Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Since 1994, GSA has spent more than $8 billion to construct 78 new federal buildings through its Design Excellence program. Some design choices can affect a building's O&M costs and functionality.
GAO was asked to review GSA's ability to manage O&M costs under the Design Excellence program. This report assesses the extent to which: (1) GSA's design choices affect O&M costs; (2) GSA considers O&M costs and functionality when planning and designing buildings; and (3) GSA systematically collects and shares information on O&M costs.
GAO conducted a web-based survey of building managers for the 78 Design Excellence buildings. GAO also visited 10 Design Excellence buildings in three GSA regions selected based on several factors, including geographic and agency diversity. GAO reviewed GSA documents, and interviewed GSA officials and building tenants. Information obtained through site visits and interviews is not generalizable.

What GAO Found

The goals of the General Services Administration's (GSA) Design Excellence Program are to creatively design federal buildings that meet federal agencies' functional needs and become public landmarks. Some design choices for Design Excellence buildings have decreased ongoing operations and maintenance (O&M) costs, but others have increased those costs. GSA's building managers and tenants told GAO that design choices that have reduced O&M costs include the use of durable materials and low maintenance landscaping. Other design choices have increased O&M costs. For example, according to GAO's survey of 78 building managers of Design Excellence buildings, multistory atriums often led to additional O&M costs, including the need to erect expensive scaffolding for maintenance.
While GSA aims to create Design Excellence buildings that are cost-effective and functional, it makes design choices without fully considering their effect on O&M costs and functionality. For example, GSA officials do not estimate the majority of O&M costs, such as the building maintenance associated with their design choices until the design is almost finalized. This outcome is partly because GSA procedures do not direct GSA officials to develop such estimates during the design and planning of Design Excellence buildings and because building and regional managers responsible for addressing the O&M consequences are also not involved in the design and planning process. As a result, important cost information that could help building project teams make the most cost-effective design choices is not available to help them. In addition, while building managers GAO surveyed reported that GSA's design choices generally support a building's functionality, they also reported that some design choices increased O&M costs without improving functionality. For example, they identified design choices related to material color and lighting that increased O&M costs but did not enhance the functionality of the building for the tenants.
Although GSA has developed some information on how design choices can affect O&M costs, it does not consistently collect and share such information. For example, GSA has evaluated the performance of only six Design Excellence buildings, and does not systematically collect information on how design choices have affected O&M costs in all existing buildings. Without a process to collect and share such information, future buildings may not benefit from these lessons, and problematic choices may be repeated.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making four recommendations to update existing GSA procedures for planning and designing new buildings to: (1) estimate full O&M costs; (2) obtain information from personnel responsible for addressing the O&M consequences of design decisions; (3) further consider how design choices may affect building functionality; and (4) systematically collect and share lessons from existing buildings. GSA agreed with these recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's July 2017 report, entitled DOD Excess Property: Enhanced Controls Needed for Access to Excess Controlled Property ( GAO-17-532 ).
merrittz@gao.gov or Wayne A. McElrath at (202) 512-2905 or mcelrathw@gao.gov .

What GAO Found

The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has taken some actions and is planning additional actions to address identified weaknesses in its excess controlled property program. However, internal control deficiencies exist for, among other things, ensuring that only eligible applicants are approved to participate in the Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO) program and receive transfers of excess controlled property. DLA is establishing memorandums of understanding with participating federal agencies intended to, among other things, establish general terms and conditions for participation, revise its program application to require additional prospective participant information, and plans to provide additional online training for participating agencies that is expected to begin in late 2017. However, GAO created a fictitious federal agency to conduct independent testing of the LESO program's internal controls and DLA's transfer of controlled property to law enforcement agencies.
Through the testing, GAO gained access to the LESO program and obtained over 100 controlled items with an estimated value of $1.2 million, including night-vision goggles, simulated rifles, and simulated pipe bombs, which could be potentially lethal items if modified with commercially available items . GAO's testing identified that DLA has deficiencies in the processes for verification and approval of federal law enforcement agency applications and in the transfer of controlled property, such as DLA personnel not routinely requesting and verifying identification of individuals picking up controlled property or verifying the quantity of approved items prior to transfer. Further, GAO found that DLA has not conducted a fraud risk assessment on the LESO program, including the application process. Without strengthening DLA and LESO program internal controls over the approval and transfer of controlled property to law enforcement agencies, such as reviewing and revising policy or procedures for verifying and approving federal agency applications and enrollment, DLA lacks reasonable assurance that it has the ability to prevent, detect, and respond to potential fraud and minimize associated security risks.
Examples of Controlled Property Items Obtained
DLA maintains a public Internet site to address statutory requirements to provide information on all property transfers to law enforcement agencies. DLA's public Internet site shows all transferred property, and, as of April 2017, in response to GAO's findings, has included a definition of controlled property to distinguish for the general public what items are considered controlled.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

TSA is responsible for ensuring that all airline passengers and their property are screened for items that could pose a threat to airplanes and passengers at 440 airports across the United States. Since 2016, TSO Basic Training—initial training for newly hired TSOs, including both TSA-employed and private screeners—has consisted of an intensive two-week course at the TSA Academy located at FLETC. TSA has obligated about $53 million for the program from its inception through March 2018. In 2015 and 2017, the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General raised questions about the effectiveness of checkpoint screening, which prompted concerns about training.
GAO was asked to review TSA's training of new TSOs. This report (1) describes the reasons why TSA established the TSO Basic Training program; (2) discusses factors OTD considers when updating TSO Basic Training curriculum; and (3) assesses the extent to which TSA evaluates its TSO Basic Training program. GAO reviewed documents on the development and modification of TSO Basic Training curriculum; visited FLETC; interviewed TSA officials; and compared TSA's program evaluation to leading practices.

What GAO Found

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) established the Transportation Security Officer (TSO) Basic Training program at the TSA Academy at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia to obtain benefits from centralized training. Prior to the Basic Training program, TSO training was conducted at individual airports, often by TSOs for whom instruction was a collateral duty. According to a business case developed by TSA for Congress in 2017 and TSA officials, TSA expected implementation of the TSO Basic Training program to provide efficiencies to the delivery of new-hire training for TSOs and to enhance the professionalism and morale of newly hired screeners. For example, GAO observed that TSO Basic Training facilities have airport checkpoint equipment and x-ray image simulators for students to practice skills, eliminating the challenge of finding available equipment and training times in a busy airport environment. According to program officials, centralized training also provides trainees with an increased focus on the TSA mission and instills a common culture among TSOs.
TSA's Office of Training and Development (OTD) updates and modifies the TSO Basic Training curriculum in response to evolving security threats and evaluations of effectiveness, among other factors. For example, OTD holds regular meetings with TSA's Office of Security Operations—the office responsible for managing TSO performance—to discuss issues such as imminent threats. The offices also discuss analyses of TSO effectiveness identified through covert tests, in which role players attempt to pass threat objects—such as knives, guns, or simulated improvised explosive devices—through the screening checkpoints. The two offices identify ways to address issues identified in covert testing, which are then incorporated into TSO Basic Training. OTD also gathers input from TSO Basic Training instructors and from participants to adjust training curriculum.
TSA has implemented a training evaluation model but has not yet established specific program goals and performance measures to assess TSO Basic Training. The Kirkpatrick model used by TSA is a commonly-accepted training evaluation model endorsed by the Office of Personnel Management and used throughout the federal government. While TSA reported expected benefits of TSO Basic Training in its business case and implemented the Kirkpatrick model to begin assessing training, it has not yet identified specific goals that the program is expected to achieve, nor has it developed applicable performance measures to evaluate progress toward goals, as called for by leading management practices for training evaluation. TSA officials told GAO that TSO Basic Training is a relatively new program and they planned to collect more data on TSO screening performance before further evaluating the potential impacts of the training program. However, TSO Basic Training serves as the foundation for TSOs to learn core skills and procedures, and it is important to establish goals and measures to better assess the effectiveness of the training they receive. This will help TSA determine the extent to which TSOs are able to fulfill their important role in ensuring passenger safety while also showing results for the funds spent on such training each year.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that TSA establish specific goals and performance measures for the TSO Basic Training program. TSA concurred with the recommendation.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

The federal government invested more than $90 billion on IT in fiscal year 2016. However, prior IT expenditures have produced failed projects. Recognizing the severity of issues, in December 2014 Congress enacted IT acquisition reform legislation (referred to as the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act, or FITARA). Among other things, OMB's FITARA implementation guidance requires covered agencies' chief acquisition officers to identify IT contracts for the CIOs to review and approve.
GAO's objectives were to determine the extent to which (1) federal agencies identify IT contracts and how much is invested in them, and (2) federal agency CIOs are reviewing and approving IT acquisitions. To do so, GAO reviewed data on IT contracts from fiscal year 2016 at 22 agencies and compared agency actions to law and OMB guidance.

