Question:
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA; P.L. 95-128, 12 U.S.C. §§2901-2908) addresses how banking institutions meet the credit needs of the areas they serve, particularly in low- and moderate-income (LMI) neighborhoods. The federal banking regulatory agencies—the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)—currently implement the CRA. The regulators issue CRA credits, or points, where banks engage in qualifying activities—such as mortgage, consumer, and business lending; community investments; and low-cost services that would benefit LMI areas and entities—that occur with a designated assessment area. These credits are then used to issue each bank a performance rating. The CRA requires these ratings be taken into account when banks apply for charters, branches, mergers, and acquisitions among other things.
The CRA, which was enacted in 1977, was subsequently revised in 1989 to require public disclosure of bank CRA ratings to establish a four-tiered system of descriptive performance levels (i.e., Outstanding, Satisfactory, Needs to Improve, or Substantial Noncompliance). In 1995, the CRA examination was customized to account for differences in bank sizes and business models. In 2005, the bank size definitions were revised and indexed to the Consumer Price Index. The 2005 amendments also expanded opportunities for banks to earn CRA credit for public welfare investments (such as providing housing, services, or jobs that primarily benefit LMI individuals). Qualifying activities under the CRA have evolved to include consumer and business lending, community investments, and low-cost services that would benefit LMI areas and entities.
Congressional interest in the CRA stems from various perceptions of its effectiveness. Some have argued that, by encouraging lending in LMI neighborhoods, the CRA may also encourage the issuance of higher-risk loans to borrowers likely to have repayment problems (under the presumption that low-income is correlated with lower creditworthiness), which can translate into losses for lenders. Others are concerned that the CRA is not generating sufficient incentives to increase credit availability to qualified LMI borrowers, which may impede economic recovery for some, particularly following the 2007-2009 recession.
This report informs the congressional debate concerning the CRA's effectiveness in incentivizing bank lending and investment activity to LMI borrowers. After a discussion of the CRA's origins, it presents the CRA's examination process and bank activities that are eligible for consideration of CRA credits. Next, it discusses the difficulty of determining the CRA's influence on bank behavior. For example, the CRA does not specify the quality and quantity of CRA-qualifying activities, meaning that compliance with the CRA does not require adherence to lending quotas or benchmarks. In the absence of benchmarks, determining the extent to which CRA incentives have influenced LMI credit availability relative to other factors is not straightforward. Banks also face a variety of financial incentives—for example, capital requirements, the prevailing interest rate environment, changes in tax laws, and technological innovations—that influence how much (or how little) they lend to LMI borrowers. Because multiple financial profit incentives and CRA incentives tend to exist simultaneously, it is difficult to determine the extent to which CRA incentives have influenced LMI credit availability relative to other factors.


Question:
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits federally funded programs, activities, and institutions from discriminating based on race, color, or national origin. In its current form, largely unchanged since its adoption, Title VI incorporates a number of unique features. Besides barring federally funded programs from discriminating based on race, Title VI also authorizes and directs all federal funding agencies to promulgate rules effectuating that nondiscrimination mandate. Those rules were also made subject to presidential approval, an authority since delegated to the Attorney General by executive order. To enforce Title VI, agencies also have at their disposal a uniquely powerful tool: the termination or refusal to provide federal financial support to an institution or program seeking it. Although this power to withdraw federal funds was envisioned as the primary mechanism for enforcing Title VI, that authority was also hedged with a range of procedural requirements designed to spur agencies to resolve complaints against recipients through voluntary agreements.
In the 50 years since Title VI became law much of the debate over the statute has centered on how the courts have read its two central provisions—Sections 601 and 602—and how federal agencies have gone about enforcing them. In the courts those debates have especially focused on what counts as unlawful "discrimination" under Section 601. The courts have long agreed that Title VI bars federally funded programs from intentionally singling out individuals by race for adverse treatment. In its first case involving Title VI the Supreme Court suggested that Section 601 might also reach beyond intentional discrimination to bar the use of policies with a disparate impact—policies that, irrespective of the intent, impose a discriminatory effect on different racial groups. With its 2001 ruling in Alexander v Sandoval, the Court appeared to put that interpretive question to rest: Title VI directly prohibits only intentional discrimination.
For the agencies charged with enforcing Title VI, the primary concerns have tended to be more operational and programmatic—how to go about the business of reviewing and assessing particular practices under Section 602 of the statute. Section 602 authorizes and directs agencies to issue regulations "effectuat[ing]" Section 601. The breadth of that authority has produced a further point of uncertainty about the statute: what limits are there to funding agencies' rulemaking authority under Title VI? So far, two divergent views have emerged from the Court's decisions: (1) a largely deferential view that would give agencies leeway to issue prophylactic rules reaching conduct beyond intentional discrimination, and (2) a more exacting view under which agencies may redress only provable cases of intentional discrimination.
Although Title VI's nondiscrimination prohibition accompanies nearly all awards of federal financial support, much of the statute's doctrine has been shaped by its use in the public schools. That doctrinal history has centered on one agency in particular: the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) in the U.S. Department of Education (ED). Title VI continues to play a central part in OCR's mission of protecting civil rights on campuses at all educational levels, and in institutions both public and private. OCR handles a large volume and variety of claims alleging race and national origin discrimination, which it administratively resolves through a series of investigative procedures laid out in its Case Processing Manual. Although the types of allegations OCR investigates vary, three major categories of complaint occupy much of its docket: disparate treatment, retaliation, and racial harassment.
Congress has the ultimate say over how Title VI works—rooted not only in its legislative power but in its authority to oversee the statute's enforcement. In recent years two questions surrounding Title VI have drawn particular congressional interest: the viability of disparate impact regulations under Section 602 and the possible inclusion of new protected classes in Section 601. No matter how Congress may choose to address those subjects, however, they are likely only to raise further questions about the future of this landmark civil rights law.


Question:
This report provides an introduction to the general tax equity financing mechanism. The term tax equity investment describes transactions that pair the tax credits or other tax benefits generated by a qualifying physical investment with the capital financing associated with that investment. These transactions involve one party agreeing to assign the rights to claim the tax credits to another party in exchange for an equity investment (i.e., cash financing). The exchange is sometimes referred to as "monetizing," "selling," or "trading" the tax credits. Importantly, however, the "sale" of federal tax credits usually occurs within a partnership or contractual agreement that legally binds the two parties.
Three categories of tax credits that either currently use or have recently used this mechanism are presented in this report to help explain the structure and function of tax equity arrangements. These include the low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC); the new markets tax credit (NMTC); and two energy-related tax credits—the renewable electricity production tax credit (PTC) and energy investment tax credit (ITC). While these credits all use the tax equity financing mechanism, no two credits do so in the same manner. The economic rationale for subsidizing the activities targeted by these tax credits is not evaluated. Instead, this report focuses on explaining the structure and functioning of tax equity arrangements, analyzing the delivery of federal financial support using this mechanism, and discussing various policy options related to tax credits that rely on tax equity.
Four policy options are presented to help Congress should it consider modifications to an existing tax equity program, or create a new one. The options are with respect to the general tax equity approach and include making the credits refundable, converting the credits to grants, allowing for the direct transfer of credits, and accelerating the credit claim periods. This list of options is not exhaustive. Due to important differences in the underlying structure of various current or future credits, some options may be better suited for particular credits than others. Careful consideration on a case-by-case basis is part of evaluating the appropriateness of each option.
Consideration of various options might ask whether the use of tax equity markets is an efficient and effective means of delivering federal financial support. At first glance, it may appear that the government would get more "bang for its buck" by delivering subsidies more directly, without a role for tax equity markets. However, such a conclusion overlooks one role that tax equity investors play in some industries in addition to providing financing: they evaluate the quality of projects before investing, as well as provide continuing oversight and compliance monitoring. Effectively, the tax equity mechanism outsources a portion of the oversight and compliance monitoring to investors in exchange for a financial return. On the one hand, there may be value to the federal government in being able to rely on outside investors to provide oversight and monitoring. On the other hand, for some tax equity programs that have a government entity overseeing participant compliance, the monitor role of investors may be redundant. There also may be ways to improve the current delivery approach.


