Question:
The economic and trade relationship with Mexico is of interest to U.S. policymakers because of Mexico's proximity to the United States, the extensive trade and investment relationship under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the conclusion of the NAFTA renegotiations and the proposed U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), and the strong cultural and economic ties that connect the two countries. Also, it is of national interest for the United States to have a prosperous and democratic Mexico as a neighboring country. Mexico is the United States' third-largest trading partner, while the United States is, by far, Mexico's largest trading partner. Mexico ranks third as a source of U.S. imports, after China and Canada, and second, after Canada, as an export market for U.S. goods and services. The United States is the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mexico.
Most studies show that the net economic effects of NAFTA, which entered into force in 1994, on both the United States and Mexico have been small but positive, though there have been adjustment costs to some sectors within both countries. Much of the bilateral trade between the United States and Mexico occurs in the context of supply chains as manufacturers in each country work together to create goods. The expansion of trade since NAFTA has resulted in the creation of vertical supply relationships, especially along the U.S.-Mexico border. The flow of intermediate inputs produced in the United States and exported to Mexico and the return flow of finished products greatly increased the importance of the U.S.-Mexico border region as a production site. U.S. manufacturing industries, including automotive, electronics, appliances, and machinery, all rely on the assistance of Mexican manufacturers.
Congress faces numerous issues related to U.S.-Mexico trade and investment relations. The United States, Mexico, and Canada signed the proposed USMCA on November 30, 2018, which would have to be approved by Congress and ratified by Mexico and Canada before entering into force. A few days after signing the agreement, President Donald J. Trump stated to reporters that he intends to notify Mexico and Canada of his intention to withdraw from NAFTA with a six-month notice. Congress may consider policy issues and economic effects of the proposed USMCA, economic and political ramifications of possibly withdrawing from NAFTA, and the potential strategic implications of Mexico's new President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who entered into office on December 1, 2018. Congress may also examine the congressional role in a possible withdrawal from NAFTA; evaluate the effects of U.S. tariffs on aluminum and steel imports from Mexico and Mexico's retaliatory tariffs on certain U.S. exports; and address issues related to the U.S. withdrawal from the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement among the United States, Canada, Mexico, and nine other countries, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which will enact much of the proposed TPP without the participation of the United States. The CPTPP is set to take effect for Mexico and five other countries on December 30, 2018. Some observers contend that the withdrawal from TPP could damage U.S. competitiveness and economic leadership in the region, while others see the withdrawal as a way to prevent lower-cost imports and potential job losses.
Congress also may maintain an active interest in ongoing bilateral efforts to promote economic competitiveness, increase regulatory cooperation, and pursue energy integration. Under the U.S.-Mexico High Level Economic Dialogue (HLED), which was first launched in September 2013, the United States and Mexico are striving to advance economic and commercial priorities through annual meetings at the Cabinet level that also include leaders from the public and private sectors. Two other initiatives that may be of interest to policymakers are the High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Council (HLRCC) and the bilateral border management initiative under the Declaration Concerning 21st Center Border Management.


Question:
Congress plays a major role in U.S. trade policy through its legislative and oversight authority. Since the end of World War II, U.S. trade policy has focused on fostering an open, rules-based global trading system, liberalizing markets by reducing trade and investment barriers through negotiations and agreements, and enforcing trade commitments and related laws. International trade and investment issues can affect the overall health of the U.S. economy and specific sectors, the success of U.S. businesses, U.S. employment opportunities, and the overall standard of living of Americans. The benefits and costs of international trade and the future direction of trade policy are active areas of interest for many in Congress.
This report addresses frequently asked questions regarding U.S. trade policy and is intended to assist Members and staff who may be new to trade issues. The report provides context for basic trade concepts and data on key U.S. trade and investment trends. It also addresses how U.S. trade policy is formulated and describes the trade and investment policy tools used to advance U.S. objectives. The report is divided into five sections:
The Basics of Trade explains key economic concepts, including why countries trade, the benefits and costs of trade expansion, and the role of global value chains in international trade. The section also highlights common trade terms and principles.
U.S. Trade Trends provides data on key U.S. trade relationships, the U.S. trade deficit, and sector-specific issues related to manufacturing, agriculture, services, and digital trade.
Formulation of U.S. Trade Policy describes key objectives and functions of trade policy. The section outlines the roles of Congress, the executive branch, private stakeholders, and the judiciary in the formulation and implementation of U.S. trade policy.
U.S. Trade Policy Tools explains some of the key vehicles for advancing U.S. trade policy objectives, including trade negotiations and agreements, special trade programs, tariff policy and trade remedies, trade adjustment assistance, and export promotion programs and controls.
Link Between International Investment and Trade explains the motivations of foreign direct investment (FDI) and its relationship to trade. The section provides data on top sources of FDI in the United States as well as destinations of U.S. FDI abroad, and explains the role of investment agreements and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).
This report is intended as an introduction to U.S. trade policy and does not provide in-depth coverage of all trade and investment issues. For more detail on U.S. trade policy issues, refer to the following CRS products:
CRS Report R45474, International Trade and Finance: Overview and Issues for the 116th Congress, coordinated by Rebecca M. Nelson and Andres B. Schwarzenberg. CRS Report R45420, U.S. Trade Trends and Developments, by Andres B. Schwarzenberg. CRS Report R44546, The Economic Effects of Trade: Overview and Policy Challenges, by James K. Jackson. CRS Report R45243, Trade Deficits and U.S. Trade Policy, by James K. Jackson. CRS In Focus IF10156, U.S. Trade Policy: Background and Current Issues, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar, Ian F. Fergusson, and Brock R. Williams. CRS In Focus IF11016, U.S. Trade Policy Functions: Who Does What?, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar.


Question:
All nuclear power in the United States is generated by light water reactors (LWRs), which were commercialized in the 1950s and early 1960s and are now used throughout most of the world. LWRs are cooled by ordinary ("light") water, which also slows ("moderates") the neutrons that maintain the nuclear fission chain reaction. High construction costs of large conventional LWRs, concerns about safety raised by the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan, and other issues have led to increased interest in unconventional, or "advanced," nuclear technologies that could be less expensive and safer than existing LWRs.
An "advanced nuclear reactor" is defined in legislation enacted in 2018 as "a nuclear fission reactor with significant improvements over the most recent generation of nuclear fission reactors" or a reactor using nuclear fusion (P.L. 115-248). Such reactors include LWR designs that are far smaller than existing reactors, as well as concepts that would use different moderators, coolants, and types of fuel. Many of these advanced designs are considered to be small modular reactors (SMRs), which the Department of Energy (DOE) defines as reactors with electric generating capacity of 300 megawatts and below, in contrast to an average of about 1,000 megawatts for existing commercial reactors.
Advanced reactors are often referred to as "Generation IV" nuclear technologies, with existing commercial reactors constituting "Generation III" or, for the most recently constructed reactors, "Generation III+." Major categories of advanced reactors include advanced water-cooled reactors, which would make safety, efficiency, and other improvements over existing commercial reactors; gas-cooled reactors, which could use graphite as a neutron moderator or have no moderator; liquid-metal-cooled reactors, which would be cooled by liquid sodium or other metals and have no moderator; molten salt reactors, which would use liquid fuel; and fusion reactors, which would release energy through the combination of light atomic nuclei rather than the splitting (fission) of heavy nuclei such as uranium. Most of these concepts have been studied since the dawn of the nuclear age, but relatively few, such as sodium-cooled reactors, have advanced to commercial scale demonstration, and such demonstrations in the United States took place decades ago.
The 115th Congress enacted two bills to promote the development of advanced nuclear reactors. The first, the Nuclear Energy Innovation Capabilities Act of 2017 (NEICA), was signed into law in September 2018 (P.L. 115-248). It requires DOE to develop a versatile fast neutron test reactor that could help develop fuels and materials for advanced reactors and authorizes DOE national laboratories and other sites to host reactor testing and demonstration projects "to be proposed and funded, in whole or in part, by the private sector." The second, the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (NEIMA, P.L. 115-439), signed in January 2019, would require the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to develop an optional regulatory framework suitable for advanced nuclear technologies. The 115th Congress also appropriated $65 million for R&D to support development of the versatile test reactor in the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, FY2019, along with funding for ongoing advanced nuclear research and development programs (Division A of P.L. 115-244).
Continued debate over advanced reactor issues is anticipated in the 116th Congress. A fundamental question may be the role of the federal government in advanced nuclear power development. DOE's budget request for FY2020 focuses the federal role on "early stage research" rather than the more expensive stages of demonstration and commercialization. Controversy is also likely to continue over the need for advanced nuclear power. Supporters contend that such technology will be crucial in reducing emissions of greenhouse gases and bringing carbon-free power to the majority of the world that currently has little access to electricity. However, some observers and interest groups have cast doubt on the potential safety, affordability, and sustainability of advanced reactors. Because many of these technologies are in the conceptual or design phases, the potential advantages of these systems have not yet been established on a commercial scale. Concern has also been raised about the weapons-proliferation risks posed by the potential use of plutonium-based fuel by some advanced reactor technologies.
Other current issues related to advanced reactors include criteria for hosting private-sector demonstration reactors at DOE sites, the licensing framework for non-LWR reactors, longer time periods for federal agreements to purchase power from advanced reactors, and the supply of the high-assay low enriched uranium fuel that would be needed for some advanced reactor designs. There also may be congressional interest about potential federal assistance for demonstration reactors, which are expected to cost billions of dollars apiece. Major options for such assistance include federal cost sharing, loan guarantees, power purchase agreements, purchase of reactor capacity for research uses, and tax credits.


