Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

CBP began work on ACE in 1994 to update the agency's existing electronic trade processing system. In 2006, Congress broadened this effort by mandating creation of a “single portal” International Trade Data System to, among other things, efficiently regulate the flow of commerce and more effectively enforce laws and regulations relating to international trade. Performance problems halted implementation of ACE from 2010 to 2013. In 2014, the President set a deadline of December 31, 2016, for completing the system.
The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 included a provision for GAO to report on issues related to ACE implementation. In this report, GAO examines (1) CBP efforts to complete core ACE capabilities since 2013; (2) agencies' access to ACE and use of the system to process imports; (3) any cost savings and trade enforcement benefits from using ACE; and (4) the approach that will be used to manage ACE after core capabilities are completed. GAO reviewed information from 22 agencies as well as importers, exporters, and brokers and interviewed agency and trade community representatives.

What GAO Found

Since renewing efforts to implement the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) in 2013, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has deployed a number of key ACE activities, processes, and functions that it terms core capabilities. After several delays, CBP reported that it had finished implementing these capabilities—other than a capability for revenue collections—in February 2018. CBP expects to decide how to proceed with collections by the end of March 2018, according to agency officials.
The 22 agencies CBP identified as requiring documentation to clear or license cargo are all authorized to access ACE, although GAO found considerable variation in their use of the system for import processing. For example, the Food and Drug Administration has integrated its systems with ACE and uses ACE data to review imports under its jurisdiction and target public health risks. In contrast, the Fish and Wildlife Service has not yet integrated ACE into its operations.
ACE users at CBP and partner agencies and in the trade community told GAO that using ACE has reduced costs by making trade processing more efficient and has strengthened enforcement of trade laws and regulations. CBP has developed metrics for itself and the trade community and estimated savings that could result from the increased efficiency of some processes in ACE. CBP also reported efforts to expand its metrics to capture more ACE benefits—for example, to estimate the value of increased efficiencies for partner agencies.
CBP has not yet established an approach for the management of ACE after February 2018. The agency plans to enhance ACE to address shortcomings ACE users have identified—such as difficulty in transmitting messages and required information —but has not established a process for prioritizing all suggested enhancements. CBP also has not identified funding for continued ACE development, including enhancements, after fiscal year 2018. CBP is leading an interagency effort to develop an ACE management approach that includes processes for prioritizing enhancements and sharing costs, but this approach has not been finalized. Federal guidance calls for establishing the organizational structure necessary to operate effectively and for examining efforts as needed to adopt coordinated approaches. Until processes for prioritizing ACE enhancements and sharing costs are finalized, agencies and the trade community will not realize the system's full potential benefits.

What GAO Recommends

The Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure that the Commissioner of CBP, in collaboration with partner agencies, finalizes an interagency approach to managing ACE that includes processes for prioritizing enhancements and sharing system costs. CBP concurred with GAO's recommendation.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) offers subsidized health-care coverage for qualifying applicants. States may operate their own health-care marketplaces or rely on the FFM, maintained by CMS. In PY 2015, 37 states relied on the FFM and over 8 million plan selections were made through the FFM. PPACA represents a significant fiscal commitment for the federal government, which pays subsidies to issuers on participants' behalf.
GAO was asked to examine enrollment into the FFM for PY 2015, the most current data available at the time of GAO's review. This report examines the extent to which indications of potentially improper or fraudulent enrollments existed in the FFM's application, enrollment, and eligibility-verification process for the 2015 enrollment period.
GAO reviewed relevant federal statutes, regulations, and policies for PY 2015 and interviewed CMS officials. GAO analyzed eligibility and enrollment data for about 8.04 million applicants in PY 2015 to identify applicants (1) who had a citizenship, status as a national, or lawful presence inconsistency; (2) whose information did not match SSA records; or (3) who were reportedly deceased. GAO also reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 45 applicants to more fully understand verification processes.

What GAO Found

A small percentage—about 1 percent—of plan year (PY) 2015 enrollments were potentially improper or fraudulent. These applicants had unresolved inconsistencies related to citizenship, status as a national, lawful presence, or Social Security number (SSN), or received coverage while reportedly deceased, according to GAO's analysis of federally facilitated marketplace (FFM) eligibility and enrollment data. To verify applicant information, such as citizenship, status as a national, or lawful presence, and SSNs, the FFM uses data from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Social Security Administration (SSA), among other sources. When an applicant's information does not match the available data sources, the FFM generates an inconsistency, and the FFM should take steps, such as requesting applicant documentation, to resolve it. Having an SSN is not a condition of eligibility; however, unresolved inconsistencies could indicate that an enrollment is potentially improper or fraudulent. The FFM did not actively resolve SSN inconsistencies for PY 2015, but the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has since completed system upgrades and established procedures for verifying SSNs with applicant-provided documentation, according to CMS officials.
Note: Some applicants may be included in more than one category.
GAO found that applicants or enrollees may have received or maintained coverage with an associated subsidy after their reported death because the FFM did not always identify individuals as deceased in a timely manner, such as prior to automatic reenrollment. CMS relied on third parties, such as family members, to report the death of an enrollee to the FFM, but did not always receive adequate notification to verify the death. According to CMS officials, CMS is exploring approaches to identify enrollees who may be deceased and should therefore be unenrolled from coverage. The FFM checks applicants' information against death information from SSA before initial enrollment but does not recheck death information prior to reenrollment. According to CMS officials, the FFM does not reverify information, other than income, when automatically reenrolling applicants to help encourage individuals to maintain enrollment in coverage from one year to the next. Without rechecking SSA death information prior to automatic reenrollment, the FFM remains at risk of providing subsidized coverage to deceased individuals with related costs to the federal government.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that CMS assess and document the feasibility of approaches to identify the deaths of individuals prior to automatic reenrollment. HHS concurred with GAO's recommendation.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Each year, GSA spends hundreds of millions of dollars on R&A projects to address the repair, renovation, or modernization needs of the more than 1,600 federally owned buildings under the agency's custody and control—the average building's age is 47 years old. In fiscal year 2018, Congress appropriated $666 million in obligational authority from the Federal Buildings Fund for GSA's R&A program. Collecting information is fundamental to monitoring progress and assessing projects' performance.
GAO was asked to review issues about GSA's collection of information needed to manage its R&A projects. This report examines how GSA (1) collects information on individual R&A projects and (2) assesses the performance of R&A projects.
GAO reviewed documentation on the systems that GSA uses to support its management of the R&A program, as well as internal GSA reports on regional offices' use of the system that tracks projects' status. GAO also interviewed officials from GSA's central office and four regional offices to understand the types of information collected on R&A projects and how the information is input in GSA's systems. To identify the regional officials to be interviewed, GAO selected a non-generalizable sample of four capital R&A projects and eight small R&A projects, active between October 2013 and August 2017, based on a preliminary analysis of GSA data.
GSA had no comments on the report.

What GAO Found

The General Services Administration (GSA) requires its regional offices to collect information on their repair and alteration (R&A) projects electronically and is working to improve the completeness and timeliness of this collection. Since 2011, GSA has required its regional offices to input and update information on both capital projects (those costing more than $3.095 million as of fiscal year 2018) and small projects (those costing less than $3.095 million). Officials from the four regions GAO interviewed said they find this system to be useful for forecasting how a capital project will progress. Regarding small projects' information, GSA has taken steps to improve regional offices' collection by, for example, conducting monthly checks to ensure that all small projects have been created in the system, assessing the number of projects that have missing information, and introducing a simplified way that GSA's regions can enter information in the system. GSA officials reported that, moving forward, they are continuing to emphasize the importance of collecting complete and timely information, which is needed to assess the performance of all R&A projects.
GSA uses schedule- and budget-focused measures to assess the individual, the regional, and the national performance of capital and small R&A projects and is working to create a consistent understanding of performance. GSA's measures rely on information input by regional officials. For example, during the construction phase, GSA uses two “project delivery” measures, which compare a project's estimated schedule and budget with actual outcomes. GSA produces regional and national reports detailing projects' performance relative to these measures. However, not all regional officials GAO spoke with view these reports as useful because they are not specific to the officials' information needs. As a result, some regions have created their own reports, contributing to an inconsistent understanding of R&A projects' performance across the agency. GSA has conducted outreach to its regions and has begun to introduce new “dashboard” reports that present a consolidated view of R&A projects' information. Moving forward, GSA's ability to assess R&A projects' performance will continue to rely on regional officials' complete and timely input of information for both capital and small projects.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

The United States belongs to several inter-American organizations, including the OAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH, which promote democracy, security, health care, agricultural development, and scientific exchange in the Western Hemisphere. The United States helps finance these organizations' operating expenses through assessed contributions. The United States also provides voluntary contributions through the federal funding of assistance agreements to OAS, PAHO, and IICA.
This testimony is based on GAO's June and December 2017 reports that, among other things, (1) determined the amounts and percentages of U.S. assessed contributions to the four organizations, (2) assessed the extent to which U.S. agencies included and documented key monitoring provisions as part of their assistance agreements, and (3) assessed the extent to which the organizations' strategic goals align with those of U.S. agencies.
GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from State, HHS, USAID, USDA, and the four organizations. GAO analyzed the four organizations' audited financial reports and a nongeneralizable sample of 12 assistance agreements awarded by State, USAID, HHS, and USDA active in calendar years 2014 through 2016.

