Question:
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), was signed into law on February 15, 2019. The act included a total of $647.0 million in funding for three trade-related agencies under the Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies (CJS) account—the International Trade Administration (ITA), the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), and the office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). This represents a 0.2% decrease from FY2018 appropriations. For FY2019, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, included $484.0 million in direct appropriations for ITA (a 0.4% increase from the FY2018 appropriation), $95.0 million in funding for USITC (a 1.4% increase), and a total of $68.0 million for USTR (a 0.2% decrease).
The Administration's Request
On February 12, 2018, the Trump Administration submitted its FY2019 budget request to Congress. The FY2019 proposal included a total of $590.8 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies, an 8.9% decrease from FY2018 total appropriated amounts for these agencies. The Administration requested reducing funding for all three trade-related agencies. For FY2019, the request included $440.1 million in direct funding for ITA (an 8.7% decrease from the FY2018 appropriation), $87.6 million for USITC (a 6.5% decrease), and $63.0 million for USTR (a 13.2% decrease).
Congressional Actions
In the spring of 2018, the House and Senate reported FY2019 CJS appropriations bills, which included proposed funding for ITA, USITC, and USTR. The reported bills did not adopt many of the Administration's budget reductions, and instead proposed funding levels that were more similar to the FY2018-enacted amounts.
The House Committee on Appropriations reported H.R. 5952 on May 17, 2018. The House proposal recommended a total of $647.6 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies. This proposal was $56.8 million more (9.6%) than the Administration's request, and $0.7 million less (-0.1%) than the FY2018-enacted legislation. The House committee proposed $480.0 million in direct funding for ITA, $95.0 million for USTIC, and a total of $72.6 million for USTR, comprised of $57.6 million for salaries and expenses and an additional $15.0 million from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund for trade enforcement activities as authorized by the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-125).
The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 3072 on June 14, 2018. The Senate committee-reported proposal recommended a total of $655.6 million for the three CJS trade-related agencies. This is $64.8 million (11.0%) more than the Administration's request and $7.3 million (1.1%) more than the FY2018-enacted appropriations. The Senate committee proposed $488.0 million in direct funding for ITA, $95 million for USITC, and a total of $72.6 million for USTR, comprised of $57.6 million for salaries and expenses and an additional $15.0 million from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund for trade enforcement activities.
After three continuing resolutions and a three-week lapse in funding, Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act. 2019 (P.L. 116-6), which was signed into law on February 15, 2019. The act included a total of $647.0 million in funding for the three trade-related agencies, which represented a 0.2% decrease from FY2018 funding levels.


Question:
Congress may review existing U.S. policies and programs in sub-Saharan Africa (henceforth, "Africa") as it establishes its budgetary and policy priorities and responds to developments in the region. Key enduring issues for Congress include the authorization and appropriation of funding for U.S. foreign aid programs and U.S. military activities in the region, and oversight of U.S. programs and policies.
Economic and Development Issues. Much of Africa experienced rapid economic growth starting in the early 2000s, reducing poverty and expanding the middle class in some countries. Since 2014, however, growth has slowed in many countries—and almost all continue to face high poverty rates and long-standing development challenges such as food insecurity and malnutrition, ineffective health and education institutions, and infrastructure deficiencies. Other factors hindering socioeconomic development in Africa include low domestic buying power, a shortage of skilled labor, limited access to capital and other inputs, poor governance, and political instability and insecurity.
Governance, Democracy, and Human Rights. Since the early 1990s, nearly all African countries have transitioned from military or single-party rule to at least nominally multiparty political systems in which elections are held regularly. Nonetheless, the development of accountable, functional democratic institutions remains limited in many countries. Corruption and mismanagement are pervasive across much of the region, and state services are limited. Authoritarian governments and armed belligerents in Africa commit serious human rights violations.
Peace and Security. Civil wars and crises have broken out in multiple African countries since 2010, reversing the previous decade's trend of stabilization. Newer crises have unfolded in the Lake Chad Basin, the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Burundi, and South Sudan, while long-running conflicts continue to affect the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan, and Somalia. Porous borders, weak institutions, and corruption have created permissive environments for transnational threats such as terrorism, trafficking, and maritime piracy. Two conflict-affected African countries, South Sudan and Nigeria, face a credible risk of famine in early 2019; in both, insecurity has hindered aid access to affected zones.
U.S.-Africa Policy under the Trump Administration. The Trump Administration has maintained several Africa-focused initiatives launched by its predecessors, but it also has proposed changes to U.S. trade policy and foreign assistance, including aid cuts, that could significantly affect U.S. engagement with Africa if implemented. The Administration's policy approach toward Africa, unveiled in late 2018, identifies three broad U.S. interests in the region: expanding U.S. trade and commercial ties with African countries, countering Islamist extremism and other forms of violent conflict, and imposing more stringent conditions on U.S. aid and U.N. peacekeeping missions in the region. Administration officials also have placed a high priority on countering Chinese and Russian influence in Africa, with the Department of Defense announcing in late 2018 that it would reorient its personnel and footprint in parts of Africa to align with that objective in the coming years. Country-specific goals identified in other Trump Administration statements and policy documents include the continued normalization of U.S. relations with Sudan, conflict resolution in South Sudan, an electoral transition in DRC, and democratic reforms in Ethiopia. The Administration also has signaled greater focus on reciprocity in trade relations, imposed tariffs affecting trade with some African countries, pressed African states to join efforts to put pressure on North Korea, and enacted immigration policies that have affected U.S.-Africa policy, among other initiatives.


Question:
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), enacted in 1938, is the federal legislation that establishes the general minimum wage that must be paid to all covered workers. While the FLSA mandates broad minimum wage coverage, states have the option of establishing minimum wage rates that are different from those set in it. Under the provisions of the FLSA, an individual is generally covered by the higher of the state or federal minimum wage.
As of 2019, minimum wage rates are above the federal rate of $7.25 per hour in 29 states and the District of Columbia, ranging from $0.25 to $6.75 above the federal rate. Another 14 states have minimum wage rates equal to the federal rate. The remaining 7 states have minimum wage rates below the federal rate or do not have a state minimum wage requirement. In the states with no minimum wage requirements or wages lower than the federal minimum wage, only individuals who are not covered by the FLSA are subject to those lower rates.
In any given year, the exact number of states with a minimum wage rate above the federal rate may vary, depending on the interaction between the federal rate and the mechanisms in place to adjust the state minimum wage. Adjusting minimum wage rates is typically done in one of two ways: (1) legislatively scheduled rate increases that may include one or several increments; (2) a measure of inflation to index the value of the minimum wage to the general change in prices.
Of the 29 states and the District of Columbia with minimum wage rates above the federal rate, 9 currently have no scheduled increases beyond 2019, 3 states have legislatively scheduled rate increases after 2019, and 17 states and the District of Columbia have scheduled increases through a combination of planned increases and current- or future-year indexation of state minimum wage rates to a measure of inflation.
Because the federal and state minimum wage rates change at various times and in various increments, the share of the labor force for which the federal rate is the binding wage floor has changed over time. Since 1981, there have been three series of increases in the federal minimum wage rate—1990-1991, 1996-1997, and 2007-2009. During that same period, there have been numerous changes in state minimum wage policies. As a result of those interactions, the share of the U.S. civilian labor force living in states in which the federal minimum wage is the floor has fluctuated but generally declined, and is about 39% as of 2018.


Question:
This report discusses runaway and homeless youth, and the federal response to support this population. There is no single definition of the terms "runaway youth" or "homeless youth." However, both groups of youth share the risk of not having adequate shelter and other provisions, and may engage in harmful behaviors while away from a permanent home.
Youth most often cite family conflict as the major reason for their homelessness or episodes of running away. A youth's sexual orientation, sexual activity, school problems, and substance abuse are associated with family discord. The precise number of homeless and runaway youth is unknown due to their residential mobility and overlap among the populations. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is supporting data collection efforts, known as Voices of Youth Count, to better determine the number of homeless youth. The 2017 study found that approximately 700,000 youth ages 13 to 17 and 3.5 million young adults ages 18 to 25 experienced homelessness within a 12-month period because they were sleeping in places not meant for habitation, in shelters, or with others while lacking alternative living arrangements.
From the early 20th century through the 1960s, the needs of runaway and homeless youth were handled locally through the child welfare agency, juvenile justice courts, or both. The 1970s marked a shift toward federal oversight of programs that help youth who had run afoul of the law, including those who committed status offenses (i.e., a noncriminal act that is considered a violation of the law because of the youth's age). The Runaway Youth Act of 1974 was enacted as Title III of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (P.L. 93-415) to assist runaways through services specifically for this population. The act was amended over time to include homeless youth. It authorizes funding for services carried out under the Runaway and Homeless Youth Program (RHYP), which is administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The program was most recently authorized through FY2020 by the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-385). This law did not make other changes to the RHYP statute. Funding is discretionary, meaning provided through the appropriations process. FY2019 appropriations are $127.4 million.
The RHYP program is made up of three components: the Basic Center Program (BCP), Transitional Living Program (TLP), and Street Outreach Program (SOP). The BCP provides temporary shelter, counseling, and after care services to runaway and homeless youth under age 18 and their families. In FY2017, the program served 23,288 youth, and in FY2018 it funded 280 BCP shelters (most recent figures available). The TLP is targeted to older youth ages 16 through 22 (and sometimes an older age). In FY2017, the TLP program served 3,517 youth, and in FY2018 it funded 299 grantees (most recent figures available). Youth who use the TLP receive longer-term housing with supportive services. The SOP provides education, treatment, counseling, and referrals for runaway, homeless, and street youth who have been subjected to, or are at risk of being subjected to, sexual abuse, sex exploitation, and trafficking. In FY2017, the SOP grantees made contact with 24,366 youth.
The RHYP is a part of larger federal efforts to end youth homelessness through the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH). The USICH is a coordinating body made up of multiple federal agencies committed to addressing homelessness. The USICH's Opening Doors plan to end homelessness includes strategies for ending youth homelessness by 2020, including through collecting better data and supporting evidence-based practices to improve youth outcomes. Voices of Youth Count is continuing to report on characteristics of homeless youth. In addition to the RHYP, there are other federal supports to address youth homelessness. HUD's Youth Homelessness Demonstration Program is funding a range of housing options for youth, in selected urban and rural communities. Other federal programs have enabled homeless youth to access services, including those related to education and family violence.