Question:
Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter, "Bosnia") drew heavily on U.S. support after gaining independence from Yugoslavia in 1992. The United States helped end the Bosnian war (1992-1995), one of the most lethal conflicts in Europe since the Second World War, by leading NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serb forces, brokering the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, and deploying 20,000 U.S. troops. Some Members of Congress became involved in policy debates over these measures, and Congress monitored and at times challenged the Bush and Clinton Administrations' response through numerous hearings, resolutions, and legislative proposals. Since 1995, the United States has been a major source of aid to Bosnia and firmly supports its territorial integrity. The United States also supports Bosnia's aspirations for NATO and European Union (EU) membership.
Today, Bosnia faces serious challenges. Nearly 25 years after the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia continues to use part of the Agreement as its constitution, which divides the country into two ethnoterritorial entities. Critics charge that Bosnia's political system is too decentralized to enact the reforms required for NATO and EU membership. They also contend that the ethnic power-sharing arrangements and veto points embedded in numerous government bodies are sources of gridlock. Domestic and international courts have ruled against several aspects of Bosnia's constitution, yet the Bosnian government thus far has failed to implement these rulings.
Since Bosnia's independence, its politics has been dominated by ethnic parties representing the country's three main groups: Bosniaks (Slavic Muslims), Croats, and Serbs. These parties have prospered under a system that critics charge lacks transparency and accountability. Critics also maintain that ethnic party leaders use divisive nationalist rhetoric to distract from serious issues affecting the country as a whole, including poverty, unemployment, and stalled political reforms. The Bosnian population exhibits low trust in political parties and the government, and disaffection toward the country's elite.
U.S. and EU officials brokered several ultimately unsuccessful rounds of constitutional reform negotiations, and continue to call on Bosnia's leaders to implement reforms to make governance more efficient and effective, dismantle patronage networks, and bring Bosnia closer to EU and NATO membership. However, there is little consensus among the country's leaders on how the country should be reformed. Bosnian Serb leaders from the Serb-majority entity (Republika Srpska) have called for greater autonomy and even secession from Bosnia. Some Bosnian Croat leaders have called for partitioning Bosnia's other entity, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to create a separate Croat-majority entity. Bosniak leaders, by contrast, generally prefer a more centralized state. Many analysts caution that any move to partition the country could lead to renewed violence, while greater decentralization could make Bosnia's government less functional. U.S. policy has long been oriented toward preserving Bosnia's statehood. Bosnia's 2018 general elections largely returned to power the same entrenched ethnic parties. Of particular concern is the election of Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik to Bosnia's collective presidency. Dodik, a sharp critic of the United States and NATO, has periodically called for a referendum on Republika Srpska's secession. He is under U.S. sanctions for obstructing the Dayton Agreement.
In addition to these internal challenges, U.S. and EU officials have expressed concern over external influence in the region. Russia reportedly relies on soft power, energy leverage, and "spoiler" tactics to influence Bosnia, particularly in the Serb-majority entity. Turkish soft power draws on Bosnia's Ottoman-era heritage and Turkey's shared religious tradition with Bosniaks. China is a more recent presence in the region, but its heavy investments and lending have prompted concern on both sides of the Atlantic. Policymakers have also expressed concern at the challenges posed by the return of Bosnians who fought with the Islamic State and Nusra Front in Syria and Iraq.
Many observers contend that the United States remains a stakeholder in Bosnia's future because of its central role in resolving the conflict and shaping the postwar Bosnian state. Given the history of U.S. involvement in Bosnia, Bosnia's importance to regional stability in the Balkans, and concerns over Russian and Chinese influence in Bosnia, Members of Congress may be interested in monitoring how the country navigates its internal and external challenges. Congress may also consider future U.S. aid levels to Bosnia and the degree to which such assistance supports the long-standing U.S. policy objectives for Bosnia of territorial integrity, NATO and EU integration, energy security, and resilience against malign influence.


Question:
Congressional interest in small business access to capital has increased in recent years because of concerns that small businesses might be prevented from accessing sufficient capital to enable them to start, continue, or expand operations and create jobs. Some have argued that the federal government should provide additional resources to assist small businesses. Others worry about the long-term adverse economic effects of spending programs that increase the federal deficit. They advocate business tax reduction, reform of financial credit market regulation, and federal fiscal restraint as the best means to assist small businesses and create jobs.
Several laws were enacted during the 111th Congress to enhance small business access to capital. For example,
P.L. 111-5, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), provided the Small Business Administration (SBA) an additional $730 million, including funding to temporarily subsidize SBA fees and increase the 7(a) loan guaranty program's maximum loan guaranty percentage to 90%. P.L. 111-240, the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to establish a $30 billion Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF), in which $4.0 billion was issued, to encourage community banks with less than $10 billion in assets to increase their lending to small businesses. It also authorized a $1.5 billion State Small Business Credit Initiative to provide funding to participating states with small business capital access programs, numerous changes to the SBA's loan guaranty and contracting programs, funding to continue the SBA's fee subsidies and the 7(a) program's 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage through December 31, 2010, and about $12 billion in tax relief for small businesses. P.L. 111-322, the Continuing Appropriations and Surface Transportation Extensions Act, 2011, authorized the SBA to continue its fee subsidies and the 7(a) program's 90% maximum loan guaranty percentage through March 4, 2011, or until available funding was exhausted, which occurred on January 3, 2011.
This report focuses on the SBLF. It opens with a discussion of the supply and demand for small business loans. The SBLF's advocates claimed the SBLF was needed to enhance the supply of small business loans. The report then examines other arguments presented both for and against the program. Advocates argued that the SBLF would increase lending to small businesses and, in turn, create jobs. Opponents contended that the SBLF could lose money, lacked sufficient oversight provisions, did not require lenders to increase their lending to small businesses, could serve as a vehicle for Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) recipients to effectively refinance their TARP loans on more favorable terms with little or no resulting benefit for small businesses, and could encourage a failing lender to make even riskier loans to avoid higher dividend payments.
The report concludes with an examination of the program's implementation and a discussion of bills introduced to amend the SBLF. For example, during the 112th Congress, S. 681, the Greater Accountability in the Lending Fund Act of 2011, would have limited the program's authority to 15 years from enactment and prohibited TARP recipients from participating in the program. H.R. 2807, the Small Business Leg-Up Act of 2011, would have transferred any unobligated and repaid funds from the SBLF to the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund "to increase the availability of credit for small businesses." H.R. 3147, the Small Business Lending Extension Act, would have extended the Department of the Treasury's investment authority from one year to two years. During the 113th Congress, H.R. 2474, the Community Lending and Small Business Jobs Act of 2013, would have transferred any unobligated and repaid funds from the SBLF to the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund.


