Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

NIH's success depends on its ability to attract, retain, develop, and otherwise support biomedical investigators—including those employed in its intramural research program as well as those working in its extramural program at universities, academic health centers, and other research institutions. For decades, the agency has faced challenges in supporting early career investigators and those from underrepresented groups, including ethnic and racial minorities and women. The 21st Century Cures Act included provisions that NIH coordinate policies and programs to promote early research independence and enhance the diversity of the scientific workforce.
The act also contained a provision that GAO examine NIH's efforts. GAO reviewed the actions NIH has taken to support (1) investigators beginning their biomedical careers; and (2) investigators from underrepresented groups and women. GAO analyzed NIH data from fiscal years 2013 through 2017 on grant funding for investigators by career phase and demographic status. GAO also reviewed relevant laws and NIH policies, programs, and initiatives, and interviewed NIH officials and stakeholders from the scientific research community.

What GAO Found

The National Institutes of Health (NIH), within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), plays a prominent role in the nation's biomedical research. While it employs investigators in its intramural research program, over 80 percent of its budget supports its extramural program, primarily through grant funding to investigators at other research institutions. Given this, NIH has a vested interest in supporting a robust national biomedical workforce, but the agency has acknowledged that the environment is highly competitive and many investigators find that it takes years to obtain the type and amount of funding that typically spurs research independence. GAO's analysis found that extramural investigators who had received at least one large NIH research grant during fiscal years 2013 through 2017 were more likely to receive such grants in subsequent application cycles than investigators who had not yet received such grants. In response to the 21st Century Cures Act, enacted in December 2016, NIH introduced an initiative to prioritize these grants for (1) early stage investigators, who are beginning their careers and have never received a large research grant, and (2) intermediate stage investigators, who are within 10 years of receiving their first large grant as an early stage investigator. However, it is too early to assess this new initiative, which was introduced in August 2017. NIH is currently considering revising the program to include investigators whose careers are more advanced.
NIH implemented recommendations made by internal advisory bodies to support investigators from racial and ethnic groups considered by NIH to be underrepresented in biomedical research. GAO's analysis shows disparities for underrepresented racial and ethnic groups, and for female investigators, from 2013 through 2017. For example, in 2017, about 17 percent of investigators from underrepresented racial groups—African Americans, American Indians/Alaska Natives, and Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islanders combined—who applied for large grants received them. In contrast, about 24 percent of Hispanic or Latino applicants, an underrepresented ethnic group, received such grants. Asians and whites—well represented groups—were successful in receiving large grants about 24 and 27 percent of the time, respectively. Though women represent about half of all doctorates in biological science, GAO found that women investigators employed by NIH in its intramural program comprised about one-quarter of tenured investigators. NIH has taken positive steps such as establishing the position of Chief Officer of Scientific Workforce Diversity, who in turn created a strategic workforce diversity plan, which applies to both extramural and intramural investigators. The plan includes five broad goals for expanding and supporting these investigators. However, NIH has not developed quantitative metrics, evaluation details, or specific time frames by which it could measure the agency's progress against these goals.

What GAO Recommends

The Director of NIH should develop quantitative metrics, evaluation details, and time frames to assess NIH's efforts to diversify its scientific workforce against its diversity strategic plan goals, and take action as needed. HHS agreed with GAO's recommendation.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Covered entities can provide 340B drugs to eligible patients and generate revenue by receiving reimbursement from patients' insurance. The number of pharmacies covered entities have contracted with has increased from about 1,300 in 2010 to nearly 20,000 in 2017. GAO was asked to provide information on the use of contract pharmacies. Among other things, this report: 1) describes financial arrangements selected covered entities have with contract pharmacies; 2) describes the extent that selected covered entities provide discounts on 340B drugs dispensed by contract pharmacies to low-income, uninsured patients; and 3) examines HRSA's efforts to ensure compliance with 340B Program requirements at contract pharmacies. GAO selected and reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 30 contracts between covered entities and pharmacies, 20 HRSA audit files, and 55 covered entities to obtain variation in the types of entities and other factors. GAO also interviewed officials from HRSA and 10 covered entities.

What GAO Found

The 340B Drug Pricing Program (340B Program), which is administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), requires drug manufacturers to sell outpatient drugs at a discount to covered entities so that their drugs can be covered by Medicaid. Covered entities include certain hospitals and federal grantees (such as federally qualified health centers). About one-third of the more than 12,000 covered entities contract with outside pharmacies—contract pharmacies—to dispense drugs on their behalf. GAO's review of 30 contracts found that all but one contract included provisions for the covered entity to pay the contract pharmacy a flat fee for each eligible prescription. The flat fees generally ranged from $6 to $15 per prescription, but varied by several factors, including the type of drug or patient's insurance status. Some covered entities also agreed to pay pharmacies a percentage of revenue generated by each prescription.
Thirty of the 55 covered entities GAO reviewed reported providing low-income, uninsured patients discounts on 340B drugs at some or all of their contract pharmacies. Of the 30 covered entities that provided discounts, 23 indicated that they pass on the full 340B discount to patients, resulting in patients paying the 340B price or less for drugs. Additionally, 14 of the 30 covered entities said they determined patients' eligibility for discounts based on whether their income was below a specified level, 11 reported providing discounts to all patients, and 5 determined eligibility for discounts on a case-by-case basis.
GAO found weaknesses in HRSA's oversight that impede its ability to ensure compliance with 340B Program requirements at contract pharmacies, such as:
HRSA audits do not fully assess compliance with the 340B Program prohibition on duplicate discounts for drugs prescribed to Medicaid beneficiaries. Specifically, manufacturers cannot be required to provide both the 340B discount and a rebate through the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program. However, HRSA only assesses the potential for duplicate discounts in Medicaid fee-for-service and not Medicaid managed care. As a result, it cannot ensure compliance with this requirement for the majority of Medicaid prescriptions, which occur under managed care.
HRSA requires covered entities that have noncompliance issues identified during an audit to assess the full extent of noncompliance. However, because HRSA does not require all the covered entities to explain the methodology they used for determining the extent of the noncompliance, it does not know the scope of the assessments and whether they are effective at identifying the full extent of noncompliance.
HRSA does not require all covered entities to provide evidence that they have taken corrective action and are in compliance with program requirements prior to closing the audit. Instead, HRSA generally relies on each covered entity to self-attest that all audit findings have been addressed and that the entity came into compliance with 340B Program requirements.
Given these weaknesses, HRSA does not have a reasonable assurance that covered entities have adequately identified and addressed noncompliance with 340B Program requirements.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making seven recommendations, including that HRSA's audits assess for duplicate discounts in Medicaid managed care, and HRSA require information on how entities determined the scope of noncompliance and evidence of corrective action prior to closing audits. HHS agreed with four of the recommendations, but disagreed with three recommendations, which GAO continues to believe are warranted to improve HRSA's oversight as explained in the report.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

As the peer support workforce has grown, there has been increased attention to standardizing the competencies of peer support specialists through certification.
The 21st Century Cures Act included a provision for GAO to conduct a study to identify best practices related to training and certification in peer support programs in selected states that receive funding from SAMHSA. This report, among other things, describes leading practices for certifying peer support specialists identified by program officials in selected states.
GAO interviewed state program officials in six selected states and reviewed online, publicly available information about their peer support programs. GAO selected the states in part based on the state's certification program being well-established (at least 2 years old), use of SAMHSA funding for peer support, and stakeholder recommendations. The six selected states—Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas--are among the 41 states and the District of Columbia that, as of July 2016, had programs to certify peer support specialists. In addition to the state program officials, GAO interviewed SAMHSA officials and 10 stakeholders familiar with peer support specialist certification, including mental health researchers and officials from training organizations, among others.
GAO provided a draft of this report to HHS for review and comment. The Department did not have any comments.