What GAO Found

While the United States' assessed contributions constituted over 57 percent of total assessed contributions by member states to four inter-American organizations from 2014 to 2016, the U.S. share may be reduced in the near future (see table). In response to a statutory requirement, the U.S. Department of State (State) said it submitted to Congress a strategy that included working with the Organization of American States (OAS) member states toward ensuring that the OAS would not assess any single member state a contribution amounting to more than 50 percent of all OAS assessed contributions. At the OAS General Assembly in June 2017, OAS member states voted to draft a proposal to modify its system for determining member states' assessed contributions to potentially reduce the maximum assessed contribution to below 50 percent. The other three organizations use OAS's system for setting assessed contributions. Hence, any change in contributions at OAS should also be reflected at Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), and the Pan-American Institute of Geography and History (PAIGH).
State, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) provide voluntary contributions to OAS, PAHO, and IICA in the form of assistance agreements (e.g., grants and cooperative agreements). In December 2017, GAO reported that its review of 12 such agreements across the four agencies found that State and USDA did not include all key monitoring provisions in their agreements as called for by applicable guidance. State has since taken corrective action. GAO also found that all four U.S. agencies did not have full documentation of 18 of the 42 monitoring activities required by the 12 assistance agreements GAO reviewed. For example, USDA did not have full documentation, such as financial reports, of any of its 10 required monitoring activities, and USAID did not have full documentation of 2 of its 11 required activities. State and HHS said they initiated corrective action before our review. If an agency does not have full documentation of monitoring activities, it may lack information needed to make appropriate budgetary and programmatic decisions.
GAO found that the strategic goals of the OAS, PAHO, IICA, and PAIGH are predominantly aligned with the strategic goals of State, USAID, HHS, and USDA. According to agency officials, the agencies employ mechanisms to ensure that assistance agreements with these organizations align with U.S. goals.

What GAO Recommends

In its December 2017 report, GAO recommended that (1) USDA ensure inclusion of all monitoring provisions as part of agreements and (2) USAID and USDA ensure full documentation of monitoring activities. USDA and USAID concurred with GAO's recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

The federal government spends approximately $137 billion annually on research and development—mostly at DOD, DOE, NASA, and NIH—to further agencies' missions, including at federal labs. Multiple laws have directed agencies and labs to encourage commercial use of their inventions, in part by licensing patents, to private sector companies and others that aim to further develop and bring the inventions to market.
GAO was asked to review agency practices for managing inventions developed at federal labs, with a particular focus on patent licensing. This report examines (1) challenges in licensing patents and steps taken to address and report them and (2) information to guide establishing financial terms in patent licenses at DOD, DOE, NASA, and NIH. GAO reviewed relevant literature, laws, and agency documents, including patent licenses from 2014, to match the most recent NIST summary report when the licenses were requested, and GAO interviewed agency officials and knowledgeable stakeholders, including organizations that assist federal labs in licensing patents.

What GAO Found

Federal agency and laboratory (lab) officials identified challenges in licensing patents across the federal government, and agencies have taken some steps to address and report them. Patent licensing is a technology transfer activity that allows, for example, federal inventions to be legally transferred to the private sector for commercial use. Specifically, officials at the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Energy (DOE), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and National Institutes of Health (NIH), as well as external stakeholders, noted challenges in having researchers identify potentially patentable inventions. DOD, DOE, and NIH officials also cited having inadequate internal systems to keep track of inventions developed in the labs. In addition, several stakeholders stated that licensing patented inventions can be lengthy and bureaucratic, which may deter companies from licensing. The agencies reported taking steps to address these challenges, such as implementing model license agreements across labs to expedite the process.
The Department of Commerce has delegated to its National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to annually report agencies' technology transfer activities, including patent licensing. Although NIST has reported some challenges, it has not fully reported the range of challenges identified by agency and lab officials and stakeholders. NIST officials stated that they were generally aware of the challenges but had not considered including them to a greater degree in their annual reports to Congress. By fully reporting the range of challenges in federal patent licensing, NIST has the opportunity to further ensure that Congress is more aware of challenges that limit agencies' efforts and ways for potentially addressing those challenges.
Federal agencies and labs have limited information to guide officials when establishing the financial terms of patent licenses. For example, while federal labs can use comparable licenses to help establish financial terms, their access to information on comparable licenses from other labs varies, and such information is not formally shared among the agencies. Based on its established interagency role, NIST is best positioned to assist agencies in sharing information on comparable licenses, in accordance with leading practices for interagency collaboration. By doing so, NIST would provide federal agencies and labs with useful information that can help them better establish financial terms and successfully license inventions.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making seven recommendations, including that Commerce instruct NIST to fully report the range of challenges in federal patent licensing in its annual reports to Congress and facilitate information sharing among agencies. Commerce, DOD, DOE, NASA, and NIH generally agreed with GAO's recommendations and are taking steps to implement them.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Western Hemisphere nations such as Mexico and Colombia are major sources of illicit drugs such as cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana. Precursor chemicals used in the production of illicit fentanyl and other dangerous synthetic drugs often originate in China but typically enter the United States through Canada and Mexico. U.S. agencies implementing the National Drug Control Strategy conduct several activities to disrupt the flow of illicit drugs and dismantle the organizations that control them (see fig.). In December 2016, Congress established the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission to, among other things, evaluate the U.S.-funded counternarcotics programs in the Western Hemisphere.
In this context, GAO was asked to review key issues related to U.S. counternarcotics efforts in the Western Hemisphere. This report examines (1) U.S. agencies' spending for counternarcotic efforts in the Western Hemisphere during fiscal years 2010-2015, the most recent data available; (2) how agencies are gathering and sharing best practices and lessons learned from their counternarcotics efforts domestically and internationally; and (3) mechanisms U.S. agencies have used to address changing drug threats. GAO analyzed agencies' data and documents, interviewed agency officials, and conducted fieldwork at the U.S. Southern Command and Joint Interagency Task Force South in Florida.
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. Several agencies provided technical comments on a draft of this report which we incorporated as appropriate.

What GAO Found

U.S. agencies implementing the National Drug Control Strategy identified billions in spending for Western Hemisphere counternarcotics efforts in fiscal years 2010 through 2015. Agencies that track their counternarcotics spending regionally—the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development—reported spending nearly $5 billion for such activities in the region during this period. Agencies that do not track counternarcotics spending regionally—DHS's Customs and Border Protection and Coast Guard; and the Department of Justice's Drug Enforcement Administration and Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces—reported spending about $34 billion for counternarcotics activities in fiscal years 2010 through 2015. According to officials of these four agencies, most of their counternarcotics activities are in the Western Hemisphere. We are not reporting Federal Bureau of Investigation counternarcotics spending separately, since it is included as part of Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces.
The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), which coordinates the National Drug Control Program, facilitates the sharing of best practices and lessons learned at meetings such as the North American Drug Dialogue workshop, including Canada, Mexico, and the United States. In addition, 7 of the 10 agencies GAO reviewed described processes they have in place for identifying and collecting best practices or lessons learned from counternarcotics efforts in the Western Hemisphere. For example, DOD reported using a process, known as the Joint Lessons Learned Program, that consists of five phases: discovery, validation, resolution, evaluation, and dissemination.
U.S. agencies use a variety of mechanisms to address changing narcotics conditions in the Western Hemisphere. ONDCP collaborates with agencies working directly on regional counternarcotics efforts to address emerging threats, as reflected in the annually updated National Drug Control Strategy and the Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy. In addition, documentary evidence GAO reviewed showed that a variety of interagency groups, task forces, and committees have been created to coordinate the U.S. government's responses to counternarcotics threats. For example, the National Heroin Coordination Group was established to provide guidance aimed at reducing the growing supply of heroin and illicit fentanyl in the U.S. market.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

ARNG provides trained and equipped units ready to defend life and property in the 54 states, territories, and the District of Columbia. In 2011, the Army Audit Agency reported weaknesses in internal controls over soldier incentive payments in the California ARNG that led to some improper payments. DOD initially took actions to recoup some of these payments, but the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 allowed for the waiver or other forgiveness of debt.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision for GAO to assess policies and procedures for minimizing and waiving the recoupment of improper payments. This report (1) evaluates the extent to which ARNG has implemented and planned to adjust the internal controls for its Selected Reserve Incentive Program to prevent improper payments and (2) describes which DOD organizations have the authority to waive ARNG incentive debts and steps taken to improve waiver documentation. GAO conducted site visits to six states based on the value of their incentive programs, reviewed documentation used to manage incentive programs, examined incentive debt waiver cases, and interviewed DOD officials.