What GAO Found

Most of the 22 selected agencies did not identify all of their information technology (IT) contracts. The selected agencies identified 78,249 IT-related contracts, to which they obligated $14.7 billion in fiscal year 2016. However, GAO identified 31,493 additional contracts with $4.5 billion obligated, raising the total amount obligated to IT contracts in fiscal year 2016 to at least $19.2 billion (see figure).The percentage of additional IT contract obligations GAO identified varied among the selected agencies. For example, the Department of State did not identify 1 percent of its IT contract obligations. Conversely, 8 agencies did not identify over 40 percent of their IT-related contract obligations.
Many of the selected agencies that did not identify these IT acquisitions did not follow Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) guidance. Specifically, 14 of the 22 agencies did not involve the acquisition office in their process to identify IT acquisitions for Chief Information Officer (CIO) review, as required by OMB. In addition, 7 agencies did not establish guidance to aid officials in recognizing IT. Until agencies involve the acquisitions office in their IT identification processes and establish supporting guidance, they cannot ensure that they will identify all IT acquisitions. Without proper identification of IT acquisitions, agencies and CIOs cannot effectively provide oversight of these acquisitions.
In addition to not identifying all IT contracts, 14 of the 22 selected agencies did not fully satisfy OMB's requirement that the CIO review and approve IT acquisition plans or strategies. Further, only 11 of 96 randomly selected IT contracts at 10 agencies that GAO evaluated were CIO-reviewed and approved as required by OMB's guidance. The 85 IT contracts not reviewed had a total possible value of approximately $23.8 billion. Until agencies ensure that CIOs review and approve IT acquisitions, CIOs will continue to have limited visibility and input into their agencies' planned IT expenditures and will not be able to use the increased authority that FITARA's contract approval provision is intended to provide. Further, agencies will likely miss an opportunity to strengthen CIOs' authority and the oversight of IT acquisitions. As a result, agencies may award IT contracts that are duplicative, wasteful, or poorly conceived.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making 39 recommendations, including that agencies ensure that acquisition offices are involved in identifying IT and issue related guidance; and to ensure IT acquisitions are reviewed according to OMB guidance. OMB and 20 agencies generally agreed with or did not comment on the recommendations. One agency agreed with one recommendation, but disagreed with another. GAO believes this recommendation is warranted. One agency disagreed with two recommendations. GAO subsequently removed one of these, but believes the other recommendation is warranted, as discussed in the report.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

SSA in October 2008 implemented CAL to fast track individuals with certain conditions through the disability determination process by prioritizing their disability benefit claims. Since then, SSA has expanded its list of CAL conditions from 50 to 225.
This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's August 2017 report entitled SSA's Compassionate Allowance Initiative: Improvements Needed to Make Expedited Processing of Disability Claims More Consistent and Accurate , GAO-17-625 . It examines the extent to which SSA has procedures for (1) identifying conditions for the CAL list; (2) identifying claims for CAL processing; and (3) ensuring the accuracy and consistency of CAL decisions.
For its August 2017 report, GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; analyzed SSA data on disability decisions for CAL claims from fiscal years 2009 through 2016 and on CAL claims with manual actions in fiscal year 2016; reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 74 claim files with fiscal year 2016 initial determinations; and interviewed medical experts, representatives from patient advocacy groups, and SSA officials in headquarters and six DDS offices selected for geographic dispersion and varied CAL caseloads.

What GAO Found

The Social Security Administration (SSA) does not have a formal or systematic approach for designating certain medical conditions for the Compassionate Allowance initiative (CAL). CAL was established in 2008 to fast-track through the disability determination process claimants who are likely to be approved because they have certain eligible medical conditions. SSA has in recent years relied on advocates for individuals with certain diseases and disorders to bring conditions to its attention for potential inclusion in CAL. However, by relying on advocates, SSA may overlook disabling conditions that have no advocates, potentially resulting in individuals with these conditions not receiving expedited processing. Further, SSA does not have clear, consistent criteria for designating conditions for potential CAL inclusion, which is inconsistent with federal internal control standards. As a result, external stakeholders lack key information about how to recommend conditions for inclusion on the CAL list.
To identify disability claims for expedited CAL processing, SSA primarily relies on software that searches for key words in claims. However, if claimants include incorrect or misspelled information in their claims the software is hindered in its ability to flag all claimants with CAL conditions or may flag claimants for CAL processing that should not be flagged. SSA has guidance for disability determination services (DDS) staff on how to manually correct errors made by the software, but the guidance does not address when such corrections should occur. Without clear guidance on when to make manual changes, DDS examiners may not take timely actions and may hinder expedited processing for appropriate claims.
SSA has taken some steps to ensure the accuracy and consistency of decisions on CAL claims, including developing detailed descriptions of CAL conditions, known as impairment summaries. These summaries help examiners make decisions about whether to allow or deny a claim. However, nearly one-third of the summaries are 5 or more years old. Experts and advocates that GAO spoke to suggested that summaries should be updated every 1 to 3 years to reduce the risk of SSA making disability determinations using medically outdated information. In addition, GAO found that SSA does not leverage data it collects to identify potential challenges to accurate and consistent decision-making on CAL claims. Without regular analyses of available data, SSA is missing an opportunity to ensure the accuracy and consistency of CAL decision-making.

What GAO Recommends

In its August 2017 report, GAO made eight recommendations, including that SSA develop a process to systematically gather information on potential CAL conditions, communicate criteria for designating CAL conditions, clarify guidance for manual corrections on CAL claims, update CAL impairment summaries, and use available data to ensure accurate, consistent decision-making. SSA agreed with all of GAO's recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, TSA has spent billions of dollars on aviation security programs. However, recent attacks involving aircraft and airports in other countries underscore the continued threat to aviation and the need for an effective aviation security program.
GAO was asked to review TSA's passenger aviation security countermeasures. This report examines the extent to which TSA has (1) information on the effectiveness of selected passenger aviation security countermeasures and (2) systematically analyzed the cost and effectiveness tradeoffs among countermeasures.
GAO reviewed TSA documentation on the effectiveness of six passenger aviation security countermeasures in fiscal year 2015—the most recent year for which data were available. GAO selected these countermeasures because they involve direct interaction with passengers, their belongings, or their personal information, and are largely operated and funded by TSA. GAO also reviewed TSA documents and interviewed TSA officials regarding efforts to systematically analyze cost and effectiveness tradeoffs across countermeasures.

What GAO Found

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has data on the effectiveness of some, but not all of its passenger aviation security countermeasures. Specifically, TSA has data on passenger prescreening, checkpoint and checked baggage screening, and explosives detection canines. Further, TSA is taking steps to improve the quality of this information. However, it does not have effectiveness data for its Behavior Detection and Analysis (BDA) program and the U.S. Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS). For BDA—a program to identify potential threats by observing passengers for behaviors indicative of stress, fear, or deception—in July 2017, GAO reported that (1) TSA does not have valid evidence supporting most of its behavioral indicators, and (2) TSA should continue to limit future funding for its behavior detection activities until it can provide such evidence. For FAMS—a program that deploys armed law enforcement officers on certain flights at an annual cost of about $800 million for fiscal year 2015—officials reported that one of the primary security contributions is to deter attacks. However, TSA does not have information on its effectiveness in doing so, nor does it have data on the deterrent effect resulting from any of its other aviation security countermeasures. While officials stated that deterrence is difficult to measure, the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, as updated, provides that agencies are to assess the effectiveness of their programs. Further, the Office of Management and Budget and GAO have suggested approaches for measuring deterrence. Developing such methods for TSA countermeasures, especially for an effort such as FAMS in which the primary goal is deterrence, would enable TSA to determine whether its substantial investment is yielding results.
TSA has a tool to compare the security effectiveness of some aviation security countermeasures, but has no efforts underway to systematically evaluate potential cost and effectiveness tradeoffs across all countermeasures. In 2014, the agency developed a tool to analyze the security effectiveness of alternate combinations of some countermeasures for the purpose of informing acquisition and deployment decisions, but does not have a tool to assess such tradeoffs across the entire system of countermeasures. TSA officials explained that the aviation security system is constantly evolving, and assessing a system in flux is challenging. However, DHS policy and TSA's strategic plan call for the systematic evaluation of costs and effectiveness of TSA's chosen mix of aviation security countermeasures. Without such an analysis, TSA is not well positioned to strike an appropriate balance of costs, effectiveness, and risk.
This is a public version of a classified report that GAO issued in August 2017. Information that TSA deemed classified or sensitive security information, such as the results of TSA's covert testing and details about TSA's screening procedures, have been omitted.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that TSA (1) explore and pursue methods to assess the deterrent effect of TSA's passenger aviation security countermeasures, with FAMS as a top priority to address, and (2) systematically evaluate the potential cost and effectiveness tradeoffs across aviation security countermeasures. DHS concurred with these recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