Question:
In 1987, Congress enacted what is commonly known as the Farm Program Payments Integrity Act (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, P.L. 100-203, §§1301-1307), which requires that an individual or legal entity be "actively engaged in farming" (AEF) to be eligible for federal commodity revenue support programs. AEF requirements apply equally to U.S. citizens, resident aliens, and foreign entities. Designing a transparent and comprehensive AEF definition has proven difficult and has evolved over the years. The current set of laws and rules governing farm program eligibility—for both family and nonfamily members on farm operations—remain subject to considerable scrutiny and criticism from both rural and farm advocacy groups as well as certain Members of Congress. In particular, critics contend that current U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) eligibility criteria—especially for providing active personal management—remain broad and subjective and may represent a low threshold to qualify for payments, thus facilitating the creation of new farm operation members simply to expand an operation's farm payment receipts.
Three major categories of legal entities are subject to AEF requirement for program payment eligibility: an individual, a partnership, and a corporation.
An individual must meet three specific AEF criteria. First, independently and separately from other individuals with an interest in the farm business, the person makes a significant contribution to the operation of: (a) capital, equipment, or land; and (b) active personal labor and/or active personal management. Second, the person's share of profits or losses is commensurate with his/her contribution to the farming operation. Third, the person shares in the risk of loss from the farming operation.
An individual that meets the AEF criteria is eligible for farm program payments but subject to annual payment limits. If a married person meets the AEF requirements, any spouse will also be considered to have met the AEF requirements, thus effectively doubling the individual payment limit. Also, every family member 18 years or older who receives income based on the farm's operating results is deemed to meet the AEF requirements and is eligible for a separate payment limit. Another exception to AEF requirements is made for landowners provided they receive income based on the farm's operating results.
A general partnership is an association of multiple persons whereby each member is treated separately and individually for purposes of determining eligibility and payment limits. A partnership's potential payment limit is equal to the limit for a single person times the number of persons or legal entities that comprise the operation's ownership and meet the AEF requirements. Thus, adding a new member can potentially provide an additional payment limit. A corporation is an association of joint owners that is treated as a single person for purposes of determining eligibility and payment limits, provided that the entity meets the AEF and other eligibility criteria. Adding a new member generally does not affect a corporation's payment limit but only increases the number of members that can share a single payment limit.
In accordance with a provision in the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79; §1604), USDA added more specificity to the role that a nonfamily member of a partnership or joint venture must play to qualify for farm program benefits. However, considerable issues remain that may be of interest to Congress. Long-standing concerns remain that some farm operations are organized to overcome program payment limits and maximize the amount of their farm program payments. In particular, some advocacy groups suggest that USDA's new rule did not go far enough in tightening AEF criteria and that it continues to allow for a high number of farm managers and associated payment limits for both family and nonfamily farm operations.


Question:
The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), signed into law on February 9, 2018, created a joint select committee of the House and Senate. The Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform was to be made up of 16 Members from the House and Senate—4 chosen by each of the chambers' party leaders. The act charged the joint select committee with formulating recommendations and legislative language to "significantly reform the budget and appropriations process." The law directed the committee to make a report no later than November 30, 2018, to be submitted, along with legislative language, to the President, the Speaker of the House, and the majority and minority leaders of the House and Senate.
The act included procedures intended to allow the Senate to reach a timely vote on the question of whether or not to consider any legislation embodying the recommendations of the joint select committee. Under the terms of the act, the Senate would be able to vote on a motion to proceed to consider any reported joint committee bill before the conclusion of the 115th Congress (2017-2018). Consideration of the motion to proceed (and all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith) was to be limited to 10 hours, equally divided and controlled by the majority and minority leaders (or their designees) with support of at least three-fifths of the Senate (60 votes if there is no more than one vacancy) necessary to approve the motion. The act did not specify any procedures governing consideration of the bill once the Senate had agreed to take it up. There were also no provisions in the act concerning the consideration of the recommendations of the joint select committee in the House nor any provisions concerning resolving any differences between the House and Senate. Such actions would have occurred under the regular procedures of each chamber.
During its lifespan, the joint select committee held five days of hearings, taking testimony from 12 outside witnesses and 27 Members, including then-Speaker of the House Paul Ryan and then-House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi.
Formal and informal discussions among committee members resulted in draft legislation to be considered in a markup that concluded on November 29, 2018. The chief recommendation in the draft provided for the budget resolution to be adopted for a two-year cycle rather than the current annual cycle. By unanimous consent, the committee members applied a voting rule for the adoption of amendments consistent with the rule required by the act for final adoption of any recommendations requiring separate majorities of the appointees from each party. The final vote on reporting the bill as amended was not agreed to by a roll-call vote of one aye and seven noes of the Members appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Senate majority leader and seven ayes and zero noes of the Members appointed by the House minority leader and the Senate minority leader.


