Question:
Difficulty with striking an appropriate balance between national security and export competitiveness has made the subject of export controls controversial for decades. Through the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the Export Controls Act of 2018 (ECA), and other authorities, the United States restricts the export of defense articles; dual-use goods and technology; certain nuclear materials and technology; and items that would assist in the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or the missile technology used to deliver them. U.S. export controls are also used to restrict exports to certain countries on which the United States imposes economic sanctions. The ECA legislates dual-use controls.
The U.S. export control system is diffused among several different licensing and enforcement agencies. Exports of dual-use goods and technologies—as well as some military items—are licensed by the Department of Commerce, munitions are licensed by the Department of State, and restrictions on exports based on U.S. sanctions are administered by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Administrative enforcement of export controls is conducted by these agencies, while criminal penalties are issued by units of the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice.
Aspects of the U.S. export control system have long been criticized by exporters, nonproliferation advocates, allies, and other stakeholders as being too rigorous, insufficiently rigorous, cumbersome, obsolete, inefficient, or combinations of these descriptions. In August 2009, the Barack Obama Administration launched a comprehensive review of the U.S. export control system. In April 2010, then-Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates proposed an outline of a new system based on four singularities
a single export control licensing agency for dual-use, munitions exports, and Treasury-administered embargoes, a unified control list, a single primary enforcement coordination agency, and a single integrated information technology (IT) system.
The rationalization of the two control lists was the Obama Administration's focus. The Administration made no specific proposals concerning the single licensing agency, although the Administration implemented some elements of a future single system, such as a consolidated screening list and harmonization of certain licensing policies.


Question:
In early 2018, the Trump Administration—citing concerns over national security and unfair trade practices—imposed increased tariffs on certain imported products in general and on U.S. imports from China in particular. Several of the affected foreign trading partners (including China) responded to the U.S. tariffs with their own retaliatory tariffs targeting various U.S. products, especially agricultural commodities.
On July 24, 2018, Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue announced that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) would be taking several temporary actions to assist farmers in response to trade damage from what the Administration has characterized as "unjustified retaliation." Specifically, the Secretary said that USDA would authorize up to $12 billion in financial assistance—referred to as a trade aid package—for certain agricultural commodities using Section 5 of the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) Charter Act (15 U.S.C. 714c). USDA intends for the trade aid package to provide short-term assistance in response to the ongoing trade disputes. However, the Secretary stated that there would not be further trade-related financial assistance beyond this $12 billion package. The aid package includes (1) a Market Facilitation Program (MFP) of direct payments (valued at up to $10 billion) to producers of soybeans, corn, cotton, sorghum, wheat, hogs, and dairy who are most affected by the trade retaliation (sweet cherries and almonds were added to this list in September); (2) a Food Purchase and Distribution Program to partially offset lost export sales of affected commodities ($1.2 billion); and (3) an Agricultural Trade Promotion (ATP) Program to expand foreign markets ($200 million).
USDA's Farm Service Agency will administer the MFP by providing payments in two potential tranches: a first round announced on August 27, 2018, initially valued at $4.7 billion; and an equivalent-valued second round announced on December 17, 2018. However, producers need only sign up once for the MFP to be eligible for first and second payments. The sign-up period for soybeans, corn, cotton, sorghum, wheat, hogs, and dairy started September 4, 2018. The sign-up period for fresh sweet cherries and shelled almonds started on September 24. To be eligible, a producer must have an ownership share in the commodity, be actively engaged in farming, and be in compliance with adjusted gross income restrictions and conservation provisions. Eligible producers should apply after their harvest is complete. Initially, producers were given a deadline of January 15, 2019, to complete an application. However, USDA extended the deadline until February 14, 2018, due to the government shutdown.
USDA used 2017 production data to estimate that approximately $9.6 billion would be distributed in MFP payments for corn, cotton, sorghum, soybeans, wheat, dairy, hogs, fresh sweet cherries, and shelled almonds, with over three-fourths ($7.3 billion) of MFP payments provided to soybean producers. MFP payments are capped on a per-person or per-legal-entity basis at a combined $125,000 for eligible crop commodities, a combined $125,000 for dairy production and hogs, and, separately, a combined $125,000 for fresh sweet cherries and shelled almonds.
In addition to the MFP payments, the Administration announced a Food Purchase and Distribution Program that is to undertake $1.2 billion in government purchases of excess food supplies. USDA has targeted an initial 29 commodities for purchases and distribution through domestic nutrition assistance programs. Purchasing orders and distribution activities are to be adjusted based on the demand by the recipient food assistance programs geographically.
The smallest piece of the trade aid package is an allocation of $200 million to the ATP to boost the trade promotion efforts at USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service, including foreign market development for affected agricultural products. On January 31, 2019, USDA awarded $200 million to 57 organizations through ATP.
USDA's use of its discretionary authority under the CCC Charter Act to make direct payments without further congressional action has historically been somewhat intermittent and limited in its scale. While the use of this authority is not without precedent, the scope and scale of this trade aid package has increased congressional and public interest. Furthermore, the significant variation in the announced MFP payment rates for affected commodities has elicited questions about equitable treatment among affected commodities. On September 13, USDA released a description of its MFP payment methodology, which is based strictly on the estimated direct trade "damage"—that is, export losses resulting from retaliatory tariffs. Indirect effects—such as the decline in market prices and resultant "lost value" for many of the affected commodities—were not included in the payment calculation.


Question:
The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is the U.S. government authority tasked with regulating the import, transit, and release of regulated animals, animal products, veterinary biologics, plants, plant products, pests, organisms, soil, and genetically engineered organisms. APHIS provides scientific authorities in trade partner countries and U.S. importers with animal and plant health import regulations.
APHIS requires U.S. importers to obtain animal or plant health import permits, which verify that the items being imported meet U.S. import standards. Animal and plant health import permits certify that imports follow U.S. regulations, World Trade Organization (WTO) guidelines, and/or trading partner specific requirements. These import permits are a part of broader agreements between the United States and its trading partners within the WTO on established sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. These measures aim to protect against diseases, pests, toxins, and other contaminants. The House and Senate Agricultural Appropriations Committees appropriate funds that allow APHIS to carry out a range of activities, including those involved in issuing import permits. From FY2014 to FY2018, discretionary appropriations for APHIS have averaged nearly $900 million. About 85% of the APHIS budget is allocated to the "Safeguarding and Emergency Preparedness/Response" mission area, which includes the administration of health import permits and other efforts to prevent imports of pests and diseases into the United States.
APHIS's authority over agricultural imports is largely provided by the Animal Health Protection Act (7 U.S.C. §§8301 et seq.), the Plant Protection Act (7 U.S.C. §§7701 et seq.), and the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (7 U.S.C. §§8401). These laws authorize APHIS to administer animal and plant health import permits and conduct agricultural import inspections. APHIS works with other federal agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection (CBP), to conduct animal and plant health monitoring programs and to determine if new pest or disease management programs are needed. In addition, Congress directs the Food and Drug Administration, the Food Safety and Inspection Service, and state-level Departments of Agriculture to participate in inspecting many products regulated by APHIS.
APHIS and CBP personnel inspect shipments of imported agricultural products and certify that the required import health permits and SPS certificates accompany each shipment. One of the major flagship programs that APHIS and CBP administer together is the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program, in which APHIS and CBP technical staff work to ensure that the required animal or plant health permits, sanitary certificates (for animal products), and phytosanitary certificates (for plant products) accompany each shipment. APHIS transfers funds to CBP to conduct AQI activities.
The ongoing congressional commitment to preventing plant and animal disease and pests from entering the United States through agricultural imports is evident in annual appropriations Congress provides for APHIS. Congress has directed APHIS to monitor pests and diseases and has assigned APHIS to oversee SPS activities in some free trade agreements. Moreover, legislation introduced in the 115th Congress sought to address invasive species (e.g., Areawide Integrated Pest Management, H.R. 5411) and would have directed CBP to enforce APHIS regulations to deter smuggling of plants and animals into the United States.