What GAO Found

According to officials from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), shortages in the behavioral health workforce are a key reason that individuals with mental illnesses do not receive needed treatment. In recent years, there has been an increased focus on using peer support specialists—individuals who use their own experience recovering from mental illness to support others—to help address these shortages. Program officials GAO interviewed in selected states generally cited six leading practices for certifying that peer support specialists have a basic set of competencies and have demonstrated the ability to support others.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Congress established the RFS in 2005 and expanded it 2 years later. The RFS generally mandates that transportation fuels—typically gasoline and diesel—sold in the United States contain increasing amounts of biofuels. In addition, the RFS is designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by replacing petroleum-based fuels with biofuels expected to have lower associated greenhouse gas emissions. The most common biofuel currently produced in the United States is corn-starch ethanol, distilled from the sugars in corn. EPA uses RINs associated with biofuels blended with petroleum-based fuels to regulate compliance with the program.
In 2014, GAO found that refiners' costs for complying with the RFS had increased, and in 2016, GAO found that greenhouse gas emissions are unlikely to be reduced to the extent anticipated because production of advanced biofuels—which reduce greenhouse gas emissions more than corn-starch ethanol—has not kept pace with the yearly increases or the target of 21 billion gallons by 2022 called for by the statute. GAO was asked to review additional issues related to the effects of the RFS.
This report examines what is known about (1) the effect the RFS has had to date on retail gasoline prices in the United States and (2) the RFS's effect on greenhouse gas emissions and whether the RFS will meet its goals for reducing those emissions. The report also provides information about RINs.
To address the likely effects of the RFS on gasoline prices, GAO reviewed studies and interviewed experts and industry stakeholders, and conducted a statistical analysis of state ethanol mandates that were similar to the mandates of the RFS. GAO selected the experts based on their published work and recognition in the professional community. GAO selected stakeholders representing a range of perspectives, including stakeholders from the renewable fuels, petroleum, and agricultural industries, as well as from environmental groups.
Because the RFS was implemented on a nationwide basis at the same time that other factors, such as the global price of crude oil and domestic demand for retail gasoline, were affecting retail gasoline prices across the nation, it is not possible to directly isolate and measure the effect the RFS had on gasoline prices nationwide given data available to GAO. Instead GAO developed and extensively tested an econometric model that estimated the effects on retail gasoline prices of state ethanol mandates. These state mandates are similar to the RFS but were put in place voluntarily by states before the RFS led to widespread ethanol blending in every state. This model estimated how ethanol mandates affected gasoline prices in these five states. These estimates suggest the RFS likely had effects in states that did not have state-wide mandates. These states incrementally blended ethanol because of the increasing volumes of ethanol required to be blended nationally by the RFS.
Regarding the RFS's effect on greenhouse gas emissions, GAO interviewed 13 experts in government and academia. GAO selected these experts based on their published work, prior GAO work, and recommendations from other experts.
During the course of the work, GAO gathered information on the topic of RINs through interviews, a review of relevant literature, and prior GAO work.
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA disagreed with GAO's finding that the RFS has had a limited effect on greenhouse gas emissions, citing research on the effects of ethanol on reducing emissions generally. GAO reported on the specific effects of the RFS on emissions. USDA also criticized GAO's methodology using experts' views. GAO employed that method to reach consensus among those with a range of perspectives. DOE and EPA did not comment on the draft report.

What GAO Found

Effect on prices. Evidence from studies, interviews with experts, and GAO's analysis suggest that the nationwide Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) was likely associated with modest gasoline price increases outside of the Midwest and that these price increases may have diminished over time. Variations in these gasoline price effects likely depended, in part, on state-by-state variation in the costs to transport and store ethanol. For example, the Midwest was already producing and blending ethanol when the RFS came into effect, so that region had lower transportation costs and had already invested in necessary storage infrastructure. Other regions began blending ethanol later to meet the RFS's requirements, thereby incurring new transportation and storage infrastructure costs that resulted in gasoline prices that were several cents per gallon higher than they otherwise would have been.
In addition, experts told GAO that the RFS caused an initial increase in refining investment costs that, over the long term, reduced refining costs for gasoline. Specifically, once all locations had made the infrastructure investments and most gasoline blendstock produced was consistent with blending ethanol then there would be two continuing effects: (1) the transportation and blending costs of ethanol, which would tend to push retail prices higher and depend on the distance traveled and the modes of transport, and (2) the lower cost of producing lower octane blendstock. The former effect might dominate for locations far from the production source of ethanol and for which more costly modes of transport were used, while the lower blendstock costs might dominate for locations close to the production source of ethanol and/or those that have low transportation costs.
GAO's analysis of the effect that state ethanol mandates had on gasoline prices also showed gasoline price effects that differed in the Midwest and elsewhere. Specifically, during the period GAO studied, when the ethanol mandates in Minnesota and Missouri were in effect, all else remaining equal, retail gasoline prices were lower by about 8 and 5 cents per gallon in these states, respectively, than they would have been without the mandates. In contrast, when the ethanol mandates in Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington were in effect, GAO's model showed that retail gasoline prices were higher by about 8, 2, and 6 cents per gallon, respectively, than they would have been without the ethanol mandates. These results suggest that the RFS likely had gasoline price effects in other states that did not have state-wide ethanol mandates but that incrementally began blending ethanol as a result of increasing RFS requirements that by around 2010 had led to almost all gasoline sold in the United States being blended with 10 percent ethanol.
Effect on greenhouse gas emissions. Most of the experts GAO interviewed generally agreed that, to date, the RFS has likely had a limited effect, if any, on greenhouse gas emissions. According to the experts and GAO's prior work, the effect has likely been limited for reasons including: (1) the reliance of the RFS to date on conventional corn-starch ethanol, which has a smaller potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions compared with advanced biofuels, and (2) that most corn-starch ethanol has been produced in plants exempt from emissions reduction requirements, likely limiting reductions early on when plants were less efficient than they are today.
Further, the RFS is unlikely to meet the greenhouse gas emissions reduction goals envisioned for the program through 2022. Specifically, GAO reported in November 2016 that advanced biofuels, which achieve greater greenhouse gas reductions than conventional corn-starch ethanol, have been uneconomical to produce at the volumes required by the RFS statute so the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has waived most of these requirements (see figure).
Renewable identification numbers. EPA uses renewable identification numbers (RINs) to regulate industry compliance with RFS requirements for blending biofuels into the nation's transportation fuel supply. In GAO's March 2014 report on petroleum refining, GAO noted that the RFS had increased compliance costs for the domestic petroleum refining industry or individual refiners. GAO reported that corn-based ethanol RIN prices had been low—from 1 to 5 cents per gallon from 2006 through much of 2012—but in 2013, RIN prices increased to over $1.40 per gallon in July before declining to about 20 cents per gallon as of mid-November 2013. Since the March 2014 report, corn-ethanol RIN prices have experienced more periods of volatility. Most experts and stakeholders GAO interviewed recently stated that RINs had either a small effect on prices or no effect on prices, though a few disagreed. Finally, GAO's past work, as well as EPA analysis, has identified several issues of concern with RINs, including possible fraud in the market and concerns about the effect on small refiners, price volatility, and the point of obligation.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

To help comply with federal policies aimed at improving federal building energy and environmental management, GSA has implemented a smart buildings program nationwide in federally owned buildings under its custody and control. Two key technologies included in the program are Internet-connected advanced utility meters and an analytical software application, GSAlink, which alerts staff to potential building system problems, such as equipment operating outside of normal hours.
GAO was asked to review GSA's smart buildings program. This report examines: (1) what is known about the costs and benefits of the program, (2) the extent to which GSA has developed performance goals and measures to help it manage the performance of the program, and (3) any challenges GSA faces in implementing the technologies used in the program and GSA's actions to mitigate those challenges. GAO reviewed relevant GSA documentation, interviewed officials at GSA's central and regional offices, and visited a sample of GSA smart buildings in San Francisco, California, and Washington, D.C. that were selected based on the high concentration of GSA smart buildings located in each city.

What GAO Found

Limited quantified information exists on the costs and benefits of the General Services Administration's (GSA) smart buildings program's key technologies. GSA officials stated that the approximate cost of equipping a building with these technologies ranged between about $48,000 to $155,000. However, they stated that accurately calculating installation costs is challenging because GSA typically installs these technologies in selected buildings incrementally and sometimes as part of other capital improvement projects. Additionally, GSA officials identified perceived operational benefits of the smart buildings program's key technologies, including that these technologies enable officials to more precisely identify building system problems and more closely monitor contractors. However, existing data on the smart buildings program are of limited usefulness in quantifying the program's benefits. For example, according to GSA officials, while data from an application within GSAlink that estimates avoided costs from addressing each fault that GSAlink identifies are useful for prioritizing maintenance actions, the imprecise estimates preclude their use as a measure of actual avoided costs in quantifying program benefits.
GSA does not have documented, clearly defined goals for the smart buildings program, nor has GSA developed performance measures that would allow it to assess the program's progress. These omissions are contrary to leading practices of results-oriented organizations identified in previous GAO work. GSA officials verbally described broad goals for the smart buildings program to GAO, but the agency has not documented these goals. Further, because GSA has not clearly defined its verbally expressed goals, it cannot demonstrate progress in achieving them. For example, GSA officials said that the agency cannot measure progress for the stated goal of improving tenant productivity and comfort because of the subjective nature of individual tenant preferences, such as for office temperatures. Additionally, GSA has not developed performance measures to assess the program, and GSA's lack of data that can be used to quantify benefits of the program impedes its ability to measure the success of the program. Without clearly defined goals, related performance measures, and data that can be used to measure its progress, GSA is limited in its ability to make informed decisions about the smart buildings program.
GSA faces challenges in implementing the smart buildings program and has taken steps to mitigate these challenges. Since smart building technologies are Internet-connected, they are potentially vulnerable to cyberattacks that could compromise security or cause harm to facilities or their occupants. GSA has taken actions intended to mitigate cybersecurity challenges, such as instituting policies to address threats and known vulnerabilities and moving Internet-connected building systems to GSA's secured network. Separately, according to GSA officials, GSA faces implementation challenges related to the limited technological proficiency of some GSA building managers and contractors or lack of buy-in from them. GSA is taking actions intended to address these challenges. For example, it has provided training to staff and contractors, and its central office monitors the extent to which staff address problems detected by the smart buildings program's key technologies.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that GSA establish clearly defined performance goals and related performance measures for the smart buildings program, and identify and develop data to measure progress. GSA concurred with GAO's recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