What GAO Found

In response to the over $22 million in improper payments the California Army National Guard (ARNG) made in cash bonuses and other soldier incentives from 2004 through 2010, ARNG officials implemented some internal controls to prevent future improper incentive payments. These internal controls include automated and manual checks of soldier incentive contracts to verify soldiers' eligibility for incentive payments. For example, ARNG implemented automated rules in its Guard Incentive Management System—an online system that tracks incentive contracts—to monitor a soldier's eligibility for an incentive by comparing the data received from multiple personnel systems against the soldier's contract. If any issues are found, the Guard Incentive Management System will flag the incentive case for review by state ARNG officials and will stop future payments until the issue is resolved.
While these internal controls have improved accountability over soldier incentive payments, ARNG is still in the process of completing further actions. For example, in April 2017, ARNG issued the fiscal year 2017 Selected Reserve Incentive Program policy. However, ARNG did not incorporate changes as a result of this policy into the Guard Incentive Management System to ensure that the automated checks captured these policy changes—including one that affects approximately 8,000 solider incentive contracts, according to ARNG officials. ARNG officials told us that they had not updated the Guard Incentive Management System with this policy because of technical challenges resulting from a transition in vendors for the Reserve Component Manpower System—an information system that houses the Guard Incentive Management System. ARNG officials also told us that they plan to update the Guard Incentive Management System to include the 2017 policy in February 2018.
GAO also found that ARNG had not developed and implemented a plan for future significant changes that could affect its internal controls over soldier incentive payments. These changes include, for example, the end of the current vendor contract in 2020 to support the Reserve Component Manpower System and the Army National Guard's migration to the Integrated Personnel and Pay System – Army that is scheduled to occur in 2018. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should identify, analyze, and respond to significant changes that could affect an internal control system. Specifically, because conditions affecting an organization and its environment continually change, management needs to anticipate and plan for significant changes by using a forward-looking process to prepare for those changes. Without taking action to plan for such changes, ARNG puts itself at risk of making improper payments in the future.
The Defense Finance and Accounting Service and the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals review and adjudicate requests for waivers of incentive debt. DOD has taken two steps to improve the availability of documentation needed to adjudicate waiver cases. First, DOD has clarified the policy in its Financial Management Regulation on the documentation soldiers are required to provide. Second, officials review documentation in the Guard Incentive Management System before validating an incentive payment, which may reduce delays associated with missing documentation when processing waiver requests.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that ARNG develop and implement a plan that identifies, analyzes, and responds to significant changes that could affect internal controls for its Selected Reserve Incentive Program. ARNG concurred with the recommendation and has identified planned actions to address the recommendation.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

In fiscal years 2006 through 2016, the federal government spent almost $193 billion on DOE's M&O contracts—a form of contract that traces its origins to the Manhattan Project. Six DOE offices use M&O contracts to manage and operate federally owned sites that perform work to fulfill DOE's diverse missions, such as conducting scientific research and maintaining nuclear weapons.
GAO was asked to review DOE's performance management of its M&O contracts. This report examines, among other things, (1) how DOE offices evaluated M&O contractor performance in fiscal years 2006 through 2016; (2) the extent to which DOE's fiscal year 2016 M&O contractor PERs provide information on contractors' technical, administrative, and cost performance; and (3) the results of DOE's M&O contractor performance evaluations for fiscal years 2006 through 2016.
GAO reviewed performance evaluation documents for 21 of the 22 DOE M&O contracts; analyzed DOE policies, procedures, and guidelines, and federal regulations; analyzed technical, administrative, and cost aspects of M&O contracts' 2016 PERs; and interviewed DOE officials.

What GAO Found

In fiscal years 2006 through 2016, six offices within the Department of Energy (DOE) generally used one of three different approaches to evaluate management and operating (M&O) contractor performance. Although these approaches varied in the performance criteria and methodologies used for determining contractor ratings and incentives, all the offices annually set expectations for contractors and assessed performance.
In analyzing DOE's fiscal year 2016 Performance Evaluation Reports (PER), GAO found that these reports provided less information on M&O contractors' cost performance than on contractors' technical and administrative performance. The cost information provided in the PERs often was not detailed, did not indicate the significance of the performance being described, and applied only to specific activities. Further, the information is of limited use for acquisition decision-making, such as deciding whether to extend the length of a contract, because it does not permit an overall assessment of cost performance. A key reason PERs did not include more cost performance information is that the DOE offices' policies do not require specific assessments of cost performance or discuss how to ensure cost information is useful for future acquisition decision-making. By updating policies to require inclusion of quality cost performance information in PERs, DOE offices could better assess M&O contractors' costs, improve acquisition decision-making, and ensure performance evaluations fully address required elements.
Based on GAO's review of DOE M&O contractor performance evaluations from fiscal years 2006 through 2016, DOE generally provided high performance ratings and more than 90 percent of available performance incentives (see figure). Ratings for some areas of contractor performance, as well as ratings for contractor performance at specific DOE sites, varied from this trend. For example, three times during this period contractors received 50 percent or less of available award and incentive fees due to a major accident and safety and security issues.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making seven recommendations to DOE, including to each of the six DOE offices to update their policies requiring that PERs include quality information to enable an overall assessment of M&O contractor cost performance. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOE generally agreed with these recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

USPS's competitive products have become increasingly important, comprising about 28 percent of USPS's total revenue. USPS scans these packages at various points throughout the postal network. When scans are inaccurate or missing, questions are raised about the veracity of USPS's data on scanning performance and can lead to customer complaints.
GAO was asked to review USPS's scanning policies and procedures. In this report, GAO (1) describes USPS's scanning performance and (2) examines how USPS ensures accurate scanning. GAO reviewed USPS's policies and procedures and assessed them against internal control standards; interviewed officials from USPS and five high-volume mailers; and conducted site visits to six post offices in two USPS districts that represented a range of volume, number of routes, and performance.

What GAO Found

Mail products over which the United States Postal Service (USPS) does not exercise market dominance, such as many of its packages, are called competitive products. These items are scanned throughout the mail delivery system to track their progress (see figure). USPS data show that these products are almost always scanned. For example, USPS data showed that for the first three quarters of fiscal year 2018; all but one of USPS's 67 districts met their scanning goals. Additionally, mailers that account for a high volume of USPS's competitive products told GAO that they believed USPS was generally scanning products correctly. However, a small percentage of missed or inaccurate scans occur. For example, a report from one USPS district showed that for one week, 0.73 percent of the products delivered were missing a scan and that for the fiscal year to date almost 155,000 competitive products were missing a delivery scan.
USPS has designed and implemented procedures and activities to help ensure accurate scanning, but some limitations could contribute to scanning errors. For example, USPS has not based its operational procedures for scanning on any internal control standards. USPS officials said the procedures were based on USPS's unique responsibilities, management experience, and sound business practices, but the officials could not identify specific standards or a framework that they followed as the basis for the procedures. USPS officials said they did not believe any internal controls standards applied to these procedures. By not basing procedures on standards, USPS may miss opportunities to improve how it achieves its mission to scan and measure the performance of competitive products. Additionally, USPS's scanning procedure documents, such as for outlining specific delivery scanning steps, are not always consistent, and USPS relies on more informal methods, such as meetings with employees to communicate changes. Thus, employees may not have accurate procedures available to them. Finally, USPS lacks procedures to help managers identify and address incorrect scans, address customer complaints or otherwise address scanning irregularities. For example, USPS's guidance for managers is limited to a list of bullet-points that do not detail the steps managers should follow to resolve scanning irregularities. In addition, this list has not been updated since 2005. Without consistent or detailed procedures, USPS's employees and managers may not scan items accurately or find information needed to resolve scanning issues—a situation that could hinder USPS's ability to reduce inaccurate or missing scans for these important mail products.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that USPS: (1) identify and adopt internal control standards for its operational activities such as for scanning of competitive products; (2) improve the communication of procedures for scanning competitive products; and, (3) create procedures for supervisors on how to address inaccurate scans and resolve scanning issues. USPS agreed to explore addressing the first recommendation and agreed with the other two recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Federal agencies are exploring ways to use telework as a tool to reduce the federal footprint and use space more efficiently. GAO was asked to examine the effects of telework on agencies' space-planning efforts. In this report, GAO reviewed: (1) how the 23 civilian CFO Act agencies reported using telework in office space planning; (2) the specific ways selected agencies and GSA used telework in their office space planning; and (3) any challenges the civilian CFO Act agencies faced in using telework in office space planning.
GAO surveyed all 23 civilian CFO Act agencies, analyzed each agency's space-planning documents, and Real Property Efficiency Plans . GAO reviewed four agencies in greater detail based on analysis of telework data and other factors. For those four agencies GAO conducted site visits, interviewed officials, and analyzed agency documents. GAO also identified challenges agencies faced in using telework in space planning, based on survey results, agency documents, and interviews.

