Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

No federal law requires testing of drinking water for lead in schools that receive water from public water systems, although these systems are regulated by the EPA. Lead can leach into water from plumbing materials inside a school. The discovery of toxic levels of lead in water in Flint, Michigan, in 2015 has renewed awareness about the danger lead exposure poses to public health, especially for children.
GAO was asked to review school practices for lead testing and remediation. This report examines the extent to which (1) school districts are testing for, finding, and remediating lead in drinking water; (2) states are supporting these efforts; and (3) federal agencies are supporting state and school district efforts. GAO administered a web-based survey to a stratified, random sample of 549 school districts, the results of which are generalizable to all school districts. GAO visited or interviewed officials with 17 school districts with experience in lead testing, spread among 5 states, selected for geographic variation. GAO also interviewed federal and state officials and reviewed relevant laws and documents.

What GAO Found

An estimated 43 percent of school districts, serving 35 million students, tested for lead in school drinking water in 2016 or 2017, according to GAO's nationwide survey of school districts. An estimated 41 percent of school districts, serving 12 million students, had not tested for lead. GAO's survey showed that, among school districts that did test, an estimated 37 percent found elevated lead (lead at levels above their selected threshold for taking remedial action.) (See figure.) All school districts that found elevated lead in drinking water reported taking steps to reduce or eliminate exposure to lead, including replacing water fountains, installing filters or new fixtures, or providing bottled water.
According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), at least 8 states have requirements that schools test for lead in drinking water as of 2017, and at least 13 additional states supported school districts' voluntary efforts with funding or in-kind support for testing and remediation. In addition, the five states GAO visited provided examples of technical assistance to support testing in schools.
EPA provides guidance and other resources to states and school districts regarding testing and remediating lead in drinking water, and the Department of Education (Education) provides some of this information on its websites. School district officials that used EPA's written guidance said they generally found it helpful. Although EPA guidance emphasizes the importance of addressing elevated lead levels, GAO found that some aspects of the guidance, such as the threshold for taking remedial action, were potentially misleading and unclear, which can put school districts at risk of making uninformed decisions. In addition, many school districts reported a lack of familiarity with EPA's guidance, and their familiarity varied by region of the country. Education and EPA do not regularly collaborate to support state and school district efforts on lead in drinking water, despite agreeing to do so in a 2005 memorandum of understanding. Such collaboration could encourage testing and ensure that more school districts will have the necessary information to limit student and staff exposure to lead.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making seven recommendations, including that EPA update its guidance on how schools should determine lead levels requiring action and for EPA and Education to collaborate to further disseminate guidance and encourage testing for lead. EPA and Education agreed with the recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

In 1974, the Settlement Act was intended to provide for the final settlement of a land dispute between the Navajo and Hopi tribes that originated nearly a century ago. The act created ONHIR to carry out the relocation of Navajo and Hopi Indians off land partitioned to the other tribe. ONHIR's relocation efforts were scheduled to end by 1986. However, those efforts continue today.
GAO was asked to review ONHIR's operations. Among other things, this report discusses (1) ONHIR's management and the status of relocation activities and (2) executive branch and legislative actions that may be needed for ONHIR to close and transfer remaining activities. GAO reviewed documentation; interviewed officials at ONHIR and other federal agencies, as well as from the Navajo Nation and Hopi Tribe; and conducted two site visits to ONHIR's offices and the Navajo reservation in Arizona.

What GAO Found

As of December 2017, the Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation, and its predecessor agency (collectively, ONHIR), has relocated 3,660 Navajo and 27 Hopi families off disputed lands that were partitioned to the two tribes and provided new houses for them. Although the Navajo-Hopi Settlement Act of 1974 (Settlement Act) intended for ONHIR to complete its activities 5 years after its relocation plan went into effect, the agency has continued to carry out its responsibilities for over three decades beyond the original deadline and the potential remains for relocation activities to continue into the future. For example, GAO found that by the end of fiscal year 2018
at least 240 households whose relocation applications were previously denied could still file for appeals in federal court and if the court rules in their favor these households could become eligible for relocation benefits under the Settlement Act, and
ONHIR is still responsible for helping homeowners who might request repairs for 52 relocation homes that remain under warranty.
ONHIR believes that it has substantially completed its responsibilities under the Settlement Act and has stated its intent to close by September 2018. However, ONHIR does not have the authority to close its operations and has not yet taken the steps necessary to facilitate such a closure. GAO identified a number of areas where either executive branch or congressional actions would be needed to affect a closure of ONHIR, as shown in these examples:
The Settlement Act states that ONHIR will cease to exist when the President determines that its functions have been fully discharged. ONHIR, however, has not requested a determination nor provided specific information to the President that could facilitate such a decision.
ONHIR has prepared a transition plan and identified potential successor agencies that could assume its remaining activities. However, officials at these agencies said they currently do not have authority under the Settlement Act to undertake ONHIR's activities. Without congressional authorization these agencies would not be able to succeed ONHIR.
ONHIR has prepared an implementation plan to guide its closure but has not yet taken necessary steps to ensure that all the key information about its activities has been compiled. For example, ONHIR's database for tracking warranty requests is missing information, such as the date of warranty repairs and other contractor information. Similarly, ONHIR has not prepared complete information from its files on the remaining denied households who could file for federal appeals. Federal internal control standards state that agencies should identify and respond to risks and use quality information. By not preparing complete information on the relocation activities it has been engaged in, ONHIR places an effective transition of its functions to another agency at risk. This is because any successor agency authorized to continue these activities will not have the complete information needed to effectively fulfill these functions.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making four matters for congressional consideration; including that Congress provide successor agencies necessary authority to continue ONHIR's remaining activities if it closes. GAO is also making five recommendations to ONHIR, including that it request a closure determination from the President and prepare necessary information to facilitate the transfer of its activities to a successor. ONHIR neither agreed nor disagreed with the five recommendations and stated it had either already taken steps or planned to once a successor is identified. GAO continues to believe the recommendations are valid, as discussed in the report.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

In 2014, NASA awarded two firm-fixed-price contracts to Boeing and SpaceX, worth a combined total of up to $6.8 billion, to develop crew transportation systems and conduct initial missions to the ISS. In February 2017, GAO found that both contractors had made progress, but their schedules were under mounting pressure. The contractors were originally required to provide NASA all the evidence it needed to certify that their systems met its requirements by 2017.
A House report accompanying H.R. 5393 included a provision for GAO to review the progress of NASA's human exploration programs. This report examines the Commercial Crew Program, including (1) the extent to which the contractors have made progress towards certification and (2) how NASA's certification process addresses safety of the contractors' crew transportation systems. GAO analyzed contracts, schedules, and other documentation and spoke with officials from NASA, the Commercial Crew Program, Boeing, SpaceX, and two of NASA's independent review bodies that provide oversight.

What GAO Found

Both of the Commercial Crew Program's contractors, Boeing and Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX), are making progress finalizing designs and building hardware for their crew transportation systems, but both contractors continue to delay their certification milestone (see figure). Certification is the process that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) will use to ensure that each contractor's system meets its requirements for human spaceflight for the Commercial Crew Program.
Further delays are likely as the Commercial Crew Program's schedule risk analysis shows that the certification milestone is likely to slip. The analysis identifies a range for each contractor, with an earliest and latest possible completion date, as well as an average. The average certification date was December 2019 for Boeing and January 2020 for SpaceX, according to the program's April 2018 analysis. Since the Space Shuttle was retired in 2011, the United States has been relying on Russia to carry astronauts to and from the International Space Station (ISS). Additional delays could result in a gap in U.S. access to the space station as NASA has contracted for seats on the Russian Soyuz spacecraft only through November 2019. NASA is considering potential options, but it does not have a contingency plan for ensuring uninterrupted U.S. access.
NASA's certification process addresses the safety of the contractors' crew transportation systems through several mechanisms, but there are factors that complicate the process. One of these factors is the loss of crew metric that was put in place to capture the probability of death or permanent disability to an astronaut. NASA has not identified a consistent approach for how to assess loss of crew. As a result, officials across NASA have multiple ways of assessing the metric that may yield different results. Consequently, the risk tolerance level that NASA is accepting with loss of crew varies based upon which entity is presenting the results of its assessment. Federal internal controls state that management should define risk tolerances so they are clear and measurable. Without a consistent approach for assessing the metric, the agency as a whole may not clearly capture or document its risk tolerance with respect to loss of crew.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making five recommendations, including that NASA develop a contingency plan for ensuring a U.S. presence on the ISS and clarify how it will determine its risk tolerance for loss of crew. NASA concurred with three recommendations; partially concurred on the recommendation related to loss of crew; and non-concurred with a recommendation to report its schedule analysis to Congress. GAO believes these recommendations remain valid, as discussed in the report.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

SNAP is the largest federally funded nutrition assistance program. In fiscal year 2017, it provided about $63 billion in benefits. USDA and the states jointly administer SNAP and partner to address issues that affect program integrity, including improper payments and fraud. GAO has previously reported on various aspects of SNAP, including state SNAP E&T programs, improper payment rates, recipient fraud, and retailer trafficking.
This testimony discusses GAO's prior and ongoing work on (1) SNAP E&T programs, including program participants, design, and USDA oversight, and (2) USDA's efforts to address SNAP program integrity, including improper payments, as well as recipient and retailer fraud. As part of its ongoing work on SNAP E&T programs, GAO analyzed E&T expenditures and participation data from fiscal years 2007 through 2016, the most recent data available; reviewed relevant research from USDA; and interviewed USDA and selected state and local officials. The prior work discussed in this testimony is based on four GAO products on E&T programs (GAO-03-388), improper payments (GAO-16-708T), recipient fraud (GAO-14-641), and retailer trafficking (GAO-07-53). Information on the scope and methodology of our prior work is available in each product.

