Question:
Congress enacted the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) in 2003 in response to the increased deployment of Reserve and National Guard military and as a modernization and restatement of the protections and rights previously available to servicemembers under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (SSCRA). The SCRA has been amended since its initial passage, and Congress continues to consider amendments from time to time.
Congress has long recognized the need for protective legislation for servicemembers whose service to the nation compromises their ability to meet obligations and protect their legal interests. The SCRA is an exercise of Congress's power to raise and support armies and to declare war. The purpose of the act is to provide for, strengthen, and expedite the national defense by protecting servicemembers, enabling them to "devote their entire energy to the defense needs of the Nation." The SCRA protects servicemembers by temporarily suspending certain judicial and administrative proceedings and transactions that may adversely affect their legal rights during military service. The SCRA does not provide forgiveness of all debts or the extinguishment of contractual obligations on behalf of active-duty servicemembers, nor does it grant absolute immunity from civil lawsuits. Instead, the SCRA provides for the suspension of claims and protection from default judgments against servicemembers. In this way, it seeks to balance the interests of servicemembers and their creditors, spreading the burden of national military service to a broader portion of the citizenry. Some protections are contingent on whether military service materially affects the servicemember's ability to meet obligations, while others are not. Courts are to construe the SCRA liberally in favor of servicemembers, but retain discretion to deny relief in certain cases. The Services are required to provide information to servicemembers explaining their rights under the SCRA.
Many of the SCRA provisions are especially beneficial for Reservists activated to respond to a national crisis, but many provisions are also useful for career military personnel. One measure that affects many who are called to active duty is the cap on interest at an annual rate of 6% on debts incurred prior to a person's entry into active-duty military service. Creditors are required to forgive the excess interest and are prohibited from retaliating against servicemembers who invoke the 6% interest cap by submitting adverse credit reports solely on that basis. Other measures protect military families from being evicted from rental or mortgaged property; from cancellation of life insurance and professional liability insurance; from taxation in multiple jurisdictions; from losing domicile for voting and other purposes due to being stationed elsewhere; from losing child custody due to deployment or the possibility of deployment; from foreclosure of property to pay taxes that are due; and from losing certain rights to public land.
The SCRA makes it unlawful for lienholders or lessors to foreclose or seize property owned or used by servicemembers without a court order. It also permits servicemembers to prematurely terminate leases and other term contracts without incurring any early termination penalties. Statutes of limitations that might otherwise prevent servicemembers from pursuing remedies in court or before any governmental agency, including state and local entities, are tolled for the duration of the servicemember's military service. Servicemembers may initiate an action in court for relief prior to defaulting on any pre-service obligation or liability, in order to obtain restructuring of loan repayments or other equitable relief without incurring any penalty. Servicemembers may bring an action in court to enforce their rights under the SCRA, or the Attorney General may bring a civil action in U.S. district court for violations of the SCRA by a person who (1) engages in a pattern or practice of violating the act; or (2) engages in a violation that raises an issue of significant public importance.


Question:
This report provides information on federal financial assistance provided to the Gulf States after major disasters were declared in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas in response to the widespread destruction that resulted from Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma in 2005 and Hurricanes Gustav and Ike in 2008.
Though the storms happened over a decade ago, Congress has remained interested in the types and amounts of federal assistance that were provided to the Gulf Coast for several reasons. This includes how the money has been spent, what resources have been provided to the region, and whether the money has reached the intended people and entities. The financial information is also useful for congressional oversight of the federal programs provided in response to the storms. It gives Congress a general idea of the federal assets that are needed and can be brought to bear when catastrophic disasters take place in the United States. Finally, the financial information from the storms can help frame the congressional debate concerning federal assistance for current and future disasters.
The financial information for the 2005 and 2008 Gulf Coast storms is provided in two sections of this report:
1. Table 1 of Section I summarizes disaster assistance supplemental appropriations enacted into public law primarily for the needs associated with the five hurricanes, with the information categorized by federal department and agency; and 2. Section II contains information on the federal assistance provided to the five Gulf Coast states through the most significant federal programs, or categories of programs.
The financial findings in this report include the following:
Congress has appropriated roughly $121.7 billion in hurricane relief for the 2005 and 2008 hurricanes in 10 supplemental appropriations statutes. The appropriated funds have been distributed among 11 departments, 3 independent agencies/entities, numerous subentities, and the federal judiciary. Congress appropriated almost half of the funds ($53.8 billion, or 44% of the total) to the Department of Homeland Security, most of which went to the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Congress targeted roughly 22% of the total appropriations (almost $27 billion) to the Department of Housing and Urban Development for community development and housing programs. Approximately 20% ($25 billion) was appropriated to Department of Defense entities: $15.6 billion for civil construction and engineering activities undertaken by the Army Corps of Engineers and $9.2 billion for military personnel, operations, and construction costs. FEMA has reported that roughly $5.9 billion has been obligated from the DRF after Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma to save lives and property through mission assignments made to over 50 federal entities and the American Red Cross (see Table 17), $160.4 million after Hurricane Gustav through 32 federal entities (see Table 18), and $441 million after Hurricane Ike through 30 federal entities (see Table 19). In total, federal agencies obligated roughly $6.5 billion for mission assignments after the five hurricanes. The Small Business Administration approved almost 177,000 applications in the region for business, home, and economic injury loans, with a total loan value of almost $12 billion (Table 28 and Table 29). The Department of Education obligated roughly $1.8 billion to the five states for elementary, secondary, and higher education assistance (Table 11).
This report also includes a brief summary of each hurricane and a discussion concerning federal to state cost-shares. Federal assistance to states is triggered when the President issues a major disaster declaration. In general, once declared the federal share for disaster recovery is 75% while the state pays for 25% of recovery costs. However, in some cases the federal share can be adjusted upward when a sufficient amount of damage has occurred, or when altered by Congress (or both). In addition, how much federal assistance is provided to states for major disasters is influenced not only by the declaration, but also by the percentage the federal government pays for the assistance. This report includes a cost-share discussion because some of these incidents received adjusted cost-shares in certain areas.


Question:
From the earliest days of the republic, the federal government has compensated members of the Armed Forces for their services. While the original pay structure was fairly simple, over time a more complex system of compensation has evolved. The current military compensation system includes cash payments such as basic pay, special and incentive pays, and various allowances. Servicemembers also receive noncash benefits such as health care and access to commissaries and recreational facilities, and may qualify for deferred compensation in the form of retired pay and other retirement benefits. This report provides an overview of military compensation generally, but focuses on cash compensation for current servicemembers.
Since the advent of the all-volunteer force in 1973, Congress has used military compensation to improve recruiting, retention, and the overall quality of the force. Congressional interest in sustaining the all-volunteer force during a time of sustained combat operations led to substantial increases in compensation in the decade following the attacks of September 11, 2001. Subsequently, in the earlier part of the 2010s, concerns over government spending generated congressional and executive branch interest in slowing the rate of growth in military compensation. Initiatives to slow compensation growth included presidentially directed increases in basic pay below the rate of increase for the Employment Cost Index (ECI) for 2014-2016 and statutory authority for the Department of Defense (DOD) to reduce Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) payments by 1% of the national average monthly housing cost per year from 2015 to 2019 (for a maximum reduction of 5% under the national monthly average housing cost).
Some have raised concerns about the impact of personnel costs on the overall defense budget, arguing that they decrease the amount of funds available for modernizing equipment and sustaining readiness. Others argue that robust compensation is essential to maintaining a high-quality force that is vigorous, well-trained, experienced, and able to function effectively in austere and volatile environments. The availability of funding to prosecute contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan mitigated the pressure to trade off personnel, readiness, and equipment costs, but the current budgetary environment appears to have brought these trade-offs to the fore again.
DOD spends about $100,000-$110,000 per year to compensate the average active duty servicemember—to include cash, benefits, and contributions to retirement programs—although some estimates of compensation costs are substantially higher. However, gross compensation figures do not tell the full story, as military compensation relative to civilian compensation is a key factor in an individual's decision to join or stay in the military. Thus, the issue of comparability between military and civilian pay is an often-discussed topic. Some analysts and advocacy groups have argued that a substantial "pay gap" has existed for decades—with military personnel earning less than their civilian counterparts—although they generally concede that this gap is fairly small today. Others argue that the methodology behind this "pay gap" is flawed and does not provide a suitable estimate of pay comparability. Still others believe that military personnel, in general, are better compensated than their civilian counterparts. The Department of Defense takes a different approach to pay comparability. The 9th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC), published in 2002, argued that compensation for servicemembers should be around the 70th percentile of wages for civilian employees with similar education and experience. According to the 11th QRMC, published in 2012, regular military compensation for officers was at the 83rd percentile of wages for civilian employees with similar education and experience, and at the 90th percentile for enlisted personnel. A 2018 RAND report concluded that these overall percentiles were nearly the same in 2016.


