Question:
As the trials of Sheldon Silver and Dean Skelos illustrate, corruption among high-profile public officials continues to be a concern in the United States. Likewise, recent examples abound of powerful executives in the private sector abusing positions of trust for personal gain. Faced with this reality, Congress has shown consistent interest in policing public- and private-sector corruption, enacting a number of criminal provisions aimed at holding corrupt officials accountable for their actions under federal law. However, one of federal prosecutors' most potent existing tools for combating such corruption—18 U.S.C. § 1346, which defines the crimes of mail and wire fraud as including so-called "honest services" fraud—has been a source of contention between the courts and Congress for years.
18 U.S.C. § 1346 defines the term "scheme or artifice to defraud," as used in the general statutes prohibiting use of the mails or wires to commit fraud, to include a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services. Congress enacted this provision in the late 1980s in response to the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in McNally v. United States that the mail fraud statute was limited in scope to only the protection of tangible property rights. The McNally decision was grounded in concerns that a broader construction of the statute could leave its outer boundaries ambiguous and unjustifiably involve the federal government in setting standards for good government at the local level. Nevertheless, Section 1346 abrogates McNally's holding, codifying the understanding of some of the lower federal courts that the mail and wire fraud statutes extend to conduct that deprives a person or group of the right to have another act in accordance with some externally imposed duty or obligation, regardless of whether the victim so deprived has suffered or would suffer a pecuniary harm.
Recognizing that this lower court understanding in fact evinced considerable disarray as to the kinds of schemes that would qualify as honest services fraud, however, the Supreme Court subsequently read a limiting principle into Section 1346 in Skilling v. United States in order to avoid invalidating the statute as unconstitutionally vague. After Skilling, mail and wire fraud prosecutions under an honest services theory may extend only to those who, in violation of a fiduciary duty, participate in bribery or kickback schemes. Notably, the Skilling decision withdrew from the reach of Section 1346 a significant category of cases that had been prosecuted as honest services fraud up to that point: cases involving more general financial self-dealing or conflicts of interest, where no bribes or kickbacks are given. Congress has considered legislation on more than one occasion that would reinstate the self-dealing category of honest services fraud rejected in Skilling, though the law remains unchanged as of this writing.
The conversation between the Court and Congress regarding the scope of honest services fraud and its culmination in Skilling have presented more questions that lower courts have been tasked with answering, including the source of the requisite fiduciary duty and the conduct that qualifies as bribery or kickbacks. Courts have looked to a variety of sources to give content to the fiduciary duty requirement, including federal, state, and common law. Likewise, in fleshing out the contours of the bribery or kickbacks called for in Skilling, lower courts have relied on anti-bribery and anti-kickback provisions found in federal statutes. In the recent case of McDonnell v. United States, the Supreme Court limited the reach of one of those statutes—18 U.S.C. § 201, which makes it a crime to offer or solicit anything of value to influence an "official act"—by construing the term "official act" narrowly. Nevertheless, alternate routes appear to be available to prosecute bribery schemes involving conduct that may be beyond the scope of McDonnell.
Should Congress seek to alter the scope of honest services fraud, it will likely need to be attuned to the concerns that federal courts interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1346 have voiced over the years. Chief among these have been the concerns that—as written—the statute has the potential to sweep too broadly and regulate ethically dubious conduct of state and local officials in a way that conflicts with the Constitution.


Question:
Whistleblowing is "the act of reporting waste, fraud, abuse and corruption in a lawful manner to those who can correct the wrongdoing." Intelligence community (IC) whistleblowers are those employees or contractors working in any of the 17 elements of the IC who reasonably believe there has been a violation of law, rule, or regulation; gross mismanagement; waste of resources; abuse of authority; or a substantial danger to public health and safety. The IC has publicly recognized the importance of whistleblowing, and supports protections for whistleblowers who conform to guidelines to protect classified information. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) whistleblowing policy and guidance is publicly available and specifically addresses the process for making protected disclosures and whistleblower protections for IC contractors, members of the Armed Forces, and federal employees. There are differing opinions, however, on whether the IC's internal processes have the transparency necessary to ensure adequate protections against reprisal, and whether protections for IC contractors are sufficient.
IC whistleblower protections have evolved in response to perceptions of gaps that many believed left whistleblowers vulnerable to reprisal. The first whistleblower legislation specific to the IC was limited to specifying a process for IC whistleblowers to make a complaint but offered no specific protections. Subsequent legislation included only general provisions for protecting IC whistleblowers with no additional guidance on standards for implementation. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-19, signed in 2012, provided the first specific protections against reprisal actions for making a complaint. The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 codified these provisions, which were further supported with IC implementation policy. Separate legislation under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, along with DOD implementing guidance, provides protections for members of the Armed Forces, including those assigned to elements of the IC. In early 2018, Congress passed legislation to address perceived gaps in protections for IC contractors.


Question:
A wide array of federal incentives supports the development and deployment of alternatives to conventional fuels and engines in transportation. These incentives include tax deductions and credits for vehicle purchases and the installation of refueling systems, federal grants for conversion of older vehicles to newer technologies, mandates for the use of biofuels, and incentives for manufacturers to produce alternative fuel vehicles. The current array of incentives for alternative fuels and related technologies does not reflect a single, comprehensive strategy, but rather an aggregative approach to a range of discrete public policy issues, including goals of reducing petroleum consumption and import dependence, improving environmental quality, expanding domestic manufacturing, and promoting agriculture and rural development.
Current federal programs are administered by five key agencies: Department of the Treasury (Treasury), Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Transportation (DOT), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The incentives and programs described in this report are organized by the responsible agency.
Treasury (through the Internal Revenue Service, IRS) administers tax credits and deductions for alternative fuel and advanced technology vehicle purchases, expansion of alternative fuel refueling infrastructure, and incentives for the production and/or distribution of alternative fuels. Many of these incentives have expired in recent years. DOE (mainly through the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, EERE) administers research and development (R&D) programs for advanced fuels and transportation technology, grant programs to deploy alternative fuels and vehicles, and a loan program to promote domestic manufacturing of high-efficiency vehicles. DOT (mainly through the Federal Highway Administration, FHWA, and Federal Transit Administration, FTA) administers grant programs to deploy "clean fuel" buses and other alternative fuel vehicles. DOT (through the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, NHTSA) also administers federal Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, which include incentives for production of alternative fuel vehicles. EPA (mainly through the Office of Transportation and Air Quality, OTAQ) administers the Renewable Fuel Standard, which mandates the use of biofuels in transportation. EPA also administers grant programs to replace older diesel engines with newer technology. USDA (mainly through the Rural Business-Cooperative Service, RBS) administers grant, loan, and loan guarantee programs to expand agricultural production of biofuel feedstocks, conduct R&D on biofuels and bioenergy, and establish and expand facilities to produce biofuels, bioenergy, and bioproducts.


Question:
President Trump's budget request for FY2020 includes approximately $134.1 billion for research and development (R&D). Several FY2019 appropriations bills had not been enacted at the time the President's FY2020 budget was prepared; therefore, the President's budget included the FY2018 actual funding levels, 2019 annualized continuing resolution (CR) levels, and the FY2020 request levels. On February 15, 2019, Congress enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6). This act included each of the remaining appropriations acts, completing the FY2019 appropriations process. The act also rendered the CR levels identified in the budget no longer relevant, though for some agencies the exact amount of R&D funding in the act remained uncertain. The analysis of government-wide R&D funding in this report compares the President's request for FY2020 to the FY2018 level. For agencies for which the FY2019 R&D funding levels are known, individual agency analyses in this report compare the FY2020 request to FY2019 enacted levels. For agencies for which the FY2019 R&D funding levels remain unknown, individual agency analyses in this report compare the FY2020 request to FY2018 actual levels; when the FY2019 levels become available, these sections will be updated to compare the FY2020 request to FY2019 enacted amounts. As of the date of this report, the House had not completed action on any of the 12 regular appropriations bills for FY2020; nor had the Senate.
In FY2018, OMB adopted a change to the definition of development, applying a more narrow treatment it describes as "experimental development." This change was intended to harmonize the reporting of U.S. R&D funding data with the approach used by other nations. The new definition is used in this report. Under the new definition of R&D (applied to both FY2018 and FY2020 figures), President Trump is requesting approximately $134.1 billion for R&D for FY2020, a decrease of $1.7 billion (1.2%) from the FY2018 level. Adjusted for inflation, the President's FY2020 R&D request represents a decrease of 5.1% below the FY2018 level.
Funding for R&D is concentrated in a few departments and agencies. In FY2018, eight federal agencies received 96.3% of total federal R&D funding, with the Department of Defense (DOD, 38.6%) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS, 27.2%) combined accounting for nearly two-thirds of all federal R&D funding. The same eight agencies account for 97.2% of the FY2020 request, with DOD accounting for 44.3% and HHS for 25.1%
Under the President's FY2020 budget request, most federal agencies would see their R&D funding decline. The primary exception is the Department of Defense. DOD's requested R&D funding for FY2020 is $7.1 billion (13.5%) above the FY2018 level. The Departments of Transportation and Veterans Affairs would see small increases in R&D funding. Among the agencies with the largest proposed reductions in R&D funding in the FY2020 budget compared to the FY2018 actual levels are the Department of Energy ($2.8 billion, 15.8%), the National Science Foundation ($567 million, 9.0%), and National Aeronautics and Space Administration ($475 million, 4.0%).
The President's FY2020 budget request would reduce funding for basic research by $1.5 billion (4.0%), applied research by $4.3 billion (10.5%), and facilities and equipment by $0.5 billion (12.8%), while increasing funding for development by $4.5 billion (8.3%).
President Trump's FY2020 budget is largely silent on funding levels for multiagency R&D initiatives. However, some activities supporting these initiatives are discussed in agency budget justifications and are reported in the agency analyses in this report.
The request represents the President's R&D priorities. Congress may opt to agree with none, part, or all of the request, and it may express different priorities through the appropriations process. In recent years, Congress has completed the annual appropriations process after the start of the fiscal year. Completing the process after the start of the fiscal year and the accompanying use of continuing resolutions can affect agencies' execution of their R&D budgets, including the delay or cancellation of planned R&D activities and the acquisition of R&D-related equipment.