Question:
A plaintiff injured by a defendant's wrongful act may file a tort lawsuit to recover money from that defendant. To name a particularly familiar example, a person who negligently causes a vehicular collision may be liable to the victim of that crash. By forcing people who wrongfully injure others to pay money to their victims, the tort system serves at least two functions: (1) deterring people from injuring others and (2) compensating those who are injured.
Employees and officers of the federal government occasionally commit torts just like other members of the general public. For a substantial portion of this nation's history, however, plaintiffs injured by the tortious acts of a federal officer or employee were barred from filing lawsuits against the United States by "sovereign immunity"—a legal doctrine that ordinarily prohibits private citizens from haling a sovereign state into court without its consent. Until the mid-20th century, a tort victim could obtain compensation from the United States only by persuading Congress to pass a private bill compensating him for his loss.
Congress, deeming this state of affairs unacceptable, enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which authorizes plaintiffs to obtain compensation from the United States for the torts of its employees. However, subjecting the federal government to tort liability not only creates a financial cost to the United States, it also creates a risk that government officials may inappropriately base their decisions not on socially desirable policy objectives, but rather on the desire to reduce the government's exposure to monetary damages. In an attempt to mitigate these potential negative effects of abrogating the government's immunity from liability and litigation, the FTCA limits the circumstances in which a plaintiff may pursue a tort lawsuit against the United States. For example, the FTCA contains several exceptions that categorically bar plaintiffs from recovering tort damages in certain categories of cases. Federal law also restricts the types and amount of damages a victorious plaintiff may recover in an FTCA suit. Additionally, a plaintiff may not initiate an FTCA lawsuit unless he has timely complied with a series of procedural requirements, such as providing the government an initial opportunity to evaluate the plaintiff's claim and decide whether to settle it before the case proceeds to federal court.
Since Congress first enacted the FTCA, the federal courts have developed a robust body of judicial precedent interpreting the statute's contours. In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has expressed reluctance to reconsider its long-standing FTCA precedents, thereby leaving the task of further developing the FTCA to Congress. Some Members of Congress have accordingly proposed legislation to modify the FTCA in various respects, such as by broadening the circumstances in which a plaintiff may hold the United States liable for torts committed by government employees.


Question:
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insures private lenders against losses on home mortgages that meet certain eligibility criteria. If the mortgage borrower defaults (that is, does not repay the mortgage as promised) and the home goes to foreclosure, FHA pays the lender the remaining principal amount owed. By insuring lenders against the possibility of borrower default, FHA is intended to expand access to mortgage credit to some households who might not otherwise be able to obtain affordable mortgages, such as those with small down payments.
When an FHA-insured mortgage goes to foreclosure, the lender files a claim with FHA for the remaining amount owed on the mortgage. Claims on FHA-insured home mortgages are paid out of the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMI Fund), which is funded through fees paid by borrowers (called premiums), rather than through appropriations. However, like all federal credit programs covered by the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, FHA can draw on permanent and indefinite budget authority with the U.S. Treasury to cover unanticipated increases in the cost of the loans that it insures, if necessary, without additional congressional action.
Each year, as part of the annual budget process, the expected costs of mortgages insured in past years are re-estimated to take into account updated information on loan performance and economic assumptions. If the anticipated costs of insured mortgages have increased, then FHA must transfer funds from a secondary reserve account into its primary reserve account to cover the amount of the increase in the anticipated cost of insured loans. If there are not enough funds in the secondary reserve account, then the MMI Fund is required to take funds from Treasury using its permanent and indefinite budget authority in order to make the required transfer.
Separately from the budget re-estimates, FHA is required by law to obtain an independent actuarial review of the MMI Fund each year. This review provides a view of the MMI Fund's financial status by estimating the MMI Fund's economic value—that is, the amount of funds that the MMI Fund currently has on hand plus the net present value of all of the expected future cash flows on the mortgages that are currently insured under the MMI Fund. The actuarial review is used to determine whether the MMI Fund is in compliance with a statutory requirement to maintain a capital ratio of at least 2%. The capital ratio is the economic value of the MMI Fund divided by the total dollar amount of mortgages insured under the MMI Fund.
In the years following the housing and mortgage market turmoil that began around 2007, increased foreclosure rates, as well as economic factors such as falling house prices, contributed to increases in expected losses on FHA-insured loans. This put pressure on the MMI Fund and reduced the amount of resources that FHA had available to pay for additional, unexpected future losses. The capital ratio fell below 2% in FY2009 and remained below 2% for several years thereafter, turning negative in FY2012 and FY2013. Concerns about FHA's finances culminated at the end of FY2013, when FHA announced that it would need $1.7 billion from Treasury to cover an increase in anticipated costs of insured loans. This marked the first time that FHA needed funds from Treasury to make the required transfer of funds between the primary and secondary reserve accounts.
More recently, the financial position of the MMI Fund has improved. The capital ratio again exceeded the 2% threshold in FY2015 and has remained above 2% in the years since. The FY2018 actuarial review of the MMI Fund estimated the economic value of the MMI Fund to be positive $34.9 billion and the capital ratio to be 2.76%. This suggests that the MMI Fund would have about $34.9 billion remaining after realizing all of its expected future cash flows on currently insured mortgages. The FY2018 results represent an increase from FY2017, when the capital ratio was estimated to be 2.18% and the economic value was estimated to be $26.7 billion.


Question:
More than 90% of federal highway assistance is distributed to the states by formula. Between 1916, when Congress created the first ongoing program to fund road construction, and 2012, various formula factors specified in law were used to apportion highway funds among the states. After 1982, these factors were partially overridden by provisions to guarantee that each state received federal funding at least equal to a specific percentage of the federal highway taxes its residents paid.
Since enactment of the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141) in 2012, formula factors such as population and highway lane mileage have ceased to have a significant role in determining the distribution of funds. The apportionment among the states under the current surface transportation law, the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94), passed in 2015, is not based on any particular policy objectives other than ensuring the stability of states' shares of total funding based on their shares in the last year of MAP-21, In addition, each state is guaranteed an amount at least equal to 95 cents on the dollar of the taxes paid by its residents into the highway account of the Highway Trust Fund.
Some policy-related factors used to distribute highway funds in the past are no longer in use, while other possible factors sometimes mentioned in policy discussions, such as states' rates of population growth and projected increases in truck traffic, have never been used as formula factors. This report describes mechanism by which Federal-Aid Highway Program funds are distributed today, and includes tables comparing individual states' shares of the FY2018 apportionment with their shares of some factors relevant to highway needs. Table 5 ranks states' apportionments based on the apportionment amount per resident, per square mile of land area, per federal-aid highway lane mile, and per million vehicle miles traveled on federal-aid highways.


Question:
The Historically Underutilized Business Zone Empowerment Contracting (HUBZone) program provides participating small businesses located in areas with low income, high poverty, or high unemployment with contracting opportunities in the form of set-asides, sole-source awards, and price-evaluation preferences. Its primary objectives are job creation and increased capital investment in distressed communities. Firms must be certified by the SBA to participate in the program. As of April 3, 2019, the SBA's Dynamic Small Business Search database included 6,769 firms with active HUBZone certifications.
In FY2017, the federal government awarded 81,082 contracts valued at $7.53 billion to HUBZone-certified businesses. About $1.90 billion of that amount was awarded with a HUBZone preference ($1.49 billion through a HUBZone set-aside, $65.3 million through a HUBZone sole-source award, and $346.9 million through a HUBZone price-evaluation preference). About $1.53 billion of that amount was awarded to HUBZone-certified businesses in open competition with other firms. The remaining $4.10 billion was awarded with another small business preference (e.g., set aside and sole source awards for small business generally and for 8(a), women-owned, and service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses).
The HUBZone program's administrative cost is about $8.4 million annually. It received an appropriation of $3.0 million for FY2019, with the additional cost of administering the program provided by the SBA's appropriation for salaries and general administrative expenses.
Congressional interest in the HUBZone program has increased in recent years, primarily due to GAO reports of fraud in the program and efforts by small businesses to ease HUBZone eligibility requirements.
This report examines arguments both for and against targeting assistance to geographic areas with specified characteristics as opposed to providing assistance to people or businesses with specified characteristics. It then assesses the arguments both for and against the continuation of the HUBZone program.
The report also discusses the HUBZone program's structure and operation, focusing on the definition of HUBZone areas and HUBZone small businesses and the program's performance relative to federal contracting goals. It includes an analysis of the SBA's administration of the program and the SBA's performance measures.
This report also examines HUBZone-related legislation, including
P.L. 114-92, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, which, among other provisions, expanded the definition of a Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC) military base closure area to make it easier for businesses located in those areas to meet the HUBZone program's requirement that at least 35% of its employees reside in a HUBZone area. It also extended BRAC base closure area HUBZone eligibility from five years to not less than eight years, provided HUBZone eligibility to qualified disaster areas, and added Native Hawaiian Organizations to the list of HUBZone eligible small business concerns. P.L. 115-91, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, which, among other provisions, allows small businesses that have HUBZone status on or before December 31, 2019, to retain that status from January 1, 2020, until the SBA prepares an updated online tool depicting HUBZone qualified areas (anticipated by the SBA to take place in December 2021). Once the new online tool (currently called the HUBZone map) is operational, the SBA must update it every five years for qualified census tracts and nonmetropolitan counties and when a change in status takes place for other HUBZone types (e.g., when an area becomes or ceases to be a redesignated area). The act also allows governors, starting on January 1, 2020, to petition the SBA each year to designate areas located in nonurban areas, with a population of 50,000 or fewer, and an average unemployment rate at least 120% of the national or state average, whichever is lower, as HUBZones; requires the SBA to process HUBZone certification applications with sufficient and complete documentation within 60 days of receipt; ensures that HUBZone-eligible BRAC areas receive HUBZone eligibility for a full eight years, beginning on the date they are designated a BRAC; and requires the SBA, not later than one year after enactment, to publish performance metrics measuring the HUBZone program's success in promoting economic development in economically distressed areas.