What GAO Found

The 23 civilian Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Act agencies reported various ways of considering and using telework as a space-planning tool, by, for example, implementing desk-sharing for employees who telework in order to relinquish leased space, or increasing the number of staff working in an existing space without increasing its size. All of the 23 agencies discussed telework in the context of space planning and achieving greater space efficiencies in either their space-planning documents or Real Property Efficiency Plans . The agencies that used telework as a space-planning tool generally reported implementing smaller or unassigned workstations.
Three of the four agencies GAO reviewed in greater detail––the General Services Administration (GSA); the Office of Justice Programs at the Department of Justice; the Centers for Disease Control at the Department of Health and Human Services; and the Bureau of the Fiscal Service at the Department of the Treasury––leveraged telework to reduce or use office space more efficiently. For example, GSA and the Office of Justice Programs used telework to accommodate more employees in a smaller office space as illustrated in figure 1 below. The Centers for Disease Control used telework to accommodate more employees in the same amount of space. The Bureau of the Fiscal Service reduced space without telework by reducing the size of individual workstations.
The 23 civilian CFO Act agencies reported several challenges in using telework to reduce space including human capital issues, mission suitability, and measuring cost savings attributable to telework. About two-thirds of the agencies said they would find it helpful to have additional information, assistance, or resources in using telework as a space-planning tool. GSA provides guidance to improve space utilization. However, GAO found that GSA last developed relevant formal guidance in 2006. This information, and that on GSA's telework and space-planning websites, was neither specific nor detailed and therefore of limited assistance to agencies that would like to use telework as a space-planning tool. Additionally, GSA's space-planning tool—the Workplace Investment and Feasibility Tool, intended to help agencies quantify the benefits and costs of telework––remains under development after more than 4 years, and GSA officials have not decided whether to make the tool available to other federal agencies. As such, agencies reported that they lack adequate guidance to determine how best to reduce space or use it more efficiently, and how to assess the benefits and costs of using telework in space planning.

What GAO Recommends

GSA concurred with recommendations that GSA should: (1) develop guidance on how agencies can use telework as a strategic space-planning tool and make this guidance readily available and (2) complete and make the Workplace Investment and Feasibility Tool available to federal agencies for use in assessing the benefits and costs of telework.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

The FMS program is one of the primary ways the U.S. government supports its foreign partners, by providing them with defense equipment and services. The program charges FMS customers overhead fees to cover the U.S. government's operating costs. They include the administrative fee for costs such as civilian employee salaries and facilities, and the CAS fee for the cost of contract quality assurance, management, and audits. In 1989, Congress excluded from administrative expenses certain costs associated with military personnel who work on the FMS program as well as unfunded civilian retirement and other benefits. As of May 2018, the administrative fee rate is 3.5 percent, and the CAS fee rate is 1.2 percent.
House Report 114-537 and Senate Report 114-255 included provisions that GAO review DSCA's collection and management of these fees. This report examines, for fiscal years 2007 to 2017, the balance of and controls over (1) the administrative account and (2) the CAS account. GAO analyzed Department of Defense (DOD) data and documents, modeled projections for the administrative account, and interviewed DOD officials.

What GAO Found

The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) administrative account balance grew by over 950 percent from fiscal years 2007 to 2017—from $391 million to $4.1 billion—due in part to insufficient management controls, including the lack of timely rate reviews. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) has some controls to manage the account balance. For example, DSCA has established a method for calculating a minimum desired balance to ensure it has sufficient funds to complete FMS cases despite uncertain future sales. At the end of fiscal year 2017, the account balance was $2.7 billion above this minimum. DSCA, however, has completed rate reviews less frequently than directed by its policy. Moreover, DSCA has not adopted the best practice of setting an upper bound for the account that would, along with the minimum level, provide a target range for the account balance. By not performing timely rate reviews or setting an upper bound, DSCA has limited its ability to prevent excessive balance growth. GAO modeling indicates that, even with a planned fee rate reduction to 3.2 percent, the account balance would likely remain above its minimum level through fiscal year 2024, including if annual expenditures increased by 15 percent more than expected. As such, the account has the potential to pay for additional expenses. These could include expenses first excluded by statute in 1989 at a time when the account balance was negative and which have since been paid from other appropriated funds. DOD told GAO it is willing to revisit these exclusions.
The FMS contract administration services (CAS) account grew from fiscal years 2007 to 2015 from $69 million to $981 million, due in part to insufficient management controls, including not setting an upper bound. The balances for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 overstated the amount of funds available due to a systems issue and limited related oversight. Since 2014, DSCA has implemented some controls for the CAS account, such as regular reviews of the account balance, but weaknesses remain. In particular, DSCA does not plan to follow its internal guidance to conduct the next CAS fee rate review within 5 years. DSCA also has inconsistently calculated the desired minimum level for the account. Finally, DSCA has not set an upper bound for the account to help officials follow internal guidance that directs them to determine when the balance is excessive and a fee rate reduction should be considered. As a result, DSCA is limited in its ability to make timely, appropriate decisions on the fee rate.

What GAO Recommends

Congress should consider redefining what it considers an allowable expense to be charged from the administrative account. GAO is making six recommendations to help DSCA improve its controls over both accounts, including completing more timely reviews and establishing a desired range for balance levels. DOD generally concurred.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

The LDA, as amended, requires lobbyists to file quarterly disclosure reports and semiannual reports on certain political contributions. The law also includes a provision for GAO to annually audit lobbyists' compliance with the LDA. GAO's objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which lobbyists can demonstrate compliance with disclosure requirements, (2) identify challenges to compliance that lobbyists report, and (3) describe the resources and authorities available to USAO in its role in enforcing LDA compliance, and the efforts USAO has made to improve enforcement. This is GAO's 11th report under the provision.
GAO reviewed a stratified random sample of 98 quarterly disclosure LD-2 reports filed for the third and fourth quarters of calendar year 2016 and the first and second quarters of calendar year 2017. GAO also reviewed two random samples totaling 160 LD-203 reports from year-end 2016 and midyear 2017. This methodology allowed GAO to generalize to the population of 45,818 disclosure reports with $5,000 or more in lobbying activity, and 30,594 reports of federal political campaign contributions. GAO also met with officials from USAO to obtain status updates on its efforts to focus resources on lobbyists who fail to comply.
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. GAO provided a draft of this report to the Department of Justice for review and comment. The Department of Justice provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.

What GAO Found

For the 2017 reporting period, most lobbyists provided documentation for key elements of their disclosure reports to demonstrate compliance with the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, as amended (LDA). For lobbying disclosure (LD-2) reports and political contributions (LD-203) reports filed during the third and fourth quarter of 2016 and the first and second quarter of 2017, GAO estimates that
87 percent of lobbyists filed reports as required for the quarter in which they first registered; the figure below describes the filing process and enforcement;
99 percent of all lobbyists who filed (up from 83 percent in 2016) could provide documentation for income and expenses; and
93 percent filed year-end 2016 LD-203 reports as required.
These findings are generally consistent with prior reports GAO issued for the 2010 through 2016 reporting periods. However, in recent years GAO's findings showed some variation in the estimated percentage of reports with supporting documentation. For example, an estimated increase in lobbyists who could document expenses is notable in 2017 and represents a statistically significant increase from 2016.
As in GAO's other reports, some lobbyists were still unclear about the need to disclose certain previously held covered positions, such as paid congressional internships or certain executive agency positions. GAO estimates that 15 percent of all LD-2 reports may not have properly disclosed previously held covered positions. On the other hand, over the past several years of reporting on lobbying disclosure, GAO found that most lobbyists in the sample rated the terms associated with LD-2 reporting as “very easy” or “somewhat easy” to understand.
The U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia (USAO) stated it has sufficient resources and authority to enforce compliance with the LDA. USAO continued its efforts to bring lobbyists into compliance by reminding them to file reports or by applying civil penalties.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act created the Innovation Center within CMS to test new approaches to health care delivery and payment—known as models—for use in Medicare, Medicaid, or CHIP. The Innovation Center became operational in November 2010. In 2012, GAO reported on the early implementation of the Innovation Center. GAO found that, during the first 16 months of operations, the Innovation Center focused on implementing 17 new models and developed preliminary plans for evaluating the effects of each model and for assessing the center's overall performance.
GAO was asked to update its previous work. In this report, GAO: (1) describes the status of payment and delivery models implemented and the resources used; (2) describes the center's use of model evaluations; and (3) examines the center's assessment of its own performance. GAO reviewed available documentation, such as model fact sheets and frequently asked questions, and evaluation reports for models that have been implemented. GAO reviewed obligation data and performance information for the time period for which complete data or information were available. GAO also interviewed officials from the Innovation Center and CMS's Office of the Actuary.
The Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.