Question:
The Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President (EOP), the judiciary, the District of Columbia, and more than two dozen independent agencies. The House and Senate FSGG bills fund the same agencies, with one exception. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is usually funded through the Agriculture appropriations bill in the House and the FSGG bill in the Senate.
President Trump submitted his FY2019 budget request on February 12, 2018. The request included a total of $49.1 billion for agencies funded through the FSGG appropriations bill, including $282 million for the CFTC. The $49.1 billion figure includes $3 billion for a legislative provision on government-wide transfers (Section 737).
The 115th Congress House and Senate Committees on Appropriations reported FSGG appropriations bills (H.R. 6258, H.Rept. 115-792 and S. 3107, S.Rept. 115-281) and both houses passed different versions of a broader bill (H.R. 6147) that would have provided FY2019 appropriations. The House-passed H.R. 6147 would have provided a combined total of $45.9 billion for the FSGG agencies, while the Senate-passed H.R. 6147 would have provided $45.7 billion. In both cases, the largest differences compared to the President's request were in the funding for the General Services Administration (GSA), the funding for the Executive Office of the President, and the absence of the Section 737 provision on government-wide transfers in both bills. No full-year FY2019 FSGG bill was enacted prior to the end of FY2018. The FSGG agencies were provided continuing appropriations until December 7, 2018, in P.L. 115-245 and until December 21, 2018, in P.L. 115-298. No final bill was enacted, and funding for FSGG agencies, along with much of the rest of the government, lapsed on December 22, 2018. No further appropriations occurred prior to the 116th Congress.
In the 116th Congress, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 21, which contained six full FY2019 appropriations bills, including FSGG provisions nearly identical to those passed by the Senate in the 115th Congress on January 3, 2019. On January 23, 2019, the House passed H.R. 648, also containing six appropriations bills, which was reportedly based on a potential conference report from the 115th Congress and would have provided $46.0 billion for FSGG appropriations. (Neither of these bills provided full-year funding for the Department of Homeland Security.) The Senate did not act on either of these bills.
On February 14, 2019, both the House and the Senate passed a conference report (H.Rept. 116-9) for H.J.Res. 31, containing seven appropriations bills providing full FY2019 funding for the government's operations that had not been previously funded, including FSGG provisions nearly identical to H.R. 648. The President signed the resolution on February 15, 2019, enacting it into law as P.L. 116-6. The law provides $45.7 billion in the FSGG appropriations portion (Division D), which includes the funding for the CFTC. This is $3.4 billion less than the President's request, with the bulk of this due to the absence of the Section 737 transfer authority in P.L. 116-6. Other notable differences include the funding for GSA and the Executive Office of the President.
Although financial services are a major focus of the FSGG appropriations bills, these bills do not include funding for many financial regulatory agencies, which are funded outside of the appropriations process. The FSGG bills have, however, often contained additional legislative provisions relating to such agencies, as is the case with H.R. 6258/H.R. 6147 in the 115th Congress, whose Title IX contained language from a number of different bills relating to financial regulation. P.L. 116-6 did not contain this language.


Question:
The 116th Congress may conduct oversight and deliberate on authorization and funding of water resource development, management, and protection. Congress engages in authorization and appropriations for water resource projects and activities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation). USACE constructs projects nationwide, primarily to improve navigation, reduce flood damage, and restore aquatic ecosystems. Reclamation constructs projects in the 17 arid states west of the Mississippi River; these projects primarily provide water supply benefits, often to agricultural irrigation users. The 116th Congress, like earlier Congresses, also may consider Indian water rights settlements and may evaluate the focus of and funding for the water resource science activities of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS).
Development pressures, droughts and floods, and concerns about changing hydrology from land-use change and climate change have engendered nonfederal interest in federal financial and technical assistance for water resource science and projects. Stakeholders are interested in a range of water resource issues, including
new water resource infrastructure (e.g., storm surge gates, water storage) and new kinds of projects (e.g., groundwater recharge, nature-based flood risk reduction); reinvestment in aging water resource infrastructure and use of water science and real-time monitoring and forecasting to improve infrastructure operations; funding and financing of projects, and whether and how to shift from federally led projects to federal partnerships with state and/or local entities; and activities to protect and restore aquatic ecosystems and enhance flood resilience (including the use of nature-based approaches).
Some topics arise within the context of specific agencies. USACE-related topics for the 116th Congress may include funding and financing issues, such as use of the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund; the status of investments in projects to deepen coastal harbors; USACE budgeting priorities; and oversight of USACE efforts to implement public-private partnerships and develop alternative financing opportunities. Some Reclamation-related water project and management issues during the 116th Congress may include the status of proposed new and augmented water storage projects, as well as efforts to address the agency's aging infrastructure and transition certain qualifying projects to nonfederal ownership. Congress also may address Reclamation drought mitigation activities in the Colorado River basin and other areas. In addition, Congress may explore ongoing issues associated with Reclamation's project operations in California and other areas. It may address how these issues affect water deliveries to irrigation districts and municipalities and threatened and endangered species, among others.
Some topics are international in character. Regarding freshwater bodies shared with Canada, potential topics for the 116th Congress include federal funding for activities supporting Great Lakes restoration and negotiations (and any resulting agreements) with Canada to modify the Columbia River Treaty. Potential topics related to Mexico include oversight of a binational agreement on water sharing during dry conditions in the Colorado River basin and Mexico's deliveries to the United States in the Rio Grande basin.
Crosscutting topics (i.e., topics relevant to multiple agencies and programs) also are part of congressional water resource deliberations. For example, the 116th Congress may consider the status and priority of new and ongoing federal efforts to restore large-scale aquatic ecosystems that have been altered or impaired by changes to their natural conditions (e.g., Florida Everglades, Chesapeake Bay). Congress may explore the funding and performance of existing restoration efforts, including what changes (if any) may be necessary to improve project delivery and evaluation. The 116th Congress may consider its guidance to multiple federal agencies on how to respond to flood hazards, including efforts related to enhancing the resilience of infrastructure and communities to flooding. There is interest in developing and evaluating approaches that protect natural elements that reduce flood risk (e.g., natural dunes) or are "nature-based" in comprehensive flood risk management (e.g., constructed dunes). Congress also may consider legislation and oversight on USACE supplemental appropriations for response to and recovery from floods.


Question:
On April 4, 2019, foreign ministers from the 29 member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are to gather in Washington, DC, to mark the 70th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty (also known as the Washington Treaty). NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg is to address a joint session of Congress on April 3, 2019, the first ever to do so. Congress was instrumental in creating NATO in 1949 and has played a critical role in shaping U.S. policy toward the alliance ever since.
A key goal of the 70th anniversary meeting will be to highlight NATO's past successes and present a unified vision for its future. The United States was the driving proponent of NATO's creation and has been the unquestioned leader of the alliance as it has evolved from a collective defense organization of 12 members focused on deterring the Soviet Union to a globally engaged security organization of 29 members. Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed U.S. leadership of NATO as a cornerstone of U.S. national security strategy. Proponents of NATO cite numerous benefits to the United States, including
peace, stability, conflict prevention, and deterrence in Europe; treaty-based defense and security support from 28 allies, including many of the world's most advanced militaries; an unrivaled platform for constructing and operating international military coalitions; U.S. military bases in strategically important locations; and economic stability in the world's largest trade and investment marketplace.
On the other hand, NATO's critics argue that European reliance on U.S. security guarantees have fostered an imbalanced and unsustainable "burdensharing" arrangement by which the United States carries an unfair share of the responsibility for ensuring European security. Critics cite the following costs to the United States of its leadership of NATO:
loss of autonomy; heightened risks to U.S. forces; continued European military dependence on the United States; provoking Russia; and a negative budgetary impact.
The anniversary meeting comes at a tense time for NATO, as the allies have struggled to present a unified response to vocal criticism from U.S. President Donald Trump. President Trump has admonished European allies for failing to meet agreed NATO defense spending targets and has repeatedly questioned NATO's value to the United States. Although he is not the first U.S. president to press the allies to increase defense spending, none has done so as stridently and none has called into question the U.S. commitment to NATO as openly or to the same extent as Trump. The President's criticisms have provoked mixed reactions in the United States, with NATO supporters, including many Members of Congress, reaffirming the U.S. commitment to NATO, and others reevaluating the costs and benefits of long-standing U.S. leadership of the alliance.
Trump Administration officials stress that they remain committed to NATO and to upholding European security. They underscore that Congress has supported the Administration's requests to increase funding for U.S. defense activities in Europe such as the European Deterrence Initiative. President Trump's supporters also argue that his forceful statements have succeeded in securing defense spending increases by European allies that were not forthcoming under his predecessors.
While many Members of Congress have criticized specific developments within NATO—regarding burdensharing, for example—Congress as a whole has demonstrated consistent bipartisan support for NATO. During the Trump Administration, congressional support has at times been viewed as an effort to reassure allies troubled by President Trump's criticisms of the alliance. During the Trump Administration, both chambers of Congress have passed legislation expressly reaffirming U.S. support (H.Res. 397; H.R. 5515/P.L. 115-232; H.Res. 256), including legislation passed by the House in January 2019 (H.R. 676) seeking to limit the president's ability to withdraw from NATO unilaterally (similar legislation, S.J.Res. 4, has been introduced in the Senate). Some analysts portrayed the bipartisan House-Senate invitation to Secretary General Stoltenberg to address a joint session as an additional demonstration of NATO's importance to the Congress.


