Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Conducting R&D on technologies is vital to enhancing the security of the nation. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, designates S&T as responsible for coordinating all R&D activities of DHS. Questions have been raised about S&T's ability to demonstrate the impact of its R&D investments. Since DHS began operations in 2003, GAO has made recommendations to help improve DHS's efforts to coordinate and oversee R&D.
GAO was asked to review DHS's R&D efforts. This report examines (1) how much DHS has obligated for R&D and what types of R&D DHS conducts, (2) to what extent S&T coordinates R&D across DHS, and (3) how, if at all, DHS identifies and tracks R&D efforts.
GAO reviewed documentation from DHS related to the conduct, coordination, tracking, and evaluation of R&D projects. GAO interviewed DHS officials with responsibilities related to, among other things, R&D financial reporting, performance evaluation, and the IPT process, including officials from the 10 DHS components that participate in the IPTs. GAO also reviewed DHS R&D budget and obligation data from fiscal years 2010 through 2017.

What GAO Found

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) obligated more than $10 billion for research and development (R&D) from fiscal years 2010 through 2017. Seven DHS components have budget authority to conduct R&D, and the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) obligated nearly 80 percent of all DHS R&D funds during this time period. These components conduct a wide range of R&D, from cybersecurity to border security projects. S&T generally leads or funds R&D projects by providing technology and knowledge products to support four homeland security mission areas:
Disaster resilience . Improving community resilience to natural disasters through technology and tools;
Critical incidents . Improving response technological capabilities;
Border security . Improving the nation's ability to detect, interdict and prosecute illegal activity across air, land and sea.
Cybersecurity . Developing technologies and tools to secure systems and critical infrastructures against cyberattacks.
S&T strengthened its R&D coordination efforts across DHS, but some challenges remain. In 2015, DHS established an R&D coordination mechanism, to be led by S&T, and in 2017 issued R&D coordination-related guidance. Specifically, to improve coordination, DHS established an Integrated Product Team (IPT) process to serve as the key R&D coordination mechanism within DHS. All ten DHS components that GAO interviewed stated that the IPT process improved visibility into DHS R&D efforts. However, the component that obligated approximately 17 percent of DHS R&D funds in 2017, or $176 million, did not participate in the IPT process in 2018, as required. Nonparticipation poses a risk to R&D coordination efforts across DHS, including R&D project information not being shared among components. Furthermore, ensuring that all required components participate in the IPT process would help S&T maintain visibility of R&D projects in order to fulfill its statutory role of coordinating R&D, and mitigate the risk of potential duplication of effort.
S&T, in its coordination role for DHS, uses disparate information sources to identify and track R&D project information and faces challenges to track progress and other information for ongoing R&D projects. For example, R&D project information is stored in multiple information sources leading to difficulty in integrating complete R&D project information and resulting in reporting that is not comprehensive. By developing a mechanism to address these challenges, S&T can further improve its efforts to report and analyze R&D project information, and have improved visibility on R&D efforts across DHS. GAO also identified challenges in collecting information related to R&D performance. Among other things, DHS is not well positioned to integrate the results and share lessons learned because limited R&D customer feedback information is collected and analyzed. Of the seven DHS components with R&D budget authority, two reported having formal customer feedback mechanisms. As a result, DHS is unable to more fully understand its customers' perceptions and experience which would allow DHS to better assess the performance of its R&D efforts.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making four recommendations, with which DHS concurred, including that DHS: 1) ensure all components participate in the IPT process, 2) develop a mechanism that aligns R&D project tracking sources, and 3) collect feedback from R&D customers.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

EXIM serves as the official export credit agency of the United States, providing a range of financial products to support the export of U.S. goods and services. Following the 2007–2009 financial crisis, demand for EXIM support increased. However, from July 2015 to May 2019, EXIM lacked a quorum on its Board of Directors and, as a result, was unable to approve medium- and long-term transactions greater than $10 million.
The Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2012 includes a provision for GAO to evaluate EXIM's underwriting process. This report discusses the extent to which EXIM's (1) process for updating its underwriting policies and procedures is properly designed and implemented and (2) underwriting policies and procedures for loan and loan guarantee transactions are consistent with guidance for managing federal credit programs. To address these objectives, GAO evaluated EXIM's underwriting policies and procedures against federal guidance and discussed the underwriting process with EXIM officials.

What GAO Found

GAO found that Export-Import Bank's (EXIM) process for updating its underwriting policies and procedures was properly designed and implemented. EXIM's Loan, Guarantee and Insurance Manual (Manual) describes EXIM's underwriting policies and procedures for its short-, medium-, and long-term loans and loan guarantees. The Manual describes the responsibilities of divisions and loan officers involved in the underwriting process and is required to be updated at least annually, except for material changes (e.g., changes resulting from legislative actions or compliance with sanctions), which are required to be made as soon as possible.
EXIM has initiated a process to streamline the Manual, which consists of over 1,400 pages, by separating the policies and procedures, thus allowing for continuous reviews. The underwriting sections of the Manual are tentatively scheduled for review in 2019.
The primary guidance for designing and managing federal credit programs is Office of Management and Budget Circular A-129, Policies for Federal Credit Programs and Non-Tax Receivables . GAO found that EXIM‘s policies and procedures were consistent with three of five areas of federal guidance; two areas related to lender and servicer eligibility and risk sharing practices were partially consistent with federal guidance.
Applicant screening. EXIM's policies and procedures were consistent with guidance in that they require applicants to provide relevant financial information and assessments of applicant eligibility and creditworthiness.
Loan documentation. EXIM's process was consistent with guidance in that it requires the preparation of loan files, which include the application, credit reports, and related analyses, as well as collateral documentation and loan agreements.
Collateral requirements. EXIM's process was consistent with guidance in that it requires a security interest in the financed export items.
Lender and servicer eligibility. EXIM established eligibility and decertification procedures for short-term delegated authority lenders that were consistent with guidance. However, it did not establish similar procedures for medium-term delegated authority lenders.
Risk sharing practices. EXIM's process was generally consistent with guidance in that EXIM provides loan guarantee terms that officials stated were necessary to achieve program purposes. However, federal guidance also calls for an agency to periodically review programs in which the government bears more than 80 percent of any loss. While EXIM prepares various program reviews, it has not developed procedures to help ensure that its risk sharing practices are routinely reviewed.
Without enhancements to its policies and procedures, EXIM may allow lenders that are not qualified to underwrite transactions and runs the risk that it will not effectively review its programs.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making two recommendations to enhance EXIM's policies and procedures related to (1) the use of medium-term delegated authority lenders and (2) periodic program reviews. EXIM concurred with GAO's recommendations and described actions planned to address them.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

VA operates the largest health care delivery system in America and VistA is essential to helping deliver the health care services and ensure the quality of health care received by the nation's veterans and their dependents. The system has been in operation for more than 30 years, is costly to maintain, and does not readily support VA's need to electronically exchange health records with the Department of Defense and private health care providers. VA has pursued initiatives to modernize VistA, using government contractors to support its efforts. In June 2017, VA announced a new effort to purchase a commercial solution to replace VistA.
GAO was requested to review VA's prior and current efforts to modernize VistA. This review determined (1) VA's efforts to modernize VistA, including key contractors, contract costs, and expected contractor activities and (2) VA's current plans for modernizing VistA and the progress that has been achieved to date. To conduct its study, GAO reviewed VA documentation and its prior work and requested and obtained data on contracts, related obligations, and expected contractor activities for previous efforts. GAO also obtained documentation on plans for VA's current modernization efforts and progress made on the efforts, and interviewed VA officials.
GAO has made recommendations to VA aimed at improving its prior modernization efforts. The department concurred with the recommendations and generally took responsive actions. GAO is making no recommendations at this time. VA provided technical comments on this report, which were incorporated as appropriate.

What GAO Found

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has, since 2001, pursued four separate initiatives to modernize its health information system—the Veterans Health Information Systems and Technology Architecture (VistA). These efforts—HealtheVet, the integrated Electronic Health Record (iEHR), VistA Evolution, and the Electronic Health Record Modernization (EHRM)—reflect varying approaches that the department has considered to achieve a modernized health system over the course of nearly two decades (see figure). This latest effort, the EHRM program, is to include the adoption of the same commercial electronic health record system that the Department of Defense is in the process of acquiring.
VA obligated about $1.1 billion to 138 different contractors that worked on iEHR and VistA Evolution (the two efforts for which VA could provide contract data) during fiscal years 2011 through 2016. Funding for the 34 contractors that worked on both efforts totaled about $793 million of the $1.1 billion obligated for contracts on the two initiatives. The top 15 of the contractors that worked on the two efforts (key contractors) accounted for approximately $741 million—$411 million for the development of new system capabilities, $256 million for project management activities, and $74 million for operations and maintenance for iEHR and VistA Evolution.
VA has begun planning for the transition from VistA Evolution to EHRM. However, the department is still early in its efforts and has begun developing plans that are intended to guide the new EHRM program. According to the EHRM Executive Director, the department intends to complete development of its plans for EHRM within 90 days after awarding the contract for its new system, which is planned to occur in early 2018. VA has also begun to staff the EHRM program's leadership positions. The department's dedication to completing and effectively executing the planning activities that it has identified will be essential to helping minimize program risks and expeditiously guide this latest electronic health record modernization initiative to a successful outcome—which VA, for almost two decades, has been unable to achieve.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

The U.S. Department of Commerce's NIST provides measurement services and supports standards that promote U.S. competitiveness. For example, NIST provides calibrations for manufacturing equipment and reference materials used in testing. NIST also supports private sector organizations in developing standards to help ensure product performance, among other things, such as Wi-Fi. In recent years, NIST has sought to improve the delivery of its services and documentary standards activities.
GAO was asked to review NIST measurement services and standards-support activities. This report examines (1) the challenges NIST faces in providing measurement services and supporting documentary standards development, and (2) the extent to which NIST has taken steps to address these challenges and how those steps align with federal guidance and policy. GAO analyzed testimony, reports, laws, and policies; conducted focus groups with academics and industry representatives; and interviewed various stakeholders.