What GAO Found

As of March 1, 2018, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (Innovation Center) had implemented 37 models that test new approaches for delivering and paying for health care with the goal of reducing spending and improving quality of care. These models varied based on several characteristics, including the program covered—Medicare, Medicaid, the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), or some combination of the three—and the nature of provider participation—voluntary or mandatory. Going forward, the Innovation Center indicated that the center plans to continue focusing on the use of voluntary participation models and to develop models in new areas, including prescription drugs, Medicare Advantage, mental and behavioral health, and program integrity. Through fiscal year 2016, the Innovation Center obligated $5.6 billion of its $10 billion appropriation for fiscal years 2011 through 2019.
The Innovation Center has used evaluations of models (1) to inform the development of additional models, (2) to make changes to models as they are implemented, and (3) to recommend models for expansion. For example, Innovation Center officials noted that, for some instances where evaluations have shown reduced spending with maintained or improved quality of care, the center has developed new models that build upon the approaches of earlier models, but with adjustments intended to address reported limitations. In addition, the Innovation Center used evaluations to recommend two models to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) Office of the Actuary for certification for expansion. According to CMS officials, a model evaluation and a certification for expansion differ in that a model evaluation assesses the impact of a delivery and payment approach for model participants only, while a certification for expansion assesses the future impact on program spending more broadly across all beneficiaries, payers, and providers who would be affected by the expanded model. As a result, the Office of the Actuary used the results of the evaluation and other information, such as Medicare claims data and published studies, to certify the expansion of both models.
To assess the center's overall performance, the Innovation Center established performance goals and related measures and reported meeting its targets for some goals in 2015, the latest year for which data were available (see table below).
Innovation Center officials told GAO that the center also recently developed a methodology to estimate a forecasted return on investment for its model portfolio. The center is in the early stages of refining the methodology and applying it broadly across its models.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

O&S costs—the costs used to operate and sustain a program—can account for up to 70 percent of a program's total cost. End users rely on O&S funds for maintenance, spares, and personnel. DHS programs initially identify O&S costs in their life-cycle cost estimate at the outset of the acquisition. This estimate informs the program's budget and affects the amount the department designates for the program's use. In 2015, GAO found that DHS's budget requests did not reflect all estimated costs—including O&S—for certain programs, which limits visibility for decision makers.
GAO was asked to review O&S activities for major acquisition programs at DHS. This report examines the extent that (1) DHS's budget management and reporting affects operations and oversight, and (2) cost estimates are comprehensive and accurate, as well as regularly updated.
GAO selected a non-generalizable sample of 11 major acquisition programs, based on asset type and acquisition status, as case studies from selected DHS components. GAO analyzed selected programs' O&S cost estimates, funding, and spending. In addition, GAO interviewed DHS officials at the headquarters, component, and program office level.

What GAO Found

While the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) budget management provides flexibility to conduct operations, such as shifting funds to programs within the same mission area to cover unforeseen needs, budget reporting does not provide Congress with insight into specific programs' operations and support O&S costs. The O&S budget information that DHS reports to Congress is oriented by mission—for example, Integrated Operations—instead of by program—for example, the Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft Program. The figure depicts the mission-oriented nature of the budget.
While some program-oriented O&S data are available at the component level, this information does not appear in DHS's budget reports to Congress. This disparity is due in part to the manner in which the department reports budget information. However, these limitations are not insurmountable. Standards for internal controls state that managers should communicate quality information, in this case full program costs. Providing additional data on O&S costs in budget reports would preserve DHS's flexibility in its use of funds while providing Congress a better understanding of the budgetary and programmatic effect of its funding decisions.
GAO reviewed the O&S portion of the most recently approved cost estimates for selected programs and found that 10 of the 11 estimates provided a complete accounting of all resources and associated cost elements. Further, all the programs had appropriately updated their cost estimates as required, a GAO best practice in cost estimating. Due to the sensitive nature of some programs' cost models, GAO could not verify all aspects of accuracy for all estimates reviewed.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making three recommendations, including that DHS work with Congress to add program-level O&S funding details to the budget information it provides Congress. DHS concurred.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

The United States has five territories: Puerto Rico, American Samoa, CNMI, Guam, and USVI. The territories, like U.S. states in some cases, borrow through financial markets. Puerto Rico in particular has amassed large amounts of debt, and defaulted on billions of dollars of debt payments. In response to the fiscal crisis in Puerto Rico, Congress enacted and the President signed the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) in June of 2016, which established an Oversight Board with broad powers of budgetary and financial control over Puerto Rico and requires GAO to study fiscal issues in all five U.S. territories.
In this report, for each territory for fiscal years 2005-2015, GAO examined (1) trends in public debt and its composition, (2) trends in revenue and its composition, (3) the major reported drivers of the territory's public debt, and (4) what is known about the ability of each territory to repay public debt.
GAO analyzed the territories' single audit reports; interviewed officials from the territories' governments, ratings agencies, and subject matter experts; and reviewed documents and prior GAO work.

What GAO Found

Puerto Rico: Between fiscal years 2005 and 2014, the latest figures available, Puerto Rico's total public debt outstanding (public debt) grew from $39.2 billion to $67.8 billion, reaching 66 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Despite some revenue growth, Puerto Rico's net position was negative and declining during the period, reflecting its deteriorating financial position. Experts pointed to several factors as contributing to Puerto Rico's high debt levels, and in September 2016 Puerto Rico missed up to $1.5 billion in debt payments. The outcome of the ongoing debt restructuring process will determine future debt repayment.
American Samoa: American Samoa's public debt more than doubled in fiscal year 2015 to $69.5 million, but remained small relative to its economy, with a debt to GDP ratio of 10.9 percent. American Samoa's debt was primarily used to fund infrastructure projects. Between fiscal years 2005 and 2015, revenues grew and the government's net position was positive and generally improving. GAO previously reported that American Samoa relies heavily on the tuna processing and canning industry. Disruptions in this industry could affect its ability to repay debt.
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI): CNMI's public debt declined from $251.7 million to $144.7 million between fiscal years 2005 and 2015, decreasing CNMI's debt to GDP ratio to 16 percent. Most of CNMI's debt was used to refinance prior debt and fund infrastructure projects. Despite revenue growth since fiscal year 2011, CNMI's net position was negative and generally declining during the period. GAO previously reported that labor shortages may affect GDP. This could impede CNMI's ability to repay debt in the future.
Guam: Between fiscal years 2005 and 2015, Guam's public debt more than doubled from almost $1 billion to $2.5 billion, with a debt to GDP ratio of 44 percent for fiscal year 2015. Most of Guam's debt was used to comply with federal requirements and court orders. Revenue grew during this period, and net position fluctuated significantly, with a negative balance in fiscal year 2015. Despite recent and expected economic growth, GAO found that large unfunded pension and other post-employment benefit (OPEB) liabilities may present a risk.
U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI): Between fiscal years 2005 and 2015, USVI's public debt nearly doubled, reaching $2.6 billion and a debt to GDP ratio of 72 percent. Since 2010, most of USVI's debt was used to fund general government operations. Revenue remained stagnant and net position was negative and declining during the period, reflecting a deteriorating financial position. While USVI holds a year's worth of debt service payments in reserve, GAO found that economic uncertainty and looming government pension fund insolvency by 2023 may hamper repayment. In early 2017, USVI was unable to access capital markets to issue new debt at favorable rates. Although the government adopted a financial plan intended to reduce expenditures and increase revenue, the plan does not address USVI's significant unfunded pension and OPEB liabilities and it is unclear whether the plan will produce the intended level of savings.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making recommendations in this report.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Patents can promote innovation by giving inventors exclusive rights to their inventions, and patent owners can bring infringement lawsuits against anyone who uses, makes, sells, offers to sell, or imports a patented invention without authorization. As GAO previously reported, such lawsuits can take years and cost several million dollars. USPTO's CBM program provides a trial proceeding to challenge a patent's validity at USPTO's board for, according to stakeholders, a fraction of the time and money that would be spent in the federal courts. The CBM program began in September 2012 and is slated to sunset in September 2020.
GAO was asked to examine the CBM program. This report (1) describes the extent to which the program has been used to challenge patents, and the results of those challenges; (2) examines the extent to which USPTO ensures timeliness of trial decisions, reviews decisions for consistency, and engages with stakeholders to improve proceedings for the program; and (3) discusses stakeholder views on the effects of the program and whether it should be extended past its sunset date. GAO analyzed CBM trial data from September 2012 through September 2017, reviewed USPTO documents, and interviewed 38 stakeholders, such as legal and academic commentators, selected for their knowledge of or direct involvement in such trials.