Question:
Congressional interest in Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) funding has continued as Members debate ways of funding priorities without breaching discretionary spending limits set in law.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress has appropriated approximately $2 trillion in discretionary budget authority designated as emergency requirements or for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism (OCO/GWOT) in support of the broad U.S. government response to the 9/11 attacks and for other related international affairs activities. This figure amounts to approximately 9.4% of total discretionary spending during this period.
Congress has used supplemental appropriation acts or designated funding for emergency requirements or OCO/GWOT—or both—in statute. These funds are not subject to limits on discretionary spending in congressional budget resolutions or to the statutory discretionary spending limits established by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-125). The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA; P.L. 99-177) allows emergency funding to be excluded from budget control limits. The BCA added the OCO/GWOT designation to the BBEDCA exemption, thereby providing Congress and the President with an alternate way to exclude funding from the BCA spending limits.
While there is no overall statutory limit on the amount of emergency or OCO/GWOT spending, both Congress and the President have fundamental roles in determining how much of the spending to provide each fiscal year. Congress must designate any such funding in statute on an account-by-account basis. The President is also required to designate it as such after it is appropriated to be available for expenditure. Debate over what should constitute OCO/GWOT or emergency activities and expenses has shifted over time, reflecting differing viewpoints about the extent, nature, and duration of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. Funding designated for OCO/GWOT has also been used to fund base-budget requirements of the DOD and State Department and to prevent or respond to crises abroad, including armed conflict, as well as human-caused and natural disasters.
Some defense officials and policymakers argue OCO funding allows for flexible response to contingencies, and provides a "safety valve" to the spending caps and threat of sequestration—the automatic cancellation of budget authority largely through across-the-board reductions of nonexempt programs and activities—under the BCA. Critics, however, have described OCO/GWOT as a loophole or "gimmick"—morphing from an account for replacing combat losses of equipment, resupplying expended munitions, and transporting troops through war zones, to a "slush fund" for activities unrelated to contingency operations.
Congress appropriated approximately $103 billion for OCO in FY2017 (8.5% of all discretionary appropriations), $78 billion for OCO in FY2018 (5.5% of all discretionary appropriations), and $68.8 billion for OCO so far in FY2019. Discretionary appropriations for FY2019 are not yet final; a continuing resolution expired December 21, 2018.
Following passage of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), which raised discretionary budget caps for defense and foreign affairs agencies in FY2018 and FY2019, the Administration proposed shifting some OCO funding into the base, or regular, budget. Although Congress has generally not followed Administration requests for reduced funding for foreign affairs and domestic activities and has increased funding for defense, the President has asked cabinet secretaries to propose spending cuts of 5% in FY2020. Such proposals, if requested in a budget submission, may create difficult choices for Congress in FY2020 and FY2021—the final two years of the BCA discretionary spending limits. Congress's decisions on OCO/GWOT designations will affect how much agency funding is available for military operations and foreign affairs activities overseas, how much is subject to the BCA caps, and how much is incorporated into regular budgets and long-term budget projections.


Question:
The Navy began procuring John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers in FY2016, and a total of four have been procured through FY2019, including two in FY2019. The first six ships are being procured under a block buy contract that was authorized by Section 127 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1356/P.L. 114-92 of November 25, 2015). The Navy wants to procure a total of 20 TAO-205s.
The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests the procurement of the fifth and sixth ships in the program. The Navy estimates the combined procurement cost of the two ships at $1,056.3 million, or an average of $528.1 million each. The two ships have received $75.0 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding, and the Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests the remaining $981.2 million in procurement funding needed to complete the two ships' estimated combined procurement cost. The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget also requests $73.0 million in AP funding for TAO-205s to be procured in future fiscal years, and $3.7 million in cost-to-complete procurement funding to cover cost growth on TAO-205s procured in prior fiscal years, bringing the total FY2020 procurement funding request for the TAO-205 program (aside from outfitting and post-delivery costs) to $1,057.9 million.
Issues for Congress include the following:
whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 procurement funding request for the TAO-205 program; the number of oilers the Navy will require in coming years to support its operations; and whether to encourage or direct the Navy to build TAO-205s with more ship self-defense equipment than currently planned by the Navy.


Question:
The Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program, administered by the Department of Transportation's Build America Bureau, provides long-term, low-interest loans and other types of credit assistance for the construction of surface transportation projects (23 U.S.C. §601 et seq.). The TIFIA program was reauthorized from FY2016 through FY2020 in the Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act (P.L. 114-94). Direct funding for the TIFIA program is authorized at $300 million for each of FY2019 and FY2020. Additionally, state departments of transportation can use other federal-aid highway grant money, both formula and discretionary, to subsidize much larger loans. To date, states have not had to use other grant funding to subsidize credit assistance because the TIFIA program has a relatively large unexpended funding balance.
The primary goal of the TIFIA program, historically, has been to enable the construction of large-scale surface transportation projects by providing financing to complement state, local, and private investment. The TIFIA program has been one of the main ways in which the federal government has encouraged the development of public-private partnerships (P3s) and private financing in surface transportation often backed by new, but sometimes uncertain, revenue sources such as highway tolls, other types of user charges, and incremental real estate taxes. To be eligible for TIFIA assistance, a project sponsor must be deemed creditworthy, that is, a good risk for repaying its debts, and must have a dedicated source of revenue for repayment. Project sponsors, therefore, are required to develop a funding mechanism, whether this is a new user fee or tax or the repurposing of existing fees and taxes. Changes to the TIFIA program have sought to make TIFIA assistance more accessible to less costly projects, but so far every TIFIA-supported project has cost $175 million or more.
Financing projects instead of relying on pay-as-you go funding from taxes and other existing revenues can mean such projects can be constructed years earlier. TIFIA, therefore, is a means to accelerate project delivery and the benefits that flow from new infrastructure. The TIFIA program is also a relatively low-cost way for the federal government to support surface transportation projects because it relies on loans, not grants, and the TIFIA assistance is typically one-third or less of project costs. Another advantage from the federal point of view is that a relatively small amount of budget authority can be leveraged into a large amount of loan capacity. Because the government expects its loans to be repaid, an appropriation need only cover administrative costs and the subsidy cost of credit assistance. Program funding of $300 million can support approximately $4 billion in TIFIA loans.
Since its enactment in 1998, the TIFIA program has provided assistance of $32 billion to 74 projects with a total cost of about $117 billion (in FY2018 inflation-adjusted dollars). All but one TIFIA credit agreement has been a loan; the exception is a loan guarantee. The average TIFIA-supported project cost is $1.5 billion, and the average TIFIA loan is $430 million (both in FY2018 dollars). About two-thirds of TIFIA loans have gone to highway and highway bridge projects, and another quarter to public transportation. TIFIA has supported at least one project in 21 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, but the top 10 states account for about 80% of the 74 projects supported.
The TIFIA program is likely to be considered in the 116th Congress during the reauthorization of the surface transportation programs. Program funding is one issue that may be discussed, because some stakeholders would like more budget authority despite a relatively large unexpended balance and the existing authority of states to use grant funding to pay the subsidy cost of credit assistance. Criticisms of the program and its implementation include the often slow decisionmaking process, the program's increasing risk aversion, and the limitation of the federal share of project costs to 33%, despite a statutory limit of 49%. Because of the relatively large unexpended balance, Congress might considered broadening the use of TIFIA assistance to nonsurface transportation and nontransportation infrastructure. Another option might be to create a national infrastructure bank, a federal infrastructure financing entity largely independent of other executive branch agencies, to take the place of TIFIA and other federal infrastructure credit assistance programs.