What GAO Found

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) faces challenges in providing measurement services and supporting private sector development of specifications for products' designs or performance—referred to as “documentary standards.” Based on reviews of relevant testimony, reports, and other documents; interviews with stakeholders; and focus groups with academics and industry representatives, GAO identified challenges including:
Identifying and prioritizing what measurement services, such as calibrating large force-measurement tools used by aerospace manufacturers, or what documentary standards activities, such as serving as a technical advisor on fire safety standards, are most needed by U.S. industry, and
Coordinating with other federal agencies on standards development issues.
NIST has taken steps to address these challenges, including industry outreach and reviews of measurement services and standards activities. However, some efforts do not fully align with federal guidance or NIST policy. For example, NIST's measurement-services and standards-activity reviews have not included a comprehensive examination of how these services and standards activities align with stakeholder needs. Federal internal control standards call for managers to use quality information to determine if the agency is meeting its objectives. Comprehensively reviewing NIST's measurement services and documentary-standards activities would provide NIST with greater confidence that its services and activities align with stakeholders' needs.
GAO also found that NIST coordinates with other agencies on standards development and related activities, but that some efforts do not fully align with specific leading practices GAO has previously identified for enhancing and sustaining interagency collaboration. For example, NIST and other agencies coordinate on standards activities through a NIST-chaired interagency committee. However, GAO found that the committee has not updated its charter since 2000—contrary to leading practices to update and monitor collaborative agreements. GAO also found that NIST has not worked with other committee members to fully clarify agencies' roles and responsibilities. Without ensuring that member agencies' roles and responsibilities are current and fully clarified, NIST and other agencies may miss opportunities to strengthen coordination.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making seven recommendations, including that NIST comprehensively review measurement services and documentary-standards activities, and work with other agencies to take steps to strengthen interagency coordination. The Department of Commerce agreed with six recommendations and disagreed with one, citing risks to the private-sector-led U.S. standards system. GAO clarified its recommendation and continues to believe this action is needed, as discussed in the report.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

DOE and its contractor are building the WTP—which consists of multiple facilities—to treat a large portion of nuclear waste at Hanford. The project has faced persistent challenges, including quality assurance problems that have delayed it by decades and more than tripled its costs, to nearly $17 billion. DOE's quality assurance framework aims to ensure that all problems are identified and do not recur.
Senate Report 114-49 accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 included a provision for GAO to carry out an ongoing evaluation of the WTP. This first report examines (1) the actions DOE has taken to identify and address WTP quality assurance problems, (2) the extent to which DOE has ensured that quality assurance problems have been identified and do not recur, and (3) the extent to which DOE's organizational structure at ORP provides the Quality Assurance Division with independence to effectively oversee the contractor's quality assurance program. GAO reviewed DOE documents and obtained the insights of ORP's internal experts on WTP quality assurance efforts and outcomes.

What GAO Found

The Department of Energy (DOE) has taken several actions to identify and address quality assurance problems at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) at its Hanford site in Washington. Among the actions taken is the implementation of the Managed Improvement Plan by DOE's Office of River Protection (ORP) and the WTP contactor. The plan is intended to ensure that the WTP can operate in compliance with DOE-approved safety and quality requirements. The contractor has stated that the plan is fully implemented, but GAO found that a number of key activities may be incomplete and ORP officials will not be able to verify the extent of implementation until December 2018.
According to DOE documents that GAO reviewed and ORP quality assurance experts GAO spoke with, ORP has not ensured that all WTP quality assurance problems have been identified and some previously identified problems are recurring. For example, a 2016 DOE report found quality assurance problems, such as engineering errors and construction deficiencies, that neither ORP nor the contractor had identified when the work was conducted. ORP quality assurance experts GAO spoke with reiterated the issues identified in reports. In addition, DOE audits have found that previously identified quality assurance problems have recurred in key areas, such as the procurement of items that do not meet requirements or perform as specified. These problems were also raised by several of the ORP quality assurance experts GAO interviewed. According to these experts, such recurring problems may lead to significant rework at WTP facilities in the future if work is not stopped and the issues addressed. ORP's quality assurance framework requires the contractor to determine the extent to which quality assurance problems exist in all WTP structures, systems, and components when such problems are identified, and allows ORP to stop work at a facility if recurring issues arise. However, ORP has neither directed the contractor to make this determination nor stopped work when problems recur because it has confidence in the Managed Improvement Plan.
ORP's organizational structure may not provide its Quality Assurance Division with sufficient independence from the office's upper management to oversee the contractor's quality assurance program effectively. GAO has previously found that an oversight organization should be structurally distinct and separate from program offices responsible for cost and schedule performance to avoid conflict between mission objectives and safety. However, a 2017 DOE headquarters assessment found that ORP's Quality Assurance Division's effectiveness has been limited. This is because in some cases ORP upper management had mischaracterized its findings, and in other instances, ORP upper management had not used this division to evaluate the extent of potential quality assurance problems. ORP quality assurance experts GAO spoke to were also concerned that ORP's organizational structure does not always ensure the independence of the division. For example, two of these experts described instances when ORP upper management had downgraded the division's findings so that the contractor could take less stringent corrective measures. By providing the Quality Assurance Division adequate independence, DOE can better ensure that compliance with nuclear safety requirements will not be subordinated to other project management goals, such as meeting cost and schedule targets.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOE direct the WTP contractor to determine the extent of problems in WTP structures, systems, and components and order work stops when problems recur, and DOE should direct ORP to revise its organizational structure to ensure the independence of the Quality Assurance Division. DOE generally agreed with GAO's recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

VA operates one of the largest health care systems in the United States, utilizing more than 6,000 federally owned and 1,500 leased buildings. DOD has repeatedly applied the BRAC process to reduce the amount of unneeded property that it owns and leases and to save billions of dollars that could be applied to higher priority defense needs.
This statement is based on GAO's April 2017 report related to VA facility alignment ( GAO-17-349 ) and numerous GAO reports related to the BRAC process as summarized in a June 2011 testimony ( GAO-11-704T ) and a March 2012 testimony ( GAO-12-513T ). This statement addresses (1) the factors that affect VA's facility alignment and the extent to which VA's capital-planning process facilitates the alignment of facilities with the veterans' population, and (2) the key elements and challenges affecting DOD and the Commission in BRAC 2005. Detailed information on our scope and methodologies for this work can be found in these published products, cited throughout this testimony.

What GAO Found

Geographic shifts in the veterans' population, changes in health care delivery, aging infrastructure, and limited stakeholder involvement affect the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) efforts to align its services and real property portfolio to meet the needs of veterans. For example, a shift over time from inpatient to outpatient care will likely result in underutilized space once used for inpatient care. Further, the historic status of some VA facilities adds to the complexity of converting or disposing of them. In such instances, it is often difficult and costly for VA to modernize, renovate, and retrofit these older facilities.
GAO reported that two of the planning processes VA uses to align its facilities—VA's Strategic Capital Investment Planning (SCIP) and the VA Integrated Planning (VAIP)—have limitations that undermine VA's efforts to achieve its goals. Specifically:
VA relies on the SCIP process to plan and prioritize capital projects, but VA routinely asks its facility planners to submit their next year's planned project narratives before knowing if their previous submissions have been funded. The overlapping budget cycle, which is outside of VA's control, combined with other SCIP limitations—including subjective narratives, long time frames, and restricted access to information—make it difficult for VA to rely on SCIP to accurately identify the capital necessary to address its service and infrastructure gaps. VA concurred that it needs to address SCIP limitations that are within its control, as GAO recommended; VA has made some progress in implementing the recommendation has made some progress in implementing the recommendation.\
The VAIP process is estimated to cost $108 million and to produce market-level service delivery plans and facility master plans. However, the VAIP master plans incorrectly assume that all future growth in services will be provided directly through VA facilities without considering alternatives, such as purchasing care from the community. GAO recommended that VA consider discontinuing the VAIP facility master plans pending an assessment of their value as a facility-planning tool. VA agreed with the recommendation and is implementing it while pursuing a national realignment strategy..
Key elements of the Department of Defense's (DOD) 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process could benefit VA's asset and infrastructure review. The key elements included: (1) establishing goals for the process, (2) developing criteria for evaluating closures and realignments, and (3) establishing an organizational structure to develop closure and realignment options. GAO identified key challenges that affected DOD's implementation of BRAC 2005 and the results achieved; these challenges would need to be addressed if VA is to successfully apply the process. These challenges included: (1) large, complex recommendations required sustained senior leadership's attention and a high level of coordination among many stakeholders, and (2) the large number of actions that depend on each other for successful implementation.