Question:
The Navy has been procuring Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) since FY1998. The three Virginia-class boats that the Navy has requested for procurement in FY2020 would be the 31st, 32nd, and 33rd boats in the class. Virginia-class submarines are being procured under a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract covering at least 10 boats to be procured in FY2019-FY2023.
Navy plans previously called for procuring two Virginia-class boats in FY2020. The third boat requested for FY2020 was added to the budget request as part of the FY2020 budget-planning cycle. The Navy states that since this third boat has not received any prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding, it would execute (i.e., be constructed) on a schedule similar to that of a boat procured in FY2023.
The Navy plans to build the second of the two boats procured in FY2019, the second and third boats requested for procurement in FY2020, the second of the two boats planned for procurement in FY2021, and all subsequent Virginia-class boats with the Virginia Payload Module (VPM), an additional, 84-foot-long, mid-body section equipped with four large-diameter, vertical launch tubes for storing and launching additional Tomahawk missiles or other payloads. The Navy's FY2020 budget submission shows that Virginia-class boats with and without the VPM have estimated recurring unit procurement costs of roughly $3.2 billion and $2.8 billion, respectively.
The Navy estimates the combined procurement cost of the three Virginia-class boats requested for procurement in FY2020 at $9.274.4 (i.e., about $9.3 billion). The boats have received $1,756.9 million in prior-year "regular" advance procurement (AP) funding and $361.6 million in additional Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) AP funding for components of boats being procured under the FY2019-FY2023 MYP contract. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests the remaining $7,155.9 million in procurement funding needed to complete the boats' estimated combined procurement cost, as well as $1,887.6 million in "regular" AP funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured in future fiscal years and $882.0 million in additional EOQ AP funding for components of boats to be procured under the FY2019-FY2023 MYP contract, bringing the total amount of procurement and AP funding requested for the program in FY2020 to $9,925.5 million (i.e., about $9.9 billion), excluding outfitting and post-delivery costs.
The Navy's SSN force included 51 boats at the end of FY2018. The Navy's force-level goal for SSNs is to achieve and maintain a force of 66 boats. From the mid-2020s through the early 2030s, the number of SSNs is projected to experience a valley or trough, reaching a minimum of 42 boats in FY2027-FY2028. Some observers are concerned that this projected valley—a consequence of having procured a relatively small number of SSNs during the 1990s, in the early years of the post-Cold War era—could lead to a period of heightened operational strain for the SSN force, and perhaps a period of weakened conventional deterrence against potential adversaries such as China. The projected SSN valley was first identified by CRS in 1995 and has been discussed in CRS reports and testimony every year since then. The Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan projects that, after reaching its projected 42-boat minimum, the SSN force will increase to 66 boats by FY2048.
Issues for Congress regarding the Virginia-class program include whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 procurement and advance procurement (AP) funding requests for the Virginia-class program; the funding profile for the third Virginia-class boat requested for procurement in FY2020; the potential industrial-base challenges of building both Columbia-class boats and Virginia-class attack submarines (SSNs) at the same time; and technical risk in the design for the Block V version of the Virginia-class program.


Question:
Written for congressional staff, this report identifies and provides details on how to obtain information on legislative procedures and process in the House and Senate. It provides references to selected CRS products and offers information on the CRS legislative institutes. A listing of selected supplementary materials is also provided.
This report will be updated as new information is available.


Question:
Since the 1950s and the creation of the first federal student aid programs, one aim of federal higher education policy has been to promote access to postsecondary education, particularly for students with financial need. In recent years, the federal government has annually made available more than $100 billion in federal grants, loans, and work-study funds to millions of students to help cover the cost of higher education. As Congress continues to focus on expanding access to postsecondary education through federal student aid policies, understanding various characteristics of the population enrolling in postsecondary education may be useful for policy deliberations.
This report focuses on the income of the undergraduate student population. It analyzes (1) how the income distribution of the undergraduate population has changed over time; (2) the relationship between student income and certain student demographics, such as race and dependency status; and (3) how the income distribution of the undergraduate population compares with that of the population of persons who do not have a postsecondary degree. Major findings presented in this report include the following:
The number and proportion of low-income students has increased in more recent years, even as total enrollment has decreased. Low-income student enrollment has increased at a faster pace than the nation's population of low-income persons. The majority of students enrolling in postsecondary education have incomes below 200% of the poverty guidelines. Independent undergraduate students who have sometimes been labeled as "non-traditional" constitute a large portion of enrolled postsecondary students and tend to have lower income than more "traditional" students. Nonwhite students account for nearly 50% of the undergraduate student population, and they tend to have lower income than white students. The majority of low-income students attend community colleges and a disproportionately high share attend private for-profit institutions.
The changing composition of the student population could have implications for federal policies designed to promote access to postsecondary education. In particular, policymakers face consideration of whether federal policies could play a role in encouraging students at various income levels to enroll at the highest performing types of schools. Policymakers also face consideration of the extent to which Higher Education Act programs are designed to support the success of non-traditional and minority students.


Question:
"Cross-border data flows" refers to the movement or transfer of information between computer servers across national borders. Such data flows enable people to transmit information for online communication, track global supply chains, share research, provide cross-border services, and support technological innovation.
Ensuring open cross-border data flows has been an objective of Congress in recent trade agreements and in broader U.S. international trade policy. The free flow of personal data, however, has raised security and privacy concerns. U.S. trade policy has traditionally sought to balance the need for cross-border data flows, which often include personal data, with online privacy and security. Some stakeholders, including some Members of Congress, believe that U.S. policy should better protect personal data privacy and security, and have introduced legislation to set a national policy. Other policymakers and analysts are concerned about increasing foreign barriers to U.S. digital trade, including data flows.
Recent incidents of private information being shared or exposed have heightened public awareness of the risks posed to personal data stored online. Consumers' personal online data is valued by organizations for a variety of reasons, such as analyzing marketing information and easing the efficiency of transactions. Concerns are likely to grow as the amount of online data organizations collect and the level of global data flows expand. As Congress assesses policy options, it may further explore the link between cross-border data flows, online privacy, and trade policy; the trade implications of a comprehensive data privacy policy; and the U.S. role in establishing best practices and binding trade rules that seek to balance public policy priorities.
There is no globally accepted standard or definition of data privacy in the online world, and there are no comprehensive binding multilateral rules specifically about cross-border data flows and privacy. Several international organizations, including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), G-20, and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, have sought to develop best practice guidelines or principles related to privacy and cross-border data flows, although none are legally binding. U.S. and other recent trade agreements are establishing new enforceable trade rules and disciplines.
Countries vary in their data policies and laws; some focus on limiting access to online information by restricting the flow of data beyond a country's borders, aiming to protect domestic interests (e.g., constituents' privacy). However, these policies can also act as protectionist measures. The EU and China, two top U.S. trading partners, have established prescriptive rules on cross-border data flows and personal data from different perspectives. The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is driven by privacy concerns; China is focused on security. Their policies affect U.S. firms seeking to do business in those regions, as well as in other markets that emulate the EU and Chinese approaches. Unlike the EU or China, the United States does not broadly restrict cross-border data flows and has traditionally regulated privacy at a sectoral level to cover data, such as health records.
U.S. trade policy has sought to balance the goals of consumer privacy, security, and open commerce. The proposed United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) represents the Trump Administration's first attempt to include negotiated trade rules and disciplines on privacy, cross-border data flows, and security in a trade agreement. While the United States and other countries work to define their respective national privacy strategies, many stakeholders seek a more global approach that would allow interoperability between differing national regimes to facilitate and remove discriminatory trade barriers to cross-border data flows; this could offer an opportunity for the United States to lead the global conversation.
Although Congress has examined issues surrounding online privacy and has considered multiple bills, there is not yet consensus on a comprehensive U.S. online data privacy policy. Congress may weigh in as the Administration seeks to define U.S. policy on data privacy and engages in international negotiations on cross-border data flows.