Question:
Antipoverty interventions that provide resources to local communities, based on the characteristics of those communities, have been of interest to Congress. One such policy, dubbed the "10-20-30 provision," was implemented in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5). Title I, Section 105 of ARRA required the Secretary of Agriculture to allocate at least 10% of funds from three rural development program accounts to persistent poverty counties; that is, to counties that have had poverty rates of 20% or more for the past 30 years, as measured by the 1980, 1990, and 2000 decennial censuses. One notable characteristic of this provision is that it did not increase spending for the rural development programs addressed in ARRA, but rather targeted existing funds differently.
Research has suggested that areas for which the poverty rate (the percentage of the population that is below poverty) reaches 20% experience systemic problems that are more acute than in lower-poverty areas. Therefore, policy interventions at the community level (such as applying the 10-20-30 provision to other programs besides those cited in ARRA), and not only at the individual or family level, could continue to be of interest to Congress.
Poverty rates are computed using data from household surveys. The list of counties identified to be persistently poor may differ by roughly 70 to 100 counties in a particular year, depending on the surveys selected to compile the list and the rounding method used for the poverty rate estimates. Before the mid-1990s, the decennial census was the only source of county poverty estimates. However, currently, the only data sources that provide poverty estimates for all U.S. counties are the American Community Survey (ACS) and the Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates program (SAIPE). Therefore, to determine whether an area is "persistently" poor in a time span that ends after the year 2000, it must first be decided whether ACS or SAIPE poverty estimates will be used for the later part of that time span.
When determining the rounding method and data source to be used to compile a list of persistent poverty counties, the following may be relevant to consider:
Characteristics of interest: SAIPE is suited for poverty or median income alone; ACS for other topics in addition to poverty and income. Geographic areas of interest: SAIPE is recommended for counties and school districts only; ACS produces estimates for other small geographic areas as well. Reference period of estimate: SAIPE for one year; ACS for a five-year span. Rounding method for poverty rates: rounding to 20.0% (one decimal place) yields a shorter list than rounding to 20% (whole number).
Poverty status is not defined for all persons: foster children (unrelated individuals under age 15), institutionalized persons, and residents of college dormitories are excluded; the homeless are not targeted by household surveys; and areas with large numbers of students living off-campus may have high poverty rates.


Question:
The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) program, which is carried out by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Navy, gives Navy Aegis cruisers and destroyers a capability for conducting BMD operations. Under the FY2020 budget submission, the number of BMD-capable Navy Aegis ships is projected to increase from 38 at the end of FY2018 to 59 at the end of FY2024. BMD-capable Aegis ships operate in European waters to defend Europe from potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as Iran, and in in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf to provide regional defense against potential ballistic missile attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran.
The Aegis BMD program is funded mostly through MDA's budget. The Navy's budget provides additional funding for BMD-related efforts. MDA's proposed FY2020 budget requests a total of $1,784.2 million (i.e., about $1.8 billion) in procurement and research and development funding for Aegis BMD efforts, including funding for two Aegis Ashore sites in Poland and Romania. MDA's budget also includes operations and maintenance (O&M) and military construction (MilCon) funding for the Aegis BMD program.
Issues for Congress regarding the Aegis BMD program include the following:
whether to approve, reject, or modify MDA's FY2020 funding procurement and research and development funding requests for the program; required numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships versus available numbers of BMD-capable Aegis ships; the burden that BMD operations may be placing on the Navy's fleet of Aegis ships, and whether there are alternative ways to perform BMD missions now performed by U.S. Navy Aegis ships, such as establishing more Aegis Ashore sites; burden sharing—how allied contributions to regional BMD capabilities and operations compare to U.S. naval contributions to overseas regional BMD capabilities and operations; whether to convert the Aegis test facility in Hawaii into an operational land-based Aegis BMD site; the potential for ship-based lasers, electromagnetic railguns (EMRGs), and hypervelocity projectiles (HVPs) to contribute in coming years to Navy terminal-phase BMD operations and the impact this might eventually have on required numbers of ship-based BMD interceptor missiles; and technical risk and test and evaluation issues in the Aegis BMD program.


Question:
Three new ship-based weapons being developed by the Navy—solid state lasers (SSLs), the electromagnetic railgun (EMRG), and the gun-launched guided projectile (GLGP), also known as the hypervelocity projectile (HVP)—could substantially improve the ability of Navy surface ships to defend themselves against surface craft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and eventually anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs).
The Navy has been developing SSLs for several years, and in 2014 installed on a Navy ship a prototype SSL called the Laser Weapon System (LaWS) that was capable of countering surface craft and UAVs. The Navy is now developing SSLs with improved capability for countering surface craft and UAVs, and eventually a capability for countering ASCMs. Navy efforts to develop these more capable lasers include
the Solid State Laser Technology Maturation (SSL-TM) effort; the Ruggedized High Energy Laser (RHEL); the Optical Dazzling Interdictor, Navy (ODIN); the Surface Navy Laser Weapon System (SNLWS) Increment 1, also known as the high-energy laser with integrated optical dazzler and surveillance (HELIOS); and the High Energy Laser Counter-ASCM Program (HELCAP).
The Navy refers to the first four efforts above collectively as the Navy Laser Family of Systems (NFLoS). Under the Navy's laser development approach, NFLOS and HELCAP, along with technologies developed by other parts of DOD, are to support the development of future, more capable shipboard lasers.
The Navy has been developing EMRG for several years. It was originally conceived as a naval surface fire support (NSFS) weapon for supporting Marines and other friendly forces ashore. Subsequently, it was determined that ERGM could also be used for air and missile defense, which strengthened interest in ERGM development. More recently, it was determined that the projectile to be fired by ERGM could also be fired by existing powder-propellant guns, including 5-inch and 155 mm guns on Navy cruisers and destroyers, and 155 mm artillery guns operated by the Army and Marine Corps. When fired from power guns, the projectile does not fly as quickly as it does when fired from an ERGM, but it still flies quickly enough to be of use as an air-defense weapon. The concept of firing the projectile from powder guns is referred to as GLGP and HVP. One potential advantage of HVP/GLGP is that, once developed, it can be rapidly deployed on Navy cruisers and destroyers and in Army and Marine Corps artillery units, because the powder guns in question already exist.
In addition to the question of whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's FY2020 funding requests for SSLs, ERGM, and HVP/GLGP, issues for Congress include the following:
whether the Navy is moving too quickly, too slowly, or at about the right speed in its efforts to develop these weapons; the Navy's plans for transitioning these weapons from development to procurement and fielding aboard Navy ships; and whether Navy the Navy's shipbuilding plans include ships with appropriate amounts of space, weight, electrical power, and cooling capacity to accommodate these weapons.


Question:
For more than forty-five years, all three branches of government have struggled with how to interpret the meaning of "waters of the United States" in the Clean Water Act. In a shift from early water pollution legislation, the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which came to be known as the Clean Water Act, eliminated the requirement that federally regulated waters must be capable of being used by vessels in interstate commerce. Rather than use traditional navigability tests, the 1972 amendments redefined "navigable waters" for purposes of the Clean Water Act's jurisdiction to include "the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." Disputes over the proper meaning of that phrase have been ongoing since that change.
Federal authority to regulate waters within the United States primarily derives from the Commerce Clause, and accordingly, federal laws and regulations concerning waters of the United States cannot cover matters which exceed that constitutional source of authority. During the first two decades after the passage of the Clean Water Act, courts generally interpreted the act as having a wide jurisdictional reach. In recent decades, however, the Supreme Court has emphasized that "the grant of authority to Congress under the Commerce Clause, though broad, is not unlimited." This modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence has informed federal courts' approach to interpreting which "waters" are subject to the Clean Water Act. At the same time, the Supreme Court has not always provided clear rules for determining whether a particular waterbody is a water of the United States. In its most recent case on the issue, Rapanos v. United States, the High Court issued a fractured 4-1-4 decision with no majority opinion providing a rationale for how to evaluate jurisdictional disputes.
Some courts and commentators disagree on how the scope of federal jurisdictional waters changed over time as a result of interpretative approaches taken by the agencies responsible for administering the Clean Water Act—the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). This debate resurfaced during the Obama Administration when the Corps and EPA issued a rule, known as the Clean Water Rule, which substantially redefined "waters of the United States" in the agencies' regulations for the first time in more than two decades. While some argued that the Clean Water Rule constituted a large-scale expansion of federal jurisdiction, others asserted that the agencies construed the term in a narrower fashion than in prior regulations.
A vocal critic of the Clean Water Rule, President Trump shifted the executive branch's policy toward the meaning of "waters of the United States." In February 2017, President Trump issued an executive order directing EPA and the Corps to review and revise or rescind the Clean Water Rule. The agencies currently are in the process of carrying out the executive order, and they unveiled proposed regulations redefining "waters of the United States" in December 2018. As in nearly all prior attempts to define this phrase, observers disagree on whether the latest proposed definition correctly calibrates the scope of federal jurisdiction to regulate water pollution.