Question:
The 2007-2009 financial crisis highlighted the problem of "too big to fail" financial institutions—the concept that the failure of large financial firms could trigger financial instability, which in several cases prompted extraordinary federal assistance to prevent their failure. One pillar of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act's (P.L. 111-203) response to addressing financial stability and ending too big to fail is a new enhanced prudential regulatory (EPR) regime that applies to large banks and to nonbank financial institutions designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). Previously, FSOC had designated four nonbank SIFIs for enhanced prudential regulation, but all four have since been de-designated.
Under this regime, the Federal Reserve (Fed) is required to apply a number of safety and soundness requirements to large banks that are more stringent than those applied to smaller banks. These requirements are intended to mitigate systemic risk posed by large banks
Stress tests and capital planning ensure banks hold enough capital to survive a crisis. Living wills provide a plan to safely wind down a failing bank. Liquidity requirements ensure that banks are sufficiently liquid if they lose access to funding markets. Counterparty limits restrict the bank's exposure to counterparty default. Risk management requires publicly traded companies to have risk committees on their boards and banks to have chief risk officers. Financial stability requirements provide for regulatory interventions that can be taken only if a bank poses a threat to financial stability. Capital requirements under Basel III, an international agreement, require large banks hold more capital than other banks to potentially absorb unforeseen losses.
The Dodd-Frank Act automatically subjected all bank holding companies and foreign banks with more than $50 billion in assets to enhanced prudential regulation. In 2017, the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 115-174) created a more "tiered" and "tailored" EPR regime for banks. It automatically exempted domestic banks with assets between $50 billion and $100 billion (five at present) from enhanced regulation. The Fed has discretion to apply most individual enhanced prudential provisions to the 11 domestic banks with between $100 billion and $250 billion in assets on a case-by-case basis if it would promote financial stability or the institutions' safety and soundness, and has proposed exempting them from several EPR requirements. The eight domestic banks that have been designated as Global-Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) and the five banks with more than $250 billion in assets or $75 billion in cross-jurisdictional activity remain subject to all Dodd-Frank EPR requirements. In addition, the Fed has proposed applying some EPR requirements on a progressively tiered basis to the 23 foreign banks with over $50 billion in U.S. assets and $250 billion in global assets.
P.L. 115-174 also reduced the amount of capital that custody banks are required to hold against one of the EPR capital requirements, the supplementary leverage ratio (SLR). In addition, the Fed has issued a proposed rule that would reduce the amount of capital that G-SIBs are required to hold against the SLR. Finally, the Fed has proposed another rule that would combine capital planning under the stress tests with overall capital requirements for large banks.
Collectively, these proposed changes would reduce, to varying degrees, capital and other advanced EPR requirements for banks with more than $50 billion in assets. In the view of the banking regulators and the supporters of P.L. 115-174, these changes better tailor EPR to match the risks posed by large banks. Opponents are concerned that the additional systemic and prudential risks posed by these changes outweigh the benefits to society of reduced regulatory burden, believing that the benefits will mainly accrue to the affected banks.
The 2007-2009 financial crisis highlighted the problem of "too big to fail" financial institutions—the concept that the failure of large financial firms could trigger financial instability, which in several cases prompted extraordinary federal assistance to prevent their failure. One pillar of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act's (P.L. 111-203) response to addressing financial stability and ending too big to fail is a new enhanced prudential regulatory (EPR) regime that applies to large banks and to nonbank financial institutions designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). Previously, FSOC had designated four nonbank SIFIs for enhanced prudential regulation, but all four have since been de-designated.
Under this regime, the Federal Reserve (Fed) is required to apply a number of safety and soundness requirements to large banks that are more stringent than those applied to smaller banks. These requirements are intended to mitigate systemic risk posed by large banks
Stress tests and capital planning ensure banks hold enough capital to survive a crisis. Living wills provide a plan to safely wind down a failing bank. Liquidity requirements ensure that banks are sufficiently liquid if they lose access to funding markets. Counterparty limits restrict the bank's exposure to counterparty default. Risk management requires publicly traded companies to have risk committees on their boards and banks to have chief risk officers. Financial stability requirements provide for regulatory interventions that can be taken only if a bank poses a threat to financial stability. Capital requirements under Basel III, an international agreement, require large banks hold more capital than other banks to potentially absorb unforeseen losses.
The Dodd-Frank Act automatically subjected all bank holding companies and foreign banks with more than $50 billion in assets to enhanced prudential regulation. In 2017, the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 115-174) created a more "tiered" and "tailored" EPR regime for banks. It automatically exempted domestic banks with assets between $50 billion and $100 billion (five at present) from enhanced regulation. The Fed has discretion to apply most individual enhanced prudential provisions to the 11 domestic banks with between $100 billion and $250 billion in assets on a case-by-case basis if it would promote financial stability or the institutions' safety and soundness, and has proposed exempting them from several EPR requirements. The eight domestic banks that have been designated as Global-Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) and the five banks with more than $250 billion in assets or $75 billion in cross-jurisdictional activity remain subject to all Dodd-Frank EPR requirements. In addition, the Fed has proposed applying some EPR requirements on a progressively tiered basis to the 23 foreign banks with over $50 billion in U.S. assets and $250 billion in global assets.
P.L. 115-174 also reduced the amount of capital that custody banks are required to hold against one of the EPR capital requirements, the supplementary leverage ratio (SLR). In addition, the Fed has issued a proposed rule that would reduce the amount of capital that G-SIBs are required to hold against the SLR. Finally, the Fed has proposed another rule that would combine capital planning under the stress tests with overall capital requirements for large banks.
Collectively, these proposed changes would reduce, to varying degrees, capital and other advanced EPR requirements for banks with more than $50 billion in assets. In the view of the banking regulators and the supporters of P.L. 115-174, these changes better tailor EPR to match the risks posed by large banks. Opponents are concerned that the additional systemic and prudential risks posed by these changes outweigh the benefits to society of reduced regulatory burden, believing that the benefits will mainly accrue to the affected banks.


Question:
Fiscal policy is the means by which the government adjusts its spending and revenue to influence the broader economy. By adjusting its level of spending and tax revenue, the government can affect the economy by either increasing or decreasing economic activity in the short term. For example, when the government runs a budget deficit, it is said to be engaging in fiscal stimulus, spurring economic activity, and when the government runs a budget surplus, it is said to be engaging in a fiscal contraction, slowing economic activity.
The government can use fiscal stimulus to spur economic activity by increasing government spending, decreasing tax revenue, or a combination of the two. Increasing government spending tends to encourage economic activity either directly through purchasing additional goods and services from the private sector or indirectly by transferring funds to individuals who may then spend that money. Decreasing tax revenue tends to encourage economic activity indirectly by increasing individuals' disposable income, which tends to lead to those individuals consuming more goods and services. This sort of expansionary fiscal policy can be beneficial when the economy is in recession, as it lessens the negative impacts of a recession, such as elevated unemployment and stagnant wages. However, expansionary fiscal policy can result in rising interest rates, growing trade deficits, and accelerating inflation, particularly if applied during healthy economic expansions. These side effects from expansionary fiscal policy tend to partly offset its stimulative effects.
The government can use contractionary fiscal policy to slow economic activity by decreasing government spending, increasing tax revenue, or a combination of the two. Decreasing government spending tends to slow economic activity as the government purchases fewer goods and services from the private sector. Increasing tax revenue tends to slow economic activity by decreasing individuals' disposable income, likely causing them to decrease spending on goods and services. As the economy exits a recession and begins to grow at a healthy pace, policymakers may choose to reduce fiscal stimulus to avoid some of the negative consequences of expansionary fiscal policy, such as rising interest rates, growing trade deficits, and accelerating inflation, or to manage the level of public debt.
In recent history, the federal government has generally followed a pattern of increasing fiscal stimulus during a recession, then decreasing fiscal stimulus during the economic recovery. Prior to the "Great Recession" of 2007-2009 the federal budget deficit was about 1% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2007. During the recession, the budget deficit grew to nearly 10% of GDP in part due to additional fiscal stimulus applied to the economy. The budget deficit began shrinking in 2010, falling to about 2% of GDP by 2015. In contrast to the typical pattern of fiscal policy, the budget deficit began growing again in 2016, rising to nearly 4% of GDP in 2018 despite relatively strong economic conditions. This change in fiscal policy is notable, as expanding fiscal stimulus when the economy is not depressed can result in rising interest rates, a growing trade deficit, and accelerating inflation. As of publication of this report, interest rates have not risen discernibly and are still near historic lows, and inflation rates show no sign of acceleration. The trade deficit has been growing in recent years; however, it is not clear that this growth in the trade deficit is a result of increased fiscal stimulus.


Question:
Strong relations between the United States and Israel have led to bilateral cooperation in many areas. Matters of particular significance to U.S.-Israel relations include
Israel's ability to address the threats it faces in its region. Shared U.S.-Israel concerns about Iran and its allies on the nuclear issue and in Syria and Lebanon. Israeli-Palestinian issues. Israeli domestic political issues, including elections scheduled for 2019.
Israel relies on a number of strengths to manage potential threats to its security and existence. It maintains conventional military superiority relative to neighboring states and the Palestinians. It also takes measures to deter attack and defend its population and borders from evolving asymmetric threats such as rockets and missiles, cross-border tunneling, drones, and cyberattacks. Additionally, Israel has an undeclared but presumed nuclear weapons capability.
Against a backdrop of strong bilateral cooperation, Israel's leaders and supporters routinely make the case that Israel's security and the broader stability of the region remain critically important for U.S. interests. A 10-year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing annually from FY2019 to FY2028, along with additional amounts from Defense Department accounts for missile defense. All of these amounts remain subject to congressional appropriations.
Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu released new Israeli intelligence on Iran's nuclear program in April 2018, days before President Trump announced the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 international agreement that constrains Iran's nuclear activities. It is unclear whether Israel might take future military action in Iran if Iranian nuclear activities resume. Since 2018, Israel has conducted a number of military operations in Syria against Iran and its allies, including Lebanese Hezbollah. Israel and Iran also appear to be competing for military advantage over each other at the Israel-Lebanon border. Amid uncertainty in the area, in March 2019 President Trump recognized Israel's claim to sovereignty over the Golan Heights, changing long-standing U.S. policy that held—in line with U.N. Security Council Resolution 497 from 1981—the Golan was occupied Syrian territory whose final status was subject to Israel-Syria negotiation.
The prospects for an Israeli-Palestinian peace process are complicated by many factors. Palestinian leaders cut off high-level political contacts with the Trump Administration after it recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital in December 2017. U.S.-Palestinian tensions have since worsened amid U.S. cutoffs of funding to the Palestinians and diplomatic moves—including the May 2018 opening of the U.S. embassy to Israel in Jerusalem. Palestinian leaders interpreted these actions as prejudicing their claims to a capital in Jerusalem and to a just resolution of Palestinian refugee claims. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has welcomed these U.S. actions. The Trump Administration has suggested that it will release a proposed peace plan after Israeli elections, which are scheduled for April 9, 2019. Speculation continues about how warming ties between Israel and Arab Gulf states may affect Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, though Saudi Arabia said that the U.S. policy change on the Golan Heights would negatively affect the peace process. Bouts of tension and violence between Israel and Hamas in Gaza have continued—reportedly accompanied by indirect talks between the two parties that are being brokered by Egypt and aim for a long-term cease-fire.
Domestically, Israel is preparing for the April 9 elections, which are closely contested. Former top general Benny Gantz is combining with former Finance Minister Yair Lapid to challenge Netanyahu, whom the attorney general has recommended be indicted for corruption in three separate cases. The elections and subsequent government formation process will have significant implications for Israel's future leadership and policies.