What GAO Found

Overseen by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and administered by states, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Employment and Training (E&T) programs served about 0.5 percent of the approximately 43.5 million SNAP recipients in an average month of fiscal year 2016, according to the most recent USDA data available. These programs are generally designed to help SNAP recipients increase their ability to obtain regular employment through services such as job search and training. Some recipients may be required to participate. According to USDA, about 14 percent of SNAP recipients were subject to work requirements in an average month of fiscal year 2016, while others, such as children and the elderly, were generally exempt from these requirements. States have flexibility in how they design their E&T programs. Over the last several years, states have 1) increasingly moved away from programs that mandate participation, 2) focused on serving able-bodied adults without dependents whose benefits are generally time-limited unless they comply with work requirements, and 3) partnered with state and local organizations to deliver services. USDA has taken steps to increase support and oversight of SNAP E&T since 2014, including collecting new data on participant outcomes from states. GAO has ongoing work reviewing SNAP E&T programs, including USDA oversight.
USDA and the states partner to address issues that affect program integrity, including improper payments and fraud, and USDA has taken some steps to address challenges in these areas, but issues remain.
Improper Payments. In 2016, GAO reviewed SNAP improper payment rates and found that states' adoption of program flexibilities and changes in federal SNAP policy in the previous decade, as well as improper payment rate calculation methods, likely affected these rates. Although USDA reported improper payment estimates for SNAP in previous years, USDA did not report an estimate for benefits paid in fiscal years 2015 or 2016 due to data quality issues in some states. USDA has since been working with the states to improve improper payment estimates for the fiscal year 2017 review.
Recipient Fraud. In 2014, GAO made recommendations to USDA to address challenges states faced in combatting recipient fraud. For example, GAO found that USDA's guidance on the use of transaction data to uncover potential trafficking lacked specificity and recommended USDA develop additional guidance. Since then, USDA has provided technical assistance to some states, including on the use of data analytics. GAO has ongoing work reviewing states' use of data analytics to identify SNAP recipient fraud.
Retailer Trafficking. In 2006, GAO identified several ways in which SNAP was vulnerable to retailer trafficking—a practice involving the exchange of benefits for cash or non-food items. For example, USDA had not conducted analyses to identify high-risk retailers and target its resources. Since then, USDA has established risk levels for retailers based on various factors. GAO has ongoing work assessing how USDA prevents, detects, and responds to retailer trafficking and reviewing the usefulness of USDA's estimates of the extent of SNAP retailer trafficking.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making new recommendations. USDA generally concurred with GAO's prior recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

In response to Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the President announced the ERI, to reassure allies in Europe of U.S. commitment to their security. This initiative has been funded using OCO appropriations, which Congress provides in addition to DOD's base budget appropriations.
The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, included a provision for GAO to review matters related to ERI. In this report, we (1) describe changes in ERI's objectives, funding under ERI, and DOD's posture in Europe since 2014 and (2) evaluate the extent to which DOD's planning processes for posture initiatives funded under ERI prioritize those initiatives, estimate their long-term costs, and communicate their estimated costs to Congress. GAO analyzed DOD strategy documentation, budget and cost analysis guidance, budget justification materials, and cost and obligations data. GAO also interviewed knowledgeable officials within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. European Command, the military services, and the State Department.

What GAO Found

Since 2014, the Department of Defense (DOD) has expanded the European Reassurance Initiative's (ERI) objectives, increased its funding, and planned enhancements to European posture. DOD expanded ERI's objectives from the short-term reassurance of allies and partners to include deterring Russian aggression in the long term and developing the capacity to field a credible combined force should deterrence fail. With respect to funding, DOD will have requested approximately $4.5 billion for ERI's posture enhancements through the end of fiscal year 2017 (about $3.2 billion for fiscal year 2017 alone), and in July 2016 EUCOM identified funding needs for future posture initiatives. The expansion of ERI's objectives has contributed to DOD's enhancing its posture in Europe. Specifically, DOD has increased the size and duration of Army combat unit deployments, planned to preposition Army equipment in Eastern Europe, added new enduring locations (e.g., locations that DOD expects to access and use to support U.S. security interests for the foreseeable future), improved infrastructure, and negotiated new agreements with European nations. As of April 2017, DOD was considering further force enhancements under ERI as part of the department's ERI budget request. DOD also was reviewing whether new enduring locations to support ERI were needed and was considering other improvements to existing infrastructure.
DOD's process for planning ERI has not established priorities among posture initiatives funded under ERI relative to those in its base budget, nor estimated long-term sustainment costs for some posture initiatives funded under ERI, nor communicated future costs to Congress. ERI is being planned using a separate process from DOD's established processes and is funded from DOD's overseas contingency operations (OCO) appropriations. GAO found several weaknesses:
Lack of prioritization : DOD establishes priorities among ERI posture initiatives but has not evaluated them against base budget initiatives using its posture management process. As a result, DOD lacks an understanding of the relative importance of ERI initiatives and may be investing in projects that it will not continue should OCO funding become unavailable.
Lack of sustainment costs : EUCOM and the military services have not fully estimated the long-term costs to sustain equipment and construction funded under ERI. Based on DOD's approach for calculating rough order sustainment costs, GAO determined that these costs could be substantial. DOD officials said that GAO correctly applied DOD's approach for estimating sustainment costs, but noted that actual costs may be lower, because the military services may not fully fund sustainment. In the absence of comprehensive estimates, DOD has been limited in its ability to assess affordability and plan for future costs.
Not communicating future costs : DOD limits Congress's visibility into the resources needed to implement ERI and achieve its objectives because it does not include future costs in its ERI budget request.
This is a public version of a classified report issued in August 2017. Information on specific posture planning, guidance, and budget estimates that DOD deemed to be classified have been omitted from this report.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD prioritize ERI posture initiatives against initiatives in its base budget, develop cost estimates for sustaining initiatives, and communicate future costs to Congress. DOD partially concurred with GAO's recommendations. GAO continues to believe that these recommendations are warranted.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