Question:
The Second Amendment states that "[a] well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed." Before the Supreme Court's 2008 opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Second Amendment had received little Supreme Court attention and had been largely interpreted, at least by the lower federal courts, to be intertwined with military or militia use. Still, there had been ample debate in the lower federal courts and political discussion over whether the Second Amendment provides an individual right to keep and bear arms, versus a collective right belonging to the states to maintain militias. Pre-Heller, the vast majority of lower federal courts had embraced the collective right theory.
In Heller, though, the Supreme Court adopted the individual right theory, holding that the Second Amendment protects an individual right for law-abiding citizens to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes including, most notably, self-defense in the home. Two years later in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court held that the Second Amendment applies to the states via selective incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment.
After Heller and McDonald, numerous challenges were brought on Second Amendment grounds to various federal, state, and local firearm laws and regulations. Because Heller neither purported to define the full scope of the Second Amendment, nor suggested a standard of review for evaluating Second Amendment claims, the lower federal courts have been tasked with doing so in the Second Amendment challenges brought before them. These challenges include allegations that provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968, as amended, as well as various state and local firearm laws (e.g., "assault weapon" bans, concealed carry regulations, firearm licensing schemes) are unconstitutional. The analyses in these cases may provide useful guideposts for Congress should it seek to enact further firearm regulations.
Generally, the courts have adopted a two-step framework for evaluating Second Amendment challenges. First, courts ask whether the regulated person, firearm, or place comes within the scope of the Second Amendment's protections. If not, the law does not implicate the Second Amendment. But if so, the court next employs the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny—rational basis, intermediate, or strict scrutiny—to assess whether the law passes constitutional muster. In deciding what level of scrutiny is warranted, courts generally ask whether the challenged law burdens core Second Amendment conduct, like the ability to use a firearm for self-defense in the home. If a law substantially burdens core Second Amendment activity, courts typically will apply strict scrutiny. Otherwise, courts generally will apply intermediate scrutiny. Most challenged laws have been reviewed for intermediate scrutiny, where a court asks whether a law is substantially related to an important governmental interest. And typically, the viability of a firearm restriction will depend on what evidence the government puts forth to justify the law. Yet sometimes courts take a different or modified approach from that described above and ask whether a challenged regulation falls within a category deemed "presumptively lawful" by Heller. If the law falls within such a category, a court does not need to apply a particular level of scrutiny in reviewing the restriction because the law does not facially violate the Second Amendment.
In early 2019, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of New York. The Court is set to review a portion of New York City's firearm licensing scheme that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld as valid. In doing so, the Court may clarify the scope of the right protected in the Second Amendment. Importantly, to make this substantive ruling, the Court likely will have to answer a question that it has eluded since Heller: Under what framework should Second Amendment challenges be evaluated?


Question:
On January 3, 2019, the House adopted Title I of H.Res. 6 , the standing rules for the House of Representatives for the 116 th Congress. In addition to the standing rules, H.Res. 6 included a separate order related to the consideration of appropriations bills. This report provides information on changes to both the standing rules and separate orders that might affect the consideration of budgetary legislation in the House of Representatives. These include the following:
Deleting language in Rule X added in the 115 th Congress providing for committees to include a review of authorizations for programs or agencies within their jurisdiction in their oversight plans. Deleting language in Rule XIII, previously adopted in the 114 th and 115 th Congresses, requiring that any budgetary estimates provided by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) include, to the extent practicable, a macroeconomic impact analysis (often referred to as "dynamic scoring") as well as a requirement that any estimate provided to CBO by the Joint Committee on Taxation also include a macroeconomic impact analysis. Deleting language added to Rule XXI in the 104 th Congress requiring the vote of a three-fifths majority to approve a federal income tax rate increase as well as a requirement in Rule XX to automatically order the yeas and nays for a vote of the House on such measures. Establishing new language as Rule XXVIII providing for certain measures concerning the debt limit to automatically be engrossed and deemed to have been passed by the House. This measure would suspend the debt limit through the end of the budget year in the concurrent resolution on the budget (but not through the period covered by any outyears beyond the budget year). The engrossed measure would then be transmitted to the Senate for further action. This rule is similar to language that was previously part of House rules from the 96 th -107 th Congresses (known as the "Gephardt Rule"). Reestablishing a PAYGO requirement in the House, which had previously been in effect during the 110 th and 111 th Congresses. This PAYGO rule (Rule XXI, clause 10) replaces the CUTGO rule that was a part of Rule XXI between the 112 th and 115 th Congresses. The new rule prohibits the consideration of direct spending or revenue legislation that is projected to increase or cause a deficit in either of two time periods: (1) the period consisting of the current fiscal year, the budget year, and the four ensuing fiscal years following the budget year or (2) the 11-year period consisting of the current year, the budget year, and the ensuing nine fiscal years following the budget year. The rule applies to any bill, joint resolution, amendment, motion, or conference report that affects direct spending or revenues.
H.Res. 6 also included a separate order establishing a limit on advance appropriations, defined as applying to funding provided in FY2019 appropriations acts that are to become available in any fiscal year following FY2019.
In addition, several separate orders from previous congresses are not included in H.Res. 6 for the 116 th Congress. These include
language prohibiting House consideration of measures estimated by CBO as causing a net increase in spending in excess of $5 billion in any of the four 10-year periods beginning with the fiscal year 10 years after the current fiscal year, two points of order that previously supplemented the point of order in Section 302(f) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 as a means for enforcing 302(b) suballocations, language requiring that appropriations bills include a spending reduction account, and language allowing certain legislative amendments in appropriations bills (known as the "Holman Rule").


Question:
Congress has maintained significant interest in Mexico, an ally and top trade partner. In recent decades, U.S.-Mexican relations have grown closer through cooperative management of the 2,000-mile border, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and security and rule of law cooperation under the Mérida Initiative. Relations have been tested, however, by President Donald J. Trump's shifts in U.S. immigration and trade policies.
On December 1, 2018, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the leftist populist leader of the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) party, which he created in 2014, took office for a six-year term after winning 53% of votes in the July 1, 2018, presidential election. Elected on an anticorruption platform, López Obrador is the first Mexican president in over two decades to enjoy majorities in both chambers of Congress. López Obrador succeeded Enrique Peña Nieto of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). From 2013-2014, Peña Nieto shepherded reforms through the Mexican Congress, including one that opened Mexico's energy sector to foreign investment. He struggled, however, to address human rights abuses, insecurity, and corruption.
President López Obrador has pledged to make Mexico a more just and peaceful society, but also to govern with austerity. Given fiscal constraints and rising insecurity, observers question whether his goals are attainable. López Obrador aims to build infrastructure in southern Mexico, revive the state oil company, promote social programs, and maintain a noninterventionist position in foreign affairs, including the crisis in Venezuela. His power is constrained, however, by MORENA's lack of a two-thirds majority in Congress, which he would need to enact constitutional reforms or to roll back reforms. Non-MORENA governors have also opposed some of his policies. Still, as of April 2019, López Obrador had an approval rating of78%.
U.S. Policy
Despite predictions to the contrary, U.S.-Mexico relations under the López Obrador government have thus far remained friendly. Nevertheless, tensions have emerged over several key issues, including trade disputes and tariffs, immigration and border security issues, and Mexico's decision to remain neutral in the crisis in Venezuela. The new government has accommodated U.S. migration and border security policies, despite the domestic criticism it has received for agreeing to allow Central American asylum seekers to await U.S. immigration proceedings in Mexico and for rapidly increasing deportations. The Trump Administration requested $76.3 million for the Mérida Initiative for FY2020 (a 35% decline from the FY2018-enacted level).
In November 2018, Mexico, the United States, and Canada signed a proposed U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) free trade agreement that, if approved by Congress and ratified by Mexico and Canada, would replace NAFTA. Mexico has applied retaliatory tariffs in response to U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum imports imposed in 2018.
Legislative Action
The 116th Congress may consider approval of the USMCA. Congressional concerns regarding the USMCA include possible effect on the U.S. economy, working conditions in Mexico and the protection of worker rights, enforceability of USMCA labor provisions, U.S.-Mexican economic relations, and other issues. It is not known whether or when Congress will consider implementing legislation for USMCA. In January 2019, Congress provided $145 million for the Mérida Initiative ($68 million above the budget request) in the FY2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-6) and asked for reports on how bilateral efforts are combating flows of opioids, methamphetamine, and cocaine. The House also passed H.R. 133 (Cuellar), a bill that would promote economic partnership between the United States and Mexico, as well as educational and professional exchanges. A related bill, S. 587 (Cornyn), has been introduced in the Senate.
Further Reading
CRS In Focus IF10578, Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, 2007-2019.
CRS In Focus IF10400, Transnational Crime Issues: Heroin Production, Fentanyl Trafficking, and U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation.
CRS In Focus IF10215, Mexico's Immigration Control Efforts.
CRS Report R45489, Recent Migration to the United States from Central America: Frequently Asked Questions.
CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications.
CRS Report R44981, NAFTA Renegotiation and the Proposed United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)
CRS Report R45430, Sharing the Colorado River and the Rio Grande: Cooperation and Conflict with Mexico


