor compliance with limitations on subcontracting and has few mechanisms for ensuring compliance. For example, GAO found that the required clause for ensuring that veteran-owned small business contractors perform the required portion of work was either missing entirely or an outdated version was used in 11 of the 29 set-aside contract actions GAO reviewed. Without better oversight, VA is limited in its ability to detect violations and ensure that the goal of Veterans First\u2014to promote opportunities for veteran-owned small businesses\u2014is not undermined.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making six recommendations, including that VA provide more targeted training for contracting officers, assess whether training should be mandatory, ensure required clauses are included in contracts, and improve oversight of compliance with subcontracting limitations. VA agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_813"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_814","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Great Lakes-Seaway system extends 2,300 miles and serves more than 100 ports in the United States and Canada. Four of the 17 locks that enable navigation are managed by the Army Corps (within the Department of Defense) and U.S. Seaway Corporation (within the Department of Transportation). The rest are managed by Canada. A 2007 U.S.-Canada study noted the system could absorb additional traffic and led to U.S. asset renewal plans to improve lock infrastructure condition.\nGAO was asked to review efforts to modernize the Great Lakes-Seaway. This report examines (1) shipping trends since 1980 and factors affecting recent trends, (2) stakeholder views on challenges to use, and (3) the extent to which the Army Corps and the U.S. Seaway Corporation have made progress on and measure performance of lock renewal efforts. GAO analyzed Seaway and Army Corps shipping data from 1980 through 2016, the agencies' asset renewal plans, and interviewed 24 stakeholders, including port and shipper representatives, selected to represent a range of perspectives.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe tons of cargo moved by domestic Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway traffic have declined since 1980\u2014by 32 and 48 percent, respectively, according to U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Army Corps) and Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation (U.S. Seaway Corporation) data. Stakeholders identified various factors for this decrease such as the U.S. economy's shift away from manufacturing. Traffic on the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway (Great Lakes-Seaway) is traditionally dominated by bulk commodities like iron ore, although stakeholders noted emerging uses like containerized cargo and cruises.\nStakeholders identified a range of challenges to using the Great Lakes- Seaway\u2014such as inadequate portside infrastructure for intermodal transfers of shipping containers\u2014that together pose risks for both traditional bulk cargos and emerging uses. Although the U.S. Seaway Corporation's mission is to improve the system's utilization and reliability, the Corporation has not fully assessed the risks that challenges pose to the system's users. Establishing a process to assess and monitor risks, in accordance with federal internal control standards, would help inform future actions to address identified and emerging challenges.\nThe U.S. Seaway Corporation and the Army Corps have made progress on lock asset renewal efforts, but the Army Corps lacks goals and measures to assess performance and outcomes of these efforts. According to estimates provided by the Army Corps, it has completed 18 projects totaling about $53 million to date, and has about $257 million in remaining and ongoing work through 2035. Meanwhile, the U.S. Seaway Corporation has completed 16 projects totaling $45 million and has almost $144 million in remaining and ongoing work through 2023. The Army Corps has not developed goals and measures to assess its asset renewal results, as the U.S. Seaway Corporation has done. As a result, the Army Corps lacks tools to assess the outcomes of these efforts and demonstrate the extent to which its asset renewal efforts have improved operational performance of the Soo Locks.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that (1) the U.S. Seaway Corporation establish a process to identify, analyze, and monitor risks to the system's use to inform future actions, and (2) the Army Corps develop and adopt goals and measures to assess the performance of the Soo Locks and assess of asset renewal outcomes. The Departments of Transportation and Defense concurred with our recommendations and provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_814"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_815","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe federal government shares liability risks with the commercial space launch industry for accidents that result in damages to third parties or federal property. This arrangement requires space launch companies to have a specific amount of insurance to cover these damages. The government is potentially liable for damages above that amount, up to a cap GAO estimated to be $3.1 billion in 2017, subject to appropriations in advance.\nCSLCA, enacted in 2015, directed the Department of Transportation, of which FAA is a part, to evaluate its MPL methodology and, if necessary, develop a plan to update that methodology. The act also included a provision requiring GAO to assess FAA's evaluation and any actions needed to update the methodology.\nThis report discusses the extent to which (1) FAA's evaluation report addresses the requirements in CSLCA and (2) FAA has addressed previously identified weaknesses in the MPL methodology. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed FAA on its loss methodology evaluation and actions to address weaknesses.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) report evaluating its maximum probable loss (MPL) methodology did not fully address the evaluation and consultation requirements specified by the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (CSLCA).\nBalance of Risk. CSLCA required FAA to include ensuring that the federal government is not exposed to greater indemnification costs and that launch companies are not required to purchase more insurance coverage than necessary as a result of FAA's MPL methodology. FAA said that it ensured this balance by improving its methodology, but it did not reevaluate its probability thresholds after revising its methodology. These thresholds are used to divide the risk of loss between launch companies and the government.\nImpact on Costs. The act required FAA to consider the costs to both the industry and the federal government of implementing an updated methodology. FAA's report discussed the impact on indirect costs, such as data collection, but did not discuss direct costs: insurance premiums for launch companies and indemnification liability for the federal government.\nConsultation. The act also required FAA to consult with the commercial space sector and insurance providers in evaluating its MPL methodology in accordance with the preceding requirements. While the agency consulted with some stakeholders, these consultations were limited in scope.\nFAA officials said they have not been able to take the actions needed to fully satisfy the mandated elements because of issues such as resource limitations and the lack of available data. However, by not resolving these issues, FAA lacks assurance that launch companies are not purchasing more insurance than needed or that the federal government is not being exposed to greater indemnification costs than expected.\nFAA has addressed two of three previously identified weaknesses in its MPL methodology but has not yet dealt with the remaining weakness. Specifically, the agency has revised its methodology for estimating the number of potential casualties for a launch and changed the factor it uses to derive estimated property damage from estimated casualties. However, FAA has not updated the amount used for the cost of an individual casualty. GAO recommended in a March 2017 report (GAO-17-366) that FAA update this amount. Not doing so could understate the amount of insurance launch companies are required to purchase, exposing the federal government to excess risk.\nGAO also determined that while FAA has two tools and methods it can use in making its MPL estimates, it does not have guidance on determining which are most appropriate for a given launch scenario. For example, one tool is more comprehensive but also labor intensive to use, while the other is inappropriate for certain launch scenarios and could result in misleading MPL amounts. Officials said they have begun to create such guidance but do not have an estimated completion date. Without such guidance, FAA cannot ensure that the most appropriate MPL methodology is used for each launch.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nFAA should fully address mandated requirements in evaluating its MPL\u2014probability thresholds, direct costs, and stakeholder consultations\u2014 and establish an estimated completion date for developing guidance on tools and methods to use for specific launch scenarios. The Department of Transportation concurred with the recommendations, and provided technical comments.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_815"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_816","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Department of Justice's EOIR is responsible for conducting immigration court proceedings, appellate reviews, and administrative hearings to fairly, expeditiously, and uniformly administer and interpret U.S. immigration laws. The Department of Homeland Security's ICE manages the U.S. immigration detention system, which houses foreign nationals, including families, whose immigration cases are pending or who have been ordered removed from the country. ICE implemented the ATD program in 2004 to be a cost-effective alternative to detention that uses case management and electronic monitoring.\nThis statement addresses (1) EOIR's caseload, including the backlog, and how EOIR manages immigration court operations, including hiring, workforce planning, and technology use; and (2) participation in and the cost of the ATD program and the extent to which ICE has measured the performance of the ATD program. This statement is based on two reports and a testimony GAO issued from November 2014 through April 2018, as well as actions agencies have taken, as of September 2018, to address resulting recommendations. For the previous reports and testimony, GAO analyzed EOIR and ICE data, reviewed documentation, and interviewed officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn June 2017, GAO reported that the Executive Office for Immigration Review's (EOIR) immigration court case backlog\u2014cases pending from previous years still open at the start of a new fiscal year\u2014more than doubled from fiscal years 2006 through 2015 (see figure), primarily due to declining cases completed per year.\nGAO also reported in June 2017 that EOIR could take several actions to address management challenges related to hiring, workforce planning, and technology utilization, among other things. For example, EOIR did not have efficient practices for hiring immigration judges. EOIR data showed that on average from February 2014 through August 2016, EOIR took more than 21 months to hire a judge. GAO also found that EOIR was not aware of the factors most affecting the length of its hiring process. GAO recommended that EOIR assess its hiring process to identify efficiency opportunities. As of January 2018, EOIR had made progress in increasing its number of judges but remained below its fiscal year 2017 authorized level. To better ensure that it accurately and completely identifies opportunities for efficiency, EOIR needs to assess its hiring process.\nIn November 2014, GAO reported that the number of aliens who participated in U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Alternatives to Detention (ATD) program increased from 32,065 in fiscal year 2011 to 40,864 in fiscal year 2013. GAO also found that the average daily cost of the program\u2014$10.55\u2014was significantly less than the average daily cost of detention\u2014$158\u2014in fiscal year 2013. Additionally, ICE established two performance measures to assess the ATD program's effectiveness, but limitations in data collection hindered ICE's ability to assess program performance. GAO recommended that ICE collect and report on additional court appearance data to improve ATD program performance assessment, and ICE implemented the recommendation.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO previously made recommendations to EOIR to improve its hiring process, among other things, and to ICE to improve ATD performance assessment. EOIR and ICE generally agreed and implemented or reported actions planned to address the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_816"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_817","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCBP is responsible for securing U.S. borders and employs nearly 45,000 law enforcement officers across its three operational components at and between U.S. ports of entry, in the air and maritime environment, and at certain overseas locations. In recent years, CBP has not attained target staffing levels for its law enforcement positions, citing high attrition rates in some locations, a protracted hiring process, and competition from other law enforcement agencies. GAO was asked to review CBP's efforts to recruit, hire, and retain law enforcement personnel.\nThis report examines CBP's efforts to (1) recruit qualified law enforcement officers, (2) more efficiently hire law enforcement applicants, and (3) retain law enforcement officers. GAO analyzed CBP data on recruitment, hiring, and retention from FY 2013 through 2017, as well as selected data for the first two quarters of FY 2018. GAO also reviewed CBP strategies and the recent contract it awarded to augment its recruiting and hiring activities and interviewed officials from CBP and three other selected law enforcement agencies.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nU.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) increased its emphasis on recruitment by establishing a central recruitment office and increasing its participation in recruitment events, among other things. As a result, the number of applications it received for law enforcement positions across its operational components\u2014the Office of Field Operations, U.S. Border Patrol, and Air and Marine Operations\u2014from fiscal years (FY) 2013 through 2017 more than tripled. Also, in November 2017, CBP hired a contractor to more effectively target potential applicants and better utilize data to enhance CBP's recruitment efforts. However, it is too early to gauge whether the contractor will be effective in helping CBP to achieve its goal to recruit and hire more law enforcement officers.\nCBP improved its hiring process as demonstrated by two key metrics\u2014reducing its time-to-hire and increasing the percentage of applicants that are hired. As shown in the table, CBP's time-to-hire has decreased since FY 2015. CBP officials stated these improvements, paired with increases in applications, have resulted in more hires. For example, the number of Border Patrol agents hired in the first half of FY 2018 increased by about 83 percent when compared to the same period for FY 2017. However, the hiring process remains lengthy\u2014for example, in FY 2017 it took more than 300 days, on average, for CBP officer applicants to complete the process. Certain factors contribute to the lengthy time-to-hire, including process steps that can be challenging and time-consuming for applicants to complete\u2014such as the polygraph exam\u2014as well as CBP's reliance on applicants to promptly complete certain aspects of the process\u2014such as submitting their background investigation form.\nCBP enhanced its efforts to address retention challenges. However, staffing levels for law enforcement positions consistently remained below target levels. For example, CBP ended FY 2017 more than 1,100 CBP officers below its target staffing level. Officials cited employees' inability to relocate to more desirable locations as a key retention challenge. CBP has offered some relocation opportunities to law enforcement personnel and has recently pursued the use of financial incentives and other payments to supplement salaries, especially for those staffed to remote or hard-to-fill locations. However, CBP does not have a formal process for capturing information on all departing employees, such as an exit survey. Ensuring that operational components are systematically collecting and analyzing such information would better position CBP to understand its retention challenges and take appropriate action to address them.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that CBP systematically collect and analyze data on departing law enforcement officers and use this information to inform retention efforts. DHS concurred with this recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_817"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_818","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAs of September 2017, $149 billion of nearly $1.4 trillion in outstanding federal student loan debt was in default. GAO was asked to examine schools' strategies to prevent students from defaulting and Education's oversight of these efforts.\nThis report examines (1) how schools work with borrowers to manage default rates and how these strategies affect borrowers and schools' accountability for defaults; and (2) the extent to which Education oversees the strategies schools and their default management consultants use to manage schools' default rates. GAO analyzed Education data on student loans that entered repayment from fiscal years 2009\u20132013, the most recent data at the time of this analysis; reviewed documentation from Education and a nongeneralizable sample of nine default management consultants selected based on the number of schools served (about 1,300 schools as of March 2017); reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations; and interviewed Education officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAccording to federal law, schools may lose their ability to participate in federal student aid programs if a significant percentage of their borrowers default on their student loans within the first 3 years of repayment. To manage these 3-year default rates, some schools hired consultants that encouraged borrowers with past-due payments to put their loans in forbearance, an option that allows borrowers to temporarily postpone payments. While forbearance can help borrowers avoid default in the short-term, it increases their costs over time and reduces the usefulness of the 3-year default rate as a tool to hold schools accountable. At five of the nine selected default management consultants (that served about 800 of 1,300 schools), GAO identified examples when forbearance was encouraged over other potentially more beneficial options for helping borrowers avoid default, such as repayment plans that base monthly payments on income. Based on a review of consultants' communications, GAO found four of these consultants provided inaccurate or incomplete information to borrowers about their repayment options in some instances. A typical borrower with $30,000 in loans who spends the first 3 years of repayment in forbearance would pay an additional $6,742 in interest, a 17 percent increase. GAO's analysis of Department of Education (Education) data found that 68 percent of borrowers who began repaying their loans in 2013 had loans in forbearance for some portion of the first 3 years, including 20 percent that had loans in forbearance for 18 months or more (see figure). Borrowers in long-term forbearance defaulted more often in the fourth year of repayment, when schools are not accountable for defaults, suggesting it may have delayed\u2014not prevented\u2014default. Statutory changes to strengthen schools' accountability for defaults could help further protect borrowers and taxpayers.\nEducation's ability to oversee the strategies that schools and their consultants use to manage their default rates is limited. Education's strategic plan calls for protecting borrowers from unfair and deceptive practices; however, Education states it does not have explicit statutory authority to require that the information schools or their consultants provide to borrowers after they leave school regarding loan repayment and postponement be accurate and complete. As a result, schools and consultants may not always provide accurate and complete information to borrowers. Further, Education does not report the number of schools sanctioned for high default rates, which limits transparency about the 3-year default rate's usefulness for Congress and the public.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nCongress should consider strengthening schools' accountability for student loan defaults and requiring that the information schools and consultants provide to borrowers about loan repayment and postponement options be accurate and complete. GAO recommends that Education increase transparency of reporting on default rate sanctions. Education agreed with our recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_818"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_819","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFEHBP provides health care coverage to about 8 million federal employees, retirees, and their dependents through carriers that contract with OPM. The Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 limited the types of plans OPM could offer. OPM has reported that the program needs more competition between plans and more diverse health plan choices and has proposed that its contracting authority be expanded to allow a greater variety of types of health plans to participate in FEHBP than are currently allowed.\nGAO was asked to examine FEHBP plan participation and the potential impact of OPM adding new plan types to the program. This report describes, among other things: (1) how the number of plans and market shares of carriers participating in FEHBP changed in recent years, and (2) what is known about the potential effects of allowing OPM to contract with a greater variety of types of health plans than are currently offered. GAO requested OPM plan availability and enrollment data by county for 2000 through 2015, but county-level availability data were only available for 2007 and 2009 through 2015. Therefore, plan availability and market share analysis timeframes differ. GAO also interviewed OPM officials, 11 FEHBP stakeholders, such as carriers and federal employee and retiree organizations, and reviewed relevant documentation and research, such as cost estimates of the potential effects of expanding OPM's authority.\nGAO provided a draft of this product to OPM for comment. The agency did not provide any comments.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFederal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) enrollees can choose from a number of health plan offerings depending on where they live. From 2007 to 2015, the median number of plan offerings available in a county increased from 19 to 24. Of the 24 plan offerings in 2015, 19 were available nationwide and 5 were health maintenance organization plans offered in specific geographic areas. Yet despite more available plan offerings in recent years, enrollment has become more concentrated within the largest health insurance carrier in a county. Specifically, the median share of enrollment held by the largest carrier in a county increased from 58 percent in 2000 to 72 percent in 2015. Further, one carrier\u2014the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association\u2014was the largest carrier in 93 percent of counties in 2000 and 98 percent of counties in 2015.\nThe stakeholders GAO interviewed and the cost estimates GAO reviewed about the potential effects of expanding the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) authority to contract with more plan types than currently offered in FEHBP did not offer clear consensus about the effects. Most stakeholders supported expanding OPM's authority; those opposed were primarily concerned about OPM adding regional preferred provider organization plans, saying this could cause program instability and higher premiums. Estimates by OPM and others differed significantly on whether the expansion would increase or decrease costs. This is because they used differing assumptions about premiums, enrollment, and other factors, and it is unclear whether the assumptions used in these estimates will be realized.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_819"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_820","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAdvances in technology and the widespread use of the Internet and mobile communication devices have helped fuel the rise of traditional financial services provided by non-traditional technology-enabled providers, often referred to as fintech.\nGAO was asked to provide information on various aspects of fintech activities. This report addresses fintech payment, lending, wealth management, and other products. GAO assesses 1) fintech benefits, risks, and protections for users; 2) regulatory oversight of fintech firms; 3) regulatory challenges for fintech firms; and 4) the steps taken by domestic and other countries' regulators to encourage financial innovation within their countries. GAO reviewed available data, literature, and agency documents; analyzed relevant laws and regulations; and conducted interviews with over 120 federal and state regulators, market participants, and observers, and regulators in 4 countries with active fintech sectors and varying regulatory approaches.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFintech products\u2014including payments, lending, wealth management, and others\u2014generally provide benefits to consumers, such as convenience and lower costs. For example, fintech robo-advisers offer low cost investment advice provided solely by algorithms instead of humans. Fintech products pose similar risks as traditional products, but their risks may not always be sufficiently addressed by existing laws and regulations. Also, regulators and others noted that fintech activities create data security and privacy concerns and could potentially impact overall financial stability as fintech grows. The extent to which fintech firms are subject to federal oversight of their compliance with applicable laws varies. Securities regulators can oversee fintech investment advisers in the same ways as traditional investment advisers. Federal regulators may review some activities of fintech lenders or payment firms as part of overseeing risks arising from these firms' partnerships with banks or credit unions. In other cases, state regulators primarily oversee fintech firms, but federal regulators could take enforcement actions. Regulators have published consumer complaints against fintech firms, but indications of widespread consumer harm appear limited. The U.S. regulatory structure poses challenges to fintech firms. With numerous regulators, fintech firms noted that identifying the applicable laws and how their activities will be regulated can be difficult. Although regulators have issued some guidance, fintech payment and lending firms say complying with fragmented state requirements is costly and time-consuming. Regulators are collaborating in various ways, including engaging in discussions on financial protections for customers that may experience harm when their accounts are aggregated by a fintech firm and unauthorized transactions occur. Market participants disagree over reimbursement for such consumers, and key regulators are reluctant to act prematurely. Given their mandated consumer protection missions, regulators could act collaboratively to better ensure that consumers avoid financial harm and continue to benefit from these services. GAO has identified leading practices for interagency collaboration, including defining agency roles and responsibilities and defining outcomes. Implementing these practices could increase the effectiveness of regulators' efforts to help resolve this conflict.\nRegulators abroad have taken various approaches to encourage fintech innovation. These include establishing innovation offices to help fintech firms understand applicable regulations and foster regulatory interactions. Some use \u201cregulatory sandboxes\u201d that allow fintech firms to offer products on a limited scale and provide valuable knowledge about products and risks to both firms and regulators. Regulators abroad also established various mechanisms to coordinate with other agencies on financial innovation. While some U.S. regulators have taken similar steps, others have not due to concerns of favoring certain competitors or perceived lack of authority. While these constraints may limit regulators' ability to take such steps, considering these approaches could result in better interactions between U.S. regulators and fintech firms and help regulators increase their understanding of fintech products. This would be consistent with GAO's framework calling for regulatory systems to be flexible and forward looking to help regulators adapt to market innovations.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making numerous recommendations related to improving interagency coordination on fintech, addressing competing concerns on financial account aggregation, and evaluating whether it would be feasible and beneficial to adopt regulatory approaches similar to those undertaken by regulators in jurisdictions outside of the United States. In written comments on a draft of this report, the agencies stated that they concurred with GAO's recommendations and would take responsive steps.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_820"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_821","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe U.S. textile industry sustained significant losses when textile production fell from $71 billion in 2006 to $46 billion in 2009, according to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. As a part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Congress passed the Kissell Amendment, which placed a restriction on DHS's procurement of certain textiles from foreign sources. DHS has applied this restriction to uniforms and body armor. The amendment was intended to increase opportunities for American textile and apparel manufacturers, according to the Senate Committee on Appropriations.\nThe Senate report that accompanied Senate Bill 1619, a bill related to the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, includes a provision for GAO to review DHS's implementation of the Kissell Amendment and its effectiveness. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS has incorporated the Kissell Amendment into its procurement policies and procedures and (2) the Kissell Amendment affects DHS's procurement of textiles. To perform this work, GAO analyzed DHS policies and procedures, procurement obligations data, textile contract files, and vendor ordering data from DHS's current uniforms contract. GAO also interviewed DHS and U.S. Trade Representative officials and private sector representatives, including the vendor for the current DHS uniforms contract. GAO received technical comments from DHS, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has updated its policies and procedures to incorporate a restriction on its procurement of certain textiles as specified in the \u201cKissell Amendment.\u201d In August 2009, DHS amended its procurement policies to reflect the Kissell Amendment restriction and describe the limitations on DHS's procurement of specified textiles from sources outside the United States. All 11 contracts GAO reviewed for uniforms and body armor entered into by a DHS component since August 2009 included language regarding the Kissell Amendment restriction. In addition, according to officials, DHS has several procedures to ensure that contracting officers adhere to the requirements of the Kissell Amendment. These include a required acquisition review process; a requirement for all DHS components to use department-wide contracts; verification procedures; and training for contracting personnel on the Kissell Amendment restriction.\nIn practice, the Kissell Amendment restriction affects a limited number of procurements due to multiple factors and has not fully restricted DHS from purchasing textiles from foreign sources. The restriction applies only to certain textile purchases directly related to U.S. national security interests above the simplified acquisition threshold of $150,000, and must be applied consistent with U.S. obligations under international agreements. For most of DHS, this restriction limits only procurements that fall between $150,000 and $191,000, the World Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement threshold. However, because procurements by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) of textiles are excluded from most international agreements, the Kissell Amendment prevents TSA's purchasing of certain textiles above $150,000 from all but three foreign countries. In September 2014, DHS signed a uniforms contract, the largest procurement covered by the Kissell Amendment. Under this contract, DHS has ordered 58 percent of the $164.6 million in uniform items from foreign sources through June 2017 (see figure).","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_821"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_822","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe MTW demonstration gives 39 participating public housing agencies the flexibility to use funding for HUD-approved purposes other than housing assistance, such as developing affordable housing; change HUD's tenant rent calculation; and impose work requirements and time limits on tenants. In 2015, Congress authorized the expansion of MTW by adding 100 new agencies. GAO was asked to evaluate the MTW demonstration. GAO examined HUD oversight of MTW agencies, including its monitoring of demonstration effects on tenants.\nFor this report, GAO reviewed HUD and MTW agency policies and documentation; interviewed officials at HUD and seven MTW agencies (selected based on type of policy changes, size, and geographic diversity); and interviewed tenants served by selected agencies. GAO also conducted a statistical analysis comparing data for MTW and non-MTW agencies on public housing occupancy rates, voucher utilization rates, and program expenses.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Housing and Urban Development\u2018s (HUD) oversight of the Moving to Work (MTW) demonstration has been limited. Improving oversight\u2014particularly for information collection and analysis\u2014would help HUD assess what MTW agencies have done, including funding use. HUD took steps to improve oversight and reporting, but GAO found limitations in the following areas:\nWorkforce planning. While HUD has taken steps to address staffing to oversee the current 39 MTW agencies, HUD has not finalized its workforce planning for 100 agencies to be added to the demonstration. According to a 2015 HUD analysis, a large number of additional staff would be needed for the expansion. HUD officials said field office staff might assume greater oversight responsibilities to fill this gap, but a joint (headquarters-field) oversight structure is not final and HUD's workforce analysis has not been updated to reflect this proposed oversight structure.\nData collection. Due to limited data, HUD cannot fully determine the extent to which demonstration flexibilities affected the performance of MTW agencies, especially in relation to outcomes that affect the number of tenants served\u2014occupancy and voucher utilization rates and program expenses. GAO found that MTW agencies had lower yearly median rates for public housing occupancy and Housing Choice Voucher (voucher) unit utilization and higher yearly median program expenses than comparable non-MTW agencies. The differences may be partly the result of demonstration funding flexibilities, such as the ability to use public housing and voucher funding for purposes such as gap financing for affordable housing (a nontraditional activity). But limitations in HUD data (such as not differentiating expenses for nontraditional activities) make it difficult to fully explain differences in outcomes GAO analyzed.\nOversight of reserves. HUD has not implemented a process to monitor MTW reserves or agencies' plans for such reserves, which led to agencies accruing relatively large amounts of unused funds that could be used for vouchers. According to HUD data as of June 30, 2017, the 39 MTW agencies had more voucher reserves than the 2,166 non-MTW agencies that administer the voucher program combined ($808 million compared to $737 million). Without a monitoring process, HUD cannot provide reasonable assurance that MTW agencies have sound plans for expending reserves.\nMonitoring the effect of rent reform, work requirements, and time limits on tenants. HUD is limited in its ability to evaluate the effect of MTW policies on tenants. HUD does not have a framework\u2014including clear guidance on reporting requirements and analysis plans\u2014for monitoring the effect of rent-reform, work-requirement, and time-limit policies. HUD guidance instructs agencies to analyze the impact of their rent reform activities, describe how they will reevaluate them, and develop a tenant hardship policy for such policies (but not for time limits or work requirements). But the guidance does not describe what must be included in the analyses or policies, leading to wide variation in how agencies develop them. Also, HUD does not assess the results of agencies' analyses.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO makes 11 recommendations to HUD, which include completing workforce planning, developing processes to track use of funds and monitor agencies' reserves, and developing a framework\u2014including clear guidance on reporting requirements and analysis plans\u2014to monitor effects on tenants. HUD generally agreed with eight of the recommendations and disagreed with three, citing the need for flexibility. GAO maintains the recommendations, as discussed further in the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_822"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_823","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nPublic-safety communications systems are used by thousands of federal, state, and local jurisdictions. It is vital that first responders have communications systems that allow them to connect with their counterparts in other agencies and jurisdictions. OEC offers written guidance, governance planning, and technical assistance to help ensure public-safety entities have the necessary plans, resources, and training to support emergency communications. FirstNet, an independent authority within the Department of Commerce, is establishing a public-safety network.\nGAO was asked to review OEC's efforts related to interoperable emergency communications. This report examines (1) OEC's and FEMA's collaborative efforts to develop grant guidance; (2) how OEC incorporates FirstNet's network and other emerging technologies into its plans and offerings; and (3) the extent to which OEC has assessed its methods of communication. GAO evaluated OEC's and FEMA's coordination against GAO's leading practices for interagency collaboration; surveyed all 54 state-designated SWICs; evaluated OEC's communications efforts against federal internal control standards; and interviewed officials that represented various areas of public safety.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) collaborate on grant guidance to help public-safety stakeholders use federal funds for interoperable emergency communications. GAO found that OEC's and FEMA's efforts generally align with GAO's leading practices for effective interagency collaboration. For example, OEC's and FEMA's memorandum of agreement and standard operating procedures articulate their agreement in formal documents, define their respective responsibilities, and include relevant participants. During this review, the agencies established a process to monitor and assess grantees' compliance with the grant guidance. However, because the grants for 2018 were not yet awarded at the time of GAO's review, GAO was unable to assess the effectiveness of the new process.\nOEC incorporates the First Responder Network Authority's (FirstNet) nationwide public-safety broadband network and other emerging technologies into various offerings such as written guidance, governance planning, and technical assistance. Public-safety organizations GAO interviewed and statewide interoperability coordinators (SWIC) GAO surveyed were generally satisfied with OEC's communication efforts.\nOEC has not assessed its methods for communicating with external stakeholders. According to federal internal control standards, management should externally communicate the necessary quality information to achieve the entity's objectives and periodically assess its methods of communication so that the organization has the appropriate tools to communicate quality information on a timely basis. Some SWIC survey respondents and public-safety representatives identified an opportunity for OEC to improve its methods of communication. For example, 26 of the 54 SWICs responded that OEC could use additional tools or approaches, such as social media, for improving communication with its stakeholders. In addition, public-safety officials reported that they have missed training because they were unaware of opportunities. Because OEC has not assessed its methods of communication, OEC may not be using the best tools and approaches to provide timely information on training opportunities, workshops, and other emergency communications information to the public-safety community.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nOEC should assess its methods of communication to help ensure it is using the appropriate tools in communicating with external stakeholders. DHS concurred with the recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_823"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_824","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nRRB is an independent agency that administers disability benefits for railroad workers. In fiscal year 2016, about 31,000 railroad workers with disabilities received $1.1 billion in disability benefits. RRB is generally required to periodically assess beneficiaries' medical condition or earnings through continuing disability reviews (CDRs) to verify that they remain eligible for disability benefits.\nThis report examines the extent to which RRB (1) conducts medical and earnings CDRs to ensure the continued eligibility of disability beneficiaries, and (2) oversees the CDR program. GAO analyzed data provided by RRB for CDRs completed in fiscal years 2014-2016, the only years for which complete data were available. GAO also reviewed RRB's policies and procedures, a nongeneralizable random sample of 14 CDR cases that were completed in fiscal year 2016, and relevant federal laws and regulations; and interviewed RRB officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn fiscal years 2014-2016, the Railroad Retirement Board (RRB) completed continuing disability reviews (CDRs) of various types for 427 beneficiaries (see figure below), covering slightly more than 1 percent of the railroad workers who received disability benefits during that period. These reviews included:\nScheduled Medical Reviews \u2013These are scheduled at different intervals depending on the likelihood of medical improvement. RRB data suggest that most beneficiaries are not subject to these CDRs because they are older than 54\u00bd, which RRB defines as the age at which they are unlikely to return to work. Of 43 medical CDRs that were scheduled, RRB identified 3 ineligible beneficiaries and 1 overpayment of about $28,000.\nHigh-Risk Reviews \u2013 In fiscal year 2015, RRB began conducting medical CDRs on cases it considered to be at high risk for fraud. It completed 166 of these reviews in fiscal years 2015 and 2016, but none identified any ineligible beneficiaries or overpayments.\nEarnings Reviews \u2013 During fiscal years 2014-2016, 163 earnings CDRs identified 47 ineligible beneficiaries and at least $970,550 in overpayments. However, RRB uses earnings information that can be up to 2 years old, thereby delaying the detection of ineligible beneficiaries and increasing the potential for lost federal dollars. Other federal agencies have access to a national federal database with more recent earnings data. Providing RRB access to these data would enable it to identify overpayments sooner.\nMedical + Earnings Reviews \u2013 In some cases, RRB conducts both a medical and earnings CDR. RRB's data do not allow GAO to attribute the outcome to either type of CDR.\nRRB oversight has primarily been limited to conducting two internal reviews of high-risk medical CDRs, one of which concluded, consistent with the above results, that these CDRs demonstrated no return on investment. Nevertheless, RRB continues to do them. RRB does not routinely compile and analyze data for all of the CDRs it conducts, which limits its ability to identify potential gaps in oversight and to monitor program performance. For example, RRB lacks data that would help it determine how many medical CDRs it should expect to conduct. RRB officials said compiling data can be challenging because it uses multiple data systems. However, by more efficiently collecting and compiling key CDR data, RRB could enhance its capability to routinely assess program performance.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nCongress should consider giving RRB access to the National Directory of New Hires, a national database of wage and employment information that would enable it to identify potential overpayments sooner. GAO is also making three recommendations to RRB, including that it reconsider the purpose and value of high-risk CDRs, and routinely compile and analyze CDR data to improve oversight. RRB agreed with these recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_824"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_825","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFederal outlays for grants to state and local governments totaled more than $674 billion in fiscal year 2017, equivalent to 3.5 percent of the gross domestic product in that year. GAO's previous work has found that growth in both the number of grant programs and level of funding has increased the diversity of federal grants to state and local governments.\nGAO's work has also found that designing and implementing grants management policies that strike an appropriate balance between ensuring accountability for the proper use of federal funds without increasing the complexity and cost of grants administration for agencies and grantees presents a governance challenge. At the same time, several government-wide initiatives hold promise for advancing the transparency, efficiency, and effectiveness of federal grants.\nThis statement is based on GAO's prior reports on federal grants management and crosscutting issues related to managing for results across the federal government issued between 2005 and 2018. It addresses: (1) GAO's observations on long-standing challenges for federal grants management, and (2) opportunities to effectively advance current grant modernization initiatives.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO has identified challenges to federal grants management in its work spanning several decades. These challenges include:\nStreamlining: Grants management requirements that are duplicative, unnecessarily burdensome, and conflicting require agencies to direct resources toward meeting them and can burden recipients of federal grants. GAO has reported on initiatives to streamline these requirements and address challenges grantees encounter throughout the grants lifecycle.\nTransparency: The Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act) required the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of the Treasury, and other federal agencies to increase the types of information available on federal spending, including grants. GAO has reported on progress in standardizing and expanding reported data, but has found inconsistencies with the completeness and quality of the reported information.\nCollaboration and consultation: Collaboration, particularly information sharing, is an important factor in effective grants management. GAO's work on interagency grants management reform initiatives found that inadequate ongoing communication with grantees sometimes resulted in poor implementation and prioritization of initiatives.\nDuplication, overlap, and fragmentation : Agencies' grants management practices, such as requirements to avoid duplication and overlap among grants before awarding them, can help agencies achieve cost savings and result in greater efficiencies in grant programs.\nInternal controls and oversight : GAO's work has identified weaknesses in grants oversight and accountability. For example, GAO has identified opportunities for agencies to more consistently close out grants when the grantee's period of performance has ended to ensure that grantees have met all requirements and identified opportunities to redirect or return unused funds.\nRecent and proposed initiatives aimed at grants management reform present opportunities to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency of federal grants. GAO's work on federal grants management and managing for results has highlighted a number of key features for effectively implementing such crosscutting initiatives, which include: (1) establishing implementation goals and tracking progress, (2) identifying and agreeing on leadership roles and responsibilities, and (3) developing an effective communication strategy.\nFurther, given the number and diversity of grantor agencies and grant programs, it is important that any grant reform initiative integrate with other government-wide reform efforts on related issues across government, such as the grants-related Cross-Agency Priority goal, implementation of the DATA Act, and initiatives related to evidence-based policy. These efforts can be effective if they complement each other rather than run the risk of operating independently and potentially duplicating effort or working at cross-purposes.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_825"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_826","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIHS, an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), receives an annual appropriation from Congress to provide health care services to over 2 million American Indians and Alaska Natives (AI\/AN) who are members of 573 tribes. IHS generally provides services through direct care at facilities such as hospitals and health centers. Some tribes receive IHS funding to operate their own health care facilities. Tribal representatives have sought legislative approval to provide IHS advance appropriation authority stating that it would facilitate planning and more efficient spending. Experts have reported that agencies can use the authority to prevent funding gaps, and avoid uncertainties associated with receiving funds through CRs.\nHouse Report 114-632 included a provision for GAO to review the use of advance appropriations authority and applications to IHS. Among other things, this report (1) describes advance appropriation authority considerations identified by stakeholders for providing IHS-funded health care services, and (2) identifies other considerations for policymakers related to providing the authority to IHS. GAO reviewed its prior reports related to IHS, VA, government shutdowns, and CRs, and interviewed officials from IHS, several tribes and other organizations representing AI\/AN interests, the Office of Management and Budget, VA and other experts.\nGAO provided a draft of this report to HHS, which had no comments; to VA, which provided general comments; and to tribal representatives, which provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Indian Health Service (IHS), like most federal agencies, must use appropriations in the year for which they are enacted. However, there has been interest in providing IHS with advance appropriation authority, which would give the agency authority to spend a specific amount 1 or more fiscal years after the fiscal year for which the appropriation providing it is enacted. Currently, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is the only federal provider of health care services to have such authority.\nStakeholders interviewed by GAO, including IHS officials and tribal representatives, identified effects of budget uncertainty on the provision of IHS-funded health care as considerations for providing IHS with advance appropriation authority. Budget uncertainty arises during continuing resolutions (CR)\u2014temporary funding periods during which the federal government has not passed a budget\u2014and during government shutdowns. Officials said that advance appropriation authority could mitigate the effects of this uncertainty. IHS officials and tribal representatives specifically described several effects of budget uncertainty on their health care programs and operations, including the following:\nProvider recruitment and retention. Existing challenges related to the recruitment and retention of health care providers\u2014such as difficulty recruiting providers in rural locations\u2014are exacerbated by funding uncertainty. For example, CRs and government shutdowns can disrupt recruitment activities like application reviews and interviews.\nAdministrative burden and costs. Both IHS and tribes incur additional administrative burden and costs as IHS staff calculate proportional allocations for each tribally operated health care program and modify hundreds of tribal contracts each time a new CR is enacted by Congress to conform to limits on available funding.\nFinancial effects on tribes. Funding uncertainty resulting from recurring CRs and from government shutdowns has led to adverse financial effects on tribes and their health care programs. For instance, one tribe incurred higher interest on loans when the uncertainty of the availability of federal funds led to a downgraded credit rating, as it was financing construction of a health care facility.\nGAO identified various considerations for policymakers to take into account for any proposal to change the availability of the appropriations that IHS receives. These considerations include operational considerations, such as what proportion of the agency's budget would be provided in the advance appropriation and under what conditions changes to the funding provided through advance appropriations would be permitted in the following year. Additionally, congressional flexibility considerations arise because advance appropriation authority reduces what is left for the overall budget for the rest of the government. Another consideration is agency capacity and leadership, including whether IHS has the processes in place to develop and manage an advance appropriation. GAO has reported that proposals to change the availability of appropriations deserve careful scrutiny, an issue underscored by concerns raised when GAO added IHS to its High-Risk List in 2017.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_826"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_827","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn addition to more than 2.2 million active duty and reserve personnel, DOD employs about 760,000 federal civilians and more than 560,000 contractors. In the Senate Report 114-49 accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 included a provision for DOD to issue a report (1) assessing functions performed by federal civilian and service contractor personnel, (2) accounting for the full costs of federal civilian and service contractor personnel performing these functions, (3) comparing these costs, and (4) assessing available hiring and retention authorities for federal civilians.\nThe Senate report also included a provision for GAO to assess DOD's report, which DOD submitted to Congress in April 2017. This report examines the extent to which DOD's report addressed the prescribed congressional elements.\nGAO reviewed DOD's report and compared it to the prescribed elements, examined documents relevant to DOD's cost estimating and comparison methodology, and interviewed DOD officials, including those in its Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation responsible for the calculations in DOD's report.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn response to Congressional direction, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a report in April 2017 comparing the costs of federal civilian and service contractor personnel at select installations. The report addressed three out of four provision elements and partially addressed one, as discussed below. DOD concluded that neither federal civilians nor service contractors were predominately more or less expensive, with costs being dependent on position, location, and level of seniority. DOD noted that it used a non-probability based sample of personnel for its report, and the results are not generalizable.\nAn assessment of performance of functions being performed by federal civilian and service contractor personnel at six military installations, with four being in the continental United States and two being outside the continental United States. GAO believes that DOD addressed this requirement because it developed a methodology to assess performance of functions performed by federal civilians and service contractors at 17 organizations within nine geographic regions including two locations outside the continental United States. DOD used data from the Defense Civilian Personnel Data System to identify military installations with large reported numbers of federal civilians. DOD determined that personnel need to perform at least 80 percent common tasks to be able to make a comparison.\nAn accounting of the fully-burdened, or full, cost of federal civilian and service contractor personnel performing functions at the selected installations including training, benefits, reimbursable costs, and facility overhead. GAO believes that DOD partially addressed this requirement because while it calculated the labor costs of selected federal civilian and service contractor full-time equivalents performing similar functions for organizations at government-owned facilities, it excluded certain non-labor costs from its calculations.\nA comparison of the costs of performance of these functions by federal civilians and service contractor personnel at the selected installations. GAO believes that DOD addressed this requirement because it compared calculated costs for selected federal civilians and service contractors performing similar functions at selected installations and included those comparisons in its report.\nAn assessment of the flexible employment authorities for the employment and retention of federal civilian employees. GAO believes that DOD addressed this requirement because it sent questionnaires to DOD hiring officials and human resource professionals to collect information on flexible employment authorities and conducted interviews with these and human resource professionals at the same 17 organizations used for the cost comparison. Based on an analysis of the information collected, DOD's report included several conclusions regarding flexible hiring authorities and made one recommendation.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making any recommendations; however, DOD non-concurred with GAO's assessment that DOD partially addressed the element to account for the full cost of personnel. GAO believes the assessment is correct as discussed in the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_827"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_828","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nUnder CAPTA, states perform a range of prevention activities, including addressing the needs of infants born with prenatal drug exposure. The number of children under the age of 1 entering foster care increased by about 15 percent from fiscal years 2012 through 2015. Child welfare professionals attribute the increase to the opioid epidemic. GAO was asked to examine the steps states are taking to implement CAPTA requirements on substance-affected infants and related amendments enacted in 2016.\nThis report examines (1) the extent to which states have adopted policies and procedures to notify CPS of substance-affected infants; (2) state efforts to develop plans of safe care, and associated challenges; and (3) steps HHS has taken to help states implement the provisions.\nTo obtain this information, GAO surveyed state CPS directors in all 50 states and the District of Columbia and reached a 100 percent response rate. GAO also visited 3 states (Kentucky, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania); reviewed relevant documents such as federal laws and regulations, and HHS guidance; and interviewed HHS officials. GAO did not assess states' compliance with CAPTA requirements.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAll states reported adopting, to varying degrees, policies and procedures regarding health care providers notifying child protective services (CPS) about infants affected by opioids or other substances. Under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), as amended, governors are required to provide assurances that the states have laws or programs that include policies and procedures to address the needs of infants affected by prenatal substance use. This is to include health care providers notifying CPS of substance-affected infants. In response to GAO's survey, 42 states reported having policies and procedures that require health care providers to notify CPS about substance-affected infants and 8 states reported having policies that encourage notification. The remaining 1 state has a policy requiring health care providers to assess the needs of mothers and infants and if they conclude that infants are at risk for abuse or neglect, CPS is notified.\nIn response to GAO's survey, 49 states reported that their CPS agency has policies to develop a plan of safe care; 2 reported not having such a requirement. Under CAPTA, states are required to develop a plan of safe care for substance-affected infants. Although not defined in law, a plan of safe care generally entails an assessment of the family's situation and a plan for connecting families to appropriate services to stabilize the family and ensure the child's safety and well-being. States reported that plans typically address the infant's safety needs, immediate medical needs, and the caregiver's substance use treatment needs. However, officials in the 3 states GAO visited noted challenges, including uncertainty about what to include in plans and the level of intervention needed for infants at low risk of abuse or neglect.\nThe Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has provided technical assistance and guidance to states to implement these CAPTA requirements. Most states reported in GAO's survey that additional guidance and assistance would be very or extremely helpful for addressing their challenges. Nevertheless, HHS officials told GAO that the agency does not anticipate issuing additional written guidance, but that states can access technical assistance through their regional offices and the National Center on Substance Abuse and Child Welfare\u2014a resource center funded by HHS. However, of the 37 states that reported on the helpfulness of the assistance they have received, 19 said it was only moderately helpful to not helpful. States offered suggestions for improving the assistance, such as developing substance abuse training materials for staff and holding video conferences with other states to share information. In October 2017, HHS officials explained that some states have submitted plans that include details on how they are addressing the CAPTA requirements. HHS officials reported that some of the plans submitted to date indicated that states are not meeting the requirements and those states have been asked to develop program improvement plans. Without more specific guidance and assistance to enhance states' understanding of CAPTA requirements and better address known challenges such as the ones described in this report, states may miss an opportunity to provide more effective protections and services for the children and families most in need.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that HHS provide additional guidance and technical assistance to states to address known challenges and enhance their understanding of requirements. HHS did not concur with the recommendation. As discussed in the report, GAO continues to believe that added guidance would benefit states.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_828"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_829","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through FEMA, provides preparedness grants to state, local, tribal, and territorial governments to improve the nation's readiness in preventing, protecting against, responding to, recovering from and mitigating terrorist attacks, major disasters and other emergencies.\nAccording to DHS, the department has awarded over $49 billion to a variety of DHS preparedness grant programs from fiscal years 2002 through 2017, to enhance the capabilities of grant recipients. For example, the State Homeland Security Program which awards grants to the nation's 56 states and territories, and the Urban Areas Security Initiative which awards grants to urban areas based on DHS's risk methodology, are the largest of the preparedness grant programs (see figure).\nThis statement addresses progress and challenges in FEMA's efforts to manage preparedness grants and GAO's prior recommendations to strengthen these programs. This statement is based on prior GAO reports issued from March 2011 through February 2016 and selected updates conducted in December 2017 through April 2018. To conduct the prior work and updates, GAO analyzed relevant FEMA data and documentation and interviewed relevant officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn February 2012, GAO identified coordination challenges among Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grant programs that share similar goals and fund similar projects, which contribute to the risk of duplication among the programs. GAO recommended that FEMA take steps, as it develops its new grant management system, to collect project information with sufficient detail to identify potential duplication among the grant programs. FEMA has since addressed these recommendations. Specifically, in 2014, FEMA modified a legacy grants data system to capture more robust grant project-level data, and in fiscal year 2017, procured a software tool and developed a set of standard operating procedures to assist its staff in identifying potentially duplicative projects. These actions should help FEMA strengthen the administration and oversight of its grant programs. Furthermore, FEMA is also developing a new grants management modernization system to consolidate and better manage its grants. GAO is currently reviewing the system for this Committee and will report out next year.\nGAO reported in March 2011 on the need for FEMA to improve its oversight of preparedness grants by establishing a framework with measurable performance objectives for assessing urban area, state, territory, and tribal capabilities to identify gaps and prioritize investments. Specifically, GAO recommended that FEMA complete a national preparedness assessment of capability gaps at each level based on tiered, capability-specific performance objectives to enable prioritization of grant funding. FEMA has taken some steps to address GAO's prior recommendation. Specifically, in February 2018, FEMA reported developing capability-specific performance objectives that will enable a national preparedness assessment of capability gaps. However, FEMA plans to finalize these efforts in 2020 and it is too early to tell how this will impact grant allocations. Until these efforts are completed, GAO will not be able to determine the extent that they address past challenges and recommendations.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO has made prior recommendations designed to address the challenges discussed in this statement. FEMA has taken actions to address some but not all of these recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_829"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_830","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nImproper payments\u2014which include payments that should not have been made or were made in an incorrect amount\u2014are a long-standing, significant problem in the federal government, estimated at almost $141 billion for fiscal year 2017. Executive branch agencies are required to annually estimate improper payments for certain programs. Estimation of improper payments is key to understanding the extent of the problem and to developing effective corrective actions. Relevant laws and guidance provide agencies flexibility in developing estimates.\nThis report describes agencies' processes to estimate improper payments in selected programs for fiscal year 2017 and the extent to which certain differences in these processes can affect the usefulness of the resulting estimates. GAO selected 10 programs across six agencies with the largest reported program outlays in fiscal years 2015 and 2016. For these programs, GAO reviewed relevant laws and guidance, analyzed agencies' policies and procedures, and interviewed officials at relevant agencies and OMB staff.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe six agencies GAO reviewed reported taking various approaches related to key components of estimating improper payments\u2014shown in the figure below\u2014for 10 selected programs, which collectively reported outlays of over $2.5 trillion for fiscal year 2017.\nSample selection. Eight of the 10 programs GAO reviewed reported using statistically valid approaches, and the remaining 2 reported using alternative methodologies approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The sampled data elements varied, including payments, medical claims, and tax returns. The age of the data used to develop fiscal year 2017 improper payment estimates also varied, ranging from calendar year 2013 to fiscal year 2017.\nIdentification of improper payments. Some of the six agencies reported using processes designed specifically to estimate improper payments, whereas others reported leveraging existing reviews. These agencies' policies and procedures include a review of aspects of eligibility, except for those related to the Department of Defense's (DOD) Military Pay and the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) Retirement overpayments. DOD and OPM have not fully assessed whether their estimation processes effectively consider key program risks. OMB guidance does not specifically address how agencies are to test to identify improper payments, such as using a risk-based approach to help ensure that key risks of improper payments are addressed.\nThe six agencies also varied in the treatment of insufficient documentation, both in identifying and in reporting the root causes of improper payments. For the agencies that contact entities outside the agency to estimate improper payments, the treatment of nonresponse differed, with one agency including nonresponses as improper payments and another generally excluding the nonresponse cases from review. Although OMB guidance states that agencies should treat cases of insufficient documentation as improper payments, it does not specifically address the treatment of nonresponse cases.\nCalculation of the improper payment estimate. The six agencies generally reported using law and OMB guidance to calculate improper payment estimates for the selected programs, except for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) removed overpayments that were recovered when developing its estimate. OMB guidance requires agencies to include recovered amounts in their estimates. Removing these overpayments understates the EITC improper payment estimate and may limit IRS's ability to develop corrective actions to prevent improper payments.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that OMB develop guidance on treatment of nonresponse cases and testing to identify improper payments, that DOD and OPM assess their estimation processes, and that IRS revise its methodology to not exclude recovered payments from its estimate. All of the agencies either agreed or partially agreed with the specific recommendations to them. GAO believes that the actions are warranted, as discussed in the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_830"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_831","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAdverse medical events are unintended incidents that may harm a patient. Serious adverse medical events, called sentinel events, have specific follow-up requirements. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (NDAA 2017) requires DHA to assume the military services' administrative responsibilities, such as adverse medical event reporting, for all MTFs beginning October 1, 2018.\nThe NDAA 2017 included a provision for GAO to examine the reporting and resolving of adverse medical events in the military health system. Among other objectives, this report reviews (1) the extent to which sentinel events and RCA reports are tracked and DHA ensures it has received complete information, and (2) the extent to which DHA ensures it has received MOS reports. GAO examined relevant policies; analyzed the most current available data on sentinel events from 2013 through 2016; and interviewed officials with DHA, the military services, and four MTFs selected for variety in military service, size, and geographic location.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO found that the process for tracking the most serious adverse medical events, called sentinel events, and their root cause analysis (RCA) reports are fragmented, impeding the Defense Health Agency's (DHA) ability to ensure that it has received complete information. Unlike other adverse medical events, sentinel events\u2014which may result in severe harm or death\u2014have additional reporting requirements that must be met within specified time frames. For example, military treatment facility (MTF) officials must develop RCA reports, which identify causal factors and corrective actions for sentinel events. However, because the database that DHA uses to collect information on adverse medical events does not currently have the capability to track this information, the military services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and DHA each maintain their own tracking records for sentinel events and RCA reports. Due to these fragmented tracking efforts, DHA reconciles its information on sentinel events and RCA reports through monthly emails to the military services\u2014a time-consuming, inefficient process. DHA officials emphasized that this process relies on the military services' cooperation because DHA does not currently have the authority to compel their responses. Moreover, despite DHA's reconciliation efforts, GAO identified discrepancies and missing information in DHA's tracking record. As a result, DHA lacks critical information about why a sentinel event may have occurred and what actions, if any, MTFs should take to prevent similar incidents in the future. Recently, DHA replaced its previous system of emails with a new tracker tool that can be accessed on the military health system website. However, the new tracker does not allow the military services to make edits, and as a result, any corrections or additional information must be submitted to DHA via email, which may perpetuate previous inefficiencies.\nGAO found that DHA cannot ensure that it is receiving all reports on the implementation of corrective actions identified in RCA reports as required by a March 2015 memo. DHA officials stated that MTFs could meet this requirement by submitting copies of their measures of success (MOS) reports, which may be required by the Joint Commission, a hospital accrediting organization. As of September 2017, DHA had received 27 MOS reports for the 319 sentinel events that were reported in 2016. However, DHA does not know how many reports it is missing because MOS reports are not required for every sentinel event, and DHA did not began reconciling its information for these reports until January 2018, when it implemented its new tracker tool. Furthermore, GAO found that the new tracker tool documents the aggregate number of MOS reports received and does not indicate whether individual sentinel events have an MOS report, impeding DHA's ability to identify which reports are missing. This issue is compounded by the fact that the military services either track MOS reports in different ways or not at all, and military service officials said that DHA's requirement for MOS report submission is not clear. DHA officials stated that they expect to clarify this requirement in their update to the patient safety policy. Because it is unable to ensure it has received all reports on the implementation of corrective actions, DHA could be missing important information that could be used to help inform broader, system-wide patient safety improvement efforts.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) ensure DHA (1) improve tracking of sentinel events and RCA reports, and (2) clarify its requirements for submitting reports on the implementation of corrective actions and consistently track and reconcile individual reports. DOD agreed with these recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_831"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_832","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSexual assault incidents involving military service members can devastate victims and have far reaching impacts for DOD due to the potential for these crimes to undermine the department's core values, degrade mission readiness, and raise financial costs.\nThe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 included a provision that GAO review, among other things, the purpose and structure of OCI and its adherence to policies. This report (1) describes OCI's services and budgetary and staffing resources; and (2) evaluates OCI's policies for investigations and internal controls to ensure its policies are consistently followed. GAO analyzed OCI policy, budget, and staffing documents and interviewed OCI, DOD, Army, and Air Force officials. GAO also interviewed National Guard officials and analyzed case files for select years from a nongeneralizable sample of five states.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe National Guard Bureau's (NGB) Office of Complex Investigations (OCI) was established in 2012 to conduct administrative investigations into allegations of sexual assault that are not criminal in nature and are conducted only when criminal law enforcement entities, such as military criminal investigative organizations or local civilian law enforcement, have declined or do not have jurisdiction to investigate and a National Guard nexus has been identified. Since 2013, OCI has completed approximately 380 investigations of allegations of sexual assault at the request of state National Guard officials and 5 assessments of state National Guard units to review the current culture, policies, and practices for the handling of sexual assault, among other things. State National Guard officials told GAO that OCI provides the states with an unbiased or impartial third-party review of reported incidents of sexual assault. OCI is primarily funded through amounts made available for the Sexual Assault Special Victims' Counsel Program in the Department of Defense's (DOD) annual defense-wide Operation and Maintenance appropriation. This funding has increased from approximately $1.4 million in fiscal year (FY) 2014 to almost $5 million in FY 2018; which OCI officials attributed to increasing demands for OCI's services. OCI uses trained National Guard members temporarily assigned to the office as investigators.\nNGB guidance establishes OCI investigation policies and OCI has implemented controls to help ensure key policies are followed. However, OCI has inconsistently documented how case acceptance criteria have been met. GAO's analysis of a sample of 27 case files from 5 states from FY 2016 and FY 2017 found that OCI generally adhered to key investigation policies. For example, in accordance with its policies, in all 27 case files GAO reviewed, OCI had included the state National Guard's requests to initiate an OCI investigation and executive summaries explaining OCI's determination of whether or not the allegation was substantiated. Furthermore, NGB has established two case acceptance criteria\u2014specifically that a National Guard nexus exists and that coordination with at least one criminal investigative organization occurred. According to OCI officials, state National Guard officials are to verify these criteria are met before submitting requests for OCI to initiate an investigation of sexual assault. NGB has developed a template with standardized language that includes these criteria that the states should use. While OCI's case files included the request letters with standardized language from state National Guards indicating the state National Guard staff had determined the case acceptance criteria were met, they did not consistently include supporting documentation to verify how the case acceptance criteria were met. This is because NGB policy does not require such documentation to be included in OCI's case files. Without such documentation, OCI does not have reasonable assurance that the cases it accepts for investigation adequately meet the two criteria for case acceptance.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DOD require OCI to include supporting documentation in case files to verify a National Guard nexus exists and referral to the appropriate law enforcement organization occurs. DOD concurred with the recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_832"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_833","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCongress created the Choice Program in 2014 to address longstanding challenges with veterans' access to care at VHA medical facilities. The Joint Explanatory Statement for the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 included provisions for GAO to review veterans' access to care through the Choice Program.