In May 2015, DOD discovered that one of its laboratories (formerly called the Life Sciences Division) at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, had inadvertently made 575 shipments of live Bacillus anthracis —the bacterium that causes anthrax—to 194 laboratories and contractors worldwide from 2004 through 2015. A December 2015 investigation by the Army determined that there was insufficient evidence to establish a single point of failure and made recommendations for improving safety and security at DOD laboratories that handle BSAT.
The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision for GAO to review DOD's actions to address the Army's recommendations. GAO assessed the extent to which (1) DOD has implemented recommendations from the Army's 2015 investigation report, (2) the Army has implemented the BSAT Biosafety and Biosecurity Program and developed a strategy and implementation plan, (3) the Army's biological T&E mission is independent from its biological R&D mission, and (4) DOD has carried out a required study and evaluation. GAO reviewed DOD documents and key actions in response to the Army's recommendations and conducted site visits to DOD's BSAT laboratories.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) has made progress by taking a number of actions to address the 35 recommendations from the Army's 2015 investigation report on the inadvertent shipments of live Bacillus anthracis (anthrax). However, DOD has not yet developed an approach to measure the effectiveness of these actions. As of March 2018, DOD reports 18 recommendations as having been implemented and 17 as having actions under way to implement them. These actions are part of a broader effort to improve biosafety, biosecurity, and overall program management. For example, in March 2016, DOD established the Biological Select Agents and Toxins (BSAT) Biorisk Program Office to assist in overseeing the BSAT Biosafety and Biosecurity Program and implementation of the recommendations. Measuring the effectiveness of each implemented recommendation would help better determine if the actions taken are working, if there are unintended consequences, or if further action is necessary.
The Secretary of the Army, as DOD's Executive Agent, has implemented a BSAT Biosafety and Biosecurity Program to improve management, coordination, safety, and quality assurance for the DOD BSAT enterprise. However, DOD has not developed a strategy and implementation plan for managing the program. Without a strategy and implementation plan, Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, and DOD's laboratory facilities that currently produce and handle BSAT may be unclear about DOD's strategy to harmonize BSAT operations to ensure safety, security, and standardization of procedures throughout DOD's BSAT enterprise.
The Army has not fully institutionalized measures to ensure that its biological test and evaluation (T&E) mission remains independent from its biological research and development (R&D) mission so that its T&E procedures are objective and reliable. In April 2016, the Army directed the transfer of the operational T&E mission from West Desert Test Center-Life Sciences Division at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, to Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, Maryland. The Army issued a memorandum of agreement between the two entities to lay out roles and responsibilities for test processes and procedures. However, the memorandum does not distinguish T&E from R&D mission requirements, and does not contain guidelines to mitigate risks associated with potential conflicts of interest between the R&D and T&E missions. Without these measures, there is a potential risk to the independence of the T&E mission.
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017 required DOD to report by February 1, 2017, on the feasibility of consolidating BSAT facilities within a unified command, partnering with industry for the production of BSAT in lieu of maintaining such capabilities within the Army, and whether such operations should be transferred to another government or commercial laboratory. DOD has not completed this required study and evaluation of its BSAT infrastructure which, when complete, will affect the future infrastructure of the BSAT Biosafety and Biosecurity Program. Further, DOD officials have no estimated time frames for when DOD will complete the study and evaluation. Without time frames for completing the study and evaluation, DOD is unable to provide decision makers with key information on its infrastructure requirements.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD develop an approach to assess the effectiveness of the recommendations, a strategy and implementation plan for its BSAT Biosafety and Biosecurity Program, measures to ensure independence, and time frames to complete a study. DOD concurred with all four of GAO's recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Contingent faculty play a large role in postsecondary education but may not have the same job protections as tenured or tenure-track faculty. In 2015, GAO reported that contingent workers—those in temporary, contract, or other non-standard employment arrangements—earn less, are less likely to have work-provided benefits, and are more likely to experience job instability than standard workers. GAO was asked to examine issues related to contingent faculty.
This report examines (1) what is known about the makeup and utilization of the postsecondary instructional workforce; (2) the roles different types of faculty fill at selected institutions and the factors administrators consider when determining faculty makeup; (3) what is known about how economic circumstances compare across different faculty types; and (4) what contingent faculty members report as advantages and disadvantages of their work.
GAO analyzed data from nationally representative sources and from public institutions in three states—Georgia, North Dakota, and Ohio. GAO selected these states based primarily on data availability. GAO interviewed administrators from 9 postsecondary institutions in these states and one large for-profit institution. GAO selected institutions based on factors such as institution size and percent of contingent faculty. GAO also conducted 21 discussion groups with contingent faculty.
The Department of Education did not have comments on this report. The National Science Foundation provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate.

What GAO Found

According to 2015 Department of Education data, contingent faculty—those employed outside of the tenure track—made up about 70 percent of postsecondary instructional positions nationwide, though this varied by type of institution. In addition, data from three selected states show that contingent faculty teach about 45 to 54 percent of all courses at 4-year public institutions, and higher proportions at 2-year public institutions. In terms of job stability, some full-time contingent positions with annual or longer contracts may be relatively stable while part-time positions with short-term contracts may be among the least stable, though it is unknown whether faculty in these positions have other employment. In contrast, tenure-track positions are often viewed as having a high degree of job security that is somewhat unique to postsecondary education.
Administrators GAO interviewed at selected postsecondary institutions said full-time contingent faculty generally carry heavy teaching loads, and some also take on additional responsibilities, such as conducting research or advising students. However, administrators stated that part-time contingent faculty generally focus solely on teaching. As shown in the figure below, administrators also described factors they consider in determining their institution's faculty makeup.
GAO examined recent data from North Dakota and Ohio public institutions and found that, among faculty who primarily teach—which excludes individuals such as administrators or researchers—part-time and full-time contingent faculty were paid about 75 percent and 40 percent less per course, respectively, compared to full-time tenure-track faculty. This comparison includes earnings for all of their responsibilities, including teaching and any other duties. However, when estimating faculty earnings for teaching duties only, pay disparities decreased to about 60 percent and 10 percent less per course for these contingent faculty, respectively. In addition, state and national data also showed that relatively few part-time contingent faculty received work-provided health or retirement benefits.
In discussion groups with GAO, contingent faculty cited advantages such as the flexibility to balance professional and personal responsibilities, skill development, or working with students, and described disadvantages that included uncertainty due to short-term contracts, untimely contract renewals, and pay—including a lack of compensation for some of their work. Other concerns they cited included limited career advancement opportunities, not having a voice in institutional decision-making, and not having certain types of institutional support.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

TSA conducts security threat assessment screening and credentialing activities for millions of workers and travelers in the maritime, surface, and aviation transportation industries that are seeking access to transportation systems. In 2008, TSA initiated the TIM program to enhance the sophistication of its security threat assessments and to improve the capacity of its supporting systems. However, the program experienced significant cost and schedule overruns, and performance issues, and was suspended in January 2015 while TSA established a new strategy. The program was rebaselined in September 2016 and is estimated to cost approximately $1.27 billion and be fully operational by 2021 (about $639 million more and 6 years later than originally planned).
GAO was asked to review the TIM program's new strategy. This report determined, among other things, the extent to which (1) TSA implemented selected key practices for transitioning to Agile software development for the program; and (2) TSA and DHS are effectively overseeing the program's cost, schedule, and performance. GAO compared program documentation to key practices identified by the Software Engineering Institute and the Office of Management and Budget, as being critical to transitioning to Agile and for overseeing and governing programs.

What GAO Found

The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) new strategy for the Technology Infrastructure Modernization (TIM) program includes using Agile software development, but the program only fully implemented two of six leading practices necessary to ensure successful Agile adoption. Specifically, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and TSA leadership fully committed to adopt Agile and TSA provided Agile training. Nonetheless, the program had not defined key roles and responsibilities, prioritized system requirements, or implemented automated capabilities that are essential to ensuring effective adoption of Agile. Until TSA adheres to all leading practices for Agile implementation, the program will be putting at risk its ability to deliver a quality system that strengthens and enhances the sophistication of TSA's security threat assessments and credentialing programs.
TSA and DHS fully implemented one of the key practices for overseeing the TIM program, by establishing a process for ensuring corrective actions are identified and tracked. However, TSA and DHS did not fully implement the remaining three key practices, which impede the effectiveness of their oversight. Specifically,
TSA and DHS documented selected policies and procedures for governance and oversight of the TIM program, but they did not develop or finalize other key oversight and governance documents. For example, TSA officials developed a risk management plan tailored for Agile; however, they did not update the TIM system life-cycle plan to reflect the Agile governance framework they were using.
The TIM program management office conducted frequent performance reviews, but did not establish thresholds or targets for oversight bodies to use to ensure that the program was meeting acceptable levels of performance. In addition, department-level oversight bodies have focused on reviewing selected program life-cycle metrics for the TIM program; however, they did not measure the program against the rebaselined cost, or important Agile release-level metrics.
TIM's reported performance data were not always complete and accurate. For example, program officials reported that they were testing every line of code, even though they were unable to confirm that they were actually doing so, thus calling into question the accuracy of the data reported.
These gaps in oversight and governance of the TIM program were due to, among other things, TSA officials not updating key program management documentation and DHS leadership not obtaining consensus on needed oversight and governance changes related to Agile programs. Given that TIM is a historically troubled program and is at least 6 months behind its rebaselined schedule, it is especially concerning that TSA and DHS have not fully implemented oversight and governance practices for this program. Until TSA and DHS fully implement these practices to ensure the TIM program meets its cost, schedule, and performance targets, the program is at risk of repeating past mistakes and not delivering the capabilities that were initiated 9 years ago to protect the nation's transportation infrastructure.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making 14 recommendations, including that DHS should prioritize requirements and obtain leadership consensus on oversight and governance changes. DHS concurred with all 14 recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

The global terrorist threat to surface transportation – freight and passenger rail, mass transit, highway, maritime and pipeline systems – has increased in recent years, as demonstrated by the 2017 London vehicle attacks and a 2016 thwarted attack on mass transit in the New York area. TSA is the primary federal agency responsible for securing surface transportation in the United States.
GAO was asked to review TSA surface inspector activities. This report addresses (1) how TSA surface inspectors implement the agency's surface transportation security mission, and (2) the extent to which TSA has used a risk-based approach to prioritize and implement surface inspector activities. GAO analyzed TSA data on surface inspector activities from fiscal year 2013 through March 24, 2017, reviewed TSA program and risk documents and guidance, and observed surface inspectors conducting multiple activities. GAO also interviewed TSA officials in 17 of 49 surface field offices and 15 industry stakeholders.