Question:
Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) constitute the Army's "light" ground forces and are an important part of the nation's ability to project forces overseas. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as current thinking by Army leadership as to where and how future conflicts would be fought, suggest IBCTs are limited operationally by their lack of assigned transport and reconnaissance vehicles as well as firepower against hardened targets and armored vehicles.
There are three types of IBCTs: Light, Airborne, and Air Assault. Light IBCTs are primarily foot-mobile forces. Light IBCTs can move by foot, by vehicle, or by air (either air landed or by helicopter). Airborne IBCTs are specially trained and equipped to conduct parachute assaults. Air Assault IBCTs are specially trained and equipped to conduct helicopter assaults.
Currently, the Army contends IBCTs face a number of limitations
The IBCT lacks the ability to decisively close with and destroy the enemy under restricted terrains such as mountains, littorals, jungles, subterranean areas, and urban areas to minimize excessive physical burdens imposed by organic material systems. The IBCT lacks the ability to maneuver and survive in close combat against hardened enemy fortifications, light armored vehicles, and dismounted personnel. IBCTs lack the support of a mobile protected firepower capability to apply immediate, lethal, long-range direct fires in the engagement of hardened enemy bunkers, light armored vehicles, and dismounted personnel in machine gun and sniper positions; with all-terrain mobility and scalable armor protection; capable of conducting operations in all environments.
To address these limitations, the Army is undertaking three programs: the Ground Mobility Vehicle (GMV)/Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV), formerly known as the Ultra-Light Combat Vehicle (ULCV); the Light Reconnaissance Vehicle (LRV); and the Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF) programs. These programs would be based on vehicles that are commercially available. This approach serves to reduce costs and the time it takes to field combat vehicles.
The GMV/ISV is intended to provide mobility to the rifle squad and company. The LRV would provide protection to the moving force by means of scouts, sensors, and a variety of medium-caliber weapons, and the MPF would offer the IBCT the capability to engage and destroy fortifications, bunkers, buildings, and light-to-medium armored vehicles more effectively.
The FY2020 Army GMV budget request for $37 million in procurement funding supports the procurement of 69 GMVs for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and 15 ISVs for the Army. The FY2020 GMV Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) request is for $3 million to support operational testing. The Army did not submit a FY2020 budget request for the LRV program. The FY2020 Army MPF budget request for $310.152 million in RDT&E funding supports the continuation of rapid prototyping efforts and the completion of 24 prototypes.
Potential issues for Congress include the future of the LRV effort; Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) and GMV/ISV, LRV, and MPF requirements; and GMV/ISV, LRV, and MPF fielding plans.


Question:
The growth of the international insurance market and trade in insurance products and services has created opportunities and new policy issues for U.S. insurers, Congress, and the U.S. financial system. Insurance regulation is centered on the states, with the federal government having a limited role. Although the risks of loss and the regulation may be local, the business of insurance, as with many financial services, has an increasingly substantial international component as companies and investors look to grow and diversify.
The 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
The 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank; P.L. 111-203) enhanced the federal role in insurance markets through several provisions, including the Financial Stability Oversight Council's (FSOC's) ability to designate insurers as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs); Federal Reserve oversight of SIFIs and insurers with depository affiliates; and the creation of a Federal Insurance Office (FIO) inside the Department of the Treasury. Alongside FIO, Dodd-Frank defined a new class of international insurance agreements called covered agreements for recognition of prudential measures which the FIO and the United States Trade Representative (USTR) may negotiate with foreign entities. Although not a regulator, FIO has the authority to monitor the insurance industry and limited power to preempt state laws in conjunction with covered agreements. Dodd-Frank requires congressional consultations and a 90-day layover period for covered agreements, but such agreements do not require congressional approval.
International Insurance Stakeholders and Concerns
The international response to the financial crisis included the creation of a Financial Stability Board (FSB), largely made up of various countries' financial regulators, and increasing the focus of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) on creating regulatory standards, especially relating to insurer capital levels. The Federal Reserve and the FIO have assumed roles in the IAIS, whereas previously the individual states and the U.S. National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) had been the only U.S. members. Any agreements reached under the FSB or IAIS would have no legal impact in the United States until adopted in regulation by federal or state regulators or enacted into federal or state statute. Congress has little direct role in international regulatory cooperation agreements such as those reached at the FSB or IAIS, but past hearings and proposed legislation has addressed these issues.
The federal involvement in insurance issues has created frictions both among the federal entities and between the states and the federal entities, and it has been a subject of congressional hearings and legislation. The first covered agreement, between the United States and the European Union (EU), went into effect on September 22, 2017. The agreement was largely rejected by the states and the NAIC, with the insurance industry split in its support, or lack thereof, for the agreement. Treasury and USTR announced a second covered agreement, with the United Kingdom (UK), on December 11, 2018.
Congressional Outlook
The recently negotiated U.S.-UK covered agreement is currently in the 90-day layover period giving the 116th Congress the opportunity to conduct oversight or pass legislation affecting the agreement. Past Congresses have been interested in revisiting the Dodd-Frank authorities that created covered agreements and the current Congress may consider similar legislation. The potential impact of international organizations and standards on the U.S. insurance markets and the potential for new trade agreements may also be of congressional concern.


Question:
The Social Security program, enacted in 1935, has been amended numerous times. Lists and summaries of individual major Social Security amendments may illuminate the tone and context of the debate of the program in the House and Senate. Major statutory decisions made by Congress on the Social Security program, vote information, summaries of major legislative actions, and descriptions of floor amendments and congressional debate may be informative to current discussions of the Social Security program.
During the 115th Congress, lawmakers enacted several pieces of Social Security legislation that included the following:
P.L. 115-59, the Social Security Number Fraud Prevention Act of 2017, which restricted federal agencies from including any individual's Social Security number (SSN) on documents sent by mail; P.L. 115-165, the Strengthening Protections for Social Security Beneficiaries Act of 2018, which made a variety of changes to the Social Security Administration's (SSA's) representative payee program; P.L. 115-243, the Tribal Social Security Fairness Act of 2018, which allowed federally recognized Indian tribes to enter into voluntary agreements with SSA to extend Social Security coverage to tribal council members; and P.L. 115-174, the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and Consumer Protection Act, which required SSA to accept electronic signatures of individuals who consent to allow a financial institution to verify their name, SSN, and date of birth with the information contained in SSA's records.


Question:
The Older Americans Act (OAA) is the major vehicle for the delivery of social and nutrition services for older persons. The act's statutory funding formulas determine allotments to states and other entities under the following OAA Titles: Title III, Grants for State and Community Programs; Title V, the Community Service Senior Opportunities Act; Title VI, Grants for Older Native Americans; and Title VII, Vulnerable Elder Rights Protection Activities. This report describes the OAA statutory provisions that allocate funds to states and other entities under various titles of the act.
Title III accounts for 73% of the act's total FY2019 discretionary appropriations ($1.498 billion out of $2.055 billion). States receive separate allotments of funds for the following six programs authorized under Title III: (1) supportive services and senior centers, (2) congregate nutrition services, (3) home-delivered nutrition services, (4) the Nutrition Services Incentive Program (NSIP), (5) disease prevention and health promotion services, and (6) the National Family Caregiver Support Program (NFCSP). Formula grants are allotted from the Administration on Aging (AOA), within the Administration for Community Living (ACL) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), to State Units on Aging (SUAs) in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. territories. The states, in turn, award funds to approximately 629 Area Agencies on Aging (AAAs).
Title V authorizes the Community Service Employment for Older Americans Program (CSEOA). Administered by the Department of Labor (DOL), Title V is OAA's second-largest program and is the only federally subsidized employment program for low-income older persons. Its FY2019 funding of $400 million represents 20% of the act's total discretionary funding. DOL allocates Title V funds for grants to state agencies in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. territories, and to national grantees who are typically nonprofit organizations that operate in more than one state. The total Title V state allotment is the sum of its respective state agency grantee allotment and national grantee allotment.
Title VI authorizes funds for supportive and nutrition services to older Native Americans to promote the delivery of home and community-based supportive services, nutrition services, and family caregiver support. Funds are awarded directly to Indian tribal organizations, Alaskan Native organizations, and nonprofit groups representing Native Hawaiians.
Title VII authorizes the Long-Term Care (LTC) Ombudsman Program and elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation prevention programs. Most Title VII funding is directed at the LTC Ombudsman Program, the purpose of which is to investigate and resolve complaints of residents of nursing facilities and other long-term care facilities. Funds for LTC ombudsman and elder abuse prevention activities are allotted to all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. territories.
The Older Americans Act Reauthorization Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-144) authorizes appropriations for most OAA programs through FY2019. P.L. 114-144 also made changes to the statutory funding formulas for several programs under Title III of the act. Appendix A of the report provides a detailed legislative history of the Title III funding formula changes, including changes under P.L. 114-144, as well as the OAA reauthorizations of 2000 and 2006. Appendix B provides an analysis of the state-based population data for the U.S. population age 60 and older. Appendix C compares FY2016 allotment amounts for states and other entities with actual allotment amounts under the statutory funding formula change in P.L. 114-144 for FY2017 to FY2019 for Title III Parts B, C, and D programs.