What GAO Recommends

In the April 2017 report, GAO made recommendations related to capital planning and stakeholder involvement. VA concurred with the recommendations to the extent that they were within its control and has started making improvements.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

VA's disability compensation program pays cash benefits to veterans with disabilities connected to their military service. In recent years, the time needed to complete appeals of VA's decisions on claims has increased. For appeals resolved in fiscal year 2017, veterans waited an average of 3 years. The subset of appeals resolved by the Board of Veterans Appeals—a separate VA agency that provides a higher level of appeals review—took on average 7 years to resolve.
The Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017 makes changes to VA's current (legacy) process, giving veterans options to have their claims further reviewed by VA or appeal directly to the Board. The Act requires VA to submit a plan to Congress and GAO for implementing a new appeals process (which VA submitted in November 2017) and periodic updates (which VA submitted in February and May 2018). The Act also includes a provision for GAO to assess VA's original plan.
In March 2018, GAO found that VA could help ensure successful implementation of appeals reform by addressing gaps in planning and made four recommendations, with which VA agreed. This testimony focuses on the steps VA has taken to address GAO's recommendations and what aspects remain unaddressed.
For this statement, GAO reviewed VA's May 2018 updated plan, and interviewed VA officials and reviewed information they provided about steps taken to implement GAO's recommendations.

What GAO Found

In a March 2018 report, GAO assessed the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) November 2017 plan for changing how veterans appeal disability claim decisions and found that VA could do more to successfully implement these reforms. The March 2018 report made four recommendations to address planning gaps. Since then, VA has updated its plan and taken some steps to address aspects of these recommendations, but further steps are needed:
Address all legally required elements . GAO reported that VA's plan did not address one and partially addressed four of 22 elements required by the Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017 (Act), and recommended VA fully address them all. In a May 2018 update to its plan, VA took steps to address the five elements, such as developing productivity projections and a model to forecast resource needs for processing appeals. These steps address one element related to projecting productivity, and partially address the four remaining elements.
Articulate performance measurement . GAO also recommended VA clearly articulate how it will monitor and assess the new appeals process relative to the legacy process. This recommendation includes specifying timeliness goals for five new appeals options to be made available to veterans, and additional goals or measures of performance, such as accuracy in processing appeals. VA's updated plan states that the agency will develop goals and measures for all appeals options after fully implementing appeals reform. Contrary to sound planning practices, it does not articulate these performance goals and measures now, which would provide a vision for what successful implementation would look like. Lacking this vision, VA does not have an “end state” to guide its implementation and help establish accountability.
Augment project plan . GAO recommended VA augment its master schedule for implementing appeals reform to include all key activities and reflect other sound practices for guiding implementation and establishing accountability. Although VA's May 2018 updated master schedule added activities, it omitted a pilot test of the new Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) options. More generally, the plan does not reflect interdependencies among activities. Until all key activities are accounted for and the master schedule reflects sound practices, VA cannot provide reasonable assurance that it has the essential information needed to manage its appeals reform implementation.
Address risk fully . GAO recommended that VA's appeals plan more fully address risks in implementing a new process by, for example, testing all appeals options prior to full implementation. In its updated plan, VA stated it will pilot all five new appeals options. By taking these steps, VA should be better positioned to assess implementation risks. However, the updated plan does not have well-defined, measurable criteria for assessing lessons learned from these pilots and does not articulate how well these lessons translate to a broader context. Taking these steps would improve VA's ability to assess and mitigate risks as it implements its reforms.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

The Coast Guard spends billions of dollars on its major acquisition programs to meet its missions. GAO's prior work has identified the Coast Guard's reliance on its annual budget process to manage its acquisition portfolio as a challenge.
GAO was asked to review the recapitalization of the Coast Guard's acquisition portfolio. This report assesses, among other topics, the extent to which the Coast Guard has made changes to how it manages its acquisition portfolio.
GAO assessed Coast Guard's major acquisition programs to determine changes since GAO's 2014 portfolio review. GAO analyzed program baselines and interviewed Coast Guard officials. GAO analyzed the CIP for fiscal years 2014 through 2018, and reviewed the EOC's documentation.

What GAO Found

The Coast Guard, a component within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), continues to manage its acquisitions through its annual budget process and the 5-year Capital Investment Plan (CIP)—congressionally mandated and used for oversight. This management approach creates constant churn as program baselines must continually re-align with budget realities instead of budgets being formulated to support program baselines. Further, Coast Guard officials said the CIP reflects the highest priorities of the department—such as the Offshore Patrol Cutter, which is the Coast Guard's highest priority—and that trade-off decisions are made as part of the annual budget process. However, the effects of these decisions, such as which acquisitions would take on more risk so others can be prioritized and adequately funded, are not communicated in the CIP to key decision makers, because including such information is not statutorily required. Over the years, this approach has left the Coast Guard with a build up—or bow wave—of near-term unfunded acquisitions, negatively affecting recapitalization efforts and limiting the effectiveness of long-term planning. Including the effects of these trade-offs in the CIP would align with GAO's cost estimating best practices. Until it does so, the Coast Guard limits its ability to manage its acquisition portfolio in the long-term, beyond the time covered in the 5-year CIP.
In response to a September 2012 GAO recommendation, the Coast Guard updated the Executive Oversight Council's (EOC)—a cross-directorate group that oversees major acquisition programs—charter in 2014 to require annual reviews of the acquisition portfolio collectively. However, EOC officials said that these annual reviews never occurred, and GAO found that the annual review requirement was removed from the charter in 2017. Thus, the Coast Guard is without a senior-level group charged to collectively review and ensure affordability of its acquisition portfolio. The Office of Management and Budget's Capital Programming Guide states that a senior-level executive committee should be responsible for reviewing the agency's entire asset portfolio and for making decisions on the proper composition of assets needed to achieve strategic goals within budget constraints.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the annual CIPs reflect acquisition trade-off decisions and their effects, and that the EOC review the overall acquisition portfolio and its affordability annually. DHS concurred with the CIP recommendation. DHS did not concur with the EOC recommendation. It noted that other existing Coast Guard bodies are responsible for evaluating and prioritizing funding. However, DHS stated that the EOC charter will be updated to require it to review the overall acquisition portfolio, including long-term planning. If this long-term planning accounts for budget realities for the acquisition portfolio, GAO believes the intent of the recommendation will be met.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

In 2018, DOD estimated that its 82 major defense acquisition programs would cost over $1.69 trillion in total to acquire. DOD relies on program offices—composed of civilian, military and contractor support personnel—to manage and oversee these technically complex programs.
GAO was asked to review factors affecting DOD's personnel needs for its acquisition programs and how DOD budgets for the costs associated with these personnel.
This report describes (1) factors affecting the workforce size, composition, and mix of contractor and government personnel, as well as organizational structure for selected programs; and (2) how personnel costs associated with those selected programs are included in DOD's budget justification documents.
GAO reviewed DOD acquisition, workforce, and financial management policies and regulations and identified a non-generalizable sample of 11 major defense acquisition programs, including programs from each military department that were recently approved to enter into system development. GAO requested information from each of these programs to identify the number and type of personnel supporting the program, reviewed program documentation, and interviewed program officials. GAO also reviewed DOD's budget justification documents for fiscal years 2018 and 2019.