Question:
Geographic proximity has ensured strong linkages between the United States and Latin America and the Caribbean, based on diverse U.S. interests, including economic, political, and security concerns. The United States is a major trading partner and the largest source of foreign investment for many countries in the region, with free-trade agreements enhancing economic linkages with 11 countries. The region is a large source of U.S. immigration, both legal and illegal; proximity and economic and security conditions are major factors driving migration. Curbing the flow of illicit drugs has been a key component of U.S. relations with the region for more than three decades and currently involves close security cooperation with Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. U.S. support for democracy and human rights in the region has been long-standing, with particular current focus on Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.
Under the Trump Administration, the outlook for U.S. relations with the region has changed. The Administration proposed deep cuts in FY2018 and FY2019 assistance to the region compared with FY2017. On trade, President Trump ordered U.S. withdrawal from the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, which would have increased U.S. economic linkages with Mexico, Chile, and Peru. President Trump criticized the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada as unfair, warned that the United States might withdraw, and initiated renegotiations; ultimately, the three countries agreed to a United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement in late September 2018. The proposed agreement, which requires congressional approval, largely leaves NAFTA intact but includes some updates and changes, especially to the dairy and auto industries. Administration actions on immigration have caused concern in the region, including efforts to end the deportation relief program known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designations for Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, and Honduras. President Trump unveiled a new policy in 2017 toward Cuba partially rolling back U.S. efforts to normalize relations and imposing new sanctions.
Congressional Action in the 115th Congress
Congress traditionally has played an active role in policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of both legislation and oversight. Congress rejected the Trump Administration's proposed FY2018 cuts in foreign assistance to the region when it enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141). Although the 115th Congress did not complete action on FY2019 appropriations funding foreign aid, both House and Senate Appropriations Committees' bills, H.R. 6385 and S. 3108, would have funded key countries and initiatives approaching FY2017 amounts.
In other action, Congress enacted the Nicaragua Human Rights and Anticorruption Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-335, H.R. 1918) in December 2018. The measure requires the United States to vote against loans from the international financial institutions to Nicaragua, except to address basic human needs or promote democracy, and authorizes the President to impose sanctions on persons responsible for human rights violations or acts of corruption. In August 2018, Congress enacted the FY2019 defense authorization measure, P.L. 115-232 (H.R. 5515), with several Latin America provisions, including required reports on narcotics trafficking corruption and illicit campaign financing in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras and on security cooperation between Russia and Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. The House also approved H.R. 2658 on Venezuela in December 2017, which, among its provisions, would have authorized humanitarian assistance for Venezuela; similar bills were introduced in the Senate but were not considered.
Both houses approved several resolutions indicating policy preferences on a range of issues and countries: S.Res. 35 and H.Res. 259 on Venezuela, S.Res. 83 and H.Res. 336 on Mexico, H.Res. 54 on Argentina, H.Res. 145 on Central America, S.Res. 224 on Cuba, and H.Res. 981 on Nicaragua.
Looking ahead to the 116th Congress, in addition to completing action on FY2019 foreign aid appropriations, many of the U.S. economic, political, and security concerns discussed in this report likely will sustain congressional interest in Latin America and the Caribbean (see "Outlook for the 116th Congress," below.)
This report, which will not be updated, tracks legislative action on Latin America and the Caribbean in the 115th Congress in 2017 and 2018.


Question:
Money-bail systems allow criminal defendants to avoid prison while awaiting trial by posting a bond set by a fee schedule. The impact of money-bail systems on indigent criminal defendants, however, has prompted legislative interest in and legal challenges to such systems, particularly when the bail does not reflect an individual's specific circumstances, such as potential flight risk or public safety. Critics of money-bail systems assert that fee schedules unduly burden indigent defendants, while supporters argue that fee schedules provide uniformity and ensure that defendants appear at trial.
Several states and municipalities have reformed their bail systems. Voters in New Mexico approved a constitutional amendment that allows judges to deny bail to defendants considered exceptionally dangerous, but otherwise permits pretrial release of nondangerous indigent offenders who cannot make bail. Other jurisdictions have altered or eliminated their money-bail systems in recent years, including cities in Alabama, Georgia, and Maryland.
Courts have heard legal challenges regarding whether state or local money-bail systems comport with the Constitution's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The Supreme Court has established that the Constitution provides certain protections to indigents during sentencing and postconviction, including ensuring that an indigent's failure to pay a fine cannot result in an automatic revocation of probation or imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum term. The Court, however, has not addressed these rights in the bail context. Applying the rational basis standard, some courts have found money-bail systems that reasonably ensure a defendant's subsequent court appearance to be constitutional. Other courts have indicated that bail systems that detain indigent criminal defendants pretrial, without considering their ability to pay, may be unconstitutional.


Question:
On January 5, 2011, the House of Representatives adopted an amendment to House Rule XII to require that Members state the constitutional basis for Congress's power to enact the proposed legislation when introducing a bill or joint resolution. (The amendment does not pertain to concurrent or simple resolutions). This Constitutional Authority Statement (CAS) rule, found at House Rule XII, clause 7(c), was subsequently adopted by every subsequent Congress.
Understanding the CAS rule first requires an understanding of both the powers provided to the Congress under the Constitution and Congress's role in interpreting the founding document. Article I's Vesting Clause creates a Congress of specified or "enumerated" powers, and every law Congress enacts must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution. The Constitution creates two central types of limitations on Congress's powers: (1) internal limits and (2) external limits. Internal limits are the restrictions inherent in the constitutional grants of power themselves, such as the limits on the scope of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause. External limits, on the other hand, are the constraints contained in affirmative prohibitions found elsewhere in the text or structure of the document, such as the First Amendment's prohibition on Congress abridging the freedom of speech. While the Court's 1803 decision in Marbury v. Madison firmly cemented the judicial branch's role in interpreting the Constitution by recognizing the power of the Court to strike down legislation as unconstitutional, the early history of the nation is replete with examples of all three government branches playing a substantial role in constitutional interpretation. By the mid-20th century, however, the Supreme Court began articulating a theory of judicial supremacy that became widely accepted, wherein the federal judiciary is the final and exclusive arbiter of the Constitution's meaning. Nonetheless, in recent decades, a number of legal scholars and government officials have criticized this theory, instead promoting the view that the political branches of government possess the independent and coordinate authority to interpret the Constitution. In support of this view, some point to (1) the Constitution itself requiring all Members of Congress to be bound by an oath to support the Constitution; (2) the presumption of constitutionality that courts afford legislation enacted by Congress; and (3) the wide range of questions the Constitution requires Congress to resolve.
A CAS is fundamentally a congressional interpretation of the Constitution, in that House Rule XII requires each Member introducing a piece of legislation to attach a statement that cites the power(s) that allows Congress to enact the legislation. The submitted CAS appears in the Congressional Record and is published on Congress.gov. The House Rules Committee has indicated that Members have significant discretion in determining whether particular CASs comply with the rule. The CAS rule is enforced only insofar as "the House clerk ... acts to verify that each bill has a justification" and "not [in judging] the adequacy of the justification itself." The most common means of complying with the rule is to cite to a specific clause in Article I, Section 8, such as the Taxing and Spending Clause. The CAS rule has itself been subject to much debate, with proponents arguing that the rule promotes constitutional dialogue in the House, while critics contend that the rule provides minimal benefits and is administratively costly.


Question:
Since 1977, statutory thresholds have effectively constrained the President's ability to close or realign major military installations in the United States. Congress has instead periodically granted temporary authorities—known as a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)—that have established independent commissions for the review and approval of basing changes submitted by the Secretary of Defense. These unique and transient authorities last expired on April 16, 2006. There have been five rounds of base closures: 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005.
Though Congress has periodically adjusted the BRAC process to account for lessons learned, the modern framework has remained generally consistent with earlier rounds, and includes
establishment of an independent commission; reliance on objective and uniform criteria; Government Accountability Office (GAO) review and certification of Department of Defense (DOD) data; deliberations designed to be transparent that include open hearings, solicitation of feedback, installation visits, and data available for public review; and requirement that the final list of closure and realignment recommendations be accepted or rejected in their entirety.
Congress has defined BRAC selection criteria in statute, thus requiring the Secretary to prioritize military value over cost savings. Additionally, Congress has required the Secretary to align the Department's recommendations with a comprehensive 20-year force structure plan. The commission may modify, reject, or add recommendations during its review before forwarding a final list to the President.
After receiving the Commission's list of recommendations, the President may either accept the report in its entirety or seek to modify it by indicating disapproval and returning it to the commission for further evaluation. If the President accepts the commission's recommendations, they are forwarded to Congress. BRAC implementation begins by default unless Congress rejects the recommendations in their entirety within 45 days by enacting a joint resolution. During the implementation phase, DOD is required to initiate closures and realignments within two years and complete all actions within six years.
The BRAC process represents a legislative compromise between the executive and legislative branches wherein each shares power in managing the closure and realignment of military bases. The imposition of an independent, third-party mediator was intended to insulate base closings from political considerations by both branches that had complicated similar actions in the past.
This report provides background on the development of BRAC, describes its major elements and milestones, and outlines issues frequently cited in the context of new rounds, such as potential savings.