Question:
Cluster munitions are air-dropped or ground-launched weapons that release a number of smaller submunitions intended to kill enemy personnel or destroy vehicles. Cluster munitions were developed in World War II and are part of many nations' weapons stockpiles. Cluster munitions have been used frequently in combat, including the early phases of the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cluster munitions have been highly criticized internationally for causing a significant number of civilian deaths, and efforts have been undertaken to ban and regulate their use. The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to view cluster munitions as a military necessity but in 2008 instituted a policy to reduce the failure rate of cluster munitions to 1% or less after 2018.
In November 2017, a new DOD policy was issued that essentially reversed the 2008 policy. Under the new policy, combatant commanders can use cluster munitions that do not meet the 1% or less unexploded submunitions standard in extreme situations to meet immediate warfighting demands. In addition, the new policy does not establish a deadline to replace cluster munitions exceeding the 1% rate and states that DOD "will retain cluster munitions currently in active inventories until the capabilities they provide are replaced with enhanced and more reliable munitions."
Potential issues for Congress include cluster munitions in an era of precision weapons, other weapons in lieu of cluster munitions, and the potential impact of DOD's 2017 revised cluster munitions policy.


Question:
Some observers perceive that after remaining generally stable for a period of about 70 years, the U.S. role in the world—meaning the overall character, purpose, or direction of U.S. participation in international affairs and the country's overall relationship to the rest of the world—is undergoing a potentially historic change. A change in the U.S. role in the world could have significant and even profound effects on U.S. security, freedom, and prosperity. It could significantly affect U.S. policy in areas such as relations with allies and other countries, defense plans and programs, trade and international finance, foreign assistance, and human rights.
The U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II in 1945 (i.e., over the past 70 years or so) is generally described as one of global leadership and significant engagement in international affairs. A key element of that role has been to defend and promote the liberal international order that the United States, with the support of its allies, created in the years after World War II. Other key elements have been to defend and promote freedom, democracy, and human rights as universal values, while criticizing and resisting authoritarian and illiberal forms of government where possible; and to oppose the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia or a spheres-of-influence world.
The fact that the U.S. role in the world has been generally stable over the past 70 years does not necessarily mean that this role was the right one for the United States, or that it would be the right one in the future. Although the role the United States has played in the world since the end of World War II has many defenders, it also has critics, and the merits of that role have been a matter of long-standing debate among foreign policy specialists, strategists, policymakers, and the public, with critics offering potential alternative concepts for the U.S. role in the world. One major dimension of the debate is whether the United States should attempt to continue playing the active internationalist role that it has played for the past 70 years, or instead adopt a more-restrained role that reduces U.S. involvement in world affairs. A number of critics of the U.S. role in the world over the past 70 years have offered multiple variations on the idea of a more-restrained U.S. role.
The overall issue for Congress is how to respond to recent developments regarding the U.S. role in the world. Potential key issues for Congress include but are not necessarily limited to the following:
Is the U.S. role changing, and if so, in what ways? Should the U.S. role change? Is a change of some kind in the U.S. role unavoidable? How are other countries responding to a possibly changed U.S. role? Is a changed U.S. role affecting world order? What implications might a changed U.S. role in the world have for Congress's role relative to that of the executive branch in U.S. foreign policymaking? How might the operation of democracy in the United States affect the U.S. role in the world, particularly in terms of defending and promoting democracy and criticizing and resisting authoritarian and illiberal forms of government? Would a change in the U.S. role be reversible, and if so, to what degree?
Congress's decisions on this issue could have significant implications for numerous policies, plans, programs, and budgets, and for the role of Congress relative to that of the executive branch in U.S. foreign policymaking.


Question:
The term child nutrition programs refers to several U.S. Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service (USDA-FNS) programs that provide food for children in institutional settings. These include the school meals programs—the National School Lunch Program and School Breakfast Program—as well as the Child and Adult Care Food Program, Summer Food Service Program, Special Milk Program, and Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program.
The most recent child nutrition reauthorization, the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (HHFKA; P.L. 111-296), made a number of changes to the child nutrition programs. In some cases, these changes spurred debate during the law's implementation, particularly in regard to updated nutrition standards for school meals and snacks. On September 30, 2015, some of the authorities created by the HHFKA expired. Efforts to reauthorize the child nutrition programs in the 114th Congress, while not completed, considered several related issues and prompted further discussion about the programs. There were no substantial reauthorization attempts in the 115th Congress.
Current issues discussed in this report include the following:
Nutrition standards for school meals and snacks. The HHFKA required USDA to update the nutrition standards for school meals and other foods sold in schools. USDA issued final rules on these standards in 2012 and 2016, respectively. Some schools had difficulty implementing the nutrition standards, and USDA and Congress have taken actions to change certain parts of the standards related to whole grains, sodium, and milk.
Offerings in the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program (FFVP). There have been debates recently over whether the FFVP should include processed and preserved fruits and vegetables, including canned, dried, and frozen items. Currently, statute permits only fresh offerings.
"Buy American" requirements for school meals. The school meals programs' authorizing laws require schools to source foods domestically, with some exceptions, under Buy American requirements. Efforts both to tighten and loosen these requirements have been made in recent years. The enacted 2018 farm bill (P.L. 115-334) instructed USDA to "enforce full compliance" with the Buy American requirements and report to Congress within 180 days of enactment.
Congregate feeding in summer meals. Under current law, children must consume summer meals on-site. This is known as the "congregate feeding" requirement. Starting in 2010, Congress funded demonstration projects, including the Summer Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) demonstration, to test alternatives to congregate feeding in summer meals. Congress has increased funding for Summer EBT in recent appropriations cycles and there have been discussions about whether to continue or expand the program.
Implementation of the Community Eligibility Provision (CEP). The HHFKA created CEP, an option for qualifying schools, groups of schools, and school districts to offer free meals to all students. Because income-based applications for school meals are no longer required in schools adopting CEP, its implementation has created data issues for federal and state programs relying on free and reduced-price lunch eligibility data.
Unpaid meal costs and "lunch shaming." The issue of students not paying for meals and schools' handling of these situations has received increasing attention. Some schools have adopted what some term as "lunch shaming" practices, including throwing away a student's selected hot meal and providing a cold meal alternative when a student does not pay. Congress and USDA have taken actions recently to reduce instances of student nonpayment and stigmatization.
Paid lunch pricing. One result of new requirements in the HHFKA was price increases for paid (full price) lunches in many schools. Attempts have been made—some successfully—to loosen these "paid lunch equity" requirements in recent years.


Question:
The National Popular Vote (NPV) initiative proposes an agreement among the states, an interstate compact that would effectively achieve direct popular election of the President and Vice President without a constitutional amendment. It relies on the Constitution's grant of authority to the states in Article II, Section 1 to appoint presidential electors "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.... " Any state that joins the NPV compact pledges that if the compact comes into effect, its legislature will award all the state's electoral votes to the presidential ticket that wins the most popular votes nationwide, regardless of who wins in that particular state. The compact would, however, come into effect only if its success has been assured; that is, only if states controlling a majority of electoral votes (270 or more) join the compact.
By early May 2019, 14 states and the District of Columbia had joined the compact. After early momentum—eight states and the District of Columbia joined the NPV Compact between 2007 and 2011—the pace of state accessions slowed through 2018. Since then, four additional states joined, bringing the total number of electoral votes controlled by NPV member states to 189. During the same period, legislation to join the compact had been introduced during the current session in at least one chamber of the legislature in 14 additional states that control an additional 150 electors.
The NPV initiative emerged following the presidential election of 2000, in which one ticket gained an electoral vote majority, winning the presidency, but received fewer popular votes than its opponents. NPV grew out of subsequent discussions among scholars and activists about how to avoid similar outcomes in the future and to achieve direct popular election.
Proponents of NPV assert that it would guarantee the presidential candidates who win the most popular votes nationwide will always win the presidency; that it would end the inequities of the general ticket/winner-take-all system of awarding electoral votes; and that candidates would extend their focus beyond winning the "battleground states," campaigning more widely and devoting greater attention to issues of concern to other parts of the country. They further assert that NPV would accomplish this while avoiding the exacting standards set for the proposal and ratification of constitutional amendments. Opponents argue that NPV would undermine the authority of states under the Constitution and the Founders' intention that presidential elections should be both national and federal contests; that it is an admitted "end run" around the Constitution that would circumvent the amendment process; and that it might actually lead to more disputed presidential elections characterized by politically contentious state recounts.
The NPV has also been debated on legal grounds. Some observers maintain that it must be approved by Congress, because it is an interstate compact that would affect key provisions of constitutional presidential election procedures. NPV Inc., the organization managing the initiative's advocacy campaign, responds that congressional approval is not necessary because NPV concerns the appointment of electors, a subject that falls within state constitutional authority, and that the Supreme Court has previously rejected arguments that similar compacts would impair the rights of nonmember states. Other critics claim that NPV might violate the Voting Rights Act by diluting minority voter influence and avoiding the recently invalidated preclearance requirement for election procedure changes in covered jurisdictions. In response, NPV Inc. has asserted that the compact is "entirely consistent with the goal of the Voting Rights Act."
This report monitors the NPV's progress in the states and will identify and analyze further developments as warranted.