Question:
Iran's national security policy is the product of many overlapping and sometimes competing factors such as the ideology of Iran's Islamic revolution, perception of threats to the regime and to the country, long-standing national interests, and the interaction of the Iranian regime's factions and constituencies. Iran's leadership:
Seeks to deter or thwart U.S. or other efforts to invade or intimidate Iran or to bring about a change of regime. Has sought to take advantage of opportunities of regional conflicts to overturn a power structure in the Middle East that it asserts favors the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Sunni Muslim Arab regimes. Seeks to enhance its international prestige and restore a sense of "greatness" reminiscent of ancient Persian empires. Advances its foreign policy goals, in part by providing material support to regional allied governments and armed factions. Iranian officials characterize the support as helping the region's "oppressed" and assert that Saudi Arabia, in particular, is instigating sectarian tensions and trying to exclude Iran from regional affairs. Sometimes disagrees on tactics and strategies. Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'i and key hardline institutions, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), oppose any compromises of Iran's national security core goals. Iran's elected president, Hassan Rouhani, and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif support Iran's integration into regional and international diplomacy. Supports acts of international terrorism, as the "leading" or "most active" state sponsor of terrorism, according to each annual State Department report on international terrorism since the early 1990s.
The Administration insists that an end to Iran's malign activities is a requirement of any revised JCPOA and normalization of relations with the United States. The Trump Administration has articulated a strategy to counter Iran's "malign activities" based on:
Applying "maximum pressure" on Iran's economy and regime through sanctions. President Trump withdrew the United States from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, and reimposed all U.S. sanctions as of November 5, 2018. Attempting to diplomatically, politically, and economically isolate Iran. Training, arming, and providing counterterrorism assistance to partner governments and some allied substate actors in the region. Deploying U.S. forces to deter Iran and interdict its arms shipments to its allies and proxies. Indirectly threatening military action against Iranian actions that pose an immediate threat to U.S. regional interests or allies.


Question:
The United States and other donors have focused substantial resources on stabilizing the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since the early 2000s, when "Africa's World War"—a conflict that drew in multiple neighboring countries and reportedly caused millions of deaths—drew to a close. DRC hosts the world's largest U.N. peacekeeping operation and is a major recipient of donor aid. Conflict has nonetheless persisted in eastern DRC, prolonging instability and an enduring humanitarian crisis in Africa's Great Lakes region. New unrest erupted as elections were repeatedly delayed past 2016, their scheduled date, leaving widely unpopular President Joseph Kabila in office. Security forces brutally cracked down on protests, while new conflicts emerged in previously stable regions, possibly fueled by political interference. An ongoing Ebola outbreak in the east has added to DRC's challenges. In April 2019, the Islamic State organization claimed responsibility for an attack on local soldiers in the Ebola-affected area, an apparent effort to rebrand a local armed group known as the Allied Democratic Forces.
National elections were ultimately held on December 30, 2018, following intense domestic and regional pressure. Opposition figure Felix Tshisekedi unexpectedly won the presidential contest, though his ability to assert a popular mandate may be undermined by allegations that the official results were rigged to deny victory to a more hardline opposition rival. Many Congolese nonetheless reacted to the outcome with relief and/or enthusiasm, noting that Kabila would step down and that voters had soundly defeated his stated choice of successor, a former Interior Minister. Kabila's coalition nonetheless won sweeping majorities in simultaneous legislative and provincial-level elections, ensuring enduring influence for the former president and his supporters. Whether President Tshisekedi will make durable progress toward spurring inclusive economic growth, reforming state institutions, or ending security force abuses remains to be seen.
The Trump and Obama Administrations expended significant efforts to encourage an electoral transfer of power in DRC, that is, "credible" elections in which Kabila was not a candidate. U.S. officials have welcomed Tshisekedi's election and pledged to work with him, but they also imposed sanctions against top election officials in the aftermath of the polls, citing corruption in the electoral process. The Trump Administration has more broadly maintained a high-level focus on human rights and governance in DRC, expanding a U.S. unilateral sanctions regime targeting high-level security commanders and appointing regional specialist J. Peter Pham as Special Envoy in 2018. U.S. diplomats have also called on DRC authorities to credibly prosecute the murder in 2017 of two U.N. sanctions investigators, one of whom was a U.S. citizen. The United States remains the largest humanitarian donor in DRC and the largest financial contributor to the U.N. peacekeeping operation, MONUSCO, though the Administration has advocated broad cuts to U.S. peacekeeping funding and secured a decrease in MONUSCO's troop level in 2017. U.S. bilateral aid to DRC totaled $375 million in FY2018, higher than in previous years.
Congress has shaped U.S. policy toward DRC, often focusing on human rights and democracy. Recent foreign aid appropriations measures have directed bilateral economic assistance for DRC. In the 115th Congress, the House passed H.R. 6207, which would have codified Executive Orders authorizing U.S. targeted sanctions, while the Senate agreed to S.Res. 386, urging the U.S. President to "deter further electoral calendar slippage and abuses against the people of Congo." For more than a decade, Congress has also sought to deter Rwandan and Ugandan proxy involvement in DRC, including via provisions in aid appropriations legislation. Laws restricting U.S. aid to countries that, like DRC, have poor records on curtailing the use of child soldiers or human trafficking have also shaped U.S. engagement and aid. See also CRS In Focus IF11100, Ebola Outbreak: Democratic Republic of Congo; CRS Report R44402, Rwanda: In Brief; and CRS Report R42618, Conflict Minerals in Central Africa: U.S. and International Responses.


Question:
Congress has enacted a series of legislative provisions since 2006 to enable certain Iraqi and Afghan nationals to become U.S. lawful permanent residents (LPRs). These provisions make certain Iraqis and Afghans who worked as translators or interpreters, or who were employed by, or on behalf of, the U.S. government in Iraq or Afghanistan, eligible for special immigrant visas (SIVs). Special immigrants comprise a category of permanent employment-based admissions under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). While the special immigrant category is unique, it does bear some similarities to other admission categories that are authorized by other sections of the INA, including refugees and Amerasian children.
To apply under the SIV programs for Iraqis or Afghans, a prospective special immigrant must submit a petition to the Department of Homeland Security; be otherwise eligible for an immigrant visa; and be otherwise admissible to the United States. An Iraqi or Afghan SIV applicant whose petition is approved and who is abroad is required to have an in-person visa interview at a U.S. embassy or consulate abroad to determine visa eligibility. Upon admission to the United States, SIV recipients are granted LPR status. Iraqi and Afghan special immigrants are eligible for the same resettlement assistance and federal public benefits as refugees.
There are three SIV programs for Iraqi and Afghan nationals. One is a permanent program for certain Iraqis and Afghans who have worked directly with U.S. Armed Forces, or under Chief of Mission authority, as translators or interpreters. This program is currently capped at 50 principal aliens (excluding spouses and children) per year.
The other two SIV programs for Iraqis and Afghans are temporary. One program is for certain Iraqis who were employed in Iraq by, or on behalf of, the U.S. government during a specified period. It was capped at 5,000 principal aliens annually for FY2008 through FY2012 and included a provision to carry forward any unused numbers from one fiscal year to the next. It expired at the end of FY2013, but was subsequently revived. Current statutory authority provides for the issuance of no more than 2,500 visas to principal applicants after January 1, 2014. Applications are no longer being accepted for this program because the application deadline has passed.
There is a similar SIV program for certain Afghans who were employed in Afghanistan by, or on behalf of, the U.S. government or by the International Security Assistance Force during a specified period. The program was capped at 1,500 principal aliens annually for FY2009 through FY2013, with a provision to carry forward any unused numbers from one fiscal year to the next. Current statutory authority provides for the issuance of no more than 18,500 visas to principal applicants after December 19, 2014. The application period for this program remains open.
Through the end of FY2018, more than 79,000 individuals were granted special immigrant status under the three SIV programs for Iraqi and Afghan nationals. Principal applicants accounted for about 26,000 of the total, and dependent spouses and children accounted for the remaining 53,000.
The Iraqi and Afghan SIV programs have faced challenges with respect to application processing, security screening, and visa availability. The structure of the SIV programs themselves, with statutory timeframes and numerical limitations, introduces additional complication.


Question:
The Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (WIFIA) program provides financial assistance for water infrastructure projects, including projects to build and upgrade wastewater and drinking water treatment systems. Congress established the WIFIA program in the Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 (WRRDA 2014, P.L. 113-121).
The WIFIA concept is modeled after a similar program that finances transportation projects, the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program. Proponents of the WIFIA approach, including water utility organizations, cite several potential benefits:
WIFIA provides credit assistance to large water infrastructure projects that may otherwise have difficulty obtaining financing. WIFIA provides credit assistance, namely direct loans, at U.S. Treasury rates, potentially lowering the cost of capital for borrowers. WIFIA assistance has less of a federal budgetary effect than conventional project grants that are not repaid, because only the subsidy cost of a loan (representing the presumed default rate on loans) is required to be appropriated. WIFIA support limits the federal government's exposure to default, because projects must be found creditworthy with a revenue stream for repayment to be eligible for assistance.
On the other hand, opponents of the WIFIA approach, including organizations that represent state environmental agency officials, have cited several concerns:
Federal funding for a WIFIA program could have a detrimental effect on federal support for established State Revolving Fund (SRF) programs that provide the largest source of water infrastructure assistance today. If WIFIA funding resulted in a decrease in SRF assistance, smaller projects may face financing challenges. The Congressional Budget Office has warned that the future costs of a WIFIA program to the federal budget may be underestimated.
America's Water Infrastructure Act of 2018 (AWIA; P.L. 115-270), enacted on October 23, 2018, removed the pilot designation from the WIFIA program, reauthorized appropriations, and revised provisions related to program administration.
Appropriations for the WIFIA program have increased since its inception, allowing EPA to provide increasing amounts of credit assistance each year:
FY2017 appropriations totaled $30 million. FY2018 appropriations totaled $63 million. FY2019 appropriations totaled $68 million.
On April 5, 2019, EPA announced a third round of WIFIA funding, inviting prospective borrowers to submit letters of interest to EPA. From these submittals, the agency will select projects for funding. EPA estimated that its budget authority would provide approximately $6 billion in credit assistance.