What GAO Found

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) surface transportation security inspectors—known as surface inspectors—conduct a variety of activities to implement the agency's surface security mission, including:
Regulatory Inspections: Surface inspectors enforce freight rail, passenger rail, and maritime security regulations. GAO found that, according to TSA data, surface inspectors reported spending approximately 20 percent of their time on these activities from fiscal years 2013 to 2017.
Non-regulatory assessments and assistance: Surface inspectors conduct voluntary assessments and provide training to surface transportation entities, among other things. GAO found that, according to TSA data, inspectors reported spending approximately 80 percent of their time on these activities.
In addition to mission-related activities, surface inspectors can assist with aviation-related activities. However, GAO found that TSA has incomplete information on the total time surface inspectors spend on these activities because of limitations in TSA's data system. Addressing these limitations would provide TSA with complete information when making decisions about inspector activities.
GAO also found that TSA prioritized inspector activities in the surface transportation mode with the lowest risk because TSA did not incorporate risk assessment results when planning and monitoring activities. Specifically, in fiscal year 2016, the last full year for which data on inspectors' activities in the surface modes was available, surface inspectors reported spending more than twice as much time on the lowest risk surface transportation mode according to TSA risk assessments than on the highest risk surface transportation mode. Incorporating risk assessment results when prioritizing inspector activities would help TSA ensure that its surface security resources address the highest risks.
In fiscal year 2017, TSA fully implemented a new risk mitigation program—Risk Mitigation Activities for Surface Transportation (RMAST)—intended to focus time and resources on high-risk surface transportation entities and locations. However, GAO found that TSA has not identified or prioritized these high-risk entities and locations, or defined the RMAST program's objectives and associated activities in a measurable and clear way. According to TSA officials, they have not done so because there are too many potential entities to list them all for prioritization and TSA has not identified an approach for determining the effectiveness of activities under the program. However, prioritizing high-risk entities, such as by type, characteristics, or location does not require a complete list of entities. By identifying and prioritizing high-risk entities and locations for RMAST, and clearly defining the program's activities and objectives, TSA would be better able to implement RMAST activities in a risk-based manner and measure their effectiveness.
This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in October 2017. Information that TSA deemed sensitive has been omitted.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that TSA (1) address limitations in its data system to collect complete information, (2) ensure inspector activities more closely align with the results of risk assessments, (3) identify and prioritize entities and locations for its risk mitigation program, and (4) define measurable and clear objectives for the program. TSA concurred with these recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Approximately 4.6 million youth ages 16 to 24 were neither in school nor employed in 2016. WIOA, enacted in July 2014, provides, in part, grants to states and local areas to assist youth—particularly out-of-school youth—in accessing employment, education, and training services. It also emphasizes the provision of work experiences to in- and out-of-school youth.
GAO was asked to review how states and local areas are using WIOA grants to serve youth. This report examines (1) what is known about states' and local areas' progress in meeting WIOA spending requirements for serving out-of-school youth and for providing youth with work experiences; (2) how local areas are addressing WIOA's emphasis on serving out-of-school youth and any challenges, and (3) how local areas are addressing WIOA's emphasis on youth work experiences and any challenges. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; interviewed DOL officials; analyzed DOL state level WIOA youth program expenditure data from program years 2015 and 2016, the most recent data available; surveyed a nationally representative sample of local workforce development areas; and visited nine local workforce development areas in three states selected for their relatively large WIOA Youth funding allotments and relatively high rates of out-of-school youth.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOL and the Department of Education provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which were incorporated as appropriate.

What GAO Found

Most states reported they were on target to meet the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act's (WIOA) requirement to spend 75 percent of their Program Year 2015 and 2016 youth grant funding to serve out-of-school youth, according to Department of Labor (DOL) data. Because deadlines had not arrived for the spending of state youth grant allotments for these program years, compliance could not be determined. Similarly, most local areas reported they were on track to meet the out-of-school youth spending requirement, as well as the requirement that 20 percent of local youth grant funds be spent on providing work experiences to youth. Through GAO's survey, many local areas reported it was not challenging or only slightly challenging to meet the spending requirements, but some reported experiencing greater challenges (see figure). Under WIOA, DOL does not collect local expenditure information, but states must monitor local areas' compliance while DOL monitors state oversight. DOL has taken some steps to determine whether states are carrying out their monitoring responsibilities, including limited on-site monitoring and ongoing dialogue with states. According to DOL officials, the agency's monitoring of the new requirements has thus far focused on providing technical assistance and guidance, but they reported plans for more formal compliance monitoring.
Note: All percentage estimates in this figure have a margin of error of plus or minus 10 percentage points or fewer. Percentages do not add to 100 due to rounding and because a small number of survey respondents answered “don't know” or did not respond.
Local areas reported in GAO's survey that they used a combination of strategies to meet the WIOA spending requirement for serving out-of-school youth and to address other related challenges. For example, many local areas reported suspending enrollment of in-school-youth to help meet the requirement to spend 75 percent of youth grant funds on out-of-school youth. In addition, local areas reported having taken steps to address challenges locating, retaining, and serving out-of-school youth in their WIOA-funded programs, including increasing their recruiting efforts and strengthening partnerships with other WIOA programs, state and local government agencies, and community-based organizations.
To meet WIOA's 20 percent spending requirement for work experiences, local areas reported expanding work experience opportunities for youth, most commonly with temporary paid employment. An estimated 81 percent of local areas reported they paid youth participants' salaries, with most paying the entire salary. Many local areas also reported challenges, including youths' lack of job-readiness and employers' reluctance to hire WIOA participants. To address these challenges, local areas reported providing job-readiness training for youth and strengthening partnerships with employers.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

EM manages DOE's radioactive and hazardous waste cleanup program using compliance agreements negotiated between DOE and other federal and state agencies. Within the agreements, milestones outline cleanup work to be accomplished by specific deadlines. EM's cleanup program faces nearly $500 billion in future environmental liability, which has grown substantially.
GAO was asked to review DOE's cleanup agreements. This report examines the extent to which EM (1) tracks the milestones in cleanup agreements for EM's cleanup sites; (2) has met, missed, or postponed cleanup-related milestones at selected sites and how EM reports information; and (3) has analyzed why milestones are missed or postponed and how EM considers those reasons when renegotiating milestones.
GAO reviewed agreements and milestones at EM's 16 cleanup sites and compared information tracked by EM headquarters and these sites; interviewed officials from four selected sites (chosen for variation in location and scope of cleanup, among other factors); and reviewed EM guidance related to milestone negotiations.

What GAO Found

The cleanup process at the 16 sites overseen by the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) is governed by 72 agreements and hundreds of milestones specifying actions EM is to take as it carries out its cleanup work. However, EM headquarters and site officials do not consistently track data on the milestones. EM headquarters and site officials provided GAO with different totals on the number of milestones in place at the four sites GAO selected for review. These discrepancies result from how headquarters and selected sites define and track milestones. First, not all sites make the same distinction between major (i.e., related to on-the-ground cleanup) and non-major milestones and, as a result, are not consistently reporting the same milestones to EM headquarters. Second, sites do not consistently provide EM headquarters with the most up-to-date information on the status of milestones at each site. These inconsistencies limit EM's ability to use milestones to manage the cleanup mission and monitor its progress.
EM does not accurately track met, missed, or postponed cleanup-related milestones at the four selected sites, and EM's milestone reporting to Congress is incomplete. EM sites renegotiate milestone dates before they are missed, and EM does not track the history of these changes. This is because once milestones change, sites are not required to maintain or track the original milestone dates. GAO has previously found that without a documented and consistently-applied schedule change control process, program staff may continually revise the schedule to match performance, hindering management's insight into the true performance of the project. Further, since 2011, EM has not consistently reported to Congress on the status of the milestones each year, as required, and the information it has reported is incomplete. EM reports the most recently renegotiated milestone dates with no indication of whether or how often those milestones have been missed or postponed. Since neither EM headquarters nor the sites track renegotiated milestones and their baseline dates at the sites, milestones do not provide a reliable measure of program performance.
EM officials at headquarters and selected sites have not conducted root cause analyses on missed or postponed milestones; thus, such analyses are not part of milestone negotiations. Specifically, EM has not done a complex-wide analysis of the reasons for missed or postponed milestones. Similarly, officials GAO interviewed at the four selected sites said that they were not aware of any site-wide review of why milestones were missed or postponed. Best practices for project and program management outlined in GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide note the importance of identifying root causes of problems that lead to schedule delays. Additionally, in a 2015 directive, DOE emphasized the importance of conducting such analysis. Analyzing the root causes of missed or postponed milestones would better position EM to address systemic problems and consider those problems when renegotiating milestones with regulators. Without such analysis, EM and its cleanup regulators lack information to set more realistic and achievable milestones and, as a result, future milestones are likely to continue to be pushed back, further delaying the cleanup work. As GAO has reported previously, these delays lead to increases in the overall cost of the cleanup.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making four recommendations, including that EM establish a standard definition of milestones across the cleanup sites, track and report original and renegotiated milestone dates, and identify the root causes of why milestones are missed or postponed. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOE agreed with three of the recommendations and partially agreed with a fourth.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

CRAs collect, maintain, and sell to third parties large amounts of sensitive data about consumers, including Social Security numbers and credit card numbers. Businesses and other entities commonly use these data to determine eligibility for credit, employment, and insurance. In 2017, Equifax, one of the largest CRAs, experienced a breach that compromised the records of at least 145.5 million consumers.
GAO was asked to examine issues related to federal oversight of CRAs. Among other things, this report discusses (1) measures FTC has taken to enforce CRA compliance with requirements to protect consumer information, (2) measures CFPB has taken to ensure CRA protection of consumer information, and (3) actions consumers can take after a breach. GAO reviewed relevant laws, documentation related to CRA examinations, and policies and practices of selected CRAs; and interviewed representatives of regulatory agencies, CRAs, consumer and industry groups, and Attorneys General from four states with consumer reporting requirements.