Question:
The federal government, through the Department of Energy, operates four regional power marketing administrations (PMAs), created by statute: the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), the Southeastern Power Administration (SEPA), the Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA), and the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). Each PMA operates in a distinct geographic area. Congressional interest in the PMAs has included diverse issues such as rate setting, cost and compliance associated with the Endangered Species Act (ESA; P.L. 93-205; 16 U.S.C. §§1531 et seq.), and questions of privatization of these federal agencies.
In general, the PMAs came into being because of the government's need to dispose of electric power produced by dams constructed largely for irrigation, flood control, or other purposes, and to achieve small community and farm electrification—that is, providing service to customers whom it would not have been profitable for a private utility to serve. With minor exceptions, these agencies market the electric power produced by federal dams constructed, owned, and operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR). By statute, PMAs must give preference to public utility districts and cooperatives (e.g., "preference customers"), and sell their power at cost-based rates set at the lowest possible rate consistent with sound business principles. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regulates PMA rates to ensure that they are set high enough to repay the U.S. Treasury for the portion of federal facility costs allocated to hydropower beneficiaries.
With energy and capacity markets changing in the western United States (especially with the growing need to integrate increasing amounts of variable renewable sources), and the development of the Energy Imbalance Market in the West, BPA and WAPA may have to adapt their plans with regard to generation needs and how transmission systems are developed.
In 2018, the Trump Administration proposed to sell the transmission assets (lines, towers, substations, and/or rights of way) owned and operated by the federal Power Marketing Administrations. The proposal suggested that "eliminating or reducing" the federal government's role in owning and operating transmission assets, and increasing the private sector's role, would "encourage a more efficient allocation of economic resources and mitigate unnecessary risk to taxpayers." The resulting PMA entities would then contract with other utilities to provide transmission services for the delivery of federal power, similar to what SEPA does currently. Reportedly, the proposed sale of PMA assets was dropped after opposition to the plan emerged from stakeholders. Under Section 208 of the Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1986 (P.L. 99-349), the executive branch is prohibited from spending funds to study or draft proposals to transfer from federal control any portion of the assets of the PMAs unless specifically authorized by Congress.
Environmental, fishing, and tribal advocates have sued the federal government over concerns that operating rules for hydropower dams on the Columbia and Snake Rivers (i.e., the National Marine Fisheries Service Biological Opinion) are inadequate to ensure survival of species threatened or endangered under the ESA. In 2016, a federal judge overturned a previous management plan for the dams, finding that it would not be sufficient to protect salmon runs, and ordered a new management plan that could include removing the dams. However, in 2018, President Trump issued a Presidential Memorandum accelerating the process for a new management plan, requiring the biological opinion to be ready by 2020.
Since FY2011, power revenues associated with the PMAs have been classified as discretionary offsetting receipts (i.e., receipts that are available for spending by the PMAs), thus the agencies are sometimes noted as having a "net-zero" spending authority. Only the capital expenses of WAPA and SWPA require appropriations from Congress.


Question:
The federal government has been involved in providing housing assistance to lower-income households since the 1930s. In the beginning, the federal government played a role in supporting the mortgage market (through establishment of the Federal Housing Administration [FHA] and the government-sponsored enterprises) and in promoting construction of low-rent public housing for lower-income families through local public housing authorities (PHAs). Over time, the federal government has shifted away from providing construction-based subsidies toward providing rental subsidies, and private developers and property owners have been playing a larger role.
Today's federal housing assistance programs fall into three main categories: rental housing assistance, assistance to state and local governments, and assistance for homeowners. Most of these programs are administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Current housing assistance programs include Section 8 vouchers and project-based rental assistance, public housing, housing for the elderly (Section 202), housing for persons with disabilities (Section 811), rural rental assistance (the United States Department of Agriculture's Section 521 program), Community Development Block Grants (CDBG), HOME Investment Partnerships Block Grants, Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC), homeless assistance programs, Federal Housing Authority (FHA) and Department of Veterans Affairs mortgage insurance, and the mortgage interest deduction in the tax code.
Most federal housing assistance programs are aimed at making housing affordable for low-income families. Affordability—defined as housing that costs no more than 30% of a family's income—is considered to be the largest housing problem today. Rental assistance programs, which are the largest source of direct housing assistance for low-income families, all allow families to pay affordable, income-based rents; however, different forms of assistance target different types of households, including the elderly, persons with disabilities, and families with children. Several trends in federal housing policy have emerged in recent decades. As the focus of federal housing assistance has shifted away from construction-based subsidies to rental assistance, block grants, and LIHTC, state and local governments have had greater access to federal resources to fund local housing and community development priorities. This shift in federal funding has also led affordable housing developers to pursue mixed financing: the use of multiple streams of federal, state, and local funding, or private financing. In the past, lagging homeownership rates among low-income and minority households have prompted several Presidents to promote homeownership-based housing policies. However, given the severe downturn in U.S. housing markets that began in 2007 and the resulting high foreclosure rate, it is unclear to what degree federal policy will continue to focus on increasing access to homeownership.


Question:
The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) is a federal workers' compensation program that covers certain private-sector maritime workers. Firms that employ these workers are required to purchase workers' compensation or self-insure and are responsible for providing medical and disability benefits to covered workers who are injured or become ill on the job and survivors benefits to the families of covered workers who die on the job. The LHWCA is administered by the Department of Labor (DOL), and all benefit costs are paid by employers and their insurance carriers. In 2016, more than $1.4 billion in LHWCA benefits were paid to beneficiaries.
Congress has extended the LHWCA provisions to cover workers outside of the maritime industry, such as overseas government contractors and civilian employees of military post exchanges. As part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), persons who repair recreational vessels of any size were added to the LHWCA exemption list. In 2011, the DOL implemented this provision; since then, those regulations have proven controversial and numerous bills have been introduced to modify the regulatory definition to increase the number of workers exempted from the LHWCA.
The LHWCA pays for all medical care associated with a covered injury or illness. Disability benefits are based on a worker's pre-injury wage, and, unlike comparable state workers' compensation benefits, are adjusted annually to reflect national wage growth.


Question:
The U.S. Fourth National Climate Assessment, released in 2018, concluded that "the impacts of global climate change are already being felt in the United States and are projected to intensify in the future—but the severity of future impacts will depend largely on actions taken to reduce greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions and to adapt to the changes that will occur." Members of Congress and stakeholders articulate a wide range of perspectives over what to do, if anything, about GHG emissions, future climate change, and related impacts. If Congress were to consider establishing a program to reduce GHG emissions, one option would be to attach a price to GHG emissions with a carbon tax or GHG emissions fee. In the 115th Congress, Members introduced nine bills to establish a carbon tax or emissions fee program. However, many Members have expressed their opposition to such an approach. In particular, in the 115th Congress, the House passed a resolution "expressing the sense of Congress that a carbon tax would be detrimental to the United States economy."
Multiple economic studies have estimated the emission reductions that particular carbon tax would achieve. For example, a 2018 study analyzed various impacts of four carbon tax rate scenarios: a $25/metric ton of CO2 and $50/metric ton of CO2 carbon tax, increasing annually by 1% and 5%. The study concluded that each of the scenarios would likely achieve the U.S. GHG emission reduction target pledged under the international Paris Agreement (at least in terms of CO2 emissions).
A carbon tax system would generate a new revenue stream, the magnitude of which would depend on the scope and rate of the tax, among other factors. In 2018, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that a $25/metric ton carbon tax would yield approximately $100 billion in its first year. CBO projected that federal revenue would total $3.5 trillion in FY2019.
Policymakers would face challenging decisions regarding the distribution of the new carbon tax revenues. Congress could apply revenues to support a range of policy objectives but would encounter trade-offs among the objectives. The central trade-offs involve minimizing economy-wide costs, lessening the costs borne by specific groups—particularly low-income households and displaced workers in certain industries (e.g., coal mining)—and supporting other policy objectives.
A primary argument against a carbon tax regards it potential economy-wide impacts, often measured as impacts to the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). Some may argue that projected impacts should be compared with the climate benefits achieved from the program as well as the estimated costs of taking no action. The potential impacts would depend on a number of factors, including the program's magnitude and design and, most importantly, the use of carbon tax revenues.
In general, economic literature finds that some of the revenue applications would reduce the economy-wide costs from a carbon tax but may not eliminate them entirely. In addition, some studies cite particular economic modeling scenarios in which certain carbon tax revenue applications produce a net increase in GDP compared to a baseline scenario. These scenarios involve using carbon tax revenues to offset reductions in other tax rates (e.g., corporate income or payroll taxes). Although economic models generally indicate that these particular revenue applications would yield the greatest benefit to the economy overall, the models also find that lower-income households would likely face a disproportionate impact under such an approach. As lower-income households spend a greater proportion of their income on energy needs (electricity, gasoline), these households are expected to experience disproportionate impacts from a carbon tax if revenues were not recycled back to them in some fashion (e.g., lump-sum distribution).
A price on GHG emissions could create a competitive disadvantage for some industries, particularly "emission-intensive, trade-exposed industries." Policymakers have several options to address this concern, including establishing a "border carbon adjustment" program, which would levy a fee on imports from countries without comparable GHG reduction programs. Alternatively, policymakers could allocate (indefinitely or for a period of time) some of the carbon tax revenues to selected industry sectors or businesses. Relatedly, a carbon tax system is projected to disproportionately impact fossil fuel industries, particularly coal, and the communities that rely on their employment. To alleviate these impacts, policymakers may consider using some of the revenue to provide transition assistance to employees or affected communities.