\nThis report examines for Choice Program care (1) VA's appointment scheduling process, (2) the timeliness of appointments and the information VHA uses to monitor veterans' access; and (3) the factors that have adversely affected veterans' access and the steps VA and VHA have taken to address them for VA's future community care program.\nGAO reviewed applicable laws and regulations, VA's TPA contracts, and relevant VHA policies and guidance. Absent reliable national data, GAO also selected 6 of 170 VAMCs (selected for variation in geographic location and the TPAs that served them) and manually reviewed a random, non-generalizable sample of 196 Choice Program authorizations. The authorizations were created for veterans who were referred to the program between January and April of 2016, the most recent period for which data were available when GAO began its review. The sample of authorizations included 55 for routine care, 53 for urgent care, and 88 that the TPAs returned without scheduling appointments. GAO also obtained the results of VHA's non-generalizable analysis of wait times for a nationwide sample of about 5,000 Choice Program authorizations that were created for selected services between July and September of 2016.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThrough the Veterans Choice Program (Choice Program), eligible veterans may receive care from community providers when it is not readily accessible at Veterans' Health Administration (VHA) medical facilities. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) uses two contractors\u2014or third party administrators (TPA)\u2014to schedule most veterans' Choice Program appointments after receiving referrals from VA medical centers (VAMC). GAO found that veterans who are referred to the Choice Program for routine care because services are not available at VA in a timely manner could potentially wait up to 70 calendar days for care if VAMCs and the TPAs take the maximum amount of time VA allows to complete its appointment scheduling process. This is not consistent with the statutory requirement that veterans receive Choice Program care within 30 days of their clinically indicated date (when available), which is the soonest date that it would be appropriate for the veteran to receive care, according to a VHA clinician. Without designing appointment scheduling processes that are consistent with this requirement, VA lacks assurance that veterans will receive Choice Program care in a timely manner.\nGAO and VHA found that selected veterans experienced lengthy actual wait times for appointments in 2016, after manually reviewing separate samples of Choice Program authorizations. For example, when GAO analyzed 55 routine care authorizations that were created between January and April of 2016, it found that the process took at least 64 calendar days, on average. When VHA analyzed about 5,000 authorizations created between July and September of 2016, it took an average of 51 calendar days for veterans to receive care.\na GAO excluded from its analysis the amount of time the TPA took to schedule the appointment and the overall wait time because its sample selection methodology differed from VHA's in a way that would have skewed these two averages but not the averages for the other segments of the process.\nGAO also found that VHA cannot systematically monitor the timeliness of veterans\u2019 access to Choice Program care because it lacks complete, reliable data to do so. The data limitations GAO identified include:\nA lack of data on the timeliness of referring and opting veterans in to the program. GAO found that the data VHA uses to monitor the timeliness of Choice Program appointments do not capture the time it takes VAMCs to prepare veterans\u2019 referrals and send them to the TPAs, nor do they capture the time spent by the TPAs in accepting VAMCs\u2019 referrals and opting veterans in to the Choice Program. VHA has implemented an interim solution to monitor overall wait times that relies on VAMC staff consistently and accurately entering unique identification numbers on VHA clinicians\u2019 requests for care and on Choice Program referrals, a process that is prone to error.\nInaccuracy of clinically indicated dates. GAO found that clinically indicated dates (which are used to measure the timeliness of care) are sometimes changed by VAMC staff before they send Choice Program referrals to the TPAs, which could mask veterans\u2019 true wait times. GAO found that VAMC staff entered later clinically indicated dates on referrals for about 23 percent of the 196 authorizations it reviewed. It is unclear if VAMC staff mistakenly entered incorrect dates manually, or if they inappropriately entered later dates when the VAMC was delayed in contacting the veteran, compiling relevant clinical information, and sending the referral to the TPA.\nUnreliable data on the timeliness of urgent care. GAO found that VAMCs and TPAs do not always categorize Choice Program referrals and authorizations in accordance with the contractual definition for urgent care. According to the contracts, a referral is to be marked as \u201curgent,\u201d and an appointment is to take place within 2 days of the TPA accepting it, when a VHA clinician has determined that the needed care is (1) essential to evaluate and stabilize the veteran\u2019s condition, and (2) if delayed would likely result in unacceptable morbidity or pain. GAO reviewed a sample of 53 urgent care authorizations and determined that about 28 percent of the authorizations were originally marked as routine care authorizations but were changed to urgent by VAMC or TPA staff, in an effort to administratively expedite appointment scheduling.\nWithout complete, reliable data, VHA cannot determine whether the Choice Program has helped to achieve the goal of alleviating veterans\u2019 wait times for care.\nGAO found that numerous factors adversely affected veterans\u2019 access to care through the Choice Program. These factors include: (1) administrative burden caused by complexities of referral and appointment scheduling processes, (2) poor communication between VHA and its VAMCs, and (3) inadequacies in the networks of community providers established by the TPAs, including an insufficient number, mix, or geographic distribution of community providers. VA and VHA have taken numerous actions throughout the Choice Program\u2019s operation that were intended to help address these factors, though not all access factors have been fully resolved. For example, to help address administrative burden and improve the process of coordinating veterans\u2019 Choice Program care, VA established a secure e-mail system and a mechanism for TPAs and community providers to remotely access veterans\u2019 VA electronic health records. However, these mechanisms only facilitate a one-way transfer of necessary information. They do not provide a means by which VAMCs or veterans can view the TPAs\u2019 step-by-step progress in scheduling appointments or electronically receive medical documentation associated with Choice Program appointments.\nWhile the Choice Program will soon end, VA anticipates that veterans will continue to receive community care under a similar program that VA plans to implement, which will consolidate the Choice Program and other VA community care programs. Incorporating lessons learned from the Choice Program into the implementation and administration of the new program could help VHA avoid similar challenges.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nFor VA's future consolidated community care program, GAO is making 10 recommendations, which include:\nestablishing an achieveable wait-time goal for the community care program that will permit VHA to monitor whether veterans are receiving care within time frames that are comparable to the amout of time they would otherwise wait for care at VHA medical facilities;\ndesigning an appointment scheduling process that (1) is consistent with the wait-time goal and (2) sets forth time frames within which veterans' referrals must be processed, appointments must be scheduled, and appointments must occur;\nallow VHA to systematically monitor the amount of time taken to prepare referrals, schedule appointments, and complete appointments;\nprevent veterans' clinically indicated dates from being modified by individuals other than VHA clinicians; and\nseparate clinically urgent referrals and authorizations from those for which the VAMC or the TPA has decided to expedite appointment scheduling for administrative reasons; and\nestablishing a system that will help facilitate seamless, efficient care coordination and exchanges of information among VAMCs, VHA clinicians, TPAs, community providers, and veterans.\nVA generally agreed with all but one of GAO's recommendations, which was to separate clinically urgent referrals from those that are administratively expedited. GAO maintains that implementing this recommendation will help improve future monitoring of urgent care timeliness for reasons explained in the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_833"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_834","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIncreasing evidence indicates that some college students are experiencing food insecurity, which can negatively impact their academic success. However, college students are only eligible for SNAP in certain cases. Given the substantial federal investment in higher education and the risk posed if students do not complete their degrees, GAO was asked to review food insecurity among college students.\nThis report examines (1) what is known about the extent of food insecurity among college students and their use of SNAP; (2) how selected colleges are addressing student food insecurity; and (3) the extent to which federal programs assist students experiencing food insecurity. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and agency documents and studies on student food insecurity; analyzed 2016 federal student data (the most recent available), and visited four states, selected based on actions taken to address student food insecurity, geographic diversity, and other factors. GAO interviewed researchers; officials from Education, FNS national and regional offices; and officials at 14 colleges, including students at 8 of these colleges. GAO also emailed all state SNAP agencies about their efforts related to students.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThere is limited information about the national prevalence of food insecurity among college students. GAO reviewed 31 studies that identified a wide range of food insecurity rates among the students studied, but the studies did not provide national estimates. College students at risk of food insecurity may be eligible for benefits from the Food and Nutrition Service's (FNS) Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). However, GAO's analysis of Department of Education (Education) data shows that almost 2 million at-risk students who were potentially eligible for SNAP did not report receiving benefits in 2016. According to GAO's analysis, having a low income is the most common risk factor for food insecurity among college students. Among low-income students, most have one additional risk factor associated with food insecurity, such as being a first-generation student or a single parent.\nThe 14 selected colleges that GAO contacted were addressing student food insecurity in a number of ways. For example, all 14 were providing free food to students through on-campus food pantries, and most were offering emergency funds to help students pay for living expenses that might otherwise force them to choose between buying food or staying in school. Many of these colleges had centralized student services to better address their students' basic needs and provide other support, such as screening students for potential eligibility and helping them apply for federal benefit programs like SNAP.\nFederal student aid generally does not cover all college costs for low-income students, and college students may have limited access to federal food assistance programs such as SNAP because of program eligibility restrictions. Some state SNAP agencies reported that they are taking steps to help students access SNAP by conducting outreach to colleges and developing guidance. Nevertheless, at 9 of the 14 colleges GAO contacted, some college officials and students said that they were unfamiliar with or did not fully understand SNAP's student eligibility rules. Some college officials said that they would like information from FNS to better explain SNAP student rules, but FNS has not made such information easily accessible on its website. Further, college officials and state SNAP agencies noted that FNS does not share examples of actions taken by other states to help eligible students access SNAP. Clarification of SNAP student eligibility rules and enhanced information sharing about state efforts could help ensure that potentially eligible college students can access federal food assistance programs.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that FNS (1) improve student eligibility information on its website and (2) share information on state SNAP agencies' approaches to help eligible students. FNS partially concurred, and plans to review its information. GAO continues to believe additional action is warranted, as discussed in the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_834"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_835","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe VA is responsible for ensuring that veterans have reasonable access to burial options in a national or state veterans' cemetery. In fiscal year 2018 VA estimated that about 92 percent of veterans had reasonable access to burial options, which was an increase from 90 percent in fiscal year 2014 but short of its goal of 96 percent by the end of fiscal year 2017.\nThe House Appropriations Committee has expressed concerns that there are geographic pockets where veterans remain unserved by burial options. House Report 115-188 accompanying a bill for the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018, includes a provision for GAO to examine veterans' access to burial options.\nThis report (1) describes VA's plan for increasing reasonable access to burial options for veterans and (2) assesses VA's progress in implementing its plan and any challenges experienced. GAO reviewed applicable VA and NCA documents, compared NCA's cost-estimating practices with GAO's cost-estimating 12 steps, and met with cognizant officials regarding NCA's efforts to provide reasonable access to burial options.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nWithin the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the National Cemetery Administration (NCA) has a plan to establish 18 new national cemeteries to increase reasonable access to burial options for veterans. NCA defines reasonable access as a national or state veterans' cemetery being located within 75 miles of veterans' homes. Key parts of NCA's plan include establishing 13 urban and rural initiative national cemeteries and awarding grant funds to state applicants for establishing new state veterans' cemeteries.\nNCA has made limited progress in implementing its plan to increase burial access and is years behind its original schedule for opening new cemeteries. For example, NCA has opened only two of its planned urban and rural initiative sites and is behind its original schedule for the other 11 (see fig. below). The primary factor delaying NCA's completion of these cemeteries has been challenges in acquiring suitable land.\nNCA has also been challenged in producing accurate estimates of construction costs for most of its rural initiative sites. Cost estimates have increased more than 200 percent (from about $7 million to $24 million) for these sites, and NCA's guidance for developing cost estimates for the cemeteries does not fully incorporate the 12 steps identified in cost-estimating leading practices\u2014such as conducting a risk and uncertainty analysis or a sensitivity analysis. As a result, NCA is not well positioned to provide reliable and valid cost estimates to better inform decisions to enhance veterans' cemetery access.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that NCA fully adopt cost-estimating leading practices into its procedures to assist in improving its cost estimates for establishing cemeteries. NCA concurred with our recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_835"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_836","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nResearch facilities, including those managed by federal agencies, use a wide range of animals in research and related activities each year. The Animal Welfare Act and the Health Research Extension Act have varying requirements for federal agencies and others to protect the welfare of and report on the use of different research animals to APHIS and NIH.\nGAO was asked to review several issues related to animals used in federal research. This report examines (1) the extent to which APHIS and NIH have provided federal facilities with guidance for reporting their animal use programs, (2) the extent to which APHIS and NIH have shared agencies' animal use information with the public, and (3) stakeholder views on federal agencies' sharing additional information. GAO identified federal agencies that used vertebrate animals in research in fiscal years 2014 through 2016, reviewed their reports to APHIS and NIH, and examined publicly available data. GAO also surveyed a nongeneralizable sample of stakeholders from federal agencies and animal advocacy, research and science, and academic organizations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) have provided guidance to federal research facilities on what they must report about their animal use programs under the Health Research Extension Act and the Animal Welfare Act, respectively. Federal research facilities we reviewed met NIH's reporting instructions. However, APHIS's instructions have not ensured consistent and complete reporting in three areas: research with birds, activities outside the United States, and field studies outside a typical laboratory. By clarifying its instructions, APHIS could improve the quality of animal use data it receives from agencies.\nAPHIS and NIH voluntarily share some information about agencies' animal research with the public. In particular, APHIS posts to its website data on agencies' annual use of animals covered by the Animal Welfare Act, and NIH publicly posts a list of research facilities with approved animal use programs. However, APHIS does not describe potential limitations related to the accuracy and completeness of the data it shares as called for by USDA guidance. For example, APHIS does not explain that the data do not include birds used for activities that are covered by the Animal Welfare Act and may include field studies that are not covered by the act. APHIS could increase the data's usefulness to the public by making such disclosures.\nFederal agencies may have additional information about their animal use programs, including data on vertebrate species used but not reported to APHIS; the purpose of research activities; and internal inspection reports. However, stakeholders GAO surveyed had different views on agencies' sharing such data with the public. Some stakeholders, particularly animal advocacy organizations, cited the need for more transparency and oversight while others, including federal agencies and research and science organizations, raised concerns about the additional administrative burden on agencies.\nSource: GAO analysis of the Animal Welfare Act and the Office of Laboratory Animal Welfare's Public Health Service Policy on Humane Care and Use of Laboratory Animals. | GAO-18-459 .\na The act covers research funded by the public health service agencies of the U.S. government.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that APHIS clarify its reporting instructions and fully describe the potential limitations of the animal use data it makes available to the public. USDA stated that APHIS will take steps to implement GAO's recommendations, with the exception of clarifying reporting instructions for activities outside the United States. GAO continues to believe that APHIS needs to ensure complete reporting of such activities by federal facilities.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_836"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_837","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nHealth care providers are increasingly sharing patients' health records electronically. When a patient's records are shared with another provider, it is important to accurately match them to the correct patient. GAO and others have reported that accurately matching patient health records is a barrier to health information exchange and that inaccurately matched records can adversely affect patient safety or privacy. At the federal level, ONC is charged with coordinating nationwide efforts to implement and use health IT.\nThe 21st Century Cures Act included a provision for GAO to study patient record matching. In this report, GAO describes (1) stakeholders' patient record matching approaches and related challenges; and (2) efforts to improve patient record matching identified by stakeholders.\nTo do its work, GAO reviewed reports by ONC and others about patient record matching. GAO also interviewed various stakeholders that play a role in exchanging health records, including representatives from physician practices, hospitals, health systems, health information exchange organizations, and health IT vendors. GAO also interviewed other stakeholders, such as ONC officials, provider and industry associations, and researchers. GAO selected stakeholders based on background research and input from other stakeholders, and interviewed 37 stakeholders in total. The information from stakeholders is not generalizable. HHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nStakeholders GAO interviewed, including representatives from physician practices and hospitals, described their approaches for matching patients' records\u2014that is, comparing patient information in different health records to determine if the records refer to the same patient. Stakeholders explained that when exchanging health information with other providers, they match patients' medical records using demographic information, such as the patient's name, date of birth, or sex. This record matching can be done manually or automatically. For example, several provider representatives said that they rely on software that automatically matches records based on the records' demographic information when receiving medical records electronically. Stakeholders said that software can also identify potential matches, which staff then manually review to determine whether the records correspond to the same patient. Stakeholders also said that inaccurate, incomplete, or inconsistently formatted demographic information in patients' records can pose challenges to accurate matching. They noted, for example, that records don't always contain correct information (e.g., a patient may provide a nickname rather than a legal name) and that health information technology (IT) systems and providers use different formats for key information such as names that contain hyphens.\nStakeholders GAO interviewed identified recent or ongoing efforts to improve the data and methods used in patient record matching, such as the following:\nSeveral stakeholders told GAO they worked to improve the consistency with which they format demographic data in their electronic health records (EHR). In 2017, 23 providers in Texas implemented standards for how staff record patients' names, addresses, and other data. Representatives from three hospitals said this increased their ability to match patients' medical records automatically. For example, one hospital's representatives said they had seen a significant decrease in the need to manually review records that do not match automatically.\nStakeholders also described efforts to assess and improve the effectiveness of methods used to match patient records. For example, in 2017 the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) hosted a competition for participants to create an algorithm that most accurately matched patient records. ONC selected six winning submissions and plans to report on their analysis of the competition's data.\nStakeholders said more could be done to improve patient record matching, and identified several efforts that could improve matching. For example, some said that implementing common standards for recording demographic data; sharing best practices and other resources; and developing a public-private collaboration effort could each improve matching. Stakeholders' views varied on the roles ONC and others should play in these efforts and the extent to which the efforts would improve matching. For example, some said that ONC could require demographic data standards as part of its responsibility for certifying EHR systems, while other stakeholders said that ONC could facilitate the voluntary adoption of such standards. Multiple stakeholders emphasized that no single effort would solve the challenge of patient record matching.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_837"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_838","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nEach year SBA produces a scorecard measuring federal contract spending allocated to small businesses. The 2016 NDAA included a provision for SBA to revise the scorecard's methodology and for GAO to evaluate the effects of those revisions for fiscal year 2017. This report discusses, among other things, (1) SBA's changes to the scorecard methodology and plans, if any, to evaluate the effects of these changes, (2) the extent to which SBA has processes to disseminate reliable information, and (3) views of selected stakeholders on the scorecard's effects on small business procurement opportunities.\nGAO analyzed SBA's prior and revised scorecard methodology and results and interviewed officials from SBA, four other federal agencies selected based on small business procurement volume and other attributes, and three groups representing the interests of small businesses.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFor fiscal year 2017, the Small Business Administration (SBA) revised the methodology for its Small Business Procurement Scorecard, which is used to assess federal agencies' progress toward small business procurement goals. SBA made revisions to address requirements specified in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (2016 NDAA). SBA (1) reduced the share of the total scorecard grade devoted to prime contracting achievement, which is the dollar amount of contracts awarded directly to small businesses, and (2) added an element calculating changes in the number of small businesses receiving prime contracts. SBA made two additional revisions\u2014with input from other agencies' representatives\u2014to increase the share of subcontracting achievement results and peer review of required activities designed to facilitate small business procurement (see figure). In July 2018, officials said they had begun developing a plan to evaluate the effects of the revised scorecard methodology but did not provide a draft plan. Conducting a well-designed and comprehensive evaluation could aid SBA in determining whether the scorecard is an effective tool for helping to achieve the agency's strategic goals.\n(Scorecard elements are expressed as a percentage of total scorecard grade.)\nThe published fiscal year 2017 scorecards originally contained errors, including an incorrect grade and numeric score for one agency, and SBA does not have a process to ensure that scorecard results are published accurately. Although SBA later corrected the errors, the agency did not initially document that scorecards had been changed, which is inconsistent with SBA's policy on information quality. SBA officials said that errors occurred in the process of formatting scorecards for publication. Errors in the published scorecards\u2014and the initial lack of disclosure about corrections\u2014weaken data reliability and may undermine confidence in scorecard data.\nAgency officials and representatives of small business groups that GAO interviewed generally expected the scorecard revisions to have little impact on small business procurement opportunities. However, one agency's officials said they would focus more on tracking subcontracting activity as a result of changes to the scorecard.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is recommending that SBA (1) design and implement a comprehensive evaluation to assess scorecard revisions and (2) institute a process for reviewing scorecards for accuracy prior to publication and a mechanism for disclosing corrected information. SBA generally agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_838"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_839","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nVA spends hundreds of millions of dollars annually on medical supplies to meet the health care needs of about 7 million veterans. To provide a more efficient, cost-effective way for its medical centers to order supplies, the VA established the MSPV-NG program.\nThe program's goals include involving clinicians in requirements development, leveraging buying power when making competitive awards, and consolidating supplies used across medical centers. VA began developing requirements in early 2015 and launched the program in December 2016.\nThis testimony summarizes key information contained in GAO's November 2017 report, GAO-18-34 . Specifically, it addresses the extent to which VA's implementation of MSPV-NG has been effective in meeting program goals. GAO analyzed VA's requirements development and contracting processes, and identified key supply chain practices cited by four leading hospital networks. GAO also met with contracting and clinical officials at six medical centers, selected based on high dollar contract obligations in fiscal years 2014-2016 and geographic representation.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) established the Medical Surgical Prime Vendor-Next Generation (MSPV-NG) program to provide an efficient, cost-effective way for its facilities to order supplies, but its initial implementation did not have an overarching strategy, stable leadership, and workforce capacity that could have facilitated medical center buy-in for the change. VA also developed requirements for a broad range of MSPV-NG items with limited clinical input. Further, starting in June 2015, VA planned to award competitive contracts, but instead, 79 percent of the items available for purchase under MSPV-NG were added through non-competitive agreements. (See figure).\nAs a result, the program did not meet the needs of medical centers, and usage remained below VA's 40 percent target. (See figure.)\nVA has taken steps to address some deficiencies and is developing a new approach to the program. However, VA will likely continue to face challenges in meeting its goals until it fully addresses these existing shortcomings.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO made 10 recommendations in its November 2017 report, including that VA develop an overarching strategy, expand clinician input in requirements development, and establish a plan for awarding future competitive contracts. VA agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_839"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_840","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nRecent chemical attacks abroad and the threat of using chemical weapons against the West by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have raised concerns about the potential for chemical attacks occurring in the United States. DHS's chemical defense responsibilities include, among others, managing and coordinating federal efforts to prevent and protect against domestic chemical attacks.\nGAO was asked to examine DHS's chemical defense programs and activities. This report examines (1) DHS programs and activities to prevent and protect against domestic chemical attacks and (2) the extent to which DHS has integrated and coordinated all of its chemical defense programs and activities. GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from relevant DHS offices and components and reviewed DHS strategy and planning documents and federal laws and directives related to chemical defense.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Homeland Security (DHS) manages several programs and activities designed to prevent and protect against domestic attacks using chemical agents (see figure). Some DHS components have programs that focus on chemical defense, such as the Science and Technology Directorate's (S&T) chemical hazard characterization. Others have chemical defense responsibilities as part of their broader missions, such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which interdicts chemical agents at the border. DHS recently consolidated some chemical defense programs and activities into a new Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office.\nHowever, GAO found and DHS officials acknowledged that DHS has not fully integrated and coordinated its chemical defense programs and activities. Several components\u2014including CBP, U.S. Coast Guard, the Office of Health Affairs, and S&T\u2014have conducted similar activities, such as acquiring chemical detectors or assisting local jurisdictions with preparedness, separately, without DHS-wide direction and coordination. As components carry out chemical defense activities to meet mission needs, there is a risk that DHS may miss an opportunity to leverage resources and share information that could lead to greater effectiveness addressing chemical threats. It is too early to tell the extent to which the new CWMD Office will enhance the integration of DHS's chemical defense programs and activities. Given the breadth of DHS's chemical defense responsibilities, a strategy and implementation plan would help the CWMD Office (1) mitigate the risk of fragmentation among DHS programs and activities, and (2) establish goals and identify resources to achieve these goals, consistent with the Government Performance and Results Modernization Act of 2010. This would also be consistent with a 2012 DHS effort, since abandoned, to develop a strategy and implementation plan for all chemical defense activities, from prevention to recovery. DHS officials stated the 2012 effort was not completed because of leadership changes and competing priorities.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that the Assistant Secretary for the CWMD Office develop a strategy and implementation plan to help DHS guide, support, integrate, and coordinate chemical defense programs and activities. DHS concurred with the recommendation and identified actions to address it.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_840"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_841","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAbout 91 percent of DOD's 811,000 reservists are part-time, performing military service in addition to civilian employment and careers. These reservists may have to travel to perform required military training or other duties.\nThe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 contains a provision for GAO to review the cost of travel for members of the reserve components. This report (1) describes the conditions under which reservists may incur unreimbursed out-of-pocket travel expenses in connection with their service, and (2) addresses the extent to which DOD has assessed the effect of reservists' unreimbursed out-of-pocket travel expenses on retention.\nGAO reviewed DOD's Joint Travel Regulations and interviewed officials to determine conditions under which reservists might incur unreimbursed travel expenses. It also compared DOD's efforts to analyze the effect of such expenses with federal internal control standards, which state that management requires quality information to make informed decisions and evaluate an entity's performance in achieving key objectives.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nReservists may incur unreimbursed out-of-pocket expenses under certain conditions in connection with their service. Although the Department of Defense's (DOD) six reserve components reported paying or reimbursing $925 million in travel costs for reservists in fiscal year 2015, the most recent year for which data were available, reservists may still incur various expenses that are not reimbursable under DOD's travel regulations.\nOfficials responsible for travel regulations told us that unreimbursed travel expenses for reservists generally arise because it is DOD's policy to: (1) not provide reimbursement, except in limited circumstances, for the cost of travel to attend Inactive Duty Training (i.e., the \u201c1 weekend a month\u201d training commitment for reservists) and (2) consider longer duration training or assignments as a Permanent Change of Station\u2014a change in reservists' home of record\u2014and not as temporary travel. The National Defense Authorization Act for 2008 established a reimbursement program for Inactive Duty Training travel costs, but reservists must meet certain eligibility criteria, such as serving in a critical occupation, and not all service Secretaries have chosen to participate. Under the program, reimbursement is limited to $300 for each roundtrip to the training location. Further, DOD's policy to consider longer duration training or assignments as a Permanent Change of Station may also result in unreimbursed expenses. Specifically, according to DOD officials, reservists may have to maintain two households if, because of their part-time status, they decide not to move themselves and their families to the location of Active Duty Training for 140 days or longer, or of other active duty assignments for 181 days or longer.\nDOD and the services have conducted a few limited assessments of the potential effect of reservists' unreimbursed travel expenses on the retention of reservists. However, several DOD reports and studies and officials whom GAO interviewed have expressed concern that such unreimbursed expenses may, among other factors, be a challenge for reservists and may therefore negatively affect retention. For example, a 2012 survey commissioned by the Army Reserve of a small sample of reservist officers potentially eligible for battalion command positions reported that unreimbursed travel costs were among several factors that could influence their decision to apply for these positions. DOD and the reserve components are considering changes to reserve travel policy to mitigate the effect of unreimbursed expenses on reservists, by, for example, increasing the $300 limit for Inactive Duty Training reimbursement. However, without the benefit of quality information, DOD risks not managing the potential influence of these policies on reservists' retention or agency expenditures.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is recommending that DOD collect quality information and conduct an analysis of the potential effects of reservists' unreimbursed travel expenses on retention, and respond to these risks by considering the costs and benefits of any possible actions to address the identified issues. DOD concurred with this recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_841"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_842","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFederal law encourages individuals to save for retirement through tax incentives for 401(k) plans and IRAs\u2014the predominant forms of retirement savings in the United States. In 2017, U.S. plans and IRAs reportedly held investments worth nearly $17 trillion dollars. Federal law also allows individuals to withdraw assets from these accounts under certain circumstances. DOL and IRS oversee 401(k) plans, and collect annual plan data\u2014including financial information\u2014on the Form 5500. For both IRAs and 401(k) plans, GAO was asked to examine: (1) the incidence and amount of early withdrawals; (2) factors that might lead individuals to access retirement savings early; and (3) policies and strategies that might reduce the incidence and amounts of early withdrawals.\nTo answer these questions, GAO analyzed data from IRS, the Census Bureau, and DOL from 2013 (the most recent complete data available); and interviewed a diverse range of stakeholders identified in the literature, including representatives of companies sponsoring 401(k) plans, plan administrators, subject matter experts, industry representatives, and participant advocates.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn 2013 individuals in their prime working years (ages 25 to 55) removed at least $69 billion (+\/- $3.5 billion) of their retirement savings early, according to GAO's analysis of 2013 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Department of Labor (DOL) data. Withdrawals from individual retirement accounts (IRA)\u2014$39.5 billion (+\/- $2.1 billion)\u2014accounted for much of the money removed early, were equivalent to 3 percent (+\/- 0.15 percent) of the age group's total IRA assets, and exceeded their IRA contributions in 2013. Participants in employer-sponsored plans, like 401(k) plans, withdrew at least $29.2 billion (+\/- $2.8 billion) early as hardship withdrawals, lump sum payments made at job separation (known as cashouts), and loan balances that borrowers did not repay. Hardship withdrawals in 2013 were equivalent to about 0.5 percent (+\/-0.06 percent) of the age group's total plan assets and about 8 percent (+\/- 0.9 percent) of their contributions. However, the incidence and amount of certain unrepaid plan loans cannot be determined because the Form 5500\u2014the federal government's primary source of information on employee benefit plans\u2014does not capture these data.\nStakeholders GAO interviewed identified flexibilities in plan rules and individuals' pressing financial needs, such as out-of-pocket medical costs, as factors affecting early withdrawals of retirement savings. Stakeholders said that certain plan rules, such as setting high minimum loan thresholds, may cause individuals to take out more of their savings than they need. Stakeholders also identified several elements of the job separation process affecting early withdrawals, such as difficulties transferring account balances to a new plan and plans requiring the immediate repayment of outstanding loans, as relevant factors.\nStakeholders GAO interviewed suggested strategies they believed could balance early access to accounts with the need to build long-term retirement savings. For example, plan sponsors said allowing individuals to continue to repay plan loans after job separation, restricting participant access to plan sponsor contributions, allowing partial distributions at job separation, and building emergency savings features into plan designs, could help preserve retirement savings (see figure). However, they noted, each strategy involves tradeoffs, and the strategies' broader implications require further study.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that, as part of revising the Form 5500, DOL and IRS require plan sponsors to report the incidence and amount of all 401(k) plan loans that are not repaid. DOL and IRS neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_842"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_843","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe United States is the largest source of remittances, with an estimated $67 billion sent globally in 2016, according to the World Bank. Many individuals send remittances through money transmitters, a type of business that facilitates global money transfers. Recent reports found that some money transmitters have lost access to banking services due to derisking\u2014the practice of banks restricting services to customers to, in part, avoid perceived regulatory concerns about facilitating criminal activity.\nGAO was asked to review the possible effects of derisking on remittances to fragile countries. This report examines (1) what stakeholders believe are the challenges facing money transmitters in remitting funds from the United States to selected fragile countries, (2) actions U.S. agencies have taken to address identified challenges, and (3) U.S. efforts to assess the effects of such challenges on remittance flows to fragile countries. GAO selected four case-study countries\u2014Haiti, Liberia, Nepal, and Somalia\u2014based on factors including the large size of U.S. remittance flows to them. GAO interviewed U.S.-based money transmitters, banks, U.S. agencies, and individuals remitting to these countries and also surveyed banks.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nStakeholders, including money transmitters, banks, and U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) officials, reported a loss of banking access for money transmitters as a key challenge, although remittances continue to flow to selected fragile countries. All 12 of the money transmitters GAO interviewed, which served Haiti, Liberia, Nepal, and particularly Somalia, reported losing some banking relationships during the last 10 years. As a result, 9 of the 12 money transmitters reported using channels outside the banking system (hereafter referred to as non-banking channels), such as cash couriers, to move funds domestically or, in the case of Somalia, for cross-border transfer of remittances (see figure). Several banks reported that they had closed the accounts of money transmitters because of the high cost of due diligence actions they considered necessary to minimize the risk of fines under Bank Secrecy Act regulations. Treasury officials noted that despite some money transmitters losing bank accounts, they see no evidence that the volume of remittances is falling.\nExample of a Cash-to-Cash Remittance Transfer Using a Cash Courier\nU.S. agencies have taken steps that may mitigate money transmitters' loss of banking access. For example, several agencies have issued guidance to clarify expectations for providing banking services to money transmitters. In addition, Treasury is implementing projects to strengthen financial institutions in some fragile countries. However, U.S. agencies disagreed with other suggestions, such as immunity from enforcement actions for banks serving money transmitters, since those actions could adversely affect goals related to preventing money laundering and terrorism financing.\nTreasury cannot assess the effects of money transmitters' loss of banking access on remittance flows because existing data do not allow Treasury to identify remittances transferred through banking and non-banking channels. Remittance data that U.S. agencies collect from banks do not include transfers that banks make on behalf of money transmitters. Additionally, the information Treasury collects on transportation of cash from U.S. ports of exit does not identify remittances sent as cash. Therefore, Treasury cannot assess the extent to which money transmitters are shifting from banking to non-banking channels to transfer funds due to loss of banking access. Non-banking channels are generally less transparent than banking channels and thus more susceptible to the risk of money laundering and terrorism financing.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nTreasury should assess the extent to which shifts in remittance flows to non-banking channels for fragile countries may affect Treasury's ability to monitor for financial crimes and, if necessary, should identify corrective actions. GAO requested comments from Treasury on the recommendation, but none were provided.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_843"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_844","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nPrevious attempted and successful terrorist attacks against the United States have raised questions about the security of the U.S. government's process for adjudicating NIVs, which are issued to foreign nationals, such as tourists, business visitors, and students, seeking temporary admission into the United States. For example, the December 2015 shootings in San Bernardino, California, led to concerns about NIV screening and vetting processes because one of the attackers was admitted into the United States under a NIV. In 2017, the President issued executive actions directing agencies to improve visa screening and vetting, and establishing nationality-based visa entry restrictions, which the Supreme Court upheld in June 2018.\nGAO was asked to review NIV screening and vetting. This report examines (1) outcomes and characteristics of adjudicated NIV applications from fiscal years 2012 through 2017, and (2) key changes made to the NIV adjudication process in response to executive actions taken in 2017.\nGAO analyzed State NIV adjudication data for fiscal years 2012 through 2017, the most recent and complete data available. GAO visited seven consular posts selected based on visa workload and other factors. GAO reviewed relevant executive orders and proclamations, and documents related to implementing these actions.\nThis is a public version of a sensitive report issued in June 2018. Information that DHS, State, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence deemed sensitive has been removed.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe total number of nonimmigrant visa (NIV) applications that Department of State (State) consular officers adjudicated annually peaked at about 13.4 million in fiscal year 2016, and decreased by about 880,000 adjudications in fiscal year 2017. NIV adjudications varied by visa group, country of nationality, and refusal reason:\nVisa group. From fiscal years 2012 through 2017, about 80 percent of NIV adjudications were for tourists and business visitors. During this time, adjudications for temporary workers increased by about 50 percent and decreased for students and exchange visitors by about 2 percent.\nCountry of nationality. In fiscal year 2017, more than half of all NIV adjudications were for applicants of six countries of nationality: China (2.02 million, or 16 percent), Mexico (1.75 million, or 14 percent), India (1.28 million, or 10 percent), Brazil (670,000, or 5 percent), Colombia (460,000, or 4 percent), and Argentina (370,000, or 3 percent).\nRefusal reason. State data indicate that over this time period, 18 percent of adjudicated applications were refused; more than 90 percent were because the applicant did not qualify for the visa sought, and a small percentage (0.05 percent) were due to terrorism and security-related concerns.\nIn 2017, two executive orders and a proclamation issued by the President required, among other actions, visa entry restrictions for nationals of certain listed countries of concern, the development of uniform baseline screening and vetting standards, and changes to NIV screening and vetting procedures.\nGAO's analysis of State data indicates that, out of the nearly 2.8 million NIV applications refused in fiscal year 2017, 1,338 applications were refused due to visa entry restrictions implemented per the executive actions.\nState, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and others developed standards for screening and vetting by the U.S. government for all immigration benefits, such as for the requirement for applicants to undergo certain security checks.\nFurther, State sought and received emergency approval from the Office of Management and Budget in May 2017 to develop a new form to collect additional information from some visa applicants, such as email addresses and social media handles.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_844"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_845","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nScientific and technological innovation contributes to U.S. economic competitiveness and prosperity. Federal agencies support transformational technological advances\u2014those that result in new or significantly enhanced technologies\u2014by, for example, funding research (nearly $70 billion in obligations in fiscal year 2017).\nGAO was asked to examine support for research that could lead to transformational technological advances. This report (1) describes federal agencies' and nonfederal entities' support for such research in selected areas, (2) examines federal agencies' coordination on this research, and (3) describes experts' views on considerations for maintaining U.S. competitiveness through such advances. GAO selected quantum computing and synthetic biology as examples of research areas that could lead to transformational technological advances. GAO reviewed agency documents and interviewed federal officials, subject matter experts, and stakeholders. GAO also worked with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine to convene a meeting to solicit views from 19 experts selected from government, academia, and industry, among others.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nMultiple federal and nonfederal entities support research for transformational technological advances in the areas of quantum computing\u2014the manipulation of bits of data using the behavior of individual atoms, molecules, or other quantum systems to potentially outperform supercomputers\u2014and synthetic biology\u2014the combination of biology and engineering to create or modify biological systems. GAO found that at least 6 agencies support quantum computing research; at least 10 agencies support synthetic biology research; and nonfederal entities, such as universities and businesses, support research in both areas.\nAgency officials said they coordinate on quantum computing and synthetic biology through efforts such as conferences and interagency groups, but GAO found that certain new efforts have not fully implemented selected leading collaboration practices. The quantum computing group, co-chaired by officials from 4 agencies, and the synthetic biology group, led by the National Science Foundation, have taken initial steps to implement some leading practices GAO identified that can enhance and sustain interagency collaboration. For example, both groups agreed to coordinate their research, and participating agencies documented agreement with the quantum computing group's purpose through a charter. However, the groups have not fully implemented other practices, such as agreeing on roles and responsibilities and identifying common outcomes, that could help ensure they effectively marshal agencies' efforts to maintain U.S. competitiveness in quantum computing and synthetic biology.\nExperts identified considerations for maintaining U.S. competitiveness through transformational technological advances. The considerations broadly address federal and nonfederal entities' roles in supporting such advances and include:\ndeveloping a strategic approach using consortia or other mechanisms to bring together potential partners;\nfostering an environment in which information is shared among researchers while also considering the risks of information sharing;\nfocusing on technology development and commercialization, for example, by providing support across multiple stages of technology innovation; and\nstrengthening the science and technology workforce through training, recruiting, and retaining talent.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that the agencies leading the interagency quantum computing and synthetic biology groups take steps to fully implement leading collaboration practices. The agencies agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_845"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_846","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nWIOA requires states to reserve at least 15 percent of their total State Vocational Rehabilitation Services program funds to provide pre-employment transition services to help students with disabilities transition from school to work. GAO was asked to review how states were implementing these services.\nThis report examines (1) steps states reported taking to implement pre-employment transition services, and (2) implementation challenges states reported and how Education has addressed them. GAO reviewed documents and funding data from Education, and federal laws and regulations; surveyed all 79 state VR agencies (74 responded); held discussion groups with representatives of 29 state VR agencies; and interviewed officials from Education and three states (Idaho, Illinois, and Maryland) GAO selected for variety in size and type of agencies, among other factors.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nOf the 74 state vocational rehabilitation (VR) agencies that responded to GAO's survey, most reported expanding services to help students with disabilities transition from school to work as required under the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA), enacted in July 2014. Most state agencies reported serving more students and providing work-based learning experiences and other activities, referred to as pre-employment transition services (see figure).\nState VR agencies reported two key challenges with implementing pre-employment transition services for students as required by WIOA.\nSpending reserved funds : States reported spending about $357 million out of the $465 million reserved for these services in fiscal year 2016. Education officials said that states had difficulty determining what expenditures were allowable, and some state officials said they would like more detailed information from Education. Education officials said they plan to clarify guidance but have no timeframe for providing further information, which would help states to better plan their use of reserved funds.\nFinalizing interagency agreements : Fewer than half the state VR agencies that responded to GAO's survey (34 of 74) reported updating their interagency agreement with their state's educational agency. Interagency agreements can help promote collaboration by, for example, establishing roles and responsibilities of each agency. Although Education offers technical assistance on interagency agreements, without increased efforts to raise awareness about the importance of these agreements and provide assistance to states where needed, Education may miss opportunities to help state VR and educational agencies efficiently and effectively coordinate services.\nIn addition, WIOA requires Education to highlight best state practices, and most VR agencies responding to GAO's survey (63 of 74) reported this would be useful. Education does not have a written plan or timeframe for identifying and disseminating best practices. As a result, Education may miss opportunities to help more students with disabilities successfully transition from school to work.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is recommending that Education (1) establish timeframes for providing additional information on allowable expenditures, (2) take additional steps to assist states that have not updated and finalized their interagency agreements, and (3) develop a written plan with specific timeframes and activities for identifying and disseminating best practices. Education agreed with the first recommendation and disagreed with the other two. GAO revised the second recommendation and maintains that specific information is needed for the third, as discussed in the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_846"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_847","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nEach year, VBA processes more than 1 million disability compensation claims and provides about $65 billion in benefits to veterans. The Jeff Miller and Richard Blumenthal Veterans Health Care and Benefits Improvement Act of 2016 includes a provision for GAO to review VBA's regional offices to help VBA achieve more consistent performance in processing disability compensation claims.\nThis report examines (1) how VBA manages workload and performance for the disability compensation claims process, (2) how well VBA's timeliness and accuracy measures capture its regional offices' performance in processing these claims, and (3) how well selected regional offices communicate with VSOs and congressional caseworkers about these claims. GAO reviewed VBA policies and procedures; visited four regional offices selected to represent a range of performance scores and claims processing volume in fiscal year 2017; and interviewed VBA headquarters officials and management and staff from the selected regional offices. GAO also interviewed VSOs and congressional caseworkers\u2014selected for House, Senate, and bipartisan representation\u2014to learn more about their communication with VBA.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn 2016, the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) centralized distribution of the disability compensation claims workload through the National Work Queue, which prioritizes and distributes claims to regional offices based on their capacity; however, there are gaps in VBA's guidance for processing claims with errors. Under the National Work Queue, multiple regional offices can work on a single claim instead of the claim remaining at one office for the duration of processing (see figure). GAO found gaps in guidance about whether a claims processor should fix an error made by another regional office, or return the claim to that office to be corrected. The former could result in missed opportunities to train staff who made the error, while the latter could result in processing delays.\nVBA primarily uses timeliness and accuracy measures to assess its regional offices' performance in processing disability compensation claims, but these measures do not adequately capture performance. The timeliness measure can be skewed because it is a snapshot of how long claims have been pending at an office on the last day of the month, and does not capture performance over a period of time. The accuracy measure is attributed to the office that finishes the claim, even though 88 percent of claims completed in fiscal year 2017 were processed at more than one office. VBA officials acknowledged that these measures are limited and said the agency is exploring alternatives, but VBA has no specific plan or time frame for determining and implementing new measures. Without measures to more accurately assess regional office performance, VBA may be limited in its ability to make efficient and effective decisions.\nVeterans service organizations (VSO) and staff working for Members of Congress (congressional caseworkers) interviewed by GAO were generally satisfied with regional office communication regarding disability compensation claims. However, VBA's policy on whom VSOs should contact during different points in the process did not always align with what occurs at the offices we visited or with VSO needs. This could result in VSOs not receiving consistent and timely responses from VBA. Evaluating this policy could help VBA assist VSOs in better serving veterans. In addition, congressional caseworkers GAO interviewed identified ways that communication could be improved or that additional support could be provided, such as a list of contacts at all regional offices for claim inquiries. VBA officials GAO interviewed described an open-door policy through which they may receive feedback from caseworkers, but the agency does not formally solicit periodic feedback from them. Without such feedback, the agency may miss opportunities to identify and address caseworker communication needs that could help them better serve veterans.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making five recommendations to VBA to clarify guidance for correcting errors, develop and implement measures to better assess timeliness and accuracy at regional offices, and evaluate communication with VSOs and caseworkers. The Department of Veterans Affairs concurred with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_847"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_848","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nBurn pits help base commanders manage waste generated by U.S. forces overseas, but they also produce harmful emissions that military and other health professionals believe may result in chronic health effects for those exposed.\nThis statement provides information on the extent to which DOD has assessed any health risks of burn pit use.\nThis statement is based on a GAO report issued in September 2016 (GAO-16-781). The report was conducted in response to section 313 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. \u201cBuck\u201d McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015. Specifically, GAO assessed the methodology DOD used in conducting a review of the compliance of the military departments and combatant commands with DOD instructions governing the use of burn pits in contingency operations and the adequacy of a DOD report for the defense committees. GAO also obtained updates from DOD on actions taken to assess health risks from burn pits since September 2016.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO reported in September 2016 that the effects from exposing individuals to burn pit emissions were not well understood, and the Department of Defense (DOD) had not fully assessed the health risks associated with the use of burn pits. Burn pits\u2014shallow excavations or surface features with berms used to conduct open-air burning\u2014were often chosen as a method of waste disposal during recent contingency operations in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, which extends from the Middle East to Central Asia and includes Iraq and Afghanistan. According to DOD Instruction 6055.01, DOD Safety and Occupational Health (SOH) Program , DOD should apply risk-management strategies to eliminate occupational injury or illness and loss of mission capability or resources. The instruction also requires all DOD components to establish procedures to ensure that risk-acceptance decisions were documented, archived, and reevaluated on a recurring basis. Furthermore, DOD Instruction 6055.05, Occupational and Environmental Health (OEH), requires that hazards be identified and risk evaluated as early as possible, including the consideration of exposure patterns, duration, and rates.\nWhile DOD has guidance that applies to burn pit emissions among other health hazards, DOD had not fully assessed the health risks of use of burn pits, according to DOD officials.\nAccording to DOD officials, DOD's ability to assess these risks was limited by a lack of adequate information on (1) the levels of exposure to burn pit emissions and (2) the health impacts these exposures had on individuals. With respect to information on exposure levels, DOD had not collected data from emissions or monitored exposures from burn pits as required by its own guidance. Given the potential use of burn pits near installations and during future contingency operations, establishing processes to monitor burn pit emissions for unacceptable exposures would better position DOD and combatant commanders to collect data that could help assess exposure to risks.\nGAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense (1) take steps to ensure CENTCOM and other geographic combatant commands, as appropriate, establish processes to consistently monitor burn pit emissions for unacceptable exposures; and (2) in coordination with the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, specifically examine the relationship between direct, individual, burn pit exposure and potential long-term health-related issues. DOD concurred with the first recommendation and partially concurred with the second. In a May 2018 status update regarding these recommendations, DOD outlined a series of steps it had implemented as well as steps that it intends to implement. The department believes these efforts will further enhance its ability to better monitor burn-pit emissions and examine the relationship between direct, individual, burn pit exposure and potential long-term health related issues. GAO believes the steps DOD is taking are appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO made two recommendations focused on improving monitoring of burn pit emissions and examining any associated health effects related to burn pit exposure. DOD concurred with one recommendation and partially concurred with the other. GAO continues to believe the recommendations are valid.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_848"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_849","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nApproximately 15,600 nursing homes participating in the Medicare and Medicaid programs provide care to 1.4 million residents\u2014a population of elderly and disabled individuals. To help ensure nursing home residents receive quality care, CMS defines quality standards that homes must meet to participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. To monitor compliance with these standards, CMS enters into agreements with state survey agencies to conduct on-site surveys of the state's homes and also collects other data on nursing home quality.\nAlthough CMS and others have reported some potential improvements in nursing home quality, questions have been raised about nursing home quality and weaknesses in CMS oversight.\nThis statement summarizes GAO's October 2015 report, GAO-16-33 . Specifically, it describes (1) trends in nursing home quality through 2014, and (2) changes CMS had made to its oversight activities as of October 2015. It also includes the status of GAO's recommendations associated with these findings. GAO recently obtained information from CMS officials about steps they have taken to implement the 2015 GAO recommendations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO's October 2015 report found mixed results in nursing home quality based on its analysis of trends reflected in key sources of quality data that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) collects.\nAn increase in reported consumer complaints suggested that consumers' concerns about nursing home quality increased.\nIn contrast, trends in care deficiencies, nurse staffing levels, and clinical quality measures indicated potential improvement in nursing home quality.\nGAO also found that data issues complicated CMS's ability to assess nursing home quality trends. For example:\nCMS allowed states to use different survey methodologies to measure deficiencies in nursing home care, which complicates the ability to make comparisons nationwide. GAO recommended that CMS implement a standardized survey methodology across states, and in November 2017 CMS completed national implementation.\nCMS did not regularly audit selected quality data including nurse staffing and clinical data (for example, on residents with pressure ulcers) to ensure their accuracy. GAO recommended CMS implement a plan for ongoing auditing of quality data. The agency concurred with this recommendation and has been conducting regular audits of nurse staffing data but does not have a plan to audit other quality data on a continuing basis. GAO continues to believe that regular audits are needed to ensure the accuracy and comparability of nursing home quality data.\nGAO's October 2015 report found that CMS had made numerous modifications to its nursing home oversight activities. However, CMS had not monitored how the modifications might affect its ability to assess nursing home quality. GAO found that some modifications expanded or added new activities\u2014such as creating new training for state surveyors on unnecessary medication usage\u2014while others reduced existing activities. For example, CMS reduced the number of nursing homes participating in the Special Focus Facility program\u2014which provides additional oversight of certain homes with a history of poor performance\u2014by over half from 2013 to 2014. CMS officials told GAO that some of the reductions to oversight activities were in response to an increase in oversight responsibilities and a limited number of staff and financial resources. To help ensure modifications do not adversely affect CMS's ability to assess nursing home quality, GAO recommended that CMS monitor modifications of essential oversight activities to better understand the effects on nursing home quality oversight. CMS concurred with this recommendation and told us it has begun to take steps to address it. Such monitoring is important for CMS to better understand how its oversight modifications affect nursing home quality and to improve its oversight given limited resources.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_849"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_850","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes that restoring and retaining readiness across the entire spectrum of conflict is critical to success in the emerging security environment. Air Force readiness has steadily declined primarily due to the persistent demand on a fleet that has aged and decreased in size since the 1990s. The Air Force is working to both rebuild the readiness of its forces and modernize its aging fleet to meet future threats. However, according to the Air Force, its readiness goals will take years to achieve as it continues to be challenged to rebuild readiness amid continued operational demands.\nThis statement provides information on Air Force (1) readiness and management challenges including personnel, equipment, training, and organization and utilization, and (2) plans to grow and modernize its force in the context of readiness recovery across DOD. Also, GAO summarizes recommendations to address these challenges and actions taken by the Air Force.\nThis statement is based on previously published work since 2016 related to Air Force readiness challenges, fighter pilot workforce requirements, weapon sustainment, aviation training, and force structure.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO's prior work has highlighted that the Air Force faces management and readiness challenges in four interrelated areas:\nPersonnel: The Air Force has reported that pilot and aircraft maintainer shortfalls are a key challenge to rebuilding readiness. GAO found in April 2018 that the Air Force had fewer fighter pilots than authorizations for 11 of 12 years, from fiscal years 2006 through 2017. Even as unmanned aerial systems had become more prevalent and fighter pilot workloads had increased, the Air Force had not reevaluated fighter squadron requirements. GAO recommended that the Air Force reevaluate fighter pilot squadron requirements to ensure it has the pilots necessary for all missions.\nEquipment: Air Force aircraft availability has been limited by challenges associated with aging aircraft, maintenance, and supply support. GAO reported in September 2018 that, from fiscal year 2011 through 2016, the Air Force generally did not meet availability goals for key aircraft. Further, in October 2017 GAO found F-35 availability was below service expectations and sustainment plans did not include key requirements. GAO recommended that DOD revise F-35 sustainment plans to include requirements and decision points needed to implement the F-35 sustainment strategy.\nTraining: The Air Force has identified the need to ensure its forces can successfully achieve missions to address a broad range of current and emerging threats. However, GAO reported in September 2016 that Air Force combat fighter squadrons did not complete annual training requirements due to aircraft availability and training range limitations, and had used the same underlying assumptions for its annual training requirements from 2012 to 2016. GAO recommended that the Air Force reassess its annual training requirements to ensure its forces can accomplish a full range of missions.\nOrganization and Utilization: Air Force management of its force structure can also exacerbate readiness challenges. GAO found in July 2018 that the Air Force's organization of its small F-22 fleet had not maximized aircraft availability, and that its utilization of F-22s reduced opportunities for pilots to train for missions in high-threat environments. GAO found that unless the Air Force assesses the organization and use of its F-22s, F-22 units are likely to continue to experience aircraft availability and pilot training rates that are below what they could be. GAO recommended that the Air Force reassess its F-22 organizational structure to reduce risk to future operations.\nLooking to the future, the Air Force will have to balance the rebuilding of its existing force with its desire to grow and modernize. To meet current and future demands, the Air Force has stated that it needs to have more squadrons. However, the costs of such growth are as yet unknown, and will have to compete with other military services looking to increase their force structure and recapitalize their forces. Even with growth, the Air Force would be dependent on the force of today for decades to come and will need to stay focused on rebuilding the readiness of existing forces. Addressing GAO's recommendations are necessary steps to meet current and future needs and can assist the Air Force moving forward.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO has made 14 recommendations in prior unclassified work described in this statement. DOD generally concurred with most of them and has implemented 1. Continued attention to these recommendations can assist and guide the Air Force moving forward as it seeks to rebuild the readiness of its forces.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_850"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_851","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSafety lapses have occurred at laboratories in the United States that conduct research on select agents\u2014such as Ebola virus or anthrax bacteria\u2014that may cause serious or lethal infection in humans, animals, or plants, raising concerns about whether oversight is effective. This statement summarizes information contained in GAO's October 2017 report, titled High-Containment Laboratories: Coordinated Actions Needed to Enhance the Select Agent Program's Oversight of Hazardous Pathogens ( GAO-18-145 ).\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Federal Select Agent Program\u2014jointly managed by the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Agriculture (USDA)\u2014oversees laboratories' handling of certain hazardous pathogens known as select agents. However, the program does not fully meet all key elements of effective oversight. For example, the program is not structurally independent from all laboratories it oversees and has not assessed risks posed by its current structure or the effectiveness of mechanisms it has to reduce organizational conflicts of interest. Without conducting such assessments and taking actions as needed to address risks, the program may not effectively mitigate impairments to its independence.\nIn addition, some experts and laboratory representatives GAO interviewed raised concerns that the program's reviews may not target the highest-risk activities, in part because it has not formally assessed which activities pose the highest risk. Without assessing the risk of activities it oversees and targeting its resources appropriately, the program cannot ensure it is balancing its resources against their impact.\nMoreover, the program does not have strategic planning documents, such as a joint strategic plan and workforce plan, to guide its oversight. Although it began taking steps to develop a joint strategic plan, the program is not developing workforce plans as part of this effort. Developing a joint workforce plan that assesses workforce and training needs for the program as a whole would help the program leverage resources to ensure all workforce and training needs are met.\nSelected countries and regulatory sectors GAO reviewed employ other approaches to promote effective oversight. For example, in Great Britain, an independent government agency focused on health and safety oversees laboratories that work with pathogens. In addition, in both Great Britain and Canada, regulators (1) focus their oversight on biological safety, because safety incidents provided the impetus for laboratory oversight in these countries and (2) regulate all potentially hazardous pathogens and activities in laboratories.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO's recommendations in GAO-18-145 included that the Federal Select Agent Program (1) assess risks posed by its current structure and address risks as needed; (2) assess the risk of activities it oversees and target reviews to the highest-risk activities; and (3) develop a joint workforce plan. HHS and USDA agreed with GAO's recommendations and outlined actions they are taking, or plan to take, to address them, which GAO will continue to monitor.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_851"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_852","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nHuman trafficking is a pervasive problem throughout the world. Victims are often held against their will in slave-like conditions.\nThe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 includes a provision for GAO to report on the programs conducted by specific agencies, including State, DOL, and USAID, that address trafficking in persons. Among other objectives, this report (1) identifies the recent projects in international counter-trafficking in persons that key U.S. agencies have awarded to implementing partners; and, for selected projects, assesses the extent to which key agencies have (2) documented their monitoring activities and (3) ensured the reliability of project performance information.\nGAO reviewed State, DOL, and USAID project documents and interviewed agency officials. GAO reviewed monitoring documents for 54 of the 57 projects that were active from the beginning of fiscal year 2016 through the end of fiscal year 2017. Of these 54 projects, GAO selected a nongeneralizable sample of 5 projects, based primarily on largest total award amounts, for review of the reliability of project performance information.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Departments of State (State), Labor (DOL), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)\u2014through agreements with implementing partners\u2014managed 120 international counter-trafficking in person projects during fiscal year 2017.