Question:
The Property Clause in the U.S. Constitution (Article IV, §3, clause 2) grants Congress the authority to acquire, dispose of, and manage federal property. The 116th Congress faces multiple policy issues related to federal lands and natural resources. These issues include how much and which land the government should own and how lands and resources should be used and managed. These issues affect local communities, industries, ecosystems, and the nation.
There are approximately 640 million surface acres of federally owned land in the United States. Four agencies (referred to in this report as the federal land management agencies, or FLMAs) administer approximately 608 million surface acres (~95%) of federal lands: the Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and National Park Service (NPS), all in the Department of the Interior (DOI). The federal estate also extends to energy and mineral resources located below ground and offshore. BLM manages the onshore subsurface mineral estate and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, also in DOI, manages access to approximately 1.7 billion offshore acres in federal waters on the U.S. outer continental shelf. However, not all of these onshore or offshore acres can be expected to contain extractable mineral and energy resources.
This report introduces some of the broad themes and issues Congress has considered when addressing federal land policy and resource management. These include questions about the extent and location of the federal estate. For example, typically Congress considers both measures to authorize and fund the acquisition of additional lands and measures to convey some land out of federal ownership or management. Other issues for Congress include whether certain lands or resources should have additional protections, for example, through designation as wilderness or national monuments, or protection of endangered species and their habitat.
Other policy questions involve how federal land should be used. Certain federal lands are considered primary- or dominant-use lands as specified in statute by Congress. For example, the dominant-use mission of the National Wildlife Refuge System is the conservation of fish, wildlife, and plant resources and associated habitats for the benefit of current and future Americans, and the dual-use mission of the National Park System is to conserve unique resources and provide for their use and enjoyment by the public. BLM and FS lands, however, have a statutory mission to balance multiple uses: recreation, grazing, timber, habitat and watershed protection, and energy production, among others. Conflicts arise as users and land managers attempt to balance these uses. Congress often addresses bills to clarify, prioritize, and alter land uses, including timber harvesting, livestock grazing, and recreation (motorized and nonmotorized). With respect to energy uses, in addition to questions about balancing energy production against other uses, other questions include how to balance traditional and alternative energy production on federal lands.
Additional issues of debate include whether or how to charge for access and use of federal resources and lands, how to use any funds collected, and whether or how to compensate local governments for the presence of untaxed federal lands within their borders. Congress also faces questions about wildfire management on both federal and nonfederal lands, including questions of risk management and funding suppression efforts.


Question:
This report describes actions taken by the Trump Administration and Congress to provide FY2019 funding for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) accounts. It also provides an overview of enacted FY2018 funding for agencies and bureaus funded as part of annual CJS appropriations acts.
The Administration requested $66.555 billion for CJS for FY2019. The request included $9.797 billion for the Department of Commerce, $28.835 billion for the Department of Justice (DOJ), $27.372 billion for the science agencies, and $551 million for the related agencies. The Administration's budget proposed eliminating funding for several CJS agencies and accounts. The Administration proposed moving funding for the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas program from the Office of National Drug Control Policy to the Drug Enforcement Administration, closing the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Office and moving its responsibilities to the Office of Justice Programs (OJP), and a new account structure for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
The bill reported by the House Committee on Appropriations (H.R. 5952) would have provided a total of $73.923 billion for CJS for FY2019. The bill would have provided $12.106 billion for the Department of Commerce, $31.113 billion for DOJ, $29.728 billion for the science agencies, and $976 million for the related agencies. The committee largely declined to adopt many of the Administration's proposals to eliminate funding for several CJS agencies and accounts, though the committee-reported bill would have moved funding for the COPS program to OJP and it included the Administration's proposed account structure for NASA.
The bill reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations (S. 3072) would have provided a total of $72.648 billion for CJS for FY2019. The bill would have provided $11.572 billion for the Department of Commerce, $30.699 billion for DOJ, $29.400 billion for the science agencies, and $977 million for the related agencies. The Senate Committee on Appropriations largely declined to adopt many of the proposals put forth by the Administration in its FY2019 budget. Unlike the Administration's request and the House committee-reported bill, S. 3072 would have funded the COPS program through its own account and the committee did not include the Administration's new account structure for NASA.
FY2019 enacted funding for CJS is $72.908 billion. This amount includes $11.414 billion for the Department of Commerce, $30.934 billion for DOJ, $29.583 billion for the science agencies, and $977 million for the related agencies. In general, FY2019 funding for CJS is in-line with FY2018 enacted funding, with a few notable exceptions. These include increased funding for the Census Bureau to help ramp up operations for the 2020 decennial census, increased funding for DOJ's law enforcement agencies and the federal prisons system, and increased funding for several NASA accounts.
For FY2018, Congress and the President provided a total of $72.119 billion in funding for CJS. This included $70.921 billion in regular funding provided in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141) and $1.198 billion in emergency-designated funding provided in the Further Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Requirements Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-123).


Question:
The State of Qatar has employed its ample financial resources to exert regional influence separate from and independent of Saudi Arabia, the de facto leader of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman), an alliance of six Gulf monarchies. Qatar has intervened in several regional conflicts, including in Syria and Libya, and has engaged both Sunni Islamist and Iran-backed Shiite groups in Lebanon, Sudan, the Gaza Strip, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Qatar has maintained consistent dialogue with Iran while also supporting U.S. and GCC efforts to limit Iran's regional influence.
Qatar's independent policies, which include supporting regional Muslim Brotherhood organizations and hosting a global media network often critical of Arab leaders called Al Jazeera, have caused a backlash against Qatar by Saudi Arabia and some other GCC members. A rift within the GCC opened on June 5, 2017, when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, joined by Egypt and a few other governments, severed relations with Qatar and imposed limits on the entry and transit of Qatari nationals and vessels in their territories, waters, and airspace. The Trump Administration has sought, unsuccessfully to date, to mediate a resolution of the dispute. The rift has hindered U.S. efforts to hold another U.S.-GCC summit that would formalize a new "Middle East Strategic Alliance" of the United States, the GCC, and other Sunni-led countries in the region to counter Iran and other regional threats. Qatar has countered the Saudi-led pressure with new arms buys and deepening relations with Turkey and Iran.
As do the other GCC leaders, Qatar's leaders have looked to the United States to guarantee their external security since the 1980s. Since 1992, the United States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that reportedly addresses a U.S. troop presence in Qatar, consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. Under the DCA, Qatar hosts about 13,000 U.S. forces and the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) at various military facilities, including the large Al Udeid Air Base. U.S. forces in Qatar participate in all U.S. operations in the region. Qatar is a significant buyer of U.S.-made weaponry, including combat aircraft. In January 2018, Qatar and the United States inaugurated a "Strategic Dialogue" to strengthen the U.S.-Qatar defense partnership, which Qatar says might include permanent U.S. basing there. The second iteration of the dialogue, in January 2019, resulted in a U.S.-Qatar memorandum of understanding to expand Al Udeid Air Base to improve and expand accommodation for U.S. military personnel. Qatar signed a broad memorandum of understanding with the United States in 2017 to cooperate against international terrorism. That MOU appeared intended to counter assertions that Qatar's ties to regional Islamist movements support terrorism.
The voluntary relinquishing of power in 2013 by Qatar's former Amir (ruler), Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, departed from GCC patterns of governance in which leaders generally remain in power for life. However, Qatar is the only one of the smaller GCC states that has not yet held elections for a legislative body. U.S. and international reports criticize Qatar for failing to adhere to international standards of labor rights practices, but credit it for taking steps in 2018 to improve the conditions for expatriate workers.
As are the other GCC states, Qatar is wrestling with the fluctuations in global hydrocarbons prices since 2014, now compounded by the Saudi-led embargo. Qatar is positioned to weather these headwinds because of its small population and substantial financial reserves. But, Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products. On December 3, 2018, Qatar announced it would withdraw from the OPEC oil cartel in order to focus on its natural gas export sector.