The Navy is responsible for providing ready forces for current operations and contingency response in the Arctic Ocean. According to data from the National Snow and Ice Data Center, the coverage of sea ice in the Arctic has diminished significantly since 1981. This could potentially increase maritime activities there, leading to a need for a greater U.S. military and homeland security presence in the region.
Public Law 115-91 required the Navy to report to Congress on the Navy's capabilities in the Arctic, including any capability gaps and requirements for ice-hardened vessels. It also included a provision for GAO to review the Navy's report. This report (1) assesses the extent to which the Navy's report aligns with current assessments of Arctic threat levels and capabilities required to execute DOD's 2016 Arctic Strategy and (2) describes any current requirements for ice-hardened vessels and DOD's approach for evaluating the capabilities needed as Arctic requirements evolve.
GAO reviewed the Navy's report along with DOD's assessments of Arctic threats and naval capabilities. GAO also reviewed the 2016 DOD Arctic Strategy— the most current strategy, DOD and Department of State information on the freedom of navigation program as well as DOD's processes for developing capabilities and assessing Arctic capability gaps.
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. DOD provided written technical comments which were incorporated as appropriate.

What GAO Found

The Navy's June 2018 report aligns with Department of Defense (DOD) assessments that the Arctic is at low risk for conflict and that DOD has the capabilities to execute the 2016 DOD Arctic Strategy . The June 2018 report also aligns with assessments of Arctic capabilities and gaps in the Navy's 2014 roadmap for implementing the strategy. The June 2018 report states that the Navy can execute the strategy with subsurface, aviation, and surface assets. The report notes the significant limitations for operating surface ships in the Arctic, but states that the Navy has the capabilities required for executing the strategy , and so has no plan to design ice-hardened surface ships. In addition, DOD officials stated that the United States has options other than Navy surface ships for demonstrating the U.S. right to operate in the Arctic, including using Coast Guard vessels, Navy submarines, or military aircraft.
Navy officials said that the Navy does not have a specific requirement for ice-hardening existing vessels or constructing new ones. The Navy plans to continue to use DOD's established process, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System to reassess Arctic-related requirements as conditions evolve (see fig.). In October 2017, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated U.S. Northern Command's initial capabilities document identifying three gaps in the ability to exercise/deploy, position, and conduct deterrence/decisive operations in ice-diminished Arctic waters. At the time of GAO's review, the Joint Staff had validated the capability gaps, which will now compete for resources with other issues designated for further study. Officials said additional study may identify alternative solutions such as adding capabilities to Coast Guard ships or partnering with allies to achieve common strategic goals in the Arctic.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

The federal government plans to invest almost $96 billion in IT in fiscal year 2018. Historically, IT investments have too often failed or contributed little to mission-related outcomes. Further, increasingly sophisticated threats and frequent cyber incidents underscore the need for effective information security. As a result, GAO added two areas to its high-risk list: IT security in 1997 and the management of IT acquisitions and operations in 2015.
This statement summarizes agencies' progress in improving IT management and ensuring the security of federal IT. It is primarily based on GAO's prior reports issued between February 1997 and May 2018 (and an ongoing review) on (1) CIO responsibilities, (2) agency CIOs' involvement in approving IT contracts, (3) data center consolidation efforts, (4) the management of software licenses, and (5) compliance with cybersecurity requirements.

What GAO Found

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and federal agencies have taken steps to improve the management of information technology (IT) acquisitions and operations and ensure the security of federal IT through a series of initiatives. As of May 2018, agencies had fully implemented about 61 percent of the approximately 800 IT management-related recommendations that GAO made from fiscal years 2010 through 2015. Likewise, since 2010, agencies had implemented about 66 percent of the approximately 2,700 security-related recommendations as of May 2018. Even with this progress, significant actions remain to be completed.
Chief Information Officer (CIO) responsibilities . Laws such as the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) and related guidance assigned 35 key IT management responsibilities to CIOs to help address longstanding challenges. However, in a draft report on CIO responsibilities, GAO's preliminary results suggest that none of the 24 selected agencies have policies that fully address the role of their CIO, as called for by federal laws and guidance. GAO intends to recommend that OMB and each of the selected 24 agencies take actions to improve the effectiveness of CIO's implementation of their responsibilities.
IT contract approval . According to FITARA, covered agencies' CIOs are required to review and approve IT contracts. Nevertheless, in January 2018, GAO reported that most of the CIOs at 22 selected agencies were not adequately involved in reviewing billions of dollars of IT acquisitions. Consequently, GAO made 39 recommendations to improve CIO oversight over IT acquisitions.
Consolidating data centers . OMB launched an initiative in 2010 to reduce data centers, which was codified and expanded in FITARA. According to agencies, data center consolidation and optimization efforts have resulted in approximately $3.9 billion of cost savings through 2018. Even so, additional work remains. GAO has made 160 recommendations to OMB and agencies to improve the reporting of related cost savings and to achieve optimization targets; however, as of May 2018, 80 of the recommendations have not been fully addressed.
Managing software licenses . Effective management of software licenses can help avoid purchasing too many licenses that result in unused software. In May 2014, GAO reported that better management of licenses was needed to achieve savings, and made 135 recommendations to improve such management. Four years later, 78 of the recommendations remained open.
Improving the security of federal IT systems . While the government has acted to protect federal information systems, agencies need to improve security programs, cyber capabilities, and the protection of personally identifiable information. Over the last several years, GAO has made about 2,700 recommendations to agencies aimed at improving the security of federal systems and information. These recommendations identified actions for agencies to take to strengthen their information security programs and technical controls over their computer networks and systems. As of May 2018, about 800 of the information security-related recommendations had not been implemented.

What GAO Recommends

From fiscal years 2010 through 2015, GAO made about 800 recommendations to OMB and federal agencies to address shortcomings in IT acquisitions and operations. Since 2010, GAO also made about 2,700 recommendations to federal agencies to improve the security of federal systems. These recommendations include those to improve the implementation of CIO responsibilities, the oversight of the data center consolidation initiative, software license management efforts, and the strength of security programs and technical controls. Most agencies agreed with these recommendations, and GAO will continue to monitor their implementation.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Tens of thousands of American Indians and Alaska Natives do not have safe drinking water or wastewater disposal in their home—referred to as needs arising from a sanitation deficiency—at a higher percentage than the general population, according to IHS. Among other things, IHS assesses homes, either individually or by reviewing public water systems, to determine any deficiencies. Seven agencies, including IHS, EPA, and USDA, have programs that provide drinking water and wastewater infrastructure assistance to Indian tribes.
GAO was asked to review federal efforts to provide water infrastructure assistance to Indian tribes. This report examines, among other objectives, the extent to which selected federal agencies (1) identified tribes' drinking water and wastewater infrastructure needs and (2) funded tribal water infrastructure projects, including tribes' most severe sanitation deficiencies. GAO reviewed agency data on tribal needs, analyzed agency funding data for tribal water infrastructure projects, reviewed agency policy documents, and interviewed agency officials and officials from 22 tribes representing different geographic locations.