What GAO Found

Since 2008, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has settled 34 enforcement actions against various entities related to consumer reporting violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), including 17 actions against consumer reporting agencies (CRA). Some of these settlements included civil penalties—fines for wrongdoing that do not require proof of harm—for FCRA violations or violations of consent orders. However, FTC does not have civil penalty authority for violations of requirements under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), which, unlike FCRA, includes a provision directing federal regulators and FTC to establish standards for financial institutions to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security of customer records. To obtain monetary redress for these violations, FTC must identify affected consumers and any monetary harm they may have experienced. However, harm resulting from privacy and security violations can be difficult to measure and can occur years in the future, making it difficult to trace a particular harm to a specific breach. As a result, FTC lacks a practical enforcement tool for imposing civil money penalties that could help to deter companies, including CRAs, from violating data security provisions of GLBA and its implementing regulations.
Since 2015, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has had five public settlements with CRAs. Four of these settlements included alleged violations of FCRA; and three included alleged violations of unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices provisions. CFPB is also responsible for supervising larger CRAs (those with more than $7 million in annual receipts from consumer reporting) but lacks the data needed to ensure identification of all CRAs that meet this threshold. Identifying additional sources of information on these CRAs, such as by requiring them to register with the agency through a rulemaking or leveraging state registration information, could help CFPB ensure that it can comprehensively carry out its supervisory responsibilities. According to CFPB staff, the bureau does not have authority to examine for or enforce the GLBA’s safeguards provisions. After the Equifax breach, however, CFPB used its existing supervisory authority to examine the data security of certain CRAs. CFPB’s process for prioritizing which CRAs to examine does not routinely include an assessment of companies’ data security risks, but doing so could help CFPB better detect such risks and prevent the further exposure or compromise of consumer information.
If a CRA experiences a data breach, affected consumers can take actions to mitigate the risk of identity theft—such as implementing a fraud alert or credit freeze—and can file a complaint with FTC or CFPB. However, consumers are limited in the direct actions they can take against the CRA. Consumers generally cannot exercise choice in the consumer reporting market—such as by choosing which CRAs maintain their information—if they are dissatisfied with a CRA’s privacy or security practices. In addition, according to CFPB, consumers cannot remove themselves from the consumer reporting market entirely because they do not have a legal right to delete their records with CRAs. This limited control by consumers, coupled with the large amount and sensitive nature of the information CRAs possess, underscores the importance of appropriate federal oversight of CRAs’ data security.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that Congress consider giving FTC civil penalty authority to enforce GLBA’s safeguarding provisions. GAO also recommends that CFPB (1) identify additional sources of information on larger CRAs, and (2) reassess its prioritization of examinations to address CRA data security. CFPB neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO’s recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

The F-22 was designed and fielded as the Air Force's premier air-to-air fighter. The small fleet of 186 F-22s is central to the Air Force's ability to accomplish its air superiority mission in high threat areas. While the Air Force has focused on other missions over the last 15 years of conflict, it is now trying to refocus on overcoming advanced threats, even as it continues to support ongoing operations. Though the recent introduction of the F-35 gives the Air Force another advanced fighter, the F-35 is primarily designed for the air-to-ground missions and so is intended to complement but not replace the F-22.
Senate Report 114-255 included a provision for GAO to review a variety of issues related to Air Force F-22 fighter squadrons. This report examines the extent to which the Air Force's (1) organization of its F-22 fleet maximizes availability of aircraft and (2) utilization of its F-22 fleet affects pilot air superiority training. GAO reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) guidance, analyzed maintenance data and training information for the F-22, evaluated the use of F-22s during deployments, and interviewed agency officials. This is a public version of a classified report issued in April 2018. Information DOD deemed classified or sensitive has been omitted.

What GAO Found

The Air Force's organization of its small F-22 fleet has not maximized the availability of these 186 aircraft. Availability is constrained by maintenance challenges and unit organization. For example, stealth is a central feature of the F-22 and, according to Air Force officials, maintaining the stealth coating on the outside of the aircraft is time consuming and significantly reduces the time F-22s are available for missions. Maintenance availability challenges are exacerbated by the Air Force's decision to organize the F-22 fleet into small units—18 or 21 primary mission aircraft per squadron and one or two squadrons per wing. Traditional fighter wings have three squadrons per wing with 24 aircraft in each squadron, which creates maintenance efficiencies because people, equipment, and parts can be shared, according to Air Force officials. Moreover, the Air Force organized F-22 squadrons to operate from a single location. However, it generally deploys only a part of a squadron, and the remaining part struggles to keep aircraft available for missions at home. Larger, traditional Air Force squadrons and deployable units provide a better balance of equipment and personnel, according to service officials. The Air Force has not reassessed the structure of its F-22 fleet since 2010. Without conducting a comprehensive assessment to identify and assess F-22 organization, the Air Force may be foregoing opportunities to improve the availability of its small yet critical F-22 fleet, and support combatant commander air superiority needs in high threat environments.
The Air Force's utilization of its F-22 fleet has limited pilot opportunities to train for air superiority missions in high threat environments. To complete the annual training requirements for air superiority missions, F-22 pilots must train almost the entire year. However, F-22 pilots are not meeting their minimum yearly training requirements for the air superiority missions, according to Air Force training reports and service officials. Moreover, the utilization of F-22s for exercises and operational missions that do not require the F-22's unique capabilities interrupt pilot training and lead to reduced proficiency. For example, F-22 units are often directed to participate in partnership building exercises. However, during these exercises, F-22 pilots may be restricted from flying the F-22 the way they would fly it in combat—due to security concerns about exposing the F-22's unique capabilities. These restrictions limit the value of the exercises and can result in pilots developing bad habits, according to Air Force officials. The Air Force also uses F-22s to support alert missions—a mission that requires certain bases to have jets ready at all times to respond to threats from civil or military aviation. The alert mission does not require the advanced capabilities of the F-22, but there are no other operational Air Force fighter squadrons currently based at the F-22 locations in Alaska and Hawaii, so the alert mission falls to the F-22 units. Pilots and aircraft assigned to the alert mission cannot be used for any other purposes, including training. This limits opportunities for pilots to enhance air superiority skills. Without examining and implementing options to improve F-22 pilot training opportunities, the Air Force may be foregoing opportunities to improve its capability to address the high-end air superiority challenges it expects to face.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Air Force reassess its F-22 organizational structure to determine alternative approaches to organizing F-22 squadrons, and identify ways to increase F-22 pilot training opportunities for high-end air superiority missions. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Over the past decade, the United States and the international community have sought to improve security in the DRC. In the eastern DRC, armed groups have committed severe human rights abuses, including sexual violence, and reportedly profit from the exploitation of “conflict minerals”— in particular, tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold, according to the United Nations. Congress included a provision in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act that, among other things, required the SEC to promulgate regulations regarding the use of conflict minerals from the DRC and adjoining countries. The SEC adopted these regulations in 2012. The act also included a provision for GAO to annually assess the SEC regulations' effectiveness in promoting peace and security and report on the rate of sexual violence in the DRC and adjoining countries.
In this report, GAO provides information about (1) companies' conflict minerals disclosures filed with the SEC in 2017 compared with disclosures filed in the prior 2 years and (2) the rate of sexual violence in the eastern DRC and adjoining countries published in 2017 and early 2018. GAO analyzed a generalizable random sample of SEC filings and interviewed relevant officials. GAO reviewed U.S., United Nations, and international organizations' reports; interviewed DRC officials, and other stakeholders; and conducted fieldwork in New York at the United Nations headquarters.
GAO is not making any recommendations.