What GAO Found

From September 2012 through September 2017, entities facing patent infringement lawsuits filed 524 petitions challenging the validity of 359 patents under the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's (USPTO) covered business method (CBM) program, resulting in decisions against about one-third of these patents. The CBM program provides entities facing infringement lawsuits an opportunity to challenge the validity of a business method patent by demonstrating that it did not meet requirements for patentability. Business method patents focus on ways of doing business in areas such as banking or e-commerce. The rate of filing petitions over this period has fluctuated but has generally declined since 2015, and none were filed in August or September 2017.
USPTO has taken several steps to ensure the timeliness of trial decisions, review past decisions, and engage with stakeholders to improve proceedings under the program:
Timeliness: USPTO regularly informs relevant parties about paperwork requirements and due dates throughout trials. According to program data, as of September 2017, all 181 completed trials were completed within statutorily required time frames.
Decision review: USPTO has taken several steps to review its decisions and has monitored the rate at which the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirms or reverses them. However, USPTO does not have guidance, such as documented procedures, for reviewing trial decisions, or the processes leading to decisions, for consistency. Without guidance, such as documented procedures, USPTO cannot fully ensure that it is meeting its objective of ensuring consistency of decisions.
Stakeholder engagement: USPTO judges have engaged with stakeholders by participating in public roundtables and webinars, and attending judicial conferences, among other things.
Stakeholders GAO interviewed generally agreed that the CBM program has reduced lawsuits involving business method patents in the federal courts. While many stakeholders favored maintaining aspects of the program, there was not strong consensus among stakeholders for how future trials should be designed.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that USPTO develop guidance, such as documented procedures, for reviewing trial decisions for consistency. USPTO agreed with GAO's recommendation.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

In 1996 Congress provided DOD with authorities enabling it to obtain private-sector financing and management to repair, renovate, construct, and operate military housing. DOD has since privatized 99 percent of its domestic housing.
The Senate Report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for 2017 included a provision that GAO review privatized military housing projects and the effect of recent changes in the basic allowance for housing on long-term project sustainability. This report examines the extent to which DOD has (1) assessed and reported the financial condition of each privatized housing project; (2) assessed the effects of recent reductions in the basic allowance for housing on privatized housing; and (3) defined notification requirements for project changes and risk tolerances relative to privatized housing goals. GAO reviewed policies, project oversight reports, and financial statements, and interviewed DOD officials and privatized housing developers.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) has regularly assessed the financial condition of its privatized housing projects; however, it has not used consistent measures or consistently assessed future sustainment (that is, the ability to maintain the housing in good condition), or issued required reports to Congress in a timely manner. Specifically:
Some data used to report on privatized housing across the military services are not comparable. For example, there are inconsistencies among the projects in the measurements of current financial condition (for example, the ability to pay debts and maintain quality housing).These differences have not been identified in reports to Congress.
The military departments vary in the extent to which they use measures of future sustainment, and information regarding the sustainment of each of the privatized housing projects has not been included in the reports to Congress.
DOD's reporting to Congress has not been timely. DOD is statutorily required to report to Congress the financial condition of privatized housing projects on a semiannual basis, but it has not reported on any fiscal year since 2014.
By taking steps to improve the consistency of the information provided and meet the reporting requirement, DOD would provide decision makers in Congress with useful, timely information about the financial condition of the privatized housing projects as they provide required oversight.
DOD has not fully assessed the effects of reductions, relative to calculations of market rates for rent and utilities, in servicemembers' basic allowance for housing payments on the financial condition of its privatized housing projects. In August 2015, DOD required the military departments to review their privatized housing portfolios and outline any effects of the reductions. Each military department reported that the reductions would decrease cash flows to their long-term sustainment accounts. However, the reports did not specify the significance of the reductions on each project's future sustainment or identify specific actions to respond to shortfalls at individual projects. If DOD fully assesses the effects of the basic allowance for housing reductions on privatized housing and identifies actions to respond to any risks, DOD and Congress will be better informed to make decisions affecting the projects.
DOD has not defined when project changes require prior notice to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment or its tolerance for risk relative to its goal of providing servicemembers with quality housing, including the risk from reduced sustainment funding. Specifically, the military departments had different understandings of when project changes, such as financial restructurings, required prior notice. Additionally, DOD has not required the military departments to define their risk tolerances—the acceptable level of variation in performance relative to the objectives—regarding the future sustainability of the projects. By clearly defining the conditions that require advance notification and developing risk tolerance levels, DOD would have consistent information that would improve its oversight of privatized housing and inform its response to any future sustainment challenges.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making eight recommendations, including that DOD improve the consistency and timeliness of the information reported on the financial condition of its privatized housing projects, fully assess the effects of the reductions in basic allowance for housing on the projects, clarify when project changes require notice, and define tolerances for project risks. DOD concurred with each of our recommendations and identified actions it plans to take to implement them.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Improper payments are a long-standing problem in the federal government, estimated at almost $141 billion for fiscal year 2017. Agencies are required to perform risk assessments to identify programs that may be susceptible to significant improper payments.
GAO was asked to review federal agencies' improper payment risk assessments. This report examines the extent to which certain agencies' improper payment risk assessments for selected programs provided a reasonable basis for determining their susceptibility to significant improper payments. GAO analyzed the most recent risk assessments, from 2015 through 2017, for the following five programs: USDA's Agriculture Risk Coverage and Price Loss Coverage programs; HHS's Head Start; DOJ's Law Enforcement; and Treasury's Interest on the Public Debt and Home Affordable Modification Program. GAO selected these programs, focusing on programs that recently underwent a risk assessment and size of programs' gross outlays—which totaled about $330 billion in fiscal year 2017 for the five programs GAO selected.

What GAO Found

The Improper Payments Information Act of 2002, as amended (IPIA), defines “significant” improper payments as improper payments in the preceding fiscal year that may have exceeded either (1) 1.5 percent of program outlays and $10 million or (2) $100 million (regardless of the improper payment rate). GAO found that the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Treasury (Treasury), Justice (DOJ), and Agriculture (USDA) assessed the five programs GAO selected for review as at low risk for susceptibility to significant improper payments; however, HHS, Treasury, and DOJ lacked sufficient documentation to assess the extent to which their risk assessments provided a reasonable basis for their risk determinations. On the other hand, USDA's quantitative risk assessment of its program's susceptibility to significant improper payments provided a reasonable basis for its low-risk determination.
Although HHS, Treasury, and DOJ considered, among other factors, the nine risk factors from IPIA and Office of Management and Budget guidance, they did not document or effectively demonstrate how these factors affected their programs' susceptibility to significant improper payments. These programs' risk assessments did not contain sufficient documentation to determine how the agencies arrived at their risk determinations for each risk factor, or how the total scores for all risk factors led to low-risk determinations. For example, HHS determined that its Head Start program was at high risk for several risk factors—including complexity per transaction and volume of payments—but did not document how these high-risk ratings informed its overall determination that Head Start was not susceptible to significant improper payments.
Further, the agencies did not have documentation to demonstrate how they determined the weighting of each risk factor or the risk level ranges from the risk assessment templates as they relate to the programs' susceptibility to significant improper payments. For example, based on GAO's analysis of Treasury's risk assessment template, the agency could identify areas of risk related to each of the nine risk factors. But because of the assigned weights given to each risk factor, Treasury's final risk calculation would still not determine the program to be at high risk of susceptibility to significant improper payments. Without documenting the basis for the assigned weights, Treasury cannot demonstrate, and GAO cannot determine, that its process for determining its programs' susceptibility to significant improper payments was reasonable. Until HHS, Treasury, and DOJ revise their risk assessment processes to help ensure that they result in reliable assessments, they cannot be certain whether their programs are susceptible to significant improper payments and therefore whether they are required to estimate the amount of improper payments.
GAO also found that HHS did not assess many of its programs and activities at least once during the 3-year period from fiscal years 2015 through 2017, as required by IPIA. Based on the analysis of HHS information, GAO identified at least 140 programs or activities that were not assessed during the 3-year period. When not all eligible programs are reviewed as required, there is an increased risk that the agency may not identify all risk-susceptible programs and activities, resulting in incomplete improper payment estimates.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that Treasury, DOJ, and HHS revise their improper payment risk assessment processes, and that HHS revise its procedures to help ensure that all programs are assessed at least once every 3 years. In their responses, Treasury and HHS agreed with the recommendations, and DOJ disagreed with GAO's recommendation. GAO continues to believe that the recommendation is valid, as discussed in the report.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Oil and gas leases on federal lands generate billions of dollars in rents and royalty payments for the federal government each year, but these revenues can be reduced if leases are suspended (i.e., placed on hold). Questions have been raised about whether some suspensions, particularly those in effect for more than 10 years, may hinder oil and gas production or adversely affect the use of federal lands for other purposes, such as recreation.
GAO was asked to review oil and gas lease suspensions on federal lands managed by BLM. This report examines, among other things, (1) the extent of and reasons for such suspensions and (2) the approach BLM uses to monitor the status of lease suspensions. GAO analyzed all data on suspensions in a BLM database and the official lease files for a nongeneralizable sample of 48 leases recorded as suspended in, Montana and Wyoming, which GAO selected based in part on the large number of suspensions these states had. GAO also reviewed BLM documents and interviewed BLM officials.