What GAO Found

Federal agencies have identified several billion dollars in existing and future tribal drinking water and wastewater infrastructure needs. Specifically, the Indian Health Service (IHS) worked with tribes to identify, in fiscal year 2016, an estimated $3.2 billion in water infrastructure projects to address existing sanitation deficiencies in Indian homes, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) identified an additional $2.4 billion in future tribal drinking water infrastructure needs over the next 20 years. However, IHS could enhance the accuracy of its information about the water infrastructure needs of some Indian homes. In February 2018, the database that IHS uses to track Indian homes' sanitation deficiencies showed that about one-third of the homes (138,700) had no deficiency. However, because the database does not provide IHS with a way to record if a home's deficiency has been assessed, IHS could not determine whether these homes had no deficiency or if they had not yet been assessed to identify a deficiency. IHS officials stated that improving the database's accuracy would be beneficial. By implementing a way to indicate in its database whether these homes' deficiencies have been assessed, IHS could also more efficiently address any deficiencies in these homes.
Federal agencies provided about $370 million for tribal drinking water and wastewater infrastructure projects in fiscal year 2016, including some projects to address what the agencies identified as the most severe sanitation deficiencies (i.e., communities that lack safe drinking water or wastewater disposal). IHS and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) policies direct the agencies to fund tribal projects that address these deficiencies. However, agency scoring processes may not always prioritize the projects that address them:
IHS assigns points to projects using eight scoring factors, including sanitation deficiency and cost. Based on GAO's review of IHS documents and interviews with agency officials, IHS's process for selecting projects can discourage funding some projects that address the most severe sanitation deficiencies, especially those with a relatively high cost per home. As a result, some projects to serve homes without water infrastructure can remain unfunded for many years. IHS officials said the scoring factors balance a number of interests, and the agency is looking to improve the extent to which it funds projects that address these deficiencies.
USDA uses a different set of scoring factors to assign points when evaluating project applications for its tribal water program, including rural population and income levels. However, USDA does not have a scoring factor to assign points to a project based on whether it will serve homes that lack safe drinking water or wastewater disposal, as it does with another program with similar goals. Instead, USDA officials said they use discretionary points to score projects on this basis, but these points may not be awarded at all. As a result, USDA may not have reasonable assurance that it consistently evaluates project applications in a way that aligns with agency policy to fund projects that address the most severe sanitation deficiencies.
By IHS reviewing and USDA updating their scoring processes, the agencies could have more assurance that the projects they fund address the most severe sanitation deficiencies in Indian communities.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making 16 recommendations, including that (1) IHS develop a way to indicate in its database if homes' deficiencies have been assessed and (2) IHS and USDA review and update project scoring processes. IHS agreed with these recommendations, and USDA proposed an approach for addressing the recommendation on scoring, as discussed in the report.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Impacts from a changing climate can pose serious risks to the global economy and affect many economic sectors, according to reports. Public companies are generally required to disclose certain risks in their SEC filings. In 2010, SEC issued guidance to clarify how existing disclosure requirements apply for climate-related matters.
GAO was asked to review (1) steps SEC has taken to clarify to companies their disclosure requirements for climate-related risks, (2) steps SEC has taken to examine changes companies may have made to their climate-related disclosures since the release of its 2010 Guidance, and (3) constraints SEC faces when reviewing climate-related disclosures and stakeholders' views of those disclosures.
GAO reviewed SEC's disclosure requirements, guidance, and reports on changes in climate-related disclosures; queried SEC's filings system to identify comment letters with issues on climate-related disclosures; identified examples of climate-related disclosures in companies' filings; and interviewed SEC staff and representatives of stakeholder groups, such as industry associations from five industry groups, and nonprofit organizations that work with investors. We selected these stakeholders because they either were from industries likely to be affected by climate change-related matters due to the nature of their operations, or have a key interest in climate-related issues.
Senior staff from SEC's Division of Corporation Finance generally agreed with GAO's findings.

What GAO Found

To help clarify to companies their disclosure requirements for climate-related matters, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued the Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change in 2010 (2010 Guidance). The 2010 Guidance was SEC's primary form of communication to clarify companies' climate-related disclosure requirements. In addition, SEC issued individual comment letters to specific companies on their climate-related disclosures. These letters are publicly available and companies can view these letters to understand SEC's assessment of a particular company's disclosures. Representatives from industry associations with whom GAO spoke stated that they consider the disclosure requirements for climate-related risks to be clear and have no need for additional guidance.
SEC issued two reports to Congress in 2012 and 2014 that examined changes in climate-related disclosures in select industries. SEC found that most of these filings included some level of climate-related disclosures and reported that there were no notable year-to-year changes. SEC staff also continue to periodically assess climate-related disclosures in addition to its regular disclosure review process. Additionally, in April 2016, SEC requested public input on modernizing certain business and financial disclosure requirements, including potential changes on reporting climate-related risks in SEC's filings. As of December 2017, SEC staff said they are considering recommendations for the Commission's consideration based on comments received.
SEC faces constraints in reviewing climate-related and other disclosures because it primarily relies on information that companies provide. SEC senior staff explained that SEC's Division of Corporation Finance staff assess companies' filings for compliance with federal securities laws—which require companies to disclose material risks—but do not have the authority to subpoena additional information from companies. Additionally, companies may report similar climate-related disclosures in different sections of the filings, and climate-related disclosures in some filings contain disclosures using generic language, not tailored to the company, and do not include quantitative metrics. When companies report climate-related disclosures in varying formats and specificity, SEC reviewers and investors may find it difficult to compare and analyze related disclosures across companies' filings. SEC has tools, mechanisms, and resources—including internal supervisory controls, regulations and guidance, a two-level filing review process, internal and external data, and staff training and experience—that help SEC staff consistently review filing disclosures, according to SEC documents and staff. Representatives of industry associations told GAO that they consider the current climate-related disclosure requirements adequate and no additional climate-related disclosures are needed. However, some investor groups and asset management firms have highlighted the need for companies to disclose more climate-related information. But, members of SEC's Investor Advisory Committee told GAO that investors have not agreed on the priority of climate-related disclosures. Also, additional disclosure requirements or increased scrutiny of companies' climate-related information—which, if necessary, SEC and Congress can consider—could have mission and resource implications for SEC's Division of Corporation Finance.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

With revenue of about $450 million in fiscal year 2017, the Trust Fund paid about $184 million in benefits to more than 25,000 coal miners and eligible dependents. However, the Trust Fund also borrowed about $1.3 billion from the Treasury's general fund in fiscal year 2017 to cover its debt repayment expenditures. Adding to this financial challenge, the coal tax that supports the Trust Fund is scheduled to decrease by about 55 percent beginning in 2019. GAO was asked to review the financial positon of the Trust Fund and identify options to improve it.
This report examines (1) factors that have challenged the financial position of the Trust Fund since its inception and (2) the extent to which Trust Fund debt may change through 2050, and selected options that could improve its future financial position. GAO reviewed Trust Fund financial data from fiscal years 1979 through 2017. GAO also interviewed officials from the Departments of Labor, Treasury, Health and Human Services (HHS) and representatives of coal industry and union groups. Using assumptions, such as the about 55 percent coal tax decrease and moderately declining coal production, GAO simulated the extent to which Trust Fund debt may change through 2050. GAO also simulated how selected options, such as forgiveness of debt, could improve finances. The options simulated are not intended to be exhaustive. Further, GAO is not endorsing any particular option or combination of options.
GAO provided a draft of this report to DOL, Treasury, and HHS. The agencies provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

What GAO Found

Multiple factors have challenged Black Lung Disability Trust Fund (Trust Fund) finances since it was established about 40 years ago. Its expenditures have consistently exceeded its revenues, interest payments have grown, and actions taken that were expected to improve Trust Fund finances did not completely address its debt. When necessary to make expenditures, the Trust Fund borrows with interest from the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) general fund. Because Trust Fund expenditures have consistently exceeded revenue, it has borrowed almost every year since 1979, its first complete fiscal year, and as a result debt and interest payments increased. Legislative actions were taken over the years including (1) raising the rate of the coal tax that provides Trust Fund revenues and (2) forgiving debt. For example, the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 provided an appropriation toward Trust Fund debt forgiveness; about $6.5 billion was forgiven, according to Department of Labor (DOL) data (see figure). However, coal tax revenues were less than expected due, in part, to the 2008 recession and increased competition from other energy sources, according to DOL and Treasury officials. As a result, the Trust Fund continued to borrow from Treasury's general fund from fiscal years 2010 through 2017 to cover debt repayment expenditures.
GAO's simulation suggests that Trust Fund borrowing will likely increase from fiscal years 2019 through 2050 due, in part, to the coal tax rate decrease of about 55 percent that will take effect in 2019 and declining coal production. The simulation estimates that Trust Fund borrowing may exceed $15 billion by 2050 (see figure). However, various options, such as adjusting the coal tax and forgiving interest or debt, could reduce future borrowing and improve the Trust Fund's financial position. For example, maintaining the current coal tax rates and forgiving debt of $2.4 billion could, under certain circumstances, balance the Trust Fund by 2050, whereby revenue would be sufficient to cover expenditures. However, a coal industry representative said that maintaining or increasing the coal tax would burden the coal industry, particularly at a time when coal production has been declining. Further, Treasury officials noted that the costs associated with forgiving Trust Fund interest or debt would be paid by taxpayers.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Safety lapses continue to occur at some of the 276 laboratories in the United States that conduct research on select agents—such as Ebola virus or anthrax bacteria—that may cause serious or lethal infection in humans, animals, or plants, raising concerns about whether oversight is effective.
GAO was asked to review the federal oversight approach for select agents and approaches from other countries or regulatory sectors. This report (1) evaluates the extent to which the Select Agent Program has elements of effective oversight and strategic planning documents to guide it, and (2) identifies approaches selected countries and regulatory sectors have used to promote effective oversight.
GAO convened a meeting of experts with the help of the National Academy of Sciences to discuss oversight of select agents. GAO also reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and guidance, and interviewed officials from the Select Agent Program and laboratories it oversees. GAO also reviewed documents and interviewed officials from two countries and other U.S. sectors selected because they have alternate oversight approaches.