Question:
The District of Columbia Opportunity Scholarship Program (DC OSP) is the only federally funded voucher program for elementary and secondary education. It operates exclusively in the District of Columbia. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-199), which included the FY2004 District of Columbia Appropriations Act, also included the now-repealed DC School Choice Incentive Act of 2003. The DC School Choice Incentive Act initially authorized the DC OSP. Appropriations were authorized for FY2004 through FY2008. The DC OSP provides scholarships to eligible students to attend participating private elementary or secondary schools, and is administered by the U.S. Department of Education (ED).
The FY2004 appropriations act provided funding for the DC OSP for the first time and also, for the first time, provided funding for District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) for the improvement of public education, and funding for the District of Columbia State Education Office for public charter schools. Funding for DCPS and public charter schools was not addressed in the DC School Choice Incentive Act of 2003. However, for every year that Congress has provided funding for the DC OSP, it has also provided funding for the DC public schools and DC public charter schools. The provision of federal funds for the DC OSP, DC public schools, and public charter schools is commonly referred to as the "three-pronged approach" to supporting elementary and secondary education in the District of Columbia.
Reauthorization
The DC OSP has been reauthorized twice. It was reauthorized by the Scholarships for Opportunity and Results (SOAR) Act (P.L. 112-10) in 2011, which also repealed the DC School Choice Incentive Act of 2003. The SOAR Act authorized appropriations from FY2012 through FY2016 for the DC OSP, DC public schools, and DC public charter schools. The DC OSP was subsequently reauthorized by the SOAR Reauthorization Act (P.L. 115-31), which amended the SOAR Act and extended the authorization of appropriations for the DC OSP, DC public schools, and DC public charter schools through FY2019. Changes to the DC OSP have also been made primarily through appropriations acts in the intervening fiscal years. For FY2019, $52.5 million was appropriated for the SOAR Act, with $17.5 million each provided to the DC OSP, DCPS, and the DC State Education Office.
Participation
Based on data available from Serving Our Children, the current local DC OSP administrator, since the program's inception in the 2004-2005 school year, over 21,057 applications have been submitted, and over 8,400 scholarships have been awarded. For the 2017-2018 school year, over 3,900 applications for scholarships were received from new applicants and returning students. Over 1,650 students received and used a scholarship at 44 of 48 participating private schools that school year. While the value of the scholarship has changed over time, for the 2018-2019 school year students may receive up to $8,857 to attend a participating private elementary or middle school and up to $13,287 to attend a participating private high school.
Evaluation
The DC OSP has been evaluated by two federal agencies: the Department of Education (ED) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). The evaluations conducted by these two agencies differed considerably in terms of purpose and scope. ED evaluated the participation of schools, parents, and students in the DC OSP, as well as the effectiveness of the program on student achievement and other outcome measures. GAO evaluated certain accountability mechanisms and whether they were operating as intended, such as the program's use of funds and general adherence to statutory requirements. GAO also evaluated how ED and the District of Columbia fulfilled their roles and responsibilities for the DC OSP. The impact evaluations conducted by ED found mixed results. These evaluations focused on four outcome measures: (1) reading and mathematics achievement, (2) parent and student satisfaction, (3) parent and student perceptions of school safety, and (4) parental involvement. The GAO evaluations revealed issues with the way the DC OSP was being administered by the first two local program administrators, as well as concerns about ED's oversight of the program.


Question:
Recent acts of terrorism and hate crimes have prompted a renewed focus on the possible links between internet content and offline violence. While some have focused on the role that social media companies play in moderating user-generated content, others have called for Congress to pass laws regulating online content promoting terrorism or violence. Proposals related to government action of this nature raise significant free speech questions, including (1) the reach of the First Amendment's protections when it comes to foreign nationals posting online content from abroad; (2) the scope of so-called "unprotected" categories of speech developed long before the advent of the internet; and (3) the judicial standards that limit how the government can craft or enforce laws to preserve national security and prevent violence.
At the outset, it is not clear that a foreign national (i.e., a non-U.S. citizen or resident) could invoke the protections of the First Amendment in a specific U.S. prosecution or litigation involving online speech that the foreign national posted from abroad. The Supreme Court has never directly opined on this question. However, its decisions regarding the extraterritorial application of other constitutional protections to foreign nationals and lower court decisions involving speech made by foreign nationals while outside of the United States suggest that the First Amendment may not apply in that scenario. In contrast, free speech considerations are likely to be highly relevant in evaluating the legality of (1) proposals for the U.S. government to regulate what internet users in the United States can post, or (2) the enforcement of existing U.S. laws where the government seeks to hold U.S. persons liable for their online speech.
Although the government typically can regulate conduct without running afoul of the First Amendment, regulations that restrict or burden expression often do implicate free speech protections. In such circumstances, courts generally distinguish between laws that regulate speech on the basis of its content (i.e., the topic discussed or the message expressed) and those that do not, subjecting the former to more stringent review. A law that expressly restricts online communications or media promoting violence or terrorism is likely to be deemed a content-based restriction on speech; whereas a law that primarily regulates conduct could be subject to a less stringent standard of review, unless its application to speech turns on the message expressed. Whether such laws would survive First Amendment scrutiny depends on a number of factors.
Over the past 50 years, the Supreme Court has generally extended the First Amendment's free speech protections to speech that advocates violence in the abstract while allowing the government to restrict or punish speech that threatens or facilitates violence in a more specific or immediate way. The subtle distinctions that have developed over time are reflected in the categories of speech that the court has deemed unprotected, meaning that the government generally can prohibit speech in these areas because of its content. These include incitement to imminent lawless action, true threats, and speech integral to criminal conduct. Although judicial decisions have helped to define the scope of some of these categories, open questions remain as to how they apply in the context of online speech. For instance, legal scholars have questioned what it means for speech to incite "imminent" violence when posted to social media. They have also asked how threats should be perceived when made in the context of online forums where hyperbolic speech about violence is common.
The extent to which the government can regulate speech promoting violence or terrorism also depends on whether its law or action satisfies the applicable level of scrutiny that the Court has developed to evaluate measures that restrict or burden speech. In general, laws that regulate protected speech on political or ideological matters are subject to strict scrutiny, a test that requires the government to demonstrate that its law is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. Nevertheless, in some cases, courts have concluded that the government's national security interests justify restrictions on protected speech, such as in 2010 when the Supreme Court upheld certain applications of a federal statute prohibiting providing material support to U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations.


Question:
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), most recently comprehensively amended by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95), is the primary source of federal aid to K-12 education. The Title I-A program is the largest grant program authorized under the ESEA and was funded at $15.8 billion for FY2018. It is designed to provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending elementary and secondary schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families.
Under current law, the U.S. Department of Education (ED) determines Title I-A grants to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). The four Title I-A formulas have somewhat distinct allocation patterns, providing varying shares of allocated funds to different types of states. Thus, for some states, certain formulas are more favorable than others.
This report provides FY2018 state grant amounts under each of the four formulas used to determine Title I-A grants. Overall, California received the largest FY2018 Title I-A grant amount ($2.0 billion, or 12.76% of total Title I-A grants). Wyoming received the smallest FY2018 Title I-A grant amount ($35.9 million, or 0.23% of total Title I-A grants).


Question:
This report examines the historical development and contemporary role of Congressional Member Organizations (CMOs) in the House, as well as informal Member groups in the House, Senate, and across the chambers. Commonly, these groups are referred to as caucuses, but they will be referred to collectively as informal Member organizations in this report to avoid confusion with official party caucuses. Some examples of groups that modern observers would consider informal Member organizations date back as far as the early 1800s, but the number of groups has grown substantially since the 1990s.
Members of the House and Senate may form these groups and participate in their activities for a variety of reasons. Often the objectives of these groups coincide with Members' policy objectives or representational considerations. These groups enable Members to exchange information and ideas with colleagues, and can facilitate interactions among Members who might not otherwise have opportunities to work with one another.
Some groups may be eligible to register with the Committee on House Administration as a Congressional Member Organization (CMO), which enables House Members to utilize some personal office resources in support of CMO legislative activities. CMOs may include Senators among their members, but the Senate has no registration process for Member groups. Informal Member organizations that are not registered with the Committee on House Administration (including those in the Senate) are called informal Member groups. The term informal Member organization is used when referring to both CMOs and informal Member groups.
Since the 1970s, the House has issued various regulations governing informal Member organizations. This history provides some additional background on existing CMO regulations and can provide further insights about some of the perceived benefits and shortcomings of these groups. To increase accountability and transparency in an era when Member groups had greater access to institutional resources, the House created its first regulations in 1979 for Member groups registered with the Committee on House Administration as Legislative Service Organizations (LSOs). In 1995, LSOs were abolished and CMOs were created, with limited abilities to use official resources in support of Member groups. Beginning in 2015, the Committee on House Administration created a designation of Eligible Congressional Member Organizations (ECMOs) for certain CMOs, which enables Members to assign personal office staff to work on behalf of an ECMO; four CMOs in the 115th Congress were designated as ECMOs.
In recent years, the number of CMOs and informal Member groups has increased, more than doubling from the 108th Congress (350) to the 115th Congress (854). This increase has taken place even though (with limited exceptions in certain specific circumstances) House Members can no longer use their Members' Representational Allowance (MRA) to directly support a CMO or informal Member group as an independent entity; provide congressional office space for these organizations; use the congressional frank to support their activities; or accept goods, funds, or services from private organizations or individuals to support their activities. Despite these limits imposed on the options available to House Members to support informal Member organizations, CMOs and other informal Member organizations have retained an ongoing role in the congressional policymaking process. Their influence has endured largely because many Members continue to consider their participation in informal Member groups and CMOs as advantageous in achieving their legislative and representational goals.