Question:
The Trump Administration submitted to Congress its FY2019 budget request on February 12, 2018. The proposal included $41.86 billion for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS). Of that amount, $13.26 billion was for State Department operations, international broadcasting, and related agencies, and $28.60 billion for foreign operations. With the enactment of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA; P.L. 115-123, February 9, 2018), which raised discretionary spending limits set by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25), the Administration's FY2019 foreign affairs funding request was entirely within enduring (base) funds; no Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding was included the SFOPS request for the first time since FY2012.
The FY2019 request would have represented a 23.3% decrease in SFOPS funding compared with FY2018 actual funding levels. The proposed State and related agency funding would have been 18.7% below FY2018 funding and the foreign operations funding would have been reduced by 25.2%. In the State and related programs budget, cuts were proposed for several accounts, including the diplomatic security accounts, contributions to international organizations, and contributions for international peacekeeping activities. In the foreign operations budget, cuts would have been applied across all accounts, with disproportionately large cuts proposed for humanitarian assistance, multilateral assistance, and funding for bilateral development programs focused on agriculture, education, and democracy promotion.
Both the House and Senate appropriations committees approved FY2019 SFOPS bills that included funding at higher levels than the Administration requested and closer to FY2018 funding. H.R. 6385, approved by the House appropriations committee on June 20, 2018, would have funded SFOPS accounts at $54.177 billion. S. 3108, approved by the Senate appropriations committee on June 21, 2018, would have provided $54.602 billion for SFOPS accounts.
FY2019 began with seven appropriations bills, including SFOPS, unfinished. Congress and the President approved continuing resolutions to fund the affected federal agencies through December 21, 2018 at the FY2018 level (P.L. 115-245, Division C and P.L. 115-298). After December 21, a partial shutdown of the government, including SFOPS funded agencies, occurred. On January 25, 2019, an agreement was reached to continue funding for SFOPS and other appropriations that had lapsed through February 15, at the FY2018 level (P.L. 116-5). On February 14, Congress passed, and the President later signed into law, a full year omnibus appropriation that included SFOPS funding (P.L. 116-6, Division F).
P.L. 116-6 included a total of $54.377 billion for SFOPS accounts in FY2019, a 0.3% decrease from the FY2018 funding level and about 30% more than the Administration's request. Of that enacted total, $8.0 billion, or 14.7%, was designated as OCO.
This report provides an account-by-account comparison of the FY2019 SFOPS request, House and Senate SFOPS legislation and the final FY2019 SFOPS appropriation to FY2018 funding in Appendix A. The International Affairs (function 150) budget in Appendix B provides a similar comparison.
This report will not be further updated unless there is further congressional activity on FY2019 appropriations.


Question:
NAFTA is an international trade agreement among the United States, Canada, and Mexico that became effective on January 1, 1994. The agreement includes market-opening provisions that remove tariff and nontariff barriers to trade, as well as other rules affecting trade in areas such as agriculture, customs procedures, foreign investment, government procurement, intellectual property protection, and trade in services. Congress approved and implemented NAFTA in domestic law in the NAFTA Implementation Act (P.L. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057). On May 18, 2017, U.S. Trade Representative Ambassador Robert Lighthizer notified Congress that the Administration intended to renegotiate NAFTA. More than a year later, following the conclusion of the negotiations, President Trump signed a proposed replacement for NAFTA, the United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (USMCA), along with his counterparts from Canada and Mexico. President Trump has at times suggested that he will withdraw the United States from NAFTA unilaterally if Congress does not approve the USMCA.
This report examines the President's authority to terminate the United States' international obligations under NAFTA without further action from Congress. It also examines whether the NAFTA Implementation Act, the primary federal statute that implements the agreement in domestic law, would remain in effect if the President successfully terminated U.S. obligations under the agreement. In analyzing these issues, the report focuses on three related questions: (1) whether, under international law, the President may terminate U.S. international obligations under NAFTA without congressional approval; (2) whether, under domestic law, the President, relying on constitutional or statutory authority, may terminate U.S. international obligations under NAFTA unilaterally; and (3) whether the NAFTA Implementation Act would remain in effect if the President successfully terminated U.S. international obligations under the agreement.
With regard to the first question, under international law, the President appears to be able to terminate the United States' international obligations under NAFTA without congressional approval by delivering six months' notice of withdrawal to Canada and Mexico, provided such notice later becomes effective (e.g., assuming that a court does not enjoin the Executive from issuing the notice or declare such issuance unlawful).
The answer to the second question is less clear, however, and would require a reviewing court to confront several complicated issues of first impression, including the scope of the President's constitutional authority and statutory authority to terminate an international agreement. Justiciability questions may prevent a court from definitively answering the constitutional questions, leaving the resolution of the President's constitutional authority to the political process. With regard to the statutory question, while legal commentators have raised various arguments with respect to the President's domestic legal authority to terminate U.S. NAFTA international obligations unilaterally, it does not appear that any statute expressly affords the President with the authority to terminate NAFTA on his own. It is unclear whether Congress's enactment of an extensive legal framework providing for legislative consideration, approval, and implementation of trade agreements indicates that Congress did not intend to authorize the President implicitly to withdraw from NAFTA without further congressional action. Nonetheless, as explained below, provisions of federal law such as Sections 125 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 may provide the Executive with broad authority to suspend individual trade concessions granted to NAFTA countries and thereby establish barriers to trade with Canada and Mexico. At the same time, the Executive's use of such authority would, however, likely be subject to review on various grounds by domestic or international tribunals.
Finally, whether the NAFTA Implementation Act would remain in effect after termination of U.S. obligations under NAFTA would be informed by Supreme Court precedent generally requiring the repeal of statutes to conform to the same bicameral process set forth in Article I of the Constitution that is used to enact new legislation. Accordingly, as an initial matter, it would appear that the President lacks authority to terminate the domestic effect of the NAFTA Implementation Act without going through the full legislative process for repeal. Thus, the Act appears to remain in effect unless Congress has, consistent with the Constitution, delegated to the President authority to terminate its provisions or made such provisions "self-terminating."


Question:
The principal federal program to aid municipal wastewater treatment plant construction is authorized in the Clean Water Act (CWA). Established as a grant program in 1972, it now capitalizes state loan programs through the clean water state revolving loan fund (CWSRF) program. Since FY1972, appropriations have totaled $98 billion.
In 1996, Congress amended the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA, P.L. 104-182) to authorize a similar state loan program for drinking water to help systems finance projects needed to comply with drinking water regulations and to protect public health. Since FY1997, appropriations for the drinking water state revolving loan fund (DWSRF) program have totaled $23 billion.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administers both SRF programs, which annually distribute funds to the states for implementation. Funding amounts are specified in the State and Tribal Assistance Grants (STAG) account of EPA annual appropriations acts. The combined appropriations for wastewater and drinking water infrastructure assistance have represented 25%-32% of total funds appropriated to EPA in recent years.
Prior to CWA amendments in 1987 (P.L. 100-4), Congress provided wastewater grant funding directly to municipalities. The federal share of project costs was generally 55%; state and local governments were responsible for the remaining 45%. The 1987 amendments replaced this grant program with the SRF program. Local communities are now often responsible for 100% of project costs, rather than 45%, as they are required to repay loans to states. The greater financial burden of the act's loan program on some cities has caused some to seek continued grant funding.
Although the CWSRF and DWSRF have largely functioned as loan programs, both allow the implementing state agency to provide "additional subsidization" under certain conditions. Since its amendments in 1996, the SDWA has authorized states to use up to 30% of their DWSRF capitalization grants to provide additional assistance, such as forgiveness of loan principal or negative interest rate loans, to help disadvantaged communities. America's Water Infrastructure Act of 2018 (AWIA; P.L. 115-270) increased this proportion to 35% while conditionally requiring states to use at least 6% of their capitalization grants for these purposes.
Congress amended the CWA in 2014, adding similar provisions to the CWSRF program. In addition, appropriations acts in recent years have required states to use minimum percentages of their allotted SRF grants to provide additional subsidization.
Final full-year appropriations were enacted as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2019 (P.L. 116-6), on February 15, 2019. The act provided $1.694 billion for the CWSRF and $1.163 billion for the DWSRF program, nearly identical to the FY2018 appropriations. The FY0219 act provided $68 million for the WIFIA program, a $5 million increase from the FY2018 appropriation.
Compared to the FY2019 appropriation levels, the Trump Administration's FY2020 budget request proposes to decrease the appropriations for the CWSRF, DWSRF, and WIFIA programs by 34%, 26%, and 63%, respectively.