In February 2017, components of California's Oroville Dam failed, leading to the evacuation of nearly 200,000 nearby residents. FERC is the federal regulator of the Oroville Dam and over 2,500 other dams associated with nonfederal hydropower projects nationwide. FERC issues and renews licenses—which can last up to 50 years—to dam operators and promotes safe dam operation by conducting safety inspections and reviewing technical engineering studies, among other actions.
GAO was asked to review FERC's approach to overseeing dam safety. This report examines: (1) how FERC collects information from its dam safety inspections and the extent of its analysis, and (2) how FERC evaluates engineering studies of dam performance to analyze safety, among other objectives. GAO analyzed documentation on a non-generalizable sample of 42 dams associated with projects relicensed from fiscal years 2014 through 2017, selected based on geography and hazard classifications, among other factors. GAO also reviewed FERC regulations and documents; and interviewed FERC staff associated with the selected projects and technical consultants, selected based on the frequency and timing of their reviews.

What GAO Found

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) staff generally followed established guidance in collecting safety information from dam inspections for the dams GAO reviewed, but FERC has not used this information to analyze dam safety portfolio-wide. For these 42 dams, GAO found that FERC staff generally followed guidance in collecting safety information during inspections of individual dams and key structures associated with those dams. (See figure.) However, FERC lacks standard procedures that specify how and where staff should record safety deficiencies identified. As a result, FERC staff use multiple systems to record inspection findings, thereby creating information that cannot be easily analyzed. Further, while FERC officials said inspections help oversee individual dam's safety, FERC has not analyzed this information to identify any safety risks across its portfolio. GAO's prior work has highlighted the importance of evaluating risks across a portfolio. FERC officials stated that they have not conducted portfolio-wide analyses because officials prioritize the individual dam inspections and response to urgent dam safety incidents. However, following the Oroville incident, a FERC-led initiative to examine dam structures comparable to those at Oroville identified 27 dam spillways with varying degrees of safety concerns, on which FERC officials stated they are working with dam licensees to address. A similar and proactive portfolio-wide approach, based on analysis of common inspection deficiencies across the portfolio of dams under FERC's authority, could help FERC identify safety risks prior to a safety incident.
Guidelines recognize that each dam is unique and allow for flexibility and exemptions in its use. FERC staff use the studies to inform other components of their safety approach, including the analysis of dam failure scenarios and their review of safety to determine whether to renew a license.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that FERC: (1) develop standard procedures for recording information collected as part of its inspections, and (2) use inspection information to assess safety risks across FERC's portfolio of dams. FERC agreed with GAO's recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

HUD insures single-family mortgage loans and is authorized to sell defaulted loans under the National Housing Act. In fiscal years 2010–2016, FHA auctioned off approximately 111,000 loans to private purchasers under DASP. DASP helped reduce a backlog of federally insured defaulted loans stemming from the 2007–2011 financial crisis and was intended to protect the MMI Fund by paying insurance claims before the costly foreclosure process.
GAO was asked to evaluate DASP. This report examines, among other things, certain DASP procedures, including verifying loan eligibility criteria, and documentation; FHA's evaluation of the identified outcomes of sold loans and how these compare with similar, unsold loans; and the potential effects that changes to DASP might have on the MMI Fund. GAO reviewed FHA policies, contracts, and reports, and interviewed FHA officials, selected servicers and purchasers based on sales participation, and other stakeholders. GAO also conducted a statistical analysis comparing outcome data for sold loans and similar loans that remained FHA-insured and analyzed the effect of loan pool characteristics on bidder participation.

What GAO Found

The Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Federal Housing Administration (FHA) uses multiple entities to check loan eligibility for the Distressed Asset Stabilization Program (DASP)—in which FHA accepts assignment of eligible, defaulted single-family loans from servicers in exchange for claim payments and sells the loans in competitive auctions. After servicers submit loans for sale, FHA and its contractors concurrently check loan data for completeness, validity, and eligibility. FHA relies on servicers to check eligibility a few weeks before and again after the bid date. The status of delinquent loans can be fluid, and a change in eligibility status close to this date may not be detected. GAO's analysis of fiscal year 2016 default data indicates about 2.67 percent of loans that FHA sold were ineligible based on length of delinquency or loss mitigation status. Without checking loan eligibility closer to bidding, FHA risks selling ineligible loans, and borrowers could lose access to benefits.
FHA does not evaluate outcomes for sold loans against similar unsold loans. GAO found that, in aggregate, sold defaulted loans were more likely to experience foreclosure than comparable unsold defaulted loans (see figure). However, GAO's analysis identified varying outcomes by purchasers and sales. For example, some purchasers' loans had higher probabilities of avoiding foreclosure, with borrowers making regular payments again by 24 months after the transfer of loans. Also, loans sold in 2016 sales were less likely to experience foreclosure compared to unsold loans. HUD policy states that the agency's evaluations isolate program effects from other influences. Evaluating outcomes for sold loans against similar unsold loans could help FHA determine whether DASP is meeting its objective of maximizing recoveries to the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMI Fund) and understand the extent to which DASP helps borrowers.
Changing some of FHA's auction processes may help the MMI Fund. FHA could increase participation and MMI Fund recoveries in its auctions by communicating upcoming sales earlier. One purchaser said that additional notice would allow it time to plan for the capital needed to bid. Also, FHA set reserve prices (minimum acceptable price) based on the amount it expected to recover after loans completed foreclosure—yet GAO estimates that some of these loans will avoid foreclosure (see figure). As a result, FHA risks recovering less for the MMI Fund in loan sales than if the loans had not been sold.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making nine recommendations to FHA, including establishing specific time frames to check loan eligibility, evaluating loan outcome data, and changing auction processes to help protect the MMI Fund. FHA generally agreed with seven recommendations, and neither agreed nor disagreed with two. GAO maintains that all the recommendations are valid.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Thousands of Coast Guard servicemembers have left the military and transitioned into civilian life, and some of these new veterans may face significant challenges, such as finding and maintaining employment. To help them prepare, federal law mandated that DHS provide separating Coast Guard servicemembers with counseling, employment assistance, and information on veterans' benefits through TAP. GAO was asked to examine TAP implementation.
This review analyzes (1) the reliability of TAP data on participation levels for Coast Guard servicemembers and the factors that affect participation, and (2) the Coast Guard's performance measures and monitoring efforts related to TAP. GAO interviewed Coast Guard headquarters staff; surveyed 12 Coast Guard installations that conduct TAP (100 percent response rate); collected and reviewed participation data for reliability; and interviewed TAP managers from three installations selected for size and location, and 25 Coast Guard servicemembers at one location. (For a companion report on TAP implementation for separating and retiring servicemembers in other military services, see GAO-18-23 .)

What GAO Found

The United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard), which is overseen by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), lacks complete or reliable data on participation in the Transition Assistance Program (TAP), designed to assist servicemembers returning to civilian life. According to senior Coast Guard officials, a major reason why data are not reliable is the lack of an up-to-date Commandant Instruction that specifies when to record TAP participation data. Consequently, the data are updated on an ad-hoc basis and may not be timely or complete, according to officials. Federal internal control standards call for management to use quality information to achieve the entity's objectives. Until the Coast Guard issues an up-to-date Commandant Instruction that establishes policies and procedures to improve the reliability and completeness of TAP data, it will lack quality information to gauge the extent to which it is meeting TAP participation requirements in the VOW to Hire Heroes Act of 2011.
According to GAO's survey of Coast Guard installations, various factors affected participation, such as servicemembers serving at geographically remote locations or separating from the Coast Guard rapidly. TAP officials and Coast Guard servicemembers GAO interviewed said commanders and direct supervisors sometimes pulled servicemembers out of TAP class or postponed participation because of mission priorities. TAP managers also said they rely on delivering TAP online because many Coast Guard servicemembers are stationed remotely.
The Coast Guard cannot effectively measure performance to ensure key TAP requirements are met because it lacks reliable data and does not monitor compliance with several TAP requirements. Further, the Coast Guard has not established a formal performance goal against which it can measure progress, although federal internal control standards stipulate that management should consider external requirements—such as the laws with which the entity is required to comply—to clearly define objectives in specific and measurable terms. Establishing a goal could help the Coast Guard define expected performance. In addition, the Coast Guard does not monitor TAP requirements regarding the timeliness of servicemembers' TAP participation or their access to additional 2-day classes. Consequently, it cannot know whether servicemembers are starting TAP early enough to complete the program or those who elected to attend additional 2-day classes were able to do so before separation or retirement, as required by the Act. Finally, the Coast Guard lacks an up-to-date Commandant Instruction that establishes the roles and responsibilities of Coast Guard staff in implementing TAP. Federal internal control standards stipulate that management should assign responsibility and delegate authority to key roles throughout the entity. Issuing an up-to-date Commandant Instruction that defines roles and responsibilities would clarify who is ultimately responsible for ensuring Coast Guard servicemembers attend TAP, thereby facilitating accountability.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making seven recommendations, including that the Coast Guard issue a new Commandant Instruction establishing data collection policies, set TAP performance goals, monitor timeliness and access, and define roles and responsibilities. DHS agreed with all of GAO's recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