Question:
Small business size standards are of congressional interest because they have a pivotal role in determining eligibility for Small Business Administration (SBA) assistance as well as federal contracting and, in some instances, tax preferences. Although there is bipartisan agreement that the nation's small businesses play an important role in the American economy, there are differences of opinion concerning how to define them. The Small Business Act of 1953 (P.L. 83-163, as amended) authorized the SBA to establish size standards to ensure that only small businesses receive SBA assistance. The SBA currently uses two types of size standards to determine SBA program eligibility: industry-specific size standards and alternative size standards based on the applicant's maximum tangible net worth and average net income after federal taxes.
The SBA's industry-specific size standards determine program eligibility for firms in 1,036 industrial classifications in 23 sub-industry activities described in the 2017 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). The size standards are based on one of four measures: (1) number of employees, (2) average annual receipts in the previous three (may soon be the previous five) years, (3) average asset size as reported in the firm's four quarterly financial statements for the preceding year, or (4) a combination of number of employees and barrel per day refining capacity. Overall, about 97% of all employer firms qualify as small under the SBA's size standards. These firms represent about 30% of industry receipts.
The SBA conducts an analysis of various economic factors, such as each industry's overall competitiveness and the competitiveness of firms within each industry, to determine its size standards. However, in the absence of precise statutory guidance and consensus on how to define small, the SBA's size standards have often been challenged, typically by industry representatives seeking to increase the number of firms eligible for assistance and by Members concerned that the size standards may not adequately target assistance to firms that they consider to be truly small.
This report provides a historical examination of the SBA's size standards and assesses competing views concerning how to define a small business. It also discusses
P.L. 111-240, the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which authorized the SBA to establish an alternative size standard using maximum tangible net worth and average net income after federal taxes for both the 7(a) and 504/CDC loan guaranty programs; established, until the SBA acted, an interim alternative size standard for the 7(a) and 504/CDC programs of not more than $15 million in tangible net worth and not more than $5 million in average net income after federal taxes (excluding any carry-over losses) for the two full fiscal years before the date of the application; and required the SBA to conduct a detailed review of not less than one-third of the SBA's industry size standards every 18 months beginning on the new law's date of enactment (September 27, 2010) and ensure that each size standard is reviewed at least once every five years. P.L. 112-239, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, which directed the SBA not to limit the number of size standards and to assign the appropriate size standard to each NAICS industrial classification. This provision addressed the SBA's practice of limiting the number of size standards it used and combining size standards within industrial groups as a means to reduce the complexity of its size standards and to provide greater consistency for industrial classifications that have similar economic characteristics. P.L. 114-328, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, which authorizes the SBA to establish different size standards for agricultural enterprises using existing methods and appeal processes. Previously, the small business size standard for agricultural enterprises was set in statute as having annual receipts not in excess of $750,000. P.L. 115-324, the Small Business Runway Extension Act of 2018, which directs federal agencies proposing a size standard (and, based on report language accompanying the act, presumably the SBA as well) to use the average annual gross receipts from at least the previous five years, instead of the previous three years, when seeking SBA approval to establish a size standard based on annual gross receipts. Legislation introduced during recent Congresses (including H.R. 33, the Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act of 2017, and its Senate companion bill, S. 584, during the 115th Congress) to authorize the SBA's Office of Chief Counsel for Advocacy to approve or disapprove a size standard requested by a federal agency for purposes other than the Small Business Act or the Small Business Investment Act of 1958. The SBA's Administrator currently has that authority.


Question:
The Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) provides funds to states, the District of Columbia, U.S. territories and commonwealths, and Indian tribal organizations (collectively referred to as grantees) primarily to help low-income households pay home energy expenses. The LIHEAP statute provides for two types of funding: regular funds (sometimes referred to as block grant funds) and emergency contingency funds. Regular funds are allocated to grantees based on a formula, while emergency contingency funds may be released to one or more grantees at the discretion of the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) based on emergency need. This report focuses on the way in which regular funds are distributed.
Regular LIHEAP funds are allocated to the states according to a formula that has a long and complicated history. (Tribes receive a share of state funding, while a percentage of regular funds is set aside for territories.) Prior to enactment of LIHEAP, in 1981, a series of predecessor energy assistance programs focused on the heating needs of cold weather states. This focus was in part the result of high heating oil prices throughout the 1970s. When LIHEAP was enacted, it adopted the formula of its immediate predecessor program, the Low Income Energy Assistance Program (LIEAP). Funds under LIEAP were distributed according to a multi-step formula that was more favorable to colder-weather states. The LIHEAP statute specified that states would continue to receive the same percentage of regular funds that they did under the LIEAP formula. This is sometimes referred to as the "old" LIHEAP formula.
After several years, when Congress reauthorized LIHEAP in 1984 it changed the program's formula by requiring the use of more recent population and energy data (data were not updated under the "old" formula) and reducing the emphasis on heating needs. The effect of these changes meant that, in general, some funding would be shifted from colder-weather states to warmer-weather states. (Using FY2019 formula data, the figure below shows which states receive a greater share of funds under the "new" and "old" formulas.) To prevent a dramatic shift of funds, Congress added two "hold-harmless" provisions to the formula. The percentage of funds that states receive under the formula enacted in 1984 is sometimes referred to as the "new" formula.
New formula data is used to calculate state allotments when appropriations for LIHEAP regular funds exceed approximately $2 billion. In the years following the enactment of the "new" LIHEAP formula, appropriations did not reach this level, so until the mid-2000s funds were largely distributed according to the "old" formula percentages. However, in FY2006, and in FY2009 through FY2019, regular fund appropriations have ranged from $2.5 billion to $4.5 billion, and the "new" formula has been incorporated into the way in which funds are distributed to the states. Notably, however, since FY2009 Congress has limited the operation of the "new" formula by requiring that the majority of regular funds be distributed using "old" formula percentages. For distributions to the states from FY2009-FY2019, see Table C-1.


Question:
The Assistance to Firefighters Grant (AFG) Program, also known as fire grants or the FIRE Act grant program, was established by Title XVII of the FY2001 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 106-398). Currently administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the program provides federal grants directly to local fire departments and unaffiliated Emergency Medical Services (EMS) organizations to help address a variety of equipment, training, and other firefighter-related and EMS needs. AFG also supports fire prevention projects and firefighter health and safety research and development through the Firefighter Prevention and Safety (FP&S) grant program. A related program is the Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response Firefighters (SAFER) program, which provides grants for hiring, recruiting, and retaining firefighters.
The fire grant program is now in its 19th year. AFG assistance is distributed to career, volunteer, combination, and paid-on-call fire departments serving urban, suburban, and rural areas. There is no set geographical formula for the distribution of fire grants—fire departments throughout the nation apply, and award decisions are made by a peer panel based on the merits of the application and the needs of the community.
On January 3, 2018, the President signed the United States Fire Administration, AFG, and SAFER Program Reauthorization Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-98). P.L. 115-98 extends the AFG and SAFER authorizations through FY2023; extends the sunset provisions for AFG and SAFER through September 30, 2024; provides that the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) may develop and make widely available an online training course on AFG and SAFER grant administration; expands SAFER hiring grant eligibility to cover the conversion of part-time or paid-on-call firefighters to full-time firefighters; directs FEMA, acting through the Administrator of USFA, to develop and implement a grant monitoring and oversight framework to mitigate and minimize risks of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement related to the AFG and SAFER grant programs; and makes various technical corrections to the AFG and SAFER statute.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6) provided $700 million for firefighter assistance in FY2019, including $350 million for AFG and $350 million for SAFER. For FY2020, the Administration requested $688.688 million for firefighter assistance, including $344.344 million for AFG and $344.344 million for SAFER. This is the same amount the Administration requested in its FY2019 budget proposal and a 1.6% reduction from the FY2019 appropriation.
A continuing issue for the 116th Congress is how equitably and effectively grants are being distributed and used to protect the health and safety of the public and firefighting personnel against fire and fire-related hazards. Another continuing issue is budget appropriations for AFG and SAFER. As is the case with many federal programs, concerns over the federal budget deficit could impact budget levels for AFG and SAFER. At the same time, firefighter assistance budgets will likely receive heightened scrutiny from the fire service community, given the local budgetary shortfalls that many fire departments may face.