What GAO Found

The Federal Select Agent Program (Select Agent Program)—jointly managed by the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Agriculture (USDA)—oversees laboratories' handling of certain hazardous pathogens known as select agents, but the program does not fully meet all key elements of effective oversight, as illustrated in the following examples:
GAO's past work identified independence as a key element of effective oversight. However, the Select Agent Program is not structurally independent from all laboratories it oversees, and it has not assessed risks posed by its current structure or the effectiveness of mechanisms it has to reduce organizational conflicts of interest. Without conducting such assessments and taking actions as needed to address risks, the program may not effectively mitigate impairments to its independence.
Another key element of effective oversight is the ability to perform reviews. Some experts and laboratory representatives raised concerns that the program's reviews may not target the highest-risk activities, in part because it has not formally assessed which activities pose the highest risk. Without assessing the risk of activities it oversees and targeting its resources appropriately, the program cannot ensure it is balancing its resources against their impact.
Technical expertise is another key element GAO identified in past work. The Select Agent Program has taken steps to hire additional expert staff and improve training, but workforce and training gaps remain.
Moreover, the program does not have joint strategic planning documents to guide its oversight. Although it began taking steps to develop a joint strategic plan during GAO's review, the program is not developing workforce plans as part of this effort. GAO's past work has found that strategic workforce planning is an essential tool to help agencies align their workforces with their missions and develop long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining staff. Developing a joint workforce plan that assesses workforce and training needs for the program as a whole would help the program leverage resources to ensure all workforce and training needs are met.
Selected countries and regulatory sectors GAO reviewed promote effective oversight using approaches that differ from the U.S. Select Agent Program's approaches:
In Great Britain, oversight of laboratories that work with pathogens is under an independent government agency focused on health and safety.
In both Great Britain and Canada, regulators focus their oversight on (1) biological safety, due to safety incidents which provided the impetus for laboratory oversight in these countries; and (2) regulation of all potentially hazardous pathogens and activities in laboratories.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making 11 recommendations for the Select Agent Program, including to (1) assess risks from its current structure and the effectiveness of its mechanisms to reduce conflicts of interest and address risks as needed, (2) assess the risk of activities it oversees and target reviews to high-risk activities, and (3) develop a joint workforce plan. HHS and USDA agreed with GAO's recommendations.
or John Neumann at (202) 512-3841 or neumannj@gao.gov .


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Software is integral to the operation and functionality of DOD equipment, platforms, and weapon systems, including tactical and combat vehicles, aircraft, ships, submarines, and strategic missiles. DOD estimates that software sustainment funding will total at least $15 billion over the next 5 fiscal years. DOD carries out software sustainment at various locations, where DOD uses its maintenance capabilities to maintain, overhaul, and repair its military weapon systems.
GAO was asked to review several issues relating to the sustainment of operational system software for DOD weapon systems. This report examines, among other things, the extent to which (1) DOD has policies and organizations in place to manage the sustainment of operational system software for weapon systems; and (2) DOD and the military departments track costs to sustain weapon system software. GAO reviewed DOD policies and procedures and interviewed cognizant officials from select DOD software centers, among others, who perform weapon system software sustainment activities.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) has policies and organizations to manage the sustainment of operational system software. DOD policy defines software sustainment and software maintenance activities synonymously, to comprise any activities or actions that change the software baseline, as well as modifications or upgrades that add capability or functionality. One example of such an action is the Air Force's modifying the security software on the B-52 bomber to better protect against attempted system penetration. The figure below defines the four categories of software sustainment actions.
DOD policies on life-cycle management of weapon systems address software sustainment, and several DOD organizations—including DOD software centers—play key roles in overseeing and managing software sustainment. DOD policy includes software maintenance as part of core logistics, and it requires the military departments to report biennially to Congress on their estimated workloads to sustain core logistics capabilities, including estimated costs of these workloads. However, while the Army and Air Force categorize and report software sustainment as part of core logistics, the Navy does not. Without the Navy's categorizing and reporting its software sustainment costs, DOD and Congress are not fully informed of the magnitude and cost of core software sustainment capability requirements. This impedes DOD's efforts to plan for a ready and controlled source of technical competence, and to budget resources in peacetime while preserving necessary surge capabilities.
DOD's ability to track weapon system software sustainment costs is impeded by limitations in its collection of software cost data. First, GAO found that the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation's (CAPE) Cost and Software Data Reporting system did not collect weapon system cost data from DOD software centers. Recognizing this, CAPE directed in January 2017 that cost and software data efforts on major acquisition programs should begin to be collected from government organizations, including DOD software centers. However, CAPE acknowledges that it lacks an implementation plan to execute and monitor the requirement for these centers to submit cost and software data. Second, GAO also found that the military departments' operating and support cost systems have incomplete software sustainment cost data. DOD policy requires the military departments to collect and maintain actual operating and support costs, including software sustainment costs. Without CAPE's taking steps to prioritize obtaining complete information on operating and support costs for software sustainment, CAPE is challenged in its ability to accurately compile total program costs or provide reliable life-cycle cost estimates to DOD and Congress.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making five recommendations, including that (1) the Navy categorize and report its software sustainment costs in accordance with DOD policy; and (2) CAPE improve the collection of weapon system software cost data. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

In 2017, the UI program provided about $30 billion in temporary income support to 5.7 million claimants who became unemployed through no fault of their own. The federal government provides various resources states can use to help UI claimants achieve reemployment. GAO was asked to review how states identify and serve claimants who need such assistance.
This report examines, among other things, (1) what key federal programs and approaches states used to help UI claimants return to work, and (2) how states used profiling systems to identify claimants who are most likely to exhaust their benefits and need assistance returning to work. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and guidance; analyzed the most recent available national data on UI claimant participation in key workforce programs, from July 2015 through June 2016; interviewed officials from DOL, six states with key reemployment practices, and three additional states with a variety of profiling practices; and reviewed national studies examining state profiling systems.

What GAO Found

Nationwide, four key federally funded workforce programs helped states provide reemployment services, such as career counseling and job search assistance, to millions of unemployment insurance (UI) claimants, according to data from July 2015 through June 2016, the most recent period available (see table). The six selected states GAO reviewed in-depth reported using these key programs to support their efforts to help claimants return to work. Selected state officials described skills assessments, job search assistance, and interview and resume workshops as the types of services they use to connect UI claimants to jobs quickly. Officials also described varying service delivery approaches, with some of the selected states emphasizing the use of online services, while others relied to a greater extent on in-person services.
According to a 2014 national questionnaire to states, most states used a statistical system to identify UI claimants who are most likely to exhaust their benefits and need assistance returning to work (known as profiling). Six of the nine states GAO reviewed used statistical systems and three used non-statistical approaches. GAO identified several concerns with the Department of Labor's (DOL) oversight and support of state UI profiling systems:
Although a 2007 DOL-commissioned study found that some statistical systems may not perform well, DOL has not collected the information needed to identify states at risk of poor profiling system performance.
Some selected states have faced technical challenges in implementing and updating their statistical systems. However, DOL does not have a process for identifying and providing technical assistance to states at risk of poor system performance or those facing technical challenges. Instead, it only provides assistance to those states that request it.
While states have latitude to choose their preferred profiling approach, DOL's 1994 guidance encourages all states to use statistical systems. Because DOL has not updated this guidance to ensure that it clearly communicates all available profiling system options, some states may not be aware that they have greater flexibility in choosing an option that best suits their needs.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOL (1) systematically collect sufficient information to identify states at risk of poor profiling system performance, (2) develop a process for providing risk-based technical assistance to such states, and (3) update guidance to clarify state profiling options. DOL agreed with these recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

NASA depends heavily upon IT to conduct its work. The agency spends at least $1.5 billion annually on IT investments that support its missions, including ground control systems for the International Space Station and space exploration programs.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Transition Authorization Act of 2017 included a provision for GAO to review the effectiveness of NASA's approach to overseeing and managing IT, including its ability to ensure that resources are aligned with agency missions and are cost effective and secure. Accordingly, GAO's specific objective for this review was to determine the extent to which NASA has established and implemented leading IT management practices in strategic planning, workforce planning, governance, and cybersecurity. To address this objective, GAO compared NASA IT policies, strategic plans, workforce gap assessments, and governance board documentation to federal law and leading practices. GAO also assessed NASA IT security plans, policies, and procedures against leading cybersecurity risk management practices.