Question:
Electronic forms of payment have become increasingly available, convenient, and cost efficient due to technological advances in digitization and data processing. Anecdotal reporting and certain analyses suggest that businesses and consumers are increasingly eschewing cash payments in favor of electronic payment methods. Such trends have led analysts and policymakers to examine the possibility that the use and acceptance of cash will significantly decline in coming years and to consider the effects of such an evolution.
Cash is still a common and widely accepted payment system in the United States. Cash's advantages include its simplicity and robustness as a payment system that requires no ancillary technologies. In addition, it provides privacy in transactions and protection from cyber threats or financial institution failures. However, using cash involves costs to businesses and consumers who pay fees to obtain, manage, and protect cash and exposes its users to loss through misplacement, theft, or accidental destruction of physical currency. Cash also concurrently generates government revenues through "profits" earned by producing it and by acting as interest-free liabilities to the Federal Reserve (in contrast to reserve balances on which the Federal Reserve pays interest), while reducing government revenues by facilitating some tax avoidance.
The relative advantages and costs of various payment methods will largely determine whether and to what degree electronic payment systems will displace cash. Traditional noncash payment systems (such as credit and debit cards and interbank clearing systems) involving intermediaries such as banks and central banks address some of the shortcomings of cash payments. These systems can execute payments over physical distance, allow businesses and consumers to avoid some of the costs and risks of using cash, and are run by generally trusted and closely regulated intermediaries. However, the maintenance and operation of legacy noncash systems involve their own costs, and the intermediaries charge fees to recoup those costs and earn profits. The time it takes to finalize certain transactions—including crediting customer accounts for check or electronic deposits—can lead to consumers incurring additional costs. In addition, these systems involve cybersecurity risks and generally require customers to divulge their private personal information to gain system access, which raises privacy concerns.
To date, the migration away from cash has largely been in favor of traditional noncash payment systems; however, some observers predict new alternative systems will play a larger role in the future. Such alternative systems aim to address some of the inefficiencies and risks of traditional noncash systems, but face obstacles to achieving that aim and involve costs of their own. Private systems using distributed ledger technology, such as cryptocurrencies, may not serve the main functions of money well and face challenges to widespread acceptance and technological scalability. These systems also raise concerns among certain observers related to whether these systems could facilitate crime, provide inadequate protections to consumers, and may adversely affect governments' ability to implement or transmit monetary policy. The potential for increased payment efficiency from these systems is promising enough that certain central banks have investigated the possibility of issuing government-backed, electronic-only currencies—called central bank digital currencies (CBDCs)—in such a way that the benefits of certain alternative payment systems could be realized with appropriately mitigated risk. How CBDCs would be created and function are still matters of speculation at this time, and the possibility of their introduction raises questions about the appropriate role of a central bank in the financial system and the economy.
If the relative benefits and costs of cash and the various other payment methods evolve in such a way that cash is significantly displaced as a commonly accepted form of payment, that evolution could have a number of effects, both positive and negative, on the economy and society. Proponents of reducing cash usage (or even eliminating it all together and becoming a cashless society) argue that doing so will generate important benefits, including potentially improved efficiency of the payment system, a reduction of crime, and less constrained monetary policy. Proponents of maintaining cash as a payment option argue that significant reductions in cash usage and acceptance would further marginalize people with limited access to the financial system, increase the financial system's vulnerability to cyberattack, and reduce personal privacy. Based on their assessment of the magnitude of these benefits and costs and the likelihood that market forces will displace cash as a payment system, policymakers may choose to encourage or discourage this trend.


Question:
Over the last decade, migration to the United States from Central America—in particular from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (known collectively as the Northern Triangle)—has increased considerably. Families migrating from this region, many seeking asylum, have made up an increasing share of the migrants seeking admission to the United States at the U.S.-Mexico border. In the past year, news reports of migrant "caravans" from the Northern Triangle traveling toward the United States have sparked intense interest and questions from Congress.
Many factors, both in their countries of origin and elsewhere, contribute to people's decisions to emigrate from the Northern Triangle. Weak institutions and corrupt government officials, chronic poverty, rising levels of crime, and demand for illicit drugs result in insecurity and citizens' low levels of confidence in government institutions. These "push" factors intersect with "pull" factors attracting migrants to the United States, including economic and educational opportunities and a desire to reunify with family members.
Addressing these factors is complex. Under the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, the United States is working with Central American governments to promote economic prosperity, improve security, and strengthen governance in the region. Since 2014, Mexico has helped the United States manage flows of Central American migrants, including a recent decision to allow certain U.S.-bound asylum seekers to remain in Mexico while awaiting U.S. immigration proceedings. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)—in collaboration with local and federal governments and civil society—is providing immediate and longer-term support for Mexico's refugee agency and migrants in transit.
Central Americans who wish to request asylum in the United States may do so at a U.S. port of entry before a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer or upon apprehension by a CBP officer between U.S. ports of entry. Those requesting asylum at the border undergo screening to determine whether they can pursue an asylum claim. To receive asylum, a foreign national must establish, among other requirements, that he or she is unable or unwilling to return to his or her home country because of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution based on one of five protected grounds (race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion). In 2018, President Trump, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) took various actions to tighten the U.S. asylum system. These actions have been met with legal challenges. For example, on November 9, 2018, the President issued a presidential proclamation to suspend immediately the entry into the United States of aliens who cross the Southwest border between ports of entry. This proclamation and a related DHS-DOJ rule are being challenged in federal court.
Chapter 15, Title 10 of the U.S. Code provides general legislative authority for the Armed Forces to provide certain types of support to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. In October 2018, active-duty personnel were deployed to the Southwest border to provide assistance in air and ground transportation, logistics support, engineering capabilities and equipment, medical support, housing, and planning support. The Posse Comitatus Act constrains the manner in which military personnel may be used in a law enforcement capacity at the border. President Trump has contemplated proclaiming a national emergency pursuant to the National Emergencies Act (NEA) in order to fund a physical barrier at the southern border with Mexico using DOD funds.
Congress provided the President with significant discretion to reduce foreign assistance to Central America in FY2018, dependent on the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras addressing a variety of congressional concerns, including improving border security, combating corruption, and protecting human rights. The President's ability to modify assistance to the Northern Triangle for the remainder of FY2019 will depend on provisions Congress may include in future appropriations legislation.


Question:
According to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the federal workforce consists of an estimated two million civilian employees. Federal law categorizes these employees into three types of service—the competitive service, the excepted service, and the Senior Executive Service (SES)—that may be distinguished by different selection, compensation, and other standards. Title 5 of the U.S. Code (Title 5) contains most of the standards governing federal employment, and OPM is generally responsible for implementing these requirements.
The competitive service largely consists of all civil service positions in the executive branch, other than (1) positions excepted from the competitive service by statute; (2) positions appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate; and (3) the SES. Traditionally, OPM has administered examinations for entrance into the competitive service. These examinations are meant to be "practical in character" and relate to "matters that fairly test the relative capacity and fitness of the applicants for the appointment sought." Title 5 also authorizes OPM to prescribe rules allowing agencies to hire candidates directly under specified circumstances.
The excepted service includes designated civil service positions that are not in the competitive service or the SES and are not subject to competitive examination. OPM maintains authority to exempt a position from the competitive service when it determines that an appointment through competitive examination is not practicable, or the recruitment of students or recent graduates would be better achieved through alternate recruitment and assessment processes.
The pay structure for the competitive service and the excepted service is similar. Both services are typically paid in accordance with the General Schedule, a schedule of annual basic pay rates that consists of 15 grades, designated "GS-1" through "GS-15." This fixed pay scale is generally designed to reflect, among other things, equal pay for substantially equal work within a local pay area. Additionally, the competitive service and the excepted service generally have similar notice and appeal rights for adverse personnel actions. For example, before a removal, a suspension for more than 14 days, a reduction in grade or pay, or a furlough of 30 days or less, the agency must provide at least 30 days' advance written notice to the affected employee. The employee must also be given a reasonable time to respond to the notice and provide affidavits and other evidence to support the answer. Some adverse actions may also be appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB or Board), an independent, quasi-judicial agency that reviews and adjudicates specified personnel actions taken against qualifying federal employees.
The SES is a corps of some 7,000 high-level government administrators who manage major programs and projects within most federal agencies. In these leadership roles, SES members may serve as a link between top-level political appointees of an agency and career civil servants within the agency. The SES is governed by a regulatory structure separate from the competitive and excepted services. While SES members are primarily career appointees chosen through a merit-based competitive hiring process, others are noncareer, limited term or limited emergency appointees (commonly political appointees) selected by agency leadership. To shield certain SES roles from political influence, some SES positions (career reserved positions) must be filled with career appointees, and Title 5 limits the number of noncareer and limited term appointees that may serve in SES positions.
The SES pay structure is distinct from the rest of the civil service. Title 5 specifies that SES members are paid within a particular range based on an executive's individual performance or contribution to agency performance (or both), as measured under a performance appraisal system. In addition, Title 5 articulates special conditions and procedures for removing, suspending, or taking other adverse actions against a member of the SES. For example, career SES appointees who have successfully completed a one-year probationary period may be removed or subject to adverse action only for specified reasons, including misconduct and substandard performance. Career appointees must receive advance written notice of these actions, and an opportunity to appeal the action. In comparison, noncareer, limited term, and limited emergency appointees are generally not subject to the same protections and may be removed from the SES at any time.