DOD obligated about $150 billion on contracted services—such as information technology support and maintenance of defense facilities—in fiscal year 2016. DOD has faced long-standing challenges in effectively managing its service acquisitions.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 amended existing requirements for DOD to annually collect data on contracted services and to compile and review an inventory of the functions performed by contractor personnel. The Act also contained a provision for GAO to report on the status of this data collection and to assess DOD's use of the inventory. This report addresses how DOD (1) collected data to create an inventory of fiscal year 2016 contracted services and (2) used the inventory to inform workforce planning, workforce mix, and budget decisions. GAO has reported on DOD's inventory of contracted services since 2010.
GAO reviewed OSD and the military departments' guidance, as well as the military departments' inventory submissions to OSD. GAO also analyzed contracted services data and interviewed OSD and military department officials.

What GAO Found

GAO found that the Department of Defense (DOD) used the same sources as it did in prior years to collect data and create an inventory of fiscal year 2016 contracted services, which is intended, in part, to help DOD make more strategic workforce decisions and better align resources. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) guidance, issued in September 2017 to implement congressional direction, required the military departments to include in their submissions, at a minimum, purchases of services with a total contract value of $3 million or more, and in four services acquisition portfolio groups—logistics management, equipment-related, knowledge-based, and electronics and communications.
As permitted under OSD's inventory guidance, the military departments varied somewhat in how they reported their contracted services data to OSD. For example, the Army and Air Force included purchases both over and under $3 million and the Air Force also identified purchases by the four portfolio groups. The Navy submitted summary data of contracted services but did not provide a list of purchases in time to be included in an inventory summary for Congress. An OSD official said, however, that the information provided was sufficient to prepare the inventory summary, which OSD submitted to Congress in February 2018. The Navy subsequently provided a list of its fiscal year 2016 service purchases to OSD in March 2018.
Military departments generally have not developed plans to use the inventory for workforce and budget decisions, as statutorily required. This is consistent with what GAO found in November 2014 and October 2016. GAO's analysis found that the military departments' guidance generally does not require using the inventory in workforce and budget decisions (see table).
Army manpower officials told GAO that inventory information such as the number of contractor full-time equivalents and the functions performed can be used to inform workforce mix decisions. However, workforce and budget officials at the Army, Navy, and Air Force stated they make limited use of the inventory to inform decision-making, in part because by the time the inventory is available, the data reflected are often too outdated to inform strategic decisions. GAO has previously recommended ways to improve use of the inventory. In November 2014, for example, GAO found that a lack of officials at the military departments who are accountable for integrating the use of the inventory leaves the department at continued risk of not complying with the legislative requirement to use the inventory to support management decisions. This issue persists, as the military departments have not made final designations for accountable officials responsible for developing plans and enforcement mechanisms to use the inventory.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making new recommendations in this report. Seven of 18 prior GAO recommendations related to the inventory remain open, including a recommendation for DOD to identify officials at the military departments responsible for developing plans and enforcement mechanisms to use the inventory. In its comments, DOD stated it is committed to improving its inventory processes.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Education provided over $122 billion in grants, loans and work study funds to help students pay for college at about 6,000 schools in fiscal year 2017. Education is responsible for certifying that these schools are eligible for and capable of properly administering federal student aid funds. Schools are required to submit an annual compliance audit that provides information on schools' administrative capability, which Education considers in its school certification decisions. GAO was asked to review Education's process for certifying schools to receive federal student aid.
This report examines (1) how Education certifies schools to administer federal student aid and how frequently schools are approved and denied certification; and (2) the role of compliance audits in the certification process and what, if any, steps Education has taken to address the quality of the audit information. GAO analyzed data on school certification outcomes for calendar years 2006-2017 (when GAO determined data were most reliable); reviewed data and reports summarizing Education's reviews of compliance audit quality for fiscal years 2006-2017; reviewed a non-generalizable sample of 21 school certification decisions from fiscal years 2015 and 2016, selected for a mix of decisions, school characteristics, and geographic regions; examined relevant federal laws, regulations, policy manuals and guidance; and interviewed Education officials.

What GAO Found

The Department of Education (Education) is responsible for evaluating a variety of information to determine whether a postsecondary school should be certified to administer federal student aid programs, and agency data show that it approves most schools that apply. Education procedures instruct regional office staff to review school policies, financial statements, and compliance audits prepared by independent auditors, among other things. Education can certify schools to participate in federal student aid programs for up to 6 years, or it can provisionally certify them for less time if it determines that increased oversight is needed—for example, when a school applies for certification for the first time or when it has met some but not all requirements to be fully certified. In calendar years 2006 through 2017, Education fully or provisionally approved most schools applying for initial or recertification to receive federal student aid (see figure).
Note: Schools applying for certification for the first time and approved are placed in provisional certification.
In deciding whether to certify schools, Education particularly relies on compliance audits for direct information about how well schools are administering federal student aid, and Education's offices of Federal Student Aid and Inspector General have taken steps to address audit quality. The Inspector General annually selects a sample of compliance audits for quality reviews based on risk factors, such as auditors previously cited for errors. In fiscal years 2006 through 2017, 59 percent of the 739 selected audits received failing scores. Audits that fail must be corrected; if not, the school generally must repay federal student aid covered by the audit. Because higher risk audits are selected for review, Inspector General officials said they cannot assess the overall prevalence of quality problems in compliance audits. These two Education offices have taken steps to improve audit quality. For example, the Inspector General offered additional training to auditors on its revised 2016 audit guide and provided guidance to schools on hiring an auditor, while Federal Student Aid created a working group to strengthen its procedures for addressing poor quality compliance audits. Education's efforts to address audit quality could help ensure that these audits provide reliable information for school certification decisions.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making recommendations in this report.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

SSDI, which is administered by SSA, provides financial and other assistance to qualifying individuals who are unable to work due to their disabilities. SSDI is primarily funded by employee and employer payroll taxes that are placed in the Disability Insurance Trust Fund, which is currently projected to not be able to pay full benefits starting in 2028. While there are a number of ways to address the fiscal condition of the Disability Insurance Trust Fund, some researchers have proposed expanding employer-provided PDI. GAO was asked to review whether expanding PDI could result in potential savings to the Disability Insurance Trust Fund.
This report examines (1) what is known about how coverage and key features of SSDI and PDI compare, and (2) the potential implications of three distinct proposals to expand employer-sponsored PDI on the Disability Insurance Trust Fund and various stakeholders.
GAO analyzed data on SSDI and PDI coverage from SSA and BLS for 2016 and 2017; reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; reviewed three PDI policies that three large insurers we selected described as typical for their companies; reviewed three distinct proposals to expand PDI identified through a literature review; and interviewed SSA and Department of Labor officials, authors, researchers, and representatives of insurance, employer, employee, and disability groups for a range of perspectives.