What GAO Found

According to data at the end of fiscal year 2016 from the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), a small portion of oil and gas leases were suspended for various lengths of time (as shown below), but the reasons for the suspensions were difficult to determine. During a suspension, the government generally does not collect revenues from the lease. Determining the reasons for suspensions is difficult, in part because BLM does not require the inclusion of this information in its database. To obtain this information, BLM officials would have to review the official lease files, of which many are in hard copy. Under Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government , management should use quality information to achieve the entity's objectives. BLM field officials GAO interviewed said that additional, more detailed information in the database on reasons for suspensions would be helpful in tracking lease suspensions. By including a data field in the database to record the reasons for suspensions, BLM could better ensure that federal lands are not being inappropriately kept from development—potentially foregoing revenue—or from other valuable uses of public lands.
The approach BLM uses to monitor lease suspensions does not ensure consistent and effective oversight because BLM does not have procedures in place for monitoring. BLM state offices generally delegate responsibility for monitoring lease suspensions to their field offices. Officials from 12 selected field offices in two states with relatively large numbers of lease suspensions reported various frequencies in their monitoring of suspensions, ranging from every few months to rarely or not at all. In the absence of BLM monitoring procedures, field officials have discretion in how and when to monitor. By developing procedures for monitoring lease suspensions, including when to conduct monitoring efforts, BLM could better ensure that lease suspensions in effect are warranted.

What GAO Recommends

To better ensure that federal lands are not being inappropriately kept from development, GAO is making four recommendations, including that BLM record the reasons for lease suspensions in its database and develop procedures for monitoring suspensions. Interior concurred with GAO's recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

In 2014, instability driven by insecurity, lack of economic opportunity, and weak governance led to a rapid increase of unaccompanied alien children (UAC) from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras arriving at the U.S. border. In fiscal year 2017, the Department of Homeland Security reported (DHS) apprehending more than 200,000 nationals from these countries and removed nearly 75,000 nationals, including UAC, of these countries from the United States and returned them to their home countries. Current estimates also indicate nearly 350,000 individuals may need to be reintegrated to El Salvador and Honduras over the next few years when their Temporary Protected Status in the United States expires.
GAO was asked to review U.S. efforts to support the reintegration of Central American migrants. This report describes (1) USAID efforts to assist reception and reintegration of migrants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras into their home countries since fiscal year 2014; and (2) what is known about the effectiveness of these efforts. GAO reviewed agency program documents and funding data; interviewed officials from U.S. government agencies, IOM, and host governments and beneficiaries; and conducted site visits in these countries.
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. USAID and IAF provided formal comments, which are reproduced in this report, and all agencies provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.

What GAO Found

Since fiscal year 2014, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided approximately $27 million to the International Organization for Migration (IOM)—an intergovernmental organization focusing on migration—for assistance to migrants returning to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Assistance to migrants includes short-term reception services, such as food and transportation, renovating reception centers, and collecting data on returning migrants that are used to support their reintegration. Assistance also includes long-term reintegration efforts, such as counseling services and employment assistance to make it easier for migrants to readjust to and stay in their home countries. These various efforts are in different stages of development.
While reception services for migrants have improved, USAID has not yet assessed the effectiveness of reintegration efforts. USAID monitored and assessed reception services through site visits, meetings, and reports from IOM. IOM's early efforts improved the three host governments' capacity to provide reception services to returning migrants. For example, since fiscal year 2014, IOM renovated the seven reception centers and shelters being used in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Further, with IOM's assistance, the host governments have improved their capacity to collect data about returning migrants. According to USAID and IOM, host governments are using these data to design policies and develop programs to provide reintegration assistance. While USAID has not yet assessed the effectiveness of reintegration efforts, many of these programs are just beginning. USAID expects to sign a new agreement by the end of December 2018 that would involve, among other things, monitoring and evaluating reintegration efforts in the three countries.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Since January 2017, the Navy has suffered four significant mishaps at sea that resulted in serious damage to its ships and the loss of 17 sailors. Three of these incidents involved ships homeported in Japan. In response to these incidents, the Chief of Naval Operations ordered an operational pause for all fleets worldwide, and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations directed a comprehensive review of surface fleet operations, stating that these tragic incidents are not limited occurrences but part of a disturbing trend in mishaps involving U.S. ships.
This statement provides information on the effects of homeporting ships overseas, reducing crew size on ships, and not completing maintenance on time on the readiness of the Navy and summarizes GAO recommendations to address the Navy's maintenance, training, and other challenges.
In preparing this statement, GAO relied on previously published work since 2015 related to the readiness of ships homeported overseas, sailor training and workload issues, maintenance challenges, and other issues; GAO updated this information, as appropriate, based on Navy data.

What GAO Found

GAO's prior work shows that the Navy has increased deployment lengths, shortened training periods, and reduced or deferred maintenance to meet high operational demands, which has resulted in declining ship conditions and a worsening trend in overall readiness. The Navy has stated that high demand for presence has put pressure on a fleet that is stretched thin across the globe. Some of the concerns that GAO has highlighted include:
Degraded readiness of ships homeported overseas : Since 2006, the Navy has doubled the number of ships based overseas. Overseas basing provides additional forward presence and rapid crisis response, but GAO found in May 2015 that there were no dedicated training periods built into the operational schedules of the cruisers and destroyers based in Japan. As a result, the crews of these ships did not have all of their needed training and certifications. Based on updated data, GAO found that, as of June 2017, 37 percent of the warfare certifications for cruiser and destroyer crews based in Japan—including certifications for seamanship—had expired. This represents more than a fivefold increase in the percentage of expired warfare certifications for these ships since GAO's May 2015 report. The Navy has made plans to revise operational schedules to provide dedicated training time for overseas-based ships, but this schedule has not yet been implemented.
Crew size reductions contribute to sailor overwork and safety risks: GAO found in May 2017 that reductions to crew sizes the Navy made in the early 2000s were not analytically supported and may now be creating safety risks. The Navy has reversed some of those changes but continues to use a workweek standard that does not reflect the actual time sailors spend working and does not account for in-port workload—both of which have contributed to some sailors working over 100 hours a week.
Inability to complete maintenance on time: Navy recovery from persistently low readiness levels is premised on adherence to maintenance schedules. However, in May 2016, GAO found that the Navy was having difficulty completing maintenance on time. Based on updated data, GAO found that, in fiscal years 2011 through 2016, maintenance overruns on 107 of 169 surface ships (63 percent) resulted in 6,603 lost operational days (i.e., the ships were not available for training and operations).
Looking to the future, the Navy wants to grow its fleet by as much as 30 percent but continues to face challenges with manning, training, and maintaining its existing fleet. These readiness problems need to be addressed and will require the Navy to implement GAO's recommendations—particularly in the areas of assessing the risks associated with overseas basing, reassessing sailor workload and the factors used to size ship crews, and applying sound planning and sustained management attention to its readiness rebuilding efforts. In addition, continued congressional oversight will be needed to ensure that the Navy demonstrates progress in addressing its maintenance, training, and other challenges.

What GAO Recommends

GAO made 11 recommendations in prior work cited in this statement. The Department of Defense generally concurred with all of them but has implemented only 1. Continued attention is needed to ensure that these recommendations are addressed, such as the Navy assessing the risks associated with overseas basing and reassessing sailor workload and factors used in its manpower requirements process.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

BLM has primary responsibility for managing oil and gas development on federal and Indian lands. To help ensure operator compliance with laws and regulations, BLM administers the Inspection and Enforcement program. Under the program, BLM inspects operators' drilling, production, and plugging activities and can issue various enforcement actions, such as monetary assessments, for violations. GAO was asked to examine key aspects of the Inspection and Enforcement program.
This report (1) describes the distribution of BLM's oil and gas Inspection and Enforcement program's workload and workforce among agency field offices for the most recent 5 years for which such data were available (fiscal years 2012 through 2016) and (2) examines the extent to which BLM conducted internal control reviews in accordance with its July 2012 oversight policy for fiscal years 2013 through 2018, the most recent period for which such data were available. GAO examined BLM policies, data, and documents; interviewed BLM headquarters, state and field office officials; visited six BLM field offices selected based on their level of resource development activity; and toured oil and gas drilling, production, and plugging sites at three of these six field offices.