Question:
The Railroad Retirement Board (RRB), an independent federal agency, administers retirement, survivor, disability, unemployment, and sickness insurance for railroad workers and their families. During FY2017, the RRB paid nearly $12.5 billion in retirement, disability, and survivor benefits to approximately 548,000 beneficiaries and paid $105.4 million in unemployment and sickness benefits to approximately 28,000 claimants. Of the total $12.5 billion benefit payments in the same fiscal year, 60.0% was paid to retired workers, 8.0% to disabled workers, 14.4% to spouses, and 16.8% to survivors.
The Railroad Retirement Act (RRA) authorizes retirement, disability, and survivor benefits for railroad workers and their families. RRA is financed primarily by payroll taxes, financial interchanges from Social Security, and transfers from the National Railroad Retirement Investment Trust (NRRIT). Railroad retirement payroll taxes have two tiers: the Tier I tax is essentially the same as the Social Security payroll tax and the Tier II tax is set each year based on the railroad retirement system's asset balances, benefit payments, and administrative costs. In FY2017, the gross RRA funding was about $12.7 billion.
Railroad retirement annuities are also divided into two tiers. Tier I annuities are designed to be nearly equivalent to Social Security benefits and are based on both railroad retirement and Social Security-covered employment. However, Tier I annuities are more generous than Social Security benefits in certain situations. For example, at the age of 60, railroad workers with at least 30 years of covered railroad work may receive unreduced retirement annuities. Tier II annuities are similar to private pensions and based solely on covered railroad service. Tier II annuities are paid in addition to Tier I annuities.
Railroad disability annuities may be payable to totally disabled railroad workers who are permanently disabled from all work and occupational disabled workers who are found to be permanently disabled from their regular railroad occupations. Eligible spouses and survivors of railroad workers may receive a certain portion of Tier I and Tier II benefits, but divorced spouses and surviving divorced spouses are eligible for only a certain portion of Tier I benefits.
The Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act (RUIA) authorizes unemployment and sickness benefits for railroad workers. RUIA is financed solely by railroad employers, whose contributions are based on the taxable earnings of their employees. Eligibility for railroad unemployment and sickness benefits is based on recent railroad service and earnings. The maximum daily unemployment and sickness benefit payable in the benefit year that began July 1, 2018, is $77, and the maximum benefit for a biweekly claim is $770. Normal benefits are paid for up to 26 weeks in a benefit year. The railroad unemployment and sickness system remains affected by sequestration, as unemployment benefits will continue to be reduced through at least September 30, 2019.


Question:
The Navy began procuring a small surface combatant called the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) in FY2005, and a total of 35 LCSs have been procured through FY2019, including three in FY2019. The total of 35 LCSs is three more than the 32 the Navy says are required under its 355-ship force-level goal. The Navy wants FY2019 to be the final year of LCS procurement, and it has not requested the procurement of any additional LCSs in its FY2020 budget submission.
The Navy wants to shift procurement of small surface combatants in FY2020 to a new frigate called the FFG(X). The Navy's proposed FY2020 budget requests funding for the procurement of the first FFG(X). Five industry teams are currently competing for the FFG(X) program. Two of these teams are offering designs for the FFG(X) that are modified versions of the two LCS designs that the Navy has procured in prior years. The other three industry teams are offering designs for the FFG(X) that are based on other existing ship designs. One of these three other industry teams is proposing to build its design at one of the LCS shipyards. The Navy plans to announce the outcome of the FFG(X) competition in the fourth quarter of FY2020. The FFG(X) program is covered in detail in another CRS report.
The Navy's 355-ship force-level goal is the result of a Force Structure Analysis (FSA) that the Navy conducted in 2016. The 2016 FSA established a force-level goal for a 355-ship Navy with 52 small surface combatants, including 32 LCSs and 20 frigates. The Navy conducts a new or updated FSA every few years, and is currently conducting a new FSA that is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2019. Navy officials have stated that this new FSA will likely not reduce the required number of small surface combatants, and might increase it. Navy officials have also suggested that the Navy in coming years may shift to a new fleet architecture that will include, among other thing, a larger proportion of small surface combatants.
The LCS is a relatively inexpensive surface combatant equipped with modular mission packages. The LCS program includes two very different LCS designs. One, called the LCS-1 or Freedom-class design, was developed by an industry team led by Lockheed. The other, called the LCS-2 or Independence-class design, was developed by an industry team that was then led by General Dynamics. LCS procurement has been divided more or less evenly between the two designs. The LCS-1 design is built at the Marinette Marine shipyard at Marinette, WI, with Lockheed as the prime contractor. The LCS-2 design is built at the Austal USA shipyard at Mobile, AL, with Austal USA as the prime contractor.
The LCS program has been controversial over the years due to past cost growth, design and construction issues with the first LCSs, concerns over the survivability of LCSs (i.e., their ability to withstand battle damage), concerns over whether LCSs are sufficiently armed and would be able to perform their stated missions effectively, and concerns over the development and testing of the modular mission packages for LCSs. The Navy's execution of the program has been a matter of congressional oversight attention for several years.
A current issue for Congress is whether to procure any LCSs in FY2020, and if so, how many. Opponents could argue that the total number of LCSs procured in prior years exceeds the Navy's stated requirement, and that adding funding to the Navy's FY2020 shipbuilding account for procuring one or more additional LCSs could reduce FY2020 funding for other Navy programs. Supporters could argue that procuring additional LCSs in FY2020 could provide a hedge against delays in the FFG(X) program and help the Navy achieve its small surface combatant force-level goal more quickly. Another issue for Congress concerns future workloads and employment levels at the two LCS shipyards if one or both of these yards are not involved in building FFG(X)s.


Question:
Review and rollback of Clean Air Act rules to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from power plants, cars and trucks, and the oil and gas sector has been a major focus of the Trump Administration since it took office in 2017. On March 28, 2017, President Trump signed Executive Order 13783, to require the review of regulations and policies that "burden the development or use of domestically produced energy resources." The E.O. directed the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to review the Clean Power Plan (CPP), which set limits on GHG emissions from existing power plants, and several other regulations for consistency with policies that the E.O. enumerates, and as soon as practicable, to "suspend, revise, or rescind the guidance, or publish for notice and comment proposed rules suspending, revising, or rescinding those rules." GHG rules for new power plants, for cars and trucks, and for methane emissions from the oil and gas industry, in addition to the CPP, are subject to the executive order and are under review at EPA, as well as being challenged in the courts.
The CPP, which was promulgated by the Obama Administration's EPA in 2015 and would limit GHG emissions from existing fossil-fueled power plants, has been one focus of debate. The Trump Administration's EPA has proposed to repeal the CPP and replace it with the Affordable Clean Energy rule (ACE), a rule that defines the "best system of emission reduction" for coal-fired power plant GHGs as efficiency improvement technologies. As proposed, the CPP repeal and ACE rules would remove federal numerical carbon dioxide (CO2) emission limits for existing coal- and natural gas-fired power plants, eliminating one backstop on power plant GHG emissions. Final agency action on ACE is expected later this year. Some Members of Congress have submitted comments to EPA on the ACE proposal. Congress may be interested in conducting oversight of the ACE rule.
Clean Air Act GHG standards for cars and light trucks are the subject of another EPA review. An August 2018 proposal would freeze EPA's GHG standards for new cars and light trucks at the level required in model year (MY) 2020. Current regulations, promulgated in 2012 and reaffirmed in January 2017, set increasingly stringent emission standards through MY2025. The EPA proposal would cause a projected increase in vehicle fuel consumption of about a half million barrels of gasoline per day (equivalent to about 186,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide per day) when fully implemented, according to EPA and the Department of Transportation. The proposal would also withdraw California's Clean Air Act waiver for new vehicle GHG standards applicable to MY2021-MY2025. The California standards have been adopted by 12 other states and cover about 35% of the new vehicle market.
Following promulgation of these or other Clean Air Act regulations, Congress could address the issues through legislation affirming, modifying, or overturning them. The threat of a filibuster, requiring 60 votes to proceed, however, has generally prevented Senate action. In the 116th Congress, the new majority in the House has indicated a greater interest in addressing climate change issues rather than rolling back regulations. One result may be a new focus on oversight of agency actions to address climate change and its impacts.
The 116th Congress may also be interested in issues related to EPA air quality standards for what are called "conventional" or "criteria" pollutants. EPA faces statutory deadlines to complete reviews of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for the two most widespread of this group: ozone and particulate matter (PM). The agency has proposed to speed up the review process, while simultaneously eliminating the scientific review panels that have historically assisted agency staff in conducting the reviews. The Clean Air Act has minimal requirements for how the agency is to conduct NAAQS reviews, leaving the details to the EPA Administrator. Nevertheless, congressional oversight is considered possible as EPA moves forward with the ozone and PM reviews.
Other issues Congress might consider include air toxics regulations (e.g., the Mercury and Air Toxics rule for power plants), standards for new residential wood heaters, and the Renewable Fuel Standard.