Question:
The U.S. energy pipeline network is composed of approximately 3 million miles of pipeline transporting natural gas, oil, and other hazardous liquids. Recent incidents in California, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and other states have drawn criticism from stakeholders and have raised concerns in Congress about pipeline safety. The Department of Energy's (DOE's) 2015 Quadrennial Energy Review also highlighted pipeline safety as an issue for the nation's energy infrastructure. Recent incident statistics suggest there is opportunity for safety improvement.
The federal pipeline safety program is administered by the Department of Transportation's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), which relies heavily on state partnerships for inspection and enforcement of its regulations. PHMSA's pipeline safety program is authorized through FY2019. For FY2019, PHMSA's estimated budget authority is approximately $164 million—more than double the agency's budget authority in FY2008 (not adjusted for inflation). Much of PHMSA's funding is for inspectors. However, due to private sector competition, the agency faces persistent challenges recruiting and retaining the staff for which it is funded. The Trump Administration's requested budget authority for PHMSA is approximately $151 million for FY2020, roughly 8% less than the FY2019 amount. The request would only slightly reduce PHMSA staffing but proposes cuts in state grants that could impact staffing at state pipeline safety agencies. In the wake of major incidents involving facilities under state jurisdiction, some state programs have come under scrutiny regarding their effectiveness and oversight by PHMSA.
Congress has used past reauthorizations to impose various mandates on PHMSA regarding standards, studies, and other elements of pipeline safety regulation. The Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-90) and the PIPES Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-183) together included 61 such mandates. As of March 5, 2019, according to PHMSA, the agency had completed 34 of 42 mandates under P.L. 112-90 and 16 of 19 mandates under P.L. 114-183. PHMSA also has not satisfied a number of safety recommendations from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). Some in Congress are concerned that major mandates and NTSB recommendations remain unfulfilled.
The NTSB highlighted aging pipelines as a particular concern in its 2019-2020 Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements. Likewise, Congress has ongoing interest in the safety of older transmission pipelines and in the replacement of leaky and deteriorating cast iron pipe in natural gas distribution systems. Recent accidents involving older pipelines and related infrastructure may refocus attention on PHMSA's regulation of pipe replacement (currently voluntary), pipeline modernization projects and work packages, older pipeline records, safety management systems, and other issues related to aging pipelines.
Ongoing physical and cyber threats against the nation's pipelines since passage of the PIPES Act have heightened concerns about pipeline security risks. Although the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has the primary statutory authority over pipeline security, pipeline safety and security are intertwined—and PHMSA is involved in both. Under the terms of a 2006 agreement, PHMSA and TSA are directed to work together "to delineate clear lines of authority … in the area of transportation security." While PHMSA reports ongoing cooperation with TSA, questions remain about what this cooperation entails and the ongoing roles of the two agencies.
In addition to these specific issues, Congress may assess how the various elements of U.S. pipeline safety and security fit together in the nation's overall approach to protect the public and the environment. This approach involves federal and state agencies, pipeline associations, large and small pipeline operators, and local communities. Reviewing how these various groups work together to achieve common goals could be an overarching consideration for Congress.


Question:
The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA; Title IV of P.L. 103-322) was originally enacted in 1994. It addressed congressional concerns about violent crime, and violence against women in particular, in several ways. It allowed for enhanced sentencing of repeat federal sex offenders; mandated restitution to victims of specified federal sex offenses; and authorized grants to state, local, and tribal law enforcement entities to investigate and prosecute violent crimes against women, among other things. VAWA has been reauthorized three times since its original enactment. Most recently, Congress passed and President Obama signed the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-4), which reauthorized most VAWA programs through FY2018, among other things.
The fundamental goals of VAWA are to prevent violent crime; respond to the needs of crime victims; learn more about crime; and change public attitudes through a collaborative effort by the criminal justice system, social service agencies, research organizations, schools, public health organizations, and private organizations. The federal government tries to achieve these goals primarily through federal grant programs that provide funding to state, tribal, territorial, and local governments; nonprofit organizations; and universities.
VAWA programs generally address domestic violence, sexual assault, dating violence, and stalking—crimes for which the risk of victimization is highest for women—although some VAWA programs address additional crimes. VAWA grant programs largely address the criminal justice system and community response to these crimes, but certain programs address prevention as well.
The Office on Violence Against Women (OVW) administers the majority of VAWA-authorized programs, while other federal agencies, including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Office of Justice Programs (OJP), also manage VAWA programs. Since its creation in 1995 through FY2018, OVW has awarded more than $8 billion in grants and cooperative agreements to state, tribal, and local governments, nonprofit organizations, and universities. In FY2019, approximately $559 million was appropriated for VAWA-authorized programs administered by OVW, OJP, and CDC. While several extensions of authorization for VAWA were provided through FY2019 continuing appropriations, authorizations for appropriations for all VAWA programs have since expired. However, all VAWA programs funded in FY2018 have been funded in FY2019 (select programs at slightly higher levels), and thus far it appears that the expiration of authorizations has not impacted the continuing operation of VAWA programs. The Administration has requested FY2020 funding for all VAWA-authorized programs funded in FY2019.
There are several issues that Congress may consider in efforts to reauthorize VAWA. These include, but are not limited to, improvements to data collection on domestic violence and stalking or the rape kit backlog; assessing the implementation and future direction of tribal jurisdiction over non-tribal members, including potentially adding new crimes under VAWA; new approaches for law enforcement in assisting victims; and enforcement of the federal prohibition on firearms for those convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence and those who are subject to a domestic violence protective order. Congress may also consider further changes to VAWA programs.
In the 116th Congress, the House passed the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2019 (H.R. 1585). Among other things, it would reauthorize funding for VAWA programs and authorize new programs; amend and add definitions used for VAWA programs; amend federal criminal law relating to firearms, custodial rape, and stalking; and expand tribal jurisdiction over certain crimes committed on tribal lands.


Question:
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), enacted in 1938, is the main federal law that establishes general wage and hour standards for most, but not all, private and public sector employees. Among other protections, the FLSA establishes that covered nonexempt employees must be compensated at one-and-a-half times their regular rate of pay for each hour worked over 40 hours in a workweek.
The FLSA also establishes certain exemptions from its general labor market standards. One of the major exemptions to the overtime provisions in the FLSA is for bona fide "executive, administrative, and professional" employees (the "EAP" or "white collar" exemptions). The FLSA grants authority to the Secretary of Labor to define and delimit the EAP exemption "from time to time." To qualify for this exemption from the FLSA's overtime pay requirement, an employee must be salaried (the "salary basis" test); perform specified executive, administrative, or professional duties (the "duties" test); and earn above an established salary level threshold (the "salary level" test).
In March 2019, the Secretary of Labor published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to make changes to the EAP exemptions. The 2019 proposed rule would become effective around January 2020. The major changes in the 2019 proposed rule include increasing the standard salary level threshold from the previous level of $455 per week to $679 per week and committing the Department of Labor (DOL) to updating the EAP exemptions every four years through the rulemaking process. The 2019 proposed rule does not change the duties and responsibilities that employees must perform to be exempt. Thus, the 2019 proposed rule would affect EAP employees at salary levels between $455 and $679 per week in 2020. DOL estimates that about 4.9 million workers would be affected in the first year, including about 1.3 million EAP employees who would become newly entitled to overtime pay and an additional 3.6 million workers who would have overtime protection clarified and thereby strengthened.
This report answers frequently asked questions about the overtime provisions of the FLSA, the EAP exemptions, and the 2019 proposed rule that would define and delimit the EAP exemptions.