Question:
Economic growth and expanded global trade have led to substantial increases in goods movement over the past few decades. The growth in freight transportation demand, along with growing passenger demand, has caused congestion in many parts of the transportation system, making freight movements slower and less reliable. Because the condition and performance of freight infrastructure play a considerable role in the efficiency of the freight system, federal support of freight infrastructure investment is likely to be of significant congressional concern in the reauthorization of the surface transportation program. The program is currently authorized by the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94), which is scheduled to expire on September 30, 2020.
Until recently, the federal surface transportation program did not pay specific attention to freight movement. However, the two most recent surface transportation acts, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141), approved in 2012, and the FAST Act, passed in 2015, encouraged federal and state planning for freight transportation from a multimodal perspective. The FAST Act also directed a portion of federal funds toward highway segments and other projects deemed most critical to freight movement. It did this by creating two new programs: a discretionary grant program administered by the Secretary of Transportation and a formula program for distributing federal funds to states.
Trucks continue to move the bulk of freight in the United States. Freight tonnage is projected to increase by an average of 1.4% per year through 2045, according to the Department of Transportation (DOT), and trucks are projected to carry the largest share of the additional freight traffic. Much of the growth in truck traffic has occurred in urban areas, and this trend is expected to continue. Consequently, most truck congestion occurs in urban areas, and comparatively few highway miles are responsible for a disproportionately large share of congestion costs. Highway infrastructure decisions are mainly made by the states, but federal fuel tax revenue is an important source of funds for the projects states pursue. With fuel taxes no longer able to fully cover the cost of existing highway infrastructure programs, Congress has considered strategies to raise new revenue and to make more effective use of federal dollars to facilitate the movement of freight. The trucking industry has favored raising additional revenue by increasing fuel taxes and has generally opposed greater use of highway tolls out of concern that these may disproportionately affect truckers. DOT studies have shown that the structure of motor fuel taxes provides a subsidy to heavily loaded trucks at the expense of passenger vehicles.
One significant question is whether additional funding for freight-related infrastructure should be distributed to the states by formula or on a discretionary basis. Federal projections indicate that a relatively small number of Interstate Highway segments and interchanges are likely to face large increases in truck traffic by 2045. However, individual states may have limited incentives to use their federal formula funds to alleviate increasing congestion in those locations, as many of the trucks affected may be passing through rather than serving local businesses. Discretionary grants may be more effective in providing large amounts of federal funding for very costly freight-related projects, particularly those requiring interstate cooperation, but could also lead to fewer projects receiving federal funds.
Besides appropriating funds for freight infrastructure, Congress has created programs to support research and development of new transportation technologies. Autonomous and connected vehicle technologies have potential applications in the freight sector, but many federal regulations are written assuming that a single person is in full control of a vehicle at all times. Congress has considered, but not advanced, proposals to update such regulations. Industry is eager to explore the cost-saving potential of new technology, so it will likely remain an issue for Congress.


Question:
There is no official or agreed-upon definition of what constitutes a "sanctuary" jurisdiction, and there has been debate as to whether the term applies to particular states and localities. Moreover, state and local jurisdictions have varied reasons for opting not to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement efforts, including reasons not necessarily motivated by disagreement with federal policies, such as concern about potential civil liability or the costs associated with assisting federal efforts. But traditional sanctuary policies are often described as falling under one of three categories. First, so-called "don't enforce" policies generally bar state or local police from assisting federal immigration authorities. Second, "don't ask" policies generally bar certain state or local officials from inquiring into a person's immigration status. Third, "don't tell" policies typically restrict information sharing between state or local law enforcement and federal immigration authorities.
One legal question relevant to sanctuary policies is the extent to which states, as sovereign entities, may decline to assist in federal immigration enforcement, and the degree to which the federal government can stop state measures that undermine federal objectives. The Tenth Amendment preserves the states' broad police powers, and states have frequently enacted measures that, directly or indirectly, address aliens residing in their communities. Under the doctrine of preemption—derived from the Supremacy Clause—Congress may displace many state or local laws pertaining to immigration. But not every state or local law touching on immigration matters is necessarily preempted; the measure must interfere with, or be contrary to, federal law to be rendered unenforceable. Further, the anti-commandeering doctrine, rooted in the Constitution's allocation of powers between the federal government and the states, prohibits Congress from forcing state entities to perform regulatory functions on the federal government's behalf, including in the context of immigration. A series of Supreme Court cases inform the boundaries of preemption and the anti-commandeering doctrine, with the Court most recently opining on the issue in Murphy v. NCAA.
These dueling federal and state interests are front and center in numerous lawsuits challenging actions taken by the Trump Administration to curb states and localities from implementing sanctuary-type policies. Notably, Section 9(a) of Executive Order 13768, "Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States," directs the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General to withhold federal grants from jurisdictions that willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373—a statute that bars states and localities from prohibiting their employees from sharing with federal immigration authorities certain immigration-related information. The executive order further directs the Attorney General to take "appropriate enforcement action" against jurisdictions that violate Section 1373 or have policies that "prevent or hinder the enforcement of federal law." To implement the executive order, the Department of Justice added new eligibility conditions to the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (Byrne JAG) Program and grants administered by the Justice Department's Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS). These conditions tied eligibility to compliance with Section 1373 and other federal immigration priorities, like granting federal authorities access to state and local detention facilities housing aliens and giving immigration authorities notice before releasing from custody an alien wanted for removal.
Several lawsuits were filed challenging the constitutionality of the executive order and new grant conditions. So far the courts that have reviewed these challenges—principally contending that the executive order and grant conditions violate the separation of powers and anti-commandeering principles—generally agree that the Trump Administration acted unconstitutionally. For instance, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a permanent injunction blocking enforcement of Section 9(a) against California. Additionally, two separate district courts permanently enjoined the Byrne JAG conditions as applied to Chicago and Philadelphia. In doing so, these courts concluded that the Supreme Court's most recent formulation of the anti-commandeering doctrine in Murphy requires holding Section 1373 unconstitutional. These lawsuits notwithstanding, the courts still recognize the federal government's pervasive, nearly exclusive role in immigration enforcement. This can be seen in the federal government's lawsuit challenging three California measures governing the state's regulation of private and public actors' involvement in immigration enforcement within its border. Although a district court opined that several measures likely were lawful exercises of the state's police powers, it also concluded that two provisions regulating private employers are likely unlawful under the Supremacy Clause. This ruling was mostly upheld on appeal, in which the Ninth Circuit additionally opined that a provision requiring the California attorney general to review the circumstances surrounding detained aliens' apprehension and transfer to detention facilities within the state also violates the Supremacy Clause.


Question:
The federal crop insurance program offers subsidized crop insurance policies to farmers. Farmers can purchase policies that pay indemnities when their yields or revenues fall below guaranteed levels. While the majority of federal crop insurance policies cover yield or revenue losses, the program also offers policies with other types of guarantees, such as index policies that trigger an indemnity payment based on weather conditions. The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC), a government corporation within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), pays part of the premium—about 63%, on average—across the federal crop insurance portfolio during crop year 2017, while policy holders—farmers and ranchers—pay the balance. Private insurance companies, known as Approved Insurance Providers (AIPs), deliver the policies in return for administrative and operating subsidies from FCIC. AIPs also share underwriting risk with FCIC through a mutually negotiated Standard Reinsurance Agreement. The USDA Risk Management Agency (RMA) administers the federal crop insurance program.
The federal crop insurance program primarily covers traditional field crops (such as wheat, corn, and soybeans) that are supported by USDA's revenue-support programs. Unlike these traditional crops, specialty crops—defined in statute as "fruits and vegetables, tree nuts, dried fruits, and horticulture and nursery crops (including floriculture)" (7 U.S.C. §1621 note)—have not been a major part of federal crop insurance support. Specialty crops are also generally not eligible for USDA's revenue-support programs. USDA estimates that the statutory definition of specialty crops covers more than 300 agricultural commodities, including fresh and processed fruits and vegetables, tree nuts, nursery plants (trees, shrubs, and flowering plants), herbs, spices, coffee, tea, honey, and maple syrup.
Legislative changes, coupled with ongoing administrative efforts by USDA, have expanded federal crop insurance coverage for specialty crops, and they now account for a small but growing number of federal crop insurance policies bought by farmers. Among the issues Congress may consider if it seeks to further expand coverage for specialty crops are data collection and price discovery for commodities not sold on exchanges (such as most fruits and vegetables), coverage of quality losses, and the effect of ad hoc payments on the demand for crop insurance.
Federal crop insurance policies currently cover around 38 specialty crop categories, which include roughly 80 types of fruits, vegetables, tree nuts, and nursery crops. Over the past few decades, total specialty crop insured liabilities rose from nearly $1 billion in 1989 to nearly $18.5 billion in 2017. In 2017, federal crop insurance policies covered about 9 million acres of specialty crops, around 800,000 bee colonies, about 100,000 tons of raisins, and roughly 60,000 fruit and coffee trees. Across all specialty crops, coverage and the premium subsidy paid by the federal government may vary depending on the crop. Moreover, for many specialty crops, crop-specific insurance policies are not available. Currently, about one-half of all U.S. specialty crop acres are covered by federal crop insurance policies. Some specialty crops may be covered under a Whole Farm Revenue Protection (WFRP) insurance policy. WFRP is designed to fill in coverage gaps for producers of uninsured crops that lack individual policy coverage and for producers marketing to local, farm-identity preserved, or direct markets. The average premium subsidy rate for WRFP was about 70% in 2017. Federal crop insurance for specialty crops and WFRP together accounted for about 17% of the entire federal crop insurance portfolio, as measured by liability, during crop year 2017.