Question:
Although congressional rules establish a general division of responsibility under which questions of policy are kept separate from questions of funding, House rules provide for exceptions in certain circumstances. One such circumstance allows for the inclusion of legislative language in general appropriations bills or amendments thereto for "germane provisions that retrench expenditures by the reduction of amounts of money covered by the bill." This exception appears in clause 2(b) of House Rule XXI and is known as the Holman rule, after Representative William Holman of Indiana, who first proposed the exception in 1876.
Since the period immediately after its initial adoption, the House has interpreted the Holman rule through precedents that have tended to incrementally narrow its application. Under current precedents, for a legislative provision or amendment to be in order, the legislative language in question must be both germane to other provisions in the measure and must produce a clear reduction of appropriations in that bill.
In addition, the House adopted a separate order during the 115th Congress that provided for retrenchments of expenditures by a reduction of amounts of money covered by the bill to be construed as applying to:
any provision or amendment that retrenches expenditures by—
(1) the reduction of amounts of money in the bill;
(2) the reduction of the number and salary of the officers of the United States; or
(3) the reduction of the compensation of any person paid out of the Treasury of the United States.
This separate order was not readopted for the 116th Congress.
This report provides a history of this provision in House rules and an analysis of precedents that are illustrative of its possible application.


Question:
The Sultanate of Oman has been a strategic ally of the United States since 1980, when it became the first Persian Gulf state to sign a formal accord permitting the U.S. military to use its facilities. Oman has hosted U.S. forces during every U.S. military operation in the region since then, and it is a partner in U.S. efforts to counter regional terrorism and related threats. Oman's ties to the United States are unlikely to loosen even after its ailing leader, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id Al Said, leaves the scene. Qaboos underwent cancer treatment abroad during 2014-2015, and his frail appearance in public appearance fuels speculation about succession. He does continue to meet with visiting leaders, including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on October 25, 2018, the first such visit by Israeli leadership to Oman in more than 20 years.
Oman has tended to position itself as a mediator of regional conflicts, and generally avoids joining its Gulf allies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) in regional military interventions such as that in Yemen. Oman joined the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization, but it did not send forces to that effort, nor did it support groups fighting Syrian President Bashar Al Asad's regime. It refrained from joining a Saudi-led regional counterterrorism alliance until a year after that group was formed in December 2015, and Oman opposed the June 2017 Saudi/UAE isolation of Qatar.
Oman also has historically asserted that engaging Iran is the optimal strategy to reduce the potential threat from that country. It was the only GCC state not to downgrade its relations with Iran in connection with a January 2016 Saudi-Iran dispute. Oman's ties to Iran have enabled it to broker agreements between the United States and Iran, including the release of U.S. citizens held by Iran as well as U.S.-Iran direct talks that later produced the July 14, 2015, nuclear agreement between Iran and the international community (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA). Yet, U.S. officials credit Oman with enforcing re-imposed U.S. sanctions and with taking steps to block Iran's efforts to ship weapons across Oman's borders to Houthi rebels in Yemen.
Prior to the 2011 wave of Middle East unrest, the United States consistently praised Sultan Qaboos for gradually opening the political process even in the absence of evident public pressure to do so. The liberalization allows Omanis a measure of representation through elections for the lower house of a legislative body, but does not significantly limit Qaboos's role as paramount decisionmaker. The public support for additional political reform, and resentment of inadequate employment opportunities produced protests in several Omani cities for much of 2011, and for two weeks in January 2018, but government commitments to create jobs helped calm the unrest. Oman has followed policies similar to the other GCC states since 2011 by increasing press censorship and arresting critics of the government who use social media.
The periodic economy-driven unrest demonstrates that Oman is having difficulty coping with the decline in the price of crude oil since mid-2014. Oman's economy and workforce has always been somewhat more diversified than some of the other GCC states, but Oman has only a modest financial cushion to invest in projects that can further diversify its revenue sources. The U.S.-Oman free trade agreement (FTA) was intended to facilitate Oman's access to the large U.S. economy and accelerate Oman's efforts to diversify. Oman receives small amounts of U.S. security assistance, and no economic aid.


Question:
Iran's nuclear program began during the 1950s. The United States has expressed concern since the mid-1970s that Tehran might develop nuclear weapons. Iran's construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source of proliferation concern. Gas centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons.
Is Iran Capable of Building Nuclear Weapons?
The United States has assessed that Tehran possesses the technological and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons. But Iran has not yet mastered all of the necessary technologies for building such weapons. Whether Iran has a viable design for a nuclear weapon is unclear. A National Intelligence Estimate made public in 2007 assessed that Tehran "halted its nuclear weapons program" in 2003. The estimate, however, also assessed that Tehran is "keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons" and that any decision to end a nuclear weapons program is "inherently reversible." U.S. intelligence officials have reaffirmed this judgment on several occasions.
Obtaining fissile material is widely regarded as the most difficult task in building nuclear weapons. As of January 2014, Iran had produced an amount of LEU containing up to 5% uranium-235, which, if further enriched, could theoretically have produced enough HEU for as many as eight nuclear weapons. Iran had also produced LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235; the total amount of this LEU, if it had been in the form of uranium hexafluoride and further enriched, would have been sufficient for a nuclear weapon.. After the Joint Plan of Action, which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the "P5+1"), went into effect in January 2014, Iran either converted much of its LEU containing nearly 20% uranium-235 for use as fuel in a research reactor located in Tehran, or prepared it for that purpose. Iran has diluted the rest of that stockpile so that it contained no more than 5% uranium-235. In addition, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, its nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with the P5+1.
Although Iran claims that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, the program has generated considerable concern that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The U.N. Security Council responded to Iran's refusal to suspend work on its uranium enrichment program by adopting several resolutions that imposed sanctions on Tehran. Despite evidence that sanctions and other forms of pressure have slowed the program, Iran continued to enrich uranium, install additional centrifuges, and conduct research on new types of centrifuges. Tehran has also worked on a heavy-water reactor, which was a proliferation concern because its spent fuel would have contained plutonium—the other type of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. However, plutonium must be separated from spent fuel—a procedure called "reprocessing." Iran has said that it will not engage in reprocessing.
Who Is Monitoring Iran's Nuclear Program?
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors Iran's nuclear facilities and has verified that Tehran's declared nuclear facilities and materials have not been diverted for military purposes. The agency has also verified that Iran's compliance with the JCPOA. On the JCPOA's Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous Security Council resolutions' requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the council adopted on July 20, 2015, compose the current legal framework governing Iran's nuclear program. Iran has continued to comply with the JCPOA and Resolution 2231. Iran and the IAEA agreed in 2007 on a work plan to clarify outstanding questions regarding Tehran's nuclear program, most of which concerned possible Iranian procurement activities and research directly applicable to nuclear weapons development. A December 2015 report to the IAEA Board of Governors from agency Director-General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA's "final assessment on the resolution" of these outstanding issues.
How Soon Could Iran Produce a Nuclear Weapon?
Then-Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman explained during an October 2013 hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that Iran would need as much as one year to produce a nuclear weapon if the government decided to do so. At the time, Tehran would have needed two to three months to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for a nuclear weapon. Iran's compliance with the JCPOA has increased that time frame to one year, according to U.S. officials. These estimates apparently assume that Iran would use its declared nuclear facilities to produce fissile material for a weapon. However, Tehran would probably use covert facilities for this purpose; Iranian efforts to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons by using its known nuclear facilities would almost certainly be detected by the IAEA.


Question:
When federal government agencies and programs lack budget authority after the expiration of either full-year or interim appropriations, they experience a "funding gap." Under the Antideficiency Act (31 U.S.C. §§1341 et seq.), they must cease operations, except in certain circumstances when continued activities are authorized by law. When there is a funding gap that affects many federal entities, the situation is often referred to as a government shutdown. In the past, there have occasionally been funding gaps that led to government shutdowns, one of which lasted 21 days, from December 16, 1995, to January 6, 1996. A shutdown occurred at the beginning of FY2014 (October 1, 2013) and lasted for a total of 16 days. Subsequently, two comparatively brief shutdowns occurred during FY2018, in January and February 2018, respectively. The longest shutdown occurred in FY2019—beginning at the end of the day on December 21, 2018, and lasting 35 days.
The relevant laws that govern shutdowns have remained relatively constant in recent decades. However, agencies and officials may exercise some discretion in how they interpret the laws, and circumstances that confront agencies and officials may differ over time. Consequently, it is difficult to predict what might happen in the event of a future shutdown. Still, information about past events may offer some insight into possible outcomes and help inform future deliberations.
This report provides an annotated list of historical documents and other resources related to several past government shutdowns. Sources for these documents and resources include the Congressional Research Service (CRS), Government Accountability Office (GAO), House and Senate Committees, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and Executive Office of the President. When possible, the report includes links to full-text documents.
For more information about federal government shutdowns and funding gaps, see CRS Report RL34680, Shutdown of the Federal Government: Causes, Processes, and Effects, coordinated by Clinton T. Brass. For more information about funding gaps, see CRS Report RS20348, Federal Funding Gaps: A Brief Overview, by James V. Saturno.
This report will be updated as additional resources are identified.