Question:
The Senior Community Service Employment Program (SCSEP) authorizes the Department of Labor (DOL) to make grants to support part-time community service employment opportunities for eligible individuals age 55 or over. In FY2019, appropriations for SCSEP programs were $400 million and supported approximately 41,000 positions. DOL may also refer to the SCSEP program as Community Service Employment for Older Americans (CSEOA)
SCSEP is authorized by Title V of the Older Americans Act (OAA). The Older Americans Act Reauthorization Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-144) authorized appropriations for OAA programs for FY2017 through FY2019. In FY2019, SCSEP appropriations accounted for about 20% of the funding under the OAA.
The bulk of SCSEP appropriations support two primary grant streams: one to national nonprofit organizations and one to state agencies. In the most recent program year, approximately 78% of formula grant funds were allocated to national grantees and about 22% were allocated to state grantees. Both the national organizations and state grantees subgrant funds to host agencies that provide the actual community service employment opportunities to participants.
Host agencies are responsible for recruiting eligible participants. To be eligible for the program, prospective participants must be at least age 55, low-income, and unemployed. Federal law requires host agencies to give preference to prospective participants who demonstrate additional barriers to employment such as having a disability or being at risk of homelessness.
Program participants work part-time in community service jobs, including employment at schools, libraries, social service organizations, or senior-serving organizations. Program participants earn the higher of minimum wage or the typical wage for the job in which they are employed. An individual may typically participate in the program for a cumulative total of no more than 48 months.
During orientation, participants receive an assessment of their skills, interests, capabilities, and needs. This assessment informs the development of an individual employment plan (IEP). A participant's IEP is updated throughout their participation in the program.
Grantees are subject to a performance accountability system. Performance metrics generally relate to participants' unsubsidized employment and earnings after exiting the program. In addition to outcome-based metrics, grantees are also assessed on participants' total number of hours of service and whether the grantee served participants with barriers to employment. Grantees that do not meet negotiated levels of performance may become ineligible for subsequent grants.


Question:
U.S. assistance to Vietnam for the environmental and health damage attributed to a dioxin contained in Agent Orange and other herbicides sprayed over much of the southern portion of the country during the Vietnam War remains a major bilateral issue. Between fiscal years (FY) 2007 and 2019, Congress appropriated nearly $255 million to address these two issues. In addition, the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (P.L. 115-232) authorized the transfer of up to $15 million to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for the dioxin cleanup of the Bien Hoa Airbase.
Most of the appropriated funds have been used by USAID for the environmental cleanup of Danang airport, one of the major airbases used for storing and spraying the herbicides between 1961 and 1971. A lesser amount of the appropriated funds have been used by USAID for assistance to Vietnam's persons with disabilities, generally, but not always in the vicinity of Danang or other dioxin-contaminated areas.
Congressional interest in Agent Orange/dioxin in Vietnam has largely been focused on two issues. The first issue is determining the appropriate amount and type of assistance to provide to address the environmental damage and the health effects of dioxin contamination in Vietnam. The second issue is oversight of how such assistance has been utilized by the State Department and USAID.
In November 2017, the United States and Vietnam completed the environmental remediation of approximately 90,000 cubic meters (118,000 cubic yards) of contaminated soil and 60,000 cubic meters (78,000 cubic yards) of lower risk materials at Danang airport by a process known as in-pile thermal desorption (IPTD). Restoration and project closure operations were completed in November 2018. The project took six years, with an estimated overall cost of $116 million.
Field studies have identified a number of other areas in Vietnam contaminated with the dioxin associated with Agent Orange, including the airports near Bien Hoa and Phu Cat, as well as sections of the A Luoi Valley. In January 2018, U.S. and Vietnamese governments signed a memorandum of intent (MOI) to begin the cleanup of the Bien Hoa airport. According to a USAID study, the environmental cleanup of Bien Hoa airport could cost an estimated $137 million to $794 million, depending on what form of remediation is used.
The provision of health-related assistance to areas contaminated with Agent Orange/dioxin has raised questions about how USAID has utilized appropriated funds. By May 2017, USAID had obligated less than two-thirds of the appropriated funds for FY2011-FY2017. The funds have generally been used for disability assistance programs regardless of the cause of the disability, rather than for both health and disability programs targeting populations residing near Agent Orange/dioxin "hot spots."
While the obligations for environmental remediation activities generally have not been a matter of congressional concern, how USAID has obligated appropriations for health and disability activities has drawn some attention.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6) appropriated "not less than $20 million" for environmental remediation and "not less than $12.5 million … for health and disability programs in areas sprayed with Agent Orange and otherwise contaminated with dioxin." The Victims of Agent Orange Relief Act of 2019 (H.R. 326) would require the Secretary of State to provide assistance to individuals in Vietnam with health issues related to exposure to Agent Orange, as well as "to institutions in Vietnam that provide health care for covered individuals." The act would also require the Secretary of State to provide assistance "to remediate those geographic areas of Vietnam that the Secretary determines contain high levels of Agent Orange."


Question:
The Office of Advocacy (Advocacy) is an "independent" office within the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) that advances "the views and concerns of small businesses before Congress, the White House, federal agencies, the federal courts, and state and local policymakers as appropriate." The Chief Counsel for Advocacy (Chief Counsel) directs the office and is appointed by the President from civilian life with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Advocacy is a relatively small office with a relatively large mandate—to represent the interests of small business in the regulatory process, provide Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) compliance training to federal regulatory officials, produce and promote small business economic research to inform policymakers and other stakeholders concerning the impact of federal regulatory burdens on small businesses and the role of small businesses in the economy, and facilitate small business outreach across the federal government.
This report examines Advocacy's origins and the expansion of its responsibilities over time; describes its organizational structure, funding, functions, and current activities; and discusses recent legislative efforts to further enhance its authority. For example, during the 115th Congress, the House passed H.R. 5, the Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017 (Title III, Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act), which would have expanded Advocacy's responsibilities. It would have revised and enhanced requirements for federal agency notification of the Chief Counsel prior to the publication of any proposed rule; expanded the required use of small business advocacy review panels from three federal agencies to all federal agencies, including independent regulatory agencies; empowered the Chief Counsel to issue rules governing federal agency compliance with the RFA; specifically authorized the Chief Counsel to file comments on any notice of proposed rulemaking, not just when the RFA is concerned; and transferred size standard determinations for purposes other than the Small Business Act and the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 from the SBA's Administrator to the Chief Counsel. The House passed similar legislation during the 114th Congress (H.R. 527).
The analysis suggests that Advocacy faces several challenges.
Advocacy, generally recognized as being an independent office, is housed within the much larger SBA which, given their statutorily overlapping missions as advocates for small businesses, makes it more difficult for stakeholders to recognize Advocacy as the definitive voice for small businesses. Chief Counsels tend to have relatively short tenures, creating continuity problems for Advocacy. The RFA does not define significant economic impact or substantial number of small entities, two key terms for triggering Advocacy's role under the RFA. The lack of clarity concerning these key terms makes it difficult for Advocacy to objectively determine agency compliance with the RFA and to train federal regulatory officials in how to come into compliance with the act. Advocacy often finds itself involved in ideological and partisan disputes concerning the outcome of federal regulatory policies for which it does not have the final say. Advocacy's ability to produce and promote economic research on small businesses and to engage in outreach activities, particularly outreach activities not directly related to its RFA role, is constrained by its relatively limited budgetary resources.


Question:
On January 4, 2019, the House established the Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress by adopting Title II of H.Res. 6, the House rules package for the 116th Congress (2019-2020), on a 418-12 vote. The purpose of the select committee as stated in its authorizing resolution is "to investigate, study, make findings, hold public hearings, and develop recommendations on modernizing Congress."
Twelve Members, six from each party, have been selected by their leadership to serve on the select committee during its year-long investigation. The committee's authorizing resolution requires its membership to include two Members from the freshman class of the 116th Congress, two Members of the Rules Committee, and two Members of the Committee on House Administration. Funding for the select committee in the amount of $487,500 was provided through House adoption of H.Res. 245 on March 27, 2019.
The committee has held four hearings to date, with additional meetings likely. Committee operations are scheduled to end on February 1, 2020. Any final report of the committee will be made public. Publication of the final report will require approval from at least two-thirds of the committee. Given that both parties are equally represented on the committee, some amount of bipartisan support will be needed to approve and publish the final report.