What GAO Found

GAO's analysis found that coverage and key features of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and long-term employer-sponsored private disability insurance (PDI) differ in a number of ways. Key differences include the number of workers covered; characteristics of covered workers; and eligibility, benefits, and return to work assistance. For example:
According to GAO's analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics and Social Security Administration (SSA) data, SSDI covers an estimated 96 percent of workers, while 33 percent of workers have PDI coverage through their employers. Also, PDI coverage is more prevalent among workers with higher wages (e.g., management positions) and in certain business sectors (e.g., finance).
GAO's review of SSDI and PDI policies found that some PDI policies may pay benefits for medical conditions that SSDI would not. However, these PDI policies may time limit payments for mental health and musculoskeletal disorders, while SSDI does not. In addition, while both SSDI and PDI policies include features designed to help beneficiaries return to work, PDI policies may provide such supports more quickly than SSDI.
GAO's review of the literature identified three distinct proposals for expanding PDI that the proposals' authors believe would address SSDI's fiscal challenges. Specifically, all three proposals suggest that cost savings for the Disability Insurance Trust Fund could be expected by expanding PDI. According to the proposals, this would happen because expanding PDI would provide workers earlier access to cash and employment supports, which would reduce the number of SSDI claims or the length of time SSDI benefits are paid to claimants. However, GAO's review of the three proposals noted that none of them provide enough information to assess how SSDI enrollment and costs might be affected with an expansion of PDI. Therefore, it is unclear whether cost savings to the Disability Insurance Trust Fund would actually be realized. For example, the proposals do not provide information on the type and timing of return-to-work services that would be provided under expanded PDI, nor do they take into account the differences in the populations served by SSDI and PDI policies. Moreover, stakeholders that GAO interviewed about these proposals raised a number of issues about other implications of PDI expansion that the proposals do not explicitly or fully address. For example:
Insurers told GAO that is was unclear how expanding PDI would affect PDI premiums and the impact this would have on enrollment.
Employers told GAO they were concerned about potential additional requirements or administrative burdens that would be placed on them if PDI were expanded.
Employee and disability advocacy groups told GAO they were concerned about whether PDI expansion would provide standard services or employee protections currently available under SSDI, especially with respect to PDI expansion proposals that would replace SSDI for 2 years.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Many individuals receive medical care for a serious or life-limiting condition during the last months of life, which may involve making difficult decisions about life-sustaining treatment. Advance care planning helps ensure that physicians, families, and friends have documentation outlining individuals' wishes under these circumstances.
GAO was asked to identify issues related to completing and accessing advance care planning documents. This report describes, among other things, (1) the challenges individuals and providers face completing and accessing the documents, and (2) selected states' strategies for improving individuals' and providers' understanding of and access to advance care planning documents.
GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from national stakeholder organizations involved in advance care planning or aging issues, and conducted a literature review of relevant articles published from January 2012 to April 2018 in peer-reviewed and other publications. In addition, GAO interviewed officials from state agencies and stakeholder organizations in California, Idaho, Oregon, and West Virginia. GAO selected those four states because they were active in encouraging advance care planning and had registries for completed documents that were in different stages of development.
The Department of Health and Human Services, states, and stakeholders provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.

What GAO Found

Advance care planning documents—including advance directives and physician orders for life sustaining treatment (POLST)—allow individuals to express their wishes for end-of-life care. Advance directives, which include living wills and health care power of attorney, provide direction regarding care when an individual becomes incapacitated. POLST documents are appropriate for seriously ill individuals whose health status indicates the need for medical orders to be documented in their medical records.
Stakeholders from national organizations and officials in the four states GAO selected to review cited several challenges—affecting both individuals and health care providers—related to the use of advance care planning documents. In particular, they noted a lack of understanding about how to complete the documents and how to initiate conversations about advance care planning. They also cited challenges related to the difficulty of ensuring access to completed documents when needed, such as in an emergency situation.
Officials from state agencies and stakeholder organizations in the four selected states reported pursuing various strategies to improve understanding of advance care planning documents by conducting education efforts for individuals and providers. In addition, the states utilized strategies to improve access to completed documents, such as improving the electronic exchange of information between health records and a state registry, which is a central repository intended to improve access to the documents. Further, stakeholder officials reported strategies related to the acceptance of out-of-state advance care planning documents; all four selected states had statutory provisions that address the validity of documents executed in another state.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Air Force aircraft maintainers are responsible for ensuring that the Air Force's aircraft are operationally ready and safe for its aviators—duties critical to successfully executing its national security mission. With more than 100,000 maintainers across the Air Force's active and reserve components, according to Air Force officials, aircraft maintenance is the Air Force's largest enlisted career field—accounting for about a quarter of its active duty enlisted personnel.
The conference report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 included a provision for GAO to review the adequacy of the Air Force's aircraft maintainer workforce. This report assesses the extent to which, from fiscal years 2010 through 2017, the Air Force (1) had aircraft maintainer staffing gaps, (2) experienced attrition of maintainers and took steps to help retain maintainers, and (3) met its annual technical school completion rate goals for maintainers.
GAO analyzed aircraft maintainer staffing levels, loss and reenlistment rates, and technical school completion rates from fiscal years 2010-2017, the most recent data available; conducted five non-generalizable discussion groups with maintainers; and interviewed aviation industry, Department of Defense, and Air Force officials.

What GAO Found

The Air Force has reduced overall aircraft maintainer staffing gaps, but continues to have a gap of experienced maintainers. The Air Force reduced the overall gap between actual maintainer staffing levels and authorized levels from 4,016 maintainers (out of 66,439 authorized active component positions) in fiscal year 2015, to 745 in fiscal year 2017 (out of 66,559 positions). However, in 7 of the last 8 fiscal years, the Air Force had staffing gaps of experienced maintainers—those who are most qualified to meet mission needs and are needed to train new maintainers. Maintainers complete technical school as 3-levels and initially lack the experience and proficiency needed to meet mission needs. Following years of on-the-job training, among other things, maintainers upgrade to the 5- and 7-levels. In fiscal year 2017, the Air Force had gaps of more than 2,000 5-level and 400 7-level maintainers, and a surplus of over 1,700 3-levels. Air Force officials anticipate that staffing gaps will continue off and on through fiscal year 2023.
Over the past 8 fiscal years, the Air Force has increasingly lost experienced aircraft maintainers, and it does not have goals and a strategy to help retain maintainers. While overall maintainer loss rates have remained generally stable, loss rates of 5-levels increased from 9 percent in fiscal year 2010 to 12 percent in fiscal years 2016 and 2017 (see figure). Air Force officials expect 7-level loss rates to also increase. Air Force officials stated that they need to retain more maintainers to help address experience gaps, but the Air Force has not developed annual retention goals for maintainers. In addition, while the Air Force has increased its use of retention bonuses since fiscal year 2015, according to Air Force officials, it does not have a strategy to improve retention. Without goals to measure progress and a retention strategy to guide efforts, the Air Force could face further challenges in managing its maintenance workforce, including ensuring there are enough experienced maintainers to meet mission needs.
The Air Force consistently met technical school completion rate goals for aircraft maintainers from fiscal years 2010 through 2017. In fiscal year 2017, about 9,600 active component maintainers completed technical school, an increase from about 5,700 in fiscal year 2015. This increase in completions has helped to address overall staffing gaps, but cannot immediately resolve experience imbalances, due to the time and training needed to reach the 5- and 7- levels.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Air Force develop annual retention goals and a retention strategy for aircraft maintainers. The Air Force concurred with both recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

The federal government owns billions of dollars of personal property—such as office furniture, scientific equipment, and industrial machinery. By law, each agency is required to follow GSA's disposal process so that an agency's unneeded property can be used by other agencies or certain non-federal entities. Since 2012, agencies have reduced their office and warehouse space due to government-wide initiatives, a reduction that in turn has required agencies to dispose of some affected personal property.
GAO was asked to review how federal agencies identify and dispose of unneeded personal property. This report examines (1) how selected agencies assess whether personal property is needed and (2) how these agencies dispose of unneeded property and how, if at all, space reduction efforts have affected disposals. GAO reviewed federal statutes and regulations, and selected five agencies—EPA, Forest Service, GSA, HUD, and IRS—mainly based on space reduction results and goals. GAO reviewed these agencies' property disposal data for 2012 through 2016 and interviewed headquarters and field staff about their property management and disposal processes.

What GAO Found

The five agencies GAO reviewed—the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Forest Service, General Services Administration (GSA), Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Internal Revenue Service (IRS)—generally do not have policies or processes for identifying unneeded personal property, such as office furniture, on a proactive basis. Instead, officials from these agencies said they typically identified unneeded property as a result of a “triggering event,” such as an office space reduction. Executive agencies are required by law to continuously review property under their control to identify unneeded personal property and then dispose of it promptly. Without such policies or processes, agencies may not be routinely identifying unneeded property that could be used elsewhere, and efforts to maximize federal personal property use and minimize unnecessary storage costs may not be effective. GSA has issued regulations establishing a government-wide disposal process for unneeded personal property. However, according to GSA officials, the agency lacks the authority to promulgate regulations or formal guidance on management of in-use agency property, and there is no government-wide guidance to agencies on identifying unneeded personal property. Agencies are required to have internal control activities—such as policies and procedures—for reasonable assurance of efficient operations and minimal resource waste, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides guidance to agencies on implementing such activities. Guidance from OMB that emphasizes agencies' internal control responsibilities could help ensure that agencies are proactively and regularly identifying property that is no longer needed.
The selected agencies reported little difficulty in following GSA's personal property disposal process, reporting over 37,000 items as unneeded property in fiscal years 2012 through 2016. This property was disposed of through transfers to other agencies, donations to authorized recipients, sales, or discarding. When disposing of personal property from space reduction projects at locations GAO visited, agencies also reported using GSA's process (see figure). Overall, agencies said they have not experienced major challenges with disposing of personal property from space reduction efforts. This lack of challenges could be because projects are geographically dispersed and spread over several years.