What GAO Found

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has not yet effectively implemented leading practices for information technology (IT) management. Specifically, GAO identified weaknesses in NASA's IT management practices for strategic planning, workforce planning, governance, and cybersecurity.
NASA has not documented its IT strategic planning processes in accordance with leading practices. While NASA's updated IT strategic plan represents improvement over its prior plan, the updated plan is not comprehensive because it does not fully describe strategies for achieving desired results or describe interdependencies within and across programs. Until NASA establishes a comprehensive IT strategic plan, it will lack critical information needed to align resources with business strategies and investment decisions.
Of the eight key IT workforce planning activities, the agency partially implemented five and did not implement three. For example, NASA does not assess competency and staffing needs regularly or report progress to agency leadership. Until NASA implements the key IT workforce planning activities, it will have difficulty anticipating and responding to changing staffing needs.
NASA's IT governance does not fully address leading practices. While the agency revised its governance boards, updated their charters, and acted to improve governance, it has not fully established the governance structure, documented improvements to its investment selection process, fully implemented investment oversight practices and ensured the Chief Information Officer's visibility into all IT investments, or fully defined policies and procedures for IT portfolio management. Until NASA addresses these weaknesses, it will face increased risk of investing in duplicative investments or may miss opportunities to ensure investments perform as intended.
NASA has not fully established an effective approach to managing agency-wide cybersecurity risk. An effective approach includes establishing executive oversight of risk, a cybersecurity risk management strategy, an information security program plan, and related policies and procedures.
As NASA continues to collaborate with other agencies and nations and increasingly relies on agreements with private companies to carry out its missions, the agency's cybersecurity weaknesses make its systems more vulnerable to compromise. Until NASA leadership fully addresses these leading practices, its ability to ensure effective management of IT across the agency and manage cybersecurity risks will remain limited.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making 10 recommendations to NASA to address the deficiencies identified in NASA IT strategic planning, workforce planning, governance, and cybersecurity. NASA concurred with seven recommendations, partially concurred with two, and did not concur with one. GAO maintains that all of the recommendations discussed in this report remain valid.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

DOD's MWR programs provide servicemembers and their families with three categories of programs: Category A (e.g., fitness and libraries), Category B (e.g., camping and performing arts), and Category C (e.g., golf). DOD oversees the percentage of appropriated funding allocated to MWR programs by category and measures the military services' compliance with established funding targets. DOD set the targets at 85 percent for Category A and 65 percent for Category B. DOD did not set a target for Category C since this category has the ability to generate revenue from user fees.
House Report 115-200 accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 includes a provision for GAO to review DOD' s MWR programs. GAO assessed the extent to which (1) the services have met DOD's established funding targets for each category of MWR programs and DOD has comprehensively evaluated the relevance of its targets, and (2) DOD has oversight structures and performance measures that include measurable goals, including those for cost-effectiveness, by which to review MWR programs. GAO analyzed MWR program information for fiscal years 2012-2017 and compared DOD's MWR policy with guidance for using measures and evaluating goals.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) established funding targets for two categories of Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs—Category A, which promotes the physical and mental well-being of servicemembers, and Category B, which funds community support systems for servicemembers and their families. These targets are intended to ensure that the military services adequately fund these programs with appropriated funds instead of requiring servicemembers and their families to pay fees out of pocket to cover program costs. However, GAO found the following:
In fiscal years 2012-2017, the military services generally met the DOD-set target to provide 85 percent of appropriated funding for Category A programs but not the 65-percent target for Category B programs. Service officials said they are taking steps to meet the Category B target, such as by restoring targeted levels of appropriated funding support in future budget planning. Data GAO reviewed indicate that these steps are helping the services get closer to meeting the target for Category B.
DOD has not comprehensively evaluated the targets, established more than 20 years ago, to ensure that they are appropriate. DOD officials said they agree that it is time to evaluate the relevancy of the targets as the current operating environment is fundamentally different than when the targets were established 2 decades ago. Further, DOD officials said that they are unsure of the process or methodology used to originally develop the targets because they have no documentation supporting these decisions. Until DOD comprehensively evaluates the appropriateness of the targets and, based on its evaluation, documents any changes made, it cannot be certain that the targets reflect the current operating environment and do not pose undue financial burden on servicemembers.
DOD established oversight structures and performance measures for MWR programs, but has not established measurable goals to assess the cost-effectiveness of the 55 activities that make up MWR programs. DOD's MWR policy identifies six broad performance measure categories for the program. DOD officials responsible for developing MWR program goals acknowledged that DOD's MWR policy does not include measurable goals for assessing the cost-effectiveness of program activities, and do not currently have plans to make any changes to the goals. Service officials told GAO that they collect and use various types of information within the categories to assess specific activities. While both the categories established by DOD and the service-specific efforts provide useful context about the status of individual MWR activities, they do not replace the need for measurable goals that can be used to assess whether the programs are operating cost-effectively. The services are in the early stages of developing more specific performance measures, but it is too early to determine whether these efforts will result in measurable goals that can be used to assess cost-effectiveness. Until DOD develops performance measures that include measurable goals, it cannot ensure that MWR programs meet servicemember needs in a cost-effective manner.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD evaluate the funding targets and document any changes needed and develop measurable goals for MWR programs' performance measures. DOD concurred with the recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Under its rural housing program, RHS provides mortgages and rental assistance to support affordable rental units for low-income tenants (see figure). When these mortgages reach the end of their terms (mature), property owners may exit the program; current law does not allow RHS to continue providing rental assistance when such exiting occurs. As a result, tenants in properties with mortgages that are maturing may face rent increases or lose their housing altogether.
GAO was asked to examine how RHS is addressing the risks posed by maturing mortgages. This report examines RHS's efforts to (1) estimate rural housing property exit dates and (2) preserve the affordability of rural rental properties with maturing mortgages. GAO reviewed RHS mortgage loan data and preservation documents, and interviewed RHS officials and industry stakeholders.

What GAO Found

The U.S. Department of Agriculture's Rural Housing Service (RHS) implemented an automated tool to estimate when properties could exit the rural rental housing program, but RHS lacked sufficient controls to ensure the accuracy, completeness, and timeliness of those estimates. In 2016, RHS developed its Multi-Family Housing Property Preservation Tool to replace a manual process of estimating exit dates. RHS data suggest that a smaller number of properties could exit RHS's program in the near term, but between 2028 and 2050, over 90 percent of RHS's properties and units could exit the program (about 13,000 properties with 407,000 units). However, RHS lacked controls that would better ensure the accuracy and completeness of these estimated exit dates, such as the verification of key data input at mortgage origination. In addition, RHS had not established a regular process to update the preservation tool's underlying data due to staff turnover and data system challenges. Without these controls, RHS may lack assurance that is has reliable data for calculating exit dates and initiating preservation efforts.
While RHS has taken actions to address properties with maturing mortgages, such as offering property owners options designed to prevent property exits, about 60 percent of properties with maturing mortgages exited the program between 2014 through 2017. The agency's planning efforts lacked key steps such as (1) establishing preservation goals, (2) developing metrics for evaluating preservation efforts, and (3) analyzing and responding to risks facing its portfolio such as resource limits and growing capital rehabilitation needs. Without taking these actions, RHS is not well positioned to preserve affordable housing in the near term or when much larger numbers of properties and units could exit the program starting in 2028. Although taking the steps above would help RHS's preservation efforts, some tenants may still be at risk of losing rental assistance when mortgages mature. Accordingly, allowing RHS to renew rental assistance after mortgage maturity could protect assisted low-income tenants from increased rents or displacement from their units. When the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) faced a similar loss of affordable housing subsidies, Congress authorized the department in 2011 to continue providing rental assistance at properties after contracts expired.

What GAO Recommends

Congress should consider granting RHS authority to continue providing rental assistance to tenants in properties with maturing mortgages. GAO is also making five recommendations, including that RHS improve data quality and take steps to comprehensively plan for preserving properties with maturing mortgages. We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to RHS and HUD. RHS agreed with all five of GAO's recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

In fiscal year 2017, VA provided about $11 billion in education benefits to about 14,460 schools to help eligible veterans and their beneficiaries pay for postsecondary education and training. VA typically contracts with state agencies to help it provide oversight of schools participating in this education benefit program.
The Harry W. Colmery Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2017 included a provision for GAO to review VA's and states' oversight of schools receiving VA education benefits. This report examines (1) how, if at all, the available level of funding to state agencies has affected states' and VA's ability to carry out their oversight responsibilities, (2) to what extent VA and state agencies use risk-based approaches to oversee schools, and (3) to what extent VA coordinates and shares information with the states to support their oversight activities. GAO reviewed VA documents; assessed VA funding data for fiscal years 2003-2018; interviewed VA and selected state agency officials; and reviewed correspondence between these officials. GAO interviewed officials from eight state agencies who were past or present officials at the association representing state agencies, and officials from three other states, including one that did not renew its contract with VA in fiscal year 2018.