Question:
The federal government owns roughly 640 million acres, heavily concentrated in 12 western states. Four agencies—the National Park Service (NPS), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the Department of the Interior, and the U.S. Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture—administer about 95% of those lands.
The extent to which each of these four federal agencies have authority to acquire and dispose of land varies considerably. The BLM has relatively broad authority for both acquisitions and disposals under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). The agency also has other authorities for disposing of land, including two laws that allow the agency to retain the proceeds for subsequent land acquisition, among other purposes, and a law that allows transfers to governmental units and other entities for public purposes. By contrast, the NPS has no general authority to acquire land to create new park units or to dispose of park lands. The FS authority to acquire lands is mostly limited to lands within or contiguous to the boundaries of a national forest. The agency has various authorities to dispose of land, but they are relatively constrained and infrequently used. The FWS has various authorities to acquire lands but no general authority to dispose of its lands. The agency frequently uses acquisition authority under the Migratory Bird Conservation Act of 1929 because of the availability of funding through the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund.
The nature of the acquisition and disposal authorities of the four federal agencies also varies. In general, the acquisition authorities are designed to allow the four agencies to bring into federal ownership lands that many contend could benefit from federal management. Disposal authorities generally are designed to allow agencies to convey land that is no longer needed for a federal purpose or that might be chiefly valuable for another purpose. Some of the authorities specify particular circumstances where they can be used, such as the conveyance of FS land for educational purposes and the disposal of BLM land for recreation and public purposes.
Congress often faces questions on the adequacy of existing acquisition and disposal authorities; the nature, extent, and location of their use; and the extent of federal land ownership overall. The current acquisition and disposal authorities form the backdrop for consideration of measures to establish, modify, or eliminate authorities, or to provide for the acquisition or disposal of particular lands. In some cases, Congress enacts bills to provide authority to acquire or dispose of particular parcels where no standing authority exists and, in other cases, to direct or facilitate land transactions. Congress also addresses acquisition and disposal policy in the context of debates on the role and goals of the federal government in owning and managing land generally, and it has considered broader measures to dispose of lands or to promote acquisition.
Other issues for Congress pertain to the sources and levels of funds for land acquisition. The Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) is the primary source of funding for land acquisition. Congress has considered diverse measures related to the LWCF, such as legislation to make LWCF funding permanent and bills to direct LWCF monies to additional, nonacquisition purposes. Additionally, the FWS has the Migratory Bird Conservation Fund, an account with mandatory spending authority supported by revenue from three sources. The BLM also has mandatory spending authorities that allow the proceeds from land sales to be used for land acquisition, among other purposes.


Question:
Iraq's government declared military victory against the Islamic State organization (IS, also ISIS/ISIL) in December 2017, but insurgent attacks by remaining IS fighters continue to threaten Iraqis as they shift their attention toward recovery and the country's political future. Approximately 5,000 U.S. troops remain in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government and provide advisory and training support to Iraqi security forces. However, some Iraqi political groups are calling for U.S. and other foreign troops to depart, and they may seek to force Iraqi government action on this question during 2019.
Elections and Politics. Iraqis held national elections in May 2018, electing members to Iraq's unicameral legislature, the 329-seat Council of Representatives (COR). Political factions spent months negotiating in a bid to identify a majority bloc of legislators to form the next government, but the distribution of seats and alignment of actors precluded the emergence of a dominant coalition. Meanwhile, protests and violence in southern Iraq highlighted some citizens' outrage with poor service delivery, lack of economic opportunity, and corruption. In October, the COR chose former Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister and former Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih as Iraq's President. Salih, in turn, named former Oil Minister Adel Abd al Mahdi as Prime Minister-designate and directed him to assemble a slate of cabinet officials for COR approval. Abd al Mahdi is a consensus figure acceptable to rival factions, but he does not lead a party or parliamentary group of his own. COR members have confirmed most of Abd al Mahdi's cabinet nominees, but key political groups are at an impasse over certain ministries, including the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense.
Iraqi politicians have increasingly reached across sectarian political and economic lines in recent years in an attempt to appeal to disaffected citizens, but ethnic and religious politics remain relevant and Iraqi citizens remain frustrated with government performance. Iraq's neighbors and other outsiders, including the United States, are pursuing their respective interests in Iraq, and their competition creates additional challenges for Iraqi leaders. Paramilitary forces have grown stronger and more numerous in Iraq since 2014, and have yet to be fully integrated into national security institutions. Some figures associated with the volunteer Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) that were organized to fight the Islamic State participated in the 2018 election and won COR seats, including critics of U.S. policy who have ties to Iran and are demanding the United States withdraw its military forces.
The Kurdistan Region. The Kurdistan Region of northern Iraq (KRI) enjoys considerable administrative autonomy under the terms of Iraq's 2005 constitution, and the KRG held legislative elections on September 30, 2018. The KRG had held a controversial advisory referendum on independence in September 2017, amplifying political tensions with the national government, which then moved to reassert security control of disputed areas that had been secured by Kurdish forces after the Islamic State's mid-2014 advance. National government security forces and Kurdish peshmerga are deployed along contested lines of control, as leaders negotiate a host of sensitive issues.
Stabilization and Reconstruction. Daunting resettlement, stabilization, and reconstruction needs face Iraqi citizens and leaders as they look to the future. More than 4 million Iraqis uprooted during the war with the Islamic State group have returned to their home communities, but many of the estimated 1.7 million Iraqis who remain internally displaced face significant political, economic, and security barriers to safe and voluntary return. Stabilization efforts in areas recaptured from the Islamic State are underway with United Nations and other international support, but many immediate post-IS stabilization priorities and projects are underfunded. Iraqi authorities have identified $88 billion in broader reconstruction needs to be met over the next decade.
U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress. In general, U.S. engagement in Iraq since 2011 has sought to reinforce unifying trends and avoid divisive outcomes. The Trump Administration seeks to continue to train and support Iraqi security forces, while hoping to limit negative Iranian influence. The 116th Congress is considering Administration requests for funding to provide security assistance, humanitarian relief, and foreign aid in Iraq and may debate authorities for and provide oversight of the U.S. military presence in Iraq and security cooperation and aid programs. For background, see CRS Report R45025, Iraq: Background and U.S. Policy.


Question:
The Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (2018 farm bill, P.L. 115-334, Title II) included a number of changes to agricultural conservation programs, including reauthorizing and amending existing programs, directing existing program activities to specific resource concerns, shifting funds within the title, and authorizing a budget-neutral level of funding.
Debate over the conservation title in the 2018 farm bill focused on a number of issues in the different versions in the House- and Senate-passed bills (H.R. 2). These differences were resolved in a House-Senate conference to create the enacted bill, which is a mix of both versions that were passed by both chambers. The enacted bill reauthorizes and amends portions of most all conservation programs; however, the general focus is on the larger programs, namely the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), and Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP).
Most farm bill conservation programs are authorized to receive mandatory funding and are not subject to appropriation. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the conservation title of the 2018 farm bill makes up 7% of the bill's total projected mandatory spending over 10 years, which is $60 billion of the total $867 billion. The conservation title is budget neutral over the 10-year baseline; however, the 2018 farm bill is projected to increase funding in the first five years (+$555 million over FY2019-FY2023) and decrease funding in the last five years (-$561 million over FY2024-FY2028). Generally, the 2018 farm bill reallocates mandatory funding within the conservation title among the larger programs.
The two largest working lands programs—EQIP and CSP—were reauthorized and amended under the enacted bill, but in different ways. The House-passed bill would have repealed CSP and created a stewardship contract within EQIP, whereas the Senate-passed bill would have reauthorized CSP and reduced program enrollment. The enacted bill creates a mix of both the House- and Senate-passed bills by reauthorizing CSP and reducing program enrollment, as well as creating a new incentive contract within EQIP. Funding for CSP is shifted away from an acreage limitation under prior law to limits based on funding. EQIP is expanded and reauthorized with increased funding levels.
The largest land retirement program—CRP—is reauthorized and expanded by increasing the CRP enrollment limit in annual increments from 24 million acres in FY2019 to 27 million by FY2023. To offset this increased enrollment level, the enacted bill reduces payments to participants, including cost-share payments, annual rental payments, and incentive payments. The 2018 farm bill also reauthorized and amended the Agricultural Conservation Easement Program (ACEP). Most of the changes to ACEP focus on the agricultural land easements by providing additional flexibilities to ACEP-eligible entities and authorize an increase in overall funding.
The Regional Conservation Partnership Program (RCPP) is reauthorized and amended by shifting the program away from enrolling land through existing conservation programs to a standalone program with separate contracts and agreements. Under the revised program, USDA is to continue to enter into agreements with eligible partners, and these partners are to continue to define the scope and location of a project, provide a portion of the project cost, and work with eligible landowners to enroll in RCPP contracts.
While the 2018 farm bill does not create new conservation programs, it does require that a number of existing programs direct a dollar amount or percentage of a program's funding to a resource-specific issue, initiative, or subprogram. Through these directed policies Congress has established a level of support, or required investment, to be carried out through implementation to target specific issues such as nutrient runoff or groundwater protection. The directed policy may also reduce the implementing agency's flexibility to allocate funding based on need, as well as reducing the amount available for activities under the larger program that may not meet a resource-specific provision.
High commodity prices in years past, changing land rental rates, and new conservation technologies have led over time to a shift in farm bill conservation policy away from programs that retire land from production (CRP) toward programs that provide assistance to lands still in production (EQIP and CSP). Much of this shift occurred following the 2008 farm bill (FY2009-FY2013) and continued under the 2014 farm bill (FY2014-FY2018) as the level of total mandatory program funding for CRP was reduced relative to EQIP and CSP. Funding for easement programs (ACEP) also declined somewhat under the 2014 farm bill, but is projected to level off under the 2018 farm bill. Partnership program (RCPP) funding has also increased in recent farm bills, but remains relatively small compared to the other categories of programs.