Question:
As congressional policymakers continue to debate telecommunications reform, a major discussion point revolves around what approach should be taken to ensure unfettered access to the internet. The move to place restrictions on the owners of the networks that compose and provide access to the internet, to ensure equal access and nondiscriminatory treatment, is referred to as "net neutrality." There is no single accepted definition of "net neutrality," but most agree that any such definition should include the general principles that owners of the networks that compose and provide access to the internet should not control how consumers lawfully use that network, and they should not be able to discriminate against content provider access to that network.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in its February 26, 2015, open meeting voted 3-2, along party lines, to adopt open internet rules and released these rules on March 12, 2015. One of the most controversial aspects of the rules was the decision to reclassify broadband internet access service (BIAS) as telecommunications service under Title II, thereby subjecting internet service providers to a more stringent regulatory framework. With limited exceptions, the rules went into effect June 12, 2015. Various parties challenged the legality of the FCC's 2015 Open Internet Order, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, in a June 14, 2016, ruling, voted (2-1) to uphold the legality of all aspects of the 2015 FCC Order. A petition for full U.S. Appeals Court review was denied and a subsequent petition for U.S. Supreme Court review was declined.
The FCC on December 14, 2017, adopted (3-2) an Order that largely reverses the 2015 regulatory framework. The 2017 Order, among other things, reverses the 2015 classification of BIAS as a telecommunications service under Title II of the Communications Act, shifts much of the oversight from the FCC to the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice, and provides for a less regulatory approach. This action has once again opened up the debate over what the appropriate framework is to ensure an open internet. Reaction to the 2017 Order has been mixed. Some see the 2015 FCC rules as regulatory overreach and welcome a more "light-touch" approach, which they feel will stimulate broadband investment, deployment, and innovation. Others support the 2015 regulations and feel that their reversal will result in a concentration of power to the detriment of content, services, and applications providers, as well as consumers, and refute the claim that these regulations have had a negative impact on broadband investment, expansion, or innovation. The 2017 Order was published in the Federal Register on February 22, 2018, and went into effect on June 11, 2018. Federal Register publication triggered timelines for both court challenges and Congressional Review Act (CRA) consideration. Petitions for review have been consolidated in the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit. CRA resolutions (S.J.Res. 52, H.J.Res. 129) to overturn the 2017 Order were introduced in the 115th Congress. S.J.Res. 52 passed (52-47) the Senate, but H.J.Res. 129 was not considered in the House. Additional bills to provide a regulatory framework to outline FCC authority over broadband internet access services were introduced, but not acted on, in the 115th Congress.
Debate over what the appropriate regulatory framework should be for broadband access has continued in the 116th Congress. Two bills (H.R. 1644, S. 682) add a new title to the Communications Act that overturns the 2017 Order and restores the 2015 Order. An amended version of H.R. 1644 passed (232-190) the House on April 10, 2019. Additional bills (H.R. 1006, H.R. 1096, H.R. 1101, and H.R. 1860) that address the net neutrality debate have also been introduced.


Question:
Successive Administrations have described the U.S. relationship with Nigeria, Africa's largest producer of oil and its largest economy, to be among the most important on the continent. The country is Africa's most populous, with more than 200 million people, roughly evenly divided between Muslims and Christians. Nigeria, which transitioned from military to civilian rule in 1999, ranked for years among the top suppliers of U.S. oil imports, and it is a major recipient of U.S. foreign aid. The country is the United States' second-largest trading partner in Africa and the third-largest beneficiary of U.S. foreign direct investment on the continent. Nigerians comprise the largest African diaspora group in the United States.
Nigeria is a country of significant promise, but it also faces serious social, economic, and security challenges, some of which pose threats to state and regional stability. The country has faced intermittent political turmoil and economic crises since gaining independence in 1960 from the United Kingdom. Political life has been scarred by conflict along ethnic, geographic, and religious lines, and corruption and misrule have undermined the state's authority and legitimacy. Despite extensive petroleum resources, its human development indicators are among the world's lowest, and a majority of the population faces extreme poverty. In the south, social unrest, criminality, and corruption in the oil-producing Niger Delta have hindered oil production and contributed to piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Perceived government neglect and economic marginalization have also fueled resentment in the predominately Muslim north, while communal grievances and competition over land and other resources—sometimes subject to political manipulation—drive conflict in the Middle Belt.
The rise of Boko Haram has heightened concerns about extremist recruitment in Nigeria, which has one of the world's largest Muslim populations. Boko Haram has focused on a range of targets, but civilians in the impoverished, predominately Muslim northeast have borne the brunt of the violence. The group became notorious for its 2014 kidnapping of over 270 schoolgirls and its use of women and children as suicide bombers. It has staged attacks in neighboring countries and poses a threat to international targets in the region. Boko Haram appears primarily focused on the Lake Chad Basin region. Its 2015 pledge to the Islamic State and the emergence of a splinter faction, Islamic State-West Africa (IS-WA), have raised concerns from U.S. policymakers, though the extent of intergroup linkages is unclear. IS-WA is credited with a number of devastating attacks in 2018 against Nigerian military bases; the army has struggled to defend them.
Domestic criticism of the government's response to corruption, economic pressures, and Boko Haram contributed to the election in 2015 of former military ruler Muhammadu Buhari. In what was widely hailed as a historic transition, the ruling People's Democratic Party and President Goodluck Jonathan lost power to Buhari and his All Progressives Congress, marking Nigeria's first democratic transfer of power. Buhari has since struggled to enact promised reforms amid persistent security challenges and a struggling economy. He faces a challenge from former vice president Atiku Abubakar in elections scheduled for February 2019; it is forecast to be a close race. As in previous elections, there are concerns about violence around the polls, and intense, high-stakes contests over a number of legislative and gubernatorial posts increase the risk of conflicts. U.S. officials and Members of Congress have called for credible, transparent, and peaceful elections.
U.S.-Nigeria relations under the Trump Administration appear generally consistent with U.S. policy under the Obama Administration. Both Administrations have supported reform initiatives in Nigeria, including anticorruption efforts, economic and electoral reforms, energy sector privatization, and programs to promote peace and development. Congress oversees more than $500 million in U.S. foreign aid programs in Nigeria and regularly monitors political developments; some Members have expressed concern with corruption, human rights abuses, and violent extremism in Nigeria.


Question:
Over the past several decades, Congress, by statute, has established a wide array of commissions, boards, and advisory bodies to provide it with assistance in meeting various legislative, investigative, and administrative responsibilities. Some of these entities are temporary and created to serve specific functions, such as studying a discrete policy area or performing one-time tasks. Others are permanent, serving an ongoing purpose, such as overseeing an institution or performing a regular administrative function.
The majority of these congressional bodies provide that Members of Congress, particularly the leadership, be intimately involved in the appointment process, either through direct service on a commission, or by appointing or recommending candidates for membership.
The choice of a particular mechanism for membership appointment may have implications for the ability of these entities to fulfill their congressional mandates. Examination of the statutory language creating these bodies reveals several common approaches to membership selection. Each alternative schema has its advantages.
For example, a commission or board composed entirely of Members permits a high degree of congressional control over the entity's operations. Bodies composed mainly of qualified private citizens or executive branch appointees may provide a broader expertise than Member-only bodies. Assemblages of mixed membership provide some of the advantages of both Member and citizen-only appointment schemes.
This report contains a compilation of existing commissions and boards that demonstrates the range of alternative membership-appointment structures. It includes any statutorily created advisory entity (e.g., boards, advisory panels, task forces) whose membership scheme mandates the participation of Members of Congress either as potential members or as participants in the process of appointing the membership. For each entity, information on the purpose, duration, appointment structure, and term of appointment is provided. Finally, information on the involvement of Members of Congress in the appointment process is presented in a series of tables.