Question:
The United States provides foreign assistance to Latin American and Caribbean nations to support development and other U.S. objectives. U.S. policymakers have emphasized different strategic interests in the region at different times, from combating Soviet influence during the Cold War to promoting democracy and open markets since the 1990s. The Trump Administration has sought to reduce foreign aid significantly and refocus U.S. assistance efforts in the region to address U.S. domestic concerns, such as irregular migration and transnational crime.
FY2019 Budget Request
For FY2019, the Trump Administration requested $1.1 billion for Latin America and the Caribbean through foreign assistance accounts managed by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). That amount would have been $581 million, or 34%, less than the estimated $1.7 billion of U.S. assistance the region received in FY2018. The proposal would have cut funding for every type of assistance and nearly every Latin American and Caribbean nation. The Trump Administration also proposed eliminating the Inter-American Foundation—a small, independent U.S. foreign assistance agency that promotes grassroots development in the region—and consolidating its programs into USAID.
The Administration's efforts to scale back U.S. assistance could have significant implications for U.S. policy in Latin America and the Caribbean. Faced with potential cuts, U.S. agencies could accelerate efforts to transition countries in the region away from traditional development assistance toward other forms of bilateral engagement. Reductions in State Department-managed security assistance could lead to the Department of Defense taking on a larger role in U.S. security cooperation. Moreover, many argue that reductions in foreign aid, combined with other policy shifts, could contribute to a relative decline in U.S. influence in the region.
Legislative Developments
President Trump signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), on February 15, 2019. Division F of the act—the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2019—includes funding for foreign assistance programs in Latin America and the Caribbean. The measure was preceded by three short-term continuing resolutions (P.L. 115-245, P.L. 115-298, and P.L. 116-5), which funded foreign assistance programs at the FY2018 level, and a 35-day lapse in appropriations from December 22, 2018, to January 25, 2019. Although the House and Senate Appropriations Committees had approved their FY2019 foreign assistance appropriations measures (H.R. 6385 and S. 3108, respectively) in June 2018, neither bill received floor consideration prior to the end of the 115th Congress.
P.L. 116-6 and the accompanying joint explanatory statement do not specify appropriations levels for every Latin American and Caribbean nation. Nevertheless, the amounts designated for key U.S. initiatives in Central America, Colombia, and Mexico significantly exceed the Administration's request. The act provides
$527.6 million to continue implementation of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, which is $92 million more than the Administration requested but $99 million less than Congress appropriated for the initiative in FY2018. at least $418.3 million to support the peace process and security and development efforts in Colombia, which is $153 million more than the Administration requested and $27 million more than Congress appropriated for Colombia in FY2018. $162.7 million to support security and rule-of-law efforts in Mexico, which is $84 million more than the Administration requested and $10 million more than Congress appropriated for Mexico in FY2018.


Question:
From its inception, the United States Intelligence Community (IC) has relied on close relations with foreign partners. These relationships often reflect mutual security interests and the trust each side has of the other's credibility and professionalism. They are generally strategic and cover a range of national security priorities involving national defense, emerging threats, counterterrorism, counter-proliferation, treaty compliance, cybersecurity, economic and financial security, counter-narcotics, and piracy.
U.S. intelligence relations with foreign counterparts offer a number of benefits: indications and warning of an attack, expanded geographic coverage, corroboration of national sources, accelerated access to a contingency area, and a diplomatic backchannel. They also present risks of compromise due to poor security, espionage, geopolitical turmoil, manipulation to influence policy, incomplete vetting of foreign sources, over-reliance on a foreign partner's intelligence capabilities, and concern over a partner's potentially illegal or unethical tradecraft. Because intelligence failures involving a foreign partner sometimes become public, the risks to the IC of cooperating with a foreign intelligence service are more easily understood. Nevertheless, the persistent cultivation of intelligence relations with foreign partners suggests that the IC remains confident that the benefits outweigh the risks.
These benefits are not always widely recognized due to their sensitivity and the potential for compromising the scope and details of what amounts to intelligence collection. The best known of these intelligence relationships are the decades-long ties to America's closest allies, who have shared history, values, and similar perspectives on national security threats. Such ties are often one component of a broader security cooperation arrangement. Less well known are liaison relationships with U.S. adversaries over a particular issue of mutual concern, or relations with non-state foreign intelligence organizations such as Kurdish groups. Regardless of the partner, the U.S. Intelligence Community's aim is to enhance national intelligence resources and capabilities and to further U.S. national security by better understanding the threat environment and thereby enabling informed strategic planning, better policy decisions, and successful military operations. Thus, U.S. foreign intelligence relationships can be an overlooked component of public discussion of various aspects of international cooperation.
Foreign intelligence agencies with ties to U.S. intelligence have often escaped the reach of congressional oversight. Yet Congress, at various times, has been interested in both the benefits and the risks of foreign intelligence relationships to U.S. national security. While sometimes extolling the value intelligence foreign partners can provide, Congress has also been critical of occasions when the IC has become too dependent on such partners at the expense of IC investment in its own intelligence capabilities. Congress has also been concerned with the IC's ability to independently assess the credibility of foreign intelligence sources, as well as the vulnerability of a foreign intelligence partner's telecommunications infrastructure to compromise by a hostile foreign intelligence service. Of particular sensitivity to Congress has been the poor record of human rights by certain foreign intelligence agencies and the potential for foreign intelligence partners to collect and share with the United States information on U.S. persons.
This report uses publicly available, unclassified sources as the basis of its research, and does not reference information in the public domain that was unlawfully disclosed.


Question:
The nation's air, land, and marine transportation systems are designed for accessibility and efficiency, two characteristics that make them vulnerable to terrorist attack. While hardening the transportation sector is difficult, measures can be taken to deter terrorists. The enduring challenge facing Congress is how best to implement and finance a system of deterrence, protection, and response that effectively reduces the possibility and consequences of terrorist attacks without unduly interfering with travel, commerce, and civil liberties.
Transportation security has been a major policy focus since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of those attacks, the 107th Congress moved quickly to pass the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA; P.L. 107-71), creating the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and mandating that security screeners employed by the federal government inspect airline passengers, their baggage, and air cargo. Despite the extensive focus on aviation and transportation security over the past decade, a number of challenges remain, including
developing and deploying effective biometric capabilities to verify the identities of transportation workers and travelers; developing effective risk-based approaches to vetting and screening transportation workers accessing secured areas of airports and other sensitive areas of transportation networks; developing cost-effective solutions to screen air cargo and freight without impeding the flow of commerce; and coordination among state, local, and federal homeland security and law enforcement personnel to effectively deter and respond to criminal and terrorist acts targeting public areas of transportation facilities.
The FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-190) and the TSA Modernization Act (P.L. 115-254, Division K) included provisions intended to improve screening technologies, streamline the passenger screening process, mandate more rigorous background checks of airport workers, strengthen airport access controls, increase passenger checkpoint efficiency and operational performance, and enhance security in public areas of airports and at foreign airports where flights depart for the United States. Oversight of TSA actions to implement these mandates may be an area of particular interest in the 116th Congress. Particular topics may include the evolution of screening technologies and assessments of emerging screening technology solutions; the expansion of canine teams for transportation security; the expansion of the PreCheck program to expedite screening of known travelers; the use of biometrics and associated data security and privacy concerns; implementing effective approaches, regulations, and international agreements to conduct risk-based screening of air cargo shipments worldwide; protecting public areas of airports; and developing effective countermeasures to protect critical infrastructure, including airports and aircraft, from attacks using drones.
Bombings of passenger trains in Europe and Asia in the past few years illustrate the vulnerability of passenger rail systems to terrorist attacks. Passenger rail systems—primarily subway systems—in the United States carry about five times as many passengers each day as do airlines, over many thousands of miles of track, serving stations that are designed primarily for easy access. Transit security issues of recent interest to Congress include the quality of TSA's surface transportation inspector program. The bulk of U.S. overseas trade is carried by ships, and thus the economic consequences of a maritime terrorist attack could be significant. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Coast Guard have implemented security screening procedures that effectively "push the borders out"—that is, they begin screening vessels and cargo before they reach a U.S. port. Two aspects of maritime security that have drawn attention recently are cybersecurity and the use of drones for coastal surveillance.


Question:
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, as amended, enumerates categories of foreign nationals, known as nonimmigrants, who are admitted to the United States for a temporary period of time and a specific purpose. One of these nonimmigrant visa categories—known as the H-2B visa—is for temporary nonagricultural workers.
The H-2B visa allows for the temporary admission of foreign workers to the United States to perform nonagricultural labor or services of a temporary nature if unemployed U.S. workers are not available. Common H-2B occupations include landscape laborer, housekeeper, and amusement park worker.
The H-2B program is administered by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the U.S. Department of Labor's (DOL's) Employment and Training Administration. DOL's Wage and Hour Division also has certain concurrent enforcement responsibilities. The H-2B program currently operates under regulations issued by DHS in 2008 on H-2B requirements, by DHS and DOL jointly in 2015 on H-2B employment, and by DHS and DOL jointly in 2015 on H-2B wages.
Bringing workers into the United States under the H-2B program is a multiagency process involving DOL, DHS, and the Department of State (DOS). A prospective H-2B employer must apply to DOL for labor certification. Approval of a labor certification application reflects a finding by DOL that there are not sufficient U.S. workers who are qualified and available to perform the work and that the employment of foreign workers will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers who are similarly employed.
If granted labor certification, an employer can file a petition with DHS to bring in the approved number of H-2B workers. If the petition is approved, a foreign worker overseas who the employer wants to employ can go to a U.S. embassy or consulate to apply for an H-2B nonimmigrant visa from DOS. If the visa application is approved, the worker is issued a visa that he or she can use to apply for admission to the United States at a port of entry. H-2B workers can be accompanied by eligible spouses and children.
By law, the H-2B visa is subject to an annual numerical cap. Under the INA, the total number of individuals who may be issued H-2B visas or otherwise provided with H-2B nonimmigrant status in any fiscal year may not exceed 66,000. USCIS is responsible for implementing the H-2B cap, which it does at the petition receipt stage. Spouses and children accompanying H-2B workers are not counted against the H-2B cap. In addition, certain categories of H-2B workers are exempt from the cap. Among these categories are current H-2B workers who are seeking an extension of stay, change of employer, or change in the terms of their employment.
Employer demand for H-2B workers has varied over the years. In recent years, demand has exceeded supply, and special provisions have been enacted to make additional H-2B visas available. For FY2016, a temporary statutory provision exempted certain H-2B workers from the cap. It applied to H-2B workers who had been counted against the cap in any one of the three prior fiscal years and would be returning as H-2B workers in FY2016. For FY2017, FY2018, and FY2019, a different type of H-2B cap-related provision authorized DHS to issue additional H-2B visas (above the cap) subject to specified conditions.