Question:
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a significant U.S. partner in Gulf security, helping to address multiple regional threats by hosting about 5,000 U.S. military personnel at UAE military facilities under a bilateral defense cooperation agreement (DCA). The UAE is a significant buyer of U.S. military equipment, including sophisticated missile defenses, and it reportedly wants to buy the F-35 combat aircraft. The alliance is expected to continue after UAE President Shaykh Khalifa bin Zayid Al Nuhayyan, who suffered an incapacitating stroke in January 2014, is succeeded by his younger brother and de-facto UAE leader Shaykh Muhammad bin Zayid Al Nuhayyan.
Advised and armed by the United States, the UAE military has become sufficiently capable that the country is able to, and is, asserting itself in the region, including militarily. The UAE is part of a Saudi-led military effort to pressure the Iran-backed Zaidi Shia Houthi rebels in Yemen, an effort to which the United States provides logistical support but which has produced criticism over the effects of the war on Yemen's civilians. UAE forces, alongside U.S. special operations forces, also are combatting Al Qaeda's affiliate in that country. UAE forces have built up several bases in East African countries to train allied forces and facilitate UAE operations in Yemen. The UAE is supporting an anti-Islamist commander based in eastern Libya, Khalifa Hafter, who in April 2019 launched an assault to capture Tripoli from a U.N.-backed government based there. The UAE has sought to counteract criticism by expanding its long-standing donations of assistance to regional and international organizations and economically strapped countries.
The UAE's opposition to Muslim Brotherhood-linked regional organizations as regional and domestic threats has driven UAE policy toward Egypt, Syria, the Palestinian territories, and other countries. The UAE's stance has contributed to a major rift with Qatar, another member of the Gulf Cooperation Council alliance (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman), but which supports Brotherhood-related groups as Islamists willing to work within established political processes. In June 2017, the UAE joined Saudi Arabia in isolating Qatar until it adopts policies closer to those of the three GCC states on the Brotherhood and other issues, including on Iran, where the UAE and the Trump Administration share a policy of strongly pressuring Iran economically and politically. U.S. mediation efforts have failed to resolve the intra-GCC rift, to date. The October 2018 killing by Saudi agents of a U.S.-based Saudi journalist at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul has added to criticism of UAE leaders for their close strategic alliance with Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud.
The UAE's relatively open borders and economy have won praise from advocates of expanded freedoms in the Middle East. The UAE is considered among the wealthiest countries in the world, in part because of the small population that requires services, and the wealth has helped the government maintain popular support. In 2006, the government established a limited voting process for half of the 40 seats in its quasi-legislative body, the Federal National Council (FNC). The most recent such vote was held in October 2015, and resulted in the selection of a woman as speaker of the FNC. However, the country remains under the control of a small circle of leaders. And, since the Arab Spring uprisings, the government has become more wary of the potential for regional conflicts to affect domestic stability and has suppressed domestic opponents. The country sought to showcase its continued commitment to pluralism by hosting a visit by Pope Francis in February 2019.
In part to cope with the effects of reduced prices for crude oil during 2014-2018, the government has created new ministries tasked with formulating economic and social strategies that, among other objectives, can attract the support of the country's youth. Any U.S. assistance to the UAE has been very small in dollar amounts and intended mainly to qualify the UAE for inclusion in training and other programs that benefit UAE security.


Question:
The United States Fire Administration (USFA)—which includes the National Fire Academy (NFA)—is currently housed within the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The objective of the USFA is to significantly reduce the nation's loss of life from fire, while also achieving a reduction in property loss and nonfatal injury due to fire.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6) provided $45.679 million for USFA, including $1.5 million in the FEMA Procurement, Construction, and Improvements account for the National Emergency Training Center. For FY2020, the Administration requested $46.605 million, which includes $1.5 million transferred from the Procurement, Construction, and Improvements account for NETC campus renovations. The budget proposal would be a $1 million increase over the FY2019 level; the increase would fund further improvements to NETC facilities. The budget proposal does not include funding for State Fire Training Assistance.
On January 3, 2018, the President signed the United States Fire Administration, AFG, and SAFER Program Reauthorization Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-98). P.L. 115-98 extends the USFA authorization through FY2023. The authorization levels are the same as in the previous authorization: $76,490,890 each year for FY2017 through FY2023.
Meanwhile, concerns over the federal budget deficit could impact future funding levels for the USFA. Debate over the USFA budget has focused on whether the USFA is receiving an appropriate level of funding to accomplish its mission, given that appropriations for USFA have consistently been well below the agency's authorized level. Additionally, an ongoing issue is the viability and status of the USFA and the National Fire Academy within the Department of Homeland Security.


Question:
The 116th Congress faces policy issues related to the Trump Administration's renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the proposed United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). On May 18, 2017, the Trump Administration sent a 90-day notification to Congress of its intent to begin talks with Canada and Mexico to renegotiate and modernize NAFTA, as required by the 2015 Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). Talks officially began on August 16, 2017. Negotiations were concluded on September 30, 2018. The proposed USMCA was signed on November 30, 2018. The agreement must be approved by Congress and ratified by the governments of Mexico and Canada before it can enter into force.
The first NAFTA negotiations were launched in 1992 under President George H.W. Bush and continued under President William J. Clinton, who signed the implementing legislation on December 8, 1991 (P.L. 103-182). NAFTA entered into force on January 1, 1994. It is particularly significant because it was the most comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) negotiated at the time, contained several groundbreaking provisions, and was the first of a new generation of U.S. FTAs later negotiated. Congress played a major role during its consideration and, after contentious and comprehensive debate, ultimately approved legislation to implement the agreement.
NAFTA established trade liberalization commitments and set new rules and disciplines for future FTAs on issues important to the United States, including intellectual property rights protection, services trade, dispute settlement procedures, investment, labor, and environment. NAFTA's market-opening provisions gradually eliminated nearly all tariff and most nontariff barriers on merchandise trade. At the time of NAFTA negotiations, average applied U.S. duties on imports from Mexico were 2.07%, while U.S. businesses faced average tariffs of 10%, in addition to nontariff and investment barriers, in Mexico. The U.S.-Canada FTA had been in effect since 1989.
The proposed USMCA, comprising 34 chapters and 12 side letters, retains most of NAFTA's market opening measures and most of its chapters, while making notable changes to auto rules of origin, dispute settlement provisions, government procurement, investment, and intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. It also modernizes provisions in services, labor, and the environment. New trade issues, such as digital trade, state-owned enterprises, anticorruption, and currency misalignment, are also addressed. Key issues for Congress in regard to the proposed USMCA include the constitutional authority of Congress over international trade, its role in revising, approving, or withdrawing from the agreement, U.S. negotiating objectives and the extent to which the proposed agreement makes progress in meeting them as required under TPA. Congress may also consider the agreement's impact on U.S. industries, the U.S. economy, and broader U.S. trade relations with Canada and Mexico.
The timing for congressional consideration of the proposed USMCA is unclear in part because of the TPA timeline and also because of issues of interest and concern voiced by Congress, including the level of enforceable labor provisions, auto rules of origin, and investor-state dispute settlement. Some policymakers have stated that the path forward to passage of the USMCA by Congress is uncertain partially because the three countries have yet to resolve disputes over U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs imposed by the Trump Administration. The United States, Canada, and Mexico are currently in a trade dispute over U.S. actions under Section 232 of the Trade Act of 1962 to impose tariffs on such imports due to national security concerns. In response to the U.S. action, Mexico and Canada initiated World Trade Organization dispute settlement proceedings and retaliated against certain U.S. exports. The conclusion of the proposed USMCA did not resolve the Section 232 tariff dispute. The U.S. business community, industry groups, and some congressional leaders have publicly stated that the tariff issue must be resolved before the USMCA could enter into force.


Question:
The U.S. Constitution provides each House of Congress with the sole authority to establish rules and punish and expel Members. From 1789 to 1964, the Senate dealt individually with cases of disciplinary action against Members, often forming ad hoc committees to investigate and make recommendations when acts of wrongdoing were brought to the chamber's attention. Events of the 1960s, including the investigation of Secretary to the Majority Robert G. "Bobby" Baker, for alleged corruption and influence peddling, prompted the creation of a permanent ethics committee and the writing of a Code of Conduct for Members, officers, and staff of the Senate.
The Senate Select Committee on Ethics was first established in 1964. This bipartisan, six-member committee investigates alleged violations of the rules of the Senate and recommends disciplinary actions. In the 95th Congress (1977-1978), the Senate expanded the committee's jurisdiction and altered its procedures to implement revisions to the Senate Code of Official Conduct. Also, to reflect these changes the committee was renamed the Select Committee on Ethics.
This report briefly outlines the background of ethics enforcement in the Senate, including the creation of the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct and the subsequent renaming of the committee as the Select Committee on Ethics. The report also provides a brief overview of the Senate Code of Conduct and on the Select Committee's current jurisdiction and procedures.
For additional information on ethics in the Senate, please see CRS Report RL30764, Enforcement of Congressional Rules of Conduct: A Historical Overview, by Jacob R. Straus.