What GAO Found

The workforce size, composition, and mix, as well as the organizational structure of the 11 Department of Defense (DOD) major defense acquisition programs GAO reviewed were influenced by several interrelated factors. These factors include the government's role in developing and integrating key technologies, the availability of government personnel to provide the skills needed, and whether the program was managed as part of a portfolio of related programs or as a stand-alone program. For example, programs that assumed more responsibility for developing and integrating key technologies generally had a larger workforce, which was primarily composed of engineering and technical personnel. Program officials GAO met with stated that they generally prefer to use government personnel, but use contractor support when the number of government personnel allocated to the program is not sufficient to meet their needs, the technical skills are not available or are limited within the government, or to fulfill short-term tasks that are too brief to justify hiring government personnel. GAO also found that DOD structured the 11 programs to allow them to leverage available personnel with the necessary skills. Two programs were structured as standalone programs because they were new, high priority, and complex. The other nine programs were managed as a part of a portfolio of related programs. For example, the Air Force's F-15 program office manages a number of programs that add capabilities to the existing system.
DOD's Financial Management Regulation, which governs the formulation and presentation of DOD's budget request, gives DOD flexibility in how it submits program personnel costs. Consequently, the personnel costs for the 11 programs GAO reviewed were not separately and distinctly identified from other costs. For example, costs for civilian and military personnel are often centrally funded through appropriations categories that support many DOD activities and do not provide information on specific program personnel costs. GAO also found that costs for contractor support are often combined with other costs in individual program budget exhibits.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

In 2018, FCC estimated that 35 percent of Americans living on tribal lands lack broadband service compared to 8 percent of Americans overall. Various federal programs support increasing broadband deployment in unserved areas, including tribal lands. Tribes can form partnerships with private sector companies and others to deploy broadband infrastructure on tribal lands. GAO was asked to provide information on these partnerships.
This report discusses (1) examples and outcomes of tribal partnership arrangements, (2) the amount of federal funding provided to tribal entities for broadband deployment, and (3) stakeholder-identified barriers that tribes face in obtaining federal funding and the extent to which federal agencies have addressed those barriers. GAO identified partnerships by reviewing federally funded broadband projects that included a partnership component; analyzed federal funding dedicated to broadband deployment; interviewed agency and tribal government officials, tribal associations, tribally owned broadband providers, and industry stakeholders; and assessed RUS's efforts to address the regulatory funding barriers tribes may face. The information presented is illustrative and is not generalizable to all tribes or all partnerships.

What GAO Found

GAO identified some partnership arrangements between tribes and other entities to increase broadband access on tribal lands. Among the seven examples GAO identified, tribes partnered with different types of entities including private broadband providers, a community access network provider, an electric cooperative, a regional consortium, and tribally owned broadband providers. According to the tribes participating in the partnerships, almost all of the partnerships improved broadband service on tribal lands.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) are the primary sources of federal funding to deploy broadband infrastructure where the cost of providing service is high, including on tribal lands. GAO reviewed funding for four programs, three in FCC and one grant program in RUS, and found that in total, less than 1 percent has gone directly to tribes or to tribally owned broadband providers to expand broadband service. GAO found that 14 tribal entities received federal funding from FCC and RUS to increase broadband deployment for 2010–2017.
The tribal officials, tribal associations, and tribally owned broadband providers GAO contacted cited several barriers tribes face in obtaining federal funding to deploy broadband service on tribal lands. For example, they said tribes face regulatory barriers in applying for RUS's grant funding, including (1) preparing existing and proposed network design, (2) demonstrating financial sustainability of the broadband project within 5 years, and (3) obtaining matching funds. An interagency council recently recommended that federal agencies identify and address regulatory barriers that may unduly impede broadband deployment. Although RUS conducts some outreach with tribes, it has not undertaken a formal assessment to identify and address the regulatory barriers that tribes may face in obtaining RUS's funding for broadband deployment. RUS officials told GAO that they do not have the resources to do so. Nevertheless, lacking such an assessment, tribes may continue to face regulatory barriers in obtaining RUS funding for broadband deployment on their lands. By identifying and addressing any regulatory barriers that impede tribal entities' access to RUS funding, RUS could help tribes obtain funding to expand broadband deployment on tribal lands.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that RUS identify and address regulatory barriers that impede tribal entities from obtaining RUS funding for broadband deployment. RUS neither agreed nor disagreed with this recommendation.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Through its civil works program, the Corps plans, designs, constructs, operates, and maintains a range of water resources projects for purposes such as aquatic ecosystem restoration, flood risk management, and navigation. To support these projects, the Corps requests funding through the annual budget and appropriation process. For fiscal year 2017, the President's budget requested $4.6 billion for Corps' water resources projects, of which about $1 billion was for construction projects.
GAO was asked to review budget requests for construction projects under the Corps' civil works program, including the geographic distribution of those projects. This report examines for fiscal years 2008 through 2017 (1) the geographic distribution of the construction projects included in the President's budget requests for the Corps, and (2) how the Corps prioritized such projects for inclusion in the President's budget requests. GAO summarized available budget data for fiscal years 2008 through 2017; reviewed the Corps' budget guidance and documents; mapped locations for construction projects in budget requests for years when sufficient information was available; and interviewed Corps headquarters and division officials.

What GAO Found

For fiscal years 2008 through 2017, construction projects included in the President's budget requests to Congress for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) were geographically distributed in 31 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. During this 10-year period, the President requested over $12.9 billion for 164 construction projects included in the Corps' three main missions—aquatic ecosystem restoration, flood risk management, and navigation. The Corps provided GAO with detailed information on the location of construction projects included in the budget requests for the 3 most recent fiscal years at the time of its review—2015 through 2017. These projects, shown in the figure below, spanned 26 states and Puerto Rico. They were typically located near sources of water or Corps-constructed water infrastructure.
To prioritize construction projects to include in the President's budget requests for fiscal years 2008 through 2017, the Corps used a process involving each of its three organizational levels—districts, divisions, and headquarters. Districts divided projects into work packages and assigned 1 of 6 priority levels to indicate the order in which work packages from the same project should be completed. Districts grouped these work packages by business line or appropriations account based on the Corps' budget guidance for the fiscal year and then ranked them. Then Corps divisions and headquarters ranked the work packages. To assign rankings, Corps officials applied criteria specific to the business line of each project. These criteria often varied by fiscal year to address changes to policy guidance. Across the organization, Corps officials ranked more than 25,000 packages for fiscal year 2017. After assigning rankings, headquarters developed final budget recommendations to submit to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, who in turn provided the recommendations to the Office of Management and Budget for review and potential inclusion in the President's budget requests.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making recommendations in this report. The Department of Defense stated that they had no comments on the draft report.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

In December 2014, Congress enacted FITARA, which was intended to improve covered agencies' acquisitions of IT. FITARA also provided an opportunity to strengthen the authority of CIOs to provide needed direction and oversight of agencies' IT budgets.
GAO was asked to review whether CIOs' IT budgeting practices are consistent with FITARA and OMB's implementing guidance. This report addresses the extent to which selected federal agencies (1) established policies and procedures that address IT budgeting requirements, (2) could demonstrate that they had developed fiscal year 2017 IT budgets for sampled investments consistent with FITARA and OMB guidance, and (3) implemented processes to ensure that annual IT budgets are informed by reliable cost information.
GAO selected four departments to review. These departments had the two highest and the two lowest average initial selfassessments scores of compliance with OMB's FITARA guidance, as well as a fiscal year 2017 IT budget of at least $1 billion. Within each of the departments, GAO also selected the component agencies with the largest fiscal year 2017 IT budget. For each selected department and component agency, GAO reviewed relevant IT budget policies and procedures, analyzed a sample of major and non-major investment proposals against key OMB requirements, and determined whether selected departments captured government labor costs, among other things.

What GAO Found

The departments GAO reviewed—the Departments of Energy (DOE), Health and Human Services (HHS), Justice (DOJ), and the Treasury (Treasury)—took steps to establish policies and procedures that align with eight selected Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requirements intended to implement information technology (IT) acquisition reform legislation (commonly referred to as the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act, or FITARA) and to provide the chief information officer (CIO) visibility into and oversight over the IT budget. For example, of the eight OMB requirements, all four departments had established policies and procedures related to the level of detail with which IT resources are to be described in order to inform the CIO during the planning and budgeting processes. Agencies varied, however, as to how fully they had established policies and procedures related to some other OMB requirements, and none of the four departments had yet established procedures for ensuring that the CIO had reviewed whether the IT portfolio includes appropriate estimates of all IT resources included in the budget request. (See table.)
Where the departments had not fully established policies and procedures, it was due, in part, to having not addressed in their FITARA implementation and delegation plans how they intended to implement the OMB requirements. Until departments develop comprehensive policies and procedures that address IT budgeting requirements established by OMB, they risk inconsistently applying requirements that are intended to facilitate the CIO's oversight and approval of the IT budget.
Departments varied in the extent to which they could demonstrate implementation of key IT budgeting requirements when developing fiscal year 2017 funding requests for sampled investments. Specifically, while DOJ demonstrated that it had fully implemented the selected requirements for the majority of the investments GAO sampled, HHS and Treasury partially demonstrated implementation for a majority of the sampled investments, and DOE could not demonstrate implementation for the majority of the sampled investments. For example, DOE, HHS, and Treasury were not able to fully show that their CIOs had reviewed whether estimates of IT resources included in the budget request were appropriate for two of their respective departments' largest fiscal year 2017 IT investments. Departments often could not demonstrate that they had implemented selected IT budgeting requirements at the investment level because they had not established comprehensive policies and procedures that required them to do so. As a result, departments could not show that CIOs were sufficiently involved in planning fiscal year 2017 IT expenditures at the individual investment level.
All four selected departments lacked quality assurance processes for ensuring their IT budgets were informed by reliable cost information. Specifically, the selected departments did not have IT capital planning processes for (1) ensuring government labor costs have been accurately reported, (2) aligning contract costs with IT investments, and (3) utilizing budget object class data to capture all IT programs. This resulted in billions of dollars in requested IT expenditures without departments having comprehensive information to support those requests, and nearly $4.6 billion in IT contract spending that was not explicitly aligned with investments in selected departments' IT portfolios. This was due to a lack of processes for periodically reviewing data quality and estimation methods for government labor estimates, as well as a lack of mechanisms to cross-walk IT spending data in their procurement and accounting systems with investment data in their IT portfolio management systems. In August 2017, OMB developed a new approach of using a standard set of categories to group IT spending that, if properly implemented, has the potential to provide departments and CIOs enhanced visibility into IT costs across the portfolio. Nevertheless, until departments establish processes for assessing or otherwise ensuring the quality of relevant IT cost data used to inform their IT budgets, department CIOs will have less assurance that their budget includes appropriate and comprehensive estimates of IT resources.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making 43 recommendations to the eight selected departments and component agencies to address gaps in their IT budgeting policies and procedures, demonstrate implementation of OMB requirements, and establish procedures to ensure IT budgets are informed by reliable cost information. HHS, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, DOJ, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Internal Revenue Service agreed with our recommendations. DOE partially agreed with one recommendation and agreed with the other recommendations made to it, as well as with the recommendations made to its component agency—the National Nuclear Security Administration. Treasury neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Research has found that sports participation yields many benefits for youth. Girls' participation in sports has increased dramatically since the passage of Title IX in 1972, but is still lower than for boys. Further, investigations by OCR, which enforces and implements Title IX, have highlighted instances of disparities in the resources provided to girls' and boys' teams.
GAO was asked to review how public high schools encourage equal athletic opportunities. This report examines (1) measures public high schools and athletics administrators have taken to encourage equal athletic opportunities for boys and girls, and (2) factors that affect boys' and girls' participation levels in public high school sports programs. GAO conducted a nationally generalizable probability survey of athletics administrators at 784 public high schools. GAO interviewed nine subject matter specialists selected to provide a range of perspectives. GAO also reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance and interviewed OCR officials.