Question:
The Small Business Administration's (SBA's) Surety Bond Guarantee Program is designed to increase small businesses' access to federal, state, and local government contracting, as well as private-sector contracts, by guaranteeing bid, performance, and payment bonds for small businesses that cannot obtain surety bonds through regular commercial channels. The program guarantees individual contracts of up to $6.5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary. The SBA's guarantee currently ranges from 80% to 90% of the surety's loss if a default occurs. In FY2018, the SBA guaranteed 10,800 bid and final surety bonds with a total contract value of nearly $6.5 billion.
A surety bond is a three-party instrument between a surety (who agrees to be responsible for the debt or obligation of another), a contractor, and a project owner. The agreement binds the contractor to comply with the contract's terms and conditions. If the contractor is unable to successfully perform the contract, the surety assumes the contractor's responsibilities and ensures that the project is completed. Surety bonds encourage project owners to contract with small businesses that may not have the credit history or prior experience of larger businesses and may be at greater risk of failing to comply with the contract's terms and conditions.
Surety bonds are important to small businesses interested in competing for federal contracts because the federal government requires prime contractors—prior to the award of a federal contract exceeding $150,000 for the construction, alteration, or repair of any building or public work of the United States—to furnish a performance bond issued by a surety satisfactory to the contracting officer in an amount that the officer considers adequate to protect the government.
P.L. 112-239, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, increased the program's bond limit to $6.5 million, or up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certifies that such a guarantee is necessary. The limit had been $2 million since 2000, with a temporary increase from February 17, 2009, through September 30, 2010, to $5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certified in writing that such a guarantee was necessary. Advocates of raising the program's bond limit argued that doing so would increase contracting opportunities for small businesses and bring the limit more in line with limits of other small business programs, such as the 8(a) Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program and the Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) Program. Opponents argued that raising the limit could lead to higher amounts being guaranteed by the SBA and, as a result, increase the risk of program losses.
This report examines the program's origin and development, including (1) the decision to supplement the original Prior Approval Program with the Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program that initially provided a lower guarantee rate (not to exceed 70%) than the Prior Approval Program (not to exceed 80% or 90%, depending on the size of the contract and the type of small business) in exchange for allowing preferred sureties to issue SBA-guaranteed surety bonds without the SBA's prior approval; (2) P.L. 114-92, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, which increased the Preferred Surety Bond Guarantee Program's guarantee rate from not to exceed 70% to not to exceed 90% of losses; and (3) the decision to increase the program's bond limit.


Question:
Since the first mobile phones were made available in the 1980s, telecommunication providers have been investing in mobile networks to expand coverage, improve services, and attract more users. First-generation networks supported mobile voice calls but were limited in coverage and capacity. To address those limitations, providers developed and deployed second-generation (2G) mobile networks, then third-generation (3G), and fourth-generation (4G) networks. Each generation offered improved speeds, greater capacity, and new features and services.
In 2018, telecommunication providers began deploying fifth-generation (5G) networks to meet growing demands for data from consumer and industrial users. 5G networks are expected to enable providers to expand consumer services (e.g., video streaming, virtual reality applications), support the growing number of connected devices (e.g., medical devices, smart homes, Internet of Things), support new industrial uses (e.g., industrial sensors, industrial monitoring systems), perform advanced data analytics, and enable the use of advanced technologies (e.g., smart city applications, autonomous vehicles).
5G is expected to yield significant economic benefits. Market analysts estimate that in the United States, 5G could create up to 3 million new jobs and add $500 billion to the nation's gross domestic product (GDP). Globally, analysts estimate that 5G technologies could generate $12.3 trillion in sales activity across multiple industries and support 22 million jobs by 2035. Experience has shown that companies first to market with new products can capture the bulk of the revenues, yielding long-term benefits for those companies and significant economic gains for the countries where those companies are located. Hence, technology companies around the world are racing to develop 5G products, and some countries (i.e., central governments) are acting in support of 5G deployment. This competition to develop 5G products and capture the global 5G market is often called the "race to 5G."
In the race to 5G, the United States is one of the leaders, along with China and South Korea. Each country has adopted a different strategy to lead in 5G technology development and deployment. China's central government is supporting the deployment of 5G infrastructure in China. China has a national plan to deploy 5G domestically, capture the revenues from its domestic market, improve its industrial systems, and become a leading supplier of telecommunications equipment to the world. In South Korea, the central government is working with telecommunications providers to deploy 5G. South Korea plans to be the first country to deploy 5G nationwide, and to use the technology to improve its industrial systems. In the United States, private industry is leading 5G deployment. U.S. providers, competing against each other, have conducted 5G trials in several cities and were the first in the world to offer 5G services commercially. The U.S. government has supported 5G deployment, making spectrum available for 5G use and streamlining processes related to the siting of 5G equipment (e.g., small cells).
While each country has taken a different approach to capturing the 5G market, there are factors that drive the timeline for all deployments, including international decisions on standards and spectrum. In the United States, 5G deployment may also be affected by the lengthy spectrum allocation process, resistance from local governments to federal small cell siting rules, and limitations on trade that may affect availability of equipment.
The 116th Congress may monitor the progress of 5G deployment in the United States and the U.S. position in the race to 5G. Congress may consider policies that may affect 5G deployment, including policies related to spectrum allocation, trade restrictions, and local concerns with 5G deployment. Policies that support 5G deployment while also protecting national and local interests could provide significant consumer benefits, help to modernize industries, give U.S. companies an advantage in the global economy, and yield long-term economic gains for the United States. In developing policies, Members may consider the economic and consumer benefits of 5G technologies, as well as other interests, such as the need to preserve spectrum for other users and uses, the protection of national security and intellectual property when trading, the privacy and security of 5G devices and systems, and the respect of local authorities and concerns during 5G deployment.


Question:
Law enforcement officials have described money laundering—the process of making illegally obtained proceeds appear legitimate—as the "lifeblood" of organized crime. Recently, money launderers have increasingly turned to a new technology to conceal the origins of illegally obtained proceeds: virtual currency. Virtual currencies like Bitcoin, Ether, and Ripple are digital representations of value that, like ordinary currency, function as media of exchange, units of account, and stores of value. However, unlike ordinary currencies, virtual currencies are not legal tender, meaning they cannot be used to pay taxes and creditors need not accept them as payments for debt. While virtual currency enthusiasts tout their technological promise, a number of commentators have contended that the anonymity offered by these new financial instruments makes them an attractive vehicle for money laundering. Law enforcement officials, regulators, and courts have accordingly grappled with how virtual currencies fit into a federal anti-money laundering (AML) regime designed principally for traditional financial institutions.
The federal AML regime consists of two general categories of laws and regulations. First, federal law requires a range of "financial institutions" to abide by a variety of AML program, reporting, and recordkeeping requirements. Second, federal law criminalizes money laundering and various forms of related conduct.
Over the past decade, federal prosecutors and regulators have pursued a number of cases involving the application of these laws to virtual currencies. Specifically, federal prosecutors have brought money laundering charges against the creators of online marketplaces that allowed their users to exchange virtual currency for illicit goods and services. In one of these prosecutions, a federal district court held that transactions involving Bitcoin can serve as the predicate for money laundering charges. Federal prosecutors have also pursued charges against the developers of certain virtual currency payment systems allegedly designed to facilitate illicit transactions and launder the proceeds of criminal activity. Specifically, prosecutors charged these developers with conspiring to commit money laundering and operating unlicensed money transmitting businesses. In adjudicating the second category of charges, courts have concluded that the relevant virtual currency payment systems were "unlicensed money transmitting businesses," rejecting the argument that the relevant criminal prohibition applies only to money transmitters that facilitate cash transactions. Finally, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)—the bureau within the Treasury Department responsible for administering the principal federal AML statute—has pursued a number of administrative enforcement actions against virtual currency exchangers, assessing civil penalties for failure to implement sufficient AML programs and report suspicious transactions.
As these prosecutions and enforcement actions demonstrate, virtual currencies have a number of features that make them attractive to criminals. Specifically, commentators have noted that money launderers are attracted to the anonymity, ease of cross-border transfer, lack of clear regulations, and settlement finality that accompanies virtual currency transactions. Several bills introduced in the 116th Congress are aimed at addressing these challenges. These bills would, among other things, commission agency analyses of the use of virtual currencies for illicit activities and clarify FinCEN's statutory powers and duties. Commentators have also identified legal uncertainty as an additional challenge facing prosecutors, regulators, and participants in virtual currency transactions. Moreover, a number of observers have argued that existing AML regulations are likely to stifle innovation by virtual currency developers. In response to these concerns about legal clarity and burdensome regulation, at least one legislative proposal contemplates exempting certain blockchain developers from various AML requirements.