\nGAO reviewed a selection of 54 counter-trafficking projects (37 State, 3 DOL, and 14 USAID), and found that DOL and USAID had fully documented their monitoring activities, while State had not. All three agencies used similar tools to monitor the performance of their projects, such as monitoring plans, performance indicators and targets, progress reports, and site visits. GAO found, however, that State did not fully document its monitoring activities for 16 of its 37 projects (43 percent). GAO found that State did not have the monitoring plans or complete progress reports for one-third of its projects and often lacked targets for performance indicators in its final progress reports. State officials said they had not required targets for each performance indicator for the projects GAO reviewed, or had not set targets due to limited resources in prior years. State has taken steps to improve its monitoring efforts, including issuing a November 2017 policy that requires targets to be set for each performance indicator and developing an automated data system that would require targets to be recorded. However, because the pilot data system allows targets to be recorded as \u201cto be determined\u201d and does not have controls to ensure entry of actual targets, it is uncertain whether performance targets will be regularly recorded. Without full documentation of monitoring activities and established performance targets, State has limited ability to assess project performance, including project efficiency or effectiveness.\nGAO reviewed the reliability of project performance information for 5 of the 54 counter-trafficking projects (2 State, 1 DOL, and 2 USAID) and found that State and USAID used inconsistent and incomplete performance information, while DOL used consistent and complete information. For example, some quarterly indicator results in State and USAID progress reports were inconsistent with annual total results, and narrative explanations for significant deviations from performance targets were sometimes not present in quarterly reports. According to agency officials, performance information from these projects is regularly used not only for direct project oversight but also for internal and external reporting, program decisions, and lessons learned. GAO found that State's and USAID's processes lack sufficient controls to ensure the reliability of project performance information, but did not find inadequate controls in DOL's process. For example, neither State nor USAID consistently used automated checks on indicator results to ensure consistency and completeness of performance indicator result calculations. In contrast, DOL used automated checks as part of its process. Without implementing controls to ensure that performance information is consistent and complete, State and USAID officials cannot fully or accurately understand what projects are, or are not, achieving, and how their efforts might be improved.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making four recommendations to State and one recommendation to USAID, including that both agencies establish additional controls to improve the consistency and completeness of project performance information, and that State maintain monitoring activity documentation and establish targets for each performance indicator. State and USAID concur with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_852"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_853","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOD spends billions of dollars annually to sustain its weapon systems to support current and future operations. The Air Force and Navy are operating many of their fixed-wing aircraft well beyond their original designed service lives and therefore are confronted with sustainment challenges.\nHouse Report 114-537 included a provision for GAO to evaluate the sustainment of major weapon systems. This report, among other things, (1) examines the trends in availability and O&S costs for selected Air Force and Navy fixed-wing aircraft since fiscal year 2011, including whether they met availability goals, and (2) assesses the extent that the departments documented sustainment strategies, reviewed sustainment metrics, and implemented plans to improve aircraft availability. GAO selected a nongeneralizable sample of 12 fixed-wing aircraft by considering a variety of factors, such as the type, age, and manufacturer of the aircraft, among other factors, and analyzed condition and availability data, O&S costs, and sustainment challenges from fiscal year 2011 through March 2017 for each aircraft in a \u201cSustainment Quick Look.\u201d GAO also analyzed policies, strategies, and plans, and interviewed Navy and Air Force officials in program offices, squadrons, and maintenance depots.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nBetween fiscal years 2011 and 2016, the Air Force and Navy generally did not meet aircraft availability goals, and operating and support (O&S) cost trends for GAO's selected fixed-wing aircraft varied. Specifically, GAO found that\navailability declined for 6 of 12 aircraft\u20143 from each service\u2014between fiscal years 2011 and 2016;\navailability fell short of goals for 9 of 12 aircraft in fiscal year 2016; and\nO&S costs increased for 5 of the aircraft, and maintenance costs\u2014the largest share\u2014increased for 8 of 12 aircraft.\nGAO found, and officials agreed, that these aircraft face similar challenges.\na Obsolescence means a part is unavailable due to its lack of usefulness or it is no longer current or available for production.\nb Diminishing manufacturing sources is a loss or impending loss of manufacturers or suppliers.\nThe Air Force and Navy have documented sustainment strategies for some aircraft, regularly reviewed sustainment metrics, and implemented improvement plans. The Air Force has documented sustainment strategies for all aircraft GAO reviewed; however, the Navy has not documented or updated its sustainment strategies for four aircraft. Specifically, the Navy does not have a documented sustainment strategy for the C-2A, and has not updated the strategies for the E2C, EA-18G, and F\/A-18A-D since before 2012. The Navy is in the process of documenting its strategies, but Department of Defense (DOD) policy is unclear on whether a sustainment strategy is required and has to be updated every 5 years for weapon systems that are in the operations and support phase of their life cycle (i.e., legacy systems). Also, Navy guidance does not specify a requirement for legacy systems, although Air Force guidance does. Clarifying the requirements to document sustainment strategies for legacy systems, and documenting those strategies, would add additional visibility over the availability and O&S costs of DOD aircraft and any associated sustainment risks.\nThis is a public version of a sensitive report issued in April 2018. Information on aircraft availability and other related information was deemed to be sensitive and has been omitted from this report.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is recommending that DOD and the Navy update or issue new policy and guidance clarifying the requirements for documenting sustainment strategies for legacy weapon systems. DOD concurred with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_853"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_854","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nUnwanted sexual behaviors in the military\u2014including sexual harassment, sexual assault, and domestic violence involving sexual assault\u2014undermine core values, unit cohesion, combat readiness, and public goodwill. Recent studies suggest that these behaviors are part of a \u201ccontinuum of harm,\u201d which DOD defines as a range of interconnected, inappropriate behaviors that are connected to the occurrence of sexual assault and that support an environment that tolerates these behaviors.\nSenate Report 114-255 included a provision for GAO to review efforts by DOD to prevent unwanted sexual behaviors in the military. GAO assessed the extent to which DOD has (1) policies on sexual harassment that include CDC principles and relevant legislative elements; (2) processes for maintaining and reporting consistent data on incidents of unwanted sexual behaviors; and (3) overarching efforts, including a prevention strategy, to address unwanted sexual behaviors across the continuum of harm. GAO reviewed DOD policies and pertinent databases, and interviewed agency officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense's (DOD) policies on sexual harassment include some but not all of the Centers for Disease Control's (CDC) principles for preventing sexual violence and include most relevant legislative elements. GAO identified six principles from CDC's framework for preventing sexual violence, which CDC defines as including sexual harassment. GAO found that Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and military service policies generally include CDC's principles regarding prevention strategies, but none address risk and protective factors, which identify conditions or behaviors that might heighten or lower the risk of sexual harassment victimization or perpetration, respectively. Additionally, a statutory provision in fiscal year 2013 mandated that DOD, among other things, develop a comprehensive sexual harassment policy that includes prevention training, mechanisms for anonymous reporting, and mechanisms for resolving incidents of sexual harassment. OSD and service policies are generally consistent with those required elements except for the inclusion of anonymous reporting. DOD is developing a new department-wide policy that will address sexual harassment, but it is too early to determine how the policy will address these issues. Without policies that include CDC's principles and mechanisms for anonymous reporting, DOD may miss opportunities to address and potentially reduce incidents of unwanted sexual behaviors. Finally, a statutory change in fiscal year 2017 redefined sexual harassment for certain purposes so it is no longer defined solely as a form of sex discrimination but is recognized also as an adverse behavior on the spectrum of behavior that can contribute to an increase in the incidence of sexual assault. While officials indicated a need to update policies, they were unclear on the full implications, if any, of this change.\nDOD has processes for maintaining and reporting consistent data on incidents of unwanted sexual behaviors including sexual assault and incidents of domestic violence that involve sexual assault, but does not have similar processes for maintaining and reporting data on incidents of sexual harassment. Specifically, DOD uses centralized databases to maintain and report data on incidents of sexual assault and domestic violence that involve sexual assault, but relies on military service-specific databases for information on incidents of sexual harassment. DOD has not established standard data elements and definitions to guide the services in maintaining and reporting data on sexual harassment. Inconsistencies in data elements and definitions generally mean that one service may be maintaining data that is more or less detailed than, or that differs from, the data maintained by other services. Such inconsistencies may create difficulties in reporting department-wide sexual harassment data, since the individual service data must be adapted to fit reporting requirements.\nDOD has several overarching efforts to address unwanted sexual behaviors across the continuum of harm, including developing an overarching prevention strategy. However, it is unclear whether the strategy under development will contain key elements for long-term and results-oriented strategic planning such as long-term goals, strategies to achieve goals, and metrics to gauge progress. Without incorporating these elements into its overarching prevention strategy, DOD may not be in a position to effectively coordinate and integrate prevention activities and reduce instances of unwanted sexual behaviors.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DOD fully include in its new policy on sexual harassment CDC's principles for sexual violence prevention and mechanisms for anonymous reporting, develop standard data elements and definitions for reporting sexual harassment incidents, and incorporate in its overarching prevention strategy elements key for a long-term, results-oriented strategy. DOD generally concurred with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_854"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_855","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSome Southwest border residents and businesses have reported difficulties accessing banking services in the region. GAO was asked to review if Southwest border residents and businesses were losing access to banking services because of derisking and branch closures.\nThis report (1) describes the types of heightened BSA\/AML compliance risks that Southwest border banks may face and the BSA\/AML compliance challenges they may experience; (2) determines the extent to which banks have terminated accounts and closed branches in the region and the reasons for any terminations and closures; and (3) evaluates how regulators have assessed and responded to concerns about derisking in the region and elsewhere, and how effective their efforts have been; among other objectives. GAO surveyed a nationally representative sample of 406 banks, which included the 115 banks that operate in the Southwest border region; analyzed Suspicious Activity Report filings; developed an econometric model on the drivers of branch closures; and interviewed banks that operate in the region.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\n\u201cDerisking\u201d is the practice of banks limiting certain services or ending their relationships with customers to, among other things, avoid perceived regulatory concerns about facilitating money laundering. The Southwest border region is a high-risk area for money laundering activity, in part, because of a high volume of cash and cross-border transactions, according to bank representatives and others. These types of transactions may create challenges for Southwest border banks in complying with Bank Secrecy Act\/anti-money laundering (BSA\/AML) requirements because they can lead to more intensive account monitoring and investigation of suspicious activity. GAO found that, in 2016, bank branches in the Southwest border region filed 2-1\/2 times as many reports identifying potential money laundering or other suspicious activity (Suspicious Activity Reports), on average, as bank branches in other high-risk counties outside the region (see figure).\nAccording to GAO's survey, an estimated 80 percent (+\/- 11 percent margin of error) of Southwest border banks terminated accounts for BSA\/AML risk reasons. Further, according to the survey, an estimated 80 percent (+\/- 11) limited or did not offer accounts to customers that are considered high risk for money laundering because the customers drew heightened regulatory oversight\u2014behavior that could indicate derisking. Counties in the Southwest border region have been losing bank branches since 2012, similar to national and regional trends. Nationally, GAO's econometric analysis generally found that counties that were urban, younger, had higher income or had higher money laundering-related risk were more likely to lose branches. Money laundering-related risks were likely to have been relatively more important drivers of branch closures in the Southwest border region.\nRegulators have not fully assessed the BSA\/AML factors influencing banks to derisk. Executive orders and legislation task the Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and the federal banking regulators with reviewing existing regulations through retrospective reviews to determine whether they should be retained or amended, among other things. FinCEN and federal banking regulators have conducted retrospective reviews of parts of BSA\/AML regulations. The reviews, however, have not evaluated how banks' BSA\/AML regulatory concerns may influence them to derisk or close branches. GAO's findings indicate that banks do consider BSA\/AML regulatory concerns in providing services. Without assessing the full range of BSA\/AML factors that may be influencing banks to derisk or close branches, FinCEN, the federal banking regulators, and Congress do not have the information needed to determine if BSA\/AML regulations and their implementation can be made more effective or less burdensome.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that FinCEN and the federal banking regulators conduct a retrospective review of BSA regulations and their implementation for banks. The review should focus on how banks' regulatory concerns may be influencing their willingness to provide services. The federal banking regulators agreed to the recommendation. FinCEN did not provide written comments.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_855"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_856","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSince Congress provided statutory authority in 1997 for the privatization of utility systems at military installations, the military departments have privatized nearly 600 utility systems. According to DOD officials, utilities privatization enables military installations to obtain safe, reliable, and technologically current utility systems at a relatively lower cost than they would under continued government ownership.\nThe Senate report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 included a provision that GAO review DOD's utilities privatization program. This report assesses the extent to which DOD has (1) tracked utilities privatization contract performance and developed measureable performance standards, and (2) implemented cybersecurity guidance for industrial control systems associated with privatized utility systems. GAO reviewed relevant policies and internal control standards, analyzed a non-generalizable sample of utilities privatization contract documents, and interviewed DOD and selected military installation officials and privatized utility system owners.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe military departments have some types of information about privatized utility systems, but they have not tracked contract performance or developed measurable performance standards for these contracts. Specifically:\nCosts for Utility Infrastructure Improvements: The military departments estimated the cost avoidance at the time of contract award; however, none of the military departments have determined whether the utilities privatization contracts are on track to achieve those estimates.\nCosts for Utility Commodities: Military department officials stated that they have observed reduced usage of commodity utilities, such as water usage, and thus decreased commodity costs, through utilities privatization; however, the officials have not tracked the data and any associated savings. Furthermore, the officials have not determined whether any savings were fully attributable to utilities privatization, recognizing that other factors may have affected commodity usage.\nSystem Reliability: Military department officials stated that they have perceived improvements in utility system reliability since utilities privatization and have access to contractor-provided data to assess reliability; however, the military departments have not used this data to determine reliability trends over time.\nContractor Performance Evaluations: The military departments use the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System to evaluate each utility system owner's performance; however, based on GAO's review of the evaluations associated with the contracts in its sample, the evaluations were anecdotal and varied in frequency and quality.\nDepartment of Defense (DOD) guidance does not require the development of metrics and associated measurable performance standards to track utilities privatization contract performance. Without a requirement to develop these metrics and standards, DOD will lack information on the performance of utilities privatization contracts and thus may not be able to perform effective program management and oversight for these long-term contracts.\nDOD has taken steps to add a cybersecurity clause to its utilities privatization contracts that requires contractors take steps to ensure safeguards are put in place to protect covered defense information, which is defined as information that is processed, stored, or transmitted on the contractor's information system or industrial control systems. To implement the clause, DOD first must identify what, if any, covered defense information is provided to or developed by the contractor in performance of the contract. However, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and military department officials stated that they have not begun to implement the clause because they need DOD to issue procedures concerning how the military departments are to determine what, if any, covered defense information associated with utilities privatization contracts is provided or developed by the contractor in performance of the contract. Without these procedures, the military departments and DLA will not have assurance that such information is being safeguarded.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DOD issue guidance requiring the military departments and DLA to develop metrics to track utilities privatization contract performance, and issue procedures concerning how the military departments are to determine what constitutes covered defense information as it relates to utilities privatization contracts. DOD concurred with both recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_856"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_857","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nUSPS faces significant financial challenges as it continues to experience declining mail volumes and revenues. Capital spending is needed to support USPS's operations, but can be affected by various uncertainties and risks, such as those related to future business activities and revenues. In the past, USPS has reduced its capital spending in response to declining revenues.\nGAO was asked to review USPS's capital-spending plans and examine how its capital-spending processes address uncertainties and risks. This report: (1) describes USPS's projected capital spending over the next 10 years and (2) assesses whether USPS's processes support its ability to address uncertainties and risks that affect its capital spending.\nGAO reviewed USPS data and information on actual capital spending from fiscal years 2007 to 2017 and projected capital spending for fiscal years 2018 through 2028. GAO also reviewed USPS reports on 14 approved capital projects in fiscal years 2017 and 2018, selected to provide a mix of project type and value; examined documentation related to USPS's processes that affect capital spending and compared USPS's processes to internal control standards adopted by USPS; and interviewed USPS officials.\nOn a draft of this report, USPS provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe United States Postal Service (USPS) projects increased capital spending over the next 10 years. According to USPS, this spending will support its mission and improve its financial position. USPS projects average annual capital cash outlays of $2.4 billion from fiscal years 2018\u20132028\u2014about 70 percent more than the $1.4 billion average from fiscal years 2007\u20132017 (see figure). For example, USPS plans to acquire a new fleet of delivery vehicles starting in 2019 to replace its aging existing fleet and plans to purchase new mail-processing equipment to increase efficiency. However, USPS faces a serious financial situation with insufficient revenues to cover expenses. This uncertainty may result in USPS's making capital-spending prioritization decisions that can lead to tradeoffs across planned capital projects and potentially between capital spending and other organizational needs such as operational expenses. Such prioritization could lead to USPS's undertaking less capital spending than currently projected in the absence of increased revenues or decreased expenses.\nUSPS has processes that help it identify the uncertainties and risks that may affect its capital spending and adjusts its capital spending accordingly, in line with internal control standards adopted by USPS. For example, USPS identifies organizational uncertainties, such as mail volumes and revenues, as part of its strategic planning process and considers them when creating its capital spending budget. It also identifies individual project risks through a project review process, and considers tradeoffs inherent in different project scenarios. USPS's processes also allow it to respond to these uncertainties and risks. Specifically, USPS sets a capital-spending budget in its overall financial plan, to help ensure that spending is in line with expected resources. USPS's process also allows it to shift funds if needed, such as to repair a facility damaged during a natural disaster. USPS also reviews individual capital projects during implementation and can change specifications or time frames based on changing circumstances.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_857"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_858","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nVictims of federal crimes may be compensated for their losses through criminal proceedings when federal courts order restitution during a defendant's sentencing. Federal law dictates the crimes for which restitution is mandatory versus discretionary and what types of losses may be compensated. Federal prosecutors and Department of Justice officials are responsible for proving and litigating issues related to victims' losses for restitution orders, enforcing orders of restitution, and collecting criminal debt, including unpaid restitution.\nThe Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-324, contains a provision for GAO to conduct a review on the factors that should be considered when broadening restitution provisions. This report describes factors stakeholders believe should be considered for a potential expansion of federal courts' authority to award restitution.\nTo gather information on factors, GAO interviewed a non-generalizable group of stakeholders knowledgeable about the restitution process, including individuals and entities representing federal judges and court officials, federal prosecutors and Department of Justice officials, victims, and defendants and their counsel. GAO also reviewed relevant federal laws, legal cases, agency documentation, summary data on orders for restitution from fiscal years 1996 through 2016, and the amount of outstanding restitution debt owed in federal cases as of the end of fiscal year 2016.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFederal courts have authority to award restitution for authorized losses to eligible victims. Generally, victims are those directly and proximately harmed as a result of a defendant's offense of conviction and they may be awarded compensation for their actual or \u201cout-of-pocket\u201d losses. Provisions for the potential expansion of restitution contained in the Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016 that GAO reviewed could allow for courts to award restitution to additional victims and for a greater scope of losses. Stakeholders GAO interviewed identified various factors to consider related to these potential expansion provisions, for example:\nRestitution for related conduct and no proximate cause requirement . A factor stakeholders stated should be considered in potentially allowing restitution for conduct that is broader than the offense of conviction was that it could be a violation of a defendant's constitutional right to due process because restitution could be awarded for conduct for which the defendant's guilt was not established. In addition, they said it could lead to increased complexity to determine victim losses, which could create challenges for federal prosecutors and could result in less restitution being awarded. For a potential expansion of restitution to compensate harm that was not proximately caused by the defendant (i.e., harm that was not reasonably foreseeable as a result of the offense) stakeholders said factors that should be considered include that the current proximate harm requirement does not present challenges and that such an expansion could lead to additional sentencing-related hearings and litigation.\nRestitution to restore victims to their position had the offense not been committed . Stakeholders said this provision is already a goal of federal restitution, but that a potential expansion could allow judges more discretion to order restitution for victim losses not specified by statute, which could help restore the victim to his or her pre-offense condition.\nRestitution for any injury, harm, or loss, including emotional distress . A factor stakeholders identified in potentially expanding restitution to cover intangible losses, including emotional distress, included that it could increase the complexity of the restitution process because these are not easily quantified losses. Relatedly, stakeholders said that the suitability of criminal versus civil proceedings should be considered because the civil system, through which crime victims may seek compensation at their own expense, is set up to handle these issues and losses, whereas officials involved in criminal cases lack the specialized skills to determine these kinds of losses.\nStakeholders GAO interviewed identified additional factors related to the potential broadening of courts' authority to order restitution generally; for example, they told GAO that increased restitution debt and collectability challenges should be considered. According to the Department of Justice, the amount of outstanding restitution debt owed in federal cases as of the end of fiscal year 2016 was $110.2 billion. Stakeholders stated that defendants often lack the financial resources to pay restitution and adding to the uncollected restitution debt through a potential expansion of authority could lead to further collection challenges.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_858"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_859","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe federal government plans to invest almost $96 billion on IT in fiscal year 2018. Historically, these investments have too often failed, incurred cost overruns and schedule slippages, or contributed little to mission-related outcomes. Accordingly, in December 2014, Congress enacted FITARA, aimed at improving agencies' acquisitions of IT. Further, in February 2015, GAO added improving the management of IT acquisitions and operations to its high-risk list.\nThis statement summarizes agencies' progress in improving the management of IT acquisitions and operations. It is based on GAO's prior and recently published reports on (1) data center consolidation, (2) risk levels of major investments as reported on OMB's IT Dashboard, (3) implementation of incremental development practices, and (4) management of software licenses.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and federal agencies have taken steps to improve the management of information technology (IT) acquisitions and operations through a series of initiatives, and as of November 2017, had fully implemented about 56 percent of the approximately 800 related GAO recommendations made between fiscal years 2010 through 2015. However, important additional actions are needed.\nConsolidating data centers . OMB launched an initiative in 2010 to reduce data centers, which was reinforced by the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) in 2014. However, in a series of reports that GAO issued over the past 6 years, it noted that, while data center consolidation could potentially save the federal government billions of dollars, weaknesses existed in several areas, including agencies' data center consolidation plans, data center optimization, and OMB's tracking and reporting on related cost savings. These reports contained a matter for Congressional consideration, and a total of 160 recommendations to OMB and 24 agencies, to improve the execution and oversight of the initiative. Most agencies and OMB agreed with the recommendations or had no comments. As of November 2017, 84 of the recommendations remained open.\nEnhancing transparency . OMB's IT Dashboard provides information on major investments at federal agencies, including ratings from Chief Information Officers that should reflect the level of risk facing an investment. Over the past 6 years, GAO has issued a series of reports about the Dashboard that noted both significant steps OMB has taken to enhance the oversight, transparency, and accountability of federal IT investments by creating its Dashboard, as well as concerns about the accuracy and reliability of the data. In total, GAO has made 47 recommendations to OMB and federal agencies to help improve the accuracy and reliability of the information on the Dashboard and to increase its availability. Most agencies agreed with the recommendations or had no comments. As of November 2017, 25 of these recommendations remained open.\nImplementing incremental development . OMB has emphasized the need for agencies to deliver investments in smaller parts, or increments, in order to reduce risk and deliver capabilities more quickly. Since 2012, OMB has required investments to deliver functionality every 6 months. Further, GAO has issued reports highlighting additional actions needed by OMB and agencies to improve their implementation of incremental development. In these reports, GAO made 42 recommendations. Most agencies agreed or did not comment on the recommendations. As of November 2017, 34 of the recommendations remained open.\nManaging software licenses . Effective management of software licenses can help avoid purchasing too many licenses that result in unused software. In May 2014, GAO reported that better management of licenses was needed to achieve savings, and made 136 recommendations to improve such management. Most agencies generally agreed with the recommendations or had no comments. As of November 2017, 112 of the recommendations remained open.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nFrom fiscal years 2010 through 2015, GAO made about 800 recommendations to OMB and federal agencies to address shortcomings in IT acquisitions and operations, and included recommendations to improve the oversight and execution of the data center consolidation initiative, the accuracy and reliability of the Dashboard, incremental development policies, and software license management. Most agencies agreed with GAO's recommendations and had taken some actions or had no comments. In addition, from fiscal year 2016 to present, GAO has made more than 200 new recommendations in this area. GAO will continue to monitor agencies' implementation of these recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_859"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_860","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nStrong preventive controls can help IRS defend itself against identity theft refund fraud. These controls include taxpayer authentication\u2014the process by which IRS verifies identities before allowing people access to a resource; sensitive data; or, in some cases, a tax refund. The risk of fraud has increased as more personally identifiable information has become available as a result of, for example, large-scale cyberattacks on various entities. IRS's ability to continuously monitor and improve taxpayer authentication is a critical step in protecting billions of dollars from fraudsters.\nGAO was asked to examine IRS's efforts to authenticate taxpayers. This report (1) describes the taxpayer interactions that require authentication and IRS's methods; (2) assesses what IRS is doing to monitor and improve taxpayer authentication; and (3) determines what else, if anything, IRS can do to strengthen taxpayer authentication in the future.\nTo meet these objectives, GAO reviewed IRS documents and data, evaluated IRS processes against relevant federal internal control standards and guidance, and interviewed IRS officials and state and industry representatives.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has identified over 100 interactions requiring taxpayer authentication based on potential risks to IRS and individuals. IRS authenticates millions of taxpayers each year via telephone, online, in person, and correspondence to ensure that it is interacting with legitimate taxpayers. IRS's estimated costs to authenticate taxpayers vary by channel.\nIRS has made progress on monitoring and improving authentication, including developing an authentication strategy with high-level strategic efforts. However, it has not prioritized the initiatives supporting its strategy nor identified the resources required to complete them, consistent with program management leading practices. Doing so would help IRS clarify relationships between its authentication efforts and articulate resource needs relative to expected benefits. Further, while IRS regularly assesses risks to and monitors its online authentication applications, it has not established equally rigorous internal controls for its telephone, in-person, and correspondence channels, including mechanisms to collect reliable, useful data to monitor authentication outcomes. As a result, IRS may not identify current or emerging threats to the tax system.\nIRS can further strengthen authentication to stay ahead of fraudsters. While IRS has taken preliminary steps to implement National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) new guidance for secure digital authentication, it does not have clear plans and timelines to fully implement it by June 2018, as required by the Office of Management and Budget. As a result, IRS may not be positioned to address its most vulnerable authentication areas in a timely manner. Further, IRS lacks a comprehensive process to evaluate potential new authentication technologies. Industry representatives, financial institutions, and government officials told GAO that the best authentication approach relies on multiple strategies and sources of information, while giving taxpayers options for actively protecting their identity. Evaluating alternatives for taxpayer authentication will help IRS avoid missing opportunities for improving authentication.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making 11 recommendations to IRS to estimate resources for and prioritize its authentication initiatives, address internal control issues to better monitor authentication, develop a plan to fully implement new NIST guidance, and develop a process to evaluate potential authentication technologies. IRS agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_860"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_861","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) remains on GAO's High-Risk List in part because of its long-standing financial management deficiencies, which have prevented it from having auditable financial statements. One of the contributing factors is the billions of dollars of unsupported JVs within DOD's accounting systems, with the largest portion attributable to the Army's general fund. Because the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 required that DOD submit audit results to Congress for fiscal year 2018, a Working Group was established to address the Army's unsupported JVs, including analyzing root causes and developing corrective action plans.\nThis report examines to what extent the Working Group, as of March 2017, has performed analyses and developed corrective action plans to address identified root causes. GAO reviewed and analyzed relevant documentation and interviewed agency officials and members of the Working Group.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nSince February 2015, the Journal Voucher Working Group (Working Group), which is comprised of Department of the Army (Army) and Defense Finance and Accounting Service personnel, has been actively working toward implementing new processes to address inadequate support for journal vouchers (JV) in the Army's general fund. JVs are accounting entries manually entered or system generated to record corrections or adjustments in an accounting system. From October 2016 to March 2017, the Working Group identified more than 121,000 unsupported JVs totaling $455 billion in one of its reporting systems, Defense Departmental Reporting System-Budgetary (DDRS-B).\nIn the May 2017 Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness Plan Status Report, the Army stated that it had completed its root cause analyses for all JVs. However, GAO found that the Working Group had conducted the analyses on only a small percentage of the total number of unsupported JVs that existed as of March 2017. Specifically, as of March 2017, the Working Group had been focusing on manual JVs processed in DDRS-B, which only represent 10 percent of the dollar value and 3 percent in the total number of unsupported JVs in that system alone. Therefore, the analyses cannot be considered complete because the Working Group had not yet analyzed the remainder of the population, including those in other systems. Members of the Working Group indicated that in March 2017, the Working Group began including system-generated JVs in its analyses, which made up 90 percent in dollar value and 97 percent in total number of unsupported JVs processed in DDRS-B as of March 2017, but had not yet begun identifying any root causes. Members of the Working Group stated that these efforts will be an ongoing, iterative process because of anticipated new challenges that continually arise from new business processes or programs.\nAs of March 2017, the Working Group reported that it had developed 38 corrective action plans to address all of the identified root causes of unsupported manual JVs in DDRS-B for the Army's general fund. According to members of the Working Group, 18 of the 38 have been implemented. However, the Working Group is unable to determine how many more corrective action plans will need to be developed to resolve the unsupported JV issue until the root cause analyses are complete. Further, GAO found that the Working Group's monitoring of corrective action plan implementation does not include a method that sufficiently identifies the progress toward fully addressing the issue of unsupported JVs or to what extent each implemented corrective action plan has reduced unsupported JVs. Members of the Working Group stated that the Working Group uses monthly JV metrics reports to monitor its implemented corrective actions, but the reports are not designed to provide the level of detail necessary to sufficiently monitor whether root causes identified are resolved through corrective action plans. Therefore, the metrics cannot demonstrate to what extent the Working Group has reduced unsupported JVs and how much more effort is required to fully address the issue and help ensure that the Army's financial statements are auditable for fiscal year 2018.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that the Army (1) ensure that the entire population of unsupported JVs is identified and analyzed and (2) develop metrics that sufficiently monitor the extent to which the Working Group has identified root causes and determine the extent to which unsupported JVs are being reduced based on the implemented corrective actions. The Army concurred with GAO's recommendations and provided information on actions it has taken or plans to take to address them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_861"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_862","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nPuerto Rico has roughly $70 billion in outstanding debt and $50 billion in unfunded pension liabilities and since August 2015 has defaulted on over $1.5 billion in debt. The effects of Hurricanes Irma and Maria will further affect Puerto Rico's ability to repay its debt, as well as its economic condition. In response to Puerto Rico's fiscal crisis, Congress passed the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Security Act (PROMESA) in 2016, which included a provision for GAO to review Puerto Rico's debt.\nThis report describes the factors that contributed to Puerto Rico's financial condition and levels of debt and federal actions that could address these factors. Consistent with PROMESA, GAO focused on actions that would not increase the federal deficit.\nTo address these objectives, GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from the Puerto Rico and federal governments and conducted a review of relevant literature. GAO also interviewed former Puerto Rico officials and experts in Puerto Rico's economy, the municipal securities markets, and state and territorial budgeting, financial management, and debt practices, as well as officials from the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico (created by PROMESA).\nGAO is not making recommendations based on the federal actions identified because policymakers would need to consider challenges and tradeoffs related to implementation.\nThe Puerto Rico government generally agreed with the factors we identified and provided additional information. GAO incorporated technical comments from SEC as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe factors that contributed to Puerto Rico's financial condition and levels of debt relate to (1) the Puerto Rico government running persistent annual deficits\u2014where expenses exceed revenues\u2014and (2) its use of debt to cope with deficits. Based on a literature review and interviews with current and former Puerto Rico officials, federal officials, and other relevant experts, GAO identified factors that contributed to Puerto Rico's persistent deficits:\nThe Puerto Rico government's inadequate financial management and oversight practices. For example, the Puerto Rico government frequently overestimated the amount of revenue it would collect and Puerto Rico's agencies regularly spent more than the amounts Puerto Rico's legislature appropriated for a given fiscal year.\nPolicy decisions by Puerto Rico's government. For example, Puerto Rico borrowed funds to balance budgets and insufficiently addressed public pension funding shortfalls.\nPuerto Rico's prolonged economic contraction. Examples of factors contributing to the contraction include outmigration and the resulting diminished labor force, and the high cost of importing goods and energy.\nAdditional factors enabled Puerto Rico to use debt to finance its deficits, such as high demand for Puerto Rico debt. One cause of high demand was that under federal law, income from Puerto Rico bonds generally receives more favorable tax treatment than income from bonds issued by states and their localities.\nBased on an assessment of relevant literature and input from current and former Puerto Rico officials, federal officials, and other relevant experts, GAO identified three potential federal actions that may help address some of these factors. GAO also identified considerations for policymakers related to these actions.\nModify the tax exempt status for Puerto Rico municipal debt. Making interest income from Puerto Rico bonds earned by investors residing outside of Puerto Rico subject to applicable state and local taxes could lower demand for Puerto Rico debt. However, reduced demand could hinder Puerto Rico's ability to borrow funds for capital investments or liquidity.\nApply federal investor protection laws to Puerto Rico. Requiring Puerto Rico investment companies to disclose risks with Puerto Rico bonds and adhere to other requirements could lower demand for the bonds. However, this action could also limit Puerto Rico's ability to borrow funds.\nModify the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) authority over municipal bond disclosure requirements. SEC could be allowed to require timely disclosure of materials\u2014such as audited financial statements\u2014associated with municipal bonds. Over the past decade, Puerto Rico often failed to provide timely audited financial statements related to its municipal bonds. Timely disclosure could help investors make informed decisions about investing in municipal bonds. However, a broad requirement could place additional burdens on all U.S. municipal issuers, such as the costs of standardizing reporting.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_862"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_863","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Coast Guard, within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is charged with preventing loss of life, injury, and property damage in the maritime environment through its SAR mission. It maintains over 200 stations with various assets, such as boats and helicopters (depending on the station), along U.S. coasts and inland waterways to carry out this mission, as well as its other missions such as maritime security. Resource limitations and changes to operations require the Coast Guard to periodically reexamine the need for these stations. GAO was asked to review these efforts.\nThis report addresses, among other objectives, the extent to which the Coast Guard has (1) a sound process for analyzing the need for its boat stations and (2) taken actions to implement its boat station process results. GAO reviewed Coast Guard laws, standards, and guidance; analyzed Coast Guard data on station locations and SAR coverage; and analyzed the process and criteria used to evaluate its station needs and compared it with established evaluation design practices and internal control standards. GAO also interviewed Coast Guard officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO found that the U.S. Coast Guard has a sound process for analyzing its boat stations that includes clear and specific steps for analyzing the need for stations using terms that can be readily defined and measured. In 2013, following this process, the Coast Guard and its contractor identified 18 unnecessarily duplicative boat stations with overlapping coverage that could be permanently closed without negatively affecting the Coast Guard's ability to meet its 2-hour search and rescue (SAR) response standard and other mission requirements. The process was designed to ensure the Coast Guard met or exceeded requirements to maintain SAR coverage and to account for such factors as boat downtime and surge capacity to respond to certain incidents. Further, the boat station analysis did not consider potential SAR responses by the Coast Guard's air stations and facilities, which can provide additional overlapping coverage. Coast Guard officials said that the closures would, among other things, help improve operations by consolidating boat station caseloads to help ensure personnel were active enough to maintain training requirements.\nIn 2017, the Coast Guard affirmed that its leadership believes the 2013 study remains valid, but so far the agency has not taken actions to implement the closures identified by its sound process. Instead, the Coast Guard is recommending conversion of some year-round stations to seasonal stations that would operate during the summer. Coast Guard officials stated that seasonal closures are preferable to no action, given its limited resources, the significant overlapping SAR coverage, and potential to improve operations. However, permanently closing unnecessarily duplicative stations may better position the Coast Guard to improve its operations. It could also achieve up to $290 million in cost savings over 20 years, if stations were permanently closed.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making three recommendations, including one recommendation that the Coast Guard close unnecessarily duplicative stations that its analysis identified. DHS concurred with the recommendations and stated it plans to act to eliminate unnecessary duplication.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_863"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_864","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nTo reform the federal government and make it more efficient and effective, agencies need to use data about program performance. The benefit of collecting performance information is only fully realized when it is used by managers to make decisions aimed at improving results.\nGAO was asked to review agencies' use of performance information. This report assesses, among other things, the extent to which: (1) 24 agencies' reported use of performance information and related leading practices has changed since 2013 and (2) the Executive Branch has taken actions to enhance the use of performance information.\nTo address the first objective, GAO analyzed results from its 2017 survey of federal managers, and compared them to 2013 results. The survey covered a stratified random sample of 4,395 managers from the 24 Chief Financial Officers Act agencies. The survey had a 67 percent response rate and results can be generalized to the population of managers government-wide and at each agency. For the second objective, GAO reviewed agency documents and interviewed staff from OMB and the PIC.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAgencies' reported use of performance information to make decisions, and leading practices that can promote such use, generally has not improved since GAO's last survey of federal managers in 2013. However, GAO's survey results continue to point to certain practices that could help agencies improve managers' use of performance information. For example, as shown in the table below, GAO's survey found that managers whose programs were subject to data-driven reviews (regular reviews used to assess progress on select agency goals) to a greater extent reported statistically significantly greater use of performance information to make decisions.\nThe Executive Branch has begun taking steps to improve the use of performance information within agencies and across the government. For example,\nIn the President's Management Agenda and government-wide reform plan, released in March and June 2018 respectively, the administration acknowledged the need to do more, and announced a goal, among other actions, to improve the use of data in federal decision making. However, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and others responsible for this goal have yet to fully develop action plans to hold agencies accountable for achieving it.\nThe Performance Improvement Council (PIC), which is chaired by OMB, has undertaken efforts to improve the use of performance information by, for example, creating a working group on agency performance reviews. But it has not yet taken a systematic approach to identify and share proven practices that led to, or challenges that may be hampering, increased use of performance information by managers. GAO's survey results identified agencies that may have insights into such practices and challenges.\nMore fully developing action plans for the new goal, and identifying and sharing proven practices and challenges, could help ensure the Executive Branch takes further steps to improve the use of performance information by managers within agencies and across the federal government.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nTo improve the use of performance information within agencies and across the federal government, GAO recommends that OMB work with (1) fellow goal leaders to more fully develop action plans for the new goal to improve the use of data and (2) the PIC to prioritize efforts to identify and share proven practices and challenges. OMB had no comments on this report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_864"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_865","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nOne of the Bureau's most important functions is to conduct a complete and accurate decennial census of the U.S. population. The decennial census is mandated by the Constitution and provides vital data for the nation. A complete count of the nation's population is an enormous undertaking as the Bureau seeks to control the cost of the census, implement operational innovations, and use new and modified IT systems. In recent years, GAO has identified challenges that raise serious concerns about the Bureau's ability to conduct a cost-effective count. For these reasons, GAO added the 2020 Census to its High-Risk list in February 2017.\nIn light of these challenges, GAO was asked to testify about the reasons the 2020 Census was placed on the High-Risk List. To do so, GAO summarized its prior work regarding the Bureau's planning efforts for the 2020 Census. GAO also included observations from its ongoing work on the 2018 End-to-End Test. This information is related to, among other things, recent decisions on preparations for the 2020 Census; progress on key systems to be used for the 2018 End-to-End Test, including the status of IT security assessments; execution of the address canvassing operation at the test sites; and efforts to update the life-cycle cost estimate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO added the 2020 Census to its high-risk list because of challenges associated with (1) developing and testing key innovations; (2) implementing and securing IT systems; and (3) controlling any further cost growth and preparing reliable cost estimates. The Census Bureau (Bureau) is planning several innovations for the 2020 Decennial Census, including re-engineering field operations by relying on automation, using administrative records to supplement census data, verifying addresses in-office using on-screen imagery, and allowing the public to respond using the Internet. These innovations show promise for controlling costs, but they also introduce new risks, in part because they have not been used extensively in earlier enumerations, if at all. As a result, robust testing is needed to ensure that key systems and operations will function as planned. However, citing budgetary uncertainties, the Bureau canceled its 2017 field test and then scaled back its 2018 End-to End Test. Without sufficient testing, operational problems can go undiscovered and the opportunity to improve operations will be lost, as key census-taking activities will not be tested across a range of geographic locations, housing types, and demographic groups.\nThe Bureau continues to face challenges in managing and overseeing the information technology (IT) programs, systems, and contracts supporting the 2020 Census. For example, GAO's ongoing work indicates that the system development schedule leading up to the 2018 End-to-End test has experienced several delays. Further, the Bureau has not addressed several security risks and challenges to secure its systems and data, including making certain that security assessments are completed in a timely manner and that risks are at an acceptable level. Given that certain operations for the 2018 End-to-End Test began in August 2017, it is important that the Bureau quickly address these challenges. GAO plans to monitor the Bureau's progress as part of its ongoing work.\nIn addition, the Bureau needs to control any further cost growth and develop cost estimates that reflect best practices. Earlier this month, the Department of Commerce (Department) announced that it had updated the October 2015 life-cycle cost-estimate and now projects the life-cycle cost of the 2020 Census will be $15.6 billion, more than $3 billion (27 percent) increase over its earlier estimate. The higher estimated life-cycle cost is due, in part, to the Bureau's failure to meet best practices for a quality cost-estimate. The Bureau and Department are still finalizing the documentation used to develop the $15.6 billion cost-estimate. Until these documents are complete and made available for inspection, GAO cannot determine the reliability of the estimate.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nOver the past decade, we have made 84 recommendations specific to the 2020 Census to address the issues raised in this testimony and others. The Bureau generally has agreed with our recommendations. As of October 2017, 36 recommendations had not been implemented.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_865"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_866","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn recent decades, many new regulations intended to strengthen financial soundness, improve consumer protections, and aid anti-money laundering efforts were implemented for financial institutions. Smaller community banks and credit unions must comply with some of the regulations, but compliance can be more challenging and costly for these institutions. GAO examined (1) the regulations community banks and credit unions viewed as most burdensome and why, and (2) efforts by depository institution regulators to reduce any regulatory burden. GAO analyzed regulations and interviewed more than 60 community banks and credit unions (selected based on asset size and financial activities), regulators, and industry associations and consumer groups. GAO also analyzed letters and transcripts commenting on regulatory burden that regulators prepared responding to the comments.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nInterviews and focus groups GAO conducted with representatives of over 60 community banks and credit unions indicated regulations for reporting mortgage characteristics, reviewing transactions for potentially illicit activity, and disclosing mortgage terms and costs to consumers were the most burdensome. Institution representatives said these regulations were time-consuming and costly to comply with, in part because the requirements were complex, required individual reports that had to be reviewed for accuracy, or mandated actions within specific timeframes. However, regulators and others noted that the regulations were essential to preventing lending discrimination and use of the banking system for illicit activity, and they were acting to reduce compliance burdens. Institution representatives also said that the new mortgage disclosure regulations increased compliance costs, added significant time to loan closings, and resulted in institutions absorbing costs when others, such as appraisers and inspectors, changed disclosed fees. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued guidance and conducted other outreach to educate institutions after issuing these regulations in 2013. But GAO found that some compliance burdens arose from misunderstanding the disclosure regulations\u2014which in turn may have led institutions to take actions not actually required. Assessing the effectiveness of the guidance for the disclosure regulations could help mitigate the misunderstandings and thus also reduce compliance burdens.\nRegulators of community banks and credit unions\u2014the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the National Credit Union Administration\u2014conduct decennial reviews to obtain industry comments on regulatory burden. But the reviews, conducted under the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996 (EGRPRA), had the following limitations:\nCFPB and the consumer financial regulations for which it is responsible were not included.\nUnlike executive branch agencies, the depository institution regulators are not required to analyze and report quantitative-based rationales for their responses to comments.\nRegulators do not assess the cumulative burden of the regulations they administer.\nCFPB has formed an internal group that will be tasked with reviewing regulations it administers, but the agency has not publicly announced the scope of regulations included, the timing and frequency of the reviews, and the extent to which they will be coordinated with the other federal banking and credit union regulators as part of their periodic EGRPRA reviews. Congressional intent in mandating that these regulators review their regulations was that the cumulative effect of all federal financial regulations be considered. In addition, sound practices required of other federal agencies require them to analyze and report their assessments when reviewing regulations. Documenting in plans how the depository institution regulators would address these EGRPRA limitations would better ensure that all regulations relevant to community banks and credit unions were reviewed, likely improve the analyses the regulators perform, and potentially result in additional burden reduction.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO makes a total of 10 recommendations to CFPB and the depository institution regulators. CFPB should assess the effectiveness of guidance on mortgage disclosure regulations and publicly issue its plans for the scope and timing of its regulation reviews and coordinate these with the other regulators' review process. As part of their burden reviews, the depository institution regulators should develop plans to report quantitative rationales for their actions and addressing the cumulative burden of regulations. In written comments, CFPB and the four depository institution regulators generally agreed with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_866"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_867","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn 2016, USPS handled over 1 billion pieces of international mail\u2014both inbound (received from other countries) and outbound (sent to other countries). International mail is governed by the UPU, which is comprised of over 190 member countries, including the United States. The UPU establishes remuneration rates, called terminal dues, for certain types of international mail exchanged between member countries. Questions have been raised about how current and future planned rates for terminal dues affect USPS and other stakeholders that are involved in international mail. GAO was asked to review the terminal dues system.\nAmong other issues, this report examines the financial effects of: (1) the current UPU rates for terminal dues and (2) the planned changes to those rates on USPS and mail stakeholders. GAO analyzed USPS's mail data for fiscal years 2012\u20132016; USPS's, the Postal Regulatory Commission's (PRC), and UPU's policies and documents; and applicable U.S. statutes. GAO interviewed USPS, PRC, and Department of State officials, and mail stakeholders, including U.S. companies, such as FedEx and UPS, and consultants. These stakeholders were identified through public comments made to PRC on proposals related to terminal dues. While not generalizable, the views provide illustrative examples.\nThis is a public version of a sensitive but unclassified report issued in August 2017. Information related to USPS's revenues, costs, and volumes for international mail that USPS has deemed proprietary has been omitted from this report.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Universal Postal Union (UPU), a specialized agency of the United Nations, created the terminal dues system so that designated postal operators in member countries could compensate designated postal operators in other countries for delivering mail in those countries. GAO found that it is not possible to quantify the financial effects of the terminal dues system on various U.S. mail stakeholders because the data needed to conduct such an analysis are not readily available. However, stakeholders GAO spoke with and literature GAO reviewed described differing impacts of the terminal dues system on U.S. stakeholders. For example,\nAnalysis by the United States Postal Service (USPS)\u2014the U.S. designated postal operator\u2014found that the rates for inbound international terminal dues mail does not cover its costs for delivering that mail in the United States. As a result, USPS's net losses on this type of mail more than doubled between 2012 and 2016. In contrast, USPS analysis indicates that the rates for outbound international terminal dues mail has resulted in net positive revenues for USPS, which offset the losses from inbound terminal dues mail.\nU.S. businesses that send outbound terminal dues mail may benefit to the extent that their costs to mail items to certain countries through USPS may be lower than the actual mail delivery costs in those countries.\nU.S. consumers who receive imported products may pay lower mailing costs for products originating from low terminal dues rate countries.\nExpress consignment operators such as FedEx and the United Parcel Service said the terminal dues system creates a competitive disadvantage for them. Representatives from these companies said that they have difficulty competing for some international mail business because they cannot offer pricing as low as the postage based on the terminal dues rates offered by designated postal operators.\nThe UPU adopted increased terminal dues rates for member countries starting in 2018. GAO found that these planned changes could affect U.S. stakeholders differently, but the effects are also difficult to quantify because of limited information and forecasting variability. Nevertheless, stakeholders identified examples of the potential effects that the planned changes could have on them. For example:\nFor USPS, an increase in inbound terminal dues rates should reduce related losses for delivering this mail; although USPS's costs may increase from paying higher terminal dues rates to countries where USPS sends most of its outbound terminal dues mail.\nU.S. businesses that send outbound terminal dues mail may have to pay higher postage to USPS to cover the increase in terminal dues rates to send mail to other countries, thus increasing costs to them.\nU.S. consumers who receive lower-priced imported products may experience a reduced benefit because of the higher terminal dues rates for inbound mail.\nThe increased rates for inbound terminal dues mail may allow rates offered by express consignment operators to become more competitive as they may be able to offer their mail products at more comparable costs.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_867"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_868","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFiscal sustainability presents a national challenge shared by all levels of government. Since 2007, GAO has published simulations of long-term fiscal trends in the state and local government sector, which have consistently shown that the sector faces long-term fiscal pressures. While most states have requirements related to balancing their budgets, deficits can arise because the planned annual revenues are not generated at the expected rate, demand for services exceeds planned expenditures, or both, resulting in a near-term operating deficit.\nThis report updates GAO's state and local fiscal model to simulate the fiscal outlook for the state and local government sector. This includes identifying the components of state and local expenditures likely to contribute to the sector's fiscal pressures. In addition, this report identifies considerations related to federal policy and other factors that could contribute to uncertainties in the state and local government sector's long-term fiscal outlook.\nGAO's model uses the Bureau of Economic Analysis's National Income and Product Accounts as the primary data source and presents the results in the aggregate for the state and local sector as a whole. The model shows the level of receipts and expenditures for the sector until 2067, based on current and historical spending and revenue patterns. In addition, the model assumes that the current set of policies in place across state and local government remains constant to show a simulated long-term outlook.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO's simulations suggest that the state and local government sector will likely face an increasing difference between revenues and expenditures during the next 50 years as reflected by the operating balance--a measure of the sector's ability to cover its current expenditures out of its current receipts. While both expenditures and revenues are projected to increase as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), a difference between the two is projected to persist because expenditures are expected to grow faster than revenues throughout the simulation period.\nGAO's simulations also suggest that growth in the sector's overall spending is largely driven by health care expenditures--in particular, Medicaid spending and spending on health benefits for state and local government employees and retirees. These expenditures are projected to grow as a share of GDP during the simulation period. GAO's simulations also suggest that revenues from personal income taxes and federal grants to states and localities will increase during the simulation period. However, revenues will grow more slowly than expenditures such that the sector faces a declining fiscal outlook.\nGAO also identified federal policy changes that could affect the state and local government sector's fiscal outlook. For example, the effects of the recently-enacted Tax Cuts and Jobs Act will likely depend on how states incorporate the Act into their state income tax rules. In addition, other factors, such as economic growth and rates of return on pension assets, could shift future fiscal outcomes for the sector.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_868"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_869","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nEM's mission is to complete the cleanup of nuclear waste at 16 DOE sites and to work to reduce risks and costs within its established regulatory framework. In December 2018, DOE reported that it faced an estimated $494 billion in future environmental cleanup costs\u2014a liability that roughly tripled during the previous 20 years.\nGAO was asked to examine EM's operations activities. This report examines, among other objectives, (1) how EM manages its cleanup work and (2) the extent to which EM's cleanup policy follows selected leading practices for program and project management.\nTo do this work, GAO reviewed agency documents and interviewed DOE project management experts and EM officials. GAO compared EM's policy with selected leading practices endorsed by the Project Management Institute for program and project management related to scope, cost, schedule, and independent review.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) manages most of its cleanup of nuclear waste (77 percent of its fiscal year 2019 budget) under a category that EM refers to as operations activities, using less stringent requirements than a category of work, known as capital asset projects. (See figure) Capital asset projects\u2014which involve the acquisition of land and other assets, including through environmental remediation\u2014must undergo a series of reviews by independent experts and DOE's senior leadership. In contrast, operations activities are not reviewed outside of EM. EM's policy defines operations activities as reoccurring facility or environmental operations, as well as activities that are project-like, with defined start and end dates. EM cleanup site managers have discretion on how to classify cleanup work because DOE and EM have not established classification requirements. Since 2015, experts in DOE's Office of Project Management have raised concerns that some operations activities should be classified as capital asset projects, and that managing them under less stringent requirements poses cost and schedule risks. For example, the experts stated the cleanup of tanks of radioactive liquid waste should be designated as capital asset projects. However, these experts also stated that EM did not respond to their concerns, even though the office has department-wide responsibilities for overseeing project management. Until EM works with DOE's Office of Project Management to establish requirements for classifying cleanup work, the department may incur more cost and schedule risks than it should.\nEM's cleanup policy does not follow any of 9 selected program management leading practices or 9 of 12 selected project management leading practices. For example, EM's 2017 cleanup policy does not follow the program management leading practice of conducting risk management throughout the life of a program or the project management leading practice of requiring independent reviews of operations activities. These leading practices help ensure that a program optimizes scope, cost, and schedule performance and that it achieves its goals and intended benefits. Until EM revises its cleanup policy to follow leading practices, EM's operations activities are at risk of uncontrolled changes to scope, exceeding initial budget and schedule, and failing to meet their original goals.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making seven recommendations, including that EM (1) establish cleanup work classification requirements and (2) revise its cleanup policy to follow program and project management leading practices. DOE generally agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_869"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_870","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOD obligated about $300 billion through contracts for goods and services in fiscal year 2016. When awarding a contract competitively, DOD may use the LPTA source selection process to select the lowest-priced offer that is technically acceptable. In contrast, DOD may use the trade-off source selection process to award a higher-priced contract to a firm if the firm's offer provides greater benefit and it is worth paying the additional cost. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 calls on DOD to avoid using the LPTA process for information technology, cybersecurity, and other knowledge-based professional support services.\nThe Act also included a provision for GAO to report on DOD's use of LPTA procedures for contracts valued at more than $10 million. This report assesses the (1) extent to which DOD used LPTA procedures for certain services, and (2) factors that contracting officials considered when deciding to use LPTA procedures.\nGAO reviewed data from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation to identify 781 contracts valued at $10 million or above awarded by the Army, Navy, and Air Force in the first half of fiscal year 2017, the most recent period for which data were available. GAO then selected 133 of these contracts for information technology and support services, which include services reflected in the Act. GAO identified that 9 contracts used LPTA procedures and reviewed 7 of these, including interviewing officials and reviewing contract documents.\nDOD had no comments on the draft report.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nDuring the first half of fiscal year 2017, the Army, Navy, and Air Force rarely used lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) source selection procedures when awarding contracts valued at $10 million or more for the types of services identified by the National Defense Authorization Act, such as information technology services. Department of Defense (DOD) guidance states that LPTA procedures are typically for requirements that are well-defined, commercial, or non-complex products or services with a minimal risk of unsuccessful contract performance. The figure shows the military departments' limited use of LPTA procedures for contracts for selected services.\nFor the 7 contracts that GAO reviewed, contracting officials determined that the government would not receive a benefit for paying more than the lowest price. Contracting officials also stated that LPTA was used, in part, because the requirements were well-defined, non-complex, or reoccurring. For example, the Navy used LPTA procedures to award a contract for commercially available monthly telephone maintenance services. In addition, the Air Force used LPTA procedures to award a contract for mail sorting and delivery. Section 813 of the fiscal year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act requires DOD to amend its regulations to require contracting officers to consider specific criteria when deciding to use LPTA procedures. DOD has not yet revised its regulations to implement Section 813. Nevertheless, for the 7 contracts GAO reviewed, contracting officials' considerations when choosing to use LPTA procedures were often consistent with most of these new criteria. DOD officials are currently developing the revisions to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement that are contemplated by Section 813.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_870"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_871","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOD spends billions of dollars each year on systems that support its key business areas, such as personnel and logistics. For fiscal year 2018, DOD reported that these business system investments are expected to cost about $8.7 billion. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2016 requires DOD to perform activities aimed at ensuring that business system investments are managed efficiently and effectively, to include taking steps to limit their complexity and cost.\nThe NDAA also includes a provision for GAO to report every 2 years on the extent to which DOD is complying with the act's provisions on business systems. For this report, GAO assessed, among other things, the department's guidance for managing defense business system investments and its business and IT enterprise architectures (i.e., descriptions of DOD's current and future business and IT environments and plans for transitioning to future environments). To do so, GAO compared the department's system certification guidance and architectures to the act's requirements. GAO also interviewed cognizant DOD officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) has made progress in complying with most legislative provisions for managing its defense business systems, but additional actions are needed. For example, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2016 required DOD and the military departments to issue guidance to address five requirements for reviewing and certifying the department's business systems. While DOD has issued guidance addressing all of these requirements, as of February 2018, the military departments had shown mixed progress.\n\u25cf Fully addressed: The department provided evidence that it fully addressed this requirement.\n\u25d0 Partially addressed: The department provided evidence that it addressed some, but not all, portions of this requirement.\n\u25cc Not addressed: The department did not provide any evidence that it addressed this requirement.\nSource: GAO analysis of Department of Defense documentation. | GAO-18-130\nThe military departments' officials described plans to address the gaps in their guidance; however, none had defined when planned actions are to be completed. Without guidance that addresses all five requirements, the military departments risk developing systems that, among other things, are overly complex and costly to maintain.\nDOD has efforts underway to improve its business enterprise architecture, but its information technology (IT) architecture is not complete. Specifically, DOD's business architecture includes content called for by the act. However, efforts to improve this architecture to enable the department to better achieve outcomes described by the act, such as routinely producing reliable business and financial information for management, continue to be in progress. In addition, DOD is updating its IT enterprise architecture, which describes, among other things, the department's computing infrastructure. However, the architecture lacks a road map for improving the department's IT and computing infrastructure for each of the major business processes. Moreover, the business and IT enterprise architectures have yet to be integrated, and DOD has not established a time frame for when it intends to do so. As a result, DOD lacks assurance that its IT infrastructure will support the department's business priorities and related business strategies.