Question:
Congress sets national food and agriculture policy through periodic omnibus farm bills that address a broad range of farm and food programs and policies. The 115th Congress established the direction of farm and food policy for five years through 2023 by enacting the Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018, which the President signed into law on December 20, 2018, as P.L. 115-334.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has scored the cost of programs with mandatory spending—such as nutrition programs, commodity support programs, major conservation programs, and crop insurance—in the enacted 2018 farm bill at $867 billion over a 10-year budget window of FY2019-FY2028. This amount is budget neutral compared with CBO's baseline scenario of an extension of 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79) programs with no changes. CBO estimates that over the five-year life of the law (FY2019-FY2023), outlays will amount to $428 billion, or $1.8 billion above the baseline scenario. In general, the new law largely extends many major programs through FY2023, thereby providing an overlay of continuity with the existing framework of agriculture and nutrition programs even as it modifies numerous programs, alters the amount and type of program funding that certain programs receive, and exercises discretion not to reauthorize some others.
The enacted 2018 farm bill extends agricultural commodity support programs largely along existing lines while modifying them in various ways. For instance, producers acquire greater flexibility, compared with prior law, to switch between the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) revenue support programs. Producers may update program yields that factor into payments under PLC, while a newly added escalator could raise a commodity's reference price under the program. The law also makes several modifications to ARC, including introducing a trend-adjusted yield that has the potential to raise ARC revenue guarantees for producers. Other changes include an increase in marketing assistance loan rates for a number of crops and revising the definition of family farm to include nephews, nieces, and cousins, making these individuals eligible for farm program payments. The law modifies dairy programs, including renaming the Margin Protection Program as Dairy Margin Coverage (DMC) and revising it to expand the margin protection between milk prices and feed costs that milk producers may purchase, as well as lowering the cost of this coverage for the first 5 million pounds of milk produced. Loan rates under the sugar program are increased.
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), the largest domestic nutrition assistance program, is reauthorized through FY2023. The law amends SNAP in a number of ways, including making changes to policies intended to reduced errors and fraud in SNAP, limiting fees that electronic benefit transfer processors may charge, and requiring nationwide online acceptance of SNAP benefits. Not included in the enacted bill are provisions in the House-passed bill that would have expanded work requirements and SNAP employment and training programs. The enacted bill does make certain modifications to these elements of the program, such as expanding the employment and training activities that a state may provide. Beyond SNAP, the law amends programs that distribute U.S. Department of Agriculture foods to low-income households, and it increases funding for The Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP).
The enacted farm bill addresses agricultural conservation on several fronts. For one, it reauthorizes the two largest working lands programs—the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) and the Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP)—while reducing the overall funding allocated for these two programs. It also reauthorizes the primary land retirement program, the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), allowing it to expand from a maximum of 24 million acres in FY2019 to 27 million acres in FY2023 while offsetting the added cost of any enrollment increase through lower payments to participants. The law also expands grazing and commercial uses on CRP acres and provides options for new and limited resource producers for transitioning CRP land.
The enacted 2018 farm bill addresses a range of issues of importance to rural America, including combatting substance abuse by prioritizing assistance under certain programs, by expanding broadband access and providing additional authorized appropriations to that end and by amending the definition of rural by excluding certain groups of individuals from population-based criteria. The credit title increases the maximum loan amount for guaranteed loans, and these amounts are adjusted for inflation thereafter. The ceiling for direct loans is also raised, among other changes.
Among the broad and diverse array of other provisions in the law are provisions intended to facilitate the commercial cultivation, processing, and marketing of hemp. Among these, hemp with low levels of the psychoactive ingredient in marijuana is excluded from the statutory definition of marijuana. The law creates a new hemp program under USDA oversight and makes hemp an eligible crop under the federal crop insurance program. The enacted 2018 farm bill also strengthens the National Organic Program and increases funding for organic agricultural research.
Within the Miscellaneous title, the livestock industry is the object of several initiatives to guard against disease outbreaks and strengthen the response to such events. These include the establishment of the National Animal Disease Preparedness Response Program and the National Animal Vaccine and Veterinary Countermeasures Bank. The law also addresses USDA organizational changes in recent years, requiring USDA to reestablish the position of Under Secretary for Rural Development and creating a Rural Health Liaison, among other changes. Among its provisions, the Forestry title addresses the accumulation of biomass in many forests and the consequent risk of wildfires by establishing, reauthorizing, and modifying various assistance programs to promote wood use and biomass removal.
With these programs, policies, and initiatives codified into law, the job that remains is for USDA, other federal agencies, and entities designated by the enacted farm law to implement the will of Congress through regulatory actions and other administrative measures. As implementation of the farm law proceeds, Congress may find it prudent to monitor this process and to provide direction and feedback through the exercise of its oversight responsibilities.


Question:
One of the most common methods for changing spending priorities in appropriations bills on the House floor is through offset amendments. House offset amendments may generally change spending priorities in a pending appropriations measure by increasing spending for certain activities (or creating spending for new activities not previously included in the bill) and offsetting the increase with funding decreases in other activities in the bill. Offset amendments are needed to avoid points of order under Sections 302(f) and 311(a) of the Congressional Budget Act, enforcing certain spending ceilings affecting regular appropriations bills, continuing resolutions (CRs), and supplemental appropriations measures (supplementals). In addition, amendments to general appropriations bills that would increase total spending provided in the bill must be entirely offset.
Two types of House offset amendments are considered in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union (Committee of the Whole): clause 2(f) and reachback (or fetchback) amendments. As provided under House Rule XXI, clause 2(f) offset amendments consist of two or more amendments considered together (or en bloc) that would change amounts by directly adding text or changing text in the body of the bill. Taken as a whole, the amendment does not increase the amount of funding in the pending bill. Such amendments (1) must provide offsets in both new budget authority and outlays, (2) can only include language transferring appropriations in the bill, and (3) may contain certain unauthorized appropriations.
Reachback offset amendments are generally offered at the end of the bill and change funding amounts in the pending bill by reference. These amendments (1) must provide offsets in new budget authority, but not necessarily outlays; (2) may add new appropriations (and spending set-asides within certain restrictions); (3) cannot include unauthorized appropriations; and (4) may provide across-the-board spending reductions as offsets.
Parliamentary rules governing consideration of offset amendments may be suspended or waived, typically by House adoption of a special rule but also by unanimous consent.
The advantages of clause 2(f) amendments over reachback amendments are that clause 2(f) amendments may contain certain unauthorized appropriations and are typically considered before reachback amendments, sometimes limiting offset opportunities for reachback amendments. The main advantages of reachback amendments are that they may not have to offset outlays, may add new appropriations, and may include across-the-board spending reductions.