What GAO Found

GAO's review of companies' conflict minerals disclosures filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2017 found that, in general, they were similar to disclosures filed in the prior 2 years. In 2017, 1,165 companies filed conflict minerals disclosures—about the same as in 2016 and 2015. Percentages of companies reporting country-of-origin inquiries in 2017 were also similar to the percentages from those 2 prior years. As a result of the inquiries they conducted, an estimated 53 percent of companies reported in 2017 whether the conflict minerals in their products came from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and adjoining countries—similar to the estimated 49 percent in 2016 and 2015 but significantly higher than the estimate of 30 percent in 2014 (see figure). In their 2017 disclosure reports, many companies described actions they took to improve data collection processes, and most companies indicated some challenges in determining the country of origin.
Similar to the prior 2 years, almost all companies required to conduct due diligence, as a result of their country-of-origin inquiries, reported doing so. After conducting due diligence to determine the source and chain of custody of any conflict minerals used, an estimated 37 percent of these companies reported in 2017 that they were able to determine that their conflict minerals came from covered countries or from scrap or recycled sources, compared with 39 and 23 percent in 2016 and 2015, respectively. Four companies in GAO's sample declared their products “DRC conflict-free,” and of those, three included the required Independent Private Sector Audit report (IPSA), and one did not. In 2017, 16 companies filed an IPSA; 19 did so in 2016.
GAO found information on the rate of sexual violence in the 2017 Uganda and Burundi Demographic and Health Surveys. For Uganda, 22 percent of women and 9 percent of men reported they had experienced sexual violence at least once in their lifetime. For Burundi, 23 percent of women and 6 percent of men reported they had experienced sexual violence at least once in their lifetime. The most recent information on the rate of sexual violence for eastern DRC and Rwanda is from 2016 and is discussed in our previous GAO reports.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 included provisions that VA and DOD jointly develop and implement electronic health record systems or capabilities and accelerate the exchange of health care information. The act also required that these systems be compliant with applicable interoperability standards. Further, the act established a joint Interagency Program Office to act as a single point of accountability for the efforts, with the function of implementing, by September 30, 2009, electronic health record systems that allow for full interoperability.
This testimony discusses GAO's previously reported findings on the establishment and evolution of the Interagency Program Office over the last decade. In developing this testimony, GAO summarized findings from its reports issued in 2008 through 2018, and information on the departments' actions in response to GAO's recommendations.

What GAO Found

Since its establishment in 2008, the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Interagency Program Office has been involved in various approaches to increase health information interoperability. However, the office has not been effectively positioned to function as the single point of accountability for the departments' electronic health record system interoperability efforts. For example,
Between July 2008 and January 2010, GAO issued reports on VA's and DOD's efforts to set up the office, which highlighted steps the departments had taken, but also identified deficiencies, such as vacant leadership positions and a lack of necessary plans. GAO recommended that the departments improve management of their interoperability efforts by developing a project plan and results-oriented performance goals and measures.
In April 2009, the Interagency Program Office was assigned responsibility for establishing a lifetime electronic record for servicemembers and veterans, called the Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record. GAO reported in February 2011 that, among other things, the office had not developed and approved an integrated master schedule, a master program plan, or performance metrics for the initiative, as outlined in the office's charter. Accordingly, GAO recommended that the departments correct these deficiencies to strengthen their efforts to establish the Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record.
In March 2011, VA and DOD committed to jointly developing a new, common integrated electronic health record system and empowered the Interagency Program Office with increased authority, expanded responsibilities, and increased staffing levels for leading the integrated system effort. However, in February 2013, the departments abandoned their plan to develop the integrated system and stated that they would again pursue separate modernization efforts. In February 2014, GAO reported on this decision and recommended that VA and DOD take steps to better position the office to function as the single point of accountability for achieving interoperability between the departments' electronic health record systems.
VA and DOD stated that they agreed with the above GAO recommendations. However, in several cases the departments' subsequent actions were incomplete and did not fully address all recommendations.
In June 2017 VA announced that it planned to acquire the same electronic health record system that DOD has been acquiring. GAO testified in June 2018 that a governance structure had been proposed that would be expected to leverage existing joint governance facilitated by the Interagency Program Office. At that time, VA's program officials had stated that the department's governance plans for the new program were expected to be finalized in October 2018. However, the officials have not yet indicated what role, if any, the Interagency Program Office is to have in the governance process. Ensuring that the role and responsibilities of the office are clearly defined within these governance plans is essential to VA successfully acquiring and implementing the same system as DOD.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that VA clearly define the role and responsibilities of the Interagency Program Office in the governance plans for acquisition of the department's new electronic health record syst


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Saving for retirement can be difficult. However, when participants lose their workplace retirement accounts when they change employers or participate in a workplace retirement plan abroad they can encounter additional challenges in securing adequate retirement savings. GAO was asked to review steps federal agencies might take to assist participants with these challenges.
This report examines key challenges U.S. participants face with: (1) unclaimed retirement accounts in the United States, and (2) complying with U.S. tax reporting requirements on their foreign retirement savings. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations, and reviewed selected tax treaties. GAO interviewed stakeholders in the United States and in Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom—chosen because these locations host relatively large populations of U.S. individuals and have well-developed workplace retirement systems.

What GAO Found

Plan participants in the United States face challenges after they change jobs, including not receiving communications from their plan sponsor and being vulnerable to unforeseen tax consequences that can result in a loss of retirement savings. GAO previously reported that when participants leave savings in a plan after separating from a job, the onus is on them to update former employers with their new address and to respond to their former employer's communications. GAO found that although an employer may incur costs searching for separated participants, there are no standard practices for the frequency or method of conducting searches. GAO reported that from 2004 through 2013, over 25 million participants in workplace plans separated from an employer and left at least one retirement account behind, despite efforts of sponsors and regulators to help participants manage their accounts. Department of Labor (DOL) officials told GAO that some sponsors do not search for participants when disclosures are returned as undeliverable. DOL has issued guidance on searching for missing participants for some plans that are terminating, but guidance does not exist on what actions DOL expects ongoing plan sponsors to take to keep track of separated participants. A key element of DOL's mission is to protect the benefits of workers and families. However, without guidance on how to search for separated participants who leave behind retirement accounts, sponsors may choose to do little more than remove unclaimed accounts from the plan when possible, and workers may never recover these savings.
Stakeholders told GAO that U.S. individuals who participate in foreign workplace retirement plans face challenges reporting their retirement savings for tax purposes because of complex federal requirements governing the taxation of foreign retirement accounts and a lack of clear guidance on how to report these savings. For example, stakeholders told GAO it is not always clear to U.S individuals or their tax preparers how foreign workplace retirement plans should be reported to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the process for determining this can be complex, time-consuming, and costly. In the absence of clear guidance on how to correctly report these savings, U.S. individuals who participate in these plans may continue to run the risk of filing incorrect returns. Further, U.S. individuals in foreign retirement plans also face problems transferring retirement savings when they switch jobs. In the United States, transfers of retirement savings from one qualified plan to another are exempt from U.S. tax. However, foreign plans are generally not tax-qualified under the Internal Revenue Code, according to IRS officials, and such transfers could have tax consequences for U.S. individuals participating in foreign retirement plans. Officials from the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) told GAO that a change to the U.S. tax code could improve the tax treatment of transfers between foreign retirement plans that Treasury has already examined. Without action to address this issue, U.S. individuals may not consolidate their foreign retirement accounts or may have to pay higher U.S. taxes on transfers than taxpayers participating in qualified plans in the United States, threatening the ability of U.S. individuals to save for retirement abroad.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends Congress consider addressing taxation issues affecting the transfer of retirement assets between plans within the same foreign country. GAO is making seven recommendations, including that DOL issue guidance to help ongoing plan sponsors search for separated participants, and that IRS issue guidance to clarify how U.S. individuals should report foreign retirement savings to the IRS. The agencies generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. IRS disagreed with two of GAO's recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

TSA employs about 43,000 Transportation Security Officers (TSO) who screen over 2 million passengers and their property each day at airports in the United States. TSA allocates TSOs to airports using both a computer-based staffing model and information from airports intended to provide each airport with the optimum number of TSOs. In the spring of 2016, long screening checkpoint lines at certain U.S. airports raised questions about TSA's process for allocating TSOs to airports. This testimony addresses (1) how TSA monitors wait times and throughput, and (2) tools TSA uses to respond to increases in passenger wait times. This testimony is based on a report GAO issued in February, 2018: GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Uses Current Assumptions and Airport-Specific Data for Its Staffing Process and Monitors Passenger Wait Times Using Daily Operations Data . GAO-18-236 , Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2018. For that report, among other things, GAO analyzed TSA documentation and passenger wait time and throughput data.