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making six recommendations, including that DOD and the military departments establish time frames for, and issue, required guidance; and that DOD develop a complete IT architecture and integrate its business and IT architectures. DOD concurred with three and partially concurred with three recommendations. GAO continues to believe all of the recommendations are warranted as discussed in this report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_871"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_872","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe IG Act established OIGs to conduct and supervise audits and investigations; recommend policies to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness; and prevent and detect fraud and abuse. The Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016 included a provision for GAO to review prolonged IG vacancies during which a temporary appointee has served as the head of the office. This report addresses (1) the status of IG vacancies as of the end of fiscal year 2017, and the number and duration of IG vacancies for fiscal years 2007 through 2016, and (2) the IG community's views about how IG vacancies impact the OIGs' ability to carry out their duties effectively, including views on the impact on independence.\nGAO analyzed data related to IG vacancies; interviewed officials from the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE); and conducted a web-based survey to obtain the views of (1) the 52 permanent IGs serving as of August 22, 2017; (2) 9 acting IGs who had served in OIGs that had vacancies of over 365 days during fiscal years 2014 through 2016; and (3) a stratified random sample of employees in OIGs with IG vacancies of over 365 days during fiscal years 2014 through 2016. Survey response rates ranged from 71 percent to 100 percent.\nCIGIE and nine OIGs provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFor the 10-year period covering fiscal years 2007 through 2016, 53 of the 64 IG Act OIGs experienced one or more periods of IG vacancy with the cumulative durations ranging from about 2 weeks to 6 years.\nPlan and conduct work. Overall, at least eight of the nine acting IGs responded \u201cno impact\u201d for the questions in this area. The estimated percentage of OIG employees who believed that working under an acting IG has \u201cno impact\u201d ranged by question from 49 percent to 69 percent, \u201cnegative impact\u201d ranged from about 8 percent to 24 percent, and \u201cpositive impact\u201d ranged from 6 percent to 13 percent.\nInteract with agency management. The responses of seven of the nine acting IGs and 63 percent to 65 percent of OIG employees indicated that an acting IG position had no impact in this area. Approximately 16 percent of the OIG employees believed that there was a negative impact on timely access to documentation, while 7 percent believed that there was a positive impact.\nManaging OIG and personnel. Four of the nine acting IGs and about 36 percent of OIG employees responded that an acting IG position had a negative impact on employee morale. An estimated 44 percent of employees believed that working under an acting IG had no impact on employee morale while about 10 percent believed it had a positive impact. Four acting IGs also responded that it had a negative impact on office restructuring.\nWith regard to independence, GAO's survey of permanent IGs found that while the majority who responded did not think that acting IGs are inherently less independent, they did indicate by a similar majority that an acting IG is less independent in appearance than a permanent IG, especially when the acting IG is applying for the IG position.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_872"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_873","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn 2016, SAMHSA estimated that about 10.4 million adults in the United States suffered from a serious mental illness, which generally includes conditions such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. As of May 27, 2017, BOP was responsible for overseeing 187,910 inmates and 7,831 of these inmates were considered to have a serious mental illness. Research has shown that inmates with serious mental illness are more likely to recidivate than those without.\nThe 21st Century Cures Act directed GAO to report on the prevalence of crimes committed by persons with serious mental illness and the costs to treat these offenders\u2014including identifying strategies for reducing recidivism among these individuals. This report discusses (1) what is known about crimes committed by inmates with serious mental illness incarcerated by the federal and selected state governments; (2) what is known about the costs to the federal and selected state governments to incarcerate and provide mental health care services to those individuals; and (3) what strategies have the federal and selected state governments and studies identified for reducing recidivism among individuals with serious mental illness.\nGAO selected six states that varied in their adult incarceration rates and provided geographic diversity. At BOP and the six states' departments of corrections, GAO analyzed criminal offense and incarceration and mental health care cost data and interviewed officials about strategies for reducing recidivism for inmates with serious mental illness. The results from these six states are not generalizable, but provide insights. GAO also reviewed studies that analyzed the relationship between various programs and recidivism among offenders with mental illness.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAbout two-thirds of inmates with a serious mental illness in the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) were incarcerated for four types of offenses\u2014drug (23 percent), sex offenses (18 percent), weapons and explosives (17 percent), and robbery (8 percent)\u2014as of May 27, 2017. GAO's analysis found that BOP inmates with serious mental illness were incarcerated for sex offenses, robbery, and homicide\/aggravated assault at about twice the rate of inmates without serious mental illness, and were incarcerated for drug and immigration offenses at about half or less the rate of inmates without serious mental illness. GAO also analyzed available data on three selected states' inmate populations and the most common crimes committed by inmates with serious mental illness varied from state to state due to different law enforcement priorities, definitions of serious mental illness and methods of tracking categories of crime in their respective data systems.\nBOP does not track costs related to incarcerating or providing mental health care services to inmates with serious mental illness, but BOP and selected states generally track these costs for all inmates. BOP does not track costs for inmates with serious mental illness in part because it does not track costs for individual inmates due to resource restrictions and the administrative burden such tracking would require. BOP does track costs associated with mental health care services system-wide and by institution. System-wide, for fiscal year 2016, BOP spent about $72 million on psychology services, $5.6 million on psychotropic drugs and $4.1 million on mental health care in residential reentry centers. The six state departments of corrections each used different methods and provided GAO with estimates for different types of mental health care costs. For example, two states provided average per-inmate costs of incarceration for mental health treatment units where some inmates with serious mental illness are treated; however, these included costs for inmates without serious mental illness housed in those units.\nDOJ, Department of Health and Human Service's Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), and criminal justice and mental health experts have developed a framework to reduce recidivism among adults with mental illness. The framework calls for correctional agencies to assess individuals' recidivism risk and substance abuse and mental health needs and target treatment to those with the highest risk of reoffending. To help implement this framework, SAMHSA, in collaboration with DOJ and other experts, developed guidance for mental health, correctional, and community stakeholders on (1) assessing risk and clinical needs, (2) planning treatment in custody and upon reentry based on risks and needs, (3) identifying post-release services, and (4) coordinating with community-based providers to avoid gaps in care. BOP and the six states also identified strategies for reducing recidivism consistent with this guidance, such as memoranda of understanding between correctional and mental health agencies to coordinate care. Further, GAO's literature review found that programs that reduced recidivism among offenders with mental illness generally offered multiple support services, such as mental health and substance abuse treatment, case management, and housing assistance.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_873"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_874","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nJWST, a large, deployable telescope, is one of NASA's most complex projects and top priorities. The project has delayed its planned launch three times since September 2017 due to problems discovered in testing. In June 2018, NASA approved new cost and schedule estimates for JWST. Since the project established its cost and schedule baselines in 2009, the project's costs have increased by 95 percent and the launch date has been moved back by 81 months.\nConference Report No. 112-284, accompanying the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, included a provision for GAO to assess the project annually and report on its progress. This is the seventh report. This report assesses (1) the considerations NASA took into account when updating the project's cost and schedule commitments and (2) the extent to which NASA has taken steps to improve oversight and performance of JWST, among other issues. GAO reviewed relevant NASA policies, analyzed NASA and contractor data, and interviewed NASA and contractor officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn June 2018, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) revised the cost and schedule commitments for the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) to reflect known technical challenges, as well as provide additional time to address unanticipated challenges. For example, the revised launch readiness date of March 2021 included 5.5 months to address a design issue for the cover of the sunshield (see image). The purpose of the sunshield is to protect the telescope's mirrors and instruments from the sun's heat. NASA found that hardware on the cover came loose during testing in April 2018. The new cost estimate of $9.7 billion is driven by the schedule extension, which requires keeping the contractor's workforce on board longer than expected.\nBefore the project enters its final phase of integration and test, it must conduct a review to determine if it can launch within its cost and schedule commitments. As part of this review, the project is not required to update its joint cost and schedule confidence level analysis\u2014an analysis that provides the probability the project can meet its cost and schedule commitments\u2014but government and industry cost and schedule experts have found it is a best practice to do so. Such analysis would provide NASA officials with better information to support decisions on allocating resources, especially in light of the project's recent cost and schedule growth.\nNASA has taken steps to improve oversight and performance of JWST, and identified the JWST project manager as responsible for monitoring the continued implementation of these changes. Examples of recent changes include increasing on-site presence at the contractor facility and conducting comprehensive audits of design processes. Sustaining focus on these changes through launch will be important if schedule pressures arise later and because of past challenges with communications. GAO will follow up on the project's monitoring of these improvements in future reviews.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends NASA update the project's joint cost and schedule confidence level analysis. NASA concurred with the recommendation made in this report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_874"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_875","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn 1998, terrorists bombed two U.S. embassies in East Africa, killing over 220 people and injuring more than 4,000 others. In 1999, State launched the CSCP with the primary goal of providing secure, safe, and functional workplaces, and OBO adopted a streamlined, standard design for all new embassies. In 2011, OBO shifted to the Excellence approach for new embassies, where greater use of custom designs is intended to improve embassies' functionality, quality, operating costs, and appearance.\nGAO was asked to review the performance of the CSCP. This report examines (1) the pace of the CSCP in constructing new embassies, (2) the cost and schedule performance of OBO's recent embassy construction projects, and (3) key factors that have affected State's ability to deliver construction projects efficiently. GAO analyzed information from State planning, funding, and reporting documents and interviewed State and contractor officials. As part of an assessment of nine construction case-study projects, selected for cost or schedule increases, GAO conducted four site visits to embassies under construction.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of State's (State) Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) has constructed new embassies at a slower pace than forecast due in part to unexpected building requirements and inflation. In 1999 State identified a need to replace 180 embassies. In 2005, with about 30 projects underway, State planned to replace the other 150 embassies by 2018. Since 1999, OBO has built 77 embassies under its Capital Security Construction Program (CSCP), at a total cost of about $24 billion as of fiscal year 2017. CSCP's pace has been affected by unexpected additional building requirements, such as office annexes and Marine quarters. Also, CSCP received only one program funding adjustment for inflation since 1999, and State does not intend to seek annual adjustments. Currently, OBO does not provide information on inflationary effects on CSCP or an estimated total capital investment or feasible time frames for the nearly 50 embassies identified for replacement beyond 2022. Lack of such information may affect stakeholders' ability to make informed budget decisions.\nWhile cost growth occurred on a majority of completed embassy projects and durations averaged about 36 months, these were generally within budgeting and planning allowances. GAO could not assess performance of Excellence projects because none had been completed as of the end of fiscal year 2017.\nStaffing workload and contractor collaboration have affected OBO's project delivery. Without an OBO-wide workforce analysis, it is unclear whether OBO's staffing is commensurate with its workload needs. OBO maintains that its office overseeing project design reviews is understaffed, adversely affecting some of its critical functions. Contractors also expressed concerns about the quality of design reviews, which may be affected by a staffing shortage and the use of temporary contractors. Also, OBO and contractor officials acknowledged weaknesses in collaboration, particularly with regard to contractors less experienced with embassy construction. Of the five contractors GAO spoke with, three said they are unlikely to pursue future projects because of issues working with OBO. Formal construction partnering\u2014an industry best practice\u2014between OBO and its contractors could help avoid adversarial relationships that inhibit swift resolution of issues. OBO's two long-standing contractors that have completed most of the CSCP embassy projects participated in early projects OBO identified as having used formal partnering.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that State (1) provide information on the estimated effects of inflation on planned projects, (2) provide an analysis of estimated total costs and time frames to complete the CSCP, (3) conduct an OBO-wide workforce analysis, and (4) pilot formal construction partnering. State concurred with our recommendations and also conveyed it is now pursuing other initiatives beyond Excellence.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_875"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_876","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe U.S. cattle industry accounted for about $64 billion in receipts in 2016, according to USDA. The price of fed cattle has fluctuated widely from 2013 through 2016 and experienced a sharp downturn beginning in late 2015, raising concerns about the market and questions about USDA's oversight.\nGAO was asked to review issues related to the U.S. cattle market. This report (1) describes key factors that affected changes in fed cattle prices from 2013 through 2016; (2) describes what CFTC found about possible trading irregularities in the futures market for fed cattle in 2015 and any changes to the futures contract for fed cattle since 2015; and (3) examines factors that may affect USDA's routine monitoring to ensure against discriminatory or anticompetitive practices in the fed cattle market. GAO reviewed economic data and USDA and CFTC documentation; analyzed transaction data on beef packer purchases from 2013 through 2015; and interviewed recognized experts, cattle industry stakeholders such as feedlot operators and packers, and agency officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nSupply and demand factors , such as a drought that affected the price of cattle feed, affected changes in prices of fed cattle\u2014those ready for slaughter from 2013 through 2016. According to industry experts and GAO's analysis, a drought from late 2010 to early 2013 led the cattle inventory to fall and rise and, in turn, fed cattle prices to fluctuate (see figure). GAO's analysis of cattle market data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) also indicated that competition levels among packers that slaughter and process fed cattle did not appear to affect the national price changes in the fed cattle market in 2015 but that areas of the country with less competition among packers had lower cattle prices.\nThe Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)\u2014an agency that regulates cattle futures markets where participants buy and sell standardized agreements for cattle at an agreed-upon price at a specified date in the future\u2014did not find evidence of trading irregularities in the cattle futures market in 2015. However, to better align futures contracts with the actual fed cattle market, CFTC reviewed changes to contract terms and will continue to monitor those changes.\nThe Packers & Stockyards Program (P&SP), which oversees the cattle industry within USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS), does not have routine access to daily data for transactions between feedlot operators, which produce fed cattle, and packers. Those data are collected by AMS's price reporting group, which does not routinely share them with P&SP because officials said it is prohibited by statute from doing so. The Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999 specifies that the Secretary of Agriculture may authorize the sharing of these data for enforcement purposes, which USDA interprets as an ongoing investigation, not market monitoring. In November 2017, USDA reorganized P&SP under AMS and officials said it was too early in the reorganization to determine whether AMS would view routine sharing of these data any differently. Reviewing the extent to which these data can be shared with P&SP provides an opportunity to enhance P&SP's oversight of the fed cattle market. Determining whether it is advisable to request additional exceptions from information disclosure restrictions from Congress would help USDA strengthen its oversight.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making two recommendations, including that USDA review the extent to which, under statute, the price reporting group can share daily transaction data with P&SP, and if USDA determines the statute does not permit such sharing and it is advisable, submit to Congress a proposal to allow such sharing. USDA agreed and subsequently determined that the act does not allow for such sharing and it would not be advisable citing concerns about the public's trust in the program.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_876"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_877","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nWildlife trafficking\u2014illegal trade in wildlife\u2014is estimated to be worth $7 billion to $23 billion annually and, according to State, continues to push some protected and endangered animal species to the brink of extinction. In 2013, President Obama issued an executive order that established an interagency Task Force charged with developing a strategy to guide U.S. efforts to combat wildlife trafficking.\nGAO was asked to review U.S. agencies' CWT efforts. GAO's September 2016 report on wildlife trafficking focused on supply side activities ( GAO-16-717 ). This report focuses on demand side activities and examines, among other things, (1) what is known about the demand for illegal wildlife and wildlife products in the United States and in Asia and (2) actions agencies are taking to reduce demand for illegal wildlife products in the United States and in Asia. GAO reviewed information from U.S. agencies and international and nongovernmental organizations and interviewed U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., and Miami, Florida, and U.S. and foreign government officials in China, Thailand, and Vietnam.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn the United States, China, and countries in Southeast Asia, there is diverse demand for illegally traded wildlife, according to data, reports, and various officials. The Department of the Interior's (Interior) U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) has seized a variety of wildlife at U.S. ports, such as coral for aquariums, conch meat for food, seahorses for medicinal purposes, and crocodile skin for fashion items. In China and Southeast Asian countries, reports and officials have identified seizures and consumption of illegally traded wildlife products such as rhino horn, elephant ivory, pangolins (shown below), turtles, and sharks, among others, used for purposes such as food, decoration, pets, or traditional medicine.\nU.S. agencies are taking actions designed to reduce demand for illegal wildlife, including building law enforcement capacity and raising awareness, but disagreement on roles and responsibilities has hindered some combating wildlife trafficking (CWT) activities in Southeast Asia. FWS inspects shipments in the United States and facilitates law enforcement capacity building with partner nations overseas. The Department of State (State) conducts diplomatic efforts, some of which contributed to a joint announcement by China and the United States to implement restrictions on both countries' domestic ivory trade. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) works with local organizations abroad to support programs intended to reduce wildlife demand, strengthen regional cooperation, and increase law enforcement capacity. Several other agencies also contribute expertise or resources to support various demand reduction activities. Certain practices can enhance and sustain collaborative efforts, such as establishing joint strategies, defining a common outcome, and agreeing on roles and responsibilities. GAO found that agencies applied the first two practices but could improve with regard to agreement on roles and responsibilities in Southeast Asia. For example, although the National Strategy for Combating Wildlife Trafficking Implementation Plan designates various Task Force agencies to lead or participate in achieving CWT strategic priorities, it does not define specific roles and responsibilities at the working level. Agencies have different views on roles and responsibilities in Southeast Asia. According to some officials, this disagreement resulted in inappropriate training activities and hindered U.S. cooperation with a host nation. More clearly defining roles and responsibilities would enhance agency collaboration.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that Interior, State, and USAID work to clarify roles and responsibilities for staff collaborating on combating wildlife trafficking efforts in Southeast Asia. Agencies agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_877"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_878","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCollegiate aviation schools are one pathway for initial civilian pilot training in the United States and are a key source of airline pilots. Over the past 5 years, aviation stakeholders have voiced concerns that there is an insufficient supply of qualified airline pilots, citing increased airline pilot retirements, among other factors.\nThe explanatory statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017 included a provision for GAO to review aspects of collegiate aviation schools' operations. This report examines: (1) what is known about schools with professional pilot degree programs and (2) challenges that affect schools' ability to produce professional pilots and schools' responses to these challenges.\nGAO reviewed relevant statutes, regulations, and documents from the FAA, Veterans Affairs, and Education; analyzed FAA's data on flight schools, airports, and pilots; and analyzed Education's degree completion data for the 2015\u20132016 academic year, the most recent data available. GAO also interviewed representatives from: 18 schools, selected based on factors including program type and location; 6 airports selected based on type and location; and 11 additional aviation stakeholders representing schools, airlines, pilots, airports, and flight instructors, selected to reflect a range of perspectives about initial pilot training. The results of the interviews are not generalizable to all aviation schools and stakeholders. GAO is not making recommendations in this report. On a draft of the report, DOT provided technical clarifications, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO identified 147 collegiate aviation schools that offered professional pilot degree programs in academic year 2015\u20132016. All pilot students must pass the same knowledge and flight tests to obtain pilot certificates from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), but schools' programs vary. For example, 101 of these schools operated relatively more formalized, FAA-certificated degree programs. The other 46 schools operated under a model that provides flexibility and meets FAA requirements but that does not require FAA certification to conduct such training. Total annual pilot-student enrollment and graduation numbers are not known. According to FAA officials, FAA does not require schools to submit enrollment data and does not verify enrollment data that many certificated schools voluntarily submit. Regarding graduation data, schools must classify and report completed degrees by program type to the Department of Education (Education) using that agency's classification system. Education's data indicated a total of 1,356 professional pilot degrees in academic year 2015\u20132016. Because pilot-student graduates can be classified under a number of aviation-related programs in Education's system, the number of pilot-student graduates could be higher.\nFlight instructor retention, which has been influenced by the current high demand for airline pilots, and the high cost of pilot training are key challenges that affect schools' ability to produce pilots, according to aviation stakeholders GAO interviewed.\nFlight instructor retention : Nearly all (16 of 18) selected school representatives cited difficulty recruiting and retaining flight instructors as a great or moderate challenge for schools' ability to train pilots. According to most school representatives (15) and other selected stakeholders, instructors who aspire to be airline pilots are rapidly accruing the flight hours necessary to qualify and are obtaining employment as soon as they are eligible. In addition, regional airlines have recently increased hiring, generating high turnover among flight instructors, who are traditionally their main source of new pilots.\nHigh cost of training : Nearly all (16) selected schools' representatives identified the cost of a professional pilot degree program as a great or moderate challenge to recruiting and retaining pilot students. High education costs are not unique to these programs. Nonetheless, in addition to tuition, flight training fees alone often exceed $50,000, well above the cap for federal financial aid available to eligible students.\nSchools and regional airlines have taken a range of actions to address these challenges. For example, eight selected school representatives reported increasing flight instructors' compensation and benefits. In addition, some regional airlines' cadet programs provide mentorship and incentives such as bonus pay or tuition reimbursement to select students while they are still in school. The Department of Transportation (DOT) has also launched an initiative to assess the level of interest among veterans in becoming pilots and to examine strategies for employing military veterans as pilots.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_878"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_879","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe KC-46 tanker modernization program, valued at about $44 billion, is among the Air Force's highest acquisition priorities. Aerial refueling\u2014the transfer of fuel from airborne tankers to combat and airlift forces\u2014is critical to the U.S. military's ability to effectively operate globally. The Air Force initiated the KC-46 program to replace about a third of its aging KC-135 aerial refueling fleet. Boeing was awarded a fixed-price-incentive contract to develop the aircraft. Among other things, Boeing was contractually required to deliver 18 fully capable aircraft (KC-46 aircraft with 9 sets of wing aerial refueling pods that allow for simultaneous refueling of 2 aircraft) by August 2017. The program plans to eventually field 179 aircraft in total.\nGAO was asked to monitor the KC-46 program because of problems Boeing is experiencing developing the aircraft. This is GAO's 7th report on the KC-46 program. This report assesses program progress and challenges toward achieving its cost goals and delivery schedule.\nGAO analyzed cost, schedule, development, and test information contained in program documents; and discussed results with officials from the KC-46 program office, other defense offices, the Federal Aviation Administration (responsible for certifying the design of the KC-46), and Boeing.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe total acquisition cost estimate for the KC-46 refueling tanker aircraft remained stable over the last year at $44.4 billion. As shown in the table below, the estimate has decreased about $7.3 billion, or 14 percent, since the initial estimate. This decrease is due in part to stable requirements.\nThe program updated its delivery schedule in 2017 to allow Boeing to delay delivery of the first 18 fully capable aircraft from August 2017 to October 2018\u2014 14 months. A schedule risk assessment, as well as GAO's analysis, however projects that deliveries could slip to May 2019, 21 months from the original schedule, if risks are not mitigated. See figure.\nBoeing faces the following risks and challenges and is trying to address them:\nupdating test aircraft to the correct configuration to complete remaining tests;\ncompleting flight tests at a pace that is almost double its monthly average;\nupdating test plans to reflect a more realistic schedule for certifying aircraft, such as F-16 fighters and C-17 cargo planes, to be refueled by a KC-46;\nretrofitting production aircraft to their final configuration for delivery; and\nfixing a critical deficiency to keep the boom from contacting receiver aircraft outside the refueling receptacle.\nBecause of the terms of the contract, Boeing, not the government, is responsible for nearly $1 billion in additional development costs already incurred. Boeing is also providing additional training for KC-46 pilots, among other things, to compensate the Air Force for delivery delays. Meanwhile, the Air Force is continuing to use KC-135 and KC-10 tankers for refueling missions.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO believes the Department of Defense should implement a prior recommendation to document lessons learned given the program's challenges.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_879"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_880","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nContinuous evaluation is a key executive branch initiative to more frequently identify and assess security-relevant information, such as criminal activity. Implementing a continuous evaluation program has been a long-standing goal, with implementation milestones as early as 2010 and DOD pilots dating back to the early 2000's.\nGAO was asked to review efforts to implement continuous evaluation. This report assesses the extent to which (1) ODNI has implemented an executive branch-wide program and developed plans to monitor and measure its performance; (2) DOD and other agencies have designed, piloted, and evaluated continuous evaluation and (3) agencies completed timely periodic reinvestigations from fiscal years 2012-2016, and the potential effects of continuous evaluation on reinvestigations. GAO reviewed documentation, analyzed timeliness data, and interviewed officials from ODNI and other agencies. This is a public version of a sensitive report that is being issued concurrently. Information that ODNI and State deemed sensitive has been omitted.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn October 2016, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) took an initial step to implement continuous evaluation\u2014a process to review the background of clearance holders and individuals in sensitive positions at any time during the eligibility period\u2014across the executive branch, but it has not yet determined key aspects of the program, and it lacks plans for implementing, monitoring, and measuring program performance. For the first phase, agencies are to conduct certain continuous evaluation record checks against a portion of their national security population by the end of fiscal year 2017. However, ODNI has not formalized its policy on what continuous evaluation encompasses, determined what the future phases will entail or when they will occur, or developed an implementation plan. According to all seven agencies GAO interviewed, this uncertainty has affected their ability to plan for the program and estimate its costs. Without a continuous evaluation policy and a fully developed plan, full implementation\u2014which has been delayed since 2010\u2014may be further delayed. Moreover, ODNI lacks a plan to monitor and measure program performance, including for the first phase, which is underway. Without developing such a plan, ODNI cannot ensure that the program is being implemented consistently across the executive branch or that it is effectively identifying risks to national security.\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State (State) have designed, piloted, and evaluated continuous evaluation. Their approaches have varied in scope, size, and duration, as they pre-date ODNI's efforts to implement continuous evaluation executive branch-wide. DOD's pilot involves the most record checks and the largest population. DOD had 500,000 employees enrolled in December 2016, and it plans to enroll 1 million by the end of calendar year 2017 and all clearance holders by the end of fiscal year 2021.\nExecutive branch agencies meeting established timeliness goals for completing periodic reinvestigations decreased from fiscal years 2012 through 2016, and the potential effects of continuous evaluation, including on reinvestigations and resources, are unknown. While 84 percent of the executive branch agencies reviewed by GAO reported meeting the executive branch's 195-day timeliness goal for at least three of four quarters in fiscal year 2012, only 22 percent did so in fiscal year 2016. Also, a 2008 report outlined a plan to replace reinvestigations with continuous evaluation, but ODNI documentation indicates that this is no longer the intent. While agencies expressed varying views about changes to reinvestigations\u2014such as modifying their scope\u2014officials from five agencies stated that the continuous evaluation program will increase their workloads and costs if no other changes are made to the requirements. DOD officials said they cannot afford to conduct both continuous evaluation and reinvestigations, as DOD estimates that more frequent reinvestigations for certain clearance holders will cost $1.8 billion for fiscal years 2018 through 2022. Although agencies have identified increased resources as a risk of the program, ODNI has not assessed the program's potential effects on agency resources. Without assessing the potential effects once ODNI has further defined the program, implementing continuous evaluation could lead to further delays and backlogs in reinvestigations, and could increase agency costs.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making six recommendations, including that ODNI formalize its policy on continuous evaluation, develop an implementation plan as well as a plan to monitor and measure program performance, and assess the potential effects of continuous evaluation on agency resources. ODNI concurred with the recommendations, but disagreed with aspects of GAO's conclusions. GAO continues to believe the conclusions are valid, as discussed in the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_880"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_881","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nPAIMI grant awards, established by Congress in 1986 and totaling $36 million in 2016, are administered by SAMHSA to support state protection and advocacy programs. PAIMI programs protect and advocate for the rights of individuals with significant mental illness by investigating reports of incidents of abuse and neglect of such individuals in facilities such as hospitals, and in the community, among other activities.\nThe 21st Century Cures Act included a provision for GAO to review the PAIMI programs and their compliance with federal statutory and regulatory requirements. This report examines (1) the outcomes reported by PAIMI programs in selected states, and (2) SAMHSA's oversight of state PAIMI programs, including their compliance with federal requirements. GAO reviewed FY 2015 and 2016 PAIMI program documentation for eight of 57 programs selected for variation in funding amount, geographic location, and other factors. GAO also reviewed relevant SAMHSA policies and procedures and assessed them against federal standards for internal control.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe eight selected state Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness (PAIMI) programs GAO reviewed reported a range of positive outcomes from their work on behalf of individuals with mental illness. For example, in fiscal year (FY) 2016, the selected programs reported resolving in the individual's favor 1,772 out of 2,390 cases (74 percent) related to complaints of alleged abuse, neglect, and rights violations. The remaining cases were reported as withdrawn by the client, closed due to lack of merit, or not resolved in the individual's favor. These programs also reported concluding a variety of broader, system-level activities\u2014referred to as systemic activities\u2014intended to benefit groups of individuals with mental illness. These systemic activities resulted in, for example, changes to procedures in mental health institutions and correctional facilities.\nSource: GAO analysis of 2016 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration data. | GAO-18-450\nThe Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), which oversees the state PAIMI programs, has a variety of procedures in place to monitor performance and compliance. However, two areas warrant additional attention, as follows:\nSAMHSA has not consistently examined changes to performance benchmarks\u2014the goals, objectives, and targets that PAIMI programs set annually for their planned work. Programs are permitted to modify these benchmarks, and GAO found that four had done so. A new SAMHSA system implemented in 2017 could improve recording of benchmark changes, but SAMHSA lacks procedures to examine changes across years, which could help identify performance concerns.\nSAMHSA often failed to complete its periodic, in-depth reviews of programs and to provide findings of identified deficiencies to PAIMI programs on a timely basis. SAMHSA has plans to improve the efficiency of its review process. However, it is unclear the extent to which these plans will resolve the timeliness issues, which could delay resolution of any issues found in the reviews.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that SAMHSA take steps to ensure that changes to performance benchmarks are examined over time, and to ensure onsite reviews are completed\u2014and findings are provided to state programs\u2014in a timely manner. The Department of Health and Human Services concurred with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_881"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_882","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAccording to HRSA, the purpose of the 340B Program, which was created in 1992, is to enable covered entities to stretch scarce federal resources to reach more eligible patients, and provide more comprehensive services. Covered entities can provide 340B drugs to eligible patients regardless of income or insurance status and generate revenue by receiving reimbursement from patients' insurance. The program does not specify how this revenue is to be used or whether discounts are to be passed on to patients. The number of participating covered entity sites\u2014currently about 38,000\u2014has almost doubled in the past 5 years and the number of contract pharmacies increased from about 1,300 in 2010 to around 18,700 in 2017. In recent years, questions have been raised regarding oversight of the 340B Program, particularly given the program's growth over time.\nIn September 2011, GAO identified inadequacies in HRSA's oversight of the 340B Program and made recommendations for improvement. Among other things, this statement describes HRSA actions in response to GAO recommendations to improve its program oversight.\nFor this statement, GAO obtained information and documentation from HRSA officials about any significant program updates and steps they have taken to implement the 2011 GAO recommendations. More detailed information on the objectives, scope, and methodology can be found in GAO's September 2011 report.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe 340B Drug Pricing Program requires drug manufacturers to sell outpatient drugs at discounted prices to covered entities\u2014eligible clinics, hospitals, and others\u2014in order to have their drugs covered by Medicaid. Covered entities are only allowed to provide 340B drugs to certain eligible patients. Entities dispense 340B drugs through in-house pharmacies or contract pharmacies, which are outside pharmacies entities contract with to dispense drugs on their behalf. The number of contract pharmacies has increased significantly in recent years.\nIn its September 2011 report, GAO found that the Health Resources and Services Administration's (HRSA) oversight of the 340B Program was inadequate to ensure compliance with program rules, and GAO recommended actions that HRSA should take to improve program integrity, particularly given significant growth in the program in recent years. HRSA has taken steps to address two of GAO's four recommendations:\nHRSA initiated audits of covered entities . GAO found that HRSA's oversight of the 340B Program was weak because it primarily relied on covered entities and manufacturers to ensure their own compliance with program requirements and HRSA engaged in few oversight activities. GAO recommended that HRSA conduct audits of covered entities and in fiscal year 2012, HRSA implemented a systematic approach to conducting annual audits of covered entities. HRSA now audits 200 covered entities a year, which is less than 2 percent of entities participating in the 340B Program. Audits conducted to date have identified instances of non-compliance with program requirements, including the dispensing of drugs to ineligible patients. GAO currently has work underway reviewing HRSA's efforts to ensure compliance at contract pharmacies, which includes an examination of HRSA's audits of covered entities.\nHRSA clarified guidance for manufacturers. GAO found a lack of specificity in guidance for manufacturers for handling cases in which distribution of drugs is restricted, such as when there is a shortage in drug supply. GAO recommended that HRSA refine its guidance. In May 2012, HRSA clarified its policy for manufacturers that intend to restrict distribution of a drug and provided additional detail on the type of information manufacturers should include in their restricted distribution plans.\nHRSA has not clarified guidance on two issues. GAO also found that HRSA guidance on (1) the definition of an eligible patient and (2) hospital eligibility criteria for program participation lacked specificity and recommended that HRSA clarify its guidance. HRSA agreed that clearer guidance was necessary and, in 2015, released proposed guidance that addressed both issues. However, in January 2017, the agency withdrew that guidance in accordance with recent directives to freeze, withdraw, or postpone pending federal guidance. In March 2018, HRSA indicated it was in the process of determining next steps related to guidance on the patient definition, but would need additional authority to further clarify guidance on hospital eligibility; rulemaking authority for the 340B Program was requested in the administration's fiscal year 2019 budget proposal.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_882"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_883","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nMore than 20 federal agencies spend billions of dollars on U.S. foreign assistance each year. Six agencies\u2014the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Health and Human Services, and State; the Millennium Challenge Corporation; and the U.S. Agency for International Development\u2014implement most of this assistance, using multiple strategies. State is responsible for coordinating their efforts. Questions have been raised about potential inefficiencies in implementing multiple foreign assistance strategies.\nGAO was asked to review the alignment of U.S. foreign assistance strategies. This report examines the extent to which strategies include key elements GAO identified, related to interagency coordination, strategic integration, and assessment of progress, that help ensure alignment. These elements are based on GAO's prior work on strategic planning and interagency collaboration. GAO reviewed 52 strategies related to health, security, and democracy assistance that were current in 2017. These included government-wide, agency, multi-agency, and regional strategies as well as strategies for two countries. GAO also reviewed agency guidance and interviewed agency officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nMany foreign assistance strategies related to health, security, and democracy assistance that GAO reviewed at least partially addressed key elements GAO identified that help ensure the strategies are aligned. Prior work has found that consistently addressing these elements, related to interagency coordination, strategic integration, and assessment of progress, is important for, among other things, better managing fragmentation in strategic planning. However, some strategies did not address these elements (see figure). For example:\nInteragency coordination . Twenty-three percent of the strategies (12 of 52) did not address agencies' roles and responsibilities, and 38 percent (20 of 52) did not identify specific interagency coordination mechanisms.\nStrategic integration . Twenty-one percent of the strategies (11 of 52) did not address linkages with other related strategies, and 25 percent (13 of 52) did not address linkages with higher- or lower-level strategies.\nAssessment of progress toward strategic goals . Twenty-one percent of the strategies (11 of 52) did not include milestones and performance indicators, and 21 percent (11 of 52) did not outline plans for monitoring and evaluation.\nThe six agencies implementing most U.S. foreign assistance do not have consistent guidance for strategy development that could help ensure their strategies address these key elements. Some agencies' guidance addresses many of the elements but does not apply to all of their foreign assistance strategies, while other agencies have no such guidance. The Department of State (State) plays a significant role in interagency coordination. By collaborating with other agencies to establish guidance that addresses the key elements GAO identified, State could help the agencies improve their ability to align future strategies and identify and manage fragmentation in foreign assistance planning.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that State lead an effort to establish, in collaboration with the five other agencies, guidance for developing foreign assistance strategies that addresses the key elements GAO identified related to interagency coordination, strategic integration, and assessment of progress. State concurred with GAO's recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_883"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_884","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Dodd-Frank Act created CFPB to regulate the provision of consumer financial products and services. Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to study financial services regulations annually, including CFPB\u2019s related activities. This eighth annual report examines steps CFPB has taken to (1) identify, monitor, and report on risks to consumers in support of its rulemakings and other functions and (2) retrospectively assess the effectiveness of certain rules within 5 years of their effective dates.\nGAO reviewed CFPB policies and procedures, internal and public reports, and memorandums documenting key decisions, assessment plans, and requests for public comment. GAO also interviewed officials from CFPB, three federal agencies with which it coordinated, and representatives of consumer and industry groups.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn accordance with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has routinely monitored the consumer financial markets to identify potential risks to consumers related to financial products and services. CFPB monitors consumer complaints, analyzes market data, and gathers market intelligence from external groups (see figure for sources of CFPB\u2019s monitoring). CFPB has used risk-monitoring findings to inform its rulemakings, supervision, and other functions. In 2015, CFPB initiated a bureau-wide process for using market data and other information to set policy priorities related to addressing risks to consumers. However, CFPB has not yet decided whether it will continue to use this process to set priorities. CFPB currently lacks a systematic, bureau-wide process for prioritizing financial risks to consumers and considering how it will use its tools\u2014such as rulemaking, supervision, and consumer education\u2014to address them. Federal internal control standards state that management should use quality information to achieve agency objectives and that it should also identify, analyze, and respond to risks related to achieving those objectives. Implementing a bureau-wide prioritization process could help to ensure that CFPB effectively focuses its resources on the most significant financial risks to consumers and enhances its ability to meet its statutory consumer protection objectives.\nCFPB has taken steps to retrospectively assess its significant rules within 5 years of these rules becoming effective, as required by the Dodd-Frank Act. CFPB developed and applied criteria to identify three rules as significant and requiring a retrospective assessment. For these three rules, CFPB created assessment plans, issued public requests for comment and information, and reached out to external parties for additional data and evidence. In October 2018, CFPB issued its first assessment report on a rule related to cross-border money transfers. Among other things, the report found that certain trends, such as increasing volume of these transfers, continued after the rule took effect. CFPB expects to complete the other two assessments by the January 2019 deadline.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that CFPB implement a systematic process for prioritizing risks to consumers and considering how to use its available policy tools\u2014such as rulemaking, supervision, enforcement, and consumer education\u2014to address these risks. CFPB did not agree or disagree with the recommendation but agreed with the importance of having processes in place to prioritize and address consumer financial risks.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_884"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_885","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFTA's Capital Investment Grants program is the primary source of federal financial assistance to support transit projects that are locally planned, implemented, and operated. FTA evaluates and rates projects seeking funding through this program according to statutory criteria and recommends to Congress which projects to fund. The funding that project sponsors receive is subject to congressional appropriation.\nMAP-21 includes a provision for GAO to biennially review FTA's implementation of the Capital Investment Grants program. This report discusses: (1) FTA's progress in addressing statutory provisions contained in MAP-21 and the FAST Act and (2) how the evaluation and rating process FTA has established for Core Capacity Improvement projects enables FTA to verify that statutory requirements are met before recommending such projects for funding. GAO reviewed the relevant laws and FTA's guidance. GAO also interviewed FTA officials and six project sponsors, representing seven of the eight Core Capacity Improvement projects in the Capital Investment Grants program at the time of GAO's review.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Federal Transit Administration (FTA) has not addressed three statutory provisions concerning the Capital Investment Grants program contained in the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) and the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act). Specifically, FTA has not:\nissued regulations regarding the evaluation and rating process for Core Capacity Improvement projects, which are a category of eligible projects within the program;\nestablished a program of interrelated projects designed to allow for the simultaneous development of more than one transit project within the Capital Investment Grants program; or\nimplemented a pilot program designed to create a fast-track approval process for transit projects that meet specific statutory criteria.\nThroughout this review, FTA officials told GAO they do not have immediate plans to address these three statutory provisions. Officials cited a proposal by the President to phase out the Capital Investment Grants program as one of the factors influencing this decision. However, in March the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, provided the program with more than $2.6 billion and required FTA to continue to administer the program in accordance with the procedural and substantive requirements specified in statute. Subsequently, FTA officials told GAO that they are reviewing the Act and determining next steps. However FTA officials did not indicate that they intend to address these provisions. If FTA does not implement the outstanding provisions, FTA and project sponsors\u2014that is, local transit agencies\u2014may be missing opportunities to deliver transit projects more efficiently.\nBased on a review of FTA's policy guidance, on FTA's instructions for applying to the Capital Investment Grants program, and on other documentation supporting the two Core Capacity Improvement projects that FTA has recommended for funding as of June 2017, GAO found that FTA has established a process to verify that proposed Core Capacity Improvement projects meet statutory requirements before recommending projects for funding. Core Capacity Improvement projects are capital investments designed to increase the capacity of an existing transit system and must meet specific statutory requirements to be eligible for funding through the program. GAO found that prior to recommending a project for funding FTA works with project sponsors to verify that their proposed project includes elements that will increase transit system capacity versus maintaining the current system, that the required amount of local funding is committed to the project, and that sponsors have the technical and financial capacity to complete the project they are proposing, among other statutory requirements.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nFTA should initiate a rulemaking regarding the evaluation and rating process for Core Capacity Improvement projects and take steps to address two other statutory provisions. FTA agreed with the recommendations but disagreed with certain findings on which they are based. GAO believes these findings are valid, as discussed in this report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_885"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_886","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes that restoring and retaining readiness is critical to success in the emerging security environment. The Navy and Marine Corps are working to rebuild the readiness of their forces while growing and modernizing their aging fleet of ships and aircraft. However, achieving readiness recovery goals will take years as both services continue to be challenged to rebuild readiness amid continued operational demands.\nThis statement provides information on current and future readiness challenges facing (1) the Navy ship and submarine fleet and (2) Navy and Marine Corps aviation. GAO also discusses prior recommendations on Navy and Marine Corps readiness and progress to address them.\nThis statement is based on previously published work since 2015 related to Navy and Marine Corps readiness challenges, including shipyard workforce and capital investment, ship crewing, weapon system sustainment, the fighter pilot workforce, and modernizing force structure. GAO conducted site visits to the Pacific fleet in November 2018 and analyzed updated data, as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Navy has taken steps to address training shortfalls in the surface fleet, but faces persistent maintenance and personnel challenges as it seeks to rebuild ship and submarine readiness. While the Navy has corrective actions underway, they will take years to implement. Following ship collisions in 2017, the Navy has taken steps to ensure its crews are trained to standards prior to deployment and made significant progress in those efforts. However, the Navy has struggled to complete ship maintenance\u2014with only 30 percent of maintenance completed on time since fiscal year 2012\u2014leading to thousands of days that ships were unavailable for training and operations (see figure). Additionally, manning shortfalls and experience gaps continue to contribute to high sailor workload and are likely to continue through at least fiscal year 2021. The Navy has developed a plan to improve shipyards and is re-examining its ship manning, among other actions; however, these positive steps have not yet fully addressed GAO's recommendations. Looking to the future, the Navy has indicated that it wants to grow its fleet to meet demands. However, the costs of such growth are not yet known and would likely require resourcing well above currently planned levels.\nNavy and Marine Corps aircraft availability has been limited due to numerous challenges (see figure). Specifically, the seven aircraft GAO reviewed have generally experienced decreasing availability since fiscal year 2011 and did not meet availability goals in fiscal years 2017 and 2018. The F-35\u2014the future of naval aviation\u2014also has not met availability goals due to part shortages and poor sustainment planning. In September 2018, the Department of Defense established aggressive targets for aircraft availability. While the Navy and Marine Corps are taking actions to improve aircraft availability, including addressing GAO's recommendations, aviation readiness will take many years to recover.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO has made a total of 45 recommendations in the prior work described in this statement. The Department of Defense concurred with most of them, and has many actions underway, but has not yet fully implemented any. Attention to these recommendations can assist the Navy and the Marine Corps as they seek to rebuild the readiness of their forces.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_886"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_887","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nInternational trade and travel to the United States is increasing. On a typical day in fiscal year 2016, CBP officers inspected nearly 1.1 million passengers and pedestrians and over 74,000 truck, rail, and sea containers at 328 U.S. land, sea, and air ports of entry, according to CBP. To help meet the increased demand for these types of CBP services, since 2013, CBP has entered into public-private partnerships under RSP and DAP. The RSP allows partners to reimburse CBP for providing services that exceed CBP's normal operations, such as paying overtime for CBP personnel that provide services at ports of entry outside normal business hours. The DAP enables partners to donate property or provide funding for port of entry infrastructure improvements.\nThe Cross-Border Trade Enhancement Act of 2016 included a provision for GAO to review the RSP and DAP. This report examines: (1) how CBP approves and administers RSP and DAP agreements, (2) the status of RSP and DAP agreements, including the purposes for which CBP has used funds and donations, and (3) the extent to which CBP monitors and evaluates program implementation. GAO reviewed partnership agreements and data on program usage. GAO also interviewed CBP and partner officials at 11 ports of entry selected based on a mix of port of entry and agreement types.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nWithin the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) uses criteria and follows documented procedures to evaluate and approve public-private partnership applications and administer the Reimbursable Services Program (RSP) and Donations Acceptance Program (DAP). For example, RSP applications undergo an initial review by CBP officials at the affected ports of entry before they are scored by an expert panel of CBP officials at headquarters. The panel evaluates RSP applications against seven criteria, such as impact on CBP operations. Similarly, DAP proposals are evaluated by CBP officials against seven operational and six technical criteria, such as real estate implications. Further, if the proposal involves real estate controlled by the General Services Administration (GSA), CBP and GSA officials collaborate on DAP selection decisions and project implementation. To administer the RSP and DAP, CBP has documented policies and procedures, such as standard operating procedures and implementation frameworks. For example, CBP uses a standard procedure to guide the process for RSP partners to request services and to provide reimbursement. For DAP projects, CBP, GSA (if applicable), and partners follow an implementation framework that includes a project planning and design phase.\nThe number of public-private partnerships is increasing, and partnerships provide a variety of additional services and infrastructure improvements at ports of entry. From fiscal years 2013 through 2017, CBP selected over 100 partners for RSP agreements that could impact 112 ports of entry and other CBP-staffed locations, and the total number of RSP partnerships doubled from fiscal year 2016 to 2017. According to CBP, since partners began requesting reimbursable services in 2014, CBP has provided its partners nearly 370,000 officer overtime hours of services, which led to over $45 million in reimbursed funds. As a result, CBP inspected an additional 8 million travelers and over 1 million personal and commercial vehicles at ports of entry. Similar to the RSP, the number of DAP partnerships more than doubled from fiscal year 2016 to 2017, and totals 16 projects that impact 13 ports of entry as of November 2017. The donations include improvements, such as the installation of new inspection booths and equipment and removal of traffic medians, and are intended to support over $150 million in infrastructure improvements.\nCBP uses various processes to monitor and evaluate its partnerships, but could benefit from establishing an evaluation plan to assess overall program performance. For example, CBP conducts regular audits of RSP records to help ensure that CBP bills and collects funds from its partners accurately, and uses guidance, such as the DAP Implementation Roadmap, to identify and monitor project milestones and tasks. However, as of November 2017, CBP had not developed an evaluation plan\u2014which could include, among other things, measurable objectives, performance criteria, and data collection plans\u2014to assess the overall performance of the RSP and DAP, consistent with Office of Management and Budget guidance and leading practices. Given CBP's staffing challenges and anticipated growth of the RSP and DAP, an evaluation plan could better position CBP to further integrate evaluation activities into program management.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that CBP develop an evaluation plan to assess the overall performance of the RSP and DAP. DHS concurred with the recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_887"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_888","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nGAO has designated DHS management as high risk because of challenges in building a cohesive department. PLCY supports cohesiveness by, among other things, coordinating departmentwide policy and strategy. In the past, however, questions have been raised about PLCY's efficacy. In December 2016, the NDAA codified PLCY's organizational structure, roles, and responsibilities.\nGAO was asked to evaluate PLCY's effectiveness. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS established an organizational structure and processes and procedures that position PLCY to be effective, (2) DHS and PLCY have ensured alignment of workforce with priorities, and (3) PLCY has engaged relevant component staff to help identify and respond to emerging needs. GAO analyzed the NDAA, documents describing specific responsibilities, and departmentwide policies and strategies. GAO also interviewed officials in PLCY and all eight operational components.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAccording to our analysis and interviews with operational components, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans' (PLCY) organizational structure and efforts to lead and coordinate departmentwide and crosscutting strategies\u2014a key organizational objective\u2013have been effective. For example, PLCY's coordination efforts for a strategy and policy executive steering committee have been successful, particularly for strategies. However, PLCY has encountered challenges leading and coordinating efforts to develop, update, or harmonize policies that affect multiple DHS components. In large part, these challenges are because DHS does not have clearly-defined roles and responsibilities with accompanying processes and procedures to help PLCY lead and coordinate policy in a predictable, repeatable, and accountable manner. Until PLCY's roles and responsibilities for policy are more clearly defined and corresponding processes and procedures are in place, situations where the lack of clarity hampers PLCY's effectiveness in driving policy are likely to continue. Development of a delegation of authority, which involves reaching agreement about PLCY's roles and responsibilities and clearly documenting them, had been underway. However, it stalled due to changes in department leadership. As of May 2018, the effort had been revived, but it is not clear whether and when DHS will finalize it.\nPLCY does some workforce planning as part of its annual budgeting process, but does not systematically apply key principles of the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to help ensure that PLCY's workforce aligns with its and DHS's priorities and goals. According to PLCY officials, the nature of its mission requires a flexible staffing approach. As such, a portion of the staff functions as generalists who can be assigned to meet the needs of different situations, including unexpected changing priorities due to an emerging need. However, shifting short-term priorities requires tradeoffs, which may divert attention and resources from longer-term priorities. As of June 5, 2018, PLCY also had a number of vacancies in key leadership positions, which further limited attention to certain priorities. According to PLCY officials, PLCY recently began a review to identify the office's authorities in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (NDAA) and other statutes, compare these authorities to the current organization and operations, and address any workforce capacity gaps. Employing workforce planning principles\u2014in particular, systematic identification of workforce demand, capacity gaps, and strategies to address them\u2014consistent with the DHS Workforce Planning Guide could better position PLCY to use its workforce as effectively as possible under uncertain conditions and to communicate effectively with DHS leadership about tradeoffs.\nOfficials from PLCY and DHS operational components praised existing mechanisms to coordinate and communicate at the senior level, especially about strategy, but component officials identified opportunities to better connect PLCY and component staff to improve communication flow about emerging policy and strategy needs. Among the ideas offered by component officials to enhance communication and collaboration were holding routine small-group meetings, creating forums for periodic knowledge sharing, and maintaining accurate and up-to-date contact information for all staff-level stakeholders.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making four recommendations. DHS concurred with three recommendations, including that DHS finalize a delegation of authority defining PLCY's roles and responsibilities and develop corresponding processes and procedures. DHS did not concur with a recommendation to apply the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to identify and communicate workforce needs. GAO believes this recommendation is valid as discussed in the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_888"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_889","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe number of individuals receiving long term care services from Medicaid in community residential settings is expected to grow. These settings, which include assisted living facilities, provide a range of services that allow aged and disabled beneficiaries, who might otherwise require nursing home care, to remain in the community.\nState Medicaid programs and CMS, the federal agency responsible for overseeing the state programs, share responsibility for ensuring that beneficiaries' health and welfare is protected. GAO was asked to examine state and federal oversight of assisted living services in Medicaid. This report (1) describes state spending on and coverage of these services, (2) describes how state Medicaid agencies oversee the health and welfare of beneficiaries in these settings, and (3) examines the extent that CMS oversees state Medicaid agency monitoring of assisted living services.\nGAO surveyed all state Medicaid agencies and interviewed officials in a nongeneralizeable sample of three states with varied oversight processes for their assisted living programs. GAO reviewed regulations and guidance, and interviewed CMS officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nState Medicaid agencies in 48 states that covered assisted living services reported spending more than $10 billion (federal and state) on assisted living services in 2014. These 48 states reported covering these services for more than 330,000 beneficiaries through more than 130 different programs. Most programs were operated under Medicaid waivers that allow states to target certain populations, limit enrollment, or restrict services to certain geographic areas.\nWith respect to oversight of their largest assisted living programs, state Medicaid agencies reported varied approaches to overseeing beneficiary health and welfare, particularly in how they monitored critical incidents involving beneficiaries receiving assisted living services. State Medicaid agencies are required to protect beneficiary health and welfare and operate systems to monitor for critical incidents\u2014cases of potential or actual harm to beneficiaries such as abuse, neglect, or exploitation.\nTwenty-six state Medicaid agencies could not report to GAO the number of critical incidents that occurred in assisted living facilities, citing reasons including the inability to track incidents by provider type (9 states), lack of a system to collect critical incidents (9 states), and lack of a system that could identify Medicaid beneficiaries (5 states).\nState Medicaid agencies varied in what types of critical incidents they monitored. All states identified physical, emotional, or sexual abuse as a critical incident. A number of states did not identify other incidents that may indicate potential harm or neglect such as medication errors (7 states) and unexplained death (3 states).\nState Medicaid agencies varied in whether they made information on critical incidents and other key information available to the public. Thirty-four states made critical incident information available to the public by phone, website, or in person, while another 14 states did not have such information available at all.\nOversight of state monitoring of assisted living services by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), is limited by gaps in state reporting. States are required to annually report to CMS information on deficiencies affecting beneficiary health and welfare for the most common program used to provide assisted living services. However, states have latitude in what they consider a deficiency. States also must describe their systems for monitoring critical incidents, but CMS does not require states to annually report data from their systems. Under federal internal control standards, agencies should have processes to identify information needed to achieve objectives and address risk. Without clear guidance on reportable deficiencies and no requirement to report critical incidents, CMS may be unaware of problems. For example, CMS found, after an in-depth review in one selected state seeking to renew its program, that the state lacked an effective system for assuring beneficiary health and welfare, including reporting insufficient information on the number of unexpected or suspicious beneficiary deaths. The state had not reported any deficiencies in annual reports submitted to CMS in 5 prior years.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommendations to CMS include clarifying state requirements for reporting program deficiencies and requiring annual reporting of critical incidents. HHS concurred with GAO's recommendations to clarify deficiency reporting and stated that it would consider annual reporting requirements for critical incidents after completing an ongoing review.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_889"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_890","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn 2006, federal banking regulators jointly issued guidance that described their expectations for sound risk management practices for banks with CRE concentrations. The guidance includes two CRE thresholds that regulators use to identify banks that are potentially exposed to significant CRE concentration risk and could be subject to greater supervisory scrutiny. Concentrations in CRE loans at U.S. banks have been steadily increasing\u2014raising safety and soundness concerns. In December 2015, the regulators jointly issued a public statement to remind banks of the 2006 CRE guidance.\nIn light of the joint 2015 statement and GAO's ongoing monitoring of regulatory efforts to identify and respond to emerging threats to the banking system, GAO examined (1) trends in the CRE lending market, including changes in risk, and (2) actions taken by regulators to help ensure that banks with CRE concentrations are effectively managing the related risks. To address these issues, GAO analyzed CRE-related data; reviewed agency policies and guidance; and reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 54 bank examinations conducted from 2013 through 2016 based on the banks' CRE concentrations, total assets, primary regulator, and geographic location. GAO also interviewed officials from the federal banking regulators.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nWhile the commercial real estate (CRE) sector has recovered since the 2007\u20132009 financial crisis, GAO's trend and econometric analyses generally indicate that risk in CRE lending by banks has increased over the past several years. Since the early 2000s, community banks have tended toward providing CRE loans more than other kinds of loans. Indicators of CRE market conditions and loan performance have been improving since 2011. At the same time, GAO's analyses of changes in CRE underwriting standards, property prices, and other data suggest that credit and concentration risks have increased in bank CRE lending. For example, the number of banks with relatively high CRE concentrations\u2014measured by the ratio of a bank's CRE loans to its total capital\u2014has been increasing. In addition, commercial property prices have been increasing rapidly, and property valuations also have risen in recent years. Similarly, GAO's predictive econometric models of CRE loan performance suggest that risk has increased, based largely on the simultaneous increase in bank CRE lending and CRE prices observed over the last several years, but is lower than the level associated with the 2007\u20132009 financial crisis.\nGAO found that federal banking regulators subjected banks with relatively high CRE concentrations to greater supervisory scrutiny based on its review of a nongeneralizable sample of 54 bank examinations covering 40 banks done by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency from 2013 through 2016. Of the 54 examinations that GAO reviewed, 41 of them covered banks with relatively high CRE concentrations. In all of these examinations, regulators examined whether the banks had adequate risk management practices and capital to manage their CRE concentration risk. In 26 of the 41 examinations, regulators did not find any risk management weaknesses. However, in 15 of the 41 examinations, regulators found the banks had weaknesses in one or more risk management areas, such as board and management oversight, management information systems, or underwriting. The regulators generally communicated their findings to the banks in the reports of examination and directed the banks to correct their risk management weaknesses.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_890"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_891","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nConcerns over efforts by U.S. taxpayers to use offshore accounts to hide income or evade taxes contributed to the passage of FATCA in 2010, which sought to create greater transparency and accountability over offshore assets held by U.S. taxpayers.\nHouse Report 114-624 included a provision for GAO to evaluate FATCA implementation and determine the effects of FATCA on U.S. citizens living abroad. GAO\u2014among other things\u2014(1) assessed IRS's efforts to use FATCA-related information to improve taxpayer compliance; (2) examined the extent to which Treasury administers overlapping reporting requirements on financial assets held overseas; and (3) examined the effects of FATCA implementation unique to U.S. persons living abroad.\nGAO reviewed applicable documentation; analyzed tax data; and interviewed officials from IRS, other federal agencies and organizations, selected tax practitioners, and more than 20 U.S. persons living overseas.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nData quality and management issues have limited the effectiveness of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) efforts to improve taxpayer compliance using foreign financial asset data collected under the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). Specifically, IRS has had difficulties matching the information reported by foreign financial institutions (FFI) with U.S. taxpayers' tax filings due to missing or inaccurate Taxpayer Identification Numbers provided by FFIs. Further, IRS lacks access to consistent and complete data on foreign financial assets and other data reported in tax filings by U.S. persons, in part, because some IRS databases do not store foreign asset data reported from paper filings. IRS has also stopped pursuing a comprehensive plan to leverage FATCA data to improve taxpayer compliance because, according to IRS officials, IRS moved away from updating broad strategy documents to focus on individual compliance campaigns. Ensuring access to consistent and complete data collected from U.S. persons\u2014and employing a plan to leverage such data\u2014would help IRS better leverage such campaigns and increase taxpayer compliance.