Question:
Political and economic developments in Cuba, a one-party authoritarian state with a poor human rights record, frequently have been the subject of intense congressional concern since the Cuban revolution in 1959. Current Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel succeeded Raúl Castro in April 2018, but Castro continues to head Cuba's Communist Party. Over the past decade, Cuba has implemented gradual market-oriented economic policy changes, although it has not taken enough action to foster sustainable economic growth. Most observers do not anticipate major policy changes under Díaz-Canel, at least in the short term; the president faces the enormous challenges of reforming the economy and responding to citizens' desires for greater freedom.
U.S. Policy
Since the early 1960s, the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at isolating the Cuban government. Congress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of legislation strengthening, and at times easing, U.S. economic sanctions. In 2014, however, the Obama Administration initiated a policy shift moving away from sanctions toward a policy of engagement. This included the restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015), the rescission of Cuba's designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015), and an increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba implemented through regulatory changes.
President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in 2017 that increased sanctions and partially rolled back some of the Obama Administration's efforts to normalize relations. In 2017, the State Department reduced the staff of the U.S. Embassy by about two-thirds in response to unexplained injuries of members of the U.S. diplomatic community in Havana; 26 individuals have been affected. The reduction has affected embassy operations, especially visa processing, and has made bilateral engagement more difficult. The most significant Trump Administration policy changes include restrictions on transactions with over 200 entities controlled by the Cuban military, intelligence, and security services (on a "restricted list" maintained by the State Department) and the elimination of people-to-people educational travel for individuals (such travel with a group specializing in educational tours is still permitted). In March 2019, the Administration ratcheted up economic pressure on Cuba by allowing certain lawsuits to go forward against those entities on the "restricted list" for trafficking in confiscated property in Cuba. In light of increased U.S. sanctions against the regime of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, the Administration has increased its criticism of Cuba's military and intelligence support for the regime in Caracas.
Legislative Activity in the 116th Congress
In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6, H.J.Res. 31) enacted in February 2019, Congress provided $20 million in Cuba democracy assistance ($10 million more than requested) and $29.1 million for Cuba broadcasting ($15.4 million more than requested).
Several legislative initiatives on Cuba have been introduced in the 116th Congress: H.R. 213 would waive certain prohibitions to allows nationals of Cuba to come to the United States to play organized professional baseball; S. 428 would repeal or amend many provisions of law restricting trade and other relations with Cuba; and H.R. 1898 would authorize private financing for U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba. S.Res. 14 and H.Res. 136 would express the sense of the Senate and House, respectively, that Cuba's foreign medical missions constitute human trafficking; and H.Res. 92 would call for the extradition or rendering to the United States all fugitives from U.S. justice receiving safe harbor in Cuba. For more on legislative initiatives in the 116th Congress, see Appendix A.


Question:
This report focuses on previous activity in Congress regarding high profile incidents of sexual assault in the military during the summer 2013 through 2016. Included are separate sections on the official responses related to these incidents by the Department of Defense (DOD), the Obama Administration, and Congress including legislation during the 113th (2013-2014) Congress and 114th Congress (2015-2016). The last section is a resource guide for sources in this report and related materials on sexual assault and prevention during this period. This report will not be updated and supersedes CRS Report R43168, Military Sexual Assault: Chronology of Activity in Congress and Related Resources.
For current information regarding Congress and issues on sexual assault in the military, see CRS Report R44944, Military Sexual Assault: A Framework for Congressional Oversight, by Kristy N. Kamarck and Barbara Salazar Torreon. For legislative initiatives in the 115th Congress, see CRS Report R44923, FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues, by Kristy N. Kamarck, Lawrence Kapp, and Barbara Salazar Torreon and CRS Report R45343, FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues, by Bryce H. P. Mendez et al.


Question:
At least 17 different reports by United Nations (U.N.) entities and independent human rights organizations have been released containing allegations that certain Burmese security force officers and units committed serious human rights violations dating back to 2011. These reports name nearly 40 individuals and over 100 security units as responsible for such gross human rights violations as murder, torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence, and forced labor. Some of these individuals, including Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, were identified in four or more of the reports. Similarly, some of the security units, in particular Infantry Division 33 and Infantry Division 99, were cited by six or more of the reports. The reports suggest that the commission of human rights abuses by Burma's security forces is pervasive, systematic, and endemic. CRS did not independently verify the credibility of these reports.
The Trump Administration has labeled the alleged human rights violations as "ethnic cleansing" and has imposed "limited targeted sanctions" on five Burmese military officers and two military units it considers responsible for serious human rights violations against the Rohingya in Burma's Rakhine State. In August 2018, the State Department released a report summarizing the results of a survey of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh that concluded that "the vast majority of Rohingya refugees experienced or directly witnessed extreme violence and the destruction of their homes." The report also stated "that the recent violence in northern Rakhine State was extreme, large-scale, widespread, and seemingly geared toward both terrorizing the population and driving out the Rohingya residents." The report, however, did not indicate if the violence constituted genocide, crimes against humanity, and/or war crimes.
Some Members of Congress and other observers view this response as too limited, and have called on the Trump Administration to take stronger action given the severity of the human rights abuses. The 116th Congress appropriated $3.75 million in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6) for the documentation of human rights violations against Rohingya and others in Burma. Congress has also placed restrictions and requirements on relations with Burma in previous appropriations legislation to address human rights issues.
Many of the reports advocate for some form of accountability for the reported human rights violations, including by calling for the U.N. Security Council to refer the alleged human rights violations in Burma to the International Criminal Court (ICC) or an ad hoc international criminal tribunal for investigation and possible prosecution. China and possibly Russia are likely to oppose an ICC referral, and recent statements by President Trump and National Security Advisor John Bolton suggest the United States may also oppose such a referral. The ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber had previously ruled that the ICC's Prosecutor can begin a preliminary investigation of the war crime of forced deportation of the country's Rohingya ethnic minority into neighboring Bangladesh.
In the interim, the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (UNFFM) has recommended that an independent international mechanism (IIM) be established to collect and preserve evidence of alleged acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed in Burma since 2011. The U.N. Human Rights Council has approved the formation of an IIM, and has urged U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to appoint "the staff of the mechanism as expeditiously as possible."
In addition to these measures to support some form of future criminal action against the alleged perpetrators, the UNFFM and others have expressed support for U.N. sanctions against the Burmese military and others considered responsible for the abuses. Some of the reports also call on individual nations to impose sanctions on Burma's military and its government.


Question:
The Congressional Review Act (CRA) allows Congress to review certain types of federal agency actions that fall under the statutory category of "rules." The CRA requires that agencies report their rules to Congress and provides special procedures under which Congress can consider legislation to overturn those rules. A joint resolution of disapproval will become effective once both houses of Congress pass a joint resolution and it is signed by the President, or if Congress overrides the President's veto.
The CRA generally adopts a broad definition of the word "rule" from the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), defining a rule as "the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency."
The CRA, however, provides three exceptions to this broad definition:
any rule of particular applicability, including a rule that approves or prescribes for the future rates, wages, prices, services, or allowances therefor, corporate or financial structures, reorganizations, mergers, or acquisitions thereof, or accounting practices or disclosures bearing on any of the foregoing; any rule relating to agency management or personnel; or any rule of agency organization, procedure, or practice that does not substantially affect the rights or obligations of non-agency parties.
The class of rules the CRA covers is broader than the category of rules that are subject to the APA's notice-and-comment requirements. As such, some agency actions, such as guidance documents, that are not subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures may still be considered rules under the CRA and thus could be overturned using the CRA's procedures. The effect of Congress disapproving a rule that is not subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking may be subject to debate, given that such rules are generally viewed to lack any legal effect in the first place. Nonetheless, the CRA does encompass some such rules, as highlighted by the recent enactment of a CRA resolution overturning a bulletin from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that was not subject to the notice-and-comment procedures.
Even if an agency action falls under the CRA's definition of "rule," however, the expedited procedures for considering legislation to overturn the rule only become available when the agency submits the rule to Congress. In many cases in which agencies take actions that fall under the scope of a "rule" but have not gone through notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, agencies fail to submit those rules. Thus, questions have arisen as to how Members can avail themselves of the CRA's special fast-track procedures if the agency has not submitted the action to Congress.
To protect its prerogative to review agency rules under the CRA, Congress and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have developed an ad hoc process in which Members can request that GAO provide a formal legal opinion on whether a particular agency action qualifies as a rule under the CRA. If GAO concludes that the action in question falls within the CRA's definition of "rule," Congress has treated the publication of the GAO opinion in the Congressional Record as constructive submission of the rule. In other words, an affirmative opinion from GAO can allow Congress to use the CRA procedures to consider legislation overturning an agency action despite the agency not submitting that action to Congress.