What GAO Found

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is responsible for overseeing schools nationwide that provide VA education benefits to veterans. To help provide this oversight, VA contracts with state agencies to oversee schools in their states and provide outreach and training to school officials and allocates them funding to cover the cost of oversight, outreach, and training activities. However, since fiscal year 2006, funding for oversight, outreach, and training has remained at about $19 million, and only recently increased in fiscal year 2018 to $21 million. State agency officials told GAO that the limited level of funding they have received from VA has been a long-standing problem that has strained their ability to (1) adequately cover staff costs, (2) pay for travel for school visits, and (3) provide needed technical assistance and training to the schools about VA education benefit requirements. As a result, a few states, such as New Mexico, have chosen to withdraw from their school oversight roles. When this happens, VA must take over the state agencies' oversight responsibilities. GAO found that assuming additional oversight responsibilities is likely to stretch VA's staff resources, especially in large states, where schools are geographically dispersed and school visits are time consuming and costly. VA has begun but has not completed an assessment of the risks that potential future state agency withdrawals could have on its ability to provide school oversight. Moreover, VA has not developed a contingency plan for how it will oversee more schools if additional states do not renew their oversight contracts. Federal standards for internal control state that agencies should identify and assess risks related to achieving objectives, and define contingency plans for assigning responsibilities if key roles are vacated. Until VA takes these steps, the agency runs the risk of being unprepared to conduct effective oversight in the event that more state agencies withdraw from their contracts in the future.
VA and state agencies use certain risk factors to select schools for oversight. VA officials said that they prioritize schools for annual reviews of compliance with program requirements based on findings from prior reviews as well as other risk factors, such as schools with a history of VA benefit payment errors. GAO found that VA and state agencies have recently begun a joint effort to explore a new strategy that they expect will strengthen the school review selection and prioritization process. According to VA officials, as of mid-October 2018, VA used this strategy to select five schools to undergo risk-based reviews. VA officials said they expect these five reviews to be completed by late December 2018.
VA and state agencies coordinate and share information about their oversight activities in a variety of ways. For example, VA has shared information with the state agencies on how to conduct annual reviews of schools in their states. However, according to officials at the association representing state agencies, VA has not provided specific direction on conducting targeted reviews in response to complaints. VA officials acknowledged that the procedures they currently have in place are outdated and said that they are being revised to provide state agencies with more details. As of late October 2018, VA officials said these procedures were undergoing internal review. Once implemented, VA's new procedures have the potential to enhance VA's and state agencies' efforts to conduct reviews at those schools for which they have received complaints.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that VA complete the identification and assessment of oversight risks, and prepare a contingency plan for overseeing schools if additional states do not renew their oversight contracts. VA concurred with the recommendation.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

BOP's rising costs and offender recidivism present incarceration challenges to both DOJ and the nation. For example, BOP's operating costs have generally increased over time, and in fiscal year 2017 amounted to more than $6.9 billion, or 24 percent of DOJ's total discretionary budget. In addition, from 1980 through 2013, BOP's prison population increased by almost 800 percent, from 24,640 to 219,298. While the prison population began to decline in 2013, DOJ has continued to identify prison crowding as a critical issue. GAO has examined a number of DOJ efforts to slow the growth of the prison population and to reduce recidivism through the use of reentry programs to help offenders successfully return to the community.
This statement summarizes findings and recommendations from recent GAO reports that address (1) DOJ's incarceration reduction initiatives, and (2) BOP reentry programs.
This statement is based on prior GAO products issued from February 2012 through June 2016, along with updates on the status of recommendations obtained as of December 2017. For the updates on DOJ's progress in implementing recommendations, GAO analyzed information provided by DOJ officials on actions taken and planned.

What GAO Found

The Department of Justice (DOJ) has fully addressed two of six GAO recommendations related to its incarceration reduction initiatives . In June 2015 and June 2016, GAO reported that to help address challenges associated with incarceration, DOJ had, among other things, taken steps to reduce the prison population by pursuing initiatives to use alternatives to incarceration for low-level nonviolent crimes. GAO made six recommendations to DOJ related to these efforts. As of December 2017, DOJ has implemented two of the six recommendations and has not fully addressed the remaining four. Specifically, to enhance efforts to measure program outcomes, DOJ issued guidance on proper data entry and began tracking data on different types of pretrial diversion programs that allow certain offenders to avoid incarceration if they satisfy program requirements. In addition, as of December 2017, DOJ has taken steps to partially implement GAO's recommendation to address unnecessary delays in reviewing inmates' petitions to commute their sentences.
DOJ has not taken action to address recommendations to better assess the results of pretrial diversion programs or another effort to prioritize prosecutions and reform sentencing to eliminate unfair disparities, among other goals. Further, in December 2017, DOJ noted there had been policy changes since GAO made a recommendation related to enhancing measures to monitor prioritizing prosecution and sentencing reform. Although DOJ reported taking some actions to implement GAO's recommendation, these actions did not include establishing measures that incorporate key elements of successful performance measurement systems.
DOJ has addressed two of four GAO recommendations related to its reentry programs . As part of its mission to protect public safety, DOJ's Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) provides reentry programming that aims to facilitate offenders' successful return to the community and reduce recidivism (a return to prison or criminal behavior). These reentry efforts include programs offered in BOP facilities as well as contractor-managed residential reentry centers (RRC)—also known as halfway houses—and home confinement services that allow inmates to serve the final months of their sentences in the community. GAO issued three reports in February 2012, June 2015, and June 2016 and made four recommendations to BOP in this area.
As of December 2017, DOJ has implemented two of the four recommendations and has begun to take action to address one of the remaining two. Specifically, to implement one of GAO's recommendations, DOJ established a plan to evaluate the effectiveness of all the 18 reentry programs it offers to inmates in BOP facilities. To implement another GAO recommendation to improve cost management, DOJ began requiring contractors to submit separate prices for RRC beds and home confinement services. As of December 2017, DOJ noted it has taken initial steps to address a recommendation to track outcome data for its RRC and home confinement programs; however, it has not taken action to develop measures to assess the performance of these programs.

What GAO Recommends

GAO has made 10 recommendations to DOJ in prior reports to help improve performance measurement and resource management. DOJ generally concurred and has addressed or taken steps to address several. GAO continues to believe all of these recommendations should be fully implemented.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Protecting federal employees and facilities from security threats is of critical importance. Most federal agencies are generally responsible for their facilities and have physical security programs to do so.
GAO was asked to examine how federal agencies assess facilities' security risks. This report examines: (1) how selected agencies' assessment methodologies align with the ISC's risk management standard for identifying necessary countermeasures and (2) what management challenges, if any, selected agencies reported facing in conducting physical security assessments and monitoring the results.
GAO selected four agencies—CBP, FAA, ARS, and the Forest Service—based on their large number of facilities and compared each agency's assessment methodology to the ISC Standard; analyzed facility assessment schedules and results from 2010 through 2016; and interviewed security officials. GAO also visited 13 facilities from these four agencies, selected based on geographical dispersion and their high risk level.

What GAO Found

None of the four agencies GAO reviewed—U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Agricultural Research Service (ARS), and the Forest Service—used security assessment methodologies that fully aligned with the Interagency Security Committee's Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities standard (the ISC Standard). This standard requires that methodologies used to identify necessary facility countermeasures—such as fences and closed-circuit televisions—must:
1. Consider all of the undesirable events (i.e., arson and vandalism) identified by the ISC Standard as possible risks to facilities.
2. Assess three factors—threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences—for each of these events and use these three factors to measure risk.
All four agencies used methodologies that included some ISC requirements when conducting assessments. CBP and FAA assessed vulnerabilities but not threats and consequences. ARS and the Forest Service assessed threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, but did not use these factors to measure risk. In addition, the agencies considered many, but not all 33 undesirable events related to physical security as possible risks to their facilities. Agencies are taking steps to improve their methodologies. For example, ARS and the Forest Service now use a methodology that measures risk and plan to incorporate the methodology into policy. Although CBP and FAA have updated their methodologies, their policies do not require methodologies that fully align with the ISC standard. As a result, these agencies miss the opportunity for a more informed assessment of the risk to their facilities.
All four agencies reported facing management challenges in conducting physical security assessments or monitoring assessment results. Specifically, CBP, ARS, and the Forest Service have not met the ISC's required time frame of every 3 years for conducting assessments. For example, security specialists have not conducted required reassessments of two ARS and one Forest Service higher-level facilities. While these three agencies have plans to address backlogs, CBP's plan does not balance conducting risk assessments with other competing security priorities, such as updating its policy manual, and ARS and the Forest Service lack a means to monitor completion of future assessments. Furthermore, CBP, ARS, and the Forest Service did not have the data or information systems to monitor assessment schedules or the status of countermeasures at facilities, and their policies did not specify such data requirements. For example, ARS and the Forest Service do not collect and analyze security-related data, such as countermeasures' implementation. FAA does not routinely monitor the performance of its physical security program. Without improved monitoring, agencies are not well equipped to prioritize their highest security needs, may leave facilities' vulnerabilities unaddressed, and may not take corrective actions to meet physical security program objectives. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in August 2017. Information that the agencies under review deemed sensitive has been omitted.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends: (1) that CBP and FAA update policies to require the use of methodologies fully aligned with the ISC Standard; (2) that CBP revise its plan to eliminate the assessments backlog; and (3) that all four agencies improve monitoring of their physical security programs. All four agencies agreed with the respective recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Much has changed since the federal government's employment policies were designed generations ago. Without careful attention to strategic human capital management, the federal government may continue to struggle to compete for workers with the skills needed to address the nation's social, economic, and security challenges.
GAO was asked to review issues related to the future of federal work and the workforce. This report identifies: (1) key trends affecting federal work and workers, and (2) key talent management strategies for achieving a high-performing workforce, given those trends.
GAO analyzed data from OPM and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and reviewed reports from GAO, OPM, and selected think tanks. GAO also held group interviews with agency Chief Human Capital Officers, and interviewed human capital experts and representatives of federal labor unions, managers, and executives. Additionally, GAO spoke with private consulting firms and foreign governments regarding human capital strategies that officials said were helpful to improving their organizations.