Question:
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is an independent federal agency established by the Communications Act of 1934 (1934 Act, or "Communications Act"). The agency is charged with regulating interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable. The mission of the FCC is to make available for all people of the United States, "without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nationwide, and worldwide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges."
The FCC operates under a public interest mandate first laid out in the 1927 Radio Act (P.L. 632, 69th Congress), but how this mandate is applied depends on how "the public interest" is interpreted. Some regulators seek to protect and benefit the public at large through regulation, while others seek to achieve the same goals through the promotion of market efficiency. Additionally, Congress granted the FCC wide latitude and flexibility to revise its interpretation of the public interest standard to reflect changing circumstances and the agency has not defined it in more concrete terms. These circumstances, paired with changes in FCC leadership, have led to significant changes over time in how the FCC regulates the broadcast and telecommunications industries.
The FCC is directed by five commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for five-year terms. The President designates one of the commissioners as chairperson. Three commissioners may be members of the same political party of the President and none can have a financial interest in any commission-related business. The current commissioners are Ajit Pai (Chair), Michael O'Rielly, Brendan Carr, Jessica Rosenworcel, and Geoffrey Starks.
The day-to-day functions of the FCC are carried out by 7 bureaus and 10 offices. The current basic structure of the FCC was established in 2002 as part of the agency's effort to better reflect the industries it regulates. The seventh bureau, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, was established in 2006. The bureaus process applications for licenses and other filings, manage non-federal spectrum, analyze complaints, conduct investigations, develop and implement regulatory programs, and participate in hearings, among other things. The offices provide support services. Bureaus and offices often collaborate when addressing FCC issues.
Beginning in the 110th Congress, the FCC has been funded through the House and Senate Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill as a single line item. Previously, it was funded through what is now the Commerce, Justice, Science appropriations bill, also as a single line item. Since 2009 the FCC's budget has been derived from regulatory fees collected by the agency rather than through a direct appropriation. The fees, often referred to as "Section (9) fees," are collected from license holders and certain other entities. The FCC is authorized to review the regulatory fees each year and adjust them to reflect changes in its appropriation from year to year. Most years, appropriations language prohibits the use by the commission of any excess collections received in the current fiscal year or any prior years.
For FY2020, the FCC has requested $335,660,000 in budget authority from regulatory fee offsetting collections. The FCC also requested $132,538,680 in budget authority for the spectrum auctions program.


Question:
Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution provides that the President shall appoint officers of the United States "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate." This report describes the process by which the Senate provides advice and consent on presidential nominations, including receipt and referral of nominations, committee practices, and floor procedure.
Committees play the central role in the process through investigations and hearings. Senate Rule XXXI provides that nominations shall be referred to appropriate committees "unless otherwise ordered." Most nominations are referred, although a Senate standing order provides that some "privileged" nominations to specified positions will not be referred unless requested by a Senator. The Senate rule concerning committee jurisdictions (Rule XXV) broadly defines issue areas for committees, and the same jurisdictional statements generally apply to nominations as well as legislation. A committee often gathers information about a nominee either before or instead of a formal hearing. A committee considering a nomination has four options. It can report the nomination to the Senate favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation, or it can choose to take no action. It is more common for a committee to take no action on a nomination than to reject a nominee outright.
The Senate handles executive business, which includes both nominations and treaties, separately from its legislative business. All nominations reported from committee are listed on the Executive Calendar, a separate document from the Calendar of Business, which lists pending bills and resolutions. Generally speaking, the majority leader schedules floor consideration of nominations on the Calendar. Nominations are considered in "executive session," a parliamentary form of the Senate in session that has its own journal and, to some extent, its own rules of procedure.
The Senate can call up a nomination expeditiously, because a motion to enter executive session to consider a specific nomination on the Calendar is not debatable. This motion requires a majority of Senators present and voting, a quorum being present, for approval.
After a nomination has been called up, the question before the Senate is "will the Senate advise and consent to this nomination?" A majority of Senators voting is required to approve a nomination. However, Senate rules place no limit on how long a nomination may be debated, and ending consideration could require invoking cloture. On April 6, 2017, the Senate reinterpreted Rule XXII in order to allow cloture to be invoked on nominations to the Supreme Court by a majority of Senators voting. This expanded the results of similar actions taken by the Senate in November 2013, which changed the cloture vote requirement to a majority for nominations other than to the Supreme Court. After the 2013 decision, the number of nominations subjected to a cloture process increased.
On April 3, 2019, the Senate reinterpreted Rule XXII again. The Senate reduced, from 30 hours to 2 hours, the maximum time nominations can be considered after cloture has been invoked. This change applied to all executive branch nominations except to high-level positions such as heads of departments, and it applied to all judicial nominations except to the Supreme Court and the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. The full impact of this change is difficult to assess at this time, but it is likely to shorten the time between a cloture vote and a vote on the nomination. If Senators respond as they did to the last reinterpretation of the cloture rule, it might also increase the number of nominations subjected to a cloture process.
Nominations that are pending when the Senate adjourns sine die at the end of a session or recesses for more than 30 days are returned to the President unless the Senate, by unanimous consent, waives the rule requiring their return (Senate Rule XXXI, clause 6). If a nomination is returned, and the President still desires Senate consideration, he must submit a new nomination.


Question:
Congress gathers much of the information necessary to oversee the implementation of existing laws or to evaluate whether new laws are necessary from the executive branch. While executive branch officials comply with most congressional requests for information, there are times when the executive branch chooses to resist disclosure.
When Congress finds an inquiry blocked by the withholding of information by the executive branch, or where the traditional process of negotiation and accommodation is inappropriate or unavailing, a subpoena—either for testimony or documents—may be used to compel compliance with congressional demands. The recipient of a duly issued and valid congressional subpoena has a legal obligation to comply, absent a valid and overriding privilege or other legal justification. But the subpoena is only as effective as the means by which it may be enforced. Without a process by which Congress can coerce compliance or deter non-compliance, the subpoena would be reduced to a formalized request rather than a constitutionally based demand for information.
Congress currently employs an ad hoc combination of methods to combat non-compliance with subpoenas. The two predominant methods rely on the authority and participation of another branch of government. First, the criminal contempt statute permits a single house of Congress to certify a contempt citation to the executive branch for the criminal prosecution of an individual who has willfully refused to comply with a committee subpoena. Once the contempt citation is received, any prosecution lies within the control of the executive branch. Second, Congress may try to enforce a subpoena by seeking a civil judgment declaring that the recipient is legally obligated to comply. This process of civil enforcement relies on the help of the courts to enforce congressional demands.
But these mechanisms do not always ensure congressional access to requested information. Recent controversies could be interpreted to suggest that the existing mechanisms are at times inadequate—particularly in the instance that enforcement is necessary to respond to a current or former executive branch official who has refused to comply with a subpoena. There would appear to be several ways in which Congress could alter its approach to enforcing committee subpoenas issued to executive branch officials. These alternatives include the enactment of laws that would expedite judicial consideration of subpoena-enforcement lawsuits filed by either house of Congress; the establishment of an independent office charged with enforcing the criminal contempt of Congress statute; or the creation of an automatic consequence, such as a withholding of appropriated funds, triggered by the approval of a contempt citation. In addition, either the House or Senate could consider acting on internal rules of procedure to revive the long-dormant inherent contempt power as a way to enforce subpoenas issued to executive branch officials. Yet, because of the institutional prerogatives that are often implicated in inter-branch oversight disputes, some of these proposals may raise constitutional concerns.


Question: The windfall elimination provision (WEP) is a modified benefit formula that reduces the Social Security benefits of certain retired or disabled workers who are also entitled to pension benefits based on earnings from jobs that were not covered by Social Security and thus not subject to the Social Security payroll tax. Its purpose is to remove an unintended advantage or "windfall" that these workers would otherwise receive as a result of the interaction between the regular Social Security benefit formula and the workers' relatively short careers in Social Security-covered employment. In December 2018, nearly 1.9 million people (or about 3% of all Social Security beneficiaries) were affected by the WEP.


Question:
A variety of housing-related issues were active during the 115th Congress. These issues included topics related to housing finance, tax provisions related to housing, housing assistance and grant programs administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and regulatory review efforts underway at HUD. In some cases, the 115th Congress considered or passed legislation related to certain housing issues, such as mortgage-related provisions enacted as part of broader financial "regulatory relief" legislation and particular housing-related tax provisions. In other cases, Congress conducted oversight or otherwise expressed interest in actions taken by HUD or other entities involved in housing, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Many of the housing-related topics that were of interest during the 115th Congress are ongoing issues, though some involved particular actions that took place during the 115th Congress. Issues of interest during the Congress included the following:
Housing finance issues included changes to certain mortgage-related requirements and other housing provisions included in broader financial legislation that became law in May 2018. Congress also expressed ongoing interest in certain issues related to the Federal Housing Administration (FHA): (1) a forthcoming final rule on FHA's requirements for insuring mortgages on condominiums and (2) the level of the mortgage insurance premiums charged by FHA. Comprehensive housing finance reform that would address the status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is also an ongoing topic of interest, although the 115th Congress did not actively consider comprehensive housing finance reform legislation. Tax issues included changes to housing-related tax provisions in the tax revision law enacted at the end of 2017 (P.L. 115-97); extensions of other, temporary housing-related tax provisions through 2017 by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123); and changes to the low-income housing tax credit in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141). Housing assistance issues included considerations related to HUD appropriations, ongoing initiatives or proposed changes to HUD rental assistance programs, committee consideration of legislation to reauthorize the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act (NAHASDA), issues related to the housing response to presidentially declared major disasters, and a variety of introduced bills that were meant to address housing affordability issues in various ways. HUD began a variety of regulatory review efforts in keeping with Executive Order 13777, which directed federal agencies to evaluate existing regulations and identify opportunities for reform. Specific HUD actions included suspending a rule related to small-area fair market rents (the suspension has since been voided by a preliminary court injunction); initiating a broad review of manufactured housing regulations; suspending certain regulations governing how HUD funding recipients must comply with the requirement to affirmatively further fair housing; and publishing an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeking public comment on whether its regulations related to disparate impact and the Fair Housing Act should be amended.
Housing and mortgage market conditions provide important context for these issues, although housing markets are generally local in nature and national housing market indicators do not necessarily accurately reflect conditions in specific communities. Generally speaking, owner-occupied housing markets in recent years have been characterized by rising house prices, relatively low levels of housing starts and housing inventory, and relatively strong home sales. Rising house prices combined with rising mortgage interest rates have raised concerns about the affordability of buying a home, although interest rates remain low by historical standards. Rental housing markets have also raised affordability concerns. Nearly 21 million renter households are considered to be cost burdened, meaning they spend more than 30% of their incomes on rent. The share of households who rent, rather than own, their homes has increased in the years since the housing market turmoil that began around 2007, contributing to lower rental vacancy rates and increasing rents. Increases in household income in recent years have generally not kept pace with increases in house prices or rents, contributing to affordability concerns.