Question:
As agreed to in the House, H.Res. 6, a resolution adopting the rules of the House of Representatives, provided amendments to the rules, as well as separate orders, that affect committee procedure in the 116th Congress (2019-2020). Several of these changes apply to general committee procedure, while others concern specific committees, such as modifications to the names, jurisdiction, or procedures of certain House committees. The rules package also established, during the 116th Congress, two new select committees.
H.Res. 6 made several changes to committee membership and organization. Most significantly, it removed the committee chair term limits that were in effect during each Congress from the 104th through the 115th Congresses (1995-2018), excluding the 111th Congress (2009-2010). H.Res. 6 added a provision to Rule XXIII that calls on any Member, Delegate, or the Resident Commissioner who has been indicted or formally charged with certain felony offenses to refrain from committee business. It clarified that Delegates and the Resident Commissioner may serve on joint committees, and it lengthened from 30 days to 60 days the period in which to adopt and publish committee rules at the start of a Congress.
In a separate order, the 116th Congress rules package established a requirement that certain legislative measures must be reported and be subject to a committee hearing and markup prior to their consideration on the floor. This requirement applies, with some exceptions, to measures that are raised under the terms of a special rule reported from the Rules Committee. Another separate order requires most standing committees to hold a Member Day Hearing during the first session of the 116th Congress, affording any Member the opportunity to speak on proposed legislation within the committee's jurisdiction. H.Res. 6 clarified the notification requirement for committee markup meetings. As amended, clause 2 of Rule XI provides Members at least three workdays to prepare for an upcoming markup, as opposed to the less specific requirement that markups may not occur before the "third day" after a chair announces the meeting.
H.Res. 6 altered procedures concerning committee oversight. The 115th Congress House rules requirement that committees prepare and submit "authorization and oversight plans" was replaced with the requirement that chairs develop oversight plans in consultation with the ranking member. In addition, a separate order now allows committee counsel to take depositions without the presence of a committee member.
Amendments to the House standing rules changed two committees' names and clarified their jurisdictions. The Committee on Education and the Workforce became the Committee on Education and Labor, a name it held in some previous Congresses. As amended, Rule X specified that the committee's jurisdiction includes the general management of the Department of Education and the Department of Labor. The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform was re-designated the Committee on Oversight and Reform. The rules changes clarified that the Committee on Oversight and Reform's existing jurisdiction over the review and study of all government activities includes "the Executive Office of the President."
A separate order directed the Committee on Ethics to empanel an investigative subcommittee to review allegations whenever a Member, Delegate, or the Resident Commissioner is indicted on a criminal charge. H.Res. 6 amended clause 3 of Rule XI to allow the Committee on Ethics, or an investigative subcommittee thereof, to consider trial evidence in ethics investigations of Members, Delegates, and the Resident Commissioner.
Another separate order enabled the Committee on Financial Services to establish as many as seven subcommittees, as opposed to the six subcommittees allowed under the rules, while an amendment to clause 3 of Rule XIII exempted the Rules Committee from the requirement that committee reports must include recorded votes taken in committee. The rules changes also removed membership term limits to the Committee on the Budget. However, the rules of the Democratic Caucus and Republican Conference may continue to limit the number of terms that Members may serve on the Budget Committee.
Finally, the rules package established, for the 116th Congress, the Select Committee on the Climate Crisis and the Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress. The committees are to "investigate, study, make findings, hold public hearings, and develop recommendations." By the end of the 116th Congress, they are to report their findings and policy recommendations to the relevant standing committees and publish them in a publicly available format.


Question:
Many observers consider sanctions to be a central element of U.S. policy to counter Russian malign behavior. Most Russia-related sanctions implemented by the United States have been levied in response to Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine. In addition, the United States has imposed sanctions on Russia in response to human rights abuses, election interference and cyberattacks, weapons proliferation, illicit trade with North Korea, support to Syria, and use of a chemical weapon. The United States also employs sanctions to deter further objectionable activities. Most Members of Congress support a robust use of sanctions amid concerns about Russia's international behavior and geostrategic intentions.
Ukraine-related sanctions are mainly based on four executive orders (EOs) the President introduced in 2014. In addition, Congress passed and the President signed into law two acts establishing sanctions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine: the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (SSIDES; P.L. 113-95/H.R. 4152) and the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (UFSA; P.L. 113-272/H.R. 5859).
In 2017, Congress passed and the President signed into law the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA; P.L. 115-44/H.R. 3364, Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act [CAATSA], Title II). This legislation codifies Ukraine-related and cyber-related EOs, strengthens existing Russia-related sanctions authorities, and identifies several new targets for sanctions. It also establishes congressional review of any action the President takes to ease or lift a variety of sanctions.
Additional sanctions on Russia may be forthcoming. On August 6, 2018, the United States determined that in March 2018 the Russian government used a chemical weapon in the United Kingdom in contravention of international law. In response, the United States launched an initial round of sanctions on Russia, as required by the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act; P.L. 102-182/H.R. 1724, Title III). The law requires a second, more severe round of sanctions in the absence of Russia's reliable commitment to no longer use such weapons.
The United States has imposed most Ukraine-related sanctions on Russia in coordination with the European Union (EU). Since 2017, the efforts of Congress and the Trump Administration to tighten U.S. sanctions on Russia have prompted some degree of concern in the EU about U.S. commitment to sanctions coordination and U.S.-EU cooperation on Russia and Ukraine more broadly. The EU continues to consider the possibility of imposing sanctions in response to Russia's use of a chemical weapon in the United Kingdom, human rights abuses, and cyberattacks.
Debates about the effectiveness of U.S. and other sanctions on Russia continue in Congress, in the Administration, and among other stakeholders. Russia has not reversed its occupation and annexation of Ukraine's Crimea region, nor has it stopped fostering separatism in eastern Ukraine. On the contrary, it has extended military operations to the Black Sea and the Azov Sea bordering Ukraine and Russia. With respect to other malign activities, the relationship between sanctions and Russian behavior is difficult to determine. Nonetheless, many observers argue that sanctions help to restrain Russia or that their imposition is an appropriate foreign policy response regardless of immediate effect.
In the 115th Congress, several bills were introduced to increase the use of sanctions in response to Russia's malign activities. The 116th Congress may continue to debate the role of sanctions in U.S. foreign policy toward Russia.


Question:
Every year the President submits a series of volumes to Congress containing the President's proposed budget for the coming fiscal year. The President's submission is required on or after the first Monday in January, but no later than the first Monday in February (31 U.S.C. §1105(a)). This year the President released the budget submission, in two installments, on March 11, and March 18, 2019.
This report provides brief descriptions of the FY2020 budget volumes and related documents, together with internet addresses, Government Publishing Office (GPO) stock numbers, and prices for obtaining print copies of these publications. It also explains how to find the locations of government depository libraries, which can provide both printed copies for reference use and internet access to the online versions. This report will be updated as events warrant.
Please note that neither the Congressional Research Service (CRS) nor the Library of Congress (LOC) distributes print copies of the budget documents.


Question:
This report provides a convenient listing of online FY2020 agency budget justification submissions for all 15 executive branch departments and 9 selected independent agencies. In most cases, budget justifications contain more detailed descriptions of the proposals and programs that are provided in the President's budget submissions.
This report will be updated to reflect the current budget justifications submissions for the forthcoming fiscal year.