Question:
Congress has long deliberated on the condition of drinking water infrastructure and drinking water quality as well as the financial and technical challenges some public water systems face in ensuring the delivery of safe and adequate water supplies. Several events and circumstances—including source water contamination incidents; water infrastructure damage from natural disasters, such as hurricanes; detection of elevated lead levels in tap water in various cities and schools; and the nationwide need to repair or replace aging drinking water infrastructure—have increased national attention to these issues. America's Water Infrastructure Act of 2018 (AWIA; P.L. 115-270), enacted on October 23, 2018, contains provisions that seek to address these and other water infrastructure concerns.
Overall, AWIA authorizes various water infrastructure projects and activities for several federal agencies. Title I of AWIA, "Water Resources Development Act of 2018," authorizes water resource development activities for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). Title II of AWIA constitutes the most comprehensive amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) since 1996. Title III primarily includes provisions that address hydropower-related activities of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Among its provisions, Title IV amends U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)-administered water infrastructure programs and several Clean Water Act authorities.
This report focuses on the drinking water provisions of Title II and Title IV of AWIA, which authorize appropriations for several drinking water and wastewater infrastructure programs for projects that promote compliance, address aging drinking water infrastructure and lead in school drinking water, and increase drinking water infrastructure resilience to natural hazards.
Title II amends SDWA to help communities achieve SDWA compliance, revise the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund (DWSRF) program, reauthorize appropriations for the DWSRF program, and increase emphasis on assisting disadvantaged communities. Provisions in Title II also revise emergency notification and planning requirements; authorize the use of DWSRF funds for the assessment and protection of drinking water sources; identify options intended to develop public water systems' technical, managerial, and financial capacity; and improve consumer confidence in public drinking water supplies. Title II authorizes a supplemental DWSRF appropriation for disaster assistance for public water systems in certain areas under certain conditions. Other provisions authorize new grant programs to reduce lead contamination in school drinking water, improve drinking water infrastructure for specified Indian tribes, respond to contamination of small and disadvantaged communities' drinking water sources, and improve the sustainability and resilience of small and disadvantaged communities' drinking water systems.
Title IV addresses several other water quality and infrastructure issues by authorizing and revising activities and programs for the EPA and other federal agencies. Title IV extends, authorizes, and amends drinking-water-related activities and programs administered by EPA. Specifically, these provisions authorize WaterSense, an EPA-initiated voluntary water efficiency labeling program, and revise the Water Instructure Finance and Innovation Act (WIFIA) financial assistance program. The WIFIA program provides credit assistance for water infrastructure projects. Other provisions authorize grant programs for innovative water technology and for water sector workforce development. Title IV also amends the Clean Water Act to expand a municipal sewer overflow grant program to include stormwater management projects, reauthorize appropriations for that program, and direct EPA to establish a task force for stormwater management.
With AWIA, the 115th Congress passed an omnibus water infrastructure and project authorization bill that affects several federal agencies. The act includes several provisions related to drinking water, with overarching themes involving drinking water infrastructure affordability and water system compliance capacity and sustainability.


Question:
Several U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010 required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavy-water reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. However, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On the JCPOA's Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous resolutions' requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, compose the current legal framework governing Iran's nuclear program. Iran has complied with the JCPOA and resolution.
Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program. The IAEA had essentially resolved most of these issues, but for several years the agency still had questions concerning "possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme." A December 2, 2015, report to the IAEA Board of Governors from agency Director General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA's "final assessment on the resolution" of the outstanding issues.
This report provides a brief overview of Iran's nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant.


Question:
The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB or Board) is a quasi-judicial independent agency in the executive branch charged with protecting federal employees against improper employment-related actions. The Board works to ensure, for example, that federal agencies avoid taking arbitrary action against employees, exhibiting favoritism, or engaging in reprisals against whistleblowers. The MSPB also aims to promote an effective federal workforce free of certain types of discrimination and other prohibited personnel practices. While the Board mainly carries out its mission through adjudication of federal employment-related disputes, it also performs specified oversight functions related to federal employment, including conducting special studies of the civil service and other executive branch merit systems.
Established by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, the MSPB consists of three Board members, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Not more than two Board members may be adherents of the same political party. The term of office of each Board member is seven years, and terms are nonrenewable. Board members may be removed by the President only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. The Board operates concurrently with the Office of Special Counsel, an independent, prosecutorial federal agency. The Special Counsel receives and investigates complaints related to certain kinds of federal agency misconduct and may petition the Board for corrective action.
The MSPB operates like a tribunal and maintains procedures for conducting hearings, examining evidence, and rendering decisions. Most cases the Board reviews are federal employee appeals of adverse actions, including those related to removal or suspension of employment. When the MSPB determines that a federal employee has been subject to an improper adverse action, the Board can issue orders that compel agencies to reverse these actions and, depending upon the particular agency action in question, may order relief, including reinstatement, backpay, and attorney's fees.
The Board also maintains original jurisdiction over certain types of cases in which it hears and decides the case initially rather than reviews an agency decision. For example, the MSPB may adjudicate cases brought by the Office of Special Counsel related to a prohibited personnel practice. The Special Counsel may, among other things, petition the Board for a stay of an adverse employment action in relation to this practice. Some of the Board's adjudicatory functions, including appeals of adverse action decisions, typically are carried out by "administrative judges" employed by the Board, while administrative law judges (ALJs) may examine matters coming under the Board's original jurisdiction.
Federal employees or applicants for employment who are adversely affected by a final order or decision of the MSPB may obtain judicial review. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) is generally the proper judicial forum for these cases. Federal law compels the Federal Circuit to examine these cases under a standard of review that is deferential to the MSPB's determination. Consequently, the Federal Circuit typically upholds Board decisions. But a special jurisdictional rule exists for so-called "mixed cases" involving an alleged violation of federal antidiscrimination laws in connection with an improper adverse personnel action. Following the MSPB's decision in a mixed case, affected employees may seek judicial review in federal district court rather than the Federal Circuit. District court review is generally preferable for the petitioning federal employee, as district courts typically review these discrimination-related claims under a de novo standard (i.e., affording no deference to the determination of the MSPB).
Since March 2019, the Board has lacked sitting members. Lack of a quorum prevents the Board from performing some of its review functions, including issuing final decisions in cases when an initial decision issued by an administrative judge has been appealed to the full Board. As a result, a significant case backlog has developed. President Trump has submitted nominees to the Senate to fill vacancies on the Board.


Question:
Congress is required by Article I, Section 6, of the Constitution to determine its own pay. In the past, Congress periodically enacted specific legislation to alter its pay; the last time this occurred affected pay in 1991. More recently, pay has been determined pursuant to laws establishing formulas for automatic adjustments.
The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 established the current automatic annual adjustment formula, which is based on changes in private sector wages as measured by the Employment Cost Index (ECI). The adjustment is automatic unless denied statutorily, although the percentage may not exceed the percentage base pay increase for General Schedule (GS) employees. Member pay has since been frozen in two ways: (1) directly, through legislation that freezes salaries for Members but not for other federal employees, and (2) indirectly, through broader pay freeze legislation that covers Members and other specified categories of federal employees.
Members of Congress last received a pay adjustment in January 2009. At that time, their salary was increased 2.8%, to $174,000. A provision in P.L. 111-8 prohibited any pay adjustment for 2010. Under the pay adjustment formula, Members were originally scheduled to receive an adjustment in January 2010 of 2.1%, although this would have been revised downward automatically to 1.5% to match the GS base pay adjustment. Members next were scheduled to receive a 0.9% pay adjustment in 2011. The pay adjustment was prohibited by P.L. 111-165. Additionally, P.L. 111-322 prevented any adjustment in GS base pay before December 31, 2012. Since the percentage adjustment in Member pay may not exceed the percentage adjustment in the base pay of GS employees, Member pay was also frozen during this period. If not limited by GS pay, Member pay could have been adjusted by 1.3% in 2012. The ECI formula established a maximum potential pay adjustment in January 2013 of 1.1%. P.L. 112-175 extended the freeze on GS pay rates for the duration of this continuing resolution, which also extended the Member freeze since the percentage adjustment in Member pay may not exceed the percentage adjustment in GS base pay. Subsequently, Member pay for 2013 was further frozen in P.L. 112-240. The maximum potential 2014 pay adjustment of 1.2%, or $2,100, was denied by P.L. 113-46. The maximum potential January 2015 Member pay adjustment was 1.6%, or $2,800. President Obama proposed a 1.0% increase in the base pay of GS employees, which would automatically have limited any Member pay adjustment to 1.0%. P.L. 113-235 contained a provision prohibiting any Member pay adjustment. The maximum potential January 2016 pay adjustment of 1.7%, or $3,000, would have been limited to 1.0%, or $1,700, due to the GS base pay increase. Member pay for 2016 was frozen by P.L. 114-113. The maximum potential January 2017 pay adjustment of 1.6%, or $2,800, would have been limited to 1.0%, or $1,700, due to the GS base pay increase. Member pay for 2017 was frozen by P.L. 114-254. The maximum potential January 2018 pay adjustment of 1.8%, or $3,100, was automatically limited to 1.4%, or $2,400, before being frozen by P.L. 115-141. The maximum potential January 2019 pay adjustment of 2.3%, or $4,000, was automatically limited to 1.4%, or $2,400, before being frozen at the 2009 level by P.L. 115-244. The maximum potential January 2020 pay adjustment is 2.6%, or $4,500.
If Members of Congress had received every adjustment prescribed by the ECI formula since 1992, and the 2 U.S.C. §4501 limitation regarding the percentage base pay increase for GS employees remained unchanged, the 2019 salary would be $210,900. When adjusted for inflation, Member salaries have decreased 15% since the last pay adjustment in 2009.
Both the automatic annual adjustments and funding for Members' salaries are provided pursuant to other laws (2 U.S.C. §4501)—not the annual appropriations bills—and a provision prohibiting a scheduled adjustment could be included in any bill, or introduced as a separate bill.