What GAO Recommends

OMB should provide guidance to executive agencies on managing their personal property, emphasizing that agencies' policies or processes should reflect the requirement to continuously review and identify unneeded personal property. OMB did not comment on GAO's recommendation.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Gender-related price differences occur when consumers are charged different prices for the same or similar goods and services because of factors related to gender. While variation in costs and consumer demand may give rise to such price differences, some policymakers have raised concerns that gender bias may also be a factor. While the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Fair Housing Act prohibit discrimination based on sex in credit and housing transactions, no federal law prohibits businesses from charging consumers different prices for the same or similar goods targeted to different genders.
GAO was asked to review gender-related price differences for consumer goods and services sold in the United States. This report examines, among other things, (1) how prices compared for selected goods and services marketed to men and women, and potential reasons for any price differences; (2) what is known about price differences for men and women for products not differentiated by gender, such as mortgages; and (3) the extent to which federal agencies have identified and addressed any concerns about gender-related price differences.
To examine these issues, GAO analyzed retail price data, reviewed relevant academic studies, analyzed federal consumer complaint data, and interviewed federal agency officials, industry experts, and academics.

What GAO Found

Firms differentiate many consumer products to appeal separately to men and women by slightly altering product attributes like color or scent. Products differentiated by gender may sell for different prices if men and women have different demands or willingness to pay for these product attributes. Of 10 personal care product categories (e.g., deodorants and shaving products) that GAO analyzed, average retail prices paid were significantly higher for women's products than for men's in 5 categories. In 2 categories—shaving gel and nondisposable razors—men's versions sold at a significantly higher price. One category—razor blades--had mixed results based on two price measures analyzed, and two others—disposable razors and mass-market perfumes—showed no significant gender price differences. GAO found that the target gender for a product is a significant factor contributing to price differences identified, but GAO did not have sufficient information to determine the extent to which these gender-related price differences were due to gender bias as opposed to other factors, such as different advertising costs. Though the analysis controlled for several observable product attributes, such as product size and packaging type, all underlying differences in costs and demand for products targeted to different genders could not be fully observed.
Studies GAO reviewed found limited evidence of gender price differences for four products or services not differentiated by gender—mortgages, small business credit, auto purchases, and auto repairs. For example, with regard to mortgages, women as a group paid higher average mortgage rates than men, in part due to weaker credit characteristics, such as lower average income. However, after controlling for borrower credit characteristics and other factors, three studies did not find statistically significant differences in borrowing costs between men and women, while one found women paid higher rates for certain subprime loans. In addition, one study found that female borrowers defaulted less frequently than male borrowers with similar credit characteristics, and the study suggested that women may pay higher mortgage rates than men relative to their default risk. While these studies controlled for factors other than gender that could affect borrowing costs, several lacked important data on certain borrower risk characteristics, such as credit scores, which could affect analysis of gender disparities. Also, several studies analyzed small samples of subprime loans that were originated in 2005 or earlier, which limits the generalizability of the results.
In their oversight of federal antidiscrimination statutes, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, Federal Trade Commission, and Department of Housing and Urban Development have identified limited consumer concerns based on gender-related pricing differences. GAO's analysis of complaint data received by the three agencies from 2012–2017 found that they had received limited consumer complaints about gender-related price differences. The agencies provide general consumer education resources on discrimination and consumer awareness. However, given the limited consumer concern, they have not identified a need to incorporate additional materials specific to gender-related price differences into their existing consumer education resources.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Thousands of facilities have hazardous chemicals that could be targeted or used to inflict mass casualties or harm surrounding populations in the United States. In accordance with the DHS Appropriations Act, 2007, DHS established the CFATS program in 2007 to, among other things, identify and assess the security risk posed by chemical facilities. DHS inspects high-risk facilities after it approves facility security plans to ensure that the facilities are implementing required security measures and procedures.
This statement summarizes progress and challenges related to DHS's CFATS program management. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from July 2012 through June 2017, along with updates conducted in June 2018 on DHS actions to address prior GAO recommendations. To conduct the prior work, GAO reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and DHS policies for administering the CFATS program, how DHS assesses risk, and data on high-risk chemical facilities. GAO also interviewed DHS officials and reviewed information on DHS actions to implement its prior recommendations.

What GAO Found

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made progress addressing challenges that GAO's past work identified to managing the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. The following summarizes progress made and challenges remaining in key aspects of the program.
Identifying high-risk chemical facilities. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS used self-reported and unverified data to determine the risk of facilities holding toxic chemicals that could threaten surrounding communities if released. GAO recommended that DHS should better verify the accuracy of facility-reported data. DHS implemented this recommendation by revising its methodology so it now calculates the risk of toxic release, rather than relying on facilities to do so.
Assessing risk and prioritizing facilities. In April 2013, GAO reported weaknesses in multiple aspects of DHS's risk assessment and prioritization approach. GAO made two recommendations for DHS to review and improve this process, including that DHS enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all of the elements of consequence, threat, and vulnerability associated with a terrorist attack involving certain chemicals. DHS launched a new risk assessment methodology in October 2016 and is currently gathering new or updated data from about 27,000 facilities to (1) determine which facilities should be categorized as high-risk because of the threat of sabotage, theft or diversion, or a toxic release and (2) assign those facilities deemed high risk to one of four risk-based tiers. GAO has ongoing work assessing these efforts and will report later this summer on the extent to which they fully address prior recommendations.
Reviewing and approving facilities' site security plans . DHS is to review security plans and visit facilities to ensure their security measures meet DHS standards. In April 2013, GAO reported a 7 to 9 year backlog for these reviews and visits. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS had made substantial progress in addressing the backlog—estimating that it could take between 9 and 12 months for DHS to review and approve security plans for the approximately 900 remaining facilities. DHS has since taken additional action to expedite these activities and has eliminated this backlog.
Inspecting facilities and ensuring compliance. In July 2015, GAO reported that DHS conducted compliance inspections at 83 of the 1,727 facilities with approved security plans. GAO found that nearly half of the inspected facilities were not fully compliant with their approved security plans and that DHS did not have documented procedures for managing facilities' compliance. GAO recommended that DHS document procedures for managing compliance. As a result, DHS has developed an enforcement procedure and a draft compliance inspection procedure and expects to finalize the compliance inspection procedure by the end of fiscal year 2018.

What GAO Recommends

GAO has made various recommendations to strengthen DHS's management of the CFATS program, with which DHS has generally agreed. DHS has implemented or described planned actions to address most of these recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

USMS mission areas include fugitive apprehension, witness protection, and federal prisoner transportation, among others. USMS whistleblowers recently alleged that USMS officials engaged in improper promotion practices—such as routinely preselecting favored candidates. Investigations have substantiated multiple whistleblower allegations which has raised questions about the integrity of USMS's merit promotion process. USMS announces about 260 law enforcement promotion opportunities annually.
GAO was asked to review USMS's promotion processes and policies and effects that USMS promotion practices have on employee morale. This report examines (1) the extent to which the USMS's merit promotion policies are aligned with federal guidelines; (2) the extent to which USMS monitors its merit promotion processes; and (3) the steps, if any, USMS has taken to understand and address employee concerns about its merit promotion policies and processes. GAO analyzed data and documents on USMS promotions from October 2015 through April 2017, and found these data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of GAO's study. GAO also analyzed USMS documentation, and interviewed USMS officials and non-generalizable groups of employees (85 in total) in four district locations.