Question:
Names for Navy ships traditionally have been chosen and announced by the Secretary of the Navy, under the direction of the President and in accordance with rules prescribed by Congress. Rules for giving certain types of names to certain types of Navy ships have evolved over time. There have been exceptions to the Navy's ship-naming rules, particularly for the purpose of naming a ship for a person when the rule for that type of ship would have called for it to be named for something else. Some observers have perceived a breakdown in, or corruption of, the rules for naming Navy ships. On July 13, 2012, the Navy submitted to Congress a 73-page report on the Navy's policies and practices for naming ships.
For ship types now being procured for the Navy, or recently procured for the Navy, naming rules can be summarized as follows:
The first Ohio replacement ballistic missile submarine (SSBN-826) has been named Columbia in honor of the District of Columbia, but the Navy has not stated what the naming rule for these ships will be. Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines are being named for states. Aircraft carriers are generally named for past U.S. Presidents. Of the past 14, 10 were named for past U.S. Presidents, and 2 for Members of Congress. Destroyers are being named for deceased members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, including Secretaries of the Navy. The Navy has not yet announced a naming rule for its planned new class of FFG(X) frigates, the first of which the Navy wants to procure in FY2021. Previous classes of U.S. Navy frigates, like Navy destroyers, were generally named for naval leaders and heroes. Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) are being named for regionally important U.S. cities and communities. Amphibious assault ships are being named for important battles in which U.S. Marines played a prominent part, and for famous earlier U.S. Navy ships that were not named for battles. San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships are being named for major U.S. cities and communities, and cities and communities attacked on September 11, 2001. John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers are being named for people who fought for civil rights and human rights. Expeditionary Fast Transports (EPFs) are being named for small U.S. cities. Expeditionary Transport Docks (ESDs) and Expeditionary Sea Bases (ESBs) are being named for famous names or places of historical significance to U.S. Marines. Navajo (TATS-6) class towing, salvage, and rescue ships are being named for prominent Native Americans or Native American tribes.
Since 1974, at least 21 U.S. military ships have been named for persons who were living at the time the name was announced. The most recent instance occurred on May 6, 2019, when the Navy announced that it was naming the destroyer DDG-51 for former Senator Sam Nunn.
Members of the public are sometimes interested in having Navy ships named for their own states or cities, for older U.S. Navy ships (particularly those on which they or their relatives served), for battles in which they or their relatives participated, or for people they admire.
Congress has long maintained an interest in how Navy ships are named, and has influenced the naming of certain Navy ships. The Navy suggests that congressional offices wishing to express support for proposals to name a Navy ship for a specific person, place, or thing contact the office of the Secretary of the Navy to make their support known. Congress may also pass legislation relating to ship names. Measures passed by Congress in recent years regarding Navy ship names have all been sense-of-the-Congress provisions.


Question:
Historically, Egypt has been an important country for U.S. national security interests based on its geography, demography, and diplomatic posture. Egypt controls the Suez Canal, which is one of the world's most well-known maritime chokepoints, linking the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Egypt, with its population of more than 100 million people, is by far the most populous Arabic-speaking country. Although it may not play the same type of leading political or military role in the Arab world as it has in the past, Egypt may retain some "soft power" by virtue of its history, media, and culture. Cairo plays host both to the 22-member Arab League and Al Azhar University, which claims to be the oldest continuously operating university in the world and has symbolic importance as a leading source of Islamic scholarship.
Additionally, Egypt's 1979 peace treaty with Israel remains one of the most significant diplomatic achievements for the promotion of Arab-Israeli peace. While people-to-people relations remain cold, the Israeli and Egyptian governments have increased their cooperation against Islamist militants and instability in the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip.
Personnel moves and possible amendments to the Egyptian constitution highlight apparent efforts by President Sisi to consolidate power with the help of political allies, including colleagues from Egypt's security establishment. President Sisi has come under repeated international criticism for an ongoing government crackdown against various forms of political dissent and freedom of expression. The Egyptian government has defended its human rights record, asserting that the country is under pressure from terrorist groups seeking to destabilize Arab nation-states.
The Trump Administration has tried to normalize ties with the Sisi government that were generally perceived as strained under President Obama. In January 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo delivered a major policy speech at the American University in Cairo, where he stated, "And as we seek an even stronger partnership with Egypt, we encourage President Sisi to unleash the creative energy of Egypt's people, unfetter the economy, and promote a free and open exchange of ideas."
The United States has provided significant military and economic assistance to Egypt since the late 1970s. Successive U.S. Administrations have justified aid to Egypt as an investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running cooperation with the Egyptian military and on sustaining the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.
All U.S. foreign aid to Egypt (or any recipient) is appropriated and authorized by Congress. Since 1946, the United States has provided Egypt with over $83 billion in bilateral foreign aid (calculated in historical dollars—not adjusted for inflation). Annual appropriations legislation includes several conditions governing the release of these funds. All U.S. military aid to Egypt finances the procurement of weapons systems and services from U.S. defense contractors.
For FY2019, Congress has appropriated $1.4 billion in total bilateral assistance for Egypt, the same amount it provided in FY2018. For FY2020, the President is requesting a total of $1.382 billion in bilateral assistance for Egypt. Nearly all of the U.S. funds for Egypt come from the FMF account (military aid). In November 2018, the U.S. Defense Department notified Congress of a major $1 billion sale of defense equipment to Egypt, consisting of 10 AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters, among other things.
Beyond the United States, President Sisi has broadened Egypt's international base of support to include several key partners, including the Arab Gulf states, Israel, Russia, and France. In the last five years, as French-Egyptian ties have improved, Egypt has purchased major air and naval defense systems from French defense companies.


Question:
Sales of U.S. agricultural products to foreign markets absorb about one-fifth of U.S. agricultural production, thus contributing significantly to the health of the farm economy. Farm product exports, which totaled $143 billion in FY2018 (see chart below), make up about 9% of total U.S. exports and contribute positively to the U.S. balance of trade. The economic benefits of agricultural exports also extend across rural communities, while overseas farm sales help to buoy a wide array of industries linked to agriculture, including transportation, processing, and farm input suppliers.
Congress has traditionally displayed a keen interest in agricultural trade issues given their importance to farmers and ranchers and to the overall economy. A major area of interest for the 116th Congress has been the loss of overseas export market shares for agricultural products due to the direction of the Trump Administration's trade policy, which places increased emphasis on reducing the overall U.S. trade deficit. In March 2018, the Trump Administration imposed Section 232 tariffs on U.S. imports of steel and aluminum from most countries and additional Section 301 tariffs on a number of imports from China. Following these actions, Canada, China, Mexico, the European Union (EU), and Turkey imposed retaliatory tariffs on more than 800 U.S. agricultural and food product exports. In response, USDA authorized $12 billion in short-term assistance to the affected agricultural producers and commodities under its Market Facilitation Program to help mitigate the economic impact on farmers.
A number of policy developments undertaken by the Trump Administration in bilateral and regional trade agreements may affect agricultural markets as well. On the Administration's initiative, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has been renegotiated and signed as the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). This agreement is subject to legislative ratification by Canada and Mexico and approval by U.S. Congress. President Trump withdrew the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in January 2017. In March 2018, the remaining 11 countries concluded a revised version of TPP, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Signatories of CPTPP have begun to reduce tariffs and provide greater agricultural market access for imports from CPTPP signatory countries, actions that could potentially erode U.S. agricultural market shares in the region. At the bilateral level, the Trump Administration has notified Congress of its intent to begin trade negotiations with Japan (a CPTPP member), the EU, and the United Kingdom.
At the global level, and at the initiative of the United States, the World Trade Organization (WTO) recently ruled that China has subsidized its agricultural production beyond the level permitted under its WTO obligations and that China's administration of its agricultural market access policies are inconsistent with its WTO obligations. The United States has also filed a counter notification against India at the WTO stating that India has underreported its agricultural domestic subsidies.
Several other agricultural trade issues may be of interest to Congress. For example, the proposed USMCA does not address all the issues that restrict U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico and Canada, and Southeastern U.S. produce growers have been seeking changes to trade remedy laws to address imports of seasonal produce. A key objective of U.S. trade negotiations continues to be the establishment of a common framework for approval, trade, and marketing of the products of agricultural biotechnology. U.S. farm and food interests see the potential for market expansion opportunities in Cuba, but a prohibition on private U.S. financing is generally viewed as a major obstacle to this end. Moreover, the United States has announced its intention to withdraw eligibility for the Generalized System of Preference (GSP)—which provides duty-free tariff treatment for certain products from developing countries—from Turkey and India. On another front, U.S. exports of beef, pork, and chicken continue to face bans and trade restrictions over disease outbreaks even though the bans are inconsistent with international trade protocols, among which are China's ongoing bans on imports of U.S. beef and poultry and restrictions imposed by several foreign markets on U.S. ractopamine-fed pork.


Question: A private bill is one that provides benefits to specified individuals (including corporate bodies). Individuals sometimes request relief through private law when administrative or legal remedies are exhausted, but Congress seems more often to view private legislation as appropriate when no other remedy is available and when enactment would, in a broad sense, afford equity. From 1817 through 1971, most Congresses enacted hundreds of private laws, but since then, the number has declined significantly as Congress has expanded administrative discretion to deal with many of the situations that tended to give rise to private bills. Since 2007, four private laws have been enacted. Private provisions are also occasionally included in public legislation. The Senate considers private bills using the same procedures that are used to consider other legislation.