What GAO Found

According to GAO's nationally generalizable survey of athletics administrators, public high schools recently took various measures to encourage equal opportunities for boys and girls in sports. For example, a majority assessed resources such as equipment, travel opportunities, and facilities that they provided to girls' and boys' teams and some schools took steps to gauge student interest in specific sports as a means of encouraging equal opportunities, according to GAO's survey. Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR) guidance indicates that Title IX coordinators—which school districts are required to designate and make visible per regulations for Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments (Title IX)—should work closely with athletics administrators to determine whether action is needed to address any underrepresentation, or to otherwise encourage equal athletic opportunities. However, GAO estimates that 51 percent of athletics administrators either were unaware of or unsupported by their Title IX coordinator, according to the survey (see figure). These findings raise questions as to whether Title IX coordinators are familiar with and using Education's guidance. Officials from an association for Title IX coordinators said this lack of communication with athletics administrators may be related to some Title IX coordinators' limited understanding of Title IX and athletics. OCR officials said that they did not know the extent to which Title IX coordinators are working with their athletics administrators to encourage equal athletic opportunities because Education generally does not collect this information. Better information on Title IX coordinators could help Education support school districts' efforts to encourage equal sports opportunities for girls and boys.
The factors that most affect boys' and girls' participation in public high school sports are the number of, and interest in, participation opportunities offered, according to GAO's survey and interviews with nine subject matter specialists. Though the survey provided no clear consensus on factors that discourage students from participating in sports, athletics administrators most often perceived students' competing responsibilities as discouraging participation.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that OCR determine the extent of K-12 Title IX coordinators' knowledge and use of tools in its existing guidance and use this information in its efforts to encourage them to work with athletics administrators to help ensure equal athletic opportunities. Education partially concurred, stating it would consider GAO's recommendation in its complaint investigations, technical assistance activities, and communication practice reviews.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

As the opioid crisis has increased in recent years, so has the number of pregnant women who use opioids, which can result in NAS. A recent peer-reviewed study found that cases of NAS have grown nearly five-fold between 2000 and 2012 and that most infants with NAS are covered under Medicaid.
The Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 includes a provision for GAO to examine NAS in the United States and related treatment services covered under Medicaid. This report 1) describes the hospital and non-hospital settings for treating infants with NAS and how Medicaid pays for services, 2) describes recommended practices and challenges for addressing NAS, and 3) examines HHS's strategy for addressing NAS.
GAO reviewed HHS documentation and interviewed HHS officials. GAO also conducted site visits to four states—Kentucky, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin—selected based on several factors, including incidence rates of NAS and geographic variation. GAO interviewed stakeholders from 32 organizations, including health care providers and state officials in the selected states.

What GAO Found

The prenatal use of opioids or other drugs can produce a withdrawal condition in newborns known as neonatal abstinence syndrome (NAS). Health care providers, state officials, and other stakeholders told GAO that most infants with NAS are treated in the hospital—such as in a neonatal intensive care unit—though some may be referred to a non-hospital setting—such as a neonatal withdrawal center with nursery rooms—to complete their treatment. The table below provides more information on settings for treating infants with NAS and on how Medicaid pays for services in these settings.
According to stakeholders GAO interviewed and literature reviewed, there are several recommended practices and challenges associated with addressing NAS. The most frequently recommended practices included prioritizing non-pharmacologic treatment to infants—treatment that does not involve medications—such as allowing the mother to reside with the infant during treatment; educating mothers and health care providers on treatment of NAS, among other things; and using a protocol in the hospital or non-hospital setting for screening and treating infants with NAS. The most frequently cited challenges included the maternal use of multiple drugs—or polysubstance use—as it can exacerbate NAS symptoms; stigma faced by pregnant women who use opioids; hospital staff burden and limited physical capacity to care for infants with NAS; limited coordination of care for mothers and infants with NAS; and gaps in research and data on NAS, such as research on the long-term effects of the condition.
In May 2017, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) published a strategy document that makes key recommendations to address NAS. The Strategy recommends, for example, that health care providers receive continuing education on managing and treating infants with NAS and promote non-pharmacologic treatment. According to HHS officials, these recommendations will inform planning and policy across the department. However, HHS has yet to determine how and when the recommendations will be implemented, including establishing priorities; the roles and responsibilities of other federal, state, and public stakeholders; implementation timeframes; and methods for assessing progress. HHS officials told GAO that they expect to develop an implementation plan sometime in 2017 but had no timeline for doing so. Without a plan that clearly specifies how HHS will implement the Strategy and assess its progress, the department increases the risk that its recommendations for addressing NAS will not be implemented.

What GAO Recommends

HHS should expeditiously develop a plan for implementing the recommendations included in its strategy related to addressing NAS. HHS concurred that it should expeditiously address NAS, but noted implementation of the strategy is contingent on funding.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Meat and poultry slaughter and processing is one of the most hazardous industries in the United States. GAO was asked to review federal efforts to help ensure meat and poultry worker safety and health.
This report (1) describes the efforts OSHA has made to help ensure worker safety and assesses any challenges to these efforts, (2) examines how OSHA and FSIS have collaborated to ensure worker safety, and (3) assesses factors that may affect OSHA and FSIS efforts to protect workers from chemical hazards. GAO analyzed OSHA inspection data from 2005—when GAO last reported on this issue—through 2016. GAO also interviewed OSHA staff in headquarters and six field offices; officials at four other federal agencies; worker advocates; and industry representatives. GAO visited four plants and interviewed workers at six sites in five states selected based on factors such as meat or poultry production.