\nDue to overlapping statutory reporting requirements, IRS and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)\u2014both within the Department of the Treasury (Treasury)\u2014collect duplicative foreign financial account and other asset information from U.S. persons. Consequently, in tax years 2015 and 2016, close to 75 percent of U.S. persons who reported information on foreign accounts and other assets on their tax returns also filed a separate form with FinCEN. The overlapping requirements increase the compliance burden on U.S. persons and add complexity that can create confusion, potentially resulting in inaccurate or unnecessary reporting. Modifying the statutes governing the requirements to allow for the sharing of FATCA information for the prevention and detection of financial crimes would eliminate the need for duplicative reporting. This is similar to other statutory allowances for IRS to disclose return information for other purposes, such as for determining Social Security income tax withholding.\nAccording to documents GAO reviewed, and focus groups and interviews GAO conducted, FFIs closed some U.S. persons' existing accounts or denied them opportunities to open new accounts after FATCA was enacted due to increased costs, and risks they pose under FATCA reporting requirements. According to Department of State (State) data, annual approvals of renunciations of U.S. citizenship increased from 1,601 to 4,449\u2014or nearly 178 percent\u2014from 2011 through 2016, attributable in part to the difficulties cited above.\nTreasury previously established joint strategies with State to address challenges U.S. persons faced in accessing foreign financial services. However, it lacks a collaborative mechanism to coordinate efforts with other agencies to address ongoing challenges in accessing such services or obtaining Social Security Numbers. Implementation of a formal means to collaboratively address burdens faced by Americans abroad from FATCA can help federal agencies develop more effective solutions to mitigate such burdens by monitoring and sharing information on such issues, and jointly developing and implementing steps to address them.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making one matter for congressional consideration to address overlap in foreign asset reporting requirements. GAO is making seven recommendations to IRS and other agencies to enhance IRS's ability to leverage FATCA data to enforce compliance, address unnecessary reporting, and better collaborate to mitigate burdens on U.S. persons living abroad. State and Social Security Administration agreed with GAO's recommendations. Treasury and IRS neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_891"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_892","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Secret Service incurs millions of dollars in travel expenses to provide security during the fast-paced operational tempo of a presidential campaign. In connection with the 2016 presidential campaign, the Secret Service provided protection for four presidential candidates, two vice presidential candidates, and six of the candidates' family members.\nGAO was asked to review the Secret Service's travel-related expenses for the 2016 presidential campaign. This report examines (1) how much the Secret Service incurred in travel-related expenses, and (2) the extent to which travel-related payments and reimbursements were made in accordance with laws, regulations, and policies. GAO analyzed Secret Service data to determine the travel expenses incurred by the agency for the 2016 presidential campaign. GAO also randomly selected 40 overnight trips to assess the Secret Service's compliance with provisions of its lodging policies and the Federal Travel Regulation. GAO analyzed the Secret Service's payments to campaign committees to determine whether committees were reimbursed the correct amounts for charter flights.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe U.S. Secret Service's (Secret Service) travel expenses during the 2016 presidential campaign totaled approximately $58 million. Of the $58 million, $17.1 million was for reimbursements to the four campaign committees for chartered aircraft flights. In the case of campaign travel, Secret Service special agents often fly with protected individuals on aircraft chartered by the campaign committees. The Secret Service reimburses the campaign committees for the number of seats occupied by special agents on board each charter flight.\nFor the 40 overnight trips GAO reviewed, the Secret Service generally followed its policies and regulations for lodging payments. However, GAO found that the agency overpaid the campaign committees at least an estimated $3.9 million when reimbursing them for special agents' seats on charter flights. Since at least 1977, the Secret Service's policy has been to pay the lower of two fares when reimbursing campaign committees for special agents' travel on chartered aircraft flights. Specifically, the Secret Service is to pay the lower of the following two fares: the lowest commercially available first-class airfare, or the pro rata fare\u2014the cost of the agent's seat on the charter flight calculated by taking the total cost of the charter divided by the number of passengers on board. However, during the 2016 presidential campaign, Secret Service officials misinterpreted a Federal Election Commission regulation, and as a result, did not conduct the comparison. Instead, the Secret Service solely paid the pro rata fare to the campaign committees. Eight months before the end of the 2016 presidential campaign, Secret Service officials determined the interpretation was erroneous, but did not ensure the agency reverted to its long standing policy. During these 8 months, 66 percent of all campaign-related flights with special agents on board were taken.\nFederal agencies are generally required to collect on debts that have been determined by an appropriate official of the federal government to be owed to the United States. Debts include overpayments. Pursuing debt collection, however, will require the Secret Service to calculate the specific amount it overpaid to the campaign committees and determine how to proceed with seeking repayment from the various committees, as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making five recommendations, including that the Secret Service should (1) calculate its overpayments to the campaign committees for special agents' seats on chartered aircraft flights, and (2) determine how it should proceed with respect to collecting on identified debts. The Department of Homeland Security concurred with the recommendations and identified actions underway to address them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_892"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_893","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nManaging employee performance has been a long-standing government-wide issue and the subject of numerous reforms since the beginning of the modern civil service. Without effective performance management, agencies risk not only losing the skills of top talent, they also risk missing the opportunity to effectively address increasingly complex and evolving mission challenges.\nGAO was asked to examine federal non-Senior Executive Service performance management systems. This report examines (1) government-wide trends in employee perceptions of performance management as measured by the results of selected FEVS statements, (2) practices that selected agencies use to improve performance management, and (3) OPM's guidance and resources to support agency efforts to improve performance management government-wide.\nGAO analyzed responses to selected FEVS statements related to the five performance management phases from 2010 through 2017; selected four agencies based on the highest average scores for the five phases, among other criteria, to identify practices which may contribute to improved performance management; reviewed OPM documents; and interviewed OPM and other agency officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO found that from 2010 through 2017, surveyed employees generally demonstrated positive responses to selected Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) statements related to four of the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) five performance management phases, including: planning and setting expectations, monitoring performance, developing the capacity to perform, and rating performance. Employees responded least positively to statements related to rewarding performance, with only 39 percent of employees, on average, agreeing with statements regarding this phase.\nOf the four agencies with among the highest average scores for the performance management phases (Bureau of Labor Statistics, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency), GAO identified practices that may contribute to improved performance management including strong organizational culture and dedication to mission; use of FEVS and other survey data; and a focus on training.\nOPM provides guidance and opportunities for agencies to share promising practices on performance management; however, some of this information is not easily accessible on its performance management website. In addition, OPM does not leverage its leadership position to formally identify and share emerging performance management research and innovation with agencies. As a result, agencies, and therefore their employees, may not benefit from the best information available.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making three recommendations, including that OPM improve its website and share innovations in performance management with agencies. OPM agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_893"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_894","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Department of Defense's (DOD) major acquisition programs continue to experience cost and schedule overruns. GAO previously found that selecting skilled program managers is a key factor to achieving successful program outcomes. DOD relies on military and civilian program managers to deliver its most expensive new weapon systems, meaning its approach to training, mentoring, retaining, and selecting program managers is critical.\nHouse Report 114-537 included a provision for GAO to review the career paths, development, and incentives for program managers. This report addresses how leading organizations train, mentor, retain, and ultimately select program managers; and the extent to which military service practices align with those leading practices. To conduct this work, GAO identified leading practices documented in prior work and by the Project Management Institute, and interviewed commercial companies identified by the Institute as leaders in this field. GAO also analyzed military service practices for developing program managers and compared those to leading practices.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nLeading organizations use 10 key practices to train, mentor, retain, and ultimately select skilled program managers. GAO found that military service practices for developing program managers align extensively with four of the leading practices, as shown in the table below.\nAt least one military service's practices do not align extensively with five of the leading practices, as shown in the table below.\nFor the remaining leading practice, none of the military services' practices align extensively, as shown in the table below.\nMilitary service officials generally agreed with the assessments. More consistent alignment with leading practices\u2014adapted for military and civilian personnel as appropriate and including greater use of existing financial rewards\u2014would enhance the services' ability to manage acquisition programs.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making eight recommendations, including that the military services improve practices that do not align extensively with leading practices and make greater use of existing financial rewards for good performance. DOD concurred with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_894"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_895","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThis testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's March 2018 report, entitled U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: Assessment of the Covered Business Method Patent Review Program ( GAO-18-320 ).\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFrom September 2012 through September 2017, entities facing patent infringement lawsuits filed 524 petitions challenging the validity of 359 patents under the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's (USPTO) covered business method (CBM) program, resulting in decisions against about one-third of these patents. The CBM program provides entities facing infringement lawsuits an opportunity to challenge the validity of a business method patent by demonstrating that it did not meet requirements for patentability. Business method patents focus on ways of doing business in areas such as banking or e-commerce. The rate of filing petitions over this period has fluctuated but has generally declined since 2015, and none were filed in August or September 2017.\nUSPTO has taken several steps to ensure the timeliness of trial decisions, review past decisions, and engage with stakeholders to improve proceedings under the program:\nTimeliness: USPTO regularly informs relevant parties about paperwork requirements and due dates throughout trials. According to program data, as of September 2017, all 181 completed trials were completed within statutorily required time frames.\nDecision review: USPTO has taken several steps to review its decisions and has monitored the rate at which the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirms or reverses them. However, USPTO does not have guidance, such as documented procedures, for reviewing trial decisions, or the processes leading to decisions, for consistency. Without guidance, such as documented procedures, USPTO cannot fully ensure that it is meeting its objective of ensuring consistency of decisions.\nStakeholder engagement: USPTO judges have engaged with stakeholders by participating in public roundtables and webinars, and attending judicial conferences, among other things.\nStakeholders GAO interviewed generally agreed that the CBM program has reduced lawsuits involving business method patents in the federal courts. While many stakeholders favored maintaining aspects of the program, there was not strong consensus among stakeholders for how future trials should be designed.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_895"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_896","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFPS, within DHS's NPPD, conducts physical security and law enforcement activities for about 9,000 federal facilities and the millions of employees or visitors who work in or visit these facilities. FPS moved from GSA to DHS's ICE in 2003 and to NPPD in 2009. GAO has reported that FPS faced challenges in each location. Legislation enacted in November 2018 requires DHS to review placement options for FPS and could result in FPS moving again within DHS or to another executive branch agency.\nGAO was asked to review issues related to organizational placement options for FPS. This report examines (1) the potential effects of FPS's placement in selected agencies and (2) steps DHS has taken to assess placement options for FPS. GAO identified five key organizational placement criteria based on prior work and identified eight agencies as potential placement options. The agencies were selected because they have the largest number of law enforcement officers or perform physical security, among other reasons. GAO reviewed documentation and interviewed officials from FPS, selected agencies, and key stakeholders. GAO compared agencies to FPS to determine if they meet the organizational placement criteria. An agency meets the criteria if it has similarities to FPS.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn considering organizational placement options for the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Protective Service (FPS), GAO found that none of the eight agencies GAO selected met all the key organizational placement criteria; thus, any of the organizational placement options could result in both benefits and trade-offs. For example, keeping FPS in DHS's National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) could provide FPS some benefits because FPS and NPPD have missions that include the protection of infrastructure or specific facilities, facility protection responsibilities, and access to and sharing of information related to national homeland security. However, unlike FPS, NPPD does not perform both physical security and law enforcement activities, which is a potential trade-off. In another example, the General Services Administration (GSA) and the United States Marshals Service (Marshals) could provide benefits because they currently coordinate with FPS on facility protection. However, Marshals does not have a mission or goals that explicitly focus on the protection of infrastructure or facilities and GSA does not perform law enforcement, which are potential trade-offs.\nDHS has not taken key steps to fully assess potential placement options. Specifically, DHS has not assessed the organizational structure of FPS, such as its placement in NPPD, even though FPS and NPPD have evolved since FPS was placed in NPPD in 2010. Standards for Internal Control state that agency management should establish an organizational structure to achieve the agency's objectives and that an effective management practice for attaining this outcome includes periodically evaluating the structure to ensure that it has adapted to changes. Additionally, because DHS did not analyze FPS's current placement in NPPD, DHS does not have a benchmark for comparison to other agencies. DHS recently established a working group to assess the placement of FPS. However, the group's planned activities are limited in several ways. For example, the group's draft charter does not indicate that the working group will describe what DHS expects to achieve by changing FPS's placement. Further, the draft charter does not indicate that the working group will evaluate the benefits and trade-offs of placement options. GAO has previously identified these and other steps as key to successful organizational change or analysis of alternatives. These steps would help DHS address the 2018 legislation to review placement options for FPS\u2014including, how DHS considered the results of GAO's review. Regardless of the legislation, DHS may not be positioning itself to make an informed decision as to what organization best supports FPS.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nDHS should identify the expectations for changing FPS's placement and take steps to fully evaluate placement options. DHS concurred with the recommendations and outlined steps it plans to take to address them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_896"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_897","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nA goal for the 2020 Census is to count everyone once, only once, and in the right place. Achieving a complete and accurate census is becoming an increasingly complex task, in part because the nation's population is growing larger, more diverse, and more reluctant to participate. When the census misses a person who should have been included, it results in an undercount. Historically, certain sociodemographic groups have been undercounted in the census, which is particularly problematic given the many uses of census data.\nGAO was asked to review the Bureau's plans for enumerating hard-to-count groups in the 2020 Census. This report examines (1) the Bureau's plans for improving the enumeration of the hard-to-count in 2020, and how that compares with 2010; and (2) the challenges the Bureau faces in improving the enumeration of the hard-to-count in 2020. GAO reviewed Bureau planning, budget, operational, and evaluation documents as well as documents of the hard-to-count related working groups of the Bureau's National Advisory Committee; and interviewed Bureau officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Census Bureau's (Bureau) plans for enumerating groups considered hard-to-count, such as minorities, renters, and young children, in the 2020 Census includes the use of both traditional and enhanced initiatives. For example, the Bureau plans to continue using certain outreach efforts used in 2010, such as a communications campaign with paid advertising, partnerships with local organizations, and targeted outreach to immigrant and faith-based organizations. The Bureau also plans enhancements to its outreach efforts compared to 2010. For example, to help address the undercount of young children, the Bureau revised the census questionnaire and instructions to enumerators to more explicitly include grandchildren in counts. Other planned changes include:\nExpanded languages: The Bureau plans to offer more non-English language response options and instructional materials than for 2010.\nMore partnership specialists: The Bureau plans to hire nearly twice as many partnership specialists as it had planned for the 2010 Census to recruit partner organizations in local communities.\nEarlier partnership hiring : The Bureau started hiring a small number of partnership staff in October 2015\u20142 years earlier than it did for 2010.\nWhile efforts have been made, enumerating hard-to-count persons in 2020 will not be easy. Aside from the inherent difficulties of counting such individuals, the Bureau faces certain management challenges related to its hard-to-count efforts.\nFirst, the Bureau's hard-to-count efforts are distributed across over one third of its 35 operations supporting the 2020 Census. And while decentralized operations can provide flexibility, to enhance visibility over these hard-to-count efforts, the Bureau recently developed a draft operational document. However, the Bureau will continue to face challenges in ensuring its hard-to-count efforts integrate with each other. For example, some of the detailed plans for 10 of the hard-to-count efforts were released in 2016 and are awaiting updates, while 4 plans have yet to be released. With less than 2 years until Census Day (April 1, 2020), there is little room for delay. Therefore, to ensure that emerging plans related to the hard-to-count efforts integrate with existing plans, Bureau management will need to continue its focus on control of the changes in hard-to-count efforts moving forward.\nSecond, the Bureau faces a challenge of a tighter labor market than existed prior to 2010 that could potentially create shortfalls or delays in its hiring of partnership staff who are needed to reach small and hard-to-count communities. In early hiring for 2020, Bureau officials reported smaller than expected applicant pools, declined offers, and turnover. Although it has plans to identify critical skills for 2020 and for tailored recruiting, collecting data on its hiring efforts will also be important. Currently, the Bureau lacks data from its 2010 Census that could have helped inform its partnership-staff hiring efforts for 2020.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that the Bureau take steps to ensure that forthcoming changes and decisions on its hard-to-count related efforts are integrated with other operational efforts and that it collects data on its 2020 partnership hiring efforts.\nThe Department of Commerce agreed with GAO's recommendations, and the Bureau provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_897"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_898","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nMisuse of prescription opioids can lead to overdose and death. In 2016, over 14 million Medicare Part D beneficiaries received opioid prescriptions, and spending for opioids was almost $4.1 billion. GAO and others have reported on inappropriate activities and risks associated with these prescriptions.\nThis statement is based on GAO's October 2017 report (GAO-18-15) and discusses (1) CMS oversight of beneficiaries who receive opioid prescriptions under Part D, and (2) CMS oversight of providers who prescribe opioids to Medicare Part D beneficiaries. For the October 2017 report, GAO reviewed CMS opioid utilization and prescriber data, CMS guidance for plan sponsors, and CMS's strategy to prevent opioid misuse. GAO also interviewed CMS officials, the six largest Part D plan sponsors, and 12 national associations selected to represent insurance plans, pharmacy benefit managers, physicians, patients, and regulatory and law enforcement authorities.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), provides guidance on the monitoring of Medicare beneficiaries who receive opioid prescriptions to plan sponsors\u2014private organizations that implement the Medicare drug benefit, Part D\u2014but lacks information on most beneficiaries at risk of harm from opioid use.\nCMS provides guidance to plan sponsors on how they should monitor opioid overutilization among Medicare Part D beneficiaries, and requires them to implement drug utilization review systems that use criteria similar to CMS's. CMS's criteria focused on beneficiaries who do all the following: (1) receive prescriptions of high doses of opioids, (2) receive prescriptions from four or more providers, and (3) fill prescriptions at four or more pharmacies. According to CMS, this approach focused actions on beneficiaries the agency determined to have the highest risk of harm.\nCMS's criteria, including recent revisions, do not provide sufficient information about the larger population of potentially at-risk beneficiaries. CMS estimates that while 33,223 beneficiaries would have met the revised criteria in 2015, 727,016 would have received high doses of opioids regardless of the number of providers or pharmacies. In 2016, CMS began to collect information on some of these beneficiaries using a higher dosage threshold for opioid use. This approach misses some who could be at risk of harm, based on Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidelines. As a result, CMS is limited in its ability to assess progress toward meeting the broader goals of its Opioid Misuse Strategy for the Medicare and Medicaid programs, which includes activities to reduce the risk of harm to beneficiaries from opioid use.\nCMS oversees the prescribing of drugs at high risk of abuse through a variety of projects, but does not analyze data specifically on opioids. According to CMS officials, CMS and plan sponsors identify providers who prescribe large amounts of drugs with a high risk of abuse, and those suspected of fraud or abuse may be referred to law enforcement. However, GAO found that CMS does not identify providers who may be inappropriately prescribing large amounts of opioids separately from other drugs, and does not require plan sponsors to report actions they take when they identify such providers. As a result, CMS is lacking information that it could use to assess how opioid prescribing patterns are changing over time, and whether its efforts to reduce harm are effective.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nIn the October 2017 report, GAO made three recommendations that CMS (1) gather information on the full number of at-risk beneficiaries receiving high doses of opioids, (2) identify providers who prescribe high amounts of opioids, and (3) require plan sponsors to report to CMS on actions related to providers who inappropriately prescribe opioids. HHS concurred with the first two recommendations, but not with the third. GAO continues to believe the recommendation is valid, as discussed in the report and in this statement.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_898"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_899","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCongress has often asked GAO to evaluate the implementation of procedural and analytical requirements that apply to agencies' rulemaking and guidance processes. The importance of improving the transparency of those processes, including providing public participation and sufficient oversight, is a common theme throughout GAO's body of work on federal regulation.\nBased on GAO's prior work, this testimony addresses: (1) the extent to which USDA, Education, HHS, and DOL adhered to OMB requirements and internal controls when developing regulatory guidance, and (2) agencies' compliance with the CRA for regulations promulgated during presidential transitions.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAgencies GAO reviewed\u2014Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Education (Education), Health and Human Services (HHS), and Labor (DOL) did not consistently adhere to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requirements and internal controls when developing regulatory guidance, as GAO reported in 2015. Unlike regulations, regulatory guidance is not generally legally binding and is subject to different requirements for regulatory oversight. Agencies weighed various factors when they determined whether to issue guidance. The agencies GAO reviewed issued different amounts of guidance for various purposes, such as explaining plans for implementing regulations. Agencies found few of their guidance documents to be \u201csignificant,\u201d guidance with a broad and substantial impact on regulated entities. USDA and Education had written procedures for the approval of significant guidance as directed by OMB; DOL's procedures needed updating and to be distributed to appropriate agency officials; HHS did not have any. GAO found that USDA, Education, and DOL consistently applied OMB's requirements for public feedback and access, for example public access to guidance through websites, while HHS did not. Agencies can better ensure consistent application of review processes and public access to significant guidance through better adherence to OMB requirements. GAO also found opportunities for agencies to improve adherence to internal controls for guidance that did not meet OMB's definition of \u201csignificant.\u201d For example, most subagencies GAO reviewed did not have written procedures for the production of guidance and about half did not regularly evaluate whether issued guidance was effective and up-to-date. Adherence to these internal controls could promote quality and consistency in guidance development processes.\nGAO found that agencies did not consistently comply with the Congressional Review Act (CRA) for regulations promulgated during the 120-day presidential transition periods (September 23 through January 20), as defined by the Presidential Transitions Improvements Act of 2015. GAO reported that during the transition from the end of one presidential administration to the next, the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations published on average roughly 2.5 times more economically significant regulations during transition periods than during nontransition periods; increases are typical during transition periods. For these regulations, agencies more frequently provided advanced notice to the public, thus providing the public opportunities to influence the development of these transition period regulations before they were finalized. In their published regulations, agencies generally reported complying with four of five procedural requirements for promulgating regulations during both transition and nontransition periods. Agencies are required to 1) assess the impact of regulations on small entities, 2) minimize the burden that information collections impose on the public, 3) assess the costs and benefits of regulations that include federal mandates, and 4) for certain agencies, obtain direct input from small entities during rulemaking. Also, a fifth requirement, agencies must comply with CRA, which provides Congress an opportunity to review and possibly disapprove regulations before they take effect. Agencies less often complied with CRA, during both transition and nontransition periods. The most common deficiency was agencies' failure to provide Congress the required time to review regulations, which GAO has also identified as a deficiency in previous work.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nIn the April 2015 report on regulatory guidance, GAO made eleven recommendations to USDA, Education, HHS, and DOL to ensure adherence to OMB requirements and applicable elements of internal controls. Three of these recommendations to HHS remain open: 1) to develop written procedures for the approval of significant guidance, 2) strengthen application of internal controls over guidance processes, and 3) improve its website.\nIn the March 2018 report on rulemaking at the end of presidents' terms, GAO recommended OMB, as part of its regulatory review process, identify economically significant regulations at risk of not complying with the CRA and work with agencies to ensure compliance. OMB staff did not agree or disagree with the recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_899"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_900","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOD offers health care services to approximately 9.4 million eligible beneficiaries through TRICARE, DOD's regionally structured health care program. In each of its regions, DOD uses contractors to manage health care delivery through civilian provider networks, among other tasks.\nThe NDAA 2017 made several changes to the TRICARE program, including the establishment of a new preferred provider network health plan option called TRICARE Select. The NDAA 2017 also required DOD to develop an implementation plan for TRICARE Select that addresses seven specific mandated elements on access to care, beneficiary complaints, and quality metrics for network providers.\nThe NDAA 2017 included a provision for GAO to review the implementation plan. This report examines the extent to which DOD's implementation plan addressed the mandated elements. GAO evaluated DOD's implementation plan using leading planning practices identified in GAO's prior work and standards for internal control. GAO examined program policies, procedures, and contracts and interviewed DOD officials and TRICARE regional contractors.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense's (DOD) TRICARE Select Implementation Plan addressed the seven specific elements mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (NDAA 2017). These elements are\nElement A: ensuring that at least 85 percent of the TRICARE Select beneficiary population is covered by the network by January 1, 2018;\nElement B: ensuring access standards for health care appointments;\nElement C: establishing mechanisms for monitoring compliance with standards for access to care;\nElement D: establishing health care provider-to-beneficiary ratios;\nElement E: monitoring complaints by beneficiaries with respect to network adequacy and health care provider availability;\nElement F: establishing requirements for mechanisms to monitor the responses to complaints by beneficiaries; and\nElement G: establishing mechanisms to evaluate the quality metrics of the network providers.\nGAO also assessed the implementation plan against leading practices for sound strategic management planning and found that it incorporated many of the practices, such as establishing goals, strategies to achieve goals, and plans to assess progress. However, a few of the leading practices were only partially incorporated or not incorporated at all. For example, the implementation plan did not always fully address the leading practice that planning documents include strategies to achieve goals and plans to assess progress. DOD officials explained that some of the details of their approach to the elements had not been finalized when they were completing the implementation plan. These officials added that their approach to the implementation plan was to create a strategic overview, and that some of the details are contained in contract documents and monitored through their oversight responsibilities.\nFurthermore, GAO's assessment of the plan's elements found that the approach outlined in the implementation plan for ensuring access standards for health care appointments (Element B) is different from the approach DOD intends to use. The plan noted that DOD will use the access standards for TRICARE Prime\u2014a managed care option\u2014for TRICARE Select. However, DOD officials told GAO that the contractors are responsible for developing their own access standards, which DOD must approve. These officials added that DOD did not include information about the contractors proposing their own access standards because DOD was still developing its approach to this element when the plan was submitted. Because the implementation plan does not reflect DOD's current approach, Congress may not have the information it needs about the contractors' responsibilities for providing access to care, impeding its ability to provide oversight.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DOD provide written documentation of its approach for developing and approving the TRICARE Select access standards, as well as the final access standards, to Congress. DOD agreed with GAO's recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_900"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_901","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nORR is responsible for coordinating and implementing the care and placement of unaccompanied children\u2014that is, children who enter the United States with no lawful immigration status. The number of these children taken into custody by DHS and placed in ORR's care rose from about 6,600 in fiscal year 2011 to nearly 57,500 in fiscal year 2014, many coming from Central America. Though declining somewhat, the number has remained well above historical levels. In fiscal year 2017, DHS referred 40,810 such children to ORR.\nThis testimony discusses efforts by DHS and HHS to improve the placement and care of unaccompanied children in four key areas: (1) the process by which unaccompanied children are transferred from DHS to ORR custody; (2) how ORR monitors the care of unaccompanied children in its custody; (3) how ORR identifies and screens sponsors before children are transferred to their care; and (4) what is known about services these children receive after they leave ORR custody.\nThis testimony is based primarily on the findings from two prior GAO reports: a 2015 report on actions needed to ensure unaccompanied children receive required care in DHS custody; and a 2016 report on further actions HHS could take to monitor their care. This testimony also includes updated information on the progress agencies have made in implementing GAO's recommendations, and more recent statistics from publicly available sources.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) have agreed to establish a joint collaborative process for the referral and placement of unaccompanied children, but the process has not yet been implemented. In 2015, GAO reported that the interagency process for referring unaccompanied children from DHS to HHS's Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) shelters was inefficient and vulnerable to error, and that each agency's role and responsibilities were unclear. GAO recommended that DHS and HHS jointly develop and implement an interagency process with clearly defined roles and responsibilities, as well as procedures to disseminate placement decisions, for all agencies involved. In February 2018, HHS officials told GAO that the agency was reviewing a draft of the DHS-HHS joint concept of operations.\nORR has reported taking steps to improve monitoring of grantees that provided services to unaccompanied children. In 2016, GAO reported that ORR relied on grantees to document and annually report on the care they provide for unaccompanied children, such as housing and educational, medical, and therapeutic services, but documents were often missing and ORR was not able to complete all of its planned visits. GAO recommended that ORR review its monitoring program to ensure that onsite visits are conducted in a timely manner, that case files are systematically reviewed, and that grantees properly document the services they provide. Since 2016, ORR has reported that its grantee monitoring has improved, with more timely completion of on-site monitoring of all its grantees.\nORR relies on grantees to identify and screen sponsors before placing children with them. In 2016, GAO reported that most unaccompanied children from certain Central American countries were released to a parent or other relative, in accordance with ORR policy (see figure).\nSponsors' Relationship to Unaccompanied Children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (Released from Custody from January 7, 2014, through April 17, 2015)\nIn 2016, GAO reported that limited information was available on the services provided to children after they leave ORR care, and recommended that HHS develop processes to ensure its post-release activities provide reliable and useful summary data. Subsequent data from ORR indicate that the percentage of children receiving these services has increased, from about 10 percent in fiscal year 2014, to about 32 percent in fiscal year 2017. Also, in August 2017, ORR officials said that new case reporting requirements had been added to ORR's policy guide; however, further steps are needed to ensure the systematic collection of these data to provide useful information on post-release services across agencies, as GAO recommended.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_901"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_902","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOD's MAIS programs are intended to help the agency sustain its key operations. In April 2017, recognizing that MAIS programs met different mission needs, DOD categorized its MAIS programs into business and non-business systems.\nThe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 includes a provision for GAO to select, assess, and report on DOD's MAIS programs annually through March 2018. GAO's objectives, among others, were to (1) assess DOD's policies for managing and overseeing MAIS programs and (2) describe the extent to which selected MAIS programs have changed their planned cost and schedule estimates and met technical performance goals. To address these objectives, GAO compared DOD's policies for managing and overseeing all 34 MAIS programs (24 non-business programs and 10 business programs) to leading IT management practices. GAO also compared 15 selected programs' initial cost, schedule, and performance baselines to their current acquisition program estimates.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe strength of Department of Defense's (DOD) policies for managing and overseeing major automated information system (MAIS) programs varies. Specifically, the policy for managing 24 non-business MAIS programs adheres to leading information technology (IT) management practices, but the policy for managing 10 MAIS business programs does not always do so (see table).\nWhen DOD categorized 10 of the 34 MAIS programs as MAIS business programs, it also directed these programs to adhere to DOD's business systems policy (DOD Instruction 5000.75). However, the department directed those programs to use a policy for the management and oversight of MAIS business programs that was not fully comprehensive. Until DOD updates its business systems policy to address gaps in establishing performance information such as baseline estimates on program cost and schedule goals, identifying thresholds to identify high risk, and requiring periodic reports to be provided to stakeholders at regular intervals, stakeholders will likely not have all the information they need to manage and oversee MAIS business programs.\nWhile all 15 business and non-business MAIS programs had either increased or decreased their planned cost estimates and the majority had delays in their planned schedule estimates, the majority of the 9 programs that had performance targets met those performance goals. Specifically, the decreases and increases in cost estimates ranged from a decrease of $1.6 billion (-41 percent) to an increase of $1.5 billion (163 percent). The decreases in planned cost were largely due to scope reduction, while cost increases were due to underestimating levels of effort and contracting issues. The slippages in schedule estimates ranged from a delay of 5 years to 5 months; these delays were caused by unrealistic expectations or unplanned changes. Six of the 9 programs that had performance targets met all of them, while the other 3 met several but not all of their performance targets. The other 6 programs were in the early stages of system development and had not begun performance testing.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making three recommendations, including that DOD update its policy for managing MAIS business programs to include baseline estimates. DOD partially concurred with this recommendation, and fully concurred with the other two recommendations. GAO continues to believe that all the recommendations are warranted.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_902"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_903","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOD manages the procurement of billions of dollars in defense items and services on behalf of foreign customers through the FMS program. These sales help support the defense industrial base and are vital to U.S. foreign policy and national security interests.\nThe FMS process generally begins with a request by a foreign government for information about a U.S. defense item or service. Requests for price and availability data are an optional step in the process. DOD guidance is to generally respond to such requests within 45 days.\nThe fiscal year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act included a provision for GAO to review DOD's process for developing price and availability data for foreign customers. This report addresses, among other objectives, (1) price and availability requests DOD received from fiscal years 2014 through 2018, (2) how DOD develops price and availability data, and (3) the factors that can influence the timeliness of DOD's responses to foreign customers with price and availability data.\nGAO analyzed DOD price and availability data for fiscal years 2014 through 2018, the latest data available; and reviewed documents for a non-generalizable sample of five price and availability responses\u2014varying by estimate value\u2014provided to foreign customers by the Army, Navy, and Air Force. GAO also interviewed defense contractors and DOD officials.\nGAO is not making any recommendations at this time.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) reported receiving 3,038 requests for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) price and availability data in fiscal years 2014 through 2018 from 93 countries across six geographic regions, as shown in the figure. Foreign customer requests included services and items such as training and support services for weapon systems, missiles, aircraft, and communication equipment.\nNot all countries in each region submitted a price and availability request.\nDOD officials indicated they generally strove to offer price and availability data that reflected rough order of magnitude estimates of total anticipated costs for a complete and sustainable capability. Contractors often provide input to DOD for these cost and schedule estimates. In the five examples GAO reviewed, DOD officials considered factors such as possible production delays and included anticipated costs for support services, operations, and sustainment, when needed. DOD officials also included FMS administrative charges and, as applicable, nonrecurring and transportation costs. GAO found that when DOD considered these factors in developing the response to the customer, at times, they made adjustments to the estimates provided by contractors to more fully reflect expected costs if the items are purchased.\nAmong the five examples, GAO found that response times ranged from 45 to 320 days and that a number of factors can affect timeliness. For example, the complexity of the system or capability the customer is interested in acquiring may require involvement from multiple program offices and defense contractors, requiring more time than the 45 days suggested by DOD's guidance.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_903"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_904","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nGAO has previously found that DHS's components had acquisition programs that did not meet requirements and that those requirements were, in some cases, poorly defined. Poorly defined requirements increase the risk that acquisitions will not meet the needs of users in the field\u2014for example, border patrol agents or emergency responders.\nGAO was asked to examine DHS components' practices for developing requirements. This report addresses the policies, organizations, and workforce that selected DHS components use to develop requirements for their acquisition programs.\nGAO selected seven DHS components with significant acquisition programs and a non-generalizable sample of programs\u2014based on cost, component, and acquisition phase\u2014as case studies. GAO analyzed policies and program documentation; and interviewed DHS and component officials, as well as end users of DHS programs. GAO compared components' practices to industry best practices and federal internal control standards.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO has identified several best practices to ensure that operational requirements for acquisitions are well-defined and found some Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) components met them while others did not. These practices include a formal policy for developing requirements, an independent requirements organization, and an understanding of workforce needs and training. The table below shows GAO's assessment of seven of DHS's components against these practices.\nEstablishing a formal policy to guide the process is critical to developing well-defined requirements. However, only the Coast Guard has an approved policy for requirements development among the seven components reviewed. Without well-defined requirements, components are at risk of acquiring capabilities that will not meet mission needs. DHS officials told GAO that components have generally prioritized obtaining funding and starting programs over developing requirements.\nThree components have a requirements development organization, separating requirements from acquisition in addressing capability gaps. Officials from components without such organizations told GAO that they have fewer major acquisitions and rely on DHS to assist in requirements development. DHS policy and best practices, however, maintain the importance of this separation regardless of the number of major acquisitions to guard against possible bias by acquisition officials toward a specific materiel solution.\nTwo components have assessed requirements development workforce needs, but both need to be updated; and one component has provided requirements development training and certification. Other component officials told GAO that they lack the resources necessary to take these steps. Best practices indicate that without an appropriately sized and trained workforce, components remain at risk of acquiring capabilities that fail to meet end user needs.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making 25 recommendations, including to individual components to establish policies and independent organizations for requirements development, assess workforce needs, and establish training and certifications. DHS concurred with all the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_904"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_905","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nNNSA is responsible for ensuring a sustainable supply of strategic materials critical to the nation's nuclear security missions, as well as the capability to process these materials. NNSA estimates that strategic materials management activities will cost about $7.7 billion over the next 5 years.\nThe House Report accompanying H.R. 4909, a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, included a provision for GAO to review NNSA's management of its strategic materials programs. This report examines (1) the extent to which NNSA has, for these programs, defined requirements, including program manager roles and responsibilities, and (2) the progress of NNSA's implementation of those program requirements.\nGAO reviewed NNSA program management policies and documents related to its strategic materials program manager positions and interviewed NNSA officials and program managers.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) manages strategic materials programs for uranium, plutonium, tritium, and lithium\u2014materials that are critical to national security. NNSA has set program requirements that each of the programs must follow and has established the roles and responsibilities of the program managers. NNSA has defined these requirements in two documents:\nProgram Execution Instruction (2016). Outlines requirements for program management documents, such as a program plan, cost and schedule estimates, and an integrated master schedule that includes the entire scope of work for successful execution.\nProgram Management Policy (2017). Outlines the program managers' authority and requirements for managing the strategic materials programs, such as managing risk, and requires each program to develop documents, such as a mission strategy and technology development plan.\nNNSA officials reported that the agency is making progress implementing the requirements outlined for each of the strategic materials programs, although some of the programs are farther along than others. For example:\nThe uranium and domestic uranium enrichment programs established in 2014 are the furthest along and have developed the documents needed to meet strategic program requirements.\nThe plutonium program has met some of the requirements, such as developing a program plan, work breakdown structure, and decision analysis, but does not yet have an integrated master schedule.\nThe tritium program met the requirements during the course of GAO's review.\nThe lithium program, which is the newest, has made the least amount of progress and to date has developed only a mission strategy, a mission requirements matrix, and a technology development plan.\nAccording to NNSA officials, shortage of staff assigned to the strategic materials programs has been the primary reason hampering progress in implementing the program requirements. For example, a lithium program manager has not yet been assigned, and all the other programs have identified the need for additional staff beyond the one or two staff currently assigned to each. According to officials, competing agency priorities and perceived staffing limits are the primary impediments to assigning more staff to these programs. However, GAO also found that NNSA has not determined the critical skills and competencies needed for these programs. GAO's prior work has identified certain activities or practices that can help an agency strategically manage its human capital. These activities include determining the critical skills and competencies that will be needed to achieve the program's mission and developing strategies to address gaps in the number, deployment, and alignment of staff needed. By determining the critical skills and competencies needed for the strategic materials programs and using this determination to develop strategies to address any gaps in the number, deployment, and alignment of program staff, NNSA may have the information it needs to better justify increased staffing levels for the programs.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that NNSA determine the critical skills and competencies that will be needed for the strategic materials programs and use this determination to develop strategies for addressing any gaps related to the number, deployment, and alignment of program staff. NNSA agreed with GAO's recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_905"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_906","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFEMA, a component of DHS, provides preparedness grants to state, local, tribal, and territorial governments to help prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from and mitigate terrorist attacks or other disasters. SHSP grants fund the nation's 56 states and territories, while UASI grants fund eligible urban areas. Grant allocations have been based, in part, on FEMA's risk-based grant assessment model, with states and urban areas deemed to be at higher risk receiving more grant dollars than those deemed at lower risk. Since 2008, GAO and others have assessed the model and made recommendations to strengthen it.\nThis report 1) describes SHSP and UASI grant awards during fiscal years 2008 through 2018, and factors affecting grant distributions; and 2) examines the steps that FEMA has taken to strengthen its risk assessment model for allocating preparedness grants, and any additional opportunities to improve the model. GAO analyzed the information in FEMA's model, and data on SHSP and UASI grant awards for fiscal years 2008 through 2018. GAO also interviewed FEMA and DHS officials and collected documents.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO found that various factors affected Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) and Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant awards from fiscal year 2008 through 2018. SHSP grant awards to states were based on two factors\u2014(1) minimum amounts set in law each year, and (2) FEMA's risk model. For example, in fiscal year 2012, each state was to receive a minimum of approximately $2.74 million, with each state receiving additional funds based on its relative risk score. Conversely, UASI grant awards are made based on its FEMA's risk-based grant assessment model, which ranks each urban area relative to others in that year, and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership decisions on how funding should be allocated. From fiscal year 2008 through 2018, the number of USAI grantees varied from year to year (see figure below).\nSince 2008, FEMA has taken steps to strengthen its risk-based grant assessment model, but has not incorporated additional scientific practices into its model. For example, in 2011 FEMA included more information in its model on potential targets and their vulnerability in each state and urban area, addressing a prior GAO recommendation. More recently in 2018, FEMA added additional factors to better assess vulnerability in each state and urban area, such as the number of special events where large crowds gather and soft targets susceptible to lone wolf attacks, among other things. However, GAO found that FEMA does not fully utilize scientific practices recognized by the National Research Council and the Office of Management and Budget as best practices. Specifically, FEMA did not fully document its model's underlying assumptions, such as the weights in its model or the justification for changes to these weights. FEMA also did not perform the level of analysis needed to determine how changes to its model could affect the resulting risk scores. Finally, FEMA has not coordinated an independent external peer review of its model. Applying such scientific practices could assist FEMA in further strengthening its model.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making three recommendations to FEMA to further strengthen its risk-based grant assessment model by (1) fully documenting the model's assumptions and justifications, (2) performing additional in-depth analyses, and (3) coordinating an external peer review. FEMA concurred with our recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_906"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_907","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe emergence of increasingly sophisticated threats and continuous reporting of cyber incidents underscores the continuing and urgent need for effective information security. GAO first designated information security as a government-wide high- risk area in 1997. GAO expanded the high-risk area to include the protection of cyber critical infrastructure in 2003 and protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information in 2015.\nFederal law and policy provide DHS with broad authorities to improve and promote cybersecurity. DHS plays a key role in strengthening the cybersecurity posture of the federal government and promoting cybersecurity of systems supporting the nation's critical infrastructures.\nThis statement highlights GAO's work related to federal programs implemented by DHS that are intended to improve federal cybersecurity and cybersecurity over systems supporting critical infrastructure. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on a body of work issued since fiscal year 2016 that highlighted, among other programs, DHS's NCPS, national integration center activities, and cybersecurity workforce assessment efforts.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn recent years, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has acted to improve and promote the cybersecurity of federal and private-sector computer systems and networks, but further improvements are needed. Specifically, consistent with its statutory authorities, DHS has made important progress in implementing programs and activities that are intended to mitigate cybersecurity risks on the computer systems and networks supporting federal operations and our nation's critical infrastructure. For example, the department has:\nissued cybersecurity related binding operational directives to federal agencies;\nserved as the federal-civilian interface for sharing cybersecurity related information with federal and nonfederal entities;\nFramework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity ; and\nNevertheless, the department has not taken sufficient actions to ensure that it successfully mitigates cybersecurity risks on federal and private-sector computer systems and networks. For example, GAO reported in 2016 that DHS's National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS) had only partially met its stated system objectives of detecting and preventing intrusions, analyzing malicious content, and sharing information. GAO recommended that DHS enhance capabilities, improve planning, and support greater adoption of NCPS.\nIn addition, although the department's National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center generally performed required functions such as collecting and sharing cybersecurity related information with federal and non-federal entities, GAO reported in 2017 that the center needed to evaluate its activities more completely. For example, the extent to which the center had performed its required functions in accordance with statutorily defined implementing principles was unclear, in part, because the center had not established metrics and methods by which to evaluate its performance against the principles. Further, in its role as the lead federal agency for collaborating with eight critical infrastructure sectors including the communications and dams sectors, DHS had not developed metrics to measure and report on the effectiveness of its cyber risk mitigation activities or on the cybersecurity posture of the eight sectors.\nGAO reported in 2018 that DHS had taken steps to assess its cybersecurity workforce; however, it had not identified all of its cybersecurity positions and critical skill requirements.\nUntil DHS fully and effectively implements its cybersecurity authorities and responsibilities, the department's ability to improve and promote the cybersecurity of federal and private-sector networks will be limited.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nSince fiscal year 2016, GAO has made 29 recommendations to DHS to enhance the capabilities of NCPS, establish metrics and methods for evaluating performance, and fully assess its cybersecurity workforce, among other things. As of April 2018, DHS had not demonstrated that it had fully implemented most of the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_907"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_908","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nWithin the limits of their statutory authority, agencies may design their regulations in different ways to achieve intended policy outcomes. Agencies also decide how they will promote compliance with their regulations and ensure that regulated entities are informed of regulatory requirements.\nGAO was asked to review how agencies make regulatory design and enforcement decisions. This report describes how selected agencies report (1) making decisions on regulatory designs among available options, (2) making decisions to designate resources among available compliance and enforcement activities, and (3) evaluating those decisions, and also identifies (4) key considerations for decision makers related to regulatory design and enforcement. To describe how agencies make and evaluate these decisions, GAO reviewed regulatory processes and spoke with officials at six executive departments\u2014the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Commerce, Health and Human Services (HHS), Labor (Labor), and Transportation and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)\u2014based on volume of significant rulemaking, and 13 subcomponents within those departments. To identify key considerations for regulatory decision makers, GAO reviewed existing criteria, including statutory and Executive requirements, conducted a literature review, and obtained input on identified considerations with subject matter specialists.\nGAO is not making any recommendations in this report. USDA, HHS, Labor, and the EPA provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAgencies have multiple available regulatory designs. Selected agency processes for choosing among them are informed by statutory and Executive requirements, regulatory objectives, and statutory discretion. Officials reported a preference for \u201cperformance\u201d designs that establish an outcome but allow flexibility in how to achieve it, but stated that in some cases their objectives could require use of more prescriptive \u201cdesign-based\u201d regulations that specify a certain required technology or action. Officials at all selected agencies stated that they discuss potential regulatory designs internally, but some agency processes also included practices such as documentation of identified design options and assessments of the options' risks and enforcement implications.\nSelected agencies used multiple tools and approaches for allocating resources to elicit compliance. Agencies generally have flexibility to use a mix of tools, including providing compliance assistance to help regulated entities understand requirements, and monitoring and enforcement through inspections. Selected agency processes to allocate compliance resources vary, and agencies reported using collected data to target enforcement resources to address risks.\nSelected agencies supplemented feedback on effectiveness of their regulatory design and enforcement approaches with evaluations, which agency officials said could prompt changes. When agencies identify noncompliance, selected agencies may update their regulation or their compliance strategy.\nGAO identified key considerations to strengthen agency decisions related to regulatory design and enforcement (see figure). These build on current directives, academic research, and the experiences of selected agencies and are intended to serve as a resource for decision makers in designing\u2014or redesigning\u2014their regulations and determining how best to elicit compliance.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_908"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_909","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nEnacted in December 2014, TSARA introduced legislative reforms to promote greater transparency and accountability in TSA's SRT acquisitions.\nTSARA contains a provision that GAO submit two reports to Congress on TSA's progress in implementing TSARA. In February 2016, GAO issued the first report that found TSA had taken actions to address TSARA.\nThis second report examines TSA's (1) progress in addressing TSARA requirements since 2016, (2) reporting to Congress on SRT acquisitions, and (3) internal communication of its implementation decisions. GAO examined TSARA and TSA documents and guidance; analyzed TSA contract data and reports from TSARA's enactment in December 2014 through July 2018 and September 2018, respectively; and interviewed DHS and TSA officials on actions taken to implement TSARA. GAO also conducted interviews with TSA officials on parameters for reporting on SRT acquisitions.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nSince 2016, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) generally addressed Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act (TSARA) requirements through its policies and procedures for acquisition justifications, baseline requirements, and management of inventory. TSA also, among other actions, submitted a technology investment plan and annual small-business contracting goals reports to Congress as required.\nSince December 2014, TSA reported limited security-related technology (SRT) acquisitions to Congress under TSARA, submitting its first report in August 2018. TSARA contains a report and certification provision pursuant to which TSA is to submit information to Congress 30 days prior to the award of a contract for an SRT acquisition exceeding $30 million. Through July 2018, TSA obligated about $1.4 billion on SRT and associated services. TSA officials explained that none of these obligations\u2014including 7 SRT orders, each in excess of $30 million\u2014invoked the report and certification provision because the obligations did not align with TSA's implementation policy, which provides that the $30 million threshold relates to the contract ceiling of the initial SRT contract and not to individual task and delivery orders. Revising TSA's policy to include contracts for services that enhance the capabilities of SRT, including any orders for SRT and associated services in excess of $30 million, would better ensure that Congress has the information it needs to effectively oversee TSA's SRT acquisitions.\nTSA has not effectively communicated internally its implementation decisions for what constitutes an SRT under TSARA. TSA officials described to GAO that SRT must be equipment that is public facing, but TSA's policy does not clearly state the parameters of what is considered an SRT. Without clear guidance, TSA staff may be unaware of these parameters and how they apply to future acquisitions under TSARA. For example, TSA acquisition program staff were initially unable to confirm for GAO whether the technologies TSA had acquired were SRTs and thus subject to TSARA. Updating TSA policy to include detailed parameters for what constitutes an SRT would better ensure consistency in applying the act.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that TSA revise its policies for the report and certification provision of TSARA to include reporting on task and delivery orders and services associated with SRT, and clarify in policy what constitutes an SRT under TSARA. DHS generally concurred with the recommendations and described steps it plans to take to implement them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_909"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_910","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nMedicaid, a joint federal-state health care program overseen by CMS, is a significant component of federal and state budgets, with total estimated expenditures of $596 billion in fiscal year 2017.\nMedicaid allows significant flexibility for states to design and implement program innovations based on their unique needs. The resulting diversity of the program and its size, make the program particularly challenging to oversee at the federal level and also vulnerable to improper payments. In fiscal year 2017, estimated improper payments were $36.7 billion in Medicaid, up from $29.1 billion in fiscal year 2015. Further, the Medicaid program accounted for about 26 percent of the fiscal year 2017 government-wide improper payment estimate.\nThis testimony focuses on the (1) major risks to the integrity of the Medicaid program, and (2) actions needed to manage these risks. This testimony draws on GAO's reports issued between November 2012 and May 2018 on the Medicaid program.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO's work has identified three broad areas of risk in Medicaid that also contribute to overall growth in program spending, projected to exceed $900 billion in fiscal year 2025.\n1) Improper payments , including payments made for services not actually provided. Regarding managed care payments, which were nearly half (or $280 billion) of Medicaid spending in fiscal year 2017, GAO has found that the full extent of program risk due to overpayments and unallowable costs is unknown.\n2) Supplemental payments , which are payments made to providers\u2014such as local government hospitals\u2014that are in addition to regular, claims-based payments made to providers for specific services. These payments totaled more than $48 billion in fiscal year 2016 and in some cases have shifted expenditures from the states to the federal government.\n3) Demonstrations , which allow states to test new approaches to coverage. Comprising about one-third of total Medicaid expenditures in fiscal year 2015, GAO has found that demonstrations have increased federal costs without providing results that can be used to inform policy decisions.\nGAO's work has recommended numerous actions to strengthen oversight and manage program risks.\nImprove data. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), which oversees Medicaid, needs to make sustained efforts to ensure Medicaid data are timely, complete, and comparable from all states, and useful for program oversight. Data are also needed for oversight of supplemental payments and ensuring that demonstrations are meeting their stated goals.\nTarget fraud. CMS needs to conduct a fraud risk assessment for Medicaid, and design and implement a risk-based antifraud strategy for the program.\nCollaborate. There is a need for a collaborative approach to Medicaid oversight. State auditors have conducted evaluations that identified significant improper payments and outlined deficiencies in Medicaid processes that require resolution.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nAs a part of this body of work, GAO has made 83 recommendations to address shortcomings in Medicaid oversight and suggested four matters for congressional consideration. The Department of Health and Human Services and CMS have generally agreed with these recommendations and have implemented 25 of them. GAO will continue to monitor implementation of the remaining recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_910"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_911","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nAccording to the U.S. Treasury, the government owns about $1.3 trillion in \u201cpersonal property\u201d such as computers, furniture, and vehicles. Federal law authorizes agencies to exchange or sell personal property and retain the allowances or proceeds for replacing similar needed property. These are called \u201cexchange\/sale\u201d transactions. GSA is responsible for issuing exchange\/sale regulations and guiding agencies on the use of the authority.\nGAO was asked to review agencies' use of the exchange\/sale authority. This report (1) describes what is known about personal property exchange\/sale transactions from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 2017 and (2) examines selected agencies' experiences using the exchange\/sale authority and monitoring such activities. GAO analyzed multi-year data compiled by GSA OGP and found the data to be sufficiently reliable. GAO selected three agencies\u2014GSA, the Army, and VA\u2014based on the type, quantity, and value of personal property exchanged and sold; reviewed agencies' personal property policies; examined agencies' monitoring of exchange\/sale activities; and interviewed their officials about personal property management.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAccording to data compiled by the General Services Administration's Office of Government-wide Policy (GSA OGP), 27 agencies executed exchange\/sale transactions, governed by statute and GSA regulations, to exchange (trade-in) or sell personal property from fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 2017. The 27 agencies reported transactions totaling about $3.1 billion. Vehicle sales accounted for $2.6 billion (about 84 percent) of that total.\nGAO found that GSA officials who procure vehicles for federal agencies and Army officials who purchase helicopters appeared to understand the exchange\/sale process and used it frequently. However, Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) officials expressed confusion about key aspects of the authority. For example, officials were unclear about how to sell property; this lack of clarity led to missed opportunities to use sale proceeds for replacing property. GSA OGP officials who guide agencies on the use of the authority acknowledged that the exchange\/sale regulations can be confusing but GSA's plan to amend them is at least 2 years away. Because GSA does not plan to address this confusion in the near term through other means such as bulletins or outreach, agencies' misunderstanding of the authority could lead to additional missed opportunities to be effective stewards of government funds.\nRegarding monitoring of exchange and sale activities, GAO found that the Army monitored activities consistent with its policy. However, GSA and VA performed limited monitoring because:\nGSA had not clarified its responsibilities or defined the scope of its authority for monitoring internal GSA exchanges and sales, and\nVA did not have a detailed policy for monitoring and had not communicated information about monitoring to pertinent employees.\nUntil GSA clarifies its responsibilities and the scope of its authority and VA revises its policy with pertinent details and communicates this information to staff members, neither agency will be positioned to sufficiently monitor exchange\/sale activities.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is recommending that GSA OGP address agency confusion about the exchange\/sale authority and that GSA clarify its responsibilities and the scope of its authority. GAO is also recommending VA revise its policy to address monitoring and communicate the revision to staff. Both agencies agreed with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_911"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_912","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Corps is primarily responsible for operating and maintaining the nation's inland waterways, including maintaining locks and dams as well as rehabilitating, modernizing, or constructing new infrastructure as needed. Persistent schedule delays and cost overruns for inland-waterways construction projects have prompted some in Congress to explore funding and management alternatives.\nGAO was asked to review options to change the management of inland waterways. Among other things, this report assesses how the Corps allocates funds for operations and maintenance for the inland waterways, describes how the Corps funds construction projects, and assesses the effect of the current funding approach on projects' costs and schedules. GAO reviewed Corps documents and data; interviewed officials from Corps headquarters, six districts, and representatives of regional and national stakeholder groups\u2014including commercial and recreational interests as well as contributors to relevant literature\u2014selected to achieve a variety of viewpoints; and developed a simulation of the effect of various funding approaches on the total funding requirements and timelines for a set of hypothetical construction projects.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) allocates its appropriated funding for operations and maintenance projects for the inland waterways based on risk and economic benefits. However, the Corps does not know how much deferred maintenance exists for inland waterways because there is no agreed upon definition for deferred maintenance. Corps and ASA-CW officials identified several challenges related to developing a useful definition with which to measure deferred maintenance. For example, a single measure may not be useful to gauge the condition of the waterways because the effect of deferred maintenance projects on the reliability of the waterways will vary. However, without a measure or measures of deferred maintenance for inland waterways that (1) the Corps finds useful, (2) reflects its priorities, and (3) accurately conveys a consistent and well-defined measure of deferred maintenance, the Corps is limited in its ability to manage its maintenance efforts and accurately communicate its estimated maintenance costs to OMB and the Congress.\nWith regard to inland-waterways construction projects, the Corps prioritizes them based on expected costs and benefits. The Corps assesses the net economic benefits of inland-waterways construction projects' alternatives by comparing estimated direct costs (e.g., construction costs to build a new lock chamber) to estimated reductions in the waterway transportation costs (e.g., reduced travel costs related to a reduction in the time it might take for a barge to pass through a larger lock chamber). According to Corps officials and stakeholders, the current incremental-funding approach for prioritized projects, among other things, has resulted in schedule delays (as shown below) and cost increases. Although full upfront funding for capital projects is an important tool for effective management, inland-waterways construction projects have been funded incrementally, meaning the Corps requests\u2014and Congress appropriates\u2014annual funding that covers a portion of a project's estimated costs. Corps reports and academic studies have found that this approach results in increased project costs because the Corps must contract for construction in separable pieces. This approach is less efficient than contracting for the entire project at once. For example, Corps officials currently expect that the Kentucky Lock Addition project will cost at least $229 million more than the originally estimated cost as a direct result of this contracting approach. Without some change in the way inland-waterways construction projects are funded to either provide full funding or reduce the effects of incremental funding by concentrating funding on fewer projects at one time, current cost increases and schedule delays resulting from inefficient contracting are likely to continue.