Question:
The National Institutes of Health (NIH), under the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), is the primary federal agency charged with performing and supporting biomedical and behavioral research. In FY2018, NIH used its over $34 billion budget to support more than 300,000 scientists and research personnel working at over 2,500 institutions across the United States and abroad, as well as to conduct biomedical and behavioral research and research training at its own facilities. The agency consists of the Office of the Director, in charge of overall policy and program coordination, and 27 institutes and centers, each of which focuses on particular diseases or research areas in human health. A broad range of research is funded through a highly competitive system of peer-reviewed grants and contracts.
The Public Health Service Act (PHSA) provides the statutory basis for NIH programs, and funding levels are mostly provided through the annual appropriations process. In December 2016, Congress introduced major reforms and programs at the NIH through the 21st Century Cures Act (P.L. 114-255). Prior to 2016, the last time Congress addressed NIH with comprehensive legislation was in December 2006, when it passed the NIH Reform Act (P.L. 109-482). Congress also gives direction to NIH through appropriations report language, but usually not through budget line items or earmarks. Historically, Congress has accepted, for the most part, the scientific and public health priorities established by the agency through its planning and grant-making activities that involve members of the scientific community and the general public.
NIH has seen periods of both low and high funding growth. From FY1998 to FY2003, Congress doubled the NIH budget from $13.7 billion to $27.1 billion. The agency then saw low funding growth or cuts from FY2004 to FY2015. Starting in FY2016, Congress provided NIH with funding increases of over 5% each year, raising the program level from $30.3 billion in FY2015 to $39.3 billion in FY2019. Under President Trump's budget request for FY2020, NIH would be provided a program level of $34.3 billion—a 12.6% reduction from the FY2019 program level.
NIH officials and scientific observers have cited funding variability and uncertainty as a challenge for the agency. Along with funding uncertainty, other challenges facing the agency and the research enterprise include
allocating funding across disease types, areas of human health, and types of research; addressing congressional priorities and concerns, while ensuring the scientific merit and quality of NIH-funded research; helping new and early-stage scientists obtain their first independent research grants; balancing the public and private sectors' relative roles in biomedical research.
NIH is the largest single public funder of biomedical research in the world, yet other countries—particularly China—have increased their funding levels for such research. Some Members of Congress have voiced concern about the position of U.S. biomedical research compared with other countries. A January 2015 study found that the total U.S. (public and private) share of global biomedical research funding declined from 57% in 2004 to 44% in 2011, while countries in Asia increased investment into biomedical research from $28 billion (2004) to $52.4 billion (2011), with especially large increases in China (analysis included Japan, China, India, Singapore and South Korea). Globally, the United States continues to be the top supporter of both public and industry medical research.


Question:
Although juvenile justice has always been administered by the states, the federal government has played a role in this area through the administration of grant programs. Congress has influenced juvenile justice by authorizing and funding grant programs administered by the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP).
The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA; P.L. 93-415), enacted in 1974, was the first comprehensive juvenile justice legislation passed by Congress. The JJDPA authorized a series of grant programs designed to support state juvenile justice systems and prevent juvenile delinquency. Since its enactment, the JJDPA has undergone several key amendments, including a significant reorganization in 2002 (by the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act; P.L. 107-273). Its grant programs were most recently amended and reauthorized by the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-385).
Funding for programs authorized by the JJDPA, as well as for other non-JJDPA grant programs that are administered by OJJDP, is provided through the Juvenile Justice Programs account in the annual Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies appropriations act. After the restructuring of juvenile justice grant programs in 2002, total funding for these programs began to decline. This decline generally continued through FY2007, after which funding for these programs started to increase. For FY2010, Congress provided $424 million for juvenile justice programs—the largest appropriation since FY2003. Juvenile justice funding then generally declined again from FY2010 through FY2017. After appropriating a low of $247 million for juvenile justice programs in FY2017, Congress increased funding for both FY2018 and FY2019. Through the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), Congress appropriated $287 million for juvenile justice programs for FY2019—the largest appropriation since the $424 million in FY2010.


Question:
Section 420 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288, hereinafter the Stafford Act) authorizes the President to "declare" a Fire Management Assistance Grant (FMAG). In the interest of saving time, the authority to make the declaration has been delegated to the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Regional Administrators. Once issued, the FMAG declaration authorizes various forms of federal fire suppression assistance such as the provision of equipment, personnel, and grants to state, local, and tribal governments for the control, management, and mitigation of any fire on certain public or private forest land or grassland that might become a major disaster. This federal assistance requires a cost-sharing component such that state, local, and tribal governments are responsible for 25% of the expenses.
This report answers frequently asked questions about FMAGs. This report will be updated as events warrant.


Question:
Congress has granted some federal land management agencies the authority to sell timber from federal lands. Two agencies, the Forest Service (FS) and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), conduct timber sales as an authorized use. Together, the FS and the BLM manage 76% of federal forest area. FS manages 144.9 million acres, while BLM manages 37.6 million acres. The other major federal land management agencies, the National Park Service (NPS) and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), rarely conduct timber sales.
Lands managed by the FS, the National Forest System (NFS), are managed under a multiple use-sustained yield model pursuant to the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 (MUSYA). This statute directs FS to balance multiple uses of their lands and ensure a sustained yield of those uses in perpetuity. Congress, through the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), has directed FS to engage in long-term land use and resource management planning. Plans set the framework for land management, uses, and protection; they are developed through an interdisciplinary process with opportunities for public participation. In the case of timber, they describe where timber harvesting may occur and include measures of sustainable timber harvest levels. FS uses these plans to guide implementation of individual sales, which generate revenue. Congress has specified various uses for this revenue.
Timber harvest on FS lands has varied over time. FS harvest volumes in the 1940s were around 1-3 billion board feet per year. Annual harvest volumes rose from the 1950s through the 1980s, sometimes exceeding 10 billion board feet. Annual harvested volumes decreased in the early 1990s and have remained between 1.8 and 2.8 billion board feet since FY2003. The total dollar value of FS timber harvests generally rose from the early 1940s to over $3 billion in FY1979. Total value has been between $100 million and $300 million since FY2001. From FY2014 to FY2018, the greatest average annual harvest volume on FS lands was from Oregon and Washington.
BLM lands are managed under a multiple use-sustained yield model pursuant to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). This statute directs BLM to balance multiple uses of their lands and ensure a sustained yield of those uses in perpetuity. Congress has directed BLM to engage in long-term land use and resource management planning through FLPMA. Plans set the framework for land management, uses, and protection; they are developed made through an interdisciplinary process with opportunities for public participation. In the case of timber, they describe where timber harvesting may occur and contain measures of sustainable timber harvest levels. The FS and the BLM use these plans to guide implementation of individual sales, which generate revenue. Congress has specified various uses for this revenue.
Although trends in timber activities on BLM lands are challenging to infer from the available data, volumes sold in the past appear to be larger than recent volumes offered for sale. Harvested volumes for the BLM have been between 100 and 260 million board feet annually from FY1995 onward, except in FY1994 and between FY2001-FY2003. Total harvest values have declined since the mid-1990s, and have generally been between $20 million and $50 million annually since FY2011. From FY2014 to FY2018, the greatest average annual harvest volume from BLM lands was from Oregon and Washington.
Congress has debated the appropriate balance of timber harvesting and other uses on federal lands. Determining the proportions of these uses, in whole and on individual lands, is challenging for land management agencies. Preferences for certain balances of these uses often stem from values about federal forests' purposes, such as consideration of economic, environmental, or recreational values. Debate has also centered on the relationship of timber harvesting levels to forest health, including whether changing harvest levels is a desirable forest management tool.
Congress has granted some federal land management agencies the authority to sell timber from federal lands. Two agencies, the Forest Service (FS) and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), conduct timber sales as an authorized use. Together, the FS and the BLM manage 76% of federal forest area. FS manages 144.9 million acres, while BLM manages 37.6 million acres. The other major federal land management agencies, the National Park Service (NPS) and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), rarely conduct timber sales.
Lands managed by the FS, the National Forest System (NFS), are managed under a multiple use-sustained yield model pursuant to the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 (MUSYA). This statute directs FS to balance multiple uses of their lands and ensure a sustained yield of those uses in perpetuity. Congress, through the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), has directed FS to engage in long-term land use and resource management planning. Plans set the framework for land management, uses, and protection; they are developed through an interdisciplinary process with opportunities for public participation. In the case of timber, they describe where timber harvesting may occur and include measures of sustainable timber harvest levels. FS uses these plans to guide implementation of individual sales, which generate revenue. Congress has specified various uses for this revenue.
Timber harvest on FS lands has varied over time. FS harvest volumes in the 1940s were around 1-3 billion board feet per year. Annual harvest volumes rose from the 1950s through the 1980s, sometimes exceeding 10 billion board feet. Annual harvested volumes decreased in the early 1990s and have remained between 1.8 and 2.8 billion board feet since FY2003. The total dollar value of FS timber harvests generally rose from the early 1940s to over $3 billion in FY1979. Total value has been between $100 million and $300 million since FY2001. From FY2014 to FY2018, the greatest average annual harvest volume on FS lands was from Oregon and Washington.
BLM lands are managed under a multiple use-sustained yield model pursuant to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). This statute directs BLM to balance multiple uses of their lands and ensure a sustained yield of those uses in perpetuity. Congress has directed BLM to engage in long-term land use and resource management planning through FLPMA. Plans set the framework for land management, uses, and protection; they are developed made through an interdisciplinary process with opportunities for public participation. In the case of timber, they describe where timber harvesting may occur and contain measures of sustainable timber harvest levels. The FS and the BLM use these plans to guide implementation of individual sales, which generate revenue. Congress has specified various uses for this revenue.
Although trends in timber activities on BLM lands are challenging to infer from the available data, volumes sold in the past appear to be larger than recent volumes offered for sale. Harvested volumes for the BLM have been between 100 and 260 million board feet annually from FY1995 onward, except in FY1994 and between FY2001-FY2003. Total harvest values have declined since the mid-1990s, and have generally been between $20 million and $50 million annually since FY2011. From FY2014 to FY2018, the greatest average annual harvest volume from BLM lands was from Oregon and Washington.
Congress has debated the appropriate balance of timber harvesting and other uses on federal lands. Determining the proportions of these uses, in whole and on individual lands, is challenging for land management agencies. Preferences for certain balances of these uses often stem from values about federal forests' purposes, such as consideration of economic, environmental, or recreational values. Debate has also centered on the relationship of timber harvesting levels to forest health, including whether changing harvest levels is a desirable forest management tool.