What GAO Found

The Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) increased its annual inspections of the meat and poultry industry from 177 in 2005 to 244 in 2016. OSHA officials told GAO that this increase was related to several new enforcement programs focusing on the poultry industry, as well as new reporting requirements that prompt additional inspections. However, OSHA faces challenges identifying and addressing worker safety concerns because workers may be reluctant to contact OSHA for fear of employer retaliation, although employers are prohibited from doing so by federal law. If workers are afraid to share concerns, OSHA may not be able to identify or address conditions that endanger them. In particular, OSHA may not be aware of the scope of problems workers could face gaining timely access to bathrooms. When asked by GAO, workers in five selected states cited bathroom access as a concern and said they fear speaking up at work, where OSHA inspectors typically interview them. Taking additional steps to encourage workers to disclose sensitive concerns and gathering additional information to determine the scope of bathroom access issues could enable OSHA to better identify worker safety and health concerns.
OSHA's and the Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service's (FSIS) main vehicle for collaboration on worker safety is their 1994 memorandum of understanding (MOU), but efforts to implement and evaluate the MOU have been limited. The MOU outlines plans for collaboration, such as referrals of plant hazards to OSHA by FSIS inspectors, training of FSIS staff, and information sharing. OSHA and FSIS have taken some steps to implement the policies and procedures outlined in the MOU. However, GAO found issues with the MOU's implementation in these three areas, hampering achievement of the MOU's goals. For example, according to FSIS officials, FSIS inspectors may be reluctant to make referrals to OSHA about hazards in plants because they fear it could trigger an OSHA inspection of FSIS. Further, the agencies have not evaluated the implementation of the MOU. Evaluating the implementation of the MOU and making any needed changes would help ensure the goals of the MOU are met and further protect the safety and health of both plant workers and FSIS inspectors.
Gaps in federal efforts create challenges to protecting workers from certain chemical hazards. For example, depending on a chemical's intended use, it may not undergo a federal review of the risks it poses to worker safety and health before it is used in a plant. FSIS collects information on how to protect its inspectors from new chemicals, but it does not have a process to share this information with OSHA or plants, among others, so that plant workers can be similarly protected. By FSIS establishing a process to regularly share the worker safety information it collects, the federal government will be better positioned to use existing resources to support the safety and health of plant workers and FSIS inspectors.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making seven recommendations, including that OSHA encourage workers to disclose sensitive concerns and gather bathroom access information; OSHA and FSIS strengthen their MOU; and FSIS share worker safety information. OSHA had concerns about two of these recommendations and did not address one. FSIS expressed concerns but described planned actions to address the recommendations. GAO believes the recommendations should be fully implemented.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Fighter pilots operate aircraft that are critical to achieving and maintaining air dominance during combat operations. The military services invest significant time and funding to train, compensate, and retain fighter pilots. According to Air Force officials, it costs between $3-$11 million and takes approximately 5 years to develop an individual fighter pilot to lead combat missions.
Senate Report 114-255 included a provision for GAO to review the Department of Defense's (DOD) management of the fighter pilot workforce. GAO's report (1) assesses the extent to which the military services had differences in the number of fighter pilots compared to authorizations, and describes any contributing factors as well as initiatives to address the differences, and (2) assesses the extent to which the military services had reevaluated squadron requirements for the number of fighter pilots needed, including consideration of UAS pilot requirements.
GAO analyzed military service personnel data, documentation on service initiatives to address factors contributing to fighter pilot shortages, and service documentation of requirements; met with a non-generalizable sample of fighter pilots at seven locations; and interviewed DOD and service officials.

What GAO Found

The Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps had gaps between the actual numbers of fighter pilots and authorizations (i.e. funded positions) in fiscal years (FY) 2013 through 2017. In FY 2017 the Air Force's gap was the widest at 27 percent of authorizations (see fig. below) and is projected to continue through FY 2023. The Marine Corps' gap grew from 6 percent in FY 2006 to 24 percent in FY 2017; it is concentrated in fighter pilots below the rank of major. While the Navy did not have comparable data, it had a gap at fighter pilots' first operational tours that grew from 12 percent in FY 2013 to 26 percent in FY 2017, and Navy officials stated it could increase through mid-2019. Service officials attributed these gaps to aircraft readiness challenges, reduced training opportunities, and increased attrition of fighter pilots due to career dissatisfaction. To help increase fighter pilot numbers, the military services are taking actions, including increasing the amounts of financial incentives to retain pilots.
The military services have not recently reevaluated squadron requirements to reflect increased fighter pilot workload and the emergence of unmanned aerial systems (UAS). According to service guidance, squadron requirements are to be reviewed on a 2-year schedule and to be updated as conditions change (in June 2017 the Navy revised its guidance to extend its schedule from 2 years to 5 years). However, service officials acknowledged that they have not updated all squadron requirements within the last 2 years. These officials stated that the requirements have not been reevaluated because existing conditions do not warrant the change. However, fighter pilots and squadron leaders interviewed at locations GAO visited consistently stated that the typical workload has significantly increased in recent years due to, among other things, changes in fighter aircraft tactics and technology and reductions to administrative support in squadrons. Further, the military services have not assessed the effect of increased reliance on UAS on fighter pilot requirements. The Air Force's vision for UAS notes that systems will work in tandem with cockpit-operated aircraft and that autonomous technologies will potentially lead to personnel efficiencies. Without re-evaluating squadron requirements to reflect current and emerging conditions, the nature of the gap may be inaccurate and thus make it difficult for the military services to target strategies to meet their personnel needs.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps reevaluate fighter pilot squadron requirements. DOD concurred with the recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

The securities industry is generally regulated by a combination of federal and industry oversight. FINRA, a self-regulatory organization, is responsible for regulating securities firms doing business with the public in the United States. SEC oversees FINRA's operations and programs.
Section 964 of the Dodd-Frank Act includes a provision for GAO, following an initial report, to triennially review and report on aspects of SEC's oversight of FINRA. GAO issued its first report in May 2012 ( GAO-12-625 ) and its second report in April 2015 ( GAO-15-376 ).
This report (1) determines if SEC's oversight of FINRA included the 10 areas specified in Section 964 of the Dodd-Frank Act and (2) evaluates the extent to which selected SEC internal guidance for examinations of FINRA follows generally accepted government auditing standards and the extent to which SEC's examinations of FINRA's governance practices followed SEC internal guidance. GAO reviewed all SEC examinations relating to a Section 964 area completed since fiscal year 2015 (including five that were governance-related), reviewed certain SEC procedures used to examine self-regulatory organizations against Government Auditing Standards , and compared completed inspections against SEC guidance. GAO also interviewed SEC and FINRA staff.

What GAO Found

Since fiscal year 2015, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) examinations of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA) covered each of the 10 areas specified in Section 964 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), such as governance, funding, and transparency. The most commonly covered area was FINRA examinations of its members.
Selected SEC guidance used to examine FINRA, including requirements for planning, prefieldwork scoping, and communicating findings, was consistent with generally accepted government auditing standards, and SEC inspections of FINRA were consistent with SEC's guidance. The five governance-related inspections of FINRA that GAO reviewed were consistent with SEC guidance for planning examinations and communicating findings (see fig.). Not all the requirements were applicable (because in certain instances completion of one requirement eliminated the need to satisfy others).

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making any recommendations. SEC agreed with GAO's findings.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

The Coast Guard, a component of DHS, serves as the principal federal agency responsible for maritime safety, security, and environmental stewardship in U.S. ports and waterways. To ensure that the Coast Guard is effectively fulfilling its missions, agency managers must have accurate information and base decisions on sound analyses for effective program management.
This statement discusses Coast Guard actions needed to (1) improve the quality of data used for program management and (2) improve the transparency of its data for reporting on mission performance and planning.
This statement is based on relevant products GAO issued from June 2014 through December 2017 on Coast Guard strategic planning and management issues, as well as related recommendation follow-up conducted through February 2018. GAO reviewed applicable laws, regulations, policies and guidance. GAO also interviewed Coast Guard officials responsible for administering these programs and obtained information on how they used data to inform decisionmaking. GAO interviewed a range of stakeholders, including federal and industry officials.

What GAO Found

GAO's prior work recommended multiple actions to improve the Coast Guard's program management by improving the quality of data it uses to manage and report on its mission performance. Specifically, GAO recommended actions such as collecting more complete data and clarifying the data limitations to facilitate more effective program management. For example, in December 2017, GAO found that more information is needed to calculate vessel safety statistics that could enhance the Coast Guard's knowledge about accident, injury, and fatality trends involving commercial fishing vessels. Having more complete information could be useful to carrying out its marine safety mission, and GAO recommended, among other things, that the Coast Guard ensure that data collected during commercial fishing vessel incident investigations is accurately captured. In 2018, the Coast Guard reported taking initial steps to capture more accurate data.
GAO's prior work also identified areas where the Coast Guard could improve the transparency of the data it uses for reporting on its mission performance as well its capital planning purposes. For example, in an October 2017 report on performance goals, GAO found the Coast Guard's Annual Performance Report (APR) has not been released publicly since 2011. Consequently, there has not been full visibility over performance across all of the Coast Guard's missions. Coast Guard officials stated that a decision by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership to limit the number of performance goals shared publicly had deterred the Coast Guard from public release of its APR. GAO recommended that APRs be available on the Coast Guard's website; the Coast Guard plans to publicly release future APRs. In addition, previous GAO reports found that the Coast Guard's annual 5-year capital investment plan, which projects acquisition funding needs for the upcoming 5 years, did not consistently reflect current total cost estimates or the effects of tradeoffs made as part of the annual budget cycle. GAO made recommendations to help the Coast Guard plan for future acquisitions and the difficult trade off decisions it will face given funding constraints. The Coast Guard agreed, but it is unclear when it will complete the 20-year plan.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making new recommendations in this statement but has made them to the Coast Guard and DHS in the past on improving its program management through, among other things, better quality and more transparent data. DHS and the Coast Guard agreed with these recommendations and reported actions or plans to address them.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Federal law enforcement agencies purchase firearms, ammunition, and tactical equipment, such as riot shields, to support their missions. GAO was asked to review these purchases for federal law enforcement agencies, and inventory controls at HHS, EPA, and IRS specifically.
This report examines, among other objectives (1) firearms, ammunition, and selected tactical equipment spending by federal agencies with 250 or more FLEOs from fiscal years 2010 through 2017; (2) the extent to which select agencies accurately reported purchases of firearms and ammunition in publicly-available data; and (3) inventory controls in place at HHS, EPA, and IRS.
GAO obtained available data on purchases from 20 agencies and from USASpending.gov, and reviewed inventory information and controls within HHS, EPA, and IRS. GAO also conducted site visits to HHS, EPA, and IRS offices to observe inventory controls, selected based on data discrepancies or reports of loss or theft, among other factors.
This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in October 2018. Information that HHS, IRS, and the Transportation Security Administration deemed sensitive has been omitted.