Question:
China's actions in recent years in the South China Sea (SCS)—particularly its island-building and base-construction activities at sites that it occupies in the Spratly Islands—have heightened concerns among U.S. observers that China is rapidly gaining effective control of the SCS, an area of strategic, political, and economic importance to the United States and its allies and partners, particularly those in the Indo-Pacific region. U.S. Navy Admiral Philip Davidson, in his responses to advance policy questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee for an April 17, 2018, hearing to consider his nomination to become Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), stated that "China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States." Chinese control of the SCS—and, more generally, Chinese domination of China's near-seas region, meaning the SCS, the East China Sea (ECS), and the Yellow Sea—could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere.
China is a party to multiple territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS, including, in particular, disputes with multiple neighboring countries over the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, and Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, and with Japan over the Senkaku Islands in the ECS. Up through 2014, U.S. concern over these disputes centered more on their potential for causing tension, incidents, and a risk of conflict between China and its neighbors in the region, including U.S. allies Japan and the Philippines and emerging partner states such as Vietnam. While that concern remains, particularly regarding the potential for a conflict between China and Japan involving the Senkaku Islands, U.S. concern since 2014 (i.e., since China's island-building activities in the Spratly Islands were first publicly reported) has shifted increasingly to how China's strengthening position in the SCS may be affecting the risk of a U.S.-China crisis or conflict in the SCS and the broader U.S.-Chinese strategic competition.
In addition to territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS, China is involved in a dispute, particularly with the United States, over whether China has a right under international law to regulate the activities of foreign military forces operating within China's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The position of the United States and most other countries is that while international law gives coastal states the right to regulate economic activities (such as fishing and oil exploration) within their EEZs, it does not give coastal states the right to regulate foreign military activities in the parts of their EEZs beyond their 12-nautical-mile territorial waters. The position of China and some other countries (i.e., a minority group among the world's nations) is that UNCLOS gives coastal states the right to regulate not only economic activities, but also foreign military activities, in their EEZs. The dispute appears to be at the heart of multiple incidents between Chinese and U.S. ships and aircraft in international waters and airspace since 2001, and has potential implications not only for China's EEZs, but for U.S. naval operations in EEZs globally, and for international law of the sea.
A key issue for Congress is how the United States should respond to China's actions in the SCS and ECS—particularly its island-building and base-construction activities in the Spratly Islands—and to China's strengthening position in the SCS. A key oversight question for Congress is whether the Trump Administration has an appropriate strategy—and an appropriate amount of resources for implementing that strategy—for countering China's "salami-slicing" strategy or gray zone operations for gradually strengthening its position in the SCS, for imposing costs on China for its actions in the SCS and ECS, and for defending and promoting U.S. interests in the region.


Question:
On January 7, 2018, World Bank President Jim Yong Kim announced that he would resign by February 1, three years before the expiration of his second five-year term in 2022. Following his resignation, Dr. Kim is to join Global Infrastructure Partners (GIP), a private equity fund that invests in projects in advanced and developing countries. Prior to his nomination to the World Bank by President Barack Obama in 2012, Dr. Kim served as the president of Dartmouth College.
The nomination period for the next president ends on March 14, after which the Executive Board is to select three candidates for interviews. To date, the only candidate is David Malpass, the Treasury Department's Under Secretary for International Affairs, nominated by President Trump on February 6, 2019. Following the interviews, the Executive Board is to select the next president, something which it aims to do before the spring meetings in April 2019.
Since its founding after World War II, the presidency of the World Bank has been held by a citizen of the United States, the Bank's largest shareholder. According to an informal agreement among World Bank member countries, a U.S. candidate is chosen as the president of the World Bank and a European candidate (typically French or German) is appointed as the managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The formal requirement for the selection of the World Bank president is that the executive directors appoint, by at least a 50% majority, an individual who is neither a member of the Board of Governors nor Board of Executive Directors. There are no requirements on how individuals are selected, on what criteria, or by what process they are vetted. Although the executive directors may select the IMF managing director by a simple majority vote, they historically aim to reach agreement by consensus. With these factors combined, the custom guaranteeing European leadership at the IMF and American leadership at the World Bank has remained in place.
This custom has been subject to increasing criticism during the past two decades. The first line of criticism is directed at the current distribution of voting power, which critics contend does not account for the increasing integration of developing countries into the global economy. A second line of criticism is directed at the method of selecting World Bank and IMF leadership, which critics argue elevates nationality above merit and undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of the institutions. Calls for a more open, transparent, and merit-based leadership selection process have been made consistently in the past, and at times have been incorporated into communiqués of various summits, but have yet to change the leadership selection process at either institution.


Question:
Kuwait has been pivotal to the decades-long U.S. effort to secure the Persian Gulf region because of its consistent cooperation with U.S. military operations in the region and its key location in the northern Gulf. Kuwait and the United States have a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), under which the United States maintains over 13,000 military personnel in country and prepositioned military equipment in Kuwait to project power in the region. Only Germany, Japan, and South Korea host more U.S. troops than does Kuwait, which hosts the operational command center for U.S.-led Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) that has combatted the Islamic State.
Kuwait usually acts in concert not only with the United States but also with allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman). Kuwait is participating militarily in the Saudi-led coalition that is trying to defeat the Shia "Houthi" rebel movement in Yemen, but Kuwait tends to favor mediation of regional issues over the use of military force. Kuwait is trying to mediate a resolution of the intra-GCC rift that erupted in June 2017 when Saudi Arabia and the UAE moved to isolate Qatar. Kuwait has refrained from intervening in Syria's civil war, instead hosting donor conferences for victims of the Syrian civil conflict, Iraq's recovery from the Islamic State challenge, and the effects of regional conflict on Jordan's economy. Kuwait generally supports U.S. efforts to counter Iran and has periodically arrested Kuwaiti Shias that the government says are spying for Iran, but it also engages Iran at high levels. U.S. government reports have praised recent steps by Kuwait to counter the financing of terrorism, but reports persist that wealthy Kuwaitis are still able to donate to extreme Islamist factions in the region. Kuwait has consistently engaged the post-Saddam governments in Baghdad in part to prevent any repeat of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
Experts have long assessed Kuwait's political system as a potential regional model for its successful incorporation of secular and Islamist political factions, both Shia and Sunni. However, this assessment has evolved since 2011 because Kuwait has followed other GCC states in incarcerating and revoking the citizenship of social media and other critics. Kuwait's political stability has not been in question but long-standing parliamentary opposition to the ruling Sabah family's political dominance has broadened in recent years to visible public pressure for political and economic reform. Parliamentary elections in July 2013 produced a National Assembly amenable to working with the ruling family, but the subsequent elections held in November 2016 returned to the body Islamist and liberal opponents of the Sabah family who held sway in earlier assemblies. Assembly oppositionist challenges to government policy led to a cabinet resignation in early November 2017, although the current cabinet does not differ much from the previous cabinet on key policy questions. Kuwait has increased its efforts to curb trafficking in persons over the past few years.
Years of political paralysis contributed to economic stagnation relative to Kuwait's more economically vibrant Gulf neighbors such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Like the other GCC states, Kuwait has struggled with reduced income from oil exports during 2014-2018. Kuwait receives negligible amounts of U.S. foreign assistance, and has offset some of the costs of U.S. operations in the region since Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait.


Question:
Georgia is one of the United States' closest partners among the states that gained their independence after the USSR collapsed in 1991. With a history of strong economic aid and security cooperation, the United States has deepened its strategic partnership with Georgia since Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia and 2014 invasion of Ukraine. U.S. policy expressly supports Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, and Georgia is a leading recipient of U.S. aid to Europe and Eurasia.
Many observers consider Georgia to be one of the most democratic states in the post-Soviet region, even as the country faces ongoing governance challenges. The center-left Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia party (GD) has close to a three-fourths supermajority in parliament and governs with limited checks and balances. Although Georgia faces high rates of poverty and underemployment, its economy in 2017 and 2018 appeared to show stronger growth than it had in the previous four years.
The GD led a coalition to victory in parliamentary elections in 2012 amid growing dissatisfaction with the former ruling party, Mikheil Saakashvili's center-right United National Movement, which came to power as a result of Georgia's 2003 Rose Revolution. In August 2008, Russia went to war with Georgia to prevent Saakashvili's government from reestablishing control over the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which broke away from Georgia in the early 1990s and became informal Russian protectorates.
Congress has expressed firm support for Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-44, Title II, §253) states that the United States "does not recognize territorial changes effected by force, including the illegal invasions and occupations" of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and other territories occupied by Russia. In September 2016, the House of Representatives passed H.Res. 660, which condemns Russia's military intervention and occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In February 2019, the Georgia Support Act (H.R. 598), which originally passed the House by unanimous consent in the 115th Congress (H.R. 6219), was reintroduced in the 116th Congress. The act would express support for Georgia's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, as well as for its democratic development, Euro-Atlantic integration, and peaceful conflict resolution in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The United States provides substantial foreign and military aid to Georgia each year. Since 2010, U.S. nonmilitary aid to Georgia has totaled around $64 million a year on average, in addition to a five-year Millennium Challenge Corporation grant of $140 million to support education. In FY2019, Congress appropriated almost $90 million in nonmilitary aid to Georgia. Since 2010, U.S. military aid to Georgia has been estimated at around $68 million a year on average. In FY2019, Congress appropriated $35 million in Foreign Military Financing and $2 million in International Military Education and Training funds. Defense assistance also includes a three-year, $35 million training initiative, the Georgia Defense Readiness Program.