Question:
The Clean Air Act requires that transportation fuels contain a minimum volume of renewable fuel. This renewable fuel standard (RFS) was established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct05; P.L. 109-58) and amended by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA; P.L. 110-140). The RFS includes scheduled volume mandates that grow each year (starting with 9 billion gallons in 2008 and ascending to 36 billion gallons in 2022). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which is responsible for administering the RFS, determines the annual volume after 2022. Within the overall RFS, there are submandates for advanced biofuels, including cellulosic biofuel, biomass-based diesel, and other advanced biofuels.
EPA has the authority to waive the RFS requirements, in whole or in part, if certain conditions outlined in statute prevail. More specifically, the statute identifies a general waiver for the overall RFS and waivers for two types of advanced biofuel: cellulosic biofuel and biomass-based diesel. Statute requires EPA to announce each year's standards by November 30 of the previous year, except for biomass-based diesel, which must be announced 14 months before the year for which the applicable volume is to apply. Further, the final section of the waiver provision—which some refer to as the "reset" section—requires a permanent modification of applicable volumes of the RFS starting in 2016 and carried forward, if certain conditions are met.
In several instances, EPA has used, has proposed to use, or has been petitioned to use its waiver authority when implementing the RFS. In November 2018, EPA announced in its final rule for 2019 for the RFS that it was using the cellulosic biofuel waiver authority to reduce the cellulosic biofuel, advanced biofuel, and total renewable fuel volume requirements. EPA's use of the cellulosic biofuel waiver authority is not new. EPA has repeatedly issued a waiver, reducing the volume required for cellulosic biofuel. For the last few years, the use of the cellulosic biofuel waiver led EPA to also reduce the total advanced biofuel volume requirement. For various reasons (e.g., technology issues, financial support, policy uncertainty), the U.S. cellulosic biofuel industry has been unable, by a wide margin, to produce the volume amounts identified in statute.
The 2019 final RFS program rule issued by EPA triggers the RFS "reset" section of the waiver provision for total renewable fuel. The reset was triggered in previous final rules for both advanced biofuel and cellulosic biofuel. It is unclear what impact the use of the reset section will have on RFS standards in future years. EPA reports it will issue a rulemaking in early 2019 that proposes to reset the cellulosic biofuel, advanced biofuel, and total renewable fuel volume targets for the years 2020-2022.
A possible issue for Congress is whether the waiver authority and the reset provisions are sufficient options for EPA to address the statutory advanced biofuel volume shortfalls—shortfalls that may have been more than what Congress envisioned when it expanded the RFS in 2007. Another issue is how the Administration might apply the reset provision, and if it would contribute to uncertainty for industry, financiers, and other interested parties.


Question:
The mail and wire fraud statutes are exceptionally broad. Their scope has occasionally given the courts pause. Nevertheless, prosecutions in their name have brought to an end schemes that have bilked victims out of millions, and sometimes billions, of dollars. The statutes proscribe (1) causing the use of the mail or wire communications, including email; (2) in conjunction with a scheme to intentionally defraud another of money or property; (3) by means of a material deception. The offenses, along with attempts or conspiracies to commit them, carry a term of imprisonment of up to 30 years in some cases, followed by a term of supervised release. Offenders also face the prospect of fines, orders to make restitution, and forfeiture of their property.
The mail and wire fraud statutes overlap with a surprising number of other federal criminal statutes. Conduct that supports a prosecution under the mail or wire fraud statutes will often support prosecution under one or more other criminal provision(s). These companion offenses include (1) those that use mail or wire fraud as an element of a separate offense, like racketeering or money laundering; (2) those that condemn fraud on some jurisdictional basis other than use of the mail or wire communications, like those that outlaw defrauding the federal government or federally insured banks; and (3) those that proscribe other deprivations of honest services (i.e., bribery and kickbacks), like the statutes that ban bribery of federal officials or in connection with federal programs.
Among the crimes for which mail or wire fraud may serve as an element, RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) outlaws employing the patterned commission of predicate offenses to conduct the affairs of an enterprise that impacts commerce. Money laundering consists of transactions involving the proceeds of a predicate offense in order to launder them or to promote further predicate offenses.
The statutes that prohibit fraud in some form or another are the most diverse of the mail and wire fraud companions. Congress modeled some after the mail and wire fraud statutes, incorporating elements of a scheme to defraud or obtain property by false pretenses into statutes that outlaw bank fraud, health care fraud, securities fraud, and foreign labor contracting fraud. Congress designed others to protect the public fisc by proscribing false claims against the United States, conspiracies to defraud the United States by obstructing its functions, and false statements in matters within the jurisdiction of the United States and its departments and agencies.
Federal bribery and kickback statutes populate the third class of wire and mail fraud companions. One provision bans offering or accepting a thing of value in exchange for the performance or forbearance of a federal official act. Another condemns bribery of faithless agents in connection with federally funded programs and activities. A third, the Hobbs Act, outlaws bribery as a form of extortion under the color of official right.
The fines, prison sentences, and other consequences that follow conviction for wire and mail fraud companions vary considerably, with fines from not more than $25,000 to not more than $2 million and prison terms from not more than five years to life.


Question:
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is an independent federal agency established by the Communications Act of 1934 (1934 Act, or "Communications Act"). The agency is charged with regulating interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable. The mission of the FCC is to make available for all people of the United States, "without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nationwide, and worldwide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges."
The FCC operates under a public interest mandate first laid out in the 1927 Radio Act (P.L. 632, 69th Congress), but how this mandate is applied depends on how "the public interest" is interpreted. Some regulators seek to protect and benefit the public at large through regulation, while others seek to achieve the same goals through the promotion of market efficiency. Additionally, Congress granted the FCC wide latitude and flexibility to revise its interpretation of the public interest standard to reflect changing circumstances and the agency has not defined it in more concrete terms. These circumstances, paired with changes in FCC leadership, have led to significant changes over time in how the FCC regulates the broadcast and telecommunications industries.
The FCC is directed by five commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for five-year terms. The President designates one of the commissioners as chairperson. Three commissioners may be members of the same political party of the President and none can have a financial interest in any commission-related business. The current commissioners are Ajit Pai (Chair), Michael O'Rielly, Brendan Carr, Jessica Rosenworcel, and Geoffrey Starks.
The day-to-day functions of the FCC are carried out by 7 bureaus and 10 offices. The current basic structure of the FCC was established in 2002 as part of the agency's effort to better reflect the industries it regulates. The seventh bureau, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, was established in 2006. The bureaus process applications for licenses and other filings, manage non-federal spectrum, analyze complaints, conduct investigations, develop and implement regulatory programs, and participate in hearings, among other things. The offices provide support services. Bureaus and offices often collaborate when addressing FCC issues.
Beginning in the 110th Congress, the FCC has been funded through the House and Senate Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill as a single line item. Previously, it was funded through what is now the Commerce, Justice, Science appropriations bill, also as a single line item. Since 2009 the FCC's budget has been derived from regulatory fees collected by the agency rather than through a direct appropriation. The fees, often referred to as "Section (9) fees," are collected from license holders and certain other entities. The FCC is authorized to review the regulatory fees each year and adjust them to reflect changes in its appropriation from year to year. Most years, appropriations language prohibits the use by the commission of any excess collections received in the current fiscal year or any prior years.
For FY2020, the FCC has requested $335,660,000 in budget authority from regulatory fee offsetting collections. The FCC also requested $132,538,680 in budget authority for the spectrum auctions program.