What GAO Found

The 20 federal law enforcement agencies in GAO's review reported spending at least $38.8 million on firearms, $325.9 million on ammunition, and $1.14 billion on tactical equipment—at least $1.5 billion in total—from fiscal years 2010 through 2017, based on data agencies provided to GAO.
The internal agency data on firearms and ammunition purchases for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, U.S. Forest Service, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) did not always match data that were publicly available on USASpending.gov—a government source for federal contract data. In particular, the dollar value of firearms purchases by ICE in USASpending.gov was approximately 8 times greater than the value of the purchases reported by ICE to GAO. Some differences result from other agencies using ICE contracts to make firearms and ammunition purchases, and ICE not properly identifying the funding agency for those purchases in the system that supplies data to USASpending.gov. Because ICE does not accurately report the agency that funded these purchases, the public does not have accurate information on how much ICE—and the agencies that make purchases using ICE contracts—have spent on firearms and ammunition. This decreases accountability and transparency of federal purchases, which is in conflict with the intended purpose of this system.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) have inventory controls for tracking, verifying, and securing federal law enforcement officers' (FLEOs) firearms. GAO observed these agencies' law enforcement components and found them to be generally following their inventory and security policies at selected locations. In instances where agencies were not in compliance with their policies, the agencies made corrections during the course of GAO's review. Each component has a process whereby at least once yearly officials review the firearms inventory to ensure that firearms match with records in the office's inventory system. The figure below illustrates a general process that all components GAO reviewed follow to verify their firearms inventory. Ammunition and tactical equipment inventory controls varied because agencies generally did not consider these items to be as sensitive as firearms. Examples of these controls include security for, and limited access to, equipment that might be vulnerable to risk of loss or unauthorized use, such as silencers or pyrotechnics.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Director of ICE update ICE's contracting process to provide the name of the agency funding the purchase of firearms and ammunition to improve the accuracy of publicly available data. ICE concurred with the recommendation.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

The federal government has a number of programs to help increase access to affordable homeownership for first-time buyers and lower-income households, including programs that provide guarantees for certain types of mortgages and funding that can be used for down-payment assistance. Generally, homeowners can build home equity by making payments on a mortgage to reduce the outstanding principal (assuming home value does not depreciate). Recently, there has been interest in mortgage products that accelerate home equity building.
GAO was asked to explore options for building equity through homeownership. This report discusses (1) how federal homeownership assistance programs affect home equity building; and (2) options, including private-sector mortgage products, through which borrowers can accelerate home equity building and the trade-offs of these options for both borrowers and lenders.
GAO analyzed relevant laws and program guidance of federal homeownership assistance programs. GAO attended housing conferences and interviewed relevant federal and state agency officials, academics, and industry stakeholders, including mortgage insurers and lenders, to identify existing and proposed accelerated equity-building products and mechanisms and to better understand the benefits and trade-offs of accelerated equity building. GAO also developed examples of mortgage scenarios to illustrate the trade-offs of accelerated equity building. Federal agencies provided technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.

What GAO Found

Federal homeownership assistance programs generally are not designed to accelerate equity building (home equity is the difference between the value of a home and the amount owed on a mortgage). For example, programs that offer grants for down-payment assistance can provide a one-time boost to home equity. However, these programs are not specifically designed to accelerate equity building—that is, increasing the pace of paying off principal more quickly than would be the case with a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage. Instead, the focus of federal programs is on providing affordable access to homeownership, including through grants, loans, and mortgage insurance or guarantees. For instance, federal mortgage insurance programs help provide market liquidity by protecting lenders from losses, in turn increasing access to credit and homeownership, and ultimately, the opportunity for equity building for home buyers.
Borrowers have options to accelerate equity building that include obtaining shorter-term mortgages, making more frequent or additional payments, or choosing a mortgage product designed to accelerate equity building. For example, a mortgage product introduced by private lenders in 2014—the Wealth Building Home Loan (WBHL)—has features designed to accelerate equity building, including shorter terms (15 or 20 years) and the option to buy down the interest rate. The product also allows for no down payment. However, these products have trade-offs, including the following:
Shorter-term loans build home equity (in terms of principal reduction) at a faster rate, but require higher monthly payments (see fig.). Payments for a 15-year fixed-rate mortgage can be more than 40 percent higher than for a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage.
Higher payments may make mortgages less affordable or limit access for lower-income borrowers. For example, higher payments may result in a higher debt-to-income ratio for some home buyers, which may prevent them from qualifying for a mortgage unless they buy a less expensive home.
In contrast, all else equal, loans with a shorter term generally have reduced credit risk—the likelihood of a home buyer defaulting on a mortgage—for lenders.
Note: Monthly mortgage payments do not include property tax or any type of insurance. Interest rates used are generally consistent with market rates in September and October 2017.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

In fiscal year 2016, private entities operated about 94,000 oil and gas wells on federal lands overseen by BLM. Once wells cease production, they can become inactive and potentially orphaned if an operator does not perform required reclamation and if an operator's bond is insufficient to cover the expenses. BLM considers oil and gas wells on federal and Indian lands and the associated leased lands as potential liabilities for the federal government because BLM may have to cover the costs of reclaiming well sites. To better manage its potential liabilities, BLM issued well and bond adequacy review policies in 2012 and 2013, respectively.
GAO was asked to review how BLM manages its potential oil and gas well liabilities. This report examines, among other things: (1) how BLM's actual costs and potential oil and gas well liabilities have changed for fiscal years 2010 through 2017 and (2) the extent to which BLM has implemented its well and bond review policies. GAO analyzed BLM's policies and data and interviewed BLM officials and representatives from stakeholder organizations.

What GAO Found

GAO's analysis indicates that the Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) actual costs incurred and potential liabilities for reclaiming oil and gas wells have likely increased for fiscal years 2010 through 2017. However, the full extent of the increase is not known because BLM does not systematically track needed data. Based on GAO's analysis of data obtained from 13 of BLM's 33 field offices that manage oil and gas programs, the average annual reclamation cost was $267,600, an increase compared to the $171,500 annual average across all BLM offices that GAO reported in 2010. Similarly, GAO's analysis of BLM data found that the number of known orphaned wells, those that generally have no responsible or liable parties, for all field offices has increased from 144 in 2010 to 219 as of 2017. However, BLM's database that contains information on oil and gas wells on federal and Indian lands does not collect information on costs incurred or on potential liabilities that might result from an increase in the number of orphaned wells. Under federal internal control standards, management should use quality information to achieve the entity's objectives. Without systematically tracking such information, BLM does not have assurance that it has sufficient bonds or financial assurances to cover the costs of reclaiming orphaned wells.
GAO was unable to fully assess the extent to which BLM field and state offices have implemented the agency's policies on reviewing wells and bond adequacy in part because of deficiencies in BLM's monitoring approach. For example, reports BLM headquarters used to monitor field offices' implementation of the policies have limitations. GAO identified discrepancies between the well and bond adequacy review reports that BLM state offices submitted to headquarters and the national summary consolidating states' information. Out of 10 state offices, 3 reported a different number of reviews completed in fiscal year 2016 than what BLM reported in its fiscal year 2016 national summary. Leading practices for monitoring the implementation of agency policies call for taking steps such as collecting and analyzing data on performance indicators. Without strengthening BLM's approach to monitoring, its ability to assess field offices' reviews of all inactive wells and determine the adequacy of all bonds is limited.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making seven recommendations, including that BLM systematically track the agency's actual reclamation costs and potential liabilities and strengthen its approach to monitoring field offices' implementation of the well review and bond adequacy review policies. BLM agreed with GAO's recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

According to the Navy, its 51 attack submarines provide the United States an asymmetric advantage to gather intelligence undetected, attack enemy targets, and insert special forces, among others. These capabilities make attack submarines some of the most–requested assets by the global combatant commanders.
GAO was asked to review the readiness of the Navy's attack submarine force. This report discusses the extent to which the Navy (1) has experienced maintenance delays in its attack submarine fleet and costs associated with any delays; and (2) has addressed any challenges and developed mitigation plans for any maintenance delays. GAO analyzed readiness information from fiscal years 2008-2018, operating and support costs, maintenance performance, and other data; visited attack submarines and squadrons; and interviewed public and private shipyard and fleet officials.
This is a public version of a classified report issued in October 2018. Information the Department of Defense deemed classified or sensitive, such as attack submarine force structure requirements and detailed data on attack submarine maintenance delays, has been omitted.