What GAO Found

Federal work is changing amid demographic and technological trends (see figure below).
Given these trends, key talent management strategies can help agencies better manage the current and future workforce. These strategies are all within agencies' existing authorities:
Align human capital strategy with current and future mission requirements. With shifting attitudes toward work, technological advances, and increased reliance on nonfederal partners, agencies need to identify the knowledge and skills necessary to respond to current and future demands. Key practices include identifying and assessing existing skills, competencies, and skills gaps.
Acquire and assign talent. To ensure agencies have the talent capacity to address evolving mission requirements and negative perceptions of federal work (e.g., that it is too bureaucratic), agencies can cultivate a diverse talent pipeline, highlight their respective missions, recruit early in the school year, support rotations, and assign talent where needed.
Incentivize and compensate employees. While federal agencies may struggle to offer competitive pay in certain labor markets, they can leverage existing incentives that appeal to workers' desire to set a schedule and to work in locations that provide work-life balance.
Engage employees. Engaged employees are more productive and less likely to leave, according to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Agencies can better ensure their workforces are engaged by managing employee performance, involving employees in decisions, and developing employees.

What GAO Recommends

GAO has open recommendations to OPM related to key talent management strategies, including developing a core set of metrics that agencies should use to close mission-critical skills gaps. OPM agreed with most of these recommendations and has made some progress, but additional actions are needed. OPM provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Safety incidents in recent years on WMATA's rail system have raised questions about its processes for performing critical maintenance and replacing capital assets. WMATA initiated a new preventive maintenance program for its rail track in 2017, and is currently implementing a new capital planning process.
GAO was asked to examine issues related to WMATA's capital funding and maintenance practices. This report examines: (1) how WMATA spent its capital funds from fiscal years 2011 through 2017, (2) how WMATA's new capital planning process addresses weaknesses it identified in the prior process, and (3) WMATA's progress toward its track preventive maintenance program's goals and how the program aligns with leading program management practices. GAO analyzed WMATA's financial and program information, interviewed officials of WMATA, the Federal Transit Administration, and five transit agencies selected for similarities to WMATA. GAO compared WMATA's capital planning process and track maintenance program with leading practices.

What GAO Found

From fiscal years 2011 through 2017, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) spent almost $6 billion on a variety of capital assets, with the largest share spent on improving its rail and bus fleet (see figure). Over this period, WMATA's capital spending was, on average, about $845 million annually.
WMATA's new capital planning process could address some weaknesses it identified in the prior process. WMATA established a framework for quantitatively prioritizing capital needs (investments to a group of related assets) over a 10-year period. However, WMATA has not established documented policies and procedures for implementing the new process, such as those for selecting specific projects for funding in its annual capital budget. WMATA is currently using its new capital planning process to make fiscal year 2020 investment decisions. WMATA has proposed a fiscal year 2020 capital budget of $1.4 billion. Without documented policies and procedures for implementing the new planning process, WMATA's stakeholders do not have reasonable assurance that WMATA is following a sound process for making investment decisions.
WMATA has made significant progress toward its track preventive maintenance program's goals, which are to reduce both track-defect and electrical-fire incidents by 50 percent in fiscal year 2019 compared with 2017. In fiscal year 2018, WMATA met its goal for reducing track defect incidents and reduced electrical fire incidents by 20 percent. However, in designing the program, WMATA did not fully assess risks. For example, WMATA did not quantitatively assess the impact of track defects or electrical fires on its ability to provide service, nor did it consider other risks such as non-electrical track fires, which represent about 30 percent of all fires on the system, or other factors, such as resources or track time. Without a comprehensive risk assessment, WMATA lacks reasonable assurance that the program is designed to address risks affecting the safety of the rail system or other risks that could hinder the new program's success.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making five recommendations, including that WMATA establish documented policies and procedures for the new capital planning process and conduct a comprehensive risk assessment for the track preventive maintenance program. WMATA described actions planned or underway to address GAO's recommendations. GAO believes the recommendations should be fully implemented, as discussed in the report.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Infringement of IPR through the illegal importation and distribution of counterfeit goods harms the U.S. economy and can threaten the health and safety of U.S. consumers. CBP leads IPR enforcement at U.S. ports of entry by detecting and seizing counterfeit goods that enter the United States. CBP works with ICE, which investigates IPR violations and builds cases for prosecution.
GAO was asked to review CBP's and ICE's IPR enforcement at U.S. borders. In this report, GAO examines (1) what is known about counterfeit goods entering the United States and the challenges they present, (2) efforts CBP and ICE have undertaken to enhance IPR enforcement and the extent to which they have assessed the results, and (3) the extent of CBP's and ICE's collaboration on IPR enforcement and ways they coordinate with the private sector. GAO reviewed agency data and documents, interviewed agency officials, and conducted field work at port locations selected on the basis of factors such as the volume of IPR seizures and variety of modes of transportation at each location. GAO also conducted undercover purchases of commonly counterfeited consumer goods on popular consumer websites, using investigative tools and techniques.

What GAO Found

Changes in the market for counterfeit goods entering the United States pose new challenges for consumers, the private sector, and U.S. agencies that enforce intellectual property rights (IPR). Specifically, growth in e-commerce has contributed to a shift in the sale of counterfeit goods in the United States, with consumers increasingly purchasing goods online and counterfeiters producing a wider variety of goods that may be sold on websites alongside authentic products. For example, 20 of 47 items GAO purchased from third-party sellers on popular consumer websites were counterfeit, according to testing by the products' rights holders (see table), highlighting potential risks to consumers. The changes in the market for counterfeit goods can also pose challenges to the private sector—for example, the challenge of distinguishing counterfeit from authentic goods listed for sale online—and complicate the enforcement efforts of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
CBP and ICE engage in a number of activities to enhance IPR enforcement; however, while ICE has assessed some of its efforts, CBP has taken limited steps to do so. CBP's and ICE's IPR enforcement activities broadly include detecting imports of potentially IPR-infringing goods, conducting special operations at U.S. ports, engaging with international partners, and undertaking localized pilot programs or port-led initiatives. CBP and ICE have collected some performance data for each of the eight activities GAO reviewed, and ICE has taken some steps to understand the impact of its efforts. However, CBP has conducted limited evaluation of its efforts to enhance IPR enforcement. Consequently, CBP may lack information needed to ensure it is investing its resources in the most efficient and effective activities.
CBP and ICE generally collaborate on IPR enforcement, but according to private sector representatives, restrictions on CBP's information sharing limit private sector enforcement efforts. GAO found that CBP and ICE have undertaken efforts that align with selected key practices for interagency collaboration, such as participating in developing a national IPR enforcement strategy and agreeing on roles and responsibilities. However, sharing additional information about seized items with rights-holding companies and e-commerce websites could improve enforcement, according to private sector representatives. CBP officials said they share information to the extent allowed under current regulations, but CBP has not completed an assessment of what, if any, additional information would be beneficial to share with private sector entities. Without such an assessment, CBP will not know if sharing additional information requires regulatory or legal changes.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making two recommendations to CBP, recommending that it (1) evaluate its efforts to enhance IPR enforcement and (2) assess potential additional information sharing with the private sector. CBP agreed with these recommendations.