What GAO Found

In February 2018, GAO reported that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) uses data to monitor passenger wait times and throughput, the number of passengers that are screened at each airport checkpoint, on a daily basis and responds to increases. For example, TSA's Airport Operations Center (AOC) monitors daily wait times and passenger throughput from 28 airports that TSA officials say represent the majority of passenger throughput nationwide or are operationally significant. Furthermore, TSA officials at airports are required to report to the AOC when an event occurs--such as equipment malfunctions--that affects airport screening operations and results in wait times that are greater than 30 minutes in standard screening lanes. For its February 2018 report, GAO analyzed wait time data for the AOC-monitored airports for the period of January 2015 through May 2017 and found that TSA's reported wait times met its standard of less than 30 minutes in standard screening 99 percent of the time. Within that time frame, two airports accounted for the longest wait times in the spring of 2016. TSA officials also identified several tools, such as passenger screening canines, that they reported using to respond to increases in passenger wait times at these airports.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making any recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

The crisis in Flint, Michigan, brought increased attention to lead in drinking water infrastructure. Lead in drinking water primarily comes from corrosion of service lines connecting the water main to a house or building. In 1991, EPA issued the Lead and Copper Rule that required water systems to conduct a “materials inventory” of lead service lines. In light of the events in Flint, EPA sent a letter to all states in February 2016 encouraging them to work with water systems to publicly post the materials inventory, along with any additional updated maps or inventories of lead service linesactions the rule does not require.
A House Committee report accompanying a bill for the Department of the Interior, Environment and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017, includes a provision for GAO to review lead service lines. This report examines (1) what is known about the number of existing lead service lines among states and water systems and (2) states' responses to EPA's February 2016 request to work with water systems to publicize inventories of lead service lines and any steps EPA has taken to follow up on these responses. GAO reviewed existing studies of lead service lines, reviewed the websites of the 100 largest water systems, and interviewed EPA officials in headquarters and its 10 regional offices.

What GAO Found

The total number of lead service lines is unknown and while national, state, and local estimates exist, approaches used to count lead service lines vary. A 2016 American Water Works Association study estimated that nationally there were 6.1 million lead service lines, but the study has significant sampling limitations and, as a result, likely does not accurately reflect the total number of lead service lines nationwide. In addition, at least two statesMassachusetts and Washingtonpublished reports with estimates of lead service lines and reported 22,023 and 1,000-2,000 lead service lines as of 2016 and 2017, respectively. Certain water systems also have estimates, such as the approximately 7 percent of publicly owned lead service lines out of the area's total number of service lines cited by a representative for the system serving Cincinnati, Ohio and surrounding areas, as of May 2018.
While most states informed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that they intend to fulfill the agency's request to publicize inventories of lead service lines, EPA has identified potential challenges to these efforts. Of the approximately 43 states that responded that they would fulfill EPA's request, almost all (39) reported to EPA that, although they had encouraged water systems to publicize inventories, few systems had completed these actions. GAO found in January 2018 that, of the 100 largest water systems, 12 had publicized information on the inventory of lead service lines. According to EPA, among challenges in conducting inventories of lead service lines and publicizing information about lead service lines were concerns about posting on public websites information about lead service lines on private property; and a lack of records about the locations of lead service lines. EPA told GAO the agency was focused on state compliance with drinking water rules, and not following up with information on how states could address the challenges cited. By sharing information with all states about the approaches that some states and water systems are using to successfully identify and publicize information about lead service lines, including responses to potential challenges, EPA could encourage states to be more transparent to the public and support the agency's objectives for safe drinking water.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that EPA share information about the successful approaches states and water systems use to identify and publicize locations of lead service lines with all states. EPA agreed with the recommendation.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

DOD uses both military depots and contractors to maintain its complex weapon systems and equipment. Recognizing the depots' key role and the risk of overreliance on contractors, section 2464 of title 10 of the U.S. Code requires DOD to maintain a core logistics capability that is government-owned and operated, involving a combination of personnel, facilities, equipment, processes, and technology. Section 2464 requires DOD to provide a Biennial Core Report to Congress that addresses 10 reporting elements, including information on its core capability requirements and projected workload for the next fiscal year.
Section 2464 includes a provision that GAO review DOD's Biennial Core Reports for compliance and completeness. In reviewing the 2018 Biennial Core Report, GAO assessed the extent to which DOD's report (1) addressed the 10 reporting elements required by section 2464(d), and (2) is complete. GAO reviewed and analyzed relevant legislation, DOD guidance, and the 2018 Biennial Core Report, and met with DOD and military service officials to discuss the processes used to develop the information in DOD's 2018 Biennial Core Report.

What GAO Found

In its 2018 Biennial Core Report, the Department of Defense (DOD) addressed 8 of 10 reporting elements. Specifically, DOD reported, by military service, its:
depot maintenance workload required to sustain core maintenance capability requirements, based on contingency planning scenarios;
projected fiscal year 2019 depot maintenance workloads; and
projected fiscal year 2019 shortfalls (i.e., insufficient workload to sustain the required level of capability) and rationales and mitigations for those shortfalls.
The Army reported a projected workload for fiscal year 2019 that would meet about 84 percent of its identified core capability—a shortfall of 2.9 million direct labor hours (see figure). The Army identified numerous reasons—such as newly established software depot maintenance requirements—for its shortfalls. Furthermore, the Army presented mitigation plans for its shortfalls, such as moving software-related work from contractor to military sources.
The other services did not report overall shortfalls, but some services reported shortfalls associated with specific types of work. For example, the Air Force reported a shortage associated with the repair of tactical missiles. As a mitigation plan, the Air Force stated that it plans to use workload associated with repairing strategic missiles to maintain this capability, since the electronics on the two types of missiles are very similar and require the same maintenance skill set.
DOD did not address two required reporting elements—progress in implementing mitigation plans from the 2016 biennial core report, and the degree to which projected workload reported in the 2016 biennial core report was executed. According to DOD officials, changes in its guidance and processes for developing the 2018 report resulted in the 2016 and 2018 reports not being directly comparable. However, DOD officials stated that they plan to address these two elements in the 2020 Biennial Core Report.
DOD's 2018 Biennial Core Report is generally complete, in that it lacks obvious errors and aligns with supporting information provided by the services. DOD's concerted efforts to implement better guidance and procedures—in part, according to DOD officials, by implementing GAO's prior recommendations from 2012, 2014, and 2016—assisted in improving the completeness of the report.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Research has shown that hospital closures can affect rural residents' access to health care services and that certain rural residents—particularly those who are elderly and low income—may be especially affected by rural hospital closures.
This report describes (1) how HHS supports and monitors rural hospitals' financial viability and rural residents' access to hospital services and (2) the number and characteristics of rural hospitals that have closed in recent years and what is known about the factors that have contributed to those closures.
GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from HHS and HHS-funded research centers; analyzed data compiled by HHS and an HHS-funded research center, with a focus on 2013 through 2017—the most recent year with complete data; reviewed relevant literature; and interviewed experts and stakeholders. GAO identified hospitals as rural if they met the Federal Office of Rural Health Policy's definition of rural.
GAO provided a draft of this report to HHS for comment. The Department provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.

What GAO Found

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) administers multiple payment policies and programs that provide financial support for rural hospitals and funds research centers to monitor closures and study access. Among the payment policies administered by HHS are special payment designations for rural hospitals in which rural hospitals that meet certain criteria receive higher reimbursements for hospital services than they otherwise would receive under Medicare's standard payment methodology. HHS-funded research centers monitor rural hospitals' profitability and other financial indicators, and study access to facilities and specific services. HHS uses the results of monitoring activities to inform future areas of research and disseminate information.
GAO's analysis of data from HHS and an HHS-funded research center shows that 64 rural hospitals closed from 2013 through 2017. This represents approximately 3 percent of all the rural hospitals in 2013 and more than twice the number of closures of the prior 5-year period. GAO's analysis further shows that rural hospital closures disproportionately occurred in the South, among for-profit hospitals, and among hospitals that received the Medicare Dependent Hospital payment designation, one of the special Medicare payment designations for rural hospitals.
According to literature GAO reviewed and stakeholders GAO interviewed, rural hospital closures were generally preceded and caused by financial distress. In particular, rural hospitals that closed typically had negative margins that made it difficult to cover their fixed costs. According to these sources, financial distress has been exacerbated in recent years by multiple factors, including the decrease in patients seeking inpatient care and across-the-board Medicare payment reductions. In contrast, according to the literature GAO reviewed and stakeholders GAO interviewed, rural hospitals located in states that increased Medicaid eligibility and enrollment experienced fewer closures.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

In December 2014, Congress enacted federal IT acquisition reform legislation that included provisions related to ongoing federal data center consolidation efforts. OMB's Federal Chief Information Officer launched DCOI to build on prior data center consolidation efforts; improve federal data centers' performance; and establish goals for inventory closures, cost savings and avoidances, and optimization performance.
The 2014 legislation also included a provision for GAO to annually review agencies' data center inventories and strategies. Accordingly, GAO reviewed agencies' data center closures to date and plans for further closures; evaluated agencies' progress in achieving consolidation savings and described their plans for future savings; and assessed agencies' progress against OMB's data center optimization targets. To do so, GAO assessed the 24 DCOI agencies' data center inventories as of August 2017; reviewed their reported cost savings documentation; evaluated their data center optimization strategic plans; and assessed 22 agencies' progress against OMB's established optimization targets. Two agencies did not have a basis to report planned optimization milestones.
OMB and the 24 DCOI agencies provided mixed responses to GAO's findings on the progress made towards initiative goals. GAO continues to believe that implementation of the recommendations made previously will help the agencies meet OMB's targets for cost savings and optimization of performance.