What GAO Found

The Navy has been unable to begin or complete the vast majority of its attack submarine maintenance periods on time resulting in significant maintenance delays and operating and support cost expenditures. GAO's analysis of Navy maintenance data shows that between fiscal year 2008 and 2018, attack submarines have incurred 10,363 days of idle time and maintenance delays as a result of delays in getting into and out of the shipyards. For example, the Navy originally scheduled the USS Boise to enter a shipyard for an extended maintenance period in 2013 but, due to heavy shipyard workload, the Navy delayed the start of the maintenance period. In June 2016, the USS Boise could no longer conduct normal operations and the boat has remained idle, pierside for over two years since then waiting to enter a shipyard (see figure). GAO estimated that since fiscal year 2008 the Navy has spent more than $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2018 constant dollars to support attack submarines that provide no operational capability—those sitting idle while waiting to enter the shipyards, and those delayed in completing their maintenance at the shipyards.
The Navy has started to address challenges related to workforce shortages and facilities needs at the public shipyards. However, it has not effectively allocated maintenance periods among public shipyards and private shipyards that may also be available to help minimize attack submarine idle time. GAO's analysis found that while the public shipyards have operated above capacity for the past several years, attack submarine maintenance delays are getting longer and idle time is increasing. The Navy may have options to mitigate this idle time and maintenance delays by leveraging private shipyard capacity for repair work. But the Navy has not completed a comprehensive business case analysis as recommended by Department of Defense guidelines to inform maintenance workload allocation across public and private shipyards. Navy leadership has acknowledged that they need to be more proactive in leveraging potential private shipyard repair capacity. Without addressing this challenge, the Navy risks continued expenditure of operating and support funding to crew, maintain, and support attack submarines that provide no operational capability because they are delayed in getting into and out of maintenance.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Navy conduct a business case analysis to inform maintenance workload allocation across public and private shipyards. The Department of Defense concurred with GAO's recommendation.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

The Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 and Senate Report 114-57 included provisions for GAO to report on VHA's OSI and the opioid prescribing practices of its health care providers.
This report examines, among other issues, (1) the extent to which VHA has met OSI goals established in 2014 and (2) the extent to which VHA providers adhere to key opioid risk mitigation strategies. To do this work, GAO reviewed data and documents related to OSI efforts and goals and interviewed VHA officials. In addition, GAO reviewed a random, nongeneralizable selection of medical records for 103 veterans who were prescribed opioids at five selected VHA medical facilities from March 2016 through March 2017. GAO selected the facilities to obtain diversity in geography and rates of opioid prescribing. At the selected facilities, GAO reviewed facility data and documents related to opioid safety and interviewed officials.

What GAO Found

The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) has made progress improving opioid safety through its Opioid Safety Initiative (OSI). Launched in 2013, the OSI aims to help ensure that veterans are prescribed opioids in a safe and effective manner. Since the OSI began, VHA has seen reductions in opioid prescribing rates. For example, from the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2013 to the first quarter of fiscal year 2018, the percentage of patients dispensed an opioid decreased from about 17 percent to about 10 percent, or by about 267,000 veterans. Also, available evidence suggests VHA has accomplished six of nine OSI goals established in 2014; however, it is unclear whether the remaining three goals have been fully met. For example, in the case of OSI goal four (establishing safe and effective regional tapering programs for patients on opioids and benzodiazepines), GAO found that VHA lacked documentation that its regional networks established these programs. VHA also did not establish measures of safety or effectiveness under this goal. These limitations prevent VHA from fully evaluating progress and accurately determining the extent to which its efforts to help ensure safe and effective prescribing of opioids have been successful.
In a review of a nongeneralizable sample of 103 veterans' medical records at five selected VHA medical facilities, GAO found that VHA providers did not always adhere to key opioid risk mitigation strategies, which are required by VHA policy or relevant to OSI goals. For example, among 53 veterans who were prescribed long-term opioid therapy (defined as a 90-day supply in the last 6 months), GAO found that
40 veterans did not have their names queried in a state-run prescription drug monitoring program database. The databases are used to identify patients who are receiving multiple prescriptions that may place them at greater risk for misusing opioids or overdosing;
21 veterans did not have a urine drug screening within the year prior to having their prescription filled. The screenings are used to determine whether veterans are taking their opioid medications as prescribed; and
12 veterans did not provide written informed consent. Informed consent is a formal acknowledgement that the veteran has been educated on the risks and benefits of opioid use prior to initiating long-term opioid therapy.
GAO found several factors that may have contributed to inconsistent adherence to key opioid risk mitigation strategies at the selected VHA facilities. For example, four of the five selected facilities did not have a pain champion (a primary care position required by VHA that can help providers adhere to opioid risk mitigation strategies), and not all facilities had access to academic detailing, a program in which trained clinical pharmacists work one-on-one with providers to better inform them about evidence-based care related to the appropriate treatment of relevant medical conditions. In addition, three of the five facilities did not consistently review veterans' medical records to ensure provider adherence to these strategies. To the extent that these factors affect all VHA facilities, VHA will continue to face challenges ensuring that its providers prescribe opioids in a safe and effective manner.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making five recommendations to VHA, including that it document actions and develop measurable outcomes related to its OSI goals, ensure that providers are adhering to opioid risk mitigation strategies, and ensure that all its regional networks have implemented academic detailing programs and that all VHA medical facilities have a designated primary care pain champion, as required. The Department of Veterans Affairs concurred with GAO's recommendations and described steps it will take to implement them.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Training is key to building readiness—the military's ability to fight and meet the demands of its missions. Through the Department of Defense (DOD) budget cycle, the Marine Corps estimates or programs its funding needs for training and spends funds to accomplish its training mission. Questions have been raised about whether the Marine Corps' training budget estimates are sufficiently detailed to determine training costs at the unit level or the expected readiness generated by those costs.
House Report 115-200 included a provision for GAO to examine the military services' budgeting processes to build unit-level training readiness. This report examines the extent to which the Marine Corps (1) tracks unit-level training funds for ground combat forces through the budget cycle, and (2) links ground combat forces' unit-level training funds to readiness. GAO analyzed budget data and studies conducted by the Marine Corps and others, examined tools used by units to link training funds with readiness, and interviewed knowledgeable officials at various levels in the Marine Corps.

What GAO Found

The Marine Corps cannot fully track all unit-level training funds for ground combat forces through the budget cycle. According to GAO's analysis of data provided by the Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs), the principal warfighting organization for the Marine Corps, units can track some, but not all, funds for training exercises from the budget request through use of the funds. The Marine Corps cannot fully track all training funds through the budget cycle, in part, because it has not established the consistent use of fiscal codes. Two key fiscal codes that officials identified as relevant to track funds for unit-level training are the Marine Corps Programming Code (MCPC) and the Special Interest Code (SIC). The Marine Corps uses MCPCs to program funds, but GAO found that when the Marine Corps spends those funds, it uses a different set of fiscal codes. This makes it difficult to link the programmed intent of funds to the execution of those funds. The Marine Corps uses SICs to track funds associated with training exercises, but GAO found that units do not use SICs consistently. For example, officials at all three MEFs told GAO that units generate SICs for large-scale training exercises, but may not do so for small-scale exercises. The Marine Corps is taking steps to align fiscal codes across the budget cycle, but this effort is in its early stages and will not include MCPCs, and may not address the inconsistent use of SICs. Without the ability to track unit-level training funds through the budget cycle, the Marine Corps lacks readily available data to assess whether funds were obligated consistent with their programmed intent and to adequately forecast and defend budget requests for training.
Although internal Marine Corps assessments and guidance state that the Marine Corps needs an enterprise-wide process to link resources to readiness, the Marine Corps has made little progress establishing a link between training funds for ground combat forces and readiness. The Marine Corps identified challenges with linking funds to readiness in a series of reports from fiscal years 2009 through 2014, citing factors such as stove-piped efforts and limited data availability and quality. Guidance directed that the Deputy Commandant for Programs and Resources organize quality coordination events with key stakeholders to synchronize activities within major lines of effort, but officials from this office stated that they have not been given the authority to direct the various efforts. Therefore, challenges have persisted, in part, because the Marine Corps has not designated a single entity with authority to oversee and coordinate efforts to link training funds to readiness. In the absence of a single oversight entity, two separate and overlapping tools were developed—the Cost to Run a MEF (C2RAM) tool and the Predictive Readiness Model (PRM). Although each tool had its own particular use and design, both were intended to link resources to readiness. Moreover, both faced similar challenges, such as data quality limitations, and relied on some of the same data sources. The Marine Corps recently assessed and discontinued development of PRM, however, it has not assessed C2RAM and how it could support an enterprise wide performance management process linking resources to readiness. Without dedicating a single entity with authority, and conducting an assessment of C2RAM, the Marine Corps is unlikely to make headway in addressing the challenges posed by trying to link resources to readiness.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Marine Corps (1) tracks training funds through the budget cycle, (2) designates a single entity to oversee establishment of a process that links resources to readiness, and (3) conducts an assessment of C2RAM. DOD concurred, and based on its comments, GAO modified one recommendation.