Question:
The combination of growing liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies and new requirements for less polluting fuels in the maritime shipping industry has heightened interest in LNG as a maritime fuel. The use of LNG as an engine ("bunker") fuel in shipping is also drawing attention from federal agencies and is beginning to emerge as an issue of interest in Congress.
In 2008, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) announced a timeline to reduce the maximum sulfur content in vessel fuels to 0.5% by January 1, 2020. Annex VI of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships requires vessels to either use fuels containing less than 0.5% sulfur or install exhaust-cleaning systems ("scrubbers") to limit a vessel's airborne emissions of sulfur oxides to an equivalent level. An option for vessel operators to meet the IMO 2020 standards is to install LNG-fueled engines, which emit only trace amounts of sulfur. Adopting LNG engines requires more investment than installing scrubbers, but LNG-fueled engines may offset their capital costs with operating cost advantages over conventional fuels. Savings would depend on the price spread between LNG and fuel oil. Recent trends suggest that LNG may be cheaper in the long run than conventional fuels.
LNG bunkering requires specialized infrastructure for supply, storage, and delivery to vessels. To date, the number of ports worldwide that have developed such infrastructure is limited, although growth in this area has accelerated. Early adoption of LNG bunkering is occurring in Europe where the European Union requires a core network of ports to provide LNG bunkering by 2030. LNG bunkering is also advancing in Asia, led by Singapore, the world's largest bunkering port. Asian countries, together with Australia and the United Arab Emirates, have about 10 coastal ports offering LNG bunkering, with another 15 projects in development.
LNG bunkering in the United States currently takes place in Jacksonville, FL, and Port Fourchon, LA—with a third facility under development in Tacoma, WA. Bunkering of LNG-fueled cruise ships using barges also is planned for Port Canaveral, FL. The relative locations of other U.S. ports and operating LNG terminals suggest that LNG bunkering could be within reach of every port along the Eastern Seaboard and in the Gulf of Mexico. On the West Coast, the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, CA, are near the Costa Azul LNG terminal in Ensenada, MX. Seattle and Tacoma are adjacent to the proposed Tacoma LNG project. Since 2015, Jones Act coastal ship operators have taken steps to transition their fleets to use cleaner burning fuels, including LNG. Shippers of dry goods to Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico have taken delivery or have ordered LNG-fueled and LNG-capable vessels from U.S. shipyards in Philadelphia, PA, and Brownsville, TX. Another company operates five LNG-powered offshore supply vessels built in Gulfport, MS.
Depending upon LNG conversions, the global LNG bunker fuel market could grow to several billion dollars by 2030. If U.S. LNG producers were to supply a significant share of this market—on the strength of comparatively low LNG production costs—LNG bunkering could increase demand for U.S. natural gas production, transportation, and liquefaction. Opportunities in LNG-related shipbuilding might be more limited, as most shipbuilding occurs overseas, although domestically-constructed LNG bunkering barges could be one area of economic growth. Finally, engineering and construction firms could benefit from new opportunities to develop port infrastructure for LNG storage and transfer. However, while vessel conversion to LNG fuel may increase demand for U.S.-produced natural gas, it partially could be offset by reduced demand for U.S.-produced crude oil or refined products. Furthermore, while LNG can reduce direct emissions from vessels, fugitive emissions and environmental impacts from natural gas production and transportation could reduce overall emissions benefits. While the LNG industry has experienced few accidents, the Coast Guard has been developing new standards to address unique safety and security risks associated with LNG in vessel operations.
The overarching consideration about LNG bunkering in the United States is uncertainty about how the global shipping fleet will adapt to the IMO sulfur standards over time. This uncertainty complicates decisions related to both private investment and public policy. Although Congress has limited ability to influence global shipping, it could influence the growth of LNG bunkering through the tax code and regulation, or through policies affecting the LNG industry or domestic shipping industry as a whole. Evaluating the potential implications of LNG bunkering within the context of broader energy and environmental policies may become an additional consideration for Congress. If LNG bunkering expands significantly, Congress also may examine the adequacy of existing measures to ensure the safety and security of LNG vessels, storage, and related facilities.


Question:
Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, coverage for losses from such attacks was normally included in general insurance policies without additional cost to the policyholders. Following the attacks, such coverage became expensive, if offered at all. Moreover, some observers feared that the absence of insurance against terrorism loss would have a wider economic impact, because insurance is required to consummate a variety of transactions (e.g., real estate). For example, if real estate deals were not completed due to lack of insurance, this could have ripple effects—such as job loss—on related industries like the construction industry. Terrorism insurance was largely unavailable for most of 2002, and some have argued that this adversely affected parts of the economy, while others suggest the evidence is inconclusive.
Congress responded to the disruption in the insurance market by passing the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA; P.L. 107-297), which created a temporary three-year Terrorism Insurance Program. Under TRIA, the government would share the losses on commercial property and casualty insurance should a foreign terrorist attack occur, with potential recoupment of this loss sharing after the fact. In addition, TRIA requires insurers to make terrorism coverage available to commercial policyholders, but does not require policyholders to purchase the coverage. The program expiration date was extended in 2005 (P.L. 109-144), 2007 (P.L. 110-160), and 2015 (P.L. 114-1). Over the course of such reauthorizations, the prospective government share of losses has been reduced and the recoupment amount increased, although the 2007 reauthorization also expanded the program to cover losses from acts of domestic terrorism. The TRIA program is currently slated to expire at the end of 2020.
In general terms, if a terrorist attack occurs under TRIA, the insurance industry covers the entire amount for relatively small losses. For a medium-sized loss, the government assists insurers initially but is then required to recoup the payments it made to insurers through a broad levy on insurance policies afterwards—the federal role is to spread the losses over time and over the entire insurance industry and insurance policyholders. As the size of losses grows larger, the federal government covers more of the losses without this mandatory recoupment. Ultimately, for the largest losses, the government is not required to recoup the payments it has made, although discretionary recoupment remains possible. The precise dollar values where losses cross these small, medium, and large thresholds are uncertain and will depend on how the losses are distributed among insurers.
The specifics of the current program are as follows: (1) a terrorist act must cause $5 million in insured losses to be certified for TRIA coverage; (2) the aggregate insured losses from certified acts of terrorism must be $180 million in a year for the government coverage to begin (this amount increases to $200 million in 2020); and (3) an individual insurer must meet a deductible of 20% of its annual premiums for the government coverage to begin. Once these thresholds are met, the government covers 81% of insured losses due to terrorism (this amount decreases to 80% in 2020). If the insured losses are less than $37.5 billion, the Secretary of the Treasury is required to recoup 140% of government outlays through surcharges on TRIA-eligible property and casualty insurance policies. As insured losses rise above $37.5 billion, the Secretary is required to recoup a progressively reduced amount of the outlays. At some high insured loss level, which will depend on the exact distribution of losses, the Secretary would no longer be required to recoup outlays.
Since TRIA's passage, the private industry's willingness and ability to cover terrorism risk have increased. According to data collected by the Treasury, in 2017, approximately 78% of insureds purchased the optional terrorism coverage, paying $3.65 billion in premiums. Over the life of the program, premiums earned by unrelated insurers have totaled $38 billion. This relative market calm has been under the umbrella of TRIA coverage and in a period in which no terrorist attacks have occurred that resulted in government payments under TRIA. It is unclear how the insurance market would react to the expiration of the federal program, although at least some instability might be expected were this to occur. With the upcoming 2020 expiration of the program, the 116th Congress may consider legislation to extend TRIA; to date, no such legislation has been introduced.