Question:
Regulation of the banking industry has undergone substantial changes over the past decade. In response to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, many new bank regulations were implemented pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203) or under the existing authorities of bank regulators to address apparent weaknesses in the regulatory regime. While some observers view those changes as necessary and effective, others argued that certain regulations were unjustifiably burdensome. To address those concerns, the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-174) relaxed certain regulations. Opponents of that legislation argue it unnecessarily pared back important safeguards, but proponents of deregulation argue additional pare backs are needed. Meanwhile, a variety of economic and technological trends continue to affect banks. As a result, the 116th Congress faces many issues related to banking, including the following:
Safety and Soundness. Banks are subject to regulations designed to reduce the likelihood of bank failures. Examples include requirements to hold a certain amount of capital (which enables a bank to absorb losses without failing) and the so-called Volcker Rule (a ban on banks' proprietary trading). In addition, anti-money laundering requirements aim to reduce the likelihood banks will execute transactions involving criminal proceeds. Banks are also required to take steps to avoid becoming victims of cyberattacks. The extent to which these regulations (i) are effective, and (ii) appropriately balance benefits and costs is a matter of debate.
Consumer Protection, Fair Lending, and Access to Banking. Certain laws are designed to protect consumers and ensure that lenders use fair lending practices. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has authorities to regulate for consumer protection. No consensus exists on whether current regulations strike an appropriate balance between protecting consumers while ensuring access to credit and justifiable compliance costs. In addition, whether Community Reinvestment Act regulations as currently implemented effectively and efficiently encourage banks to provide services in their areas of operation is an open question.
Large Banks and "Too Big To Fail." Regulators also regulate for systemic risks, such as those associated with very large and complex financial institutions that may contribute to systemic instability. Dodd-Frank Act provisions include enhanced prudential regulation for certain large banks and changes to resolution processes in the event one fails. In addition, bank regulators imposed additional capital requirements on certain large, complex banks. Subsequently, some argued that certain of these additional regulations were too broadly applied and overly stringent. In response, Congress reduced the applicability of the Dodd-Frank measures and regulators have proposed changes to the capital rules. Whether relaxing these rules will provide needed relief to these banks or unnecessarily pare back important safeguards is a debated issue.
Community Banks. The number of small or "community" banks has declined substantially in recent decades. No consensus exists on the degree to which regulatory burden, market forces, and the removal of regulatory barriers to interstate branching and banking are causing the decline.
What Companies Should Be Eligible for Bank Charters. To operate legally as a bank, an institution must hold a charter granted by a state or federal government. Traditionally, these are held by companies generally focused on and led by people with experience in finance. However, recently companies with a focus on technology are interested in having legal status as a bank, either through a charter from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency or a state-level industrial loan company charter. Policymakers disagree over whether allowing these companies to operate as banks would create appropriately regulated providers of financial services or inappropriately extend government-backed bank safety nets and disadvantage existing banks.
Recent Market and Economic Trends. Changing economic forces also pose issues for the banking industry. Some observers argue that increases in regulation could drive certain financial activities into a relatively lightly regulated "shadow banking" sector. Innovative financial technology may alter the way certain financial services are delivered. If interest rates rise, it could create opportunities and risks. Such trends could have implications for how the financial system performs and influence debates over appropriate banking regulations.


Question:
The federal government incurs a budget deficit when its total outgoing payments (outlays) exceed the total money it collects (revenues). If instead federal revenues are greater than outlays, then the federal government generates a surplus. Deficits are measured over the course of a defined period of time—in the case of the federal government, a fiscal year.
Debt measurements may be taken at any point in time, and represent the accumulation of all previous government borrowing activity from private citizens, institutions, foreign governments, and other parts of the federal government. Federal debt increases when there are net budget deficits and outflows made for federal credit programs, which combine to represent debt held by the public. Federal debt also rises through increases in intragovernmental debt, which is generated by trust fund surpluses that are used to finance other government activity. Federal debt declines when there are budget surpluses, a reduction in the federal credit portfolio, or decreases in intragovernmental borrowing.
Federal deficit and debt outcomes are interdependent: budget deficits increase federal debt levels, which in turn increase future net deficits. The nature of the relationship between deficits and debt varies depending on the type of debt considered. Budget deficits are the principal contributor to debt held by the public. The effect of deficits on intragovernmental debt is less certain than their contribution to debt held by the public. All else equal, increases in net trust fund deficits will lead to increases in total budget deficits but decreases in intragovernmental debt.
Interest payments made on publicly held debt instruments contribute directly to federal deficits. Holders of federal debt are compensated by receiving interest payments from Treasury. Intragovernmental debt does not contribute to future deficits.
Persistent budget deficits and a large and increasing federal debt have generated discussions over the long-term sustainability of current budget projections. Federal budget deficits declined from 9.8% of gross domestic product (GDP) in FY2009 to 2.4% of GDP in FY2015, and subsequently increased to 3.8% of GDP in FY2018. Recent estimates forecast that the government will run deficits in every year through FY2029.
Federal debt totaled $21.516 trillion at the end of FY2018, which as a percentage of GDP (106.0%) was its highest value since FY1947; of that debt, $15.761 trillion (or 77.8% of GDP) was held by the public.
Over time, persistent budget deficits can hamper economic growth. Deficits represent an intertemporal transfer from later generations to the current one, as money borrowed now will eventually require repayment with interest. The effect of deficit financing on economic output depends on the nature of the government activity being financed and the private activity that would have otherwise taken place.
Federal debt is constrained by the willingness of investors to finance borrowing. While the amount of federal borrowing investors will finance may be affected by economic growth and other factors, real federal debt cannot increase indefinitely. There are no signs that federal borrowing capacity will be exhausted in the short term. However, the consequences of exhausted fiscal space may be worth considering when examining the medium- and long-term trajectory of the federal budget.


Question:
The program activities of most federal agencies are generally funded on an annual basis through the enactment of regular appropriations acts. When those annual appropriations acts are not enacted by the beginning of the fiscal year (i.e., by October 1), one or more continuing appropriations acts (commonly known as continuing resolutions or CRs) may be enacted to provide temporary funding to continue certain programs and activities until action on the regular appropriations acts is completed.
Congress has included six main components in CRs. First, CRs have provided funding for certain activities (coverage), which are typically specified with reference to the prior fiscal year's appropriations acts. Second, CRs have provided budget authority for a specified duration of time. This duration may be as short as a single day or as long as the remainder of the fiscal year. Third, CRs have provided funds based on an overall funding rate. Fourth, the use of budget authority provided in the CR has been prohibited for new activities not funded in the previous fiscal year. Fifth, the duration and amount of funds in the CR, and purposes for which they may be used for specified activities, may be adjusted through anomalies. Sixth, legislative provisions—which create, amend, or extend other laws—have been included in some instances.
This report provides detailed information on CRs beginning with FY1977, which was the first fiscal year that began on October 1. Congress has enacted one or more CRs in all but three of the last 43 fiscal years (FY1977-FY2019). In addition, in 10 of the last 18 fiscal years, the initial CR—and in some years subsequent CRs—provided continuing appropriations for all the regular appropriations acts.
After FY1997—the most recent fiscal year that all regular appropriations bills were enacted before the start of the new fiscal year—an average of at least five CRs were signed into law for each fiscal year before the appropriations process was completed for that year. During this period, CRs provided funding for an average of almost five months each fiscal year.
For some fiscal years, a CR has provided continuing appropriations (i.e., at a rate of operations) through the end of that year (often referred to as a full-year CR). Most recently, a full-year CR was enacted for most of the regular appropriations acts for FY2007, FY2011, and FY2013. In the 1980s, in contrast, some "full-year CRs" actually included the full text of certain regular appropriations acts (i.e., in the form of an omnibus appropriations act rather than a typical CR).