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making two recommendations: that the Corps define and measure deferred maintenance for inland waterways and that it pursue changes to increase its ability to more efficiently use available funding for construction. The Department of Defense concurred with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_912"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_913","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nVA has pressing infrastructure needs. The Communities Helping Invest through Property and Improvements Needed for Veterans Act of 2016 (CHIP-IN Act) authorized VA to accept donated real property\u2014such as buildings or facility construction or improvements\u2014through a pilot program. VA has initiated one project in Omaha, Nebraska, through a partnership with a donor group. VA can accept up to five donations through the pilot program, which is authorized through 2021.\nThe CHIP-IN Act includes a provision for GAO to report on donation agreements. This report (1) examines the extent to which the VA's pilot design aligns with leading practices and (2) discusses what VA has learned from the pilot to date. GAO reviewed VA documents, including plans for the pilot program, and visited the Omaha pilot project. GAO interviewed VA officials, the Omaha donor group, and three non-federal entities that responded to VA's request seeking donors. GAO compared implementation of VA's pilot to leading practices for pilot design, organizational transformation, and cross-functional teams.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is conducting a pilot program, called CHIP-IN, that allows VA to partner with non-federal entities and accept real property donations from them as a way to help address VA's infrastructure needs. Although VA signed its first project agreement under the program in April 2017, VA has not yet established a framework for effective design of the pilot program. Specifically, VA's pilot program design is not aligned with four of five leading practices for designing a well-developed and documented pilot program. VA has begun to implement one leading practice by improving its efforts to communicate with relevant stakeholders, such as including external stakeholders in key meetings. However, the VA offices involved have not agreed upon and documented clear, measurable objectives for the pilot program, which is a leading practice. Further, VA has not developed an assessment methodology or an evaluation plan that would help inform decisions about whether or how the pilot approach could be expanded. While VA officials said they intend to develop these items as tasks for the newly formed CHIP-IN steering committee, they have no timeline for doing so. Without clear objectives and assessment and evaluation plans, VA and Congress may have difficulty determining whether the pilot approach is an effective way to help address VA's infrastructure needs.\nTo date, the CHIP-IN pilot suggests that donation partnerships could improve construction projects, but identifying donors and establishing a team for the pilot program have presented challenges. Officials from VA and the donor group for the first pilot project\u2014an ambulatory care center in Omaha, Nebraska\u2014said they are completing the project faster than if it had been a standard federal construction project, while achieving potential cost savings by using private sector practices. However, VA officials said it is challenging to find partners to make large donations with no financial return, and VA's lack of marketing and philanthropic development experience exacerbates that challenge. VA and the donor group agreed that a dedicated team of individuals with relevant expertise could facilitate the pilot's implementation. The new CHIP-IN steering committee could serve this purpose, but it lacks documented roles and responsibilities. Establishing a team with clear roles and responsibilities and identifying both available and needed staff resources could assist VA in partnering with additional donors and creating new opportunities to meet veterans' needs.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is recommending that VA: (1) establish pilot program objectives, (2) develop an assessment methodology and an evaluation plan, and (3) document roles and responsibilities and identify available and needed staff resources. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_913"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_914","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe United States has a national security interest in promoting stability in conflict-affected countries to prevent or mitigate the consequences of armed conflict, according to the 2017 National Security Strategy. State, USAID, and DOD have reported that a collaborative government approach is an essential part of maximizing the effectiveness of U.S. efforts in conflict-affected areas.\nGAO was asked to review U.S. conflict prevention, mitigation, and stabilization efforts abroad. This report (1) describes examples of conflict prevention, mitigation, and stabilization efforts that U.S. agencies and USIP conducted in Iraq, Nigeria, and Syria and their goals in fiscal year 2017 and (2) examines the extent to which U.S. agencies and USIP incorporated key collaboration practices to coordinate their efforts. GAO collected data from the agencies and USIP on their efforts and goals in Iraq, Nigeria, and Syria. GAO selected these countries based on U.S. national security interests, among other criteria. GAO reviewed agency and USIP documents, interviewed officials, and conducted fieldwork in Iraq, Nigeria, and Jordan. GAO assessed coordination against key practices identified by GAO to enhance interagency collaboration.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP)\u2014an independent, federally funded institute\u2014reported conducting various efforts to address conflict prevention, mitigation, and stabilization for Iraq, Nigeria, and Syria in fiscal year 2017. For example, in Iraq, State supported efforts to remove improvised explosive devices from homes and infrastructure (see figure); USAID contributed to the United Nations to restore essential services; DOD provided immediate medical trauma supplies to the World Health Organization to treat injured civilians; and USIP conducted facilitated dialogs to enable local reconciliation in areas liberated from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.\nIn conducting U.S. conflict prevention, mitigation, and stabilization efforts, State, USAID, DOD, and USIP have addressed aspects of key collaboration practices such as elements of bridging organizational cultures and leadership. However, the agencies have not formally documented their agreement on coordination for U.S. stabilization efforts through formal written guidance and agreements that address key collaboration practices. GAO found the following, for example, with regard to the extent key collaboration practices have been used by these entities.\nBridging organizational cultures: U.S. agencies have established various mechanisms to coordinate their efforts, such as interagency working groups and staff positions focused on coordination. USIP convenes interagency actors, including State, USAID, and DOD through various programs and events.\nDefining outcomes and accountability: One or more agencies have established some common outcomes and accountability mechanisms for their stabilization efforts in Iraq, Nigeria, and Syria. Moreover, through an interagency review of U.S. stabilization assistance, State, USAID, and DOD identified a need to develop an outcome-based political strategy outlining end states for U.S. stabilization efforts and strategic analytics to track and measure progress, among other needs.\nWritten guidance and agreements: Although State, USAID, and DOD have developed a framework for stabilization, they have not documented their agreement on the key collaboration practices identified, such as defining outcomes and accountability and clarifying roles and responsibilities. According to key practices for enhancing interagency collaboration, articulating agreements in formal documents can strengthen collaborative efforts, and reduce the potential for duplication, overlap, and fragmentation.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nState, USAID, and DOD should document agreement on their coordination for U.S. stabilization efforts though formal written guidance and agreements addressing key collaboration practices. The agencies concurred with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_914"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_915","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCommercial fishing has one of the highest death rates of any industry in the United States. Fishing vessels that are at least 50 feet long and were built after 2013 are required by law to be built and maintained to rules developed by a classification society, a process known as classing. Congress created an alternative-to-class approach in 2016, allowing certain size vessels to be designed and built to equivalent standards in lieu of classing.\nThe Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2015 included a provision for GAO to review the costs and benefits of classing commercial fishing vessels. This report assesses (1) known numbers and rates of commercial fishing vessel accidents, injuries, and fatalities; (2) what is known about the costs, effects, and benefits of constructing and maintaining classed vessels; and (3) how the alternative-to-class approach compares with classing. GAO collected data on vessel accidents, injuries, and fatalities; interviewed vessel owners, builders, classification societies, Coast Guard, and other agencies; and studied classing costs.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Coast Guard, the only military service within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), investigated 2,101 commercial fishing vessel accidents between 2006 and 2015 that occurred in federal waters; however, because there are no reliable data on the total number of commercial fishing vessels that are actively fishing, rates of accidents, injuries, and fatalities cannot be determined. Agencies, such as the Coast Guard, keep records of accidents, but without reliable data on active vessels, trend information cannot be determined. The Coast Guard and the National Marine Fisheries Service have separate efforts to collect data that could be used to develop an estimate of active commercial fishing vessels, but each agency is taking a different approach to do so. These and other agencies agreed that it is important to calculate rates to assess commercial fishing vessel accidents, injuries, and fatalities. Establishing a mechanism\u2014such as a working group\u2014to coordinate efforts and collect reliable data on the number of active vessels and key characteristics, such as vessel age and length, would allow the agencies to do so in an efficient manner.\nWhile data on the costs to design, construct, and maintain classed vessels are limited, vessel owners, builders, and classification societies agree that classification increases costs and told GAO that the perceived costs of classing may affect vessel owners' decisions to purchase new vessels to avoid classification requirements. However, they also agree that classification is one of many factors that contribute to safety.\nThe alternative-to-class approach is more flexible than classing\u2014for example, in its use of marine surveyors to verify vessel construction. Industry stakeholders and GAO's analysis, however, identified numerous questions and uncertainties regarding implementation of the approach, including licensing requirements for naval engineers and architects. The Coast Guard has not issued regulations or guidance to address these issues on the alternative-to-class approach due, in part, to its ongoing efforts to issue regulations to implement safety-related legislation enacted in 2010 and 2012. However, without specific written procedures\u2014either in the form of regulations or guidance\u2014the Coast Guard cannot ensure consistent implementation of the alternative-to-class approach.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nAmong GAO's recommendations, the Coast Guard and other agencies should form a working group to collect reliable data on the number of active fishing vessels. The Coast Guard should also issue regulations or guidance to address questions about the alternative-to-class approach. The agencies generally concurred with the recommendations, but DHS did not concur that the Coast Guard assess vessel accident rates. GAO revised this recommendation to allow the Coast Guard or another appropriate agency to do the assessment.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_915"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_916","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCreated in the mid-1980s, FCC's Lifeline program provides discounts to eligible low-income households for home or wireless telephone and, as of December 2016, broadband service. Lifeline reimburses telephone companies that offer discounts through the USF, which in turn is generally supported by consumers by means of a fee charged on their telephone bills.\nThis testimony is based on GAO's May 2017 report and discusses steps FCC has taken to measure Lifeline's performance in meeting goals; steps FCC and USAC have taken to enhance controls over finances, subscribers, and providers; and any weaknesses that might remain.\nFor the May 2017 report, GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from FCC and USAC. GAO also analyzed subscriber data from 2014 and performed undercover tests to identify potential improper payment vulnerabilities. The results of this analysis and testing are illustrative, not generalizable.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn its May 2017 report, GAO found the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has not evaluated the Lifeline program's (Lifeline) performance in meeting its goals of increasing telephone and broadband subscribership among low-income households by providing financial support, but it has recently taken steps to begin to do so. FCC does not know how many of the 12.3 million households receiving Lifeline as of December 2016 also have non-Lifeline phone service, or whether participants are using Lifeline as a secondary phone service. FCC revamped Lifeline in March 2016 to focus on broadband adoption; however, broadband adoption rates have steadily increased for the low-income population absent a Lifeline subsidy for broadband. Without an evaluation, which GAO recommended in March 2015, FCC is limited in its ability to demonstrate whether Lifeline is efficiently and effectively meeting its program goals. In a March 2016 Order, FCC announced plans for an independent third party to evaluate Lifeline design, function, and administration by December 2020.\nFCC and the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC)\u2014the not-for-profit organization that administers the Lifeline program\u2014have taken some steps to enhance controls over finances and subscriber enrollment. For example, FCC and USAC established some financial and management controls regarding billing, collection, and disbursement of funds for Lifeline. To enhance the program's ability to detect and prevent ineligible subscribers from enrolling, FCC oversaw completion in 2014 of an enrollment database and, in June 2015, FCC adopted a rule requiring Lifeline providers to retain eligibility documentation used to qualify consumers for Lifeline support to improve the auditability and enforcement of FCC rules.\nNevertheless, in its May 2017 report, GAO found weaknesses in several areas. For example, Lifeline's structure relies on over 2,000 Eligible Telecommunication Carriers that are Lifeline providers to implement key program functions, such as verifying subscriber eligibility. This complex internal control environment is susceptible to risk of fraud, waste, and abuse as companies may have financial incentives to enroll as many customers as possible. On the basis of its matching of subscriber to benefit data, GAO was unable to confirm whether about 1.2 million individuals of the 3.5 million it reviewed, or 36 percent, participated in a qualifying benefit program, such as Medicaid, as stated on their Lifeline enrollment application. FCC's 2016 Order calls for the creation of a third-party national eligibility verifier by the end of 2019 to determine subscriber eligibility. Further, FCC maintains the Universal Service Fund (USF)\u2014with net assets of $9 billion, as of September 2016\u2014outside the Department of the Treasury in a private bank account. In 2005, GAO recommended that FCC reconsider this arrangement given that the USF consists of federal funds. In addition to addressing any risks associated with having the funds outside the Treasury, FCC identified potential benefits of moving the funds. For example, by having the funds in the Treasury, USAC would have better tools for fiscal management of the funds. In March 2017, FCC developed a preliminary plan to move the USF to the Treasury. Until FCC finalizes and implements its plan and actually moves the USF funds, the risks that FCC identified will persist and the benefits of having the funds in the Treasury will not be realized.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nIn its May 2017 report, GAO made seven recommendations, including that FCC ensure plans to transfer the USF from the private bank to the Treasury are finalized and implemented expeditiously. FCC generally agreed with all the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_916"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_917","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nForty-one railroads including 29 commuter railroads are required by statute to implement PTC. Commuter railroads unable to implement a PTC system by December 31, 2018, may receive a maximum 2-year extension if they meet certain statutory criteria.\nGAO was asked to review commuter railroads' PTC implementation. Among other objectives, this statement discusses (1) commuter railroads that may not be positioned to meet the PTC deadline or to qualify for an extension, and factors affecting their progress, and (2) the extent to which FRA's management and oversight approach has helped ensure that commuter railroads meet the deadline or qualify for an extension.\nGAO analyzed commuter railroads' most recently available quarterly progress reports and collected information on planned implementation schedules, interviewed 19 commuter railroads\u2014including 14 FRA identified as at-risk and 5 others further ahead with implementation\u2014and interviewed FRA officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) is responsible for overseeing railroads' (including commuter railroads') implementation of positive train control (PTC) by December 31, 2018. PTC is a communications-based train control system designed to prevent certain types of accidents and involves the installation, integration, and testing of hardware and software components. For example, railroads must install equipment on locomotives and along the track, and complete field testing, including revenue service demonstration (RSD)\u2014an advanced form of testing that occurs while trains operate in regular service.\nGAO's analysis of commuter railroads' PTC scheduled milestones for two key activities necessary to meet the 2018 deadline or qualify for an RSD-based extension (one of the statutory options) found that as many as two-thirds of the 29 commuter railroads may not have allocated sufficient time to complete these milestones. Specifically, in comparing the commuter railroads' schedules to FRA's estimates of the time required to complete these milestones and the experiences of railroads that have already completed them, GAO's analysis found that from 7 to 19 commuter railroads may not complete the milestones before the 2018 implementation deadline or qualify for an RSD-based extension. For example, FRA estimates that field testing (one of the milestones) takes at least one year, but GAO found that 14 commuter railroads plan to start this testing less than a year before the 2018 deadline, increasing the potential risk that this milestone will not be completed. However, FRA has the authority to establish alternative criteria for an extension not based on RSD, and several other factors can affect commuter railroads' planned and future progress. As a result, the number of commuter railroads at risk of not meeting the deadline or qualifying for an extension could increase or decrease in the coming year.\nFRA's PTC management and oversight includes monitoring commuter railroads' progress, reviewing documentation, and sharing information with them, but the agency has not systematically communicated information or used a risk-based approach to help these railroads prepare for the 2018 deadline or qualify for an extension. GAO found that FRA has primarily used informal assistance, meetings with individual railroads, and participation in industry-convened groups to share information with commuter railroads, and in some cases the information conveyed has been inconsistent according to industry representatives. Some commuter railroads also told GAO that clarification about the agency's planned process for reviewing and approving extension requests would be helpful. Federal internal control standards state that management should externally communicate the necessary quality information to achieve its objectives. While FRA officials have said they are working to identify additional ways to convey extension-related information, they have not yet done so. Moreover, although FRA receives information from commuter railroads on their progress in implementing PTC, it has not used this information to prioritize resources using a risk-based approach. With the year-end 2018 deadline approaching, and an anticipated significant increase in FRA's workload, targeting resources to the greatest risk can help better ensure that FRA effectively fulfills its oversight responsibilities and provides commuter railroads the information they need to prepare for the 2018 deadline or seek an extension.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends FRA identify and adopt a method for systematically communicating information to railroads and use a risk-based approach to prioritize its resources and workload.\nDOT concurred with the recommendations. The agency also provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_917"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_918","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe need for LTSS to assist individuals with limited abilities for self-care is expected to increase, in part due to the aging of the population. Medicaid is the nation's primary payer of LTSS, with spending estimated at $167 billion in 2016. State Medicaid programs are generally required to cover LTSS provided in institutions, such as nursing homes, but coverage of the same services outside of institutions\u2014that is, HCBS\u2014is generally optional. In recent years there have been efforts to shift the balance of LTSS away from institutions through the expanded use of HCBS. National spending for HCBS has increased and now exceeds that for services in an institution. However, the extent to which Medicaid programs cover HCBS varies by state, as does the structure of states' HCBS programs.\nGAO was asked to review the approaches states use to provide coverage for HCBS in the Medicaid program. For selected states, this report describes (1) decisions that influenced the structure of Medicaid HCBS programs, and (2) challenges providing HCBS to Medicaid beneficiaries and efforts to respond to these challenges. GAO reviewed information and conducted interviews with officials from a nongeneralizable sample of five states, which GAO selected to obtain variation in the percentage of total Medicaid LTSS expenditures used for HCBS, geography, and other factors. GAO also reviewed information and interviewed officials from four MCOs\u2014two in each of the two selected states that used managed care to provide HCBS. The MCOs varied in enrollment size and population served.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAll state Medicaid programs finance coverage of long-term services and supports (LTSS), which help beneficiaries with physical, cognitive, or other limitations perform routine daily activities, such as eating, dressing, and making meals. When these services are provided in beneficiaries' homes or other community settings instead of nursing homes, the services are known as home- and community-based services (HCBS). The structure of the 26 HCBS programs we reviewed in five states\u2014Arizona, Florida, Mississippi, Montana, and Oregon\u2014reflected decisions about which populations to cover, whether to limit eligibility or enrollment, and whether to use managed care.\nPopulations: Four of the five states had multiple HCBS programs that targeted specific populations. For example, Mississippi had separate HCBS programs for aged or physically disabled individuals and individuals with intellectual or developmental disabilities. The fifth state, Arizona, had one program that targeted two specific populations.\nEligibility: All five states had at least one HCBS program that limited eligibility to beneficiaries whose needs would otherwise require care in a nursing home or other institutional setting.\nEnrollment: Four of the five states limited enrollment in one or more of their HCBS programs; 19 of the 26 programs had enrollment caps, and 12 of these programs maintained a waiting list.\nManaged care: Two of the five states used managed care to provide HCBS, paying managed care organizations (MCO) a fixed fee for each beneficiary rather than paying providers for each service delivered.\nState and MCO officials identified several challenges providing HCBS and described their efforts to respond to them:\nHCBS workforce: Officials cited challenges recruiting and retaining HCBS providers, particularly given the low wages these providers typically receive. To respond to this, officials from Mississippi, Montana, and two of the MCOs reported offering providers higher payment rates.\nComplex needs: Officials described challenges serving beneficiaries with complex medical and behavioral health needs, including individuals who display aggressive or other challenging behaviors. Officials from Montana and one MCO reported responding to this challenge by providing behavioral health training for providers.\nHCBS funding: State officials reported that limitations on overall HCBS funding levels posed a challenge, which they responded to by providing their state legislatures with information on the projected need for HCBS to inform future funding decisions, and leveraging other available resources, such as federal grants.\nThe Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_918"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_919","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe government-wide personnel security clearance process was designated as a high-risk area in January 2018 because it represents one of the highest management risks in government.\nThis testimony focuses on, among other things, the extent to which executive branch agencies (1) made progress reforming the security clearance process, and (2) are meeting timeliness objectives and reducing NBIB's investigative backlog.\nGAO's statement is based on information from public versions of its reports issued in November 2017 on continuous evaluation of clearance holders and in December 2017 on clearance reform efforts. Information that ODNI and OPM deemed sensitive was omitted. For those reports, GAO reviewed Executive Orders and PAC strategic documents; obtained data from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) on the timeliness of initial clearances and periodic reinvestigations; and interviewed officials from ODNI, NBIB, and other agencies.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nExecutive branch agencies have made progress reforming the security clearance process, but long-standing key initiatives remain incomplete. Progress includes the issuance of federal adjudicative guidelines and updated strategic documents to help sustain the reform effort. However, agencies still face challenges in implementing aspects of the 2012 Federal Investigative Standards\u2014criteria for conducting background investigations\u2014and in implementing a continuous evaluation program. In addition, while agencies have taken steps to establish government-wide performance measures for the quality of investigations, neither the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) nor the interagency Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability Council (PAC) have set a milestone for completing their establishment.\nGAO's analysis of timeliness data for specific executive branch agencies showed that the number of agencies meeting investigation and adjudication timeliness objectives for initial secret and top secret security clearances and periodic reinvestigations decreased from fiscal years 2012 through 2016. For example, while 73 percent of agencies did not meet timeliness objectives for initial clearances for three of four quarters in fiscal year 2012, 98 percent of agencies did not meet these objectives in fiscal year 2016. The DNI has not developed a government-wide plan, including goals and milestones, to help agencies improve timeliness. Agencies' challenges in meeting timeliness objectives have contributed to a significant backlog of background investigations at the agency that is responsible for conducting the majority of investigations, the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB). NBIB documentation shows that the backlog of pending investigations increased from about 190,000 in August 2014 to more than 710,000 as of February 2018, as shown below. NBIB leadership has not developed a plan to reduce the backlog to a manageable level.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nIn November 2017 and December 2017, GAO made 12 recommendations to the DNI and the Director of NBIB, including setting a milestone for establishing measures for investigation quality, developing a plan to meet background investigation timeliness objectives, and developing a plan for reducing the backlog. NBIB concurred with the recommendations. The DNI concurred with some, but not all, of GAO's recommendations. GAO continues to believe they are valid.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_919"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_920","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nMarijuana is generally illegal under federal law. Nonetheless, an increasing number of states have legalized medical or recreational marijuana under state law. However, in these states, some marijuana-related activity may still be illegal under state law. Since 1981, DEA's DCE\/SP has provided financial support to participating state and local agencies for their efforts to eradicate illegal marijuana.\nGAO was asked to review DEA's DCE\/SP. This report examines (1) DCE\/SP funding and expenditures in recent years, (2) how DEA ensures that participating agencies expend funds in accordance with program requirements, and (3) how DEA uses performance assessment to help manage DCE\/SP. GAO analyzed DCE\/SP guidance, and expenditure and performance information from 2015 through fiscal year 2017, and evaluated DEA's oversight and performance management efforts against internal control standards. GAO also interviewed officials from DEA, the U.S. Forest Service, and participating agencies in six states, which GAO selected to include varying levels of DCE\/SP funding and numbers of marijuana grow sites eradicated in recent years.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) obligated over $17 million annually on average from 2015 through 2018 to its Domestic Cannabis Eradication\/ Suppression Program (DCE\/SP)\u2014which supports participating state and local law enforcement agencies' efforts to eradicate illegal marijuana. DEA obligated funds to participating agencies in states with and without marijuana legalization laws. Participating agencies expended the majority of funds on aviation support and overtime (see fig. below). Officials told GAO they expended funds to help eradicate marijuana that was not in compliance with state and local marijuana laws. For example, officials in California\u2014a state with medical and recreational marijuana legalization laws\u2014said that all of their eradication occurs on public lands such as national forests, or private land that had been trespassed upon. In total, agencies have eradicated several million plants annually in recent years.\nParticipating Agencies' Top Domestic Cannabis Eradication\/Suppression Program (DCE\/SP) Expenditures in Recent Years\nDEA oversees participating agencies' compliance with program expenditure requirements in various ways, but does not consistently collect supporting documentation for expenditure reports. DEA field officials collect varying levels of documentation, and headquarters officials were not aware of these varying practices. DEA officials said they are now working to address this issue, but they have not developed a plan with specific actions and time frames for completion. By developing and implementing such a plan, DEA could have greater assurance that funds are being expended appropriately.\nDEA collects information on program activities to help manage DCE\/SP, such as number of plants eradicated. However, participating agencies GAO spoke with have practices for reporting some program activities that differ from DEA's guidance due to varying interpretations of the guidance. As a result this information is neither fully accurate nor reliable for assessing program performance. Also, DEA has not clearly documented all of its program goals or developed performance measures to assess progress toward those goals. Improving the reliability of the information it collects, clearly documenting all program goals, and developing performance measures could provide DEA with the information it needs to manage the program more effectively.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making four recommendations, including that DEA develop a plan to ensure the collection of consistent documentation of expenditures, clarify its guidance for reporting program activities, document all of its program goals, and develop performance measures. DEA concurred with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_920"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_921","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOJ's EOIR is responsible for conducting immigration court proceedings, appellate reviews, and administrative hearings to fairly, expeditiously, and uniformly administer and interpret U.S. immigration laws and regulations.\nThis statement addresses (1) scenarios that experts and stakeholders have proposed for restructuring EOIR's immigration court system and the reasons they offered for or against these proposals; and (2) how EOIR manages and oversees the immigration courts, including hiring and performance assessment, among other things.\nThis statement is based on a report GAO issued in June 2017, with selected updates conducted through April 2018 to obtain information from EOIR on actions it has taken to address the report's recommendations. GAO's report incorporated information obtained by reviewing EOIR documentation, analyzing EOIR data, and interviewing agency officials and immigration court experts and stakeholders. For the selected updates, GAO reviewed EOIR documentation.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn June 2017, GAO reported that some immigration court experts and stakeholders have recommended restructuring the Executive Office for Immigration Review's (EOIR) administrative review and appeals functions within the immigration court system\u2014immigration courts and Board of Immigration Appeals\u2014to improve its effectiveness and efficiency. The 10 experts and stakeholders GAO interviewed stated that they generally supported one of the following scenarios for restructuring the immigration court system, all of which would require a statutory change to implement:\na court system outside of the executive branch to replace EOIR's immigration court system, including both trial and appellate tribunals;\na new, independent administrative agency within the executive branch to carry out EOIR's quasi-judicial functions with both trial-level immigration judges and an appellate level review board; or\na hybrid approach, placing trial-level immigration judges in an independent administrative agency within the executive branch, and an appellate-level tribunal outside of the executive branch.\nSix of the 10 experts and stakeholders GAO interviewed supported restructuring the immigration court system into a court independent of the executive branch. Experts and stakeholders offered several reasons for each of the proposed scenarios, such as potentially improving workforce professionalism and credibility. They also provided reasons against restructuring options, including that restructuring may not resolve existing management challenges, such as difficulties related to hiring immigration judges.\nGAO also reported in June 2017 that EOIR could take several actions to address management challenges. EOIR has since taken some steps to address these challenges, but additional actions are needed. For example, GAO found that EOIR did not have efficient practices for hiring immigration judges, which contributed to judges being staffed below authorized levels. EOIR hiring data showed that on average from February 2014 through August 2016, EOIR took more than 21 months to hire an immigration judge. GAO recommended that EOIR assess the immigration judge hiring process to identify opportunities for efficiency. As of January 2018, EOIR had increased the number of its judges but remained below its authorized level for fiscal year 2017. Hiring additional judges is a positive step; however, to fully address GAO's recommendation, EOIR needs to assess its hiring process to identify opportunities for efficiency.\nIn June 2017, GAO also reported on ways EOIR could enhance its video teleconferencing (VTC) program, through which judges conduct hearings by VTC. GAO found that EOIR had not, in accordance with best practices, established a mechanism to solicit feedback and comments about VTC from those who use it regularly to assess whether it meets user needs. GAO recommended EOIR develop and implement such a mechanism. EOIR concurred and implemented this recommendation in December 2017 by establishing a mechanism on its public website to solicit feedback from respondents regarding their satisfaction with VTC hearings. This effort should help EOIR ensure VTC hearings it conducts meet all user needs.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nIn its June 2017 report GAO made 11 recommendations to improve EOIR's hiring process and performance assessment, among other things. EOIR generally concurred with the recommendations, has implemented 1, and reported actions planned or underway to address the remaining 10.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_921"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_922","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSBA's 7(a) program is required to serve creditworthy small business borrowers who cannot obtain credit through a conventional lender at reasonable terms. The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 includes a provision for GAO to review the 7(a) program.\nThis report discusses, among other things, (1) how SBA monitors lenders' compliance with the credit elsewhere requirement, (2) the extent to which SBA evaluates trends in lender credit elsewhere practices, and (3) lenders' views on the credit elsewhere criteria for 7(a) loans.\nGAO analyzed SBA data on 7(a) loans approved for fiscal years 2007\u20132016, the latest available, and reviewed literature on small business lending; reviewed standard operating procedures, other guidance, and findings from SBA reviews performed in fiscal year 2016; and interviewed lender associations and a nonrepresentative sample of 7(a) lenders selected that concentrated on larger lenders.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFor its 7(a) loan program, the Small Business Administration (SBA) has largely delegated authority to lenders to make 7(a) loan determinations for those borrowers who cannot obtain conventional credit at reasonable terms elsewhere. To monitor lender compliance with the \u201ccredit elsewhere\u201d requirement SBA primarily uses on-site reviews conducted by third-party contractors with SBA participation and oversight, and other reviews. According to SBA guidance, lenders making 7(a) loans must take steps to ensure and document that borrowers meet the program's credit elsewhere requirement. However, GAO noted a number of concerns with SBA's monitoring efforts. Specifically, GAO found the following:\nOver 40 percent (17 of 40) of the on-site lender reviews performed in fiscal year 2016 identified lender noncompliance with the requirement.\nOn-site reviewers identified several factors, such as weakness in lenders' internal control processes that were the cause for lender noncompliance.\nMost on-site reviewers did not document their assessment of lenders' policies or procedures, because SBA does not require them to do so. As a result SBA does not have information that could help explain the high noncompliance rate.\nFederal internal control standards state that management should design control activities, including appropriate documentation, and use quality information to achieve the entity's objectives. Without better information on lenders' procedures for complying with the documentation requirement, SBA may be limited in its ability to promote compliance with requirements designed to help ensure that the 7(a) program reaches its target population.\nSBA does not routinely collect or analyze information on the criteria used by lenders for credit elsewhere justifications. SBA recently began collecting some information on lenders' use of the criteria, but this information is limited, and SBA does not analyze the information that it does collect to better understand lenders' practices. Federal internal control standards state that management should use quality information to achieve the entity's objectives. Without more robust information and analysis, SBA may be limited in its ability to understand how lenders are using the credit elsewhere criteria and identify patterns of use by certain lenders that place them at a higher risk of not reaching borrowers who cannot obtain credit from other sources at reasonable terms.\nIn general, representatives from 8 of 11 lenders that GAO interviewed stated that SBA's credit elsewhere criteria are adequate for determining small business eligibility for the 7(a) program. These criteria help them target their lending to small businesses that would otherwise have difficulty obtaining conventional credit because they are often new businesses or have a shortage of collateral. However, they also said that other factors\u2014such as lender policies and economic conditions\u2014can affect their decisions to offer 7(a) loans. In January 2018, SBA issued revised guidance for the 7(a) program and has provided training on this new guidance to lenders and trade associations. Lenders told GAO they are still in the process of understanding the new requirements.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that SBA (1) require its on-site reviewers to document their assessment of lenders' policies and procedures related to the credit elsewhere documentation requirement, (2) collect information on lenders' use of credit elsewhere criteria, and (3) analyze that information to identify trends. SBA generally agreed with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_922"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_923","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nWith increasing globalization, multinational corporations can take advantage of differences in countries' corporate tax systems to reduce their overall tax liabilities. However, globalization can also lead to disputes about the correct tax liability for U.S. MNCs in different countries. GAO was asked to review how the United States administers the process for resolving international tax disputes when a U.S. MNC disagrees with a tax determination of another country.\nThis report (1) describes IRS's dispute resolution process, (2) assesses the information IRS provides to taxpayers about the process, and (3) assesses the extent to which IRS evaluates its management of dispute resolutions cases. GAO reviewed IRS guidance on the MAP process, interviewed IRS officials and compared IRS actions to federal standards for internal control and GAO's criteria for a good tax system. GAO analyzed MAP data for cases closed from 2013 to 2017 as well as a stratified random sample of MAP case files.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nA U.S. multinational corporation (MNC) operating in a foreign country is subject to taxes in that country as well as in the United States. The U.S. MNC's tax return may be audited by the United States or the other country. Such audits can result in an adjustment to the U.S. MNC's taxable income that may result in income being subject to tax in both countries. If the U.S. MNC disagrees with the adjustment, it can ask the United States Competent Authority (USCA) within the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to help resolve the dispute through the mutual agreement procedure (MAP). Generally, disputes are resolved by one country withdrawing some or all of the adjustment and the other country providing other relief to the MNC to address double taxation of income. The following figure provides an overview of the dispute resolution process.\nDispute resolution assistance is available to U.S.MNCs that need it and USCA provides comprehensive technical information on its website on how to request assistance. However, because USCA's website does not provide an overview or plain language guidance on the MAP process U.S. MNCs may not have clear information on how to navigate the process.\nUSCA has taken a number of steps to ensure efficient management of MAP cases including assigning staff with requisite background and skills to cases according to their complexity and organizing staff into teams that specialize by countries. However, GAO identified a number of weaknesses that impact USCA's management of MAP cases. These include the following\nkey data are not tracked and existing data are not used to assess the effective allocation of resources for the program,\nfew controls have been established to monitor and ensure the reliability of the data in the case management database, and\nlack of trend analyses on dispute case characteristics that could help inform management decision making and the more efficient operation of the program.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making a total of eight recommendations, including that IRS improve the clarity of information on the dispute resolution process, track and use dispute resolution case data, ensure the quality of case data, and analyze trends in dispute case characteristics. IRS agreed with GAO's recommendations and said it will provide detailed corrective action plans.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_923"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_924","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSince 2005, over 30 provisions have been enacted in law to speed up the delivery of highway and transit projects, mainly by streamlining the NEPA review process. NEPA requires federal agencies to evaluate the potential environmental effects of proposed projects on the human environment. These project delivery provisions included new categorical exclusions to streamline the review process, and a provision allowing DOT to assign federal NEPA approval authority to states.\nCongress included provisions in statute for GAO to assess the use of these provisions and whether they have accelerated project delivery. This report examines: (1) which project delivery provisions were used by state DOTs and selected transit agencies and the reported effects, and (2) the extent to which DOT has assigned NEPA authority to states and the reported effects, among other objectives. GAO surveyed all state DOTs and interviewed federal and state DOT officials and 11 selected transit agencies GAO determined were likely to have been affected by the provisions, and analyzed information from NEPA assignment states.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and Federal Transit Administration (FTA) are responsible for National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) compliance on highway and transit projects. Project sponsors that receive federal funds, typically a state DOT or transit agency, develop documents necessary for NEPA compliance for FHWA and FTA to evaluate and approve. Project sponsors prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) when a project will have a significant environmental impact, or an environmental assessment to determine if a project will have a significant impact. Projects that fit within a category of activities pre-determined to have no significant impact (such as repaving a road) can receive a categorical exclusion, and an EIS or environment assessment is generally not needed. GAO found:\nState DOTs and selected transit agencies reported using provisions enacted in law to speed up the delivery of highway and transit projects, and while state DOTs reported that a number of provisions they used sped up delivery of highway projects, the effects on transit projects were less clear. For example, according to GAO's survey responses, 10 of 17 provisions that mainly created new \u201ccategorical exclusions\u201d were used by 30 or more state DOTs and generally sped up projects. The provision state DOTs and transit agencies most often reported using was one that authorizes parkland or a historic site to be used for a transportation project if that project has a minimal impact on the environment. A majority of the 11 transit agencies GAO reviewed were not clear whether provisions they used sped up project delivery because these agencies did not track how long it took projects to complete the NEPA process, among other reasons.\nDOT assigned NEPA authority to six states: Alaska, California, Florida, Ohio, Texas, and Utah. Under agreements with FHWA, state DOTs calculate time savings by comparing NEPA completion times before (the baseline) and after assuming the authority. Only California and Texas have reported results; California reported that it reduced EIS review time 10 years from a 16-year baseline. However, these reported time savings are questionable because the comparisons do not consider other factors, such as funding, that can affect timelines. In establishing baselines, both states have also faced challenges, such as how many and which projects to include. California reported to its legislature that its baseline may not be meaningful because of the relatively small sample of five projects, but nevertheless presents these data on its web site as evidence of \u201csignificant\u201d time savings.\nFHWA does not review the states' timeliness measures and time savings estimates, but has broad authority to offer guidance and technical assistance, which can include helping states develop sound evaluation methodologies and baselines. FHWA officials stated that they provide general technical assistance, but that no state has requested help developing evaluation methodologies. Offering and providing such assistance could help ensure that states considering applying for NEPA assignment base their decisions on reliable information, and that FHWA and Congress have reliable information to assess whether NEPA assignment results in more efficient environmental reviews.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nFHWA should offer and provide guidance or technical assistance to NEPA assignment states on developing evaluation methodologies, including baseline time frames and timeliness measures. DOT partially concurred with the recommendation, saying it would clarify environmental review start times. GAO continues to believe further evaluation guidance is needed, as discussed in the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_924"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_925","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFEMA, a component of DHS, annually awards billions of dollars in grants to help communities prepare for, mitigate the effects of, and recover from major disasters. However, FEMA's complex IT environment supporting grants management consists of many disparate systems. In 2008, the agency attempted to modernize these systems but experienced significant challenges. In 2015, FEMA initiated a new endeavor (the GMM program) aimed at streamlining and modernizing the grants management IT environment.\nGAO was asked to review the GMM program. GAO's objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which FEMA is implementing leading practices for reengineering its grants management processes and incorporating needs into IT requirements; (2) assess the reliability of the program's estimated costs and schedule; and (3) determine the extent to which FEMA is addressing key cybersecurity practices. GAO compared program documentation to leading practices for process reengineering and requirements management, cost and schedule estimation, and cybersecurity risk management, as established by the Software Engineering Institute, National Institute of Standards and Technology, and GAO.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nOf six important leading practices for effective business process reengineering and information technology (IT) requirements management, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) fully implemented four and partially implemented two for the Grants Management Modernization (GMM) program (see table). Specifically, FEMA ensured senior leadership commitment, took steps to assess its business environment and performance goals, took recent actions to track progress in delivering IT requirements, and incorporated input from end user stakeholders. However, FEMA has not yet fully established plans for implementing new business processes or established complete traceability of IT requirements.\nUntil FEMA fully implements the remaining two practices, it risks delivering an IT solution that does not fully modernize FEMA's grants management systems.\nWhile GMM's initial May 2017 cost estimate of about $251 million was generally consistent with leading practices for a reliable, high-quality estimate, it no longer reflects current assumptions about the program. FEMA officials stated in December 2018 that they had completed a revised cost estimate, but it was undergoing departmental approval. GMM's program schedule was inconsistent with leading practices; of particular concern was that the program's final delivery date of September 2020 was not informed by a realistic assessment of GMM development activities, and rather was determined by imposing an unsubstantiated delivery date. Developing sound cost and schedule estimates is necessary to ensure that FEMA has a clear understanding of program risks.\nOf five key cybersecurity practices, FEMA fully addressed three and partially addressed two for GMM. Specifically, it categorized GMM's system based on security risk, selected and implemented security controls, and monitored security controls on an ongoing basis. However, the program had not initially established corrective action plans for 13 medium- and low-risk vulnerabilities. This conflicts with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) guidance that specifies that corrective action plans must be developed for every weakness identified. Until FEMA, among other things, ensures that the program consistently follows the department's guidance on preparing corrective action plans for all security vulnerabilities, GMM's system will remain at increased risk of exploits.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making eight recommendations to FEMA to implement leading practices related to reengineering processes, managing requirements, scheduling, and implementing cybersecurity. DHS concurred with all recommendations and provided estimated dates for implementing each of them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_925"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_926","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nSince 2014, millions of consumers have purchased health insurance from the exchanges established by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Consumers can enroll in coverage during an annual open enrollment period. HHS and others conduct outreach during this period to encourage enrollment and ensure the exchanges' long-term stability. HHS announced changes to its 2018 outreach, prompting concerns that fewer could enroll, potentially harming the exchanges' stability.\nGAO was asked to examine outreach and enrollment for the exchanges using healthcare.gov. This report addresses (1) 2018 open enrollment outcomes and any factors that may have affected these outcomes, (2) HHS's outreach efforts for 2018, and (3) HHS's 2018 enrollment goals. GAO reviewed HHS documents and data on 2018 open enrollment results and outreach. GAO also interviewed officials from HHS and 23 stakeholders representing a range of perspectives, including those from 4 navigator organizations, 3 issuers, and 6 insurance departments, to obtain their non-generalizable views on factors that likely affected 2018 enrollment.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAbout 8.7 million consumers in 39 states enrolled in individual market health insurance plans offered on the exchanges through healthcare.gov during the open enrollment period for 2018 coverage. This was 5 percent less than the 9.2 million who enrolled for 2017 and continued a decline in enrollment from a peak of 9.6 million in 2016. Among the 23 stakeholders we interviewed representing a range of perspectives, most reported that plan affordability played a major role in exchange enrollment\u2014both attracting and detracting from enrollment. In 2018, total premiums increased more than expected, and, as a result, plans may have been less affordable for consumers, which likely detracted from enrollment. However, most consumers receive tax credits to reduce their premiums, and stakeholders reported that plans were often more affordable for these consumers because higher premiums resulted in larger tax credits, which likely aided exchange enrollment. Stakeholders had mixed opinions on the effects that other factors, such as the impact of reductions in federal advertising and the shortened open enrollment period, might have had on enrollment.\nThe Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which manages healthcare.gov enrollment, reduced consumer outreach for the 2018 open enrollment period:\nHHS spent 90 percent less on its advertising for 2018 ($10 million) compared to 2017 ($100 million). Officials told us that the agency's approach for 2018 was to focus on low-cost, high-performing forms of advertising.\nHHS reduced funding by 42 percent for navigator organizations\u2014which provide in-person enrollment assistance for consumers\u2014spending $37 million in 2018 compared to $63 million in 2017 due to a shift in administration priorities. HHS allocated the funding using data that it acknowledged were not reliable in December 2016. The lack of quality data may affect HHS's ability to effectively manage the navigator program.\nUnlike in prior years, HHS did not set any numeric targets related to 2018 total healthcare.gov enrollment; officials told us that they instead focused on enhancing the consumer experience for the open enrollment period. Setting numeric targets would allow HHS to monitor and evaluate its overall performance, a key aspect of federal internal controls. Further, while HHS reported meeting its goal of enhancing the consumer experience, such as by improving healthcare.gov availability, it did not measure aspects of the consumer experience it had identified as key in 2017, such as successful outreach events. Absent a more complete assessment, HHS may not be able to fully assess its progress toward its goal of enhancing the consumer experience and may miss opportunities to improve other aspects of the consumer experience.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making three recommendations to HHS, including that it ensure the data it uses for determining navigator organization awards are accurate, set numeric enrollment targets, and assess other aspects of the consumer experience. HHS agreed with two recommendations, but disagreed with the need to set numeric targets. GAO maintains that such action is important.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_926"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_927","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nLIHTCs encourage private investment in low-income rental housing and have financed about 50,000 housing units annually since 2010.The LIHTC program is administered by IRS and credit allocating agencies (state or local housing finance agencies). The program has come under increased scrutiny following reports of high or fraudulent development costs for certain LIHTC projects. GAO was asked to review the cost-efficiency and effectiveness of the LIHTC program.\nThis report examines (1) development costs for selected LIHTC projects and factors affecting costs, (2) allocating agencies' oversight of costs, and (3) factors limiting assessment of costs. GAO compiled and analyzed a database of costs and characteristics for 1,849 projects completed in 2011\u20132015 (the most recent data available when compiled) from 12 allocating agencies. The agencies span five regions and accounted for about half of the LIHTCs available for award in 2015. GAO also reviewed the most recent allocating plans and related documents for 57 allocating agencies and reviewed federal requirements.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO identified wide variation in development costs and several cost drivers for Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) projects completed in 2011\u20132015. Across 12 selected allocating agencies, median per-unit costs for new construction projects ranged from about $126,000 (Texas) to about $326,000 (California). Within individual allocating agencies, the variation in per-unit cost between the least and most expensive project ranged from as little as $104,000 per unit (Georgia) to as much as $606,000 per unit (California). After controlling for other characteristics, GAO estimates that\nlarger projects (more than 100 units) cost about $85,000 less per unit than smaller projects (fewer than 37 units), consistent with economies of scale.\nAllocating agencies use measures such as cost and fee limits to oversee LIHTC development costs, but few agencies have requirements to help guard against misrepresentation of contractor costs (a known fraud risk). LIHTC program policies, while requiring high-level cost certifications from developers, do not directly address this risk because the certifications aggregate costs from multiple contractors. Some allocating agencies require detailed cost certifications from contractors, but many do not. Because the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) does not require such certifications for LIHTC projects, the vulnerability of the LIHTC program to this fraud risk is heightened.\nWeaknesses in data quality and federal oversight constrain assessment of LIHTC development costs and the efficiency and effectiveness of the program. GAO found\ninconsistencies in the types, definitions, and formats of cost-related variables 12 selected agencies collected.\nallocating agencies did not capture the full extent of a key indirect cost\u2014a fee paid to syndicators acting as intermediaries between project developers and investors that IRS requires be collected.\nIRS does not require allocating agencies to collect and report cost-related data that would facilitate programwide assessment of development costs. Further, Congress has not designated any federal entity to maintain and analyze LIHTC cost data.\nEven without a designated federal entity, opportunities exist to advance oversight of development costs. In particular, greater standardization of cost data would lay a foundation for allocating agencies to enhance evaluation of cost drivers and cost-management practices.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nCongress should consider designating a federal agency to maintain and analyze LIHTC cost data. GAO also makes three recommendations to IRS to enhance collection and verification of cost data. IRS disagreed with the recommendations and said it lacked certain data collection authorities. GAO maintains the recommendations would strengthen program oversight and integrity and modified one of them to allow IRS greater flexibility in promoting data standards.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_927"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_928","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe misuse of prescription opioid pain relievers and illicit opioids, such as heroin, has contributed to increases in overdose deaths. According to the most recent Centers for Disease Control and Prevention data, in 2015 over 52,000 people died of drug overdose deaths, and about 63 percent of them involved an opioid. For those who are addicted to or misuse opioids, MAT has been shown to be an effective treatment.\nGAO was asked to review HHS and other efforts related to MAT for opioid use disorders. This report (1) describes HHS's key efforts to expand access to MAT, (2) examines HHS's evaluation, if any, of its efforts to expand access to MAT, and (3) describes efforts by selected stakeholders (states, private health insurers, and national associations) to expand access to MAT. GAO gathered information from HHS officials as well as a non-generalizable selection of 15 stakeholders selected based on their MAT expansion activities, among other factors. GAO also assessed HHS's evaluation plans using internal control standards for defining objectives and evaluating results.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nIn an effort to reduce the prevalence of opioid misuse and the fatalities associated with it, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) established a goal to expand access to medication-assisted treatment (MAT). MAT is an approach that combines behavioral therapy and the use of certain medications, such as methadone and buprenorphine. HHS has implemented five key efforts since 2015 that focus on expanding access to MAT for opioid use disorders\u2014four grant programs that focus on expanding access to MAT in various settings (including rural primary care practices and health centers) and regulatory changes that expand treatment capacity by increasing patient limits for buprenorphine prescribers and allowing nurse practitioners and physician assistants to prescribe buprenorphine.\nSome of the grant awards were made in 2015, while others were made as recently as May 2017. (See figure.) As of August 2017, efforts under all the grant programs were ongoing. Grant recipients can use funding to undertake a range of activities, such as hiring and training providers and supporting treatments involving MAT. In addition, certain providers and grant recipients are required to develop plans for preventing MAT medications from being diverted for nonmedical purposes.\nHHS officials told GAO that as of August 2017, the department was in the process of finalizing its plans to evaluate its efforts to address the opioid epidemic. In September 2016, HHS awarded a contract to conduct the evaluation. HHS officials told GAO that they are still working with the contractor to finalize the evaluation approach and that it will focus on whether HHS's efforts to address the opioid epidemic have been implemented as intended. HHS officials said that in the future, HHS may also evaluate whether, or to what extent, its efforts have been effective in expanding access to MAT, in addition to evaluating implementation.\nWhile HHS has some of the information that could be used in a future evaluation of the effectiveness of its efforts to expand access to MAT, it has not adopted specific performance measures with targets specifying the magnitude of the increases HHS hopes to achieve through its efforts to expand access to MAT, and by when. For example, HHS has not established a long-term target specifying the percentage increase in the number of prescriptions for buprenorphine HHS would like to achieve, which would help to show whether efforts by HHS and others are resulting in a sufficient number of prescriptions for MAT medications. HHS has also not chosen a specific method of measuring treatment capacity or established targets associated with it, which would help determine whether a sufficient number of providers are becoming available to evaluate and treat patients who may benefit from MAT.\nWithout specifying these performance measures and associated targets, HHS will not have an effective means to determine whether its efforts are helping to expand access to MAT or whether new approaches are needed. Gauging this progress is particularly important given the large gap identified nationwide between the total number of individuals who could benefit from MAT and the limited number who can currently access it based on provider availability.\nIn addition, GAO also found that as of August 2017, HHS had not finalized its approach for its planned evaluation activities, including timeframes. Without timeframes for the evaluation's activities, HHS increases the risk that the evaluation will not be completed as expeditiously as possible.\nIn addition to HHS efforts to expand access to MAT, officials from selected states, private health insurers, and national associations reported using several efforts to expand patients' access to MAT for opioid use disorders. For example, several stakeholders provided GAO with the following examples of their efforts:\nStates. State health officials from all five selected states have implemented or are planning approaches that focus on integrating the use of MAT into primary care, such as by providing services for centralized intake and initial management of patients or through telehealth that connects patients in rural areas with addiction specialists in a different location.\nPrivate health insurers. Three private health insurers reported removing prior authorization requirements for MAT medications so patients can avoid a waiting period before receiving the medications.\nNational associations. Officials told GAO that they are conducting outreach and training for their members and developing tools and resource guides. For example, one association developed a road map with strategies that state policymakers can use to address the opioid epidemic, including strategies for reducing the stigma associated with MAT through educating the public and potential providers.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that HHS take two actions: (1) establish performance measures with targets related to expanding access to MAT, and (2) establish timeframes for its evaluation of its efforts to expand access to MAT. HHS concurred with both recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_928"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_929","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThis testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's September 2017 report, entitled Space Exploration: DOE Could Improve Planning and Communication Related to Plutonium-238 and Radioisotope Power Systems Production Challenges ( GAO-17-673 ).\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) selects radioisotope power systems (RPS) for missions primarily based on the agency's scientific objectives and mission destinations. Prior to the establishment of the Department of Energy's (DOE) Supply Project in fiscal year 2011 to produce new plutonium-238 (Pu-238), NASA officials said that Pu-238 supply was a limiting factor in selecting RPS-powered missions. After the initiation of the Supply Project, however, NASA officials GAO interviewed said that missions are selected independently of decisions on how to power them. Once a mission is selected, NASA considers power sources early in its mission review process. Multiple factors could affect NASA's demand for RPS and Pu-238. For example, high costs associated with RPS and missions can affect the demand for RPS because, according to officials, NASA's budget can only support one RPS mission about every 4 years. Expected technological advances in RPS efficiency could reduce NASA's demand for RPS and Pu-238.\nDOE has made progress in reestablishing Pu-238 production to meet NASA's future demand to fuel RPS and has identified challenges to meeting its production goals. Specifically, since the start of the Supply Project, DOE has produced 100 grams of Pu-238 and expects to finalize production processes and produce interim quantities by 2019. However, DOE has also identified several challenges to meeting the Supply Project goal of producing 1.5 kilograms (kg) of new Pu-238 per year by 2026. DOE officials GAO interviewed said that DOE has not perfected the chemical processing required to extract new Pu-238 from irradiated targets to meet production goals. These officials also said that achieving the Pu-238 production goal is contingent on the use of two reactors, but only one reactor is currently qualified for Pu-238 production while the second reactor awaits scheduled maintenance. Moreover, while DOE has adopted a new approach for managing the Supply Project and RPS production\u2014based on a constant production approach\u2014the agency has not developed an implementation plan that identifies milestones and interim steps that can be used to demonstrate progress in meeting production goals and addressing previously identified challenges. GAO's prior work shows that plans that include milestones and interim steps help an agency to set priorities, use resources efficiently, and monitor progress in achieving agency goals. By developing a plan with milestones and interim steps for DOE's approach to managing Pu-238 and RPS production, DOE can show progress in implementing its approach and make adjustments when necessary. Lastly, DOE's new approach to managing the Supply Project does not improve its ability to assess the potential long-term effects of challenges DOE identified, such as chemical processing and reactor availability, or to communicate these effects to NASA. For example, DOE officials did not explain how the new approach would help assess the long-term effects of challenges, such as those related to chemical processing. Under Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government , agencies should use quality information to achieve objectives and to communicate externally, so that external parties can help achieve agency objectives. Without the ability to assess the long-term effects of known challenges and communicate those effects to NASA, DOE may be jeopardizing NASA's ability to use RPS as a power source for future missions.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_929"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_930","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nUSPS is required to prefund its share of health benefits costs for its retirees. To do so, USPS is required to make payments into the RHB Fund, which is administered by OPM. However, USPS has not made any payments to the fund since fiscal year 2010. At the end of fiscal year 2017, USPS had missed $38.2 billion in payments, leaving the fund 44 percent funded. Pursuant to law, beginning in fiscal year 2017, OPM started drawing from the fund to cover USPS's share of postal retirees' health benefits premiums. GAO was asked to review issues related to the sustainability of the RHB Fund.\nThis report examines (1) the financial outlook for the RHB Fund and (2) policy approaches for postal retiree health benefits, among other topics. GAO evaluated financial projections for the RHB Fund from OPM. GAO reviewed laws and regulations and identified policy approaches primarily by identifying legislative proposals, and literature on actions of companies and state governments to address retiree health benefits. These approaches are not exhaustive or mutually exclusive. GAO also interviewed experts in retiree health benefits and postal stakeholders, chosen on the basis of relevant publications and prior GAO work, and interviewed and obtained written responses from OPM and USPS officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe financial outlook of the Postal Service Retiree Health Benefits Fund (RHB Fund) is poor. At the end of fiscal year 2017, the fund's assets declined to $49.8 billion and unfunded liabilities rose to $62.2 billion. Based on Office of Personnel Management (OPM) projections requested by GAO, the fund is on track to be depleted in fiscal year 2030 if the United States Postal Service (USPS) continues to make no payments into the fund. Annual payments of $1 billion or $2 billion into the fund would extend the projected depletion date by 2 to 5 years (see figure). USPS has said that its required payments to the fund are unaffordable relative to its current financial situation and outlook. For the past 11 years USPS has incurred large operating losses that it expects will continue. Additionally, USPS has stated that its opportunities for revenue generation and cost-cutting are limited. USPS reported that it did not make required fund payments in 2017 in order to preserve liquidity and cover operational costs. If the fund becomes depleted, USPS would be required by law to make the payments necessary to cover its share of health benefits premiums for current postal retirees. Current law does not address what would happen if the fund becomes depleted and USPS does not make payments to cover those premiums. Depletion of the fund could affect postal retirees as well as USPS, customers, and other stakeholders, including the federal government. About 500,000 postal retirees receive health benefits and OPM expects that number to remain about the same through 2035.\nGAO identified three categories of policy approaches for postal retiree health benefits, based on legislative proposals and pertinent literature. First, some approaches, such as generally requiring eligible postal retirees to participate in Medicare, would shift costs to the federal government. Second, some approaches would reduce benefits or increase costs to postal retirees and\/or employees. Third, some approaches would change how benefits are financed (see table). All of these approaches have different potential effects and would require congressional action. Thus, it is up to Congress to consider the merits of different approaches and determine the most appropriate action to take. It would be preferable to take action when careful consideration is possible, rather than wait until lack of adequate funding could disrupt postal retiree health benefits.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nCongress should consider passing legislation to put postal retiree health benefits on a more sustainable financial footing. USPS agreed that congressional action is needed and offered views on some policy approaches discussed in this report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_930"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_931","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nA high-quality personnel security clearance process is necessary to minimize the risks of unauthorized disclosures of classified information and to help ensure that security-relevant information is identified and assessed. The passage of IRTPA initiated an effort to reform the security clearance process government-wide.\nThis report assesses the extent to which (1) executive branch agencies made progress reforming the security clearance process; (2) executive branch agencies completed timely initial clearances from fiscal years 2012-2016, and reported on timeliness; and (3) NBIB has taken steps to improve the background investigation process and address the backlog. GAO reviewed documentation; analyzed timeliness data; and interviewed officials from the four PAC Principals and NBIB. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in December 2017. Information that the DNI and OPM deemed sensitive has been omitted.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nExecutive branch agencies have made progress reforming the security clearance process, but long-standing key initiatives remain incomplete. Progress includes the issuance of common federal adjudicative guidelines and updated strategic documents to help sustain the reform effort. However, agencies face challenges in implementing certain aspects of the 2012 Federal Investigative Standards\u2014criteria for conducting background investigations\u2014including establishing a continuous evaluation program, and the issuance of a reciprocity policy to guide agencies in honoring previously granted clearances by other agencies remains incomplete. Executive branch agencies have taken recent steps to prioritize over 50 reform initiatives to help focus agency efforts and facilitate their completion. In addition, while agencies have taken steps to establish government-wide performance measures for the quality of investigations, neither the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) nor the Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability Council (PAC) have set a milestone for their completion. Without establishing such a milestone, completion may be further delayed and agencies will not have a schedule against which they can track progress or to which they are accountable.\nThe number of executive branch agencies meeting established timeliness objectives for initial security clearances decreased from fiscal years 2012 through 2016, and reporting has been limited. For example, 59 percent of the executive branch agencies reviewed by GAO reported meeting investigation and adjudication timeliness objectives for initial top secret clearances in fiscal year 2012, compared with 10 percent in fiscal year 2016. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) required the executive branch to submit an annual report, through 2011, to appropriate congressional committees on, among other things, the time required to conduct investigations, adjudicate cases, and grant clearances. Since the requirement ended, reporting has been limited to a portion of the intelligence community. Without comprehensive reporting, Congress will not be able to monitor agencies' progress in meeting timeliness objectives, identify corrections, or effectively execute its oversight role.\nThe National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), within the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), has taken steps to improve the background investigation process, but it faces operational challenges in addressing the investigation backlog and increasing investigator capacity. While NBIB has taken positive steps to improve its oversight of background investigation contracts, it faces operational challenges in reducing the investigation backlog\u2014which grew from 190,000 cases in August 2014 to more than 709,000 in September 2017. To increase capacity NBIB has hired additional federal investigators and increased the number of its investigative fieldwork contracts, but it has not developed a plan for reducing the backlog or established goals for increasing total investigator capacity. Without such a plan and goals, the backlog may persist and executive branch agencies will continue to lack the cleared personnel needed to help execute their respective missions. The bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, passed by Congress in November 2017, would authorize DOD to conduct its own background investigations.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nCongress should consider reinstating the IRTPA requirement for clearance timeliness reporting. GAO is also making six recommendations, including that the DNI and other PAC Principals set a milestone for establishing measures for investigation quality, and that NBIB develop a plan to reduce the backlog and establish goals for increasing total investigator capacity. NBIB concurred with the recommendations made to it. The DNI did not concur with GAO's conclusions and recommendations. GAO continues to believe they are valid, as discussed in the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_931"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_932","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nEducation refers to school choice as the opportunity for students and their families to create high-quality, personalized paths for learning that best meet the students' needs. For Indian students, school choice can be a means of accessing instructional programs that reflect and preserve their languages, cultures, and histories. For many years, studies have shown that Indian students have struggled academically and the nation's K-12 schools have not consistently provided Indian students with high-quality and culturally-relevant educational opportunities.\nGAO was asked to review K-12 school choice options for Indian students. This report examines the public school options located in areas with large Indian student populations. GAO used Education's Common Core of Data for school year 2015-16 (most recent available) to analyze public school choice in (1) school districts in which Indian students accounted for 25 percent or more of all students (i.e., high percentages of Indian students) and (2) the 100 school districts with the largest number of Indian students. GAO also interviewed federal officials, relevant stakeholder groups, and tribal leaders to better understand school choice options for Indian students.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFew areas provide American Indian and Alaska Native students (Indian students) school choice options other than traditional public schools. According to GAO's analysis of 2015-16 Department of Education (Education) data, most of the school districts with Indian student enrollment of at least 25 percent had only traditional public schools (378 of 451 districts, or 84 percent). The remaining 73 districts had at least one choice, such as a Bureau of Indian Education, charter, magnet, or career and technical education school (see figure). Most of these 451 districts were in rural areas near tribal lands. Rural districts may offer few school choice options because, for example, they do not have enough students to justify additional schools or they may face difficulties recruiting and retaining teachers, among other challenges.\nSome of the 100 school districts with the largest number of Indian students were located in large urban areas, such as New York City, and the majority (62) offered at least one option other than a traditional public school, according to GAO's analysis. The most common option was a charter school. However, because Indian students often account for a small percentage of all students in these districts, Indian education experts GAO interviewed said that the schools are less likely to have curricula that reflect Indian students' cultural identity or provide instruction on Native languages\u2014things that tribes and experts consider crucial to strengthening, rebuilding, and sustaining Indian cultures and communities. Also, even when Indian students had more options, no consistent enrollment patterns were evident. Whether Indian students enrolled in different types of schools could be a function, in part, of differences in state school choice laws and the extent to which these schools offered curricula that reflect Indian languages, cultures, or histories, according to Indian education experts.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making recommendations in this report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_932"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_933","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe federal government provided $64 billion in SNAP benefits in fiscal year 2017 to help approximately 42 million low-income individuals purchase food. SNAP is administered by FNS in partnership with states. To help reduce the risk of improper receipt or use of SNAP benefits, states use data analytics, including data matching and data mining, to identify patterns or trends indicative of potential fraud in SNAP purchases. Based on concerns about potential SNAP benefit trafficking across state lines, GAO was asked to review out-of-state transactions and states' efforts to combat such fraud.\nThis report examines (1) the extent to which SNAP households in selected states made out-of-state purchases that may indicate potential fraud, (2) the advantages and challenges selected states have experienced in using data analytics to identify potential fraud, and (3) how FNS has assisted states in implementing leading practices for data analytics. GAO analyzed fiscal year 2017 data on SNAP purchases for North Dakota, Washington, and the District of Columbia, which had large percentages of non-border out-of-state purchases and interviewed FNS officials and officials in these states as well as in Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Mexico, and Wisconsin about their use of data analytics compared with leading practices.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nSupplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) recipients are allowed to spend their benefits outside their state of residence, and GAO's analysis of fiscal year 2017 SNAP data in three selected states found that overall about 2 percent of households made purchases, both in state and out-of-state, potentially indicative of trafficking\u2014the prohibited exchange of benefits for cash or nonfood goods or services. Also, GAO found little difference in potential trafficking behaviors between households that made one or more purchases out-of-state and those that shopped only in their home state.\nOfficials in all seven states GAO reviewed said they conducted data matching. Officials in five of these states stated that they use more sophisticated data analytics including data mining to help identify potential fraud (see figure). These officials cited advantages to using more sophisticated analytics to automate fraud detection and prioritize cases, allowing them to focus investigative resources on cases most likely to involve fraud. For example, officials in Mississippi reported that overpayment collections increased $2 million since the state incorporated more data techniques into its fraud detection efforts. However, officials in all seven selected states cited factors such as high cost, resource demands, data limitations and organizational support as challenges that affect their ability to use or maintain more advanced data-analytics techniques.\nThe U. S. Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) has helped some states adopt certain leading practices for data analytics, but its current outreach is limited. FNS has provided assistance to some states through pilot projects, grants, and training, but, beyond a recently issued guide, FNS has done little to disseminate information more broadly about successful efforts to adopt data analytics. FNS officials said they are in the early stages of promoting data analytics for SNAP fraud prevention and detection, and their efforts have focused on assessing the current capability of states to use data analytics and determining analytic practices that are effective. State officials GAO interviewed said that training provided was helpful but expressed concern about their access to information on successful data analytic approaches. Disseminating information to states on successful strategies could help states address challenges.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that FNS more widely disseminate information to states about successful strategies used by states to adopt data analytics. FNS agreed with this recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_933"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_934","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe 2005 BRAC round was the costliest and most complex BRAC round ever. In contrast to prior rounds, which focused on the goal of reducing excess infrastructure, DOD's goals for BRAC 2005 also included transforming the military and fostering joint activities.\nGAO was asked to review DOD's performance outcomes from BRAC 2005. This report examines the extent to which DOD has (1) measured the achievement of its goals for BRAC 2005 and (2) implemented prior GAO recommendations on BRAC 2005 and addressed any additional challenges to improve performance for any future BRAC round. GAO reviewed relevant documents and guidance; met with a nongeneralizable selection of 26 military organizations and 12 communities involved with BRAC 2005; and interviewed DOD officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) components generally did not measure the achievement of goals\u2014reducing excess infrastructure, transforming the military, and promoting joint activities among the military departments\u2014for the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round. In March 2013, GAO recommended that, for any future BRAC round, DOD identify measures of effectiveness and develop a plan to demonstrate achieved results. DOD did not concur and stated that no action is expected. Without a requirement for DOD to identify measures of effectiveness and track achievement of its goals, Congress will not have full visibility over the expected outcomes or achievements of any future BRAC rounds.\nOf the 65 recommendations GAO has made to help DOD address challenges it faced in BRAC 2005, as of October 2017 DOD had implemented 33 of them (with 18 pending DOD action).\nDOD has not addressed challenges associated with communication and monitoring mission-related changes. Specifically:\nSome military organizations stated that they could not communicate to BRAC decision makers information outside of the data-collection process because DOD did not establish clear and consistent communications. For example, Army officials at Fort Knox, Kentucky, stated that there was no way to communicate that excess facilities were ill-suited for relocating the Human Resources Command and moved forward without full consideration of alternatives for using better-suited excess space at other locations. As a result, DOD spent about $55 million more than estimated to construct a new building at Fort Knox.\nDOD implemented BRAC recommendations that affected units' ability to carry out their missions because DOD lacked specific guidance to monitor and report on mission-related changes. For example, DOD spent about $27.7 million on a landing field for a Marine Corps F-35 training squadron at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, even though it had been previously decided to station the F-35 aircraft and personnel at another base.\nBy addressing its communication and monitoring challenges, DOD could better inform decision making, better ensure that its infrastructure meets the need of its force structure, and better position itself to achieve its goals in any future BRAC round.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nCongress should consider requiring DOD to identify and track appropriate measures of effectiveness in any future BRAC round. Also, GAO recommends that in any future BRAC round DOD (1) take steps to establish clear and consistent communications while collecting data and (2) provide specific guidance to the military departments to monitor and report on mission-related changes during implementation. GAO also continues to believe that DOD should fully implement GAO's prior recommendations on BRAC 2005. DOD objected to Congress requiring DOD to identify and track performance measures, but GAO continues to believe this to be an appropriate action for the reasons discussed in the report. Lastly, DOD concurred with the two recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_934"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_935","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe federal government spends close to $1 billion annually for advertising activities that, among other things, inform the public about programs and services. The government seeks to provide procurement opportunities for these services to businesses such as SDBs and those owned by minorities and women. SDBs are those primarily owned by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.\nGAO was asked to analyze federal advertising obligations to these types of businesses. This report discusses (1) the amount federal agencies have obligated towards advertising contracts over the most recent 5 fiscal years (2013 through 2017) and the amount going to SDBs and businesses owned by minorities and women; and (2) the agencies that have directed the most advertising contract obligations to these businesses and how this has changed over time.\nGAO analyzed data on advertising contracts from the Federal Procurement Data System \u2013 Next Generation database for fiscal years 2013 through 2017. GAO also interviewed Small Business Administration officials.\nThe Small Business Administration provided technical comments on this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFederal advertising contract obligations to small disadvantaged businesses (SDB) and businesses of all sizes owned by minorities and women (specified businesses) generally increased from fiscal years 2013 through 2017, and constituted 13 percent of all advertising obligations over this period. This figure is consistent with the percentage of all federal contract obligations to these businesses over this period. Overall, advertising contract obligations to all three categories of businesses increased between fiscal years 2013 and 2017, as shown in the figure below. Within the minority-owned business category, which includes businesses owned by Asian-Pacific-, Subcontinent-Asian-, Black-, Hispanic-, and Native-Americans, over half of the obligations went to those owned by Hispanic-Americans.\nThree agencies\u2014the departments of Defense (DOD), Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security\u2014were responsible for nearly three-quarters of advertising contract obligations to the three categories of businesses from fiscal years 2013 through 2017. These agencies were associated with much of the increase in these obligations to specified businesses over the 5-year period. Although some agencies obligated higher shares of their advertising contract obligations to these businesses, they generally obligated fewer dollars than DOD and the two other agencies. For example, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration directed 98 percent of its obligations to these businesses, but the agency's total advertising contract obligations were $21 million over the 5-year period. DOD obligated $2.6 billion for these contracts over the same period.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_935"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_936","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOD has used the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process primarily to reduce excess infrastructure capacity, transform the force, and produce cost savings. DOD completed hundreds of base closures and realignments in previous BRAC rounds and intends to work with Congress to address remaining excess capacity. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2016 required DOD to submit, among other things, a force structure plan and a categorical infrastructure inventory of worldwide military installations. In response, DOD submitted its infrastructure capacity report to Congress in October 2017.\nThe NDAA included a provision for GAO to evaluate DOD's report for accuracy and analytical sufficiency. In this report, GAO evaluates the extent to which (1) DOD's report included the required elements, and (2) DOD's methodology and analysis result in accurate and analytically sufficient information on excess capacity. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed DOD's 2017 report and compared it with the statutory requirements and generally accepted research standards. GAO also interviewed DOD and military service officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense's (DOD) 2017 infrastructure capacity report addressed four of five required elements from section 2815 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2016. Specifically, DOD's report addressed the elements requiring it to submit\na force-structure plan,\na categorical inventory of worldwide military installations,\na discussion of categories of excess infrastructure, and\nan assessment of the value of retaining certain excess infrastructure.\nDOD's report partially addressed the element to include a description of the infrastructure capacity required to support the force structure. Specifically, DOD's report did not provide a complete picture of the infrastructure needed. For example, infrastructure at Air Force large aircraft installations was described by square yards of apron space, but did not include other infrastructure needs such as aircraft hangars and maintenance facilities.\nDOD's excess capacity methodology and analysis has three key limitations that affect the accuracy and analytical sufficiency of the estimate. Specifically:\nDOD used a 1989 baseline for excess capacity that may lead to inaccurate results. This 1989 baseline does not reflect updates in DOD facility standards and requirements or requirements associated with new weapon systems.\nDOD's excess capacity methodology includes assumptions, such as not accounting for potential shortfalls\u2014not having enough infrastructure to support the mission\u2014that may not be reasonable. Specifically, when DOD's calculation identifies shortfall in capacity, DOD concludes that no excess capacity exists. As a result, DOD's analysis identifies no excess capacity in nearly half (14 of 32) mission categories. However, most installations support more than one mission and have more infrastructure present than the installation category metric measures. Thus, including potential capacity shortfalls could provide DOD and Congress with a more accurate estimate of excess capacity upon which to base decisions concerning the management of base infrastructure and excess capacity.\nDOD's method for estimating excess capacity is not always sufficient because the installation selection process does not result in a generalizable sample. Furthermore, DOD's method is not always implemented effectively because the military departments did not follow a consistent approach.\nAccording to DOD officials, specific department-wide guidance concerning DOD's methods for selecting installations in its analysis does not exist. Moreover, without developing guidance, the estimate of excess capacity may not be based on consistent methods across the department, resulting in inaccurate estimates. Furthermore, neither DOD nor Congress will have the necessary information to make decisions concerning the management of excess infrastructure capacity across the department.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making three recommendations to DOD to update the baseline; use reasonable assumptions; and develop guidance to improve its methods for estimating excess capacity. In comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with one recommendation, partially concurred with two recommendations, and plans to incorporate them in any future capacity analysis.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_936"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_937","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nTSA is responsible for securing the nation's transportation systems and uses security technologies to screen airline passengers and their luggage to prevent prohibited items from being carried on commercial aircraft. TSA has special authority for using OTAs, which are not subject to certain federal contract laws and requirements. OTAs provide flexibility to help meet mission needs, but potentially carry the risk of reduced accountability and transparency.\nGAO was asked to examine TSA's use of OTAs. This report addresses: (1) the extent and purposes of TSA's use of OTAs, and (2) how TSA ensures prices are reasonable and how it oversees OTAs.\nTo address TSA's use of OTAs, GAO analyzed data on OTA awards and obligations from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation from fiscal years 2012 to 2016 (the most recent years for which data were available). GAO determined that data were sufficiently reliable to report on TSA's minimum use of OTAs. To examine how TSA prices and oversees OTAs, GAO selected a nongeneralizable sample of 29 OTAs from the 8 TSA programs that awarded them based on program size and OTA value. GAO reviewed relevant documentation, and interviewed contracting and program officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nDuring fiscal years 2012 through 2016, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) awarded at least 1,039 other transaction agreements (OTA) and obligated at least $1.4 billion on them. These agreements, which are neither traditional contracts nor grants, were primarily used to reimburse airports and law enforcement agencies for the costs associated with TSA security programs. For example,\nTSA awarded at least 109 OTAs and obligated at least $783 million from fiscal years 2012 through 2016 to reimburse airports for the allowable design and construction costs associated with installing, updating, or replacing checked baggage screening systems.\nTSA also used OTAs for intelligence analysis and to offset the costs of providing canines for explosives detection, among other things.\nTSA Used Other Transaction Agreements to Reimburse Airports for Design and Construction Costs Associated with Checked Baggage Screening Systems\nFor the selected 29 OTAs GAO reviewed, GAO found that the methods TSA used to determine price reasonableness varied depending on the complexity of the requirement. For example,\nFor complex design and construction projects, TSA compared independent government cost estimates with contractor bids. Certified program managers monitored project schedule and scope through site visits and status reports.\nIn contrast, TSA independently verified the rates set by the local power authority when reimbursing some airports for electricity costs to operate TSA screening equipment.\nGAO also found that TSA has taken action to address prior lapses in oversight, resulting in improved compliance. In 2015, TSA identified significant gaps in OTA file documentation and data reported in the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation. TSA took action to address these deficiencies by (1) updating its policy, (2) requiring additional training for contracting officers, (3) instituting monthly data verification, and (4) monitoring compliance through quarterly reviews. GAO's analysis confirmed that the quality of the data had improved between fiscal year 2012 and 2016. Moreover, the 29 OTAs generally met key requirements of TSA's policy that GAO identified.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is not making any recommendations in this report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_937"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_938","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nTSA employs about 43,000 TSOs who screen over 2 million passengers and their baggage each day at airports in the United States. TSA allocates TSOs to airports using both a computer-based staffing model and information from airports that are intended to provide each airport with the optimum number of TSOs. In the spring of 2016, long screening checkpoint lines at certain U.S. airports raised questions about TSA's process for allocating TSOs to airports.\nThe Aviation Security Act of 2016 includes a provision for GAO to review TSA's process for allocating TSOs. This report examines how (1) TSA modifies staffing assumptions and tailors staffing levels to airports' needs, (2) TSA monitors wait times and throughput and adjusts resources accordingly, and (3) TSA shares information with stakeholders about staffing and related screening procedures at airports. GAO reviewed TSA documentation describing how the agency modifies staffing assumptions and manages stakeholder coordination. GAO also analyzed passenger wait time and throughput data from January 2015 through May 2017 for the 28 airports monitored by headquarters. GAO visited eight airports selected on the basis of passenger volume and other factors and interviewed TSA officials and stakeholders at those locations.\nGAO is not making any recommendations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Transportation Security Administration (TSA) modifies staffing assumptions used in its computer-based staffing model (model) and tailors staffing levels to individual airport needs. Specifically, TSA works with a contractor annually to evaluate the assumptions used in the model and modifies the model's assumptions as needed. For example, TSA adjusted its model after contractor evaluations conducted in fiscal years 2016 and 2017 found that transportation security officers (TSO) needed more time to screen passengers and their baggage when using one type of screening equipment. Moreover, in 2016, TSA began using forecasts on the number of passengers screened at each airport's checkpoints (throughput) to better allocate staff commensurate with the expected rate of increase in passenger throughput at each airport. Furthermore, prompted by the long wait times at some airports in 2016, for the 2017 model TSA officials used actual expedited screening data, specific to each individual airport, rather than relying on the system-wide estimate used in 2016. TSA officials also use other information specific to each airport\u2014such as staff training needs\u2014to further tailor the TSO allocation because the initial allocation resulting from the model does not reflect the full range of operating conditions at individual airports.\nTSA uses data to monitor passenger wait times and throughput on a daily basis and responds to increases. For example, TSA's Airport Operations Center (AOC) monitors daily wait times and passenger throughput from 28 airports that TSA officials say represent the majority of passenger throughput nationwide or are operationally significant. Furthermore, TSA officials at airports are required to report to the AOC when an event occurs\u2014such as equipment malfunctions\u2014that affects airport screening operations and results in wait times that are greater than 30 minutes in standard screening lanes. GAO analyzed wait time data for the AOC-monitored airports for the period of January 2015 through May 2017 and found that TSA's reported wait times met its standard of less than 30 minutes in standard screening 99 percent of the time. Within that time frame, two airports accounted for the longest wait times in the spring of 2016. TSA officials identified several tools, such as passenger screening canines, that they use to respond to increases in passenger wait times at these airports.\nTSA has taken steps to improve information sharing with airline and airport officials (stakeholders) about staffing and related airport screening operations, and most stakeholders GAO interviewed reported improved satisfaction with information sharing. However, some stakeholders noted differences in the type and extent of information shared. According to TSA officials, stakeholders can elevate any problems they experience with information sharing within TSA to ensure information is shared regularly with stakeholders.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_938"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_939","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nTo address concerns with the current Medicare FFS cost-sharing design, various groups have proposed modernizing the design to make it simpler and include features found in private plans. These proposals have generally included a single deductible, modified cost-sharing requirements (e.g., a uniform coinsurance), and the addition of a cap on beneficiaries' annual cost-sharing responsibilities.\nGAO was asked to review how modernized cost-sharing designs would affect beneficiaries' costs over multiple years. This report describes implications of the current cost-sharing design; options for modernizing; and how modernized cost-sharing designs could directly and indirectly affect beneficiaries' costs.\nGAO reviewed studies related to modernizing Medicare's cost-sharing design and interviewed authors of those studies and other experts. GAO also used summarized Medicare claims data from 2007 to 2014 (the most recent data available) to develop four illustrative modernized designs, each including a single deductible, uniform coinsurance, and an annual cap while maintaining Medicare program spending similar to the current design. For each design, GAO calculated how beneficiaries' annual cost-sharing responsibilities compared with the current design over a 1-, 4-, and 8-year time horizon.\nThe Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO and others have raised concerns about the design of Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) cost-sharing\u2014the portion of costs beneficiaries are responsible for when they receive care. The current cost-sharing design has been largely unchanged since Medicare's enactment in 1965, can be confusing for beneficiaries, and can contribute to overuse of services. Additionally, the design leaves some beneficiaries exposed to catastrophic costs that can exceed tens of thousands of dollars annually. The complexity of the design and lack of an annual cap on cost-sharing responsibilities also increases demand for supplemental insurance, which can cost beneficiaries thousands annually and further contribute to overuse of services.\nModernizing Medicare FFS's cost-sharing design to include features found in private plans could help address these concerns, but would involve design trade-offs. For example, adding an annual cap on cost-sharing responsibilities while maintaining Medicare's aggregate share of costs similar to the current design would involve a trade-off between the level of the cap and other cost-sharing requirements.\nIn analyzing four illustrative FFS cost-sharing designs, GAO found that the direct effect of modernizing the design on beneficiaries' cost-sharing responsibilities\u2014that is, the effect when holding utilization and enrollment constant\u2014would depend on the specific revisions and the time horizon examined. For example, GAO found that\nDuring year 1, cost-sharing designs that feature relatively low deductibles (costs a beneficiary is responsible for before Medicare starts to pay) and relatively high caps would result in a median annual beneficiary cost-sharing responsibility close to or below that of the current design. In contrast, designs with relatively low caps\u2014and therefore greater beneficiary protection from catastrophic costs\u2014would result in a median annual cost-sharing responsibility above that of the current design.\nBy the end of 8 years, there would still be differences in the median annual beneficiary cost-sharing responsibility across different designs, but they would become less pronounced.\nModernizing the Medicare FFS cost-sharing design would also affect beneficiaries' costs indirectly through altered incentives. The studies GAO reviewed and experts GAO interviewed identified several types of behavioral responses that would influence the net effect of a modernized design on beneficiaries' out-of-pocket costs, including changes in beneficiaries' demand for and insurers' supply of supplemental insurance; changes in beneficiaries' use of services; changes in Medicare beneficiaries' enrollment in FFS versus Medicare's private plan alternative; and interactions among these and other behavioral responses, including effects on the price of supplemental insurance.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_939"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_940","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nVeterans suffer a disproportionately higher rate of suicide than the civilian population. VA has estimated that an average of 20 veterans die by suicide per day, and in 2018, VA identified suicide prevention as its highest clinical priority. VHA's suicide prevention media outreach campaign\u2014its collective suicide prevention outreach activities\u2014helps raise awareness among veterans and others in the community about suicide prevention resources. VHA has contracted with an outside vendor to develop suicide prevention media outreach content.\nGAO was asked to examine VHA's suicide prevention media outreach campaign. This report examines the extent to which VHA (1) conducts activities for its suicide prevention media outreach campaign, and (2) evaluates the effectiveness of its campaign. GAO reviewed relevant VHA documents and data on the amount, type, and cost of suicide prevention outreach activities since fiscal year 2013. GAO also reviewed VHA's contract for developing suicide prevention outreach content and interviewed VA and VHA officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Veterans Health Administration (VHA) conducts national suicide prevention media outreach on various platforms to raise awareness about VHA's suicide prevention resources. The primary focus of this campaign since 2010 has been to raise awareness of the Veterans Crisis Line (VCL), VHA's national hotline established in 2007 to provide support to veterans in emotional crisis. GAO found that VHA's suicide prevention media outreach activities declined in recent years due to leadership turnover and reorganization. For example, the amount of suicide prevention content developed by VHA's contractor for social media decreased in fiscal years 2017 and the first 10 months of 2018 after increasing in each of the 4 prior years.\nVHA officials reported not having leadership available for a period of time to make decisions about the suicide prevention media outreach campaign. GAO found that VHA did not assign key leadership responsibilities or establish clear lines of reporting, and as a result, its ability to oversee the outreach campaign was hindered. Consequently, VHA may not be maximizing its reach with suicide prevention media content to veterans, especially those who are at-risk.\nVHA evaluates the effectiveness of its suicide prevention media outreach campaign by collecting data on metrics, such as the number of people that visit the VCL website. However, VHA has not established targets for the majority of these metrics. Officials said they have not established targets because, apart from one industry-wide target they use, they lack meaningful targets for evaluating the campaign. However, VHA could use information about how its metrics performed in the past to develop reasonable and meaningful targets for future performance. Without established targets for its metrics, VHA is missing an opportunity to better evaluate the effectiveness of its suicide prevention media outreach campaign.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nVHA should (1) establish an approach to oversee its suicide prevention media outreach campaign that includes clear delineation of roles and responsibilities, and (2) establish targets for its metrics to improve evaluation efforts. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations and described steps it will take to implement them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_940"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_941","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe number of vehicles affected by safety defect recalls increased sharply in recent years\u2014from nearly 13 million in 2011 to over 51 million in 2016. Once a defect is identified, auto manufacturers are required to send written notification to vehicle owners by mail. NHTSA also aims to enhance awareness of auto recalls by providing information on its website, NHTSA.gov .\nThe Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act includes a provision requiring GAO to study the use of publicly available safety recall information. This report addresses: (1) how consumers and industry stakeholders use such information and (2) how easy to use do consumers find the auto recall areas of NHTSA.gov, among other objectives. To understand consumers' use of auto recall information and to test website usability, GAO conducted 12 focus groups with 94 consumers who had a recall. Focus groups were held in six locations selected for population and geographic variation. GAO identified key website usability practices and requested an evaluation by website usability professionals. GAO reviewed statutes, regulations, and NHTSA documents, and interviewed industry stakeholders\u2014including 10 manufacturers selected based on sales market share and other factors.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nConsumers, manufacturers, and auto dealers use publicly available auto recall information differently. For example, the 94 consumers in 12 focus groups that GAO conducted used this information to decide whether to repair their vehicles. These consumers overwhelmingly cited safety risk and convenience as the two most influential factors they considered. Most consumers reported a preference for receiving recall notification by at least one electronic means, such as by e-mail or text message, in addition to mail. However, only 7 of 94 consumers reported receiving electronic notifications, suggesting a gap between the industry's auto recall notification practices and consumers' preferences. (See fig.). In response to a mandate in law, in September 2016, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued a proposed rule that, if finalized, would require manufacturers to notify consumers about auto recalls by electronic means in addition to mail.\nMost consumers in GAO's focus group website usability tests found the auto recall areas of NHTSA's website\u2014NHTSA.gov\u2014easy to use; however, some consumers experienced difficulties when asked to complete auto recall related tasks. For example, when consumers attempted to search for recalls affecting their specific vehicles, some found the search results confusing, leading them to question the accuracy of the results. Similarly, some consumers were hampered in searching for recalls by their vehicles' year, make, and model because the website did not always display model options using plain language. GAO found that the auto recall areas of NHTSA.gov do not always reflect federal and industry key website usability practices, and that an independent evaluation conducted by website usability professionals at GAO's request identified similar issues. NHTSA is in the process of consolidating its websites and plans to conduct a website usability study of NHTSA.gov with consumers after the consolidation is complete. However, the agency has not determined a completion date for the consolidation effort\u2014an essential step for organizations to effectively guide their information technology efforts. Without establishing a completion date and taking interim steps to improve the usability of NHTSA.gov, consumers will likely continue to experience difficulties, which may limit the effectiveness of the website's primary means of providing consumers with information about recalls affecting their vehicles.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that NHTSA determine a completion date for its website consolidation effort and take interim steps to improve the usability of NHTSA.gov by addressing the website usability difficulties GAO identified. The Department of Transportation concurred with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_941"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_942","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCoal accounts for 17 percent of domestic energy production. SMCRA requires coal mine operators to reclaim lands that were disturbed during mining and to submit a financial assurance in an amount sufficient to ensure that adequate funds will be available to complete reclamation if the operator does not do so. Recent coal company bankruptcies have drawn attention to whether financial assurances obtained by OSMRE and state agencies will be adequate to reclaim land once coal mining operations have ceased.\nGAO was asked to review management of financial assurances for coal mine reclamation. This report describes, among other things, the amounts and types of financial assurances held for coal mine reclamation in 2017 and the challenges that OSMRE and state agencies face in managing these financial assurances. GAO collected and analyzed data from OSMRE and 23 state agencies; reviewed federal laws, regulations, and directives; and interviewed OSMRE and state agency officials and representatives from organizations associated with the mining and financial assurance industries and environmental organizations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nState agencies and the Department of the Interior's Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE) reported holding approximately $10.2 billion in surety bonds (guaranteed by a third party), collateral bonds (guaranteed by a tangible asset, such as a certificate of deposit), and self-bonds (guaranteed on the basis of a coal operator's own finances) as financial assurances for coal mine reclamation.\nOSMRE and state agencies face several challenges in managing financial assurances, according to the stakeholders GAO interviewed. Specifically,\nObtaining additional financial assurances from operators for unanticipated reclamation costs, such as long-term treatment for water pollution, can be difficult.\nDetermining the financial stability of surety companies has been challenging in certain instances.\nSelf-bonding presents a risk to the government because it is difficult to (1) ascertain the financial health of an operator, (2) determine whether the operator qualifies for self-bonding, and (3) obtain a replacement for existing self-bonds when an operator no longer qualifies. In addition, some stakeholders said that the risk from self-bonding is greater now than when the practice was first authorized under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA).\nGAO's previous work examining environmental cleanup found that the financial risk to government and the amount of oversight needed for self-bonds are relatively high compared to other forms of financial assurances. GAO also previously reviewed federal financial assurance requirements for various energy and mineral extraction sectors and found that coal mining is the only one where self-bonding was allowed. However, because SMCRA explicitly allows states to decide whether to accept self-bonds, eliminating the risk that self-bonds pose to the federal government and states would require SMCRA be amended.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that Congress consider amending SMCRA to eliminate self-bonding. Interior neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_942"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_943","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIn fiscal year 2016, VHA's 733 CBOCs provided care to more than 3 million veterans at a cost of $5.3 billion. Although most of these clinics are VHA-owned and -operated, 101 are operated through contracts with non-VHA organizations. VHA policy states that CBOCs, whether VHA-operated or contracted, must provide one standard of care that is of high quality.\nGAO was asked to review VHA's use of contracts to carry out core functions. This report examines, among other issues, the extent to which VHA oversees CBOC operations.\nTo conduct this work, GAO reviewed VHA's policies and CBOC Report. GAO also interviewed officials from VHA's central office and from a nongeneralizable sample of eight CBOCs and their four respective VAMCs and VISNs. The CBOCs were selected for variation in factors such as contract status and geographic area.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nCommunity-based outpatient clinics (CBOC) are an important part of the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Veterans Health Administration (VHA) health care delivery system. These clinics are geographically separate from VA medical centers (VAMC) and provide outpatient services, including primary care and mental health care. GAO found weaknesses in VHA's oversight of CBOCs:\nIncomplete policy implementation. VHA has not implemented certain CBOC oversight requirements as outlined in its policy. Specifically, VHA has not developed guidelines for monitoring the quality and comprehensiveness of care in CBOCs and officials said they have no plans to do so. Officials told GAO they believe the requirement was met as part of their regular oversight of Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN)\u2014regional networks responsible for oversight of VAMCs and CBOCs. However, VHA may miss CBOC performance problems that are not identifiable in VISN-level data. Further, although policy requires VHA central office officials to review CBOC performance as part of quarterly VISN performance reviews, officials said they do not specifically do so unless the VISN identifies a problem. Officials from three of the four VISNs in GAO's review said they largely delegate CBOC oversight to VAMCs, and do not separately review clinic performance unless a VAMC identifies a problem.\nAn inaccurate and incomplete CBOC Report. VHA's CBOC Report is prepared by VHA central office and distributed to VISNs and VAMCs quarterly and at year-end. The CBOC Report could be useful to compare clinical quality of care between VHA-operated and contracted CBOCs, but it is inaccurate and incomplete. Specifically, VHA officials have used their judgment to classify certain sites as CBOCs in the report, rather than use the official classifications in policy. GAO found that 22 percent of sites were incorrectly classified as CBOCs when they were other types of sites, including VAMCs. As a result, the report is of limited usefulness to VHA as an oversight tool.\nLack of guidance or training on the CBOC Report. VHA central office officials do not provide guidance or training specific to understanding the CBOC Report to assist VISNs and VAMCs in their oversight of CBOCs. GAO found that in several places in the report, shorthand text and acronyms were used, but not defined. In addition, several VISN and VAMC officials stated that guidance or training would be helpful.\nNo requirement to use the CBOC Report. VHA officials told GAO that VAMCs and VISNs are expected to use the CBOC Report as an oversight tool, but GAO found that VHA lacks a requirement that they do so. Officials from three of the four VISNs and three of the four VAMCs in GAO's review were not using the report.\nThese weaknesses potentially lead to inconsistent oversight and create a risk that VHA is not providing one standard of care that is of high quality to veterans across VHA-operated and contracted CBOCs.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that VHA (1) implement oversight requirements that align with existing policy; (2) establish a process to ensure the CBOC Report is accurate and complete; (3) provide guidance or training to VISNs and VAMCs on how to use the CBOC Report; and (4) require use of the CBOC Report as an oversight tool. VA concurred with all of GAO's recommendations and identified actions it is taking to implement them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_943"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_944","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nNASA is undertaking a trio of closely related programs to continue human space exploration beyond low-Earth orbit. All three programs (SLS, Orion, and EGS) are working toward a launch readiness date of no earlier than October 2019 for the first test flight. Each program is a complex technical and programmatic endeavor. Because all three programs must work together for launch, NASA must integrate the hardware and software from the separate programs into a working system capable of meeting its goals for deep space exploration.\nThe House Committee on Appropriations report accompanying H.R. 2578 included a provision for GAO to assess the progress of NASA's human space exploration programs. This report assesses (1) the benefits and challenges of NASA's approach for integrating these three programs and (2) the extent to which cross-program risks could affect launch readiness. GAO examined NASA policies, the results of design reviews, risk data, and other program documentation and interviewed NASA and other officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe approach that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is using to integrate its three human spaceflight programs into one system ready for launch offers some benefits, but it also introduces oversight challenges. To manage and integrate the three programs\u2014the Space Launch System (SLS) vehicle; the Orion crew capsule; and supporting ground systems (EGS)\u2014NASA's Exploration Systems Development (ESD) organization is using a more streamlined approach than has been used with other programs, and officials GAO spoke with believe that this approach provides cost savings and greater efficiency. However, GAO found two key challenges to the approach:\nThe approach makes it difficult to assess progress against cost and schedule baselines. SLS and EGS are baselined only to the first test flight. In May 2014, GAO recommended that NASA baseline the programs' cost and schedule beyond the first test flight. NASA has not implemented these recommendations nor does it plan to; hence, it is contractually obligating billions of dollars for capabilities for the second flight and beyond without establishing baselines necessary to measure program performance.\nThe approach has dual-hatted positions, with individuals in two programmatic engineering and safety roles also performing oversight of those areas. As the image below shows, this presents an environment of competing interests.\nThese dual roles subject the technical authorities to cost and schedule pressures that potentially impair their independence. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board found in 2003 that this type of tenuous balance between programmatic and technical pressures was a contributing factor to that Space Shuttle accident.\nNASA has lowered its overall cross-program risk posture over the past 2 years, but risk areas\u2014related to software development and verification and validation, which are critical to ensuring the integrated body works as expected\u2014remain. For example, delays and content deferral in Orion and SLS software development continue to affect ground systems software development and could delay launch readiness. GAO will continue to monitor these risks.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nCongress should consider directing NASA to establish baselines for SLS and EGS's missions beyond the first test flight. NASA's ESD organization should no longer dual-hat officials with programmatic and technical authority responsibilities. NASA partially concurred with our recommendation and plans to address it in the next year. But NASA did not address the need for the technical authority to be independent from programmatic responsibilities for cost and schedule. GAO continues to believe that this component of the recommendation is critical.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_944"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_945","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear and radiological weapons remains a pressing national security challenge. DNN implements nuclear nonproliferation programs worldwide. To carry out its mission, for fiscal year 2018 DNN requested an appropriation of about $1.5 billion for its 4 major programs and their 13 subprograms.\nA House Armed Services Committee report, accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, included a provision for GAO to review and assess DNN's project and program management processes and systems. GAO's report examines the extent to which (1) selected DNN subprograms use program management leading practices to manage schedule and cost (2) DNN has incorporated leading practices in its revised program management policy.\nGAO selected 4 DNN subprograms to review that had defined end dates and\/or work scope and that GAO had not recently examined. GAO reviewed documentation on DNN and NNSA's program management policies and practices; reviewed selected leading practices published by PMI and GAO; and interviewed agency officials.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe 4 selected subprograms from the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) GAO reviewed generally do not use selected program management leading practices to manage schedule and cost. According to generally recognized leading practices from the Project Management Institute (PMI) and GAO, programs should (1) establish schedules necessary to achieve the program's goal, (2) establish life-cycle cost estimates, and (3) measure performance against schedule and cost baselines. However, none of the DNN subprograms have schedule and cost estimates covering their planned life cycles and none measure performance against schedule and cost baselines. The following figure illustrates the extent to which the selected subprograms have established schedule and cost estimates compared to their planned life cycles.\nNNSA officials said that the subprograms do not have schedules and cost estimates that cover their life cycles and do not measure performance against baselines, in part, because DNN management does not require such estimates or baseline measurements.\nThe lack of a requirement is consistent with the limitations in DNN's revised program management policy, which does not address leading practices on establishing schedule estimates, estimating life-cycle costs, and measuring against such baselines. According to leading practices, in developing schedule and cost estimates a program should define assumptions tailored to the program such as its life-cycle phases. Updating the DNN policy to include requirements and guidance on cost estimating and tracking performance against schedule and cost baselines could help ensure that NNSA managers and Congress have better information on how much DNN programs and subprograms may cost, the time they may need to achieve their goals, and how effectively they are being executed compared to plans.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DNN revise its program management policy to require DNN programs and subprograms to follow life-cycle program management, such as requiring life-cycle estimates and measuring against baselines. NNSA neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation but plans to take action to revise its policy.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_945"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_946","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\n\u201cGot milk?\u201d and \u201cPork: The Other White Meat\u201d are examples of advertising campaigns undertaken by 2 of the 22 federal agricultural research and promotion programs, commonly known as commodity check-off programs. These programs, funded by a fraction of the sale of each unit of a commodity, are led by boards consisting of industry members appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture. The programs conduct research and promotion activities to strengthen a commodity's position in the market. In 2016, check-off funds totaled over $885 million. By law, funds cannot be used for lobbying or disparaging other commodities, among other things. AMS has primary responsibility for overseeing the check-off programs.\nGAO was asked to review AMS's oversight of the check-off programs. This report examines (1) the extent to which AMS has addressed previously identified weaknesses in its oversight and (2) how the effectiveness of the programs has been evaluated and what the results have indicated. GAO selected a sample of 8 such programs\u2014selected, in part, based on total funds collected\u2014and reviewed laws, regulations, and agency guidance. GAO interviewed agency officials, check-off board executives, and economists.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) has improved its oversight of check-off programs since USDA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) made recommendations in a 2012 report. In response to two OIG recommendations, AMS developed and implemented standard operating procedures, which outline specific oversight responsibilities of AMS, and began to conduct internal reviews of its oversight functions. However, GAO found that AMS does not consistently review subcontracts\u2014a legal agreement between a contractor and third party\u2014or ensure that certain documents are shared with stakeholders on program websites.\nSubcontracts. Under AMS's 2015 guidelines for check-off programs, which cover broad oversight activities, staff are to review a sample of subcontracts during agency reviews of program operations. However, AMS did not revise its standard operating procedures to match its guidelines with this responsibility, and GAO found that AMS reviewed subcontracts for only one check-off program in its sample of eight. Without revising the standard operating procedures to include a review of subcontracts, AMS's ability to prevent misuse of funds is impaired.\nTransparency. According to leading business principles, transparency is central to stakeholders' access to regular, reliable, and comparable information. However, GAO found that four of the eight check-off programs reviewed posted all key documents, such as budget summaries and evaluations of effectiveness, to program websites. GAO found that AMS's guidelines state that budget summaries should be posted on program websites, while the other key documents are to be available on the website or otherwise made available to stakeholders. Agency officials said that boards would supply documentation if contacted by a stakeholder. Industry representatives GAO interviewed said that transparency of how funds are used and the effectiveness of programs are important to their members. Without including in its guidelines and standard operating procedures that all key documents should be posted on a check-off program's website, AMS may miss an opportunity to ensure that stakeholders have access to information on program operations and effectiveness.\nIndependent economic evaluations of the effectiveness of check-off programs, required by law to be conducted every 5 years, have generally shown positive financial benefits. For the eight evaluations GAO reviewed, benefits ranged from an average of $2.14 to $17.40 for every dollar invested in the programs. However, the evaluations varied in the methods used and had certain methodological limitations. For example, some evaluations did not account for the effects of promotion from competing commodities, which could overstate the programs' benefits. AMS's standard operating procedures state that the agency should review the evaluations to ensure that there is a credible methodology, among other things; however, AMS did not consistently document reviews of the evaluations or have criteria by which to review the evaluations. Without developing criteria to assess the methodology and results of evaluations, the agency's assessments of independent economic evaluations may be inconsistent across check-off programs and misleading to stakeholders.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making five recommendations, including that USDA revise its standard operating procedures to include the review of subcontracts, include key documents on check-off program websites, and develop criteria to assess evaluations. USDA generally agreed with GAO's recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_946"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_947","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nVHA operates one of the largest health care delivery systems in the nation, serving over 9 million enrolled veterans. In providing health care services to veterans, VAMCs use RME which must be reprocessed\u2014that is, cleaned, disinfected, or sterilized\u2014between uses. Improper reprocessing of RME can negatively affect patient care. To help ensure the safety of veterans, VHA policy establishes requirements VAMCs must follow when reprocessing RME and requires a number of related oversight efforts.\nGAO was asked to review VHA's reprocessing of RME. This report examines (1) VHA's oversight of VAMCs' adherence to RME policies and (2) challenges VAMCs face in operating their Sterile Processing Services programs, and any efforts by VHA to address these challenges. GAO reviewed relevant VHA documents including RME policies and VISN inspection results for fiscal year 2017. GAO interviewed officials from VHA, all 18 VISNs, and four VAMCs, selected based on geographic variation, VAMC complexity, and data on operating room delays. GAO examined VHA's oversight in the context of federal internal control standards on communication, monitoring, and information.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO found that the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Veterans Health Administration (VHA) does not have reasonable assurance that VA Medical Centers (VAMC) are following policies related to reprocessing reusable medical equipment (RME). Reprocessing involves cleaning, sterilizing, and storing surgical instruments and other RME, such as endoscopes. VHA has not ensured that all VAMCs' RME inspections have been conducted because it has incomplete information from the annual inspections by Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN), which oversee VAMCs. For fiscal year 2017, VHA did not have 39 of the 144 VISN reports from the VISNs' inspections of their VAMCs' Sterile Processing Services departments. VISNs were able to provide GAO with evidence that they had conducted 27 of the 39 missing inspections; top areas of non-adherence in these inspections were related to quality and training, among other things. Although VHA has ultimate oversight responsibility, a VHA official told GAO that VHA had not been aware it lacked complete inspection results because it has largely relied on the VISNs to ensure complete inspection result reporting. Without analyzing and sharing complete information from inspections, VHA does not have assurance that its VAMCs are following RME policies designed to ensure that veterans receive safe care.\nGAO also found that VAMCs face challenges operating their Sterile Processing Services programs\u2014notably, addressing workforce needs. Almost all of the officials from all 18 VISNs and selected VAMCs GAO interviewed reported Sterile Processing Services workforce challenges, such as lengthy hiring timeframes and limited pay and professional growth potential. According to officials, these challenges result in programs having difficulty maintaining sufficient staffing. VHA officials told GAO that the office is considering studying Sterile Processing Services staffing at VAMCs, although VHA does not have definitive plans to do so. VHA's Sterile Processing Services workforce challenges pose a potential risk to VAMCs' ability to ensure access to sterilized medical equipment, and VHA's failure to address this risk is inconsistent with standards for internal control in the federal government. Until VHA examines these workforce needs, VHA won't know whether or to what extent the reported challenges adversely affect VAMCs' ability to effectively operate their Sterile Processing Services programs and ensure access to safe care for veterans.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making three recommendations to VHA, including that it ensure all RME inspections are being conducted and complete results reported, and that it examine Sterile Processing Services workforce needs and make adjustments, as appropriate. VA concurred with these recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_947"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_948","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe federal government spends tens of billions of dollars each year on IT products and services. Competition is a key component to achieving the best return on investment for taxpayers. Federal acquisition regulations allow for noncompetitive contracts in certain circumstances. Some noncompetitive contracts act as \u201cbridge contracts\u201d\u2014which can be a useful tool to avoid a lapse in service but can also increase the risk of the government overpaying. There is currently no government-wide definition of bridge contracts.\nGAO was asked to review the federal government's use of noncompetitive contracts for IT. This report examines (1) the extent that agencies used noncompetitive contracts for IT, (2) the reasons for using noncompetitive contracts for selected IT procurements, (3) the extent to which IT procurements at selected agencies were bridge contracts, and (4) the extent to which IT procurements were in support of legacy systems. GAO analyzed FPDS-NG data from fiscal years 2013 through 2017 (the most recent and complete data available). GAO developed a generalizable sample of 171 fiscal year 2016 noncompetitive IT contracts and orders awarded by DOD, DHS, and HHS\u2014the agencies with the most spending on IT, to determine the reasons for using noncompetitive contracts and orders, and the extent to which these were bridge contracts or supported legacy systems.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nFrom fiscal years 2013 through 2017, federal agencies reported obligating more than $15 billion per year, or about 30 percent, of information technology (IT) contract spending on a noncompetitive basis (see figure).\nGAO found, however, that Departments of Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), and Health and Human Services (HHS) contracting officials misreported competition data in the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) for 22 of the 41 orders GAO reviewed. GAO's findings call into question competition data associated with nearly $3 billion in annual obligations for IT-related orders. DHS identified underlying issues resulting in the errors for its orders and took corrective action. DOD and HHS, however, had limited insight into why the errors occurred. Without identifying the issues contributing to the errors, DOD and HHS are unable to take action to ensure that competition data are accurately recorded in the future, and are at risk of using inaccurate information to assess whether they are achieving their competition objectives.\nGAO found that DOD, DHS, and HHS primarily cited two reasons for awarding a noncompetitive contract or order: (1) only one source could meet the need (for example, the contractor owned proprietary technical or data rights) or (2) the agency awarded the contract to a small business to help meet agency goals.\nGAO estimates that about 8 percent of 2016 noncompetitive IT contracts and orders at DOD, DHS, and HHS were bridge contracts, awarded in part because of acquisition planning challenges. GAO previously recommended that the Office of Federal Procurement Policy define bridge contracts and provide guidance on their use, but it has not yet done so. GAO believes that addressing this recommendation will help agencies better manage their use of bridge contracts.\nAdditionally, GAO estimates that about 7 percent of noncompetitive IT contracts and orders were used to support outdated or obsolete legacy IT systems. Officials from the agencies GAO reviewed stated these systems are needed for their mission or that they are in the process of modernizing the legacy systems or buying new systems.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommended DOD and HHS identify the reasons why competition data for certain orders in FPDS-NG were misreported and take corrective action. DOD and HHS concurred.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_948"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_949","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFederal agencies use heavy equipment such as cranes and forklifts to carry out their missions, but there is no government-wide data on federal agencies' acquisition or management of this equipment.\nGAO was asked to review federal agencies' management of heavy equipment. This report, among other objectives, examines: (1) the number, type, and costs of heavy equipment items that are owned by 20 federal agencies and (2) the heavy equipment that selected agencies recently acquired as well as how they decided whether to purchase or lease this equipment.\nGAO collected heavy equipment inventory data as of June 2017 from the 24 agencies that have chief financial officers responsible for overseeing financial management. GAO also selected three agencies (using factors such as the heavy equipment fleet's size) and reviewed their acquisitions of and guidance on heavy equipment. These agencies' practices are not generalizable to all acquisitions but provide insight into what efforts these agencies take to acquire thousands of heavy equipment items. GAO also interviewed officials at the three selected agencies.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nOf the 24 agencies GAO reviewed, 20 reported owning over 136,000 heavy equipment items such as cranes, backhoes, and forklifts, and spending over $7.4 billion (in 2016 dollars) to acquire this equipment. The remaining 4 agencies reported that they do not own any heavy equipment.\nThe three selected agencies GAO reviewed in-depth\u2014the Air Force within the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Park Service within the Department of the Interior (Interior)\u2014spent about $360 million to purchase about 3,500 heavy equipment assets in calendar years 2012 through 2016 and over $5 million to lease heavy equipment from fiscal years 2012 through 2016. Officials from all three agencies stated that they consider mission needs and the availability of equipment leases when deciding whether to lease or purchase heavy equipment. Federal regulations provide that agencies should consider whether it is more economical to lease or purchase equipment when acquiring heavy equipment, and federal internal control standards require that management clearly document all transactions in a manner that allows the documentation to be readily available for examination. However, in reviewing selected leases and purchases of heavy equipment from these three agencies, GAO found that officials did not consistently conduct or document lease-versus-purchase analyses. Officials at the Air Force and Interior said that there was a lack of clarity in agency policies about when they were required to conduct and document such analyses. Without greater clarity on when lease-versus-purchase analyses should be conducted and documented, these agencies may not be spending funds on heavy equipment effectively.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nThe Department of the Interior and the Air Force should clarify the circumstances in which lease-versus-purchases analyses for heavy equipment acquisitions are to be conducted and documented. The Departments of the Interior and Defense concurred with these recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_949"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_950","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDOD requested about $60 billion for fiscal years 2009 - 2017 to purchase goods and services overseas and reimburse service-members for costs incurred while stationed abroad. DOD uses foreign currency exchange rates to budget and pay (that is, disburse amounts) for these expenses. It also manages the FCFD account to mitigate a loss in buying power that results from foreign currency rate changes.\nGAO was asked to examine DOD's processes to budget for and manage foreign currency fluctuations. This report (1) describes DOD's revision of its foreign currency budget rates since 2009 and the relationship between the revised rates and projected O&M and MILPERS funding needs; (2) evaluates the extent to which DOD has taken steps to reduce costs in selecting foreign currency rates to disburse funds to liquidate O&M obligations, and determined whether opportunities exist to gain additional savings; and (3) assesses the extent to which DOD has effectively managed the FCFD account balance. GAO analyzed data on foreign currency rates, DOD financial management regulations, a non-generalizable sample of foreign currency disbursement data, and FCFD account balances.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Defense (DOD) revised its foreign currency exchange rates (\u201cbudget rates\u201d) during fiscal years 2014 through 2016 for each of the nine foreign currencies it uses to develop its Operation and Maintenance (O&M) and Military Personnel (MILPERS) budget request. These revisions decreased DOD's projected O&M and MILPERS funding needs. DOD's revision of the budget rates during these years also decreased the expected gains (that is, buying power) that would have resulted from an increase in the strength of the U.S. Dollar relative to other foreign currencies. DOD did not revise its budget rates in fiscal years 2009 through 2013. For fiscal year 2017, DOD changed its methodology for producing budget rates, resulting in rates that were more closely aligned with market rates. According to officials, that change made it unnecessary to revise the budget rates during the fiscal year.\nDOD has taken some steps to reduce costs in selecting foreign currency rates used to pay (that is, disburse amounts) for goods and services, but DOD has not fully determined whether opportunities exist to achieve additional savings. The Army has estimated potential savings of up to $10 million annually by using a foreign currency rate available 3 days in advance of paying for goods or services rather than a more costly rate available up to 5 days in advance. The Army has converted to the use of a 3-day advanced rate. GAO's analysis suggests that DOD could achieve cost savings if the services reviewed and consistently selected the most cost-effective foreign currency rates when paying for their goods and services. Absent a review, DOD is at risk for paying more than it would otherwise be required to conduct its transactions.\nDOD used the Foreign Currency Fluctuations, Defense (FCFD) account to cover losses (that is, less buying power) due to unfavorable foreign currency fluctuations in 6 of the 8 years GAO reviewed. Since 2012, DOD has maintained the FCFD account balance at the statutory limit of $970 million, largely by transferring unobligated balances before they are cancelled from certain DOD accounts into the FCFD. However, DOD has not identified the appropriate FCFD account balance needed to maintain program operations by routinely analyzing projected losses and basing any transfers into the account on those expected losses. Thus, DOD may be maintaining balances that are hundreds of millions of dollars higher than needed, and that could have been used for other purposes or returned to the Treasury Department (see figure).\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making four recommendations, including that DOD review opportunities to achieve cost savings by more consistently selecting the most cost-effective foreign currency rates used for the payment of goods and services, and analyze projected losses to manage the FCFD account balance. DOD generally concurred with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_950"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_951","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nVA provides health care services to approximately 9 million veterans and their families and relies on its health information system\u2014VistA\u2014to do so. However, the system is more than 30 years old, is costly to maintain, and does not fully support exchanging health data with DOD and private health care providers. Over nearly 2 decades, VA has pursued multiple efforts to modernize the system. In June 2017, the department announced plans to acquire the same system\u2014the Cerner system\u2014that DOD is implementing. VA plans to continue using VistA during the decade-long transition to the Cerner system.\nGAO was asked to review key aspects of VistA and VA's plans for the new acquisition of the Cerner system. The objectives of the review were to (1) determine the extent to which VA has defined VistA, (2) evaluate VA's annual costs to develop and sustain VistA, and (3) describe the actions VA has taken to transition from VistA to the Cerner system.\nGAO analyzed documentation that defines aspects of VistA and identifies components to be replaced; evaluated the reliability of cost data, including obligations associated with the development and sustainment of VistA for fiscal years 2015, 2016, and 2017; and reviewed program documentation related to VA's program, governance, and plans to transition to Cerner.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has various documents and a database that describe parts of the Veterans Health Information Systems and Technology Architecture (VistA); however, the department does not have a comprehensive definition for the system. For example, VA has identified components that comprise VistA, identified interfaces related to the system, and collected system user guides and installation manuals. VA has also conducted analyses to better understand customization of VistA components at various medical facilities. Nevertheless, the existing information and analyses do not provide a thorough understanding of the local customizations reflected in about 130 versions of VistA that support health care delivery at more than 1,500 sites. Program officials stated that they have not been able to fully define VistA due to the decentralization of the development of the system for more than 30 years. Cerner's contract to provide a new electronic health record system to VA calls for the company to conduct comprehensive assessments to identify site-specific requirements where its system is planned to be deployed. Three site assessments have been completed and additional assessments are planned. If these assessments provide a thorough understanding of the 130 VistA versions, the department should be able to define VistA and be better positioned to transition to the new system.\nVA identified costs for VistA and its related activities adding up to approximately $913.7 million, $664.3 million, and $711.1 million in fiscal years 2015, 2016, and 2017, respectively\u2014for a total of about $2.3 billion over the 3 years. However, of the $2.3 billion, the department was only able to demonstrate that approximately $1 billion of these costs were sufficiently reliable. In addition, the department omitted VistA-related costs from the total. The lack of a sufficiently reliable and comprehensive total cost for VistA is due in part to not following a well-documented methodology that describes how the department determined the costs for the system. As a result of incomplete cost data and data that could not be determined to be sufficiently reliable, the department, legislators, and the public do not have a complete understanding of how much it has cost to develop and maintain VistA. Further, VA lacks the information needed to make decisions on sustaining the many versions of the system.\nVA has initiated a number of actions to prepare for the transition from VistA to the Cerner system. These actions include taking steps to establish and begin to staff a program office, forming a governance structure, conducting assessments at the initial sites, preparing program plans to guide the initial system implementation, and setting a program baseline to help guide implementation at the initial sites. The department's actions in these important areas are ongoing. Additional actions are in progress to address GAO's September 2018 recommendation that VA clearly define the role and responsibilities of the joint Department of Defense (DOD) and VA Interagency Program Office in the department's governance plans for the new electronic health record system. VA intends to continue maturing and fully establishing a program management organization and a program governance structure to track program progress.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is recommending that VA develop and implement a methodology for reliably identifying and reporting the total costs of VistA. VA agreed with the recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_951"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_952","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe nation's critical infrastructure includes cyber and physical assets and systems across 16 different sectors whose security and resilience are vital to the nation. The majority of critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector. Multiple federal entities, including DHS, work with infrastructure owners and operators to assess their risks.\nGAO was asked to review DHS's risk assessment practices for critical infrastructure. This report describes:(1) DHS's risk assessment practices in 3 of 16 critical infrastructure sectors and private sector representatives' views on the utility of this risk information, and (2) how this risk information influences DHS's strategic planning and private sector outreach.