Question:
Intellectual property (IP) rights play an important role in the development and pricing of pharmaceutical products such as prescription drugs and biologics. In order to encourage innovation, IP law grants the rights holder a temporary monopoly on a particular invention or product, potentially enabling him to charge higher-than-competitive prices. IP rights, if sufficiently limited, are typically justified as necessary to allow pharmaceutical manufacturers the ability to recoup substantial costs in research and development, including clinical trials and other tests necessary to obtain regulatory approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). However, because they may operate to deter or delay competition from generic drug and biosimilar manufacturers, IP rights have been criticized as contributing to high prices for pharmaceutical products in the United States.
Two main types of IP may protect pharmaceutical products: patents and regulatory exclusivities. Patents, which are available to a wide range of technologies besides pharmaceuticals, are granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to new and useful inventions. Pharmaceutical patents may claim chemical compounds in the pharmaceutical product, a method of using the product, a method of making the product, or a variety of other patentable inventions relating to a drug or biologic. The holder of a valid patent generally has the exclusive right to make, use, sell, and import the invention for a term lasting approximately 20 years. If a court concludes that a competitor's generic or biosimilar version infringes a valid patent, the court may issue an injunction precluding the competitor from making, using, selling, and importing that competing product until the patent expires.
In some circumstances, FDA grants regulatory exclusivities to a pharmaceutical manufacturer upon the completion of the process required to market pharmaceutical products. Before a new drug or biologic can be sold in the United States, companies must apply for regulatory approval or licensure from FDA, which determines if the pharmaceutical is safe and effective. For certain pharmaceuticals, such as innovative products or those that serve particular needs, FDA provides a term of marketing exclusivity upon the successful completion of the regulatory process. If a product is covered by an unexpired regulatory exclusivity, FDA generally may not accept and/or approve an application seeking FDA approval of a follow-on product (i.e., a generic drug or biosimilar). Regulatory exclusivities vary in length from as little as six months to as much as 12 years depending on the specific type of drug or biologic at issue and other factors.
Like regulatory exclusivities, patent rights can affect when generic and biosimilar manufacturers can market their follow-on products. Pharmaceutical patent disputes are subject to certain specialized procedures under the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA). Under Hatch-Waxman, applicants seeking approval of a generic version of an existing FDA-approved drug must make a certification with respect to each patent that the brand-name drug manufacturer lists as covering the product. If the generic manufacturer challenges those patents, FDA generally cannot approve the generic drug application for 30 months while the patent dispute is litigated. For biologics, applicants seeking approval of a biosimilar version of an existing biological product may choose to engage in the BPCIA's "patent dance," a complex scheme of private information exchanges made in preparation for formal patent disputes between brand-name biologic and biosimilar manufacturers. The patent dance does not affect FDA's ability to approve a biosimilar application.
Some pharmaceutical companies have been criticized for charging high prices and engaging in practices that are perceived by some to exploit the existing legal system governing IP rights on pharmaceutical products. For example, some generic manufacturers have claimed that brand-name drug manufacturers have unreasonably refused to sell them samples of brand-name drugs in order to impede their ability to obtain FDA approval and delay market entry of generic competition. Other commentators have criticized the practice of "pay-for-delay" settlements, through which brand-name drug companies settle patent litigation with generic or biosimilar manufacturers by paying them to delay their entry into the market. Still others criticize so-called patent "evergreening," in which pharmaceutical companies are alleged to serially patent minor improvements or ancillary features of their products in order to extend the effective term of patent protection.
In recent years, a number of congressional proposals have been introduced that seek to address these and other issues in IP law that are perceived by some to contribute to high prices for pharmaceutical products. These proposed reforms range from relatively modest changes, such as increasing patent transparency, to more sweeping reforms such as pricing controls and government compulsory licensing provisions.


Question:
Under the Agricultural Improvement Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-334; 2018 farm bill), U.S. farm program participants—whether individuals or multiperson legal entities—must meet specific eligibility requirements to receive benefits under certain farm programs. Some requirements are common across most programs, while others are specific to individual programs. In addition, program participants are subject to annual payment limits that vary across different combinations of farm programs. Federal farm support programs and risk management programs, along with their current eligibility requirements and payment limits, are listed in Table 1. Terms for most of these programs are applicable for the 2019-2023 crop years.
Since 1970, Congress has used various policies to address the issue of who should be eligible for farm payments and how much an individual recipient should be permitted to receive in a single year. In recent years, congressional policy has focused on tracking payments through multiperson entities to individual recipients (referred to as direct attribution), ensuring that payments go to persons or entities actively engaged in farming, capping the amount of payments that a qualifying recipient may receive in any one year, and excluding farmers or farming entities with large average incomes from payment eligibility.
Current eligibility requirements that affect multiple programs include identification of every participating person or legal entity—both U.S. and non-U.S. citizens—the nature and extent of an individual's participation (i.e., actively engaged in farming criteria), including ownership interests in multiperson entities and personal time commitments (whether as labor or management) and means testing (persons with combined farm and nonfarm adjusted gross income in excess of $900,000 are ineligible for most program benefits); and conservation compliance requirements.
In general, if foreign persons or legal entities meet a program's eligibility requirements, then they are eligible to participate. One exception is the four permanent disaster assistance programs created under the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79) and the noninsured crop disaster assistance program (NAP) in which nonresident aliens are excluded.
Current law requires direct attribution through four levels of ownership in multiperson legal entities. Current payment limits include a cumulative limit of $125,000 for all covered commodities under the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and Agricultural Revenue Coverage (ARC) support programs, with the exception of peanuts, which has its own $125,000 limit. Only one permanent disaster assistance program—the Livestock Forage Disaster Program (LFP)—is subject to a payment limit ($125,000 per crop year). NAP is also subject to a $125,000 per crop year limit per person for catastrophic coverage.
Supporters of payment limits contend that large payments facilitate consolidation of farms into larger units, raise the price of land, and put smaller family-sized farming operations and beginning farmers at a disadvantage. In addition, they argue that large payments undermine public support for farm subsidies and are costly. Critics of payment limits counter that all farms need support, especially when market prices decline, and that larger farms should not be penalized for the economies of size and efficiencies they have achieved. Further, critics argue that farm payments help U.S. agriculture compete in global markets and that income testing is at odds with federal farm policies directed toward improving U.S. agriculture and its competitiveness.
Congress may continue to address these issues, as well as related questions, such as: How does the current policy design of payment limits relate to their distributional impact on crops, regions, and farm size? Is there an optimal aggregation of payment limits across commodities or programs? Do unlimited benefits under the marketing assistance loan program reduce the effectiveness of overall payment limits?


Question:
This report describes actions taken by the Trump Administration and Congress to provide FY2020 appropriations for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) accounts. The annual CJS appropriations act provides funding for the Department of Commerce, which includes agencies such as the Census Bureau, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST); the Department of Justice (DOJ), which includes agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), the U.S. Marshals, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the U.S. Attorneys; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); the National Science Foundation (NSF); and several related agencies such as the Legal Services Corporation and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
The Administration requests $71.388 billion for CJS for FY2020, which is $1.520 billion (-2.1%) less than the $72.908 billion appropriated for CJS for FY2019. The Administration's request includes $12.214 billion for the Department of Commerce, $30.529 billion for the Department of Justice, $28.092 billion for the science agencies, and $552 million for the related agencies. The Administration's FY2020 budget proposes eliminating several CJS agencies and programs, including the Economic Development Administration, the Community Oriented Policing Services Office, NASA's STEM Engagement Office (formerly the Office of Education), and the Legal Services Corporation. The Administration proposes reducing funding for many accounts in CJS, though there are a few exceptions—the most notable of which is the proposed $2.334 billion increase for the Census Bureau's Periodic Censuses and Programs account. The increased funding is requested to help the Census Bureau conduct the decennial 2020 Census.


Question:
Commemorative coins are produced by the U.S. Mint pursuant to an act of Congress and are often proposed by Members of Congress as part of their representational duties. These coins are legal tender that celebrate and honor American people, places, events, and institutions. Overall, 152 commemorative coins have been authorized since 1892. Since 1982, when Congress reinstituted the commemorative program, 91 commemorative coins have been authorized. Since 1998, only two coins may be authorized for any given year. To date, Congress has authorized commemorative coins to be issued through 2020.
The issuance of commemorative coins can be broadly divided into two eras: historical coins and modern coins. Historical commemorative coins were those authorized between 1892 and 1954 and generally celebrated anniversaries, public events, or the construction of new memorials. These coins were sold by the government to the sponsor organization, which then resold the coins to the public at a higher price to earn money to support their mission.
In 1939, Congress stopped authorizing new coins because a glut of commemorative coins on the market had caused their value to decline, and the U.S. Treasury became concerned that so many coins might facilitate counterfeiting. These sentiments were echoed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who in 1954 vetoed legislation for a half-dollar honoring the tercentennial of New York City and remarked that "large quantities [of coins] have remained unsold and have been returned to the mints for melting." The historical era concluded with the minting of George Washington Carver and Booker T. Washington half-dollars between 1951 and 1954.
The modern commemorative coin era began in 1982, when Congress authorized coins to celebrate the 250th anniversary of George Washington's birth. Between 1982 and 1997, prior to the Commemorative Coin Reform Act (CCRA) of 1996's statutory limitation of two commemorative coins issued per year, 47 commemorative coins were authorized and minted. Between 1998 and 2018, an additional 41 coins were authorized and minted. Three additional coins have been authorized, two in 2019 and one in 2020 (to date).
Commemorative coin legislation generally has a specific format. Once a coin is authorized, it follows a specific process for design and minting. This process includes consultation and recommendations by the Citizens Coin Advisory Commission (CCAC) and the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts (CFA), pursuant to any statutory instructions, before the Secretary of the Treasury makes the final decision on a coin's design. Following the conclusion of a coin program, designated recipient organizations may receive surcharge payments, once the U.S. Mint has recouped all costs associated with producing the coin.
Should Congress want to make changes to the commemorative coin process, several individual and institutional options might be available. The individual options include decisions made by Members of Congress as to which people, places, events, or institutions should be celebrated; which groups should receive potential surcharge payments; and any specific design requirements Congress might want to request or require. The institutional options could include House, Senate, or committee rules for the consideration of commemorative coin legislation and whether the statutory maximum of two coins minted per year is too many or too few.