What GAO Found

The U.S. Marshals Service's (USMS) merit promotion policy aligns with relevant provisions in title 5 of the United States Code and Code of Federal Regulations, which are the government-wide laws and related provisions agencies must follow to make federal appointments. Agencies must design and administer merit promotion programs to ensure a systematic means of selection for promotion based on merit and these programs must conform to five key requirements outlined in title 5. GAO found that the USMS merit promotion plan, as revised in November 2016, aligned with each of these five requirements. For example, the first requirement states that agencies must establish merit-based procedures for promoting employees that are available in writing to candidates. The USMS merit promotion plan, which is available to employees, outlines such procedures.
USMS is taking steps to improve how it monitors the implementation of the scoring component of its process to rate promotion applications, but lacks documented guidance to ensure consistent compliance with its merit promotion policy. GAO found that USMS does not adequately monitor the rating process, which allowed for conflicts of interest with raters who may compete with candidates whose applications they score. USMS also does not monitor the rating process to ensure that raters complied with a key requirement—that raters decline to score applications of candidates with whom there is a conflict of interest, such as a supervisor-employee relationship. USMS is implementing a process change that, if implemented effectively, can address these two deficiencies. The new process entails having a third-party contractor, rather than USMS employees, determine candidates' scores. Finally, GAO found that USMS lacks documented guidance on rater scoring. USMS only provides verbal guidance to instruct raters on how to score the experience category of merit promotion packages, creating inconsistent application of the guidelines. Employees GAO met with expressed the view that such discrepancies create the perception that the rating process is unfairly subjective. Developing clear and specific documented guidance on how raters should apply the benchmark guidelines could minimize scoring inconsistency and potential rater subjectivity for both the current rating process and the new competency-based assessment.
USMS has taken limited steps to understand and address employee concerns about the promotion process. An estimated 41 percent of USMS respondents to the 2016 Office of Personnel Management Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey strongly disagreed or disagreed that USMS promotions are merit-based, while 34 percent strongly agreed or agreed, and 25 percent neither agreed nor disagreed. During discussion groups GAO held at four USMS district locations across the U.S., employees frequently expressed negative views and many indicated low or no trust that the process is fair and merit-based. Although USMS has acknowledged employees' negative perceptions of the promotion process, it has not developed an agency-wide action plan in accordance with federal guidance to better understand the nature and causes of employee concerns across districts and divisions. Providing specific and consistent information to employees about key steps in the merit promotion process and internal management decisions could improve transparency and help mitigate employee perceptions of favoritism that have negatively impacted employee morale.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that USMS develop specific rater guidance and develop and implement an agency-wide action plan to better understand and address employee concerns, among other steps. USMS concurred with the recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

According to UNHCR, as of June 2017, more than 21 million people were refugees worldwide. State manages the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) and coordinates with UNHCR, which refers the most applicants to USRAP, and USCIS, which adjudicates refugee applications. Deterring and detecting fraud is essential to ensuring the integrity of USRAP and an increase in the number of applicants approved for resettlement in the United States from countries where terrorists operate has raised questions about the adequacy of applicant screening.
This statement addresses (1) how State works with UNHCR to ensure program integrity in the UNHCR resettlement referral process; (2) the extent to which State and RSCs have policies and procedures on refugee case processing and State has overseen RSC activities; (3) the extent to which USCIS has policies and procedures for adjudicating refugee applications; and (4) the extent to which State, USCIS, and their partners follow leading practices to reduce the risk of staff and applicant fraud in USRAP. This statement is based on GAO's July 2017 reports regarding USRAP. To conduct that work, GAO analyzed State, USCIS, and UNHCR policies; interviewed relevant officials; conducted fieldwork in 2016 at selected UNHCR offices, as well as at RSCs in Austria, Jordan, Kenya, and El Salvador, where GAO observed a nongeneralizable sample of refugee screening interviews (selected based on application data and other factors).

What GAO Found

The Department of State (State) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have worked together on measures designed to ensure integrity in the refugee resettlement referral process and have established a framework to guide their partnership. Working with State, UNHCR has implemented standard operating procedures and other guidance that, according to UNHCR officials, provides baseline requirements throughout the referral process. UNHCR also uses databases to help verify the identities of, and manage information about, refugees.
State and the nine worldwide Resettlement Support Centers (RSC) have policies and procedures for processing refugee applications. Overseen by State, the organizations that operate RSCs hire staff to process and prescreen applicants who have been referred for resettlement consideration. GAO observed 27 prescreening interviews conducted by RSC caseworkers in four countries and found that, for example, RSCs generally recorded key information and submitted any required security checks. However, State has not established outcome-based performance indicators to evaluate whether RSCs were consistently and effectively prescreening applicants and preparing case files—key RSC activities that have important implications for timely and effective adjudication and security checks. Developing outcome-based performance indicators would better position State to determine whether RSCs are meeting their responsibilities.
The Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has policies and procedures for adjudicating refugee applications for resettlement in the United States, including how officers are to conduct interviews and adjudicate applications. GAO observed 29 USCIS interviews and found that officers completed all parts of the required assessment. USCIS also provides guidance to help officers identify national security concerns in applications, which can be challenging to identify as country conditions evolve. In 2016, USCIS determined that its pilot to send officers with national security expertise overseas to support interviewing officers was successful. USCIS has taken steps to fill these positions, but it has not yet developed a plan for deploying these additional officers, whose expertise could help improve the effectiveness of the adjudication process.
State, USCIS, and their partners have implemented antifraud measures to reduce the risk of staff and applicant fraud—both of which have occurred—but could further assess fraud risks. Officials from all nine RSCs stated that they assign staff fraud risk management responsibilities to designated individuals. However, not all RSCs reported complying with all required program integrity measures—reported compliance at individual RSCs ranged from 86 to 100 percent. State has also not required RSCs to conduct regular staff fraud risk assessments tailored to each RSC or examined the suitability of related controls. Without taking additional steps to address these issues, State and RSCs may face challenges in identifying new staff fraud risks or gaps in the program's internal control system and implementing new control activities to mitigate them. Further, State and USCIS have not jointly assessed applicant fraud risk program-wide. Doing so could help them ensure that fraud detection and prevention efforts across USRAP are targeted to those areas that are of highest risk.

What GAO Recommends

GAO made recommendations to State and USCIS to strengthen the implementation of USRAP. State and USCIS agreed with GAO's recommendations and have begun taking actions to address them.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

The DATA Act was enacted to increase accountability and transparency and, among other things, expanded on the required federal spending information that agencies are to submit to Treasury for posting to a publicly available website. The act also includes provisions requiring a series of oversight reports by agencies' OIGs and GAO.
The objectives of this report are to describe (1) the reported scope of work covered and type of audit standards OIGs used in their reviews of agencies' DATA Act spending data; (2) any variations in the reported implementation and use of data standards and quality of agencies' data, and any common issues and recommendations reported by the OIGs; and (3) the actions, if any, OMB and Treasury have reported taking or planning to take to use the results of OIG reviews to help monitor agencies' implementation of the act.
To address these objectives, GAO reviewed 53 OIG reports issued on or before January 31, 2018, that assessed agencies' first submissions of spending data for the second quarter of fiscal year 2017 and surveyed the OIGs to obtain additional information.

What GAO Found

The Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act) requires agencies' Offices of Inspector General (OIG) to issue reports on their assessments of the quality of the agencies' spending data submissions and compliance with the DATA Act. The scope of all OIG reviews covered their agencies' second quarter fiscal year 2017 submissions. The files the OIGs used to select and review sample transactions varied based on data availability, and OIGs performed different types of reviews under generally accepted government auditing standards. Some OIGs reported testing a statistical sample of transactions that their agencies submitted and other OIGs reported testing the full population of submitted transactions. Because of these variations, the overall error rates reported by the OIGs are not fully comparable and a government-wide error rate cannot be projected.
According to the OIG reports, about half of the agencies met Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Department of the Treasury (Treasury) requirements for the implementation and use of data standards. The OIGs also reported that most agencies' first data submissions were not complete, timely, accurate, or of quality.
OIG survey responses show that OIGs generally reported higher (projected) overall error rates for the accuracy of data than for completeness and timeliness. OIGs reported certain errors that involve inconsistencies in how the Treasury broker (system that collects and validates agency-submitted data) extracted data from certain federal award systems that resulted in government-wide issues outside the agencies' control, while other errors may have been caused by agency-specific control deficiencies. For example, OIGs reported deficiencies related to agencies' lack of effective procedures or controls and systems issues. Most OIGs made recommendations to agencies to address identified concerns.
OMB staff and Treasury officials told GAO that they reviewed the OIG reports to better understand issues identified by the OIGs. OMB issued new guidance in June 2018 requiring agencies to develop data quality plans intended to achieve the objectives of the DATA Act. Treasury officials told GAO that they are collaborating with OMB and the Chief Financial Officers Council DATA Act Audit Collaboration working group to identify and resolve government-wide issues.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making recommendations in this report. The Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) noted that GAO's report provides useful information on OIG efforts to meet oversight and reporting responsibilities under the DATA Act. OMB, Treasury, and CIGIE also provided technical comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Full implementation of GPRAMA could facilitate efforts to reform the federal government and make it more effective. GPRAMA includes a provision for GAO to review the act's implementation. This report assesses how GPRAMA implementation has affected the federal government's progress in resolving key governance challenges in (1) addressing cross-cutting issues, (2) ensuring performance information is useful and used, (3) aligning daily operations with results, and (4) building a more transparent and open government.
To address these objectives, GAO reviewed statutory requirements, OMB guidance, and GAO's recent work related to GPRAMA implementation and the key governance challenges. GAO also interviewed OMB staff and surveyed a stratified random sample of 4,395 federal managers from 24 agencies on various performance and management topics. With a 67 percent response rate, the survey results are generalizable to the government-wide population of managers.