\nGAO selected 3 of 16 sectors\u2013Critical Manufacturing; Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste; and Transportation Systems\u2013to examine based on their varied regulatory structures and industries. GAO reviewed DHS guidance related to infrastructure protection, the QHSR and DHS Strategic Plan, and plans for the selected critical infrastructure sectors. GAO interviewed DHS officials responsible for critical infrastructure risk assessments, and the owner and operator representatives who serve as chairs and vice-chairs of coordinating councils for the 3 selected sectors. Information from the 3 sectors is not generalizable to all 16 sectors but provides insight into DHS's risk management practices.\nGAO provided a draft of this report to DHS and relevant excerpts to the council representatives interviewed during this review. Technical comments provided were incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Homeland Security (DHS) primarily conducts assessments for each of the three elements of risk\u2014threat, vulnerability, and consequence\u2014for critical infrastructures from the three sectors GAO reviewed\u2014Critical Manufacturing; Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste; and Transportation Systems. In limited circumstances, DHS generates risk assessments that both incorporate all three elements of risk and cover individual or multiple subsectors.\nThreat : DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis assesses threats\u2014natural or manmade occurrences, entities, or actions with the potential to cause harm, including terrorist attacks and cyberattacks\u2014and disseminates this information to critical infrastructure owners and operators. For example, the Transportation Security Administration provides threat intelligence to mass transit security directors and others through joint classified briefings.\nVulnerability : DHS officials provide various tools and work directly with owners and operators to assess asset and facility vulnerabilities\u2014physical features or operational attributes that render an asset open to exploitation, including gates, perimeter fences, and computer networks. For example, DHS officials conduct voluntary, asset-specific vulnerability assessments that focus on physical infrastructure during individual site visits.\nConsequence : DHS officials also assess consequence\u2014 the effect of occurrences like terrorist attacks or hurricanes resulting in losses that impact areas such as public health and safety, and the economy\u2014to better understand the effect of these disruptions on assets.\nThese assessments help critical infrastructure owners and operators take actions to improve security and mitigate risks. Six private sector representatives told GAO that threat information is the most useful type of risk information because it allows owners and operators to react immediately to improve their security posture. For example, one official from the Transportation Systems sector said that government threat information is credible and is critical in supporting security recommendations to company decision-makers.\nDHS uses the results of its risk assessments to inform the department's strategic planning and to guide outreach to infrastructure owners and operators. Critical infrastructure risk information is considered within DHS's strategic planning. Specifically, according to DHS officials, risk information informs the Department's Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR)\u2014a process that identifies DHS's critical homeland security missions and its strategy for meeting them. DHS also uses risk information to guide outreach to critical infrastructure owners and operators. For example, DHS officials annually prioritize the most critical assets and facilities nationwide and categorize them based on the severity of the estimated consequences of a significant disruption to the asset or facility. DHS officials then use the results to target their assessment outreach to the infrastructure owners and operators categorized as higher risk. DHS officials also told GAO that they use risk information after an incident, such as a natural disaster, to quickly identify and prioritize affected infrastructure owners and operators to help focus their response and recovery assistance outreach.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_952"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_953","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe federal government plans to invest almost $96 billion in IT in fiscal year 2018. Historically, these investments have too often failed, incurred cost overruns and schedule slippages, or contributed little to mission-related outcomes. In December 2014, Congress and the President enacted FITARA, aimed at improving covered agencies' acquisitions of IT. Further, in February 2015, GAO added improving the management of IT acquisitions and operations across government to its high-risk list.\nThis statement summarizes agencies' progress in improving the management of IT acquisitions and operations. Among others, GAO summarized its published reports on (1) data center consolidation, (2) incremental software development practices, (3) IT acquisitions, (4) IT workforce, and (5) legacy IT.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and federal agencies have taken steps to improve the management of information technology (IT) acquisitions and operations through a series of initiatives, to include (1) data center consolidation, (2) implementation of incremental development practices, (3) approval of IT acquisitions, (4) implementation of key IT workforce practices, and (5) addressing aging legacy IT systems. As of March 2018, the agencies had fully implemented about 59 percent of the approximately 800 related recommendations that GAO made during fiscal years 2010 through 2015. However, important additional actions are needed.\nConsolidating data centers . OMB launched an initiative in 2010 to reduce data centers, which was codified and expanded by a law commonly referred to as the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA). GAO has since noted that, while this initiative could potentially save the government billions of dollars, weaknesses exist in areas such as optimization and OMB's reporting on related cost savings. Accordingly, GAO has made 160 recommendations to OMB and agencies to improve the initiative; however, about half of GAO's recommendations have not yet been implemented.\nImplementing incremental development . OMB has emphasized the need for agencies to deliver investments in smaller increments to reduce risk and deliver capabilities more quickly. Further, GAO has issued reports highlighting actions needed by OMB and agencies to improve their implementation of incremental development. In these reports, GAO made 42 related recommendations, but the majority of GAO's recommendations have not yet been addressed.\nApproval of IT acquisitions . OMB's FITARA implementation guidance required covered agencies' chief information officers (CIO) to review and approve IT acquisition plans. In January 2018, GAO reported that many agencies' CIOs were not reviewing and approving acquisition plans, as required by OMB. GAO made 39 recommendations to improve the review and approval of IT acquisitions, but they have not yet been implemented by the agencies.\nImplementation of key IT workforce practices . Effective IT workforce planning can help agencies improve their ability to acquire IT. In November 2016, GAO reported on agencies' IT workforce planning activities. GAO noted that five selected agencies had not fully implemented key workforce planning activities and recommended that they do so, but the agencies have not yet addressed the recommendations.\nAddressing aging legacy IT systems. Legacy IT investments across the federal government are becoming increasingly obsolete and consuming an increasing amount of IT dollars. In May 2016, GAO reported that many agencies were using systems which had components that were, in some cases, at least 50 years old. GAO noted, however, that several agencies did not have specific plans with time frames to modernize or replace these investments. GAO recommended that 12 agencies plan to modernize or replace legacy systems; all of which have not yet been implemented.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nFrom fiscal years 2010 through 2015, GAO made about 800 recommendations to OMB and federal agencies to address shortcomings in IT acquisitions and operations. Among other recommendations, GAO made recommendations to improve the oversight and execution of the data center consolidation initiative, incremental development policies, the review and approval of IT acquisitions, implementation of key workforce planning activities, and aging federal IT systems. Most agencies agreed with GAO's recommendations. In addition, from fiscal year 2016 to present, GAO has made more than 200 new recommendations in this area. GAO will continue to monitor agencies' implementation of these recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_953"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_954","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nTechnology companies are a major source of high-paying U.S. jobs, but some have questioned the sector's commitment to equal employment opportunity. EEOC provides federal oversight of nondiscrimination requirements by investigating charges of discrimination, and OFCCP enforces federal contractors' compliance with affirmative action requirements. GAO was asked to review workforce trends in the technology sector and federal oversight.\nThis report examines (1) trends in the gender, racial, and ethnic composition of the technology sector workforce; and (2) EEOC and OFCCP oversight of technology companies' compliance with equal employment and affirmative action requirements. GAO analyzed workforce data from the American Community Survey for 2005-2015 and EEOC Employer Information Reports for 2007-2015, the latest data available during our analysis. GAO analyzed OFCCP data on compliance evaluations for fiscal years 2011-2016. GAO interviewed agency officials, researchers, and workforce, industry, and company representatives.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe estimated percentage of minority technology workers increased from 2005 to 2015, but GAO found that no growth occurred for female and Black workers, whereas Asian and Hispanic workers made statistically significant increases (see figure). Further, female, Black, and Hispanic workers remain a smaller proportion of the technology workforce\u2014mathematics, computing, and engineering occupations\u2014compared to their representation in the general workforce. These groups have also been less represented among technology workers inside the technology sector than outside it. In contrast, Asian workers were more represented in these occupations than in the general workforce. Stakeholders and researchers GAO interviewed identified several factors that may have contributed to the lower representation of certain groups, such as fewer women and minorities graduating with technical degrees and company hiring and retention practices.\nBoth the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) have taken steps to enforce equal employment and affirmative action requirements in the technology sector, but face limitations. While EEOC has identified barriers to recruitment and hiring in the technology sector as a strategic priority, when EEOC conducts investigations, it does not systematically record the type of industry, therefore limiting sector-related analyses to help focus its efforts. EEOC has plans to determine how to add missing industry codes but has not set a timeframe to do this. In addition, OFCCP's regulations may hinder its ability to enforce contractors' compliance because OFCCP directs contractors to set placement goals for all minorities as a group rather than for specific racial\/ethnic groups. OFCCP also has not made changes to its establishment-based approach to selecting entities for review in decades, even though changes have occurred in how workplaces are structured. Without taking steps to address these issues, OFCCP may miss opportunities to hold contractors responsible for complying with affirmative action and nondiscrimination requirements.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO makes 6 recommendations, including that EEOC develop a timeline to improve industry data collection and OFCCP take steps toward requiring more specific minority placement goals by contractors and assess key aspects of its selection approach. EEOC neither agreed nor disagreed with its recommendation, and OFCCP stated the need for regulatory change to alter placement goal requirements. GAO continues to believe actions are needed, as discussed in the report.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_954"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_955","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nTo achieve Medicare DME savings, Congress required CMS to implement a CBP in certain geographic areas for certain DME items. Beginning in 2011, CMS began implementing the CBP in several phases. The agency estimates that the CBP will save the Medicare program $19.7 billion between 2013 and 2022.The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act required CMS to use CBP information to adjust fee-for-service payment rates for certain DME items in non-bid areas. On January 1, 2016, adjusted rates for 393 items went into effect in non-bid areas. CMS estimated these adjustments will save the Medicare program about $3.6 billion between fiscal years 2016 and 2020.\nGAO was asked to review the potential effects of reduced payment rates for DME in non-bid areas. In this report, GAO examines (1) payment rate reductions and any changes in the number of suppliers; (2) any changes in the utilization of rate-adjusted items; and (3) available evidence related to potential changes in beneficiaries' access to rate-adjusted items.\nGAO compared non-adjusted 2015 fee-for-service payment rates to adjusted 2016 and 2017 rates and reviewed Medicare claims data from 2010 through 2016. GAO also reviewed CMS's monitoring activities and interviewed CMS officials. In addition, GAO interviewed select beneficiary advocacy groups and DME industry trade organizations.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) implemented a competitive bidding program (CBP) for certain durable medical equipment (DME), such as wheelchairs and oxygen, in 2011 that is currently operating in 130 designated U.S. areas. On January 1, 2016, CMS used information from the CBP to start adjusting Medicare fee-for-service payment rates for certain DME throughout the country in areas that had previously not been subject to the CBP (known as non-bid areas). For the first year adjusted rates were in effect in non-bid areas, GAO found:\nReductions in payment rates were generally significant but varied by category of DME item. The unweighted average reduction in payment rates for the five rate-adjusted DME items with the highest expenditures in 2016 within each DME category was 46 percent.\nChanges in the number of suppliers furnishing rate-adjusted items were generally consistent with the years before adjusted rates went into effect. GAO found that the number of suppliers furnishing rate-adjusted items in non-bid areas in 2016 decreased 8 percent compared to 2015.\nGAO's review of Medicare claims data found that beneficiary utilization of rate-adjusted items in non-bid areas in 2016 showed little change compared to 2015. GAO also found that CMS's activities to monitor beneficiary access, including changes in health outcomes, showed little change between 2015 and 2016.\nGAO interviewed several stakeholder groups that reported anecdotal examples of specific beneficiary access concerns they attributed to the rate adjustments, but stakeholders could not provide evidence to substantiate that the access issues were widespread. GAO's findings are consistent with CMS's monitoring results, which indicate that there were no widespread effects on beneficiary access in the year after the adjusted rates went into effect. However, some effects may take longer to appear, underscoring the importance of CMS's continued monitoring activities.\nThe Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_955"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_956","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nMedicaid has grown by over 50 percent over the last decade, with about $370 billion in federal spending in fiscal year 2017. CMS is responsible for assuring that expenditures\u2014reported quarterly by states\u2014are consistent with Medicaid requirements and matched with the correct amount of federal funds. CMS's review of reported expenditures has become increasingly complex due to variation in states' Medicaid programs and an increasing number of different matching rates.\nGAO was asked to examine CMS's oversight of state-reported Medicaid expenditures. In this report, GAO examined how CMS assures that (1) expenditures are supported and consistent with requirements; and (2) the correct federal matching rates were applied to expenditures subject to a higher match. GAO also examined the financial impact of resolved errors. GAO reviewed documentation for the most recently completed quarterly reviews by 3 of CMS's 10 regional offices for six states that varied by Medicaid program expenditures and design. GAO also reviewed policies, procedures, and data on resolved errors; and interviewed CMS and state officials. GAO assessed CMS's oversight processes against federal standards for internal control.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), which oversees Medicaid, has various review processes in place to assure that expenditures reported by states are supported and consistent with Medicaid requirements. The agency also has processes to review that the correct federal matching rates were applied to expenditures receiving a higher than standard federal matching rate, which can include certain types of services and populations. These processes collectively have had a considerable federal financial benefit, with CMS resolving errors that reduced federal spending by over $5.1 billion in fiscal years 2014 through 2017.\nHowever, GAO identified weaknesses in how CMS targets its resources to address risks when reviewing whether expenditures are supported and consistent with requirements.\nCMS devotes similar levels of staff resources to review expenditures despite differing levels of risk across states. For example, the number of staff reviewing California's expenditures\u2014which represent 15 percent of federal Medicaid spending\u2014is similar to the number reviewing Arkansas' expenditures, which represents 1 percent of federal Medicaid spending.\nCMS cancelled in-depth financial management reviews in 17 out of 51 instances over the last 5 years. These reviews target expenditures considered by CMS to be at risk of not meeting program requirements.\nCMS told GAO that resource constraints contributed to both weaknesses. However, the agency has not completed a comprehensive assessment of risk to (1) determine whether oversight resources are adequate and (2) focus on the most significant areas of risk. Absent such an assessment, CMS is missing an opportunity to identify errors in reported expenditures that could result in substantial savings to the Medicaid program.\nGAO also found limitations in CMS's processes for reviewing expenditures that receive a higher federal matching rate.\nInternal guidance for examining variances in these expenditures was unclear, and not all reviewers in the three CMS regional offices GAO reviewed were investigating significant variances in quarter-to-quarter expenditures.\nReview procedures for expenditures for individuals newly eligible for Medicaid under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act were not tailored to different risk levels among states. For example, in its reviews of a sample of claims for this population, CMS reviewed claims for the same number of enrollees\u201430\u2014in California as for Arkansas, even though California had 10 times the number of newly eligible enrollees as Arkansas.\nWithout clear internal guidance and better targeting of risks in its review procedures for expenditures receiving higher matching rates, CMS may overpay states.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making three recommendations, including that CMS improve its risk-based targeting of oversight efforts and resources, and clarify related internal guidance. The Department of Health and Human Services concurred with these recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_956"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_957","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFTZs allow companies to reduce, eliminate, or defer duty payments on foreign goods imported into FTZs for distribution or as components of other products before transferring the finished goods into U.S. commerce or exporting them overseas. The value of foreign and domestic goods admitted to FTZs in 2016 exceeded $610 billion. Responsibilities of the Board, consisting of officials from the Departments of Commerce (Commerce) and the Treasury, include evaluating production notifications and applications on the basis of factors such as the proposed activity's net effect on the U.S. economy. Federal regulations set forth requirements, pursuant to the Foreign-Trade Zones Act of 1934, for these evaluations.\nGAO was asked to review the Board's evaluation processes. This report examines the extent to which the Board has established and followed procedures aligned with regulations for evaluating (1) notifications and (2) applications. GAO analyzed the Board's regulations and procedures and interviewed Commerce, Treasury, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials. GAO also analyzed a nongeneralizable sample of 59 of 293 notifications the Board evaluated from April 2012 through September 2017, which GAO selected to include a range of Board decisions and exclude pending decisions. GAO also analyzed all three applications the Board issued decisions on during that period.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe U.S. Foreign-Trade Zones Board (the Board) has procedures that generally align with its regulations for evaluating production notifications and followed these procedures for all 59 notifications GAO reviewed. Notifications are filed by companies proposing to bring foreign components into a foreign-trade zone (FTZ) for use in manufacturing finished products, among other purposes. GAO found, for example, that, following Board procedures, Board staff evaluating the notifications collected and considered comments from the general public, industry specialists, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection and recommended to the Board whether to authorize companies' proposed activities. Of the 59 notifications GAO reviewed for seven industry categories, 49 notifications either were approved or were approved with restrictions\u2014for example, the proposed activity was authorized for a limited time period or certain duty benefits were denied for one or more foreign components. Ten notifications were denied for reasons such as new or complex policy issues that required further review.\nThe Board also has procedures that generally align with its regulations for evaluating production applications and followed these procedures for the three applications GAO reviewed. The applications were submitted by three of the companies whose notifications were denied. According to Board staff, if a notification is not approved or is approved with restrictions, a company may submit an application with additional details. Following Board procedures, Board staff, for example, collected and considered comments and recommended to the Board whether to authorize the proposed activities. Two of the applications were approved with restrictions, and the third was not approved. While the regulations require consideration of a number of criteria\u2014for example, consistency with U.S. trade and tariff law\u2014Board staff did not document consideration of all required criteria for two of the three applications, and the procedures do not require such documentation. Board staff said they document only the most relevant criteria in their reports. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should document its rationale for determining a criterion is not relevant and make this documentation readily available for examination. Without such documentation, the Board lacks an institutional record that all required criteria were considered and also lacks assurance that its decisions comply with U.S. trade and tariff law and public policy.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nCommerce should require Board staff to document consideration of all criteria required in the regulations when evaluating production applications. Commerce concurred with this recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_957"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_958","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nHIPAA and its implementing regulations, as amended by the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, require health care providers to give patients, upon request, access to their medical records, which contain protected health information (i.e., diagnoses, billing information, medications, and test results). This right of access allows patients to obtain their records or have them forwarded to a person or entity of their choice\u2014such as another provider\u2014in a timely manner while being charged a reasonable, cost-based fee. Third parties, such as a lawyer or someone processing disability claims, may also request copies of a patient's medical records with permission from the patient.\nThe 21st Century Cures Act included a provision for GAO to study patient access to medical records. Among other things, this report describes (1) what is known about the fees for accessing patients' medical records and (2) challenges identified by patients and providers when patients request access to their medical records. GAO reviewed selected HIPAA requirements and implementing regulations and guidance, and relevant laws in four states selected in part because they established a range of fees associated with obtaining copies of medical records. GAO also interviewed four provider associations, seven vendors that work for providers, six patient advocates, state officials, and Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) officials. The information GAO obtained and its analysis of laws in the selected states are not generalizable. HHS provided technical comments on this report.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nAvailable information suggests that the fees charged for accessing medical records can vary depending on the type of request and the state in which the request is made. Under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and its implementing regulations, providers are authorized to charge a reasonable, cost-based fee when patients request copies of their medical records or request that their records be forwarded to another provider or entity. In the case of third-party requests, when a patient gives permission for another entity\u2014for example, an attorney\u2014to request copies of the patient's medical records, the fees are not subject to the reasonable cost-based standard and are generally governed by state law. According to stakeholders GAO interviewed, the fees for third-party requests are generally higher than the fees charged to patients and can vary significantly across states.\nThe four states GAO reviewed have state laws that vary in terms of the fees allowed for patient and third-party requests for medical records. For example, three of the states have per-page fee amounts for patient and third-party records requests. The amounts charged are based on the number of pages requested and vary across the three states.\nOne of the three states has established a different per-page fee amount for third-party requests. The other two do not authorize a different fee for patient and third-party requests.\nOne of the three states also specifies a maximum allowable fee if the provider uses an electronic health records system. The other two do not differentiate costs for electronic or paper records.\nIn the fourth state, state law entitles individuals to one free copy of their medical record. The statute allows a charge of up to $1 per page for additional copies.\nPatient advocates, provider associations, and other stakeholders GAO interviewed identified challenges that patients and providers face when patients request access to their medical records.\nPatients' challenges include incurring what they believe to be high fees when requesting medical records\u2014for example, when facing severe medical issues that have generated a high number of medical records. Additionally, not all patients are aware that they have a right to challenge providers who deny them access to their medical records.\nProviders' challenges include the costs of responding to patient requests for records due to the allocation of staff time and other resources. In addition, according to provider associations and others GAO interviewed, fulfilling requests for medical records has become more complex and challenging for providers, in part because providers may store this information in multiple electronic record systems or in a mix of paper and electronic records.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_958"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_959","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFEMA, an agency of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has obligated more than $36 billion in PA grants to state, local, and tribal governments to help communities recover and rebuild after major disasters since 2009. Further, costs are rising with disasters, such as Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017. FEMA recently redesigned how the PA program delivers assistance to state and local grantees to improve operations and address past challenges identified by GAO and others. FEMA tested the new delivery model in selected disasters and announced implementation in September 2017.\nGAO was asked to assess the redesigned PA program. This report examines, among other things, the extent to which FEMA's new delivery model addresses (1) past workforce management challenges and assesses future workforce needs; and (2) past information sharing challenges and key IT management controls. GAO reviewed FEMA policy, strategy, and implementation documents; interviewed FEMA and state officials, PA program applicants, and other stakeholders; and observed implementation of the new model at one test location following Hurricane Matthew in 2016.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) redesigned the Public Assistance (PA) grant program delivery model to address past challenges in workforce management, but has not fully assessed future workforce staffing needs. GAO and others have previously identified challenges related to shortages in experienced and trained FEMA PA staff and high turnover among these staff. These challenges often led to applicants receiving inconsistent guidance and to PA project delays. As part of its new model, FEMA is creating consolidated resource centers to standardize and centralize PA staff responsible for managing grant applications, and new specialized positions, such as hazard mitigation liaisons, program delivery managers, and site inspectors, to ensure more consistent guidance to applicants. However, FEMA has not assessed the workforce needed to fully implement the new model, such as the number of staff needed to fill certain new positions, or to achieve staffing goals for supporting hazard mitigation on PA projects. Fully assessing workforce needs will help to ensure that FEMA has the people and the skills needed to fully implement the new PA model and help to avoid the long-standing workforce challenges the program encountered in the past.\nFEMA designed a new PA information and case management system\u2014called the FEMA Applicant Case Tracker (FAC-Trax)\u2014to address past information sharing challenges, such as difficulties in sharing grant documentation among FEMA, state, and local officials and tracking the status of PA projects, but additional actions could better ensure effective implementation. Both FEMA and state officials involved in testing of the new model stated that the new information system allows them to better manage and track PA applications and documentation, which could lead to greater transparency and efficiencies in the program. Further, GAO found that this new system fully addresses two of four key information technology (IT) management controls\u2014project planning and risk management\u2014that are necessary to ensure systems work effectively and meet user needs. However, GAO found that FEMA has not fully addressed the other two controls\u2014requirements development and systems testing and integration. By better analyzing progress on high-level user requirements, for example, FEMA will have greater assurance that FAC-Trax will meet user needs and achieve the goals of the new delivery model.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making five recommendations, including that FEMA assess the workforce needed for the new delivery model and improve key IT management controls for its new information sharing and case management system, FAC-Trax. DHS concurred with all recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_959"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_960","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe nation's gas pipeline network moves about 74 billion cubic feet of combustible gas to homes and businesses daily. To alert the public of a gas leak before an explosion occurs, PHMSA has different requirements for odorizing gas. All gas transported by distribution pipelines throughout communities must be odorized. Gas transported across many miles by transmission pipelines is required to be odorized only in certain populated areas. There are no requirements to odorize gas in gathering pipelines. Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to review odor requirements for all pipelines.\nThis report presents the views of federal and state pipeline safety officials and industry and safety stakeholders on: (1) the advantages and disadvantages of odorizing combustible gases in pipelines; and (2) whether and how federal requirements for odorizing pipelines should be modified. GAO reviewed relevant regulations and reports; surveyed officials in 48 states and the District of Columbia; and interviewed PHMSA and NTSB officials. GAO also interviewed 34 stakeholders, including 14 experts identified by the National Academies, and 20 other industry and safety stakeholders.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nPipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) officials, state officials, and stakeholders GAO contacted cited safety as the main advantage to odorizing combustible gases in pipelines, primarily for distribution pipelines in densely populated areas (see figure). Specifically, adding a chemical with a distinctive odor to gas allows the public to generally detect leaks before an explosion can occur. The most frequently cited disadvantage was that commonly used sulfur-based odorants must be removed\u2014primarily from gas in transmission pipelines\u2014before the gas can be used in certain processes, such as producing fertilizer.\nWhile federal odorization requirements follow a risk-based approach by focusing on pipelines in populated areas, the officials and stakeholders GAO contacted disagreed on the need to modify these requirements for some pipelines. Specifically, because distribution pipelines run through populated areas, everyone GAO contacted generally agreed that these pipelines should be odorized for safety, as currently required. For gathering pipelines, the majority of officials and stakeholders did not see a need to modify regulations because these pipelines would be technically challenging to odorize and are primarily located in rural areas. However, about two-thirds of state officials and about half of stakeholders said that additional transmission pipelines should be odorized for public safety.\nConversely, officials from PHMSA and NTSB and about half of the stakeholders contacted noted that, because transmission pipelines operate at high pressure and generally rupture rather than leak, it is unlikely that odorant could mitigate risk. Instead, other required safety practices\u2014such as internal pipeline inspections\u2014can provide more preventative, risk-based safety management, according to PHMSA officials. In this regard, PHMSA officials said that they plan to strengthen risk-based safety requirements for transmission and gathering pipelines as part of on-going rulemakings. PHMSA anticipates issuing these rules in 2019.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_960"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_961","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nIRS estimates that fraudsters attempted at least $14.5 billion in IDT tax refund fraud in tax year 2015. Since 2015, GAO's High-Risk List has included IRS's efforts to address IDT refund fraud. Starting with its March 2015 Security Summit, IRS has partnered with state tax administrators and tax preparation companies, among others, on initiatives aimed at better preventing and detecting IDT refund fraud.\nGAO was asked to examine IRS's efforts to collaborate with these partners. This report, among other things, (1) describes actions taken to implement the ISAC and RRT, (2) evaluates the extent to which the ISAC pilot aligns with leading practices for pilot design, and (3) identifies actions, if any, that IRS could take to improve the ISAC pilot.\nGAO reviewed planning and other documents on the initiatives. It interviewed IRS and state officials and industry and trade organization representatives, among others involved in the ISAC and RRT. GAO also conducted four non-generalizable focus groups with state and industry partners.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Internal Revenue Service (IRS) launched an Identity Theft Tax Refund Fraud Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) pilot for the 2017 filing season. It aims to allow IRS, states, and tax preparation industry partners to quickly share information on identity theft (IDT) refund fraud. The ISAC pilot includes two components: an online platform run by IRS to communicate data on suspected fraud, and an ISAC Partnership, a collaborative organization comprised of IRS, states, and industry, which is intended to be the governance structure. As of November 2017, the ISAC had 48 members: 31 states (including full members and those receiving alerts only), 14 tax preparation companies, and 3 financial institutions. In addition, IRS is using a Rapid Response Team (RRT) in partnership with states and industry members to coordinate responses to IDT refund fraud incidents that pose a significant threat within 24 to 72 hours of being discovered. IRS deployed the RRT for six incidents in 2016 and once in 2017.\nGAO found that the ISAC pilot aligns with key aspects of all five leading practices for effective pilot design GAO previously identified, but none fully. For example, IRS has worked to incorporate stakeholder input, but its message about the ISAC's benefits has not fully reached states. Further, IRS does not have criteria for assessing whether the pilot's objectives have been met. Without this assessment and better alignment with leading practices, IRS, its partners, and Congress will have difficulty determining the effectiveness of the pilot and whether to implement it more broadly.\nIRS has taken actions to improve the ISAC pilot, but the ISAC Partnership does not have an outreach plan. While the ISAC Senior Executive Board limited industry participation to partners who participated in its Security Summit, the ISAC has obtained support from trade organizations. However, officials from almost all states represented in our focus groups noted that they either had not used, or were unfamiliar with, the ISAC-specific resources. While the ISAC Board has taken steps to engage stakeholders, the ISAC Partnership does not have an outreach plan to increase membership and improve states' and industry partners' understanding of the ISAC's benefits. Without such a plan, less effective collaboration is likely among stakeholders and opportunities to prevent IDT refund fraud may be missed.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends IRS ensure (1) the ISAC better aligns with leading practices for effective pilot design, and (2) the ISAC Partnership develops an outreach plan to expand membership and improve understanding of the ISAC's benefits. IRS and the ISAC Board state and industry co-chairs agreed with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_961"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_962","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCongress recognizes the harmful effects of permitting delays on infrastructure projects and has passed legislation to streamline project reviews and hold agencies accountable. For example, in 2015 Congress passed the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act, which included provisions streamlining the permitting process. Federal agencies, including the Department of the Interior and FERC, play a critical role by reviewing energy infrastructure projects to ensure they comply with federal statutes and regulations.\nThis testimony discusses factors GAO found that can affect energy infrastructure permitting timeliness and efficiency. To do this work, GAO drew on reports issued from July 2012 to December 2017. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and policies; reviewed and analyzed federal data; and interviewed tribal, federal, state and industry officials, among others.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nGAO's prior work has found that the timeliness and efficiency of permit reviews may be affected by a range of factors. For the purposes of this testimony, GAO categorized these factors into five categories.\nCoordination and Communication. GAO found that better coordination between agencies and applicants is a factor that could result in more efficient permitting. Coordination practices that agencies can use to streamline the permitting process include the following:\nDesignating a Lead Coordinating Agency . GAO found having a lead agency to coordinate the efforts of federal, state, and local stakeholders is beneficial to permitting processes. For example, in a February 2013 report on natural gas pipeline permitting, industry representatives and public interest groups told GAO that the interstate process was more efficient than the intrastate process because in the interstate process the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) was lead agency for the environmental review.\nEstablishing Coordinating Agreements among Agencies . In the February 2013 report, GAO reported that FERC and nine other agencies signed an interagency agreement for early coordination of required environmental and historic preservation reviews to encourage the timely development of pipeline projects.\nHuman Capital. Agency and industry representatives cited human capital factors as affecting the length of permitting reviews. Such factors include having a sufficient number of experts to review applications. GAO reported in November 2016 on long-standing workforce challenges at the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), such as inadequate staff resources and staff at some offices without the skills to effectively conduct such reviews. GAO recommended that Interior incorporate effective workforce planning standards by assessing critical skills and competencies needed to fulfill its responsibilities related to energy development. Interior agreed with this recommendation, and BIA stated that its goal is to develop such standards by the end of fiscal year 2018.\nCollecting and Analyzing Accurate Milestone Information. GAO's work has shown that a factor that hinders efficiency and timeliness is that agencies often do not track when permitting milestones are achieved, such as the date a project application is submitted or receives final agency approval. Having quality information on permitting milestones can help agencies better analyze process deficiencies and implement improvements.\nIncomplete Applications. Agency officials and agency documents cited incomplete applications as affecting the duration of reviews. For example, in a 2014 budget document, BLM reported that\u2014due to personnel turnover in the oil and gas industry\u2014operators were submitting inconsistent and incomplete applications for drilling permits, delaying permit approvals.\nSignificant Policy Changes. Policy changes unrelated to permitting can affect permitting time frames. For example, after the 2010 Deepwater Horizon incident and oil spill, Interior issued new safety requirements for offshore drilling. GAO found that review times for offshore oil and gas drilling permits increased after these safety requirements were implemented.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO has made numerous recommendations about ways to improve energy infrastructure permitting processes. Federal agencies have implemented a number of GAO's recommendations and taken steps to implement more efficient permitting, but several of GAO's recommendations remain open, presenting opportunities to continue to improve permitting processes.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_962"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_963","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFor decades, Energy, its predecessor agencies, and contractors employed thousands of employees in hazardous work in nuclear weapons production, exposing many employees to toxic substances. The Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program, administered by DOL, provides compensation for illnesses linked to exposures. Since 2004, DOL has provided about $4.4 billion to eligible employees and their survivors.\nGAO was asked to review aspects of the claims process for contracted employees. GAO examined (1) the number and outcome of compensation claims for illnesses resulting from exposure to toxins that DOL has reopened since 2012, and (2) the Advisory Board's advice to DOL on the scientific soundness of its database on toxins and illnesses, and DOL's responses. GAO analyzed DOL claims data for 2012\u2014when a new data system was introduced\u2014 through 2017 and assessed their reliability. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and DOL procedures, and Advisory Board documents and interviewed DOL officials, Advisory Board members, experts, and a claimant advocate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Labor (DOL), from 2012 through 2017, reopened more than 7,000 compensation claims by contracted workers with illnesses resulting from exposure to toxins at Department of Energy (Energy) worksites. Of these reopened claims, 69 percent were approved for compensation (see figure). Claims can be reopened for various reasons, including new information on toxic substances and associated illnesses or new evidence provided by a claimant. According to DOL's Office of the Ombudsman officials, some claims may have been denied as a result of claimants not understanding the evidence required to support their claim. Moreover, the Ombudsman's two most recent reports in 2015 and 2016 found DOL's letters to claimants requesting additional evidence or informing them of the final decision did not clearly explain the specific evidence needed or why previously submitted evidence was deemed insufficient. GAO's previous work also found deficiencies in the quality of a sample of DOL's written communication with claimants. DOL has provided training to claims examiners on how to write clearly in correspondence and plans to assess the training. The assessment is an opportunity for DOL to better understand why some claimants remain confused about needed evidence and could help DOL target its training resources more effectively.\nThe Advisory Board on Toxic Substances and Worker Health (Advisory Board) recommended in 2016 and 2018 that DOL incorporate additional sources of information on toxic substances and associated illnesses into the database it uses to help determine eligibility for claims compensation. While DOL noted that certain additional data sources might be useful, it has not added all of the recommended data sources. The Advisory Board was created to provide technical advice to DOL on its database, among other things.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DOL ensure any assessment of its staff training efforts considers claimants' challenges with understanding DOL's communications on evidence for claims. DOL neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendation except to note that it plans to focus its training on such topics as quality of written communications and assess its training efforts.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_963"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_964","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nDeveloping independently capable ANDSF is a key component of U.S. and coalition efforts to create sustainable security and stability in Afghanistan under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Resolute Support mission. The United States is the largest contributor of funding and personnel to Resolute Support, providing and maintaining ANDSF equipment, along with training, advising, and assistance to help the ANDSF effectively use and sustain the equipment in the future.\nHouse Report 114-537 included a provision for GAO to review the ANDSF's capability and capacity to operate and sustain U.S.-purchased weapon systems and equipment. This report addresses (1) what has been reported about ANDSF capabilities and capability gaps and (2) the extent to which DOD has information about the ANDSF's ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed DOD and NATO reports and documents, examined three critical equipment types, and interviewed DOD officials in the United States and Afghanistan.\nThis is a public version of a sensitive report issued in September 2018. Information that DOD deemed sensitive has been omitted.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nSince the Resolute Support mission began in 2015, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) have improved some fundamental capabilities, such as high-level operational planning, but continue to rely on U.S. and coalition support to fill several key capability gaps, according to Department of Defense (DOD) reporting. DOD has initiatives to address some ANDSF capability gaps, such as a country-wide vehicle maintenance and training effort, but DOD reports it does not expect the ANDSF to develop and sustain independent capabilities in some areas, such as logistics, for several years.\nWhile DOD has firsthand information on the abilities of the Afghan Air Force and Special Security Forces to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment, it has little reliable information on the equipment proficiency of conventional ANDSF units. U.S. and coalition advisors are embedded at the tactical level for the Air Force and Special Security Forces, enabling DOD to directly assess those forces' abilities. However, the advisors have little direct contact with conventional ANDSF units on the front lines. As a result, DOD relies on those units' self-assessments of tactical abilities, which, according to DOD officials, can be unreliable.\nGAO's analysis of three critical equipment types illustrated the varying degrees of DOD's information (see figure above). For example, DOD provided detailed information about the Air Force's ability to operate and maintain MD-530 helicopters and the Special Security Forces' ability to operate and maintain Mobile Strike Force Vehicles; however, DOD had limited information about how conventional forces operate and maintain radios and Mobile Strike Force Vehicles. DOD's lack of reliable information on conventional forces' equipment operations and maintenance abilities adds to the uncertainty and risk in assessing the progress of DOD efforts in Afghanistan.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that DOD develop options for collecting reliable information on conventional ANDSF units' ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment. DOD concurred with this recommendation.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_964"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_965","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nTo secure the southwest border between ports of entry, Border Patrol uses approximately 5,200 miles of roads, most of which are owned by other entities, both private and public. CBP estimates spending $12.5 million in fiscal year 2016 to maintain and repair roads Border Patrol uses for its operations, including roads CBP does not own.\nGAO was asked to review Border Patrol's use and maintenance of roads for its border security operations. This report examines the extent to which (1) CBP has processes and authorities to access and maintain roads for its security operations and (2) CBP's operations are affected by its use of public roads it cannot maintain, and options CBP could consider to address any needed maintenance. GAO selected three southwest border sectors to visit based on the sectors' total mileage of non-owned roads and number of apprehensions of illegal border crossers. GAO interviewed officials from Border Patrol, and from selected federal, state, local, tribal, and private and community organizations. The information collected from these entities is not generalizable, but provides valuable insights.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nU.S. Border Patrol, within the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), generally has access to public roads and has certain processes and authorities to use other federal, state, local, tribal, and private owned roads for its operations. CBP may enter into arrangements or agreements to address maintenance of certain federal, state, local, and private roads, but CBP has not consistently documented these arrangements, or shared them with all relevant Border Patrol sector officials. This could hinder maintenance efforts and, therefore, Border Patrol's access to the roads. Six of the nine southwest Border Patrol sectors reported that they do not document all road maintenance arrangements and agreements. Developing a policy and guidance for documenting maintenance arrangements and agreements, as needed, could help all sectors more consistently work with landowners to address road maintenance. CBP has two categories for the roads it maintains: (1) roads that CBP owns and has a right to maintain (owned operational roads) and (2) roads that CBP does not own, but may maintain through a license or permit (non-owned operational roads). Border Patrol has established a process for prioritizing maintenance of owned operational roads, but it has not clearly documented the process and criteria for non-owned operational roads, or shared this information with sector officials. Moreover, no sector official GAO spoke with reported being aware of the process and criteria. By clearly documenting and communicating the process and criteria it uses to prioritize non-owned operational roads, Border Patrol could enable sectors to more adequately plan for and better anticipate funding to meet road maintenance needs.\nBorder Patrol sector officials reported negative effects from using public roads in poor condition that they cannot maintain, such as limited road access and poor relations with local governments and border communities that attribute the poor road conditions to Border Patrol's regular use. However, the full extent of these effects is unknown due to lack of data on Border Patrol's use of non-owned roads. While CBP officials discussed options for addressing maintenance of non-federal public roads, including a specific appropriation or a grant program, it has not assessed the feasibility of these or other options. Assessing the feasibility of options, including a review of data needed to show Border Patrol's reliance on non-owned roads, including public roads, could lead to a possible solution for enhancing Border Patrol's operations and its community relationships.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that CBP develop policy and guidance for documenting arrangements with landowners, as needed, and share the arrangements with its sectors; document and communicate the process and criteria for prioritizing funding of non-owned operational roads; and assess the feasibility of options, including data needs, for addressing the maintenance of non-federal public roads. DHS concurred with the recommendations.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_965"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_966","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe Caribbean region, which shares geographic proximity and common interests with the United States, faces high rates of crime and violence. In 2010, the United States and Caribbean countries formally launched CBSI, which aims to increase citizen safety. GAO was asked to examine U.S. assistance through CBSI. This report (1) discusses U.S. funding for CBSI activities, (2) examines the extent to which there is a planning and reporting process for CBSI, and (3) examines the extent to which State and USAID have established objectives and performance indicators to measure progress of their CBSI activities. GAO analyzed State and USAID data; assessed government strategies and performance reports; selected a non-generalizable sample of 25 CBSI activities and analyzed State and USAID documentation related to those activities; interviewed relevant officials; and conducted fieldwork in Barbados, Dominican Republic, and Jamaica, which are the countries generally receiving the most CBSI funding.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nU.S. agencies have allocated more than $560 million for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) from fiscal years 2010 through 2018 for activities related to the three pillars of CBSI\u2014reduce illicit trafficking (such as in narcotics and firearms), improve public safety and security, and promote social justice. For example, State Department's (State) Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has ongoing activities such as advisory programs and equipment procurements, while the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has activities aimed at increasing economic opportunities for at-risk youth and improving the skills of prosecutors.\nThe U.S. government has undertaken some planning and reporting of CBSI activities, but State has not created an initiative-wide planning and reporting mechanism. Agencies individually set strategic goals and priorities with CBSI countries and plan and report on their CBSI activities on a country-specific basis. However, State has not created an initiative-wide planning and reporting mechanism that facilitates interagency coordination or establishes consistent performance indicators across agencies, countries, and activities\u2014key elements for effectively aligning foreign assistance strategies. Without such a planning and reporting mechanism, overall progress of the initiative cannot be assessed.\nState and USAID have established objectives and performance indicators for selected CBSI activities, and INL is taking steps to improve identified weaknesses in its program monitoring. State and USAID had established objectives and performance indicators for the 25 activities in our sample. However, INL cannot ensure the reliability of its program monitoring data because collection and maintenance of this data is conducted differently in each country and there is no centralized data storage system. INL recently contracted to improve and standardize its program monitoring data for Western Hemisphere activities, but according to INL officials, data challenges remain\u2014in particular, how to collect standardized data from each of the embassies and how to build a data management system that is compatible with State requirements. Without reliable data, INL may continue to struggle with program monitoring of CBSI activities.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO recommends that State (1) create an initiative-wide planning and reporting mechanism for CBSI that includes the ability to monitor, evaluate, and report the results of collaborative efforts, and (2) ensure that INL develops and implements a data management system for centrally collecting reliable CBSI data. State agreed with the recommendations, noting that it plans to develop an updated Results Framework for initiative-wide planning and reporting and to improve centralized data collection through an enhanced data management system.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_966"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_967","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nThe U.S. workforce force has become increasingly diverse and is projected to become even more diverse in the coming decades. As a result, many private sector organizations have recognized the importance of recruiting and retaining minorities and women for key positions to improve their business or organizational performance and help them better meet the needs of a diverse customer base. The financial services industry is a major source of employment in the United States and affects the economic well-being of its customers. However, questions remain about diversity in the financial services industry, which provides services that help families build wealth and are essential to economic growth.\nGAO was asked to analyze diversity trends in the financial services industry, particularly in management positions. This report examines (1) trends in management-level diversity in the financial services industry from 2007 through 2015, (2) trends in diversity among potential talent pools, and (3) challenges financial services firms identified in trying to increase workforce diversity and practices firms used to address them.\nGAO analyzed data from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Department of Education. The most recent available data were from 2015. GAO also reviewed studies on workforce diversity and interviewed representatives from financial services firms and organizations that advocate for the financial services industry, women, or minorities. EEOC provided technical comments on a draft of this report that GAO incorporated as appropriate.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nOverall representation of minorities in first-, mid-, and senior-level management positions in the financial services industry increased from about 17 percent to 21 percent from 2007 through 2015. However, as shown in the figure below representation varied by race\/ethnicity group and management level. Specifically, representation of African-Americans at various management levels decreased while representation of other minorities increased during this period. Overall representation of women was generally unchanged during this period. Representation of women among first- and mid-level managers remained around 48 percent and senior-level managers remained about 29 percent from 2007 through 2015.\nPotential employees for the financial services industry, including those that could become managers, come from external and internal pools. For example, the external pool includes those with undergraduate or graduate degrees, such as a Master of Business Administration. In 2015, about 33 percent of the external pool included minorities and around 60 percent were women. The internal talent pool for potential managers in financial services includes those already in professional positions. In 2015, nearly 28 percent of professional positions in financial services were held by minorities and just over 51 percent were held by women.\nResearch, financial services firm representatives, and financial industry stakeholders described challenges to recruiting and retaining members of racial\/ethnic minority groups and women and practices that could help address these challenges, including recruiting from a wider variety of schools. Firm representatives said that it is important for firms to assess firm-level data on diversity and inclusiveness. However, firm representatives and other stakeholders differed in their views on whether firm-level diversity data should be made public. For example, one stakeholder stated that sharing diversity data publicly would create incentives for improvement. However, a firm representative said that for firms that are not diverse, making employee diversity data public could make improvement of workforce diversity more difficult for them.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_967"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_968","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nCongress has authorized federal agencies to collect hundreds of billions of dollars annually in fees, fines, and penalties. These collections can fund a variety of programs, including programs related to national security, and the protection of natural resources. Data on collections are important for congressional oversight and to provide transparency in agencies' use of federal resources.\nGAO was asked to review the availability of government-wide data on fees, fines, and penalties. This report examines (1) the extent to which data on collections of fees, fines, and penalties are publically available and useful for the purpose of congressional oversight; and (2) the benefits and challenges to government-wide reporting of fees, fines, and penalties. GAO assessed government-wide fee, fine, and penalty data against criteria for availability and usefulness based on multiple sources, including prior GAO work and input from staff of selected congressional committees. GAO interviewed OMB staff, Treasury officials, and representatives of organizations with expertise in federal budget issues and reviewed prior GAO work to identify benefits and challenges of reporting these data.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThere are no comprehensive, government-wide data at the level of detail that identifies specific fees, fines, or penalties. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) report data that include these collections at the budget account level, which generally covers a set of agency activities or programs. OMB and Treasury also report some summary data for budgeting and financial management purposes. In the Budget of the U.S. Government , for example, OMB data showed government-wide fees totaled just over $335 billion in fiscal year 2017. These reports, however, are not designed to inventory or analyze fee, fine, or penalty collections and have significant limitations for that purpose.\nAlthough OMB collects more disaggregated data on fees, fines, and penalties, it does not make the data publicly available. OMB uses the disaggregated data in its OMB MAX database\u2014such as the agency and account\u2014to compile reported totals, such as the government-wide fees total in the Budget of the U.S. Government . Until OMB makes more disaggregated data publicly available, Congress has limited information on collections by agency to inform oversight and decision-making.\nOMB's government-wide total of fees includes collections that are not fees and excludes some fee collections. The total includes all collections for accounts in which fees make up at least half of the account's collections and excludes all others. OMB does not direct agencies to regularly review and update the accounts included in the total. Therefore, if accounts' makeups change such that fee collections drop below, or rise above, the 50 percent threshold, accounts may have incorrect fee designations and the total may be inaccurate.\nFurther, OMB does not disclose the limitation that the total may exclude some fees and include other collections that are not fees. As a result, some users of the data are likely unaware of the potential for the total fees to be overestimated or underestimated.\nFurther, no source of government-wide data consistently reports data elements on fees, fines, and penalties that could help inform congressional oversight. Generally, congressional staff told us that additional data, such as amounts of specific penalties, would increase transparency and facilitate oversight. These data could help Congress identify trends in collections and significant changes that could be an indication of an agency's performance. While reporting government-wide fee, fine, and penalty data provides benefits, there are trade-offs in terms of the time and federal resources it would take to develop and implement a process for agencies to report these data. The level of federal investment would vary depending on factors, such as the number of data elements included and the level of detail reported. Developing a comprehensive and accessible data source would provide greater benefits, but would likely be resource intensive. Alternatively, incorporating a small number of data elements that Congress identifies as most useful for oversight into ongoing government-wide reporting efforts could incrementally improve transparency and information for oversight and decision-making, with fewer resources.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making four recommendations to enhance OMB reporting on fees, fines, and penalties, including making disaggregated data publically available, updating instructions to federal agencies to review accounts designated as containing fees, and disclosing limitations in data reported. OMB did not provide comments.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_968"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_969","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nFSA administers billions of dollars in student financial aid, including loans and grants, to eligible college students. The processing of student aid is complex, and FSA relies on non-school partners to carry out various activities supporting the student aid process, such as loan repayment and collection.\nGAO was asked to review how FSA ensures the protection of PII by its non-school partners. The objectives of this review were to (1) describe the roles of non-school partners and the types of PII shared with them and (2) assess the extent to which FSA policies and procedures for overseeing the non-school partners' protection of student aid data adhere to federal requirements, guidance, and best practices.\nTo address these objectives, GAO collected and reviewed FSA documentation, reports, policies, and procedures and compared FSA policies and procedures to four key practices included in federal guidance for overseeing the protection of PII by non-federal entities. GAO also interviewed FSA officials with responsibility for the oversight of non-school partners.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Education's Office of Federal Student Aid (FSA) partners with various entities (\u201cnon-school partners\u201d) that are involved primarily in supporting the repayment and collection of student loans.\nFederal loan servicers are responsible for collecting payments on loans and providing customer service to borrowers on behalf of the Department of Education through its Direct Loan program.\nPrivate collection agencies collect on loans that are in default and work with borrowers to help them get out of default.\nGuaranty agencies insure lenders against loss due to borrower default and carry out a variety of loan administration activities.\nFederal Family Education Loan lenders are non-federal lenders, such as banks, credit unions, or other lending institutions, that made loans to students in the past and continue to service these loans.\nFSA shares a variety of personally identifiable information (PII) on borrowers with its non-school partners. This includes names, addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, Social Security numbers, and financial information.\nKey practices for overseeing the protection of PII shared with non-federal entities include requiring (1) risk-based security and privacy controls, (2) independent assessments to ensure controls are effectively implemented, (3) corrective actions to address identified weaknesses in controls, and (4) ongoing monitoring of control status. FSA established oversight policies and procedures for loan servicers and private collection agencies that generally address these key practices. However, FSA exercises minimal oversight of lenders' protection of student data (see table).\nFSA officials maintain that the lenders are subject to other legal and regulatory requirements for protecting customer data. However, FSA does not have a process for ensuring lenders are complying with these requirements, and thus lacks assurance that appropriate risk-based safeguards are being effectively implemented, tested, and monitored.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO is making six recommendations to FSA to ensure that its oversight of non-school partners addresses the four key practices for ensuring the protection of PII. FSA concurred with three of the recommendations, partially concurred with two, and did not concur with one. It also described actions planned or under way to implement four of the recommendations. GAO maintains that all of its recommendations are warranted.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_969"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_970","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nLead paint in housing is the most common source of lead exposure for U.S. children. HUD awards grants to state and local governments to reduce lead paint hazards in housing and oversees compliance with lead paint regulations in its rental assistance programs. The 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Joint Explanatory Statement, includes a provision that GAO review HUD\u2019s efforts to address lead paint hazards. This report examines HUD\u2019s efforts to (1) incorporate statutory requirements and other relevant federal standards in its lead grant programs, (2) monitor and enforce compliance with lead paint regulations in its rental assistance programs, (3) adopt federal health guidelines and environmental standards for its lead grant and rental assistance programs, and (4) measure and report on the performance of its lead efforts. GAO reviewed HUD documents and data related to its grant programs, compliance efforts, performance measures, and reporting. GAO also interviewed HUD staff and some grantees.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Housing and Urban Development\u2019s (HUD) lead grant and rental assistance programs have taken steps to address lead paint hazards, but opportunities exist for improvement. For example, in 2016, HUD began using new tools to monitor how public housing agencies comply with lead paint regulations. However, HUD could further improve efforts in the following areas:\nLead grant programs. While its recent grant award processes incorporate statutory requirements on applicant eligibility and selection criteria, HUD has not fully documented or evaluated these processes. For example, HUD\u2019s guidance is not sufficiently detailed to ensure consistent and appropriate grant award decisions. Better documentation and evaluation of HUD\u2019s grant program processes could help ensure that lead grants reach areas at risk of lead paint hazards. Further, HUD has not developed specific time frames for using available local-level data to better identify areas of the country at risk for lead paint hazards, which could help HUD target its limited resources.\nOversight. HUD does not have a plan to mitigate and address risks related to noncompliance with lead paint regulations by public housing agencies. We identified several limitations with HUD\u2019s monitoring efforts, including reliance on public housing agencies\u2019 self-certifying compliance with lead paint regulations and challenges identifying children with elevated blood lead levels. Additionally, HUD lacks detailed procedures for addressing noncompliance consistently and in a timely manner. Developing a plan and detailed procedures to address noncompliance with lead paint regulations could strengthen HUD\u2019s oversight of public housing agencies.\nInspections. The lead inspection standard for the Housing Choice Voucher program is less strict than that of the public housing program. By requesting and obtaining statutory authority to amend the standard for the voucher program, HUD would be positioned to take steps to better protect children in voucher units from lead exposure as indicated by analysis of benefits and costs.\nPerformance assessment and reporting. HUD lacks comprehensive goals and performance measures for its lead reduction efforts. In addition, it has not complied with annual statutory reporting requirements, last reporting as required on its lead efforts in 1997. Without better performance assessment and reporting, HUD cannot fully assess the effectiveness of its lead efforts.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nGAO makes nine recommendations to HUD including to improve lead grant program and compliance monitoring processes, request authority to amend its lead inspection standard in the voucher program, and take additional steps to report on progress. HUD generally agreed with eight of the recommendations. HUD disagreed that it should request authority to use a specific, stricter inspection standard. GAO revised this recommendation to allow HUD greater flexibility to amend its current inspection standard as indicated by analysis of the benefits and costs.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_970"],"dataset":"gov_report"}
+{"qid":"gov_report_Query_971","query":"Why GAO Did This Study\n\nVA's disability compensation program pays cash benefits to veterans with disabilities connected to their military service. In recent years, the number of appeals of VA's benefit decisions has been rising. For decisions made on appeal in fiscal year 2017, veterans waited an average of 3 years for resolution by either VBA or the Board, and 7 years for resolution by the Board. The Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017 makes changes to VA's current (legacy) appeals process, giving veterans new options to have their claims further reviewed by VBA or appeal directly to the Board. The Act requires VA to submit to Congress and GAO a plan for implementing a new appeals process, and includes a provision for GAO to assess VA's plan.\nThis testimony focuses on the extent to which VA's plan: (1) addresses the required elements in the Act, and (2) reflects sound planning practices identified in prior GAO work. GAO's work entailed reviewing and assessing VA's appeals plan and related documents against sound planning practices, and soliciting VA's views on GAO's assessments.\n\nWhat GAO Found\n\nThe Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) plan for implementing a new disability appeals process while attending to appeals in the current process addresses most, but not all, elements required by the Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017 (Act). VA's appeals plan addresses 17 of 22 required elements, partially addresses 4, and does not address 1. For example, not addressed is the required element to include the resources needed by the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) and the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) to implement the new appeals process and address legacy appeals under the current process. VA needs this information to certify, as specified under the Act, that it has sufficient resources to implement appeals reform and make timely appeals decisions under the new and legacy processes.\nVA's appeals plan reflects certain sound planning practices, but it could benefit from including important details in several key planning areas:\nPerformance measurement : VA's plan reflects steps taken to track performance, but could articulate a more complete and balanced set of goals and measures for monitoring and assessing performance on a range of dimensions of success. Specifically, the plan reports that VA is developing a process to track timeliness of the new and legacy processes. However, contrary to sound planning practices, the plan does not include timeliness goals for all five appeals options available to veterans, does not include goals or measures for additional aspects of performance (such as accuracy or cost), and does not explain how VA will monitor or assess the new process compared to the legacy process. Unless VA clearly articulates a complete and balanced set of goals and measures, it could inadvertently incentivize staff to focus on certain aspects of appeals performance over others or fail to improve overall service to veterans.\nProject management : VA's plan includes a master schedule for implementing the new appeals plan; however, this schedule falls short of sound practices because it does not include key planned activities\u2014such as its pilot test of two of the five appeals options. In addition, the schedule does not reflect other sound practices for guiding implementation and establishing accountability\u2014such as articulating interim goals and needed resources for, and interdependencies among, activities. Unless VA augments its master schedule to include all key activities and reflect sound practices, VA may be unable to provide reasonable assurance that it has the essential program management information needed for this complex and important effort.\nRisk assessment : VA has taken steps to assess and mitigate some risks related to appeals reform by, for example, pilot testing two of the five appeals options through its Rapid Appeals Modernization Program (RAMP). However, as designed, RAMP does not include key features of a well-developed and documented pilot test. For example, VA has not articulated how it will assess RAMP before proceeding with full implementation. In addition, RAMP is not pilot testing three options and, as a result, VA will not have data on the extent to which veterans will appeal directly to the Board when given the option. Unless VA identifies and mitigates key risks associated with implementing a new process, VA is taking a chance that untested aspects will not perform as desired.\n\nWhat GAO Recommends\n\nIn its forthcoming report, GAO is considering recommending that VA: fully address all legally required elements in its appeals plan, articulate how it will monitor and assess the new appeals process as compared to the legacy process, augment its master schedule for implementation, and more fully address risk.","answer_pids":["gov_report_Passage_971"],"dataset":"gov_report"}