What GAO Found

Based on GAO's analysis of Bureau of Land Management (BLM) data, the distribution of BLM's oil and gas Inspection and Enforcement program's workload and workforce showed an imbalance among BLM's 33 field offices in fiscal years 2012 through 2016. GAO analyzed BLM data on the overall percentage of the workload and workforce distributed at each field office (i.e., activity level) and grouped similar activity level field offices together into highest, medium and lowest activity categories. GAO found that the program distributed the majority of its workload to 6 highest activity offices and distributed the majority of the workforce to 21 medium activity offices (see fig.). Based on GAO's review of BLM documentation and interviews with agency officials, BLM took both short- and long-term actions in fiscal years 2012 through 2016 to address this imbalance, such as temporarily re-assigning inspectors from some medium activity offices to some of the highest activity offices.
BLM has not completed all required internal control reviews of its field offices. BLM's July 2012 oversight policy instructs its state offices to periodically conduct internal control reviews of field offices, which are to, among other things, identify staffing needs. BLM state offices completed internal control reviews at 6 of 33 field offices from 2013 through 2017, and 5 more are scheduled from 2018 through 2020. Officials from BLM state offices told GAO that some human capital and workload challenges hindered their ability to complete reviews, including long-term vacancies in some state offices positions. However, a senior BLM official said that headquarters did not consistently track and monitor the extent to which state offices completed field office internal control reviews, and headquarters officials said they were not aware that so few reviews had been completed. Under federal standards for internal control, management should design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks, such as by comparing actual performance to expected results and analyzing significant differences. Identifying the reasons it did not complete internal control reviews, developing and implementing a plan to address those challenges, and monitoring state offices' progress toward completing required reviews will better position BLM to ensure that its state offices are completing all required internal control reviews as called for by its July 2012 oversight policy.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making three recommendations to BLM, including taking actions to increase monitoring of state offices' progress toward completing internal control reviews. BLM concurred with all three recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

HBCUs play a prominent role in our nation's higher education system. For example, about one-third of African-Americans receiving a doctorate in science, technology, engineering, or mathematics received undergraduate degrees from HBCUs. To help HBCUs facing challenges accessing funding for capital projects, in 1992, federal law created the HBCU Capital Financing Program, administered by Education, to provide HBCUs with access to low-cost loans. GAO was asked to review the program.
This report examines HBCUs' capital project needs and their funding sources, and Education's efforts to help HBCUs access and participate in the HBCU Capital Financing Program. GAO surveyed all 101 accredited HBCUs and 79 responded, representing a substantial, but nongeneralizable, portion of HBCUs. GAO analyzed the most recent program participation data (1996-2017) and finance data (2015-16 school year); reviewed available HBCU master plans; visited nine HBCUs of different sizes and sectors (public and private); and interviewed Education officials and other stakeholders.

What GAO Found

Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), stakeholders, and planning documents identified extensive and diverse capital project needs at HBCUs and GAO found HBCUs rely on a few funding sources—such as state appropriations and tuition and fees—to address those needs. HBCUs responding to GAO's survey reported that 46 percent of their building space, on average, needs repair or replacement. Based on a review of master plans—which assess the condition of HBCU facilities—and visits to nine HBCUs, GAO identified significant capital project needs in the areas of deferred maintenance, facilities modernization, and preservation of historic buildings. The Department of Education's (Education) HBCU Capital Financing Program has provided access to needed funding for some HBCUs and has helped modernize their facilities to improve student recruitment. However, fewer than half of HBCUs have used the program, according to Education data, which was specifically designed to help them address capital project needs (see figure).
Education has undertaken several efforts to help HBCUs access and participate in the HBCU Capital Financing Program. For example, Education conducts outreach through attending conferences. However, some HBCUs in GAO's survey and interviews were unaware of the program. Moreover, public HBCUs in four states reported facing participation challenges due to state laws or policies that conflict with program requirements. For example, participants are required to provide collateral, but public HBCUs in two states reported they cannot use state property for that purpose. In March 2018, a federal law was enacted requiring Education to develop an outreach plan to improve program participation. An outreach plan that includes direct outreach to individual HBCUs and states to help address these issues could help increase participation. Without direct outreach, HBCUs may continue to face participation challenges. In addition, two HBCUs recently defaulted on their program loans and 29 percent of loan payments were delinquent in 2017. Education modified a few loans in 2013 and was recently authorized to offer loan deferment, but has no plans to analyze the potential benefits to HBCUs and the program's cost of offering such modifications in the future. Until Education conducts such analyses, policymakers will lack key information on potential options to assist HBCUs.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends Education (1) include direct outreach to individual HBCUs and steps to address participation challenges for some public HBCUs in its outreach plan, and (2) analyze the potential benefits and costs of offering loan modifications in the program. Education outlined plans to address the first recommendation, and partially agreed with the second. GAO continues to believe both recommendations are warranted.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

According to DOD, about 3 million people in the United States receive drinking water from DOD public water systems, which are to comply with EPA and state health-based regulations. EPA and DOD have detected elevated levels of two unregulated, DOD-identified emerging contaminants found in firefighting foam—PFOS and PFOA—in drinking water at or near installations. Perchlorate, an unregulated chemical used by DOD in rocket fuel, can also be found in drinking water.
The Senate Report accompanying a bill for national defense authorization for fiscal year 2017 included a provision for GAO to review DOD management of drinking water contaminants. This report examines the extent to which DOD has (1) internally reported data on compliance with health-based drinking water regulations at military installations and used those data to assess compliance at its two types of public water systems, and (2) taken actions to address concerns with its firefighting foam and elevated levels of PFOS, PFOA, and perchlorate in drinking water at or near military installations. GAO reviewed DOD guidance and EPA drinking water regulations, advisories, and orders; analyzed DOD and EPA drinking water data; and visited seven installations from among those addressing emerging contaminants in drinking water.

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) has not internally reported all data on compliance with health-based drinking water regulations or used available data to assess compliance. DOD data for fiscal years 2013-2015 indicate that DOD public water systems complied with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and state health-based drinking water regulations at levels comparable with other systems in the United States. However, the military departments did not report all violations to DOD, i.e., while 77 installations reported violations to DOD, GAO found that at least 16 additional installations did not. Until DOD takes steps to increase the clarity and understanding of its internal reporting requirements, it may not have the data it needs to fully oversee compliance. DOD also has not used its data to determine why its two types of systems—one that provides DOD-treated water and another that provides non-DOD-treated water—have different compliance rates. Specifically, DOD's data indicate that about 99 percent of the people who received non-DOD-treated drinking water were served by systems with no violations, while about 89 percent of the people who received DOD-treated drinking water were served by systems with no violations. Absent further analysis of its data, DOD may not be able to improve overall compliance.
DOD has initiated actions to address concerns with both its firefighting foam and also with elevated levels in drinking water of perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS), perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), and perchlorate, which are DOD-identified emerging contaminants. PFOS and PFOA can be found in DOD's firefighting foam. DOD has restricted its use of this foam and is funding efforts to develop a new foam that meets DOD performance requirements. Additionally, at 11 military installations (see fig.), DOD has shut down wells, provided alternate water sources, or installed water treatment systems to respond to elevated levels of PFOS and PFOA, at times in response to EPA and state orders.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making five recommendations to improve DOD's reporting and use of data on compliance with health-based drinking water regulations. DOD concurred with the recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

U.S. diplomats and their families in Havana, Cuba, were affected by incidents that were associated with injuries, including hearing loss and brain damage. Over State has reported that over 20 U.S. diplomats and family members in Havana have suffered from medical conditions believed to be connected to the incidents, which began in late 2016 and have continued into 2017. By law, State is generally required to convene an ARB within 1260 days of incidents that result in serious injury at, or related to, a U.S. mission abroad, but the Secretary of State can determine that a 60 day extension is necessary. According to State's policy, M/PRI is responsible for initiating and leading State's ARB incident vetting process.
This report is part of a broader request to review State's response to the incidents in Cuba. In this report, GAO examines the extent to which State's ARB policy ensures that M/PRI is made aware of incidents that may meet the ARB statute criteria. GAO analyzed relevant federal laws, State policies, and other State documents. GAO also interviewed cognizant State officials.

What GAO Found

The Department of State's (State) Accountability Review Board (ARB) policy does not ensure that the responsible office—State's Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation (M/PRI)—is made aware of incidents that may meet the ARB statute criteria, such as those that occurred in Cuba and were associated with injuries to U.S. personnel. According to State policy, as soon as M/PRI becomes aware of potentially qualifying incidents, M/PRI will start the process for considering whether the incident warrants an ARB. M/PRI relies on informal communication to identify potentially qualifying incidents to begin the vetting process because State does not have a policy, procedure, or process for internal communication of such incidents to M/PRI, according to State officials and GAO analysis. As illustrated in the figure below, other State entities began responding to the incidents in early 2017, but M/PRI was not made aware of the incidents until mid-August 2017, when a former M/PRI official contacted the office after seeing media reports. If M/PRI is not aware of incidents, it cannot initiate State's ARB incident vetting process. This situation puts State at risk of not meeting statutory time frames for convening an ARB and could result in State being less able to improve security programs and practices at other U.S. diplomatic posts. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government call for internal communication to achieve the entity's objectives and note that management should document responsibilities through policy.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that State revise its policies to define responsibilities for internal communication to M/PRI of relevant incidents. State concurred with GAO’s recommendation.