What GAO Found

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and agencies have made some progress in more fully implementing the GPRA Modernization Act (GPRAMA), but GAO's work and 2017 survey of federal managers highlight numerous areas where improvements are needed.
Cross-cutting issues: Various GPRAMA provisions are aimed at addressing cross-cutting issues, such as cross-agency and agency priority goals and related data-driven reviews of progress towards those goals. To ensure alignment with the current administration's priorities, OMB's 2017 guidance removed the priority status of those goals, which stopped quarterly data-driven reviews and related public progress reports until new goals are published. OMB plans to resume implementation of these provisions in February 2018. GPRAMA also requires OMB and agencies to implement an inventory of federal programs, which could help decision makers better identify and manage fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. OMB and agencies implemented the inventory once, in May 2013. In October 2014, GAO found several issues limited the usefulness of that inventory. Since then, OMB has postponed updating the inventory, citing among other reasons the passage of subsequent laws. OMB has yet to develop a systematic approach for resuming implementation of the inventory and specific time frames for doing so. A systematic approach to developing the inventory could help ensure it provides useful information for decision makers and the public.
Performance information: Survey results show federal managers generally reported no improvements in their use of performance information in decision making for various management activities, or practices that can enhance such use, since GAO's 2013 survey. For example, the use of performance information to streamline programs to reduce duplicative activities (an estimated 33 percent in 2017) is statistically significantly lower relative to 2013 (44 percent). In contrast, managers who were familiar with and whose programs were subject to quarterly data-driven reviews reported that those reviews were used to make progress toward agency priority goals. Identifying and sharing practices to expand the use of such reviews—for other performance goals and at lower levels within agencies—could lead to increased use of performance information.
Daily operations: Agencies have made progress in developing results-oriented cultures but need to take additional actions. GAO's past work found that high-performing organizations use performance management systems to help individuals connect their daily activities to organizational goals. In 2017, about half of federal managers reported using performance information when setting expectations with employees (no change from GAO's last survey in 2013).
Transparent and open government: GAO's past work identified a number of needed improvements to Performance.gov, the central government-wide website required by GPRAMA. The site is to provide quarterly updates on priority goals in effect through September 2017, but those updates stopped in December 2016. According to OMB, the existing information for cross-agency priority goals is the final update, and agencies should publish final updates on their priority goals in annual performance reports. Performance.gov does not provide users with this information, thereby limiting the transparency and accessibility of those results.

What GAO Recommends

In addition to following through on plans to resume implementation of key GPRAMA provisions, GAO recommends that OMB (1) consider a systematic approach to developing the program inventory, (2) revise guidance to provide specific time frames for inventory implementation, (3) identify and share practices for expanding the use of data-driven reviews, and (4) update Performance.gov to explain that reporting on priority goals was suspended and provide the location of final progress updates. OMB staff agreed with these recommendations.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

The IRS, a bureau of the Department of the Treasury, relies extensively on IT to annually collect more than $3 trillion in taxes, distribute more than $400 billion in refunds, and carry out its mission of providing service to America's taxpayers in meeting their tax obligations. For fiscal year 2016, IRS expended approximately $2.7 billion for IT investments, 70 percent of which was allocated for operational systems.
GAO has long reported that the effective and efficient management of IT acquisitions and operational investments has been a challenge in the federal government. Accordingly, in February 2015, GAO introduced a new government-wide high-risk area, Improving the Management of IT Acquisitions and Operations. GAO has also reported on challenges IRS has faced in managing its IT acquisitions and operations, and identified opportunities for IRS to improve the management of these investments.
In light of these challenges, GAO was asked to testify about IT management at IRS. To do so, GAO summarized its prior work regarding IRS's IT management, including the agency's management of operational, or legacy, IT systems.

What GAO Found

GAO has issued a series of reports in recent years which have identified numerous opportunities for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to improve the management of its major acquisitions and operational, or legacy, information technology (IT) investments. For example,
In June 2016, GAO reported that IRS had developed a structured process for allocating funding to its operations activities, consistent with best practices; however, GAO found that IRS did not have a similarly structured process for prioritizing modernization activities to which the agency allocated hundreds of millions of dollars for fiscal year 2016. Instead, IRS officials stated that they held discussions to determine the modernization efforts that were of highest priority to meet IRS's future state vision and technology roadmap, and considered staffing resources and lifecycle stage. However, they did not use formal criteria for making final determinations. GAO concluded that establishing a structured process for prioritizing modernization activities would better assist Congress and other decision makers in ensuring that the right priorities are funded. Accordingly, GAO recommended that IRS establish, document, and implement policies and procedures for prioritizing modernization activities. IRS agreed with the recommendation and has efforts underway to address it.
In the same report, GAO noted that IRS could improve the accuracy of reported performance information for key development investments to provide Congress and other external parties with pertinent information about the delivery of these investments. This included investments such as Customer Account Data Engine 2, which IRS is developing to replace its 50-year old repository of individual tax account data, and the Return Review Program, IRS's system of record for fraud detection. GAO recommended that IRS take steps to improve reported investment performance information. IRS agreed with the recommendation, and has efforts underway to address it.
In a May 2016 report on legacy IT systems across the federal government, GAO noted that IRS used assembly language code to program key legacy systems. Assembly language code is a computer language initially used in the 1950s that is typically tied to the hardware for which it was developed; it has become difficult to code and maintain. One investment that used this language is IRS's Individual Master File which serves as the authoritative data source for individual taxpayer accounts. GAO noted that, although IRS has been working to replace the Individual Master File, the bureau did not have time frames for its modernization or replacement. Therefore, GAO recommended that the Department of Treasury identify and plan to modernize and replace this legacy system, consistent with applicable guidance from the Office of Management and Budget. The department had no comments on the recommendation.

What GAO Recommends

GAO has made a number of recommendations to IRS to improve its management of IT acquisitions and operations. IRS has generally agreed with the recommendations and is in various stages of implementing them.


Question:
Why GAO Did This Study

Crashes at highway-rail grade crossings are one of the leading causes of railroad-related deaths. According to FRA data, in 2017, there were more than 2,100 crashes resulting in 273 fatalities. Since 2009 crashes have occurred at a fairly constant rate. The federal government provides states funding to improve grade-crossing safety through FHWA's Section 130 Program. The persistence of crashes and deaths raises questions about the effectiveness of the federal grade-crossing-safety program.
GAO was asked to review federal efforts to improve grade-crossing safety. This report examines: (1) the focus of FRA's grade-crossing-safety research, (2) how states select and implement grade-crossing projects and what data are available from FRA to inform their decisions, and (3) the challenges states reported in implementing and assessing projects and the extent to which FHWA assesses the program's effectiveness. GAO analyzed FRA data; reviewed FRA's, FHWA's, and states' documents; reviewed a study of states' selection of projects; and interviewed FRA and FHWA headquarters and field staff, and officials from a non-generalizable sample of eight states, selected to include a mix in the number of grade crossings and crashes, and geographic diversity.

What GAO Found

Research sponsored by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has identified driver behavior as the main cause of highway-rail grade crossing crashes and that factors such as train and traffic volume can contribute to the risk of a crash. (See figure.) Over 70 percent of fatal crashes in 2017 occurred at grade crossings with gates.
To meet the requirements of the federal grade-crossing program, states are responsible for selecting and ensuring the implementation of grade-crossing improvement projects. Most state DOT officials and other relevant transportation officials use local knowledge of grade crossings to supplement the results of models that rank grade crossings based on the risk of an accident. These states generally consider the same primary risk factors, such as vehicle and train traffic. FRA is taking steps to improve the data used in its model to help states assess risk factors at grade crossings. For example, FRA's grade-crossing inspectors will review and identify issues with railroad- and state-reported inventory data. FRA is currently developing guidelines, which it plans to finalize by the end of 2018, to implement these inspections as it has for other types of FRA inspections.
Officials we spoke with in eight states reported challenges in pursuing certain types of projects that could further enhance safety, in part because of federal requirements. While safety has improved, many crashes occur at grade crossings with gates, and officials said there could be additional ways to focus program requirements to continue improving safety. States' and the Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) reporting focuses on the program's funding and activity, such as the number and types of projects, yet the low number of crashes makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of projects in reducing crashes and fatalities. FHWA reports the program has been effective in reducing fatalities by about 74 percent since 1975. However, since 2009, annually there have been about 250 fatalities—almost one percent of total highway fatalities. FRA expects future crashes to grow, in part, due to the anticipated increase in rail and highway traffic. An evaluation of the program should consider whether its funding and other requirements allow states to adequately address ongoing safety issues. FHWA officials said they are not required to perform such evaluations. GAO has previously reported on the importance of program evaluations to determine the extent to which a program is meeting its objectives. An evaluation of the program could lead FHWA to identify changes that could allow states to more strategically address problem areas.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that FHWA evaluate the program's requirements to determine if they allow states the flexibility to address ongoing safety issues. The Department of Transportation concurred with GAO's recommendation.