What GAO Found

The 24 agencies participating in the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Data Center Optimization Initiative (DCOI) reported mixed progress toward achieving OMB's goals for closing data centers by September 2018. Over half of the agencies reported that they had either already met, or planned to meet, all of their OMB-assigned goals by the deadline. This would result in the closure of 7,221 of the 12,062 centers that agencies reported in August 2017. However, 4 agencies reported that they do not have plans to meet all of their assigned goals and 2 agencies are working with OMB to establish revised targets.
With regard to agencies' progress in achieving cost savings, 20 agencies reported, as of August 2017, that they had achieved $1.04 billion in cost savings for fiscal years 2016 and 2017. In addition, the agencies' DCOI strategic plans identify an additional $0.58 billion in planned savings—for a total of $1.62 billion for fiscal years 2016 through 2018. This total is approximately $1.12 billion less than OMB's DCOI savings goal of $2.7 billion (see figure). This shortfall is the result of 12 agencies reporting less in planned cost savings and avoidances in their DCOI strategic plans, as compared to the savings targets established for them by OMB.
The 24 agencies reported limited progress against OMB's five data center optimization targets for server utilization and automated monitoring, energy metering, power usage effectiveness, facility utilization, and virtualization. As of August 2017, 1 agency had met four targets, 1 agency had met three targets, 6 agencies had met either one or two targets, and 14 agencies reported meeting none of the targets. Further, as of August 2017, most agencies were not planning to meet OMB's fiscal year 2018 optimization targets. Specifically, 4 agencies reported plans to meet all of their applicable targets by the end of fiscal year 2018; 14 reported plans to meet some of the targets; and 4 reported that they do not plan to meet any targets.
In 2016 and 2017, GAO made a number of recommendations to OMB and the 24 DCOI agencies to help improve the reporting of data center-related cost savings and to achieve optimization targets. As of March 2018, 74 of these 81 recommendations had not been fully addressed.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

The tactical herbicide Agent Orange was first produced in 1964, and some 12 million gallons were shipped from U.S. ports to Southeast Asia from 1965 to 1970. DOD suspended its use in 1970 and incinerated remaining stockpiles at sea in 1977. Congress has expressed long-standing interest in the effects of Agent Orange exposure.
The House report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 included a provision that GAO review the government's handling of Agent Orange on Guam. This report examines (1) information the federal government has about the procurement, distribution, use, and disposition of Agent Orange; (2) DOD and VA efforts to make information about where Agent Orange and its components were tested and stored available; and (3) challenges associated with Agent Orange testing. GAO reviewed agency policies, documents, and available archival records that GAO identified; interviewed DOD, VA, and other agency officials; and met with a non-generalizable sample of 38 veterans and a veterans service organization.

What GAO Found

Available shipment documentation indicates that nearly all of the Agent Orange procured was either used in U.S. military operations in Southeast Asia, used for testing, damaged, or destroyed. However, some records are incomplete, such as shipment documentation and logbooks that identify ports where vessels stopped on the way to Southeast Asia. GAO obtained and reviewed shipment documentation for over 12.1 million of the 13.9 million gallons of Agent Orange procured by the Department of Defense (DOD). GAO reviewed logbooks for 96 percent (152 of 158) of those shipments and identified that vessels stopped at various ports on the way to Southeast Asia, including at least one vessel carrying Agent Orange that stopped at Guam. While the logbooks GAO reviewed identify when vessels left various ports as they traveled to and from Vietnam, they do not show whether and how much cargo was loaded or unloaded at those ports.
DOD's official list of herbicide testing and storage locations outside of Vietnam that is posted on the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) website is inaccurate and incomplete. For example, the list lacks clarity in descriptive information and omits both testing and storage locations and additional time periods covered by testing events. Also, the list has not been updated in over a decade, though DOD and VA have obtained reports on its shortcomings since 2006. Both DOD and VA communicate with veterans in response to inquiries about Agent Orange, but some veterans GAO met with expressed confusion regarding how to obtain information on potential exposure. DOD officials acknowledged this confusion and stated that veterans are contacting multiple agencies to obtain such information. However, DOD and VA have not established a formal process for coordinating on how best to communicate information to veterans and the public regarding the presence of Agent Orange outside of Vietnam. Without a reliable list with complete and accurate information and a formal process for DOD and VA to coordinate on communicating this information, veterans and the public do not have quality information about the full extent of locations where Agent Orange was present and where exposure could potentially have occurred.
Challenges exist with testing for Agent Orange today due to degradation of the herbicide's two chemical components and a potential for sources of contamination other than the herbicide. According to scientific research, the half-life (average time for components to decrease by half of the original amount) of Agent Orange's two chemical components—n-butyl 2,4-D and n-butyl 2,4,5-T— in soil can range from several days to many months, depending on conditions. The suggested half-life of the dioxin 2,3,7,8-TCDD—a by-product of the 2,4,5-T manufacturing process—is much longer, but there are multiple sources of dioxins, including the burning of wood and waste. DOD and the U.S. and Guam Environmental Protection Agencies are testing for the acid form of the components of Agent Orange at Andersen Air Force Base on Guam. While acknowledging the low probability of conclusively identifying the components of Agent Orange on Guam, DOD has made a decision to move forward with testing to address veterans' and the public's concerns, and it expects to complete the updates for the sampling and analysis plan, field sampling, analysis, and reporting in early 2019.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making six recommendations, including that DOD develop a process for updating its list of Agent Orange testing and storage locations, and that DOD and VA develop a process for coordinating the communication of information on where Agent Orange was known to have been present. DOD concurred with four recommendations. VA concurred with one recommendation and non-concurred with one recommendation.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

VA provides health care services to almost 9 million veterans and their families and relies on its health information system—VistA—to do so. However, the system is more than 30 years old, is costly to maintain, and does not support interoperability with DOD and private health care providers. Since 2001, VA has pursued multiple efforts to modernize the system. In June 2017, VA announced plans to acquire the same system—the Cerner system—that DOD is implementing.
GAO was asked to summarize preliminary observations from its ongoing review of VistA and the department's efforts to acquire a new system to replace VistA. Specifically, the statement summarizes preliminary observations regarding (1) costs incurred for the system and related activities during the last 3 fiscal years; (2) key components that comprise VistA and are to be replaced; and (3) actions VA has taken to prepare for its transition to the Cerner system. The statement also discusses common factors critical to the success of IT acquisitions that GAO has previously identified.
GAO reviewed its prior reports on the VistA modernization and on critical success factors of major IT acquisitions. GAO also reviewed records of obligations for VistA for fiscal years 2015, 2016, and 2017; analyzed VA documentation that describes the scope of VistA, and reviewed program documentation.

What GAO Found

According to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the Veterans Health Information Systems and Technology Architecture (VistA) and related costs, as approximated by funding obligations, were approximately $1.1 billion, $899 million, and $946 million in fiscal years 2015, 2016 and 2017, respectively. These obligations total about $3.0 billion over 3 years to support the system. As identified by the department, the obligations were to cover the costs for three programs (VistA Evolution, Interoperability, and Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record Health) and other supporting investments for activities such as networks and infrastructure sustainment. The following table provides a summary of the total VistA and VistA-related obligations.
GAO's preliminary results indicate that VA is working to define VistA and identify system components to be replaced by the new system. However, according to VA officials, there is no single information source that fully defines the scope of VistA. This situation is partly due to differences in VistA at various facilities. In the absence of a complete definition of VistA, program officials have taken a number of steps to define the system's scope and identify the components that the new system will replace. These steps have included conducting analyses, performing preliminary site (medical facility) assessments, and planning for a detailed assessment of each site where the new system will be deployed.
Since VA announced in June 2017 that the department would acquire the same electronic health record system as the Department of Defense (DOD), GAO's preliminary results indicate that VA has begun taking actions to prepare for the transition from VistA. These actions have included standardizing VistA, clarifying the department's approach to interoperability, establishing governance for the new program and the framework for joint governance with DOD, and preparing initial program plans. VA is early in its effort to transition from VistA to the Cerner system and the department's actions are ongoing.
In 2011, GAO reported on nine common factors critical to the success of major IT acquisitions. Such factors include ensuring active engagement of senior officials with stakeholders and having qualified, experienced program staff. These critical success factors can serve as a model of best practices that VA could apply to enhance the likelihood that the acquisition of a new electronic health record system will be successfully achieved.