Question:
Over the years, many Members of Congress have demonstrated an ongoing interest in the role and effectiveness of the United Nations (U.N.) Human Rights Council (the Council). The Council is the primary intergovernmental body mandated with addressing human rights on a global level. During the Obama Administration and the first part of the Trump Administration, the United States served three terms as a Council member. In June 2018, Trump Administration officials announced U.S. withdrawal from the Council, noting concerns with the Council's focus on Israel, overall ineffectiveness in addressing human rights issues, and lack of comprehensive reform.
Background
The U.N. General Assembly established the Human Rights Council in 2006 to replace the Commission on Human Rights, which was criticized for its apparent ineffectiveness in addressing human rights abuses and for the number of widely perceived human rights abusers that served as its members. Since 2006, many governments and observers have expressed serious concerns with the Council's disproportionate attention to Israel and apparent lack of attention to other pressing human rights situations. In particular, some criticize the inclusion of the "human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories" (Israel) as a permanent item on the Council's agenda. No other country-specific human rights situation is singled out in this manner. Some are also concerned that countries widely perceived as human rights abusers, such as Saudi Arabia, China, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, serve as Council members. On the other hand, supporters argue that the Council is an improvement over the previous commission. They contend that the Council's Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process, which aims to evaluate each member state's fulfillment of its human rights obligations, is an effective means for addressing human rights issues in various countries. Many proponents of the Council are encouraged by its increased attention to human rights situations in countries such as Iran, North Korea, and Syria.
U.S. Policy
Over the years, U.S. policymakers have debated U.S. participation in and funding of the Human Rights Council. The George W. Bush Administration voted against the General Assembly resolution creating the Council and did not run for membership; it also decided to withhold U.S. funding to the organization in FY2008 under a provision enacted by Congress. Conversely, the Obama Administration supported the overall purpose of the Council and decided that it was better to work from within as a Council member to improve its effectiveness. The Obama Administration was also critical of the Council's focus on Israel, sometimes boycotting debates on the issue. The United States was elected to the Council in 2009 and in 2012. In October 2016, it was elected for a third term, which began in January 2017. The United States remained a member during the Trump Administration until mid-2018, when it announced its withdrawal. The Administration also withheld Council funding in FY2017 and FY2018.
Some Members of Congress maintain an ongoing interest in the credibility and effectiveness of the Council. Members have been particularly critical of both the Council's focus on Israel and lack of competitive Council elections. Some Members have proposed or enacted legislation calling for U.S. withdrawal; at the same time, others have introduced legislation urging the Council to address specific human rights situations. Most recently, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6 ), prohibits Council funding unless the Secretary of State determines that U.S. participation is important to the national interest of the United States, and that the Council is taking steps to remove Israel as a permanent agenda item and ensure the integrity of Council elections.


Question:
The Constitution grants Congress the sole authority over the regulation of foreign commerce. Over the past several decades, Congress has authorized the President to adjust tariffs and other trade restrictions in certain circumstances through specific trade laws. Using these delegated authorities under three trade laws, President Trump has imposed increased tariffs, largely in the range of 10% - 25%, on a variety of U.S. imports to address concerns related to national security, injury to competing industries, and China's trade practices on forced technology transfer and intellectual property rights, among other issues. Several U.S. trade partners argue that these tariff actions violate existing U.S. commitments under multilateral and bilateral or regional trade agreements and have imposed tariffs on U.S. exports in retaliation. Congress continues to actively examine and debate these tariffs, and several bills have been introduced either to expand, limit, or revise existing authorities.
U.S. Trade Laws Authorizing the President's Tariff Actions
The President's recent tariff actions raise a number of significant issues for Congress. These issues include the economic effects of tariffs on firms, farmers, and workers, and the overall U.S. economy, the appropriate use of delegated authorities in line with congressional intent, and the potential implications and impact of these measures for broader U.S. trade policy, particularly with respect to the U.S. role in the global trading system.
The products affected by the tariff increases include washing machines, solar products, steel, aluminum, and numerous imports from China. Retaliatory tariffs are affecting several U.S. exports, including agricultural products such as soybeans and pork, motor vehicles, steel, and aluminum. Using 2017 values, U.S. imports subject to the increased tariffs accounted for 12% of annual U.S. imports, while exports subject to retaliatory tariffs accounted for 8% of annual U.S. exports. A pending Section 232 investigation on motor vehicle and parts imports could result in increased tariffs on more than $360 billion of imports, and the President has stated that additional tariffs could be imposed on imports from China absent a negotiated agreement to address certain Chinese trade practices of longstanding concern to the United States.
Although the consensus among most economists is that the tariffs are likely to have a negative effect on the U.S. economy overall, they may have both costs and benefits across different market sectors and actors. Import tariffs are effectively a tax on domestic consumption and thus increase costs for U.S. consumers and downstream industries that use products subject to tariffs. Retaliatory tariffs create disadvantages for U.S. exports in foreign markets, and can lead to fewer sales of U.S. products abroad and depressed prices. However, domestic producers who compete with affected imports can benefit by being able to charge higher prices for their goods. The Administration also argues the tariffs may have an indirect benefit if they result in tariff reductions by U.S. trading partners and lead to resolution of U.S. trade concerns affecting key sectors of the U.S. economy. Economic analyses of the tariff actions estimate a range of potential effects, but generally suggest a 0.1%-0.2% reduction in U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) growth annually owing to the actions to date. The economic effects of the President's actions are likely to be central to ongoing congressional debate on legislation to alter the President's tariff authority.


Question:
This report provides information on the ongoing crisis in Yemen. Now in its fifth year, the war in Yemen shows no signs of abating. The war has killed thousands of Yemenis, including combatants as well as civilians, and has significantly damaged the country's infrastructure. The difficulty of accessing certain areas of Yemen has made it problematic for governments and aid agencies to count the war's casualties. One U.S. and European-funded organization, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), estimates that 60,000 Yemenis have been killed since January 2016.
Though fighting continues along several fronts, on December 13, 2018, Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Yemen Martin Griffiths brokered a cease-fire centered on the besieged Red Sea port city of Hudaydah, Yemen's largest port. As part of the deal, the coalition and the Houthis agreed to redeploy their forces outside Hudaydah city and port. The United Nations agreed to chair a Redeployment Coordination Committee (RCC) to monitor the cease-fire and redeployment. On January 16, the United Nations Security Council (UNSCR) passed UNSCR 2452, which authorized (for a six-month period) the creation of the United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA), of which the RCC is a significant component. As of late March 2019, the Stockholm Agreement remains unfulfilled, although U.N. officials claim that the parties have made "significant progress towards an agreement to implement phase one of the redeployments of the Hudayda agreement."
Although both the Obama and Trump Administrations have called for a political solution to the conflict, the two sides in Yemen appear to fundamentally disagree over the framework for a potential political solution. The Saudi-led coalition demands that the Houthi militia disarm, relinquish its heavy weaponry (ballistic missiles and rockets), and return control of the capital, Sanaa, to the internationally recognized government of President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who is in exile in Saudi Arabia. The coalition asserts that there remains international consensus for these demands, insisting that the conditions laid out in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2216 (April 2015) should form the basis for a solution to the conflict. The Houthis reject UNSCR 2216 and seem determined to outlast their opponents while consolidating their control over northern Yemen. Since the December 2017 Houthi killing of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, a former Houthi ally, there is no apparent single Yemeni rival to challenge Houthi rule in northern Yemen. Armed groups, including Islamist extremists, operate in other parts of the country, and rival political movements and trends advance competing visions for the long-term reestablishment of national governance in the country. The reconciliation of Yemeni factions and the redefinition of the country's political system, security sector, and social contract will likely require years of additional diplomatic engagement.
According to the United Nations, Yemen's humanitarian crisis is the worst in the world, with close to 80% of Yemen's population of nearly 30 million needing some form of assistance. Two-thirds of the population is considered food insecure; one-third is suffering from extreme levels of hunger; and the United Nations estimates that 230 out of Yemen's 333 districts are at risk of famine. In sum, the United Nations notes that humanitarian assistance is "increasingly becoming the only lifeline for millions of Yemenis."
For additional information on Yemen, including a summary of relevant legislation, please see CRS Report R45046, Congress and the War in Yemen: Oversight and Legislation 2015-2019, by Jeremy M. Sharp and Christopher M. Blanchard.